United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-2951

___________ Alfreda Spencer, * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Ripley County State Bank; Ronald D. * Brooks, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Defendants - Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 17, 1997 Filed: July 21, 1997

___________ Before LOKEN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In July 1 992, Alfreda Spencer began working as a teller at the Ripley Count y State Bank in Doniphan, Missouri. I n October 1992, the Bank opened a branch office in Naylor, Missouri. Ronald Brooks, the Bank’s President, asked Spencer to work at the new b ranch. When Spencer refused, Brooks fired her. Spencer then brought this action aga inst the Bank and Brooks individually under Title VII and the Missour i Human Rights Act, alleging that Brooks’s sexual harassment had subjected her to a hostile work environment.The HONORABLE STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, United States District Judge 1 for the Eastern District of Missouri. -2- At her deposition, Spencer testified that shortly after she began work, the Bank’s head te ller warned her that Brooks “can’t keep his hands to himself.” Thereafter , Spencer testified, on at least ten occ asions over the course of her employment, Brooks came to her teller cage, where “[h]e would put his arm around you and pull you to him and he would pinch you on the back around your bra and he actuall y even pulled on my braat times in the back.” Spencer found this conduct “disgusting” and attempted t o m o ve away when Brooks touched her, but she did not complain to Brooks or anyone else a t the Bank. She refused to transfer to the Naylor branch because it would b e easier for Brooks to “hit on me” at that more isolated location.
One m onth before trial, the Bank moved for summary judgment, submittin g aff idavits by numerous male and female Bank employees averring that: (i) no othe r female e mployee had been harassed by Brooks; (ii) Spencer never complained t o anyon e about Brooks’s alleged conduct, and no one had seen any such conduct a t Spen cer’s teller cage; (iii) Spencer did not accuse Brooks of harassment or state he r alleged concern about working at the Naylor branch at her termination meeting with Brooks and Brenda Pigg, vice president of operations, or when she complaine d immediate ly after the termination to Floyd Lynxwiler, a member of the Bank’s Board of Directors, or when she sought help from Dwayne Hackworth, Chairman of th e Board and the Bank’s majority owner; and (iv) the Bank has a written policy against sexual harass ment

and a well understood procedure by which employee sexual harassmen t complaints may be reported to the Chairman of the Board. Spencer did not respond to the Bank’s motion. The district court granted the 1 motion, explaining that by resting on her pleading Spencer failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment in two respects. First, she-3-

present ed no evidence that Brooks’s conduct was so offensive or abusive as to affect her w ell-being or her work performance; second, she presented no evidence that th e Bank kne w or should have known of the alleged harassment and failed to tak e appropriate remedial action. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Burns v

. McGregor Elec. Indus. , Inc. , 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992). The court dismissed Spencer’s claims against Brooks on the ground that individual employees are no t personally liable under Title VII. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech. , 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. St. Bernards Regional Med. Ctr. , 19 F.3d 125 4, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). It dismissed her pendent state law claims without prejudice. Spencer then moved to alter or amend th e court’s judgment, stating that she had delayed resp onding to the Bank’s motion in order to complete additional depositions. The dis trict court granted her time to complete and submit those depositions and a respons ive memorandum. After considering these additional submissions, the court denied Spencer’s motion to alter or amend because “[n] one of these deponents provide any factua l support to plaintiff’s contention that she was sexually harassed, that he r w o rk environment was hostile, that the defendant Bank was aware of the harassment and failed to take proper measures to end it, or that she was fired because she would not submit to defendant Brooks’s sexual advances.” On appeal, Spencer argues that she presente d a triable claim of sexual harassment, that the Bank should be strictl y lia ble for the actions of supervisor Brooks, and that we should afford her a Title VI I cause o f action against Brooks individually. After carefully considering the spars e record, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See 8th Cir. Rule 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.