GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Committee 

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

For Release of Delivery

Expected at

1:30 p.m., EST

Wednesday,

March 17, 1999

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Progress of the F-22 and 

F/A-18E/F Engineering and 

Manufacturing 

Development Programs

Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense 

Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International 

Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Air Forces F-22 and the Navys

F/A-18E/F engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) programs.

Related GAO reports are listed in appendix I. The National Defense

Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 require us to review and

report annually on these programs. My testimony is based on our work in

response to these mandates.

Summary The F-22 and F/A-18E/F programs are approaching critical investment

decision points, and each faces significant challenges. The F-22 is

approaching a decision for undertaking production activities and the E/F is

getting ready to enter the Operational Test and Evaluation (OPEVAL)

phase. Regarding the F-22 program, although the Air Force estimates it can

complete the F-22 EMD program within the nearly $19-billion cost limit

established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,

in 1998, F-22 costs exceeded budgets, and work was not always completed

as scheduled. The Air Force is exploring ways to keep EMD costs within

the congressional limit, but there are several obstacles. For example:

 The Air Force and F-22 contractors have identified potential cost

increases totaling $667 million. If not addressed, F-22 EMD costs will

rise above the cost limit. Plans are being developed to address the

increase but have not been finalized. According to the Air Force, some

planned EMD activities will be deferred, reduced, or eliminated.

 The contractor notified the Air Force that F-22 program costs may

increase further if sales of C-130J aircraft, which are manufactured in

the same plant as the F-22, are lower than anticipated because the F-22

program will have to absorb a higher share of the plants overhead costs.

 First flights of the next four test aircraft are expected to be late,

reducing the time available to accomplish flight tests before EMD is

completed. If the Air Force is not able to effectively revise its test

schedule, some planned EMD activities will need to be deferred,

reduced, or eliminated.

 Development of the F-22s integrated avionics systems has been delayed,

and the schedule for completing avionics development appears

unrealistic. If EMD completion must be delayed for avionics

development, additional costs will be incurred.

The Air Force plans to start F-22 production activities later this year by

awarding contracts to procure the first 6 low-rate initial production aircraft
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

and initiate advance procurement of the next 10 aircraft. However,

because of delays in the EMD program, the Air Force has substantially

reduced or delayed the testing it had planned to accomplish before

awarding the contracts. In 1994, the Air Force planned to have 1,400 flight

test hours completed before starting production activities. Now, the Air

Force plans to complete 511 flight test hours. Progress of the flight test

program so far indicates that achieving 511 hours will be difficult. In

addition, completing static and fatigue tests on the airframe structures has

now been delayed until after contract award. Likewise, early flight testing

of an F-22 equipped with its integrated avionics will not be accomplished,

as previously planned, before contract award.

In terms of the F/A-18E/F program, we do not agree with the Navys

assessment that the program is meeting all performance requirements and

is on schedule and on cost. The Navy based its assessment on the E

models performance and assumed some improvements to the aircraft that

have not yet been demonstrated. Without that assumption, the F model,

which makes up over half of the E/F planned buy, is not meeting the

interdiction range requirementa primary justification for the program.

Department of Defense (DOD), Navy, and contractor personnel have

reported that even if the E/F meets all performance specifications, it might

fail the next phase of operational testing, known as OPEVAL. Regarding

the programs schedule, although completion of the development effort has

slipped from November 1998 to April 1999, the Navy intends to maintain its

original schedule to start OPEVAL in May 1999. Consequently, the

contractor has insufficient time to correct some critical deficiencies in the

aircraft that, according to Navy criteria, should be corrected prior to

OPEVAL. Conducting OPEVAL with these unresolved deficiencies could

invalidate OPEVAL results.

Corrections of some deficiencies have been shifted to later in the program.

This will help the Navy stay within the congressionally mandated

developmental cost cap; however, correcting these deficiencies will

increase the procurement costs of the aircraft. And finally, the correction

of some deficiencies could result in design changes to the aircraft. This

increases the risk associated with Congress approving the Navys multiyear

procurement request for the E/F program at this time.

I would now like to discuss the basis for our conclusions on each of these

programs.
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

F-22 Program Concerned about growing costs on the F-22 program, the Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, in June 1996, established the

Joint Estimating Team (JET) to estimate the most probable costs of the

F-22 EMD and production programs. The JET concluded in 1997 that

additional time would be required to complete EMD and estimated that

EMD costs would increase by $1.45 billion to $18.688 billion. The JET

recommended slowing manufacturing for a more efficient transition from

development to low-rate initial production and adding 12 months to

complete avionics development. The JET also estimated that the

production costs for 438 F-22s would increase by $13.1 billion to about

$61.2 billion. The JET identified initiatives that it expected would offset the

production cost increase. The Air Force and Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and Technology generally adopted the JETs

recommendations.1

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a

cost limit of $18.688 billion (an amount that mirrored the JET estimate) for

the F-22 EMD program and $43.4 billion for the production of 339 F-22s.

The act instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to adjust the cost

limitations for the amounts of increases or decreases in costs attributable

to economic inflation and compliance with changes in federal, state, and

local laws. Since then, the Air Force has adjusted the EMD cost limit to

$18.880 billion and the production limit to $39.759 billion to account for

changes in inflation and to move costs associated with out-of-production

parts from production to EMD.

F-22 EMD Costs Have 

Increased

Contractor cost experience and studies in 1998 indicate that cost growth

threatens the Air Forces ability to complete EMD within the congressional

cost limit. During 1998, because costs were exceeding budgets and work

was behind schedule, Lockheed Martin and the Air Force studied the EMD

program and identified potential cost increases of $667 million. 2 The

increases are attributed primarily to (1) problems in manufacturing the aft

1For more information on the JETs recommendations, see Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air

Force F-22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).

2In February 1999, the Air Force stated that additional costs would be incurred because of problems

manufacturing wings. The Air Force estimated that another $22 million would have to be added to the

increase of $667 million identified in 1998. As a result, the Air Force will be required to identify offsets

to remain within the cost limitation.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

fuselage, horizontal tails, engine air inlets, and castings that attach the wing

to the aircrafts body and (2) problems developing the aircrafts integrated

avionics systems.

Plans to Address Potential 

Cost Growth 

Because the increases would cause the EMD program to exceed the cost

limit, the Air Force is exploring ways to defer, reduce, and eliminate

activities. Actions and potential cost reductions include

 deferring testing to certify that the F-22 can effectively carry external

weapons ($140 million),

 reassessing testing associated with a helmet targeting system and the

AIM-9X missile ($110 million),

 reducing contractor laboratory costs for the test program ($100 million),

 reducing government costs for special studies ($50 million),

 implementing Lockheed Martin cost reduction plans ($80 million), and

 applying contractor management reserves ($185 million).

Potential Impact of C-130J 

Sales on Program

The $667-million increase does not include the effects that lower-thananticipated sales of C-130J cargo aircraft may have on F-22 costs.

Lockheed Martin, which produces the C-130J and the F-22 in its Marietta,

Georgia plant, notified the Air Force that the F-22 EMD program would

have to absorb a higher share of the plants overhead if fewer C-130Js are

sold than expected. According to the Defense Contract Management

Command at Marietta, the added cost to the F-22 program would be about

$150 million to $160 million per year if C-130J production were to cease.

According to DOD officials, increased costs would have to be absorbed

only partially by the F-22 EMD program because other business may

develop. They indicated that Lockheed Martin was negotiating potential

sales of C-130Js with several foreign governments. DOD had not, however,

determined how these actions would impact the F-22 program. In our

report issued earlier this week, we recommended that the Secretary of

Defense evaluate how decisions regarding C-130J production are likely to

impact the F-22 EMD program and assess the Air Forces ability to negate

additional overhead costs that may be allocated to the F-22.
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

F-22 Is Experiencing 

Delays 

Schedules for EMD aircraft and avionics development had not been met

through December 1998. As a result, test aircraft are expected to be

delivered late and ground and flight test activities cannot be completed as

planned.

Problems Have Caused Late 

Deliveries and Reduced 

Flight and Ground Testing 

Time

The first two F-22 EMD aircraft were flight tested through most of

December 1998. Flight testing began about 3 months later than planned

for the first aircraft and began on time for the second aircraft. However,

because of manufacturing problems, the Air Force estimates that the next

four flight test aircraft will be delivered late. Flight testing for these four

aircraft is scheduled to begin 2 weeks to over 5 months late. As a result, the

Air Force has 16.9 fewer flight test months available to complete flight

testing. The Air Force is studying ways to reduce the flight test hours

required. Also, the two ground test aircraft are expected to start testing 6 to

8 months late. If the Air Force cannot effectively revise its test schedule,

additional deferments or deletions will be needed to remain within the cost

limit.

Table 1 compares the 1997 scheduled first flight dates with the expected

first flight dates as of January 1999.

Table 1: Schedules for First Flights of EMD Aircraft

aActual date of first flight.

EMD aircraft 1997 schedule

January 1999

schedule

Delay

(in months)

4001 May 29, 1997 September 7, 1997a 3.3

4002 July 9, 1998 June 29, 1998a -0.3

4003 June 16, 1999 November 22, 1999 5.2

4004 August 17, 1999 February 3, 2000 5.6

4005 January 11, 2000 March 31, 2000 2.7

4006 May 18, 2000 May 30, 2000 0.4

4007 September 25, 2000 September 25, 2000 0

4008 February 2, 2001 February 2, 2001 0

4009 June 1, 2001 June 1, 2001 0

Total 16.9
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

The first flight delays were caused by (1) problems developing and

manufacturing large titanium castings that attach the wing to the aircrafts

body and (2) late deliveries of the aft fuselagethe rear aircraft body

section. Air Force officials believe they have solved the problems causing

late deliveries of the aft fuselage but are continuing to seek solutions to the

wing problem. Air Force officials told us in February 1999 that continuing

problems with late wing deliveries will further delay first flights for the

third through the sixth test aircraft by another 2 to 6 weeks. Air Force

officials are seeking ways to avoid these further delays.

Avionics Development 

Behind Schedule

Avionics development and integration is a challenge for the F-22. The JET

review in 1997 recommended that avionics development be extended

12 months. The Air Force, however, did not adopt the recommendation.

The Air Force has experienced software, hardware, and integration

problems with the F-22s communication, navigation, and identification and

electronic warfare avionics systems. Because of these problems, the Air

Force developed a revised avionics schedule in August 1998, allocating

more time to complete the first two avionics segments, known as blocks 1

and 2.3

The August 1998 schedule, while extending completion dates for blocks 1

and 2, did not change the completion dates for subsequent blocks 3 and

3.1,4 even though the majority of initial software development tasks related

to these last two segments have been delayed from 1 to 18 months. In fact,

the Air Force estimates that blocks 3 and 3.1 can be completed 5 months

earlier than what the JET considered realistic. If it takes longer to

complete blocks 3 and 3.1, additional costs will be incurred.

Issues About Starting 

Production Activities

Later this year, the Air Force plans to award contracts to procure the first

6 low-rate initial production aircraft and initiate advance procurement of

the next 10 aircraft. However, because of delays in the EMD program, the

Air Force has reduced or delayed much of the testing it had planned to

accomplish before awarding the contracts. For example, in 1994, the Air

3Blocks 1, 2, 3S, 3, and 3.1 are all designed to have increased capability over the previous block. The

last phase of development for each block begins when it is placed on the aircraft for testing.

4The revised schedule also adds block 3S between blocks 2 and 3. In adding this block, the Air Force

moved some block 3 activities ahead for earlier evaluation. This did not change the planned completion

date for block 3 activities, however, which is scheduled later.
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Force planned to complete 1,400 flight test hours before starting

production activities. Now, the Air Force is planning to have 511 flight test

hours completed. The slow progress of the flight test program so far this

year indicates that achieving 511 hours will be difficult. In addition,

completing static and fatigue tests on the airframe structures has now been

delayed until after contract award. And there will be no flight testing of an

F-22 equipped with its integrated avionics as originally planned before

contract award.

Limited Flight Testing 

Completed

Through December 1998, the Air Force accumulated about 200 flight test

hours. When the contract is awarded in December 1999 for 6 low-rate

initial production aircraft and advance procurement for the next

10 aircraft, the Air Force plans to have 511 flight test hours completed,

considerably fewer hours than previously planned. Table 2 shows that the

amount of flight testing planned to be completed before production has

been reduced significantly in recent years.

Table 2: F-22 Flight Test Hours

To accomplish 1999 flight testing, the Air Force plans to complete 173

flights and 311 test hours. While Air Force plans call for completing 13

flights and 23.4 hours through March 1999, the Air Force is likely to

complete only 2 flights and 3.9 test hours.

The Air Force has two aircraft, 4001 and 4002, available for testing in 1999.

However, Air Force officials said that 4001 is not scheduled to resume flight

testing until May 10 and 4002 is not scheduled to resume flight testing until

March 31.

Table 3 shows that completing 311 flight test hours in 1999 will require a

more demanding flight test program than the Air Force planned.

Flight test 

schedule as of

Hours planned before

production award

Percent planned

before production award

November 1994 1,400 27

May 1997 601 14

January 1999 511 12
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Table 3: Planned Flight Testing for 1999

In 1998, the F-22 completed 200 hours (averaging 13.8 flights and 31.6 hours

per month), which was enabled by deferring ground tests and maintenance

and providing dedicated refueling support and priority to test center assets.

According to the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, this kind of

support may not be available for the remainder of EMD test operations. If

the Air Force is not successful in completing the planned flight testing by

the time the contract is awarded, it will have fewer than 511 flight test

hours and less flight performance data upon which to base its production

decision.

Delayed Testing of Ground 

Test Articles

Structural testing of the airframe was to be completed by December 1999.

However, static testingdesigned to ensure the airframe will withstand

stresses expected throughout the F-22 flight envelopewill not be

completed until February 2000. And fatigue testsdesigned to ensure the

airframe will withstand stresses expected during prolonged operational

usewill not be completed until September 2000. Table 4 shows the

completion dates for these tests according to the JET schedule and the Air

Forces current plan.

Table 4: Completion Dates for Static and Fatigue Tests

Failure to complete these tests before contract award increases risk. For

example, when the C-17 static test aircraft was undergoing a stress test,

both wings on the aircraft buckled before they reached the ultimate design

limits. Serious damage occurred inside the wing where the ribs and

strengtheners were fractured. If the test aircraft were flying and

encountered this type of a failure, it would have caused the aircraft to

crash.

Flight test

Average flights

per month

Average flight test

hours per month

Plan for 1999 14.4 25.9

Required to achieve 1999 plan 19.2 34.5

Type of test JET schedule Current plan

Static October 1999 February 2000

Fatigue December 1999 September 2000
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

No Avionics Flight Testing The Air Force intended to flight test an F-22 equipped with its integrated

avionics package in August 1999. However, that is not expected to occur

now until February 2000, after contract award. Integrated avionics is one

of the critical features of the F-22 and is expected to provide pilots

previously unmatched awareness of potential threats and targets.

Mr. Chairman, I will now turn to the F/A-18E/F program.

F/A-18E/F Program

Extent to Which F/A-18E/F 

Is Meeting Performance 

Requirements

The F/A-18E/F is nearing completion of its development program. The

development flight test program began in February 1996 and is scheduled

to be completed in April 1999. During this phase of the program, the Navy

has conducted both developmental and some limited operational testing

using the aircraft produced under the EMD phase of the program. Based

on the results of that testing, the Navy reports that the E/F is meeting all

performance parameters.

Our review showed that the Navys statements about the performance of

the E/F reflect the performance of the E model aircraft, not the less capable

F model. Also, the statements reflect the projected aircraft performance,

not the actual performance being demonstrated in flight tests. Specifically,

the Navys performance values include anticipated, but not yet

demonstrated, range improvements. If these values are not included in the

performance estimates, the F model aircraft will be 33 nautical miles short

of meeting its interdiction range requirement. This is significant because

(1) the F model, which was originally planned to be used as a trainer

aircraft and therefore made up only about 20 percent of the total buy, now

comprises about 56 percent of the total buy and (2) increased range over

the current C/D aircraft was critical to justifying the decision to buy the

F/A-18E/F. The Navy formally reports that the F/A-18E/F will have over

40 percent more range than F/A-18Cs. However, initial E/F range

predictions have declined as actual flight data is gathered and incorporated

into range prediction models. Test data currently projects that the E model

will have a range of 434 nautical miles, or about 15 percent greater than the

376 nautical miles demonstrated by current F/A-18Cs. If the anticipated but

not yet demonstrated range improvements are not included in the range

estimates, the F/A-18E interdiction range drops to 405 nautical miles, or

about 8 percent greater range than an F/A-18C.
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Another qualification I would offer is that the Navys assessment of the

E/Fs performance does not consider the potential degradation of

performance as a result of modifications to correct unresolved deficiencies

identified during the developmental and operational flight test programs.

These deficiencies and their potential negative impacts relative to the areas

cited by the Navy when it justified the E/F program are as follows.

Combat Range

Early in 1996, a condition described as wing drop was observed during

F/A-18E/F development tests. The phenomenon was described as an

unacceptable, uncommanded abrupt lateral roll that randomly occurred at

the altitude and speed at which air-to-air combat maneuvers are expected

to occur. In October 1998, the anticipated fix to the problem, replacing

solid wing fold fairings with porous fairings, was flown and significantly

reduced, but did not totally eliminate, the frequency and severity of wing

drop. However, the porous wing fold fairing has caused buffeting of the

aircraft. The magnitude of the buffeting was described as severe enough to

affect the pilots voices and could also mask an aircraft malfunction,

particularly for aircrews not accustomed to the sensation. Buffeting

reduces aircraft range; however, the actual range decrease is not yet known

because resolution of the problem is still being worked on. According to

program officials, the final production fixes to wing drop may involve

something other than the porous wing fold fairing.

Other range-related issues are associated with the Navys attempts to

resolve design problems that were resulting in bombs colliding with each

other or with the aircraft. To correct this problem, the Navy toed, or

slanted, the inner wing pylons. However, that fix increased the drag on the

aircraft and has resulted in air loads on the pylons where the 480-gallon

tanks would be carried that significantly exceed the load limit designed

into the E/F wings in this area. If uncorrected, this deficiency would

preclude the E/F from carrying the two 480-gallon external fuel tanks on

each of the two inner wing stations specified for the interdiction mission

and would prevent the aircraft from meeting its required range

specification. The Navy is studying options for redesigning the pylons and

their attachment to the aircraft to correct this problem.

Aircraft range will also be affected by the extent of afterburner use to

compensate for deficiencies in the E/Fs climb, turn, and acceleration rates.

Using afterburner to overcome these deficiencies will significantly increase

fuel consumption and reduce mission range.
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Payload and Bringback

The F/A-18E/F is reported to have a 22-percent increase in payload over

existing F/A-18s. This increased payload is the result of the two additional

wing stations that the E/F has. However, development flight tests have

revealed that the E/F is experiencing noise and vibration at the wing tips

that could damage air-to-air missiles carried by the aircraft. The Navy is

determining whether a redesign of the missiles will be necessary for them

to be carried on the E/F. Additionally, the excessive loads on the inner wing

pylons have been caused by the closeness of these pylons to the aircraft

fuselage and to the toeing of the pylons. Current plans are to restrict what

can be carried on these pylons during OPEVAL until a fix is designed and

tested. The restrictions would prohibit the E/F from carrying dual MK-83

(1,000 pound) bombs on these pylons during OPEVAL, which reduces the

payload capacity for the interdiction mission. We were told that the

underwing pylon loads problem could also result in a problem returning to

the carrier with unused weapons (bringback) because carrier landings

would exert significant stress on these pylons. The Navy is still studying

this issue and has not yet identified a final fix.

Survivability

The Navy planned to improve F/A-18E/F survivability relative to existing

F/A-18s by reducing its susceptibility to detection and, if detected, the

probability of being destroyed. Initial operational tests cite concerns about

E/F survivability systems. While the specifics on E/F survivability are

classified, the unclassified portions of the test reports identify concerns

with the ALE-50 towed decoy and the ALR-67 radar warning receiver. The

ALE-50 towed decoy is designed to improve F/A-18E/F survivability by

attracting enemy missiles to the decoy and away from the aircraft. The line

that tows the decoy has been burning off when it crosses the heat path of

the engine when the engine is in afterburner. The problems relative to the

ALR-67 radar warning receiver have to do with the receivers ability to

provide accurate information on the direction of arrival of enemy threats.

E/F survivability issues comprised the majority of challenges that the

Procurement Executive Officer for Tactical Aircraft identified as the major

challenges facing the E/F program.

Growth Space

In justifying the need for the F/A-18E/F, the Navy stated that it needed more

space than was available on existing F/A-18s to accommodate additional
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

new systems without having to remove existing capability. The Navy

reported early in the F/A-18E/F program that the aircraft would have

21 cubic feet of growth space. This was revised, and it is now reported that

the F/A-18E/F will have 17 cubic feet of growth space. However, program

documents show that only 5.46 cubic feet of the 17 cubic feet will be usable

growth space. We reported in 1996 that growth space was available within

the C/D. The Navys F/A-18 upgrade roadmap shows that most of the

upgrades planned for the E/F will also be installed on C/Ds, which

demonstrates that the C/Ds have growth capability.

The performance issues I have been discussing relate to the E/Fs

performance during the developmental and initial operational test phases

of the program. I will now discuss the next phase of the program

OPEVAL.

Test Schedule and 

Unresolved 

Deficiencies Cause 

Risks to Successful 

OPEVAL

The testing to be done during OPEVAL will use production representative

aircraft that are being produced under the first low-rate initial production

contract. The objective of OPEVAL is to field test the E/F under realistic

combat conditions to determine the operational effectiveness and

suitability of the aircraft for use in combat by typical military users. The

OPEVAL results will be used to determine whether to proceed into full-rate

production of the F/A-18E/F. Accordingly, the primary questions facing the

E/F program are whether the aircraft is ready to advance into OPEVAL and

whether successful completion of that evaluation is highly probable. We

believe the Navy faces significant challenges regarding each of those

questions.

F/A-18E/F development was scheduled to be completed by November 1998,

with OPEVAL scheduled to begin in May 1999. This would provide time to

correct deficiencies in the aircraft that would be used for OPEVAL.

However, additional test requirements, caused by the need to test

corrections of deficiencies such as wing drop, have caused the completion

of the development flight test program to slip to April 1999. As a result of

the development program delay, and the Navys plan to retain the May 1999

OPEVAL schedule, the Navy will not have time to correct aircraft

deficiencies before OPEVAL, which according to the Navys criteria, should

be fixed. In that regard, the OPEVAL Preparedness Team, which comprises

DOD, Navy, and contractor personnel, meets periodically to determine

whether the E/F is ready for OPEVAL. On February 25, 1999, the team held

its final meeting before the scheduled start of OPEVAL. At that meeting,

the team concluded that 71 E/F deficiencies would not be corrected until
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

after OPEVAL. The Navys criteria indicate that 23 of those deficiencies

should be corrected prior to OPEVAL. These deficiencies consist of the

problems associated with the ALE-50 towed decoy, the ALR-67 radar

warning receiver, and the wing pylon loads. In addition, they include such

things as bomb-to-bomb collisions, delamination of the composite surface

layers of the horizontal tail, and problems with the nose landing gear tires

and wheels during catapult testing.

Notwithstanding these unresolved deficiencies, the Navy plans to begin

OPEVAL as originally scheduled in May 1999. Consequently, during

OPEVAL the Navy plans to use modeling or tests of other systems before

they are incorporated into the E/F as the basis for making some OPEVAL

assessments. The Navy also plans to impose some flight restrictions on the

aircraft during OPEVAL as a result of the wing pylons load problem.

The E/F operational test team has completed two operational assessments,

using aircraft produced during the EMD phase of the program, that relate

to the potential for a successful OPEVAL. Those assessments, referred to

as OT-IIA and OT-IIB, were conducted in November 1997 and in June and

August 1998, respectively. Based on the test results, the operational testers

assigned a level of risk relative to a successful OPEVAL to each critical

operational issue tested. Table 5, which we extracted from the operational

test reports, shows that the testers identified two operational issues with

significant risk (air-to-air weapons, and survivability) and six with

moderate risk.

Table 5: Critical Operational Issues

The operational testers assessment of the E/F identified 29 major

deficiencies with the aircraft. The deficiencies related to such things as

Critical operational issues OT-IIA risk OT-IIB risk

Air-to-air weapons Not assessed Significant

Survivability Significant Significant

Fighter escort Moderate Moderate

Combat air patrol Little or no risk Moderate

Air combat maneuvering Not assessed Moderate

Air-to-ground sensor performance Moderate Moderate

Air-to-ground weapons Moderate Moderate

Air-to-air sensor performance Moderate Moderate
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

the E/Fs ability to accelerate, turn, climb, and roll. Essentially, the E/F

does not do as well in these areas as the F/A-18C aircraft. Additionally, the

testers identified buffeting and lateral instability, or drift, as flying quality

deficiencies. They also listed problems with the ALE-50 towed decoy and

the radar warning receivers problems with indicating the direction of

oncoming threats as major concerns. Some of the specific deficiencies

identified by the operational testers are as follows:

 poor climb performance above 30,000 feet,

 low acceleration,

 insufficient transonic and supersonic acceleration,

 high angle of attack agility and controllability,

 slow response to control inputs,

 tactically ineffective sustained turn rate,

 excessive speed loss during air combat maneuvering,

 incapability to safely deliver the Rockeye bomb when carrying the

Tactical Forward Looking Infrared Radar,

 insufficient cooling capacity for seekers on air-to-air weapons,

 damage to AIM-9 missile assemblies caused by wing tip environment,

 limited life of AIM-7 missile flown on under wing stations,

 improper indication of direction of arrival of oncoming threat systems,

 ALE-50 tow line burn-off in afterburner,

 inconsistent brake effectiveness, and

 imprecise and difficult trimability.

The operational testers recommended that the E/F continue to be

developed. They stated, however, that their recommendation was based on

continued improvements in the E/Fs current maneuvering performance

and the development of follow-on systems that they considered essential to

be able to get the operational effectiveness projected for the E/F. These

improvements include such things as the Active Electronic Scanned Array

radar, the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, the AIM-9X missile, and

the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure system.

In addition to the risks to OPEVAL identified by the operational testers and

the OPEVAL Preparedness Team, the Program Risk Advisory Board,

comprising Navy and contractor personnel, in its January 1999 assessment,

stated that there is a medium risk that OPEVAL might find the E/F not

operationally effective and/or suitable, even if all performance

requirements are met. The Board stated that the consequence of this type

of conclusion from OPEVAL could result in a delay or postponement of the
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

full production decision and the need to conduct additional operational

testing.

To summarize, many obstacles affect the E/Fs ability to undergo OPEVAL,

and there is risk that the program might not successfully complete

OPEVAL.

I will now discuss the cost of the E/F aircraft and the Navys pending

request for multiyear funding for the program.

F/A-18E/F Costs and 

Request for Multiyear 

Funding 

The Navy reports that the F/A-18E/F development effort will be completed

within the $4.88 billion (in fiscal year 1990 dollars) development cost

ceiling established by Congress. However, as of the end of February 1999,

71 identified deficiencies will not be corrected during the development

effort. Correction of these deficiencies will be accounted for as

procurement, not development, costs. The Navy said that estimates for

correcting these 71 deficiencies are not available. In addition, Boeing has

identified 105 deficiencies in the aircraft that it believes it is not required to

correct under the development contract. Estimates for correcting these

deficiencies are also not available.

Also, the Navys unit procurement cost estimate for the E/F assumes

$1.3 billion of savings that is contingent upon Congress approval of

multiyear funding as part of the fiscal year 2000 authorization and

appropriation process.

Regarding the Navys request for multiyear authority, such approval has

historically depended on the ability to obtain significant savings, a stable

system design, an adequately validated requirement, and a commitment to

stable funding over the life of the contract. The concerns raised within

DOD about the uncertainty that the E/F will successfully complete OPEVAL

as well as the number of unresolved issues, like the final solution to wing

drop and buffeting and the inner wing pylon load concerns that could

require design changes to the aircraft, increase the risk associated with

Congress approving the E/F multiyear funding request.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe it is unlikely that the Air Force will

be able to keep the F-22 EMD program, as planned, within the cost limit

established by Congress. In addition, we are concerned about the

significant reduction the Air Force has made in the tests planned to be
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

completed before awarding contracts to initiate advance procurement to

accelerate F-22 production.

With regard to the E/F, the OPEVAL test plan has not yet been approved by

the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. We plan to monitor the

OPEVAL effort as part of our next effort under the congressional mandate

for annual reviews of the program. During that effort, we plan to determine

whether extensive modeling and simulation, and any other test restrictions,

could invalidate OPEVAL results.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to respond to

any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee might have.
Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113
Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113
Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113
Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113

Related GAO Products

ApendIxi

F-22 Program F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Goals

(GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137, Mar. 25, 1998).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing

Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-98-67, Mar. 10, 1998).

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program

(GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on

Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100BR, Feb. 28, 1997).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Air Force Embedded Computers (GAO/AIMD-94-177R, Sept. 20, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, May 5,

1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

F/A-18E/F Program Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Development and Production Issues

(GAO/NSIAD-98-61, Mar. 13, 1998).

F/A-18E/F Production Decision Should Be Delayed (GAO/NSIAD-97-106R,

Mar. 4, 1997).

Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Improvement at High Cost

(GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).

(707406) Letr
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