In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1330

THOMAS M. JANUSZ, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 CV 4402 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2016

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Thomas Janusz sued the City of

Chicago and several of its police officers, alleging that the

officers had acted unlawfully in arresting him. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and

the officers. In doing so, it applied the single‐recovery rule

and found that in a separate but related state court action,

Janusz had already obtained the damages to which he was
2 No. 15‐1330

entitled. We conclude that the district court correctly found

that the single‐recovery rule barred Janusz from recovering

damages in his federal lawsuit, since both lawsuits involve a

single, indivisible set of injuries for which Janusz has already

received compensation. We also agree with the district court

that Janusz is judicially estopped from arguing that the

judgment in the state action was not fully satisfied—a posi‐

tion at odds with several statements he made to the state

court. So we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Janusz’s Arrest and Termination

In December 2001, three Chicago police officers—

Defendants Alan Lucas, Parris George, and Gina Liberti—

approached Plaintiff Thomas Janusz at a Chicago‐area gas

station. The officers claimed that they went to the area after

receiving an anonymous tip about a drug transaction, and

that they approached Janusz after noticing that his license

plate was expired and that he was pacing around the gas sta‐

tion parking lot with a duffle bag. The officers further

claimed that as they advanced, Janusz’s companion, Paula

Siragusa, informed them that Janusz had been smoking

crack cocaine and that a plastic cup containing cocaine was

in Janusz’s car. The officers proceeded to search Janusz’s

duffle bag, discovered that it contained several thousand

dollars in cash, and arrested Janusz. The police also discov‐

ered a white substance in a plastic cup in Janusz’s car. How‐

ever, the substance was later determined not to be cocaine.

At the police station, the three arresting officers were

joined by a fourth officer—Defendant Amy Mugavero Lu‐

cas—and obtained Janusz’s consent to search his apartment,
No. 15‐1330 3

which was located above one of the funeral homes he man‐

ages for Keystone Illinois, Inc. (Janusz claims that this con‐

sent was acquired through coercion.) At the apartment, the

officers allegedly found approximately $18,000 in cash and

several illicit drugs—crystal methamphetamine, cocaine, and

illegal anabolic steroids.  

Approximately five months later, Janusz filed a motion

to quash his arrest. A judge granted the motion, finding that

the officers’ stated reasons for approaching and ultimately

arresting Janusz at the gas station were implausible. (The

district court has explained in some detail why the state

judge likely concluded this. See generally Janusz v. City of Chi.,

797 F. Supp. 2d 884, 886–89 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Regardless, that

finding is not relevant for this appeal.) The charges against

Janusz were dropped immediately thereafter. By that time,

however, the arrest had set other negative events in motion.  

Keystone suspended Janusz following his arrest and in‐

stalled Brian Durante as his replacement. Durante and an‐

other coworker, Thomas Kotrba, later told several individu‐

als within and outside of Keystone that Janusz had been sell‐

ing crystal meth, operating a meth lab in his apartment, and

stealing from clients. Unsurprisingly, Janusz was fired.

B. Lawsuits Against Keystone and the City

Janusz filed two separate suits in connection with his ar‐

rest and termination. He sued Keystone, Durante, and Ko‐

trba (“Keystone defendants”) in Illinois state court, alleging

breach of employment contract, defamation, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. He also sued the City of Chi‐

cago and Officers Lucas, George, Liberti, and Mugavero Lu‐
4 No. 15‐1330

cas (“City defendants”) in federal court, alleging violations

of his Fourth Amendment rights and various state laws.  

The Keystone case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in

Janusz’s favor and awarded approximately $3,177,500. But

both sides were disappointed with the result and appealed.

In order to stay collection of the judgment, Keystone also

filed an appeal bond for approximately $4.8 million. While

the appeals were pending, the parties executed a settlement

agreement requiring Janusz to execute a release in exchange

for $3 million ($177,500 less than the jury award). Critically,

however, the parties stipulated to the trial judge that “Key‐

stone ha[d] paid [Janusz] all monies due and owing him as

the result of the Judgment previously entered against Key‐

stone.” The trial judge vacated the judgment and dismissed

the appeal pursuant to 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐183(h) and

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 309.

Meanwhile, the City case remained at the summary

judgment stage. The original district judge denied in part the

City defendants’ summary judgment motion, and in doing

so declined to determine the effect of the Keystone settlement

on Janusz’s damages claim. After a new judge was assigned,

the City defendants renewed their summary judgment mo‐

tion as to damages, arguing that Illinois’s single‐recovery

rule prevented Janusz from recovering any damages relating

to the lost wages and the emotional injuries for which the

Keystone settlement had compensated him. The defendants

also argued that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Ja‐

nusz from claiming that the Keystone judgment had not been

fully satisfied when the state court vacated it. The district

court granted the City defendants’ motion; however, the ac‐

companying court order did not constitute a final appealable
No. 15‐1330 5

judgment, since the Keystone settlement did not encompass

all of the damages Janusz sought from the City defendants.

This prompted the parties to stipulate that Janusz would

“permanently waive[] and relinquish[] his right to seek to

recover all damages that were not barred” by the summary

judgment opinion. The district judge entered a judgment to

that effect, and this appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐

ment de novo and construe all reasonable inferences in favor

of Janusz as the non‐moving party. Goodman v. Nat’l Sec.

Agency, Ins., 621 F.3d 651, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg‐

ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Draper

v. Martin, 664 F.3d 1110, 1112–13 (7th Cir. 2011).  

On appeal, Janusz argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment in the City defendants’ favor

on his damages claim. Specifically, he contends that the sin‐

gle‐recovery rule does not prevent him from obtaining dam‐

ages here because the judgment in Keystone was vacated, and

that he should not be judicially estopped from claiming that

the parties in Keystone settled for an amount less than the

judgment. We disagree.

A. Single‐Recovery Rule Bars Damages

Janusz has brought claims under both federal and Illinois

law, and in both jurisdictions, “[a] tort victim can obtain on‐

ly one recovery for his harm, no matter how many tortfea‐
6 No. 15‐1330

sors inflicted it.”1 Reliance Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Great Lake Aviation,

Ltd., 430 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bosco v. Ser‐

hant, 836 F.2d 271, 280 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also Thornton v.

Garcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 811 (Ill. 2010) (“A plaintiff may ...

receive only one full compensation for his or her injuries,

and double recovery for the same injury is not allowed.”).

“That is so ‘regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has re‐

covered all that he or she might have recovered’ in the initial

proceeding.” Saichek v. Lupa, 787 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ill. 2003)

(quoting Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002)).

The rule applies if “the amount of the loss has been judicially

determined and a valid and final judgment has been en‐

tered.” Id. at 833 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments

§ 50, cmt. d (1982) (“[W]hen a judgment is based on actual

litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is there‐

after paid in full, the injured party has no enforcible [sic]

claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the

same loss.”)).  

We find that the Keystone litigation involved a “valid and

final judgment” for purposes of the single‐recovery rule. The

court in Keystone vacated the judgment and dismissed the

case pursuant to § 12‐183(h) of the Illinois Code of Civil Pro‐

cedure, which states, “Upon the filing of a release or satisfac‐

tion in full satisfaction of judgment, signed by the party in

whose favor the judgment was entered or his or her attor‐

ney, the court shall vacate the judgment, and dismiss the ac‐

                                                 

1 We assume, as the parties do, that both federal common law and Il‐

linois law govern Janusz’s recovery of damages, since he has filed claims

under both federal and state law. See, e.g., Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710,

713 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Federal common law governs the recovery of dam‐

ages for complaints filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
No. 15‐1330 7

tion.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐183(h). Generally, a vacated

judgment in one case has no effect on future cases under Illi‐

nois law, and Illinois law “is determinative on the question

because the judgment in question was rendered by an Illi‐

nois state court.” Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chi., 929

F.2d 339, 340 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Matchett v. Rose, 344

N.E.2d 770, 779 (Ill. 1976). However, in Saichek v. Lupa, 787

N.E.2d 827 (Ill. 2003), the Illinois Supreme Court carved out

a narrow exception for the preclusive effect of vacaturs and

dismissals made under § 12‐183(h).

The plaintiff in Saichek was a passenger in a taxicab that

was involved in a traffic collision. The plaintiff suffered inju‐

ries as a result and sued both the cab driver and the driver of

the car that collided with the cab. After the cab driver failed

to respond to the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a default

judgment against him and initiated nonwage garnishment

proceedings against his insurer. The parties ultimately exe‐

cuted a “Satisfaction Release of Judgment” that stipulated

the insurer had paid the plaintiff the full amount of the

judgment, and the trial court vacated the judgment and dis‐

missed the action pursuant to § 12‐183(h).  

The driver of the other car then filed a motion to dismiss,

arguing that the plaintiff had obtained all that she was enti‐

tled to receive for the single, indivisible set of injuries that

she had suffered. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with

the driver, explaining that because the judgment had been

fully satisfied, the plaintiff was precluded from relitigating

the damages issue. 787 N.E.2d at 833. Several other Illinois

cases comport with Saichek, insofar as they describe the pur‐

pose of § 12‐183(h) as “serv[ing] as proof of the payment of

the judgment, barring any further attempts by the judgment
8 No. 15‐1330

creditor to enforce the judgment.” Bricks, Inc. v. C & F Devel‐

opers, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Klier v.

Siegel, 558 N.E.2d 583, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“It is clear that

the purpose of a section 12‐183 proceeding is to determine

whether all sums of money ‘really due’ from the judgment

debtor have in fact been paid and the judgment satisfied.”).

Janusz attempts to distinguish Saichek on the ground that

the plaintiff “was precluded from relitigating the amount of

her damages because the judgment was final and valid, not

because it was satisfied.” Not so. The Saichek Court expressly

referenced satisfaction in its analysis. 787 N.E.2d at 833 (“Be‐

cause the judgment has now been satisfied, and because plaintiff

is precluded from relitigating the question of her damages,

she has already received all that she is entitled to receive for

the injuries that gave rise to this litigation.” (emphasis add‐

ed)). Janusz also argues that Saichek is distinguishable be‐

cause it did not involve an appeal that was pending when

the parties sought to vacate the judgment and dismiss the

case under § 12‐183(h). Cf. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 499

N.E.2d 1373, 1375 (Ill. 1986) (“For purposes of applying the

doctrine of collateral estoppel, finality requires that the po‐

tential for appellate review must have been exhausted.”).

But we see nothing in Saichek that indicates this modest fac‐

tual variance is relevant. Indeed, although the parties in Key‐

stone initially pursued separate appeals, they ultimately

abandoned those appeals, stipulated that the judgment had

been fully satisfied, and petitioned the trial court for vacatur

and dismissal.

Janusz looks to Pontarelli Limousine v. City of Chicago,

where we held that a vacated judgment in a state court ac‐

tion had no collateral estoppel effect under Illinois law on a
No. 15‐1330 9

similar federal dispute. 929 F.2d at 340–41. Pontarelli bears

some similarity to the current dispute: after judgment on the

jury’s award was entered and while the defendant’s appeal

was pending, the parties entered into a settlement agreement

to voluntarily dismiss the action. But Pontarelli did not in‐

volve § 12‐183(h), and there is no indication that the parties

stipulated or otherwise communicated to the court that the

payments made to the plaintiffs had fully satisfied the

judgment. So Janusz’s reliance on Pontarelli is misplaced.  

Finally, Janusz argues against applying Saichek because

doing so will deter parties from settling cases in the future.

We understand Janusz to be implying that if a plaintiff dis‐

covers that settling pursuant to § 12‐183(h) might preclude

her from pursuing other alleged wrongdoers, she would

forgo settlement and see the dispute to the end—at poten‐

tially great cost to the parties and the court. While Janusz’s

prediction has merit, it may be equally possible that Janusz’s

preferred approach could deter a defendant from settling, out

of concern that a settlement might not conclusively settle the

matter: the plaintiff may later obtain a damages award from

a different party who, in turn, might seek contribution from

the defendant. We leave it to Illinois courts to weigh these

and other relevant considerations in future cases that in‐

volve vacated judgments under § 12‐183(h).  

Before continuing, we acknowledge that Saichek appears

to be an idiosyncratic decision with few (if any) true analogs.

That alone, however, does not empower us to ignore an un‐

ambiguous decision rendered by a state supreme court on a

matter of state substantive law. See Williams, McCarthy, Kin‐

ley, Rudy & Picha v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Grp., 750 F.2d 619, 624 (7th

Cir. 1984) (observing that “the Illinois Supreme Court is the
10 No. 15‐1330

final authority on the meaning of Illinois statutes”). Saichek

was decided in 2003—approximately six years before Janusz

and Keystone jointly sought to dismiss the Keystone case un‐

der § 12‐183(h). That gave Janusz ample opportunity to re‐

view Saichek and to decide whether to continue with his ap‐

peal (rather than abandon it), or even to press for a quicker

resolution in this case relative to Keystone. Janusz must live

with the consequences of his decisions.  

B. Judicial Estoppel Applies

In an apparent attempt to circumvent the single‐recovery

rule, Janusz emphasizes that the settlement in Keystone was

for less than the full amount of the judgment, thereby sug‐

gesting that the judgment was not fully satisfied. But Janusz

unambiguously informed the Keystone court that the judg‐

ment had been fully satisfied—information the court relied

on in vacating the judgment and dismissing the case. As a

result, Janusz is judicially estopped from suggesting that the

Keystone judgment was not fully satisfied due to the settle‐

ment amount.

When the doctrine of judicial estoppel is invoked against

a party, we examine three factors: “(i) whether the party’s

positions in the two litigations are clearly inconsistent; (ii)

whether the party successfully persuaded a court to accept

its earlier position; and (iii) whether the party would derive

an unfair advantage if not judicially estopped.” Wells v.

Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). On at least one occa‐

sion, we have suggested that state law, not federal common

law, should apply when the judgment at issue was rendered

by a state court. See Saecker v. Thorie, 234 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th

Cir. 2000). But we need not resolve that issue here, since Illi‐

nois law does not differ significantly from federal law on the
No. 15‐1330 11

issue. See People v. Caballero, 794 N.E.2d 251, 262 (Ill. 2002)

(“[T]he party to be estopped must have (1) taken two posi‐

tions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judi‐

cial or quasi‐judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intend‐

ing for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged,

and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received

some benefit from it.”).

The district court correctly concluded that judicial estop‐

pel applies here. First, Janusz has taken inconsistent posi‐

tions as to whether the Keystone judgment was satisfied by a

payment of the entire judgment amount. Janusz and Key‐

stone jointly executed a “Release (Satisfaction) of Judgment”

in which they declared that Janusz “ha[d] received full satis‐

faction and payment” for the $3,177,500 judgment. Separate‐

ly, the parties executed a stipulation stating that “Keystone

had paid Plaintiff all monies due and owing to him as the

result of the Judgment previously entered against Key‐

stone.” Both documents were attached to Keystone’s motion

to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case with prejudice,

which the state court granted. These statements conflict with

Janusz’s repeated claim in this case that he received only $3

million from Keystone.  

Unwilling to acknowledge this clear inconsistency, Ja‐

nusz contends that he and Keystone merely conveyed to the

Keystone court that the settlement, not the judgment, had been

fully satisfied. But this ignores the unambiguous language of

the Release, the Stipulation, and Keystone’s Motion. Janusz

argues that focusing on these documents without regard to

the existence of a settlement somehow elevates “form over

substance.” However, Janusz has failed to cite a single fact

demonstrating that the court in Keystone could have reason‐
12 No. 15‐1330

ably believed that the parties’ settlement involved an

amount different from the judgment. Notably, there is no

evidence that Janusz or Keystone ever provided a copy of

their settlement agreement to the court. And at oral argu‐

ment, Janusz was unable to explain why he could not have

modified the Release and the Stipulation to note the precise

amount of the settlement.

Second, the court in Keystone clearly accepted Janusz’s

earlier position. In its order granting Keystone’s motion to

vacate and dismiss, the court found that “the Judgment pre‐

viously entered against Keystone in the amount of Three‐

Million One‐Hundred and Seventy‐Seven Thousand Five‐

Hundred and 00/100s United States Dollars ($3,177,500.00)

ha[d] been remitted and satisfied in full.” At oral argument,

Janusz conceded that he never informed the Keystone court

that this statement was incorrect and should be modified ac‐

cordingly.

Third, we find that Janusz would be unfairly enriched if

he were not judicially estopped. We disagree with Janusz’s

claim that he did not derive any benefit from his statements

to the Keystone court. As the City defendants correctly ob‐

serve, the settlement agreement obligated Janusz to help ob‐

tain vacatur, dismissal, and discharge of Keystone’s appeal

bond by co‐signing the stipulation and release and by “ex‐

ecut[ing] any and all supplementary documents ... which

may be necessary or appropriate to give full force and effect

to the terms and intent of this Agreement.” A plain reading

of the agreement indicates that Janusz was to undertake

these actions in exchange for receiving $3 million. We also

find that it would be unfair for Janusz to seek compensation

in addition to the $3 million he has already received. As dis‐
No. 15‐1330 13

cussed above, Saichek instructs that Janusz is not entitled to a

second bite at the apple simply because he believes he

should have been awarded more money on the first go‐

round. While the City defendants may not be immune from

a contribution action by the Keystone defendants, it would be

unfair to require them to continue defending claims “based

on the very same theory of recovery for the very same inju‐

ries in the very same [event]” that gave rise to the Keystone

judgment. Saichek, 787 N.E.2d at 834–35.  

Because we find that the single‐recovery rule and the

doctrine of judicial estoppel apply here, we need not address

the City defendants’ alternative argument that the Keystone

settlement agreement released the City defendants from lia‐

bility for injuries jointly caused by the Keystone and City de‐

fendants.

III.  CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.