GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Secretary of Defense

May 1999 BALLISTIC MISSILE 

DEFENSE

More Common 

Systems and 

Components Could 

Result in Cost Savings

GAO/NSIAD-99-101

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280494 Letter

May 21, 1999

The Honorable William S. Cohen

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Affordability is a major concern for ballistic missile defense programs. 

According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s (BMDO) 

November 1998 development plan, the organization faces a shortfall of 

several hundred million dollars per year when its baseline acquisition 

programs are compared to available funding in the future years’ defense 

plan. Because using common subsystems and components when designing 

systems can reduce system costs, BMDO and the services1 have considered 

the feasibility of sharing designs among some of their programs.

We reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to incorporate 

common subsystems and components in its ballistic missile defense 

acquisition programs. Specifically, we (1) identified the key benefits that 

BMDO and service officials believe could be achieved through 

commonality, (2) determined what BMDO and the services have done to 

incorporate commonality into their programs, and (3) identified BMDO’s 

plans for instilling commonality in the future. We are addressing this report 

to you because of the potential cost savings from commonality and because 

your support is needed for DOD to take advantage of such potential 

savings.

Results in Brief According to BMDO and service officials, the key benefits of 

commonality—using the same or interchangeable subsystems and 

components in more than one weapon—are cost savings and improved 

interoperability among BMDO systems. Increased use of common items 

can reduce both production costs and total life-cycle costs of a system. 

Because BMDO systems must interoperate with each other, DOD officials 

said that commonality is directly linked to the success of interoperability. 

1

The military services execute most of the BMDO-funded acquisition programs.

Letr
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Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

While commonality is theoretically possible at any level of a weapon 

system, BMDO has achieved commonality primarily at lower levels of 

assembly, such as in components. According to BMDO and program 

officials, they have had limited success in designing common systems or 

major subsystems mostly because of differences in system requirements 

and operating environments and difficulties in incorporating new 

technologies into systems with mature designs. These officials said that 

the greatest benefits of commonality can be produced at the component 

level. BMDO has sought to promote commonality within its ballistic 

missile defense systems through the use of an “open systems” approach 

and technology insertion at the component level—an approach that seeks 

to use commonly available commercial products in DOD systems, rather 

than developing program unique components. 

BMDO officials said that they expect more commonality in the future for a 

variety of reasons, such as having fewer suppliers and more opportunities 

to upgrade systems with newer technologies. Although BMDO tries to 

promote commonality in its programs, it does not have a structured 

process to systematically identify promising common technologies and has 

provided little funding to evaluate the feasibility of the use of these 

technologies. Although some technologies have been identified and 

preliminary estimates show that they could save substantial dollar 

amounts, these technologies must be thoroughly evaluated. Without 

adequate evaluation, program offices and their prime contractors are 

reluctant to convert to unproven technologies.

To better achieve commonality, BMDO needs to establish a structured 

effort or program with appropriate funding to identify and evaluate 

potential common systems and components.

Key Benefits of 

Commonality in 

Ballistic Missile 

Defense Programs 

According to DOD officials, the primary benefit from the use of common 

subsystems and components is cost savings, especially over the life of a 

system. One way to achieve commonality is to insert common 

technologies into existing systems. BMDO’s November 1998 development 

plan states that the success of technology insertion can be improved by 

using open systems concepts in system design. These concepts, introduced 

into DOD in 1994, promote affordability by extensive use of common 

components. Open systems, according to DOD documents, allow DOD to 

use commercially available, widely accepted standard products from 

multiple vendors. The advantage of this is that wide availability of a 

potentially large variety of compliant products makes rapid design and 
B-280494

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

prototyping much easier than when every element of the system must be 

custom designed. DOD documents note that the long-term payoffs for 

open systems include lower life-cycle costs for weapon systems, better 

system performance with greater interoperability between systems, and 

more rapid technology upgrades. Army missile defense program officials 

told us that the advantage of commonality is that as the quantity of an item 

increases, both fixed and unit component production costs are reduced. 

Increased commonality results in reduced life-cycle costs.

Another benefit of commonality, according to BMDO, is improving 

interoperability among BMDO systems. Officials from the Army’s Theater 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program told us that each BMDO 

program is required to interoperate with the other programs and that 

BMDO plans to have common messages, communication, and processing 

equipment. Navy officials said that commonality is inherently linked to the 

success of interoperability. Army officials told us that commonality also 

may enhance reliability. According to these officials, experience in the 

electronics industry has shown that when the quantity of production items 

increases, reliability increases.

Mixed Success in 

BMDO’s Commonality 

Efforts

Depending on the particular circumstances, commonality is possible at any 

level of a weapon, from the entire system or a major subsystem to 

components or piece parts. BMDO has had limited success in achieving 

commonality in entire systems or major subsystems. The use of a common 

interceptor missile for the Army’s THAAD program and the Navy’s Theaterwide program has been studied extensively, and cost savings have been 

shown to be outweighed by modification and integration costs and risks. 

BMDO and service officials believe that system commonality has been 

limited because of differences in system requirements and operating 

environments. BMDO and the services have had some success in achieving 

commonality below the system level, especially at the component level.

System Level Commonality To date, the most ambitious attempt at instilling commonality in a BMDO 

program relates to considering a common interceptor for the Army’s 

THAAD program and the Navy’s Theater-wide program. Since 1991, several 

DOD studies have examined the possibility of such a common interceptor. 

These studies looked primarily at adapting the THAAD missile for the 

Theater-wide program since the THAAD program was further along in 

development. While initially, a common interceptor appeared attractive 

given that the threats, defense objectives, and system functions are very 
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similar, the studies generally found that differences in the systems’ mission 

requirements and operating environments would be difficult and costly to 

overcome. For example, in 1993, a DOD committee reported that a 

common THAAD and Navy Theater-wide interceptor would likely be 

impractical because of safety concerns unique to shipboard operations. 

Also in 1993, DOD’s independent Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

reported that although it was too early to assess cost-effectiveness, it was 

unlikely that the objective of a common interceptor could be achieved, in 

part, because of different operating environments. THAAD subsystems 

may be spaced out over an area of several square miles, while the Navy 

system must operate from a ship at sea. Navy radars and missiles will be 

much closer together, increasing the possibility of interference and the 

hazards associated with flammable materials. Also, THAAD is intended to 

be located near critical assets and to intercept missiles both inside and 

outside the atmosphere as they fly toward the system. The Theater-wide 

missile will be designed to intercept a target missile in all stages of flight 

outside the atmosphere. In many cases, the target missile will travel away 

from the defense system, which will require an interceptor that is roughly 

twice as fast as the planned THAAD interceptor. 

More recent studies have further defined the risks associated with a 

common interceptor. The Navy’s 1997 cost analysis, which specifically 

evaluated whether the Navy Theater-wide system could use the THAAD 

interceptor’s kill vehicle,2

 concluded that the kill vehicle could not be used 

in the Navy system without significant modifications. The study 

concentrated on two variants of the THAAD kill vehicle. The first variant 

would be about 85-percent common with the Army’s kill vehicle and would 

result in commonality benefits totaling $150 million. However, these 

benefits, according to the analysis, were almost totally offset by increases 

in safety-related costs associated with the Army’s use of liquid fuels in the 

kill vehicle’s design. The use of liquid fuels, which are toxic, corrosive, and 

explosive, would require additional Navy investments in safety equipment 

and training. The second variant was estimated to be 54-percent common 

with the Army’s kill vehicle and it would result in commonality benefits of 

$50 million versus additional costs of $500 million. These additional costs 

were primarily for developing a new seeker capable of longer range 

intercepts and a new solid fuel control system to reduce shipboard safety

2

The kill vehicle is the front end of an interceptor that will see the target and destroy it by colliding with 

it.
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Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

hazards. A 1997 BMDO study3 reconfirmed that designing a common 

interceptor for the two programs would increase costs and risks and 

recommended that both systems proceed as planned. The study also 

recommended that both programs be structured to support commonality 

objectives when they are upgraded and suggested that commonality could 

be revisited as a mitigation approach if major problems occur in either 

program. 

Commonality Below the 

System Level

BMDO has had more success at incorporating commonality below the 

system or major subsystem level, as the following examples show. 

• The THAAD4

 and National Missile Defense5 radars use several common 

components, including common hardware, software, and processors. 

Program officials believe that measurable cost savings have been 

achieved by this commonality, but the magnitude of the savings is yet to 

be determined.

• Both Navy theater missile defense systems rely on technology that has 

evolved from earlier versions of the Standard missile and the AEGIS 

weapon system. For example, the Navy Area program6

 is modifying an 

earlier version of the Navy’s Standard missile and is upgrading the 

existing AEGIS system in order to perform its theater ballistic missile 

defense mission. DOD officials could not provide an estimate of the 

cost savings associated with this commonality.

• The Navy Theater-wide program and the National Missile Defense 

program are developing common infrared seekers and propulsion 

systems. DOD officials could not provide an estimate of the cost savings 

associated with this commonality.

BMDO and service officials said that component level commonality has 

been the focus of most recent initiatives. BMDO has emphasized 

commonality at the component level through the use of open systems and 

3

BMDO, The Commonality Alternatives Systems Study, 1997.

4

For more details on the THAAD program, see Ballistic Missile Defense: Improvements Needed in

THAAD Acquisition Planning (GAO/NSIAD-97-188, Sept. 12, 1997).

5For more details on the National Missile Defense program, see National Missile Defense: Even With

Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks Are High (GAO/NSIAD-98-153, June 23, 1998).

6

For more details on the Navy Area program, see Ballistic Missile Defense: Improvements Needed in

Navy Area Acquisition Planning (GAO/NSIAD-98-34, Nov. 14, 1997).
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technology insertion. To this end, BMDO has established several working 

groups, including the Open Systems Working Group and the Government/

Industry Open Systems Applications Group. The purpose of the Working 

Group,7

 which meets quarterly, is to coordinate the use of open systems 

within the BMDO community, and the purposes of the Applications Group8

are to provide a forum for communication regarding specific and planned 

open systems implementation opportunities and to enhance the consistent 

application of open systems. The Applications Group met three times in 

1998. Participants at the Working Group’s and Applications Group’s 

meetings have generally been pleased with the results to date.

According to BMDO officials, BMDO recently implemented two processes 

that, while not primarily focused on commonality, should help identify 

promising common technologies. These are the technology master plan 

process and the Family of Systems architecture. The technology master 

plan process has identified multiple potential applications for new 

technology. For example, four different window technology efforts, 

supporting two different programs, were combined into one “advanced 

window” effort to support both programs. The Family of Systems 

architecture is focused on systems interoperability, but, according to 

BMDO officials, commonality and affordability are inherently linked to the 

systems design trade-offs necessary to achieve interoperability.

Factors That Restrict 

Commonality

We discussed factors that have restricted the use of common subsystems 

and components in ballistic missile defense systems with BMDO and 

service officials. These officials said that commonality must be 

incorporated into the design phase of a system or subsystem when 

requirements are being established for maximum benefit. They identified 

several reasons why commonality in BMDO systems has been difficult to 

achieve.

One reason given was different performance requirements. BMDO systems 

are designed to meet specific service performance requirements that may 

be compromised with common components. For example, according to 

the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office, an inertial measurement 

7The Working Group consists of representatives from BMDO and its program offices.

8

The Applications Group’s members include not only BMDO and program office representatives, but 

also representatives from BMDO’s prime contractors and major subcontractors.
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Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

unit developed for a theater missile defense interceptor could be used for 

the National Missile Defense Program’s interceptor. However, the weight, 

volume, and power requirements may not be fully compatible with the 

National Missile Defense program goals, possibly lowering performance. 

Navy officials said where operating requirements and environments are 

substantially different, commonality may not be appropriate, especially if 

cost and performance goals must be sacrificed to achieve it.

A second reason was mature designs. BMDO systems have mature designs 

and integration of common systems may involve high integration costs. As 

noted previously, for example, the cost to integrate the Army’s THAAD 

interceptor into the Navy’s Theater-wide system was estimated to be 

between $150 million and $500 million. Officials from the Army’s missile 

defense program office told us that the stage of maturity of a weapon 

system limits the extent to which changes can be implemented. While 

some components such as batteries can be changed easily, others, such as 

composite airframes, cannot. They added that the only way to make 

changes at a system level for a mature system is through future upgrades. 

A third reason given by officials was that candidate common systems 

emanating from other programs have to be proven to a program office or 

prime contractor before either one will accept them. That is, program 

offices and prime contractors are reluctant to accept systems they did not 

design. THAAD officials told us that commonality is a design constraint 

that must be considered at the beginning of the design process and that 

program managers would resist changing the baseline design after it has 

been established. According to the Army’s missile defense program office, 

DOD acquisition reforms have given prime contractors total system 

performance responsibility, and thus, they have little incentive to use 

common systems that can be produced by another contractor. Navy 

officials added that a company that produces a common product for all 

applications is unlikely to encourage a competitive industrial base for that 

product.

A fourth reason was management challenges. A joint service program is 

likely to require many more decision trade-offs than would a single service 

development, and there are complex budget, cost, and schedule 

interactions that affect the delivery of products for both services. The 

effort will result in a successful conclusion only if all parties are willing to 

make the necessary compromises to maintain commonality.
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BMDO’s Plans for 

Enhancing 

Commonality in the 

Future

Despite the limited commonality that exists, officials told us that they 

expect to see more commonality in the future because there will likely be 

fewer suppliers and more opportunities to upgrade existing designs with 

newer technology. Several efforts that involve increased commonality have 

already started. However, BMDO does not have a structured process to 

systematically identify promising common technologies. Furthermore, 

even when promising technologies are identified, BMDO’s ability to 

incorporate them into weapon systems is hampered because it does not 

have a consistent source of funding to evaluate the feasibility of using the 

technologies. 

DOD’s Future Emphasis on 

Commonality

The decreasing number of defense contractors, subcontractors, and 

suppliers is forcing DOD system designs to contain common subsystems or 

components that are made by the same supplier. One BMDO official told 

us that industry is moving away from producing defense-specific parts; 

thus, defense programs will be forced toward more commonality. Also, 

BMDO’s requirement that all of its theater ballistic missile defense systems 

operate in an integrated manner, that is, interoperate with each other—a 

concept known as the Family of Systems—will facilitate the use of 

common items. According to Navy officials, commonality, affordability, 

schedule, and performance are inherently linked to interoperability 

success.

Most officials said that commonality will become more prevalent as 

systems are improved through periodic upgrades. The BMDO development 

plan notes that new technology has primarily been viewed as a contributor 

in the earliest stages of development before a system’s design has been 

“frozen.” It states that many of the current BMDO component technologies 

are already obsolete and often unavailable. With the lifetime of many 

microelectronic devices at less than 2 years, BMDO will have to modify 

system designs several times during the development phase. Finally, it 

notes that programs must plan to make use of emerging commercial and 

defense developed technologies based on availability of technology rather 

than on DOD acquisition phases. A BMDO official said that BMDO 

programs have mature system designs and thus seeking commonality could 

result in high engineering costs. However, in the future, when these 

systems are upgraded, common subsystems and components could be 

inserted more affordably.
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Several system upgrades related to commonality are being developed. For 

example, BMDO is developing the next generation radar transmit/receive 

modules to replace modules that are currently planned for use in both 

National Missile Defense and THAAD radars. Also, BMDO’s Advanced 

Interceptor Technology program is to develop a new interceptor that can 

be used to upgrade current systems. Although it does not have 

commonality as a specific goal, the program, according to many officials, 

would result in greater BMDO commonality through system upgrades. For 

example, Navy officials said that a number of common components are 

being developed under this and other programs, including common 

infrared seekers and common propulsion systems.

Further Application Limited 

By Lack of Structured 

Process for Identifying and 

Funding Promising 

Technologies 

BMDO currently promotes component commonality primarily by acting as 

a “clearinghouse” for information. The working groups meet and discuss 

common technologies that could possibly be shared by the services or may 

be available commercially. However, even with the working groups and the 

process initiatives, BMDO officials told us that they lack a formal process 

to systematically identify promising common technologies. One BMDO 

official described BMDO’s effort as “hit or miss.”

Furthermore, even if a promising common technology is identified, BMDO 

does not have a consistent source of funding to evaluate the feasibility of 

the use of that technology. Evaluation is necessary to assess (1) the costs 

and risks of transitioning to a new technology and (2) the cost impact of 

operating and maintaining that technology after system deployment. 

Funding for evaluations often comes from reprogrammed sources or from 

excess program funds; a budget account for such evaluations does not 

exist.

Through the Applications Group, BMDO has identified 16 possible common 

technologies, but only 4 have been funded for evaluation. One technology 

involves replacing ring laser gyroscopes, which cost $70,000 to $100,000 

each, with interferometric fiber optic gyroscopes,9

 which cost $15,000 to 

$30,000 each. The cost to evaluate the feasibility of this one technology is 

estimated to be $500,000, with funding being provided by BMDO. Another 

$7 million is estimated to be needed to develop the technology for program 

insertion. This development funding is expected to be provided by BMDO, 

9

These gyroscopes are part of an interceptor’s inertial measurement units and allow the interceptor to 

track and intercept the target.
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Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Patriot Advanced 

Capability-3 Program Office. According to BMDO, while the Army’s 

THAAD and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 programs would be the initial 

beneficiaries of this common component, other programs may also benefit 

in the future. BMDO’s preliminary estimate of the cost savings that would 

result from the use of the common gyroscopes is about $116 million over

the life of the systems.

The average cost to evaluate the other three technologies was estimated at 

$1 million to $1.8 million, versus average projected life-cycle cost savings 

of $33 million. BMDO’s preliminary estimates show that five of the other 

technologies could save $113 million if implemented, but they have not 

received funding for the needed evaluations. Army officials told us that 

many good common technologies are never realized because the near-term

funding needed to quantify the technical and cost benefits for those 

candidates is insufficient.

To better structure its commonality effort, BMDO could consider the 

example of other DOD programs, such as the Army’s Horizontal 

Technology Integration Program, which has many of the same goals as 

BMDO’s effort. The purpose of this program is to apply common 

technologies across multiple systems within a force to increase 

effectiveness. The program seeks to reduce overall cost while allowing for 

rapid fielding of high payoff technologies, ensure interoperability and 

commonality, and facilitate simultaneous system upgrades.

The Army’s process for this is more structured than BMDO’s. Proposals are 

forwarded to an executive secretariat and are then reviewed by a “council 

of colonels.” If the proposal is promising, it is reviewed by a council of 

general officers for formal approval. The program provides funding to the 

appropriate program offices for approved projects so as to control design 

and funding. The Army estimates that the program has already resulted in 

cost savings of $2 billion.

Conclusions Because DOD and BMDO studies have demonstrated the potential for 

reducing costs and enhancing interoperability through increased 

commonality within BMDO systems, BMDO has taken some initial steps to 

make its systems more affordable through the use of commonality, 

primarily at the component level. BMDO expects to have greater 

commonality in the future, either through the use of upgrades to existing 

systems or through more common designs in future weapon systems. 
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Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

However, at the time of our review, BMDO did not have a structured effort 

or program with appropriate funding to systematically identify and 

evaluate potential common systems and components. In our opinion, 

developing such an effort is both feasible and potentially beneficial. The 

Army’s Horizontal Technology Integration program is an example of 

another DOD program that has many of the same goals as BMDO’s. While 

we recognize that BMDO must fund many pressing priorities within its 

available resources, we believe that the potential for significant cost 

savings warrants formalization of BMDO’s commonality activities. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said that BMDO had recently 

begun planning for a structured and funded commonality program.

Recommendation In light of potential cost savings that will enhance the affordability of 

ballistic missile defense programs, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense take steps to ensure that BMDO implements plans to establish a 

structured program, with appropriate milestones and funding, to identify 

and evaluate potential common systems and components for its missile 

defense systems.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendation. DOD concurred with the intent of the recommendation 

but stated that action by the Secretary of Defense was unnecessary 

because BMDO was in the process of establishing the recommended 

structured and funded program. In clarifying DOD’s comments, a BMDO 

official told us that the organization began internal discussions aimed at 

establishing the program in March 1999 and that a process action team, 

established in April 1999, recommended the following actions. 

• Criteria be established to judge commonality proposals; the criteria will 

include readiness of the technology, its producibility, benefits to more 

than one program, future potential, and the ability to build on existing 

technologies.

• A working group be formed to evaluate proposed technologies.

• Promising technologies be forwarded to an existing BMDO advanced 

technology and cost benefits team that will estimate life-cycle costs.

• Technologies with reasonable cost estimates be passed to a senior level 

steering group for approval.
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Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

The official told us that this process had not yet been finalized or 

implemented and that no decision had been made on how the evaluations 

would be funded. We modified our report to recognize that BMDO has 

begun planning a structured and funded program for identifying and 

evaluating potential common systems and components. We have also 

modified our recommendation to emphasize the need for the Secretary of 

Defense to take steps to ensure that BMDO’s plans for a structured 

program are implemented, with appropriate milestones and funding.

DOD also provided additional technical comments, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are included in appendix I.

Scope and 

Methodology

To describe the benefits of commonality to BMDO programs, we 

interviewed agency officials and reviewed pertinent documentation, 

including the BMDO Development Plan, the BMDO Open Systems 

Deployment Plan, and the Theater Missile Defense Engineering and 

Technology Commonality Study. We analyzed the various factors that have 

contributed to commonality within BMDO programs.

To determine what current efforts have been undertaken by BMDO and the 

services to achieve commonality, we interviewed agency officials and 

analyzed relevant documentation, including the Navy Theater-wide Phase II 

Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis, the BMDO Commonality 

Alternatives System Study, and committee charters and meeting 

summaries. We examined BMDO’s open systems and technology insertion 

efforts to determine achievements and future plans. We also interviewed 

government and industry participants in commonality meetings and 

forums. 

To identify BMDO’s plans to instill commonality in the future, we 

interviewed agency officials and analyzed documentation related to 

BMDO’s commonality efforts and the Army’s Horizontal Technology 

Integration program, which has goals similar to BMDO’s commonality 

effort.

We interviewed responsible agency officials at the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, BMDO, and the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Office, in Washington, D.C.; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Research, Development & Acquisition) and the Office of the 

Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, in Washington, D.C.; 

the Army’s Program Executive Office for Air and Missile Defense, and 
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Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

THAAD and Patriot program offices, in Huntsville, Alabama; the Navy’s 

Program Executive Office (Theater Surface Combatants) in Washington, 

D.C.; the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia; the Office of 

the Secretary of the Air Force, Theater Air Defense Division, Washington, 

D.C.; and industry officials in Washington, D.C.

We conducted our review from June 1998 to February 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, the head of a federal agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to 

submit a written statement of actions taken on our recommendations to the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on 

Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A 

written statement also must be submitted to the Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for 

appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO; the 

Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard 

Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting 

Secretary of the Air Force. We will also make copies available to others on 

request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report were 

Lee Edwards, David Hand, and Judy Lasley.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApeInxdi

Lret

Now on p. 5.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707368) Lret Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-101 Ballistic Missile Defense Program Commonality

Now on p. 11.
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