No. 185, September 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

C

hina seeks to become the major power

in Asia by 2050. Under its so-called

New Security Concept, it will attempt

to displace the United States as the preeminent military presence in the region while

avoiding arms races with its Asian neighbors. Beijing will also try to retake “lost

territories” at the expense of other Asian

countries. China also seeks to achieve economic supremacy in Asia, drawing other

nations into a regional market dominated by

the Chinese yuan. American military power

has been insufficient to overcome cultural

divisions and divergent interests in Asia, so

attempts to multilateralize regional security

on the model of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization failed. These efforts bolstered

the impression that Washington was looking

for a way out of regional commitments.

The U.S. policy of engagement has not

yet produced its intended results. America

needs to adopt a new realism in relations

with China. Washington should leverage

Beijing’s need for capital, technology, and

markets to influence nonproliferation and

other issues. Such a new realism will promote stability in Asia and continued American presence.

The United States must recognize and

reaffirm that only strong bilateral relationships and interaction with its allies will

convince Asia that a U.S. presence is longterm and an alternative to Chinese dominance. Bilateral alliances should be strengthened and the network expanded to include

India, Mongolia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Chinese aspirations to become a great

power in the 21st century have numerous regional implications. Beijing claims to seek a

peaceful international climate so as to concentrate on domestic development. Yet under the

rubric of a New Security Concept (NSC), China

also is pursuing a long-term strategy to alter

radically regional power relationships that

have contributed to prosperity and relative

stability in East Asia over the past 50 years.

The New Security Concept echoes wellestablished Chinese principles of peaceful coexistence first articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai

at the Bandung Conference in 1955: mutual

respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,

nonaggression, noninterference in the internal

affairs of other states, equality and mutual

benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Other Chinese

statements stress the themes of mutually beneficial economic cooperation; elimination of

inequalities and discriminatory trade relations;

and the promotion of security through dialogue

and cooperation, rather than by forming alliances against specific threats. Behind these

generalizations, however, China has a two-fold

goal: first, to allay the fears of its Asian neighbors, who are suspicious not only of China’s

claims in the South China Sea and other territories but also its efforts to build a military force

unequaled (with the exception of the United

States) in Asia; and, second, to challenge the

rationale behind the U.S. alliances and military

presence in Asia, which China characterizes as

holdovers from the Cold War.

China’s Strategy

According to official Chinese pronouncements, peace and development increasingly

characterize the world; the major trends are

toward multipolarity and economic globalization; and the general international security

situation is improving. In its 2000 Defense

White Paper, the Chinese government asserts

that it “is devoting itself to its modernization

drive, [and the country] needs and cherishes

dearly an environment of long-term international peace, especially a favorable peripheral

environment.” China characterizes its efforts to

build the most powerful military force in the

region as “pursuing a national defense policy

that is defensive in nature, and its national

defense construction (resources and funds) is

in a subordinate position to and in service of

economic construction.”

The white paper also portrays another side

to the existing order:

The world is far from peaceful. . . . No

fundamental change has been made in the

old, unfair, and irrational international

political and economic order. Hegemonism

and power politics still exist. . . . Certain big

powers are pursuing “neo-interventionism,”

“neo-gunboat policy,” and neo-economic

colonialism, which are seriously damaging

the sovereignty, independence, and developmental interests of many countries, and

threatening world peace and security.

. . . Only by developing a new security concept and establishing a fair and reasonable

new international order can world peace

and security be fundamentally guaranteed.

Such statements are significant because

they reflect the lack of trust that the Chinese

still hold toward the outside world. With the

demise of the Soviet threat on its northern

border and the diminished likelihood of nuclear war between the superpowers, China is

free to spend more on economic growth and

China: Making the Case for

Realistic Engagement

by Michael E. Marti

No. 185

September 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
less on defense. However, China also entertains

visions of becoming the predominant power in

Asia and thereby one of the poles in a multipolar world. To accomplish this goal, it must

reorder the existing power structure in Asia to

diminish the influence of the United States

while avoiding arms races with neighbors.

China’s ambitions must be understood

from the perspective of its historical development. From 1840 to 1949, China was divided

into spheres of influence and was effectively

controlled by Western powers and Japan. The

Communist revolution in 1949 finally ousted

the foreigners and ended the period of colonialism. The use of the terms neo-gunboat policy,

neo-economic colonialism, and hegemonism

in the white paper is designed to recall images

of foreign domination and humiliation and to

link historic ill will to the current Chinese

sense of frustration with the West in general

and the United States in particular.

Against this background, China has never

accepted the contemporary geopolitical system

in the region, which is characterized by American bilateral military alliances and forwardbased troop deployments, or Western, mainly

American, preeminence in global economic

decisionmaking. Hence NSC, which is both a

new post-Cold War concept and an Eastern

creation by virtue of its basis in the Bandung

Principles, is China’s attempt to establish a

regional alternative to Western dominance.

This effort resonates with Chinese intellectual

arguments of earlier periods that sought salvation from foreign domination, including arguments for the doctrine of Marxism as an alternative to Western-style capitalism.

China’s ambition to become a prosperous

and powerful nation also includes reacquiring

what it calls “lost territories.” While NSC advocates peaceful coexistence, China has ongoing

territorial disputes with India, Japan, Malaysia,

the Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

It went to war with India in 1962 and with

Vietnam in 1979, and it clashed with Vietnam

in 1988 and the Philippines in 1995 over the

South Sea Islands. While some of these claims

have a weak historical basis, they nonetheless

figure prominently in Chinese identity.

China professes not to seek hegemony in

Asia; however, its determination to reclaim lost

territories and become a preeminent power in

the region can be accomplished only at the

expense of the status quo. What are the implications for the nations of Asia that must deal

with the growing economic and military power

of their giant neighbor?

The Russian Connection

A cash-strapped Russia has been selling

arms to China to its potential detriment, especially in light of China’s claims to territories

lost through “unequal treaty” agreements

made over the years with both tsarist Russia

and the Soviet Union. Russia also is aware that

China seeks to edge it out of the Far East by

developing a competing economy there, most

likely in conjunction with Japan. However,

Russia has chosen to ally with China in the

near term in an attempt to stave off any precipitous Chinese move to force it out of Asia before

it has recovered its military, economic, and

political prowess. Thus, to stay engaged as a

regional player, Russia has signed China’s 

five-nation border agreement initiative with its

former Central Asian states of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Also, Western media

reported that President Vladimir Putin has

agreed to Beijing’s anti-American position on

national missile defense (NMD) and theater

missile defense (TMD), despite his earlier

statements that a limited system would be

acceptable in Europe.

Russia also has sought to shore up its

other relations around the region. It has begun

talks with Outer Mongolia on mutual cooperation to reestablish political and economic 

ties. Putin has persisted in his courtship of

Pyongyang, despite occasional setbacks. 

He also has sought to reaffirm ties to India

through arms sales and support for its position

against Pakistan, which relies on China for

political and military support.

The Sino-Russian relationship can be

characterized as a marriage of convenience.

China wants to end Russian influence in the

region as much as it wants to end American

influence, but it needs the military hardware

and technology that only Russia is prepared to

provide. Russia needs time to sort out its domestic situation and to reclaim its superpower

status, and this affects Chinese goals in the

short term.

Japanese Concerns

For Japan, critical interests involve access

to the Chinese market and a significant role in

exploiting the Russian Far East, either in

partnership with China and Russia, or alone.

Japan accepts that China’s long-term goal is to

gain power in the region and that Beijing will

attempt to use its economic potential as the

prize for ending Tokyo’s security alliance with

Washington.

Japan continues to solidify and strengthen

its ties to the United States to counter Chinese

designs but is wary that America may tire of the

cost of maintaining its protective military

umbrella. Therefore, Japan has been developing its own military capability. If its military

power eventually matches its economic power,

Japan may pursue an independent role in

regional and global affairs. Through NSC,

China hopes to allay Japan’s fears, thereby

forestalling its rearmament.

The Two Koreas

Since its communist takeover, North Korea

has relied heavily upon China and Russia for

economic and military support. South Korea,

however, has begun to make accommodations

with China, despite its history of conflict with

that nation and its ties to the West—especially

to the United States. Like other countries with

developed economies, South Korea would like

access to China’s market, but it also wants

Beijing’s assistance in improving relations with

the North. Under Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine

Policy,” the South seeks to open relations—

including economic trade and development—

2 Strategic Forum No. 185, September 2001

Michael E. Marti is a senior research professor in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the

National Defense University. Questions or comments may be directed to Dr. Marti either at (202) 685–2229 or 

via e-mail to martim@ndu.edu.

Russia has chosen to ally

with China in the near

term to stave off any

precipitous Chinese move

to force it out of Asia

before it has recovered

its military, economic,

and political prowess
with the North as part of its long-term goal of

reconciliation and reunification.

China needs the sort of investment capital,

technology, and markets that South Korea has

to offer, but the prospect of a unified Korea

holds even greater benefit. With economic and

political ties to China, a unified Korea could be

drawn into a yuan-dominated regional market

to counter Japan’s economic and potential

military influence. Even more important, however, the rationale for United Nations and American troops in Korea would be gone, furthering

China’s goals of becoming a regional hegemon

and pushing the United States out of Asia.

Southeast Asia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) recognizes that China is emerging as

a military and economic power. In response to

China’s growing status and in anticipation of a

possible diminished U.S. presence, members

have formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

to discuss regional issues. Concentrating on the

common economic interests of ASEAN and

China, the forum has permitted China to

participate in its meetings and is thus constrained from putting any threat issues on the

agenda. In response to one such attempt in

1995, China appeared to support the ASEAN

multinational approach to preserve the status

quo in the South China Sea, where it and

several ASEAN members (Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam) have conflicting

claims. Instead, it undertook bilateral negotiations to settle the claims. ASEAN also attempted

confidence-building measures, including a

code of conduct to prevent clashes such as

those that occurred between China and the

Philippines in 1995 over Mischief Reef in the

Spratly Islands. Yet this approach to a regional

solution also failed because China refused to

allow this territorial issue, or any other, to be

raised in any meaningful manner in the forum. Beijing anticipates the time when it will

be strong enough to negotiate bilaterally with

each claimant and apply political, economic,

and military pressure accordingly.

China points to the existence of ARF as

proof that regional cooperation is possible in

Asia without a U.S. presence. ASEAN members,

not willing to oppose growing Chinese political

and military power, rely on an American presence to keep China’s ambitions in check.

South Asian Players

In South Asia, India is developing a regional nuclear force de frappe, shoring up

relations with Russia and trying to mend fences

with the United States, because it believes China

is the real threat to its security. Areas along the

Sino-Indian border, where the two countries

fought a war in 1962, are still in dispute. In the

Indian Ocean, China is establishing a presence

in Burma that could be a staging base to challenge Indian dominance of the region. In

Pakistan, Beijing is facilitating the dispute over

Kashmir with continuing supplies of military

technology and supplies to Islamabad.

By Beijing’s calculation, India increasingly will be a force in Eurasia. China’s alliance with Pakistan gives it not only a buffer

against India but also the perception of having

leverage over such issues as Tibet, the Dalai

Lama, border claims, and nuclear and missile

development. To China, Pakistan is a convenient and cooperative check on Indian activity.

Central Asia

The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union bordering on China are, of

necessity, making accommodations with both

Russia and China. Landlocked, squeezed between two powerful neighbors, and sitting on

significant oil and gas resources, these Central

Asian states hope to balance one power with the

other. They also must deal with the threat of

Islamic radicalism from within and across

their borders. Russia and China will act forcefully to prevent separatist or Islamic radicalism

from threatening the stability or economic

potential of the region. Mongolia will have to

look again to Russia to fend off historic Chinese territorial claims and yet somehow avoid

being reintegrated into the Russian sphere.

Western help probably will be necessary for

Mongolia to maintain its independence.

American Response

The Clinton administration policy of

engagement accepted China as a major player

in Asia and on the world scene; therefore,

Chinese cooperation was needed on issues such

as weapons proliferation, international crime,

and the environment. American leaders engaged Chinese leaders in a dialogue, hoping to

find some common ground. However, that

dialogue was largely a one-way conversation,

with China dictating the subject and terms. In

pursuing the Chinese market, the United States

failed to exact any meaningful concessions

from China on such issues as weapons proliferation, human rights, and access to open markets. China continued to destabilize the Middle

East and South Asia by supplying nuclear and

missile technology and systems to states of

those regions. It also erected artificial barriers

to market access by American businesses,

especially in the areas of telecommunications,

insurance, and financial services. Despite U.S.

and Western protests, China continued to

persecute dissidents and religious groups, such

as Catholics and Falun Gong.

The Bush administration is committed to

a tougher stance on China, which means that

the policy of engagement must be redefined.

First, China must be made to realize that there

would be consequences for its failure to cooperate on issues that are important to the United

States. For instance, America offers a major

source of the foreign investment, technology,

and markets that the Chinese economy needs,

giving it considerable leverage over China. The

creative use of regulatory and health and labor

standards could seriously affect Chinese imports to the United States. Likewise, laws could

curtail investment capital. In addition, transfer

of dual-use technology, aircraft, computers,

semiconductors, and other similar items could

be banned.

China remains vulnerable to internal

pressures that could be exacerbated by outside

influences. The United States could provide a

forum for political and religious dissidents, and

it could give financial and moral support to

oppressed minority groups, such as the Tibetans

and Uighurs, to enable them to establish governments in exile. It also could continue to

supply Taiwan with state-of-the-art defensive

weapons and encourage Japan to build a military commensurate with its economy. Stronger

policies in these areas may make China realize

No. 185, September 2001 Strategic Forum 3

the Bush administration

is committed to a

tougher stance on China,

which means that the

policy of engagement

must be redefined
4 Strategic Forum No. 185, September 2001

that it cannot undermine U.S. interests around

the world with impunity.

A new policy of engagement should respond to China’s intent to displace the United

States as the major power in the Western Pacific and Asia and should adopt proactive

policies to meet the challenge by shoring up

the American geopolitical position in the region. America has used a system of bilateral

alliances to achieve its dominance in the

Pacific, which has ensured regional stability

since the end of World War II. Washington

should maintain its preference for bilateralism.

The Clinton administration worked to

multilateralize regional security, an effort that

was driven by the Western view that American

largesse and military might could influence

Asian nations to form a collective security

community in East Asia similar to NATO. Such

a community eventually would include China,

and, it was hoped, mutual cooperation in such

efforts as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and confidence-building measures

would develop into a regional community of

shared interests that would promote stability

and economic development. However, Asian

countries have shown little desire to form a

collective security bloc, and their historical

development weighs strongly against it. ARF,

which is the best current example of collective

action, has been stunningly ineffective in

preventing conflict or resolving territorial

issues. The United States was ignoring history

and reality in its attempt to draw the culturally

diverse states of Asia into a collective security

arrangement. The effort only served China’s

long-term goal of weakening and undermining

American influence by creating the impression

that Washington was watering down its commitment preliminary to withdrawal.

The United States must

■ recognize and reaffirm that only strong

bilateral relationships and ongoing meaningful

interaction with its allies will convince Asia that a

U.S. presence is long-term and an alternative to

Chinese dominance

■ strengthen bilateral alliances with Australia,

Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand,

and expand this network to include India, Mongolia, Singapore, and Vietnam

■ lead economic development in the region by

providing domestic incentives for investment and

promoting free trade

■ guarantee regional resolutions to territorial

disputes and the unimpeded flow of commerce

throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans

■ support South Korea’s Sunshine Policy to

engage the North, and link all progress on reunification to its continued local presence to support

peace, stability, and economic development, the

absence of which could force the Koreas into

China’s greater yuan arena and undermine a key

component of the U.S. geostrategic position in Asia.

China’s national security strategy is on a

collision course with U.S. goals and interests in

the region. Beijing has joined Moscow in a

tactical alliance against Washington to rally

international opposition against American

missile defenses. This priority was underscored

at the Putin-Jiang Zemin summit meeting in

July 2001 in Moscow, where both sides signed a

20-year Treaty of Friendship and stated that the

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should be maintained in its current form. Moreover, Putin and

Jiang Zemin called for active cooperation

between their countries in discussing missile

defenses and disarmament as a way to enhance

their efforts at building a multipolar world and

a “rational” international order.

Past engagement policies vis-à-vis China

have failed. China is no more cooperative,

humane, or democratic as a result of U.S.

engagement. To the contrary, it remains inimical to American policies, values, and interests

globally as well as regionally. Beijing seeks

nothing less than the withdrawal of the United

States from Asia and hegemony over the region. Therefore, the question is whether a

harder line would affect China’s attitude. The

answer is yes, because the paramount concern

is the economy. Modernization of the Chinese

economy is the key to China’s future as a great

nation and a great power. It cannot achieve

this goal by turning inward; instead, it needs

access to technology, markets, and capital. No

other nation has the wherewithal to supply

these commodities to the extent that the United

States does. By leveraging these assets, Washington has the power to influence Beijing’s

domestic and foreign policies constructively.

However, leveraging does not require cutting off

trade. Through the judicious use of trade

policy, the United States can reward and encourage reform and signal displeasure with

Chinese handling of issues, such as weapons

and technology proliferation. Thus, a harder

U.S. line would promote regional stability

because China would quickly discover the

boundaries of acceptable behavior. In addition,

Asian allies of America’s would be reassured by

its consistency of purpose.

The United States must put its China

policies on a new foundation. China must no

longer be the focus of an Asian policy in pursuit of markets that are yet to materialize,

notwithstanding its admission to the World

Trade Organization. Indeed, fostering trade and

development with the other nations of the

region could prove more productive. China’s

importance in the region cannot be denied.

Isolation of China would be an ill-advised,

unrealistic alternative to past failed policies.

Engagement should continue, but it must be

based on a realistic appraisal of the costs and

benefits to America’s national interest.

Beijing has joined

Moscow in a tactical

alliance against

Washington to rally

international opposition

against American missile

defenses

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