United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Joint Economic Committee

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Tuesday,

April 28, 1998

CHINA

U.S. and European Union

Arms Sales Since the 1989

Embargoes

Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues, National

Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the arms embargoes

imposed on China by the European Union (EU) and the United States

following the 1989 massacre of demonstrators in Beijing’s Tiananmen

Square. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the terms of the EU and U.S.

embargoes, (2) the extent of EU and U.S. sales of military items to China

since 1989, and (3) the potential role that such items could play in

addressing China’s defense needs.

As you requested, we developed information regarding EU and U.S. arms

sales to China; and did not assess China’s military modernization efforts.1

However, these efforts are the context for China’s arms imports. In 1985,

China adopted a military doctrine that emphasizes the use of modern naval

and air power in joint operations against regional opponents. It later began

buying foreign military hardware to support its new doctrine. The 1989

Tiananmen Square massacre ruptured China’s growing defense

relationships with the United States and the European Union.2

 Since then,

China has relied heavily on other nations, such as Russia, for its military

hardware imports—although it is impossible to know the extent to which

China’s import patterns would have been different had the Tiananmen

massacre not occurred.

Before I begin, I should emphasize that we focused on military items—that

is to say, items that would be included on the U.S. Munitions List. As you

know, this list includes both lethal items (such as missiles) and nonlethal

items (such as military radars) that cannot be exported without a license.

We did not address exports of items with both civil and military

applications because the embargoes do not bar the sale of such “dual-use”

items to China, although experts believe that dual-use imports are an

important source of high technology for the Chinese military. Also, I

should note that the information presented in this statement was

developed from open data sources and, therefore, its completeness and

accuracy may be subject to some degree of uncertainty.

1

For a fuller discussion of China’s military, see our report entitled National Security: Impact of China’s

Military Modernization in the Pacific Region (GAO/NSIAD-95-84, June 6, 1995).

2

In 1989, the European Union consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Austria, Finland, and Sweden

have since become EU members.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Summary The EU embargo consists of a 1989 political declaration that EU members

will embargo the “trade in arms” with China. Each EU member may

interpret and implement the embargo’s scope for itself. We found no

instances of EU members entering into new agreements to sell China lethal

military items after 1989, although some members delivered lethal and

nonlethal military items to China during the 1990s—apparently in

connection with pre-embargo agreements—and have more recently agreed

to deliver additional nonlethal military items. According to experts, the

embargo is not legally binding and any EU member could legally resume

arms sales to China if it were willing to bear the political consequences of

doing so. We noted that at least two EU members are presently

reconsidering whether the EU embargo should be continued.

In contrast to the EU embargo, the U.S. embargo is enacted in U.S. law and

bars the sale to China of all military items—lethal and nonlethal—on the

U.S. Munitions List. The President may waive this ban if he believes that

doing so is in the national interest. Since 1989, the President has issued

waivers to (1) allow the delivery to China of military items valued at

$36.3 million to close out the U.S. government’s pre-1989 defense

agreements with China and (2) license commercial military exports valued

at over $312 million—primarily commercial satellite and encryption items.

The rather small amount of EU and U.S. sales of military items to China

since 1989 could help address some aspects of China’s defense needs;

however, their importance to China’s modernization goal may be relatively

limited because Russia and the Middle East have provided almost

90 percent of China’s imported military items during this period.

According to experts with whom we spoke, China must overcome

obstacles posed by its military’s command and control, training, and

maintenance processes before it can fully exploit such items.

Recent U.S. executive branch actions suggest that its view of China’s

human rights record—the basis for the embargo in the first place—may be

changing. In light of the possible weakening of support for continuing the

embargo by some European governments, the question facing the U.S.

government appears to be how the United States should respond if the EU

embargo were to erode significantly in the near future.

EU Military Exports

to China Have Been

Limited

In reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, the European Council—an

EU decision-making body comprised of ministers from EU member

countries—imposed several sanctions in June 1989, including “an embargo

on trade in arms with China.” However, according to experts, the Council’s

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
declaration was not legally binding. It also did not specify the embargo’s

scope. For example, it did not state whether the embargo covers all

military articles, including weapons platforms, nonlethal military items, or

components.

EU and other European officials told us that the European Union has left

the interpretation and enforcement of the declaration to its individual

member states3

 and that the members have interpreted the embargo’s

scope in different ways. Officials in some EU nations informed us that their

nations have embargoed the sale of virtually all military items to China. In

contrast, the United Kingdom’s interpretation of the EU embargo does not

bar exports of nonlethal military items, such as avionics and radars. The

UK embargo is limited to lethal weapons (such as bombs and torpedoes),

specially designed components of lethal weapons, ammunition, military

aircraft and helicopters, warships, and equipment likely to be used for

internal repression. European and EU officials told us that EU members

tried during the early 1990s to develop a detailed EU-wide interpretation of

the embargo’s scope. These attempts apparently fell short and resulted

only in the members’ mutual recognition that they were not selling China

lethal weapons.

According to EU and European officials, the EU embargo could be formally

ended by unanimous consent or informally eroded by individual EU

members’ resumption of military trade with China. EU members, whose

defense firms are faced with severe economic pressures, could move to

modify their participation in the embargo if they believe China’s human

rights situation is improving. A recent EU report noted that human rights in

China, while still far from meeting international standards, had improved

over the past 20 years. There have been signs that some EU members have

sought to increase military sales to China. We found that at least two EU

members are now reassessing whether the embargo should be continued.

EU Sales of Military Items

to China Since 1989

As of today, no EU members appear to have concluded new agreements to

sell lethal weapons to China since the imposition of the EU embargo. As

shown in table 1, three EU members have delivered, or agreed to deliver,

military items to China since 1989.

3

EU officials informed us that this reliance on the EU members reflects the members’ independence in

defense matters. 

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Table 1: Deliveries of EU Military Items to China, 1990-97

Country System Lethal Agreement date

France Castor-2B naval fire control radar 

Crotale ship-to-air missile and launcher

TAVITAC naval combat automation

system 

Sea Tiger naval surveillance radar 

AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter 

SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Pre-1989

Pre-1989

Pre-1989

Pre-1989

Pre-1989

Pre-1989

Italy Aspide air-to-air missile 

Electronic countermeasures for A-5M

aircraft

Radar for F-7M and F-7MP fighters

Yes

No

No

1989a

Pre-1989

1993

United Kingdom Avionics for F-7M fighter

Searchwater airborne early warning radar

(no deliveries to date)

No

No

1989b

1996

aAccording to the source of the information, this agreement’s exact date is unclear.

bThis agreement appears to have been concluded prior to June 1989.

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, various other public sources.

Two EU member states delivered lethal weapons to China after the

embargo, according to publicly available sources of information. These

deliveries of French Crotale ship-to-air missiles and Italian Aspide

air-to-air missiles appear to have been made in connection with

pre-embargo agreements. Similarly, French-licensed Chinese production

of the Super Frelon and Dauphin helicopters, which continued into the

1990s, began prior to 1989. Also, the United Kingdom honored a

pre-embargo agreement by providing China with radars, displays, and

other avionics for its F-7M fighter aircraft.

During the 1990s, Italy and the United Kingdom agreed to sell China

nonlethal military items. Italy agreed to sell fire control radars for use on

Chinese F-7M and F-7MP export fighters. The United Kingdom agreed to

sell China the Searchwater airborne early warning radar system. UK

officials informed us that the decision to do so is consistent with the U.K.

interpretation of the EU embargo because the Searchwater is not a lethal

weapon or a weapons platform. (The appendix briefly describes the

systems in table 1.)

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Waivers Have Allowed

Exports of Some U.S.

Military Items to

China

On June 5, 1989, immediately after the massacre of pro-democracy

demonstrators at Tiananmen Square, the President announced sanctions

on China to protest its actions. In February 1990, Congress codified the

sanctions’ prohibition on weapon sales in Public Law 101-246. The law

suspended export licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List and

specifically barred the export of U.S.-origin satellites for launch on

Chinese launch vehicles. It exempted from this prohibition U.S. Munitions

List items that are designed specifically for use in civil products (such as

internal navigation equipment for commercial airliners) unless the

President determines the end user would be the Chinese military. Because

the U.S. Munitions List includes nonlethal military equipment (for

example, radios and radars) in addition to lethal equipment (such as

missiles), the U.S. prohibition on arms sales to China covers a broader

range of items than the EU embargo, as implemented.4

Under the law, Munitions List items can be exported to China if the

President reports to Congress that it is in the national interest to allow the

export.5

 Presidents Bush and Clinton exercised this option and issued

waivers for exports of Munitions List and satellite equipment to China

based on determinations that doing so was in the national interest.6

U.S.-China relations have slowly improved since the 1989 massacre.

According to press reports, the executive branch is now considering

easing restrictions on commercial satellite projects in China—in part

through the use of blanket waivers. Moreover, for the first time in several

years, the United States recently decided against sponsoring a United

Nations resolution condemning China’s human rights.

Sales of Munitions List

Items to China Since 1989

The United States has delivered or licensed for export to China almost

$350 million in Munitions List equipment since 1990. These exports were

made through (1) government-to-government agreements managed by the

Department of Defense (DOD) under the Foreign Military Sales Program

and (2) commercial exports licensed by the State Department, the majority

of which were related to launches of U.S.-origin satellites in China. All

4

The Munitions List can also include dual-use items if they are specifically designed, developed,

configured, adapted, or modified for military application and have significant military or intelligence

applicability such that controlling them as munitions is necessary.

5

The law also allows the President to lift the sanctions if he reports to Congress that China has made

progress on a program of political reform covering a range of issues, including human rights.

6

Since 1990, many items once controlled on the Munitions List have been moved to Commerce

Department control and are therefore no longer subject to U.S. sanctions barring their export to China.

In 1992, many items were moved as part of a larger rationalization process.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
were authorized under presidential waivers declaring the export to be in

the national interest or were specifically exempted from the sanctions

under the law.

Government-togovernment Sales

In December 1992, President Bush issued a waiver stating that it was in the

national interest to allow the export of military equipment in order to

close out four government-to-government military assistance programs

that had been suspended by the sanctions. The waiver stated that these

deliveries would not significantly contribute to China’s military capability

and closing these cases would improve the prospects for gaining further

cooperation from China on nonproliferation issues. The total value of

these exports, which are shown in table 2, was about $36.3 million.

Table 2: U.S. Government Exports of Munitions Items to China, 1990-97

Dollars in millions

Program Description Deliveries

Peace Pearl - F-8 modernization Provide modern avionics for China’s F-8

fighters.

Two modified F-8 fuselages, four avionics

kits, and related equipment.

MK-46 Mod 2 torpedoes Provide four torpedoes for test and

evaluation purposes with ultimate

deployment on Chinese Navy ships and

helicopters.

Four torpedoes, including spares and

related test and maintenance equipment.

Artillery locating radars Provide four AN/TPQ-37 “Firefinder”

counter-artillery radar systems.

Two AN/TPQ-37 radars, including parts

and support equipment. Two of these

radars had been shipped before the

sanctions.

Large-caliber artillery plant Provide production capability for

large-caliber artillery munitions.

Miscellaneous components. Major

equipment was shipped prior to the

sanctions.

These programs were in various states of completion when U.S. sanctions

prohibited further assistance or deliveries. No new

government-to-government agreements have been opened since 1990.

There are now no open or unfulfilled agreements pending between the

U.S. government and China under the Foreign Military Sales Program.

The equipment ending these programs was delivered to China between

1993 and 1995. It included four MK-46 Mod 2 torpedoes, spare parts,

maintenance, and test equipment. The Chinese Navy was to test the

torpedoes for use on its ships and helicopters.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Commercial Exports of

Munitions List Items

The Department of State has approved for export to China about

$313 million in Munitions List items since 1990.7

 As shown in table 3,

$237 million of these exports involved launches of U.S.-origin satellites

from China.

Table 3: Approved U.S. Commercial Export License Applications for Munitions List Equipment to China,

January 1990-April 1998

Dollars in millions

Waiver requirement Munitions List Items Value

Approved export licenses for Munitions List items requiring

a presidential waiver for export to China

Satellites and related equipment

Encryption for civil applications or satellites

$237.0

63.1

Approved export licenses for items not covered by U.S.

sanctions

Munitions List equipment for inclusion in civil products

(e.g., inertial navigation gear for civil airliners)

12.7

Total $312.8

Note: Values represent figures provided on the export applications, not the value of actual

shipments. In practice, the value of actual exports is often less.

The President determined that allowing these exports was in the national

interest. According to State officials, since 1990, 11 presidential waivers

have been issued removing export restrictions on 21 satellite projects.

Presidential waivers were also granted to permit the export of encryption

equipment controlled on the Munitions List.

Since 1990, over $12 million in export licenses have been approved for

Munitions List equipment designed for inclusion in civil products. These

exports are not prohibited under U.S. sanctions and therefore do not

require a presidential waiver. The majority of these exports involve

navigational electronics used in commercial airliners operated in China.

Between 1992 and 1996, control over exports of commercial encryption

equipment and commercial satellites was moved from the Munitions List

to the Commerce Department’s Commodity Control List. Since U.S.

sanctions restrict Munitions List exports and do not prohibit the export of

dual-use items, commercial encryption equipment can now be exported to

China without a presidential waiver. U.S.-origin commercial satellites,

7

State also denied, or returned without action, export license applications valued at over $1 billion.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
however, though no longer on the Munitions List, are covered by the law,

and exports still require a presidential waiver.8

China’s EU and U.S.

Military Imports

Could Help Address

Some Defense Needs

The small amount of EU and U.S. military item sales to China since 1989

could help address some of China’s defense needs. However, their

importance to China’s modernization goal is overshadowed by the much

larger amounts of military equipment provided by Russia and the Middle

East. Moreover, before China can fully exploit such items, it must

overcome obstacles in its military’s command and control, training, and

maintenance.

Chinese Use of EU and

U.S. Military Items

China has used French helicopters to reinforce its weak antisubmarine

warfare capabilities. According to open sources, China has imported or

built under license between 65 and 105 modern French turbine-powered

helicopters, including about 40 after 1989. The helicopters include the

SA-321 Super Frelon (built as the Z-8) and the AS-365 Dauphin-2 (built as

the Z-9). China’s Navy has adapted 25 of these helicopters to serve as its

antisubmarine warfare helicopter force and equipped some with

antisubmarine torpedoes. Several Chinese naval vessels carry the Z-9

helicopter. China’s Army has also tested the Z-9 helicopter with

ground-attack equipment, including antitank missiles.

According to experts, China’s only effective ship-to-air missile is the

French Crotale missile system. China has deployed the Crotale on four

ships, including its two most modern destroyers.9

 Also, China has

reverse-engineered the Crotale—reducing China’s dependence on foreign

suppliers. Similarly, China has reportedly reverse engineered the Italian

Aspide air-to-air missile for use as a ship-to-air missile.

China’s planned purchase of six to eight British Searchwater airborne

radar systems would provide China with some degree of warning against

low-flying air attacks as well as help it direct fighter aircraft, detect small

8

Other items that have moved from the Munitions List to Commerce’s jurisdiction since 1990 include

jet engine hot-section technology, commercial global positioning system equipment, and some night

vision equipment. See our reports entitled Export Controls: Issues in Removing Militarily Sensitive

Items From the Munitions List (GAO/NSIAD-93-67, May 31, 1993); and Export Controls: Change in

Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items (GAO/NSIAD-97-24, Jan. 14, 1997.)

9

These ships, however, still lack long-range, ship-to-air missiles.

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
vessels, and augment over-the-horizon targeting.10 China is expected to

mount the radars on converted Y-8 transport aircraft.

China could possibly use its four U.S. Mod 2 version MK-46 torpedoes to

improve its copy of the Mod 1 version, which China has already deployed

on its French helicopters. The early-1970s era Mod 2 has an improved

computer that provides it with a re-attack capability. The MK-46 torpedo’s

range and speed exceed that of China’s other western air launched,

antisubmarine torpedo—the mid-1970s era Italian Whitehead 244S.11

It is unclear whether China has benefited from any of the U.S. commercial

satellite transfers. State officials told us that U.S. export licenses for

satellite projects in China contain provisos intended to minimize the risk

of any unauthorized transfer of sensitive technology. Recent press reports

have asserted that, despite these controls, U.S. technology has been

transferred to China and has improved the reliability of China’s nuclear

missiles. We have not examined the security guidelines and control

procedures on satellite launches or how they are being implemented.

Russia and Middle East

Provide Most of China’s

Modern Military Items

While these EU and U.S. military items could be used to address some

modernization needs, they constitute only a small part of the range of

military items that China has imported from foreign suppliers since 1989.

As shown in figure 1, total EU and U.S. exports constituted less than

9 percent of the military items imported by China during the first 7 years of

the embargoes. This share falls to less than 3.4 percent if U.S. exports of

commercial satellites and encryption items are excluded.

10The United Kingdom has been reported as offering its Argus airborne warning system to China,

although China appears to have chosen an Israeli system.

11China acquired the Whitehead in the mid-1980s and has deployed it on helicopters.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Figure 1: Deliveries of Foreign Military

Items to China, 1990-96

U.S. government

Middle East

Russia/Soviet Union

Other

Western Europe

U.S. commercial

0.7%

17.0%

71.7%

2.5%

2.3%

5.9%

Total value: $5.3 billion (current-year dollars)

Note: The U.S. commercial share depicted above is based on the value of export licenses

granted since 1990, rather than on the value of actual deliveries.

Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; the Departments of State and Defense.

Moreover, Russia and Israel have sold or agreed to sell China items that

are far more lethal than those sold by EU members, as well as items similar

to those obtained from EU members. For example, reported Russian arms

agreements include

• two Sovremenniy destroyers, which are more modern than China’s

domestically produced destroyers and which typically carry advanced

supersonic antiship missiles, ship-to-air missiles with a much greater range

than the Crotale, and antisubmarine helicopters that are considerably

larger than the Z-9 helicopter;

• about 50 Su-27 fighter aircraft—similar to U.S. F-15s—armed with potent

air-to-air missiles, and assistance in producing more Su-27s in China;

• about 25 Mi-17 transport assault helicopters; and

• four Kilo diesel electric submarines (including two of a very quiet class

that Russia has never before exported) and homing torpedoes.

Israel has helped China with its development of the F-10 fighter aircraft

(similar to the U.S. F-16) by providing technology developed for the

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
aborted Israeli Lavi fighter project—and of various missiles. It has also

offered to sell to China its Phalcon airborne phased array surveillance

radar which, if fitted to a Russian airframe, would provide China an

airborne warning and command system.

China Faces Difficulties in

Incorporating Modern

Arms

According to experts, China will have to overcome several persistent

problems before it can effectively use its imported arms to support its new

military doctrine and help reinvigorate its domestic defense industry.

China lacks command and control capabilities needed to effectively

integrate its armed forces in the fast-moving joint offensive operations

called for by its new doctrine. China’s Air Force units are hampered in

their ability to communicate with air defense, naval, and ground units.

China also lacks a reliable air defense intelligence system. While its future

airborne early warning systems will help address this problem, China will

still have to learn how to integrate such systems into its air defense

system. Experts informed us that military systems integration remains a

weakness for China.

China’s acquisition of new and advanced military systems will also test its

training and maintenance processes. China may have to significantly

enhance the training, quality, and education level of its military personnel

to use increasingly advanced equipment. Moreover, according to experts,

China’s Air Force has not yet considered the training implications of its

new offensive joint operations doctrine. Chinese pilots fly fewer hours

than their Western counterparts and tend to fly less demanding training

missions that do not emphasize joint operations. Experts informed us that

China’s preference for buying relatively small numbers of foreign military

systems and skimping on training and maintenance support packages

reduces opportunities for its military personnel to become familiar with

their new equipment and to augment China’s weak maintenance efforts.

This practice of buying limited numbers of foreign systems may reflect

China’s interest in obtaining foreign arms for reverse-engineering

purposes. China has long stressed its need to become self-sufficient in

weapons development and less dependent on foreign suppliers. However,

despite some successes, China has had a mixed record in

reverse-engineering foreign systems. Its efforts to do so are hampered by

an inefficient defense sector and by the increasing complexity of modern

military systems.

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared

remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Appendix 

Description of Selected European Union

Military Items Provided to China, 1990-97

According to various public sources, European Union (EU) member states

have delivered, or agreed to deliver, the following items to China since

1989.

• Naval Systems for the Luhu destroyers. France has provided several

systems for China’s Luhu destroyers, including the Crotale missile system.

France first installed the Crotale on its ships in the late 1970s. In 1982, it

developed the Crotale variant later provided to China. According to public

sources, the Crotale is a short-range (up to 13 kilometers), ship-to-air point

defense missile. The system consists of the missile (which can travel at

more than twice the speed of sound), a missile director, a missile launcher

mounting, a fire control room with supporting electronics, and a console

in a combat information center. The missile director uses a Castor radar,

as well as infrared and television tracking systems.

Other French equipment on the Luhu destroyers includes the Sea Tiger

naval surveillance radar, the Dauphin-2 (Z-9) helicopter (described later),

and the TAVITAC combat data system (which is used to integrate the

Luhus’ various onboard systems).

• Dauphin-2 (Z-9) Helicopter. In 1980, France agreed to allow China to build

the AS-365 Dauphin-2 in China as the Z-9 helicopter. The Chinese Navy has

equipped Dauphin-2s with sensors, torpedoes, and missiles for use aboard

its vessels. The Dauphin-2 is a medium-weight multirole helicopter that is

powered by two turbine engines. Capable of carrying 11 passengers and 

2 pilots, the Dauphin-2 has a top speed of 140 nautical miles per hour and a

range of 410 nautical miles. Composite materials are used in its main and

rear rotor blades, and its tail rotor is built into the vertical fin.

• Super Frelon (Z-8) Helicopter. France delivered the SA-321 Super Frelon

helicopter to China in 1977 and 1978 and agreed to allow China to build

the Super Frelon, under the designation of Z-8, in 1981. The Chinese Navy

has used Super Frelons for anti-submarine missions and has equipped

them with sensors, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. The Super Frelon is a

heavy shipboard helicopter that is powered by two turbine engines. It has

a top speed of 134 nautical miles per hour and a range of 440 nautical

miles. The Super Frelon can carry 27 fully armed troops or 39 unequipped

troops.

• Aspide Missile. According to one public source, Italy developed the Aspide

from the U.S. Sparrow air-to-air missile. Aspide production began in 1977.

The semi-active radar-guided Aspide has a top speed of more than twice

the speed of sound and a range of about 7 nautical miles.

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Appendix 

Description of Selected European Union

Military Items Provided to China, 1990-97

• Searchwater Airborne Early Warning Radar. The United Kingdom first

deployed the Searchwater aboard its Nimrod aircraft in 1979 and adapted

it for use aboard Sea King helicopters during its 1982 war with Argentina

over the Falkland Islands. It later developed the Skymaster version of the

Searchwater, which it subsequently incorporated into the Searchwater 

2 system. According to a public source, the airborne Skymaster uses an

I-band transmitter that can operate in (1) a pulse Doppler mode to provide

look-down detection of airborne targets and (2) a frequency agile

conventional mode to detect ships as well as aircraft flying above the

Skymaster. When operating at 10,000 feet, it is capable of detecting

(1) fighters and small boats below it at ranges of about 70 nautical miles,

(2) bombers flying below it about 100 nautical miles away, and (3) larger

vessels about 130 nautical miles away. The radar can store and update

data on 100 airborne and 32 surface targets simultaneously.

• F-7M/F-7MP Avionics. The United Kingdom and Italy have provided

avionics for the F-7M and F-7MP fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union first

authorized China to build the F-7—a variation of the MiG-21 fighter—in

1961. China later developed the F-7M and MP versions for export to other

nations, including Pakistan. According to public sources, the United

Kingdom provided China with heads-up displays, weapon-aiming

computers, and fire control radars for the F-7M. Italy later provided a new

fire control radar for the F-7M and F-7MP.

(711295)(711349) Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-171 China
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100