The Honor able Thoma s B. Russell, United States Dis trict J udg e for the Western District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0406n.06 F iled: Jun e 19, 2007 No. 05-2678 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
TI MO TH Y WI L L IAM S, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. BA RRY MC L E M O RE , H A RO L D WHI TE, HAROL D WARR, and W I L L I AM BA I L EY, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts
.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

BEF ORE: ROGERS and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and RUSSEL L , District J udg e. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff Timothy

Wil liams, a Michig an state pr isoner, sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleg ed viol at i on of his Eig hth Amendment rig hts and of the Ame rica ns with Disabiliti es Ac t (“A DA ” )
. D e f

e n d an ts B ar

r y M c L e mo r e , H ar o ld

Wh it e , H ar o ld

Wa r r , an d Wi ll ia m B a il e y a p p eal the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Oc tob e r 27 , 20 05 , or de r de nying the ir mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. De fe nd ants argue that they

are entitled to qualified immunit y from Wil liams’s claims and that the ADA doe s not pr ov ide fo r a

c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls s ue d in

the ir ind ividu a l c a

pa c iti e s. Willi a ms c on te nd s th a t th e law- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine pr e c lud e s de fe nd ants ’ a pp e a l, that de fe nd antsNo. 05-2678

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c Le mo re e t al

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The note state d: “I have enemies here at J .M.F. and I ’m asking for pr otection, bec ause I am 1 afr aid for my

life. One of the guy s name is L ovejoy -B ey . And they call one by the name of

‘F oots.’ I ’m afr aid to come out in the morning .” - 2 - a re n o te n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y

f r o mh i s c l a i m s , an d

t h a td e f e n d an t s h a v e f

o r f e i t e d t h e ir argument that Wil liams is not entit led to relief under the ADA. For the re asons set for

th below, we
reve rse the district court’s October 27, 2005, order with r espec t to Wil liams’s ADA c laims, affirm wi th re sp e c t to Willi ams’ s Eig hth Am e ndme nt cl a im ag a ins t def e nd ant Mc L e mor e , an d r e ve rs e wi th
r e s p e c tt o W i l l i am s ’ s E i g h t h A m e n dm e n tc l a i m s a g a i n s td e f e n d an t s W ar

r , W h i t e , an d

B a i l e y. I. On J anuar

y 13 , 1 9 9 8 , W i lliams handed a note to J osephine McCa llum Facility (“JMF”) Offic er Me eks stating that he had e nemies and that he fea red for his life
. I n response , Wil liams was

1 transfe rre d from JMF to the State P ri s o n o f S outhern Michig an (“ SMI ”). O ffice r Mee ks
rec ommended that Willi ams be plac ed in tempora ry seg reg ation until proper pl ace ment could be deter mined by the Secur ity

Classification Commi ttee (“ SCC ”). A hea ring on Wil liams’s note was sc heduled f or J anuar y 15, 1998. When defe ndant Off icer Ha ro ld Wa rr and un kn ow n Of

fi c e r John Do e c a me to Wi lli a ms’ s c e ll a nd a tte mpt e d to tr ans po rt

him to the meeting , Wil liams r efuse d to be handcuf fed behind his ba ck. Wil liams infor med the guards that he su ff

e rs fr om a c on g e nit a l de fo rm ity

kn ow n a s Ka sa

ba c h- Me rr itt Sy

nd ro me , wh ic h c a

us e s h is ha nd to b e c ur le d at the wr ist , limit s his rang e of mot ion , a

nd pr e se nts mul tip le tum or s. Willi a ms insisted that he be handc uffe d in the front with specia l larg e cuf fs as a result of his def

ormity . TheNo. 05-2678

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c Le mo re e t al

.

The status of Connie Ande rson with respe ct to this lawsuit is in dispu t e. Anderson was 2 named a s a def

endant in Willi ams’s ame nded complaint. In this court’s Fe bruar y 1, 2001, order , we instructed the district court to serve the amende d complaint on all defe ndants, includingAnder son. W il lia ms v . M

c Le mo re , 1 0 F
. A p p ’ x 2 4 1 , 2 4 4 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( u np u b li s h e d )
. T h e d istric t court attempted to serve Ander son, but its sum mons was re turned on Mar ch 9, 2001, as A nderson ha d retire d and wa s no longe r employ ed at the State Prison of Michig an. In its J uly 15, 2004, Memorandum a

nd Opinion dism i ssing Williams’s complaint for failure to exhaust admini strative reme dies, the district c ourt noted that “Ande rson was or igina lly named a s a De fenda

nt to this action. S h e i s n o t a par

ty to this action, however .” On Oc tober 27, 2005, Willi ams moved to compel the district c ourt to issue summons on and serve Connie Ander son. The court gran t ed W i lliams’s motion, and entere d an Or der I ssuing Summons and Direc ting Ser vice on Co n n i e Anderson. On Dec ember

12, 2005, Wil liams notified the court that Ander son had passe d awa y on May 24, 2005, and mov e d th e c ourt

to s ub sti tut e the e xec utr ix of An de rs on ’s e state fo r An de rs on a s a de fe nd ant. On J anuar

y 23, 2006, the di strict court held a hearing conce rning Wil liams’s motion to s ubstitut e. Following the hea

ring , the cour

t e ntere d an Or der of

Substi tution, orderingthat J anine Jordan, the executrix of Ander son’s estate, be substituted as a de fenda nt for Ande rson. J ordan ha s appea led that order , which is the subject of a sepa rate appea l.

- 3 - of fi c e rs re qu e ste d th a t Will iams p ro du c e “ me dic a l de ta il” do c ume nti nghis ne e d for e nla rg e d c uf fs , but Wi lliams was unable to produc e any such docume ntation. The off icer s then soug ht guida

nce f rom Deputy

Warden Connie Ande rson. Deputy Warden 2 An de rs on tol d th e g ua

rd s th a t Will iams wo ul d hav e to s ub mit to n or ma l c uf fi ngor fo rf e it h is interview w ith the SC C. W hen W illiams ref used to submit to normal cuffing , he wa s order ed to be transfe rre d back to JMF. On J anuar y 16, 1998, due to his failure to attend the SCC i nterview , Wil liams was ordere d to vacate his cell at SMIand to re turn to J MF. Willi ams ref used, explaining that he fe are d for his life if he returne d to J MF. Due to his resistance, Williams rece ived a misconduct ticket that re sulted in a fourte en-da y detention at SMI
. Duringhis seg reg ation, Wil liams filed a g rieva nce, claiming that he shoul d not have r ece ived the mis c on du c t ti c ke t be c a us e he on ly so ug ht t o p re ve nt h is r e tur n to JMF . D e fe nd ant H aro ld Wh iteNo. 05-2678

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- 4 - re sp on de d to thi s g ri e va

nc e a t th e se c on d s te p in

the thr e e -s te p pr oc e ss. Di re c tor Ke nn e th M c Gi nn is, the thir d a

nd fi na l r e sp on de nt t o Wil liams’ s g ri e va nc e a pp e a l, f ound se ve ra l e rr or s w ithre g ard to Wil liams’s treatment – c oncluding that Wil liams “has a phy sical i mpairment which c alls for spec ial cuff s to be used for

handcuf fing ” – and f

orwa rded Williams’s gr ievanc e to def endant Warde n Ba

rry McL emore “to ensure that appropr iate ac tion is t aken on this issue.” D irec tor McGinnis, howeve r, did not specifica lly

order McL emore to provide Will iams another oppor tunity for a hear ing w ith the SCC. On

F e br ua ry 4, 19 98 , Willi ams g a ve pr iso n o ff ic ia ls a no te statin g that he pla

nn e d to g e t hi s enemies upon his re turn to J MF. The prison staff c onstrued the n o t e as t hreatening behavior and iss ue d Wil lia

ms a se c on d mi sc on du c t ti c ke t, d e ta ininghim a t SMI fo r a n a dd iti on a l th ir

ty da y s. Willi a ms a g a in f

ile d a g ri e va nc e , c la imi ngthat he inc ur re d the tic ke t on ly to pr e ve nt his tr ans fe r t o J MF. On A

pril 9, 1998, at the sec ond step i n t h e gri evanc e proc ess, def endant B arr

y McL emore denied Williams’s grie vance . At the third step in th e p ro ce s s, McGinnis denied Willi ams’s g ri e va nc e a pp e a l, f ind ingtha t no vio latio n o f p oli c y

ha d o c c ur re d a nd that th e “ re c or d p re se nte d w ith the appe al does not sug g est that furthe r ac tion is j ustified at this level.” Wil liams d i d n o t re ce ive a he aringon his safety conce rns and wa s returne d to the g ener al population at J MF on August 26, 1998. Near ly one month later, on September 25, Willi ams was stabbed by

an unknown a ssailant while in the g y m. Wi lliams filed a pro se a ction on September 18, 19 98 , a lle g ingvio latio ns of his c on sti tut ion a l r ights pu rs ua nt t o 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 . Wil liamsNo. 05-2678

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I n his origina l complaint, Wi lliams alleg ed that def endants violated his Eighth and 3 F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt r ig hts in r e fu sin g to h and c uf f himus inglarg e r c uf

fs . H e a me nd e d h is complaint following his alleg ed attac k to include his failure to protect a nd ADA c laims. - 5 - subsequently

amende d his complaint to add additional constitutional claims and to allege violations of the AD A. 3 Wil liams’s amende d complaint included the following § 1983 claims: Eighth Ame ndment fa ilure to pr ote c t, c ru e l and unus ua l punis hme nt, re ta liatio n, vio latio n of the AD A, a nd First Amendment ac cess to the co u rt s . On Octobe r 27, 1999, def endants fir st moved for summary judgme nt. I n an orde r date d J anuar y 10, 2000, the district court co n s i d ere d the merits of e ach of Wil liams’s claims and g rante d defe ndants’ motion. Wi th respec t to W ill i ams ’s fa ilure to protec t claim, the cour

t c oncluded that defe ndants’ “ac t of returning Plaintiff to J MF does not form a pattern of un dis pu te d v iol e nc e or

an e g re g iou s f

a ilure to p ro vid e se c ur ity to P la int if

f. ” Withres pect t o Wil liams’s ADA c laim, the district court held that on the date Wil liams r efuse d cuff ing, “he did not have a dis a

bil ity a s de fi ne d by the AD A” and , the re fo re , summa ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f d e fe nd ants on this claim was prope r. On appe al, we r ever sed, holding that the district court e rre d in gr anting summary judgme nt to defen d an t s befor e they wer e ser ved with Will iams’s second a mended c omplaint. W

illiams v. Mc Le mo re , 10 F. App’ x 241, 242 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). We did not addre ss the merits of the district court’s January 10 order
. After beingserve d with Wi lliams’s second ame nded complaint, def endants filed a

motion to dismi ss or, in the alternative, for summ ary judgme nt on Aug ust 30, 2001. The district courtNo. 05-2678

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c Le mo re e t al

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- 6 - g rante d in part and denied in part defenda nts’ motion. The court noted t hat W illiams had conce ded that hi s c la im w a s “ no w f oc us e d o n tw o b a sis fo r r e lie f: de lib e ra te ind if fe re nc e in t he fa ilure to provide him protec tion and the violation of the ADA which resulted in his beingdenied a hear ing on his request for protec tion,” and thus dismissed all but the se two rema ining c laims. W ith respec t to Wi lli a ms’ s f

a ilure to p ro te c t c la im, the c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Will iams h a d “a lle g e d s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts fr om whic h a

tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld c on c lud e that D e fe nd ants su bje c tively perc e ive d a

se ri ou s r isk

to Plaintiff’ s s a f

e ty ” a n d conseque ntly

denied de fenda

nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt. Wi th respec t to Wi lliams’s ADA cla im, the court held that Willi ams “at the very least states a cl ai m u n d er the ADA” and denie d defe ndants’ motion. The cour t held further

t h at qualified immunity

was not available to defe ndants on either c laim. The cour t did not explain why its c onclusions differ ed fr om tho se e xpre sse d in

its Janu ary

10 , 2 00 0, or de r gra

nti ng de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r sum mary

jud g me nt. On M arc h 15, 2004, defe ndants once ag ain m oved for summary judgme nt. The district cour t g rante d defe n dants’ motion on J uly 15, 2004, concludingthat Wil liams had failed to plea d exhaustion of remedies in his or igina l c omplaint. On appea l, w e re verse d, holding that the district court e rre d in looking only to Wi lliams’s origina l – rather than amended – complaint to determine whether he had sufficie ntly pled exhaustion. W ill iam s v . M

c Le mo re , 148 F. App’ x 342, 344 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). We f ound that Wil liams had sufficie ntly pled exha u s t i o n i n his amended complaint and re verse d and re manded f or fur ther proc eeding s. Id. De fe nd ants on c e a g a in m ov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt o n Augus t 30 , 200 5. Th e c ourt he ld
a he ari ngon de fe nd ants ’ mot ion on Oc tob e r 17, 20 05 . Af te r h e ari ngargume nts fr om b oth pa rt ie s, the cour t concluded that it was “constra ined to deny t h e Motion for Summary J udg ment . . . forNo. 05-2678

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- 7 - essentially

the same r easons that the C ourt once befor e denie d the Motion for Summary J udg ment in this case .” The court e ntere d an orde r deny ing de fenda

nts’ motion for summary judgme nt on October 28, 2005. Def

endants timely

appea led. II. Al tho ug h n ot c on te ste d by e ith e r part y , we mus t fir st de c ide wh e the r we have jur isd ic tio n to consider de fenda

nts’ appea l. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 l imits our jurisdiction to “final dec isions of the district courts of the U nited S t at es . . . . ” A district court’s de nial of qualified immunity is a final decision, appe alable pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but only “‘to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.’ ” Es tate of C

ar te r v . Ci ty

of D e tro it , 4 0 8 F. 3 d 3 0 5 , 3 0 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Mitchell v. Fo rsy th , 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). Adefe ndant ra ising a qualified immunity

defe nse “ma

y not appea l a district c ourt’s summary judgme nt or der insofar as that order deter mines whether

or not the pretria l r ecor d sets forth a ‘ g enuine’ issue of fa ct for tr ial.” Johnson v. J ones , 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1 99 5) ; see also Be rryman v. R ieger , 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998) (“ A def endant who is de nied qualified immunity

may file an inter locutory

appea l with this Court only if that appe al involves the abstrac t or pure le g al issue of whet h er t h e facts alleg ed by the plaintiff constitute a violation of clea rly established law.”). Neve rtheless, that the di strict court here de nied def endants’ motion for
summa ry jud g me nt o n th e g ro un ds that g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xist d oe s n ot n e ces sari ly prec lude this court’s jurisdiction over de fenda nts’ appea l. Rather, as w e have rec og nized, “re ga rd le ss of thedis tri c t c ou rt’

s re as on s fo r de nyingqu a lif ie d im mun ity , [th is c ourt ] may e xer c ise jurisdiction over the [defe ndants’] app eal to the ex tent it raises questions of law.” W illiams v.No. 05-2678

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- 8 - Me hra , 1 86 F .3 d 6 85 , 6 89 -9 0 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 9) (e n b anc ); se e als o Tu rn e r v . S c ott , 119 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1997). L an gu age i n o u r e ar l i er

d ec i s i o n s i n t er

p re t i n g Johnson su g g e sts that w he re the a pp e lla nt f a ils to conce de the fac ts a s alleg ed by the appellee , we a re de prived of jur isdiction over the appe llant’s interlocutory

appea l. See Berrym an , 150 F.3d at 563 (“I f . . . the de fenda nt disputes the plaintiff’s version of the s tory , the defendant must nonetheless be willing to conc ede the most favora ble view of the fa cts to the pl aintiff for purposes of the appea l.”). Subsequent c ases, howe ver, ha ve re jected that a pp ro a c h a nd cla rif ie d th a t w e may

c on sid e r a

pure qu e sti on

of law, de sp ite the de fe nd ants ’ f a i l u r e t o c o n c e d e t h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s v e r s i o no f

t h e f a c t s f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r

y a p p e a l : “ If . . . aside fr om the impermissible arguments reg ardingdisputes of fac t, the defe ndant also raise s the pure ly le g a l qu e sti on

of wh e the r t

he fa c ts a lle g e d .
. . su

pp or t a c la im o f v iol a tio n o f c le arl y established law, the n there is an issue over which this court has jurisdiction.” Estate of Carter , 408 F .3 d at 31 0 ( int e rn a l qu otatio ns and c itatio n o mitte d) ; se e als o Smith v. Cupp , 43 0 F .3 d 7 66 , 7 72 (6 th Cir . 2 00 5) ; but see Mc

Ke nn a v. City

of R oy al O ak

, e t al

. , 469 F.3d 559, 561 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (holding this court lacks jurisdi ction to consider interlocutory appea l where appellant r elies solely on disputed fac ts). We conclude th at we have jur isdiction over def endants’ inter locutory

appea l to consider wh e the r, int e rp re tin g the fa c ts a s a lle g e d b y Willi a ms, de fe nd ants are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d im mun ity from Willi ams’s Eig hth Amendment claims. See Me hra , 186 F.3d at 690 (instructing that court ha s jurisdiction to consider whethe r fa cts, as alleg ed by plaintiff, entit l e def

endant to summary jud g me nt) ; Berrym an , 150 F.3d at 562 (same) . At oral argument, counsel for defe ndants conc ededNo. 05-2678

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- 9 - Wil lia ms ’ s v e r s io no f

th e f a c ts f o r p u r p o s e s o f th is a p p e a l a n d ar g u e d th a t, e v e na cce pting Willi a ms’ s p le a din g s a s tr ue , d e fe nd ants are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity

fr om Wi lli a ms’ s E ig hth Am e ndme nt c la im. Couns e l’ s c on c e ssi on make s c le ar t

hat we hav e juri sd ic tio n o ve r d e fe nd ants ’ interlocutory appea l w ith r espec t to Williams’s Eighth Amendment c laim. See E state of Cart er , 408 F.3d at 310. We conclude f

urther that we have jurisdiction to consider de fenda nts’ interlocutory

appea l
c o n c e r n i n g W i l l i am s ’ s § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m b a s e d o n t h e A D A
. D e f e n d an t s c o u c h e d t h e ir

a rg ume nt i n terms of a qualified immunit y defe nse, and we interpre t the district c ourt’s denial of su m m ary jud g me nt a s a

de nia l of qu a lif

ie d immun ity . We the re fo re have jur isd ic tio n to c on sid e r d e fe nd ants ’ int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l ari sin g fr om t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d is mis s Wil liams’s ADA c laim for fa ilure to state a claim for which re lief ca n be g rante d. Ev an s-

Ma rsh all v. Bd. of Educ ., 42 8 F .3 d 2 23 , 2 28 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Key v . Grayson , 179 F.3d 996 ( 6th Cir. 1999). III
. We revie w t he dis trict court’ s entry of summary

judgme nt de novo. Brain ar d v . A m. Sk

an dia LifeAs su r. Cor

p ., 432 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 2005)
. Summary judgme nt is prope r whe n there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c)
. A g enuine issue for trial exis ts only when ther e is sufficie nt “evidenc e
on which the jury could rea sonably find for the pla intiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc ., 47 7 U .S. 242, 252 (1986). To the extent that there is disag ree ment about the fa cts, this court must review the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff, takingall infere nces in his favor
. Champion v. Ou tlo ok Nas hv ill e , 380 F.3d 893, 900 ( 6th Cir. 2004).No. 05-2678

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- 10 - I V. Wil liams first argues t hat t he law-of-the -ca se doctrine bars de fenda nts’ appea l, contending that “the issues ra ised in this appeal we re r aised by the Appellants in a pr evious motion for summary judgme nt and ruled on by the Dis trict Court on J une 27, 2002 and Defenda nt failed to appea l as of ri g ht at th a t ti me .” “ Th e law- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine pr ov ide s that ‘whe n a c ourt de c ide s up on a ru le of law, that de c isi on

sh ou ld c on tin

ue to g ov e rn

the sa me iss ue s in

su bs e qu e nt s ta g e s in

the same
case .’” Sc ott

v . Ch ur c hil l , 3 7 7 F. 3 d

5 6 5 , 5 6 9 -7 0 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Ar izo na v . Ca lif or nia , 460 U. S
. 6 0 5 , 6 1 8 (1 9 8 3 ))
. T h e do ct ri n e ba rs a co u rt fr o m re co n s i d er i n g i s s u es “d ec i d edat an ea rl y s t age of t he li tigation, either ex plicitly or by nece ssary infere nce f rom the disposition.” Hanove r Ins. Co.

v. A m. E ng’g Co. , 1 0 5 F. 3 d 3 0 6 , 3 1 2 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g C o a l R es . , I n c . v . G u l f & W e ste rn Indus., Inc

. , 865 F.2d 761, 766 ( 6th Cir. 1989)). The doc trine ca

n be applied in two c ircumstance s. Where an a ppellate court has dete rmined an issue of la

w – either

expli citly

or implicitly

– a l o we r court may

not depar

t from that deter mination, unless under one of three “exceptionally narr ow” g rounds: (1) “ when the e vidence in a subsequent tria l is subst antially differ ent; (2) whe n controlling authority has subseque ntly

made
a con trary

de c isi on of the law a

pp lic a ble to s uc h is su e s; o r ( 3) wh e n th e de c isi on wa s c le arl y
err oneous and w ould work a ma nifest injustice.” W

aste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc . v. City of Dayton , 169 F. Ap p ’x 9 7 6 , 9 8 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g McI lravy v . Kerr-Mc GeeCoal Cor p. , 204 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2000)). Where , howeve r, a c ourt seeks to re visit i ts own ear lier deter mination, it has more fr eedom to do so, and its ex erc ise of t hat freedom is revie wed for an abuse of discretion. Pac. Employe rs Ins. Co . v. Sav- a-Lot of W inchester , 291 F.3d 392, 398- 99 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, “theNo. 05-2678

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- 11 - law- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine is r ig idl y a pp lie d to e nf

or c e a low e r c ourt ’s ob e die nc e to a highe r c ourt ; ho we ver, the do c tr ine is m or e fl e xibly a pp lie d to re c on sid e ra

tio n o f e arl ie r d e c isi on s b y the same court or a coordinate cour

t.” United States v. Dunbar , 357 F.3d 582, 592 ( 6th Cir. 2004), vacate d on other grounds , 543 U.S. 1099 (2005). Willi ams’s ar g ument conce rns the sec ond scena rio. Wil liams argues that def

endants a re ba rre d from bring ing this appe al bec ause the y d i d not
a pp e a l th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s June 27 , 20 02 , Me mor and um and Op ini on , in

wh ic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld that defe ndants wer e not entitled to qua lified immunit y from Willi ams’s cla ims. Defenda nts argue that the law- of-the- case doctrine is inapplica ble to this case. They contend that, although they wer e entitled to file an i n t er l o cu t ory appea l to the district court’s June 27, 2002, order, they wer e not
re qu ir e d to do so , a

nd the ir fa ilure to r a ise su c h a

n a pp e a l do e s n ot tr igger the law- of -t he -c a se doctrine. We a g ree with defe ndants. In Behrens v . Pelletier , 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996), the Court held that a de fenda

nt who has bee n denied qua lified immunit y in an interlocutory

appea l filed afte r t h e d en i al o f am o t i o nt o d i s m i s s m ay , n o n et h el es s , f i l e a s e c o n d

i n t er l o cu t o ry

ap p ea l fo l l o wi n g a distric t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f th e d e f e n d an t’ s mo ti o n f

o r s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t. T h a t d e f

e n d an ts d id not exercise their rig ht to file an inter locutory appea l of the district court’ s J une 27, 2002, orde r does not prec lude them from r aising the pre sent appe al. V. W i t hr e s p e c tt o W i l l i am s ’ s § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m s b a s e d o nt h e A D A , d e f

e n d an t s ar g u e t h a tT i t l e II of the AD A d oe s n ot p ro vid e fo r a c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls s ue d in t

he ir individual capac ities. W illiams contends that defe ndants ha ve for feited this ar g ument beca use it was
a lle g e dly no t r a ise d b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt . Wil liams’ s c on te nti on is w ith out me ri t.No. 05-2678

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I n their S eptember 30, 2005, reply brief, defe ndants noted t hat the Supreme Court gr anted 4 cer tiorari in Miller . The Court issued its decision on J anuar y 10, 2006, and held that Title I Iof the AD A v a lid ly

a br og a te s st a te so ve re ig n im mun ity fo r c on du c t th a t a c tua lly

vio late d th e F ourt e e nth Amendment. Un ite d S

tates v . G e or

gia , 546 U.S. 151 (2006). The Court did not addre ss whether Title I Iof the AD A provides f or a c au s e of action ag ainst defe ndants sued in their individual c a pa c iti e s. - 12 - I n their re ply

brief in support of

their motion for summary judgme nt, f iled on September 30, 20 05 , d e fe nd ants argue d th a t “ the law i s unc le ar whe the r P la int if f c an e ve n s ue pr iso n o ff

ic ia ls i n their individual capa cities for da mag es. In Miller v. King , th e El e ve nth Cir c uit hel d th a t li a

bil ity under § 12132 of

the ADA ‘ extends o n l y t o public entities and not to persons in their individual
c apa c i t i e s . ’ ” A tt h e O c t o b e r 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 , h e ar i n g o nd e f e n d an t s ’ m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t, 4 de fe nd ants ’ c ouns e l argue d w ithre sp e c t to Willi a ms’ s A DAc la im that “ a t the ve ry mos t it ’s up in the air w hether

this officer

could be [liable] u n d er t hat Act at all, and for othe r re asons stated.” De fe nd ants ra ise d th is a

rgume nt b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , a nd it m ay pr op e rl y be c on sid e re d b y thi s
c ourt
. We also ag ree with defe ndants that the ADAdoes not provid e for persona l liabilit y for defe ndants sued in their indivi d u al ca p ac ities. Title I Iof the AD A prohibits a public entity from dis c ri min a tin g a g a ins t di sa ble d ind ivi du a ls and

state s th a t “ no qu a lif

ie d in div idu a l w itha

dis a bil ity shall, by rea son of such disability , be excluded fr om pa rticipation in or be denied the benef its of the service s, prog rams, or a ctivities of a public entity , or be subjec ted to discrimination by any such entity .” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ter m “ public entity ” is de fined, in releva nt part, as “ any

State or local g overnme nt.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)( A). “Unde r Title I I of the ADA , wh i ch fo rbi ds discrimination by

‘any public entity ’, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, the proper defe n d an t i s that ‘entity .’”No. 05-2678

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- 13 - W alker v . Snyder , 213 F.3d 344, 346 ( 7th Cir. 2000). W e have held re peate dly that the ADA doe s
n o t p e r mi t p u b li c e mp lo y e e s o r s u

p e r v is o r s to b e s u e d in th e ir in d iv id u a l c a p a c it ie s . See Sullivan

v . R iv e r V alle ySc h. Di st. , 1 97 F .3 d 8 04 , 8 08 n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 9) ; W

athen v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 115 F.3d 40 0, 40 4- 05 n. 6 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 7) ; se e als o W

alker , 213 F.3d at 346 (“ The dire ctor a nd all of the other defe ndants must have been sued in the ir officia l c apac ities – that is, a s proxi es for the state – rather tha n th e ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s, be c a

us e the AD A ad dr e sse s its rul e s to e mpl oy e rs , p la c e s o f p ub lic
acc ommodation, and other org anizations, not t o the employ ees or manag ers of these org anizations.”) (interna l citations omit ted). Her e, W illiams’s orig inal complaint, filed September 18, 1998, decla

red that “All The [sic] defe ndants named in this complaint is [sic] sued in both individual a nd officia l c apac ity on plaintiff [sic ] cl a ims fo r d ama g e s and c la ims fo r a

decl arat ory

re lie f. ” On

No ve mbe r 3 0, 19 98 , Wil liams soug ht leave to f

ile a sec ond amende d complaint, “to correc t prior added names of defe ndants and [t o] add fo u r d ef

en d ants . . . .” The district court g rante d Wil liams’s motion on J anuar y 7, 1999. Wil liams’s amende d complaint specifie s that ea ch o f t he def endants a re sue d in their individual capa cities. Be cause eac h defe ndant has been sue d in his indi vidual capa city , the district court e rre d in d e n yin g d e f

e n d an ts ’ mo ti o nf

o r s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t w it

h r e s p e c t to Wi ll ia

ms ’ s A D A c la im s . We
re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Oc tob e r 28 , 2 00 5, or de r w ithre g ard to Wi lli a ms’ s A DAc la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ants
. V I. De fe nd ants ne xt argue that the y are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d im mun ity

fr om Wi lli a ms’ s E ig hth Amendment cla ims. Qualified imm u n i t y is an aff irmative def

ense that “shields ‘g overnme ntNo. 05-2678

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- 14 - officia ls perfor

ming discr etionary

functions .
. . from civil damag es l iability as long as their a ctions could re as o n ab ly

have be en thoug ht consistent with the rig hts they are alleg ed to have violated.’” Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police De p’t , 389 F.3d 167, 172 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (quotin g A n derson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)) . I n order to withstand a motion for summary judgme nt based on the def

ense of qualified immunity , Wil liams must first show that defenda nts viol at ed a constitutionally

protec ted rig ht. Br e nn an v . Twp. of N or thv ille , 78 F.3d 1152, 1154 ( 6th Cir. 1996). I f so, Will iams must then show that the rig ht w as cle arly established. Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the r ight the of ficial is alleg ed to have v iolated must have be en ‘c lear ly established’ in a more pa

rticularized , an d hence more re levant, sense : The contours of the rig ht must be sufficie ntly

clea r that a r eason ab le offic ial would understand that what he is doing violates that rig ht.” Anderson , 483 U.S. at 640. Thus, “the r eleva nt, disposit ive inquiry

in determining whether a rig ht is clearly

established is whethe r it would be cle ar to a rea sonable off

icer that his c onduct was unlawful in the situation he confr onted.” Brosseau v. Hauge n , 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (quoting Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001))
. Willi ams c la ims that by

re tur nin g him to JMF , d e fe nd ants fa ile d to pr ote c t hi m f ro m hi s
a tta c ke rs , th e re by

de pr ivi nghi m of hi s Ei g hth Am e ndme nt r ig hts . In o rd e r t o e sta bli shlia bil ity
un de r t he Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt f

or a pr iso n off

ici al’ s fa ilure to p ro te c t hi m, Wi lli a ms mus t de mon str a te that de fe nd ants we re de lib e rate ly ind if fe re nt “ to a

su bs tanti a l r isk

of se ri ou s h arm ” to him. Farmer v . Brennan , 5 11 U. S. 8 25 , 8 28 (1 99 4) ; Gree ne v. B owles , 361 F.3d 290, 294 ( 6th Cir. 2004). “To de monstrate deliber ate indiffe renc e, an inmate must present evide nce from which a trier of fa c t c ou ld c on c lud e ‘t

hat th e of fi c ia l w a s su

bje c tiv e ly awa re of the ri sk ’ an d ‘di sr e g ard e d th a t r iskNo. 05-2678

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- 15 - by failing to take re asonable measure s to abate it.’” Bowles , 3 6 1 F. 3 d at 2 9 4 (q u o t i n g Farmer , 511 U. S. at 82 9, 84 7) ; se e als o Hester v . Morgan , 52 F. App’x 220, 222-23 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (“ De lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e is a

state of min d mo re bla

me worth y th an neg lig e nc e , b ut i t e nta ils ‘something less than ac ts or omissions for the ve ry purpose of

causingharm or w ith knowledg e that h arm wi l l re s u l t
. ’” (q u o t i n g Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 83 5)). Mo re ov e r, “ pr iso n o ff ic ia ls who a c tua lly knew of a substantial risk to inmate hea lth or safe ty may be found f

ree from liabilit y i f they responde d rea sonably

to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not ave rted.” Farmer , 5 11 U. S.
a t 83 0 ( no tin g tha

t a “ pr iso n o ff

ic ia l’ s d uty un de r t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt i s to e nsure ‘r e a so na ble safe ty ’” ( citation omitted )). De fe nd ants do no t c on te st the ob je c tiv e c omp on e nt o f Wi lli a ms’ s E ig hth Am e ndme nt c la im. I n th e a bs tr a c t, one pr iso n inmate ’s thr e a t to the he a lthand sa fe ty of ano the r i nmate is “ su ff

ic ie ntl y serious” to satisfy

this requireme nt. See F

armer , 511 U.S. at 833 (noting that “prison off icials have a du t y . . . t o p ro t ec tp ri s o n er s fr o m v i o l en ce at t h e h a n d s o f o t h er p ri s o n er s ”) (q u o t i n g Cor tesQu ino nes v . J

im e ne z-Ne ttl esh ip , 8 42 F .2 d 5 56 , 5 58 (1 st C ir . 1 98 8) ); see also Clark-Murphy v. Foreback , 4 39 F .3 d 2 80 , 2 86 -8 7 ( 6th Cir
. 20 06 ) ( vie wi ngob je c tiv e c omp on e nt o f d e lib e rate ind if fe re nc e sta

nd ard “ [i]n th e a

bs tr a c t” ). F ur

the r, the a lle g a tio ns he re c on tr a st wi th oth e r c a se s in which we have f

ound that an inm ate plaintiff failed to show that the defendant prison officials wer e indiffer ent to a spec ific, known risk to the inmate’ s safe ty
. Se e Ga nt v . Ca mp be ll , 4 F. App’ x 254, 25 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) (u

np ub lis he d) (n oti ngthat pl a int if f “ e xpre sse d a

g e ne ra l c on c e rn ” a

bo ut h is safe ty but did not “identify

any particula r g angmembers whom he fea red” ).No. 05-2678

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- 16 - Def endants instead a

rgue that Willi ams has fa iled to show that they wer e subjec tively

awa re of Will iams’s alleg ed thre at of ha rm. We theref

ore a ssume that the objective c om p o n en t of the deliberate indiffer ence standard has been met and focus our attention with respec t to each de fenda nt to determine w hether

Wil liams has alleg ed fa cts that could s u p p o rt a holding that the def endant
unre a so na

bly dis re g ard e d k

no wl e dg e of

the a lle g e d r isk

of ha rm . A. Har old Warr Acce pti ngthe fa c ts a s p le a de d b y Willi a ms, we ho ld t

hat Will iams h a s n ot a lle g e d f a c ts
su ff ic ien t to su

pp or t th e le g a l c on c lus ion

tha t de fe nd ant H aro ld Wa

rr a c te d w ithde lib e rate indiffer en ce to W illiams’s Eighth Amendment r ights. Warr was one of two prison guards who
a tte mpt e d un su c c e ssf

ull y to ha nd c uf f and tr ans fe r Willi a ms to a sc he du le d me e tin g wi th the SCC on J anuar y 15, 1998. Even a ssuming that Warr subjectively knew of the risk to Wil liams, nothing in t he ple a din g s o r t

he re c or d s ug g e sts that Warr ha d a ny ro le or re sp on si bi li ty in the de c isi on to
re tur n Wil liams t o JMF . T hu s, Willi ams h a s not se t for th ple a din g s tha t War

r dis re g ard e d th e ri sk to Wi lliams by

failing to take re asonable m easures to g uard a g ainst it. W e ther efor e re verse the district court’s denial of summary judgme nt on Wi lliams’s Eighth Amendme nt claim with respec t to defe ndant Har old Warr. B . H aro ld Wh ite Ac c e pti ngthe fa c ts a s p le a de d b y Willi a ms, we ho ld t

hat Will iams h a s n ot alle g e d f a c ts sufficie nt to support the leg al conc lusion that defenda nt Harold W hite acte d unrea sonably in the fac e of a kn ow n r isk

to Wi lli ams’ s h e a lth. Wh ite ’s re latio ns hip to Wi lli a ms’ s tr e a tme nt i s te nu ou s. Whit e wa s th e se c on d r e sp on de nt t o Wil liams’ s a pp e a l f ro m his fi rs t g ri e va

nc e (s te mmi ng fr om h isNo. 05-2678

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- 17 - re fu sa l to be c uf

fe d in stand ard ha

nd c uf fs ). I n his re sp on se to Wi lli a ms’ s g ri e va nc e a pp e a l, Wh ite
rec ounted Will iams’s reque st for protec tion from the J MF fac ility and stated that Wi lliams “ref used to come out of [his] cell and D eputy An d er s o n conclude d that [W illiams’s] ref usal of intervie w indicated that [Wi lliams] did not wish to pr ocee d with the proce ss a nd should be retur

ned to J MF.” Willi a ms a lle g e s that Whit e “ ne g a t[e d] the tr ue fa c ts wh ic h inv olv e d [Willi a ms] no t be inga ble to attend the Jan[uary ] 15, 1998, S .C.C. int ervie w” a nd “did not reme dy

Def endant Ande rson’s fa ilure to a ff or d P lai nt if

f pr ote c tiv e c us tod

y , g ive n th e pr oc e ss w a s d isc ri min a tor y in n a tur e , b y

ho w h is dis a bil ity wa s u se d to pr e c lud e him fr om the S.C. C. int e rv ie w, and ins te a d, De fe nd ant Wh ite up he ld the violations.” Although Williams has allege d that Whit e had subje ctive knowledg e of Williams’s alleg ed threats, he has not set for th pleading s that could supp o rt the leg al conc lusion that W hite acte d
unrea sonably

in disreg ardingthe risk. W h i t e’ s responsibi lity was to re spond to W illiams’s g ri e va nc e ; Whi te de te rm ine d th a t O ff ic e rs War

r a nd Do e a c te d in a man ne r c on sis te nt w ith de pa rtm e nt a l p o l i c y

in r e fu sin g to p ro vid e a lte rn a tiv e ha nd c uf fs , n oti ngthat w ith out “ me dic a l de ta il” the g uards “ would be subjec t to disciplinary proce eding s for bre achingsecur ity .” Willi ams has not alleg ed that White had any authority to, or play ed any

role in the de cision to, order Williams’s return to J MF. Willi ams ca

nnot show t h at W h i t e’s actions or omissions wit hin his li mited role violated clea rly established constitutional law
. We the ref ore reve rse the district court’s de nial of summary judgme nt with respec t to Harold White. C. W illiam BaileyNo. 05-2678

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Acc ording to Wi lliams’s amended c omplaint, Bailey “re viewed the first step g rieva nce 5 response , and he f

ound it proper a

nd in compliance w ith policy and [W illiams’s] rig hts.” - 18 - De fe nd ant Wi lli am B a ile y , li ke White , h a s a te nu ou s r e latio ns hip to Wi lli a ms’ s f a ilure to protec t claim. Ba iley

revie we d t h e fi rst step response to Wi lliams’s second filed g rieva nce (s te mmi ngfr om a

no te that Will iams g a ve pr iso n o ff ic ia ls in whic h h e thr e a te ne d to “ g e t” his enemies at J MF, and for

which he r ece ived a thre ateningbehavior misconduct ticket), a

pproving the g rieva nce response, a

nd indicating that Wil liams’s g rieva nce a ppeal wa s denied. As with Whi te, 5 Ba iley ’s ac tions as pleaded by Wil liams do not viol ate c lear ly established constitutional law. Wil liams did not alleg e that Bailey had any authority to, or play ed any

role in the de cision to, order Wil liams’s return to JMF. Thus, Wi lliams cannot show that B ailey ac t ed u n reasonably or disreg arde d the risk to Wil liams’s safe ty . We likewise reve rse the district c ourt’s denia l of summary j u d g m e n tw i t h r e s p e c tt o W i l l i am B a i l e y. D. B arr y McL emore Willi a ms ’ s E ig h th A me n d me nt c la im

is s tr o ng est with respe ct to defe ndant B arr y McL emore . At the time of Will iams’s alleg ations, McL emore serve d as the Warde n at SMI
. Wil liams has set forth alleg ations that sugg est McL emore had subjec tive kno wl ed ge of the alleg ed dang er that Willi a ms f

a c e d at JMF . In h is thir d s te p g ri e va nc e re sp on se , D ir e c tor

Mc Gi nn is n ote d that Will iams
wa s in adm ini str a tiv e se g re g a tio n due to h is r e qu e st f or pr ote c tio n a

nd state d th a t Mc Gi nn is w ou ld be for wa rdi ng his gr ievanc e re sponse to McL emore . Moreove r, McL emore serve d as the sec ond responde nt to W illiams’s second g rieva nce a ppeal. I n his gr ieva n ce ap p eal, which McL emore revie wed, Williams ex plained that he ha d enemies at J MF and that he fea red f or his life. ANo. 05-2678

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Be cause Direc tor McGinnis forw arde d his gr ievanc e re sponse to McL em o re wi th the 6 imp lie d in str

uc tio n to c on du c t an SCC me e tin g , a nd McL emo re faile d to do so , th is c a se is distinguished fr om our prior c ases that have held that a prison officia l’s denial of an a dminist rative g rieva nce c annot be the basis of liability
. Se e Sh e he e v . Lu ttr e ll , 199 F.3d 295, 300 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiff’s only alleg ations ag ainst defe ndants was their “ denial of his administrative

- 19 - rea sonable fa ctfinder

could there fore conclude that McL emore had knowledg e of the ri sk that Wil liams face d at J MF. See Ewolski v. City of Brunswi ck, 287 F. 3 d 4 92, 513 n.7 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that “an officia l’s subjective awa rene ss of a risk may be proved circ umstantially by evidenc e
su g g e sti ngtha

t th e de fe nd ant .
. . ha d b e e n e xpos e d to i nf or matio n c on c e rn ingthe ri sk and thu s mu st have kn ow n a

bo ut i t.” ) ( int e rn a l c itatio n a nd qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; see also Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 843 n.8 ( n o t i n g that a prison off icial “would not esc ape liability if the evide nce show ed that he
mere ly ref used to verif

y underlying f

acts that he strong ly suspected to be true, or declined to c onfirm infere nces of

risk that he strong ly

suspected to e x ist”). I n contra st to defe ndants Warr, W hite, and Bailey , Wil liams has also alleg ed fa cts sufficie nt to support a finding that McL emore acte d unrea sonably in returningWil liams to J MF without conducting an SCC meeting
. I n his r esponse to Williams’s f irst grieva nce, Direc tor McGinnis found that there wer e seve ral e rror s with the denial of Williams’s S CC hearing , concluding that “it appea rs based on the step one re sponse, the g rieva nt has a phy sical impairment which c alls for spe cial cuf fs to b e us e d f

or ha nd c uf fi ng .” Al tho ug h D ir e c tor Mc Gi nn is d id n ot e xplic itl y dir e c t Mc L e mor e to conduc t a n SCC meeting with Wi lliams, McGinnis forwar ded the g rieva nce to Mc L emore “to ensure that appropr iate action is taken on this issue.” This lang uag e, and Mc L emore ’s title, sugg ests that Mc L e mor e ha d t he a

uth or ity to c on du c t an SCC me e tin g in o rd e r t o inve sti g a te and su bs tanti a te W il li ams ’s c lai ms of d anger at J MF. 6No. 05-2678

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g rieva nces” ). - 20 - Neve rtheless, de spite Direc tor McGin n i s ’s g rieva nce r esponse a

nd Wil liams’s repe ated claims o f d ang er, Williams was sent back to JMF without a meeting . Given Willi ams’s re peate d
e xpre sse d c on c e rn s f

or hi s sa fe ty

and his c on tin

ue d w ill ingne ss t o s ub

je c t hi mse lf

to d isc ipl ine in order to avoid a re turn to J MF, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fac t could find t hat McL emore
unrea sonabl y disreg arde d the risk to Wil liams’s safe ty by failing to conduct an SCC meeting and attempting to substantiate Williams’s alleg ations of dang er. I n order to avoid qualified immunit y for Mc L emore , in addition to showing that McL emore vio late d Wil liams’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht, Willi a ms mus t als o s ho w t hat th e ri g ht M c L e mor e a lle g e dly violated was c lear ly

established. We conc lude that it was. The Court made clea r in Farmer

that prison officia ls have a

duty “to p rotec t prisoners fr om violence at the hands of other prisoners,” Farmer , 511 U.S
. at 833, and that a n officia l may

be held liable if

he knows of a

nd disreg ards a

n excessive risk to a

n inmate’s hea lth or safe ty , id. at 837. Thus, in Aug ust of 1998, four y ear s after Farmer wa s is su e d, Mc L e mor e wo uld have ha d rea so n to kn owthat he a c te d unla wf ull y in disreg ardingthe risk to Wil liams’s safe ty ; qualified immunity is thus not available to McL emore . F ina lly , d e fe nd ants a lso argue that the y are e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e Willi a ms ha s n ot s ho wn

tha t he wa s atta c ke d b y

e ithe r o f t

he tw o e ne mie s th a t Will iams i de nti fi e d in his Fe bruar y 1998 note. We disag ree . I n Farmer , the Court stated that a de fenda nt prison official may
no t:
esca

pe liability

for deliberate indiffer ence by showing that, while he wa s awa re of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safe ty , he did not know that the complaina nt was espec ially likely to be assaulted by

the spec ific prisoner

who eve ntually

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- 21 - the a ssa ult . T he qu e sti on

un de r t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt i s w he the r p ri so n o ff ic ia ls, actingwi t h d el i b erate indiffer ence , exposed a prisoner to a sufficie ntly

substantial “risk of serious damag e to his future he alth,” Helling [ v. Mc Kinley ], 509 U.S . [25] at 35 [(1993)], and it does not matter whether the risk comes f

rom a sing le source or mul tip le so ur c e s, any

mor e tha n it matte rs wh e the r a pr iso ne r fa c e s a n e xce ssi ve ri sk o f attack f

or re asons per sonal to him or beca use all prisoner s in his si tuation fac e such a r isk. Farmer , 5 1 1 U. S
. at8 4 3
. Fo l l o wi n g Farmer , we have up he ld pr iso ne r Eig hth Am e ndme nt c la ims based on a lleg ations that prison officia ls disreg arde d a risk of f uture assault to the inmate base d on the inmate’s cha

rac teristics. See, e .g., Gree ne , 3 61 F .3 d at 29 5; Tay lor v . M ic h. De p’ t of Cor r. , 69 F.3d 76, 84 ( 6th Cir. 1995). I n these cases, it was not fata l to the inmate-plaintiff’ s claim that they
w e r e u n a b l e t o i d e n t i f

y t h e i r a c tu a l a s s a i l an tb e f

o r e t h e p r i s o no f

f i c i a l ’ s d i s r e g ar d

o f t h e i r s a f e t y; nothing in Farmer

sug g ests that Wil liams’s claim must fail beca use he c annot identify

the per son wh o s ta bb e d h im. V II. For the re asons provided above, we reve rse the district c ourt’s denia l of summary judgme nt with respect to Wi lliams’s § 1983 claims based on the A DA ag ainst defe ndants. We aff irm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of

summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to Willi a ms’ s E ig hth Am e ndme nt c la im
a g a ins t de fe nd ant B arr

y Mc L e mor e , b ut r e ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l o f summa ry jud g me nt w ith respe ct t o W i l l i am s ’s E i gh t h Am en dm en tcl ai m s aga i n s td ef en d an t s Ha ro l d

W arr, Ha ro l d

W hite, and W i l l i a m B a i l e y.