COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-15-00195-CV 

TERRY REVELL APPELLANT

V. 

MORRISON SUPPLY COMPANY, 

LLC 

 APPELLEE

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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 2014-001828-2 

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OPINION 

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Appellant Terry Revell appeals the trial court’s take-nothing judgment in 

favor of appellee Morrison Supply Company, LLC (Morrison Supply). In two 

issues, he contends that the trial court erred by granting Morrison Supply’s 

traditional motion for summary judgment on the basis of his alleged lack of 

standing. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to that 

court for further proceedings. 
2 

Background Facts 

Revell sued Morrison Supply. In his original petition, he pled that in 

February 2013, while he was at Morrison Supply’s business, one of Morrison 

Supply’s employees caused 4,000 pounds of pipe to fall on him, which caused 

him to suffer severe injuries. He brought a claim for negligence and sought 

damages. 

Morrison Supply answered the suit by pleading that Revell lacked 

standing. Specifically, Morrison Supply pled in its first amended answer that 

Revell had previously filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy;1 that his negligence claim 

against Morrison Supply, which was based on an injury occurring during the 

bankruptcy case, was property of the bankruptcy estate; and that he therefore 

had no standing to pursue the claim. 

Morrison Supply filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on the 

standing issue. In the motion, Morrison Supply argued in part, 

[Revell] has no standing because any interest he had in the instant 

action was transferred to his bankruptcy estate before he sued. As 

such, there is no controversy between [him and] . . . Morrison 

Supply. Further, because [Revell] failed to disclose his claim to the 

bankruptcy court, despite his affirmative duty to do so, the claim did 

not return to him when his bankruptcy case was dismissed and 

closed. 

 1See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–30 (West 2016). Chapter 13 allows wageearning debtors to “reorganize with a repayment plan as an alternative to seeking 

a complete discharge of debts through the . . . liquidation process.” In re Meza, 

467 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2006). 
3 

To its summary judgment motion, Morrison Supply attached evidence 

showing that Revell filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in December 2012, 

that he filed an amended bankruptcy plan that same month, that creditors 

objected to the confirmation of the plan, that the trustee filed a motion to dismiss 

for Revell’s failure to obtain timely confirmation of the plan in February 2013, and 

that the bankruptcy court dismissed the case in April 2013 while explicitly stating 

that Revell’s debts were not discharged.2 The evidence also showed that Revell 

never formally disclosed his potential claim against Morrison Supply as an asset 

in any document he filed with the bankruptcy court even though one schedule 

asked him to list “contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature.” 

Revell responded to Morrison Supply’s summary judgment motion. He 

argued, in part, that he had met any disclosure requirement because his wife had 

verbally informed the bankruptcy trustee about his injury at Morrison Supply, that 

any property vested in the bankruptcy estate was revested in him when the 

bankruptcy case was dismissed, and that Morrison Supply’s motion was based 

on a “discredited” and “rogue” case from this court, Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 

S.W.3d 690, 700–03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).3 He also 

contended that Morrison Supply would receive a windfall if the trial court granted 

summary judgment on the standing argument, stating, 

 2Another document from the bankruptcy court’s record shows that the 

amount of “unsecured claims discharged without payment” was “$0.00.” 

3We discuss Kilpatrick below. 
4 

This Court must ask itself: who is prejudiced if this case proceeds? 

Because there was no bankruptcy plan ever confirmed and the 

bankruptcy was dismissed, [Revell’s] creditors have full collection 

rights and [Revell] is still obligated to pay each creditor in full. If this 

case proceeds, [Morrison Supply’s] obligations remain exactly the 

same as they would have had the bankruptcy trustee brought the 

claims: to pay [Revell] damages only in the event a jury determines 

they have liability. 

Finally, Revell contended that a federal statute—11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3) (West 

2015)—unambiguously revested all assets (including all potential claims) in him 

upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case. 

 To his response, Revell attached summary judgment evidence, including 

affidavits from him and his wife. Revell testified through his affidavit that his 

injuries occurred in February 2013 but that he did not realize that he “had a claim 

at that point.” He stated that he learned he had a claim against Morrison Supply 

well after the dismissal of the bankruptcy case, when his attorney in this case 

completed the investigation about the incident leading to his injuries. Revell’s 

wife swore that after Revell was injured, she called the bankruptcy trustee to 

inform the trustee about the injury. She stated, 

The Trustee told me that the bankruptcy court has no sympathy for 

injuries and our case would be dismissed if we were unable to timely 

make our payments. I told them there was no way to make a 

payment and thought the case would just be dismissed. I had no 

idea my husband actually had a claim at that point. 

 A few days after calling the Trustee, Terry continued to talk 

about how his injuries occurred[,] and I thought [Morrison Supply] 

should be held responsible. We met with an attorney a few days 

later. The attorney took the case under investigation. I was unsure 

if a case would be filed until after the investigation was complete. 

After the attorney received all the information, he let us know he was 
5 

going to file a lawsuit on behalf of Terry. This was about 14 months 

after the injuries occurred. 

 In its reply to Revell’s response, Morrison Supply contended, in part, that 

although Revell may have disclosed his injury during the bankruptcy case, he 

had not disclosed a potential cause of action formally through schedules as 

required. Morrison Supply also argued that section 349(b)(3) did not revest the 

potential claim in Revell after the bankruptcy’s dismissal because the potential 

claim arose during the pendency of the bankruptcy (rather than before its 

commencement) and because section 349(b)(3) does not apply when a party 

fails to disclose an asset in the bankruptcy court. 

 The trial court granted Morrison Supply’s summary judgment motion and 

ordered that Revell take nothing. Revell brought this appeal. 

Revell’s Standing 

 In his two issues, Revell contends that the trial court erred by granting 

Morrison Supply’s summary judgment motion based on his alleged lack of 

standing because his chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed,4 the property 

subject to the bankruptcy revested in him, there is no prejudice to the creditors or 

Morrison Supply by allowing him to proceed on his claim in this suit, and a 

genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether he adequately disclosed 

 4Revell argues in part, “The trial court erred in finding that the personal 

injury claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate and [finding that] once the 

bankruptcy estate was dismissed, Revell was deprived of standing to bring the 

claim.” 
6 

his potential claim in the bankruptcy case by verbally informing the trustee about 

his injuries. Morrison Supply contends that Revell’s negligence claim is the 

property of his bankruptcy estate and that he therefore lacks standing to assert 

the claim in this suit. Morrison Supply also contends that while Revell may have 

disclosed his injuries to the trustee, he did not properly disclose the potential 

claim in the bankruptcy case by amending his personal property schedule, and 

the dismissal of Revell’s bankruptcy case did not revest in him property that he 

had failed to disclose. 

 We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 

315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). A defendant that conclusively negates a 

plaintiff’s standing is entitled to summary judgment. See Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 

S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000); Duque v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 462 S.W.3d 542, 

550 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Standing is a component of 

subject matter jurisdiction that focuses on who may properly bring a claim. Lake 

v. Cravens, 488 S.W.3d 867, 885, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) 

(op. on reh’g); City of Arlington v. Centerfolds, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“The issue of standing focuses on whether 

a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a justiciable 

interest in its outcome.”). A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to 

adjudicate a dispute, and without it, the merits of a case may not be reached. 

Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 362 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, 

pet. denied). 
7 

 As both parties focus their briefing and their contentions concerning 

standing, in part, on our prior decision in Kilpatrick, we will begin by discussing 

that decision. There, the plaintiff in a state case concerning the ownership of 

certain stock had filed separate federal bankruptcy petitions in 1990, 1995, and 

1996 without disclosing his ownership of the stock as an asset in any of the 

bankruptcy cases. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d at 693–95. The plaintiff received a 

discharge in the first bankruptcy, while the second and third bankruptcies were 

dismissed. Id. at 695. The defendants in the state litigation obtained a summary 

judgment on the basis that the stock was the property of the bankruptcy estates 

created by the bankruptcy filings and that, therefore, only the bankruptcy trustees 

had standing to bring claims related to the stock. Id. at 699. We upheld the 

summary judgment, stating, 

 When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all of his property, 

including all legal and equitable interests, instantly becomes part of 

the bankruptcy estate. Antonov v. Walters, 168 S.W.3d 901, 904–05 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). When property passes 

into the bankruptcy estate, the debtor loses all right, title, and 

interest in the property. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West [2016]).[5] 

 5Section 541 states that the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates 

an estate that holds the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in property, with 

some exceptions. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1); see also Norris, 362 S.W.3d at 231 

(“[V]irtually all of a debtor’s assets, including causes of action at the 

commencement of the case, vest in the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a 

bankruptcy petition.”). Once an asset becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, all 

rights held by the debtor in the asset are typically extinguished unless the asset 

is abandoned by the trustee. Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 

385 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(d) (West 2016) (“Unless the court 

orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned under this section 

and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate.”); Norris, 

362 S.W.3d at 231. 
8 

When this occurs, a debtor also loses standing to pursue claims held 

by the bankruptcy estate. [Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 882 

(Tex. 1999).] The trustee, as the representative of the estate, gains 

exclusive standing to assert any claim arising from the violation of 

rights associated with the estate. Id. Here, [the plaintiff] asserts that 

because the 1995 and 1996 bankruptcy proceedings were 

dismissed before a final disposition was made, the . . . stock 

revested with him, giving him standing to bring this claim. We 

disagree. 

 When a bankruptcy case is dismissed, the property of the 

estate revests in the entity in which the property was vested 

immediately before the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C.A. 

§ 349(b)(3).[6] The practical effect of a dismissal is to “undo” the 

bankruptcy case by restoring all property rights to the person to 

whom they belonged immediately before the initiation of the case. 

Kunica v. St. Jean Financial, Inc., 233 B.R. 46, 53–55 (S.D.N.Y. 

1999). But there is an important caveat to this rule on which we 

base our decision: upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy case, the 

estate’s assets revest in the debtor only if the assets were disclosed 

to the bankruptcy court when the debtor scheduled his assets. Id.

Here, [the plaintiff] filed two Chapter 13 bankruptcies in 1995 and 

1996. As a result of these filings, all assets he held became the 

property of the bankruptcy estates. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a). [The 

plaintiff] did not disclose any interest in . . . stock within his 

bankruptcy schedules as required pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a). 

Therefore, when the 1995 bankruptcy was dismissed, the 900 

shares of . . . stock remained with the bankruptcy estate. 

 In making our decision, we have carefully considered the 

importance of the disclosure requirement in bankruptcy cases. Full 

disclosure of the debtor’s assets is absolutely required when a 

bankruptcy case is first initiated, and the debtor is required to 

 6Section 349(b)(3) states that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders 

otherwise, a dismissal” of a bankruptcy case “revests the property of the estate in 

the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the 

commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3); see also Crawford v. 

Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that 

section 349(b)(3) controls over section 554(d) because after dismissal of a 

bankruptcy case, there is “no longer any bankruptcy estate . . . [and] no longer 

any property of the estate”). 
9 

provide a complete schedule of his assets to the trustee.[7] In re 

Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 207–08 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. 

denied, 528 U.S. 1117, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000). . . . Full disclosure is 

crucial to the integrity of bankruptcy proceedings; thus, we hold that 

all nondisclosures of assets, whatever the reason, must be treated 

the same. To hold otherwise would encourage a procedural end-run 

around the disclosure requirements. It would provide the opportunity 

for debtors to assert ignorance about ownership of an asset only to 

conveniently discover ownership of the asset at a later time. Hence, 

differentiating between intentional and unintentional disclosure 

would undermine the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement of [disclosure], 

and we hold that all instances of nondisclosure of assets will be 

treated the same. It is for this reason that we accept the reasoning 

of Kunica and hold that only disclosed assets will be revested to the 

debtor upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding. 

. . . Here, the 900 shares of stock remained with the 

bankruptcy estate upon the dismissal of the 1995 bankruptcy 

because [the plaintiff] did not disclose the assets when the 

proceedings began. . . . As such, the 900 shares of undisclosed . . . 

stock remained with the bankruptcy estate, and [the plaintiff] has no 

standing to assert claims arising from the sale of the 900 shares. 

 . . . [T]he law established in Kunica . . . applies to all 

bankruptcy proceedings: estate assets can revest in the debtor only 

if the assets were disclosed to the bankruptcy court.

Id. at 701–03 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). 

 7We have stated, 

 In a bankruptcy action, the debtor must disclose all assets 

including contingent or unliquidated claims. The duty to disclose is a 

continuing duty that requires the debtor to amend schedules and 

forms if circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy change. If the 

debtor knows enough information to suggest that she might have a 

cause of action, then she must disclose the potential cause of 

action. 

Horsley-Layman v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 221 S.W.3d 802, 806–07 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (citations omitted). 
10 

 The principal takeaway from our decision in Kilpatrick is that based on one 

federal district court decision—Kunica8—we held that the revesting of assets in a 

debtor that usually occurs upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy case under section 

349(b)(3) does not occur when the assets were not disclosed in a bankruptcy 

schedule. See id. But this holding from Kilpatrick (along with the holding in 

Kunica, which Kilpatrick echoed), which is untethered to the plain and 

unambiguous revesting language of section 349(b)(3),9 has been criticized by 

state and federal courts. 

 For example, in Norris, our sister intermediate appellate court in Dallas 

considered the question of whether a debtor lacked standing to litigate a lawsuit 

because of her failure to disclose the claim in her dismissed bankruptcy case. 

 8In Kunica, the court concluded that only disclosed assets revert to a 

debtor under section 349(b)(3) after dismissal. 233 B.R. at 54–55. The court 

stated that certain factors “militate[d] in favor” of that conclusion, including that 

the debtor in that case “obtained . . . dismissal after [the bankruptcy] case was 

fully administered and all of its assets scheduled, [so] it arguably obtained the 

functional equivalent of a discharge.” Id. at 55. Similarly, although two of the 

bankruptcies at issue in Kilpatrick had been dismissed, it appears that the debtor 

received some relief because our opinion recites that the “creditors in all three 

bankruptcies were paid in full, with interest.” 205 S.W.3d at 695. There is no 

indication in the record of this appeal that Revell received any relief from his 

debts during his bankruptcy. 

9We generally apply a statute according to its plain and unambiguous 

language unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. See Jack Cty. 

Appraisal Dist. v. Jack Cty. Hosp. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2016, no pet.); see also Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 508 

(Tex. 2015) (“A court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words that are 

not contained in the language of the statute. Instead, it must apply the statute as 

written.”). 
11 

362 S.W.3d at 229, 231. The Dallas court noted that the “basic purpose” of 

section 349(b)(3)’s revesting language is to “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as 

practicable, and to restore all property rights to the position in which they were 

found at the commencement of the case.” Id. at 232 (citing In re Petty, 848 F.2d 

654, 655 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009 (1989)). Applying section 

349(b)(3)’s plain wording, the court concluded that Norris’s lawsuit revested in 

her at the dismissal of her bankruptcy despite her failure to disclose it during the 

bankruptcy; the court explicitly rejected our contrary holding in Kilpatrick.

10 Id.

 Similarly, in Crawford, a federal court of appeals, rejecting Kunica’s 

holding, held that a debtor’s claim revested in her despite her failure to disclose it 

during a dismissed bankruptcy. 758 F.3d at 485. The court noted that section 

349(b)(3)’s revesting language is broad and “makes no distinction between 

[assets] that were listed in the debtor’s schedule . . . and those that were not.” Id.

at 484. The court stated that the “dismissal of [a] case under [section] 349, 

automatically revesting all of the property of the estate in its prior owners, means 

that there are no assets remaining to be abandoned or administered.” Id. at 485. 

 10Morrison Supply contends that “Revell does not argue on appeal that his 

claim revested in him when his bankruptcy case was dismissed and closed.” We 

conclude that he does so in his original brief by challenging Kilpatrick and by 

relying on Norris while quoting its discussion of section 349(b)(3) and in his reply 

brief by explicitly contending that the dismissal of the bankruptcy case vested this 

claim in him under section 349(b)(3). Morrison Supply also argues that Norris is 

distinguishable because it concerned a chapter 7 bankruptcy, but Morrison 

Supply does not explain why this difference affects the application of section 

349(b)(3). 
12 

 Several other courts across the country have joined these criticisms of the 

holdings in Kunica and Kilpatrick and have applied the plain language of section 

349(b)(3) to conclude that a debtor had standing to bring a suit despite the 

debtor’s failure to disclose the claim in a dismissed bankruptcy. See Mackall v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 356 P.3d 946, 950 (Colo. App. 2014) (holding that 

upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy case, “[a]ll of the property that was 

transferred from the debtor to the estate revests in the debtor regardless of 

whether the debtor disclosed it to the bankruptcy court”); Ass’n Res., Inc. v. Wall, 

2 A.3d 873, 889 (Conn. 2010) (concluding that under section 349(b)(3), the 

“failure to disclose a cause of action in bankruptcy proceedings does not 

preclude the assertion of that claim in proceedings instituted after the dismissal 

of the bankruptcy proceedings”); B.N. Realty Assocs. v. Lichtenstein, 801 

N.Y.S.2d 271, 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[T]he dismissal of the bankruptcy case 

had the effect, pursuant to [section 349(b)(3)], of restoring [the debtor’s] standing 

to assert his [claims] in this action, notwithstanding his failure (which we 

obviously do not condone) to disclose such matters in the bankruptcy case 

. . . .”).11 These courts’ conclusions are supported by the longstanding principle 

that the dismissal of a bankruptcy case has the effect of the case having never 

been filed. See In re Dumontier, 389 B.R. 890, 897 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008); In re 

 11We have not found any case citing Kilpatrick in support of the proposition 

that a debtor’s failure to disclose an asset precludes revesting of the asset under 

section 349(b)(3). 
13 

Derrick, 190 B.R. 346, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995); see also In re Income Prop. 

Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1983) (op. on reh’g) (“After an order of 

dismissal, the debtor’s debts and property are subject to the general laws, 

unaffected by bankruptcy concepts.”); In re Garnett, 303 B.R. 274, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 

2003) (explaining that “dismissal undoes the bankruptcy estate”); In re Sports & 

Sci., Ind., Inc., 95 B.R. 745, 747 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (“[Section 349(b)(3)] 

attempts to place the parties in the same position they had prior to the 

commencement of the case.”). 

 The language of section 349(b)(3) is unqualified; it states simply that 

unless a court orders otherwise, the dismissal of a bankruptcy revests the 

estate’s property in the entity in which the property was previously vested. 11 

U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3). Nothing in the section states that revesting is subject to 

disclosure requirements. Id. Rather, the section protects the interests of 

creditors and the bankruptcy process by allowing a court, for cause, to alter the 

general rule of revesting upon dismissal on a case-by-case basis. Id. Thus, if a 

bankruptcy court finds that undisclosed assets, if in existence, could impact the 

decision to dismiss, or if the debtor is receiving a “functional equivalent of a 

discharge” through the dismissal (as in Kunica), or if other considerations exist 

impacting the fairness to debtors or creditors of the revesting of undisclosed 

assets, the court has the authority to fashion an appropriate remedy in its 
14 

dismissal order.12 See id.; Kunica, 233 B.R. at 55; see also Iannini v. Winnecour, 

487 B.R. 434, 439 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“[A] bankruptcy court has the ability under 

[section 349] to retain jurisdiction over the administration of the estate in its 

dismissal order, if it finds cause to do so.”). 

 We conclude that the “caveat” to section 349(b)(3) that formed the basis of 

our holding in Kilpatrick is neither supported by the plain, unambiguous language 

of that section nor necessary to protect the interests of creditors or the integrity of 

the bankruptcy process. Therefore, we hold that to that extent, our decision in 

Kilpatrick was erroneous, and we overrule it.13 We hold that under the plain 

language of section 349(b)(3), the dismissal of a bankruptcy case revests the 

property of the bankruptcy estate “in the entity in which such property was vested 

immediately before the commencement of the case” even if the debtor did not 

properly disclose the property during the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3); 

see Crawford, 758 F.3d at 485; Norris, 362 S.W.3d at 231–32. Thus, when the 

bankruptcy court dismissed Revell’s bankruptcy petition, property that the estate 

once held revested in him, and he has standing to pursue his claim in this suit.14 

See Norris, 362 S.W.3d at 231–32; B.N. Realty Assocs., 801 N.Y.S.2d at 276. 

 12The bankruptcy court did not do so here. 

13Furthermore, we now expressly reject the holding in Kunica. 

14Given this holding, we need not decide other legal disputes presented in 

the parties’ briefs, including whether Revell otherwise had standing to bring this 

suit based on distinct aspects of a chapter 13 bankruptcy and whether Revell 

adequately disclosed his potential claim to the bankruptcy trustee by informing 
15 

 To the extent that Morrison Supply contends that Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy Procedure 6009 conflicts with this holding, we disagree. That rule 

states, “With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in possession may 

prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or 

proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or 

proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6009 

(emphasis added). We conclude that this rule does not apply here because upon 

the dismissal of a bankruptcy case, no bankruptcy estate continues to exist. See 

Crawford, 758 F.3d at 485; Garnett, 303 B.R. at 278; Mackall, 356 P.3d at 951. 

 Morrison Supply argues that the “plain terms of [section] 349 provide that 

assets that existed before the commencement of a bankruptcy return to the 

person . . . that owned those assets before the bankruptcy.” Thus, according to 

Morrison Supply, because Revell acquired his potential claim during his 

bankruptcy (when he was injured) rather than before it, section 349(b)(3) does 

not apply. We cannot agree because the effect of section 349(b)(3) is to divest 

the bankruptcy estate of all property upon a case’s dismissal, to revest the 

property in the person or entity that previously owned it, and to allow parties to 

proceed as if a bankruptcy case had not been filed. See Crawford, 758 F.3d at 

485; Income Prop. Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d at 965; see also In re Edwards, 538 

B.R. 536, 541–42 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that section 349(b)(3) required 

 

the trustee about his injury. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; QuikTrip Corp. v. 

Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665, 677 n.19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). 
16 

the return of the debtor’s postpetition wages after dismissal); In re Hamilton, 493 

B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2013) (reaching a similar conclusion). To “hold 

otherwise would be to fail to give full effect to [section] 349(b)’s broad scope.” 

See Edwards, 538 B.R. at 542; see also In re Slaughter, 141 B.R. 661, 663 

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (“It would be anomalous to give prepetition property of the 

estate to the debtor under [section] 349(b)(3) and postpetition property of the 

estate to creditors.”). 

 For all of these reasons, we conclude that we must reverse the trial court’s 

summary judgment in favor of Morrison Supply on the basis of Revell’s alleged 

lack of standing. We sustain Revell’s first issue, which is dispositive. 

Conclusion 

 Having sustained Revell’s first, dispositive issue, we reverse the trial 

court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

/s/ Terrie Livingston 

TERRIE LIVINGSTON 

CHIEF JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ. 

DELIVERED: August 29, 2016