Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government

Mapping the Future of the Middle East 

A report prepared for the 

National Intelligence Council 

Based on a workshop held on 

16 May 2005 

The National Intelligence Council routinely sponsors unclassified conferences with 

outside experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level of debate on critical 

issues. The views expressed in this conference report are those of individual participants 

and do not represent official US Government positions or views or those of the 

participants' organizations. 

CR 2005-03

August 2005

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Contents 

Page

I. Introduction 5

II. Economic Issues and the Context of Globalization 

Implications of High Oil Prices 

China and India as Consumers and Investors 

Trade a Key to Economic Success 

Questions for Research 

5

5

7

8

8

III. Political Issues 

Prospects for Democratization 

Islamists and Democracy 

Democratic Constraints 

International Leverage 

Questions for Research 

9 

9 

9 

10 

11 

11 

IV. Sub-Regional Conflicts and Terrorism 

Arab-Israeli Conflict 

International Terrorism

Islamic Trend Toward Evangelism

Questions for Research 

11 

12 

13 

14 

14 

V. Geopolitical Landscape 

US Influence 

Influence of Other External Powers 

Rise of Iran 

Regime Change 

Questions for Research 

15 

15 

15 

16 

17 

17 

VI. Final Note 17 

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Mapping the Future of the Middle East 

I. Introduction 

This paper summarizes a one-day conference of Middle East and functional specialists 

convened by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in May 2005 to discuss likely 

regional trends between now and 2020. The discussion was informed by the NIC’s 2020 

Project report Mapping the Global Future (December 2004). In addition to debating 

trends currently observable or on the horizon, participants identified additional questions 

deserving research and analysis in each of the following four areas: economic issues and 

the context of globalization, political issues, sub-regional conflicts and terrorism, and the 

geopolitical landscape. 

Among the major themes of the economic discussion were the uneven benefits of 

globalization in the region, the challenge of diversifying economies and building trade in 

the face of high oil prices and the implications of a likely collapse of prices. Political

trends addressed included the growing but still weak and essentially illiberal demands for 

reform, the adaptability of authoritarian regimes, and the nature of US influence. 

Islamism in various forms—extremist, evangelical, politically accommodating—was a 

major focus of discussion. Participants debated the extent to which the Arab-Israeli 

conflict continues to motivate regional politics and suggested that terrorism might 

become increasingly diffuse and difficult to counter. Participants saw an increasing role 

for China economically, but one that will not be translated into real political influence for 

some time. Participants recognized India’s growing significance but believed it was still 

far behind China in terms of influence in the region. They expected Iran as a rising 

regional power to present a significant challenge for the United States. 

II. Economic Issues and the Context of Globalization 

The participants assessed that while some Middle Eastern countries have made progress 

in diversifying their economies, the area as a whole remains economically 

underdeveloped and highly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues. Smaller countries are 

doing a better job of integrating into the world economy and will benefit more from

globalization than those states with either large populations or high hydrocarbon 

revenues. Current high oil prices will allow some states, notably Saudi Arabia (as well as 

Algeria, Libya, and Oman) to avoid making difficult economic and social decisions, but 

will not let those with smaller resources (such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and

Yemen) off the hook. A price collapse, which will have significant economic and 

political ramifications in the area, is likely in five to 15 years. 

Implications of High Oil Prices 

In periods of record-high oil prices such as the present, the major oil-producing regimes 

will find it easier to avoid political and economic reforms that would otherwise be 

necessary. As one expert said, “With $50 oil, you can cover a multitude of political and 

economic sins.” High prices will distort the incentives for economic reform, temporarily 

allowing the oil-producing regimes to continue practices that are not in their long-term 

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economic interest, such as public sector domination of private activity, restrictive 

measures on foreign investment, and high government spending. 

High oil prices will similarly affect the supply of and demand for political reform. High 

prices give the oil-producing regimes revenue that they use to co-opt and buy off major 

social constituencies and elites. Additional revenue can also be used to strengthen police 

forces and militaries, fortifying the coercive apparatuses that ultimately enforce the 

regimes’ power. High oil prices may not only cause political reform in the oil-producing 

countries to stagnate; they might even cause regimes to retract and renege on some

political liberalization that has already happened. On the demand side, high prices and 

the accompanying relative prosperity alleviate demands for change; society is more 

tolerant of political repression if the regime is providing major economic benefits. 

Not all regimes will be affected equally by high oil prices. For regimes without major 

oil-production capabilities, high oil prices will not allow the regimes to escape or even 

long postpone needed economic reforms. The deeper structural reasons that necessitate 

reform will remain in place, and the urgency for reform will remain. Some countries 

have locked in enough momentum towards economic change that high prices are unlikely 

even to significantly delay reform. Similarly, while marginal additional revenue from

high oil prices will allow the regimes some degree of leeway to absorb potential demands 

for political change—as Egypt and Tunisia may have recently done by hiring additional 

public servants to reduce unemployment—it will not give these regimes the ability to 

counter demands for political change for long. One way in which hydrocarbons will be 

less of a factor in the region than in the past is labor migrations; the Gulf countries now 

largely employ unskilled laborers from Asia and South Asia and Arab countries 

increasingly export labor to Europe. 

Oil prices rise and fall in cycles, and although prices are not likely to fall in the next one 

to five years, they are likely to drop precipitously at some point in the next five to 15 

years as companies begin seeing returns on over-investments made during the current 

high price period. The longer prices continue to rise, the more dramatic their fall is likely 

to be. The consequences of that fall will be compounded by governments’ ambitious oil 

price calculations: the longer prices continue to rise, the more likely governments are to 

project future revenues based on higher prices and spend accordingly. When prices fall, 

demands for political change will become extremely acute at the same time that regimes 

will have fewer resources to counter and deflect those demands. The participants 

believed that as a result, the next oil price fall might well produce a major crisis for the 

oil-producing regimes, especially if it coincides with significant pressures from other 

sources. An analogy was drawn to the fall of the Shah; the oil price spike in the early 

1970s sparked massive overspending; when prices fell in the late 1970s, the associated 

economic problems combined with political discontent and strong human rights criticism

from the Carter Administration to undermine the Shah’s regime. 

Participants differed as to whether high oil prices will cause the oil-producing Gulf

countries to slow their diversification away from oil. Some experts noted that the 

additional revenue from high oil prices creates little incentive for governments to 

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diversify away from oil production. The longer high oil prices persist, the more likely 

governments are to project high oil revenues in the future, creating a more optimistic 

long-term budget picture that discourages diversification. Others stated, however, that 

countries such as Bahrain and Dubai are already committed to and invested in 

diversification, and they argued that even high oil prices would not slow that process. 

China and India as Consumers and Investors 

As the 2020 Project Report emphasizes, energy consumption will increase significantly in 

the next 15 years as demand rises in China and India, impelling these two ascendant 

powers to play a growing political and economic role in the Middle East. There is an 

international consensus that expanding hydrocarbon production capability to meet rising 

demands is a necessity, and the rise of China and India will be a major trend both 

internationally and in the region. 

The role of parastatal oil companies such as PetroChina will increase, especially in an

environment of high prices, allowing their patron states to develop closer economic and 

political ties with oil-producing regimes. When oil prices are low, relatively better 

contract terms make investment more attractive for traditional profit-driven multinational 

oil companies (with their comparative advantages in technology, efficiency, and project 

management). But when prices are high, with correspondingly more costly contract 

terms, politically-driven parastatal companies such as PetroChina are more likely to 

invest. Parastatal companies’ political agenda makes them more willing to tolerate 

financial risk and lower profits, because their actions are an extension of state policy 

instead of a purely financial calculation. This is especially important in regions where 

many countries either have extremely restrictive regulations on foreign investment (Saudi 

Arabia) or consistently offer poor business terms (Iran). Parastatals’ greater willingness 

to invest in poor climates will allow their corresponding states to create closer political 

and economic ties with oil-producing regimes. China is the clear leader in parastatal 

influence and impact in the Middle East; India is also a player but is playing catch-up. 

Some participants were uncomfortable with what they viewed as the 2020 Project 

Report’s adversarial tone in discussing the rise of China and India. In an interdependent 

world in which an international consensus for greater energy production exists, there is 

no need to perceive the rise of China and India in a threatening way. 

Participants differed on whether the global consensus in favor of expanding production 

will mean an international de-emphasis on political liberalization. Some argued that the 

imperative of expanding production, combined with the increasing role of actors like 

China that are willing (and even eager) to de-emphasize political liberalization as an 

international issue, is likely to reduce the international pressure on regimes for political

reform. Others noted, however, that the international investment that globalization brings 

often carries with it international business norms and practices of transparency and 

accountability. In this sense, globalization can be a politically opening exercise. 

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Trade a Key to Economic Success 

As the 2020 Project Report states, integration in the global economy will become more

important to economic success. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements are taking on 

an increasingly important role in mediating countries’ relationships with the global 

economy. Bahrain’s bilateral agreement with the United States has set a precedent that 

other Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, are interested in 

following. Saudi Arabia feels threatened by US agreements with individual Gulf 

countries, which it perceives as detrimental to the regional cooperation in the Gulf 

Cooperation Council. 

Conference participants debated which trade frameworks (regional, bilateral, or 

multilateral) have the greatest potential to bring economic success and/or economic and 

political liberalization. Some experts stressed the political and economic benefits that 

multilateral integration into the world economy through World Trade Organization 

(WTO) mechanisms would bring. The WTO is the gateway to the global economy, and 

joining it brings international standards of transparency and accountability. On the other 

hand, others endorsed the bilateral approach the United States has taken with Bahrain and 

other countries, noting that it brings similar standards of accountability and that joining 

the WTO brings shocks in addition to benefits. Countries with fewer skilled laborers will 

be forced to compete with other countries in a framework of rules that disadvantages 

them. Still other experts endorsed the idea of regional integration in order to address the 

area’s labor/industry imbalance. 

Questions for Research 

Participants raised a number of questions as deserving further exploration: 

• What are the likely political effects of the inevitable collapse of oil prices? How can 

oil resources be managed to minimize price cycles and reduce volatility? Can 

stabilization funds used for this purpose also bring political and economic

transparency and accountability?

• Are regional, bilateral, or multilateral frameworks of cooperation likely to bring the 

greatest economic gains? Political gains?

• According to available statistics, many states in the region have very low levels of 

information technology (IT) infrastructure and access, even compared to other 

developing countries. However, anecdotal evidence indicates far greater IT 

investment and usage than statistics indicate. Are existing IT statistics accurate 

measures of Middle Eastern countries’ IT capabilities?

• What economic factors influence the timing of transitions from authoritarianism? Is 

the Latin America example appropriate for the Middle East? 

• What kind of crises can be expected regarding water use and availability as this 

resource becomes increasingly scarce? Does environmental pollution, for example, 

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water contaminated by hydrocarbon waste, offer opportunities for transnational 

cooperation?

III. Political Issues 

While participants generally agreed that chances for political liberalization were 

increasing in the region, there are still significant factors militating against widespread 

democratization. Such factors include the ability of authoritarian regimes to adapt to and 

withstand pressures, the weak and illiberal nature of citizens’ demand for democracy, and 

lack of seriousness in Western pressure for change. Islamism will continue to play a 

major role in the political life of the region, but perhaps in less extreme and more varied 

ways than suggested by the 2020 Project Report. 

Prospects for Democratization 

The 2020 Project Report argues that economic stagnation has held back democratization 

in the Middle East. Conference participants noted that such explanations disregard the 

fact that Arab authoritarian regimes have held onto power partly because they are skilled 

in managing internal and external pressures. The regimes’ semi-authoritarian type of 

government is intentionally gauged to allow a limited degree of political participation and 

economic liberalization without opening either arena to full contestation. 

Conference participants agreed with the 2020 report’s assessment that “democratic 

consensus could gain ground in Middle Eastern countries,” but suggested that at present 

the odds are still against such a development. The regimes’ current steps toward 

liberalization are tactical, easily reversible, and in some cases are already being reversed. 

Leaders are frightened to let go of power, because it might cost them not only their social, 

political, and economic dominance, but in some cases their lives. So far, splits within 

ruling elites are not observable in most countries, although there are a few indicators of

such a possibility in Egypt. Some participants believed that regimes are so unlikely to 

democratize that there is a major possibility of reinvigorated authoritarianism. 

 

Regarding the demand for political change, the popular desire for democracy in the 

region is widespread but appears to be shallow, illiberal, and majoritarian in nature. 

There is widespread and significant popular desire for more free, open, participatory, and 

accountable government, but the desire does not encompass the full range of rights and 

liberties considered essential to liberal democracy. Most participants believed that 

significant secular democratic forces are unlikely to emerge. Most secular leaders (such 

as Saddam Hussayn) have been authoritarian and often brutal. Democratic political 

forces are most likely to emerge from Islamist movements. 

Islamists and Democracy 

The participants agreed with the 2020 report assessment that Islamism, fueled by 

political, economic, conflict-related, and geopolitical forces, will have a significant global 

impact over the next 15 years. Conference participants believed, however, that the 

impact would not resemble the “New Caliphate” scenario portrayed in the 2020 Project 

Report. The creation of a trans-territorial ideocracy, or a widely recognized Islamic 

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authority that transcends national boundaries, is extremely unlikely. Instead, radical 

Islam will mainly affect traditional state structures and societal norms. 

The 2020 report, conference participants agreed, draws too dire and undifferentiated a 

picture of the political role Islamists will play in the region. Islamist movements’ current 

programs—and the trajectory of what their programs might become were they allowed 

full participation in competitive political systems—differ significantly from place to 

place in the region. Some experts believe that many non-violent Islamist movements (in 

Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan, among other places) have demonstrated a 

willingness to play by democratic rules and that there is a broader region-wide trend 

towards increasing moderation by Islamists. These organizations represent a powerful 

and broad political constituency, and the participants believed it is in the United States’ 

interest for them to participate and become more moderate, as opposed to being excluded 

and becoming more radical. 

The report expresses legitimate worries about the degree to which Islamist actors would 

be dedicated to democratic principles, but it omits the fact that secular leaders have 

shown even less dedication to democracy. Some participants pointed out that the most 

vicious regimes in the Middle East have been those with secular modernizing traditions. 

Other experts argued that Islamists are as likely to be authoritarian as the current rulers, 

even if they are willing to play by democratic rules while they are in opposition. They 

noted that, especially in the Gulf, it was likely that Islamists would come to power 

through free and fair elections. The regimes had only managed to avoid this scenario by 

conducting sham elections, as in Bahrain, where the ruling family unilaterally imposed an 

appointed consultative council despite the Islamists’ success in elections.

Participants debated whether Islamists’ explicit commitment to democratic principles and 

coordination with secularists represent new trends. Some analysts pointed to the 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s 50-page declaration in 2004 endorsing elections, reform, 

accountability, and nonviolence as evidence of a new era in Islamists’ dedication to 

democracy. Many also see the Brotherhood’s cooperation with the Kifaya opposition 

movement in Egypt as an indication of budding cooperation between Islamists and 

secularists. Other analysts, however, noted the Brotherhood’s past cooperation with 

secular parties in Egyptian elections as evidence that this trend was not new. 

Democratic Constraints 

The participants opined that if political reform in the region is to succeed without 

bringing about major instability, new institutions and processes need to define the rules of 

the game. This applies to both Islamists and secularists, as both have the potential to 

govern undemocratically. Rather than relying solely on leaders’ goodwill and dedication 

to democracy, it would be prudent to box them in with constitutional, institutional, and 

procedural constraints. These might include the separation of powers, independent 

judiciaries, fixed election cycles, and perhaps bills of rights. 

Some experts argued that such constraints could only be established after opposition 

forces come to power. In other regions (such as Eastern Europe), contestation has 

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generally preceded rigorous democratic constraints. The international community is not 

in a position to assume the worst about Islamists’ intentions, and the demonstration effect 

of their electoral victory would be a powerful force for moderation upon Islamists 

elsewhere. Other experts argued, however, that constraints must precede (or occur 

simultaneously with) free and fair elections. Governments tend to act undemocratically if

unconstrained by democratic parameters, and to delay the establishment of those 

parameters endangers the likelihood of repeated iterations of the democratic process. 

Some analysts saw the dearth of civil society, especially in the Gulf, as a major reason for 

the extremism of many Islamist actors. Because Islamists have few civil society outlets 

in which to organize, they are marginalized and radicalized. Others, however, stressed 

the importance of rigorous constitutional frameworks in constraining Islamists and 

consolidating democracy. They noted that people in the region place much greater 

emphasis on constitutions than on civil society. 

International Leverage 

Participants debated whether Western pressure to democratize is likely to be a catalyst for 

change in the Arab world. There was concern that while regimes may declare their 

dedication to political liberalization, behavior is less likely to change; and the question

then becomes to what extent will the United States and other Western powers exert real 

leverage on friendly regimes. 

Participants believed that among the more effective kinds of pressure that the United 

States could exert would be to press for electoral monitoring. Monitoring is an essential 

mechanism to improve the transparency and legitimacy of electoral processes, and 

elections should be monitored by both domestic and international organizations. US 

demands for this, however, risk tainting domestic monitors with the stigma of US 

interference. Calls for electoral monitoring should be made by respected international 

organizations with no direct tie to the United States. 

Questions for Research 

Among questions participants believed needed further exploration: 

• Among the tremendous diversity of Islamists, which Islamist leaders and 

organizations are likely to behave democratically both in opposition and in power?

• What is the future of civil-military relations in the region? Will it be a component of 

reinvigorated authoritarianism or will the military gradually cede to civilian control? 

• What are the most effective institutions and procedures to introduce some element of 

safety into political competition, and when and how can they be most effectively 

promoted?

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IV. Sub-Regional Conflicts and Terrorism 

Looking out over the next 15 years, conference participants debated the extent to which 

the transnational issues of the past 20 years—the Arab-Israeli conflict and terrorism—

will continue to affect the Middle East. There were disagreements about whether the 

Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to be the major issue motivating Arab political

behavior. Participants agreed that terrorism would continue, perhaps in a more 

fragmented way than envisioned in the 2020 report. They also pointed out that 

developments in the Islamist movement suggest a trend toward a more evangelistic 

approach based on reforming societies as opposed to overthrowing regimes. 

Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be tremendously important to Arabs at a symbolic 

level, and as long as it is unresolved, it will hinder political liberalization in the region. 

The 2004 United Nations Arab Human Development Report cites three consequences of 

the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Middle East, which will continue to operate if the peace 

process stagnates, or if the current situation degenerates: 

• The pervasive sense of insecurity caused by the conflict facilitates a rally-around-theflag effect that de-legitimizes internal critics. 

• The conflict creates a rationalization for the diversion of national resources into 

excessively strong national security establishments. 

• Regimes use the conflict as an excuse for domestic repression, and the public is more 

willing to tolerate repression in a conflict-oriented environment. 

Each of these three consequences negatively affects the supply of and demand for 

political reform in the region, although they apply differently to countries depending on a 

country’s geographic proximity to and relationship with Israel. 

In some cases domestic imperatives can override the pressures of the conflict, but the 

conflict still exerts a powerful force, especially in countries close to Israel. The 

convulsion of Lebanon after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is 

one example; the domestic outrage at Hariri’s assassination was strong enough that 

Syrian forces were forced to withdraw despite the unresolved situation with Israel. Yet 

even this watershed moment did not completely overshadow the conflict; Hizballah 

continues to justify its armament on the grounds that it provides a deterrent against Israeli 

aggression. 

In theory, Palestine has more potential than Iraq to provide a positive democratic 

demonstration effect to the rest of the region if its democratic experiment is allowed to 

proceed. Some participants thought Arabs might find more in common with Palestinians, 

who are now wrestling with issues such as corruption, the role of the security services in 

society, and political Islam, than with Iraqis, who face a different set of challenges. The 

growing popularity of HAMAS, however, raises the possibility that the democratic 

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process might be shut down or suspended at some point. HAMAS is gaining ground on 

Fatah and appears likely to perform well in the upcoming legislative elections, due more 

to Palestinians’ disgust with corruption and inefficiency than to the appeal of political 

Islam. The current process is fraught with risks; overwhelming HAMAS success could 

reduce the willingness of other regimes in the region (such as Jordan) to open additional 

political space to Islamists. On the other hand, an abridgement of the democratic process 

would send a negative message to other Islamists in the region who seek to play by the 

rules of the democratic game, potentially radicalizing their demands for change. 

 

Participants disagreed about the degree to which a stagnant or suspended peace process—

for example after a Gaza withdrawal—would increase the potential for terrorism and 

anger towards the United States and Israel. Some experts argued that if the withdrawal

from Gaza suspends the peace process in formaldehyde, then not only will Gaza be in 

crisis, but the atmosphere in the West Bank will be little better. It is conceivable in such 

a scenario that Palestine could in the future become, like Afghanistan and Iraq before it, a 

draw for Islamic militants from throughout the region. Others argued, however, that even 

a suspended peace process offers reasonable opportunities—through Israeli policy, 

cooperation from Jordan and Egypt, and international investment—to manage the conflict 

and provide for tolerable quality of life among Palestinians. 

Participants debated the degree to which more intensive US engagement in mediating the 

Palestinian-Israeli conflict would improve public opinion in the region about the United 

States. Some argued that due to the deep suspicion of US motives in the region, it would 

take major and dramatic policy changes—such as a reassessment of the United State’s 

special relationship with Israel—to signal US credibility on democratization and the 

peace process. Others contended that any appearance of additional US engagement or 

pressure on Israel would play well in the Arab world, especially the Gulf. 

Participants also differed about whether Arab political behavior, as opposed to attitudes, 

is motivated by the conflict. Some experts noted that public opinion data shows the 

Arab-Israeli conflict to be the number one political issue for Arabs and by far the 

dominant driver of anger and suspicion towards the United States. Others questioned the 

value of public opinion surveys in authoritarian countries, however, and stressed that the 

conflict is probably not the most important driver of Arabs’ political behavior. Other 

more immediate issues, such as governance, are more important—even though such 

issues might not elicit as visceral a reaction—particularly in countries not bordering 

Israel. 

International Terrorism

Participants agreed with the 2020 report’s assessment that globalization’s impact on 

terrorism will reinforce the growth of small, decentralized movements at the expense of 

centralized, hierarchical organizations such as al-Qa’ida. The riots caused by the 

Newsweek report about Qur’an desecration by American soldiers in Guantanamo Bay 

provide a vivid example of the way that information technology and globalization have 

strengthened the potential for decentralized actions. Networks to disseminate 

information efficiently to interested parties already exist; information inputted into them

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quickly spreads. These new networks, being virtual, are more difficult to detect and 

combat and make it increasingly easy for extremists to conduct what one participant 

called “fungible jihad,” or a “jihad-of-the-month.” Whereas previous jihads were 

distinct and required extensive dedication and preparation, new networks allow for jihads

to be declared and publicized at the click of a mouse. Thus, counterterrorist strategies 

built on eliminating the top leadership of terrorist organizations will be insufficient. 

Islamic Trend Toward Evangelism 

Participants judged that underlying almost all of the security- and Islam-related areas of 

the 2020 Project Report is a pervasive focus on Bin Ladinism and the September 11 

attacks, as well as rhetoric reinforcing the notion of a clash of civilizations. In an era of 

globalization, the Muslim world reads these reports too, and Muslims will not hesitate to 

dissect the report with detailed intellectual arguments on al-Jazeera. 

 

As noted above, the report rightly states that “the spread of radical Islam will have a 

significant global impact leading to 2020,” but that it focuses almost exclusively on 

violent Islamic extremists to the exclusion of more moderate and political Islamist trends. 

There are many echoes of violent groups such as Indonesia’s Jema’at Islami in the report, 

but not of moderate, non-violent and much larger Islamist organizations such as Nahdat 

al-Ulema, which have shown a willingness to play by democratic rules of the game. 

These moderates will have an immensely important global impact over the next 15 years, 

and their role deserves at least as much analysis as that of the extremists. 

Over the next 20 years, it is likely that Islamism will move from a state-centered political 

framework towards a more evangelical orientation. Early indications of this trend 

include the growing popularity of organizations such as Tablighi Jema’at, the Preaching 

Society, which is a fundamentalist Islamic movement that generally operates in South 

Asia and other areas outside the Middle East but draws some of its financial support from 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These types of evangelical groups are more interested in 

societal transformation and change than in formal political power. While evangelical 

organizations are attracting more followers, political Islamist groups that concentrate on 

the implementation of shari’a are fraying and fading. Internal schisms have arisen 

regarding the meaning of implementing the shari’a; people are more inclined to agree on 

the general idea that societies should follow the will of God than they are to endorse the 

enforcement of rules established centuries ago. It is unclear, with the decline of statecentered political Islam, what other tendencies or ideologies may take over the channels 

of political grievance and opposition that political Islam has largely occupied for the last

several decades. 

Questions for Research 

Participants suggested that among questions needing further research were: 

• Is the direction of large-scale Islamist organizations such as Tablighi Jema’at towards 

extremism and violence or towards moderation and accommodation?

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• If state-centered political Islam fades, what types of organizations will take over the 

channels of grievance and opposition that they have dominated in recent decades?

V. Geopolitical Landscape 

Participants felt that continuing US influence will depend upon restoring stability to Iraq 

in order to enable the withdrawal of US military forces and avoid a possible resurgence 

of “anti-colonial” style politics. In any event, some countries in the region will seek to 

“hedge” their ties to the United States through cultivating expanded relations with China. 

Other countries, notably all of the North African states, are eager to build closer ties with 

the United States. Trends affecting the balance of power within the region include efforts 

by Iran to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East and Central Asia and the 

resurgence of the Shi’a in Iraq and elsewhere. 

US Influence 

Participants agreed that the current period is characterized by Arab countries’ stunning 

political weakness relative to the United States, and this situation is unlikely to change in 

the coming period. After a war in which the United States overthrew a major Arab 

regime, no country took even the minimal step of breaking off diplomatic relations with 

the United States. There has been no attempt to boycott American oil investment, and 

some regimes that used to be anti-US (such as Libya) have moved closer to more normal 

relations. 

 

Participants differed, however, about whether this weakness really contributes to US 

influence. Some contend that the Arab weakness indicates a high degree of US political 

leverage and even diffuse support in the Arab world. They point to American cultural 

influence, the growing role of English, and the societal level (where there have been 

fewer manifestations of anti-American protest than one might expect) as evidence that the 

United States is not as hated among Arabs as it might sometimes appear. Others, 

however, contend that while Arabs may value American education and technology, they 

remain deeply hostile to and suspicious of US policies in the region. Arab leaders 

cooperate with the United States primarily because their other options are limited. 

An exception to the trend of increased suspicion of the United States is North Africa, 

where countries such as Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia will continue to seek closer 

relations with the United States as a hedge against European influence. Libya also will 

continue to try to develop the relationship with the United States as a necessary 

component of ending its isolation. 

Influence of Other External Powers

Increased political roles for China and India are still distant possibilities; for now, when 

they come to the Middle East, they come “speaking English.” China is far ahead of India 

in terms of investments. In parts of the Middle East, China and even Russia are discussed 

as more salient models for economic and political reform than the United States or 

Europe, but it is unclear whether this will lead to increased influence for such countries. 

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Participants discussed whether Gulf countries in particular fear US hegemony and will 

seek recourse to other rising world powers. Some experts noted that since the Iran-Iraq 

war, the Gulf regimes have decided to stake their security on the US military presence

rather than on their own defense capabilities. Bahrain and Qatar have demonstrated their 

willingness to host major US military forces. But other experts saw Saudi Arabia as 

developing a distinct fear of US hegemony in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia sees itself 

surrounded by American military forces, recognizes its own vulnerability, and notes the 

calls from some American quarters to hold it responsible for Islamic extremism. These 

factors are causing it to consider other military and economic partners. China and India, 

with their increasing appetite for oil, their escalating military strength, and their 

diplomatic leverage, both provide possible counterweights to the United States. 

Iraq and the US Military Presence. Most participants believed that, among Iraq’s 

neighbors, the US military presence in Iraq is a source of uncertainty and suspicion about 

US intentions. As long as there are major concentrations of US troops there, regimes in 

surrounding countries will be uncertain and suspicious about US intentions. At the same

time, an immediate US withdrawal from Iraq would create an even greater degree of 

instability inside Iraq. How and when to withdraw from Iraq is one of the central 

paradoxes facing the United States in the Middle East. 

Revival and Empowerment of the Shi’a. One clear result so far of the US intervention in 

Iraq and the January 2005 elections has been the dramatic empowerment of the Shi’a 

majority. The ascendance to power of the Shi’a in Iraq, one of the definitive winners 

from the US involvement, has tremendous emotive value and symbolism and aspirations 

and will change the governing equation for other regimes with Shi’a populations. Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani is creating a region-wide virtual Shi’a community. Several Iraqi Shi’a 

figures have spent significant amounts of time in Iran, and some Iranian figures have 

lived or studied in Iraq, reinforcing the possibility for cross-border coordination. 

In discussing the shape of future Shi’a identity in the region, some experts argued that the 

Iraqi example would spark major demands for change from Shi’a populations in other 

Gulf states, potentially endangering some of the existing regimes. But other experts 

noted that national identity trumped Shi’a identity in the Iran-Iraq war, and that in many 

Gulf regimes the Shi’a seek protection from the ruling families against Salafi excesses. 

Major influences on future Shi’a identity in the region will include the role of religion in 

the Iraqi constitution and the degree to which Shi’a perceive the potential to improve 

their situation through peaceful electoral means. The regimes’ reaction will be crucial; 

political stagnation or de-liberalization could radicalize Shi’a demands for participation, 

while liberalization would allow demands to be expressed through peaceful processes. 

Rise of Iran

Participants felt that the 2020 Report gives inadequate attention to Iran as an ascendant 

power. Iran is at a “Prussian moment” in its history—not necessarily in the sense of 

military expansionism, but more in terms of political, economic, and cultural ambitions. 

Iranian politicians frequently talk about increasing their zone of influence, not only in the 

Middle East but also in Central Asia, and Iran wants the United States to recognize its 

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Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government
Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government

status as a regional power. Thus US-Iranian rivalry for influence over Iran’s Arab and 

Asian neighbors is likely. Factors that will affect the nature and degree of Iranian 

influence in the neighborhood include whether Iran acquires nuclear weapons, whether 

Iran has a military conflict with the United States or another power over the nuclear issue, 

and whether the Iranian people find a way to remove or sideline the increasingly 

unpopular clerical regime. 

Participants believed that while many American analysts tend to focus on the clerical

regime as the main constraint on change, they often fail to see that Iran’s underlying 

economic and social situation gives it advantages over other countries in the region. Iran 

will gain significantly from globalization; the country has made relatively large strides 

towards strengthening its information technology capabilities, in addition to its oil 

resources and other economic capabilities. Persian is the third most used language on the 

Internet, and there are tens of thousands of Iranian blogs. Participants also noted that Iran 

suffers from serious internal issues including a severe drug problem (its addicted 

population is estimated at over one million) and trafficking, which results in the death of 

thousands of police officers. 

Regime Change 

In addition to the possibility of a change in the character of the Iranian regime, 

participants identified the Syrian regime and Saudi monarchy as potentially vulnerable to 

significant changes. Regarding Syria, participants discussed the possibility of the Sunni 

merchant class, the Muslim Brotherhood, or some new variant of the Alawi ruling elite 

gaining power. Regarding Saudi Arabia, changes in the nature of the current SaudiWahhabi bargain—i.e. regime change rather than regime removal—could have 

significant implications for the Saudi role in the region and the US-Saudi relationship. 

Questions for Research 

Among the issues identified by participants as needing further research and analysis: 

• There are significant and growing Muslim populations in Europe, Russia, India, 

China, and the United States. Some flashpoints have exploded already (Chechnya, 

Kashmir), while others have remained dormant (Muslims in China). What 

consequences will the growth of these populations have both on their own countries, 

on the broader Muslim world, and on the Middle East? 

• What are the consequences of integrating the rising powers (India, China) into 

multilateral organizations like the International Energy Agency? How are they likely

to react if they are excluded from the system? 

• Considering the possibility that certain states—particularly Syria and Saudi Arabia—

are vulnerable to regime change during the coming 15 years, what are the resulting 

implications for US interests?

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Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government
Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government

VI. Final Note 

Underlying discussions during the conference was the theme that a stronger American 

understanding of the Middle East and North Africa is needed. One participant wondered 

aloud about the preparation (or lack thereof) of “people who would be sitting in these 

chairs in the future,” expressing a hope that study of the region might begin at much 

secondary or even elementary educational levels. There was a general consensus 

regarding the need for greater training in the languages, cultures, and history of the region 

to deal with the challenges discussed in this report. 

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Discussion paper—does not represent the views of the US Government