Enclosure 3: Dominion Presentation

Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 

Public Meeting with NEI

Dated August 4, 2010
© 2003 Dominion

DOlllinlon •• ® 
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Region II

Eric Hendrixson

Fred Mladen
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Implementation

• Modified Previous Safety Culture Binning

– Started in 2008

– Only looked at RCEs

– Only used the Leadership Team

– Informal

– Biennial Safety Culture Assessment conducted with 4 SMEs

• Formal Program 

– Started in 3rd Quarter, 2009

– Developed LI-NA-1002 (Rev. 2)

– Expanded to the NEI 09-07 guidance

– Results are reviewed by MSRC
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Safety Culture Assessment

• 71 question electronic survey provided to 

1,099 site workers (included supplemental 

personnel)

• Survey was conducted 11/18/09 – 11/30/09

• 70.15% response rate, resulted in 55,509 data 

points

• Results used to focus the interviews
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Safety Culture Assessment

• Site Assessment performed 12/14/09 – 12/19/09

• Team consisted of 21 members (11 from North 

Anna), as well as several observers

• 62 interviews conducted, and 12 observations, 

resulted in 1,282 data points

• 3 strengths, 0 weaknesses, 5 positive, 3 negative, 

and 7 general observations were made

• Results loaded into the Self Assessment module of 

the Corrective Action Program
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Safety Culture Monitoring Panel

• Consists of Supervisors and Specialists

– Operations

– Engineering

– Maintenance

– RP/Chemistry

– Corrective Action

– Human Resources

– ECP

– HU Coordinator

• Also has attendance by OR (organizational 

effectiveness) Manager and NS&L Director for 

consistency 
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Safety Culture Leadership Team

• Consists of Senior Management

– Site Vice President

– Plant Manager

– NS&L Director

– Engineering Director

– OR Manager

– Training Manager
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Data Analysis

• Used Guidance from NEI 09-07

– Monitoring Panel meets 1-2 times per Quarter

– Leadership Team meets once per Quarter

– Considered larger extent than previous binning

• RCEs, NRC Violations and Findings, ACEs, Oversight 

AFIs and PDs, CAP and HU Trend Reports, INPO AFIs 

and PDs, OWAs, Margin Management Issues, HR and 

ECP Concerns/Trends, ODEC Concerns

– 91 items considered in the current 4 quarters

– 58 Items binned, 8 “doubled counted”, 33 items not binned

– Bin to both INPO Safety Culture Codes and NRC Cross 

Cutting Aspects
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Results

- DOminion' 

Nuclear Safety Culture 

-

1- QUilrter 2010 
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Results

Area Components Aspects 4th Qtr 

2008

1st Qtr 

2009

2nd Qtr 

2009

3rd Qtr 

2009

4th Qtr 

2009

1st Qtr 

2010

Running 4 

Quarter Total

Human Performance

1. Decision Making

a. Safety/Risk Significant Decisions 1 1 1 1 1 4

b. Conservative Assumptions & Safe Actions 1 1 1 5 1 8

c. Communications of Decisions 1 1

2. Resources

a. Proper Maintenance Programs 1 1 2 4

b. Personnel Training & Qualifications 1 1

c. Complete Documentation & Labeling 1 1 1 2 1 5

d. Proper Facilities & Equipment

3. Work Control

a. Proper Work Planning 1 2 2

b. Work Activity Coordination 1 1 1 2

4. Work Practices

a. Human Performance & Error Prevention 11 3 1 5

b. Procedural Compliance 2 1 1 3 3 8

c. Supervisory & Management Oversight 1 1 1 1 1 3

PI & R

1. Corrective Actions Program (CAP)

a. Proper Issue Identification

b. Trend Performance Using CAP 1 1

c. Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems

1 2 1 4

d. Appropriate Timely Corrective Actions (CA)

1 2 2

e. Appropriate Timely Alternative CAP Process

2. Operating Experience

a. Utilizing Operating Experiences 1 1

b. Implementing Operating Experience 1 1 1 2 4

3. Self & Independent Assessment

a. Appropriate Self-Assessment 1 1

b. Track and Trend Safety Indicators

c. Coordinates & Communicates Results

SCWE

1. Environment for Raising Concerns

a. Free Flow of Information

b. Alternative Free Flow

2. Preventing, Detecting, and 

Mitigating Perceptions of Retaliation

a. Personnel Are Free to Raise Safety Concerns

b. Discrimination Claims Investigated & CA Taken

c. Appropriate Disciplinary Actions Taken

OTHER

1. Accountability Defined lines of authority and responsibility 3 2 1 1 4

2. Continuous Learning Environment

Licensee ensures that a learning environment exists

3 2 1 3

3. Organizational Change 

Management

Systematic Process for change is used

2 2

4. Safety Policies

a. Policies reinforce the right to raise concerns

b. Personnel are effectively trained on safety policies

c. Actions are consistent with safety policies 1 1 1

d. policies are periodically communicated
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Results

• Provided Training, and other actions; 

– Results tracked by PIIs or CAP

– Davis-Besse and Strategic and Action Planning leadership 

training

– Managing Risk and Proceeding in the Face of Uncertainty 

leadership training

– QVV (Question, Validate, Verify) leadership training

– Change Management (Who, What, When) leadership training

– Importance of adhering to nuclear standards and personal 

accountability leadership training

– Collective significance review of items binned under INPO 

principle #7, (Organizational Learning is Embraced)

– Passive Design Features training for the entire staff
© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program

North Anna Power Station

Learnings

• Only half of the items cleanly “bin” into either the INPO 

Principles or the Cross Cuttings Aspects

• The other half are very subjective, and can easily fit into 

multiple categories based perspective

• Leadership Team tends to be more critical than the 

Monitoring Panel

• Most actions are training directed at behaviors, not changes 

to processes or procedures (CAP already addresses these)

• Biennial Safety Culture Assessment results are different than 

and complement the results of the binning

• About 20-30 “bins” appear to be manageable and meaningful, 

8 is too few, 71 is too many for the quarterly binning
© 2003 Dominion

Questions?