Filed 12/21/22 Vascos Excavation Group v. Gold CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

VASCOS EXCAVATION GROUP, 

LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROBERT GOLD,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B315205

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCV01372)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Timothy P. Dillon, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Daniel M. O’Leary and Daniel M. O’Leary for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

The Law Offices of Abdulaziz, Grossbart & Rudman and 

Bruce D. Rudman for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Plaintiff and appellant Vascos Excavation Group, LLC 

(Vascos), a contractor, prevailed in an arbitration against its 

client, defendant and respondent Robert Gold. After finding that 

Vascos was not duly licensed because its responsible managing 

employee (RME) did not meet the criteria required by law, the 

trial court granted Gold’s petition to vacate the arbitration award

on the ground the arbitrator exceeded her powers.

Vascos makes two main arguments on appeal. It first 

contends the trial court misapplied the burden of proof regarding 

whether Vascos was a duly licensed contractor. We reject this 

argument. The trial court correctly determined that Vascos had 

the burden of proof on this issue.

Vascos also argues the trial court erroneously denied it an 

evidentiary hearing. In the trial court, however, Vascos did not 

seek an evidentiary hearing. It instead argued that such a 

hearing was not authorized by law. Vascos therefore forfeited the 

issue on appeal.

BACKGROUND

In June 2019, Vascos and Gold executed a written 

agreement. Under the contract, in exchange for monetary 

compensation, Vascos was required to perform certain 

excavation, grading, and concrete work at Gold’s property in 

Pacific Palisades. The contract included an arbitration clause.

A dispute arose between Vascos and Gold regarding the 

amount Gold owed under the contract. Vascos recorded a 

mechanics lien and then, in January 2020, filed a complaint in 

superior court against Gold to enforce the lien.

Gold did not file an answer to the complaint. Instead, he 

filed a petition to compel arbitration. Vascos responded by filing 

a notice of non-opposition to the petition and serving Gold with a 
3

demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration 

Association (AAA) pursuant to AAA’s Construction Industry 

Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Construction 

Arbitration Rules). The court then entered an order compelling 

the parties to arbitrate.

AAA advised counsel for both sides that it would apply the 

Construction Arbitration Rules and assigned the matter to 

arbitrator Marcia Haber Kamine. Gold corresponded with the 

arbitrator but did not file an answer to Vascos’ demand for 

arbitration.

The arbitrator held a four-day hearing in October 2020. 

After both parties rested, Gold argued that Vascos was barred 

from seeking compensation because it was not a duly licensed 

contractor. The arbitrator re-opened the arbitration for the 

limited purpose of giving Vascos an opportunity to prove it had a 

valid license.

Vascos filed a certified copy of its license, showing its 

license was current and that John Matthew Welch was its RME. 

On the RME issue, Vascos filed a declaration by Victor Montes, 

the project manager at Gold’s property. Montes attached a 

“snippet” of two videos that purportedly show Welch at the 

construction site on June 29 and August 10, 2020. These videos 

are not in the record.

In January 2021, the arbitrator issued an interim award, 

finding that Vascos was entitled to recover $111,440.29 in 

damages and penalties. In the interim award, the arbitrator 

found: “The evidence of Mr. Welch’s participation was his 

attendance at the job site on at least one occasion, and that he 

worked remotely from his home in his capacity as RME. Working 

remotely would allow Mr. Welch to make administrative 
4

decisions. For this reason, the challenge to his RME status is 

over ruled.” The arbitrator issued a final award in February 

2021, adopting the relevant portions of her interim award.

In March 2021, Gold filed a petition to vacate arbitration 

award in the superior court. Vascos opposed the petition and 

asked the court to confirm the arbitration award.

On July 28, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting 

Gold’s petition to vacate the arbitration award.

1

 The trial court 

found Vascos failed to meet its burden of proving that Welch was 

a bona fide RME and, consequently, failed to show that Vascos 

was a duly licensed contractor at the time it provided Gold with 

construction services.

Vascos timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Misapply the Burden of 

Proof

A. An Arbitration Award Issued Pursuant to an

Unenforceable Contract May be Vacated

The trial court compelled an arbitration in this case 

pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract between the 

parties. The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory 

scheme regulating arbitration in furtherance of a “ ‘strong public 

policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively 

inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ ” (Moncharsh v. Heily 

& Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 (Moncharsh).)

1 The trial court also denied Vascos’ request to 

“partially correct” the award to grant Vascos attorney fees. 

Vascos does not make any argument on appeal regarding this 

issue.
5

Generally, an arbitration award is final. (See Moncharsh, 

supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9.) “The scope of judicial review of 

arbitration awards is extremely narrow because of the strong 

public policy in favor of arbitration and according finality to 

arbitration awards.” (Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 21, 33 (Ahdout).)

A trial court may vacate an arbitration award only on 

certain, enumerated grounds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2.) One 

ground is that the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers. (Id. at 

§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) “[T]he power of the arbitrator to 

determine the rights of the parties is dependent upon the 

existence of a valid contract under which such rights might 

arise.” (Loving & Evans v. Blick (1949) 33 Cal.2d 603, 610

(Loving & Evans).)

In Loving & Evans, an unlicensed contractor prevailed in 

an arbitration against its client. Our Supreme Court held the 

trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award because the 

underlying contract was illegal. (Loving & Evans, supra, 33 

Cal.2d at pp. 614–615.) Since Loving & Evans, the courts have 

repeatedly upheld the rule that arbitration awards issued 

pursuant to illegal or unenforceable contracts must be vacated. 

(See, e.g., All Points Traders, Inc. v. Barrington Associates (1989) 

211 Cal.App.3d 723, 738 [unlicensed real estate broker]; 

Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 882, 893 

(Lindenstadt) [unlicensed real estate broker]; Richey v.

AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 917 [“judicial review may 

be warranted when a party claims that an arbitrator has

enforced an entire contract or transaction that is illegal”]; 

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M 
6

Manufacturing Co. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 73–75 (Sheppard Mullin) 

[violation of attorney professional responsibility rules].)

While the California Supreme Court has “identified limits” 

to the Loving & Evans exception to arbitral finality, it has 

“not questioned the continued validity” of the exception. 

(Sheppard Mullin, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 75.) “[T]he basic 

premise of Loving & Evans is that an agreement to arbitrate is 

invalid and unenforceable if it is made as part of a contract that 

is invalid and unenforceable because it violates public policy.” 

(Sheppard Mullin, at pp. 78–79.)

B. The Trial Court and This Court Review the Issue of

Illegality/Unenforceability De Novo

“Whether a contract is entirely illegal, and therefore 

unenforceable, is an issue ‘for judicial determination upon the 

evidence presented to the trial court, and any preliminary 

determination of the legality by the arbitrator . . . should not be 

held to be binding upon the trial court.’ ” (Sheppard Mullin, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th 59 at pp. 74–75 [quoting Loving & Evans]; 

accord Ahdout, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 33.)

We review the trial court’s decision regarding whether an 

arbitrator exceeded his or her powers de novo. (Haworth v. 

Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 382; Ahdout, supra, 213 

Cal.App.4th p. 33.)

C. The Requirements of the CSLL

The purpose of the Contractors State License Law (CSLL; 

Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7000 et seq.)2is to protect the public from 

2 Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory 

references are to the Business and Professions Code.
7

incompetent and dishonest contractors who provide building and 

construction services. (Manela v. Stone (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 90, 

102; Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 

988, 995 (Hydrotech).) To further that goal, the CSLL “imposes 

strict and harsh penalties for a contractor’s failure to maintain 

proper licensure.” (MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser 

Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 418

(MW Erectors).)

Under the CSLL, a contractor may not maintain any 

action, legal or equitable, to recover compensation for the 

“performance of any act or contract” unless the contractor was 

duly licensed “at all times during the performance of that act or 

contract.” (§ 7031, subd. (a).)

A limited liability company (LLC) like Vascos may qualify 

for a license through the qualification of certain individuals 

affiliated with the company, including an RME. (§ 7068, subd. 

(b)(4).) If an RME is disassociated with an LLC, and is not 

replaced within 90 days of the disassociation date, the company’s

license is automatically suspended. (§ 7068.2, subd. (a); Buzgheia 

v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 387 

(Buzgheia).)

An RME must satisfy two basic requirements. The 

individual must be (1) a “bona fide employee” of the LLC and (2) 

“actively engaged” in the work for which the LLC has a license. 

(§ 7068, subd. (c)(1).) “Bona fide employee” of the LLC means an 

employee who is “permanently employed.” (§ 7068, subd. 

(c)(2)(A).) “ ‘Actively engaged’ means working 32 hours per week, 

or 80 percent of the total hours per week that the [LLC’s] 

business is in operation, whichever is less.” (§ 7068, subd. 

(c)(2)(B).)
8

An RME “shall be responsible for exercising supervision 

and control of their employer’s or principal’s construction 

operations to secure compliance” with the CSLL and related 

regulations. (§ 7068.1, subd. (a).)

D. The Trial Court’s Order Was Correct

Section 7031, subdivision (d) provides: “If licensure or 

proper licensure is controverted, then proof of licensure pursuant 

to this section shall be made by production of a verified certificate 

of licensure from the Contractors State License Board which 

establishes that the individual or entity bringing the action was 

duly licensed in the proper classification of contractors at all 

times during the performance of any act or contract covered by 

the action. Nothing in this subdivision shall require any person 

or entity controverting licensure or proper licensure to produce a 

verified certificate. When licensure or proper licensure is 

controverted, the burden of proof to establish licensure or proper 

licensure shall be on the licensee.”

Vascos suggests that it met its burden of demonstrating it 

had a valid license by producing a copy of its certificate and had 

no further burden to prove that it was properly licensed because 

defendant did not meet its burden of proving that the RME was a 

sham. We disagree. Indeed, the court in Buzgheia rejected the 

argument made by the contractor in that case that it “had no 

burden other than to produce the license certificate.” (Buzgheia,

supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) Instead, the court found that 

“production of the certificate is necessary, but insufficient if the 

point is controverted.” (Ibid.)

A party sued by a corporate contractor may also challenge 

the contractor’s license on the ground that the RME is a “sham.” 

(Buzgheia, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 385.) “If the RME was a 
9

sham, the contractor is barred from recovery because [it] is, in 

effect, acting outside the license, just like a specialty contractor 

who labors at a task for which he or she has no expertise nor 

license.” (Id. at p. 386.) The contractor has the burden of proof 

on the issue of whether it has a bona fide RME. (Id. at p. 389; 

Jeff Tracy, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 510, 

516–518 (Jeff Tracy, Inc.).)

In Jeff Tracy, Inc., the defendant argued the plaintiff 

contractor could not recover compensation because it had a sham 

RME. The trial court denied the contractor’s request for a jury 

trial on the issue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597, 

which permits non-jury trials on special defenses. The Court of 

Appeal reversed, holding that the contractor’s licensure—

including its satisfaction of the RME requirements—is an 

element of its breach of contract claim. (Jeff Tracy, Inc., supra, 

240 Cal.App.4th at p. 518.)

A plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proof with respect 

to each element of its causes of action. (Evid. Code, § 500.)

In Buzgheia, the defendants argued the plaintiff contractor 

could not prevail because his company had a sham RME. The 

trial court instructed the jury the contractor’s presentation of a 

certificate of licensure shifted the burden of proof on the issue of 

licensure to the defendants. (Buzgheia, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 383.) The Court of Appeal held this instruction was erroneous 

because the contractor’s burden “included the burden of proving 

compliance with the RME requirements.” (Id. at p. 393.)

Similarly, in the present case, Vascos’ presentation of a 

certificate of licensure did not end the inquiry or shift the burden 

of proof. As the trial court correctly determined, Vascos had the 

burden of proof on the issue of whether its purported RME, 
10

Welch, was bona fide. This is because Vascos’ licensure through 

a bona fide RME is an element of its cause of action.

Vascos did not meet its burden. It presented no evidence 

showing Welch was a “permanent” employee of the company. 

Vascos also failed to present any evidence that Welch worked 32 

hours per week, or 80 percent of the total hours per week that the

company’s business was in operation.

The only evidence in the record on this issue is a

declaration by project manager Victor Montes.3 Although Montes 

states that he attaches videos purporting to show Welch at Gold’s 

property, the videos are not in the record. In any case, even 

assuming Welch was at the project site on two occasions as 

Vascos claims, this falls far short of showing Welch was a bona 

fide RME.

The trial court correctly noted that “Vascos could have 

easily submitted a declaration from Welch establishing that he 

was a bona fide RME.” Vascos could have met its burden, the 

trial court stated, with a “five sentence declaration” from Welch. 

We agree with the trial court’s observation. The burden on 

Vascos was not high, yet it failed to meet it.

Vascos argues it never had the burden on the issue of 

licensure because the issue was not “controverted” by Gold within 

the meaning of section 7031, subdivision (d). We disagree.

3 The parties make different assertions about the 

evidence presented to the arbitrator regarding the RME issue. 

There was no court reporter at the arbitration hearing and very 

little of the evidence the arbitrator considered is in the record. 

From our perspective, “if it is not in the record, it did not 

happen.” (Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 

Cal.App.4th 362, 364.)
11

“[A] defendant’s answer containing a general denial of the 

material allegations of the contractor’s claim [citation] is 

sufficient to ‘controvert’ the contractor’s allegation of licensure, 

and thus invokes the requirement of section 7031, subdivision 

(d) . . . .” (Advantec Group, Inc. v. Edwin’s Plumbing Co., Inc.

(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 621, 624.) Here, though Gold did not file 

an answer in court, he did controvert Vascos’ licensure at the 

arbitration.

The AAA Construction Arbitration Rules provide that the 

parties may proceed under “Regular Track” or “Fast Track” 

procedures.4 Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the arbitrator

applied the Fast Track Procedures in this case.

Section F-2 of the Fast Track Procedures provides: “If an 

answer or counterclaim is to be filed, it shall be filed within seven 

calendar days after notice of the filing of the demand is sent by 

the AAA. All other requirements of Section R-4 apply.”

Section R-4(c)(i) of the Regular Track Procedures, in turn, 

provides: “A respondent may file an answering statement with 

the AAA within 14 calendar days after notice of the filing of the 

demand is sent by the AAA. . . . If no answering statement is 

filed within the stated time, the respondent will be deemed to 

deny the claim.”

In the present case, while Gold did not file an answering 

statement, he was “deemed” to deny Vascos’ allegations, 

including its allegation that it was a duly licensed contractor. 

Gold also argued in his closing arbitration brief that Vascos was 

4 The Fast Track Procedures are in the record. We 

take judicial notice of the remainder of the Construction 

Arbitration Rules. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).)
12

not duly licensed because Welch was not a bona fide RME. After 

Gold made this argument, Vascos was given an opportunity to 

present evidence on the issue at the arbitration.

Vascos’ contention that Gold did not controvert its licensure 

claim elevates form over substance. This argument also fails to 

account for the public policy underlying section 7031. The shield 

against the “evil targeted by section 7031” is undermined if the 

RME is sham. (Buzgheia, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) 

“Because of the strength and clarity of this policy, it is well 

settled that section 7031 applies despite injustice to the 

unlicensed contractor.” (Hydrotech, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 995.)

Moreover, there are sound public policy reasons for placing 

the burden on the contractor rather than the consumer under 

these circumstances. “The contractor will (or should) have 

knowledge of how he has utilized the RME. The contractor will 

(or should) have greater access to evidence, namely his own 

records, including payroll records, timesheets, the names of other 

employees who can testify to the activities of the RME and so 

forth. The ‘most desirable result in terms of public policy in the 

absence of proof’ that a contractor complied with the licensing 

laws, including the RME provisions thereof, is that the contractor 

who evades the law should be barred from court. [Citations].” 

(Buzgheia, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.)

Vascos argues that the trial court should have given 

“deference” to the arbitrator’s findings and that “[t]he Arbitration 

Award created a presumption of proper licensure.” As we have 

explained, however, this position has been repeatedly rejected by 

the courts. “A party seeking confirmation [of an arbitration 

award] cannot be permitted to rely upon the arbitrator’s 

conclusion of legality for the reason that paramount 
13

considerations of public policy require that this vital issue be 

committed to the court’s determination whenever judicial aid is 

sought.” (Loving & Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 614; accord 

Lindenstadt, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 892–893 [holding trial court’s 

failure to review issue of illegality de novo was error]; Sheppard 

Mullin, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 74–75 [affirming Loving & Evans

rule].)

Vascos’ reliance on MW Erectors is misplaced. There, the 

California Supreme Court held that “the CSLL does not 

automatically void all contracts entered by unlicensed 

contractors.” (MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 440.) In 

particular, the court held, “if fully licensed at all times during 

contractual performance, a contractor is not barred from 

recovering compensation for the work solely because he or she 

was unlicensed when the contract was executed.” (Id. at p. 419.)

MW Erectors did not involve judicial review of an 

arbitration award and stated nothing about the issue here, 

namely the burden of proof on the issue of a contractor’s 

licensure. Further, the trial court’s decision is consistent with

MW Erectors because there is no evidence that Vascos was a duly 

licensed contractor at any time, including when it performed its 

obligations under the contract.

Vascos’ citation to Templo Calvario Spanish Assembly of 

God v. Gardner Construction Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 509 

(Templo Calvario) is also unpersuasive. In Templo Calvario, an 

arbitrator ruled a consumer could disgorge fees it paid an 

unlicensed contractor. Citing MW Erectors, the court held the 

CSLL did not prohibit a consumer from arbitrating a dispute 

“simply because the contractor was unlicensed at the time of the 
14

signing of the construction contract.” (Templo Calvario, supra, 

198 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.)

The present case is factually distinguishable from Templo 

Calvario. Instead of a consumer seeking disgorgement from an 

unlicensed contractor, an unlicensed contractor is attempting to 

recover from a consumer. The Templo Calvario court expressly 

recognized this distinction. It noted that the CSLL and MW 

Erectors barred a contractor from “initiating any affirmative 

arbitration claim” and “bringing suit or using the courts to collect 

compensation of its work while unlicensed.” (Templo Calvario, 

supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.)

Vascos unconvincingly cites dicta in Tempo Calvario. The

Templo Calvario court stated that MW Erectors “effectively” 

overruled Loving & Evans “on the issue of whether a contract 

entered into by an unlicensed contractor is automatically ‘ “illegal 

and void.” ’ ” (Templo Calvario, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 

520.) Addressing this comment, the Ahdout court stated that 

“even if Templo Calvario correctly interprets the state of the law, 

the decision does not affect the outcome here.” (Ahdout, supra, 

213 Cal.App.4th at p. 39, fn. 8.)

The same is true in this case. Nothing in MW Erectors or 

Templo Calvario changes our analysis. Further, as explained 

ante, after MW Erectors, Templo Calvario, and Ahdout were 

decided, the California Supreme Court endorsed the continued 

validity of Loving & Evans, though it noted the decision has been 

limited in certain respects that do not change the outcome here. 

(See Sheppard Mullin, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 75–79.)

The trial court applied the correct burden of proof and 

reached the right result. Vascos did not meet its burden of 

proving it was a duly licensed contractor through a bona fide 
15

RME. The arbitration award therefore must be vacated because 

the arbitrator exceeded her powers.

II. Vascos’ Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

In his petition to vacate the arbitration award, Gold asked 

for an order permitting “very limited discovery to determine the 

existence of documents proving full-time employment of John 

Matthew Welch from June to November 2019, including: (a) 

payroll records with cancelled checks; (b) worker’s compensation 

employee reports; and (c) payroll tax returns.” (Italics omitted.) 

Gold also requested the trial court to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing with live witness testimony on whether Welch was a 

bona fide RME.

In its opposition to Gold’s petition, Vascos objected to 

permitting discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. Vascos 

argued that “Gold’s request for what would effectively be a new 

court trial on the issue of licensure is legally unsupported and 

unsupportable.” According to Vascos, the trial court only had 

authority, at most, to conduct “a de novo review of the available 

evidence to the trial court at the time of review.” (Italics and bold 

omitted.) Vascos asserted an evidentiary hearing would be an

inappropriate “fishing expedition” that “is clearly not supported 

by law.”5

Now, on appeal, Vascos argues that it “should have been 

given notice and an opportunity to present evidence of the bona 

5

In support of his request for an evidentiary hearing, 

Gold cited Ahdout, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 39–40 and 

Lindenstadt, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 893, fn. 8. Vascos 

argued Ahdout and Lindenstadt did not support Gold’s position. 

We do not reach this issue.
16

fides of its responsible managing employee prior to the trial 

court’s ruling.” The trial court, Vascos contends, “erred by not 

setting an evidentiary hearing.”

Gold argues Vascos “waived” a request for an evidentiary 

hearing and is judicially estopped from contending it was 

deprived of an evidentiary hearing.

A. Waiver/Forfeiture

“It is axiomatic that a party may not complain on appeal of 

rulings to which it acquiesced in the lower court.” (Porterville 

Citizens for Responsible Hillside Development v. City of 

Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 912 (Porterville).) 

Although “waiver” and “forfeiture” are often used 

interchangeably to describe a party’s failure to raise an issue in 

the trial court, the two terms should be differentiated. (In re 

Stier (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 63, 74.) “ ‘ “ ‘Whereas forfeiture is 

the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 

“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.) Forfeiture is “the 

correct legal term to describe the loss of the right to raise an 

issue on appeal due to the failure to pursue it in the trial court.” 

(Ibid.; accord Porterville, at p. 912.)

Vascos forfeited on appeal any argument that the trial 

court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing because it 

did not ask for one in the trial court. To the contrary, Vascos 

successfully opposed such a hearing.

B. Judicial Estoppel

Because we conclude Vascos forfeited its argument that the 

trial court denied it an evidentiary hearing, we do not reach the 
17

issue of whether Vascos is judicially estopped from making that 

argument.

DISPOSITION

The July 28, 2021, order of the superior court is affirmed. 

Respondent Robert Gold is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J. *

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P.J.

KIM, J.

*

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.