Information Technology Solutions

Safeguards and Security Issues 

Development of Regulations for 

Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

REGULATORY GAPS 

DISCUSSED IN THIS 

SECTION: 

9 Gap 4 - Exclusion of 

Irradiated Fuel 

Reprocessing Facilities 

in 10 CFR 74.51 

9 Gap 8 - Risk-Informing 

10 CFR Part 73 and 

10 CFR Part 74 

9 Gap 17 - Diversion Path 

Analysis Requirements 

9 Gap 18 - Approaches 

toward Material 

Accounting 

Management 

9 Gap 20 - Advanced Fuel 

Cycles and Transuranic 

Special Nuclear Material 

(SNM) Classification 

Part of NRC’s mission, beyond ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety, 

and protecting the environment, is to promote the common defense and security. To 

meet its mission, the NRC implements licensing and oversight programs for material

control and accounting (MC&A) and physical protection. As part of its efforts to develop 

a regulatory framework for reprocessing facilities, the NRC is evaluating its licensing and 

oversight programs for MC&A and physical protection to ensure that reprocessing 

operations provide adequate protection and ensure the secure use of nuclear materials. 

NRC’S SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 

CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK 

NRC divides special nuclear material (SNM) 

into three main categories, according to the risk 

and potential for its direct use in a fissile 

explosive or for its indirect use in the production 

of nuclear material for use in a fissile explosive: 

• Strategic SNM (SSNM) – indentified as 

Category I quantity 

• SNM of moderate strategic significance

– identified as Category II quantity 

• SNM of low strategic significance – 

identified as Category III quantity 

NRC regulations in 10 CFR 73.2 and 10 CFR 

70.4 define the types and quantities of SNM that 

correspond to each category. The NRC’s 

MC&A and physical protection programs use 

this classification framework to establish 

security and safeguards requirements that are 

commensurate to the risks presented by the 

theft, loss, or diversion of these materials.

NRC’S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MC&A AND 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

Material control means the use of control and 

monitoring measures to prevent or detect loss 

of SNM. Material accounting is defined as the 

use of statistical and accounting measures to 

maintain knowledge of SNM quantities 

present in each area of a facility. It includes 

the use of physical inventories and material 

balances to verify the presence of material or 

to detect the loss of material through theft or 

diversion. NRC's MC&A requirements are 

graded based on the significance of the 

material or facilities being protected. The 

NRC establishes regulations for MC&A in 

10 CFR Part 74, and assesses compliance 

with these requirements through a 

comprehensive licensing, inspection, and 

oversight program. 

Physical protection consists of a variety of 

measures for the protection of nuclear 

material or facilities against sabotage, theft, 

and diversion. NRC's approach to physical 

protection is graded based on the 

significance of the material or facilities being 

protected. NRC establishes physical 

protection requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 

and assesses compliance with the 

requirements through a comprehensive 

licensing, inspection, and oversight program. 
IMPROVEMENTS TO MATERIAL 

ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT 

Modern reprocessing facilities are likely to 

have large throughputs and inventories. 

Currently, 10 CFR 74.59(f) gives 

predefined quantity limits and timeliness 

requirements for Category I facilities, which 

must perform physical inventories every 6 

months. Predefined limits on inventory 

difference determinations and the 

frequency of inventory periods could pose 

a challenge for reprocessing facilities. 

Improved technology, such as near realtime accounting, has been used at certain 

overseas reprocessing plants. This and 

other technologies can provide a more 

frequent inventory analysis without a 

facility shut-down, and will facilitate 

meeting the current timeliness and quantity 

goals. Without the assistance of modern 

technology, meeting the established 

timeliness and goal quantities could be a 

challenge for new reprocessing facilities.

DIVERSION PATH ANALYSIS 

Currently, there are no existing regulations 

for a diversion path analysis requirement in 

10 CFR Part 74. Establishing diversion 

path analysis requirements could make 

10 CFR Part 74 more risk-informed and 

would provide an effective detection and 

response program to mitigate potential 

safeguards vulnerabilities and system 

weaknesses. 

ADVANCED FUEL CYCLES AND 

EXPANDED SNM CLASSIFICATION

Existing regulations do not address the 

security risks of certain fissile elements, 

such as americium (Am) and neptunium 

(Np), which can be separated in more 

advanced fuel cycle separations, because 

these elements are currently not regulated 

or treated as fissile material or SNM. 

Some advanced fuel cycle separation 

methods have the ability to separate 

actinides, such as Am and others, resulting 

in separated and pure fissile products. 

Currently, these advanced fuel cycle 

separation methods are not industrially 

mature and are still being researched. The 

NRC will continue to monitor industry 

interest in these alternative separation 

processes, and consider if additional 

changes to its requirements are needed. 

Security and Safeguards Issues

(Page 2)

RISK INFORMING NRC’S SECURITY 

AND MC&A REQUIREMENTS

The current quantity-based categorization 

scheme in the existing regulations may not 

adequately address the different attributes 

and risk levels of materials that could be 

handled in a reprocessing facility. 

Accordingly, current requirements may 

result in excessive safeguards and security 

measures for relatively unattractive 

materials. A new material categorization 

scheme for 10 CFR Part 73 and 10 CFR 

Part 74 that incorporates attractiveness 

levels, based on material composition for 

currently designated SNM, could provide a 

more risk-informed approach for protection 

of material involved in reprocessing 

processes. The NRC may consider 

alternative risk-informed regulatory 

approaches that consider other factors, 

beyond type and quantity, which contribute 

to the overall attractiveness of commercial 

fuel derived from reprocessing. 

EXCLUSION OF REPROCESSING 

FACILITIES FROM CATEGORY I 

MC&A REQUIREMENTS

The regulation in 10 CFR 74.51 currently 

excludes reprocessing facilities from 

Category I material control and accounting 

(MC&A) requirements. Category I 

reprocessing facilities would not have the 

same MC&A requirements as other 

Category I facilities if the exclusion is not 

removed, yet comparable requirements 

may be needed to protect against theft and 

diversion of separated special nuclear 

material and other materials.