POLICY ISSUE 

INFORMATION

May 20, 2010 SECY-10-0066

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: James T. Wiggins, Director 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL RADIOACTIVE SOURCE SECURITY EFFORTS 

PURPOSE: 

This information paper responds to one item of the May 20, 2009, Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) M090423, “Briefing on Radioactive Source Security” (Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML091400200), 

directing staff to remain aware of what other countries are doing regarding security 

requirements for blood irradiators, including lessons learned, and make a recommendation to 

the Commission on what, if anything, should be incorporated into the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s (NRC) Radioactive Materials Programs. Other items in the SRM are addressed 

separately. 

DISCUSSION: 

Staff remains aware of international activities in a number of ways. Information is exchanged 

during bilateral and multilateral meetings with international counterparts. Staff also participated 

in the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series 

(NSS) documents and international conferences on this topic. Information is also obtained 

through coordination with other Federal Agencies. With respect to the specific security 

requirements for blood irradiators, staff is not aware of any countries that have unique security 

requirements for blood irradiators. 

CONTACT: Timothy E. Harris, NSIR/DSP 

(301) 415-7218
The Commissioners -2- 

As of May 2010, 99 countries have made a non-binding commitment to implement the IAEA 

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct). Of 

those 99 countries, we understand based on conversations with IAEA and country 

representatives that only a limited number of countries including Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 

Iraq, Japan, Philippines, United Kingdom (UK), and Vietnam have developed and implemented 

radioactive source security measures through various means (e.g., codes of practice, 

incorporating guidance documents into license conditions, or regulations). Staff reviewed 

available information and conducted a review of documents from Australia, Canada, Philippines, 

UK, and Vietnam. This review did not identify any specific security requirements for blood 

irradiators. Other countries (such as Albania, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 

Estonia, Hungary, Ghana, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 

Poland, Russia, Tanzania, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) are in the process of developing security 

requirements for radioactive sources. 

Based on staff discussions, most countries are designing their source security programs using 

or considering the IAEA NSS Implementing Guide, “Security of Radioactive Sources” 

(NSS No. 11, 2009) which includes guidance and recommended measures for the prevention 

of, detection of, and response to malicious acts involving radioactive sources. The document 

does not include any specific requirements associated with blood irradiator security. The draft 

IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities 

(which was published in March 2010, and is available for 120-day Member State comment) 

notes that countries should consider ways of reducing the security risk associated with 

radioactive material, particularly radioactive sources, for example by encouraging the use of an 

alternative radionuclide, chemical form, or non-radioactive technology, or by encouraging device 

designs that are more tamper resistant. This document also notes that if the regulatory body 

becomes aware of a specific threat of sabotage against particular radioactive material or 

particular facilities, the regulatory body could choose to require additional or more stringent 

security measures to increase the level of protection against sabotage. While not specifically 

highlighting blood irradiators, this document raises issues that the U.S. has raised in its 

evaluation of blood irradiator security. 

Domestically, the NRC continues to work with the Department of Energy/National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) to enhance security of certain blood and research irradiators. 

These efforts are discussed in SECY-10-0036, “Update on Staff Efforts to Work with Federal 

Partners on Voluntary Security Initiatives for Radioactive Materials,” dated March 30, 2010, 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML100670638). Internationally, NNSA through its Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative Program has completed physical protection upgrades in over 40 countries at 

more than 755 radiological sites, including industrial, medical, and commercial facilities. Their 

focus is on increasing the protection of nuclear and radioactive materials in countries without 

regulatory requirements for enhanced security. NNSA also shares best practices with other 

countries including in-device delay efforts for blood and research irradiators and has briefed the 

Netherlands, UK, Germany, Japan, France, Canada, Austria and IAEA. 

Staff has remained aware of what other countries are doing regarding security requirements for 

radioactive sources including blood irradiators. NRC’s program is consistent with IAEA 

guidance and is ahead of other countries both in timing of implementing requirements and in 

program robustness. In summary, staff’s assessment of international activities regarding blood 

irradiators did not uncover new or significant issues which the Commission should consider. 
The Commissioners -3- 

CONCLUSION: 

Therefore, as it applies to blood irradiator security, staff does not recommend any specific 

changes to the Radioactive Materials Programs. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. This paper 

has been coordinated with the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs and the Office of International Programs. 

/RA/ 

James T. Wiggins, Director 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 
The Commissioners -3- 

CONCLUSION: 

Therefore, as it applies to blood irradiator security, staff does not recommend any specific 

changes to the Radioactive Materials Programs. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. This paper 

has been coordinated with the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs and the Office of International Programs. 

/RA/ 

James T. Wiggins, Director 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML101190425 (W200900121) 

OFFICE NSIR/DSP/MWISB NSIR/DSP/MWISB/BC NSIR/DSP: D 

NAME T. Harris S. Wastler R. Correia 

DATE 5/06/2010 5/12/2010 5/13/2010 

OFFICE FSME OIP OGC NSIR 

NAME C. Miller/ For C. 

Carpenter (by e-mail) 

M.Doane NStAmour 

for/M.Young 

J. Wiggins 

DATE 5/13 /10 5/17/10 5/14/10 5/20/10 

OFFICAL RECORD COPY