GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m., EST 

Thursday,

February 25, 1999

MILITARY RETIREMENT 

Proposed Changes Warrant 

Careful Analysis 

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military 

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and 

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am here today to discuss military retirement. Concerned about its ability 

to retain personnel, the Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed pay 

and retirement changes in its fiscal year 2000 budget. The pay proposal 

includes a 4.4 percent, across-the-board raise and pay table reform that will 

target increases to noncommissioned officers and mid-grade 

commissioned officers. The retirement change proposed by DOD is 

essentially a partial repeal of the 1986 Military Retirement Reform Act, 

which is commonly called “Redux.” 

After providing background on the differences among the various military 

retirement systems and how those differences came into being, I will 

address (1) changes being proposed by DOD; (2) areas where we believe 

more information is needed; and (3) the opportunity to take a long-term, 

strategic view of the military compensation system. But first, I will 

summarize our observations regarding DOD’s proposed changes to the 

military retirement system.

Results in Brief Overall, we see no clear indication that the proposed change to the 

retirement system, which would cost an estimated $13 billion in increased 

costs and unfunded liabilities, will address the retention issue.

While the recently reported downturn in retention rates is of concern, the 

nature of the retention problem is not clear. Is the problem widespread or 

is it concentrated in certain military occupations or year groups? Is it a 

transitory problem attributable to such factors as reduced accessions 

during the drawdown and the strong economy, or is it the beginning of a 

long-term problem that will affect the military for the foreseeable future? 

Understanding the nature of the retention problem is critical in choosing 

solutions—pockets of problems are best treated with targeted rather than 

across-the-board solutions, and transitory problems are best treated with 

actions that can be reversed or eliminated once the problem has receded.

According to DOD, Redux has become a symbol of eroding benefits to 

military members. Although surveys of military personnel show an 

increasing level of dissatisfaction with the retirement system, it is not clear 

what that really means. Some of the surveys do not differentiate between 

retirement pay and other retirement benefits. Also, many military 

personnel appear to lack knowledge about their retirement system. For 
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

example, a 1998 Navy survey showed that over half the respondents did not 

know which retirement system they were under. 

The link between retirement pay and retention is unclear. The decision to 

stay in or leave the military is a complex, highly individual decision. Many 

factors (such as the availability of civilian jobs, family considerations, and 

satisfaction with military life) can influence a servicemember’s decision. 

The influence of retirement in this decision has not been definitively 

determined. According to an analysis done by the Congressional Budget 

Office, retention rates under Redux have not been markedly different than 

rates under the prior system. Even if the retirement system is found to be 

related to retention, it may not be the most cost-effective tool for 

addressing any existing retention problems. For example, when given a 

choice, military members have tended to prefer up-front compensation to 

deferred compensation. 

In addition, DOD’s proposal does not address other military retirement 

issues and their impact on the structure of the force. For example, DOD’s 

proposal does not address a key purpose of the Redux system—to 

encourage personnel to remain on active duty after reaching 20 years of 

service. Also, since the first potential Redux retirees are still more than 

7 years away from retirement eligibility, DOD may be missing the 

opportunity for the kind of comprehensive change to its compensation 

system suggested by the Eighth Quadrennial Review of Military 

Compensation. The June 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Review called for 

DOD to take a broad approach to align its policies with its strategy—rather 

than take a piecemeal or “one-size-fits-all” approach.

Current Retirement 

Systems for Military 

Personnel

Military members are presently covered by three separate retirement 

systems, depending on when they joined the military. All three systems 

require no contribution from the servicemember and allow retirement after 

20 years of service. Servicemembers have no vesting before 20 years. 

Military members pay social security taxes and are eligible for social 

security benefits, as well.

Depending on when servicemembers joined, the amount of their military 

pension is calculated differently. Reforms in 1980 altered the pension 

calculations, changing the computation base from 50 percent of the final 

monthly basic pay to 50 percent of an average of the highest 3 years of 

basic pay (often called the “high-3” system). Under these two systems, 

retirees are eligible for 75 percent after 30 years. 
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Major reforms followed in 1986. At that time, there were concerns about 

the cost of the military retirement system, given the large standing military 

force and the budget deficits at the time. Further, some believed that the 

retirement system was overly generous. These concerns ultimately led to 

the passage of the Military Retirement Reform Act. Redux reduced the 

retired pay calculation in such a way that retirees with 20 years of service 

would receive 40 percent of their high-3 basic pay—rather than the 

50 percent received under the previous two systems. Under all three 

systems, however, servicemembers earn 75 percent after 30 years because 

Redux increased the amount earned each year toward retirement after 

20 years in such a way that retirees receive 3.5 percent for each additional 

year of service up to 30. 

Another feature of Redux is a reduced cost of living adjustment (COLA). 

High-3 retirees receive an annual adjustment equal to the consumer price 

index (CPI). However, Redux retirees’ annual adjustment is 1 percentage 

point less than the CPI. 

When retirees reach age 62, retirement pay is recalculated at 2.5 percent 

per year of service at retirement, and COLA is recalculated to restore the 

purchasing power lost due to the annual COLA reductions. Thus, at 

62, Redux retirees with 20 years of service would receive 50 percent, rather 

than 40 percent, of their high-3 basic pay and all COLA decrements would 

be made up. After age 62, retirees’ pay remains at 50 percent of their 

average high-3 basic pay, but the 1-percent reduction in COLA begins again. 

Table 1 describes the features of all three retirement systems.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Table 1: Current Retirement Systems for Military Personnel

aAt age 62, the retiree’s pay will be recalculated based upon the number of years of service multiplied 

by 2.5 percent up to a maximum of 75 percent. 

bA one-time recomputation of the retiree’s annuity to make up for lost purchasing power caused by the 

holding of COLAs to the inflation rate minus 1 percent. #R-11 COLAs for Military Retirees: Summary of 

Congressional and Executive Branch Action, 1982-1998.pop 

Source: DOD.

None of the retirement changes were retroactive. Redux applied only to 

servicemembers who joined on or after its effective date of August 1, 1986. 

This change was made prospectively so that it would not affect 

servicemembers who entered the service under the previous systems.

Redux was adopted for two main reasons. The first was cost. Congress 

wanted to reduce the overall cost of the military retirement system but still 

provide fair and equitable retirement benefits. Redux is a less costly 

system than its predecessors. According to an estimate prepared in 1998, 

the DOD actuary estimated that the military would have needed to put 

aside an additional $7.5 billion between 1986 and 1999 had Redux not been 

passed. 

The second reason for Redux was to provide an incentive for personnel to 

stay past 20 years of service and thus to increase the size of the senior 

career force. For each year of service beyond 20, Redux provided 

servicemembers with 3.5 percent toward their retirement pensions. 

According to the DOD actuary, about 47 percent of retirees leave within 

1 year after reaching 20 years of service; by 3 years, almost 70 percent have 

left. Since the first Redux-covered servicemembers will not reach 20 years 

of service until 2006, it is unknown whether this incentive will actually 

Final pay High-3 Redux

Applies to 

servicemembers 

joining:

Before September 8, 

1980

Between 

September 8, 1980, 

and July 31, 1986

On or after August 1, 

1986

Basis of 

computation:

Final basic pay Average basic pay 

for highest 3 years

Average basic pay 

for highest 3 years

Multiplier 2.5 percent per year 

of service

2.5 percent per year 

of service

2 percent per year at 

20 years; 3.5 percent 

per year thereafter 

up to 30 years of 

service (2.5 percent 

restored at age 62)a

Cost-of-living 

adjustments

CPI CPI CPI minus 1 percent 

(one-time catch-up 

at age 62)b
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

encourage servicemembers to remain in the military. Table 2 compares the 

percent of base pay that retirees would receive under the high-3 and Redux 

systems depending upon the years of service they had at the time of 

retirement.

Table 2: Percentages of Base Pay Used to Calculate Retirement Pay Under the 

High-3 and Redux Retirement Systems by Years of Service.

Source: GAO.

Figures 1 and 2 compare the projected retirement pay for hypothetical 

retirees under the high-3 and Redux systems over a 30-year period.1

Figure 1 shows what an officer at the O-5 pay level would earn after retiring 

at 42 years of age with 20 years of service. Figure 2 shows what a 

noncommissioned officer at the E-7 pay level would earn after retiring at

 38 years of age with 20 years of service. The figures illustrate the 

adjustment that would be made under Redux at age 62 to equalize the 

retirement pay with the high-3 system. After age 62, the figures illustrate 

the impact of the reduced COLA provision for the Redux retiree.

Years of 

service 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

High-3 50 52.5 55 57.5 60 62.5 65 67.5 70 72.5 75

Redux 40 43.5 47 50.5 54 57.5 61 64.5 68 71.5 75

1

The charts use the “over 20” column of the January 1998 pay tables as the high-3 average. In addition, 

the charts assume a 3.5-percent annual change in the CPI.
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Figure 1: Projected Annual Retirement Pay (42 year old O-5 after 20 years of service)

)

Figure 2: Projected Annual Retirement Pay (38 year old E-7 after 20 years of service)

Without having had to contribute toward retirement, retirees become 

eligible to receive an income for life at a relatively young age—in their late 

30s to early 40s—allowing them to engage in other, full-time employment. 

Military retirees do not usually completely retire from the workforce; 

instead, they have a second career. The catch-up provisions in Redux 

provide for restored benefits at age 62, when military retirees are more 

likely to actually be fully retired and are eligible for social security benefits.

More than two-thirds of the current military force came in after the 

effective date of the 1986 Reform Act and would be covered by Redux, 

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,000

$90,000

High-3

Redux

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

$35,000

$40,000

$45,000

High-3

Redux
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

should they retire. This includes large numbers of junior enlisted 

personnel in the force. At the end of fiscal year 1997, the DOD actuary 

estimated that about 16 percent of the enlisted personnel who entered the 

service stay to earn a military retirement. A higher proportion of officers, 

about 46 percent of those who entered the service over that same period, 

are likely to stay for 20 years or more. 

It is important to note that no one has yet taken a nondisability retirement 

under Redux. The first Redux retirees will reach retirement eligibility in 

2006, 20 years after the effective date of the legislation. The most senior 

military members covered by Redux—those who entered the military just 

after the effective date of August 1, 1986—now have approximately 

12-1⁄2 years of military service. Thus, the first potential Redux retirees are 

still more than 7 years from retirement.

DOD Proposal to 

Change Military 

Retirement 

DOD has proposed pay and retirement changes in its fiscal year 2000 

budget as a means of addressing declines in retention. The pay portion of 

the proposal contains two parts: a 4.4-percent, across-the-board pay raise 

and pay table reform that will provide targeted pay increases to 

noncommissioned officers and mid-grade commissioned officers. The 

retirement change proposed by DOD would essentially be a partial repeal 

of Redux. DOD’s proposal would restore the multiplier provision to allow 

servicemembers to earn 50 percent of their high-3 salary at 20 years of 

service. DOD proposes to alter the way the COLA is calculated, as well. 

When the CPI is more than 3 percent, the formula would still be CPI minus 

1 percent. However, the proposal provides some low-inflation protection 

when the CPI drops below 3 percent. If the CPI is between 2 and 3 percent, 

the cost-of-living adjustment would be 2 percent. If the CPI is below 

2 percent, retirees would receive a full cost-of-living adjustment.

DOD estimates that the retirement changes it proposes will cost about 

$6 billion over the next 6 fiscal years (2000-2005). This is about 24 percent 

of the $24.7 billion total cost of the DOD military pay and retirement 

proposal.2 This $6 billion represents the additional amount that DOD 

projects it will need to pay into the retirement trust fund to provide 

increased benefits. The year-by-year accrual projections are shown in 

table 3.

2

The total estimate does not include the cost of giving DOD civilians a commensurate 4.4-percent pay 

raise. According to DOD, the cost of the DOD civilian pay raise would be about $10 billion.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

Table 3: DOD Projections of the Additional Accrual Costs to Fund Its Proposed 

Retirement Changes in the Fiscal Year 2000 President’s Budget

Source: DOD.

DOD’s cost figures do not include an estimated $7 billion3 increase in the 

unfunded liability for the military retirement trust fund if Redux were 

repealed. This liability would increase because DOD has been setting aside 

money for the less-costly Redux retirement plan since its adoption in 1986. 

At the end of fiscal year 1997, the total existing unfunded liability in the 

military retirement trust fund was almost $500 billion. The trust fund has a 

large unfunded liability because, prior to 1984, DOD did not set aside funds 

to pay for retirement liabilities. The $500 billion is what remains of the 

unfunded liability identified when DOD switched to accrual accounting 

practices. The unfunded liability is assigned to the Treasury to pay off over 

a very long period of time; the DOD actuary estimates that the initial 

unfunded liability will be fully amortized in 2033.

Personnel Surveys 

Provide Mixed Results

In support of proposed retirement changes, the military leadership has 

cited growing dissatisfaction among military members about their 

retirement benefits. Reports of dissatisfaction have often been 

anecdotal—arising when military leaders visit the troops. In addition, 

various DOD and service surveys show that military members have 

increasingly cited dissatisfaction with military retirement. For example, 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Multiplier repeal COLA reform

Total accrual

 projection

2000 $601 $195 $796

2001 656 232 888

2002 713 270 983

2003 773 276 1,049

2004 797 285 1,082

2005 862 291 1,153

Total $4,402 $1,549 $5,951

3

The difference between the estimated $7 billion increase in the unfunded liability and the estimated 

$7.5 billion in reduced accrual payments under Redux is due to the fact that the DOD proposal 

represents only a partial repeal of Redux. As discussed, DOD’s proposal does not call for totally 

repealing the reduced COLA.
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

the Army conducts a semi-annual personnel survey that addresses 

satisfaction with 56 aspects of military life, one of which is retirement 

“benefits.” Since 1992, satisfaction with retirement benefits has declined 

steadily. However, the results may not be directly attributable to 

retirement pay because the survey lumps all retirement benefits together, 

including pay, health care, commissary privileges, access to recreation 

facilities, and others.

Another example is a late-1998 Air Force survey of 633 departing 

personnel. Retirement pay was cited as an important reason for separating 

from the Air Force by 58 percent of the enlisted respondents and 42 percent 

of the officers. Other reasons cited were the availability of civilian jobs, 

pay, frequent moves, and compatibility of the military with family life. 

Approximately 86 percent indicated that retirement was not a good 

incentive to serve 20 years or more. However, when asked if there was one 

single thing that the Air Force could do to keep them in the service, only 

35 percent of enlisted personnel and 48 percent of officers said that there 

was. Of those who indicated that there was one single change that could be 

made, the most frequently cited changes were more choice in assignments 

and a decrease in the amount of time spent away from their home station. 

Retirement was not among the single changes that were cited as being 

sufficient to keep them in the service. Officers wanted more say/choice in 

assignments and a decrease in OPSTEMPO; Enlisted Personnel wanted 

more pay, more control over assignments and to decrease OPSTEMPO.

These and other survey results also reveal that many military members do 

not understand their retirement systems. The Army’s fall 1996 Sample 

Survey of Military Personnel showed that, of those who planned to stay in 

the Army until retirement, more than one-half of the officer respondents 

and two-thirds of the enlisted respondents did not know which retirement 

plan they were under. Even with the recent publicity surrounding 

retirement issues, approximately 58 percent of the enlisted personnel 

responding to a Navy survey in late 1998 indicated that they did not know 

what retirement system they were under. Such lack of knowledge makes 

the basis for their dissatisfaction unclear. 

Issues Warranting 

Further Analysis

Before proceeding with changes to the military retirement system, 

Congress may want to seek the answers to several questions: (1) What is 

the nature of the retention problem? Is it widespread or limited primarily 

to relatively small pockets? Is it a transitory problem or is it expected to 

continue for the foreseeable future? (2) What is the link between 
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

retirement pay and retention? (3) Should other aspects of retirement or the 

military compensation system be addressed in a more comprehensive way? 

Only with further examination of these questions can Congress be 

confident that changing the retirement system will solve DOD’s reported 

retention problems and be cost-effective. I do not have the answers to 

these questions today—but believe that they are important enough to 

warrant further analysis.

Extent of Retention 

Problems Not Yet Known

According to DOD officials, aggregate historical retention patterns are 

relatively stable, but recent downturns in retention are indicators of an 

impending problem. The Air Force and Navy have recently fallen short of 

their retention goals. Some of the most critical shortfalls are in the Air 

Force, where overall retention rates are below target and second-term 

retention rates are at 68 percent, below the target rate of 75 percent.

Retention problems have reportedly been severe in certain jobs, such as 

pilots and computer specialists, among others. We are now reviewing the 

retention of pilots and other specialties where retention has been 

problematic. The results are expected to be available this summer.

Some shortfalls may be a relatively short-run problem. For example, the 

shortfalls may be related to how the services approached reducing the size 

of the force in the early 1990s. To meet reduced personnel ceilings and yet 

maintain readiness, the services generally opted to reduce accessions 

rather than separate experienced personnel. Those lowered accessions 

during the drawdown may be contributing to shortfalls, as the pipeline now 

has fewer junior personnel. With fewer junior personnel in the pipeline, 

DOD needs to retain a higher percentage to fill its now relatively constant 

personnel slots. This task is made more difficult because of the low 

unemployment rate and strong economy.

Unclear Link Between 

Retention and Retirement

The empirical link between retirement and retention has not been 

convincingly drawn. When asked about the effect of Redux on retention, 

the Marine Corps was blunt, saying that it is “difficult to quantify the impact 

of the Redux retirement system” and that it cannot “definitively 

substantiate” direct impacts on retention. Army leadership has said that 

retirement is less effective as a retention tool than it used to be. The 

service chiefs are united in their belief that Redux is hurting retention. This 

appears to be based on a combination of anecdotal reports, survey data, 

and professional military judgment.
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

This lack of hard evidence concerns us and concerns some in Congress. In 

October 1998, two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee sent 

a letter to the Secretary of Defense asking for an analysis of the likely 

impact of DOD’s pay and retirement proposals. During January 1999 

testimony, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked about this 

analysis. He cited the concerns evidenced in the surveys and said that 

taking time to perform detailed studies might lead to the “demise of the 

force.” Similarly, the House National Security Committee has twice 

requested that DOD report on the effects of Redux on retention, among 

other items. The first of these reports, requested in the House 

subcommittee report on the fiscal year 1998 Defense authorization act, was 

never received. The second report, requested in the House report on the 

fiscal year 1999 Defense authorization act, is due June 30, 1999.

Several factors blur the link between retention and retirement. It has not 

been shown that retention among personnel that entered the service under 

Redux is lower than it is for those that entered under the previous systems. 

Also, the decision to stay in or leave the military is complex and based on a 

number of factors. Finally, deferred compensation such as retirement pay 

is typically less of an incentive than up-front compensation for retaining 

personnel. I will expand on each of these points.

Historical data shows no conclusive evidence of a lower retention rate for 

Redux personnel. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzed 

retention decisions of personnel who entered the military around the time 

Redux was implemented. CBO has stated that its analysis generally shows 

no significant difference in retention under Redux. Had Redux been a 

major influence in the retention decision, fewer Redux personnel would be 

staying in the military.

The decision of whether to stay in or leave the military is complicated. 

DOD and the services contend that Redux is simply not attractive enough 

to keep people in like the previous systems did. In addition to retirement, 

several other factors—civilian employment opportunities, quality of life, 

and general satisfaction with military life ranging from military housing to 

rotation policies—influence retention. These influences are difficult to 

isolate. 

Finally, increasing retirement pay may not be the most cost-effective way to 

increase retention. Rand believes that targeted pay increases—of the type 

that DOD is proposing—are the most effective way to address pockets of 

retention problems. Increasing retirement pay is generally seen as a less 
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

effective incentive compared to increasing current pay because of the 

tendency of military personnel to deeply discount the value of future 

dollars. For example, personnel who were offered early separations during 

the drawdown showed a strong preference for the cash incentives rather 

than an annuity—even though the annuity was worth more from a present 

value perspective. According to an analysis performed by DOD, 

approximately 50 percent of officers and around 90 percent of enlisted 

people took the up-front payment, even though the present value of the 

annuity was, in many cases, worth more than twice as much. In addition, 

since retirement pay is computed on basic pay, an increase in pay also 

results in an increase in retirement pay.

Other Issues to Consider DOD may be missing an opportunity to take a more comprehensive 

approach to its compensation system. The purpose of the military 

compensation system is to attract, retain, and motivate the number of 

quality personnel needed to maintain the desired level of national security. 

The military compensation system is a complex accretion of over 

40 different pays and allowances, many of which came into being to 

address a specific problem at the time. Over the past 50 years, at least 

15 presidentially or congressionally commissioned study groups have 

recommended improvements to the system. While the level of 

compensation has changed dramatically over that period, the features of 

the military compensation system have changed relatively little. 

The most recent broad review of military compensation, the Eighth 

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, sought to design a 

compensation system that would attract, retain, and motivate the diverse 

workforce of the 21st century. Its June 1997 executive report encouraged a 

broad, strategic approach to human resource management systems 

through which DOD would align its personnel practices with the strategic 

direction of the organization. The report says that a comprehensive review 

of the compensation system requires the military to include everything that 

servicemembers value, and it concludes that “one size does not fit all.”

In 1996, GAO hosted a roundtable of military experts to discuss possible 

changes to the military retirement system.4

 The consensus of the panel 

members was that the military retirement system—while exerting a strong 

pull toward retirement after members reach 10 to 12 years of service—can 

4

Military Retirement: Possible Changes Merit Further Evaluation (GAO/NSIAD-97-17, Nov. 15, 1996).
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

actually impede effective force management. Many of the participants 

indicated that the 20-year vesting provision of the retirement system is a 

hindrance to effectively managing the force. Because military personnel 

are not entitled to any retirement benefits unless they have served 20 years, 

the services have been reluctant to involuntarily separate personnel as they 

approached 20 years of service. And although some military combat 

specialties (like infantry) require youth and vigor, experience may be of 

greater value in occupations such as intelligence analysis or systems 

acquisition. 

Once a member reaches 20 years, the previous retirement systems tend to 

exert a considerable “push” effect. As I noted earlier, about 47 percent of 

retirees leave within one year after reaching 20 years of service; by the end 

of 22 years of service, almost 70 percent have left. Part of the rationale for 

the Redux reform was to increase the size of the career force by reducing 

this push effect. If Redux is repealed, we will not know whether it would 

have achieved the objective of stemming the loss of senior career 

personnel—and repeal may have an unintended consequence of reducing 

the incentive for people to stay in the military after they become eligible for 

retirement.

In summary, I believe that changes to the military retirement system must 

be carefully analyzed. Such changes would apply across the board and 

would likely have a long-term effect. Overall, DOD has not demonstrated 

that the proposed change to the retirement system, estimated to cost 

$13 billion in higher accrual payments to the retirement trust fund and an 

increase in Treasury’s unfunded liabilities, is a cost-effective way to 

improve retention. 

A number of questions should be explored before making changes to a 

system that has been changed only twice in over 50 years. First, we need to 

understand what kind of a retention problem exists. Are retention 

problems focused in certain subpopulations or do they apply across the 

force? Are current retention problems a transitory result of such factors as 

restricted accessions during the recent military downsizing and a good 

economy, or do they signal a long-term decline in the attractiveness of 

military careers? Second, we need to understand the relationship between 

the retirement system and retention, particularly its relative importance to 

servicemembers compared to other changes that might be made in 

compensation or quality of life in the military. Would spending scarce 

resources to increase retirement benefits have a greater impact on DOD’s 

current and long-term manning than spending those resources in other 
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-94

areas? Finally, given that the first retirees under Redux will not reach 

retirement eligibility until 2006, an opportunity exists to take a longer term, 

strategic perspective. Is the current military compensation system, which 

is the result of an historical accretion of elements, best suited for meeting 

our national defense manning needs into the 21st century? 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We are prepared to 

respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee 

may have.

(703271) Letr
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