Filing 1/22/24 (opinion on rehearing)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VINCENT MEDRANO,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B324567

(Super. Ct. No. CR28216)

(Ventura County)

OPINION ON REHEARING

Vincent Medrano again appeals an order denying his Penal 

Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 The order was 

made at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. This is his 

second petition for resentencing.

In 1991 appellant was convicted of two counts of first 

degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances 

finding (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), two counts of attempted 

first degree murder (§§ 664/187, 189), and one count of conspiracy 

to commit first degree murder (§ 182). The jury found true 

allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had 

been armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a 

firearm enhancement. In 1994 we affirmed the judgment in an 

unpublished opinion, People v. Medrano (Jul. 26, 1994, B065832). 

In 2019 appellant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. 

After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). 

The trial court denied the petition, and we affirmed in People v. 

Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, hereafter referred to as 

“Medrano” or “our 2021 opinion.” We held “that section [1172.6] 

relief is unavailable to a petitioner [such as appellant] 

concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder where both convictions involve the 

same victim” because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit 

first degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target 

offense’ is murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.)

In the present appeal we conclude that the above holding is 

the law of the case and conclusively establishes at the prima facie 

stage that appellant is not entitled to resentencing based on his 

second 1172.6 petition. Accordingly, we again affirm.

Our conclusion may be at variance with the holding of 

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden): “[P]rior 

to [an evidentiary] hearing under section [1172.6], subdivision 

(d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish 

disentitlement [to relief under section 1172.6].” We explain below 

why the holding of Harden is inapplicable here. We also explain 

why our conclusion is consistent with People v. Curiel (2023) 15 

Cal.5th 433 (Curiel).)

Facts

The following facts are taken from Medrano, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th at p. 179: Appellant and Carlos Vargas purchased a 
3

.22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Appellant “scored” the “tip” of 

the rifle’s bullets in the belief that “the scoring would make the 

bullets more explosive.” As overt act No. 7 underlying the 

conspiracy charge, the jury found that appellant, Vargas, Edward 

Throop, and Joseph Scholle had “discussed among themselves 

committing a drive-by shooting.”2 Vargas drove them to Cabrillo 

Village in Ventura County. “Throop held the rifle and sat in the 

back seat next to appellant.” Throop pointed the rifle out the 

window and fired multiple shots at a group of people attending a 

baptism party. As Vargas drove away, Scholle shouted the 

names of rival gangs. Two men attending the baptism party died 

of gunshot wounds. Two other men were shot but survived.

Senate Bill No. 1437 Eliminated the Natural and Probable 

Consequences Doctrine as a Basis for Murder Liability

Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437) became effective on 

January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) It “imposed a new 

requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in 

a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of 

murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a

person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ 

[Citation.] One effect of this requirement was to eliminate

liability for murder as an aider and abettor under

2 “A conviction of conspiracy requires proof . . . of the 

commission of an overt act ‘by one or more of the parties to such 

agreement’ in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (People v. Morante

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416.) The jury found that appellant and 

his co-conspirators had jointly committed seven overt acts, 

including that they had (1) purchased the rifle used in the 

murders, (2) “scored the bullets,” (3) “armed themselves with 

[the] rifle,” and (4) “hid the rifle used in the murders.”
4

the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.]

‘[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an 

accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly 

aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any other 

offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the 

“natural and probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice 

aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense). [Citation.] A

nontarget offense is the natural and probable consequence of a

target offense “if, judged objectively, the [nontarget] offense was

reasonably foreseeable.” [Citation.] . . .’ . . . Thus, under prior

law, a defendant who aided and abetted an intended assault

could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and

probable consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.] The

defendant need not have intended the murder or even

subjectively appreciated the natural and probable consequences

of the intended crime. [Citation.] [S.B.] 1437 ended this form of

liability for murder.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)

Section 1172.6 and Its Legislative History

Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by S.B. 1437. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) 

originally provided, “A person convicted of felony murder or 

murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may 

file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have 

the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced 

on any remaining counts when” certain conditions apply. 

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by 

Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) S.B. 

775 added the following ground for relief to section 1172.6, 

subdivision (a): the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant 

to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based 
5

solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” S.B. 775 also 

amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility for 

resentencing to persons convicted of “attempted murder under 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” One of the 

conditions for relief under amended section 1172.6 is that “[t]he 

petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or 

attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made 

effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)

After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, “the court shall hold 

a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima 

facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie 

showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall 

issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “At the

prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner's

allegation that he or she could not currently be convicted of a

homicide offense because of changes to section 188 or 189 made

effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by the

record. [Citation.] And this allegation is not refuted by the

record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of

the offense. If only one element of the offense is established by 

the record, the petitioner could still be correct that he or she 

could not currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on 

the absence of other elements.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.

463.)

If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct 

an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for 

relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing the 

burden is on the People “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder . . . .” 

(Id., subd. (d)(3).)
6

Our 2021 Medrano Opinion

In our 2021 opinion we noted that “[t]he jury [at appellant’s 

trial] was instructed on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine.” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) Despite 

this instruction, we concluded: “The prosecutor met his burden 

[at the evidentiary hearing] of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that [appellant] is ineligible for resentencing.’ (§ [1172.6], 

subd. (d)(3).) Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder rendered him ineligible as a matter of law. The 

conviction established that he had not been ‘convicted of . . . [first 

degree] murder under a natural and probable consequences 

theory.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) He was convicted of first degree 

murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory, i.e., he knew 

and shared the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator, 

Throop.” (Id., at p. 186.) 

The Second Section 1172.6 Petition

Appellant filed a second section 1172.6 petition (the 

petition at issue in this appeal) after the effective date of the 

amendment of that section by S.B. 775. In the trial court he 

asserted, “This petition is based on S.B. 775, which amended 

section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to include [as grounds for relief], in 

addition to felony-murder or murder under the [natural and 

probable consequences] doctrine, any ‘other theory under which 

malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s 

participation in a crime.’” Appellant argued that he had made a 

prima facie showing that he was convicted of murder pursuant to 

a theory under which malice had been imputed to him based 

solely on his participation in the drive-by shootings. In addition, 

he argued that he had made a prima facie showing that he was 

convicted of both murder and attempted murder under the 
7

natural and probable consequences doctrine. Relying on Harden, 

supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, appellant contended the law of the case 

doctrine was inapplicable at the prima facie stage of a section 

1172.6 proceeding. 

The People’s Opposition and the Trial Court’s Ruling

In opposition to appellant’s second section 1172.6 petition, 

the People argued that our holding in Medrano, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th 177, is the law of the case. In denying the second 

petition, the trial court explained, “[B]ased on the reasoning o[f] 

the appellate opinion, specifically with regards to the conviction 

for conspiracy, I will find that the petition is barred, as a matter 

of law.” 

The Law of the Case Doctrine

“‘“The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where, 

upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, 

states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the 

decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and 

must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in 

the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and . . . in any 

subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .”’ The principle 

applies to criminal as well as civil matters [citations] . . . .”

(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) “We will apply the 

law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was

‘“actually presented and determined by the court.”’” (People v.

Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.) But “the doctrine will not be 

adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision, 

e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing 

principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or the 

controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a 

decision or [statutory amendment] intervening between the first 
8

and second appellate determinations [citation].’” (Stanley, supra, 

at p. 787.)

Applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine at 

the Prima Facie Stage of a Section 1172.6 Proceeding 

Appellant claims the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable 

at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. He relies 

on Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45. There, the Court of Appeal 

held: “At the prima facie stage of an [1172.6] proceeding, it is of 

course impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at 

an evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred. We thus agree 

with Harden that prior to a hearing under section [1172.6], 

subdivision (d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot 

conclusively establish disentitlement [to relief under section 

1172.6].” (Id. at p. 50.)

In an earlier appeal from Harden’s judgment of conviction, 

the Court of Appeal had “determined [that at Harden’s 2001 trial] 

there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Harden’s 

role was anything other than that of [the] actual killer.” 

(Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) The Court of Appeal 

concluded that this determination was not the law of the case. It 

credited Harden’s argument, which was as follows: “[The] law of

the case [doctrine] cannot be invoked where there is a 

‘“substantial difference in the evidence”’ on retrial of the 

particular issue. [Citation.] . . . [I]f at [an evidentiary] hearing 

under subdivision (d) of section [1172.6], the evidence material to 

[Harden’s] role in the murder were substantially the same [as the 

evidence in Harden’s 2001 trial], then law-of-the-case principles 

would compel the same legal conclusion to be drawn, i.e., that she 

was the actual killer. But if the evidence were materially 

different on that issue, . . . [the] law of the case [doctrine] would 
9

not apply. This is because law of the case ‘controls the outcome 

on retrial only to the extent the evidence is substantially the 

same.’ [Citation.] Where ‘“there is a substantial difference in the 

evidence to which the [announced] principle of law is applied, . . . 

the [doctrine] may not be invoked.”’” (Id., at p. 50; see People v.

Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 442 [“the law-of-the-case doctrine 

governs only the principles of law laid down by an appellate 

court, as applicable to a retrial of fact, and it controls the outcome 

on retrial only to the extent the evidence is substantially the 

same. [Citation.] The doctrine does not limit the new evidence a 

party may introduce on retrial”].)

Appellant asserts, “Harden precludes the court from 

invoking the law of the case doctrine at the prima facie stage 

because it is unclear what the evidence will be at an evidentiary 

hearing that has yet to occur. [Appellant] may present evidence 

at the evidentiary hearing that contradicts [this court’s] 

conclusion [in our 2021 opinion] that [he] harbored an intent to 

kill.” 

The holding in Harden should be limited to prohibiting 

application of the law of the case doctrine at a prima facie 

hearing where, as in Harden, the appellate court’s prior 

determination concerned the sufficiency of the evidence at the 

petitioner’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing conducted pursuant 

to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), Harden would have had the 

opportunity to introduce new evidence showing that she was not 

the actual killer. Therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence 

determination in the earlier appeal from Harden’s judgment of 

conviction could not be the law of the case at the prima facie 

stage of his section 1172.6 petition.
10

Unlike Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, in Medrano, 

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 177, we were not concerned with an 

appellate court’s prior determination of the sufficiency of the 

evidence at appellant’s trial. Instead, we were concerned with 

the effect of the jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of both 

first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder. We enunciated the following principle of law: “[S]ection 

[1172.6] relief is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently 

convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim” 

because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target offense’ is 

murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.) This principle of law necessarily 

applies where, as here, the petitioner has also been concurrently 

convicted of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder and both convictions involve the 

same victim.

At a section 1172.6, subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing, 

appellant could not introduce new evidence that would affect the 

validity of the principle of law enunciated in our 2021 Medrano

opinion. This is the key distinction between Medrano and 

Harden. Unlike appellant, the petitioner in Harden theoretically 

could have introduced new evidence to controvert the appellate 

court’s prior determination that, based on the evidence 

introduced at trial, she must have been the actual killer. Thus, 

in contrast to Harden, the principle of law enunciated in our 2021 

opinion is the law of the case. 

This principle of law was not altered by S.B. 775’s 

amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility 

to persons convicted of murder pursuant to a “theory under which 
11

malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s 

participation in a crime.” (Ibid., italics added.) A person cannot 

be convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on 

such “imputed” malice. (People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 

1226 [“[T]he crime of conspiracy to commit murder requires a 

finding of unlawful intent to kill, i.e., express malice”].) 

We noted in Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184: 

“According to an instruction given before the jury started its 

deliberations (CALJIC No. 6.10), it could convict appellant of 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder only if it found he had 

acted ‘with the specific intent to agree to commit the public 

offense of first degree murder and with the further specific intent 

to commit such offense.’ In view of this instruction, the 

conspiracy conviction shows that the jury found appellant had 

specifically intended to commit first degree murder.” Appellant 

cannot relitigate this issue. “[A] section [1172.6] petition is not a 

means by which a [petitioner] can relitigate issues already 

decided.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549.)

Each charge and conviction for a separate count stands or 

falls on its own. (People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 

1657.) Thus, even if there were some instructional error as to the 

murder and attempted murder counts, it could not be used to 

impeach the jury’s finding of intent to kill as to the conspiracy 

count. This finding is as true today as it was in 1991 when the 

jury returned its guilty verdicts. 

Appellant’s Claim that Our 2021 Medrano

Opinion Conflicts with Our 1994 Opinion

Appellant argues, “[T]he law of the case doctrine should not 

apply at all in this case [because we] rendered two irreconcilable 

opinions on the issue of whether the jury found that [he had] 
12

harbored the specific intent to kill.” The two opinions – our 2021

opinion and our 1994 opinion in appellant’s direct appeal from 

the judgment of conviction – are not in conflict. In our 2021 

opinion we rejected appellant’s similar contention. We noted that 

in the 1994 opinion “[w]e did not consider whether, by convicting 

appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the jury 

necessarily found that he had harbored the specific intent to kill.” 

(Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)

Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine

Will Not Result in an Unjust Decision

Appellant has not shown that, by applying the law of the 

case doctrine, we would be shutting our eyes to a manifest

misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial 

injustice. As our Supreme Court observed: “‘[A]ll conspiracy to 

commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated 

and deliberated first degree murder.’” (People v. Beck & Cruz

(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641-642.) “[A] conviction of conspiracy to 

commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill . . . .” (People v. 

Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)

The California Supreme Court’s Recent

Decision in Curiel Is Distinguishable

At our request, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs 

discussing the applicability of Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, to 

the issue of whether appellant made a prima facie case for relief. 

In his supplemental brief appellant asserts, “[T]he law of the case 

doctrine should not bar [him] from making a prima facie case for 

relief based on Curiel.” We disagree. Curiel is distinguishable. 

In 2006 a jury convicted Curiel of first degree murder and 

found true a gang-murder special-circumstance allegation 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) that required a specific intent to kill the 
13

victim. Curiel petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6. 

“He alleged . . . that he had been convicted of first degree murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could 

not currently be convicted of murder because of changes to the 

murder statutes enacted by [S.B.] 1437.” (Curiel, supra, 15 

Cal.5th at p. 440.) “[T]he trial court denied Curiel’s petition for 

failure to state a prima facie case. The court believed the jury’s 

finding that Curiel ‘inten[ded] to kill,’ which was required for the 

gang-murder special circumstance, refuted Curiel’s allegation 

that he could not be convicted of murder under current law and 

therefore precluded relief under [S.B.] 1437.” (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s 

judgment reversing the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court 

stated: “We hold only that under the jury instructions here, the 

findings the jury must have made are insufficient to conclusively 

establish that Curiel is liable for murder under current law. The 

jury could have relied on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine to convict Curiel of murder, and the findings required 

under that theory—even when combined with the finding of 

intent to kill required by the gang-murder special circumstance—

do not encompass all of the elements of any theory of murder 

under current law. These findings were therefore insufficient to 

rebut Curiel's allegation that he could not be convicted of murder 

under current law, and the trial court erred by denying Curiel's 

petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.” (Curiel, 

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471.)

The Supreme Court explained: “Although intent to kill is

certainly blameworthy, it is insufficient standing alone to render

a person culpable for another’s acts. The aider and abettor must

know the direct perpetrator intends to commit the murder or life-
14

endangering act and intend to aid the direct perpetrator in its

commission.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.) “Under the 

court’s instructions, the jury was not required to make these 

findings. Because the jury was instructed on the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, the jury was required to find 

only that Curiel knew that [the actual killer] intended to commit 

one of the underlying target offenses [disturbing the peace or 

carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member] and that Curiel 

intended to aid him in that offense, not murder.[3] . . . While the 

jury separately found Curiel intended to kill, such an intent 

standing alone is insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea 

for aiding and abetting murder. The essence of aiding and 

abetting is involvement in the crime of another. The aider and

abettor must become ‘concerned’ with the crime itself. (§ 31.) ‘[A]

person “chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of

another”’ and ‘“says in essence, ‘your acts are my acts.’”’” (Ibid.)

3 The jury was instructed: “ ‘To prove that the defendant is 

guilty of murder under the theory of aiding and abetting [based 

on] natural and probable consequences, the People must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [1] the defendant is guilty of 

disturbing the peace or of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang 

member; [2] during the commission of the crime of disturbing the 

peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang 

member the crime of murder was committed; and [3] under all 

the circumstances a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 

would have known that the commission of murder was a natural 

and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of 

disturbing the peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed 

firearm by a gang member.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 446.)
15

Unlike Curiel, appellant was convicted of conspiracy to

commit first degree murder. Thus, the target offense was not an

underlying offense other than murder, such as assault with a

firearm. The target offense was murder. Appellant and his

accomplices formed a conspiracy to commit murder during a

drive-by shooting. “The mental state elements of conspiracy

require the prosecution to demonstrate the defendant had the 

specific intent both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the 

object offense.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 164.) As 

we stated in Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184, “First 

degree murder was the object of the conspiracy, not the natural 

and probable consequence of an act committed to further the 

object of the conspiracy.” (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

72, 123 [“For a conspiracy to commit murder, intent to commit 

the target offense means an intent to kill”].) 

Accordingly, the jury must have found that appellant knew 

his co-conspirator, Throop, intended to commit murder and that 

appellant intended to aid Throop in committing murder. The 

jury was instructed, “‘A conspiracy is an agreement entered into 

between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to 

commit the public offense of first degree murder and with the 

further specific intent to commit such offense . . . .’” (Medrano, 

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 185, fn. 4.)

Because the facts, jury instructions, and verdicts in the 

present case are different from those in Curiel, the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Curiel is of no assistance to appellant. (See 

Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471 [“our holding today does not 

necessarily apply to other cases where the jury found intent to 

kill . . . . The jury instructions in other cases might be materially 
16

different, and they might therefore have required different 

factual findings by the jury”].)

Disposition

The order denying appellant’s second section 1172.6 

petition for resentencing is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Michele M. Castillo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William Quest, Snr. 

Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.