United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1998 MANAGING FOR

RESULTS

Agencies’ Annual

Performance Plans Can

Help Address Strategic

Planning Challenges

GAO/GGD-98-44

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

B-278878 

January 30, 1998

The Honorable Richard K. Armey

Majority Leader

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman, Committee on Government

Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Livingston

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

In recent years, governments around the world, including ours, have faced

a citizenry that is demanding that government become at the same time

more effective and less costly.1

 These twin demands are the broad forces

behind the move to a performance-based approach to management in

public sector organizations—the most important effort to improve

government management in over a generation. Congress enacted the

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, commonly referred to

as “GPRA” or “the Results Act,” in conjunction with the Chief Financial

Officers (CFO) Act and information technology reform legislation, such as

the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, to address these twin demands and to

instill performance-based management in the federal government.

The Results Act seeks to shift the focus of government decisionmaking

and accountability away from a preoccupation with the activities—such as

grants and inspections made—to a focus on the results of those

activities—such as real gains in employability, safety, responsiveness, or

program quality. Under the Act, agencies are to develop strategic plans,

1

See, for example, Managing for Results: Experiences Abroad Suggest Insights for Federal

Management Reform (GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995); Managing for Results: State Experiences

Provide Insights for Federal Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994); and Government

Reform: Goal-Setting and Performance (GAO/AIMD/GGD-95-R, Mar. 27, 1995).

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annual performance plans, and annual performance reports.2 The Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) is also to prepare the annual federal

government performance plan that is based on the performance plans of

individual agencies. Agencies submitted the first cycle of the strategic

plans to Congress and OMB in September 1997. The first federal

government performance plan is to be submitted to Congress in

February 1998 with the President’s fiscal year 1999 budget; and the first

annual performance plans, which were to be submitted to OMB in the fall of

1997, are due to Congress after the submission of the President’s budget.

On October 30, 1997, we submitted a statement for the record at the

request of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight on

those strategic plans.3

 As requested, this report builds upon that statement

to (1) summarize our observations on agencies’ September plans and

(2) provide additional information on how the next phase of the Results

Act’s implementation—performance planning and measurement—can be

used to address the critical planning issues we observed in reviewing the

September strategic plans.4

Scope and

Methodology

This report is based on our reviews of 24 major agencies’ strategic plans

that were formally submitted to Congress and OMB by September 30, 1997.

To do these reviews, we used the Results Act supplemented by OMB’s

guidance on developing the plans (Circular A-11, part 2) as criteria to

determine whether the plans contained the six elements required by the

Act. As agreed, we focused our reviews on the progress of agencies’

strategic planning efforts, specifically their efforts to improve their

strategic plans, with particular attention to the key planning challenges

that are most in need of sustained attention. Agencies included in our

analysis are listed in appendix I, and our observations on individual

agencies are summarized in appendixes II through XXV. To gather

information on how annual performance planning and measurement could

be used to address the critical planning challenges we observed in our

reviews of the September plans, we relied on our recent report on critical

2

Agencies are required to submit to the President and Congress annual reports on program

performance for the previous fiscal year (the first reports for fiscal year 1999 are due by March 31,

2000) reviewing the agencies’ success in achieving the performance goals established in their annual

performance plans.

3

Managing for Results: Building on Agencies’ Strategic Plans to Improve Federal Management

(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-29, Oct. 30, 1997).

4

See Managing For Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal Agencies’ Strategic Plans

(GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997) for a discussion of the critical planning issues we first observed in

the draft strategic plans agencies used during their consultations with Congress last summer.

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challenges needing sustained attention, our report on governmentwide

implementation of the Results Act, our guidance for congressional review

of Results Act implementation, and our guidance on effectively

implementing the Act.5

We reviewed individual agency plans from September 30, 1997, through

November 1997. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. We provided a draft of this

report for comment to the Director of OMB on January 5, 1998; a discussion

of OMB’s comments appears at the end of this letter. In addition, we

provided drafts of the appendices we prepared on individual agency plans

to the relevant agencies for comment. The comments from those agencies

are summarized in the relevant appendixes.

Results in Brief On the whole, agencies’ September plans appear to provide a workable

foundation for Congress to use in helping to fulfill its appropriations,

budget, authorization, and oversight responsibilities and for agencies to

use in setting a general direction for their efforts. These plans represent a

significant improvement over the draft plans we reviewed last summer.

For example, we found that all but six of the draft plans were missing at

least one element required by the Results Act, and about a third were

missing two of the six required elements. In contrast, the September plans

we reviewed contained at least some discussion of each element required

by the Act. And, in many cases, those elements that had been included in

the draft plans were substantially improved.

Nonetheless, agencies’ strategic planning efforts are still very much a work

in progress. Our reviews of September plans indicate that continued

progress is needed in how agencies address three difficult planning

challenges: setting a strategic direction, coordinating crosscutting

programs, and ensuring the capacity to gather and use performance and

cost data. First, we found that agencies can build upon their initial efforts

to set a strategic direction for their programs and activities. Specifically,

many of the strategic goals contained in the September plans did not focus

on results to the extent feasible and were not always expressed in a

manner conducive to assessing progress in terms of actual performance.

Also, the plans often did not clearly link planning elements, such as

5

See GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997; The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997

Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven (GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997); Agencies’ Strategic

Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review (GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997);

and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act

(GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996).

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strategic goals, objectives, and strategies. In addition, many of the

strategies were incomplete and underdeveloped in that they lacked a

discussion of how agencies would accomplish goals. For example, some

plans lacked information on resources needed to achieve goals or failed to

address critical issues, such as unreliable information systems, that

threaten agencies’ ability to meet strategic goals and objectives.

The next stage in the Results Act’s implementation—performance

planning and measurement—can assist agencies in addressing the

challenge of setting a strategic direction. As an agency develops its

performance plan, which is to contain the annual performance goals it will

use to track progress toward its strategic goals, it likely will identify

opportunities to revise and clarify those strategic goals in order to provide

a better grounding for the direction of the agency. Also, as agencies

develop the objective, measurable annual performance goals as envisioned

by the Act, those goals can serve as a bridge that links long-term strategic

goals to agencies’ daily operations. For example, an annual goal that is

linked to a program and also to a long-term strategic goal can be used both

to (1) hold agencies and their program offices accountable for achieving

those goals and (2) assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of that

strategic goal for the agency as a whole. In addition, annual performance

planning can be used to better define strategies for achieving strategic and

annual performance goals.

The Results Act’s requirements for annual performance plans and

performance measurement can also provide a structured framework for

Congress, OMB, and agencies to address agencies’ crosscutting

programs—the second critical planning challenge. In our reviews of the

September plans, we found that although agencies have begun to

recognize the importance of coordinating crosscutting programs, it is

important that they undertake the substantive coordination that is needed

for the effective management of those programs. In a recent report on

mission fragmentation and program overlap, we noted that Congress, OMB,

and agencies can continue to use the Results Act as a framework for

ensuring that goals for crosscutting programs are consistent and, as

appropriate, that program efforts are mutually reinforcing.6

 Likewise,

Congress and OMB can use this framework, including the OMB-prepared

federal government performance plan, to facilitate the identification of

program overlap, duplication, and fragmentation among federal agencies.

6

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap

(GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997).

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Finally, the third critical planning challenge is the need for agencies to

have the capacity to gather and use sound program performance and cost

data to successfully measure progress toward their intended results. For

example, our work has shown that the lack of reliable, timely performance

and cost data has hampered, and may continue to hamper, agencies’

efforts to identify appropriate goals and confidently assess performance.7

Our work has also shown that the September plans often did not

adequately cover how program evaluations would be used to assess the

contributions of programs to goal achievement and the appropriateness of

those goals. Under the Results Act, agencies are also to discuss in their

annual performance plans how they will verify and validate the

performance information that they plan to use to show whether goals are

being met. Verified and validated performance information, in conjunction

with augmented program evaluation efforts, will help ensure that agencies

are able to report progress in meeting goals and identify specific strategies

for improving performance.

Background The Results Act is the centerpiece of a statutory framework that Congress

put in place during the 1990s to help resolve the long-standing

management problems that have undermined the federal government’s

effectiveness and efficiency and to provide greater accountability for

results. In addition to the Results Act, the framework comprises the CFO

Act and information technology reform legislation, including the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.

Congress enacted the CFO Act to remedy decades of serious neglect in

federal financial management by establishing chief financial officers

across the federal government and requiring the preparation and audit of

annual financial statements. The information technology reform legislation

is based on the best practices used by leading public and private sector

organizations to manage information technology more effectively.8

Under the Results Act, strategic plans are the starting point and basic

underpinning for performance-based management. In our report on

agencies’ draft strategic plans, we noted that complete strategic plans

were crucial if they were to serve as a basis for guiding agencies’

operations and be used to help congressional and other policymakers

7

GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997; and GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997.

8

See Executive Guide: Improving Mission Performance Through Strategic Information Management

and Technology (GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994) for a discussion of the consistent best practices used

by senior managers in leading organizations.

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make decisions about activities and programs.9 The Act requires that an

agency’s strategic plan contain six key elements. These elements are (1) a

comprehensive agency mission statement; (2) agencywide long-term goals

and objectives for all major functions and operations; (3) approaches (or

strategies) and the various resources needed to achieve the goals and

objectives; (4) a description of the relationship between the long-term

goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; (5) an

identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control,

that could significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals; and

(6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or

revise strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations.

Building on the decisions made as part of the strategic planning process,

the Results Act requires executive agencies to develop annual

performance plans covering each program activity set forth in the

agencies’ budgets.10 The first annual performance plans, covering fiscal

year 1999, are to be submitted to Congress after the President’s budget is

submitted, which is approximately February 1998. Each plan is to contain

an agency’s annual performance goals and associated measures, which the

agency is to use in order to gauge its progress toward accomplishing its

strategic goals. OMB is to use the agencies’ performance plans to develop

an overall federal government performance plan that is to be submitted

with the President’s budget. The performance plan for the federal

government is to present to Congress a single cohesive picture of the

federal government’s annual performance goals for a given fiscal year.

September Plans

Included Required

Elements and

Addressed Many

Weaknesses in Draft

Plans

Agencies’ September plans appear to provide a workable foundation for

the continuing implementation of the Results Act. These plans represent a

significant improvement over the draft plans we reviewed last summer.11

In those reviews, we found that all but six of the draft strategic plans were

missing at least one required element, and about a third were missing two

of the six required elements. In addition, just over a fourth of those plans

failed to cover at least three of the required elements. Moreover, we found

that many of the elements included in the plans contained

weaknesses—some that were more significant than others.

9

GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997.

10The term “program activity” refers to the listings of projects and activities in the appendix portion of

the Budget of the United States Government. Program activity structures are intended to provide a

meaningful representation of the operations financed by a specific budget account.

11See GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997, for a list of our reports on 27 agencies’ draft strategic plans (the

24 major agencies plus the U.S. Trade Representative, OMB, and the U.S. Postal Service).

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The agencies, on the whole, made a concerted effort during August and

September to improve their plans. For example, all of the September plans

we reviewed contained at least some discussion of each element required

by the Act. And, in many cases, those elements that contained weaknesses

were substantially improved by September. For example:

• The Department of Transportation explained more clearly how its mission

statement is linked to its authorizing legislation.

• The Small Business Administration (SBA) improved its ability to assess

progress toward its strategic goals by stating when specific performance

objectives would be met.

• The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) better explained the scope of

its crosscutting functions by identifying major crosscutting functions and

interagency programs and its coordination with those agencies.

• The Department of Education improved its discussion of external factors

that could affect its achievement of strategic goals by describing agency

actions to mitigate against those factors.

Appendixes II through XXV contain our observations on the progress and

remaining challenges of individual agencies’ strategic planning efforts.

Critical Planning

Challenges Remain to

Be Addressed as

Efforts Under the

Results Act Proceed

Although the September plans appear to provide a workable foundation

for the continuing implementation of the Results Act, we found that

critical planning challenges remain. Among the remaining critical

challenges are (1) clearly establishing a strategic direction for agencies by

improving goal-setting and measurement; (2) improving the management

of crosscutting program efforts by ensuring that those programs are

appropriately coordinated to avoid duplication, fragmentation, and

overlap; and (3) ensuring that agencies have the data systems and analytic

capacity in place to better assess program performance and costs, improve

management and performance, and establish accountability. The

forthcoming annual performance planning and measurement processes

offer agencies an opportunity to make progress in addressing these

challenges.

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Agencies Can Use the

Annual Performance

Planning Process to Build

Upon Their Initial Efforts

to Establish a Strategic

Direction

By improving on their draft strategic plans, agencies’ September plans

undertook the first steps toward setting a strategic direction for their

programs and activities. However, we found that the September plans

often lacked clear articulation of the agency’s strategic direction:

(1) strategic goals and objectives were not as measurable and results

oriented as possible, (2) linkages among planning elements were not clear,

and (3) strategies for achieving those goals and objectives were

incomplete or underdeveloped.12 However, the performance planning and

measurement phase of the Results Act offers agencies an opportunity to

continue to refine their strategic directions.

In our reviews of agencies’ September plans, we found that some agencies

have begun to address the challenge of setting a strategic direction. For

example:

• The most notable improvement in the plan for the Department of Health

and Human Services (HHS) is the inclusion of an outline of strategic

objectives for accomplishing the Department’s six strategic goals. Those

objectives are largely focused on outcomes and are defined in measurable

terms. This plan also identifies for each strategic objective the key

measures of progress. For example, one measure of progress for the

outcome-oriented objective of “reducing the use of illicit drugs” is “death

rate of persons aged 15 to 65 attributed to drug use.”

• The September plans of the Departments of Agriculture, Education, and

the Treasury now include helpful matrixes to link various planning

elements, such as goals, objectives, measures, and programs or

responsible organizational components. These matrixes are also useful in

assessing a plan’s underlying logic, determining programmatic

accountability, and identifying crosscutting programs and potential

duplication and overlap among program efforts. For example, Treasury’s

September plan contained an appendix that identified which bureau or

office is responsible for achieving its Department-wide goals and

objectives.

• The September plan for the Department of Energy (DOE) better explains

how it plans to accomplish many of its goals. The plan provides greater

specificity on the money, staff, workforce skills, and facilities that the

agency plans to employ to meet its goals. For example, to support its

national security goal, DOE’s plan says it will need to change the skills of its

workforce and how it constructs new experimental test facilities.

12See GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997; and GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-29, Oct. 30, 1997, for background

information on the critical strategic planning issues we identified in our prior work.

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Although improvements were not isolated to these agencies, we also found

that agencies need to further clarify their strategic directions if the Results

Act is to be effective in guiding the agencies and informing congressional

and other decisionmakers. The goals and objectives of many agencies

could be more results oriented and expressed in a manner that will better

allow for a subsequent assessment of whether the goals and objectives

have been achieved. For example, the plan for the Department of Veterans

Affairs (VA) contains the following objectives supporting the goal for its

compensation and pension area: “(1) evaluate compensation and pension

programs and (2) modify these programs, as appropriate.” Also, although

the first goal in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) September plan

“[t]o promote valued, strong, and responsive social security programs and

conduct effective policy development, research, and program evaluation”

sets a strategic direction for the agency, it could be stated in more

measurable terms to better enable the agency to make a future assessment

of whether it is being achieved.

Another challenging area for agencies in setting strategic direction in the

September plans was to establish linkages among planning elements, such

as goals, objectives, and strategies. For example, Treasury’s plan says that

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a role in three law enforcement

objectives—to reduce counterfeiting, money laundering, and drug

smuggling. However, the IRS plan contained no specific strategy to help

achieve any of those objectives. In another example, the September plan

for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) included lists of

objectives and strategies under each goal with no explanation of how the

strategies would contribute to achievement of the objectives.

Another weakness of agencies’ September plans was incomplete and

underdeveloped strategies for achieving long-term strategic goals and

objectives. More specifically, we found that agencies did not always

provide an adequate discussion of the resources needed to achieve goals.

For example, SBA’s September plan did not contain any discussion on the

resources, such as human resources and information technology, needed

to achieve its goals. Although other plans we reviewed discussed

resources, the discussions were incomplete. For example, few plans

discussed the physical capital resources, such as facilities and equipment,

needed to achieve their goals. Although many agencies may not rely

heavily on physical capital resources, even the plans of some of those that

do, such as the General Services Administration and the National Park

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Service, a component of the Department of the Interior, did not provide a

focused discussion of their capital needs and usage.

The role that information technology played, or can play, in achieving

agencies’ long-term strategic goals and objectives was generally neglected

in the September plans. The government’s track record in employing

information technology is poor, and the strategic plans we reviewed often

contained only limited discussions of technology issues. For example,

most of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategic goals are

fundamentally linked to information technology. However, we have placed

DOD’s management of critical information management processes on our

high-risk list. We believe DOD’s strategic plan would be significantly

enhanced if it more explicitly linked its strategic goals to a strategy for

improving management and oversight of information technology

resources. Additionally, DOD should recognize the dramatic impact the

Year 2000 problem will likely have on its computer operations, including

the mission-critical applications identified in its strategic plan.13

The Department of State’s September plan also does not specifically

address the serious deficiencies in State’s information and financial

accounting systems. Rather, the plan notes, in more general terms, that it

will take State several years to develop performance measures and related

databases in order to provide sufficient information on achievement of its

long-term goals. The lack of such a discussion in many of the plans is of

particular concern because, without it, agencies cannot be certain that

they are (1) addressing the federal government’s information technology

problems and (2) better ensuring that technology acquisition and use are

targeted squarely on program results.

Annual Performance Planning

and Measurement Offers

Agencies Opportunity to Better

Clarify a Strategic Direction

Strategic planning—setting a strategic direction for agency

operations—did not end with the submission of a strategic plan to

Congress last September. Performance-based management, as envisioned

by the Results Act, is not a linear, sequential process but, rather, an

iterative one in which strategic and performance planning cycles will

result in subsequent revisions to both strategic and annual performance

plans. Each cycle of strategic planning and performance planning,

particularly in the first few years of governmentwide implementation of

the Results Act, will likely result in agencies making significant changes

and improvements in those documents.

13On January 1, 2000, many computer systems, including DOD and defense contractor systems, if not

adequately modified, will either fail to run or malfunction simply because the equipment and software

were not designed to accommodate the change of the date to the new millennium. See The Results Act:

Observations on DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R, Aug. 5, 1997).

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Consequently, agencies can continue to address the critical planning

challenges associated with setting a strategic direction as they develop

their first annual performance plans. For example, the process of defining

targeted levels of performance within set time frames and providing

baselines against which to compare actual performance will likely produce

opportunities for agencies to revisit and improve upon their strategic goals

and objectives so that those goals are as results oriented and measurable

as they can be.

If successfully developed, those annual performance goals can function as

a bridge between long-term strategic planning and day-to-day operations,

thereby assisting agencies in establishing better linkages among planning

elements. For example, agencies can use performance goals to show clear

and direct relationships in two directions—to the goals in the strategic

plans and to operations and activities within the agency. By establishing

those relationships, agencies can (1) provide straightforward roadmaps

that show managers and staff how their daily activities can contribute to

attaining agencywide strategic goals, (2) hold managers and staff

accountable for contributing to the achievement of those goals, and

(3) provide decisionmakers with information on their annual progress in

meeting the goals. As agencies gain experience in developing these annual

performance goals, they likely will become better at identifying and

correcting misalignment among strategic goals, objectives, and strategies

within their plans.

The importance of clearly showing how strategies are linked to goals is

underscored by the Results Act requirement that annual goals are to be

based on budgetary program activities. Unlike previous federal reform

initiatives, the Results Act requires agencies to plan and measure

performance using the same program activity structures that form the

basis for their budget requests. However, we have found that the

relationships among the budget structures, performance plans, and

strategic plans will require coordinated and recurring attention by

Congress, OMB, and agencies as they move to implement the annual

performance planning and measurement phase of the Act.14 This attention

is important because the wide variability of the budget structures indicates

that the suitability of those structures for the Results Act’s performance

planning and measurement will also vary.

14Performance Budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer Insights for GPRA Implementation (GAO/AIMD-97-46,

Mar. 27, 1997).

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For example, we reported in 1997 that agency officials we spoke with

confirmed the varying suitability of their program activity structures for

the Results Act’s purposes.15 One agency successfully worked through its

recent performance-planning process using its existing program activities.

A second agency had a program activity structure that reflected its

organizational units—a structure that is useful for traditional

accountability purposes, such as monitoring outputs and staff levels—but

less useful for results-oriented planning. Still other agencies separated

performance planning from program activity structures, believing it

necessary to first establish appropriate program goals, objectives, and

measures before considering the link to the budget. These agencies

planned to rely on the Results Act’s provision to aggregate, disaggregate,

or consolidate program activities in constructing their annual performance

plans.

In addition, annual performance planning can be used to better define

strategies for achieving strategic and annual performance goals. For

example, annual performance plans provide agencies with another

opportunity to further discuss strategies for information technology

investments and the operational improvements expected from those

investments. The annual performance plans should also provide annual

performance measures that Congress and other decisionmakers can use to

determine if those investments are achieving the expected improvements.

Thus, annual performance planning and measurement can provide

decisionmakers with an early warning of information investment strategies

that need to be revisited.

Agencies and Congress

Can Use Performance

Planning to Address

Crosscutting Program

Efforts

A focus on results, as envisioned by the Results Act, implies that federal

programs that contribute to the same or similar results should be closely

coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent and, as appropriate,

program efforts are mutually reinforcing.16 We have found that

uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and

frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the

federal effort.17 This suggests that federal agencies are to look beyond

their organizational boundaries and coordinate with other agencies to

ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary.

15GAO/AIMD-97-46, Mar. 27, 1997

16GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997.

17GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

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Agencies’ September plans show progress in this area, but coordination of

crosscutting programs continues to be a strategic planning challenge.

During the summer of 1996, in reviewing early strategic planning efforts,

OMB alerted agencies that augmented interagency coordination was needed

at that time to ensure consistency among goals in crosscutting programs

areas. However, the draft strategic plans we reviewed during the summer

of 1997 often lacked evidence that agencies in crosscutting program areas

had worked with other agencies to ensure that goals were consistent;

strategies were coordinated; and, as appropriate, performance measures

were similar.

Agencies’ September plans better described crosscutting programs and

coordination efforts. Some plans, for example, contained references to

other agencies that shared responsibilities in a crosscutting program area

or discussed the need to coordinate their programs with other agencies.

For example, as noted earlier, NRC better explained its crosscutting

functions in its September plan. In addition, the Environmental Protection

Agency’s (EPA) plan contains an appendix that lists the federal agencies

with which EPA coordinated. This appendix describes the major steps in

the coordination process and lists by strategic goal the agencies with

which EPA believes greater integration and review of efforts will be

needed. Similarly, the plan for the Department of Transportation contains

a table that shows the contributions of other federal agencies to each of its

major mission areas. NRC’s, EPA’s and Transportation’s plans illustrate the

kind of presentation that could be especially helpful to Congress and the

administration in identifying program areas to monitor for overlap and

duplication.

These presentations, and similar ones in other agencies’ September plans

that identify agencies with crosscutting programs, also provide a

foundation for the much more difficult work that lies ahead—undertaking

the substantive coordination that is needed to ensure that those programs

are effectively managed. For example, in an improvement over its draft

plan, the Department of Labor’s September plan refers to a few other

agencies with responsibilities in the area of job training programs and

notes that Labor plans to work with them. However, the plan contains no

discussion of what specific coordination mechanism Labor will use to

realize efficiencies and possible strategies to consolidate job training

programs to achieve a more effective job training system.

Our work has shown that the next phases of the Results Act’s

implementation will offer a structured framework to address crosscutting

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issues.18 For example, the Act’s emphasis on results-based performance

measures as part of the annual performance planning process should lead

to more explicit discussions concerning the contributions and

accomplishments of crosscutting programs and encourage related

programs to develop common performance measures. As agencies work

with OMB to develop their annual performance plans, they can consider the

extent to which agency goals are complementary and the need for

common performance measures to allow for cross-agency evaluations.

Also, the Results Act’s requirement that OMB prepare a governmentwide

performance plan that is based on the agencies’ annual performance plans

can be used to facilitate the identification of program overlap, duplication,

and fragmentation.

Our work also indicates that if agencies and OMB use the annual planning

process to highlight crosscutting program efforts and provide evidence of

joint planning and coordination of those efforts, the individual agency

performance plans and the governmentwide performance plan should help

provide Congress with the information needed to identify agencies and

programs addressing similar missions. Once these programs are identified,

Congress can consider the associated policy, management, and

performance implications of crosscutting program efforts and whether

individual programs make a sufficiently distinguishable contribution to a

crosscutting national issue. This information should also help identify the

performance and cost consequences of program fragmentation and the

implications of alternative policy and service delivery options. These

options, in turn, can lead to decisions concerning department and agency

missions and the allocation of resources among those missions.19

Performance Planning Can

Assist Agencies in Building

the Capacity to Gather,

Process, and Analyze

Performance and Program

Cost Information

Our previous work has shown that agencies need to have reliable data

during their planning efforts to set realistic goals and later, as programs

are being implemented, to gauge their progress toward achieving those

goals.20 In addition, in combination with an agency’s performance

measurement system, a strong program evaluation capacity is needed to

provide feedback on how well an agency’s activities and programs

contributed to achieving its goals and to identify ways to improve

18GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997.

19GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997.

20GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

Page 14 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
B-278878 

performance.21 However, our work has also found serious shortcomings in

agencies’ ability to generate reliable and timely data to measure their

progress in achieving goals and to provide the analytic capacity to use that

data. The Results Act’s requirement that annual performance plans discuss

the verification and validation of data provides agencies with an

opportunity to be forthcoming about data limitations and to show how

those limitations will be addressed. Verified and validated performance

information, in conjunction with augmented program evaluation efforts,

will help ensure that agencies are able to report progress in meeting goals

and identify specific strategies to improve performance.

The absence of both sound program performance and cost data and the

capacity to use those data to improve performance is a critical challenge

that agencies must confront if they are to effectively implement the

Results Act. Efforts under the CFO Act have shown that most agencies are

still years away from generating reliable, useful, relevant, and timely

financial information, which is urgently needed to make our government

fiscally responsible. The widespread lack of available program

performance information is equally troubling. For example, in our June

report on a survey of managers in the largest federal agencies, we found

that fewer than one-third of those managers said that results-oriented

performance measures existed to a great or very great extent for their

programs.22

Our work also suggests that even when performance information exists,

its reliability is frequently questionable. For example, our work has shown

that the reliability of performance data currently available to a number of

agencies is suspect, because the agencies must rely on data collected by

parties outside the federal government. In a recent report, we noted that

the fact that data were largely collected by others was the most frequent

explanation offered by agency officials for why determining the accuracy

and quality of performance data was a challenge.23 In our June 1997 report

on the implementation of the Results Act, we also reported on the

difficulties that agencies were experiencing as a result of their reliance on

outside parties for performance information.24

21Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance (GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138,

May 30, 1997).

22GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

23GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 30, 1997.

24GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

Page 15 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
B-278878 

Agencies are required under the Results Act to describe in their annual

performance plans how they will verify and validate the performance

information that will be collected. This section of the performance plan

can provide important contextual information for Congress and agencies

to address the weaknesses in this area. For example, this section can

provide an agency with the opportunity to alert Congress to the problems

the agency has had or anticipates having in collecting needed

results-oriented performance information. Agencies can also use this

section to alert Congress to the cost and data quality trade-offs associated

with various collection strategies, such as relying on sources outside the

agency to provide performance data and the degree to which those data

are expected to be reliable. The discussion in this section can also provide

Congress with a mechanism for examining whether the agency currently

has the data to confidently set performance improvement targets and will

later have the ability to report on its performance.

More broadly, continuing efforts to implement the CFO Act also are central

for ensuring that agencies resolve their long-standing problems in

generating vital information for decisionmakers. In that regard, the

Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) has developed a

new set of accounting concepts and standards that underpin OMB’s

guidance to agencies on the form and content of their agencywide

financial statements.25 As part of that effort, FASAB developed managerial

cost accounting standards that were to be effective for fiscal year 1997.

These standards are to provide decisionmakers with information on the

costs of all resources used and the costs of services provided by others to

support activities or programs. Such information would allow for

comparisons of costs across various levels of program performance.

However, because of serious agency shortfalls in cost accounting systems,

the Chief Financial Officers Council—an interagency council of the CFOs of

the major agencies—requested an additional 2 years before the standard

would be effective. FASAB recommended extending the date by 1 year, to

fiscal year 1998, with a clear expectation that there would be no further

delays.

Under the Results Act, another aspect of performance planning is a

requirement for agencies to discuss the use and planned use of program

evaluations that can provide feedback on how well an agency’s activities

and programs contributed to the achievement of its goals and to assess the

25FASAB was created in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of OMB, and the

Comptroller General to consider and recommend accounting principles for the federal government. If

accepted by Treasury, OMB, and GAO, the standards are to be adopted and issued by OMB and GAO.

Page 16 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
B-278878 

reasonableness and appropriateness of those goals. However, our recent

report on agencies’ draft plans stated that 16 of the 27 draft plans did not

discuss program evaluations.26 Although all the September plans included

discussions of program evaluations, we continued to find weaknesses in

those discussions. However, this is not surprising because agencies that

had not undertaken program evaluations prior to the preparation of the

first cycle of strategic plans would not likely be able to discuss in their

September plans how they used program evaluations to help develop the

plans.

Of greater concern, many agencies, including the Departments of Health

and Human Services, Justice, and Labor, also did not discuss how they

planned to use evaluations in the future to assess progress or did not offer

a schedule for future evaluation as required by the Results Act. In contrast,

the National Science Foundation’s September plan contains a noteworthy

exception to this trend. The plan discusses how the agency used

evaluations to develop key investment strategies, action plans, and its

annual performance plan. It also discusses plans for future evaluations and

provides a general schedule for their implementation.

Over the longer term, the program performance information that agencies

are to generate under the Results Act should be a valuable new resource

for Congress to use in its program authorization, oversight, budget, and

appropriation responsibilities. As we have noted before, to be most useful

in these various contexts, that information needs to be consolidated with

budget data and critical financial and program cost data, which agencies

are to produce and have audited under the CFO Act.27 This consolidated

program performance, cost, and budget information, in conjunction with

the annual performance plans, should provide congressional and other

decisionmakers with a more complete picture of the results, operational

effectiveness, and costs of agencies’ operations.

Conclusion Agencies, on the whole, made significant progress in improving their plans

during August and September 1997. The strategic plans they formally

submitted to Congress and OMB in September 1997 appear to provide a

workable foundation for the continuing implementation of the Results Act.

Nonetheless, the critical planning challenges that we found demonstrate

that the effective implementation of performance-based management and

26GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997.

27Financial Management: Continued Momentum Essential to Achieve CFO Act Goals

(GAO/T-AIMD-96-10, Dec. 14, 1995).

Page 17 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
B-278878 

accountability, as envisioned by the Results Act, is still, as to be expected,

very much a work in progress.

Since performance-based management is not a linear, sequential process

but, rather, an iterative one, each subsequent strategic and performance

planning cycle can, and likely will, result in revisions to preceding

planning documents. Therefore, Congress, OMB, and agencies’ senior

managers can use the next stage of performance-based

management —performance planning and measurement—to ensure that

agencies continue to address the critical planning challenges as well as

maintain momentum on the implementation of the Results Act.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

On January 5, 1998, we provided a draft of this report to the Director of

OMB for comment. We provided drafts of the appendixes we prepared on

individual agency plans to the relevant agencies for comment, and the

comments from those agencies are summarized in the relevant

appendixes.

On January 13, 1998, a senior OMB official provided us with OMB’s

comments on this report. He generally agreed with our observations and

said that the report was a useful compilation of our work on agencies’

September strategic plans. The official also said that this report

underscores that the implementation of the Results Act will be an ongoing,

iterative process in which agencies will learn from their initial experiences

in developing strategic plans and can then apply those lessons learned as

they continue to develop strategic planning processes. In addition, the

official provided technical comments that were incorporated in this

report.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Minority

Leader of the House; the Ranking Minority Members of your Committees;

other appropriate congressional committees; and the Director, Office of

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on

request.

Page 18 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
B-278878 

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on

(202) 512-8676.

J. Christopher Mihm, Associate Director, Federal Management

 and Workforce Issues

Page 19 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Agencies Covered by

This Review

26

Appendix II 

Observations on the

Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic

Plan

27

Appendix III 

Observations on the

Department of

Commerce’s Strategic

Plan

34

Appendix IV 

Observations on the

Department of

Defense’s Strategic

Plan

40

Appendix V 

Observations on the

Department of

Education’s Strategic

Plan

43

Page 20 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

Appendix VI 

Observations on the

Department of

Energy’s Strategic

Plan

50

Appendix VII 

Observations on the

Department of Health

and Human Services’

Strategic Plan

54

Appendix VIII 

Observations on the

Department of

Housing and Urban

Development’s

Strategic Plan

58

Appendix IX 

Observations on the

Department of the

Interior’s Strategic

Plan

62

Appendix X 

Observations on the

Department of

Justice’s Strategic

Plan

66

Page 21 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

Appendix XI 

Observations on the

Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

70

Appendix XII 

Observations on the

Department of State’s

Strategic Plan

76

Appendix XIII 

Observations on the

Department of

Transportation’s

Strategic Plan

81

Appendix XIV 

Observations on the

Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic

Plan

87

Appendix XV 

Observations on the

Department of

Veterans Affairs’

Strategic Plan

93

Page 22 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

Appendix XVI 

Observations on the

Environmental

Protection Agency’s

Strategic Plan

97

Appendix XVII 

Observations on the

Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s

Strategic Plan

101

Appendix XVIII 

Observations on the

General Services

Administration’s

Strategic Plan

105

Appendix XIX 

Observations on the

Office of Personnel

Management’s

Strategic Plan

111

Appendix XX 

Observations on the

National Aeronautics

and Space

Administration’s

Strategic Plan

116

Page 23 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

Appendix XXI 

Observations on the

National Science

Foundation’s Strategic

Plan

120

Appendix XXII 

Observations on the

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s

Strategic Plan

125

Appendix XXIII 

Observations on the

Small Business

Administration’s

Strategic Plan

130

Appendix XXIV 

Observations on the

Social Security

Administration’s

Strategic Plan

134

Appendix XXV 

Observations on the

U.S. Agency for

International

Development’s

Strategic Plan

138

Abbreviations

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs

BOR Bureau of Reclamation

Page 24 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Contents

CFO Chief Financial Officer

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

EASI Easy Access for Students and Institutions

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ESA Employment Standards Administration

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FASAB Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFELP Federal Family Education Loan Program

FWS Fish and Wildlife Service

GMRA Government Management Reform Act of 1994

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

GSA General Services Administration

HCFA Health Care Financing Administration

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development

IRS Internal Revenue Service

ITA International Trade Administration

MMS Minerals Management Service

NAPA National Academy of Public Administration

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPS National Park Service

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSF National Science Foundation

NSLDS National Student Loan Data System

NSTC National Science and Technology Council

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPM Office of Personnel Management

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PTO Patent and Trademark Office

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review Report

SBA Small Business Administration

SSA Social Security Administration

SSI Supplemental Security Income

TPCC Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

Page 25 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix I 

Agencies Covered by This Review

Department of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Education

Department of Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Department of the Interior

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Department of State

Department of Transportation

Department of the Treasury

Department of Veterans Affairs

Environmental Protection Agency

Federal Emergency Management Agency

General Services Administration

Office of Personnel Management

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Science Foundation

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Small Business Administration

Social Security Administration

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 26 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

On July 10, 1997, we issued a report on the U.S. Department of

Agriculture’s (USDA) May draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations on

USDA’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-196R). USDA’s publicly issued

strategic plan was submitted to the President and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed USDA’s September

strategic plan and compared the results of our assessment with our

observations on the draft plan, as reported in July. On October 17, 1997,

we briefed your staffs on our assessment of the September strategic plan.

The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report on

USDA’s Draft Strategic

Plan

USDA’s May 1997 draft strategic plan included a Department-wide strategic

overview as well as 30 plans for the mission areas, agencies, and staff

offices that make up the Department. We reviewed the overview and the

16 agency plans that are directly related to accomplishing USDA’s mission

and implementing its programs. We also reviewed the plans for the offices

of the Chief Financial Officer and the Chief Information Officer.

We observed that the May draft strategic plan did not fulfill the

requirements of the Results Act. USDA’s overall mission and goals were

contained in the Department-wide strategic overview; the overview then

referred the reader to the agencies’ plans for information on the six

required elements. However, only one of the agencies’ plans we reviewed

contained all six required elements. The draft strategic plan also fell short

in several other areas necessary for achieving the purposes of the Results

Act. Among other things, the draft strategic plan lacked an emphasis on

externally focused goals and objectives, adequate quantifiable

performance measures, and good linkages between the agencies’ goals and

the Department’s goals.

We also reported that we could not determine the extent to which

coordination with other federal agencies, both within and outside the

Department, occurred in the formulation of the draft strategic plan. It was

also unclear whether agencies’ goals and objectives had been assessed for

duplication and complementary functions. USDA’s Department-wide

strategic overview acknowledged the role of USDA agencies that carry out

similar and/or complementary functions but did not recognize the role of

other federal agencies. Many of the agencies’ plans generically recognized

the roles of other federal agencies in accomplishing their missions.

However, there was little evidence in either the Department-wide strategic

overview or the agencies’ plans to suggest that the agencies coordinated

Page 27 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

with other agencies—internally or externally—when developing their

goals and objectives.

USDA’s draft plan addressed some, but not all, of the high-risk issues and

management problems we had previously identified. Generally,

information on how USDA planned to address these high-risk issues and

management problems, such as the need to reduce losses in the farm loan

program, was included as goals and objectives in the agencies’ plans.

However, USDA’s draft plan did not address some management issues, such

as the need to reform milk marketing orders, improve the management of

agricultural trade programs, and strengthen financial controls under credit

reform. In addition, we have identified significant, long-standing

Department-wide problems in information technology, accounting, and

financial management. However, USDA’s draft strategic plan did not

adequately recognize and address these problems. For example, the plan

for the Office of the Chief Information Officer lacked time frames and

milestones and the resources needed to accomplish the stated goals. We

also noted that it lacked an explanation of how the goals were specifically

linked to the agencies’ plans.

Improvements Made

in USDA’s September

Strategic Plan

USDA made significant improvements in its September strategic plan. This

plan incorporates many changes that make it more responsive to the

requirements of the Results Act. The strategic plan complies with the six

elements required by the Results Act and includes many of the key

attributes necessary for a quality plan. It also includes information on

some management challenges that we identified in the past.

While all 16 agencies’ plans contain the six required elements, the clarity

of information presented varies across the plans. For example:

• Most of the agencies’ plans have comprehensive and concise mission

statements. However, the mission statements for two agencies’

plans—concerning the Agricultural Marketing Service and Rural

Development—are stated so broadly that it is difficult to determine what

the basic purpose of the agency is or how it differs from that of other

agencies. For example, it is unclear how the mission of the Agricultural

Marketing Service differs from the missions of the Grain Inspection,

Packers and Stockyards Administration and the Foreign Agricultural

Service.

• Most of the agencies’ plans have results-oriented goals and objectives.

However, some plans—those of the Farm Service Agency, Food and

Page 28 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

Consumer Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the

Forest Service—have too many goals and objectives structured around

existing programs and activities rather than the ultimate results that these

agencies should achieve. For example, the Farm Service Agency’s plan has

four goals that we believe could be combined under two that would fulfill

the agency’s mission—(1) improving the economic viability of the

agriculture sector and (2) protecting the environment.

• All of the agencies’ plans provide more detailed strategies and improved

information on the resources needed for achieving goals and objectives,

compared with the information provided in the May draft plan.

• All of the agencies’ plans provide a detailed discussion of the external

factors beyond the control of the agency that could affect the achievement

of the goals. However, the linkages between external factors and their

impact on specific goals could be improved in some plans, such as the

plans for the four research agencies.

• Unlike the May draft, in which only 1 of the 16 agencies’ plans included

information on the relationship between annual performance goals and

strategic goals, all of the agencies’ September plans include this

information. However, the quality of the descriptions provided in this

section of the agencies’ plans varies by agency. For example, some plans,

such as those for the Food and Consumer Service, Farm Service Agency,

Food Safety and Inspection Service, and Center for Nutrition Policy and

Programs, easily allow the reader to envision how the annual performance

goals relate to the strategic goals; other agencies’ plans, such as those for

the Economic Research Service and the Risk Management Agency, are less

clear.

• Most of the agencies’ plans provide greater detail than they did in the May

draft on how program evaluations were used to develop the strategic plan

and how they will be used in the future. However, two plans—those for

the Food Safety and Inspection Service and the Agricultural Research

Service—state that program evaluations were not used to develop the

strategic plan, although information on program evaluations planned for

the future is included; and the plan for the Agricultural Marketing Service

states that program evaluations were not used to develop the plan and are

not planned for the future. While these agencies state that they did not use

formal program evaluations when developing their plans, the information

provided in the plans indicates that the results of relevant studies and

assessments were actually used to help develop the plans—which in our

opinion meets the requirements of the Results Act. Consequently, we

believe that these agencies may be using too narrow a definition for the

term “program evaluation.” According to an August 7, 1997, letter, sent by

the House Majority Leader to the Director, OMB, program evaluations

Page 29 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

should include all significant evaluations relevant to the development and

future assessment of an agency’s plan. The letter suggested that this

definition include reviews by the Inspector General, GAO, and others that

deal with program implementation and operating policies and practices.

Moreover, we found that many of the key attributes necessary for a quality

plan, which were missing in the May draft plan, have been included in the

September strategic plan. These include clear linkages between the

agencies’ goals and their statutory authorities as well as the

Department-wide goals; a better focus on external goals rather than

internal processes (the result of a separation of strategic goals from

management initiatives); and a more complete discussion of relevant

performance measures, although some agencies are still developing

baseline information and targets. For targets included in the plans, it is

sometimes unclear whether they are annual or 5-year targets.

Some of the management challenges facing USDA that we raised in the past

have been included in the September plan. For example, reform of the

milk marketing orders is included in the Agricultural Marketing Service’s

plan as an objective. Similarly, USDA revised its strategic plan to address

certain accounting and financial management issues that the draft plan did

not adequately address. For example, the strategic plan reflects USDA’s

efforts to strengthen controls for establishing and reestimating loan

subsidy costs, as required under credit reform. Also, the strategic plan

recognizes that additional staff and resources may be needed to ensure

that USDA can accomplish the goals set out in the plan for the Office of the

Chief Financial Officer.

USDA’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Improved

Further

In addition to the suggestions that we have made herein to improve the

clarity of some agencies’ plans, some more significant aspects of the

strategic plan could be further improved. These improvements include

(1) explaining interagency coordination for crosscutting issues and

(2) addressing previously identified management problems.

USDA’s September strategic plan provides more detailed information about

other agencies—both internal and external to the Department—that share

responsibilities for achieving the stated goals and objectives. The

Department-wide strategic overview now includes links to agencies

outside of the Department that are important partners to USDA agencies. In

addition, the agencies’ plans not only identify the agencies that they

coordinate and consult with, in some cases they also identify the specific

Page 30 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

roles of these other agencies. However, we still could not determine from

the information provided in most of the agencies’ plans whether

consultations actually took place with these agencies to resolve

crosscutting issues. Moreover, we could not determine whether an

assessment of duplicative or complementary programs and activities was

performed when the agencies were developing their goals and objectives.

In addition, we found that while many agencies’ plans explain that

stakeholders were consulted during the plan’s development, they usually

do not clearly identify the stakeholders. Although this information is not

required to be included in the strategic plan by the Results Act, we believe

that including information in the agencies’ plans that clearly identifies all

stakeholders would be helpful.

In addition, the September plan still does not include two management

issues that we identified in the past. In particular, the Foreign Agricultural

Service’s plan still does not address the numerous problems we have

identified in agricultural trade programs. Furthermore, there is little

evidence to suggest that substantial progress has been made in addressing

our concerns about information technology. Although USDA has added time

frames for completing the 14 objectives appearing in its Office of Chief

Information Officer’s plan, each time frame has a completion date

“through FY 2002.” We are concerned about the absence of earlier time

frames, or at least interim ones, for resolving major Department-wide

information technology problems, such as the Year 2000 issue. By

establishing such time frames, it is not clear what priority USDA is really

placing on solving its information technology problems or whether the

Department has adequate strategies for doing so. In addition, although the

Office of Chief Information Officer’s plan includes a number of goals and

objectives to better manage its $1 billion in annual investments for

information technology, we remain concerned about the lack of

information in the plan on the resources needed to accomplish these goals

and objectives and how they link to the agencies’ plans.

Agency Comments We provided a draft of our observations on USDA’s strategic plan for the

Department’s review and comment. We met with USDA’s Acting Chief

Financial Officer and the Director, Planning and Accountability Division,

Office of Chief Financial Officer, who told us that they were pleased that

we had recognized the significant improvements made to the strategic plan

and that the additional comments made by us would help them as they

continue to refine and enhance the plan. In addition, USDA made the

following observations:

Page 31 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

• USDA disagreed with our statement that program evaluations were not used

to develop the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s plan. While

we agree that this plan recognizes the importance of using program

evaluations to set performance goals, it does not clearly identify how the

results of program evaluations were used to develop the strategic plan.

Consequently, we have deleted this statement from our report to reflect

the agency’s comment, but we would suggest that the Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service add language to clarify how program

evaluations were used to develop its plan.

• USDA noted that while there is no duplication of services between the

Agricultural Marketing Service and the Grain Inspection, Packers and

Stockyards Administration and the Foreign Agricultural Service, the

mission statement of the Agricultural Marketing Service would be

clarified, in future versions of the plan, to distinguish it from the mission

statements of the other two agencies.

• In connection with our observation about the Food and Consumer

Service’s plan having too many goals that were structured around current

programs rather than results, USDA told us that the Food and Consumer

Service had considered structuring its plan around a smaller number of

generic goals. However, the agency chose to establish six goals

corresponding to its existing programs because it believed that a plan

structured in this manner would be more meaningful to all interested

parties, including external partners and program participants. While we

agree that setting up goals around familiar programs and activities may

make the plan easier to understand, this approach may ultimately defeat

the purpose of the Results Act—which is to require agencies to focus on

outcomes by reevaluating what they do and why they do it. Therefore, we

would suggest that the Food and Consumer Service consider restructuring

the goals in its plan around broader outcomes rather than current

programs.

• USDA disagreed with our statement that the Foreign Agricultural Service

plan still does not address the numerous problems that we have identified

in the past relating to agricultural trade programs. For example, USDA

believes that the Foreign Agricultural Service has addressed the concerns

outlined in our report entitled U.S. Department of Agriculture: Foreign

Agricultural Service Could Benefit From Better Strategic Planning

(GAO/GGD-95-225, Sept. 28, 1995) by including information on agency resource

allocation, overseas priorities, and trade opportunities under the

management initiatives section of the plan. According to USDA, other issues

raised by us, such as streamlining the agency’s foreign service, will be

addressed in the annual performance plan. Although we agree that some

issues that we have raised in the past can be appropriately addressed by

Page 32 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix II 

Observations on the Department of

Agriculture’s Strategic Plan

including them in the annual performance plan, others cannot. Over the

past decade, we have issued a series of reports that raise serious concerns

about the fundamental operations of the Foreign Agricultural Service’s

export programs, such as the Foreign Market Development Program,

Market Access Program, P.L. 480 Program, and Export Credit Guarantee

Program. We believe that solutions to these problems will require

long-term planning that has not been adequately addressed in the strategic

plan.

• Finally, USDA stated that it did not believe that the Office of Chief

Information Officer’s strategic plan had to be the medium to address

specific solutions to the individual agencies’ issues identified in previous

audits. Our observations on the Office of Chief Information Officer’s plan,

however, did not discuss the need for specific solutions; rather, we noted

that the plan lacked sufficient information on time frames, resources, and

how the goals and objectives were linked to other USDA agencies’ plans. We

believe that such information is essential to clearly identify what priority

USDA is placing on solving its information technology problems and

determining whether the Department has adequate strategies for

addressing these issues. This is especially important given the Secretary of

Agriculture’s May 1997 direction to subcabinet officials that fixing USDA’s

long-standing, pervasive information technology management problems

must be a top priority. USDA also disagreed with our statement that there is

a perceived lack of attention on the Year 2000 issue. While we recognize

that the plan discusses the Year 2000 issue, we are concerned about the

stated time frames for completion for this objective. By stating a “through

FY 2002” completion time frame for the Year 2000 problem, we believe

that the plan does not present an adequate strategy for resolving one of

USDA’s most pressing information technology management problems and

one that must be solved within the next 2 years.

Issue Area Contact Robert A. Robinson, Director, Food and Agriculture Issues; Resources,

Community, and Economic Development Division, (202) 512-5138.

Page 33 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix III 

Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

On July 14, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Commerce’s

draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on Commerce’s

June 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/GGD-97-152R). Commerce’s formally

issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on September 30,

1997. As requested, we reviewed Commerce’s revised strategic plan,

compared it with the earlier draft version that we reported on in July, and

identified significant changes or improvements that Commerce made in

the areas covered by our July report and areas or required plan elements

where additional improvements still could be made as the plan evolves.

We briefed your staffs on our findings on October 17, 1997. Our findings

are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

Commerce’s draft strategic plan was inadequate and incomplete in several

respects. Of the six elements required by the Results Act, four were

included in the draft plan—a mission statement, goals and objectives,

strategies for achieving goals and objectives, and a discussion of key

external factors—but each of these had weaknesses, some more

significant than others. For example, the mission statement included the

core functions of the Department and mentioned the role of businesses

and universities but not the important role also played by other

government entities. While there were useful linkages among themes,

goals, objectives, and responsible components, the goals and objectives

were not as results oriented as they could be. The draft plan identified the

Commerce bureau responsible for each goal and objective but did not

adequately discuss strategies for achieving those goals and objectives or

include required information describing the operational processes, staff

skills, and technologies, as well as the human, capital, information, and

other resources needed to achieve them. Many but not all key external

factors were discussed, but the factors that were identified appeared to be

used to justify programs rather than to show how those factors could

affect the achievement of goals.

Commerce’s draft strategic plan did not explicitly discuss the other two

elements required by the Results Act—the relationship between long-term

goals and objectives and annual performance goals and the description of

program evaluations used to establish general goals and objectives and a

schedule for future program evaluations. The draft plan said that relating

long-term goals and objectives to annual performance goals will more

appropriately be done in the Department’s future annual budget requests.

The draft plan made limited references in various sections to a few past

studies of Commerce programs, but those references did not describe how

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Appendix III 

Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

the studies were used to establish general goals and objectives, and the

draft plan did not provide a schedule for future program evaluations.

Concerning other plan components, the draft plan provided much useful

information on Commerce’s statutory authorities. However, the draft plan

could have been more useful to Commerce, Congress, and other

stakeholders if it had provided a more explicit discussion of crosscutting

activities, the major management challenges the Department faces, and

the Department’s ability to provide reliable financial and other

management and program information to measure achievement of its

goals.

Improvements Made

in Commerce’s

Strategic Plan

Commerce’s publicly issued strategic plan incorporated improvements in

several areas and now addresses, to some extent, all of the elements

required by the Results Act. The improvements that the Department made

are steps in the right direction and address some but not all of the

weaknesses discussed in our July 1997 report on an earlier draft of the

plan. The plan’s discussions of strategic goals have been expanded to

briefly indicate Commerce’s strategy for achieving each goal. For example,

under the theme of keeping America competitive with cutting-edge science

and technology, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) has a goal to “predict and assess decadal to centennial change.” The

plan now describes how NOAA will approach this goal by addressing

questions dealing with air quality, ozone depletion, greenhouse warming,

and climate change.

Also, the plan now more explicitly acknowledges the need to link strategic

goals and objectives to annual performance goals and includes an

illustrative performance measure for each of the objectives under the

three strategic themes. For example, the illustrative performance measure

for two of the Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) objectives is “reduced

pendency time.” This illustrative performance measure is one of several

that addresses PTO’s goal of granting exclusive rights for limited times to

inventors for their discoveries. Similarly, the plan’s three strategic theme

chapters now more strongly emphasize the importance of external factors

that could affect achievement of Commerce’s strategic goals and identify

more key external factors. Under the economic infrastructure strategic

theme, for example, the plan now includes a reference to the International

Trade Administration’s (ITA) strategy to identify obstacles to U.S. exports

and plans for removing such obstacles and marshaling U.S. government

resources to eliminate barriers.

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Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

Commerce’s revised strategic plan includes new sections on program

evaluations, interagency linkages, and major management challenges. The

new section on the role of program evaluations discusses current

evaluations as well as future evaluation plans, provides examples,

highlights the difficulties in specifying the level and focus of future

evaluations because of year-to-year competition for funds, and states that

future evaluations for many Commerce bureaus will be included in annual

performance plans and budgets. The new section on interagency linkages

acknowledges the importance of close interagency ties and emphasizes

the Department’s commitment to strengthen those ties by reaching out to

other federal agencies with complementary responsibilities. In addition,

the partnership sections of the three strategic theme chapters now more

fully identify and discuss Commerce’s shared mission responsibilities with

other federal agencies. Under the economic infrastructure theme, for

example, the plan now emphasizes those aspects of Commerce’s mission

that are complementary. It points out that Commerce chairs the Trade

Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), a 20-member interagency task

force charged by the President and Congress with developing and

implementing the National Export Strategy.

The new section on management challenges recognizes and discusses

three of the key management challenges facing the Department that were

highlighted in our July report—weather service modernization, Census

2000, and financial management systems. Finally, the usefulness of the

plan has been improved by the addition of an index or matrix, which

shows which Commerce bureaus are responsible for which strategic

themes and goals; and an appendix, which provides clearer and more

comprehensive information on, and consolidates in one place in the plan,

the statutory and other authorities for the Department and its bureaus,

themes, and goals and objectives.

Commerce’s Strategic

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

While the overall quality of Commerce’s strategic plan has been improved

since we reported in July 1997 on an earlier draft of the plan, further

improvements still could be made in each of the elements required by the

Results Act. As we indicated in our July report, the mission statement

could be made more complete by explicitly recognizing that several other

federal agencies as well as state and local governments also play major

roles in the areas covered by Commerce’s three strategic themes. In the

export controls area under the economic infrastructure theme, for

example, the plan acknowledges that Commerce shares mission

responsibilities with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and

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Appendix III 

Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but the mission statement

does not recognize this or other shared responsibilities.

Similarly, the treatment of crosscutting functions could clarify

Commerce’s role in the three strategic theme areas, specify how the

Department’s efforts intersect with or complement the efforts of the other

participants, and identify which other government entities Commerce

coordinated its plan with and the results of that coordination. The

Department’s September 30, 1997, letter transmitting the revised plan to

Congress said that Commerce consulted with stakeholders, provided them

and congressional committees with copies of its draft plans, and

responded to stakeholder and congressional comments. According to

Commerce’s transmittal letter, there were no unresolved contrary views

concerning its plan.

The strategies for achieving each strategic goal could be further expanded

to specify how Commerce will hold its bureaus and managers accountable

for meeting strategic goals and the resources that will be required to meet

them. The linkages between long-term strategic goals and objectives and

annual performance goals could be improved by (1) making the illustrative

performance measures more outcome oriented, such as by using the

“number of counseling sessions” as a measure of ITA’s economic

infrastructure objective to “increase trade assistance targeted to small and

medium-sized businesses,” or (2) showing how the performance measures

that were added cause results. The discussion of external factors could

identify and discuss more key factors beyond Commerce’s direct control

that could affect achievement of its goals, such as congressional concerns

about the Census Bureau’s plans for conducting Census 2000, and specify

how the external factors that are identified will be addressed or mitigated.

The discussion of program evaluations could indicate more specifically

how evaluations were used to establish goals/objectives and performance

measures.

Finally, the discussions of Commerce’s major management challenges and

its capacity to provide reliable data on performance could acknowledge

and discuss more of the major management challenges and data capacity

problems that we emphasized in our July 1997 report, such as managing

modern information technology and the “year 2000 computer problem.”

Also, the plan could relate identified management challenges, including

performance measurement limitations, to Commerce’s strategic goals and

objectives, discuss their implications for achievement of its strategic goals

and objectives, and indicate more specifically how and when the

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Appendix III 

Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

Department expects to overcome these challenges. The plan could be

made more useful to stakeholders and would better meet the intent of the

Act if it identified and discussed these types of problems as well as other

material weaknesses or high-risk areas, such as NOAA’s fleet for acquiring

marine data, that are disclosed in Commerce’s Federal Managers’

Financial Integrity Act reports or financial statements.

Other Observations

on Commerce’s

Strategic Plan

Given the diversity of its programs and activities and its bureaus’

independence, Commerce faced an especially formidable challenge in

developing its strategic plan. The Department developed a “thematic”

strategic plan that covers its major functions and activities; is consistent

with relevant statutory and other authorities; and addresses, to some

extent, the various elements required by the Results Act. The plan’s

readability, usefulness, and overall effectiveness as a planning and

oversight tool could be enhanced by streamlining its organization and

content to eliminate many of the details that do not relate directly to the

Act’s requirements, thus reducing its 178-page length.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We provided a copy of a draft of this briefing document to the Department

of Commerce for review and comment. On October 17, 1997, the Director

for Budget, Management and Information and Deputy Chief Information

Officer provided us with written comments. He characterized our review

as balanced and fair and said that the Department clearly agrees that it

needs to do more planning with other agencies and crosscutting programs

and that this is a very high departmental priority. In this regard, he said

that the Department has stepped forward as the lead agency to link with

the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in forming the

Performance Consortium and that a dozen other federal departments and

agencies have joined Commerce in this effort to develop common planning

activities and elements.

The Director also said that the Department disagrees with our suggestion

that its plan could be improved by providing additional information in

certain areas and eliminating many of the details that do not relate directly

to the Act’s requirements. He said that the Department made a specific

decision to have a single, integrated strategic plan that covers all its

bureaus. The Department believes that its plan demonstrates clearly how

the Commerce bureaus fit together and provide critical service to the

nation and that it addresses some of the administration’s key priorities and

secures the buy-in of its bureaus. As Commerce’s strategic plan evolves,

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Appendix III 

Observations on the Department of

Commerce’s Strategic Plan

we continue to believe that its readability and specificity could be

improved by streamlining its organization, content, and presentation.

Issue Area Contact L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues;

General Government Division, (202) 512-8676.

Page 39 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix IV 

Observations on the Department of

Defense’s Strategic Plan

On August 5, 1997, we issued a report on DOD’s draft strategic plan (The

Results Act: Observations on DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/NSIAD-97-219R).

The Department of Defense’s formally issued Results Act strategic plan

was submitted to OMB and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested,

we reviewed the strategic plan and compared its changes to DOD’s draft

plan.1

 On October 17, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further

observations on the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are

summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our August Report

Our prior evaluation revealed that DOD’s draft plan included discussions of

each of the six critical components required in strategic plans but that

some were of higher quality than others. We noted, for example, that DOD’s

draft plan contained a succinct mission statement and general goals and

objectives that cover its major functions and operations and reflect its

broad statutory defense responsibilities, but it did not include schedules

for initiating and completing significant actions to achieve its goals. We

also noted that, although DOD included some discussion of other elements,

such as formidable management problems, these discussions could be

more complete. And, we suggested several improvements to the draft plan,

including that DOD (1) more completely state strategies for achieving its

goals and include schedules of significant actions; (2) link and discuss

how external factors could affect its ability to achieve its goals; (3) discuss

how program evaluations were used in developing its goals and identify

key issues for future evaluations; (4) discuss planned or ongoing actions to

resolve persistent management problems, including time frames and

required resources; and (5) identify and discuss coordination efforts for

programs that crosscut with other agencies’ programs. Finally, we

suggested that DOD develop one clear and succinct document to serve as

its strategic plan.

1

For our August 5 report, we reviewed DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), issued in

May 1997, and DOD’s June 23, 1997, letter, which explained how it believes the QDR meets Results Act

strategic planning requirements. DOD was required to perform the QDR by section 923 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 and intended it to be a fundamental and comprehensive

examination of America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015, including potential threats, strategy, force

structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other

elements of the defense program. For this report, we reviewed the QDR and DOD’s September 30,

1997, letter, which updates how DOD believes the QDR meets Results Act strategic planning

requirements. DOD, however, considers the QDR, alone, to be its strategic plan. Including the

additional documents in our reviews gave DOD more credit toward meeting requirements and

expectations for strategic plans than would have resulted from considering the QDR alone.

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Appendix IV 

Observations on the Department of

Defense’s Strategic Plan

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

DOD revised its general goals and objectives to provide a clearer

presentation. In line with the revision, DOD also rearranged its description

of how the performance goals it is developing will be related to the general

goals in an effort to improve the description’s clarity. It also defined some

terms and included some additional information in the rearranged

description. DOD’s general goals and objectives as reworded still cover its

major functions and operations and reflect its broad statutory defense

responsibilities.

DOD also included a table listing the major management problems that we

have identified as high-risk areas and the documents, such as the DOD

Logistics Strategic Plan, that address each of the high-risk areas. However,

it did not include an explanation of what actions will be taken to address

the high-risk areas and when the problems in these areas are expected to

be corrected. Additionally, DOD did not adopt our other suggested

improvements, nor did it consolidate the strategic plan into one succinct

document.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

We believe that DOD’s strategic plan could be further improved by adopting

the suggestions we made in our August 5, 1997, report (summarized

herein). We believe that addressing these areas would provide

decisionmakers and stakeholders the information necessary to ensure that

DOD has well-thought-out strategies for resolving ongoing problems,

achieving its goals and objectives, coordinating crosscutting activities, and

becoming more results oriented, as expected by the Results Act.

Agency Comments DOD officials reiterated that the QDR, alone, has been the Department’s

finalized strategic plan since it was issued in May 1997. They also stated

that they included a table listing the underlying plans that address the

high-risk management problems noted in our August 5 report but did not

attach or include significant detail from the underlying plans because that

would have made their submission too voluminous. They said that they did

not include details in summary fashion because that would not have

provided enough information. They noted that DOD is working to address

its management problems and said that those interested in seeing how the

problems are being addressed should read the underlying plans.

Additionally, the officials noted that although coordination of programs

and activities that crosscut other agencies’ programs are not discussed in

DOD’s strategic plan, DOD coordinates and cooperates extensively with

other federal agencies as part of its ongoing strategic planning process.

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Appendix IV 

Observations on the Department of

Defense’s Strategic Plan

Finally, DOD officials commented that in congressional consultations, the

only change suggested was that DOD reword a couple of its general goals

and objectives.

Issue Area Contact David R. Warren, Director, Defense Management Issues; National Security

and International Affairs Division, (202) 512-8412.

Page 42 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix V 

Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

On July 18, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Education’s

draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on the Department of

Education’s June 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/HEHS-97-176R). Education’s

formally issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on

October 3, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our July 18 report.

On October 16, 1997, we briefed your staffs on further observations on the

strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

The Department’s June 17, 1997, draft plan generally complied with the

Results Act. Overall, it is a useful document and included all but one of the

six elements required by the Act—it did not discuss how the agency’s

long-term goals and objectives will be related to its annual performance

goals. The plan’s long-term goals and objectives were succinct and

logically linked to its mission statement, and the quality of the goals and

objectives reflected the Department’s thoughtful deliberation in its efforts

to comply with the Results Act. In addition, the plan addressed in some

form all of the Department’s major statutory responsibilities.

Although the plan presented a logical and fairly complete description of

how the Department intends to achieve its mission, we identified a few

areas in the draft plan that could be improved. We observed that the plan

could benefit from more information, clarity, and context in some of its

components. The plan should have included an explanation of the

relationship between its long-term goals and objectives and its annual

performance goals as well as a complete description and schedule of

program evaluations. It could also have better addressed the Department’s

major statutory responsibilities.

The Department has the primary responsibility for implementing federal

education policy and programs, but several other federal agencies also

provide education-related programs and services. In our past work, we

have identified opportunities for consolidating programs in certain areas,

such as job training and early childhood education, to eliminate

inappropriate duplication. The draft strategic plan did a good job of

identifying crosscutting program activities in elementary and secondary

programs, but it did not identify or discuss activities for postsecondary

programs that require coordination. By discussing the agencies and

activities involved with the Department’s higher education programs, the

strategic plan could provide Congress with a more complete picture of the

scope of the Department’s coordination activities.

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Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

In its discussion of core strategies for achieving its strategic goals and

objectives, the Department identified several management challenges it

will face in the coming years, but it provides little detail about these

challenges and how it will meet them. This type of information could help

the Department and its stakeholders identify major management problems

that could impede the Department’s efforts to achieve its goals and

objectives. Further, stakeholders could benefit from knowing what the

Department has done, is doing, or plans to do to address such problems.

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

The Department’s strategic plan issued October 3, 1997, included several

significant improvements that make it more responsive to the

requirements of the Results Act than its draft plan. The Department’s plan

now addresses all six elements required by the Results Act. The plan

addressed the relationship between the agency’s long-term goals and

objectives and its annual performance plan—the only element missing

from its draft plan—by including a matrix linking long-term goals and

objectives in the strategic plan with fiscal year 1997 appropriation

information and agency programs. The matrix indicated where programs

have a significant number of activities or products supporting an objective.

Though the strategic plan does not specifically describe how the

Department intends to measure the performance of its programs each

year, the matrix and the supplemental information on the Department’s

performance indicators (shown in appendix A of the plan) provided a

better understanding of the relationship between the Department’s

strategic and annual performance plans. The Department states that the

strategic plan was based, in part, on objectives and indicators in draft

program performance plans prepared for key programs in the winter of

1997. According to the plan, the annual performance plan (which includes

budget and performance plans for each of the Department’s programs) will

further clarify this linkage.

The Department’s October 1997 plan also provided a description of the

program evaluations and assessments that were used to develop each of

its four strategic goals as well as evaluations that will help to “inform the

implementation” of the plan and provide data for the performance

indicators supporting the goals. For example, at the end of the narrative

describing Goal 2 (build a solid foundation for learning for all children),

the plan stated that early evaluations of the Even Start program and

crosscutting evaluations of Goals 2000 and the reauthorized elementary

and secondary education programs were used to develop this goal. In

addition to the evaluations highlighted in the introduction of each goal,

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Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

appendix B of the plan described 57 key program evaluations and other

studies, including information on when the evaluation data were or will be

collected and, in many instances, how often the data will be collected in

the future. The Department’s strategic plan also identified agency efforts

that will help to avoid duplication among its evaluation efforts and reduce

respondent burden.

In addition, the narrative supporting the Department’s mission statement

now encompasses the Department’s major statutory responsibilities. Our

review of the Department’s draft plan indicated that it had failed to

address the agency’s statutory requirements for basic education for adults,

vocational rehabilitation, education of individuals with disabilities, and

school-to-work opportunities. In its October 1997 plan, the Department

addressed this weakness by including as one of its key agency functions

“providing grants for literacy, employment, and self-sufficiency.”

The plan more clearly addressed the Department’s civil rights function

within the goals and objectives sections. During our review of the

Department’s draft plan, we observed that the agency’s civil rights

function, although reflected in its mission statement, was not addressed in

the plan’s long-term goals or objectives. In support of two objectives

related to goals 1 and 4, the Department added strategies for addressing its

civil rights function. Objective 1.5 is to get families and communities fully

involved with schools and school improvement efforts. In support of this

objective, the plan states that the Department will create collaborative

partnerships among parents, community groups, and other stakeholders

that ensure equal educational opportunity, and provide civil rights training

and technical assistance to build these linkages. Objective 4.2 is to provide

Education’s partners the support and flexibility they need without

diminishing accountability. In support of this objective, the plan adds the

following strategy: to build civil rights partnerships to achieve shared civil

rights objectives and secure timely improvements for students.

As required by the Results Act, the Department described in its draft plan

several factors outside the agency’s program scope and responsibilities

that could negatively affect its ability to achieve its strategic goals. The

Department strengthened this discussion in the plan by describing agency

actions intended to mitigate against seven key external factors that could

affect the achievement of its long-term goals. For example, the plan states

that school systems will need to undertake long-term investments in

professional development and other capacity-building activities if

education reforms are to succeed. Yet, pressures outside of the

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Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

Department’s control may encourage school systems to focus instead on

demonstrating short-term gains. To counter these pressures, the plan

states that the Department will (1) work with program and technical

assistance providers to highlight the importance of sustained professional

development aligned with the standards and (2) emphasize the importance

of professional development in its performance indicators.

Consistent with our suggestions in our July report, the Department’s

strategic plan also addressed several other issues. The plan specifically

identified coordination activities related to the Department’s

postsecondary education programs and activities. It listed interagency

coordination and data matches with, for example, the Social Security

Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the

Selective Service as a strategy for ensuring that postsecondary student aid

delivery and program management are efficient (objective 3.3). Core

strategies to achieve this objective also included working with the Internal

Revenue Service on tax refund offsets and address matches and the

Department of the Treasury on administrative offsets to increase defaulted

student loan collections.

In addition, the Department has taken the important step to revise the date

for its Year 2000 conversion performance indicator. The plan established

1998, rather than 1999, as the year all of its relevant computer systems will

be Year 2000 compliant, thus allowing more time for system testing and

validation. While the Department had previously included the Year 2000

conversion effort in its draft plan, it established in its current plan

December 31, 1999, as the deadline for repairing seven mission critical

systems. As we pointed out, the Year 2000 problem is not technically

challenging; however, it is massive and complex. With about 800 days

before the Year 2000 deadline, the current plan’s performance indicator of

assuring that all systems have been evaluated and, where necessary,

converted to make them Year 2000 compliant by December 31, 1998, is a

major improvement. In recognition of the critical challenge facing federal

agencies in dealing with this issue, GAO has added the Year 2000 problem

as one of its high-risk areas.

Other Observations The Department has made significant strides in its October 1997 plan in

recognizing major management challenges facing the Department. In our

review of its draft strategic plan, we discussed the Department’s

particularly difficult challenge in improving its information systems for the

student aid program. We discussed the problems that the lack of an

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Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

integrated student financial aid system creates. We also discussed the

Department’s reengineering effort, known as “Easy Access for Students

and Institutions (EASI),” which was being developed to redesign the entire

student assistance program delivery system. In its draft strategic plan, the

Department identified EASI as an important part of its core strategy for

integrating its aid systems. However, as we pointed out, the project had a

history of false starts. We subsequently recommended in another report

that the Department should first develop a systems architecture to address

system integration deficiencies before proceeding with new major systems

development.1

 The Department’s plan eliminated EASI from its core

strategies and adopted the broader core strategy of (1) developing an

“integrated, accurate, and efficient student aid delivery system” and

(2) ensuring that systems are mission-driven and consistent with the

Department’s information technology architecture.

In our July 18, 1997, report we also highlighted problems with the

Department’s management, systems, and processes that affect its ability to

ensure financial accountability, particularly among its student financial aid

programs. The Department recognized these problems in its strategic plan

and listed the following as its most important challenges: (1) student aid

systems that are incompletely integrated, (2) financial data from aid

programs that are only partially consolidated at the student level, and

(3) too many contractors who use different operating systems. The plan

stated that correcting this situation will require the redesign and

modernization of the federal student financial aid system using the latest

information engineering and computer system technology. To address

these and other issues, the Department included under Goal 3 a new,

separate objective for the management of its postsecondary student

financial aid programs: “Postsecondary student aid delivery and program

management is efficient, financially sound, and customer-responsive”

(objective 3.3). The Department identified with specificity numerous

strategies and performance indicators that will help to address and track

agency efforts to achieve this objective.

• Postsecondary program management. To improve efforts in this area, the

strategic plan states that the Department will develop and utilize a risk

management system to target compliance and enforcement activities on

poorly performing institutions while reducing burdens on high performing

ones. Responding to a recommendation from its fiscal year 1996

Department-wide financial audit, the Department is currently developing

1

Student Financial Aid Information: Systems Architecture Needed to Improve Programs’ Efficiency

(GAO/AIMD-97-122, July 29, 1997)

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Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

this new risk analysis system to better utilize its limited monitoring

resources towards the highest risk institutions. However, this system will

not be fully implemented until fiscal year 1998. Another Department

strategy to improve the management of its student financial aid programs

involves expanding the use of the case management approach to maximize

the effectiveness of institutional oversight. According to the plan, this

approach encompasses review of recertification applications, compliance

audits, financial statements, risk management system inputs, and program

reviews.

• Financial integrity. The Department stated in its draft strategic plan that

poor data from the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) have

prevented it from obtaining an unqualified audit opinion on its annual

financial statements for the past 4 years. The Department’s plan included

several core strategies for addressing this data integrity problem, such as

integrating the multiple student aid databases based on student-level

records and improving contract performance for major information

systems by increased use of performance-based contracting. The

Department also added to its plan an indicator to track the accuracy and

integrity of data supplied by applicants, institutions, lenders, and guaranty

agencies. Data from these sources have been problematic in the past. In

addition, the Department’s October 1997 strategic plan included a new

performance indicator related to the financial integrity of the

Department’s postsecondary financial aid programs. It states that: “There

will be no material internal weaknesses identified in the student aid

programs’ portions of the Department-wide financial statement audit and

no student aid program issues that prevent the Department from receiving

an unqualified opinion on the financial statements.” This indicator is

linked to and supports indicator 26, which now definitively states that

auditors will issue a clean opinion on the Department-wide financial

statements every year.

Although, in general terms, the plan better specifies how the Department

will address this critical financial management weakness, it still has not

completely clarified how it will resolve the data integrity issues for FFELP

or accurately estimate the government liability that has prevented the

Department from obtaining an unqualified opinion.

Agency Comments On October 21, 1997, the Department provided written comments on a

draft summary of our observations of its October 3, 1997, strategic plan.

The Department generally had no objections to our observations but

wanted to clarify several issues we raised in the draft.

Page 48 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix V 

Observations on the Department of

Education’s Strategic Plan

• To measure the performance of Department programs, the agency will

include program performance plans in its detailed annual plan currently

being prepared by Department staff in conjunction with OMB. The

individual program plans will be linked directly to “budget activity lines”

and will accompany the Department’s fiscal year 1999 budget justification

to Congress in February 1998. The Department submitted 17 draft program

plans to Congress in March 1997 that, among other things, identified each

program’s goals and objectives, key performance indicators, program

evaluations and other data sources, the year the performance indicator

data will first be available, and key strategies for achieving the objectives.

These performance plans were developed by the program offices and have

been reviewed extensively internally—some have been shared with

stakeholders. Program performance plans covering the Department’s

approximately 100 program activities will include essentially the same

information as the 17 draft plans and will be reviewed and updated this fall

for inclusion in the agency’s annual plan.

• The Department’s Chief Information Officer has contracted with Lockheed

to work with the agency to ensure that it meets its Year 2000 performance

indicator target of December 31, 1998. This activity will be monitored at

the highest levels within the agency, and progress will be reported at least

quarterly through the strategic planning tracking process.

• The Department is engaged in several activities that should help to resolve

the data integrity issues for FFELP and accurately estimate the

government’s liability for this program. Specifically, the Department

(1) has developed a workplan, approved by the independent accounting

firm of Price Waterhouse, to address concerns about the government’s

liability estimate in time for the Department’s fiscal year 1997 audit; (2) is

comparing data from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) with

audited data submitted by selected guaranty agencies; and (3) is working

with E-Systems, Inc., and direct loan origination and servicing contractors

to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of direct loan data submitted to

NSLDS.

Issues Area Contact Carlotta C. Joyner, Director, Education and Employment Issues; Health,

Education, and Human Services Division, (202) 512-7014.

Page 49 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VI 

Observations on the Department of Energy’s

Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Energy’s (DOE)

draft strategic plan dated June 16, 1997 (Results Act: Observations on the

Department of Energy’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-199R). DOE

formally submitted its strategic plan to OMB and Congress on September

30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed this strategic plan and compared

it with the observations in our July report. On October 14, 1997, we briefed

your staffs on our further observations on DOE’s strategic plan. The key

points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our Reports

As we reported in July 1997, the draft plan did not meet all the

requirements of the Results Act. It fully addressed two of the six required

elements of the Results Act—the mission statement and goals and

objectives—partially addressed a third, and acknowledged that three

others needed to be completed for the September plan. Furthermore, the

draft plan did not expressly link its missions, goals, objectives, and

strategies with DOE’s relevant major statutory responsibilities, although we

noted that the missions and activities defined in DOE’s draft plan were

generally supported by legislation and that the draft plan accurately

reflected all of DOE’s major legislative requirements. However, we

observed that DOE’s missions have evolved from those that Congress

envisioned when it created the Department in 1977 and that the Results

Act provides a forum through which Congress can review the

appropriateness of these missions.

Our July 1997 report also noted that the draft plan did not identify

programs and activities that are crosscutting or similar to those of other

federal agencies. In addition, some of the draft plan’s measures addressing

management challenges appeared limited in scope or were unclear.

Finally, we noted several weaknesses in the information system that DOE

uses to track performance measures.

In addition to our July report, the Secretary of Energy requested our

continued involvement in refining DOE’s plan. On September 2, 1997, we

provided the Department with our comments on its revised draft strategic

plan—dated August 15, 1997 (Results Act: Observations on the

Department of Energy’s August 15, 1997, Draft Strategic Plan,

GAO/RCED-97-248R). In that report, we noted that the revised draft plan was

much improved over the earlier draft. Specifically, the revised plan

included all six elements required by the Results Act. However, we

reported that some of the strategies and many of the measures still did not

appear to be results oriented.

Page 50 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VI 

Observations on the Department of Energy’s

Strategic Plan

Improvements Made

in DOE’s Strategic

Plan

DOE’s September 30, 1997, strategic plan incorporated several

improvements that make it more responsive to the requirements of the

Results Act than was the June draft plan. In July, we observed that DOE’s

draft plan fully addressed two of the six required elements of the Results

Act—the mission statement and goals and objectives—partially addressed

a third, and acknowledged that three others needed to be completed for

the September plan. The September plan complies with the Results Act

requirements by including the remaining three sections and fully

developing the third by adding a discussion of resource requirements. In

describing its resource requirements, the September plan states that the

Department assumed budget appropriations consistent with the

administration’s and Congress’ agreed-upon 5-year budget deficit

reduction targets through fiscal year 2002.

Our July report also observed that the draft plan did not expressly link its

missions, goals, objectives, and strategies with DOE’s relevant major

statutory responsibilities. The September plan now shows the linkage

between the Department’s business line objectives and its relevant major

statutory responsibilities.

Furthermore, DOE’s strategic plan now acknowledges—in its discussion of

key external factors—that the Department participates in some

crosscutting government functions and initiatives that are beyond the

mission of any one agency. While the plan does not describe how DOE will

work in concert with other agencies, it does acknowledge DOE’s

commitment to work closely with other federal agencies, OMB, and

Congress to ensure that its programs provide critical and unique

contributions to these crosscutting efforts.

DOE’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

DOE did not adopt all of the suggested improvements noted in our July and

September reports. These suggestions were based on several of our past

reports and represent areas in which we have had disagreements with DOE

in the past. However, we still believe that if the Department made these

suggested changes—as outlined in our July and September reports—the

plan would better address the goals of the Results Act.

One such example that we identified in our September report relates to an

evaluation that we made concerning the vulnerability of U.S. oil supplies

to disruptions.1

 On the basis of that report, we believe that DOE’s measures

1

Energy Security: Evaluating U.S. Vulnerability to Oil Supply Disruptions and Options for Mitigating

Their Effects (GAO/RCED-97-6, Dec. 12, 1996).

Page 51 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VI 

Observations on the Department of Energy’s

Strategic Plan

for its objective to “reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to

disruptions in energy supplies” are not very useful indicators of how the

Department’s programs will affect the economy’s vulnerability. DOE’s

measures are based on six strategies: to (1) support activities capable of

ending the decline in domestic oil production, (2) maintain an effective

Strategic Petroleum Reserve, (3) diversify the international supply of oil

and gas, (4) develop alternative transportation fuels and more efficient

vehicles, (5) maximize the productivity of federal oil fields, and (6) take

measures to avoid and respond to domestic energy disruptions. However,

our report on the vulnerability of oil supplies observed that, in today’s

world oil market, replacing oil imports with domestically produced oil

would only marginally lower the potential costs of disruptions because oil

prices are set in the global marketplace and the price for all oil rises

during disruptions.

While we agree that one of DOE’s strategies—diversify the international

supplies—can lead to measures that contribute to reducing the

vulnerability of the U.S. economy to disruptions in the energy supply, our

vulnerability report offers five other factors that we believe would better

focus DOE’s efforts in developing strategies and measures for its objective

of reducing the vulnerability to energy supply disruptions: (1) excess

world oil production capacity, (2) the oil intensity of the U.S. economy,

(3) the oil dependency of the U.S. transportation sector, (4) world oil

stocks, and (5) the dependence of the U.S. economy on oil imports.

Finally, our July report noted several weaknesses in the information

system that DOE uses to track performance measures. However, DOE’s

September 1997 strategic plan makes no reference to these problems. We

still believe that DOE will need to modify the information system it

anticipates using to track the strategic plan’s performance measures and

identify management problems. In addition, we also noted that the

information used to update the tracking system depends on various other

information systems that we and DOE’s Inspector General have found

contain incomplete or inaccurate information.

Other Observations While DOE’s strategic plan is organized along four business lines—energy

resources, national security, environmental quality, and science and

technology—the agency is organized by program, and it is not clear from

the plan which program offices are accountable for implementing the

different sections of the plan. For example, several of the Department’s

program offices have science missions, including the Office of Nuclear

Page 52 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VI 

Observations on the Department of Energy’s

Strategic Plan

Energy, Science and Technology and the Office of Energy Research; the

Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and the Assistant

Secretary for Defense Programs have defense missions. However, the plan

does not describe how the Department’s current organizational alignment

is suited to the plan’s four business lines, nor does it provide a matrix

showing which program offices will be held accountable for implementing

each section of the plan.

Agency Comments On October 10, 1997, we met with DOE officials, including the Acting

Director, Office of Strategic Planning, Budget and Program Evaluation, to

obtain the Department’s comments on our observations about its strategic

plan. DOE officials made three points. First, they stated that development

of performance measures is difficult—especially in the science area—and

that they recognize the need to continually work to improve these

measures.

Second, in reference to the disagreements that they had with some of the

policy positions of our past reports, they noted that these differences will

continue; however, they do not believe that they are strategic planning

differences. We disagree because such differences have an impact on the

substance of the plan. For example, if DOE uses incorrect measures, it will

not know if it has achieved its goals and objectives.

Finally, the officials acknowledged that DOE’s strategic plan does not show

program accountability but stated that the Department has developed a

draft matrix document that provides a crosswalk between its performance

measures and the programs. They also pointed out that after the

Department-level matrix is completed, each program will need to cascade

performance measure accountability to it subunits.

Issue Area Contact Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources, and Sciences Issues;

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-3841.

Page 53 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VII 

Observations on the Department of Health

and Human Services’ Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Health and

Human Services’ (HHS) draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations

on the Department of Health and Human Services’ April 1997 Draft

Strategic Plan, GAO/HEHS-97-173R). HHS submitted its revised strategic plan to

the Office of Management and Budget and Congress on September 30,

1997. As requested, we reviewed the revised plan and briefed your staffs

on our observations. The key points from that briefing are summarized

herein, together with a brief overview of our comments on the initial HHS

plan.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

We found HHS’ draft strategic plan to be missing most of the key elements

required by the Results Act and to be more a summary of current

programs than a document projecting actions HHS might take in the next

several years to achieve the goals of the Act. Although HHS had developed a

mission statement that successfully captured the broad array of its

activities, the draft plan did not define measurable goals and objectives,

describe approaches to achieving these goals and objectives, describe the

relationship between long-term goals and objectives and annual

performance, identify key external factors beyond HHS’ control, or describe

how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals.

Furthermore, although the draft strategic plan recognized that many

different HHS operating divisions and programs are responsible for meeting

each of HHS’ goals, it did not discuss strategies for coordinating such

efforts, nor did it discuss HHS’ need to coordinate its work with other

federal agencies.

Finally, we observed that HHS faces many major management challenges in

carrying out both its program responsibilities and the type of strategic

planning and performance measurement the Results Act requires. Two

challenges that we highlighted were HHS’ reliance on state, local, and

private agencies to carry out many programs for which it is responsible

and HHS’ maintenance of financial management and program integrity.

Although we believed HHS was aware of these challenges, its plan did not

address them. By acknowledging these challenges in its plan, however, we

pointed out that HHS could foster a more useful dialogue with Congress

about its goals and the strategies for achieving them.

Page 54 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VII 

Observations on the Department of Health

and Human Services’ Strategic Plan

Improvements Were

Made in HHS’

Strategic Plan

HHS’ revised strategic plan incorporated many of the elements that were

missing from its earlier draft, making it a more useful document and one

that is more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act. The current

strategic plan includes all six critical elements as required by the Act. The

most notable improvement is in the plan’s outline of objectives for

accomplishing HHS’ six strategic goals. The objectives are largely focused

on outcomes, such as reducing the use of illicit drugs, and they are defined

in measurable terms, such as increasing the percentage of the nation’s

children and adults who have health insurance coverage. The plan also

identifies for each strategic objective the key measures of progress. For

example, the two measures to determine the reduction of tobacco use are

the rate of tobacco use among the young and rate of smoking among

adults.

HHS also added descriptions of its efforts to coordinate both internally

among its operating divisions and externally with other departments and

agencies. It describes, for example, a range of approaches to improve

internal coordination among the various operating divisions, such as

special initiatives managed by two or more operating divisions and

coordinating councils that integrate planning and policy development

across HHS. The discussions of several strategic objectives include a

recognition of the need to cooperate with other departments and agencies.

For example, the plan indicates that HHS’ substance abuse treatment and

prevention programs will work with the Health Resources and Services

Administration as well as the Departments of Education and Justice to

support an initiative to provide information to communities on the

incidence of street and gang violence, domestic violence, and substance

abuse and violence.

The plan is also improved by HHS’ discussion of three types of challenges

that could significantly affect its ability to achieve its strategic

goals—external factors, management issues, and data administration. The

plan discusses these issues as general obstacles to achieving the

Department’s overall goals. Moreover, it describes the Department’s

current status in improving performance with respect to these specific

issues.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

As its strategic planning process evolves, HHS’ plan should continue to

reflect its progress toward results-oriented management. In the meantime,

however, we observed several opportunities for further improvements in

the plan.

Page 55 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VII 

Observations on the Department of Health

and Human Services’ Strategic Plan

The greatest opportunities for improvement, in our view, are in HHS’

discussion of its strategies for accomplishing its objectives. First, its

strategies are not clearly linked to the attendant measures of success,

making it difficult to determine how the strategies would contribute to the

desired outcomes. For example, to increase the economic independence

of families on welfare, the plan specifies three strategies—providing

technical assistance, promoting employment, and improving access to

child care. The four measures of success for economic independence,

however, are all related to employment, with no apparent relationship to

the strategies for child care or technical assistance.

Second, the plan does not discuss the effectiveness of the outlined

strategies, making no mention of either existing evaluations to indicate

what is known about the effectiveness of these strategies or plans for

future evaluation to determine their effectiveness. For example, some of

the strategies were built around a common HHS approach to support

state-administered programs: technical assistance, training, and identifying

and disseminating best practices. Yet, we have found in our work on these

programs that there have been problems in implementing such strategies:

in some cases, HHS’ technical assistance was inadequate, the capacity of

regional offices to provide assistance and training was limited, and the

dissemination of research and best practices was lacking. In addition to

drawing on past evaluations, HHS’ plans should identify future evaluations

to determine how well its strategies are working.

Third, the plan does not discuss the resources required to implement the

strategies. For example, strategies to enhance the fiscal integrity of the

Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) programs include

consolidation of Medicare payment systems to improve HHS’ ability to

identify aberrant billing and improve payment accuracy. However, there is

no mention of the resources necessary to implement such a strategy.

Fourth, although the plan identifies key external factors that affect

achievement of the strategic objectives, there is little discussion of how

HHS intends to ameliorate these factors. For example, a key external factor

to achieving a number of objectives is the state of the economy, yet the

plan does not indicate how the strategies will adjust to changes in the

economy.

While the plan reflects a recognition of management and information

challenges to achieving HHS’ goals, including those mentioned in our July

correspondence, it provides little discussion of potential solutions. For

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Appendix VII 

Observations on the Department of Health

and Human Services’ Strategic Plan

example, the plan acknowledges HHS’ reliance on state, local, and tribal

government organizations, contractors, and private entities and mentions

the need to coordinate with them but is less specific on how it would do

so.

Similarly, HHS’ plan recognizes the importance of improving its financial

management information. In July, we reported that HHS had not addressed

its problems in complying with the Government Management Reform Act

of 1994 (GMRA), which would furnish decisionmakers with reliable,

consistent financial data. While the revised plan acknowledges that

obtaining an unqualified or clean opinion on its financial statements is a

fundamental and critical objective and challenge for HHS, it does not

specify the corrective actions and timetables to address these concerns.

With respect to information technology, we noted in our July

correspondence that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the

Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 set forth requirements that promote more

efficient and effective use of information technology to support agency

missions and improve program performance. While the plan identified

several information technology initiatives that may help HHS achieve some

program objectives, the plan does not discuss how HHS intends to identify

and coordinate information technology investments in support of overall

Department-wide goals and missions.

Agency Comments We provided HHS officials with a draft of this appendix. While they were

pleased that we recognized the improvements made to the plan, they

agreed that the plan can be further improved. In their view, strategic

planning is a continuous process; ongoing assessments and updates will be

needed to strengthen the plan and ensure that it continues to provide

relevant direction for their program activities.

Issue Area Contact Bernice Steinhardt, Director, Health Services Quality and Public Health

Issues; Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-7119.

Page 57 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix VIII 

Observations on the Department of Housing

and Urban Development’s Strategic Plan

On August 8, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Housing and

Urban Development’s (HUD) draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations

on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Draft Strategic

Plan, GAO/RCED-97-224R). HUD submitted its strategic plan to OMB and

Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our August report.

On October 14, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on

the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized

herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our August Report

HUD’s draft strategic plan included five of the six components required by

the Results Act. The plan was missing a description of how program

evaluations were used in establishing the strategic objectives, including a

schedule of future evaluations. Also, HUD’s treatment of the other five

required components did not yet fully comply with the Results Act or OMB’s

guidance. The draft included two separate mission statements, which did

not define the agency’s basic purpose or focus on its core programs. One

of the statements, which focused on restoring the public’s trust, was not

clearly supported by HUD’s strategic objectives. While the strategic

objectives covered HUD’s major program activities, they did not clearly

describe how HUD would assess whether it was making progress toward

achieving those objectives. Also, the discussion of HUD’s strategies to

achieve its objectives and the relationship of annual performance goals to

the strategic objectives was missing a discussion of the resources needed

and the type of information needed for its performance goals. The draft

strategic plan only partially met the requirements of the Results Act to

describe key factors that are external to an agency and beyond its control

that could significantly affect the achievement of its objectives. The plan

also did not cover the time frames specified by the Results Act.

The draft strategic plan generally reflected consideration of HUD’s key

authorizing statutes. The draft also discussed HUD’s consultation process

and its many community partnerships but did not reflect whether the

Department coordinated with other federal agencies and did not identify

programs or activities that were crosscutting or similar to those of other

agencies.

HUD’s draft strategic plan acknowledged that it faced significant

management challenges and broadly described how these problems would

be addressed. However, we observed that HUD could improve the plan by

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Appendix VIII 

Observations on the Department of Housing

and Urban Development’s Strategic Plan

more fully integrating its management reform plan1 with the strategic plan

and providing specific information about how the plan addressed the

Department’s financial and management information weaknesses. HUD’s

capacity to provide reliable information on the achievement of its strategic

objectives was uncertain because the draft strategic plan had not yet been

developed sufficiently to identify the types and sources of the data needed

to evaluate progress. The plan identified some annual performance goals

for which obtaining reliable data could be difficult because of the

weaknesses associated with HUD’s current financial and management

information systems.

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

HUD’s September 30, 1997, strategic plan covers all six components

required by the Results Act and incorporates many improvements that

make it more responsive to the requirements of the Act. Specifically, the

plan discusses past evaluations and refines HUD’s mission statement. The

new mission statement clearly identifies HUD’s role in achieving the

nation’s housing mission. However, the language remains very broad in

terms of how HUD can empower communities and individuals to succeed.

A mission statement related to the management reforms was reworked

and is now included in the plan as the Secretary’s personal mission to

emphasize the importance the Secretary places on these reforms. The

strategic plan also links the strategic objectives and the annual

performance goals, expands the discussion of external factors, and covers

the appropriate time frame. Additionally, the revised plan addresses HUD’s

consultation process and interagency coordination efforts. The strategic

plan discusses HUD’s ongoing and planned coordination with the

Departments of Health and Human Services and Labor. This coordination

will give HUD the opportunity to identify in future plan updates any

programs that complement or duplicate those administered by other

federal agencies.

HUD has also improved the discussion of the management problems it faces

and the corrective actions it plans to take. The strategic plan now includes

(1) an explanation of the agency’s current efforts to integrate its program

and financial management systems and clean up the data in those systems,

(2) a discussion of HUD’s plans to address the issues that led to a qualified

opinion on the agency’s financial statements for fiscal year 1996, (3) a

discussion of the reform efforts that will affect each objective, and (4) an

appendix that lists the management reform goals to be completed in fiscal

1

On June 26, 1997, HUD announced its HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan to address the ongoing

operational, informational, and management concerns.

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Appendix VIII 

Observations on the Department of Housing

and Urban Development’s Strategic Plan

year 1998. The plan also includes a brief discussion of HUD’s efforts to

ensure the quality of performance measurement data by requiring program

offices to develop quality assurance plans that will be reviewed and

approved by the Chief Financial Officer. However, the agency’s ability to

accurately measure progress in achieving its strategic objectives is

uncertain because doing so depends on completing its goal of integrating

program and financial management systems, cleaning up the data in most

of HUD’s existing systems, and receiving accurate reporting from local and

federal entities. Despite the improvements in the discussion of HUD’s

management problems, the plan lacks details on how the agency will

address the internal control weaknesses reported by the Office of

Inspector General in the agency’s financial statement audit report.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

Some elements of HUD’s strategic plan could be further improved to better

meet the purposes of the Results Act. HUD will have an opportunity to

address these issues as the strategic plan evolves further over time.

• While the plan includes a listing of the program evaluations under each

objective, it does not describe how the evaluations were used to develop

the strategic objectives and does not include a schedule of future

evaluations. Although wording was added to the plan stating that

evaluation schedules are determined on an annual basis, the plan does not

include a schedule, which is required by the Results Act.

• HUD’s discussion of its strategies does not discuss the staff, capital, and

technology resources needed to achieve the Department’s strategic

objectives, as called for by the Results Act. This issue is a critical one for

HUD because of its downsizing efforts and planned organizational changes.

• While the discussion of external factors was expanded, the plan does not

discuss the impact on the strategic plan or on HUD’s programs if the

legislative proposals discussed in the plan are not enacted. Additionally,

some of the discussions indicate that the external factors may have such a

great impact on the strategic objectives that HUD may not be able to

achieve its objectives. For example, under the strategic objective to

provide self-sufficiency opportunities for low-income individuals, the plan

states that HUD has no direct control over the extent to which funds will be

used to address this objective. Furthermore, the plan states that

“realistically, relatively few people who have reached their 30s with little

education, with families, and little work history, will achieve great success

in this economy.”

• While HUD included additional information to aid in the assessment of the

strategic objectives, it is not yet clear whether the achievement of a

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Observations on the Department of Housing

and Urban Development’s Strategic Plan

number of the objectives will be assessable. The evaluation component is

not yet complete, the discussions of strategies omit significant information

about resources, and the discussions of external factors indicate that HUD

sees significant impediments to achieving its objectives. As HUD is

developing future strategic plan updates and annual performance plans,

additional consideration should be given to what each objective is

intended to achieve and how that can best be assessed.

Agency Comments We provided HUD with a draft of this section of the report for review and

comment. We met with HUD officials from the Office of the Chief Financial

Officer and the Office of Policy Development and Research, who generally

agreed with our observations. They said that information in the annual

performance reports and the next update of the plan, which should be

available around the end of fiscal year 1998, together should address our

observations. Additionally, they said HUD prefers to keep the strategic

objectives broad so that the program offices maintain a long-term focus

and continue to think of ways to achieve the objectives.

Issue Area Contact Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development

Issues; Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-7631.

Page 61 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix IX 

Observations on the Department of the

Interior’s Strategic Plan

On July 18, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of the Interior’s

draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on the Department of

Interior’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-207R). Interior formally

submitted its strategic plan to OMB and Congress on September 29, 1997.

As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued strategic plan and

compared it with the observations in our July 18 report. On October 14,

1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the strategic

plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

Interior’s draft strategic plan did not meet the requirements of the Results

Act. The Department-wide strategic overview contained the Department’s

overall mission and goals and referred to the plans of its eight components

or subagencies for information on the six elements required by the Act.

However, half of the eight subagency plans lacked at least two of the six

required elements. Furthermore, the overall quality of the plan was not yet

sufficient to achieve the purposes of the Act. Among other things, it did

not provide clear linkages between the subagencies’ goals and objectives

and the contributions of these goals and objectives to the Department’s

major goals, and some of the goals and objectives in the subagencies’

plans were not stated in a manner to allow for a future assessment of

whether the goals have been achieved.

We pointed out that Interior has a number of crosscutting areas in which a

more coordinated strategic planning process would help to provide

Department-wide information on programs’ results. These include

environmental protection and remediation, stewardship assets, Indian

programs, land and natural resources management, and recreation

programs.

Although Interior identified information management resource goals in its

strategic plan, how it plans to achieve and measure the success of those

goals was not clearly delineated. Traditionally, Interior has allowed its

subagencies to independently acquire and manage information technology.

This culture has resulted in inefficiencies in technology investments and

information sharing.

We also noted that Interior needs to continue to address certain

accounting and financial management internal control weaknesses,

including, among other things, weaknesses in accounting for investments

in fixed assets and project cost accounting controls.

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Observations on the Department of the

Interior’s Strategic Plan

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

The September 1997 strategic plan—the Department’s strategic overview

plan as well as each of the eight subagencies’ plans—incorporates several

improvements that make it more responsive to the requirements of the

Results Act than was the draft plan. As a whole, the plan provides a clearer

presentation of how it covers the six required elements of the Act by

providing explicit linkages between the requirements of the Act and the

relevant parts of the plan. Furthermore, each of the four subagencies that

had lacked a number of required elements in the draft plans has added or

further developed many of these elements in the issued plan. In particular,

each of these four subagencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and

Wildlife Service (FWS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and Minerals

Management Service (MMS)—added material to address the relationship

between long-term goals and performance goals. In addition, both BIA and

FWS have included discussions of the approaches or strategies they will use

to achieve their respective goals and objectives—information that was not

present in the draft plans for these subagencies. Also, additional

information was added to the overview section of the plan to more fully

explain the Department’s approach to program evaluations.

In addition to more fully addressing several required elements, the

September 1997 overview and subagencies’ plans now contain explicit

linkages between the subagencies’ goals and objectives and the

contributions of these goals and objectives to the Department’s goals and

commitments. Also, many of the goals included in the issued plan have

been restated in a quantitative manner. These are positive changes and will

facilitate a future assessment of whether the goals have been or are being

achieved.

Consistent with the suggestions in our July report, Interior included a

section in the departmental overview discussing its current efforts to

address crosscutting issues throughout the Department and its strategy for

further coordination. Interior’s strategic plan also includes a more

aggressive goal for addressing internal control weaknesses. Additionally, a

section has been added that specifically discusses accountability for

personal, real, and museum property (fixed assets). The plan also

discusses integrating the personal and real property systems with financial

and procurement systems that would appear to represent progress toward

attaining project cost accounting.

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Observations on the Department of the

Interior’s Strategic Plan

Interior’s Strategic

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

There are a number of aspects of Interior’s plan that still can be improved

to better meet the purposes of the Results Act. In particular, some of the

subagencies—BIA, the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), FWS, and NPS—need to

more fully develop the program evaluation component of their plans.

While each of these subagencies, as well as the departmental overview,

has made revisions to its draft plan in this area, the revisions still do not

provide a complete understanding of specifically how program evaluations

were used in developing the plan or what future evaluations will be done

and when for each of the subagencies. Including this kind of information is

important because without it, it is difficult for both the subagencies and

other users of the plan to have confidence that the goals are the correct

ones and that the strategies will be effective.

Furthermore, while the subagencies have made progress in restating a

number of their goals and objectives in a more measurable way as we

suggested in our July report, this area of the plan still can to be improved.

Many of the goals and objectives are still process oriented, not results

oriented, and/or expressed in a manner that will make meaningful

performance measurement difficult. For example, one of the strategic

goals in FWS’ plan states that: “By 2002, the current maintenance backlog

will be reduced annually.” As stated, it is not clear what level of

performance is expected or will be considered acceptable in achieving this

goal. We observed similar difficulties in several of the subagencies’ plans.

While the September 1997 plan now includes a discussion of ongoing

efforts to coordinate a number of crosscutting issues facing the

Department and identifies its future approach in this area, the plan still

does not explicitly address the crosscutting issues identified in our July

report. These included the Department’s environmental protection and

remediation, stewardship assets, Indian programs, land and natural

resource management, and recreation programs.

In our July report, we noted that the plan needed to more fully address

information management issues. This need still exists in the September

plan. In the September plan, Interior has identified goals and actions

needed to implement the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 but does not clearly describe how

it plans to achieve, or to measure its success in achieving, its goals. Also,

Interior needs to explain how it plans to address the Year 2000 problem as

well as significant information security weaknesses—two issues that we

have identified as high risk across the federal government.1

 Furthermore,

1

GAO High-Risk Series (GAO/HR-97-20, Feb. 1997).

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Observations on the Department of the

Interior’s Strategic Plan

the September plan now states that Interior’s critical information systems

will be Year 2000 compliant by September 30, 2000—9 months after the

January 1, 2000, deadline.2

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

On October 10, 1997, we met with Interior officials, including the Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance, to obtain the Department’s

comments on our observations about its strategic plan. Interior believes

that the September 1997 plan meets the requirements of the Results Act.

However, the Department acknowledges that improvements can be made

in several areas. Interior noted that the development of its strategic plan is

an iterative process and that future versions of the plan will address areas

in which we and others show a need for improvement. Furthermore, in

connection with crosscutting issues, Interior commented that it believes

that its current efforts and initiatives in this area are sufficient. However,

in our view, focusing on results implies that federal programs’ contribution

to the same or similar results should be closely coordinated to ensure that

goals are consistent and that, as appropriate, program efforts are mutually

reinforcing. In connection with information management issues, Interior

commented that it has detailed plans to address Year 2000 issues and does

not believe the level of detail that we suggested is necessary for inclusion

in a strategic plan. We continue to believe that clear discussions of Year

2000 and information security issues would strengthen the strategic plan

and provide linkages for its operational plans. This disclosure would help

Congress, departmental customers, and the general public to better

understand the Department’s goals, strategies, and measures.

Issue Area Contact Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues;

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-3841.

2

Interior officials told us that the September 30, 2000, date that appears in the issued plan is a

typographical error. According to these officials, the date should be September 30, 1999. They told us

they will be issuing an errata sheet correcting this error.

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Appendix X 

Observations on the Department of Justice’s

Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Justice’s

February draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on the

Department of Justice’s February 1997 Draft Strategic Plan,

GAO/GGD-97-153R). On August 15, 1997, Justice revised its plan and we

testified on September 30 on the plan’s compliance with the Act’s

requirements (Results Act: Comments on Justice’s August Draft Strategic

Plan, GAO/T-GGD-97-184). Justice’s formally issued strategic plan was

submitted to OMB and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we

have reviewed the issued strategic plan and compared it with the

observations in our July 11 report and September 30 testimony. On

October 7, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the

strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report and

Our September

Testimony

In response to comments on its February strategic plan, Justice revised its

plan in August. The revised plan addressed many of the issues we raised in

our July report.

In our July report, we pointed out that of the six elements required by the

Act, three—the relationship between long-term goals and the annual

performance plans, the key external factors that could affect Justice’s

ability to meet its goals, and a program evaluation component—were not

specifically identified in the draft plan. The remaining three elements—the

mission statement, goals and objectives, and strategies to achieve those

goals and objectives—were discussed, but each had weaknesses. The most

important of these were that the mission statement did not cover a major

statutory responsibility, goals and objectives were not consistently as

results oriented or measurable as they could have been, and strategies

were not fully developed.

In addition, we observed that the February draft plan could be more useful

to Justice, Congress, and other stakeholders if it provided a more explicit

discussion of (1) crosscutting activities, (2) major management challenges,

and (3) Justice’s capacity to provide reliable information to manage its

programs or determine if it is achieving its strategic goals. Recognizing

crosscutting issues and the coordination required to address them is

particularly important for Justice because, as the federal government’s

attorney, it helps the various federal law enforcement agencies enforce the

law in federal courts. Explicit consideration of major management

challenges, including the capacity to produce reliable information for

management decisionmaking, is important because these challenges could

affect Justice’s ability to develop and meet its goals.

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Observations on the Department of Justice’s

Strategic Plan

In our September testimony, we pointed out that Justice’s August draft

plan discussed, to some degree, five of the six required elements—a

mission statement, goals and objectives, key external factors, a program

evaluation component, and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives.

The August draft plan did not include a required discussion on the

relationship between Justice’s long-term goals/objectives and its annual

performance plans.

In addition, we noted that the August draft plan could have better

addressed how Justice plans to (1) coordinate with other federal, state,

and local agencies that perform similar law enforcement functions, such

as the Defense and State Departments with regard to counter-terrorism;

(2) address the many management challenges it faces in carrying out its

mission, such as internal control and accounting problems; and

(3) increase its capacity to provide performance information for assessing

its progress in meeting the goals and objectives over the next 5 years.

Improvements Were

Made in Justice’s

Strategic Plan

Justice’s issued strategic plan incorporated several improvements that

make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act than were

the February and August draft plans. Its September plan discusses each of

the Act’s required elements. In particular, Justice added in its August plan

a discussion of eight key external factors that could significantly affect

achievement of its long-term goals, information that is helpful to Congress

in its consideration of Justice’s plan. However, information about

alternatives that could reduce the potential impact of these external

factors was not provided.

In addition, Justice’s August strategic plan included a discussion of the

role program evaluation is to play in Justice’s strategic planning efforts.

Justice recognized that it has done few formal evaluations of Justice

programs in the past, but the plan acknowledged that sound program

evaluation is an essential aspect of achieving the purposes of the Act and

stated that Justice plans to examine its evaluation approach to better align

evaluations with strategic planning efforts. Further, Justice pointed out

that it will continue to improve its efforts to benefit from our evaluations.

This element of the plan could be more helpful to decisionmakers if it

identified future planned evaluations and their general scope and time

frames, as encouraged by OMB strategic plan guidance.

Consistent with suggestions in our July report, Justice included in its

issued strategic plan a discussion of its management functions that

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Observations on the Department of Justice’s

Strategic Plan

address (1) its process for managing its information technology

investments, steps taken to provide security over its information systems,

and strategy to ensure that computer systems accommodate dates beyond

the year 2000; and (2) aspects of its internal control processes that identify

management weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Justice also added a

discussion on “accountability,” debt collection, and asset forfeiture.

However, the plan would be more helpful if it included a discussion of

corrective actions Justice has planned for significant internally and

externally identified management weaknesses, as well as how it plans to

monitor the implementation of such actions. In addition, the plan does not

address how Justice will correct significant problems identified during the

Inspector General’s fiscal year 1996 financial statement audits, such as

inadequate safeguarding and accounting for physical assets and

weaknesses in the internal controls over data processing operations.

Justice’s Strategic

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

Several elements of Justice’s issued strategic plan could be further

improved to better meet the purposes of the Results Act. In particular,

some of the plan’s goals and objectives still were not stated in as results

oriented or measurable a form as they could be, and some of the strategies

to achieve the goals and objectives did not clearly explain how and to

what extent Justice programs would contribute to achieving the goals,

how its resources are to be utilized to achieve the goals, or how Justice

plans to assess progress in meeting those goals. For example, Justice has a

goal to maximize deterrents to unlawful immigration by reducing the

incentives of unauthorized employment and entitlements. It is likewise

unclear how Justice will be able to determine the effect of its efforts to

deter unlawful immigration, compared to the effect of changes in the

economic and political conditions in countries from which illegal aliens

originated. In addition, Justice’s mission statement, which we observed in

July as seeming to be incomplete because it omitted one of its largest

budget items—detention and incarceration function—was not changed.

One of the elements required by the Results Act was missing when we

reviewed the February and August draft plans—the relationship between

long-term goals and objectives and annual performance plans. In its

September plan, Justice added a discussion of the relationship between

the strategic plan and the annual performance plan. In its discussion,

Justice points out that its first annual performance plan will cover fiscal

year 1999 activities and be submitted to Congress in calendar year 1998,

together with the President’s budget. The performance plan is to contain

(1) a Department-wide summary plan, organized by strategic goals, that

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Observations on the Department of Justice’s

Strategic Plan

reflects high level and crosscutting annual goals and indicators and

(2) more detailed component and appropriation-specific performance

information. Justice added that goals and indicators will be supportive of,

and derived from, those set forth in the strategic plan. Recognizing that the

linkage between the strategic plan and the annual performance plan is a

critical element of the Act, Justice said that it has revised its internal

processes to ensure that the strategic plan serves as the foundation for the

development of annual budgets and performance plans. In our opinion,

Justice’s September strategic plan could better meet the purposes of the

Act by discussing, as contained in OMB guidance, (1) the type, nature, and

scope of the performance goals to be included in its performance plan;

(2) the relation between the performance goals and the general goals and

objectives; and (3) the relevance and use of performance goals in helping

determine the achievement of general goals and objectives. This

information is important because the linkage between the goals and

objectives and annual performance plan provides a basis for judging

whether an agency is making progress toward achieving its long-term

goals, not just its annual goals, which would be reflected in the annual

performance plan.

We observed that the February and August draft plans did not include a

discussion of how Justice’s activities would be coordinated with other

related crosscutting law enforcement activities. The issued strategic plan

includes a goal to coordinate and integrate law enforcement activities

wherever possible and to cooperate fully with other federal agencies.

However, the plan could better serve the purposes of the Results Act by

discussing how Justice plans to implement that goal and to measure and

assess inputs, outputs, and outcomes to achieve crosscutting law

enforcement goals.

Agency Comments On October 14, 1997, we obtained oral comments from Justice officials,

including the Director, Management and Planning Staff, on a draft of our

analysis and observations of Justice’s issued strategic plan. They said that

our analysis and observations fairly represent Justice’s strategic plan.

Issue Area Contact Norman J. Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues; General

Government Division, (202) 512-8777.

Page 69 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XI 

Observations on the Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Labor’s draft

strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on Department of Labor’s

June 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/HEHS-97-172R). Labor formally submitted

its plan to OMB and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we have

reviewed this strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our

earlier report. On October 16, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further

observations on the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are

summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

To meet the Results Act requirements for a strategic plan, Labor submitted

individual plans for 15 of its 24 component offices or subunits, which it

supplemented with a “strategic plan overview.” In one case, one of Labor’s

offices—the Employment Standards Administration (ESA)—did not submit

a plan itself, but instead submitted plans for the four subunits under its

responsibility.1

 While OMB Circular No. A-11 provides agencies discretion

to submit strategic plans that cover only major functions or operations,

Labor provided no indication as to why its other offices or subunits did not

provide plans.

We reported that neither the overview nor the component plans fully met

the Act’s requirements or OMB guidance. For example, the overview’s

mission statement was not sufficiently descriptive of Labor’s basic

purpose, and the overview did not include elements identified by the Act,

such as strategies to achieve goals or evaluations used to establish goals.

Further, a majority of the component plans did not include all of the

elements required by the Act, such as the strategies to achieve the goals or

key factors affecting goal attainment. We noted that the overview would

be more useful if it included all of the elements identified by the Act and,

regarding the mission statement specifically, if it communicated more

about Labor’s purpose, referring to such basic responsibilities as job skills

development, job placement, and worker protection.

We also reported that the overview did not include Department-wide,

overarching goals that would facilitate Labor’s functioning as a unified

organization with central direction. Instead, the overview excerpted and

listed the goals contained in the component unit plans organized around

1

In a subsequent report, we said that Labor may want to consider whether the development of an

ESA-level plan would enhance its planning efforts. We wrote that such a plan could use common

programmatic themes found in the four subunit plans as a foundation to help ESA make policy

decisions with regards to direction and operations of its programs, to evaluate whether the programs

are achieving intended results, and to increase coordination among its program operations. See The

Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plans of Selected Department of Labor Components

(GAO/HEHS-97-188R, July 31, 1997).

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Observations on the Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

three broad programmatic categories that were not developed into goals.

We observed that Department-wide goals enunciated by the Secretary in

recent congressional testimony could serve as the basis from which to

develop Department-wide goals that are results oriented and set out the

long-term programmatic policy and management goals of the agency.

We found that the goals in the overview and in the component plans were

generally consistent with Labor’s statutory responsibilities, and the plans

generally covered all of Labor’s major functions and operations.

Regarding crosscutting issues, we reported that the strategic overview

recognized the roles of other organizations in carrying out particular

functions and the importance of establishing partnerships with these

organizations to carry out such functions. However, we indicated that the

overview could be improved if it recognized the importance and number of

other participants—namely, the other 14 federal agencies—involved in one

major area of responsibility—job training. In so doing, Labor could discuss

how its programs fit in with a broader national job training strategy. We

also found that the Labor officials responsible for preparing the plan and

monitoring its progress had not consulted with congressional staff

regarding the overview or the component plans.

Finally, we reported that the strategic overview highlighted the need for

information and data systems to ensure timely and sound evaluations to

assess agency progress in meeting its goals. However, the overview did not

describe Labor’s strategy for ensuring that this kind of information was

collected and used to assess progress and performance. The overview also

did not discuss how Labor planned to use information technology to

achieve its mission, goals, and objectives, or to improve performance and

reduce costs. We reported that the plan could be improved by including a

discussion of Labor’s investment technology process, including how Labor

planned to address the Year 2000 problem, or how Labor planned to

comply with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which calls for agencies to

implement modern technology management to improve performance and

meet strategic goals.

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

Labor’s formally issued strategic plan incorporates many improvements

that make it more responsive to the requirements in the Results Act. Labor

maintained its original approach of submitting plans for its component

offices or subunits supplemented by a strategic overview. However, for

this revision, 3 additional offices/subunits prepared plans that had not

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Observations on the Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

prepared draft plans previously (including 1 that has overall management

responsibility for implementing the Results Act) and the 4 plans originally

submitted by ESA’s subunits were consolidated into 1 ESA-level plan for a

total of 15 component-level plans. In its overview, Labor provided a

rationale for the components included, noting that “. . . strategic plans

have only been required of the 15 program and management agencies of

the Department. Several staff offices whose functions are in direct support

of the Secretary’s office are not included.”

Labor’s strategic overview and all but 1 of the 15 component unit plans2

include all 6 elements. Further, the overview’s mission statement now

provides a more complete description of Labor’s basic purpose of

“foster[ing] and promot[ing] the welfare of job seekers, wage earners, and

retirees of the United States by improving their working conditions,

advancing their opportunities for profitable employment, and protecting

their retirement investments.” Moreover, discussions of strategies to

achieve goals and external factors that could affect the achievement of

goals are discussed alongside individual goals, which facilitates the

understanding of how particular strategies and external factors are linked

to each goal.

The overview also appears to address Labor’s traditionally decentralized

management approach, which has posed numerous management

challenges for Labor in the past. For example, the overview now contains

five clearly articulated Department-wide goals that are generally results

oriented and that are consistent with those recently enunciated by the

Secretary. The overview also includes a sixth Department-wide goal of

maintaining a departmental strategic management process, which may be

an indication of a renewed emphasis by Labor to develop a more strategic

approach to departmental management. Other indications of this renewed

approach to Department-wide leadership are evident in the similar

organizational style of each of the component plans and the clear linkage

between the strategic overview and the plans. For example, in the

overview, the strategic goals of each of the units/offices are highlighted

under the appropriate Department-wide goal; and in each of the plans for

the offices/units, the office/unit strategic goals are categorized according

to the Department-wide goal to which they correspond. Further, the

overview now includes a discussion of the relationship between the goals

in the annual performance plan and in the strategic plan.

2

The plan for the Bureau of International Labor Affairs does not include a discussion of the

relationship between the goals in the annual performance plan and in the strategic plan.

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Observations on the Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

The overview and component plans we reviewed continue to describe all

of Labor’s major functions, and the goals are consistent with relevant

statutes.

Strategic Overview

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

Although Labor has made significant improvements to its strategic plan

overview, some sections in the overview may benefit from further

elaboration. For example, the overview does not detail how information

from evaluations was used to develop the plan, nor does it specify how

future evaluations will help assess Labor’s success in achieving its stated

goals. Instead, the overview discusses the fact that evaluations in the

regulatory agencies have lagged behind those in the employment and

training area. In that respect, it is even more important that the overview

provide schedules or time lines for future evaluations, identify what

evaluations will be done, and highlight how future program evaluations

will be used to improve performance. Along those lines, we had earlier

reported that the experiences of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) as a pilot could provide insight on how evaluations

can be managed. OSHA has been involved in a number of activities geared

toward making the management improvements intended by the Results

Act. Although it is not a requirement of the strategic planning process, we

continue to believe that a discussion in Labor’s overview related to the

experiences gained from the OSHA pilot project—including lessons learned

and whether best practices or other lessons could be applied

Department-wide or in units with similar functions—may prove helpful.

Labor could also improve the overview by continuing to enhance the

discussion of crosscutting issues, such as coordination with others who

have similar roles for particular functions. While the overview does make

reference to a few other organizations with responsibilities in this area and

notes that Labor will work with them, there is no discussion of what

specific strategies Labor will use to realize efficiencies through

coordination and possible consolidation of job training programs in order

to achieve a more efficient employment training system.

A more detailed discussion of internal coordination among those units

responsible for safety and health would also provide additional benefits to

the overview. Several of the goals of the component units responsible for

ensuring safe and healthful workplaces—such as improving workplace

safety and health or reducing workers’ exposure to hazards—are similar

yet are listed separately for these component units. In order to encourage

improved coordination between these units, the overview may benefit

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Observations on the Department of Labor’s

Strategic Plan

from additional discussion on how these agencies are working together to

share information on efficient enforcement and public education

strategies or measurement tools.

The overview could also benefit from a more elaborate discussion of the

strategies Labor will use to ensure that its information technology allows it

to achieve its goals. While the overview continues to cite the vision of

expanded use of technology across Labor and its component units, the

plan does not adequately discuss the inclusion of a

framework—sometimes called a systems architecture—that will serve as a

blueprint for developing and maintaining integrated information systems.

Such a framework would help ensure that the data being collected and

maintained within Labor are structured and stored in a manner that makes

them consistent, accessible, understandable, and useful. The overview also

still does not include a clear, integrated, measurable Year 2000 strategy,

which may be needed to adequately consider the multitude of system and

information interfaces inside and outside of Labor that must be addressed

prior to the millennium change.

Agency Comments In an October 14, 1997, letter from Labor’s Acting Assistant Secretary for

Administration and Management, Labor thanked us for acknowledging the

substantial progress in Labor’s plan. The letter noted that there is more

work to be done and that Labor will address the concerns we raised about

the use of evaluations in developing plans and evaluating results,

crosscutting issues, and internal coordination among safety and health

agencies during the next revision. Labor also noted that it will expand its

presentation in the strategic overview to provide additional information on

its information technology. However, Labor noted that a more detailed

discussion of its systems architecture and its Year 2000 compliant strategy

are included in Labor’s separate Information Technology Strategic Plan

and other documents. Additionally, it said its approach for addressing

information technology in the overview was to describe the linkage and

the importance of information technology in support of program agencies

and the achievement of goals. While this approach is reasonable, and our

preliminary review of the Information Technology strategic plan indicates

that it tries to address many of the issues we outlined previously, the

strategic overview could still benefit from clearer cross-referencing and

linkage between the two plans. Additionally, the Information Technology

Strategic Plan may benefit from clearer linkage between the components’

activities and Labor’s activities as a whole to enhance information

technology.

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Issue Area Contact Carlotta C. Joyner, Director, Education and Employment Issues; Health,

Education, and Human Services Division, (202) 512-7014.

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Appendix XII 

Observations on the Department of State’s

Strategic Plan

On July 18, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of State’s draft

strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on the Department of State’s

May 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/NSIAD-97-198R). State issued its formal

strategic plan and submitted it to OMB and Congress on September 27,

1997. As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued strategic plan

and compared it with the observations in our July 18 report. On

October 20, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the

strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized in the

following sections.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

State’s draft strategic plan was useful in setting and clarifying U.S. foreign

policy goals, but it did not contain sufficient information to fully achieve

the purposes of the Results Act and was incomplete in several important

respects. In particular, the draft plan omitted two elements required by the

Act: (1) components identifying the relationship between long-term

goals/objectives and annual performance goals and (2) a description of

how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals

and a schedule for future program evaluations. To fully achieve the

purposes of the Act, State’s draft plan needed to be more descriptive and

consistent with OMB guidance. For example, the plan contained several

sections labeled strategy for specific goals, but it did not specifically

identify the actions and resources needed to meet the plan’s goals or

include a schedule for taking significant actions. State’s strategies often

focused on describing the Department’s role in various areas instead of

describing how State’s programs and operations would help achieve the

goals.

We observed that State’s draft plan did not specifically discuss the

likelihood that other agencies might have functions similar to or possibly

duplicative of State’s role that could affect the formulation and

implementation of strategies.

The draft strategic plan addressed some, but not all, of the major

management challenges that the Department faces in carrying out its

foreign policy responsibilities. These problems include the lack of

attention to cost reduction opportunities, the existence of widespread

weaknesses in overseas mission management, and the presence of

deficiencies in the Department’s financial management system. The

management challenges that State did recognize as part of its plan

included staffing and workforce planning, information resource

management, property management, logistics, security, and core

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Observations on the Department of State’s

Strategic Plan

administrative systems. These issues were discussed separately in a

diplomatic readiness section of the strategic plan. We said that the draft

plan would be strengthened if it better described how meeting these

management challenges could affect achievement of the plan’s strategic

goals. Furthermore, we noted that the draft plan would have been

enhanced if it had included a discussion of how the proposed

consolidation of State, U. S. Information Agency, and Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency might affect goals, strategies, and resource

requirements. In addition, we suggested that State’s plan would be easier

to use if it contained a clearly labeled agency mission statement and

included a discussion of the Department’s key legal authorities.

We also observed that State’s capacity to provide reliable information

about its operations and program performance was questionable because

of long-standing deficiencies in the Department’s information and financial

accounting systems. Successfully resolving a number of these material

deficiencies in the Department’s financial and information management

systems will be critical to implementing the plan.

Some Improvements

Were Made in State’s

Strategic Plan

State’s September 1997 strategic plan incorporated some improvements

that help make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act.

With respect to the first element required by the Results Act that was

missing in the draft plan, State introduced a separate section describing

the relationship between the plan’s strategic goals and the goals and

objectives in the Department’s performance plan. It used only one

example to describe this relationship, discussing the linkages between

operational and performance goals for achieving the strategic goal of

eliminating the threat from weapons of mass destruction or destabilizing

conventional arms. This example is helpful, but it would be more useful if

it clearly described how the resource and performance measurement

components will be handled in the Department’s annual program planning

cycle. With respect to the second missing element, the plan now includes a

section dealing with program evaluations. However, instead of including a

description of the program evaluations used in developing goals and

objectives, as required by the Results Act, the new section is largely a

discussion of State’s rationale for not fully meeting this requirement.

Consistent with suggestions in our July report, State (1) clearly labeled its

mission statement in the plan and (2) included a detailed description of

the Department’s key legal authorities. A section was added to the plan

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Observations on the Department of State’s

Strategic Plan

explaining how resources from various sources, and managed by different

agencies, are established in the international affairs function of the

President’s budget—the “150” account.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

State’s strategic plan focused on the Department’s mission and role in

carrying out 16 strategic foreign policy goals. A few modifications were

made in the strategic goals since our July review (for example, a goal of

promoting broad-based economic growth in developing and transitional

economies was added, and a goal of improving the well-being of the

world’s poor was dropped), but the plan still did not consistently explain

what results are expected from the Department’s major functions or when

to expect the results. Some changes in the Department’s strategies were

also made, but it remained unclear how some of the goals are to be

achieved or what level of resources is required. State’s plan specifically

acknowledged that more needs to be done to identify agencies’

capabilities and the resources needed to achieve the goals.

The plan’s section on program evaluations is essentially an explanation of

why the plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Results Act. The

plan pointed out that no process existed for systematic evaluation of the

foreign affairs goals. As a result, the plan did not identify any evaluations

used for establishing or revising the strategic goals or include a schedule

for future evaluations. It is State’s position that it should not be held

strictly accountable for this and other requirements of the Act because of

the complexities of foreign policy, the scope of the Department’s

responsibilities that cover most other agencies, and the complexities of

managing overseas missions. We recognize that program evaluations in the

foreign affairs area are difficult, but we believe that an effective evaluation

process will be critical to determining the extent to which State is

successfully achieving/helping to achieve goals and what actions may be

necessary to help improve performance.

Specific discussions of crosscutting functions, management issues, data

capacity, and interagency consultations were included in the strategic

plan, but the discussions did not address many of the deficiencies noted in

our July report. For example, the sections on crosscutting and

consultative functions described State’s efforts to coordinate preparation

of the plan but did not address the potential for other agencies to have

functions duplicative of State’s. As noted in our July report, State’s

functional bureaus share responsibility with multiple U.S. agencies on

various overlapping issues, including trade and export promotion policy,

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Observations on the Department of State’s

Strategic Plan

global programs, and international security functions. The plan also noted

that the incorporation of management goals for the integration of other

foreign affairs agencies awaits decisions concerning how the

reorganization will proceed.

The plan’s section on management issues emphasized the importance of

the strategies for achieving diplomatic readiness but noted that this

represents a first effort to set strategic goals for the Department’s major

management responsibilities. It still did not address the serious

management problems related to cost control, overseas embassy

management, and financial management identified in our prior work and

discussed in our July report. The plan’s discussion of data capacity did not

specifically address the serious deficiencies in State’s financial accounting

and information systems, but it noted in more general terms that it will

take several years to develop performance measures and related databases

in order to provide sufficient information on achievement of the goals. The

Chief Financial Officers Act requires agencies to have accounting and

financial accounting systems that provide for the development of cost

information and systematic measurement of performance. Currently, State

does not have a true cost accounting system, and, as a result, reliable cost

information by function cannot be provided.

Other Observations In addition to developing the data capacity and information systems

essential for measuring progress, State’s strategic plan also acknowledged

that much more remains to be done to adequately develop the

Department’s long-term strategic planning process. State’s plan identified

several long-term actions as critical to the process, including the

development of

• an agency performance plan and mission performance plans for each

overseas embassy linking annual goals with long-term strategic goals,

• performance measures, and

• a process for conducting performance evaluations.

State’s strategic plan cautioned that it will take substantial effort to

develop a fully refined set of performance measures and a performance

evaluation process. In discussing its efforts to develop an integrated

planning process, State noted that a process linking overseas mission

performance plans to the Department’s strategic and diplomatic readiness

goals will first be in place for the Department’s fiscal year 2000 budget

submission.

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Strategic Plan

As State’s strategic plan evolves over time, other matters will clearly

require attention. For example, State’s performance plan will need to be

definitive to compensate for the continued lack of specificity in State’s

strategies concerning how the Department will achieve individual

long-term goals and the level of resources needed for State’s activities. The

overseas mission performance plans will also need to be high quality to be

successfully integrated into State’s master plan, in view of (1) the billions

of dollars in resources associated with State’s overseas operations and

(2) the historical weaknesses we have identified in overseas embassy

management. These weaknesses have included insufficient staff training,

poor inventory controls, and questionable procurement practices. State’s

lack of attention to the use of evaluations in setting and refining its

long-term goals and the lack of a specific schedule for future evaluations

are other areas that deserve attention. We believe that several areas may

require evaluation to ensure that the Department’s strategic planning

process is sound, including the adequacy of State’s performance and

program planning processes, the extent to which State and other agencies’

functions may or may not be duplicative, and the adequacy of State’s

overseas staffing decisions based on design and implementation of its new

staffing model.

Agency Comments We obtained oral comments from State officials responsible for the

Department’s strategic planning efforts. They generally agreed with our

description of the progress State made in its strategic plan and the issues

that require further attention. However, they noted that in judging the

quality of the plan, it is important to keep in mind the complexities of

strategic planning in the foreign affairs area. These complexities include

the scope of the strategic goals and the national interests involved, the

numerous government agencies sharing responsibilities, and the lack of

proven performance measures in key functional areas. Department

officials also recognized that the strategic planning process has not yet

paid sufficient attention to management and cost issues. However, they

expect that the diplomatic readiness section of the plan will be revised in

the spring of 1998, along with other parts of the plan, based on a series of

seminars and stakeholder discussions scheduled to begin in

November 1997.

Issue Area Contact Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues;

National Security and International Affairs Division, (202) 512-4128.

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Appendix XIII 

Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Strategic Plan

On July 30, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of Transportation’s

(DOT) draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-208R). DOT’s formally

issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on September 30,

1997. As requested, we have reviewed the September plan and compared it

with the observations in our July report. On October 16, 1997, we briefed

your staffs on our further observations on the strategic plan. Our key

points are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

DOT’s draft strategic plan did not fulfill all of the requirements of the

Results Act. The draft plan met the Results Act’s requirements for mission

statement, long-term goals, and a description of program evaluations;

however, each component had weaknesses that could be improved. The

draft plan did not meet the Act’s requirements to describe strategies for

achieving goals, a linkage between long-term goals and annual

performance goals, and those key external factors that could significantly

affect DOT’s achieving its goals. Overall, the draft was so general that it did

not clearly identify the Department’s priorities. We reported that the

quality of the draft plan could have been improved throughout by adhering

more closely to OMB’s guidance for preparing strategic plans and including

more detailed information.

In addition, the draft plan did not (1) show evidence of coordination with

other agencies that have programs and activities that are crosscutting or

similar to DOT’s or (2) adequately address major management challenges

and high-risk areas that we and others previously identified. We also

observed that DOT’s ability to produce reliable performance information

was uncertain because the draft plan was unclear about what information

would be needed to measure performance. Finally, the draft plan reflected

the Department’s key statutory authorities.

Improvements Made

in DOT’s Strategic

Plan

DOT’s September plan reflects significant improvements to the July draft

plan. The three components of the July draft that already met the

requirements of the Results Act have been improved. Specifically, the

mission statement has been revised to more closely track with DOT’s

authorizing legislation. In addition, the plan’s discussion of its five

long-term goals has been improved by adding (1) examples of possible

performance measures, (2) a few examples of how specific activities or

programs are expected to contribute to achieving the goals, and (3) an

appendix that lists the agencies and programs that are expected to

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Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Strategic Plan

contribute significantly to each goal. Finally, the discussion of program

evaluations has been revised to include a table that lists future evaluations

and, for each, describes the scope, methodology, key issues to be

addressed, schedule, and relationship to the plan’s long-term goals.

Moreover, the September plan meets two of three additional requirements

of the Results Act that the draft plan did not meet. First, the revised plan

now meets the Act’s requirements by discussing how the annual

performance goals, which are being developed for the fiscal year 1999

budget submission, will link to DOT’s mission and long-term goals.1

 The

September plan also includes a table for each long-term goal showing

examples of possible indicators that may be used to measure annual

performance and the availability of data. Second, the discussion of those

key external factors that could significantly affect DOT’s ability to achieve

its goals has been rewritten and expanded to meet the Act’s requirements.

The September plan identifies new factors—such as legislation to address

long-term financing for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and

Amtrak—that will affect DOT’s ability to achieve its long-term goals. The

plan also summarizes how economic, social, political, environmental

quality, national defense and security, and technology trends affect each

long-term goal; provides a few examples of activities needed to mitigate

the effect of these trends; and explains each factor in greater detail in both

a separate section and an appendix.

Information also has been added to the plan to describe the Department’s

activities to coordinate with other agencies in preparing the plan,

examples of data needed to implement the plan, and several management

challenges identified by us and others—issues not addressed in the draft

plan. The new information on interagency coordination describes a

Department-wide effort to identify duplication or overlap with programs in

other federal agencies and DOT’s activities during the summer of 1997 to

share its draft plan with other federal agencies. New information

concerning data—lists of potential measures and data sources—was

added to the discussion of each strategic goal. Additional new information

addresses certain management challenges we raised concerning the need

to (1) enhance transportation safety and security; (2) meet the long-term

financing needs of FAA; (3) improve the management of air traffic control

modernization acquisitions; (4) implement information management

technology reforms called for in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and

the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; (5) address any significant information

1

The Results Act requires OMB to have agencies prepare annual performance plans beginning for fiscal

year 1999. This plan is to contain annual performance goals and identify the performance measures

that an agency will use to assess its progress.

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Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Strategic Plan

security weaknesses; and (6) change computer systems to accommodate

dates beyond the year 1999, that is, address the Year 2000 problem.

Finally, the September plan continues to reflect DOT’s key statutory

authorities in an appendix and includes minor clarifications.

DOT’s Plan Can Be

Further Improved

DOT’s September plan can be further improved in two areas. First, the

plan’s discussion of strategies for achieving its long-term goals has

improved in some areas but still does not meet all requirements of the

Results Act. The revised plan describes corporate management strategies

for implementing the plan that cut across the Department. These strategies

provide useful information, for example, in explaining how long-term goals

will be communicated to employees and how personnel will be assigned

accountability for achieving the goals. However, the revised plan still does

not describe the operational processes, skills, technology, and resources

required to meet the long-term goals, as required by the Results Act. The

general discussion of corporate management strategies does not meet

these requirements, which should be addressed for each goal.

Furthermore, the plan could be improved by following OMB’s guidance on

strategic plans and providing additional detail when achieving a goal is

predicated on a significant change in resource or technology levels. For

example, we have reported that successful implementation of certain

aviation security measures mentioned in the plan is contingent upon

deciding who will finance the security improvements and developing the

needed technology.2

 In addition, the plan could be improved by following

OMB’s guidance on including time frames for initiating or completing

significant actions. The September plan contains time frames for some

significant actions, such as addressing the Year 2000 problem and

obtaining reliable financial statements by fiscal year 2000; but it does not

include time frames for other significant actions, such as completing air

traffic control modernization and improvements to Amtrak’s Northeast

Corridor.

Second, while new information in the plan addresses certain management

challenges we raised in our July report, other issues are not adequately

addressed. The plan does not adequately address challenges to

(1) improve the oversight of highway and transit projects, (2) meet the

long-term funding needs of Amtrak, and (3) have adequate financial and

other management information. Although the revised plan acknowledges

2

Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept.

19, 1996).

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Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Strategic Plan

these problems, it does not demonstrate a firm commitment to resolve

them through specific strategies. For example, the plan mentions our

concerns about the need to improve the oversight of highway and transit

projects, which are continuing to incur cost increases, experience delays,

and have difficulties acquiring needed funding commitments. The plan

states that these concerns are addressed under corporate management

strategies. The strategies, however, provide insufficient details to address

the problems with these projects. As another example, the revised plan

mentions Amtrak in an appendix but provides too little information to

adequately address our concerns about the corporation’s very precarious

financial condition, which threatens its survival. The plan could be

improved by addressing Amtrak’s role in a national transportation

framework and providing objectives concerning the future of Amtrak and

strategies for meeting these objectives.

The plan acknowledges the significance of financial management to the

achievement of its long-term goals and is generally responsive to specific

comments that we made about the draft plan. The revised plan includes a

new section that discusses (1) general financial management and (2) the

need for and plans to improve financial management of and accountability

for the Department’s financial resources. However, while the revised plan

acknowledges that unreliable accounting (including cost accounting)

information exists at the program level, it does not provide specific

strategies or timetables for resolving key problems.

Other Observations DOT has added specificity to the plan that greatly improves its overall

quality. However, the plan still takes an “umbrella” approach—it is

expansive enough to encompass all of DOT’s programs, but it does not

describe the contributions from specific modes to implement the plan. The

plan refers to the development of a “National Transportation Strategy”

with subordinate strategies for air, surface, and maritime elements. This

strategy might provide the missing link between the Department-wide

goals and the programs throughout DOT.

Agency Comments We provided copies of a draft of these observations to DOT for review and

comment. We received comments from DOT’s Assistant Secretary for

Administration. DOT disagreed with our finding that its revised strategic

plan does not describe the operational processes, skills, technology, and

resources required to meet the long-term goals, as required by the Results

Act. The Department stated that the strategic plan meets this requirement

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Observations on the Department of

Transportation’s Strategic Plan

in two ways. First, in discussing each strategic goal, the plan includes a

section entitled “How We Will Achieve the Strategic Goal” that describes

the processes that DOT will employ to achieve the goal. Second, the

Department stated that the plan meets this requirement in a section that

describes six overarching management strategies—the “ONE DOT

management philosophy,” human resources, customer service, resource

and technology, information technology, and resource and business

process management.

We disagree that the sections of the plan mentioned by DOT fulfill the Act’s

requirements. For the most part, the sections that discuss how DOT will

achieve the goals are too general to do so. For example, the plan states

that to achieve the mobility goal of ensuring an accessible, efficient

transportation system, DOT will improve technical assistance. The plan

does not explain the type of technical assistance, who will receive the

assistance, or how the assistance will improve mobility. As another

example, the plan states that to achieve its economic growth and trade

goal, DOT will assess the performance of the transportation system as a

whole. The plan does not explain how such an assessment will help the

Department achieve this goal. Furthermore, as we mentioned, the plan’s

corporate management strategies are also too general to meet the Act’s

requirement, although they do provide useful information in certain areas,

such as explaining how the goals will be communicated to employees.

These strategies provide a philosophy for the Department to operate

under, but not specific steps to achieve the goals. For example, the human

resources management strategy states that the Department will “achieve

its strategic goals with a workforce that is knowledgeable, flexible,

efficient, and resilient.” The actions to accomplish this include redesigning

human resources programs to “allow DOT to recruit, develop, and deploy a

diverse workforce with those 21st Century competencies needed to

achieve the DOT’s strategic goals.” The strategy does not explain what

competencies are needed.

Finally, DOT commented that achieving its strategic goals is not predicated

on a significant change in resource or technological levels. We disagree. As

we stated in our observations, successful implementation of certain

aviation security measures mentioned under the national security goal is

contingent upon deciding who will finance the security improvements and

developing the needed technology.

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Issue Area Contact Phyllis F. Scheinberg, Associate Director, Transportation Issues;

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-2834.

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Appendix XIV 

Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

On July 31, 1997, we issued a report on the Department of the Treasury’s

draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on the Department of

the Treasury’s July 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/GGD-97-162R). Treasury’s

formally issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the September 30

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our July 31 report.

On October 15, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on

the strategic plan. The key points from our July report and October

briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

Treasury’s July draft strategic plan was incomplete and did not meet all of

the requirements of the Results Act. Of the six elements required by the

Act, the Treasury draft plan included four. Of these four elements,

two—the mission statement and key factors external to the agency that

could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals and

objectives—generally met the Act’s requirements, but, as we stated, these

could have been strengthened. The information contained in the plan on

the two other elements—goals and objectives and the strategies to achieve

them—was often too general and vague to be used effectively by Treasury

management, Congress, and other stakeholders. We said these two

elements could be improved if they were more specific, results oriented,

and linked to the plans of Treasury’s bureaus and major program offices.

Two elements—the relationship between long-term goals and objectives

and annual performance goals, and a description of how program

evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic plans—were missing

from the draft plan we reviewed.

The draft strategic plan did not adequately address crosscutting issues and

made no mention of whether Treasury had coordinated with other federal

departments and agencies that shared related functions. In addition,

although a major part of the mission statement was focused on

management, the draft plan did not adequately address some of the critical

management problems facing Treasury that could affect its ability to

achieve its strategic goals and objectives. Finally, we said that Treasury’s

capacity to provide reliable information on the achievement of strategic

and program performance was questionable.

Improvements Made

in Treasury’s Strategic

Plan

Treasury’s formally issued strategic plan incorporates many improvements

that make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act.

Specifically, Treasury’s strategic plan now includes all six required

elements, including two that were missing from the draft plan. Also,

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Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

Treasury revised the four elements that were in its draft plan so that they

better meet the requirements of the Results Act. In addition, the plan

better addresses Treasury’s critical management problems and includes

more information on how the Department plans to coordinate with other

agencies on crosscutting issues.

Treasury’s plan is now presented as an overview with more detailed

information provided in the plans of its 17 bureaus and major program

offices. Taken together, the 18 plans comprise Treasury’s strategic plan.1

Treasury’s goals and objectives are now linked with those of its bureaus

and major program offices. Consequently, the plan provides a clearer

discussion of which bureaus and program offices have responsibility for

carrying out the goals and objectives. Treasury’s plan also states that

details on resources needed to implement strategies are to be included in

bureau and program office strategic plans as well as the Department’s

budget submission. Because the plan also links the goals and objectives in

the overview plan to the annual performance goals and measures in the

strategic plans of the bureaus and program offices, it provides information

on one of the elements required by the Results Act that was missing from

the draft plan.

Treasury has also made several other improvements to its plan. A section

was added describing how program evaluations were used to develop the

plan. This section also cites examples of planned evaluations that Treasury

is to use as input for future plans. The plan includes more information

aimed at addressing the critical management problems the Department

faces. For example, an objective has been added to the plan to address the

Year 2000 computer problems. Also, throughout its plan, Treasury

addresses crosscutting issues by pointing out where coordination is

required with other agencies.

Treasury’s Strategic

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

Several elements of Treasury’s strategic plan could be further improved to

better meet the purposes of the Results Act. Specifically, the linkage

between Treasury’s goals and objectives and those of its bureaus and

major program offices could be made more complete. Also, Treasury’s

plan could be improved if more complete and detailed information on

strategies for achieving goals and objectives were included in the plans of

1

We reviewed the strategic plans of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); the U.S. Customs Service; the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Office of Thrift Supervision; and the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency to assess whether they reflected each of Treasury’s goals and objectives

that should apply. We also assessed the quality and detail of information on strategies and

performance goals provided in these plans.

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Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

its bureaus and program offices. Treasury’s plan could also be improved if

performance goals were provided for each objective and if some of these

goals were more results oriented. Treasury could also improve its plan by

more explicitly addressing its critical management problems. Finally,

Treasury’s plan could better address issues relating to its capacity to

provide the types of reliable data needed to measure performance and

assess progress in meeting its goals and objectives.

Treasury’s plan could be improved if the linkage between Treasury’s goals

and objectives and those of its bureaus and program offices were more

complete. Specifically, we found several gaps in the linkage between

Treasury’s plan and the plans of its bureaus and components. For

example, Treasury has an objective to “ensure strong financial

management of Treasury accounts.” However, only six bureaus or

program offices have corresponding objectives. For this objective,

Treasury’s plan does not include a related objective for the Financial

Management Service, which is responsible for managing the government’s

finances, and IRS, the government’s primary revenue collector.

Treasury’s plan could also be improved if more complete and detailed

information on strategies for achieving goals and objectives were included

in the plans of its bureaus and program offices. Treasury’s plan contains

general information on some strategies that are needed to achieve its goals

and objectives. It also states that more detailed information regarding

resource needs is to be included in its budget submission and the plans of

its bureaus and program offices. However, we found several instances

where a Treasury objective was linked to a bureau objective, but the

bureau plan contained no corresponding strategy. For example, Treasury

has three law enforcement objectives—to reduce counterfeiting, money

laundering, and drug smuggling—where IRS has a role. However, IRS’ plan

contains no specific strategy related to these three objectives. Also, where

strategies were found in the bureau plans, they could be improved if more

detailed information, such as technological and resource needs, were

included. For example, IRS lists several strategies, including expanding

nationwide access to taxpayer information on-line and updating taxpayer

information daily, to achieve its objective to “improve customer service.”

However, IRS’ plan does not discuss the resources needed to carry out

these strategies.

Treasury’s plan could also be improved if performance goals were

provided for each objective. We found several instances where

performance goals were missing from bureau plans. For example,

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Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

Treasury’s plan has an objective to “improve capacity to recruit, develop,

and retain high-caliber employees.” The plan lists six bureaus and program

offices that have related objectives, but only one, the U.S. Mint, has a

related performance goal.

Likewise, Treasury could enhance its plan by making its performance

measures more results oriented. For example, Customs’ strategic plan

includes a strategy to prevent drug smuggling whose performance

measures (the number of arrests, seizures, and convictions, for example)

are output oriented. The plan could be improved if more results-oriented

measures, focusing on lowered drug smuggling rates, were developed in

support of Customs’ strategy to prevent drug smuggling.

Treasury officials stated that they will attempt to develop results-oriented

measures whenever possible, but that performance data may be difficult to

collect in some cases, and output measures may be the best data available,

at least for the near term. Furthermore, they felt that a balance of

output-oriented and results-oriented measures may be desirable since the

purpose of performance measures is to determine an agency’s effect on

results. Nonetheless, Treasury’s plan could be further improved if

results-oriented measures were developed to complement output

measures wherever possible.

As we observed in our review of Treasury’s draft strategic plan, the

current plan could also be improved if it explicitly addressed all critical

management problems. Although the plan states that it addresses all our

high-risk areas and other critical management issues, its discussion of

Treasury’s critical management problems is not always explicit. For

example, IRS’ accounts receivable—a high-risk area—is not addressed

specifically in Treasury’s or IRS’ plan. Both plans contain goals related to

increasing compliance with the tax laws and improving customer service,

which indirectly could address IRS’ accounts receivable. However, as we

previously reported, Treasury’s strategic plan could be more useful to

Congress and other stakeholders if it more clearly presented how Treasury

will address its critical management problems and how this will facilitate

the Department’s achievement of its strategic goals and objectives.

Similar to our comment on Treasury’s draft strategic plan, the current plan

could further be improved if it more clearly addressed the Department’s

capacity to measure its progress toward achieving its goals. The current

overview does contain a very brief discussion of the Department’s efforts

to improve performance measurement systems and data, and specific

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Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

performance measures are contained within the plans of the bureaus and

program offices. However, the Treasury plan does not address the

difficulties of developing measures and collecting reliable data for some

important areas of performance. For example, IRS and the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms both use taxpayer burden as a

performance indicator, but neither agency has adequate measures or data

for tracking taxpayer burden. We recognize that developing measures of

some areas of Treasury’s performance, such as taxpayer burden, will be

very challenging, but the Treasury plan does not discuss how the

Department plans to deal with these challenges.

Agency Comments On October 30, 1997, we obtained oral comments from Treasury officials,

including the Director of the Office of Strategic Planning, on a draft of our

analysis of Treasury’s strategic plan. The officials generally agreed with

our observations but suggested several changes to clarify areas where

Treasury has improved its plan. They said that it was important to

emphasize that their July 1997 draft strategic plan was a “working

document” issued as required for consultation purposes with Congress

and other stakeholders. As a result of the consultation process, they said

that the plan was revised to address the concerns of Congress and other

stakeholders, including GAO and OMB. Also, while the officials agreed that

the current plan could be further improved in several areas, they said that

the plan meets the Results Act’s requirements in that it contains all six

required elements.

The officials also reiterated that the Department should be recognized for

its Results Act implementation efforts. In particular, the officials told us

that Treasury has reformatted its budget to serve as the performance plan

required by the Results Act for the past 2 fiscal years. Also, last year, the

Department issued its performance report for fiscal year 1996 as part of its

budget submission—ahead of the Act’s requirements. They said that

Treasury intends to better align its performance plan with the goals and

objectives in its strategic plan and to submit the plan as part of its fiscal

year 1999 budget request, scheduled to be released in February 1998.

Finally, Treasury officials stated that two of the areas where we said they

could improve their plan—establishing results-oriented performance

measures and collecting reliable data for performance measures—appear

to pose challenges for government agencies in general. Nonetheless,

Treasury plans to make improvements in both areas, but officials said that

input from Congress and other stakeholders will be beneficial as they

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Observations on the Department of the

Treasury’s Strategic Plan

attempt to develop performance measures that are results oriented and for

which reliable data exist.

Issue Area Contact Jim White, Associate Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues;

General Government Division, (202) 512-9110.

Page 92 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XV 

Observations on the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report with our observations on the

Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) draft strategic plan, dated June 9,

1997 (The Results Act: Observations on VA’s June 1997 Draft Strategic Plan,

GAO/HEHS-97-174R). Following this review, VA issued two additional drafts,

dated August 1 and August 15, 1997. The August 15 draft was sent by VA to

OMB for review and interagency coordination. On September 18, 1997, we

testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, on the improvements in VA’s August 15

draft and the challenges remaining for VA in implementing the Results Act.1

VA submitted its formally issued plan to Congress and OMB on

September 25, 1997. On October 14, 1997, we briefed your staffs on the

observations we made in our September 18 testimony and further

observations based on our review of the formally issued strategic plan.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Letter

We found that VA’s June 1997 draft strategic plan represented an

inconsistent and incomplete application of the six key components of a

strategic plan as required under the Results Act. Also, the draft plan was

somewhat confusing and difficult to follow, mainly because it had several

different levels of goals, objectives, and strategies. In addition, the draft

plan had not clearly identified needs for VA to coordinate and share

information with other federal agencies. In terms of the key strategic

planning elements, VA’s draft plan (1) focused more on the process of

providing benefits and services than on results of VA programs for veterans

and their families; (2) lacked objectives and strategies for achieving some

of VA’s major strategic goals—in particular, for veterans’ benefits

programs; (3) provided only limited discussions of external factors beyond

the control of VA that could affect achievement of strategic goals; and

(4) was not based on formal program evaluations.

VA officials acknowledged that these elements still need to be developed.

The June 1997 draft included plans to establish a schedule of evaluations

for VA’s major programs. These evaluations, in turn, would lead to

development of results-oriented strategic goals. Also, the draft included

plans to identify coordination efforts with other federal agencies and to

develop communication mechanisms with them.

1

The Results Act: Observations on VA’s August 1997 Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/T-HEHS-97-215, Sept.

18, 1997).

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Observations on the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ Strategic Plan

Improvements Were

Made in VA’s Strategic

Plan

VA made significant progress in making the strategic plan clearer, more

complete, and more results oriented. Instead of presenting four overall

goals, three of which were process oriented, VA has reorganized its draft

strategic plan into two sections. The first section, entitled “Honor, Care,

and Compensate Veterans in Recognition of Their Sacrifices for America,”

is intended to incorporate VA’s results-oriented strategic goals. The second

section, entitled “Management Strategies,” incorporates the three other

general goals, related to customer service, workforce development, and

taxpayer return on investment. VA believes that the process-oriented

portions of the plan are important as a guide to VA’s management. We

agree, as long as they are integrated with the plan’s primary focus on

results. In addition, VA filled significant gaps in the discussions of strategic

goals. The formally issued plan includes strategic goals covering all of its

major programs and includes objectives, strategies, and performance goals

supporting the strategic goals.

VA’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

VA’s strategic plan still needs improvement in four major areas:

(1) development of results-oriented goals, (2) descriptions of how the

goals are to be achieved, (3) discussion of external factors, and

(4) discussion of coordination efforts with other agencies. Until VA makes

improvements in these areas, its strategic plan will be incomplete and will

not fully comply with the strategic planning requirements of the Results

Act.

Perhaps the most significant challenge for VA is to develop results-oriented

goals for its major programs, particularly for benefit programs. For some

major VA programs, the strategic plan’s goals are placeholders for

results-oriented goals that have not yet been developed. For example, the

general goals for four of five major benefit program areas—compensation

and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation, and housing credit

assistance—are stated in terms of ensuring that VA is meeting the needs of

veterans and their families. The objectives supporting VA’s general goal for

its compensation and pension area are to (1) evaluate compensation and

pension programs to determine their effectiveness in meeting the needs of

veterans and their beneficiaries and (2) modify these programs, as

appropriate.

VA has noted that developing results-oriented goals will be difficult until

program evaluations have been completed. Given the program evaluation

time periods stated in the draft strategic plan, results for some programs

may not be developed for several years. Also, VA officials suggested that

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Observations on the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ Strategic Plan

defining program results is difficult for programs where congressional

statements of the program purposes and expected results are vague or

nonexistent. This is an area where VA and Congress can make progress in

further clarifying program purposes and expected results. Once VA has

developed strategic goals focused on results, it can develop objectives and

strategies for achieving the goals.

Another remaining challenge for VA is to better integrate discussions of

external factors that could affect its strategic planning. While VA added

discussions of the implications of demographic changes among veterans,

they are not linked to specific goals in the plan. For example, VA noted the

impact of increased veteran death rates on demands for burials in VA and

state veterans’ cemeteries. However, this is not linked to VA’s performance

goals to complete specific numbers of cemetery construction and land

acquisition projects by fiscal year 2002. Discussions of external factors

were often limited to whether Congress would appropriate sufficient funds

or make substantive legislative changes. Assessments of factors outside

VA’s control, such as economic, social, and demographic changes, are also

important in setting VA’s goals and in assessing VA’s progress in meeting

them.

The other remaining challenge for VA is to identify areas where it needs to

coordinate and share information with other federal agencies, as well as

develop coordination plans. VA’s strategic plan identifies this need and

includes a goal to (1) identify overlaps and links with other agencies,

(2) enhance communication links with other agencies, and (3) keep state

directors of veterans’ affairs and other state officials apprised of VA

benefits and opportunities for collaboration and coordination.

Other Observations VA had substantial consultations with Congress, and we participated in

these consultations at the request of the House and Senate Committees on

Veterans’ Affairs. In addition, VA held consultation sessions with

representatives of veterans service organizations. VA has attributed

improvements in its formally issued strategic plan to these consultations.

VA officials have stressed that they consider strategic planning a

continuing, long-term process. Based on comments by VA officials and the

changes VA has already made to its strategic plan, we expect further

improvements over the next few years.

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Observations on the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ Strategic Plan

Agency Comments In transmitting the formally issued strategic plan to Congress and OMB, VA

also provided detailed responses to comments on its draft plans from the

House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, GAO, OMB, veterans service

organizations, and VA employee organizations. These comments addressed

the observations in both our July 11 letter and September 18 testimony. In

general, VA agreed with our observations and indicated areas where it has

revised its plan since the June 1997 draft. Also, we sent a draft of this

appendix to VA officials, who had no additional substantive comments.

Issue Area Contact Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Associate Director, Veterans’ Affairs and Military

Health Care Issues; Health, Education, and Human Services Division,

(202) 512-7202.

Page 96 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XVI 

Observations on the Environmental

Protection Agency’s Strategic Plan

On July 30, 1997, we issued a report on the Environmental Protection

Agency’s (EPA) draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations on EPA’s

Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-209R). EPA made revisions to the draft plan

and formally submitted it to OMB and Congress on September 30, 1997. As

requested, we have reviewed the September 1997 plan and compared the

changes with the observations we made in our July 30 report. On

October 15, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the

strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

EPA’s draft strategic plan contained four of the six elements required by the

Results Act: (1) a mission statement, (2) general goals and objectives,

(3) approaches or strategies to achieve the goals and objectives, and (4) an

identification of key external factors. For these four elements, we noted

that the draft plan did not contain all of the details suggested by OMB

Circular A-11 and/or that other improvements could be made to increase

the plan’s usefulness. The two elements not included in the draft plan were

(1) the relationship between the general goals and objectives and the

annual performance goals and (2) the program evaluations used in

developing the plan and a schedule for future evaluations. Although the

draft plan contained a section on program evaluation, the discussion

focused on the role of evaluation in assessing future results and provided

general criteria for deciding which evaluations to perform in the future.

The draft strategic plan did not discuss interagency coordination for

crosscutting programs, activities, or functions that are similar to those of

other federal agencies. It is important that the plan do so because EPA and

other agencies carry out a number of mission-related activities that are

crosscutting or similar. Our July 30, 1997, report noted that EPA had begun

taking steps to coordinate its plan with other agencies, such as the

Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, to address crosscutting programs and activities.

The draft plan included actions to address major management challenges

that we had previously identified. However, it provided limited details on

how these long-standing problems are to be resolved.

Improvements Were

Made in EPA’s

Strategic Plan

EPA made changes in its strategic plan to make it more responsive to the

specific requirements of the Results Act, improve its clarity, and provide

information on the coordination of the plan with other federal agencies. In

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Observations on the Environmental

Protection Agency’s Strategic Plan

addition, the agency strengthened the plan’s treatment of management

problems by setting out several additional actions to resolve them.

In the September 30, 1997, version of its strategic plan, EPA added the two

elements required by the Results Act that were missing from the draft

plan: (1) the relationship of the general goals in the strategic plan to the

performance goals to be included in the annual performance plan and

(2) the program evaluations used in developing its general goals and

objectives. The issued plan also incorporates improvements in other

elements required by the Results Act. For example, the section identifying

key external factors was expanded to include other factors, such as

producer and consumer behavior, that could directly affect the

achievement of the plan’s goals and objectives. The mission statement was

also revised to more closely coincide with the language of the agency’s

statutes.

EPA improved the clarity of its strategic plan in several ways. It added

information that explains how the agency’s responsibilities for human

health and the environment intersect with or support the work of other

federal departments or agencies, such as the Departments of the Interior

and Health and Human Services. It also added information that better

describes the important role of the states as having primary responsibility

for implementing many day-to-day environmental program activities, such

as issuing permits and monitoring environmental conditions. In addition,

EPA added statements to clarify the relationship among certain

components of its plan, that is, the goals and objectives, guiding principles,

and planned cross-agency program activities. Furthermore, an addendum

listing the agency’s potential authorities was revised to identify the actual

authorities by goal and objective.

The information that EPA added on interagency coordination of the plan

included the major steps it took to coordinate with other agencies. The

plan also identifies a total of 25 federal agencies whose activities relate to

EPA’s efforts under one or more of its goals. According to the plan, the

actions taken to coordinate with other agencies on the plan will help to

establish long-term efforts to address any inconsistencies, conflicts, or

redundancies among federal programs, as identified in any future strategic

and annual performance plans.

To better address management problems, EPA made changes to the plan in

the areas of its working relationship with the states, the quality and

completeness of its science, and financial management. The National

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Observations on the Environmental

Protection Agency’s Strategic Plan

Environmental Performance Partnership System was developed by EPA

and the states in 1995 as a more collaborative approach to implementing

environmental programs. The plan now sets out the objectives of the

partnership system and identifies how they will be accomplished. In

addition, the plan now makes conducting peer reviews and providing

guidance on the science underlying the agency’s decisions an objective

under the “sound science” goal. As noted in our July 1997 report, the use

of peer review is an important means of ensuring the credibility of the

scientific and technical documents that the agency uses in its work.

Furthermore, EPA added a performance measure to the “effective

management” goal dealing with the need to achieve success in

implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Government

Management Reform Act. This performance measure will help ensure that

EPA addresses financial management issues that resulted in the agency’s

receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1996 financial statements.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

Several revisions that we suggested in our previous report have not been

made. Some of these relate to improvements in aspects of the six elements

required by the Results Act, while others deal with further improvement in

the treatment of management and data problems and the effectiveness of

the plan in conveying the agency’s priorities.

Although the plan provides a general methodology for selecting future

program evaluations and describes how they are to be used, it does not

identify the general scope and time frames of the evaluations, as

encouraged by OMB’s guidance. In addition, as in the draft plan, (1) some of

the goals and objectives, such as those for effective management, are not

stated in quantifiable or measurable terms; (2) staffing skills and resources

are generally not discussed in describing how the plan’s goals and

objectives are to be achieved; and (3) because strategies are generally

organized by goal rather than objective, it is not always clear how specific

strategies relate to specific objectives. Moreover, future revisions or

updates of the plan could further benefit from a more detailed discussion

of how other federal agencies and the states are to contribute to individual

goals and objectives.

In future revisions or updates of the plan, EPA may also want to more

explicitly identify and discuss actions to resolve the management and data

problems identified by the agency and others because of their importance

to the agency’s operations and the achievement of its goals and objectives.

This more explicit treatment would improve the credibility of the plan by

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Observations on the Environmental

Protection Agency’s Strategic Plan

demonstrating that the agency recognizes the significance of these

problems and is committed to resolving them.

As the strategic plan evolves over time, EPA could improve its effectiveness

in conveying the agency’s priorities. The large number of goals and

objectives, coupled with the guiding principles and planned cross-agency

program actions, continues to make it difficult to discern EPA’s priorities.

To better convey its priorities, EPA could directly relate the cross-agency

programs to specific goals and objectives or further consolidate its goals

or objectives.

Agency Comments We provided a draft of our observations on EPA’s strategic plan for its

review and comment. EPA officials, including the Director of the Office of

Planning, Analysis, and Accountability, told us that the strategic plan was

a product of a broader reform of the agency’s planning, budgeting,

analysis, and accountability functions and that the consolidation and

harmonization of these functions will, over time, bring about many of the

improvements that we have suggested. EPA noted that as EPA refines its

approaches to analysis and accountability, the agency will be better able

to outline the prospective uses of program evaluation and consequent

refinements to its goals, objectives, and performance measures. In

addition, EPA said that the agency has taken the “unprecedented” step of

submitting its first annual performance plan under the Results Act and its

fiscal year 1999 budget request to OMB as a single document. According to

EPA, this action has had the effect of transforming budgetary decisions into

the structure of strategic goals and objectives, which makes the kind of

direct budget and performance linkages that we have suggested. While we

recognize that EPA’s annual performance plan will provide detailed

information on resources, strategies, goals, and objectives, we believe that

the strategic plan would be more complete and useful to congressional

and other stakeholders if it provides an overview of resource needs and

links the agency’s major strategies to individual goals and objectives.

Issue Area Contact Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Environmental Protection Issues; Resources,

Community, and Economic Development Division, (202) 512-6111.

Page 100 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XVII 

Observations on the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s Strategic Plan

On July 22, 1997, we issued a report on the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s (FEMA) draft strategic plan (Results Act:

Observations on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Draft

Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-204R). FEMA’s strategic plan was submitted to OMB

and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the

September 30 strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our

July 22 report. On October 16, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further

observations on the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are

summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

As we reported in July, FEMA’s draft plan indicated that the agency had

made good progress toward fulfilling the requirements of the Results Act

but needed improvements to fully meet those requirements. For instance,

we observed that the draft plan lacked two of the six elements required by

the Results Act: (1) the relationship between strategic goals and annual

performance goals and (2) the role of program evaluations. The required

elements contained in the plan could have better conformed to the Act’s

requirements and OMB’s guidance. For example, the plan did not explicitly

address the major legislation or executive orders that serve as a basis for

FEMA’s mission statement, goals, and strategies or sufficiently deal with

financial and information management issues that we and others have

previously identified. We also noted that clarifying the linkage between

FEMA’s strategic objectives and the strategies intended to achieve them

would make the plan more useful to FEMA and to Congress. Furthermore,

the draft plan did not address the roles of external stakeholders and how

FEMA coordinated with them in developing the plan.

Improvements Made

in FEMA’s Strategic

Plan

FEMA’s September 30 plan incorporates many improvements that make it

more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act. First, it contains

explicit language describing the role of program evaluations, a key

element missing from the earlier version. For instance, the plan includes

for each of FEMA’s three strategic goals a discussion of the type(s) of

program evaluation that have been completed and are planned to help

assess the accomplishment of those goals.

The September 30 plan explicitly references the major legislation or

executive orders that serve as a basis for the agency’s mission statement,

goals, and strategies. Furthermore, it links the key statutory authorities to

the agency’s strategic goals. This addition should be helpful to Congress

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Observations on the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s Strategic Plan

and the agency in ensuring that FEMA’s stated goals respond to the entire

spectrum of its key statutory authorities.

Following suggestions in our July report, FEMA’s September 30 plan

elaborates on certain aspects of two issues that we felt were not fully

discussed in the draft plan: (1) management issues that we and others

have previously identified and (2) the agency’s capacity to provide reliable

information assessing the achievement of its goals and objectives. For

example, the plan now reflects consideration of containing disaster

program costs and remedying financial management problems. It also now

more fully addresses how FEMA intends to address the Year 2000 problem,

which is an issue that we have identified as high risk across the

government.

Unlike the earlier version, the September 30 plan discusses external

stakeholders involved in the development of the plan. Identifying external

stakeholders is important given the many and varied stakeholders that

have critical roles in determining the extent to which FEMA’s goals are met.

For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides assistance for

constructing flood control facilities and clearing debris from

disaster-ravaged areas. FEMA could further enhance its strategic plan by

clearly identifying federal agencies, or programs within those agencies,

with related missions or potentially crosscutting program activities, and

how coordination with them shaped FEMA’s plan.

FEMA’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

Some of the elements of FEMA’s strategic plan could be further improved to

more fully meet the purposes of the Results Act. For example, while the

revised plan incorporates language on the relationship between annual

goals and the strategic goals and objectives, the plan would benefit from

elaboration on this issue. OMB’s guidance suggests that strategic plans

include a discussion of the type, the nature, and the scope of the

performance goals to be included in the annual performance plans. While

FEMA’s September 30 plan states that the agency’s annual performance

plans will illustrate how annual performance goals will support the

strategic goals and objectives, it lacks an explicit discussion of the type,

the nature, and the scope of the performance goals to be included in the

plans and their linkages to the strategic goals and objectives.

In July, we observed that FEMA’s plan, in order to be consistent with OMB’s

guidance, should link external factors, which could affect the

accomplishment of strategic goals and objectives, to particular goals and

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Observations on the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s Strategic Plan

also describe how achieving the goals could be influenced by the factors.

While the plan contains a section on external factors, it does not link the

factors to specific goals or objectives or articulate strategies for mitigating

the factors’ effects.

Also, in our July report, we suggested that FEMA’s plan could be

strengthened if the strategies were more integrally linked to FEMA’s

strategic objectives. The September 30 plan does more clearly link

strategies with overall goals, although not with specific objectives.

Because of this structure, the plan is not as useful as it could be in

assigning accountability for achieving specific objectives.

Other Observations The Results Act requires that strategic plans contain goals and objectives

that are expressed in a manner allowing a future assessment of whether

they are being achieved. While the goals in FEMA’s September 30 plan are

not substantially different from those in the earlier version, the proposed

assessment approaches are. The revised approaches raise questions as to

their feasibility. For example, the first goal—“protect lives and prevent the

loss of property from all hazards”—includes an approach that relies on

incomplete modelling and data collection efforts and an implied but

unquantified relationship between an increase in readiness and a decrease

in risk. Because of the potential assessment difficulties, it is less clear that

FEMA’s goals and objectives are expressed in a manner that allows a future

assessment of whether they are being achieved.

The plan’s usefulness could be enhanced if it were easier to read and

follow. More explanatory language and/or a visual “road map” might help

show how the major elements of the plan relate to one another. For

example, a few sentences explaining that the operational objectives link to

the strategic goals rather than the strategic objectives would be helpful.

Finally, providing clarifying and simplified language would enhance the

plan’s usefulness to audiences external to FEMA.

Agency Comments We provided FEMA with a draft of our observations on its strategic plan for

its review and comment. On October 14, 1997, we obtained comments

from officials from the Office of Policy and Regional Operations and from

the Mitigation Directorate. Overall, FEMA agreed with our observations and

facts, indicating that the thrust of the product was appropriate. FEMA also

clarified efforts under way at the agency to assist officials in assessing the

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Observations on the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s Strategic Plan

achievement of goals and objectives. We incorporated their suggested

changes where appropriate.

Issue Area Contact Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development

Issues; Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-7631.

Page 104 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XVIII 

Observations on the General Services

Administration’s Strategic Plan

On July 7, 1997, we issued a report on the General Services

Administration’s draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on

GSA’s April 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/GGD-97-147R). GSA has since revised

its strategic plan and formally submitted it to OMB and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the September 30

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our July 7 report.

On October 16, 1997, we briefed your offices on our further observations

on the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized

herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

We reported in July that the April 28 draft plan included the six

components required by the Results Act and that the general goals and

objectives in the plan reflected GSA’s major statutory responsibilities.

However, our analysis showed that the plan could have better met the

purposes of the Act and related OMB guidance. Two of the required

components—how goals and objectives were to be achieved and program

evaluations—needed more descriptive information on how goals and

objectives were to be achieved, how program evaluations were used in

setting goals, and what the schedule would be for future evaluations to

better achieve the purposes of the Act. The four other required

components—mission statement, general goals and objectives, key

external factors, and relating performance goals to general goals and

objectives—were more responsive to the Act but needed greater clarity

and context. We also noted that the general goals and objectives and the

mission statement in the draft plan did not emphasize economy and

efficiency, as a reflection of taxpayers’ interests. Also, the general goals

and objectives seem to have been expressed in terms that may be

challenging to translate into quantitative or measurable analysis, and there

could have been better linkages between the various components of the

plan.

We also reported that the draft plan could have been made more useful to

GSA, Congress, and other stakeholders by providing a fuller description of

statutory authorities and an explicit discussion of crosscutting functions,

major management problems, and the adequacy of data and systems.

Although the plan reflected the major pieces of legislation that establish

GSA’s mission and explained how GSA’s mission is linked to key statutes, we

reported that GSA could provide other useful information, such as listing

laws that broaden its responsibilities as a central management agency and

that are reflected in the goals and objectives.

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Administration’s Strategic Plan

Relatedly, the draft plan did not discuss the potential for crosscutting

issues to arise or how these issues might affect successful

accomplishment of goals and objectives. It also made no mention of

whether GSA coordinated the plan with its stakeholders. The plan was also

silent on the formidable management problems we have identified over

the years—issues that are important because they could have a serious

impact on whether GSA can achieve its strategic goals. Finally, the plan

made no mention of how data limitations would affect GSA’s ability to

measure performance and ultimately manage its programs. We reported

that consideration of these areas would give GSA a better framework for

developing and achieving its goals and help stakeholders better

understand GSA’s operating constraints and environment.

Improvements Made

in the Strategic Plan

The September 30 plan reflects a number of the improvements that we

suggested in our July 1997 report. The clarity of the September 30 plan is

improved, and it provides more context, descriptive information, and

linkages within and among the six components that are required by the

Act. Compared to the April 28 draft, the September 30 plan generally

should provide stakeholders with a better understanding of GSA’s overall

mission and strategic outlook. Our analysis of the September 30 plan also

showed that, in line with our suggestion, GSA placed more emphasis on

economy and efficiency in the comprehensive mission statement and

general goals and objectives components. The September 30 plan also

generally described the operational processes, staff skills, and technology

required, as well as the human, information, and other resources needed,

to meet the goals and objectives. The plan now contains a listing of

program evaluations that GSA used to prepare the plan and a more

comprehensive discussion of the major pieces of legislation that serve as a

basis for its mission, reflecting additional suggestions we made in our

July 1997 report.

Furthermore, the September 30 plan’s overall improvement in clarity and

context should help decisionmakers and other stakeholders better

understand the crosscutting, governmentwide nature of GSA’s operations

as a central management agency. The September 30 plan makes some

reference to major management problems in the program evaluations

component and also addresses the importance of data reliability in the

general goals and objectives component. The improvements that GSA has

made are a step in the right direction, and the six components better

achieve the purposes of the Act. However, we believe that additional

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Observations on the General Services

Administration’s Strategic Plan

improvements, which are described in the following section, would

strengthen the strategic plan as it evolves over time.

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

As we discussed in our July 7, 1997, report on the draft plan, the

September 30 plan continues to have general goals and objectives that

seem to be expressed in terms that may be challenging to translate into

quantitative or measurable analysis. This could make it difficult to

determine whether they are actually being achieved. For example, the goal

to “compete effectively for the federal market” has such objectives as

“provide quality products and services at competitive prices and achieve

significant savings” and “open GSA to marketplace competition where

appropriate to reduce costs to the government and improve customer

service.” However, this goal, its related objectives, and the related

narrative do not state specifically how progress will be measured, such as

the amount of savings GSA intends to achieve or the timetable for opening

the GSA marketplace for competition. OMB Circular A-11 specifies that

general goals and objectives should be stated in a manner that allows a

future assessment to be made of whether the goals are being met. The OMB

guidance states that general goals that are quantitative facilitate this

determination, but it also recognizes that the goals need not be

quantitative and that related performance goals can be used as a basis for

future assessments. However, we observed that many of the performance

goals that GSA included in the plan also were not expressed in terms that

could easily enable quantitative analysis, which could make gauging

progress difficult in future assessments.

The strategies component—how the goals and objectives will be

achieved—described the operational processes, human resources and

skills, and information and technology needed to meet the general goals

and objectives. This component is an improvement over the prior version

we reviewed, and applicable performance goals are listed with each of

these factors. Although GSA chose to discuss generally the factors that will

affect its ability to achieve its performance goals, we believe that a more

detailed discussion of how each goal will actually be accomplished would

be more useful to decisionmakers. To illustrate with a specific example,

the plan could discuss the approaches that GSA will use to meet the

performance goals related to its general goal of promoting responsible

asset management using operational processes, human resources and

skills, information and technology, and capital/other resources.

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Administration’s Strategic Plan

The September 30 plan does discuss, in the general goals and objectives

component, an operational/human resource change involving the

appointment of a new Chief Measurement Officer in the Public Buildings

Service. More discussion of this type of change in the strategies

component would help stakeholders better understand GSA’s specific

strategies to ensure that it is achieving its goals and objectives. We also

noted that the strategies component does not discuss priorities among the

goals and objectives. Such a discussion would be helpful to

decisionmakers in determining where to focus priorities in the event of a

sudden change in funding or staffing. Finally, GSA deferred to the

President’s budget its discussion about capital and other resources. We

believe it seems reasonable to include in this component at least some

general discussion of how capital and other resources will be used to meet

each general goal.

Although the external factors component in the September 30 plan is

much clearer and provides more context than the draft plan we reviewed,

the factors are not clearly linked to the general goals and objectives. OMB

Circular A-11 states that the plan should include this link, as well as

describe how achieving the goals could be affected by the factors. This

improvement would allow decisionmakers to better understand how the

factors potentially will affect achievement of each general goal and

objective. The program evaluations component in the September 30 plan

provides a listing of the various program evaluations that GSA indicates

were used in developing the plan. However, it still does not include a

schedule of future evaluations. Instead, the plan states that the schedule

for future program evaluations is under development and that GSA intends

to use the remainder of the consultation process to obtain input from

Congress and stakeholders concerning the issues that should be studied

on a priority basis. However, OMB Circular A-11 indicates that the schedule

should have been completed and included in the September 30 plan,

together with an outline of the general methodology to be used and a

discussion of the particular issues to be addressed.

Although the September 30 plan does a much better job of setting forth

GSA’s statutory authorities in the attachment, this description could be

further improved if the different statutory authorities discussed therein

were linked with either the general goals and objectives or the

performance goals included in the plan. Further, the plan only makes

limited reference to the other important areas we identified in our

July 1997 report—crosscutting issues, major management problems, and

data reliability. The plan’s improved clarity and context should help

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Administration’s Strategic Plan

decisionmakers understand the crosscutting issues that affect GSA as a

central management agency. However, explicit discussion of these issues

is limited, and the September 30 plan makes no reference to the extent to

which GSA coordinated with stakeholders.

The September 30 plan references major management problems in the

program evaluations component, but it does not explicitly discuss these

problems or identify which problems could have an adverse impact on

meeting the general goals and objectives. Our work has shown over the

years that these types of problems have significantly hampered GSA’s and

its stakeholder agencies’ abilities to accomplish their missions. For

example, the plan could address how GSA will attempt to ensure that its

information systems meet computer security requirements or how GSA

plans to address the Year 2000 problem in its computer hardware and

software systems. The plan does reference data reliability in the general

goals and objectives component. However, the discussion of data

reliability, which is so critical for measuring progress and results, is

limited and not as useful as it could be in attempting to assess the impact

that data problems could have on meeting the general goals and

objectives. We continue to believe that greater emphasis on how GSA plans

to resolve management problems and on the importance of data reliability

could improve the plan.

Agency Comments On October 9, 1997, we obtained oral comments from GSA’s Director of

Performance Management on a draft of our analysis of GSA’s September 30

plan. She said that GSA generally agreed with our observations about the

September 30 plan and said that many of the observations will be

addressed in future versions of the plan and in the various performance

plans that GSA has drafted. However, she added that GSA is concerned that

many of our observations could lengthen the plan, thereby making it less

usable or readable to GSA’s broad constituency, including Congress, OMB,

GSA employees, and GSA’s various business partners.

We understand GSA’s concern but believe that the plan, at a minimum,

would benefit from better linkages between and among its elements and

more discussion of related factors, such as crosscutting issues,

management problems, and data reliability. In fact, we believe that the

plan would be more usable to GSA’s broad constituency if GSA made the

improvements we suggested. It would then provide a clearer roadmap on

how GSA plans to achieve its strategic goals and measure progress and

results. Furthermore, it seems that GSA should be able to address our

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Administration’s Strategic Plan

concerns in a succinct fashion that is both usable and reader-friendly

while, at the same time, better achieving the purposes of the Act and

related OMB guidance.

Issue Area Contact Bernard L. Ungar, Director, Government Business Operations Issues;

General Government Division, (202) 512-4232.

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Appendix XIX 

Observations on the Office of Personnel

Management’s Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Office of Personnel

Management’s (OPM) draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on

OPM’s May 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/GGD-97-150R). OPM’s formally issued

strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on September 29, 1997.

As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued strategic plan and

compared it with the observations in our July 11 report. On October 17,

1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the strategic

plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

Of the six components required by the Results Act, two—how the goals

and objectives will be achieved and relating performance goals to general

goals/objectives—were not specifically identified in the draft plan. The

remaining four components—mission statement, goals and objectives,

external factors, and program evaluations—were discussed in the draft

plan. However, each of these components had weaknesses, some of more

significance than others. Specifically, the mission statement was too

broad, lacking explicit reference to certain key responsibilities; the goals

and objectives suggested some results to be achieved but provided little

basis for judging how OPM would know whether those goals were being

achieved or what OPM’s contribution toward achieving those results might

be; some external factors were identified, but others were not included in

the plan, which also did not meet the Act’s requirement to link each factor

to a particular goal or to identify how it might affect OPM’s success in

meeting its goals; and, finally, the program evaluation component

discussed customer satisfaction with OPM services but did not indicate

how evaluations were used in developing strategic goals or provide a

schedule for future evaluations as the Act requires and OMB guidance

reiterated.

In addition, while the draft plan did identify a number of OPM’s crosscutting

program activities, it did not discuss coordination or indicate that OPM, in

developing the plan, coordinated with the entities involved in these

crosscutting activities. Including a fuller discussion of OPM’s

interrelationship with other agencies in the plan would be consistent with

the purposes of the Act. Such a discussion likely would also provide more

information for Congress and other stakeholders to use in judging whether

OPM’s crosscutting responsibilities should be modified in any way.

Further, OPM’s draft strategic plan did not address some major

management challenges. Some of the major management challenges OPM

faces include (1) ensuring that the federal government is adequately

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Observations on the Office of Personnel

Management’s Strategic Plan

competitive in obtaining future workers; (2) determining whether federal

employee compensation (e.g., pay and benefits) is appropriate; and

(3) ensuring that decisions for information technology projects are based

on assessments of mission benefits, risks, and costs. Discussion of these

challenges as well as of management problem areas where OPM has taken

successful corrective actions would be informative and useful to both OPM

and Congress.

Improvements Were

Made in OPM’s

Strategic Plan

OPM’s publicly issued strategic plan incorporated several improvements

that make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act than

was the draft plan. In particular, OPM revised its mission statement to

recognize its key responsibilities. OPM’s revised mission statement is more

results oriented and outlines OPM’s functions and activities as the

government’s central personnel agency. OPM has added specific sections to

its plan describing OPM and what it does, OPM’s history, and its statutory

responsibilities. These sections augment the mission statement by linking

it to relevant statutory authorities.

Two of the components required by the Results Act that were missing

when we reviewed the draft plan in July—how the goals and objectives

will be achieved and relating annual performance goals to general

goals/objectives—have been added to the issued strategic plan. OPM has a

section under each goal entitled “Strategies for Achieving Objectives” that

lists general action items OPM has identified for achieving its goals and

objectives. Also, under each strategic goal, OPM has proposed measures to

assess progress toward its overall goals. In several cases, OPM has

established measurable targets that can be used to gauge the agency’s

progress. OPM’s issued plan includes a section on the relationship between

its strategic goals and objectives and its forthcoming annual performance

plans. This section generally states that strategic goals will be linked to

specific performance goals and performance improvements in the annual

performance plan and that the plan’s program evaluation section further

links the strategic plan to the annual performance plans.

We observed in July that the draft plan identified external factors but did

not discuss how OPM would address them operationally. The issued

strategic plan elaborates on several of its identified external factors, links

them to specific goals, as called for by OMB Circular A-11, and includes

some mitigating actions. In addition, the issued plan provides more

information on OPM’s evaluation efforts. This additional information sets

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Management’s Strategic Plan

OPM’s evaluation agenda and schedule and also describes the evaluations

used to provide baseline data for some of OPM’ s performance measures.

We observed in July that the draft plan did not assess the potential for

overlap and duplication or, conversely, cooperation and coordination with

agencies and others on crosscutting issues. The issued plan includes a

strategy to identify and solve common problems and avoid duplication of

effort by working cooperately with consortia, agencies, and interagency

groups such as the Interagency Advisory Group of Federal Human

Resources Directors.

OPM’s issued plan includes specific sections on its information technology

and financial management systems strategies. For example, the financial

management strategies section addresses goals in improving OPM’s

financial information. This is a positive step since data reliability is

extremely important for obtaining reliable performance measures to

evaluate management performance and measure progress and results.

Although the plan does not have specific sections that address other

challenges, such as attracting and retaining well-qualified employees and

determining appropriate compensation, as we had suggested, we note that

OPM has included under its strategic goals certain objectives and strategies

regarding staffing and examining and federal compensation.

OPM’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

Although OPM made several improvements that we suggested in our

previous report, some elements of its issued plan could be further

improved. OPM’s five strategic goals, which we previously characterized as

process oriented as opposed to results oriented, have not been revised

from OPM’s May 1997 draft. However, for each of the five goals, OPM has

provided a number of corresponding results-oriented objectives. Several of

these objectives are time specific and allow future assessments to be made

of whether they were or are being achieved. We acknowledge that not all

objectives may lend themselves to quantification; however, this element of

the plan could be more helpful to decisionmakers if more of the objectives

had specified time frames, quantifiable targets, or identified base points

against which progress could be measured. For example, neither OPM’s

objective for fostering movement by senior executives nor its associated

measures of success provide a sense of how much more movement may be

desirable or how OPM or others will know when movements of executives

have reached a more appropriate level.

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Management’s Strategic Plan

As previously mentioned, OPM has added specific strategies for achieving

its objectives. However, these strategies generally do not include a

description of the processes and the human, capital, and information

resources required to achieve the goals and objectives as called for by the

Results Act. OPM officials point to the fifth goal and its accompanying

strategies as providing this information. However, although one strategy

states in part that OPM will “acquire the necessary resources,” thus

implying that additional resources will be needed, none of the strategies

under this goal specify the necessary resources, costs, or information

technology OPM will need to achieve its goals.

One of the elements required by the Results Act that was missing when we

reviewed the draft plan in July—the relationship between long-term goals

and objectives and annual performance plans—is addressed in the issued

strategic plan as previously described. By explicitly recognizing that future

annual performance goals will be needed to assess progress toward the

targets set in the strategic plan and by adding additional measurable

targets to its issued plan, OPM has provided a greater assurance that

combined information in the strategic and annual plans will be useful to

OPM and stakeholders in tracking OPM’s progress. However, particularly

because a significant number of OPM’s goals and objectives are not

expressed in a manner readily susceptible to progress assessments,

additional discussion of how OPM will assess progress over the 5-year

period covered by the plan would have been useful.

OPM’s discussion of external factors also could be further improved.

Specifically, OPM could provide more information on how the external

factors may affect goals and also identify additional actions by OPM to

reduce potential impact. For example, the issued plan notes that the

accelerated loss of experienced managers and personnelists throughout

the federal government may affect strategic goals II, III, and IV. However,

the plan does not indicate how OPM believes this external factor will affect

each goal, nor does it indicate the actions that OPM plans to take to reduce

the potential impact of the factor on OPM’s efforts to achieve its goals.

Agency Comments On October 17, 1997, the Acting Director of OPM provided written

comments on a draft analysis of the issued strategic plan. OPM expressed

appreciation for our recognition that improvements had been made in its

plan and said that it would give consideration to our comments as it

further revises and updates the strategic plan and also as it develops the

annual performance plan.

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Issue Area Contact Michael Brostek, Associate Director, Federal Management and Workforce

Issues; General Government Division, (202) 512-8676.

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Appendix XX 

Observations on the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s Strategic Plan

On July 22, 1997, we issued a report on the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration’s (NASA) draft strategic plan (Results Act:

Observations on NASA’s May 1997 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/NSIAD-97-205R).

NASA formally transmitted its strategic plan to OMB and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we reviewed this plan and compared it

with the observations in our July report. On October 17, 1997, we briefed

your staffs on our further observations on the plan. The key points from

that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

NASA’s draft strategic plan included four of the six elements required by the

Results Act. Those four elements were a mission statement, goals and

objectives, strategies for achieving the goals and objectives, and a

discussion of external factors. Two of the four elements had weaknesses.

The other elements—relating annual performance goals to general goals

and objectives, and providing a description of program evaluations used to

establish general goals and objectives and a schedule of future program

evaluations—were not explained in enough detail in the draft plan.

Although many of NASA’s objectives are shared with or involve other

agencies, the draft plan did not discuss whether interagency coordination

occurred to address duplication or overlap of activities. Also, the draft

plan did not address the importance of working with other agencies to

achieve its objectives. Although NASA officials said that activities are

coordinated at the program level, such efforts were not discussed in the

plan.

Major management problems that could affect NASA’s ability to achieve its

mission were not explicitly discussed in the draft plan. For example, NASA

did not discuss its long-standing problems with managing contracts,

managing information technology, and developing a fully integrated

accounting system, even though the agency has recognized them as

problems and has initiated some steps designed to address them. This

information could be beneficial to NASA and its stakeholders because major

management problems could impede the agency’s efforts to achieve its

goals and objectives.

Improvements Were

Made in NASA’s

Strategic Plan

NASA incorporated improvements to its publicly issued strategic plan,

which now addresses in more detail the six required elements of the

Results Act. In particular, NASA added discussions on the two elements of

the Act that were not adequately addressed in the draft plan: (1) relating

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Observations on the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s Strategic Plan

performance goals to general goals and objectives and (2) describing how

program evaluations were used to establish general goals and objectives

and a schedule for future program evaluations. In addition, the

relationship between questions and missions has been clarified.

NASA’s plan now includes a more detailed discussion of the element

relating performance goals to general goals and objectives. A new chart

(characterized by NASA as the “Strategic Management System Roadmap”)

illustrates the relationship between agency-level goals and the goals and

objectives of the four Enterprises.1

 Also, in the crosscutting processes

section of the plan, NASA provides examples of how agency goals relate to

performance goals. In our July report, we observed that the draft plan did

not clearly indicate whether near-term, mid-term, or long-term goals would

be used for performance measurement, or whether performance would be

measured against the strategic outcomes, agencywide goals, or Enterprise

goals. The plan now includes provisions for reviewing performance goals

against the near-term objectives of the Enterprises and the four

crosscutting processes that support all agency activities.

Responding to our concern that the draft plan did not provide a

description of program evaluations used to establish general goals and

objectives and a schedule of future program evaluations, NASA has included

a description of its strategic plan provisions for semiannual reviews by

NASA’s Senior Management Council. These reviews are to take place in

March and September of each year. The plan also provides a more detailed

explanation of NASA’s planning process. According to the plan, NASA’s

Strategic Management System will provide the information and results to

fulfill the planning and management requirements of the Results Act.

Furthermore, a series of documents, such as the Headquarters

Functional/Staff Office Implementation Plans, will explain how NASA plans

to implement activities to accomplish its goals.

The draft plan included “fundamental questions” posed by the NASA

Administrator. In our July report, we noted that these questions were not

discussed in the context of the stated missions of the agency. The plan

addresses this concern by including the questions in the Strategic

Management System Roadmap chart and linking them to the mission,

Enterprises, and crosscutting processes.

1

NASA’s strategic plan separates the agency’s programs into four Enterprises: Space Science, Mission

to Planet Earth, Human Exploration and Development of Space, and Aeronautics and Space

Transportation Technology.

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and Space Administration’s Strategic Plan

NASA’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

The Results Act anticipated that it may take several planning cycles to

perfect the process and that the strategic plan would be continually

refined as various planning cycles occur. NASA officials also recognize that

developing a strategic plan is a dynamic process and that NASA’s plan will

evolve further over time as improvements are identified. We discussed the

following opportunities for improvement with NASA officials:

• Although the plan provides more information on budgetary and human

resource needs, this quantification is at the agency level. In discussing the

plan with NASA officials, they told us that budgetary and human resource

needs at the Enterprise and program levels are identified in annual budget

requests to preserve the strategic character of the plan. The plan could be

improved by identifying this source for cross-reference purposes.

• The plan now lists “key assumptions” under the section heading of “Key

External Factors” and describes consequences of such assumptions not

being met. These descriptions would be more complete with the addition

of mitigation steps NASA might take in the event these assumptions do not

materialize.

• While the plan provides greater explanation of NASA’s planning

process—including the contributions of internal and external

reviews—the plan can be improved by explicitly describing the role

program evaluations played in establishing or revising goals and

objectives.

• An appendix has been added to the plan that summarizes how the

long-term goals of the Enterprises relate to the goals and mission of the

agency. Though this information is helpful to understanding the

relationships between agency-level and Enterprise goals in the long-term

years (from 2010 to 2023), the plan would have been even more effective

had this information on near-term goals (from 1998 to 2002), which form

the foundation of NASA’s plan, also been included.

• The plan describes instances in which coordination and cooperation with

other agencies have occurred at both agency and program levels. For

example, the plan discusses NASA’s participation in the National Science

and Technology Council. The plan could be improved by explaining more

clearly how NASA coordinated with other agencies to ensure that NASA’s and

these agencies’ priorities were in agreement.

• The plan recognizes the importance of developing and implementing an

integrated financial management system and its integration with full cost

accounting. Similarly, the plan now presents as objectives the

improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of managing contracts

and the contribution of information technology to mission success. As we

pointed out in our July report, it would be beneficial to present the

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Observations on the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s Strategic Plan

implementation of an integrated financial management system, contract

management reform, and information technology management in the

context of their having been long-standing management challenges.

Agency Comments On October 15, 1997, NASA’s Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning and

Management provided us with the agency’s comments on our observations

about its strategic plan. The Senior Advisor made three points. First, he

said that NASA strongly believes that the agency has addressed all six

required elements of the Results Act. Second, he stated that NASA is

pleased that we recognize that many improvements have been made. He

added that NASA has gone to great lengths and effort to ensure that

concerns about the draft strategic plan expressed by Congress, OMB, and

GAO were addressed. In particular, he said that numerous examples have

been added to illustrate the fact that NASA is committed to leveraging other

agency programs and resources. Third, NASA agrees with our view that

developing a strategic plan is a dynamic process and that NASA will

consider our suggested improvements when the agency moves forward in

future updates to the plan.

Issue Area Contact Allen Li, Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues; National

Security and International Affairs Division, (202) 512-4841.

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Appendix XXI 

Observations on the National Science

Foundation’s Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the National Science Foundation’s

(NSF) draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations on the National

Science Foundation’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-203R). NSF’s formally

issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on September 30,

1997. As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued strategic plan

and compared it with the observations in our July 11 report. On

October 15, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on the

strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

Of the six elements required by the Act, one—external factors that could

affect the achievement of the plans’ goals—was not specifically identified

in the draft plan. Of the remaining five elements, three—goals and

objectives, strategies for achieving goals, and how program evaluation was

used—were discussed but were not complete. Specifically, some of the

goals were not expressed in a measurable form, the strategies to achieve

NSF’s goals lacked precision, and the description of program evaluations

was not fully developed.

In addition, we observed that the draft plan could be more useful to NSF,

Congress, and other stakeholders if it provided a more explicit discussion

of crosscutting activities, statutory authorities, and NSF’s capacity to

provide reliable information to manage its programs or determine if it is

achieving its strategic goals. Recognizing crosscutting issues and the

coordination required to address them is particularly important for NSF

because in the science and technology area, for which the federal

government spent $60 billion in fiscal year 1996, the potential for

unnecessary overlap is particularly high. While NSF’s draft plan reflected its

key statutory authority, other statutes broaden the scope of its

responsibilities and are embedded in NSF’s goals and objectives. Explicit

consideration of NSF’s capacity to produce reliable information for

management decisionmaking is important because it could affect NSF’s

ability to develop and meet its goals.

Improvements Were

Made in NSF’s

Strategic Plan

NSF’s publicly issued strategic plan incorporated many improvements

consistent with our suggestions that make it more responsive to the

requirements of the Results Act than was the draft plan. In particular, NSF

added appendixes addressing (1) the external factors that could influence

its ability to meet its goals, (2) the measurability of outcome goals and

additional details on strategies for meeting those goals, (3) current and

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Foundation’s Strategic Plan

future program evaluation efforts, (4) interagency crosscutting activities,

and (5) how NSF plans to use information technology.

External factors are now addressed in appendix 1 of NSF’s plan. In it, NSF

describes the challenges that science and engineering faculty and students

face in the current research environment and identifies how the

achievement of four of its five goals could be affected by external factors.

Consistent with OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 2, NSF briefly describes

external factors, their link with a particular goal, and how the achievement

of the goal could be affected by the factor. For example, for goal

1—“discoveries at and across the frontier of science and engineering,” NSF

raises concern about the quality of research facilities and their influence

on the pace of discovery. In particular, NSF relies on the academic research

facilities available at colleges and universities to provide a base from

which grantees can build their research programs. To the extent that

moves toward cost efficiency in academic institutions affect this base,

allowing it to deteriorate or failing to maintain it at the state of the art,

NSF’s costs for the support of research will increase, which could slow the

pace of discovery or change the types of discoveries open to researchers.

NSF states that it would need to balance the number of researchers whose

work could be supported with the added cost of conducting the research.

NSF’s outcome goals are addressed more fully in appendix 2 and in the

body of the report. In our earlier report on the draft plan, however, we had

several reservations about NSF’s goals, some of which remain. In particular,

we noted in our earlier report that while NSF’s draft plan provided some

general dates for achieving its goals, it did not provide underlying

assumptions, projections, or a schedule for initiating or completing

significant actions. It also lacked a process for communicating goals and

objectives throughout the agency and for assigning accountability to

managers and staff for the achievement of goals. While the goals are still

not expressed in a measurable fashion, the plan now describes examples

of performance goals for NSF management and programs and includes both

investment strategies and action plans for achieving each goal. According

to OMB Circular A-11, when the goals are defined in a way that precludes a

direct, future determination of achievement, the performance goals and

indicators in the performance plan should be used to provide the basis for

assessment. According to NSF, the action plans are provided to

operationalize each strategy; to provide guidance to program officers; and

through quantitative indicators, to link the goals to the development of

annual budgets and performance plans.

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Foundation’s Strategic Plan

Current and future program evaluation efforts are now addressed in

appendix 3. NSF discusses how the agency used specific formal and

informal evaluations to develop key investment strategies, action plans for

the strategic plan, and aspects of performance plans. Also included are

details on future evaluations, a rough schedule for their implementation,

and how the findings could be useful (1) in assessing NSF’s progress

toward outcome goals and (2) for strategic planning discussions. For

example, a Results Act pilot project on the physical sciences facilities gave

NSF experience with setting performance goals and performance baselines

for NSF’s oversight of the construction and operation of large facilities.

This effort facilitated NSF’s development of appropriate performance goals

for facilities management that are applicable across NSF for its

performance plans. In addition, in connection with future evaluations and

beginning in fiscal year 1998, NSF is planning to develop a formal process

of assessment that includes periodic external assessment of progress

toward outcome goals.

Interagency crosscutting activities are now addressed in appendix 4. NSF

describes the integration of its plan with the plans of other agencies and

acknowledges that decisionmaking for science and engineering is

distributed among many agencies. NSF describes its focus on promoting the

progress of science and engineering by taking into account the activities of

other agencies, partnering where there are shared interests, and taking

complementary approaches where appropriate. Its plan states that NSF

empowers those closest to the field to determine through interaction with

peers in other agencies how they will proceed to manage their programs

so that the federal investment is synergistic. For example, at the K-12 level

of education, the most significant national programs are at the Department

of Education and NSF, although the programs of the two agencies have

different approaches and strengths. According to the strategic plan, the

Education Department generally provides large-scale, flexible support

directly to education agencies and couples this support with technical

assistance. NSF’s portfolio is much smaller in scale and is targeted at

improving mathematics, science, and technology education and is

established through competitive processes. According to the plan, staff at

the two agencies regularly interact and are developing an action strategy

to increase the impact of federal resources by creating synergy among

these programs. Another avenue of coordination described by NSF is the

National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), which leads interagency

efforts by the Committees on Fundamental Science and Education and

Training for discussions on science, mathematics, engineering, and

technology education. According to NSF, the most visible interagency NSTC

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Observations on the National Science

Foundation’s Strategic Plan

programs are the U.S. Global Change Research Program and the High

Performance Computing and Communications Program, both of which NSF

participates in.

Information technology in support of NSF’s mission is now discussed in

appendix 5, and strategies for addressing information technology needs

are identified in the section on “Critical Factors For Success.” In

connection with its attention to Year 2000 issues, NSF states that it sent a

notification to all grantees describing this potential problem and making

clear that grantees bear the responsibility of addressing any difficulties it

might create for the conduct of the research and education awards they

hold. NSF refers to the fiscal year 1996 Annual Financial Report in its

strategic plan; in that report, the Chief Financial Officer noted that NSF

continues to meet or exceed virtually every federal goal for financial

management performance. In addition, NSF has noted its commitment to

manage its systems in support of the Results Act and the Chief Financial

Officers Act as a key strategy in its plan.

NSF’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

We observed in July that the draft plan could be enhanced by further

discussion of statutory authorities and additional detail on NSF’s use of

information. While our earlier report indicated that NSF’s statutory

responsibilities were generally reflected in NSF’s draft strategic plan, we

also stated that NSF is subject to other statutes related to its core functions.

We suggested that providing a description of its responsibilities under its

various statutory authorities could be useful, as a supplement to its plan,

since the plan includes goals and objectives based on them. We also noted

that it might be helpful to link the stated outcome goal to the relevant

statutory objective. In this regard, NSF’s mission statement briefly touches

on additional charges to the agency beyond the initial authorizing

legislation, but the plan does not attempt to link NSF’s goals and strategies

to the relevant statutory objective.

As previously stated, information technology in support of NSF’s mission is

now discussed in appendix 5, and strategies for addressing information

technology needs are identified in the section on Critical Factors For

Success. However, with respect to the high-risk issue of information

security, the plan is still silent. Also, the revised plan does not discuss how

NSF intends to improve its accounting for property, plant, and equipment in

the possession of contractors and grantees in order to attain an

unqualified audit opinion—which would seem to be a key goal for the

financial management area.

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Foundation’s Strategic Plan

Other Observations NSF’s performance goals for the results of its investments will appear as

descriptive standards developed under the Results Act option to set

performance goals in alternative formats. Since the timing of outcomes

from NSF’s activities is unpredictable and annual change in the outputs

does not provide an accurate indicator of progress toward outcome goals,

performance goals for results are not specific to a fiscal year. NSF plans to

use data and information on the products of NSF’s investments combined

with the expert judgment of external panels to assess NSF’s performance

over time and to provide a management tool for initiating changes in

direction, when needed. As we stated in our earlier report, quantitative

and qualitative indicators are widely used as proxies to assess research

and development results because of the difficulties in identifying the

impacts of research. Yet, while implying a degree of precision, these

indicators were not originally intended to measure long-term research and

development results. It remains to be seen whether NSF’s use of descriptive

standards to evaluate results will become valuable sources of information

for tracking progress and measuring outcomes.

Agency Comments On October 10, 1997, we spoke with NSF’s Assistant to the Director for

Science Policy and Planning to obtain the agency’s comments on our

observations about its strategic plan. NSF generally supported our

observations and agreed that some stakeholders may find useful the

addition of an appendix explicitly identifying the links between the goals

and strategies to the relevant statutory objective. In addition, NSF pointed

out that attention to information security is addressed in another strategic

plan in accord with the Information Technology Management Reform Act.

Finally, with respect to NSF’s accounting for property, plant, and

equipment, the agency indicated that NSF is taking necessary preliminary

steps while awaiting guidance from the Federal Accounting Standards

Advisory Board and OMB and expects to address this topic in a forthcoming

performance plan.

Issue Area Contact Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues;

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-3841.

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Appendix XXII 

Observations on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s Strategic Plan

On July 31, 1997, we issued a report on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s (NRC) draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations on

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Draft Strategic Plan,

GAO/RCED-97-206R). NRC’s formally issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB

and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the

publicly issued strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our

July 31 report. On October 15, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further

observations on the September 1997 plan. The key points from the briefing

are summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

The draft strategic plan contained two of the six required components of

the Results Act—the mission and the goals and objectives. While NRC’s

draft strategic plan met some of the requirements for three other

components, it did not describe (1) the resources, such as staff skills and

experiences, capital, and information, that will be needed to execute the

plan’s strategies; (2) how key external factors could affect the

achievement of its goals; and (3) its schedule for future program

evaluations. Finally, NRC had not included in its draft plan the relationship

between its long-term goals and objectives and its annual performance

goals.

Although NRC shared its draft and consulted with other agencies, the draft

strategic plan did not fully discuss some programs and activities that were

crosscutting or similar to those of other federal agencies. For example,

NRC and the Department of Energy (DOE) share the responsibility for the

federal government’s high-level waste disposal program; DOE builds such

facilities, which NRC must license. Consequently, NRC is affected by

changes in DOE’s strategies and program funding. The draft plan would

have benefited by a more thorough discussion of these issues.

Our previous work has highlighted major management challenges that NRC

needs to address more completely in its draft plan. For example,

weaknesses in how NRC oversees nuclear power plants have led to

questions about the quality of the information that NRC uses to inform the

public about the safety conditions of the plants it is required to regulate.

The draft strategic plan did not provide a thorough discussion of these

issues. Similarly, the draft strategic plan did not discuss in sufficient detail

the consequences of competition and economic uncertainties in the

electric utility industry in connection with decommissioning issues. We

have reported that NRC’s cost estimates for decommissioning are not

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Commission’s Strategic Plan

realistic, which could mean future problems for those licensees not having

sufficient funds to properly close their facilities.

Improvements Were

Made in NRC’s

Strategic Plan

NRC’s September 1997 plan incorporated several improvements that make

it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act than was the

draft strategic plan. In response to our concern that resource needs to

execute strategies were not discussed, NRC added a statement to the

September 1997 plan explaining that it did not anticipate any major,

unique resource requirements and that its budget will identify the specific

resources needed to implement the plan. NRC noted in its September 1997

plan that performance indicators have been established for human, capital,

information, and funding resources in its performance plan. NRC explained

that in the event legislation is enacted to have NRC oversee DOE’s facilities,

changes to NRC’s strategies and resource needs could be required.

NRC also added key external factors, which it called “major factors or

assumptions,” affecting the achievement of its goals for the two strategic

arenas that had none—“Protecting the Environment” and “Excellence.”

NRC also expanded its goals section to provide a clearer link between the

long-term (general) goals in its September 1997 strategic plan and those to

be included in the annual performance plan. NRC added intermediate

performance goals from the annual performance plan to the general goals

to show the relationship between the final September 1997 plan and the

annual performance plan; it also provided additional measures of results.

In July, we observed that NRC did not fully address crosscutting program

activities. The September 1997 plan was extensively revised to include a

section in the appendix, entitled “Cross-Cutting Functions,” that identifies

major crosscutting functions and interagency programs and discusses

NRC’s coordination with other agencies, such as DOE and the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA).

We also observed in July that while NRC’s draft strategic plan addressed

previously identified management problems, the draft strategic plan could

be more helpful if the measures to address the challenges were clearer.

Consequently, NRC added a section to the appendix of its September 1997

plan, entitled “Responsiveness to Audit Reports and Investigative

Findings,” in which it discusses initiatives to improve its capability to

measure plant performance and changes to the rules and processes

governing licensing bases information. NRC also modified its draft strategic

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Observations on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s Strategic Plan

plan to discuss its actions to provide reliable performance information .

Most of the data that NRC plans to use to measure performance will come

from existing reports to Congress; and, in fiscal year 1998, it plans to

identify any primary data systems that require improvement to provide any

other information needed.

NRC also addressed our concern that it had not discussed legislative needs

that it may have had. NRC added a statement to its September 1997 plan to

indicate its conclusion that it had not identified a need for any significant

legislative changes to achieve its goals and strategies. NRC noted, for

certain substrategies related to reactor and nonreactor decommissioning,

that it is seeking legislation that would eliminate the overlap in the

standard-setting authority of NRC and EPA in connection with Atomic

Energy Act sites and materials by recognizing NRC’s and Agreement States’

standards in these areas.

NRC’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

While NRC described in its September 1997 plan its program evaluation

process, NRC still needs to include schedules for future program

evaluations as required by the Results Act. Moreover, the September 1997

plan does not describe the general methodology to be used and the scope

and issues to be addressed in such evaluations.

The NRC plan indicates that no unique resources are anticipated, but it

does not explicitly describe the resources and processes required to

achieve its goals—in particular, its goal for nuclear waste safety. The Act

states that the strategic plan is to contain a description of how the goals

and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the

operational processes, skills and technology, and other resources required

to meet the goals and objectives. To the extent that the achievement of a

goal (i.e., the nuclear waste safety goal) relies on the resources or

activities of others, NRC should describe those resources and activities in

describing how its goals are to be achieved. Discussions of major

management challenges and how NRC will meet them should appear in

NRC’s plan, either under its “Excellence” goal or as strategies for achieving

programmatic goals. While NRC’s 1997 strategic plan provides a set of

strategies that are linked to specific goals, these strategies could be more

complete.

The annual performance goals for NRC’s strategic goals for “Public

Confidence” and “Excellence” could be improved in that the annual goals

generally focus on measuring progress by implementing actions already

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Observations on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s Strategic Plan

planned or directly under way and will not provide the information needed

to assess the achievement of the strategic goals. Also, the precise meaning

of some of its goals—in particular, its “Common Defense and Security and

International Involvement” goal relating to international

involvement—could be further clarified.

We observed in July that NRC’s draft strategic plan did not discuss how NRC

intended to plan for and use information technology to support the

agency’s missions and improve its program performance. NRC modified its

draft strategic plan to explain that annual performance plans that will

delineate objective, quantifiable, and measurable goals to be achieved in a

given fiscal year will be developed to further the general goals in the

strategic plan. NRC’s September 1997 plan does not indicate how it intends

to address such key information technology issues as the Year 2000

problem and the information security problem, or how it intends to plan

for and use information technology to support the agency’s mission.

Instead, the strategic plan says that these key issues are included in NRC’s

fiscal year 1999 performance plan.

NRC recognizes that assuming the regulation of the nuclear activities of DOE

may be required in the future, but it has not yet begun projecting plans for

that purpose. NRC has, however, agreed to pursue a pilot program of

simulated regulation of DOE, in which regulatory concepts may be tested.

NRC and DOE believe that information from the pilot program should be

available before legislation to transfer regulatory responsibility is enacted.

Other Observations We had suggested that NRC link all of its goals and strategies to its major

statutory authorities to facilitate a better understanding of the diversity

and complexity of its overall mission, goals, and strategies. NRC responded

to this suggestion by listing the statutory authorities for its general goals

under five of its seven strategic arenas, but it did not include specific

statutory references for its “Public Confidence” and “Excellence” arenas.

Agency Comments On October 8, 1997, we met with NRC officials, including NRC’s Chief

Financial Officer, to obtain NRC’s comments on our observations about the

September 1997 plan. NRC said that the Commission is committed to

implementing the Results Act and will continue to make improvements to

its first strategic plan, including addressing our observations for future

improvements, and take the other actions necessary to make managing for

results a reality at NRC.

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Issue Area Contact Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues;

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-3841.

Page 129 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
Appendix XXIII 

Observations on the Small Business

Administration’s Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the Small Business

Administration’s (SBA) draft strategic plan (Results Act: Observations on

the Small Business Administration’s Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/RCED-97-205R).

SBA’s formally issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our July 11 report.

On October 16, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on

the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are summarized

herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

SBA’s draft strategic plan, as discussed in our July report, lacked two

required elements: (1) a discussion of the relationship between the

long-term goals and objectives and the annual performance goals and (2) a

description of how program evaluations were used to establish or revise

strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations. The four

required elements contained in the plan could have better conformed to

the Results Act’s requirements and OMB’s guidance. For example, (1) the

mission statement did not encompass SBA’s significant disaster loan

program for individuals, (2) many of the goals and objectives appeared

less outcome oriented than process oriented, (3) the strategies consisted

entirely of one-line statements and were not detailed enough to enable an

assessment of how they would help achieve the plan’s goals and

objectives, and (4) the plan did not discuss how identified external factors

would be taken into account when assessing progress toward goals. Also,

because of the way in which the information was presented, the linkages

among specific performance measures, strategies, and objectives were not

clear.

SBA’s draft strategic plan also did not explicitly address the relationship of

SBA’s activities to similar activities in other agencies and provided no

evidence that SBA coordinated with other agencies in developing its plan.

In addition, the plan could have benefited from an explicit

acknowledgment of the extent to which SBA must rely on other federal

agencies in carrying out its federal procurement-related responsibilities.

Because the draft plan’s strategies were vaguely stated, the extent to

which the plan addressed management problems that we have previously

identified was unclear. For example, we have identified problems with

SBA’s liquidation of guaranteed loans and of small business investment

companies; SBA’s draft plan proposed improvements in its liquidation

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Observations on the Small Business

Administration’s Strategic Plan

processes but did not describe the specific strategies to achieve the

objectives.

Improvements Were

Made in SBA’s

Strategic Plan

SBA’s September 30, 1997, strategic plan includes several improvements

that make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act than

the earlier version. At the same time, SBA’s September plan differs

significantly from the earlier draft in that it includes, as appendixes,

separate strategic plans for SBA’s Office of Inspector General and Office of

Advocacy. As discussed further on, SBA has not made clear the relationship

between the goals and objectives in the plans included in the appendixes

and those in the main text of the plan.

With a discussion of (1) the relationship between the long-term goals and

objectives and the annual performance goals and (2) how program

evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals, SBA’s

September plan addresses all six required elements. The plan’s five new

strategic goals, as a group, are more clearly linked to SBA’s statutory

mission than were the previous plan’s seven goals. In addition, the

inclusion of date-specific performance objectives that incorporate

performance measures make the strategic goals more amenable to a future

assessment of SBA’s progress. For example, under the goal to “increase

opportunities for small business success,” one of SBA’s performance

objectives is as follows: “By the year 2000, SBA will help increase the share

of federal procurement dollars awarded to small firms to at least

23 percent.” Also, SBA significantly improved its plan by more clearly and

explicitly linking the strategies to the specific objectives that they are

intended to accomplish.

Other improvements include a mission statement that includes the disaster

loan program for individuals and more accurately reflects SBA’s statutory

authorities, a better recognition that SBA’s success in achieving certain

goals and objectives in the plan is dependent on the actions of other

agencies, and the addition of a section that discusses how SBA’s programs

and activities interact with other federal agencies’ programs and activities.

While the latter section states that SBA will coordinate with other agencies

in the future, it does not provide evidence that SBA coordinated with the

other agencies in the plan’s development. Also, the section that discusses

SBA’s goal to improve internal controls implicitly addresses management

problems that we and others have identified. However, specific strategies

to address the identified management problems are not described.

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Observations on the Small Business

Administration’s Strategic Plan

Strategic Plan Can Be

Further Improved

While SBA’s goals are more clearly linked to SBA’s statutory mission, the

relationship of one goal—leading small business participation in the

welfare-to-work effort—to SBA’s mission is unclear. While the plan’s

performance objective places an emphasis on helping small businesses

meet their workforce needs, the subsequent discussion implies a focus on

helping welfare recipients find employment; for example, the plan states

that “SBA’s goal is to help 200,000 work-ready individuals make the

transition from welfare to work . . . .” It is not clear why SBA is focusing on

welfare recipients only and not on other categories of potential employees

to help meet small businesses’ workforce needs.

SBA’s plan mentions certain program evaluations that SBA plans for future

fiscal years, as well as the continuation of its goal of monitoring field and

headquarters offices. However, the plan does not contain schedules of

future comprehensive program evaluations for SBA’s major programs,

including its 7(a) loan program and 8(a) business development program.

(The Inspector General’s plan references future audits and evaluations

that the Inspector General plans to conduct to improve SBA management.)

In addition, the plan acknowledges that SBA needs a more systematic

approach for using program evaluations for measuring progress toward

achieving its goals and objectives, but it does not outline how SBA will

develop and implement such an approach. Also, the strategy sections in

the plan do not describe the human, capital, and information resources

that are needed to achieve the goals and objectives.

The September plan identifies various external factors, such as the

economy and congressional support, that could affect the achievement of

the plan’s goals. However, with the exception of “interagency

coordination,” the plan does not link these factors to particular goals or

consistently describe how the factor(s) could affect achievement of the

goals and objectives. Furthermore, the plan also does not articulate

strategies for mitigating the factors’ effects. Also, while recognizing the

need for reliable information to measure progress toward the plan’s goals

and objectives, the plan notes that SBA currently does not collect or report

many of the measures that it will require to assess performance. The plan

would benefit from brief descriptions of how SBA plans to collect the data

to measure progress toward its goals and objectives.

Other Observations The earlier version of SBA’s plan presented a section on the Inspector

General as a means of improving SBA’s management—one of the plan’s

seven goals. However, the September 30 plan presents the Inspector

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Observations on the Small Business

Administration’s Strategic Plan

General’s plan as an appendix, without cross-reference to any specific SBA

goal or objective. Also, the September plan includes an appendix

containing a plan for the Office of Advocacy; this material did not appear

in SBA’s earlier plan. Generally, the goals and objectives in the Inspector

General and Advocacy plans appear consistent with, and may contribute

to the achievement of, the goals and objectives in SBA’s plan, but the

relationship is not explicit. SBA’s plan makes little mention of the Inspector

General and Advocacy plans and does not indicate at all how, or if, the

Inspector General and Advocacy activities are intended to help SBA achieve

the agency’s goals and objectives. Similarly, the Inspector General and

Advocacy plans do not make reference to the goals and objectives in the

SBA plan. These plans could be more useful to decisionmakers if their

relationships were clearer.

Agency Comments We provided copies of a draft of these observations to SBA for review and

comment. We received comments from the SBA Administrator. SBA

commented that our analysis of the plan provided useful suggestions that

will be used in its next draft of the plan. SBA also provided additional

information concerning two of our observations. First, SBA stated that the

emphasis of the fourth goal—to lead small business participation in the

welfare-to-work initiative—is focused on helping small businesses rather

than former welfare recipients. Second, SBA commented that the agency

works with the Inspector General and Advocacy offices to carry out SBA’s

mission, and the Inspector General and Advocacy plans were included as

appendixes to its strategic plan to highlight the offices’ statutory

independence.

Issue Area Contact Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development

Issues; Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,

(202) 512-7632.

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Appendix XXIV 

Observations on the Social Security

Administration’s Strategic Plan

On July 22, 1997, we issued a report on the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA) draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations

on the Social Security Administration’s June 1997 Draft Strategic Plan,

GAO/HEHS-97-179R). SSA’s formally issued strategic plan was submitted to OMB

and Congress on September 30, 1997. As requested, we reviewed the

September 30 plan and compared it with the observations in our July 22

report. On October 14, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further

observations on the strategic plan. The key points from that briefing are

summarized herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

SSA’s draft strategic plan contained all six of the elements required by the

Results Act and reflected its status as an independent agency. To the

agency’s credit, the draft plan was forward-looking and provided a solid

foundation for SSA’s consultation with Congress and other stakeholders.

Also, the goals in the draft plan were more balanced than those of prior SSA

plans because they emphasized sound program management in addition to

customer service. However, some of the required elements in the plan

could have been strengthened in important ways. For example, for some

goals, it was not clear what SSA hoped to achieve and how it planned to

measure its achievement, and some goals seemed to overlap. In addition,

the plan cited many initiatives that SSA intends to begin or continue

without additional agencywide resources and without setting priorities or

delineating time frames and schedules. As a result, it was difficult to see

how SSA could accomplish all of its planned initiatives. SSA went beyond

minimum requirements by providing numerous performance measures.

However, we noted that it was sometimes difficult to link the performance

measures with specific objectives. The draft plan included a description of

the external factors that SSA considered in developing the plan, but this

discussion could have been improved had SSA more explicitly linked the

effects of certain external factors, such as changes in available technology,

with goal attainment and had it more clearly explained how it has used

and plans to use program evaluations.

The draft plan could have been more useful if it had reflected how SSA

coordinates with other agencies and if it had provided adequate assurance

that the agency would focus sustained attention on its greatest

management challenges. SSA’s draft plan was structured to capture and

monitor progress in meeting agencywide priorities and, as such, did not

focus on specific programs or beneficiary groups. As a result, SSA’s draft

plan did not address the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program’s

long-standing management weaknesses. In addition, the plan did not

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Observations on the Social Security

Administration’s Strategic Plan

disclose the challenges SSA has faced in redesigning its disability process

and did not fully integrate a return-to-work strategy for its disabled

beneficiaries throughout the agency’s operations.

SSA’s draft plan accurately conveyed the agency’s strong reliance on

improved information technology to provide world-class service and to

better manage its programs with its existing resources. However, we

observed that the plan would be strengthened by adding information on

how SSA will use information technology to achieve the agency’s goals and

objectives. Finally, the draft could have discussed in more detail SSA’s

plans to cope with two technology-related high-risk areas—the Year 2000

computer problem and the need to adequately protect the sensitive data in

its computer systems.

Improvements Made

in SSA’s Strategic Plan

SSA incorporated several of the changes we suggested in its formally issued

plan, but the extent of the revisions and the attendant improvements vary

from element to element. Throughout the plan, SSA added pieces of

information on processes and technologies it will use to achieve its goals.

However, this information, along with the needed staff skills and

timetables, is not discussed uniformly for each goal. In response to the

need to better link performance measures with specific objectives, SSA

added a matrix that presents the goals, objectives, and related

performance indicators. In most cases, the goals, objectives, and measures

are clearly stated in the body of the plan, and the matrix provides a useful

summary of how SSA will assess its performance. In other cases, however,

it is difficult to relate the discussion of performance measures in the body

of the plan with the indicators in the matrix. SSA appropriately included its

program evaluation activities in its first goal; it also added more

information about the types of program evaluations used or planned for

the future and the timetables for some of the planned evaluations.

Consistent with our suggestion that SSA include a discussion of how it has

coordinated with other agencies, SSA provided a listing of crosscutting

activities with its “federal business partners.” It was helpful to see the

many and varied relationships that SSA has with other federal agencies;

however, the list gives equal weight to routine activities, such as providing

IRS forms to Social Security beneficiaries, and complex relationships

requiring ongoing policy coordination, such as between SSA and the

Department of Education regarding vocational rehabilitation services for

the disabled. We found even more helpful those instances where SSA

incorporated a description of its relationship with other agencies in its

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Observations on the Social Security

Administration’s Strategic Plan

discussion of goals and strategies. For example, SSA describes its need to

cooperate with law enforcement agencies in its discussion on ways to

combat fraud.

SSA also acknowledged that some of its management challenges were not

adequately addressed in its draft plan. SSA recognized SSI as a high-risk area

and noted that the agency intends to develop a separate plan to improve

the program. For its disability process redesign, SSA added a short

explanation of the complexity of the redesign process and recent attempts

to narrow its focus. SSA also expanded its discussion of its return-to-work

efforts and included information on the studies it plans to undertake.

Finally, SSA has improved its plan by including discussions of the Year 2000

problem, the importance of resolving it, and the need to mitigate any

future problems with other agencies with whom SSA shares information.

SSA’s Strategic Plan

Can Be Further

Improved

Several improvements that we suggested in our previous report were not

made, or, in some cases, changes were minimal and did not noticeably

improve the plan. For some goals, there seems to be overlap, and it is still

not clear what SSA hopes to achieve or how it will do so. For example, SSA

added some discussion on planned strategies to implement its first

goal—“[t]o promote valued, strong, and responsive social security

programs and conduct effective policy development, research, and

program evaluation”—and measure performance. However, the meaning

of the goal itself and some of the objectives could be further clarified and

stated in more measurable terms to enable a more certain future

assessment of whether they are achieved. In addition, SSA offers a general

discussion of implementation strategies by goal, rather than describing

how each individual objective will be achieved. Because SSA cites a large

number of initiatives that it will begin or continue over the next 5 years

and does not delineate priorities or time frames, it is still difficult to be

confident that SSA will accomplish its planned initiatives. Adding to this

concern is the lack of information on how managers and staff will be held

accountable for achieving objectives. Future revisions or updates of the

plan would benefit from a more focused, organized, and simplified

presentation of these issues. SSA’s final plan describes several external

factors that may affect its programs, such as the aging of the baby boom

generation and advances in information technology. SSA also added a

discussion of public concern about future program financing. However, its

discussion of the financing issue does not focus on the fact that decisions

about the structure and financing of the program will be made by

policymakers outside of SSA. Overall, the plan would be stronger in the

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Appendix XXIV 

Observations on the Social Security

Administration’s Strategic Plan

future if SSA linked the discussion of these external factors with goal

attainment and consistently included any mitigation strategies.

As previously stated, the success of several goals is dependent on

technological improvements or changes in agency operational processes,

but we found that SSA has encountered difficulty implementing some of

these changes. SSA has not acknowledged these difficulties, such as the

challenges it faces in developing new software to complement the

redesigned disability determination process, and the plan could be

improved by providing additional information on how information

technology strategies will be used to achieve the agency’s goals and

objectives. Relative to changes in technology, SSA has not incorporated any

plans to begin the difficult task of assessing its current service delivery

structure and how it should change in the future.

Agency Comments We provided SSA with a draft of our observations on its strategic plan. In its

written reply, SSA said that it appreciated that we recognized the

improvements made to the draft plan. SSA also stated that it believes that

the strategic plan contains as much detail as is possible and appropriate at

this point in its planning cycle. It is refining and refocusing its current key

initiatives, as necessary, and developing plans for new initiatives to ensure

that the agency reaches its objectives.

Issue Area Contact Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues; Health, Education, and

Human Services Division, (202) 512-7215.

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Appendix XXV 

Observations on the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Strategic Plan

On July 11, 1997, we issued a report on the U.S. Agency for International

Development’s (USAID) draft strategic plan (The Results Act: Observations

on USAID’s November 1996 Draft Strategic Plan, GAO/NSIAD-97-197R). USAID

submitted its formally issued strategic plan to OMB and Congress on

September 30, 1997. As requested, we have reviewed the publicly issued

strategic plan and compared it with the observations in our July 11 report.

On October 24, 1997, we briefed your staffs on our further observations on

USAID’s strategic plan. We summarize the key points from that briefing

herein.

Summary of Key

Observations From

Our July Report

USAID’s November 1996 draft strategic plan included the six elements

required by the Results Act. However, two components of the

plan—sections on (1) relating performance goals to general goals and

objectives and (2) program evaluations—did not contain sufficient

information to fully achieve the purposes of the Results Act and related

OMB guidance. More specifically, these sections did not include a

discussion of performance goals, relevant evaluation findings USAID used to

develop its plan, or USAID’s plan for conducting future evaluations.

Many agencies are involved in activities directly related to USAID’s mission,

goals, and objectives, and there is potential for crosscutting issues.

Nevertheless, the draft strategic plan did not address areas of possible

duplication and USAID’s efforts to minimize them or the extent to which

USAID relies on other agencies to meet its goals and objectives.

We also observed that the draft plan did not address key management

challenges that the agency faces. The plan provided a general description

of recent management initiatives but did not discuss how effective these

initiatives have been in resolving critical management problems USAID has

acknowledged in nearly all areas of its operations. In particular, the plan

did not describe difficulties USAID has encountered in developing a

performance measurement system, in reforming its personnel systems, in

implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576), and

in deploying a new information management system that is intended to

correct several material weaknesses in its financial management

processes.

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International Development’s Strategic Plan

Improvements Were

Made in USAID’s

September Strategic

Plan

USAID’s publicly issued strategic plan incorporated some improvements

that make it more responsive to the requirements of the Results Act. In

particular, USAID has developed performance goals related to the agency’s

overall goals and objectives. These goals generally appear to be objective,

quantifiable, and measurable. The rationale and data sources for the

indicators are described in detail in an appendix to the plan. Although the

performance goals presented are generally long-term ones, it appears that

USAID will be able to derive required annual performance goals from many

of them in the future. We did not evaluate the appropriateness of these

indicators or the reliability of the data sources cited.

USAID’s plan is clearer and more explicit about its long-term goals and

objectives. The seven goals are clearly identified in narrative form, and

both the goals and related objectives are presented graphically in an

appendix. USAID has also improved this element of its plan by omitting

other implicit goals, included in the November 1996 draft plan, that made

it unclear what USAID intended to achieve. However, USAID’s goals and

objectives are targeted at results over which USAID does not have a

reasonable degree of influence. As we previously reported,1 USAID officials

have acknowledged that in only a few cases have USAID’s programs been

directly linked to the types of country-level development results described

in the plan.

With regard to strategies to achieve these goals, USAID’s plan now includes

the goal of improving its management efficiency and effectiveness,

including the steps that it is taking in that regard, and indicators for

measuring progress. Consistent with suggestions in our July report, the

plan now also includes an explicit discussion of the program, support, and

workforce resources USAID believes are necessary to achieve its

performance goals. The plan presents resource needs at an aggregate level

and does not specify the level of resources needed to achieve each of

USAID’s strategic objectives.

USAID’s strategic plan also addresses other key issues, as we suggested in

our July report, to improve the description of external factors affecting

USAID’s achievement of its strategic goals. The plan now discusses

conditions, such as political unrest, natural disasters, and impacts of a

shifting international economy, that are beyond USAID’s control. The plan

indicates that the impact of these factors can be offset by USAID field

missions, which can monitor these conditions and modify USAID’s approach

accordingly. In addition, USAID’s strategic plan more fully addresses the

1

Foreign Assistance: USAID’s Reengineering at Overseas Missions (GAO/NSIAD-97-194, Sept. 12, 1997).

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Observations on the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Strategic Plan

contribution that USAID’s development partners make toward achievement

of the agency’s goals and objectives. In particular, the plan identifies the

commitment of other donor countries and multilateral agencies as the

major external factor affecting USAID’s performance.

USAID’s plan now includes a discussion of crosscutting functions across the

U.S. government. It recognizes that other agencies provide technical

assistance to developing and transitional countries and that achievement

of USAID’s goals is affected by the actions of these agencies. The plan states

that mechanisms are in place to reduce or minimize duplication at the field

level, and for each goal it identifies those agencies with which it

coordinates on related activities. However, it does not indicate what these

coordination mechanisms are and lacks the information to demonstrate

that they are adequate. The plan implies that only limited coordination

with these other agencies on strategic planning has taken place and

indicates that USAID anticipates expanded and ongoing interagency

dialogue.

The plan more fully addresses key principles of the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as we suggested in our July report. For example, it

more extensively discusses the principles of coordination of foreign

assistance with other donors and supporting development goals chosen by

the recipient country. However, it does not specifically address the

principle of encouraging regional cooperation by developing countries.

USAID’s Strategic

Plan Can Be Further

Improved

We suggested in our previous report that several elements of the USAID

plan could be further improved to better meet the purposes of the Results

Act. The plan still does not contain sufficient information on program

evaluations. It does not show how program evaluations by USAID or

external organizations were used to establish strategic goals and does not

outline the scope, methodology, key issues, or schedule for future

evaluations. Although the plan refers to other documents and means by

which USAID communicates evaluation schedules and findings, a summary

of that information would be appropriate in this section to demonstrate

the role that program evaluation plays in USAID’s strategic planning and

results assessment.

Also, the plan still does not fully acknowledge the major management

challenges USAID faces. Program and financial management issues are

presented in terms of goals and strategies for improvement, without

outlining what problems spur the need for greater improvement or what

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Observations on the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Strategic Plan

difficulties USAID has encountered in its efforts to improve. For example,

the plan indicates that USAID hopes to improve the availability of financial

and program results information. However, it does not convey the

significant problems USAID has had to date generating complete, timely,

and reliable financial and performance data—problems that hamper

USAID’s ability to identify costs and measure performance. Nor does the

plan establish a time frame for achieving substantial and verifiable

improvement in this area. Frank acknowledgement of specific

management challenges in the area of information technology is also

absent from the strategic plan. The plan describes progress USAID has made

in implementing a new management system but is silent on the major

setbacks it is having with this implementation, even though this system

will be critical to the success of financial and program management

reforms. Similarly, the plan does not address information security and the

Year 2000 problem, which we have identified as high-risk areas

governmentwide. Instead of dealing with these issues directly, the plan

refers to a Strategic Information Resource Management Plan that is said to

set the direction for USAID to meet its information needs through 2002. A

summary of the plan would be helpful, inasmuch as it acknowledges the

hurdles USAID must overcome in achieving its goals.

While USAID recognizes its dependence on other donors and its

susceptibility to factors beyond its control, as we had suggested, we

believe that USAID has not adequately emphasized the importance of these

issues. The plan could articulate the relative magnitude of USAID’s

assistance within the donor community to more clearly convey the extent

of USAID’s dependence on the contributions of other donors to meet the

performance goals it has established. In addition, the plan could articulate

the extent of USAID’s ability to offset country and international conditions

that hamper development to more realistically convey the magnitude of

the risk and uncertainty that USAID faces in trying to achieve its goals.

Further, USAID’s strategic plan does not specifically discuss its Economic

Support Fund programs and its programs in the East European and Baltic

states and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. We noted

in our July report and continue to believe that the plan could benefit from

greater discussion of these activities, which directly serve U.S. foreign

policy interests and represent about 60 percent of USAID’s budget.

Other Observations Concerning other possibilities for improvement, the plan could be clearer

about the time frames needed for achieving performance goals and

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Observations on the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Strategic Plan

whether the goals apply to each recipient country individually or to all

collectively. In some, but not all, cases this is clarified within the text of

the appendix containing the rationale for the indicators used.

USAID substantially reorganized the strategic plan from the November 1996

version. Many key elements of the plan have been consolidated into one

section with no indication of where one element ends and another begins.

Separate sections or increased use of subheadings would significantly

improve the presentation and the ease of using this plan.

Agency Comments On October 10, 1997, we briefed USAID officials on our observations about

the issued strategic plan. On November 3, 1997, USAID officials provided us

with comments on a draft of this appendix. They generally believe that we

have fairly recorded the progress made to date, but they provided

additional comments and clarification of several points, which we have

incorporated as appropriate. They acknowledged that in some cases, for

the sake of brevity, the plan did not reflect the level of specificity that is

called for by the OMB and our guidance, particularly with regard to

program evaluations, crosscutting functions, and information resource

management issues. They noted that such detail is readily available from

other USAID sources and believe that including it in the plan would add

little value and would unduly increase the plan’s size. We continue to

believe that the clarity and credibility of USAID’s strategic plan could be

improved with the inclusion of the type of detail we have outlined.

USAID officials also contended that the plan acknowledges USAID’s

management challenges by outlining management improvement strategies

that would resolve the types of problems we raised. However, we believe

that an explicit description of management challenges would provide the

reader a better sense of the nature and gravity of the problems USAID must

overcome and the implications for USAID’s performance if it is not

successful in overcoming these problems.

USAID officials also provided comments regarding the development of the

strategic plan and the degree of USAID’s influence on agency goals. The

officials pointed out that their strategic plan was not formed from specific

evaluations only, but also from the agency’s long experience with the goal

areas, public discussions, and consultations, as well as from evaluations

conducted by USAID and others. In addition, USAID officials said that they

believe that the goals in the strategic plan lie within the agency’s sphere of

influence, despite USAID’s inability to directly link its programs to

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Appendix XXV 

Observations on the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Strategic Plan

country-level results. They stated that USAID has been able to influence the

use of the resources of other donors, which affects the development goals

USAID seeks to achieve.

Issue Area Contact Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues;

National Security and International Affairs Division, (202) 512-4128.

(410196) Page 143 GAO/GGD-98-44 Strategic Planning Challenges
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