FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT February 11, 2004 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 03-12896 Non-Argument Calendar

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 01-01425-CV-AR-S PATRICK L. BISHOP, SR., Plaintiff-Appel lant,

versus BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF, Defendant, BIRMINGHAM, CITY OF, THE, Defendant-Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for th e Nort hern D istri ct of A labama

_________________________ (February 11, 20 04) Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Jud ges. PER CURIAM:2

Patrick L. Bisho

p, Sr., appeals the district court’ s order granting the C ity of Birmingham

(“the City

”)’s renewed

motion for judg

ment as a m

atter of law in Bishop’s action und er Title VII of the Civil Ri ghts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 et seq (“Title VII”). In reaching its conclusion, the district court determined tha

t the factual findin

gs of the Jefferson County Personnel Board (“the Board”), an independent state agency , were entitled to preclusive effe ct over the federal action. Because the distri ct court improp erly failed to draw a distinction between Title V

II and § 1983with reg

ard to the preclusive

effects of state administrative proceedings on actions brought thereunder, we vacate the district court’s order,

and remand for

further proceedi

ngs. Background Bishop filed an em

ployment disc

rimination act

ion against the City

, alleging race discrim

ination and retaliat

ion, in violation of T

itle VII and § 1983.After the conclusi on of disc overy, the Ci ty moved for su mmary judgment on all of Bishop ’s claims. In response, Bishop abandoned all of his claims except his Title VII retal iatio n clai m. Prior to trial, B ishop filed a mot ion in limine , seeking to exclude any testimony or documentary evidence refe rring to the report and detailed factual findings of the Board. The report found that Bishop had established a prima facie3

case of retaliation, but that the city had proffered numerous legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons justifying the termination. As such, the Board sustained the City’s decision to terminate Bishop. Bishop then pursued his federal action. At trial, the dist

rict court denied B ishop’s motion in limine and admitted the report, reasoning

that the report wa

s similar to non-

binding factual findi

ngs by the EEOC. After the close of Bishop’s case-in-chief, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law arguing, inter alia , that the Bo ard had alr eady upheld Bishop’s termination. The court took the m otion under advisem

ent. After the C

ity presented its case, it renewed the motion. The court again took the motion under advisement and submitted the case to the jury. After a deadlock, the court declared a mi strial. The Court then issue d a written order denying t he City’s Rule 50 motions. Shortly before

jury selecti

on in the retrial, B ishop renewed his m otion in limine

. The court then issue

d a memora

ndum opinion, vacating its prior denial of the City’s Rule 50 motions, gra nting the Rule 50 moti ons, and di smissing Bi shop’s action. Specifically, the distr ict court relied on o

ur recent decision i

n Travers v. Jones , 323 F.3d 1294 (11t h Cir. 2003) (per curiam), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 472 (2003), and determined that even though the Board lacked jurisdiction over4

Bishop’s Title VII claim, the facts found by the Board had a preclusive eff ect over the subsequent feder

al employm

ent rights action. Bishop then moved t

o alter or ame

nd the judgment,

arguing that his case was ins tead go verned by University of Tenne ssee v. Elliott

, 478 U.S. 788 (1986), arguing that Elliott

found that unreview

ed state admini strative proceedin gs did not have a precl usive effe ct on Title VII claims. The d istrict co urt denied Bishop’s motion. This a

ppeal followed. Discussion We review de novo a distri ct court’s grant of judgment a s a matter of law, applying the same legal stan dards used in the d istrict court. See Taylor v. Runy on , 175 F.3d 861, 865 (11th Cir. 1999). Those standards require us to consider “whether the

evidence presents a

sufficient disagre

ement to requir

e submission to a jury of whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a m atter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). We consider all evidence, and the i

nferences drawn

therefrom,

in the light most f

avorable to the nonmovant. See Carter v. City of Mia mi , 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989). “If the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict, then the motion was properly granted.” Id.5

In Elliott , the Supreme

Court addressed the

question of whether

a state administrative

law judge’s f

actfinding is ever e

ntitled to preclusive

effect in federal court, where an individual had pursued claims under Title VII. Title VII requires the EEOC to give “substan tial weight to final

findings and orders m

ade by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Relyi ng on this provision, the

Court noted that “

it would make little sen

se for Congress to w

rite such a provision i

f state agency

provisions were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court.” Elliott , 478 U.S. at 795. We have consisten

tly recognized Elliott ’s conclusion that Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect over Title VII claim

s. Specifically

, in Crapp v. City of Miami Beach , 242 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2001), w

e noted that although a state administr ative agency’ s findings are entitled to preclusive effect in § 1983 proceedings, a different result is required for Title VII claims. See id. at 1022. Several o ther Circuits shar

e this approach. See id. (citing Rao v. County of F airfax, Va. , 108 F.3d 42, 45 (4th Cir. 1997); Roth v. Koppers Indus., Inc. , 993 F.2d 1058, 1060- 63 (3d Cir. 1993); McInnes v. California , 943 F.2d 1088, 1093- 94 (9th Cir. 1991); DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr. , 821 F.2d 111, 114-1 5 (2d Cir. 1987); Duggan v. Board of6

Educ. , 818 F.2d 1291, 1293- 95 (7th Cir. 1987); Abramson v. Council Bluffs Cmty. School Dist. , 808 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987)). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, [t]he clear teaching of Elliott is that in a Title V

II action a prior s

tate decision enjoys issue preclusive effect only if rendered or reviewed by a court . .. . In contrast, unreviewed adm

inistrative determ

inations lack preclusive ef

fect in a subsequent T

itle VII action,

regardless of any pre clusi ve effect st ate la w might accor d to t hem. McInnes , 943 F.2d at 1093-94. Travers , the case at the h eart of the distric

t court’s discussio

n, involved a First Amendment cla im raised under § 1983, no t Title VII. See Travers , 323 F.3d at 1295. B ecause Travers sought relief under § 1983, he was subject to the

more restric

tive preclusion rule s governing § 1983 actions, as discusse

d in Elliott

. See Elliott

, 478 U.S. at 796 -97. As such, that the state agenc

y findings in Traverswere entitled to preclusive effect has no bearing on this case. We there fore must vaca

te and remand t

he district court’s opinion. Conclusion Our case law has

recognized the disti

nction between the p

reclusive effect of state a

dministrative pr

oceedings over § 1983 c

laims and that on Title VII claim

s. Because the dis

trict court incorr

ectly concluded

that our7

holding in Traversmandated that the factual findings of the Board be given preclusive effec

t in this action, we

vacate and rem

and the decision of the district court, fo

r proceedings not inconsistent with this opini on. VACATED AND REMANDED.