POLICY ISSUE 

NOTATION VOTE 

October 26, 2010 SECY-10-0140

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR REVISING THE CONSTRUCTION REACTOR 

OVERSIGHT PROCESS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 

PURPOSE: 

This paper responds to Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) M081022, Periodic Briefing on 

New Reactor Issues, dated December 5, 2008, and requests Commission approval of the staff’s 

recommended option for the assessment of licensee performance during the construction of 

new reactor facilities pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, 

“Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” This paper also provides 

the Commission information regarding plans for implementation and updates to thresholds in 

the construction action matrix (CAM), and plans for the development and embodiment of safety 

culture within the construction inspection program (CIP). This paper does not address any new 

commitments. 

SUMMARY: 

The staff recommends that the Commission approve the development of a construction 

assessment program that includes a regulatory framework, the use of a construction 

significance determination process (SDP) to determine the significance of findings identified 

during the CIP, and the use of a CAM to determine the appropriate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) response to degrading licensee performance. 

CONTACT: Thomas J. Kozak, NRO/DCIP 

 (301) 415-6892 
The Commissioners -2- 

The staff does not recommend that construction performance indicators (PIs) be developed for 

use in assessing licensee construction performance at this time. The staff plans to evaluate 

construction PIs during the annual Construction Reactor Oversight Process (cROP) selfassessment and will recommend their development and implementation if meaningful 

construction PIs can be identified. 

Should the Commission approve the staff’s recommendation, staff plans to pilot the new 

construction assessment program for 12 months and, provided the results of the pilot are 

positive, the staff will fully implement the new program. 

BACKGROUND: 

The staff initially described the CIP in SECY-06-0041, “Proposed Strategy to Support 

Implementation of the New-Reactor Construction Inspection Program,” dated 

February 22, 2006. The CIP builds on the lessons learned from the construction of the existing 

fleet of operating reactors. The CIP comprises four different parts and is described in Inspection 

Manual Chapter (IMC) 2501, “Construction Inspection Program: Early Site Permit (ESP)”; 

IMC 2502, “Construction Inspection Program: Pre-Combined License (Pre-COL) Phase”; 

IMC 2503, “Construction Inspection Program: Inspections of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 

Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)”; and IMC 2504, “Construction Inspection Program—Inspection of 

Construction and Operational Programs.” These IMCs cover all aspects of the inspection 

program, from early site preparation work, through construction, to the transition to inspections 

under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for operating reactors. 

In SECY-07-0047, “Staff Approach to Verifying the Closure of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 

Acceptance Criteria Through a Sample-Based Inspection Program,” dated March 8, 2007, the 

staff described its planned approach to select those ITAAC to be given priority for inspection 

and how these inspection results will be used to support ITAAC closeout. The Commission 

approved this inspection approach in the SRM, Staff Requirements—SECY-07-0047, Staff 

Approach to Verifying the Closure of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria 

Through a Sample-Based Inspection Program,” dated May 16, 2007. 

In SECY-08-0155, “Update on the Development of the Construction Inspection Program for New 

Reactor Construction Under 10 CFR Part 52,” dated October 17, 2008, the staff described its 

planned approach to the assessment of licensee construction performance, which is described 

in IMC 2505, “Periodic Assessment of Construction Inspection Program Results.” As part of the 

finding screening process described in SECY 08-0155, the significance of the identified findings 

would be used over a predetermined period of time as an input to the assessment of licensee 

performance. The construction assessment program currently described in IMC 2505 uses 

traditional enforcement to determine the significance of violations. The staff did not develop 

construction PIs or a construction SDP as part of the staff proposals in SECY-08-0155. 

The staff briefed the Commission on new reactor issues, including the IMC 2505 assessment 

program, on October 22, 2008. On December 5, 2008, the Commission directed the staff in 

SRM M081022 to reconsider the construction assessment process as presented in IMC 2505 

and to propose policy options to the Commission. The Commission also directed that the staff 

proposal should address the construction program oversight already inherent in the ITAAC 

monitoring and closure processes, and the inclusion in the construction oversight process of 

objective elements such as construction program PIs and SDPs analogous to those used in the 
The Commissioners -3- 

ROP. The Commission further directed the staff to keep the Commission informed of plans for 

implementation and updates to thresholds in the construction response table, and plans for the 

development and embodiment of safety culture within the CIP. 

 

In SECY-09-0113, “Update on the Development of Construction Assessment Process Policy 

Options and the Construction Inspection Program Information Management System,” dated 

August 14, 2009, the staff described a proposal submitted to the NRC in a draft white paper 

from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) titled, “Proposed Construction Inspection Assessment 

Process (CIAP),” dated July 3, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML092020274) that presented a concept for the construction 

assessment process that is similar in structure to the ROP regulatory framework. The staff 

determined that the NEI proposal had merit but required development work. 

On November 16, 2009, the staff conducted a Category 3 public meeting that featured a panel 

discussion during which views on construction assessment program options were presented in 

a forum open to the agency's stakeholders and the public. Meeting participants included senior 

managers from the NRC, NEI, industry representatives, and a representative from the State of 

Georgia. During that meeting, stakeholders provided feedback that a cROP analogous to the 

NRC's ROP should be developed and that all aspects of the operating reactor assessment 

program should be evaluated for inclusion in the cROP. 

The staff formed a cROP working group in December 2009 with representatives from each 

regional office, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Nuclear Security and 

Incident Response, and the Office of New Reactors (NRO). This working group reached out to 

stakeholders for input on construction assessment process options through 10 Category 2 

public meetings with the NEI-led Construction Reactor Oversight Process Task Force, four 

Category 3 public meetings, the 2010 Regulatory Information Conference, the 2010 American 

Nuclear Society Utility Working Conference, and a Federal Register notice. 

In August 2009, NRO issued an ESP and limited work authorization (LWA) to Southern Nuclear 

Operating Company for the Vogtle site near Augusta, GA. The LWA allows a narrow set of 

construction activities at the Vogtle site that are limited to placement of engineered backfill, 

retaining walls, lean concrete, mudmats, and a waterproof membrane. In SECY-10-0038, 

“Update Status on the Development of Construction Reactor Oversight Process Options,” dated 

April 2, 2010, the staff informed the Commission that the construction activities authorized by 

the LWA would warrant the implementation of the NRC’s construction assessment program in 

the near future. On July 1, 2010, the staff implemented the formal construction assessment 

program described in IMC 2505. 

DISCUSSION: 

Construction Reactor Oversight Process

Based on public interactions with stakeholders and cROP working group discussions, the 

working group used the following basic guiding principles to refine the cROP and develop 

construction assessment program options: 

• The objective of construction oversight is to evaluate licensee performance of 

construction activities and the effectiveness of licensee oversight and quality assurance 
The Commissioners -4- 

efforts associated with construction, in order to appropriately focus NRC resources and 

independently assess if the plant is constructed in accordance with regulatory 

requirements. 

• The cROP should include a regulatory framework consisting of strategic performance 

areas and associated cornerstones. 

• The significance of findings should be determined using a predictable and transparent 

process, similar to the ROP’s SDP. 

• The CIP is not limited to independently assessing the completion of ITAAC listed in the 

combined license. The NRC must also consider inspection and assessment of both 

construction and operational programs that the licensee is required to develop and 

implement. 

• Transition from construction to operating reactor oversight is expected to occur once the 

Commission makes a positive determination under 10 CFR 52.103(g) that all ITAAC 

acceptance criteria are met. 

• The cROP must be robust enough to continue to be relevant and viable until the ROP is 

ready to assume oversight responsibilities after the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding. 

• The cROP structure should be kept as simple as possible. The agency should not 

attempt to create a process that can handle all possible scenarios, but should only 

design it to handle routine and expected situations. The cROP should define an 

appropriate process to ensure that the necessary deviations resulting from unexpected 

situations are documented, approved, and reviewed in a predictable and transparent 

manner. 

• The use of PIs in conjunction with inspections should be considered in the cROP where 

relevant and feasible. 

• Similar to the ROP, the cROP should identify and define bands of performance requiring 

increased levels of NRC oversight corresponding to degraded licensee performance. 

The bands should include a threshold above which licensee performance is deemed 

unacceptable and should identify the corresponding regulatory actions. 

• Similar to the ROP, the cROP should identify a licensee performance band that does not 

require additional regulatory oversight beyond the baseline inspection level. 

• The cROP should evaluate both performance findings and programmatic findings. 

• Due to the transitory phases of construction, the cROP cornerstones may not be of 

equal weight, and a construction assessment process may not integrate them equally. 

In September 2010, the staff issued IMC 2506, “Construction Reactor Oversight Process 

General Guidance and Basis Document,” which provides the basis for the significant decisions 

made in developing the cROP and serves as the source of information for all applicable 
The Commissioners -5- 

program documents, such as manual chapters and assessment guidance. Enclosure 1 

provides an overview of the cROP. 

In the cROP, the staff implements the CIP. Inspection findings are evaluated for safety 

significance and enforcement actions are considered, as appropriate. Inspection findings are 

also considered during the ITAAC closure verification process. The resulting information is then 

assessed and an appropriate NRC response is determined using the guidelines in the CAM. 

NRC then uses various communication avenues to inform stakeholders of its regulatory 

decisions and actions. 

Proposed Construction Regulatory Framework

The cROP working group used a top-down, hierarchical approach to develop the concept for a 

new construction regulatory oversight framework that addresses the agency’s regulatory 

principles. The working group then identified those aspects of licensee performance during the 

construction life cycle that are important to the mission and, therefore, merit regulatory 

oversight. 

Enclosure 2 describes the proposed construction regulatory framework. Within this framework, 

the NRC’s cROP provides a means to collect information about licensee performance, assess 

the information for its safety and security significance, and provide for appropriate licensee and 

NRC responses. There are three key strategic performance areas: construction reactor safety, 

safeguards programs, and operational readiness. Within each strategic performance area are 

cornerstones that reflect the essential safety aspects of facility construction. These six 

cornerstones include design/engineering, procurement/fabrication, construction/installation, 

inspection/testing, security programs for construction inspection and operations, and operational 

programs. Satisfactory licensee performance in the cornerstones provides reasonable 

assurance that the facility has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the 

combined license. 

The staff envisions that all findings associated with ITAAC-related work activities, including 

emergency preparedness and security ITAAC, will be assigned to a cornerstone in the strategic 

performance area for construction reactor safety. Non-ITAAC programmatic findings will be 

assigned to either the security programs for construction inspection and operations cornerstone 

or the operational programs cornerstone. Licensee performance within these cornerstones will 

be used as part of the assessment process to focus NRC resources and provide reasonable 

assurance that the plant is constructed in accordance with regulatory requirements. 

Assessment of Violations/Findings Using Traditional Enforcement

The 10 CFR Part 52 construction assessment program currently in place uses traditional 

enforcement approaches to evaluate the significance of inspection findings. This is similar to 

the approach the staff used successfully during the Browns Ferry Unit 1 restart and the 

approach it is using to assess construction activities at Watts Bar Unit 2, the Louisiana Energy 

Services (LES) Gas Centrifuge Facility, and the U.S. Department of Energy Mixed Oxide (MOX) 

Fuel Fabrication Facility. The staff has practical experience implementing this approach and 

has not observed any widespread problems with its use in the construction assessment 

environment. However, only one escalated enforcement case has been identified at these 
The Commissioners -6- 

facilities to date, so there is limited current experience with evaluating more complex 

construction deficiencies using traditional enforcement. 

The construction assessment process currently described in IMC 2505 defines a finding as a 

violation of NRC requirements. The NRO staff has worked closely with the Office of 

Enforcement during the development of a recent revision to the Enforcement Policy that has 

been approved by the Commission and published in the Federal Register on September 30, 

2010 (75 FR 60485). In this revision, the staff has included examples of violations in each of 

the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations 

identified through the CIP. Using examples as guidance in dispositioning findings provides a 

level of transparency and predictability to the oversight of licensee performance. As additional 

experience is gained in the CIP, the Enforcement Policy will be updated if necessary based on 

the lessons learned to further enhance the predictability associated with traditional enforcement. 

It is possible that the NRC will identify findings under the CIP that are associated with the 

implementation of quality assurance programs. This includes issues that span multiple 

structures, systems, and components. Traditional enforcement is well suited to disposition 

findings associated with inadequate program development and implementation and allows the 

inspection staff and licensee to focus on the programmatic issue at hand. 

One of the recommendations in NUREG-1055, “Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality 

in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants,” issued May 1984, was for the NRC to 

take stronger enforcement action in the oversight of nuclear power plant construction. The use 

of traditional enforcement allows for the issuance of notices of violation (NOVs) and the 

consideration of the use of civil penalties for escalated enforcement cases. 

Assessment of Violations/Findings Using a Construction Significance Determination Process

Per the Commission’s direction in SRM M081022, the staff has reconsidered the construction 

assessment program and determined that a construction SDP can be used to assess the 

significance of most construction findings identified through the CIP. Analogous to the ROP, 

findings identified under the CIP involving discrimination against workers for raising safety 

issues or other willful violations, incidents with actual safety consequences, and actions that 

may adversely affect the NRC’s ability to monitor utility activities would continue to be 

processed under traditional enforcement. For example, Section VIII of the design certification 

rules and 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and Experiments,” establish the conditions under 

which applicants and licensees may make changes to the facility or procedures and conduct 

tests or experiments without prior NRC approval. Proposed changes, tests, and experiments 

that satisfy the definitions and one or more of the criteria in the rule must be reviewed and 

approved by the NRC before implementation. Violations identified under the CIP that are 

associated with these requirements would be dispositioned using traditional enforcement. 

If a construction SDP is used to disposition findings identified under the CIP, the staff envisions 

implementing a finding screening process that is based on the ROP’s screening process and is 

described in Enclosure 3. The screening process begins with an issue of concern (IOC), which 

is a well-defined observation or collection of observations. The first step is to determine if an 

IOC is a willful violation warranting investigation by the Office of Investigations. Then, the 

screening process proceeds to determine if the IOC is a performance deficiency (PD). A PD is 

an issue that is the result of a licensee not meeting a requirement or standard when the cause 
The Commissioners -7- 

was reasonably within the licensee’s ability to foresee and correct and, therefore, should have 

been prevented. A PD can exist if a licensee fails to meet a self-imposed standard or a 

standard required by regulation; thus, a PD may exist independently of whether a regulatory 

requirement was violated. The use of PD’s in a construction environment would provide a 

process for use in dispositioning non safety-related IOCs. 

Once a PD is determined to exist, two paths are taken. The first path is to determine whether 

the PD affects the regulatory process or is associated with actual consequences and therefore 

would be addressed through traditional enforcement and not the SDP. The second path is to 

determine whether the PD is of more than minor significance. If the PD is associated with 

traditional enforcement, that violation is processed separately from the underlying technical 

issue. If the PD is more than minor, the IOC is considered a finding and its significance is 

determined through the construction SDP. 

Inspection findings processed through the current ROP SDP, including associated violations, 

are documented in inspection reports and are assigned a color of green, white, yellow, or red, 

depending on their safety significance. The SDP uses risk insights, where possible, to assist 

the NRC staff in determining the safety or security significance of inspection findings identified 

within the ROP. SDPs that could not be related to core damage or containment failure risk used 

other rationale for assigning significance. Historically, such other factors included those listed in 

Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 

Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,” Revision 1, issued 

November 2002, such as maintaining defense in depth, compliance with regulations, 

engineered safety margins, and expert staff judgment. An SDP similar and analogous to the 

ROP Security SDP will be utilized in the safeguards strategic performance area. 

It took several years and significant resources to develop all of the SDPs for the ROP and the 

tools needed by the inspection staff to implement them. However, the staff expects that a 

construction SDP will be simpler and more straightforward than the ROP SDP, so that fewer 

resources and less time will be necessary to develop and implement the process. Because 

there is no fuel in the reactor vessel during construction, it is not practical to relate a 

construction SDP to core damage or containment failure risk. Therefore, the staff used other 

factors in developing the construction SDP approaches, described in detail in Enclosure 3. 

The staff believes that a construction SDP is needed to process programmatic findings and that 

a separate SDP is needed to process technical findings. The staff developed a flow chart to 

disposition programmatic findings. The staff considered two viable approaches to the 

development of a construction technical finding SDP. One approach would be to use a matrix to 

determine the significance of findings. The second approach would be to use a flow chart to 

determine the significance of findings. A goal in the development of a construction SDP was to 

ensure that findings can be processed through the SDP in a timely, transparent, and repeatable 

manner. Although neither of these approaches has been fully developed, the staff believes that 

this goal can be met with either of the construction SDP approaches described in Enclosure 3. 

The staff designed the proposed cROP structure and construction SDP to handle routine and 

expected situations. In rare instances, when the construction SDP is not well suited for the 

specific application, the staff may be required to use qualitative engineering judgment and 

regulatory oversight experience to determine the significance of findings. The staff plans to 

develop a process analogous to that used by the ROP for these rare instances. 
The Commissioners -8- 

Using the SDP to determine the significance of findings in the ROP allows NRC actions and 

conclusions to be more objective, predictable, transparent to all stakeholders, and repeatable 

for findings of comparable significance. It is reasonable to expect that the same benefits would 

be realized in the evaluation of construction inspection findings with a construction SDP. 

A high-level review of historical issues that resulted in escalated enforcement during the last 

power reactor construction cycle revealed that many of the issues were programmatic in nature 

or involved other issues that could be difficult to process using a construction SDP. Although 

the power reactor construction licensing process under 10 CFR Part 52 is different than that 

under 10 CFR Part 50, the underlying processes and programs used by licensees to ensure 

compliance and the NRC’s regulatory expectations regarding quality construction are similar. 

Thus, there is the potential that similar issues may need to be addressed by the NRC in the 

future. To address this issue, the staff developed a simple flow chart to disposition 

programmatic issues. 

There are potential NRC resource impacts from the use of a construction SDP that are difficult 

to estimate at this time. For example, each region and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

have senior reactor analysts assigned to participate in the implementation of the ROP. 

However, the staff does not envision that there will be a need for senior reactor analysts to 

participate routinely in the CIP. 

It is also possible that the use of a process similar to the ROP could delay the processing of 

some findings; there have been instances in the ROP when complex issues were not processed 

through the SDP in a timely manner and considerable licensee and NRC resources were 

expended conducting the risk determination. It is possible that similar issues could arise if a 

construction SDP is developed and implemented. This could be problematic in a fast-paced 

construction environment. However, timeliness issues in the ROP have primarily been 

associated with Phase 3 SDP evaluations (the most detailed and complete evaluations). The 

staff does not envision the need for Phase 3 evaluations for construction activities and many of 

the same challenges to the use of an SDP can be expected during the development of the 

regulatory basis for issuing an escalated enforcement action through the traditional enforcement 

process. 

The staff believes that it would be prudent to pilot the construction SDP to ensure that it can be 

effectively implemented and provide the benefits that have been realized in the ROP without 

negatively affecting the staff’s ability to process findings identified through the CIP in a timely 

manner. The staff believes that meaningful results can be only be obtained from a pilot once 

significant construction work begins. Therefore, the staff would begin the pilot once a combined 

license is issued and significant construction begins at a construction site. 

Performance Indicators

The staff considered the development of construction PIs as a means of measuring licensee 

performance in areas that are covered by the CIP. In evaluating potential PIs, the staff first 

reviewed and applied the basis for the initial development of PIs in the ROP. The staff tried to 

identify PIs for construction program performance that (1) were capable of being objectively 

measured, (2) allowed for the establishment of a threshold to guide NRC and licensee actions, 

(3) provided a reasonable sample of performance in the area being measured, (4) represented 
The Commissioners -9- 

a valid and verifiable indication of performance in the area being measured, (5) would 

encourage appropriate licensee and NRC actions, and (6) would provide sufficient time for the 

NRC and licensees to correct PDs before the deficiencies posed an undue risk to public health 

and safety. 

The NRC developed the ROP with the benefit of four decades of operational experience and, 

generally speaking, steadily improving plant performance. Before implementing the ROP, 

industry (Nuclear Management and Resources Council, NEI, Institute of Nuclear Power 

Operations) and the NRC (Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research) maintained plant operational PIs that were used in various ways 

to assess overall industry and individual plant performance. These PIs were used as a basis to 

develop the PIs that were implemented as part of the ROP assessment process. The staff 

initially developed the ROP PI thresholds based on years of historical licensee performance 

data collected by the NRC and industry. Performance data against which to benchmark new 

construction PI thresholds does not exist. 

The staff plans to evaluate the development and implementation of construction PIs during the 

annual cROP self-assessment process. As part of this process, the staff will monitor the 

industry’s use of PIs and will also monitor international construction experience to determine if 

PIs can be developed and used as an input to the assessment of licensee performance. Until 

experience is gained with the CIP, and data can be gathered upon which to base thresholds, the 

staff does not recommend the development and implementation of construction PIs. If PIs were 

incorporated into the cROP in the future, greater-than-green PIs would be an input to the CAM 

along with greater-than-green inspection findings, analogous to the inputs to the ROP’s action 

matrix. 

Safety Culture

The staff recognizes that a strong safety culture during new reactor construction is paramount to 

ensuring that newly constructed plants are in compliance with the design and will be capable of 

operating safely following construction. In order to address historical construction issues 

identified in the United States (e.g., NUREG-1055) and current international experiences that 

have reemphasized the importance of safety culture in the new construction environment, the 

staff believes that it is essential to include an assessment of a licensee’s safety culture in the 

construction assessment process. Therefore, the staff developed a near-term approach to 

safety culture that closely resembles the operating reactor assessment program’s safety-culture 

approach. This approach includes tagging findings with construction cross-cutting component 

aspects, evaluating these findings against a predefined set of criteria to determine if a significant 

concern exists, and conducting appropriate follow-up actions using a graded approach. In this 

approach, significant concerns will be treated in a manner analogous to the ROP’s substantive 

cross-cutting issues. The current construction safety culture approach is described in 

IMC 2505. 

In order to remain aligned with agency safety culture developments, NRO representatives have 

been involved with NRC staff activities pursuant to the Commission direction provided in 

COMSECY COMGBJ-08-0001, “A Commission Policy Statement on Safety Culture,” dated 

February 25, 2008. The formulation of a long-term, agency-level approach to safety culture is 

ongoing. The staff intends to continue to work with industry and other stakeholders and will 

develop a long-term approach to safety culture that is aligned with the agency-level approach. 
The Commissioners -10- 

Construction Action Matrix

In the assessment program currently described in IMC 2505, the NRC determines its regulatory 

response to licensee performance in accordance with a CAM that provides for a range of 

actions commensurate with the significance of the construction inspection results. The CAM is 

intended to provide consistent, predictable, and understandable agency responses to licensee 

performance. The CAM currently contains four columns, with actions that are graded such that 

the NRC becomes more engaged as licensee performance declines. Overall response to 

licensee performance will be determined by the number of violations that rise to the level of 

escalated enforcement (Severity Level I, II, or III). For licensee’s that have escalated 

enforcement issues, the NRC will conduct additional inspections beyond the baseline inspection 

program and initiate other actions commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. 

As is the case in the ROP, there may be rare instances in which the regulatory actions dictated 

by the CAM may not be appropriate. In these instances, the agency may deviate from the CAM 

to either increase or decrease agency action when approved by the Executive Director for 

Operations. 

If the Commission approves the proposed regulatory framework and construction SDP, the color 

of findings would become the input to the CAM. The thresholds for crossing CAM columns 

would be based on the number and significance of findings in the respective cornerstones. 

However, due to the transitory phases of construction, the cROP cornerstones will not be of 

equal weight. Therefore, thresholds for crossing columns in the CAM may differ from the ROP’s 

action matrix thresholds. The staff plans to continue to work with stakeholders to update the 

CAM structure and thresholds pending Commission construction assessment program direction. 

Assessing Construction Performance

The current construction assessment program is divided into three basic parts: continuous 

assessment, quarterly assessment, and semiannual performance reviews. The continuous 

assessment of construction performance begins with the onset of the CIP. Formal quarterly 

assessments and semiannual performance reviews begin after a LWA and/or a combined 

license has been issued, the NRC has implemented either IMC 2503 or 2504, and there is 

sufficient activity occurring for any assessment to be meaningful. 

During the semiannual performance review assessments, violations identified during the 

previous 6 months or remaining open from previous quarters will be evaluated to determine if a 

construction substantive cross-cutting issue exists. As mentioned above, the existence of 

violations resulting in escalated enforcement will be used as the input to determine the 

appropriate column of the CAM that applies to the licensee’s performance. The NRC’s 

response to licensee performance will be determined by the actions listed in the applicable 

column of the CAM and by the number and duration of construction substantive cross-cutting 

issues. Semiannual performance review results will be communicated to the licensee and the 

public via assessment letters. A public meeting with the licensee will be conducted on an 

annual basis following issuance of every second semiannual performance review assessment 

letter to discuss the results of the NRC’s assessment of the licensee’s performance over the 

prior year. 
The Commissioners -11- 

Enforcement

In the construction assessment program currently in place, the staff is implementing the 

traditional enforcement process, including the issuance of NOVs and the consideration of the 

use of civil penalties for escalated enforcement cases. The current assessment process also 

allows the staff to use enforcement discretion, when appropriate, to issue noncited violations 

(NCVs) in lieu of NOVs. The use of NCVs as part of the enforcement process is predicated on 

a licensee having an adequate corrective action program into which identified issues are 

entered and effectively resolved in a timely manner. Because the corrective action program at 

construction sites will be new and implemented initially by individuals with limited experience 

with the new program, and because construction will likely involve program implementation by 

contractors, the NRC will not consider the use of enforcement discretion through NCVs until 

there is independent NRC confirmation that the new program is adequate and being effectively 

implemented. 

If the Commission approves the use of a construction SDP to determine the significance of 

findings, the staff plans to revise the Enforcement Policy, if necessary, to provide cROP 

enforcement guidance that is similar to the guidance that is provided for ROP enforcement 

actions. The NRC would first assess a finding to determine if there was discrimination against 

workers for raising safety issues or other willful violations; actions that may adversely affect the 

NRC’s ability to monitor utility activities; and incidents with actual safety consequences. If the 

finding met one of these criteria, the NRC would impose traditional enforcement. These types 

of findings would not be an input to the CAM. All other findings would be evaluated using the 

construction SDP to determine the level of significance and would be considered in the CAM. 

cROP Self-Assessment Process

The staff plans on developing a cROP self-assessment process that will be modeled after the 

ROP’s self-assessment process. On an annual basis, the staff will inform the Commission, 

NRC senior management, and the public of the results of the cROP self-assessment program, 

including any conclusions and resultant improvement actions. As mentioned in this paper, the 

staff will evaluate construction PIs during the annual self-assessment to determine if the 

development and implementation of PIs would be an effective and efficient means of gathering 

and assessing licensee performance information. 

A review of the cROP self-assessment will be incorporated into the Agency Action Review 

Meeting (AARM) process. The guidance for the AARM will also be revised to include criteria for 

when a construction licensee is discussed during the AARM. 

Stakeholder Feedback

From December 2009 to August 2010, the staff reached out to stakeholders for input on 

construction assessment process options during 10 Category 2 public meetings with the NEI-led 

Construction Reactor Oversight Process Task Force, four Category 3 public meetings, the 2010 

Regulatory Information Conference, the 2010 American Nuclear Society Utility Working 

Conference, and a Federal Register notice soliciting feedback on the development of 

construction assessment program options. 
The Commissioners -12- 

NEI was the only respondent to the Federal Register notice. In its response, which is included 

as Enclosure 4, NEI stated, in part, that it was in substantive agreement on the proposed cROP 

framework, including cornerstone objectives and attributes; the proposed use of a construction 

SDP to evaluate the significance of findings identified through the CIP; and the deferral of the 

development of construction PIs. Interactions with NEI at Category 2 and Category 3 public 

meetings has also resulted in agreement that the use of the PD concept is appropriate for 

construction inspection and assessment. However, NEI stated that the industry has concerns 

about whether the current ROP safety culture approach, which has been adapted for 

construction, is effective. NEI stated that, in the future, it will present an alternative safety 

culture approach for new construction. 

During the November 16, 2009, panel meeting, the State of Georgia representative 

recommended that radiation protection and emergency response should be construction 

cornerstones of safety. The staff considered this position but ultimately determined that, 

because of the nature of nuclear plant construction, these functional areas do not warrant 

separate cornerstones and are sufficiently covered as areas to measure in the operational 

programs cornerstone. 

Construction Assessment Program Options and Recommendations

The staff is proposing three options for the Commission in setting policy for the construction 

assessment program. Each option uses traditional enforcement to disposition violations 

associated with discrimination against workers for raising safety issues or other willful violations, 

actions that may adversely affect the NRC’s ability to monitor utility activities, including 

violations of the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59, and incidents with actual safety consequences. 

In addition, each option employs the use of a CAM to determine the NRC’s regulatory response 

to licensee performance. Further, each option implements the near-term approach to safety 

culture that is described in IMC 2505. The use of construction PIs is not recommended in any 

of the options. The options differ primarily in the use of a regulatory framework and in the 

approach to determining the significance of construction findings. 

• Option 1: Continue to implement the construction assessment program as currently 

described in IMC 2505. 

In this option, the staff would continue to use traditional enforcement to disposition CIP 

inspection findings and to use the severity of the findings as the input to the CAM. This 

option would be the most efficient for the staff to implement. The use of traditional 

enforcement has already been established and was done effectively to address issues 

identified by inspectors during the Browns Ferry Unit 1 recovery project. Traditional 

enforcement is also being used successfully for the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactivation and 

construction projects at the LES and MOX facilities. This option requires no revisions to 

program guidance documents and is already implemented at Vogtle. In addition, staff 

training has been completed for this approach. Completion of the CIP using traditional 

enforcement to evaluate the significance of findings and ensuring that adequate 

corrective actions were implemented to address the findings would provide reasonable 

assurance that the facility has been constructed in accordance with regulatory 

requirements. In addition, the use of traditional enforcement may minimize the potential 

for delays in enforcement while determining the risk of a finding. 
The Commissioners -13- 

• Option 2: Implement a construction regulatory framework, including strategic 

performance areas and cornerstones; use traditional enforcement to disposition CIP 

inspection findings; and use the severity of the findings as the input to the CAM. 

 In this option, the staff would implement the regulatory framework that has been 

developed and is described in Enclosure 2. Implementation of a regulatory framework 

may bring more structure to the construction assessment program and allow for the 

better integration of findings to identify adverse trends in licensee performance. 

Traditional enforcement would be used to disposition CIP inspection findings, and the 

severity level of the findings would be the input to the CAM. However, thresholds in the 

CAM would be tied to cornerstone performance, and the NRC’s response to licensee 

performance issues should be more transparent and predictable than in Option 1. 

Approval of this option would require the staff to update program guidance documents 

and provide inspector training. 

• Option 3: Develop a construction assessment program that includes a regulatory 

framework, the use of a construction SDP to determine the significance of findings 

identified during the CIP, and the use of a CAM to determine the appropriate NRC 

response to degrading licensee performance. Pilot the new construction assessment 

program in parallel with the current assessment process for 12 months and, provided the 

results of the pilot are positive, fully implement the new program. 

 In this option, the staff proposes to implement the regulatory framework that has been 

developed and is described in Enclosure 2 and to finalize the construction SDP using the 

work described in Enclosure 3 as a basis. The staff also proposes to modify the finding 

screening process to include the PD concept. The staff proposes to continue to use 

traditional enforcement for violations that do not fit into the SDP, such as violations 

involving willfulness, etc. 

 The construction SDP would be used to disposition CIP inspection findings, and the 

significance of the findings would be the input to the CAM. Thresholds in the CAM can 

be tied to cornerstone performance. Although there is some subjectivity in evaluating 

findings using an SDP, on balance, given the ROP’s SDP experience, use of a 

construction SDP may allow NRC actions and conclusions to be more objective, 

predictable, and transparent to all stakeholders, and more repeatable for findings of 

comparable significance than in Options 1 and 2. 

Approval of this option would require the staff to fully develop a construction SDP, 

develop draft Enforcement Policy guidance regarding the disposition of findings 

identified in the CIP, update other program guidance documents, and provide inspector 

training. Once these actions are complete, the staff would pilot the process in parallel 

with the existing process for 12 months at construction sites where the formal 

assessment process described in IMC 2505 has been implemented. The staff would 

then evaluate the results of the pilot. If the pilot is found to be successful, the staff will 

then implement this option. If significant adverse information is revealed, the staff will 

inform the Commission with revised options. 
The Commissioners -14- 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The staff recommends approval of Option 3. The staff believes that Option 3 includes elements 

that provide for the most objective approach to the cROP. This option also provides for 

stakeholder involvement in the development of the construction SDP. If directed by the 

Commission to implement Option 3, the staff would carry out the revisions to the cROP per the 

milestones in Enclosure 5. The staff also would continue to evaluate construction PIs during the 

annual cROP self-assessment and would recommend their development and implementation if 

meaningful construction PIs are identified. 

RESOURCES: 

Option 1 would require no additional resources. 

Option 2 would require approximately 0.5 full-time equivalent staff (FTE) in FY 2011 for program 

guidance document updates and staff training. 

Option 3 would require a total of approximately 4 FTE in FYs 2011 and 2012 for SDP 

development, program guidance document updates, staff training, and pilot implementation. 

Implementation of each option can be accomplished within currently budgeted resources. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has 

no objections. 

 /RA by Martin J. Virgilio for/ 

R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Construction Reactor Oversight Process Overview 

2. Construction Reactor Oversight Process Regulatory Framework 

3. Construction Significance Determination Process 

4. Letter from NEI dated August 6, 2010 

5. Milestones for Option 3 
The Commissioners -14- 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The staff recommends approval of Option 3. The staff believes that Option 3 includes elements 

that provide for the most objective approach to the cROP. This option also provides for 

stakeholder involvement in the development of the construction SDP. If directed by the 

Commission to implement Option 3, the staff would carry out the revisions to the cROP per the 

milestones in Enclosure 5. The staff also would continue to evaluate construction PIs during the 

annual cROP self-assessment and would recommend their development and implementation if 

meaningful construction PIs are identified. 

RESOURCES: 

Option 1 would require no additional resources. 

Option 2 would require approximately 0.5 full-time equivalent staff (FTE) in FY 2011 for program 

guidance document updates and staff training. 

Option 3 would require a total of approximately 4 FTE in FYs 2011 and 2012 for SDP 

development, program guidance document updates, staff training, and pilot implementation. 

Implementation of each option can be accomplished within currently budgeted resources. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has 

no objections. 

 /RA by Martin J. Virgilio for/

R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Construction Reactor Oversight Process Overview 

2. Construction Reactor Oversight Process Regulatory Framework 

3. Construction Significance Determination Process 

4. Letter from NEI dated August 6, 2010 

5. Milestones for Option 3 

WITS 200800443/EDATS: SECY-2010-0250; WITS 200800444 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML102320315 SECY-012 * via email 

OFFICE NRO/DCIP/CCIB* DCIP/CCIB:BC NRO/DCIP/D RII:DRA* NSIR:D* OE 

NAME TKozak(DCopeland for) TFrye JTappert LPlisco (RLanksbury for) JWiggins (DDiec for) JWray* 

DATE 8/30/2010 9/16/2010 9/22/2010 9/30/2010 10/01/2010 9/30/2010 

OFFICE Tech Editor* NRO/PMDA* OCFO* OGC* NRO:OD EDO 

NAME KAzariah-Kribbs JMurphy GPeterson (FMiller for) MZobler (AWilson for) MJohnson RBorchardt (MVirgilio 

for)

DATE 10/04/2010 10/01/2010 10/08/2010 10/12/2010 10/ 19 /10 10/26/10 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Management Conference

Monitor Licensee Actions 

Additional Regulatory Actions

Agency Action Review Meeting

NRC Inspections

Agency Response

Enforcement

Assessment Process

(Construction Action Matrix)

Public Mee

Press Rele

NRC Web

ADAMS

Assessment 

Inspection R

Inspection F

Communic

Evaluation of Inspection Results NRC ITAAC Closure Verificati

Licensee ITAAC 

Closeout Submittal

Reactive

Inspections

Vendor 

Inspections

Program 

Inspections

ITAAC related 

Inspections

Federal Re

Notic

Inspections ITAAC Closeout

Performance Results Across All Areas Of Construction

Construction Reactor Oversight Process Overview

10 CFR 52.103(g) 

Determination
 Enclosure 2 

CONSTRUCTION REACTOR OVERSIGHT 

PROCESS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

CONSTRUCTION 

REACTOR SAFETY

License and regulate the use of 

byproduct, source, and special 

nuclear materials to ensure 

adequate protection of the 

public health and safety

DESIGN/

ENGINEERING

CONSTRUCTION/

INSTALLATION

PROCUREMENT/

FABRICATION

INSPECTION/

TESTING

SAFEGUARDS 

PROGRAMS

OPERATIONAL 

READINESS

SECURITY

PROGRAMS for 

CONSTRUCTION 

INSPECTION

AND

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL 

PROGRAMS
2

Construction Reactor Oversight Process Cornerstone 

Objectives, Attributes, and Areas to Measure 

Cornerstone Design/Engineering

Objective To Independently Assess the Licensee’s Methods To 

(1) Develop and Implement Detailed Design and 

Construction Drawings and Procedures, and 

(2) Implement a Design Change Process 

Attributes Design Control, Procedure/Document Quality 

Areas To Measure ITAAC; Site-Specific Design, Design Implementation,

Design Changes, Applicable Criteria from 10 CFR Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities,” Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for 

Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 

Plants,”(Appendix B) 

Inspectable Areas Applicable IMC 2503 ITAAC Procedures, Applicable 

IMC 2504 Construction Program Procedures, Design 

Acceptance Criteria 

Cornerstone Procurement/Fabrication

Objective To Independently Assess the Licensee’s Methods To 

(1) Procure Material, Equipment, and Services, and 

(2) Control Materials, Parts, and Components during 

Fabrication 

Attributes Process Control, Material Control, Procedure Quality

Areas To Measure ITAAC, Commercial-Grade Dedication, Receipt Inspection,

Licensee’s Evaluation of Suppliers, Applicable Criteria 

from Appendix B, Maintenance and Storage of SSCs, and 

Reports Required by Regulations 

Inspectable Areas Applicable IMC 2503 ITAAC Procedures, Applicable 

IMC 2504 Construction Program Procedures

 

Cornerstone Construction/Installation

Objective To Independently Assess the Licensee’s Programs and 

Processes Developed and Implemented To Ensure the 

Construction and Installation of Facilities and Structures, 

Systems, and Components in Accordance with the Design 

Attributes Process Control, Material Control, Procedure Quality

Areas To Measure ITAAC, Civil/Structural, Mechanical, Electrical, Welding,

Maintenance and Storage of SSCs, Applicable Criteria 

from Appendix B, Reports Required by Regulations 

Inspectable Areas Applicable IMC 2503 ITAAC Procedures, Applicable 

IMC 2504 Construction Program Procedures

Cornerstone Inspection/Testing
3

Objective To Independently Assess the Licensee’s Programs and 

Processes Developed and Implemented To Inspect and 

Test Programs, Facilities, and Structures, Systems, and 

Components 

Attributes Process Control, Material Control, Procedure Quality

Areas To Measure ITAAC, ITAAC Closure, ITAAC Maintenance, Non-ITAAC 

Testing, Preoperational Testing, Applicable Criteria from 

Appendix B

Inspectable Areas Applicable IMC 2503 ITAAC Procedures, Applicable 

IMC 2504 Construction Program Procedures

Cornerstone Operational Programs

Objective To Independently Assess the Licensee’s Capability To 

Safely Operate the Facility 

Attributes/Areas To 

Measure

Program Effectiveness

Emergency Preparedness, Radiation Protection, Process and 

Effluent Monitoring, Fire Protection, Preservice Inspection, 

Preservice Testing, Inservice Inspection, Inservice Testing, 

Environmental Qualification, Reactor Vessel Material 

Surveillance, Containment Leak Rate Testing, Maintenance 

Rule, Motor-Operated Valves, Quality Assurance (Operations), 

Operational Readiness 

Training and Qualification 

Reactor Operator Training, Reactor Operator Requalification, 

Nonlicensed Plant Staff Training 

Inspectable Areas Applicable IMC 2504 Operational Program Procedures

Cornerstone Security Programs for Construction Inspection and 

Operation

Objective To Provide Assurance that (1) Construction Activities Are 

Not Adversely Impacted Due to Fitness-For-Duty Issues; 

and (2) The Licensee’s Programs Use a Defense In Depth 

Approach and Can Protect Against the Design Basis 

Threat of Radiological Sabotage From Internal and 

External Threats and Prevent Theft or Loss of Radiological 

Materials 

Attributes/Areas To 

Measure 

Note: Additional areas to 

measure will be added 

pending future construction 

security rulemaking

Access Authorization

Operational Program: Personnel Screening, Behavior 

Observations, Fitness for Duty 

Construction Program: Fitness for Duty 

Access Control

Operational Program: Search; Identification 
4

Physical Protection

Operational Program: Protected Areas and Vital Areas 

(Barriers, Alarms, Assessment) 

Contingency Response

Operational Program: Protective Strategy Evaluation 

Material Control and Accounting

Operational Program: Records, Reports, Procedures, 

Inventories 

Cyber Security

Operational Program: Protection of Systems and Networks, 

Cyber Security Program, Plan and Procedures 

Protection of Safeguards Information

Operational and Construction Programs: Access to SGI; 

Designation and Storage; Processing, Reproducing and 

Transmitting; Removal and Destruction 

Inspectable Areas Access Control; Assessment and Detection; Contingency 

Plan and Compensatory Measures; Material Control and 

Accounting; Personnel Access, Fitness for Duty and 

Insider Mitigation; Physical Barriers; Programs and 

Procedures; Safeguards, Records, and Reports; Security 

Management Oversight 
Enclosure 3 

Construction Significance Determination Process 

The overall objectives of the construction baseline inspection program are to provide a sufficient 

basis to support the Commission determination, in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.103(g), that the acceptance criteria in a combined license 

have been met and to develop a level of confidence in the licensee’s programmatic controls. 

Therefore, the construction inspection program is not limited to verifying the completion and 

closure of inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) listed in the combined 

license. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) must also consider inspection and 

assessment of construction programs and operational programs that are required to be 

developed and implemented by the licensee. Inspection findings from the baseline program are 

evaluated for significance and used to assess licensee performance. Unlike the Reactor 

Oversight Process (ROP), the significance of both licensee performance deficiencies and 

programmatic deficiencies needs to be determined in the construction Reactor Oversight 

Process (cROP). 

The cROP working group, in close coordination with stakeholders, developed a flow chart for 

use in evaluating the significance of programmatic findings identified through the construction 

inspection program (CIP). The working group also developed two concepts for use in 

determining the significance of technical findings identified through the CIP. One concept would 

use a matrix to determine the significance of findings. A second concept would use a flow chart 

to determine the significance of findings. The staff plans to develop a security significance 

determination process (SDP) that is similar and analogous to the ROP security SDP. These 

proposed concepts require further work to fully develop and refine the methodology if the 

Commission determines that these options should be implemented. A description of the staff’s 

proposed method to disposition construction inspection findings follows. 

Simplified Finding Screening Process

The construction finding screening process begins with an issue of concern (IOC). The first 

step is to determine if an IOC is a willful violation warranting investigation by the NRC Office of 

Investigations. Then, the screening process proceeds to determine if the IOC is a performance 

deficiency (PD). A PD is an issue that is the result of a licensee not meeting a requirement or 

standard where the cause was reasonably within the licensee’s ability to foresee and correct, 

and therefore it should have been prevented. A PD can exist if a licensee fails to meet a 

self-imposed standard or a standard required by regulation; thus, a PD may exist independently 

of whether a regulatory requirement was violated. Once a PD is determined to exist, two paths 

are taken. The first path is to determine whether the PD is associated with traditional 

enforcement (e.g., affects the regulatory process, associated with actual consequences) and the 

second path is to determine if the PD is of more than minor significance. If the PD is associated 

with traditional enforcement, that violation is processed separately from the underlying technical 

issue. If the PD is more than minor and is treated as identified by the NRC, the IOC is 

considered a finding and its significance is determined through the applicable SDP. A simplified 

finding screening process is shown below. 
2 

 

Inspector 

Identifies an IOC Is IOC willful?

Is IOC a PD?

Is PD more than 

minor (is it a 

finding)?

Is finding only 

programmatic 

(no technical issue)?

Prepare for 

and conduct 

Yes ARB

Yes

Yes

No

Go to 

programmatic 

finding SDP Yes No

Go to technical 

finding SDP

Did PD impact 

regulatory process or 

contribute to actual 

consequences?

TE violation; 

Disposition IAW Enf

Policy, continue with 

PD screening 

block 11

No TE violation; 

continue with PD 

screening in block 11 

Simplified Finding Screening Process

Yes No

1

2 3

4

Is IOC a more 

than minor 

violation?

Exit

Process 

IAW EP

Yes

No

No

No 

Finding

5

6

7

8

9 10

11 12

13

15 16

No

Is PD treated as 

NRC identified? No

14

Yes

Programmatic Finding SDP

In most cases, it is anticipated that programmatic deficiencies will result in an underlying 

technical finding. In these cases, the technical finding will be processed through the technical 

finding SDP. However, there will likely be findings identified through the CIP that are primarily 

programmatic in nature. For instance, inspections will be conducted to determine if operational 

programs are developed in accordance with their description in the final safety analysis report 

(FSAR). Findings associated with these inspections will likely be programmatic findings. 

The staff developed a simple flow chart for use in dispositioning construction programmatic 

findings. Once a finding has been processed through the finding screening flow chart above 

and is determined to be a programmatic finding, it is evaluated to determine if it is associated 

with a construction program or an operational program before the license condition 

implementation milestone. If it meets these criteria and is a construction security program 

finding, the security SDP will be used to determine significance. Other programmatic findings 

will be assessed against critical program functions listed in the final safety analysis report 

(FSAR). Findings associated with operational programs that have met the milestones in the 

license will be processed using the ROP SDP. If the finding has an underlying technical issue, 

then it is processed using the technical finding SDP. The proposed programmatic finding SDP 

is shown below. 
3 

 

Is issue associated with a construction 

program or is it before the operational 

program’s license condition 

implementation milestone?

Is finding an omission of a 

needed requirement to satisfy 

a critical function for program 

in FSAR?

Has issue been 

previously identified?

Green

Green

White

Yes Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Go to technical finding SDP

Draft Construction Programmatic Finding SDP Flow Chart

Is finding a security 

construction program finding?

Go to applicable ROP SDP

No Yes

From Issue Screening

Block 15

Operational program finding 

after license condition 

implementation milestone? 

No

Yes

17 18 19

20 21 22

23

Technical Finding SDP

Concept 1: Matrix Approach 

Once a finding has been processed through the finding screening flow chart above and is 

determined to be a technical finding, it could be evaluated using a construction technical finding 

SDP. The SDP for inspection findings of degraded performance of structures, systems, and 

components (SSCs) in operating reactors uses as input the estimated impact on core damage 

frequency, large early release frequency, or both, along with the estimated duration of the 

degraded condition. This formulation is highly quantitative in nature and reasonably objective 

given the inputs that are assumed. For new reactor construction, it is not possible to replicate 

these elements. However, the use of a 2-dimensional matrix that includes a measure of the risk 

importance of the SSC or program element in question, along with the degree of 

nonconformance, would provide an objective, risk-informed, and performance-based 

significance determination for technical findings identified through the CIP. 

The y-axis of the matrix would be a measure of the degree of nonconformance, which an 

inspector would determine by assigning a point value to each of several factors associated with 

the finding. For example, one set of factors might consist of the following: 

• Quality of Construction 

– 3 points (e.g., findings involving substantial construction quality concerns) 

– 2 points (e.g., findings involving significant construction quality concerns) 

– 1 point (e.g., findings involving construction quality that are less serious but are 

of more than minor concern) 
4 

• Extent of Onsite Review Before Identification 

– 3 points (e.g., finding identified after all onsite review is complete) 

– 2 points (e.g., finding identified after second-level review is complete) 

– 1 point (e.g., finding identified after quality control review is complete) 

• Corrective Actions 

– 3 points (e.g., repetitive significant condition adverse to quality) 

– 2 points (e.g., repetitive condition adverse to quality) 

– 1 point (e.g., prior opportunity existed to identify the condition) 

The degree of nonconformance would be placed in the following category based on the sum of 

the points: 

• High: 9 points 

• Medium: 7–8 points 

• Low: 5–6 points 

• Minimal: 4 points or less 

As the concept of the matrix approach is developed further, other factors may be included, e.g., 

the likelihood of identifying the deficiency prior to plant operations. 

The x-axis of the matrix would be the risk importance of the system, design function, or program 

element impacted by the performance deficiency. Risk importance measures such as 

Fussell-Vesely (FV) and risk achievement worth (RAW) can be derived for relevant systems 

and/or functions from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for all the new standardized 

reactor designs. An expert panel could use these risk-importance measures as a basis for 

determining the risk significance for each system in a respective certified design. The 

systems/functions could then be grouped into the following three categories based on their 

relative risk significance: 

(1) Low Risk Importance 

– For example, the finding involves a design function, structure, or system with no 

components that are modeled in the PRA, or are modeled but have an FV value 

less than 0.005 and RAW less than 2. 

(2) Intermediate Risk Importance 

– For example, the finding involves a design function, structure, or system with 

components with an FV value greater than 0.005 or RAW above 2. 

(3) High Risk Importance 

– For example, the finding involves a design function, structure, or system with 

components with an FV value greater than 0.05 or RAW greater than 20. 

The above FV and RAW ranges for each category are provided for illustrative purposes only. 
5 

Once the degree of nonconformance and the risk importance of the finding have been 

determined, the color of the finding would be determined by the corresponding row and column 

in the matrix: 

 Significance Determination Process Matrix 

White Yellow Red 

Green White Yellow 

Green Green White 

Green Green Green 

While much of the development work had been completed by the staff in close coordination with 

stakeholders, both the risk importance and the degree of nonconformance measures require 

finalizing. The staff plans to convene an expert panel to determine the relative risk importance 

of systems or design functions in each certified design. The staff would then conduct a public 

workshop to develop specific guidance for use in assigning point values for each factor used in 

determining the degree of nonconformance. The staff would then conduct a tabletop exercise to 

ensure that the SDP matrix provides the expected results and is objective, predictable, 

transparent, and repeatable. 

Concept 2: Flow Chart Approach 

The staff developed a second approach to the construction technical finding SDP that employs 

a flow chart similar to the ROP’s deterministic SDPs. In this approach, once a finding has been 

Intermediate 

Importance

High 

Importance 

Low 

Importance 

High 

Medium 

Low 

Risk Importance 

Degree of Nonconformance 

Minimal 
6 

processed through the finding screening flow chart above and is determined to be a technical 

finding, it is evaluated to determine if it is material to the acceptance criteria of an ITAAC 

associated with a risk-important system. If it meets this criterion, it is evaluated to determine 

whether the finding is material to the acceptance criteria of ITAAC in multiple ITAAC families. 

The effectiveness of the corrective action program is taken into consideration during the 

evaluation. When repetitive significant conditions adverse to quality exist, the color of the 

finding is increased. The draft technical finding SDP is shown below. 

 

Is finding material to the 

acceptance criteria of a 

ITAAC associated with 

a risk-important 

system?

Ineffective corrective 

actions resulting in an 

SCAQ?

Is finding material to the 

AC of ITAAC in multiple 

ITAAC families?

Ineffective corrective 

actions resulting in an 

SCAQ?

Ineffective corrective 

actions resulting in an 

SCAQ?

Material to the acceptance criteria of an 

ITAAC: invalidation of the acceptance 

criteria for an ITAAC for which onsite 

review activities are complete

Draft Construction Technical Finding SDP Flow Chart 

Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

From Issue Screening

Block 16

Red

Green

Yellow

White

24 25 26

27

28

SCAQ- Significant Condition Adverse to Quality 

The staff has some work remaining to fully develop the construction technical finding SDP flow 

chart, such as defining risk-important systems and conditions adverse to quality. Similar to the 

work needed to finalize the matrix, the staff plans to convene an expert panel to determine the 

relative risk importance of systems in each certified design, conduct a public workshop to 

develop specific guidance for the use of the flow chart, and conduct a tabletop exercise to 

determine its effectiveness. 

While the staff plans to develop both the construction SDP matrix and flow chart, to date, the 

matrix has provided the most flexibility in dispositioning different types of findings and has 

shown the most promise for success. Stakeholder feedback points to alignment of opinion that 

the implementation of the matrix is preferable over the flow chart.
Enclosure 5 

Milestones for Option 3 

Pending Commission approval, the staff plans to complete the following activities for Option 3: 

Activity Time To Complete after 

Commission Decision 

Convene Expert Panel To Determine System Relative Risk 

Rankings for AP1000 

6 months 

Conduct Public Workshop To Complete Construction SDPs 6 months 

Complete Tabletop Exercise 6 months 

Complete Draft Guidance Documents 9 months 

Complete Staff Training 12 months 

Begin Pilot After combined license is 

issued 

End Pilot 12 months after pilot begins 

Implement Revised cROP or Provide Revised Options to 

Commission Based on Pilot Results 

3 months after pilot ends