GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate

March 1999 MILITARY 

OPERATIONS

Status of DOD’s 

Efforts to Develop 

Future Warfighting 

Capability

GAO/NSIAD-99-64

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

GAO

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280338 Letter

March 31, 1999

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman, Committee on

 Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) is implementing a plan designed to 

meet the critical security challenges of the future by transforming the 

Armed Forces into a joint force capable of meeting the requirements of 

21st century operations. A key element of achieving this transformation is 

the conduct of joint warfighting experimentation, which involves assessing 

joint warfighting concepts that could lead to changes to doctrine, 

organization, training and education, materiel, leadership, and personnel 

(DOTMLP). As agreed with your office, this letter responds to the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services' report on the fiscal year 1999 DOD 

Authorization Act and (1) describes the status of DOD’s efforts to 

implement its joint experimentation program, (2) identifies some of the 

factors that we believe contribute to the success of a joint experimentation 

program, and (3) provides answers to the issues posed in the report 

regarding the extent of DOD’s support for future warfighting. 

Results in Brief DOD is beginning to implement its future warfighting vision and joint 

experimentation, both of which are formidable efforts. It has done a 

significant amount of work in establishing the processes to implement both 

efforts, but it is too early to assess their success. Joint Vision (JV) 2010 is 

the conceptual template for future joint warfighting. To provide joint 

policy and guidance for the implementation of JV 2010 in December 1998, 

the Joint Staff published the Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

(JIMP). The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is responsible for JV 

2010 implementation. The U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), designated 

by the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for joint experimentation, is 

responsible for concept development, assessment, and experimentation 

within the program to implement JV 2010. 

USACOM’s role as executive agent for joint experimentation is less than a 

year old. In that time, it has developed a plan to implement its 

responsibilities, which includes a detailed joint experimentation process 

and an organization to implement it. It also has developed its first Joint 
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Experimentation Campaign Plan (CPLAN), which identifies the first 

advanced warfighting concepts and supporting experimentation events 

that will be undertaken during fiscal years 1999-2001. A key early element 

of its CPLAN is the proof of process experiment, scheduled for completion 

in November 1999, which will be used to validate the experimentation 

process. USACOM is still building its staff and the first experiment events 

are just beginning. Because it takes time to staff a new organization,

USACOM officials report that in their first year of operation they have not 

been able to do as much as they had hoped to do.

Since experiments are just beginning in 1999 and the proof of process 

experiment will not be completed until late 1999, necessary data will not be 

available for at least a year for anyone to make a preliminary assessment of 

how well the joint experimentation process is working in practice and for 

several years to thoroughly assess whether joint experimentation is 

achieving the results envisioned by the Secretary of Defense and the 

Congress. To aid the Committee in its oversight of joint experimentation in 

the interim, we have identified what we believe are important initial factors 

in a successful joint experimentation program. These factors include 

whether joint experimentation is becoming institutionalized within DOD, 

the extent to which joint experimentation includes exploring changes in 

doctrine and organization as well as technology, and the extent to which 

USACOM is establishing linkages with other DOD organizations exploring 

future warfighting. This last factor is particularly important since 

USACOM places heavy emphasis on leveraging other DOD components’ 

experimentation.

The Committee’s report directed us to examine a number of issues related 

to the extent of DOD’s support for implementing JV 2010, including the 

extent to which it is supported by the JIMP, the Secretary of Defense’s and 

CJCS’s guidance on DOD priorities, and the defense science and 

technology plans. Table 1 states the issues and provides a summary of our 

responses. Our detailed responses are in appendixes I through VI.
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Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and Our Answers

Source: GAO.

Issue Answer

Does the JIMP reflect a viable time line and adequate resources to 

achieve the operational concepts of the vision by 2010 and 

incorporate the operational challenges and desired force 

characteristics described in the report of the National Defense 

Panel (NDP); is funding for the execution of the JV 2010 

assessment roadmaps adequately reflected in the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP); and are service plans for 

experimentation activities consistent with these roadmaps?

For the most part. The JIMP provides joint policy and guidance to 

implement JV 2010. It does not nor was it intended, to discuss time 

lines and resources. The JIMP describes the year 2010 as a way 

point rather than an end point for achieving JV 2010 capabilities. 

The JIMP incorporates all of the NDP's operational challenges and 

desired force characteristics. Responsibility for the assessment 

roadmaps was transferred to USACOM as executive agent for joint 

experimentation. The fiscal years 2000-2005 FYDP will contain 

funding for USACOM, whose planned experiments should be 

consistent with the services' events since USACOM plans to utilize 

them. (See app. I.)

Is the plan for the development of joint enablers adequate to 

implement the operational concepts of JV 2010 by 2010? 

No, but it is a beginning. Joint enablers—such as command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance—comprise over half of the JIMP’s 72 desired 

operational capabilities to implement JV 2010. USACOM’s 

experiment plan begins to address joint enablers but does not go 

beyond 2001. (See app. II.)

Are the fielding of advanced technologies, the preparation of forces, 

and the funding support for the joint experimentation plan reflected 

in the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000 through 

2005 and the subsequent budget and planning review process 

documents?

They are not reflected in most recent documents but are expected 

to be reflected in future documents. While the defense guidance 

contains considerable discussion of JV 2010, it and associated 

budget and planning review process products mostly make limited 

or no mention of joint experimentation or the fielding of advanced 

technology and preparation of forces for the joint experimentation 

plan. This is partly due to these documents preceding the joint 

experimentation program. They are expected to discuss joint 

experimentation in 1999. There is no complete picture of funding 

support for joint experimentation, JV 2010, and defense 

transformation activities. (See app. III.)

What are the views in the modeling and simulation community as to 

the capability and limitations of existing and developing models and 

simulations to support the joint experimentation process?

The ability to model or simulate important elements of future 

warfighting is not within DOD’s current capability. It may be a 

decade or more before such capabilities exist. (See app. IV.)

Do the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the Basic 

Research Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Joint 

Warfighting Science and Technology Plan synchronize the fielding 

of advanced technologies across the services to support the 

development of joint capabilities?

To a great extent. The plans are linked to each other. We found 

almost all of the key future technology needs for the Army and Navy 

reflected in these plans. (See app. V.)

How does USACOM’s charter compare to the Joint Forces 

Command recommended by the NDP and what is USACOM’s 

capability to implement its charter?

While the charter establishing USACOM as executive agent for joint 

experimentation did not address any of the NDP recommendations 

regarding the framework for a Joint Forces Command, USACOM's 

Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan (IPLAN) followed the 

framework for 10 of the 17 recommendations and part of an 11th

recommendation. USACOM has established a joint 

experimentation process and is beginning to implement it. (See 

app. VI.)
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Background On May 1, 1996, the CJCS approved a document entitled Joint Vision 2010. 

This document responded to a recommendation in the Commission on 

Roles and Missions’ May 1995 report that the CJCS propose a joint 

warfighting vision to help guide service force development efforts. It, along 

with future concepts documents, is to guide joint warfighting 

experimentation. JV 2010 describes how technological innovations and 

information superiority will allow the services to use four new operational 

concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional 

protection, and focused logistics—in future conflicts. The synergy of these 

new concepts is described as defining the end state of the vision—full 

spectrum dominance, the ability to dominate the full range of military 

operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to 

and into the highest intensity conflict. The Joint Staff is responsible for 

overseeing JV 2010 implementation. To provide further guidance for 

achieving future joint warfighting capabilities, in December 1998 the Joint 

Staff published the JIMP.

On May 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense chartered USACOM to serve as 

the DOD executive agent for joint experimentation, effective October 1, 

1998, and directed the development of an implementation plan. As 

executive agent, USACOM is to plan, conduct, and assess joint 

experiments, synchronize service experimentation efforts, and provide 

“best value-added” recommendations for changes to DOTMLP based on the 

results of those experiments. The charter made USACOM responsible for 

concept development, assessment, and experimentation within the CJCS 

program to implement JV 2010 and future warfighting visions.

USACOM Is Making 

Progress in 

Establishing a Joint 

Experimentation 

Program 

USACOM has had to perform three critical tasks concurrently to meet its 

responsibilities as executive agent for joint experimentation—create a joint 

experimentation capability, develop a joint experimentation plan, and 

execute the plan. In anticipation of, and to accomplish, this mission, it 

began working on the preparation phase in April 1998, with the 

establishment of the joint experimentation concept team. This team 

developed the IPLAN and the joint experimentation process, and on 

September 1, 1998, this team became the USACOM Joint Experimentation 

(J9) Directorate. Both the organization and the process will evolve as the 

joint experimentation program matures.

USACOM has taken a number of steps to implement its joint 

experimentation responsibilities. In addition to developing the IPLAN and 
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the joint experimentation process, it has identified resource requirements, 

completed the first CPLAN, and begun preparation for the first 

experiments.

The Joint Experimentation 

Process 

The IPLAN, dated July 14, 1998, documents USACOM’s concept for 

executing its mission. It establishes an eight-element experimentation 

process and describes how USACOM will task organize to accomplish the 

mission (see table 2).

Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process

Source: USACOM’s IPLAN.

Element Description

Concept development Assimilates strategic guidance and other inputs from the combatant commanders, 

services, non-DOD agencies, private sector, and others. From this compilation of 

information, the J9 Directorate refines and further develops concepts for joint 

experimentation.

Campaign planning Develops a multiyear CPLAN detailing a series of experiments addressing each of 

the concepts selected for experimentation. 

Experimentation plan development Each concept approved for experimentation will be fully developed in a white paper 

describing the concept and desired capabilities in sufficient detail for implementation 

by the warfighter. The paper also will contain the experimental hypotheses for 

defining the objectives for each experiment event, which provide the basis for the 

experimentation plan. Experimentation plans will identify events required to assess 

the concept and provide the information required to select, design, schedule, and 

develop the events to be executed.

Experiment design Experiment management plans are developed for events identified in the experiment 

plans. The management plan may include measures of effectiveness and 

performance, a data collection plan, an analysis plan, and a modeling and simulation 

plan. Experiment objectives are defined and experiments, demonstrations, and 

exercises being conducted throughout DOD are examined to determine the extent to 

which they can be leveraged to support USACOM's experiment objectives. 

Experiment preparation Establishes the experiment control cell and develops the experiment training, 

support, and technical support plans.

Experiment conduct The hypothesis testing and data generation portion of the process.

Assessment Data collected is analyzed in accordance with the analysis plan and results in two 

major outputs: (1) an initial after action report and (2) a final report based on more 

extensive analysis of the data with conclusions and recommendations.

Integration Examines the results of all experiments pertaining to a given concept, as well as 

information available from other sources, and draws conclusions about the utility of 

the concept and the value-added to joint operations. After extensive review, these 

conclusions become recommendations for new DOTMLP actions required to 

implement the concept.
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Resource Requirements USACOM has identified its resource requirements, both for personnel and 

funding, and it is anticipating rapid personnel growth over a 3-year period. 

In November 1998, the USACOM J9 Directorate had 27 military and civilian 

personnel.1

 It had a staffing goal of 127 military and DOD civilian personnel 

by September 1999, but it now expects to have 58 people, including 

30 military personnel, by that date. By October 2001, USACOM officials 

told us that their goal is to have staffing of 161 personnel, including 

126 military and DOD civilian personnel and 35 reimbursable personnel 

from other organizations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has 

authorized the 126 military and DOD civilian personnel for both fiscal years 

2000 and 2001. The reimbursable personnel do not require Office of the 

Secretary of Defense authorization. USACOM officials told us that because 

it takes time to staff a new organization, in their first year of operation they 

have not been able to do as much as they had hoped to do.

Because joint experimentation is a new mission, it was not included in the 

President’s fiscal year 1999 budget or the FYDP, so DOD transferred funds 

from other accounts. USACOM requested $41 million for the J9 Directorate 

in fiscal year 1999 and DOD agreed to fund $30 million.2 Initially, 

$14.1 million was provided to USACOM, of which it has actually received 

$12.48 million. USACOM officials believe that this amount is sufficient to 

last until March 1999. The balance is to come from a $16-million 

reprogramming action approved by DOD and expected to be submitted to 

the Congress in early 1999. USACOM officials told us that they expect to 

receive those funds in April 1999. In addition, DOD has included 

$350 million for joint experimentation for fiscal years 2000-2005 in the 

FYDP. Joint Staff officials told us that additional funding may be added in 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to fund an additional joint experiment in each of 

those years.

In April 1999, USACOM will lease a commercial building that is currently 

under construction to house its joint experimentation personnel and battle 

laboratory. Long-range plans include repairing an existing Navy-owned 

facility on Naval Air Station Norfolk as a permanent location for the J9 

Directorate, with a planned occupancy date in fiscal year 2001.

1The J9 Directorate was augmented by about 50 reservist and contractor personnel who are available 

for varying periods of time. 

2

Current resource estimates include funds for initial experimentation efforts, operation and 

maintenance funding, facilities for operations, contractor support, communications and information 

systems, and experimentation forces and logistics support.
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The CPLAN The first CPLAN, known as CPLAN 99, was submitted by USACOM for 

CJCS approval in December 1998, with CJCS review expected in late 

February or early March 1999. It covers fiscal years 1999-2001. The second 

CPLAN, which is to cover a 6-year period, is scheduled to be issued in 

spring 1999. 

CPLAN 99 identified the first group of advanced warfighting concepts to be 

studied in the joint experimentation program. These concepts were 

selected through the concept development process described in the IPLAN 

experimentation process. Concept development and selection for CPLAN 

99 began with a concept development workshop and a review of concept 

papers from various sources. Rating the concepts as to their suitability, 

feasibility, appropriateness, and acceptability, the workshop attendees 

identified eight concepts as having the greatest potential for early 

experimentation. The eight concepts are:

• attack operations against critical mobile targets,

• future collaborative information environment,

• common relevant operational picture,

• interoperable combat identification, 

• adaptive joint command and control,

• joint contingency force operations, 

• focused logistics: enabling early decisive operations, and

• surveillance and fires from space.

USACOM will use three types of events to assess concepts. These are

(1) USACOM-generated events; (2) major-leveraged events where USACOM 

plays a major role in previously scheduled events of a combatant 

commander, service, or agency, including adding components to the 

experiment to meet USACOM’s experiment needs; and (3) minor-leveraged 

events where USACOM plays a reduced role in previously scheduled events 

of a combatant commander, service, or agency, which does not involve 

adding any components to the experiment.

To leverage previously scheduled experiment events, USACOM has begun 

to establish linkages with the services, the defense agencies, and the 

national laboratories on future warfighting efforts. It has had discussions 

with the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Navy’s Maritime Battle 

Center, the Air Force’s Expeditionary Force Experiment group, the Marine 

Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency, and national laboratories such as Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

We gathered information using a data collection instrument from
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14 organizations across the services, combatant commands, and national 

laboratories about their future warfighting efforts and relationships with 

USACOM. Nine of the 14 organizations said that a linkage had been 

established with USACOM. For example, the U.S. Central Command, the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the Army’s Battle Laboratory 

Integration, Technology, and Concepts Division reported that they have had 

direct contact with the J9 Directorate. Three of the remaining five 

organizations anticipate establishing linkages with USACOM in the near 

future.

USACOM provided us with a list of 88 experiment events to be conducted 

over the next 3 years. Experiment events are focused on three different 

time phases—near-, mid-, and far-term. According to the CPLAN, the

near-term phase, which covers the next 6 years, focuses on improving 

current capabilities; the mid-term phase, which is the 4 to 18-year period 

from now, focuses on achieving JV 2010 operational capabilities, and the 

far-term phase, which is the 15- to 25-year period from now, focuses on 

developing revolutionary concepts. The most detailed planning for the 

88 experiment events has been for those that address the mid-term phase. 

A total of 42 mid-term-oriented experiments are detailed in a 

synchronization matrix that identifies each event, the fiscal year and 

quarter when it is scheduled to be conducted, and the advanced 

warfighting concepts to be assessed. The matrix will be updated as new 

experiments are identified. There is no similar matrix for the other

46 events.

The first leveraged experiment events will involve face-to-face contacts 

with the service sponsor to arrange for USACOM participation. The first 

agreement has been reached with the Navy’s Maritime Battle Center for the 

Center to identify the contribution that Fleet Battle Experiment “Echo” can 

make to USACOM joint experimentation goals and to design a coordination 

process to allow USACOM to leverage off service experiments. The 

agreement calls for the Center to provide a report on both the coordination 

process and the results of the fleet battle experiment.

A key part of the first year’s experimentation, designed to validate 

organizational structure and relationships and resource requirements, is 

the proof of process experiment that USACOM has selected. It is 

scheduled to be conducted between July 15 and August 15, 1999. The data 

analysis is scheduled to occur from August 15 through November 15, 1999. 

The final report is scheduled for completion on November 30, 1999. 
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To address the far-term phase of joint experimentation, USACOM hosted a 

futures program workshop with representatives from DOD, the services, 

government, industry, and academia to identify potential concepts for 

future evaluation. Using a construct based on descriptions of views of the

future, attendees looked for common concepts or capabilities that would 

be needed by future warfighters to meet multiple scenarios. The attendees 

identified the following eight areas for focus as far-term concepts.

• Mastery of information

• Bio-centric operations and counters

• Space operations

• Organizing for military operations

• Weapons of mass effects

• Operational and strategic sanctuaries

• Autonomous operations

• Global power projection

Some Important Initial 

Factors of a Successful 

Joint Experimentation 

Program

Because actual experiments are just beginning and the proof of process 

experiment will not be completed before November 1999, we believe that a 

preliminary assessment of how well the joint experimentation process is 

working cannot be made by anyone before early in the year 2000 because 

the necessary data will not be available for at least a year. Since the final 

phase of the joint experimentation process leading to recommendations for 

changes to DOTMLP involves examining the results of all experiments 

pertaining to a given concept, we further believe that it will require several 

years to conduct enough experiments to thoroughly assess whether joint 

experimentation is achieving the results envisioned by the Secretary of 

Defense and the Congress. To aid the Committee in its oversight of joint 

experimentation in the interim, we have identified several initial factors 

that we believe are important to successful joint experimentation. We 

chose these initial factors based on a synthesis of (1) our review of various 

documents related to defense transformation and joint experimentation; 

(2) the sense of the Congress and the reporting requirements regarding 

joint experimentation contained in the fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization 

Act; and (3) discussions with officials involved in joint experimentation, 

including those at USACOM, a member of the NDP, and those at think tank 

organizations. The initial factors we have identified and, where 

appropriate, a brief description of how each factor could be assessed, are 

as follows. We recognize that a certain amount of trial and error is to be 

expected because DOD has not conducted a joint experimentation program 

before.
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Institutionalizing the 

Program

The Joint Experimentation Program is less than a year old. The fiscal

year 1999 DOD Authorization Act includes the finding that it is essential 

that an energetic and innovative organization be established in DOD with 

the authority to design and implement a process of joint experimentation. 

The JIMP states that near-term (1999-2000) objectives that support the 

goals of JV 2010 implementation include establishing and institutionalizing 

the process for joint experimentation and identifying and institutionalizing 

the process of resourcing JV 2010 assessments. According to senior 

USACOM officials involved in the joint experimentation program, the 

program is not yet institutionalized, that is, permanent. A number of 

actions have been and are being taken that should help institutionalize the 

program. Completed actions include the requirement for an annual report 

to the Congress on joint experimentation, the creation of USACOM’s J9 

Joint Experimentation Directorate, the validation of over 100 positions for 

the directorate, the development of a joint experimentation process, and 

the inclusion of the joint experimentation program in DOD’s long-term 

budget projections. A planned action is to include USACOM’s joint 

experimentation responsibilities in the next revision to the Unified 

Command Plan.3

Short Versus Mid- and 

Far-Term Focus for 

Experimentation

The allocation of resources among the near-, mid-, and far- term phases of 

experimentation can have an important influence on the program’s success 

in developing new warfighting capabilities. USACOM plans to use about

20 percent of its fiscal year 1999 resources for near-term experimentation, 

about 75 percent for mid-term experimentation, and about 5 percent for

far-term experimentation. Other organizations, such as the combatant 

commands and the services, already focus on meeting short-term needs 

and improving current capabilities. We discussed this matter with the 

Director of the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Operational Plans and 

Interoperability, which is the executive agent and primary Joint Staff 

proponent for JV 2010 implementation and systems integration. The 

Director said that while in the future it might be good to focus on the far 

term, not all of the problems from the Gulf War have been fixed. He also 

said that there is a need for a mid-term focus for a while and to show some 

concrete results. As USACOM makes resource allocations for subsequent 

years, there should be a full dialogue among USACOM, the Joint Staff, the 

3

This document sets basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders and establishes their 

missions, responsibilities, and force structure. 
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Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress regarding the focus of 

USACOM’s efforts, particularly whether they should include near-term 

experimentation. 

Assessing Organizational 

Structures and Operational 

Concepts, Creating 

Common Scenarios, and 

Using Realistic Adversaries 

in Experiments

The fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act contains both a sense of the 

Congress and an annual reporting requirement for joint warfighting 

experimentation. The sense of the Congress noted the importance of 

assessing the effectiveness of current and new organizational structures, 

operational concepts, and technologies in addressing expected early

21st century operational challenges as well as developing scenarios and 

measures of effectiveness and using realistic adversaries in experiments, 

called red teaming. It stated that the commander responsible for joint 

warfighting experimentation should have the authority to integrate and test 

the system and concepts that result from warfighting experimentation 

conducted by the armed services and defense agencies. In the annual 

reporting requirement, the Congress directed that the report include any 

recommendations the commander responsible for such experimentation 

considers appropriate regarding, among other things, changes in 

organizational structure, operational concepts, or joint doctrine. 

USACOM’s charter and IPLAN call for USACOM to recommend new 

DOTMLP to the CJCS and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

Because recommendations regarding DOTMLP are the last step in the joint 

experimentation process and actual experimentation is just beginning, it 

will be several years before all experiments relating to a given concept are 

complete and the results are available. A necessary step is to assure that 

experimentation includes new organizational structures and operational 

concepts. Whether experiments examine organizational structures and 

operational challenges, as well as technology, can be ascertained by 

examining the hypotheses and designs of specific experiment events. In 

the longer term, it will be possible to assess the extent to which USACOM 

recommends changes in organizational structure, operational concepts, 

and joint doctrine and how the Joint Staff reacts to the recommendations.

USACOM has identified a number of experiment events that it believes 

address the eight advanced warfighting concepts mentioned previously as 

having the greatest potential for early experimentation. Each of the 

military services is exploring concepts for future warfighting that could 

serve as a basis for joint experimentation. Some of the leveraged events 

USACOM identified involve service future warfighting concepts such as the 

Army After Next wargame. By examining service and USACOM 
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experimentation plans and events, it will be possible to compare the 

concepts being assessed by the services and USACOM to determine the 

extent to which the joint experimentation program tests service concepts.

The battle laboratories, research laboratories, and other service 

organizations we contacted believe that USACOM should provide a 

common set of experimentation concepts and/or scenarios while leaving 

leeway to pursue independent scenarios. The combatant commands we 

contacted believe that Commanders in Chief should be free to set 

scenarios, although one combatant command believes that USACOM 

should provide an overview of the future security environment. Examining 

the details of individual experiments will provide an early indication of the 

extent to which the services, defense agencies, and combatant commands 

are using common scenarios and measures of effectiveness in their 

participation in joint experimentation. 

The importance of red teams in experimentation was identified as 

important by people with whom we discussed benchmarks of joint 

experimentation progress. Red teams should be allowed to try all 

constructive and reasonable ways of foiling the experiment's goal or 

objective. Nothing should be considered "off the table" and thinking 

asymmetrically or "out of the box" should be strongly encouraged and 

rewarded. Otherwise the experiments may not generate valid results. The 

extent to which red teaming is being used should be apparent by examining 

the specifics of individual experiments.

Linkages to the Services A successful joint experimentation program should include linkages to all 

DOD components experimenting with future warfighting concepts and 

technologies as well as non-DOD components, such as the national 

laboratories. USACOM plans to rely heavily on leveraging other DOD 

components’ warfighting experiments. USACOM has begun to establish 

such linkages. As part of these linkages, the components must be willing to 

allow USACOM to add experimentation elements to their experiments and 

exercises so that USACOM can leverage them to support its joint 

experimentation plan. Because planning an experiment can require 

considerable lead-time, USACOM and the components need to allow 

sufficient time to add elements to the experiment or exercise. Our queries 

of 14 DOD components involved with future warfighting found that they 

were amenable to USACOM participation, and all noted that if adding 

experiment elements results in increased funding and/or resource needs, 

than USACOM must be prepared to provide them. Consequently, 
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USACOM’s budget should include funding for USACOM-generated 

experiments as well as for leveraging others’ experiments. An examination 

of events USACOM has decided to leverage, discussions with USACOM and 

the services, and an analysis of USACOM’s J9 Directorate’s budget should 

provide insight into the extent to which USACOM is leveraging service and 

other DOD activities.

Ability to Systematically 

Capture Experiment Data

Because of the emphasis on leveraged experimentation events, USACOM 

will need to establish a mechanism to systematically capture leveraged 

experiment results. USACOM officials agree with the need for such a 

mechanism and, in October 1998, were beginning to examine how to create 

one. One objective of the J9 assessment division is database management, 

which includes capturing experiment results. Examining experiment plans 

and the actual experiments should indicate how well USACOM is capturing 

data from leveraged events. 

Feedback to the Defense 

Research Community

The science and technology community will play an essential role in 

providing new technologies that will affect future warfighting, sometimes 

described as technology push. Likewise, warfighting organizations can 

provide guidance to the science and technology community about 

technological improvements that they would find most helpful, sometimes 

described as technology pull. Therefore, a communication mechanism, 

including a feedback loop, is essential between the science and technology 

community and the Joint Staff, USACOM, and warfighters. The CPLAN 

states that joint experimentation has the potential to shape the science and 

technology community’s efforts and will provide for successful integration 

of innovative technologies into tomorrow’s battlefield. USACOM's joint 

experimentation insights should be one of the many factors that help 

decide future science and technology priorities. A periodic examination of 

experiment outcomes and discussion with the defense research community 

should provide insight into the extent to which USACOM is providing 

feedback.

Role of Modeling and 

Simulation

USACOM’s charter states that joint warfighting experiments may include 

modeling and simulation. The IPLAN states that modeling and simulation 

will be used throughout the experimentation process, including to conduct 

predictive analyses for developing plans for individual experiments and to 

assist planners in identifying problem areas. However, according to DOD 

modeling and simulation officials, the ability to model or simulate 
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important warfighting elements, such as information operations, is not well 

understood or within DOD’s current technological capabilities. These 

capabilities may not be achievable in full for a decade or more, and 

developing them will require significant basic research. USACOM, in 

conjunction with the Joint Staff, has produced a database tool to help with, 

among other things, refining concepts and developing hypotheses and 

measures of merit and performance. USACOM reports that this tool has 

become a living document that is supporting modeling and simulation 

within joint experimentation.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

report, stating that it is a fair and accurate assessment of DOD’s current 

and projected efforts to develop future joint warfighting capabilities. DOD 

also stated that we have identified three key factors that are important to a 

successful joint experimentation program—institutionalization of joint 

experimentation within DOD, the extent to which joint experimentation 

includes exploring changes in doctrine and organization as well as 

technology, and the extent to which USACOM is establishing linkages with 

other DOD organizations exploring future warfighting—and agreed that 

these three factors are key to successful joint experimentation. 

Appendix VII contains the full text of DOD’s comments.

Scope and 

Methodology

To address the issues directed by the Committee’s report, including the 

extent to which the JIMP, defense guidance, the FYDP, modeling and 

simulation, and DOD’s science and technology efforts support the 

development of future warfighting capabilities and joint experimentation, 

we reviewed the JIMP, the FYDP, defense guidance, and the NDP report, 

among other documents. We compared these documents to one another to 

assess their support for JV 2010 and joint experimentation and talked with 

Joint Staff, USACOM, and service officials. We also reviewed a number of 

documents relating to the defense science and technology program and 

compared these to service identified technology needs to assess how the 

science and technology program supports the synchronizing of advanced 

technologies and the development of joint capabilities. We also talked with 

DOD and service officials involved in modeling and simulation to ascertain 

their views as to the state of modeling and simulation capability to support 

the joint experimentation process. 
B-280338

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

To assess the status of joint experimentation, we talked with officials of 

USACOM’s Joint Experimentation Directorate, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services, the combatant commands, and the 

defense agencies, a member of the NDP, and contractors involved in the 

joint experimentation program. We reviewed key documents involving 

joint experimentation, specifically the USACOM charter, the IPLAN, and 

the CPLAN. We developed a series of questions regarding joint 

experimentation and USACOM’s role that we electronically provided to a 

number of DOD components and tabulated their responses.

We performed our review between May and December 1998 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senator 

Pete V. Domenici, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, 

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Fred 

Thompson, and to Representative Rod R. Blagojevich, Representative Dan 

Burton, Representative John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, 

Representative John P. Murtha, Representative David R. Obey, 

Representative Christopher Shays, Representative Henry A. Waxman, and 

Representative C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or Ranking 

Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. 

We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F.W. 

Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made 

available to others upon request.
B-280338

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4300. The major contributors to this report were Steve 

Sternlieb, Assistant Director, Joe Dewechter, evaluator-in-charge, Connie 

Sawyer, senior evaluator, Dale Wineholt, evaluator, and Elizabeth Ryan, 

evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations
Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Joint Vision 

Implementation Master 

Plan Provides 

Guidance

22

Appendix II

Joint Enablers Are 

Beginning to Be 

Addressed

26

Appendix III

Defense Guidance and 

Associated Budget and 

Planning Review 

Process Expected to 

Address Joint 

Experimentation in 

1999

27

Appendix IV

Modeling and 

Simulation for Joint 

Experimentation Could 

Take Years to Develop

30
Contents

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix V

Science and 

Technology Plans Are 

Interrelated and 

Support Future 

Warfighting 

Technology Needs

32

Appendix VI

IPLAN Meets the Spirit 

of Many of the NDP 

Recommendations for 

a Joint Forces 

Command

36

Appendix VII

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

39

Tables Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and Our 

Answers 3

Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process 5

Table V.1: JV 2010-Related Defense Technology Objectives

 Funding in Fiscal Year 1999 34

Table VI.1: Comparison of the NDP Recommendations and

 USACOM IPLAN 37
Contents

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Abbreviations

BRP Basic Research Plan

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,

 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CPLAN Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan

DOD Department of Defense

DOTMLP doctrine, organization, training and education,

 materiel, leadership, and personnel

DTAP Defense Technology Area Plan

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

IPLAN Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan

JIMP Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan

JV Joint Vision

JWARS Joint Warfare System

JWSTP Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan

NDP National Defense Planel

USACOM United States Atlantic Command
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix I

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

Provides Guidance ApeInxdi

Joint Vision (JV) 2010 is the conceptual template for future joint 

warfighting and expresses how technological innovations and information 

superiority will enable the vision’s operational concepts. The Joint Vision 

Implementation Master Plan’s (JIMP) stated purpose is to provide joint 

policy and guidance for implementing JV 2010 and subsequent Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) joint vision documents. The Joint Staff delayed 

publishing the JIMP for over a year because Joint Staff officials said it was 

difficult to obtain concurrence from all of the services, unified commands, 

and defense agencies involved. The JIMP contains guidance on the 

implementation process, project management, and long-range planning; 

defines roles and responsibilities; and identifies 72 desired operational 

capabilities.

The JIMP Was Not Intended 

to Contain Resources or 

Time Lines

The JIMP was not intended to, nor does it, identify the resources needed to 

implement JV 2010. Instead, it states that initial start-up funding will be 

provided by retargeting Joint Staff resources and reprogramming 

Department of Defense (DOD) resources. Joint Vision implementation 

funds will then be delineated in future DOD budgets. Planned funding was 

discussed earlier in this report.

The JIMP was also not intended to, nor does it, contain a time line for 

implementing JV 2010’s new operational concepts. Specifically, the JIMP 

states that development of a long-range planning process for JV 2010 

implementation recognizes that the year 2010 is a way point, not an end 

point. The long-range planning process is described as helping to focus 

available time and resources to ensure integrated joint operational 

capability development. In the July 1996 JV 2010, CJCS referred several 

times to implementing and/or needing the JV 2010 operational capabilities 

by 2010. In addition, the U.S. Atlantic Command’s (USACOM) July 1998 

Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan (IPLAN) states that the end 

result of the joint experimentation process will be the development of 

sustained, continuous operational innovations and the realization of 

desired operational capabilities that meet the full spectrum of joint 

operational requirements in the year 2010 and beyond. Since then, the 

Joint Staff has shifted from describing 2010 as a date by which it seeks to 

achieve desired operational capabilities to a way point on the path to 

achieving them. The JIMP also states that the development, assessment, 

and integration of emerging concepts and capabilities are a continuous, 

never ending journey of discovery. 
Appendix I

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

Provides Guidance

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Joint Staff stated that it 

adopted the concept that the year 2010 is a way point, not an end point, to 

recognize a continual process that explores and develops a 

capabilities-based force for the future (2010 and beyond). The Joint Staff 

further stated that developing a capabilities-based force must be an

open-ended process and that the “journey” concept does not indicate a lack 

of resolve to achieve the vision described in JV 2010 by the year 2010 but a 

determination to build a permanently viable force.

We believe that the CJCS’ goal of achieving JV 2010 capabilities by the

year 2010 is important because a specific time goal is quantifiable and 

provides a basis for measuring progress against the goal. A time goal also 

can be a motivational tool that challenges the leadership to quickly improve 

capabilities as opposed to getting there when they get there. In addition, 

setting a common goal for all entities involved in developing future 

warfighting capabilities has merit because it helps those entities to act 

synergistically, as opposed to one service, for example, implementing new 

capabilities by 2007 and another service implementing them by 2012. A 

time goal also would help DOD assess its progress toward meeting the goal 

of exploiting the revolution in military affairs that it set in response to the 

requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 

The JIMP Incorporated All 

of the National Defense 

Panel Operational 

Challenges and Desired 

Force Characteristics 

The Congress authorized establishment of the National Defense Panel 

(NDP) in the Defense Authorization Act of 1997. The NDP began its work 

on February 2, 1997, and, in December 1997, issued its report entitled 

Transforming Defense - National Security in the 21st Century. The report 

focused on the long-term issues facing U.S. defense and national security 

and recommended an immediate transformation strategy to meet the 

challenges of the 21st century. The NDP believes the challenges of the 21st 

century will be quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the 

Cold War and will require fundamental change to national security 

institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020. 

The NDP report identified six operational challenges that the U.S. military 

must meet in the 21st century, and the JIMP incorporated all of them. The 

six operational challenges are 

• project military power,

• deter and manage weapons of mass destruction,

• maintain U.S. information superiority,

• maintain U.S. lead in space,
Appendix I

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

Provides Guidance

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

• prepare for urban operations, and 

• meet transnational challenges.

The NDP report also identified 10 desired force characteristics on which 

the U.S. military should place far greater emphasis in the 21st century, and 

the JIMP incorporated all of them. The desired force characteristics are

• systems architectures,

• information system protection,

• information operations,

• automation,

• small logistics footprint,

• mobility,

• stealth,

• speed,

• increased operational and strike ranges, and

• precision strike. 

Service and USACOM Plans 

Are Consistent 

Assessment roadmaps, which are plans describing the events required to 

achieve desired operational capabilities, are contained in the Joint 

Experimentation Campaign Plan (CPLAN). Originally, the Joint Staff had 

planned to publish an assessment roadmap for each desired operational 

capability. Joint Staff officials said that the roadmaps were to cover the 

first 3 years of JV 2010 implementation rather than serve as roadmaps 

ending with achievement of the desired operational capabilities. According 

to the Joint Staff, the roadmaps were originally intended as tools for the 

Joint Staff JV 2010 coordinating authorities to use in assessing concepts 

and capabilities within their assigned areas.1

 The designation of USACOM 

as the executive agent for joint experimentation, however, transferred 

much of the assessment role from the coordinating authorities to 

USACOM. The Joint Staff told us that USACOM, in collaboration with the 

coordinating authorities, services, and combatant commands, will develop 

experimentation plans that meet the intent of the assessment roadmaps. 

USACOM's first CPLAN identifies experiment events that are to take place 

over the next 3 years, through fiscal year 2001, to address new joint 

1

Coordinating authorities are parts of Joint Staff organizations, such as the Logistics Directorate, 

designated as responsible for participating with USACOM in joint experimentation and monitoring 

progress in support of CJCS oversight.
Appendix I

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

Provides Guidance

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

warfighting concepts and further achievement of the JIMP’s desired 

operational capabilities. 

With the transfer of responsibility for assessment roadmaps to USACOM, 

the development of the first CPLAN, and USACOM’s plans to leverage 

previously scheduled experimentation, service and USACOM plans for 

experimentation should be consistent. Our review of 42 experimentation 

events for fiscal years 1999-2001 shows that 37 are leveraged events being 

conducted by the services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. 

To help guide USACOM's selection of experiments for the CPLAN, the Joint 

Staff identified what it considered to be the six most important 21st century 

challenges, according to a Joint Staff official. These are all three 

information superiority challenges (battlespace awareness, information 

transport and processing, and information operations); joint command and 

control; combat identification; and joint theater logistics management. The 

initial eight concepts chosen by USACOM for joint experimentation 

reflected five of these six challenges.
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix II

Joint Enablers Are Beginning to Be 

Addressed ApIexndi

Joint enablers are military capabilities, such as command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR), logistics, force protection, and others that allow 

the military to integrate its operations. The JIMP makes extensive 

reference to them through its desired operational capabilities. Of the

72 desired operational capabilities the Joint Staff identified to implement 

JV 2010, 38, according to our analysis, directly relate to joint enablers. Of 

these 38, 9 relate to command and control, such as situational awareness; 

10 relate to focused logistics, such as providing unimpeded access to 

operational and logistical information for all who need it; and 19 relate to 

information superiority, such as information transport and processing, 

battlespace awareness, and information operations. In addition to the

38, 12 other desired operational capabilities relate to full dimensional 

protection, such as early detection, identification, and dissemination of air 

and missile threats, which also could be considered joint enablers. 

USACOM’s CPLAN begins to address joint enablers in that it addresses five 

of the six most important challenges identified by the Joint Staff, which 

involve some of these types of enablers. Because the current CPLAN does 

not go beyond 2001, we could not evaluate the adequacy of plans to 2010. 

We previously reported that DOD faces many challenges in achieving its 

information superiority goals and objectives and may need many years of 

concerted effort to reach them.1

 We reported that for over 30 years (since 

1967) DOD has been trying to establish some form of DOD-wide C4ISR 

architecture. The most important component, which defines the 

information needs that are the basis for setting system standards and 

acquiring and protecting systems, has not been completed. Meanwhile, 

DOD has been developing a number of critical C4ISR systems and 

information assurance measures without the benefit of a completed and 

approved architecture. Enforcing compliance with the architecture will be 

an important factor in achieving information superiority. However, we 

found that DOD has had difficulty in achieving compliance with related 

C4ISR policies and decisions. 

1

Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant Challenges Remain

GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257, Aug. 31, 1998).
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix III

Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and 

Planning Review Process Expected to 

Address Joint Experimentation in 1999 ApIexndi

The Secretary of Defense issues guidance annually on the goals, priorities, 

and objectives for the services and DOD components, called the Defense 

Planning Guidance. The current defense guidance, issued in April 1998, 

preceded the Secretary of Defense’s charter designating USACOM as 

executive agent for joint experimentation. Therefore, it makes no mention 

of who will conduct such experimentation and contains no directives 

regarding the fielding of advanced technology and preparation of forces for 

the joint experimentation plan. However, the current guidance emphasizes 

the importance of transforming U.S. military forces and contains an 

extensive discussion of JV 2010 and its operational concepts. The guidance 

was accompanied by the Secretary of Defense's message that described it 

as aiding the transformation of U.S. forces by serving as a central reference 

for the joint implementation of the revolution in military affairs. The 

message also stated that the guidance initiates a series of analytical efforts 

to support the deliberation of DOD's senior leadership council on matters 

pertaining to the revolution in military affairs and to provide the basis for 

future years' planning and programming guidance.

The Current Guidance Does 

Not Link Planning and 

Programming Guidance

The defense guidance is divided into two main sections. A strategy section 

outlines the defense strategy upon which DOD plans and programs will 

continue to be based. This section states that DOD's commitment to 

prepare now for an uncertain future includes pursuing a focused 

modernization effort that replaces aging systems and incorporates 

cutting-edge technologies and continues to exploit the revolution in 

military affairs. A guidance section identifies key planning and 

programming priorities necessary to execute the defense strategy. Within 

the guidance section, there is planning and programming guidance. 

Planning guidance sets broad objectives within a program area, such as 

modernization. Programming guidance contains specific directives as to 

actions the military services and agencies are to take, such as the number 

and types of weapon platforms to be procured and the period over which 

the procurement is to take place. 

The guidance section includes a section entitled Prepare: A Transformation 

Strategy that discusses the revolution in military affairs and JV 2010, 

describing JV 2010 as providing the conceptual framework for developing 

the innovative operational concepts, advanced technologies, organizational 

architectures, and doctrine required to meet a range of security challenges 

in the early part of the 21st century. This section also states that JV 2010 

concepts and capabilities will be explored through information superiority 

experiments and a series of progressively advanced joint warfighting 
Appendix III

Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and 

Planning Review Process Expected to 

Address Joint Experimentation in 1999

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

experiments. The guidance section also includes a section entitled 

Prepare: Modernization that includes a discussion of each of the 

operational concepts of JV 2010, which includes planning and 

programming guidance sections. However, there appears to be no clear 

connection between the planning and programming guidance sections. For 

example, the planning guidance on dominant maneuver, one of JV 2010's 

operational concepts, states that there are two key objectives for 

developing dominant maneuver capabilities. These objectives are that 

forces be (1) lighter, more lethal, and less dependent on logistics tails and 

(2) sufficiently versatile to, among other things, sustain a high operating 

tempo. The programming guidance section directs the acquisition of 

specific weapons systems but makes no mention of what steps are to be 

taken to meet the objectives described in the planning guidance section. 

The programming guidance section also does not link the directed 

acquisitions to the JV 2010 operational concepts or joint experimentation.

The CJCS’s 1998 Program 

Recommendations and 

Assessment Do Not Address 

Joint Experimentation

According to Joint Staff officials, neither the Chairman's program 

recommendations nor the Chairman's program assessment addresses 

advanced technology and preparation of forces in terms of joint 

experimentation. The program recommendations are issued in February of 

each year and contain the Chairman’s views on what should be included in 

the guidance. When the program recommendation was issued in February 

1998, the Joint Experimentation Plan Report and the USACOM charter had 

not been formalized. The program assessment provides the Chairman's 

assessment of the extent to which the services and other DOD components 

conform to the priorities established in the defense guidance and is issued 

each August. Joint Staff officials said that the August 1998 program 

assessment does not address joint experimentation and that the defense 

guidance is the best place to look for such discussion. Since USACOM had 

been selected as the joint experimentation executive agent at that point, 

the program assessment could have, if the Chairman wished, made some 

comment on joint experimentation. Senior USACOM officials involved in 

the joint experimentation program believe that joint experimentation was 

not addressed in August 1998 because USACOM’s charter was new and 

because of the Chairman’s desire to wait for USACOM to complete its 

IPLAN, USACOM's staffing request to be evaluated at the Joint Staff, and 

the Defense Resources Board to act. These officials anticipate a major 

change in the 1999 program recommendations and assessment. The 

Director of the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Operational Plans and 

Interoperability, which is the executive agent and primary Joint Staff 

proponent for JV 2010 implementation and systems integration, also 
Appendix III

Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and 

Planning Review Process Expected to 

Address Joint Experimentation in 1999

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

expects to see a change in the program recommendations and assessment 

in 1999.

There is No Complete 

Funding Picture for Defense 

Transformation

In December 1998, the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided 

USACOM with a joint experimentation program element in the Future 

Years Defense Program (FYDP), which contains $350 million in funding for 

the period fiscal years 2000-2005. This funding should appear in the FYDP 

that DOD will submit in fiscal year 1999.

Prior to December 1998, in examining the FYDP submitted in fiscal 

year 1998, we found few clearly identifiable joint experimentation program 

elements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense also attempted to identify 

the programs and resources devoted to defense transformation activities, 

which include joint experimentation, but abandoned the effort due to 

definitional problems as to what constituted transformation. However,

funding was identified in some instances, such as advanced concept 

technology demonstrations and service battle laboratories, while activities 

were identified in other instances with no associated funding. At this point,

there is no complete picture of defense transformation-related funding.
Page 30 GAO/MSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix IV

Modeling and Simulation for Joint 

Experimentation Could Take Years to DevelopApVenIxdi

Many DOD components and national organizations have modeling and 

simulation capabilities. However, most of these models are predominantly 

based on force-on-force assessments and attrition warfare concepts that 

date from the Cold War. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 

services are updating current modeling and simulation capabilities and 

developing new ones that reflect current and future warfighting. The Joint 

Staff and USACOM plan to use these new capabilities, which are in varying 

stages of development, to help implement JV 2010 and joint 

experimentation.

According to the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, the ability to 

model or simulate important warfighting elements, such as command and 

control, operations other than war, information operations, and 

human/group behavior representation, is not well understood or within 

DOD’s current technological capabilities. These capabilities may not be 

fully achieved for a decade or more and will require significant basic 

research effort to establish an acceptable degree of confidence in their 

utility. The ability to model or simulate warfighting that occurs 10 or more 

years in the future is not comfortably within the current capabilities of 

models and simulations across the diverse alternative futures that 

USACOM may need to address. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology will, 

through DOD’s Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation and the 

Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, advise and assist USACOM and 

work to develop necessary modeling and simulation support for joint 

experimentation, including promulgating modeling and simulation policy, 

initiatives, and guidance to maximize efficiency and effectiveness by 

promoting cooperation among DOD components. The Defense Modeling 

and Simulation Office took advantage of our modeling and simulation 

meetings by inviting the services, which have most of the capability, to 

attend each other’s meetings with us so that they could learn about each 

other’s capabilities and efforts.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is developing a new analytic model 

called the Joint Warfare System (JWARS), which is to be a state-of-the art, 

constructive simulation that provides a multisided and balanced 

representation of joint theater warfare. JWARS is to have four applications: 

force assessment, planning and execution, system effectiveness and 

trade-off studies, and concept and doctrine development and assessment. 

JWARS' limited initial operational capability is scheduled for March 2000, 
Appendix IV

Modeling and Simulation for Joint 

Experimentation Could Take Years to 

Develop

Page 31 GAO/MSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

full initial operational capability is scheduled for May 2001, and full 

operational capability is scheduled for fiscal year 2002. 

At our August 1998 meeting with the JWARS Director, there was limited 

awareness of JV 2010 and joint experimentation, even though the JWARS 

model is planned to have important applications that could be helpful to 

both efforts. He said that joint experimentation was not identified in the 

JWARS operational requirements document as an objective. He also said 

that JWARS would not be an ideal tool for joint experimentation because it 

may require higher resolution than JWARS may be able to provide. After 

further deliberation, in a subsequent document provided to us by the 

JWARS Office, the Director stated that JWARS would assist JV 2010 

implementation by providing a vehicle to assess current and future military 

capabilities within JV 2010's four operational concepts and to represent 

and assist in defining these operational concepts. He also identified several

ways that JWARS can contribute to joint experimentation. 

USACOM Studied How to 

Use Modeling and 

Simulation

USACOM studied the best ways to use modeling and simulation in joint 

experimentation and has developed a database tool to assist with the joint 

modeling and simulation effort. Joint experimentation is to rely heavily on 

simulations to support concept development and the conduct of 

experiments, initially using existing legacy simulation systems. USACOM 

intends to use existing simulation capabilities to the maximum extent 

possible, commercially lease additional capability when required, and 

develop systems only when there are no other means of meeting the 

requirement. As joint experimentation matures and concepts and 

capabilities that cannot be supported by legacy systems are identified, 

USACOM will identify requirements for future simulation technologies and 

recommend that its Joint Training and Analysis Simulation Center integrate 

them into proposals for developing future simulations. 
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix V

Science and Technology Plans Are 

Interrelated and Support Future Warfighting 

Technology Needs ApVenxdi

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology), within the 

Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, plays a key role 

in the science and technology strategic planning process. Critical to the 

process is a series of interrelated documents—-the Defense Science and 

Technology Strategy, the Basic Research Plan (BRP), the Joint Warfighting 

Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), and the Defense Technology Area 

Plan (DTAP). These documents are linked not only by the process but by 

the people who prepare them. 

The Defense Science and Technology Strategy guides DOD’s science and 

technology program and, in turn, is supported by the BRP, the DTAP, and 

the JWSTP. The science and technology program includes identifying 

current and emerging technology candidates for the development of joint 

capabilities. These science and technology documents present the vision, 

strategy, plan, and objectives for the defense science and technology 

planners, programmers, and performers. The BRP provides overall 

guidance for basic research, presenting the objectives and investment 

strategy for DOD-sponsored basic research performed by universities, 

industry, and service laboratories. The DTAP presents the objectives and 

applied research and advanced technology development investment 

strategy for technologies critical to DOD acquisition plans, service 

warfighter capabilities, and the JWSTP. The DTAP takes a perspective 

across the service and defense agency efforts, thereby charting the total 

DOD investment for a given technology, and documents the focus, content, 

and principal objectives of the overall DOD science and technology efforts. 

The objectives are expressed in the form of Defense Technology 

Objectives. The BRP and the DTAP lay out broad technology objectives 

and provide support for achieving priority far-term, joint warfighting 

capabilities.

The JWSTP provides a joint perspective across the applied research and 

advanced technology development plans of the services and defense 

agencies. According to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & 

Technology), that organization, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, 

combatant Commanders in Chief, the services, and the defense agencies, 

publishes the JWSTP, in part, to ensure that DOD’s science and technology 

program supports achievement of near- and mid-term joint warfighting 

capabilities. The JWSTP contains roadmaps for 11 Joint Warfighting 

Capabilities Objectives, which support achieving the operational concepts 

of JV 2010 and other critical capabilities for maintaining the warfighting 

advantage of U. S. forces. Each year, the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviews and validates these objectives. Each objective roadmap 
Appendix V

Science and Technology Plans Are 

Interrelated and Support Future Warfighting 

Technology Needs

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

identifies specific technology advancements that will be developed or 

demonstrated and the anticipated date when the technology will be 

available. These specific technology advancements are described in a 

published volume of Defense Technology Objectives that provides detailed 

information about Advanced Technology Demonstrations and Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstrations. 

The Process for Developing 

the Science and Technology 

Plans

The process for developing the various plans involves a number of 

interrelated participants from the Directorate for Defense Research and 

Engineering, the services, and the defense agencies, with the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology) being responsible for the 

overall direction, quality, and content of the DOD Science and Technology 

Program. The BRP is developed, coordinated, and implemented through 

the Basic Research Panel, which includes members from the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology), the services, 

and the defense agencies. The BRP is linked with the DTAP and the JWSTP 

in several ways. One is through scientific planning groups for each of 

10 technical disciplines, such as mathematics and computer science, 

physics, and chemistry. The 10 scientific planning groups are comprised of 

and have the active participation of both the service laboratories and the 

warfighters. 

The JWSTP is developed by Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives panels, 

one for each of the 11 objectives, with participation from warfighters, the

services, the defense agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology). The DTAP is 

developed by DTAP panels, one for each of the 11 technology areas, with 

participation from service and defense agency technical specialists.

There is overlap between representatives on the Joint Warfighting 

Capability Objectives and DTAP panels, according to Defense Research 

and Engineering officials, and consequent overlap between defense 

technology objectives in the DTAP and the JWSTP. Technology Area 

Reviews and Assessments are held for each of the 11 DTAP technology 

areas, the basic research area, and manufacturing technology program to 

provide an independent assessment of the science and technology program 

by world class experts in their fields. 
Appendix V

Science and Technology Plans Are 

Interrelated and Support Future Warfighting 

Technology Needs

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

JV 2010-Related Defense 

Technology Objectives 

Funding Totals $766 Million 

in Fiscal Year 1999

The JWSTP contains $766 million in fiscal year 1999 funding planned for 

JV 2010-related defense technology objectives. Table V.1 shows a breakout 

of the funds by category.

Table V.1: JV 2010-Related Defense Technology Objectives Funding in Fiscal Year 

1999

The Army’s and the Navy’s 

Future Warfighting 

Technology Needs Could 

Almost Always Be Identified 

in Science and Technology 

Plans

The services and the defense agencies develop their own science and 

technology plans with input and guidance from the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Science & Technology)’s plans, and we found that the Army’s 

and the Navy’s future technology needs were adequately reflected in the 

plans. For example, in the Army's future warfighting effort, the Army After 

Next, it identified a short list of desired technologies. We compared the 

technology short list with the Army’s science and technology plan and the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology)’s plans and 

found that the Army’s plan almost always contained planned efforts 

addressing the technology needs to some degree, which could also be 

traced through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & 

Technology)’s plans. We had difficulty doing our comparison because the 

technology short list frequently provided a general technology heading 

under which any number of efforts may fall. 

The Navy has also identified a future Navy capability options list of desired 

technologies to support the future Navy and Marine Corps. These 

technology needs almost always appeared to be addressed in the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology)’s plans. However, as 

we found with the Army, the Navy’s list frequently provided a general 

technology heading under which any number of efforts may fall, making it 

difficult to determine the extent to which these science and technology 

efforts support the JV 2010 operational concepts. 

Dollars in millions

Category Amount

Dominant maneuver $257

Precision engagement 81

Full dimensional protection 181

Focused logistics 85

Information superiority 162

Total $766
Appendix V

Science and Technology Plans Are 

Interrelated and Support Future Warfighting 

Technology Needs

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

The Air Force reports that its strategic plan provides authoritative direction 

for planners at all Air Force levels, including tailoring capabilities that meet 

JV 2010. The Air Force has a list of six high-priority areas: space 

superiority, flexible strike, information dominance, aircraft sustainment, 

agile combat support, and training for warfighting. However, a senior 

science and technology official in Air Force headquarters stated that 

JV 2010 technology needs must be clarified to allow direct linkage with

science and technology efforts.
Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix VI

IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP 

Recommendations for a Joint Forces 

Command ApenVxdiI

The NDP made 17 recommendations regarding the framework for a Joint 

Forces Command, but the Secretary of Defense did not establish it; instead, 

he made USACOM executive agent for joint experimentation. Therefore, 

we concluded that the USACOM charter did not address any of the 

recommendations. We also compared the NDP recommendations to 

USACOM’s IPLAN to assess if it met the spirit of the recommendations. In 

our opinion, USACOM's IPLAN met the spirit or framework for 10 of the

17 NDP recommendations and part of an 11th recommendation. Table VI.1 

compares the NDP recommendations and the USACOM IPLAN.
Appendix VI

IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP 

Recommendations for a Joint Forces 

Command

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Table VI.1: Comparison of the NDP Recommendations and USACOM IPLAN

NDP report recommendation IPLAN response

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for driving the transformation 

process of U.S. forces.

Yes, in the form of the USACOM J9 Directorate for joint 

experimentation. 

Eliminate USACOM. No.

Create a Joint Forces Command with appropriate resources. Yes, USACOM, like any major command, requests 

resources. USACOM has been authorized both 

personnel and budgetary resources for joint 

experimentation.

Create a Joint Forces Command with appropriate requirement authorities. No.

Create a Joint Forces Command that formulates challenging scenarios. Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command that conducts regular field exercises under 

the aegis of a Joint Battle Laboratory.

Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for conducting joint 

experimentation.

Yes. DOD designated USACOM as executive agent for 

joint experimentation. 

Create a Joint Forces Command that ensures forces possess the appropriate 

cultural and political awareness of the specific regions to which they will be 

deployed.

No.

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for developing and validating 

joint doctrine for the approval of the Joint Chiefs.

Yes for developing joint doctrine; no for validating it.

Create a Joint Forces Commander with Major Force Program 11-type 

authority to ensure the ability to support the experimentation program.

No.

Appoint a Joint Forces Commander who would submit an annual report to 

the Secretary of Defense detailing the conduct of joint exercises, including 

their number, forces involved, the operational challenges they faced, the 

exercise results, and the effect of the exercise on the transformation process, 

to include recommended changes in force structure, doctrine, and resource 

allocation. 

Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command that would have exercises based on the 

emerging challenges of 2010-2020 that would take place at joint training 

centers.

No, the location of training exercises is not yet known.

Have exercises that would use scenarios developed by a Joint Concept 

Development Center. 

Yes.

Have a Joint Concept Development Center that would monitor exercises, 

determine measures of effectiveness, and evaluate the adequacy of current 

analytic methodologies, models, and simulations. 

Yes.

Make maximum use of service battle laboratories. Yes.

Have Joint Warfare Centers: the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint C4ISR 

Battle Center, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Joint Command and 

Control Warfare Center, and the Joint Doctrine Center that would report to 

the Joint Forces Commander; assist in the development of new strategies 

and task force objectives; establish desired outcomes, measures of 

effectiveness, and analysis of experimentation results; and develop follow-on 

experiments.

Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for all joint modeling and 

simulation.

No.
Appendix VI

IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP 

Recommendations for a Joint Forces 

Command

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

USACOM’s Ability to Meet 

Its Charter

USACOM has taken a number of steps to implement its charter, which are 

described in the body of this report. These steps include developing a joint 

experimentation process, identifying resource requirements, and 

developing an IPLAN and the first CPLAN. USACOM has developed an 

eight-element joint experimentation process that begins with concept 

development and ends with integration, resulting in recommendations for 

new DOTMLP actions that are required to implement the concept and the 

first joint experiments are to begin in 1999.
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Defense ApVenxdiI
Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Defense

(701138) Lret Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations
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Contents

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-25 Relative Risk Implementation

Tables Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and Our 

Answers 3

Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process 5

Table V.1: JV 2010-Related Defense Technology Objectives

 Funding in Fiscal Year 1999 34

Table VI.1: Comparison of the NDP Recommendations and

 USACOM IPLAN 37