1 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Airman-Scholar 

A Journal of Contemporary Military Thought

Vol 7, No 1 Spring 2001
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 2

Cover Photos

Front—Painting of aerial maneuvers done by C2C Philip Schembri, USAFA ‘03

Back—Painting of the USAFA Cadet Memorial with the Cadet Chapel and Rocky Mountains in the background. Painted by C1C Stephen Wilson, USAFA ‘02

Courtesy USAF Academy Department of English and Fine Arts.
3 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Airman-Scholar -Scholar Scholar 

Published by the 34th Education Group at the

United States Air Force Academy

Spring 2001

Vol 7, No 1

Commandant of Cadets

Commander 34th Training Wing

Brig Gen Mark A. Welsh III

Commander and Permanent

Professor, 34th Education Group

Col Thomas A. Drohan

________________________

Editor

Charles Krupnick

Assistant Editor

Capt Ron Dains

The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum development and instruction in Military Strategic Studies for the cadets of the US Air Force Academy. This consists of courses covering Military Theory and Strategy, Officership, Airmanship, Aerospace Theory and Doctrine, and

Joint and Multinational Operations. Group personnel conduct research on a variety of topics, including international

security, space-related issues, military service culture, and

educational modeling. Research activities are coordinated

through the 34th Education Group Research Office.

The opinions expressed in Airman-Scholar do not represent

any official policies of the Commandant of Cadets, US Air

Force Academy, US Air Force, or US government. They

are presented to stimulate discussion on current military issues and domestic and international affairs.

Airman-Scholar is published twice annually. If you have

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Table of Contents

4 From the Editor:

War Stories and Leadership into the

the 21st Century

Charles Krupnik

_______________________________________

5 Dealing with Combat Stress:

Anecdotes from the Gulf War

Brent J. Talbot

11 The Precision Strike “Live” and on

Mom and Dad’s TV; Leadership

Challenges for Today’s Air

Commanders

Michael R. Boera

16 Military Theory at the Puzzle Palace

Clayton Chun

19 If It’s a Weapon System, Then Treat

It That Way

Mark Heredia

25 NATO Air Ops with EASE

Richard White

29 Heroes of the Vietnam Generation

James Webb

33 Forgotten Heroes

Mandy Hutchison

37 Defining Required Leadership Skills

for USAF Company Grade Officers

J.D. Garvin and Warren Berry

48 Taking the Good with the Bad:

Maximizing the Benefits of

Participating in Peace Operations

William C. Thomas
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 4

From The Editor

War Stories and Leadership into the 21st Century

The men and women of the US armed services

are serving in a time of considerable transition

for the foreign and security policy of the United

States. After a decade of the so-called post-Cold

War period, the outlines of the 21st century world

the United States will face are beginning to take

shape. Powerful China and neighboring India are

pushing for the trappings and recognition as great

powers to match their enormous populations; Japan struggles to maintain its place while Russia

falls further behind other developed countries;

Europe is deepening and widening its economic

and political cooperation based on the institutions

of the European Union even as the nearby Middle East – with its conflicts and immense oil resources – continues to fracture and command attention. Africa, Latin America, and the rest of

the world, are all playing their role but seem

unlikely to occupy center stage.

At home, a new administration pledges

significant change to US foreign and security

policy and seems likely to alter military missions

and force structure as well. The outcome of their

policy reviews may well be a smaller force based

ever more on high technology. Lighter and more

mobile armored vehicles will rely on precision

targeting for their effectiveness; pilots will take

to the skies in new stealth aircraft for perhaps one

last fling before smart drones take their place;

and, fewer ships and sailors will put to sea, but

well-armed with potent long range weapons.

All of this is by way of providing background for this issue of Airman-Scholar and its

theme of war stories and leadership. Almost all

members of the US military have periods of trial

and tribulation, where great effort and courage

are required to accomplish a mission. Sometimes

the challenges take place in the heat and fear of

battle, but other times in rooms full of noisy machinery or silent computers. The bullets may not

be flying, but mission and lives still depend on

what transpires: engines need human maintenance, remote planes need human controllers,

and precision weapons need human decisions on

what to strike and when.

Brent Talbott begins this issue with an

analysis of stress during the first days of the Gulf

conflict – he gives us many war stories rolled

into one. Michael Boera then speaks to air leadership in the era of instant news coverage. Clayton Chun, Mark Herredia, and Richard White –

in three separate articles – follow with stories

about the reality of modern service life, being a

warrior and leader in a very bureaucratic and

technological age. The next article is on heroes

of the Vietnam generation, a reminder that it too

had Americans who served selflessly in combat

for their country just as the oft-cited “Greatest

Generation” did in World War II. AirmanScholar is greatly privileged to republish this article by noted author and public servant James

Webb. Mandy Hutchison continues in Vietnam

with a philosophical analysis of the war story of

Hugh Thompson and Larry Coburn, men who

tried to stop the massacre at My Lai. Our issue

concludes with a scholarly look at mid-level

leadership in the modern Air Force by J. D.

Garvin and Warren Berry and with a defense of

peacekeeping missions as valid training by William Thomas.

These articles inform us about the men

and women who serve in today’s armed forces.

The 21st century will be different from the 20th,

but war stories will continue to be made by the

capable and the brave.

CK
5 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Dealing with Combat Stress:

Anecdotes from the Gulf War

Brent J. Talbot

Early this year, a planeload of US dignitaries accompanying the former President George Bush

returned to the Gulf to join in the celebration of

the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait.

A decade earlier, a group of pilots and weapons

system officers (WSOs) contributed to the liberation process by flying their first combat missions

over the skies of northern Iraq. Although the war

is now but a memory, it remains vivid to those

who experienced their first hours of air combat;

the lessons remain deeply ingrained. Preparing

one for such a level of stress remains a difficult if

not impossible task. Certainly it is worth the effort to do so, especially since air power has become much more significant during the last decade. The United States has intervened militarily

in the Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and each time

air power has been the force of first choice. Six

weeks of precision bombing preceded a hundredhour ground campaign to retake Kuwait in 1991.

NATO willingness to use air power led to the

1995 Dayton accords and the introduction of

peacekeeping forces into Bosnia. And the 1999

Kosovo campaign consisted entirely of aerial

bombardment. This article then, is an effort to

provide some insight to aviators who have yet to

experience combat, but who almost certainly will

during the next decade, considering that we have

fought three air wars during the last and each has

involved a large share of US air forces. It is

hoped that such insight will better prepare those

aircrews for the time and place in which they

might be faced with the stresses of their own first

combat missions.

Background

While serving as the Flight Safety Officer

for the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, an F-111

fighter unit based at RAF Upper Heyford in England, I felt it might be useful to gather data to

document the mental stresses encountered during

air combat. Many of Heyford’s aircrews had participated in the Gulf War, so I gathered survey

data from the war veterans while events were still

fresh in their minds during March 1991.1

During the timeframe of Desert Shield/

Storm, the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing consisted

of four squadrons: the 55th, 77th, and 79th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (flying F-111Es) and the

42nd Electronic Combat Squadron (flying EF111s).2 The F-111 aircraft were designed to fly

high speed, low-level, deep interdiction combat

missions able to penetrate enemy radar defenses,

remain below the thick surface to air missile

(SAM) coverage of the Warsaw Pact threat environment, and deliver heavy bomb loads at night

or during adverse weather. All squadrons regularly trained in the art of defeating the thick enemy air defenses of Europe, but were also prepared to fly in the Middle East region. During

the summer-fall 1990, each of the squadrons had

rotated through Incirlik airbase in Turkey, maintaining a continuous presence after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, until Kuwait was

liberated in February 1991.

The F-111 forces deployed to Incirlik became part of Operation Proven Force, a NATO

support unit immediately deployable and available to Central Command’s Desert Shield forces

based in the Gulf. In addition to the Upper Heyford aircraft, Proven Force units included

AWACS, KC-135 tankers, F-15s, F-16s, F-4Gs

and RF-4Cs. All based at Incirlik, this assortment of aircraft became the 7440th Composite

Wing and was led by Brigadier General Lee A.

Downer, a former 20th TFW Commander.3 As

combat operations began on 16 January 1991 and

operations transitioned from Desert Shield to De-
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 6

sert Storm, the 79th Tactical Fighter Squadron

was in place at Incirlik. The United States obtained permission from the Turkish government

to fly combat missions from Turkey beginning

the second night of Desert Storm. Shortly thereafter, Downer announced to the aircrews that

they needed to prepare for combat. He said that

“things became quiet, people became focused,

sensing the tension of potential combat ... I told

them they had more training than any troops

from previous wars and were ready.”4 So they

joined the Desert Storm forces in combat, and

elements from the 55th Squadron deployed from

England and joined the 79th in combat operations

on subsequent nights of the war. As the war progressed, portions of the 77th also were brought

into the Proven Force effort. An average of 22 F111s remained at Incirlik during the war/preludeto-war period, and the airmen of Upper Heyford

flew a total of 473 combat missions, logging

1373 combat flight hours.5

Interestingly, it was only during the first

nights of combat operations out of Incirlik that

the F-111’s were used in the primary way they

had trained for combat operations in the European Cold War environment: night, low-level

flight operations. After the initial days of continuous attacks which significantly reduced the

SAM threat, the F-111s began operating at and

delivering bomb-loads from 25,000 feet, which

significantly reduced the level of combat stress

attributed to the low-altitude environment, including intense encounters with anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). It was during those first nights that

aircrews recorded the most interesting combat

anecdotes. Approaching targets at 300-400 feet

above ground level (AGL), they were intently engaged in auto-terrain following operations

through the thick of Iraqi barrage and aimed

AAA fire.

One young captain who had flown his

first combat mission in the low-level environment records the intensity of his experience. He

piloted the third aircraft in a package of four F111s that were assigned to destroy a power station near a dam. The first two aircraft had awakened the AAA gunners that lined both sides of

the river valley below and by the time he made

his target run, the sky was full of tracers. They

crossed the canopy in an ‘x’ fashion just above

his head as he approached the target at 300 feet

AGL. No one had discussed the question of

“when is a target too heavily defended?” So he

pressed forward and delivered his bombs on target. Even though he made it home that night, he

thought that every night of the war would be a

repeat of the same experience and he fully expected that he could not survive that kind of

AAA on successive missions. After getting settled back into his room early the next morning,

he wrote “good bye” letters to his wife and parents fully convinced that he would never see

them again.6 Such was the stress level, a near

death experience during his first combat mission,

and fortunately for him, the low-level sorties

ended after that night.

Combat Stress Survey

I will introduce my survey data with a

note about the aircrews themselves. Only 11 percent of those participating had less than 500

hours of flight experience. Over two-thirds of

the aircrews had over 1000 flight hours, meaning

that the majority were highly experienced crewmembers. I mention this only to point out that

stress is not simply a factor of inexperience, but

shows up at all experience levels. In fact, some

of the biggest mistakes were actually made by

the most experienced senior leaders of the contingent. For example, one very senior pilot accidentally deployed several flares while flying in the

clouds at medium altitude. Not knowing he had

deployed the flares, he thought they were enemy

SAMs exploding in the near vicinity of his aircraft after guiding toward him. In his effort to

maneuver and defeat the ‘SAMs,’ he flew the aircraft out of control, lost over 10,000 feet of altitude, and recovered only 2000 feet above the

mountainous terrain below. All this took place

near the Turkish-Iraqi border, before he had even

crossed into enemy territory. It was later learned

that the chaff/flare switch he had used to deploy

chaff (in order to confuse Iraqi acquisition radars) had sprung-up past the neutral position and

inadvertently deployed a flare each time he deployed chaff (to deploy chaff, one would press

the switch to the down position, flares were deployed via the same switch by moving it to the

up position). His particular aircraft had a faulty

switch, and because peacetime training rarely in-
7 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

volved the deployment of flares due to safety

(fire hazard) reasons, the crew was not aware of

the effects of flare deployment at night and in the

clouds and thus did not recognize their own

flares as such.

Combat stress affects crews in several

ways. Aircrews listed becoming a prisoner of

war (POW) as their biggest fear of going into

combat. Forty-eight percent of those surveyed

listed it as their number one concern. Considering recent events in China where the crew of a

Navy EP-3A was held for 11 days after an emergency landing on Hainan island, this is a fear that

needs to be addressed even during peacetime operations.7 Other fears included getting shot down

(22 percent), death (17 percent), and worries

about their families (11 percent). The shootdown/death fears were evidenced in the anecdotes relating to over-nervousness caused by radar homing and warning (RHAW) indications

that were near-constant during missions, especially during high altitude flights in the vicinity

of Baghdad. Each new indication made them

feel as if they were personally being targeted and

it was only after numerous missions and getting

used to the indications being present more often

than expected that the worries of getting shot

down became more subdued.

Another interesting question concerned

whether combat stress affected in-flight decisionmaking. Seventy-seven percent of those surveyed admitted that it did so, but most of those

felt that it did so in a positive way by helping

them to think faster and more thoroughly. A select few felt that the stress actually slowed the

decision-making process or resulted in confusion

during the mission. All admitted that stress necessitated very thorough pre-briefings to allow

aircrews to pre-think out the mission to aid in the

decision-making process while airborne. One

stressed airman admitted fear affected him on a

mission where, after hitting the target and turning

towards home, he climbed out and slowed to

cruising speed while rejoining on his flight lead.

In doing so, he forgot to sweep the wings forward and nearly stalled the aircraft. He was distracted by the fear of the enemy territory and

SAM threat disappearing behind him. The inflight stresses carried over to ground operations

as well. One pilot shared that “[I] pressur[ed]

myself to take an aircraft that was not really fit to

go into combat (or to fly in peacetime, either).

Don’t be afraid to abort – in the air or on the

ground. There’s always tomorrow. If you make

a ‘wrong’ call, so what? You’ll get to go again.

Everyone makes ‘mistakes.’ Shake it off and

move on.”8 Another airman sums up the fears of

early combat missions: “On my first combat

mission, I could not add 1 + 1. On my tenth mission, I could juggle knives ‘IP’ to target [or on

the target run, normally the most stressful part of

the mission].”9

This leads to the next question, which

asked whether fear increased or decreased after

the first mission. Eighty-five percent agreed that

it decreased after the first combat mission. Still,

sixty percent felt that they had problems sleeping

prior to each combat mission due to stress, which

means that its effects were still present, at least in

the background noise of the thought process.

However, the schedule of sleeping during the day

and flying nights was also a contributor; all F111 missions were conducted at night, which

meant that sleeping out of the normal sleep cycle

would be difficult even during peacetime operations. Moreover, thirty-eight percent reported fatigue during successive combat missions, meaning a number of aircrews were continually affected by stress and the lack of sleep even after

moving to a high altitude environment and during

successive nights of the war as the threat was further reduced. I also asked whether aircrews felt

‘immune to fire on successive missions,’ to analyze another element of stress, and here there was

an even 50/50 split on responses. Half the aircrews continued to feel the effects of stress and

remained wary of SAMs and AAA in the high

altitude environment.

When analyzing aircraft losses during the

Gulf War, it is interesting to note that the highest

coalition losses occurred on the first night. A total of nine aircraft, five of them American, were

lost in the first 24 hours of combat. Eight of the

nine were in the low altitude environment (1 F15E, 3 Tornados, 2 Navy A-6s, a Marine OV-10

and a Kuwaiti A-4) and lost to AAA or short

range SAMs. This helps to explain the added

stress of the first nights of low-level combat described by the young captain above. The ninth

loss was a Navy F-18 shot down by a longer-
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 8

range SAM, possibly an SA-2.10 Interestingly,

overall loss rates were fairly consistent over the

course of the war, which meant that the threat of

shoot down remained fairly constant after the

first 24 hours of combat operations. This would

also help to explain the mixed reaction to the

above question concerning fear on successive

missions. A summary of all US aircraft losses is

shown in Table 1.

A final important question concerned how

aircrews dealt with the stresses of air combat.

This was a fill-in-the-blank question and answers

were mixed, but the most common responses

were as follows: use of alcohol (22 percent), going to the gym/working out (19 percent), religion/prayer (14 percent), talked about it with others (14 percent), slept to alleviate it (11 percent),

and wrote letters home (11 percent). Thus, it

seems that the Top Gun image of visiting the bar

after the mission was the most common means of

dealing with stress, although working out in the

gym was a close second and no single method

emerged as a majority among the F-111 aircrews

at Incirlik during the Gulf war. Still, this is one

of the most important lessons from the survey.

The stress was real and aircrews needed to find a

way to deal with it.

Anecdotes of Combat

Lastly, I want to share more of the actual

words recorded by the F-111 aircrews. They describe combat stress much better than I can summarize it, and so I will close by listing some of

more interesting anecdotes in response to the

question: “Anything you could add that would

help future combat aircrews to prepare for and

reduce combat stress?”12 The most interesting

and valuable answers from the surveys are

quoted below:

– “During the first combat sortie, you will

feel the ‘fog of war’ descend on you as you’re

mission planning and getting [your flight] gear

ready ... realize you are going to be scared, so

follow your checklist and take your time.”

– “Know the target area cold. Memorize

it. Trust your crewmate. Be objective about the

threats – don’t embellish them, or overreact.

Talk over situations (death, capture) and come to

grips with it. Know you’ve provided all you can

for the ones left behind.”

Reason for Loss: SAM AAA Combat Loss Non-Combat Loss

Reason Unknown

January 91 5 6 1 10

February 91 3 6 8 12

Table 1. Gulf War US Aircraft Losses by Month11

Source: Bruce W. Watson, ed. Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993),

Appendix D, Aircraft Losses, 228-230.

Drink Alcohol 22 percent

Gym/Workout 19 percent

Religion/Prayer 14 percent

Talk About It 14 percent

Sleep 11 percent

Letters Home 11 percent

Other 9 percent

Table 2. How Did You Deal With Combat Stress?
9 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

– “Know your job (pilot, WSO) and the

jet cold. Commanders should emphasize study

time on ground training days; and INTEL, INTEL, INTEL, the ‘Tigers’ (the 79th Squadron)

had the best intel officer and it showed.” (A plug

for the importance of the intelligence officers

who provide a critical combat support role to the

aircrews. Intel training plays an important role in

reducing stress – and saving your life!)

– “Do things slowly and deliberately, especially during preflight, taxi, takeoff, and enroute to the target prior to crossing the border.”

– “Be honest – if screw up/miss the target, let people know. It may help them.”

– “In a combat area the Chaplain takes on

new meaning for lots of aircrews. It’s nice to

think you have God on your side even if you’re

not overly religious.”

– “Fear of the unknown is probably your

own worst enemy. Be flexible. Don’t let superiors ‘stupidity’ destroy morale.”

– “Don’t think you’re NOT gonna’ be

scared ... Be flexible and expect confusion at the

start and recognize [that] it’s ‘buffoonery’ that

will be your biggest threat.”

– “Stress keeping a simple game plan –

even simple plans are difficult when someone is

shooting at you. Things that you never thought

could go wrong will – a simple plan provides

greater flexibility.”

– “Expect to be afraid on early sorties, but

after 5-10 sorties it got much better.”

– “I don’t think you can prepare for

[combat] stress. But, by training hard for the

mission, you are very prepared to overcome

some of the stresses associated with combat.”

– “Slap yourself when you start to like it

(that’s around mission # 10-12).”

– “As long as you don’t let fear take-over,

once in the cockpit you really do fall back to

your normal flying instincts, training, and habit

patterns.”

– “On day one, you felt like you were in a

dream. Only training allowed me to perform that

first mission. After that, it became more routine,

easier to handle changes during flight.”

– “I don’t think it’s possible to prepare

for [combat] stress. Each individual has to learn

to cope and until you actually experience it, there

is no yardstick to measure by.”

– “You can read a million books, talk to

experienced (war) aircrews, and think about it all

day. But in the end you will still be scared and

deal with it in your own way. There is not much

of a way to reduce the stress. The only way is to

‘just do it’ and when your ‘fears of the unknown’

go away, it gets better.”

– “Guys that didn’t go [into combat]

aren’t interested enough to ask those who did,

what it was really like; and those that did go

don’t speak up for fear of being seen as a

‘braggart’ or a ‘know-it-all.’ You have to experience it first hand. I wanted to go so bad 16 January 1991. I was ready to come home 19 January

1991.”

Notes

1 Surveys were distributed to all Upper Heyford-based aircrews that participated for any length of time in Proven Force/Desert Storm operations

(during January-February 1991) upon their return to England the following month. The author compiled the data from those that voluntarily completed and returned the surveys to the 20th TFW Safety office. Individuals

participating in the survey remained anonymous in order to encourage full

disclosure of unsafe acts and incidents that occurred.

2 The 20th Fighter Wing remains active and now consists of F-16s based at

Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. RAF Upper Heyford was deactivated after the Cold War’s end and all F/EF-111 aircraft have been decommissioned from active flying service. The aircraft reside today in

what is known as the ‘boneyard’ adjacent to Davis Monthan Air Force

Base, Arizona.

3 Overall, the 7440thComposite Wing flew 4600 combat missions from

Incirlik airbase and suffered only one non-combat loss, an F-16 that

flamed out over southeastern Turkey. The pilot ejected successfully. For

more information about the 7440th, see Sid Balman, “Strikes from Turkey

‘Windfall’ for Air War,” Air Force Times, 22 April 1991, 14 and 37. 4 Ibid., 14.

5 This does not include seven EF-111 aircraft from Upper Heyford operating from two locations: Incirlik and the Royal Saudi Air Force base at

Jiddah. EF-111 flight crews logged an additional 464 combat support

sorties, jamming the skies over northern and southern Iraq for an additional 1739 flight hours. Data was transcribed from wing logs during

1991 by the author.

6 Information recorded by airman in write-in portion of author’s 1991
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 10

survey.

7 The EP-3A was involved in a midair collision with a Chinese fighter

while flying a reconnaissance mission over international waters near the

southern Chinese coast. The US aircrew landed at Lingshui airbase on

Hainan Island due to the heavy damage that resulted from the collision.

The Chinese held the crew for 11 days awaiting an apology from the US

government for “violating” their airspace and “killing” their pilot. See the

New York Times or other national newspapers during the period 1 – 12

April 2001 and later for articles and information about this incident. The

actual collision resulted from the Chinese pilot flying too close to the

larger and slower EP-3A aircraft.

8 Quote by airman recorded in write-in portion of author’s 1991 survey.

9 Ibid.

10 The SA-2 is an older generation Soviet designed SAM. See Bruce W.

Watson, Ed. Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio

Press, 1993), 65, also see Appendix D, Aircraft Losses, 228-230.

11 Data includes all US aircraft from all branches of service, including

helicopters. Ibid., 228-230.

12 This last question was a fill-in-the-blank response in the author’s 1991

survey.

Biography

Major Brent J. Talbot, USAF, serves as the Deputy Director for the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies located at the US Air

Force Academy in Colorado. He holds BA and

MA degrees in International Relations from Brigham Young University, has completed PhD

(ABD) coursework at the University of Denver

and is currently writing his dissertation on US

relations with allies during cooperative security

efforts. He is also an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy where

he specializes in teaching US Foreign and National Security Policy as well as Middle East

Politics. Major Talbot was the 20th Fighter Wing

Flight Safety Officer based at Royal Air Force

(RAF) Upper Heyford, United Kingdom, during

the 1991 Gulf War.

Painting by 2Lt Erika Paulo, USAFA ‘00. Courtesy of the USAFA Academy Department of English and Fine Arts.
11 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

“Every idea in the history of man, good or bad,

has started in a single human mind, and wars begin because one mind thinks it profitable to kill

and steal. This time, it’s happened to us in a particularly cruel way. This time, we can be exactly

sure who did it – and more.”

Worldwide, in every country with a satellite dish

and TV cable, in over a billion homes, the picture

changed from the Oval Office of the White House

to a three-story building on a city street. Most

viewers thought it some mad error, something

from a movie, a bad connection –

A handful knew different, even before the President went on. Daryaei, too, was watching the

President’s speech, as much from pure curiosity

as political advantage. What sort of man was

this Ryan, really? He’d wondered so long. Too

late, he found out.

“This is where he lives, Mahmoud Haji Daryaei,

the man who attacked our country with disease,

the man who attacked my child, the man who

tried to attack me, the man who sent his army on

a mission of conquest that turned into a mission

of death. He is a man who has defiled his religion and the laws of men and nations, and now,

Mr. Daryaei, here is the reply of the United

States of America.”

The President’s voice stopped, and a second or

two later, so did translations all over the world,

replaced only by silence, as eyes watched an ordinary black-and-white picture of a quite ordinary building – and yet everyone knew that

something extraordinary was about to happen.

Those looking very closely saw a light go on in a

window, and the front door open, but no one

would ever know the identity of the person who

might have been attempting to leave, because

both weapons fell true, struck the roof of the

building, and went off a hundredth of a second

later.1

Introduction

So goes the story in Tom Clancy’s fictional

thriller, Executive Order. World viewers are

brought ‘up close and personal’ to the fighter jet

precision strike taking place live as the President

calls the shot. Imagine the pressure on the air

commander (we will not even talk of the pressure

on the pilot!) as he sits helplessly and watches

with the rest of America, and possibly many

throughout the world, a tactical event with strategic implications. The commander in chief is using the miracles of modern weaponry and modern communications to deliver a message through

one particular bomb. Not since Paul Tibbets’ B29 dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima

has there been the potential for one bomb to have

such a strategic impact.

Yet the air commander’s anticipation in

the fictional scenario described above is the media’s joy. What more could the media ask for?

The various “news pegs” making this story worthy of public attention include conflict, impact,

timeliness, prominence, emotion, and suspense or

drama to name just a few. Such a “piece” would

easily be considered the ‘Super Bowl’ of the

The Precision Strike “Live” and on Mom and Dad’s TV

________________________________________

Leadership Challenges for Today’s Air Commanders

Michael R. Boera
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 12

Global Information Environment. Now consider

just-released, non-fictional “thrillers” by the

names, Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force

respectively, and Tom Clancy’s future fiction

comes close to being today’s reality.

Many CINCs speak to the command challenges associated with their relationship with the

media and the impact of tactical events on the

strategic environment. Accordingly, this paper

will briefly discuss the leadership challenges of

today’s air commanders caused by the media implications of modern technology on the

‘battlefield’ as we enter the 21st century. The

military can no longer guarantee control of what

does and does not get to the media and, in turn, to

the public during conflicts. Because of changes

in the nature of military operations and changes

in the technologies used to conduct warfare, it is

imperative for today’s air commanders to grasp

the implications that traditionally tactical actions

can have in the global information environment.2

For example, “the most arresting video footage

from the Gulf War was the shot of a bomb going

into a particular window in a particular building . . . [and] was not taken from a network camera, but from an Air Force camera that was on

either a missile itself or on the plane from which

it was launched – thus putting the Air Force directly into the media business.”3 A similar example can be found from Operation Allied Force

(OAF) when recalling the cockpit video of the

laser-guided bomb from an F-15E Strike Eagle as

it closed in on a Serbian railroad bridge just as a

passenger train was coming into view. How does

the air commander manage such implications?

Information Operations/Affairs Cell

During his presentation to the Air War

College (AWC) in August 1999, Brig Gen Daniel

Leaf, 31st AEW Commander during OAF, related

his lessons learned as the air commander of the

largest combat wing ever assembled. At the top

of his list was the need to be better prepared to

quickly assess cockpit video for not only target

damage assessment/munitions effects, but also to

lead-turn any ‘bad-news’ accidents. I believe he

needed a robust ‘information operations/affairs’

cell (for lack of a better name) to accomplish

such a task with so many missions being flown

on a 24-hour basis out of Aviano Air Base in Italy. Such a cell may be able to preclude enemy

propaganda techniques winning the day because

of our own lack of prioritization of ‘information.’

The intent is not to manipulate the media and the

public, but to guarantee that the accident is put

into the proper perspective before ‘Moms and

Dads’ see the video on TV. Such an information

operations/affairs cell needs to be an integral addition to any air operations center or wing operations center. Actually, it is needed right up

through the DoD chain as certain events get elevated to either exploit a successful operation, or

‘cap’ the severity of the ‘fallout’ from a mistake.

Time becomes the air commander’s worst

enemy as the media have more access and the

military less control of information than in the

past. In fact, “the only certainty is that increased

control and improved media management systems await us in the future.”4 The military air

commander can no longer turn a ‘cold shoulder’

and keep his distance from the media. He will

need to dedicate efforts to deftly manage the

global information environment he ‘fights’ in.

The “U.S. has found itself embroiled in a series

of bewildering confrontations often ignited by

ethnic and religious hatreds. The results have

rarely been a clear-cut ‘victory;’ sometimes they

have more closely resembled defeat.”5 This is

likely to continue for some time. The air commander and his relationship and handling of information and the media may just mean the difference between victory and defeat.

General Sir Rupert Smith advised the Air

War College class of 2000 that the commander

must command “amongst the people” and today,

the people means the media. He must command

in the arena and act as the producer, director and

writer of a script that will ‘sell.’ He used General

Wesley Clark’s conditions for success during

Operation Allied Force as an example. General

Sir Smith mentioned General Clark stated that

“we have to be seen to be doing” four things for

the whole operation to be successful: keep the

NATO coalition together; minimize collateral

damage; minimize loss of aircrews; and attack

the Serbian Fielded Forces. These were the

CINCs criteria by which we all would be measured against and set the overall course for his direction throughout the air war.
13 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

The Little Things Continue to Matter

As the air commander moves up the chain

of command he would also be wise to remember

that little things continue to matter. During Desert Storm my squadron commander took the

time to write what may have been hundreds of

letters to the families of the fighting members.

These letters were to the spouses in some cases

and parents with others. None of this was known

to us at the time but I certainly heard about it after the war from my parents who were thoroughly pleased to receive such an encouraging

letter describing the mission, how I was doing,

the reason for our being there and the challenges

we had faced or will face soon (all unclassified of

course). His encouraging words were music to

the ears of my parents and, besides belaying any

fears they may have had, could have helped explain some of what may not have been accurately

potrayed by the media.

It is a technique I used as a commander

myself during Operation Allied Force (recalling a

personal leadership technique that any good idea

I ever had I stole). I may never know fully what

its impact was, but I know it couldn’t have hurt.

I believe we can do better at the group/wing level

and above by doing the same. It is not an easy

task, but the potential benefits are worth it. It is a

way of going ‘offensive,’ maybe a very small

way, but a good way nevertheless. The hearts

and souls of the fighting members and their families must be committed to the mission at hand.

Their support should not be allowed to easily

sway against the military operation because of

unsubstantiated media reporting. This becomes

particularly important with operations other than

full-up combat and with the strategic implications possibly caused by tactical operations. It

becomes especially true during a conflict without

widespread public support before hand, such as a

Vietnam War or even Operation Allied Force as

compared to World War II or Desert Storm.

Another ‘little thing’ that has been neglected but certainly could have a negative impact on the air commander and the military operation is the audio read from cockpit video. An

AWC discussion of the 1994 Air Force shoot

down of two friendly Blackhawk helicopters over

northern Iraq reminded me of the cockpit video

footage I had seen years before. In it, at least one

F-15 pilot made some crude ‘victorious’ comments after the kill, which only added to the

negative ‘fallout’ from the unfortunate incident,

and certainly would have infuriated the families

of the victims. Knowing the results, the comments were embarrassing to any fighter pilot, air

commander and United States Air Force officer.

The Air Force was seen to be unprofessional and

this did not sit well amongst the people.

Our training of today’s combat pilots

needs to be all encompassing. The air commander of yesteryear was charged with keeping

the ‘heat’ away from his warriors in the arena of

battle. The same is true today, yet today’s air

commander must ensure his knights in the sky

realize the realities of the modern battlefield. I

would never ask to tame the enthusiasm and aggressiveness of our nation’s warriors, but only

remind them of the professionalism required

when wearing the uniform of United States

Armed Forces, in peace and in war. Additionally, I would remind them it is the rare ‘bird’ indeed that possesses perfect situational awareness

or SA, especially in combat; think before speaking.

Core Values

The way our air commanders handle adversity when the tactical bomb goes astray creating an incident of strategic proportions should in

no way call into question Air Force integrity. I

would hope that in future wars, we begin a media

campaign to make sure people understand there

can, and probably will be mistakes made. The

fog of war is as much a reality of combat in the

21st century as it has been since the beginning of

human conflict. Apologizing for each and every

mistake during the conflict is a mistake in itself.

But questions will be asked and we need to be

able to respond professionally; the air commander must be prepared accordingly. If a mistake is made, briefing what went wrong, and

what is being done to try to make sure it doesn’t

happen again, is a good opener.

Final Thought

As we evolve in a leadership discussion

about squadron level leadership to that of senior

officer leadership, I find it amazing how much

time the senior commander needs to spend on
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 14

tactical operations, at least the possible consequences from them. The strategic and operational plans have to be a given to include well

thought out branches and sequels in each. They

must be scripted for success as General Sir Smith

recommended. No doubt follow-on operations

need to include possible courses of action when a

tactical incident has immediate strategic implications.

Today’s air commander must understand

the media implications of modern technology.

Tactical actions on the battlefield can have strategic consequences. Accordingly, young pilots

may unknowingly dictate the overall course of

the war, for better or worse, more so today than

at anytime in the history of warfare. The air

commander must dedicate resources and effort to

quickly analyze and disseminate information, in

particular, cockpit video footage from a mission

or ‘strike.’ An information operations/affairs cell

may help accomplish this and could be used as

far down the chain of command as wing level,

and as far up as the office of the secretary of defense. Even squadrons may need a liaison to

these cells as the need arises.

Additionally, the little things continue to

matter. Speaking or writing directly to the families of airmen carrying the torch about the mission, their people, the challenges of the modern

battlefield and their pride in the job being accomplished may just preempt or deflate some unwarranted negative media attention in the future. Remember to train the pilots to act professionally in

all aspects of peacetime and combat operations,

and ensure they understand the potential consequences of their actions or words. Finally, never

compromise your integrity or the integrity of

your service so as to avoid negative consequences if mistakes are made on the battlefield.

Instead, be ready with a “fix” so as to avoid repeating the mistake.

Maybe then the Air Force can live with

the consequences, good or bad, when the precision strike is shown on ‘Mom and Dad’s’ TV.

To take it one step further, as Tom Clancy has in

his book, when the film is on TV “live” in the future, air commanders that understand the media

implications of modern technology on the 21st

century battlefield and are trained to manage

them will be better poised to lead the Air Force

through the ‘danger zone’ associated with mass

media and almost-instantaneous communication.

They will be ready to answer questions, for good

or bad, soon thereafter, but a tactical “pause” to

think before answering may still be warranted

Notes

1 Tom Clancy, Executive Order (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996),

870.

2 Nancy Ethiel, Senior-Editor, The Changing Nature of Conflict (Robert

R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996), 7.

3 Ibid., 11.

4 Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Media and the Military From the

Crimea to Desert Strike (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 296. 5 Ethiel, Changing Nature of Conflict, 7.

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Boera, USAF, is

the 2nd Group Air Officer Commanding, 34th

Training Group, USAF Academy, Colorado. He

holds a BA in Architectural Engineering from the

University of Colorado, Boulder and MAs in

Management & Supervision from Central Michigan University and Strategic Studies from the Air

War College. As commander of the 23rd

(Fightin’ Hawks) Fighter Squadron he led combat deployments in support of Operations

SOUTHERN WATCH, NORTHERN WATCH,

DELIBERATE FORCE, and ALLIED FORCE.
15 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

F-15 and F-16 painted by C1C Stephen Wilson, USAFA ‘02. Courtesy of the USAF Academy

Department of English and Fine Arts.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 16

In my military career, I was convinced that

knowledge about military theory, thought, and

strategy was only necessary for those general officers in positions of planning and directing combat operations. My Air Force experience as a

missile, space, and comptroller officer found, at

the time, little need for such esoteric subjects as

Clausewitz’s Remarkable Trinity or arguments

concerning the applicability of Giulio Douhet’s

airpower theory about breaking the will of a

population, so I thought. I was convinced I

would never use such triviality in any future assignments. After all, the Air Force would provide all necessary training and education for me

to solve any problem. If anyone had to solve

strategic problems, it would be the four-star generals in some highly classified command center.

As I would find out, this would not be the case.

My views quickly changed when I was

sent to an assignment in that five-sided building

along the Potomac River in Virginia, the Pentagon. Seeing myself as a mere action officer responsible for economic advice and analysis, I believed my assignment would revolve around cost

reports, analysis, and acquisition schedules.

Number crunching would occupy my existence

for the next four years, so I thought. During the

time I was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force, Financial Management, the nation

was riveted on downsizing the military from its

Cold War force structure. For the Air Force, this

focus meant disbanding whole wings and shutting down bases and activities. Organizations

with rich heritages were relegated to the dustbin

of history; fabled bases and units were shuttered

and their resources distributed across an ever

shrinking Air Force; and, aircraft were sent to

storage or the scrap heap.

I was assigned to evaluate many of these

base realignment and closure actions. The calculations included the “cost” and “savings” of alternative actions, local economic impact from job

losses and taxes, efforts to revitalize the area after a closure, and transfer and resources spent to

convert military units. This was all fairly

straightforward, using existing Department of

Defense guidelines and any number of computer

spreadsheet models. I had the education and the

support of colleagues to overcome any problems.

Yet the problem would develop in unexpected

directions, as I was soon to find out.

One of my first assignments was to calculate the effects of closing a number of tactical

fighter bases. I proceeded with crunching numbers to find costs and savings. After all, wasn’t

the reason we were accomplishing these actions

to reduce the defense budget and produce a peace

dividend to the public? After a number of days

of producing a series of impressive spreadsheets,

I started to compare alternatives. Obviously, the

lower cost and higher savings bases were the

ones I would focus on my analysis. But something told me that I was somehow missing a key

ingredient. The planes, people, and bases existed

for some reason. Tactical fighter bases have distinct missions that may depend on geographic location. Bases close to disputed borders, near a

training facility, or that have unique characteristics provide something incalculable that is missing from computer models. The nature of fighting an air and space war might change dramatically given a series of closures or realignments. I

had to understand the impact of all this on the

American ability to go to war.

I found that many capabilities were interconnected with the potential base closures. What

Military Theory at the Puzzle Palace

Clayton Chun
17 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

would the effect be on Air Force operations if

tanker bases were suddenly closed? Could the

Air Force deploy certain forces efficiently without adequate depot and maintenance bases? How

do we consolidate diverse military operations on

a single base? What will be the reaction of our

allies and potential enemies to closure of overseas bases? Other experts around the Pentagon

were responsible for answering these questions,

but understanding many issues involving the Air

Force’s operations and their impact on national

security helped me probe into the question of

how the military capability of the service would

be affected, not just through cost savings and

seemingly straight forward computer models.

Bases that had different missions and capabilities opened my eyes to better evaluation of

the potential costs and savings of base closures.

For example, fighter pilots need a certain amount

of mandatory training flights requiring live ordnance firing to maintain combat proficiency.

These requirements and an understanding of

military operations allowed me to study the costs

and savings issue in a different light. Although

not required to measure such considerations, I

began to look at the issues from a different perspective. I only hoped that other analysts were

also trying to analyze them in the same manner.

These considerations were invaluable in discussing the overall impact of proposed base closure

or realignment actions. The calculation of savings and costs had to be more inclusive and logically based. These considerations were also invaluable towards comparing other potential base

closings. Instead of looking solely at cost, I tried

to provide a linkage between military requirements and cost.

I attempted to include the military use of

the bases, if possible, on a number of military

and base operations activities with a common

framework – dollars. These actions allowed my

supervisor and others to compare disparate functions with a common, albeit imperfect, denominator for evaluation. Further, the impact of closing bases also allowed me to focus on the issues

associated with logistics, future mobilization,

support to other services, and a wide range of issues that I had examined in my professional military education. There was a reason why military

thought, theory, and education were applicable,

even for a staff officer in a support area. Unless

one understood the purpose and interconnected

issues of military operations, many questions

would be left unanswered and potentially not

analyzed. My knowledge of air and space power

was enhanced and put to good use.

I was able to expand my experience, after

the conclusion of my base closure analysis projects, by transferring to duties that directly required knowledge about military thought and theory – especially air and space power issues. My

assignment was to the Air Force Deputy Chief of

Staff for Plans and Operations’ Strategy Division. The division was responsible for developing future Air Force concepts of operations and

force structure. The Strategy Division was an interesting mix of individuals from a broad background of operational experiences such as mobility, fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance. Although my operational experience was limited, I

had a strong desire to work on issues that affected long range planning for the Air Force and

joint force operations. I was responsible for a

number of joint planning activities that ranged

from determining force structure requirements to

reviewing wartime contingency planning. This

was a great opportunity to learn about national

security issues at the highest levels and about

how Air Force leadership, faced with difficult

problems, made key decisions.

Working in this environment required one

to not only use military theory and thought, but

also to apply and develop new concepts. Some

of these actions included developing the initial

set of Air Force core competencies. How the Air

Force defined itself at the time and where it

wanted to be in the future took careful thought

and effort in terms of resources and capabilities.

The Air Force was struggling with a downsized

force and unknown future threats after the demise

of the Soviet Union. What air and space power

capability should be provided to the nation was a

burning question. I was fortunate to explore

many ideas about fighter, bomber, space, missile,

information, and support issues and how the Air

Force would transform itself into a future fighting force. In some small manner, I was a part of

developing that future capability. To do so, however, I needed more than just a passing knowledge of military and aerospace theory.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 18

I embarked on a self-paced course of

study to include military and aerospace theory,

military history, and learning as much as I could

about national security policy issues. Although I

was always interested in military history, I now

had a strong focus. Spending the time and effort

was worth every second of effort. Issues and

problems important to the Air Force became

more relevant to me. I could not rely on recent

operational experience, nor did I think my course

of study would ever substitute for those actions;

however, any military officer that has the desire

and inclination can certainly contribute to the debate about the future of their service. The

strength of the Air Force is not necessarily in the

amount of military force it can field, but on the

ability of its people to solve the tough problems.

I was able to ask a lot of “why” or “what happens

if” questions. I thought this would get people to

think about the implications of their actions and

form a stronger foundation for any argument they

might make. Analyzing a concept of operations

or an issue took on a new meaning for me. Since

we had left the Cold War and finished Desert

Storm, I was confronted with answers like, “we

always have done it that way.” If the basic

threats and resources have changed, shouldn’t

the approach offered to solve problems change

too? I had to ask. Many times there were reasonable and certainly logical reasons to define

positions that were appropriate in the Cold War,

but there were also conditions where they were

not. This was where the value of my study paid

off.

In the future, warfare and the use of military force will face many challenging situations

where innovative solutions are required. The nature of military operations will also encompass

many personnel who were once thought of as

“support.” Under the aerospace expeditionary

force concept, individuals that were never deployed may find themselves directly involved in

any number of wide ranging contingency operations. Those individuals will not only have to

maintain their technical knowledge of their specialties, but will also have to understand fully the

impact of their actions in terms of a theater employment. Additionally, the United States Air

Force will, most likely, not fight a major contingency unilaterally. Joint and combined operations will include air and space assets from other

services and countries. Officers who are able to

articulate and apply aerospace and military theory and thought in this environment can only improve the probability of mission success. Military officers must understand the importance of

aerospace and military theory to the attainment of

critical military and political objectives.

My experience and studies of these subjects led to opportunities I thought I would never

be offered. I have always been interested in

aerospace and military issues, since it was my

primary focus as an Air Force officer. I truly believe that a firm grounding in aerospace and military theory and thought provided me with a

sound foundation to make better decisions and a

broader horizon to think about a range of topics

that affected my performance on the job. My experience at the Pentagon reinforced these views

and led me to a career of emphasizing this

knowledge.

Biography

Clayton K.S. Chun is Professor of Economics at the

United States Army War College where he teaches

courses on national security and defense economics.

He earned his doctorate in Public Policy Analysis in

1992 at the RAND Graduate School, a part of the

RAND Corporation. Dr. Chun completed several operational and staff assignments during his Air Force

career. He recently retired from the Air Force after

commanding the 34th Education Squadron at the

United States Air Force Academy.

Classical Warrior scratchboard by 2Lt Petdet Petchuay, USAFA ‘01.

Courtesy of the USAF Academy Department of English and Fine Arts.
19 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Undoubtedly, you are aware of our many Air

Force weapon systems. But I will bet there is a

weapon system you may not know about yet you

probably use every day. Think with me for a

minute. What weapon system exists that you and

almost everyone else on your base use every

day? Give up? It’s the base network. Surprised?

If you are, you are in good company. If we were

to survey all Air Force personnel, I would estimate the majority would not know their base network is considered a weapon system. Now, I am

not saying it should be thought of as a weapon or

that it functions like a weapon. I mean how the

Air Force officially views the network – as a mission-critical weapon system.1

First, a bit of history should help us understand how our networks evolved into a

weapon system. The network was not acquired

like your “run-of-the-mill” weapon system. The

process (very simplified here) starts with requirements. For instance, the Air Force realizes it

needs a new fighter to maintain air superiority

into the future. So we determine our requirements, allocate money, review contractor proposals to meet our requirements, choose a contractor,

and pay them to build our new fighter. Our networks were not acquired that way; they have

emerged as a part of the information technology

advancements over the years. It was not until we

began to recognize their importance to our mission that we realized they were effectively a

weapon system. Ten years ago, many Air Force

bases did not even have networks. Where were

you a decade ago and what kind of computer support and network/Internet access did you have

from your office? Your experience is probably

similar to mine.

As a brand new communications/

computer officer, I was stationed at Lowry AFB

from Dec ‘88 - Sep ‘92. We were a tenant unit

full of communications-computer personnel. Our

mission was to maintain software for a satellite

system. When I left in September ’92, we had

just implemented a Local Area Network (LAN)

for our unit, never mind the whole base. In my

office of five people, we had access to one terminal. The best thing I can recall from that LAN is

we centralized the printer locations and saved

money by having fewer printers and having those

printers controlled and maintained by the computer operators in their secure area. We did not

have E-mail and most of us hardly knew what the

“world-wide web” (WWW) was.

My next assignment was a remote tour in

Australia. We did not have an operational LAN

there until early 1994. That one connected our

unit with the town nearby. We all thought it was

great we could communicate over the LAN not

only with each other at the work site, but also

with those personnel working in the village

twelve miles away. Our only way of longdistance communications (back to HQ at Peterson AFB) was through “snail-mail,” Autovon

(now DSN), commercial long-distance, or facsimile. We did not have access to the WWW. It

was not until I became the executive officer/

squadron section commander that I warranted my

“very own” personal computer (PC) for the first

time. If I had stayed in the software programming section, I was destined to share a PC with 4

to 5 other personnel for the duration of my tour.

When I PCS’d to Maxwell AFB in Oct

'94 to work at Officer Training School (OTS), I

took a step backwards with regards to computer

and network access. I did have my own PC, but

it was “stand-alone” – meaning it was not hooked

up to any type of network. I did not have E-mail

or WWW access. Here I began to learn about

what we Comm & Info weenies call “stovepiped” systems. Those are systems that could be

If It’s a Weapon System, Then Treat It That Way

Mark Heredia
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 20

thought of as a LAN in that they normally have a

central computer which holds a database of information and software to process that information.

Usually remote terminals are connected to the

one central computer to allow users to input, review, and monitor the data. What makes this

type of system “stove-piped” is that it has no

other interface with any other system or network.

It is used for just one purpose. We used this system to track the progress of our officer trainees.

We used our PCs for word processing and if we

needed to print something out, we saved our file

to a floppy diskette, and walked down the hall to

the PC that had a printer connected to it. This

was from 1994 to 1996. In 1997 Maxwell AFB

implemented a base network, the first one I had

experienced. We had E-mail service, but it was

restricted to people on Maxwell AFB. Also, only

some machines had access to the WWW and you

needed special permission to “surf” the WWW.

In Oct ’97, I reported to Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Communications and Information Directorate. A Hickam AFB, the network

was up and operational and we all had our own

desktop computers and nearly unlimited access to

the Internet. This was a big surprise to me. Now

recall, we are talking only about 3.5 years ago.

Today, wherever you are stationed in the Air

Force, you most likely have your own PC which

is undoubtly connected to unlimited, 24/7 access

to the Internet. It was during this tour that I became aware of how the Air Force began to see

our networks as weapon systems.

For purposes of this article, let me describe what comprises a “basic” network. A network includes your desktop computer, the base’s

infrastructure (fiber in the ground, servers to

house the information and applications, other

hardware devices to protect and maintain the network) and all the systems/applications that reside

on the network. If this network is indeed a

weapon system, then it needs to be maintained

and operated as such. Think about how an F-15

or A-10 is operated, maintained, and secured.

Access to the flight line, hangers and other areas

is controlled. If you do not have a flight-line

pass, then you will be challenged by flight line

security forces before you get too close to the aircraft. Would the Air Force have a problem with

someone who wanted to download “freeware”

off the Internet and integrate that software into

the F-15’s software suite (a common occurrence to USAF networks)? What if we need to

modify something on the A-10? We would

want to make sure the right person does the

job, thoroughly test it to ensure it does what its

supposed to do and that it does not degrade any

of the existing A-10’s functionality. We want

to make sure additions to the A-10 do not hamper the mission, but improve it. We want to

know what they are doing and when, so we can

accurately plan the implementation of the new

modification. If we have those concerns with

our aircraft weapon systems, shouldn’t we

have the same concerns for our base’s network? I say yes, and the intent of this article is

to convince you of the same. The real issue I

am leading to is security of the network or

what the Comm & Info community calls

“Information Protection” (IP) and “Information

Assurance” (IA). IP is mainly concerned with

protecting the base network, while IA is focused on ensuring the information is accurate

and accessible.

So what are we protecting the network

from? We all know the negative impact a virus

can have on a network and, according to Symantec (USAF authorized anti-virus software

company), in the month of March ’01 there

have been 42 different viruses launched to attack networks.2 During a recent “Anna

Kournikova” virus attack, many USAF networks were down due to the large number of

E-mail’s generated by this virus.3 According

to the 10 ABW CS/CC, the USAF Academy

network was down for several hours and Air

Force Space Command (Peterson AFB) was

affected for 2 to 3 days.4 This was a major impact from a relatively tame virus. What would

happen if a more serious virus got through and

infected the network? Recently, even Microsoft was successfully infiltrated and the blueprints to a new Microsoft software system stolen.5 So it is not like the USAF is doing a poor

job, it is just a very difficult job to do.

Another problem that IP combats is unauthorized intrusions. These include but are

not limited to “hackers.” Over the last 4

months, the USAF Academy has averaged 164

unauthorized “probes” a month.6 That means
21 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

on average, there are 164 attempts to get through

the network’s protection devices and get information to which they are not entitled. A further

disturbing trend is that over half of these probes

are from people in foreign countries.7 So how do

you feel knowing that several times each week

there are unauthorized attempts from foreign

countries to get information from the USAF

Academy? Is this a risk to our national security?

Perhaps not at this academic institution, but what

about our other bases? The Pentagon alone experiences between 10 – 15 attempted intrusions a

day and the workload of the OSI computer crime

division to investigate “serious” intrusion attempts has jumped from 10 percent of its workload in 1978 to 85 percent of its workload today.8

How would you feel if these same people were

trying to get information on an F-117? Well they

are, and the safeguards in place to protect that

weapon system should be in place to protect our

networks as well.

If commanders are relying on the network

and the information contained therein to make

decisions (in some cases over matters of life and

death), then we need to make sure the information is always accessible and accurate. That is

the job of Information Assurance. USAFE/CC

words it this way: “The USAFE Enterprise Network is a mission-critical weapon system delivering trusted and timely information. NAF and

Wing commanders, in their role as a designated

approving authority, are accountable for accrediting the security of their networks and eliminating

risks that could cause adverse impact to the

USAFE Mission.”9 (italics added for emphasis)

To help protect the networks, the Air

Force Comm & Info community began installing

“firewalls” at each base. These firewalls are

hardware and software suites that act as single

entry and exit points for our bases’ network traffic, enabling us to monitor and control the electronic traffic going in and out of the base. This is

where we can detect viruses and take care of

them at the “front gate” so to speak – very similar to the idea of security forces personnel checking vehicles at a base’s front gate before letting

them in. Additionally, we can monitor where Air

Force personnel are going and catch those personnel going to unauthorized websites just like

security forces stopping unauthorized military

members from access to the flightline. These

firewalls, mandated for each AFB, are fairly new

technology for the Air Force. HQ PACAF had

an Information Resource Management Strategic

Plan measurement which tracked the installation

of these firewalls at each of the nine bases in

PACAF. Completion of all installations was

planned for late 1999, less than two years ago.

With the installation of these firewalls,

came some frustrations for users. First, they

slowed Internet access time down. Think about

it – 5,000 people going through one “choke

point” all trying to get out to the Internet. It did

not matter if they were going to legitimate websites such as “AF Link” (official USAF website)

or other websites needed for their job, they still

had to go through the firewall. Many of these users experienced faster access time at home from

their personal Internet access accounts and slow

modems, which made their frustration greater.

With the advent of firewalls came polices that restricted access to some services. For instance, to

minimize the load on the infrastructure, streaming audio/video is not allowed. So you can not

go to CNN, for example, and click on one of its

video news clips and watch it. Streaming audio/

video can quickly clog up the “bandwidth” – a

Comm & Info term relating to the communication infrastructure “pipes” that can become

clogged with electronic traffic just as city streets

are clogged with vehicle traffic as more people

move into an area. Eventually, the city needs to

either widen or add roads to ease the congestion.

The same phenomena occurs with the communication infrastructure as you add more systems

and services to the network. Eventually, the

electronic traffic clogs the infrastructure so much

that more infrastructure is needed – and that costs

lots of money. This in turn impacts the more

mission-critical systems as they compete for access to the infrastructure against all the other systems on the base. If left unchecked, this can severely impact the mission – even bring the network down to a slow crawl much like viruses do.

Another problem with networks in general was that the Comm & Info community did a

poor job of maintaining and operating their base

networks. At one time, most unscheduled network outages were not the result of intruders, or

viruses; rather, they were the result of mistakes
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 22

by network administrator personnel.10 We were

bringing down our own networks due to poor

training, lack of experience and lack of procedures. These frustrations led many users to lose

confidence in the people that were supposed to

keep the network operational. Users began to

question other policies that were implemented in

the name of network protection/assurance. To

fix this problem, the Comm & Info community

began to “Operationalizing and Professionalizing

the Network.” This included better training and

incentives, such as re-enlistment bonuses, to keep

experienced network administrators in the service.

Have you ever wondered why your passwords have to be so cryptic and why you have to

change them every 90 days? Hackers can

“crack” passwords and the “typical” password

one might naturally pick is pretty easy to do.

Many people use their name, kids/spouses name,

username, even pets’ name or some group of

numbers like birthdays, anniversaries, kids birthdays, car license plates, etc. The rules to make

your password cryptic make it much more difficult for someone to figure out, and with a little

creativity you can figure out a password that is

easy to remember. Also, changing passwords

frequently ensures that if someone has gained access to your password, they will not have it for

long. The password policies may make it difficult to remember passwords, but there are some

very good reasons for the policies to exist.

Many Comm & Info personnel also share

another frustration and concern. Consider this:

If you were in charge of ensuring the security and

assurance of the network for the wing commander, would you think twice about letting

someone add a new application to the network?

What would you do if some technicians show up

at your office Monday morning announcing they

are on a one-week TDY to install a new financial

management pay system to your network so your

foreign national civilians can get paid? All they

need to know is where they can hook up to your

network. To make matters worse, these are contractors getting paid by someone in the Air Force

to install the new system and if they have to

leave and come back later, it is going to cost a lot

more and the implementation schedule will be

delayed. But you are wondering who approved

this? How do you know it is a secure application? Does it introduce a “back-door” (access to

the network around the firewall) into the base’s

network system? Has it been thoroughly tested?

If so, where is the documentation? Who is going

to fix any “bug” that appears once the contractor

is gone? Remember, you are responsible for ensuring the security and integrity of the data on the

network. If you allow them to install their application without getting answers to your questions,

then you and the wing commander assume a

huge risk. What if it impacts your network to the

point of you having to shut it down? This could

result in a huge mission impact for the entire

base. This is the kind of responsibility the wing

commander of each base has as the Designated

Approving Authority (DAA).11 As you would

expect, the wing commander relies on base communications squadron personnel to ensure the

network is properly maintained, secure, and that

the integrity of data is assured. However, the

DAA is ultimately responsible. This problem

scenario is increasing since nearly every new application or system is now designed to operate on

or with the network. That means the communications squadron has a big task. They are responsible for recommending to the DAA approval to install each and every system to their

network. Gone are the days of stove-piped systems that stand-alone. Everyone wants their system hooked to the Internet to ease access. Here

is a small sampling of the types of systems I am

talking about:12

-Air Force White Pages

-Automated Business Services System

(for TDY orders, AF Forms 9, etc.)

-Cargo Movement Operations System

-IDEA Program Data System

-Lodging Touch System

-Pharmacy Data Transaction Service

-TaxWise

-Virtual Military Personnel Flight

-InfoWorkspace (a collaborative tool)

-Military Personnel Data System

Modernization

-Air Force Fitness Assessment Software

-Automated Civil Engineer System

-C-130 Avionics Modernization Program

-Deers On-line Enrollment System
23 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

-Fuel Automated System

-Global Broadcast System

To help with this problem and to meet

the customer’s requirements, the Comm & Info

community developed a new process. The procedure is called the Certificate to Operate

(CTO) process and is being institutionalized in

the way the Air Force does business.13 As

mandated by the Assistant Secretary of the Air

Force for Acquisition,14 the new process will

help ensure every new system added to the network or current system upgrade “... will not

adversely impact the network and can be sustained from a Comm & Info perspective.”15

This is a very similar process to how we approve updates to our aircraft weapon systems.

The process establishes a very clear and definite methodology to certify new additions or

upgrades to existing aircraft which results in a

certificate of airworthiness. The result of the

Comm & Info CTO process is the issuance of a

“Certificate Of Networthiness.” This process

evaluates many factors to determine the networthiness of a new system or upgrade to include: network security; network impact; compatibility with the network; compliance with

architecture standards; adherence to USAF

spectrum use policy; Comm & Info sustainability (manpower, training, logistics); Comm &

Info infrastructure cost; and, an implementation

schedule to include phasing out obsolete systems. These are all critical aspects to consider

when adding or upgrading a system to the network.

Many see this CTO process as cumbersome, bureaucratic and a hindrance to implementing new technology. In reality, to lay out

this process in a very deliberate way (such as in

the Air Force C4ISP guide) is an advantage.16

Now the user will know exactly what needs to

be done to earn a Certificate of Networthiness

for their new system so they can include it in

the base network with minimal risk to the

USAF. This way there are no surprises, USAF

is ensured the network will be protected, the

infrastructure can support it, and the user is ensured that future sustainability exists for their

systems. The CTO process takes on more importance when you realize where this network

technology is headed. We are no longer looking at just a LAN for a unit or a network for a

base, but we are now connecting all Air Force

bases into an “enterprise network” (much like

what USAFE/CC refers to) and eventually into

a wide-area network for the entire USAF and

perhaps DoD. As we expand our weapon system, it becomes more vulnerable to attack and

the need for a CTO process becomes even

more apparent to protect our networks and ensure the integrity of our information.

So the next time you frown about a policy that comes down from the Comm & Info

community or complain about that message

telling you your password is about to expire,

think twice. Think about it in terms of a

weapon system. Think about the responsibilities of your wing commander to protect the

network and to ensure the information is accurate for all users – including you. Put yourself

in his/her shoes and see if you come up with a

different perspective on why that policy is in

place. Also, realize this technology is ever

changing and growing. The bigger it gets, the

more people have access to it and the more we

need to protect this newest, emerging weapon

system. Finally, next time you see your communications squadron commander, let him

know how happy you are he is protecting your

weapon system.

Notes

1 USAFE/CC MSG DTG 201352Z, Subj: Delegation of DAA Authority.

2 http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/vinfodb.html#threat_list. This

website provides a complete list of known computer viruses.

3 For information on the Symantec virus, go to http://www.symantec.

com/avcenter/..

4 Statistics gathered from 10 ABW/CS network monitoring provided

by 10 ABW CS/CC on 27 February 01.

5 Airman magazine, February ’01. 6 Statistics gathered from 10 ABW/CS network monitoring provided

by 10 ABW CS/CC on 27 February 01.

7 Ibid.

8 Airman magazine, February ’01. 9 USAFE/CC MSG DTG 201352Z, Subj: Delegation of DAA Authority.

10 AF/SC, Lt General Donahue, Air Force Information Technology

Conference keynote address September ‘99.

11 AFI 33-202 15 February 2001, Communications and Information

Computer Security paragraphs 1.5.1, 2.7, 2.8, 2.10.

12 For a complete listing of all systems currently under consideration

by the Air Force, go to http://is-dls.scott.af.mil/certofnet/. This list

contains over 140 systems plus updates to the systems.

13 For more information on the CTO process, go to https://www.afca.

scott.af.mil/con/.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 24

14 SAF/AQ Memorandum 13 Jun 00, Subj: Air Force Command, Control,

Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Support Plan (C4ISP) Policy.

15 Air Force C4ISP Guide, 13 Jun 00 paragraph 6.1. 16 For a copy of the AF C4ISP guide, go to https://www.afca.scott.af.mil/

c4isp/.

Biography

Major Mark L. Heredia is the Course Director

for the USAF Academy’s Military Strategic Studies course, Introduction to the Profession of

Arms. He is a former Flight Commander at the

US Air Force Officer Training School and prior

to his assignment to USAFA was the Chief, Strategic Planning and Integration Branch, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Communications

and Information Directorate.

Bald Eagle painted by C2C Philip Schembri, USAFA ‘03. Courtesy of the USAF Academy

Department of English and Fine Arts
25 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

NATO Air Ops with EASE

Richard White

In December 1995, lead elements of the United

States 1st Armored Division advanced into war

torn Bosnia as part of the NATO Implementing

Force (IFOR) dispatched to subdue hostilities according to provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation marked the first commitment of forces in NATO’s history as well as the

first time since World War II that American and

Russian soldiers shared a common mission.1 The

introduction of NATO ground forces proceeded

without incident in part due to NATO air efforts,

including Operation DELIBERATE FORCE

which first brought the warring factions to the

peace table. The Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

peacekeeping mission underscored NATO’s new

role in the post-Cold War era. The abrupt transition from a stationary to expeditionary mission

caught NATO air planners by surprise, and traditional means for command and control were unprepared to deal with the new role. Fortunately,

a small group of dedicated individuals perceived

the emerging needs and stayed the course to deliver a new capability to bridge the transition, and

help conduct NATO air operations with EASE.

In the deepest darkest days of the Cold

War, NATO forces prepared to meet Warsaw

Pact armies pouring through the Fulda Gap.

While the Army fought a rearguard action buying

time for the Navy to win the Battle of the Atlantic, allied air forces would ultimately decide the

fate of the war in a deadly dual over the skies of

central Germany. To coordinate the air forces of

six nations effectively, the West German Luftwaffe built the EIFEL command and control system. EIFEL was a marvel of modern engineering

for its time: three massive SIEMENS computers

powered an extensive network of remote workstations interconnected through the nuclearhardened Bundespost telephone exchange.

EIFEL provided NATO commanders an immediate, secure, and reliable means to direct distributed air operations from central Combined Air

Operations Centers (CAOCs) located throughout

Germany.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and

the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO leaders began postulating new roles for the continuing military alliance outside the traditional European theater. All eyes turned towards the troubled breakup in the Balkans. In anticipation of

these new roles, a Luftwaffe engineer conceived

and developed a set of communication protocols

that would allow EIFEL to expand beyond

NATO’s Central Region. Hauptmann Droth designed EIFEL-XA (eXtended Architecture) as a

toolkit for building communication links between

EIFEL and other allied computer systems.

Hauptmann Droth’s project captured the attention

of American officers working with their Luftwaffe counterparts. EIFEL-XA offered the promise of interfacing the USAF Contingency Theater

Air Planning System (CTAPS) with EIFEL.

CTAPS was the successor to CAFMS

(Consolidated Air Force Management System)

which produced the daily Air Tasking Order

(ATO) for the Gulf War. The success of air

power in Desert Storm elevated the once obscure

ATO to exalted status, and emphasized the need

for automated production and dissemination.

CTAPS was the heir apparent to CAFMS but was

still in developmental testing when US forces deployed to Saudi Arabia. CTAPS was certified

shortly after the Gulf War and was quickly designated the USAF standard for ATO production

worldwide. Accordingly, the 17th Air Force (17

AF) installed CTAPS within its planning cell colocated with a NATO CAOC in Sembach Germany. Soon afterwards, US forces began using
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 26

CTAPS to generate NATO-releasable ATOs for

planning and exercises.

Despite its significant capabilities,

CTAPS introduced considerable technical and

doctrinal challenges to the NATO CAOC. First

of all, CTAPS was classified US SECRET – it

could not be shared with our NATO allies. Second of all, NATO operators were not prepared to

work with ATOs – they were only trained to deal

with individual air missions designated as ATMs

(Air Tasking Messages). What resulted was a

painstaking procedure whereby US planners

would automatically generate a CTAPS ATO,

then manually transcribe it into corresponding

EIFEL ATMs. It was a time-consuming process

exacerbated by the fact a single ATO could literally contain thousands of ATMs. US planners

quickly seized on the idea of EIFEL-XA since it

promised a means to provide a secure, seamless

method to automatically translate CTAPs ATOs

into EIFEL ATMs ... it was just a matter of

building an appropriate interface.

A small US detachment assigned to Systems Center EIFEL (SCE) took on the challenge

to independently develop an automated interface

for CTAPS. SCE was a multinational concern

comprised of representatives from Germany, the

United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium,

and the Netherlands. The Luftwaffe maintained

controlling interest in SCE which was located on

a Luftwaffe installation in Birkenfeld, twenty-five

miles north of Ramstein AFB. Det 1 of the 617th

Communications Squadron (617 CS) was assigned to represent US interests. The six members of the detachment were integrated into the

SCE organization to maintain EIFEL software.

Fully cognizant of developments on EIFEL-XA,

in August 1994 Det 1 volunteered to separately

design an EIFEL interface for the USAF planning system. At the time, the USAF capability

was simply known as the Advanced Planning

System (APS). It was renamed CTAPS after the

Gulf War to emphasize its deployability and to

reflect the USAF’s changing role as an expeditionary air force. The new program to build an

APS/EIFEL interface was subsequently christened “APFEL” ... a German word meaning

“Apple,” and a veiled reference to the famous

American computer company. The Director of

SCE did not approve the new project because its

name implied preferential status for a single nation within an impartial multinational organization. To sidestep this obstacle, the project was

renamed “EASE” and the Luftwaffe gave tacit approval to develop a capability known as the

“EIFEL Automated Support Environment.”

EASE was a high risk venture from the

start. To begin, EIFEL-XA was still under development and its schedule very much in doubt.

More to the point, however, Det 1 personnel

were confined to working within the constraints

of SCE; that is to say, maintaining EIFEL was

the first priority, EASE only a secondary concern. Add to these facts there was no dedicated

budget or equipment, and it soon became apparent EASE was a highly unlikely prospect. Ignoring these risks, Det 1 pushed forward and began

meeting with 17 AF planners to hammer out a

suitable design. They conceived a separate SUN

SPARC computer that would receive the CTAPS

ATO on floppy disk, automatically transcribe it

to NATO ATMs, and upload them to EIFEL using a series of user-friendly windows displays.

EASE may not have progressed much beyond the

design stage except for the remarkable efforts of

Staff Sergeant Brian Echelle. Sergeant Echelle

brokered a deal to borrow the necessary SUN

SPARC workstations to build EASE. He installed the equipment and setup a miniature laboratory at SCE. He then located free software and

became the lead programmer in constructing the

EASE graphical user interface. His singular efforts jump started the project and got EASE off

the drawing board.

Between October ’94 and January ’95,

EASE blossomed from a vague concept to a

working prototype. Despite a shoe-string budget

and part-time manpower support, Det 1 committed itself to a timeline and delivered a series of

products in quick succession, including: 1) requirements specifications, 2) design specifications, 3) users’ manual, and 4) demonstration

models. CAOC planners were thrilled by what

they saw and grew anxious for the final product.

Unfortunately, the bottom suddenly and unexpectedly fell out in February. Hauptmann Droth

separated from the Luftwaffe and SCE announced

a one year delay for EIFEL-XA. Compounding

this setback was the announced US decision to
27 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

withdraw from SCE by the end of the year.

Without EIFEL-XA, it seemed EASE was a lost

cause and the CAOC would have to continue

manually transcribing CTAPS ATOs into EIFEL

ATMs.

Shortly after the announced delay to

EIFEL-XA, the detachment assembled to demonstrate the latest EASE prototype. The working

model readily accepted a CTAPS ATO and handily converted it to corresponding NATO ATMs.

CAOC planners were blown away by the capabilities of the system: in so many words, EASE

more than exceeded their expectations. The

overall mood remained subdued, however, because the program seemed to have reached a

dead end. Without EIFEL-XA, there was no

means to upload the EASE generated ATMs and

to distribute them through EIFEL. We were

standing around the lab mulling the situation

when Captain Sean Broderick voiced a crazy idea

from the back of the room: why not bypass

EIFEL and transmit the NATO ATMs directly to

allied units through EASE? It was a “Eureka”

moment! Light bulbs flashed above everybody’s

head. Yes, it could be done. In a blinding instant

of revelation everybody realized that EASE

could be modified to replace EIFEL! Suddenly

the whole atmosphere changed and the room

grew excited with the prospects of tackling an

even greater technical challenge. The meeting

concluded on a triumphant note and the unit was

re-energized with the prospects of creating a

wholly new command and control system for

NATO.

A new project schedule was drawn up and

detachment efforts redoubled to produce an expanded EASE capability before NATO exercises

in June. An entire new subsystem was created to

encapsulate NATO rules for processing ATMs.

Additional hardware was scrounged to accommodate the new communications package. What

emerged was a highly-practical, cost-effective,

NATO-compliant, automated command and control system. A SUN SPARC still formed the nucleus of the EASE architecture. As before, the

system accepted a CTAPS generated ATO and

parsed it into NATO ATMs. But now, an additional handling procedure allowed operators to

transmit ATMs directly to allied air units. Remote bases equipped with nothing more than an

ordinary desktop computer and secure telephone

could dial-in and establish a modem link with

EASE. The live connection accommodated realtime updates to active taskings in the EASE database. It was an elegantly simple design requiring

no specialized equipment, high-speed communication links, or doctrinal changes. Best of all, it

was not classified. In a single stroke, EASE

bridged the gap and solved the problems of both

CTAPS and EIFEL.

EASE was completed in May 1995 and

demonstrated to CAOC planners in early June.

The demonstration was so successful that EASE

was immediately pressed into service for exercise

CENTRAL ENTERPRISE ’95. Our enterprising

sergeant performed two more miracles that summer. With only two weeks before the start of the

exercise, Sergeant Echelle worked feverishly

over the telephone to talk through the installation

of EASE at each of four bases in England and

Germany. He further went on to operate EASE

throughout the one week NATO exercise. EASE

accepted its first ATO Friday, June 16th, successfully parsed and distributed it. Live-fly exercises

began the following Monday, June 19th, and continued through exercise conclusion Friday, June

23d. EASE was operated along side EIFEL

which directed only two bases. For every one

ATM sent through EIFEL, five went through

EASE. EIFEL suffered indeterminate problems

and was inoperable most of the exercise. EASE

crashed once, but was down a total of ten minutes for the entire exercise. Both the CAOC operations and planning staffs praised EASE as an

unqualified success. The CTAPS program office

requested a copy of EASE software for evaluation, and a full program report was requested for

the 17 AF Commander.

After successfully demonstrating operational capabilities during live-fly exercises,

AIRCENT evaluated EASE to become the new

NATO standard. The Luftwaffe understandably

closed ranks and stood behind their investment in

EIFEL. A competing effort under development

at the SHAPE Technical Center further divided

opinion. EASE was withdrawn from consideration, however, when Det 1 closed its offices and

the United States withdrew from SCE: without its

supporting technical team, AIRCENT was reluctant to endorse EASE. But just when it seemed
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 28

the program was destined to fade into obscurity,

events would call upon EASE’s capabilities to

bridge a critical gap in NATO air operations over

the Balkans.

As conflict continued to flare over the

breakup of Yugoslavia, AIRSOUTH began preparing a NATO CAOC in Vicenza Italy. Lt.

Gen. Michael Ryan, Commander AIRSOUTH,

continued a program begun under Lt. Gen. Joseph Ashy to equip the new CAOC with the latest command and control equipment.2 Members

from Det 1 were recruited in this effort and reported to Vicenza to operate CTAPS. Unlike

their northern counterparts, NATO AFSOUTH

operators were trained to work with the US-style

ATO. A problem arose with the inability to disseminate the CTAPS ATO efficiently: allied

units were not sufficiently cleared to access the

US SECRET system, plus communication lines

were not uniformly capable to support remote

CTAPS terminals. US units could automatically

download mission taskings and report results; allied units, on the other hand, relied on less timely

methods, including courier dispatches to distribute the ATO. The similarity of this situation to

the problems at Sembach prompted Captain

Roftiel Constantine to place a call back to Germany. A few days later, in December 1995, Sergeant Echelle was dispatched to Italy with a copy

of EASE. Sergeant Echelle established the system hub at Vicenza and quickly set about coordinating fifteen remote terminals at selected allied

locations in Italy, Germany, and Greece. Soon

afterwards, CAOC operators began using EASE

to automatically upload and distribute the

CTAPS ATO, significantly enhancing NATO operations over the Balkans. When NATO ground

forces participating in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR entered Bosnia a few weeks later, Operation DECISIVE EDGE, NATO air operations

over the region were being coordinated with

EASE.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR IFOR operations paved the way for a follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) putting a halt to the atrocities

which prompted NATO intervention in the region. Det 1 received special recognition from the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for its work on

EASE. The Luftwaffe, however, remained committed to EIFEL with proposals to make it deployable for future NATO operations. CTAPS

security problems were overcome with the advent of a NATO-releasable version of the software, and other technical aspects were being addressed by its successor program, TBMCS

(Theater Battle Management Core System). Butwhile the players are gone and the systems have

changed, I recall with great satisfaction how for

at least one moment NATO air operations were

conducted with EASE.

Notes

1 Federation of American Scientists, “Operation Joint Endeavor,” http://

www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/joint_endeavor.htm

2 Col. Robert C. Owen, USAF, “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part

1”, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/apj-sum97-owen.html

Biography

Major Richard L. White is the Operations Officer

for Applications, 50th Education Squadron,

USAF Academy, Colorado. He holds a Bachelor

of Science Degree in History from Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, and Master of Science Degree in Computer Science from Old Dominion University Virginia He is also the Course

Director for the Academy’s Military Strategic

Studies course, The Media and the Profession of

Arms.

Glider painted by C1C Stephen Wilson, USAFA ’02.

Courtesy of the USAF Academy Department of

English and Fine Arts.
29 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Heroes of the Vietnam Generation

James Webb

The rapidly disappearing cohort of Americans

that endured the Great Depression and then

fought World War II is receiving quite a send-off

from the leading lights of the so-called ‘60s generation. Tom Brokaw has published two oral histories of The Greatest Generation that feature ordinary people doing their duty and suggest that

such conduct was historically unique.

Chris Matthews of Hardball is fond of

writing columns praising the Navy service of his

father while castigating his own baby boomer

generation for its alleged softness and lack of

struggle. William Bennett gave a startlingly condescending speech at the Naval Academy a few

years ago comparing the heroism of the “D-Day

Generation” to the drugs-and-sex nihilism of the

“Woodstock Generation.” And Steven Spielberg,

in promoting his film Saving Private Ryan, was

careful to justify his portrayals of soldiers in action based on the supposedly unique nature of

World War II.

An irony is at work here. Lest we forget,

the World War II generation now being lionized

also brought us the Vietnam War, a conflict

which today’s most conspicuous voices by and

large opposed, and in which few of them served.

The “best and brightest” of the Vietnam age

group once made headlines by castigating their

parents for bringing about the war in which they

would not fight, which has become the war they

refuse to remember.

Pundits back then invented a term for this

animus: the “generation gap.” Long, plaintive

articles and even books were written examining

its manifestations. Campus leaders, who claimed

precocious wisdom through the magical process

of reading a few controversial books, urged fellow baby boomers not to trust anyone over 30.

Their elders who had survived the Depression

and fought the largest war in history were looked

down upon as shallow, materialistic, and out of

touch.

Those of us who grew up on the other

side of the picket line from that era’s counterculture can’t help but feel a little leery of this

sudden gush of appreciation for our elders from

the leading lights of the old counter-culture.

Then and now, the national conversation has proceeded from the dubious assumption that those

who came of age during Vietnam are a unified

generation in the same sense as their parents

were, and thus are capable of being spoken for

through these fickle elites.

In truth, the “Vietnam generation” is a

misnomer. Those who came of age during that

war are permanently divided by different reactions to a whole range of counter-cultural agendas, and nothing divides them more deeply than

the personal ramifications of the war itself. The

sizable portion of the Vietnam age group who declined to support the counter-cultural agenda, and

especially the men and women who opted to

serve in the military during the Vietnam War, are

quite different from their peers who for decades

have claimed to speak for them. In fact, they are

much like the World War II generation itself.

For them, Woodstock was a side show, college

protestors were spoiled brats who would have

benefited from having to work a few jobs in order to pay their tuition, and Vietnam represented

not an intellectual exercise in draft avoidance or

protest marches but a battlefield that was just as

brutal as those their fathers faced in World War

II and Korea.

Few who served during Vietnam ever

complained of a generation gap. The men who

fought World War II were their heroes and role

models. They honored their fathers’ service by
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 30

emulating it, and largely agreed with their fathers’ wisdom in attempting to stop Communism’s reach in Southeast Asia. The most accurate poll of their attitudes (Harris, 1980) showed

that 91 percent were glad they’d served their

country, 74 percent enjoyed their time in the service, and 89 percent agreed with the statement

that “our troops were asked to fight in a war

which our political leaders in Washington would

not let them win.” And most importantly, the

castigation they received upon returning home

was not from the World War II generation, but

from the very elites in their age group who supposedly spoke for them.

Nine million men served in the military

during the Vietnam war, three million of whom

went to the Vietnam theater. Contrary to popular

mythology, two-thirds of these were volunteers,

and 73 percent of those who died were volunteers. While some attention has been paid recently to the plight of our prisoners of war, most

of whom were pilots, there has been little recognition of how brutal the war was for those who

fought it on the ground.

Dropped onto the enemy’s terrain 12,000

miles away from home, America’s citizensoldiers performed with a tenacity and quality

that may never be truly understood. Those who

believe the war was fought incompetently on a

tactical level should consider Hanoi’s recent admission that 1.4 million of its soldiers died on the

battlefield, compared to 58,000 total U.S. dead.

Those who believe that it was a “dirty little war” where the bombs did all the work might

contemplate that it was the most costly war the

U.S. Marine Corps has ever fought – five times

as many dead as World War I, three times as

many dead as in Korea, and more total killed and

wounded than in all of World War II.

Significantly, these sacrifices were being

made at a time the United States was deeply divided over our effort in Vietnam. The babyboom generation had cracked apart along class

lines as America’s young men were making difficult, life-or-death choices about serving. The

better academic institutions became focal points

for vitriolic protest against the war, with few of

their graduates going into the military. Harvard

College, which had lost 691 alumni in World

War II, lost a total of 12 men in Vietnam from

the classes of 1962 through 1972 combined.

Those classes at Princeton lost six, at MIT two.

The media turned ever-more hostile. And frequently the reward for a young man’s having

gone through the trauma of combat was to be

greeted by his peers with studied indifference or

outright hostility.

What is a hero? My heroes are the young

men who faced the issues of war and possible

death, and then weighed those concerns against

obligations to their country. Citizen-soldiers who

interrupted their personal and professional lives

at their most formative stage, in the timeless

phrase of the Confederate Memorial in Arlington

National Cemetery, “not for fame or reward, not

for place or for rank, but in simple obedience to

duty, as they understood it.” Who suffered loneliness, disease, and wounds with an often contagious élan. And who deserve a far better place in

history than that now offered them by the socalled spokesmen of our so-called generation.

Mr. Brokaw, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Spielberg, meet my Marines.

1969 was an odd year to be in Vietnam.

Second only to 1968 in terms of American casualties, it was the year made famous by Hamburger Hill, as well as the gut-wrenching Life

cover story showing the pictures of 242 Americans who had been killed in one average week of

fighting. Back home, it was the year of Woodstock, and of numerous anti-war rallies that culminated in the Moratorium march on Washington. The My Lai massacre hit the papers and was

seized upon by the anti-war movement as the emblematic moment of the war. Lyndon Johnson

left Washington in utter humiliation. Richard

Nixon entered the scene, destined for an even

worse fate.

In the An Hoa Basin southwest of

Danang, the Fifth Marine Regiment was in its

third year of continuous combat operations.

Combat is an unpredictable and inexact environment, but we were well-led. As a rifle platoon

and company commander, I served under a succession of three regimental commanders who had

cut their teeth in World War II, and four different

battalion commanders, three of whom had seen

combat in Korea. The company commanders
31 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

were typically captains on their second combat

tour in Vietnam, or young first lieutenants like

myself who were given companies after many

months of “bush time” as platoon commanders in

the Basin’s tough and unforgiving environs.

The Basin was one of the most heavily

contested areas in Vietnam, its torn, cratered

earth offering every sort of wartime possibility.

In the mountains just to the west, not far from the

Ho Chi Minh Trail, the North Vietnamese Army

operated an infantry division from an area called

Base Area 112. In the valleys of the Basin,

main-force Viet Cong battalions whose ranks

were 80 percent North Vietnamese Army regulars moved against the Americans every day. Local Viet Cong units sniped and harassed. Ridge

lines and paddy dikes were laced with sophisticated booby traps of every size, from a hand grenade to a 250-pound bomb. The villages sat in

the rice paddies and tree lines like individual fortresses, criss-crossed with trenches and spider

holes, their homes sporting bunkers capable of

surviving direct hits from large-caliber artillery

shells. The Viet Cong infrastructure was intricate and permeating. Except for the old and the

very young, villagers who did not side with the

Communists had either been killed or driven out

to the government-controlled enclaves near

Danang.

In the rifle companies we spent the endless months patrolling ridge lines and villages

and mountains, far away from any notion of

tents, barbed wire, hot food, or electricity. Luxuries were limited to what would fit inside one’s

pack, which after a few “humps” usually boiled

down to letter-writing material, towel, soap,

toothbrush, poncho liner, and a small transistor

radio.

We moved through the boiling heat with

60 pounds of weapons and gear, causing a typical

Marine to drop 20 percent of his body weight

while in the bush. When we stopped we dug

chest-deep fighting holes and slit trenches for toilets. We slept on the ground under makeshift

poncho hootches, and when it rained we usually

took our hootches down because wet ponchos

shined under illumination flares, making great

targets. Sleep itself was fitful, never more than

an hour or two at a stretch for months at a time as

we mixed daytime patrolling with night-time ambushes, listening posts, foxhole duty, and radio

watches. Ringworm, hookworm, malaria, and

dysentery were common, as was trench foot

when the monsoons came. Respite was rotating

back to the mud-filled regimental combat base at

An Hoa for four or five days, where rocket and

mortar attacks were frequent and our troops

manned defensive bunkers at night.

Which makes it kind of hard to get excited about tales of Woodstock, or camping at the

Vineyard during summer break.

We had been told while in training that

Marine officers in the rifle companies had an 85

percent probability of being killed or wounded,

and the experience of “Dying Delta,” as our company was known, bore that out. Of the officers in

the bush when I arrived, our company commander was wounded, the weapons platoon commander was wounded, the first platoon commander was killed, the second platoon commander was wounded twice, and I, commanding

the third platoon, was wounded twice. The

enlisted troops in the rifle platoons fared no better. Two of my original three squad leaders were

killed, the third shot in the stomach. My platoon

sergeant was severely wounded, as was my right

guide. By the time I left my platoon I had gone

through six radio operators, five of them casualties.

These figures were hardly unique; in fact,

they were typical. Many other units – for instance, those who fought the hill battles around

Khe Sanh, or were with the famed Walking Dead

of the Ninth Marine Regiment, or were in the

battle for Hue City or at Dai Do – had it far

worse.

When I remember those days and the very

young men who spent them with me, I am continually amazed, for these were mostly recent civilians barely out of high school, called up from

the cities and the farms to do their year in Hell

and then return. Visions haunt me every day, not

of the nightmares of war but of the steady consistency with which my Marines faced their responsibilities, and of how uncomplaining most of

them were in the face of constant danger. The

salty, battle-hardened 20-year-olds teaching

green 19-year-olds the intricate lessons of that

hostile battlefield. The unerring skill of the

young squad leaders as we moved through unfa-
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 32

miliar villages and weed-choked trails in the

black of night. The quick certainty with which

they moved when coming under enemy fire.

Their sudden tenderness when a fellow Marine

was wounded and needed help. Their willingness to risk their lives to save other Marines in

peril. To this day it stuns me that their own

countrymen have so completely missed the story

of their service, lost in the bitter confusion of the

war itself.

Like every military unit throughout history we had occasional laggards, cowards, and

complainers. But in the aggregate these Marines

were the finest people I have ever been around.

It has been my privilege to keep up with many of

them over the years since we all came home.

One finds in them very little bitterness about the

war in which they fought. The most common regret, almost to a man, is that they were not able

to do more – for each other and for the people

they came to help.

It would be redundant to say that I would

trust my life to these men. Because I already

have, in more ways than I can ever recount. I am

alive today because of their quiet, unaffected

heroism. Such valor epitomizes the conduct of

Americans at war from the first days of our existence. That the boomer elites can canonize this

sort of conduct in our fathers’ generation while

ignoring it in our own is more than simple oversight. It is a conscious, continuing travesty.

This article is available at the author's website (http://www.jameswebb.

com). Reprinted with permission of the author.

Biography

The Honorable James H. Webb Jr. is a graduate

of the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a Marine in Vietnam. He was US Secretary of the

Navy from 1987 to 1988. Mr. Webb has authored numerous books including Fields of Fire

and A Sense of Honor (Prentice-Hall, 1978 and

1981 respectively), and most recently The EmAirdrop painted by C1C Makia Epie, USAFA ‘02. Courtesy of the USAF

Academy Department of English and Fine Arts.
33 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Forgotten Heroes

Mandy Hutchison

Heroes walk among us everyday, yet we are

oblivious to the fact. Men and women who, at

some point in their life, performed worthy acts

defining themselves as true warriors are today

our neighbors and friends. Men and women who

will some day in the future perform heroic acts

are also with us all the time. They will be virtuous, courageous in the face of danger, always

striving to maintain integrity, and the very definition of the American war hero. The names we

associate with hero status are the few whose actions become known to the public through the

media. We know them as Patton, McCain, and

Stockdale, to name only a few more recent examples. Not to take away from what these men

have accomplished, but forgotten heroes far outnumber the ones known to us. Everyone knows

about Patton’s march to Germany during World

War II, just as many are aware of James Stockdale and John McCain as POWs in the Hanoi

Hilton during the Vietnam War; some of our well

known heroes were tragically killed doing the

acts that made them heroic, such as Air Force pilot Lance Sijan in 1968 at the Hanoi Hilton. The

forgotten heroes are still alive today, well aware

of the momentous things they did in wars past,

but also knowing that their actions will likely

never come to light in the public’s eye. The forgotten heroes are hidden in the shadow of events,

too humble to come forward or just too distant

from the events to really care. No one should be

surprised that they seek neither the fame nor recognition of a Patton, Stockdale, or McCain, and

none ever will even if given the chance. Instead

they walk silently among us, their deeds unspoken.

Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson and his

gunner Larry Colburn are among the silent warriors whose achievements raise them to the category of real heroes. Their actions have only

come to light over the past several years; yet

what they did happened over 30 years ago in

Vietnam on one of the worst days in US military

history.

My Lai

Who are Hugh Thompson and Larry

Colburn? To answer this question, I must remind

you first of a significant event that happened in

Vietnam, an event known as the My Lai Massacre. Many have heard of My Lai, the carnage

that American soldiers led by Lt. William Calley

brought down on old men, women, and children

in Vietnam. Most have also heard stories about

how these innocents were lined up in ditches and

shot, put up against walls and mowed down, and

mercilessly killed as they tried to surrender.

Most know that the US military tried to cover up

this singular event, and when word got out there

was a huge public outcry. Unfortunately, hardly

anyone remembers the actions of a 3-man crew

aboard a small scout helicopter circling the skies

that day in Vietnam.

Lt. Calley and his men were charged with

various violations of the UCMJ, huge ethics debates began over what was and what was not

considered a lawful order, and Calley was eventually convicted for his part in the massacre – although later paroled. This was where Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson and Specialist

Larry Colburn came in. They, along with their

Crew Chief, Glenn Andreotta (who was killed in

action 3 weeks later) were witnesses to the carnage below. Thompson and the rest of his crew

had gone into My Lai to “draw fire from the Viet

Cong,” but did not receive any. Instead, they observed US soldiers apparently firing on Vietnamese noncombatants, women and children.1
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 34

Meeting Mr. Thompson and Mr. Colburn

In March 1999 I had the wonderful opportunity to escort Hugh Thompson and Larry

Colburn as part of the Air Force Academy’s annual National Character and Leadership Symposium. I was able to ask them in person what was

going through their heads at the time of My Lai

and to see the emotion of those recalled memories as they described to me the horror of what

was happening below. I listened to them downplay their actions, saying anyone else in that

situation would have done the same thing. I

don’t think so: Thompson and Colburn were

very humble about the whole experience, but

their humility said a lot about what it took to become a warrior and a hero.

When writing this paper, I asked Mr.

Thompson and Mr. Colburn some questions to

help me understand how they embodied Plato’s

virtues of courage and justice and how they embraced a true warrior’s obligations. On that fateful day, 16 March 1968, Thompson and his crew

did everything they could to stop what was going

on below them – where things were rapidly getting out of control.2 After landing, the crew told

women and children lying in ditches who were

still alive to lay still in hopes they could stay

alive. They plucked a child from among the dead

and sent him to safety. And in probably their

greatest risk, Thompson landed his helicopter between advancing American troops and a bunker

full of scared Vietnamese people to save their

lives.3 In a conversation I had with him in December 1999, Thompson said: “I was confused

at first and was in denial about what I was seeing,

but pretty soon I could not ignore what was going

on and had to admit it to myself, and I remember

thinking that there was no reason for this, and

that I am an American just like the guys on the

ground, therefore I am to blame also, and I did

not want to be a part in the senseless killing ...”4

Courage

Plato defines courage as: “The preservation of the belief ... about what things and sorts

of things are to be feared. And by preserving this

belief I mean preserving it and not abandoning it

because of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears.”5

Clearly, Thompson and his crew could have

taken the easy way out and just flown away, ignoring the injustice of what was going on around

them. They could have kept quiet about the

whole thing, to forever wonder what might have

happened had they attempted to stop it all. But

Thompson and his crew did exactly the opposite.

They faced those fears, those pains, and had

enough courage to do the right thing – their duty.

Thompson told me that he: “... never felt

that he/we were doing anything except our job,

which was to protect the Americans and protect

the noncombatants. By the time I stepped in I

knew that I was not thinking things through, i.e.,

I had no idea what I was going to do with the ...

people I thought were in the bunker.”6 So

Thompson landed the helicopter, got out, and

went to talk with the officer in charge of the

troops advancing on the bunker. No one is really

sure exactly what was said in the conversation

(Hugh does not remember himself), but it was

very brief. Thompson also told his crew to cover

him, and fire on the Americans if they tried to

shoot him or any of the Vietnamese in the bunker.7

When I discussed the stand-off with Mr.

Colburn in November 1999, he explained to me

that after Hugh told them to fire on the American

troops if need be, he and Glenn looked at each

other, pointed their guns at the ground, and got

into a staring contest with the American troops.

Colburn said they knew everything was going to

be OK when the troops sat down and started to

eat their C-rations. He confided to me that he

“would have done anything to stop the killing of

children. To see it happen was almost like not

being there at all. Hard to put into words. A

feeling of being detached from what we knew

was real. Yet driven to stop it.”8

These words pretty much summed up the

courage Thompson and his crew exemplified that

day. They stood by the belief that what they

were doing was their job and duty, and did so

without worrying about the consequences or repercussions of their actions. The fact that they

also did this without thinking there was any other

choice to make shows how deeply the courage

was in them, how much they were acting like

true warriors, and why they were heroes.
35 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Justice

As for justice, this virtue is almost selfexplanatory as described above. The helicopter

crew saw an injustice being done and felt compelled to right it as best they could. They knew

what the bounds of justice were and that the

American troops on the ground had certainly

crossed that boundary. As Thompson told me, he

“became very angry and decided to put a stop to

it all and if it meant killing Americans that is just

what was going to happen ... I felt I had to protect these people ... I felt I could not leave these

people alone because they would be killed and

enough people had already been killed for no reason at all.”9 Colburn added his words of wisdom

as well, words that should be taken very seriously, because they were so very true: “To be a

wise warrior one must know how to show mercy.

In war man can justify killing, being an agent of

the state. But when there is no threat, as in an

unarmed civilian population, there is no justification.”10

After Thompson got the Vietnamese people out of the bunker and another helicopter arrived to take them to safety, the crew saw a

young boy in a ditch. Thompson recalled:

“Then when we got the little boy out of the ditch

I remember thinking that I have a kid the same

size and that he could be my kid ... I really got

mad then and I had no feeling towards the

Americans on the ground ... I classified them as

the enemy.”11

Stockdale and the Obligations of a Warrior

All the events that occurred, all the

thought processes that were run through, and all

the repercussions that were not even considered,

showed that these men met and most likely exceeded what Admiral James Stockdale considered to be the obligations of a warrior. From a

speech he gave at West Point in 1979, Stockdale

classified duty as “doing what is expected of

you.”12 He went on to say that warriors “must be

not only leaders to your men, but examples to the

nation of the truth that for any position of responsibility in society ... there is a corresponding obligation to carry out the assigned task.”13

Thompson, Colburn, and Andreotta certainly did

what was expected of them; the troops on the

ground did not. These three men carried out their

assigned task, which was to draw enemy fire, and

then moved on to do their real job as Thompson

explained, which was to protect the noncombatants. They acted as moralists and jurists as

Stockdale defined them, by recognizing what was

going on below and passing judgment on those

troops to do something about it. They acted as

jurists especially afterwards, when the military

tried to cover up the tragedy, and Thompson pursued justice through appropriate channels.

Stockdale also said it was a warrior’s

duty: “...to be a teacher. Every great leader I’ve

known had been a great teacher, able to give

those around him a sense of perspective and to

set the moral, social, and particularly the motivational climate among them.”14 Colburn left me

with this to say about his pilot: “I have seen men

broken by war. Not just in body, but in mind.

Men unable to live with the memory of their own

actions. Memories of war never go away. The

important thing is one can’t let memories of war

destroy the warrior. If possible, use them to educate others and help prevent future war. That is

what Mr. Thompson is doing now.”15

Overlooked but not Forgotten

General Douglas MacArthur once described the soldier as “charged with the protection of the weak and the unarmed. It’s his very

existence for being.” It seems only fitting and

proper therefore that when the US Army finally

recognized Thompson, Colburn, and Andreotta

some 30 years after their heroic actions over My

Lai, they were awarded the Soldier’s Medal.

Their courageous actions were obscured

for three decades by the shame surrounding My

Lai, as the Army focused solely on the crimes of

the guilty rather than the efforts of the heroic.

Too often we as Americans seem too eager to remember the faults and failings of our fellow citizens and soldiers while downplaying and even

ignoring equivalent or surpassing examples of

grace and virtue.

The actions of Colburn and Thomson

should never have been overlooked, for they remind us that Right can and will be done by those

who envelop the obligations and responsibilities

of the soldier, by those warriors who know the

true meaning of courage and justice. There are

many forgotten heroes scattered throughout the
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 36

world and, although their actions often go unnoticed, they should never be discounted for their

experiences have shaped the world in which we

live. Thucydides reminds us all that: “... the

whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; and

their story is not graven only on stone over their

native hearth, but lives on far away, without visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other men’s

lives. For you now it remains to rival what they

have done and, knowing the secret of happiness

to be freedom and the secret of freedom a brave

heart, not idly to stand aside from enemy’s onset.”16 The story of Thompson and Colburn is

now woven into our lives. If we hope to carry

forward the best traditions of the American Soldier, we dare not forget their efforts or deny their

courage.

Acknowledgments

A special thanks to Brett Nicholson for

proofing this paper and making numerous suggestions to improve the message I was attempting

to convey.

This article is an adaptation of a paper

written for a Philosophy class during the Fall

1999 semester at the US Air Force Academy. It

was also presented at the 2000 National Character and Leadership Symposium held at the Academy.

Notes

1 Michael Norris, “Army awards veterans who stopped My Lai massacre,”

ArmyLINK News Online, www.dtic.mil/ armylink/news/mar1998/

a19980311mylai.htm.

2 James Olson and Randy Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, 1998), 20. 3 Olson and Roberts, My Lai, 90-92. 4 Hugh Thompson, personal conversations, November – December 1999.

5 Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve., Classics

of Moral and Political Theory, ed. Michael L. Morgan, 2nd ed.,

(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 108.

6 Hugh Thompson, personal conversations, November – December 1999.

7 Trent Angers, The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson

Story (Lafayette, LA: Acadia House Publishing: 1999), 124. 8 Larry Colburn, personal conversations, November – December 1999.

9 Hugh Thompson, personal conversations, November – December 1999.

10 Larry Colburn, personal conversations, November – December 1999. 11 Hugh Thompson, personal conversations, November – December 1999. 12 James Stockdale, “Courage Under Fire,” Moral Dimensions of the Military Profession: Readings in Morality, War, and Leadership. 5th Ed., ed.

Dept. of Philosophy, USAF Academy (New York: Forbes Custom Publishing, 1999), 331.

13 Stockdale, “Courage Under Fire,” 331. 14 Stockdale, “Courage Under Fire,” 333. 15 Larry Colburn, personal conversations, November – December 1999. 16 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner

(New York: Viking Press, 1986).

Biography

Cadet First Class Mandy Hutchison is a member

of the Mitchell Class, USAFA 2001. She is a

Basic Sciences major with a Physics concentration and plans to attend undergraduate pilot training after graduation, with the ultimate goal of flying Pave Hawks helicoptors. Cadet Hutchison is

the President of the USAFA Chapter of the National Space Society and a volunteer 34th Training Wing Operations Center Senior Controller.

She is a 1997 graduate of Westlake High School

in Austin, Texas.

F-15 painted by C2C Sam Kidd, USAFA ‘03.

Courtesy of the USAF Academy Department of

English and Fine Arts.
37 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Leaders need to emphasize different behaviors as

they advance through increasing levels of responsibility. This same thesis can be applied to Air

Force officers - different behaviors are needed as

an officer progresses from company grade to

field grade to general officer. This article defines

the specific leadership behaviors required by junior officers at the direct level of responsibility in

the USAF, and determines differences in effective behaviors across major career tracks. A

sample of 647 Squadron Officer School captains,

who were between their fourth and seventh years

of commissioned service, were administered

Yukl’s Managerial Practices Survey (MPS). The

modified MPS asked each subject to rate the importance of 11 managerial behaviors in relation

to their current job. By empirically defining required leadership skills, senior officers should be

better able to mentor and develop junior officers

and professional military education can be tailored to focus on those critical behaviors for effective leadership.

INTRODUCTION

Preparing tomorrow’s leaders is one of our

most important jobs as Air Force officers. As a

result, the Air Force made mentoring—

developing the potential of junior officers—an

integral part of an officer’s career development.

Yet, we are left wondering exactly which leadership behaviors are the “best” ones to develop.

Do all leaders, regardless of their position, need

the same skills and behaviors? Is there, in fact, a

specific set of behaviors junior officers can focus

on to develop their potential for future leadership?

Two developments may address this void in

defining desired leadership behaviors. Yukl

(1982) developed a taxonomy of specific leadership behaviors to address the concern of “what”

behaviors to measure. Additionally, the situation

may be better controlled by applying Jacobs’

Stratified Systems Theory (1985), which maintains leaders require different behaviors as they

progress in their careers (e.g., colonels require

different behaviors than captains to be effective).

By combining these two theories, we may be able

to define specific behaviors required for a specific situation; in this case, specific behaviors

most important to junior officers.

This article discusses the behaviors junior

officers report are important to their current job;

the behaviors junior officers report they need the

most improvement; and a comparison of reported

behaviors across different career tracks. With a

set of leadership behaviors defined and prioritized, senior leaders should be better able to mentor junior officers, helping ensure a robust set of

leaders for the next century.

Yukl’s Taxonomy and the Managerial Practices Survey

Yukl was among the first to recognize the

dilemma facing leadership behavior research.

The absence of a single set, or taxonomy, of

leader behaviors prevented researchers from

comparing results. Prior to Yukl, many different

taxonomies had been used with a number of different scales. Some taxonomies were extremely

general and provided too simplistic a view of

leadership behavior. Others tended to be too specific, leading to results where no behaviors were

“significant.” However, Yukl noticed a commonality among all the taxonomies and set forth

to define a set of leadership behaviors which

were: (1) broad enough to allow recognition and

relevance; (2) specific enough to be useful in determining leadership effectiveness within a given

Defining Required Leadership Skills for

USAF Company Grade Officers

J.D. Garvin in association with Warren Berry
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 38

situation; and, (3) valid to allow correlation and

comparison across studies.1 Thus, Yukl set out

to universally identify the “what” to measure in

leadership behaviors. His group developed a list

of 21 behaviors in 1979. Subsequent studies and

factor analysis reduced and collapsed the number

of behaviors to 14, and finally 11. The 11 behaviors cover four broad categories: giving/seeking

information, building relations, influencing, and

making decisions2 (Figure 1). More specific

definitions and examples of these behaviors are

presented in Table 1.

Yukl’s taxonomy brings a number of advantages. First, “it includes most behaviors found

important in [previous] research, and it has a larger number of more specific behaviors than earlier [taxonomies].”3 In practice, Yukl developed

a taxonomy that can define critical leadership behaviors. Second, the taxonomy can be used to

define critical leadership behaviors in different

circumstances. In other words, using Yukl’s taxonomy, we can define critical behaviors in different situations, such as a leader’s level of responsibility or the nature of his task. In this way,

Yukl provides a construct for “what” behaviors

to study. In addition, he also provides a means

for “how” to study them through the use of a

validated survey.

The leadership behaviors from Yukl’s taxonomy are measured with a questionnaire known as

the Managerial Practices Survey (MPS). The

strength of this questionnaire is that it has been

thoroughly validated through a number of studies. Each of the studies assessed the meaningfulness, validity, and reliability of the MPS and its

scale by investigating the content validity, relevance to leadership effectiveness, internal consistency, stability of measurements over time, interrater reliability, discrimination of contrasted

groups, and criterion-related validity.4

The validation program for Yukl’s MPS was

“more intensive and comprehensive than the validation research done on any previous leader behavior questionnaire”5 and resulted in a widelyaccepted, valid instrument for measuring leader

behaviors. This study employs Yukl’s taxonomy

and MPS to measure specific leadership behaviors, solving the dilemma of “what” to study.

Still missing, however, is a means by which the

study can “control” the leader’s situation.

Stratified Systems Theory...Toward a Hierarchical Leadership Model

If leadership is truly situational, then behavioral research must account for a leader’s situation when defining desired or required behaviors.

Jacobs and Jaques (1985) introduced the Stratified Systems Theory (SST), which describes

leadership requirements at different levels of responsibility (or situations) within a bureaucratic

organization. In general, this theory attempts to

explain how leadership behaviors must change

over time as leaders progress through the various

levels of the organizational structure.

The SST breaks an organization into seven

strata and three domains, or organizational levels.

The theory postulates that critical tasks required

of leaders differ across these organizational levels (domains).6 Effective leaders recognize and

deal with critical tasks at their particular level of

responsibility within the organization. Simply

put, leaders require different behaviors at different organizational levels within a unit, making

those behaviors situationally dependent upon

their position in the organizational hierarchy.

Thus, Jacobs and Jaques propose a theory which

links a leader’s function to specific organizational functions by level.7

Clarifying

Monitoring

Informing

Networking

Team Building &

Conflict Mgmnt

Mentoring &

Supporting

Planning

Problem Solving

Consulting &

Delegating

M

In

o

s

ti

p

v

i

ating &

ring

Recognizing

& Rewarding

Giving-Seeking Information

Making Decisions

Building Relationships

Influencing People

Figure 1. Yukl’s Taxonomy of Leadership Behaviors
39 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Military Studies in Leadership Behavior

Jacobs and Jaques’ SST for civilian organizations was modified by the US Army in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 (DAP 600-

80, 1986), “Executive Leadership.” The pamphlet describes how leaders progress through

three levels of leadership, “each with systematic

changes in the nature of leadership tasks.”8 DAP

600-80 defines the three levels of leadership as

direct, organizational and executive, mirroring

the domains from SST. While SST links the

leaders’ function to the domain in which they

work, SST fails to describe specific behaviors required within each domain. DAP 600-80 attempts to fill this void by describing specific behaviors required at each level. For example, the

pamphlet describes the direct level, consisting of

lieutenants and captains, with the following behaviors: coaching, directing, motivating, and

fostering cohesion. While this serves as a starting point for defining behaviors as a result of the

leader’s situation within a unit, the behaviors

listed in DAP 600-80 were not the result of a robust study. Instead, they were simply the authors’ “best guesses.” The lack of an empirical

measure across the x-axis of DAP 600-80’s

“Leadership Skills” model (Figure 2) illustrates

Table 1. Yukl’s Taxonomy of Leadership Behaviors

Planning & Organizing: Determining long-term objectives and strategies for adapting to

environmental change, determining how to use personnel and allocate resources to accomplish

objectives, determining how to improve the efficiency of operations, and determining how to

achieve coordination with other parts of the organization.

Problem Solving: Identifying work-related problems, analyzing problems in a timely but

systematic manner to identify causes and find solutions, and acting decisively to implement

solutions and resolve important problems or crises.

Making Decisions

Consulting & Delegating: Checking with people before making changes that affect them,

encouraging suggestions for improvement, inviting participation in decision making,

incorporating the ideas and suggestions of others in decisions, and allowing others to have

substantial responsibility and discretion in carrying out work activities and making decisions.

Motivating: Using influence techniques that appeal to emotion, values, or logic to generate

enthusiasm for the work; commitment to task objectives; and compliance with requests for

cooperation, assistance, support or resources; also setting an example of proper behavior.

Influencing

People

Recognizing & Rewarding: Providing praise, recognition, and rewards for effective

performance, significant achievements, and special contributions.

Networking: Socializing informally; developing contacts with people who are a source of

information and support; maintaining contacts through periodic interaction, including telephone

calls, correspondence, and attendance at meetings and social events.

Managing Conflict & Team Building: Encouraging and facilitating the constructive

resolution of conflict, and encouraging cooperation, teamwork, and identification within the

organizational unit.

Building

Relations

Supporting & Mentoring: Acting friendly and considerate, being patient and helpful,

showing sympathy and support, and doing things to facilitate someone’s skill development and

career enhancement.

Monitoring Operations & Environment: Gathering information about work

activities, checking on the progress and quality of the work, evaluating the performance of

individuals and the organizational unit, and scanning the environment to detect threats and

opportunities.

Clarifying Roles and Objectives: Assigning tasks, communicating a clear

understanding of job responsibilities, task objectives, deadlines, and performance expectations,

and directing how to do work.

Giving/Seeking

Information

Informing: Disseminating relevant information about decisions, plans, and activities to

people that need it to do their work; answering requests for technical information and telling

people about the organizational unit to promote its reputation.

Source: Yukl, Gary A. Leadership in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994),

65.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 40

this shortfall in the theory’s ability to identify

specific behaviors.

Jacobs and Jaques built upon their 1985 SST

by making two more developments to this line of

research within the military organization. First,

Jacobs and Jaques empirically established a

three-tiered, military leadership model that resembled SST. Thus, SST has been expanded

from civilian applications to military applications

as well. Second, Jacobs continued his study of

military leadership by developing the Strategic

Leader Development Inventory (SLDI) in 1995.

The SLDI is a survey instrument based upon the

SST and is designed to help the Army describe

more clearly the leadership skills required for officers to be effective at the strategic/executive

level. The SLDI allows the Army to begin empirical measures for strategic behaviors. Unfortunately, the behaviors are once again unique and

are derived for just one level of leadership -

strategic.

This highlights a trend in military leadership

research: a focus on behaviors required at the

strategic, or highest, level of leadership. In fact,

very little attention has been given to those skills

required at the lower two levels.10 Yukl and Van

Fleet speculated that different leadership behaviors are “likely by level (company grade officers,

field grade officers, and general officers)” within

the military, though those behaviors have not

been empirically defined.11

Determining Effective Leadership Behaviors

for USAF Company Grade Officers

Nearly every study in behavioral research

concluded “leader effectiveness” rests on situational determinants. Thus, determining “what”

behaviors to study while also finding a means of

controlling the situation becomes the ultimate

challenge. Fortunately, Yukl’s taxonomy and

MPS provide the what and how for determining

effective behaviors. Additionally, Jacobs and

Jaques’ SST allows a control for the situation by

examining only one level of the organizational

hierarchy. Therefore, using both MPS and SST,

it may be possible to determine behaviors appropriate for a specific situation—in this case, effective behaviors for USAF junior officers at the direct level.

Unfortunately, determining only the relative

importance of effective behaviors may not be

enough. Ideally, mentors focus on behaviors

deemed most important as well as behaviors in

which junior officers need improvement. Addressing behaviors that are both important and in

need of further development increases the potential of that officer, meeting the goal of mentoring.

Thus, this study also sought to answer the research question: “Which leadership behaviors do

junior officers need the most improvement?”

Finally, the responses should be situationally

dependent upon the participants’ career track, or

AFSC category. In fact, prior research found significant differences in self-reported behaviors

when participants were asked to rate the importance of Yukl’s behaviors in relation to their primary and secondary duties.12 This leads to the

final hypothesis: since different career tracks offer different challenges and different situations,

one could expect operations and support personnel to have significant differences in the selfreported importance of effective leadership behaviors.

Figure 2. Leadership Skills Required at Hierarchical

Levels (DAP 600-80)

LEVELS SKILLCATEGORIES*

Indirect

Direct

Executive:

Influenceinternal

&external

environments

Organizational:

Influence

organizations

Direct:

Influencepeople

&buildgroups

TECHNICAL

CONCEPTUAL

INTERPERSONAL

*Areareflectsrelativeimportancewithinhierarchy
41 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Subjects and Population

The population for this investigation was

647 USAF captains attending Squadron Officer

School (SOS) Class 98-A at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The officers participated voluntarily, and

the sampling technique used was holistic. Table

2 lists the demographic information for the sample. The sample is largely representative of the

USAF and should be generalizable to captains

across the entire Air Force. Additional demographics by specific career field show similar

correlation between the SOS sample and the

USAF.

Instrument

The survey is a modified, off-the-shelf, version of Yukl’s Managerial Practices Survey

(MPS). Yukl’s MPS has been extensively tested

and is considered a reliable (r=0.9) and valid

(r=0.4) instrument for measuring leadership behaviors.13

This paper and pencil version of Yukl’s

MPS asked subjects to self-report information

concerning their current jobs in the Air Force in

four sections. Section I captured the demographic information for each participant, to include gender, number of people supervised, years

of commissioned service, and job task (AFSC).

Section II asked participants to rate the importance of each of the 11 leadership behaviors to

the subjects’ current job. The instrument used a

5-point Lickert scale (1=“not relevant,”

2=“slightly important,” 3=“moderately important,” 4=“very important,” and 5=“absolutely essential”). In Section III, participants were also

asked to rate the three most important and three

least important behaviors to being an effective

leader in their current job. Finally, Section IV

asked each participant to identify the one area

where they perceived they needed the most improvement.

Design and Procedures

The survey was submitted to the ACSC

Evaluations Department (ACSC/CVV) and approved. A pilot study was then conducted with an

ACSC seminar to validate the instructions and

the process for collecting data. The survey was

administered 3 December 1997 in SOS’s Polifka

Auditorium. DoD civilians and international officers were excused, and each USAF captain was

given a survey. The survey administrator read

the instructions, and the subjects completed the

informed consent. The students then completed

the survey in 15 minutes. The return rate was

87.9 percent. Student absences and incomplete

surveys accounted for the other 12.1 percent.

Hypotheses were tested using t-tests (2-tail significance) or ANOVA (Tukey-B) with an α=.05.

RESULTS

The results of this study are presented in

three sections. The first section shows the selfreported importance of the 11 behaviors and their

relative importance in terms of the three most important and three least important behaviors for

effective leadership. The second section focuses

on the behaviors juniors officers felt they needed

the most improvement. Finally, the third section

compares the responses across two major career

tracks: operations versus support.

Importance of Yukl’s Leadership Behaviors

Participants were asked to rate the importance of each of Yukl’s 11 leadership behaviors

in relation to their Air Force job. Table 3 shows

descriptive statistics for how junior officers rated

the importance and relevance of these behaviors

for effective leadership. Overall, participants reSOS

Sample

(n=569)

USAF*

Population

(n=27,743)

Male 83.6 % 82.2 %

Female 16.4 % 17.8 %

Line 84.5 % 75.6 %

Non-Line 15.5 % 24.4 %

Operations 50.4 % 47.7 %

Support 34.1 % 27.9 %

Rated Ops 33.4 % 34.2 %

Non-Rated

Ops

17.0 % 13.4 %

Table 2. Demographics (Sample vs. USAF)
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 42

ported informing, problem solving and planning

as the most important behaviors. Least important

was networking, while managing conflict and

team building and supporting and mentoring

were closely grouped toward the bottom.

Behavior Needing Most Improvement

Once participants rated the importance and

relevance of the 11 behaviors, they were asked to

choose the one behavior in which they felt they

needed the most improvement. The frequency

statistics are presented in Table 4. The results

clearly show three behaviors in which junior officers felt they needed help: planning (15.8%), motivating (15.3%) and networking (11.1%).

Comparison of Major Career Tracks

Table 5 shows the results from a one-way

comparison of behavior significance means between two major career tracks. The response differences were tested using a 2-tail significance

test. Significant differences (α < .05) appeared

between operations and support personnel in 7 of

the 11 behaviors: consulting and delegating,

planning, clarifying roles and objectives, monitoring operations, recognizing and rewarding,

managing conflict and team building, and networking. In accordance with AFI 36-2105,

USAF Officer Classification, the operations career track consists of pilots, navigators, space and

missile operations, command and control, intelligence, weather, and operations support (AFSCs

11XX, 12XX, 13XX, 14XX, 15XX, and 16XX).

Support personnel consist of all other AFSCs except medical (4XXX), professional (51XX and

52XX), and special duty (8XXX and 9XXX).

DISCUSSION

Importance of Yukl’s Leadership Behaviors

Informing (M=4.4), problem solving

(M=4.2) and planning (M=4.1) comprised the

three most important behaviors in this investigation. This study expected the results to follow the

same pattern established in the Morabito (1985)

and Taylor (1997) studies, where the three most

important behaviors consisted of one technical

Table 3. Self-Reported Importance

Table 4. Needs Improvement (%)

BehaviorBehaviorMean SD

Inform 4.4. .7

Problem 4.2 .8

Plan 4.1 .9

Consult 4.0 .8

Clarify 3.9 .9

Motivate 3.9 1.0

Recognize 3.8 1.0

Monitor 3.8 .9

Manage 3.7 1.0

Support 3.7 1.0

Network 3.4 1.1

n=569

BehaviorBehavior% CUM

Plan 15.8. 15.8

Motivate 15.3 31.1

Network 11.1 42.2

Problem 9.1 51.3

Consult 8.4 59.7

Recognize 7.7 67.4

Manage 7.7 75.1

Support 7.4 82.5

Clarify 6.9 89.4

Inform 6.2 95.6

Monitor 4.4 100.0

n=569
43 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

behavior, one interpersonal behavior and one

conceptual behavior. In this study, two conceptual behaviors (problem solving, planning) and

one technical behavior (informing) comprised the

top three self-reported behaviors. While motivating was the highest-ranked interpersonal behavior, it ranked only sixth in overall importance. In

fact, interpersonal behaviors consistently ranked

lowest in importance. The three least important

behaviors - networking, managing conflict and

team building, and supporting and mentoringwere all interpersonal behaviors.

This finding seems to call at least one part

of DAP 600-80’s (1986) theory into question.

This theory states interpersonal behaviors are

least important to junior officers. This seems to

be supported by the findings in this study. However, DAP 600-80 also stipulates technical behaviors are much more important to junior officers than conceptual behaviors. This study may

indicate the exact opposite. In this investigation,

junior officers reported two conceptual behaviors

among the three most important to effective leadership. It appears conceptual behaviors may, in

fact, be the most important behaviors at the direct

level.

Why did this study find conceptual behaviors so important? While the survey asked subjects to rank behaviors based on their current job,

some subjects may have been influenced by the

SOS curriculum (Hawthorne effect). For example, SOS places a high emphasis on problem

solving with over 15 contact hours dedicated to

this behavior. In contrast, motivating receives

only 1 contact hour.14 Thus, instead of focusing

on their primary jobs, subjects may have focused

on the secondary task of SOS. This could skew

the findings because, as Taylor found, there is a

difference in the relative importance of behaviors

between primary and secondary duties. A second

explanation may be that today’s junior officers

(particularly support officers) operate at a higher

level due to force reductions. As a result, captains may require more conceptual behaviors

since they are filling billets designed for higherranking officers, who normally operate at a

higher level of the SST. Forced into a higher

rung of the SST hierarchy, junior officers may

Operations versus Support

Operations

(n=287)

Support

Behavior (n=194)

Mean SD Mean SD

 

p

Inform 4.4 .8 4.4 .7 *

Problem Solve 4.1 .8 4.2 .7 *

Plan 4.0 .9 4.3 .8 .01

Consult 3.9 .9 4.1 .8 .01

Clarify 3.8 1.0 4.0 .8 .01

Motivate 3.8 1.0 3.9 1.1 *

Monitor Ops 3.7 .9 3.9 .8 .02

Support 3.6 1.0 3.8 .9 *

Manage Conflict 3.6 1.0 3.8 1.0 .02

Recognize 3.6 1.0 3.9 1.0 .01

Network 3.1 1.1 3.6 1.0 .01

Note: * indicates significance > .05 (no significant differences)

Table 5. Significance Tests (2-Tail): Operations versus Support
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 44

need the higher-order conceptual behaviors required of that higher-order level.

Behavior Needing Most Improvement

The second part of this study attempted to

answer the research question, “which leadership

behaviors do USAF junior officers report they

need the most improvement?” This aspect of the

investigation yielded interesting results. Three of

the 11 behaviors-planning, motivating, and networking-accounted for nearly 50 percent of the

responses. Interestingly enough, the three behaviors were scattered across the importance scale.

Planning was the second most important behavior, motivating sixth, and networking eleventh, or

last. This indicates junior officers need improvement across the spectrum of behaviors, probably

to address both current deficiencies and anticipated future needs. Thus, junior officers may

recognize the challenges of future situations as

they progress in the organizational hierarchy

(Jacobs, 1985) and may want to improve those

behaviors before they are placed in a new situation requiring them (Bowers & Seashore, 1966).

Planning and organizing is a behavior that junior

officers felt was almost “absolutely essential” for

effective leadership, yet was the one behavior in

which they could use the most help. One explanation may lie in Yukl’s definition of planning

and organizing: “Determining long-term objectives/strategies ... [resource allocation] ... and

improving coordination, productivity and effectiveness.” At the direct level, junior officers are

responsible for process improvements to improve

productivity and effectiveness. One look at the

emphasis on efficiency in the USAF, especially

at the direct level, bears this out. However, junior

officers may also view this as a future need.

Long-term objectives and resource allocations

are requirements generally associated with more

senior officers in the USAF. While some junior

officers may be forced into doing these behaviors

today due to the military drawdown and streamlining of organizations, most junior officers

probably recognize that planning will become

more important as they progress in the organization. Thus, they may view this as a need for future development in this critical behavior. Additionally, SOS stresses objectives, goal-setting,

and resource allocation during the first week of

the course.15 Resource allocation receives even

more attention during feedback sessions following leadership exercises. Thus, the importance

subjects placed on planning and organizing, coupled with the emphasis placed on this behavior at

SOS, may explain why this behavior was ranked

first.

Motivating was the second most frequent

choice for the “needs improvement.” As the military draws down further, the pace of operations

remains high, and retention remains an issue, this

behavior may become even more important. It

may highlight the need for junior officers to motivate their subordinates, peers, and themselves to

keep the enthusiasm level up in the face of high

“ops tempo.” This may also be a sign of a future

need. Junior officers may realize that as they

progress to higher ranks and their span of control

increases, motivating more subordinates may be

a critical behavior.

Although ranked last in importance, networking was one of the top three behaviors needing improvement. Since most subjects were between their fourth and seventh years of commissioned service, they have spent the majority of

their career becoming experts in their respective

career fields. As such, they have had little interaction with other career fields across the Air

Force. SOS provides junior officers their first

opportunity to work with officers outside their

primary career field. This becomes their initial

exposure to networking and developing contacts

for the future, which may explain its mention

here.

Comparison of Major Career Tracks

The second hypothesis set forth in this study,

that “significant differences will appear in the responses between operations and support personnel, was supported. The t-test showed differences between operations and support in 7 of the

11 behaviors. This finding supports the theories

that indicate effective leadership behaviors depend upon the leader’s situation (Bowers & Seashore, 1966). Furthermore, it supports Taylor’s

(1997) findings where subjects rated the relative

importance of Yukl’s behaviors differently across

job types (between primary and secondary du-
45 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

ties). Finally, comparing Morabito’s (1985)

study on maintainers with Taylor’s study on pilots shows significant differences in reported behaviors between the two groups of subjects. This

study finds the same phenomenon across a

broader grouping of these two career fields: operations and support.

A closer look at the data shows operations

personnel consistently rated every behavior lower

than support personnel did. At first glance, it

may seem the differences were simply due to

scale interpretation. However, this conclusion

may be shortsighted. As an example, the importance of recognizing and rewarding was significantly different between the two career tracks.

More revealing, however, is this behavior’s relative rank in importance. Operations personnel

rated this behavior next-to-last in importance,

while support personnel ranked it sixth. This

could be related to the number of people supervised. Over 36 percent of all support personnel

supervise more than 10 people, while only 14

percent of all operations personnel have the same

supervisory responsibility. Perhaps recognizing

and rewarding behaviors become more important

as the number of people supervised rises, which

could explain the significant difference found in

the t-test. These differences could be the result

of the subjects’ situation (Bowers & Seashore,

1966) and must be explored further before simply

dismissing them as a matter of scale interpretation.

IMPLICATIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Implications

This study’s results tends to question some

theories put forth by Jacobs (1985) and DAP

600-80 (1986). Two of the top three behaviors in

this study were conceptual in nature, which indicates conceptual behaviors may be far more important than DAP 600-80 envisioned. As such,

conceptual behaviors may be more important at

the direct level as the force draws down from its

highest peacetime strength, which ironically coincided with DAP 600-80’s publication. A second explanation is related to DAP 600-80’s relationship to Jacobs’ SST. Captains may not be

operating at the lowest (direct) level; instead,

they may be at the middle (organizational) level

in the SST hierarchy, where conceptual behaviors

are theoretically more important to effective

leadership (Jacobs, 1985). As a result, one’s position in the SST hierarchy may be less dependent on rank than on the leader’s situation, such as

number of people supervised or specific AFSC.

Fundamentally, this study successfully determined a prioritized set of behaviors required for

effective leadership at the direct level in the

USAF, filling a void in this area of research

(Hurry, 1995; Yukl and Van Fleet, 1986). Since

the demographics from this sample closely match

the USAF as a whole, the findings should be generalizable to the entire Air Force. Thus, the three

most important behaviors highlighted in Figure 3

can be considered the most effective behaviors,

in order of importance, for junior officers in the

USAF.

With the most important behaviors identified, this study can serve as the basis for mentoring and training junior officers to enhance professional development. However, one can ask,

“Which behaviors should be the focus for the

junior officer’s career development: the most

important or those most in need of improvement?” Clearly, an officer needs to develop all

11 leadership behaviors, but concentrating on a

combination of these two categories will likely

bring the most “bang for the buck.” Therefore,

mentoring and training junior officers primarily

in planning and organizing, informing, problem

solving, motivating, and networking should yield

the most beneficial results.

In light of this discussion, it may be worthwhile to explore the curricula junior officers are

exposed to at both technical and professional

training. For example, SOS dedicates almost the

entire first week of their 7-week curriculum to

presenting leadership tools. While planning and

problem solving receive much attention, motivating receives relatively little. Similarly, SOS

dedicates 20 contact hours to formal communication skills, yet very little to the informal communication skills required to be effective in the informing behavior. With the Air and Space Basic

Course starting in 1998, it may be a good time to

match its curriculum with the needs reported by

junior officers in this study.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 46

Since leadership is situational, as Michigan

(1952) and Bowers & Seashore (1966) revealed,

then perhaps different training and mentoring

may be required across different career tracks.

This study highlighted significant differences between the operations and support career tracks.

While the most important behaviors identified in

this study may be a good start for training or

mentoring a large, heterogeneous group, individuals in specific career tracks may need different behaviors to be effective leaders.

Recommendations

This study, like many others in behavioral

research, answered some questions but raised

several others. Since behavioral and situational

research on junior military officers is limited, future research could focus on some of the nuances

uncovered in this study. First, there may be additional factors that drive significant differences in

the self-reported important behaviors for junior

officers. Thus, another study similar to this one

in which different control variables were explored could be extremely informative. For example, what impact does the number of people

supervised have on the effective behaviors?

When collecting data for this study, 2-tail significance and ANOVA tests revealed differences between line and non-line officers, between males

and females, and between specific career fields

(pilots and medical). Could this hold true for

other career fields also? Finally, does prior

enlisted service or commissioning source have

any influence on the behaviors required to be an

effective leader?

Jacobs’ SST theorized officers require different skills and behaviors as they progress

through the organizational hierarchy to be effective. This study indicated captains may be operating at a higher level than that stipulated in Jacobs’ SST. As such, it opens the door to explore

when officers transition between levels in the

SST, which would be a signal of when officers

need to focus on different behaviors to be effective. Thus, it could help indicate when mentoring should focus on current needs and when it

can begin to focus on an officer’s future needs as

well.

Notes

1 Yukl, G., S. Wall, and R. Lepsinger, “Preliminary Report on Validation

of the Managerial Practices Survey,” in Measures of Leadership, (Clark

and Clark, 1990), 70

2 Ibid, 72 3 Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 128 4 Yukl, Wall and Lepsinger, 227-233 5 Ibid, 236 6 Jacobs, T.O. and Elliott Jaques, “Leadership in Complex Systems” in

Human Productivity Enhancement, edited by Joseph Zeidner (Praeger

Publishing, 1987), 13

7 Ibid, 17 8 Department of the Army Pamphlet (DAP) 600-80, Executive Leadership

(HQ, Department of the Army, 1986), 4

9 Ibid, 5 10 Hurry, Linda S., “Measuring Behaviors of Air Force Officers as Indicators of Effective Performance and Leadership,” Master’s Thesis, AFIT,

WPAFB AFB, OH, 1995, 2

11 Van Fleet, D. and G.A. Yukl. Military Leadership: An Organizational

Behavior Perspective. (JAI Press, 1986), 96 12 Taylor, Ralph, “Redefining Leadership Skills For Instructor Pilots”

(Research project, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1997), 19-21

13 Yukl, G., S. Wall, and R. Lepsinger, “Preliminary Report on Validation

of the Managerial Practices Survey., in Measures of Leadership, Clark

and Clark, 1990, 70

14 “SOS Lesson Planning Sheet,” dated 5 Jan 98, as published by SOS/

DC (Directorate of Curriculum)

5 Ibid.

Clarifying

Monitoring

Informing

Networking

Team Building/

Conflict Mng

Mentoring &

Supporting Planning

Prob Solving

Consulting &

Delegating

M

In

o

s

ti

p

vating &

iring

Recognizing

& Rewarding

Giving-Seeking Info

Making Decisions

Building Relations

Influencing People

TECHNICAL

CONCEPTUAL

INTERPERSONAL

Figure 3. Most Important Behaviors (Entire Sample)
47 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Garvin, USAF, is the Director of Operations at the 94th Flying Training Squadron

at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He formerly served as the Director of Leadership at both the Air Command and Staff College at Air University (97-00), and in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the US Air Force Academy (94-97). He earned a Doctorate in Higher

Education Administration and Leadership from Texas Tech University in 1995 and has a BS in Electrical

Engineering from Southern Illinois University. He has published a number of articles addressing leadership development and has a McGraw-Hill text in airmanship education. Lt Col Garvin is a command instructor pilot with experience in the UV-18, B-52, T-38, T-3, T-41, and TG-7.

Warriors’ Helmets by C2C Wilbert Gettys, USAFA ‘03.

Courtesy of the USAFA Department of English and Fine Arts.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 48

Rules of Engagement (ROE) – The ROE in a

peace operation will limit the use of force more

strictly than the ROE in a mid- to high-intensity

conflict environment. The threat to peace support

forces should be less than that for forces who expect to be in combat. The objectives in a peace

mission are to contain conflict and reduce violence,

so there will be greater restriction on the use of

force that could lead to further escalation. To accomplish their mission, a peace support force must

maintain a sense of legitimacy, something that can

be easily destroyed by a perceived overuse of force

against one party or the other.

Multinational Nature – When functioning as part

of a coalition or alliance, contributing nations will

often maintain the integrity of their units. In a

peace operation, however, multinational forces are

more likely to come together into a common unit.

For instance, eight officers from a variety of nations typically man observation posts along the Kuwait-Iraq border supporting UNIKOM.2 Bringing

together representatives from different cultures can

be difficult. There may be, for instance, representatives from countries that are traditionally adversaries, such as India and Pakistan. Americans operating in this environment must be concerned not only

with how they interact with and understand these

different cultures, but also with how the personnel

under their command interact with each other.

Displaced Persons and Refugees – The presence of

displaced persons will affect a combat environment

and can put a serious strain on logistics systems if

part of the mission involves caring for them. It will

also lead to the introduction of humanitarian relief

agencies, both government and non-governmental,

which leads to command and control issues and requirements to provide transportation and security

for agency representatives. Aerial ports supporting

military operations may also be used to support reThe increased US involvement in peace operations

since 1990 has raised concerns over military readiness. There have been large deployments of US

personnel to operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia

and Kosovo as well as in the skies over Iraq. The

different skills required in peace operations and the

accompanying reduction in time available for combat training lead many to conclude that peace operations inherently reduce America’s combat readiness.

This paper suggests that peacekeeping and

peace enforcement operations can have a positive

effect on combat readiness, and that negative effects, which do exist, can be minimized. Much of

the information here is derived from a 1997-1999

study on the US Air Force’s role in peace operations that was conducted for the Air Force Institute

for National Security Studies.1 The author interviewed personnel and observed operations at the

Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in

Vicenza, Italy, which oversees NATO air operations in the Balkans; and at Tuzla Air Base and Eagle Base in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aerial port and

headquarters for Multinational Division-North. Research and field observations demonstrate how officers at all levels can help their forces realize the

maximum benefit from participation in peace operations. Although the focus of this paper is on the

US Air Force, there are useful lessons here for

members of all services.

Unique Aspects of Peace Operations

Although both employ military forces, there are

significant differences between warfighting and

peace operations. The latter have more limited objectives that may be difficult to measure, and as a

result different means are employed. Some of the

more important differences that are likely to affect

military readiness, either positively or negatively,

are discussed below.

Taking the Good with the Bad - Maximizing the Benefits of

Participating in Peace Operations

William C. Thomas
49 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

lief efforts. Security concerns will increase if refugees seek shelter in the protected area of a military

facility. Intratheater airlift might be used to transport refugees or carry relief supplies in addition to

supporting military forces.

Demining – The prevalence of mines throughout

the world makes them a threat to peacekeepers everywhere. Not only must forces be trained to avoid

the hazards of mines, they may be called upon to

oversee or conduct demining operations. Other UN

or private agencies may be brought in to clear

mined areas. Medical staffs should be prepared to

treat casualties from mines, both among the peacekeepers and the general population. The United

Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

(UNIKOM) observation posts, for instance, often

have civilians come to them seeking assistance after a mine incident.3 Airfields may have been

mined during a conflict, so aerial ports and combat

airfields must be cleared of unexploded ordnance,

or at least have dangerous areas clearly marked, before they can be safely used.

Force Protection – Protective measures for military forces are important, but care must be taken

not to appear so strong as to be perceived as a

threat. A force that takes protective measures out

of proportion to the risk it faces may appear offensive rather than defensive in nature, diminishing its

ability to create a peaceful environment. Because

of this requirement, commanders must have an effective intelligence-gathering system that can measure not only capabilities but also the attitudes of the

local population. Contingency plans must be available and a response force must be identified in advance to provide a force protection capability that

can react quickly but which can maintain a low profile when not needed. Peace forces should endeavor to use the smallest number of personnel required to perform a mission in order to minimize

the force’s footprint and limit the number of potential targets.

Civil-Military Relations – In a peace operation the

role of the military is to support civilian efforts to

resolve a conflict and restore a basic sense of normalcy. In this light, it is obvious that there will be

significant contact between military and civilian organizations. In this case, “Unity of Effort” between

all the participants is as important as “Unity of

Command” is within the military structure. Commanders need to establish a means of coordinating

not only with relief agencies but also with local entities such as municipal government, civil aviation

administration, utilities, and so forth.

Normalization – Military forces have the opportunity to contribute significantly to the normalization

process that is so critical to peacebuilding. The restoration of a normal living environment can go a

long way toward facilitating the resolution of a

conflict. Rebuilding basic services such as water,

electricity, railroads, postal service, and civil aviation, can enable the population to raise their standard of living and see that there are attractive alternatives to conflict. In Bosnia, the Stabilization

Force (SFOR) developed the rail system to ease the

movement of forces from Germany into the theater

and made the rail lines available for civilian freight

and passenger use as well, for the first time in

years. While normalization should not be the focus

of military operations, planners should consider the

peacebuilding benefits of their activities and try to

take advantage of them.

Impact on Military Readiness

The US military’s purpose is to support the national security interests of the United States in

whatever manner is directed by the country’s political leadership. Since the end of the Cold War, this

has meant a surge in peace operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and so forth. But there

is no denying that the military sees as its primary

purpose the fighting and winning of America’s

wars. While it exercises this ability only rarely, the

cost associated with failure in this role means that

America must have a force that is prepared to engage in combat.

The effects of peace operations on American

combat readiness are difficult to quantify with any

degree of accuracy. The capabilities of forces after

conducting such missions vary so much that there

is no obvious conclusion that peace operations are

either “good” or “bad.” There are many factors involved, such as a unit’s mission, the particular

situation in which it was involved, and its skill

level prior to deploying. However, it is important

to consider the potential positive and negative effects that peace operations can create. This will

help minimize the negative effects while taking advantage of the benefits of participation.
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 50

Positive Effects on Forces

Strong evidence suggests that training for and

participating in peace operations may improve the

ability of forces to participate in combat, and a

number of commanders have noted the benefits of

these missions. The effects on different types of

forces will not be the same, but in many cases, the

skills needed for combat may be practiced or even

improved upon by training for or being a part of a

peace operation.

One of the biggest potential advantages is that

conferred by operational, as opposed to training or

in-garrison, experience. Participation in a realworld event is very different from a training environment because there are no controls, no scripts,

and no observer/controllers in an operation. There

is also the opportunity to develop combat skills that

may not be routinely used in a day-to-day job at

home. Security forces that perform law enforcement duties at home may find themselves patrolling

a perimeter or defending an airfield. Medical personnel will face real casualties rather than the simulated injuries found in an exercise. Human intelligence specialists and counterintelligence agents

will be able to use their skills in an uncertain environment rather than with actors in a training scenario.

The positive effects of operational experience

are not reserved for operational support personnel.

Combat aircrews find themselves working from

forward-deployed bases, reacting to changing

threats and mission requirements, and adapting to

the realities of a strained logistics system in a fastpaced environment. Restrictive ROE demand enhanced decision making skills at all levels, not just

among pilots but among ground personnel as well.

In many cases, the demands on targeteers may be

more difficult in a peace operation because of the

limits on targets and munitions. Combat forces as

well as support personnel can benefit from exposure to operational conditions.

Another opportunity these operations afford is

the chance for individuals to broaden their skills.

Given the need for a small military presence in a

peace operation, and the reality of military downsizing, manning for these missions will be minimal.

As a result, deployed personnel will often take on

new tasks that require immediate on-the-job training. At Tuzla AB, for example, a Civil Engineering heavy equipment operator from Edwards AFB

left after 120 days with the skills of a master carpenter; a command post controller from Whiteman

AFB spent her spare time working with the Air

Terminal Operations Center and the airfield manager; and, a Master Sergeant running the Transportation branch found himself overseeing Supply as

well.4 The introduction of personnel to new skills

enhances their versatility and adaptability.

Air Force members also find themselves working closely with representatives of other Services

and other countries. Given that the United States

rarely conducts single-service or unilateral operations, the experience of working with other services

and nations will further improve the ability to integrate with such forces when the need arises in a

combat situation. The joint and multinational environment at the CAOC in Vicenza allows Air Force

planners to learn about the culture and perspectives

of other forces. Potential problems that could be a

serious impediment in a combat environment might

be identified in a peace operation and could be addressed before the nations or services work together

again.5 Relief agencies and local civilians have

very different perspectives from military forces.

The exposure to different ways of doing things may

allow Air Force members to learn new ways to accomplish their mission more effectively.

In addition to expanding their breadth of knowledge, Air Force members assigned to peace operations can develop their depth of understanding in

their particular career field by assuming more responsibility than they might have at their home station. At Tuzla AB, Captains and Majors served as

squadron commanders, a position often held by a

Lieutenant Colonel. The Chief of Security Forces

at Tuzla was a First Lieutenant, with the responsibility often possessed by a Major or Lieutenant

Colonel, while the Base Civil Engineer (responsible

for CE Ops, Fire Department, Environmental Issues, and Explosive Ordnance Demolition) was a

Senior Master Sergeant. The same advantage often

holds true for Army personnel; an NCO leading a

patrol has to make on-the-spot decisions for his unit

operating by itself, rather than as part of a larger,

synchronized tactical unit.6 These individuals have

been placed in a position where their leadership

skills are tasked to a level far beyond their years.

Their experience in Bosnia should allow them to

perform their roles better when they return to their

home stations, and will give them a better appreciation for what is required when they rise to command positions again in the future.
51 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Finally, there are many skills common to both

peace operations and combat situations. These

skills are practiced in peace operations training and

are further exercised in a real-world environment.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report studying the effects of peace operations on readiness

found that some Army leaders find such training to

be useful:

According to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials, the Division Commander believed that

incorporating some peace operations training in

standard unit training can enhance combat skills

and capabilities, since troops will likely encounter many of these tasks and conditions on

complex future battlefields.7

The Commanding General of the First Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) told GAO analysts

that standard training should address those aspects

of peace operations that differ from traditional

combat skills, and also that this training is not

likely to affect combat skills negatively. According

to the GAO report,

Incorporation of those aspects can be done, he

believes, without degrading the combat capability of US military forces and may in fact enhance combat capabilities, based on his past

participation in peace operations.8

Skills that are important in peace operations, such

as mine awareness, security threat assessment and

force protection, are equally important in warfighting.

Given the frequency with which peace operations occur, and the large number of personnel who

will rotate through them, it seems important that

units be trained to participate in them. It is important, though, to minimize the effect on units’ combat skills. The commanders discussed above appear confident that such training will enhance,

rather than diminish, their units’ skills, but more

should be done to minimize any negative effects

brought on by peace operations.

Negative Impact on Forces

Of greatest concern to military leaders is the

possibility that combat skills may erode after extended participation in a peace operation. The objectives of a peace support mission demand great

restraint and minimal use of force, which is contrary to the manner in which combat is typically

waged. The low intensity of a peace operation can

dull the combat “edge” attained by forces that have

prepared to fight in mid- to high-intensity conflicts.

• Maneuver forces maintain observation posts,

conduct small-unit patrols, and provide a rapid

response capability, rather than functioning as

part of a larger tactical unit as they normally

would.

• Combat aircrews flying “presence” missions in

a low-threat environment may become complacent about surface-to-air missile threats and enemy aircraft. Skills required for precision strike

capability may erode over time when the lethal

force of airpower is kept on call but held in

check.

• Planning skills and the ability to recognize and

seize opportunities may deteriorate when the

mission objective is to prevent conflict rather

than to maneuver an enemy into defeat.9

The National Military Strategy calls for the United

States to be able to redeploy forces from lowintensity operations to major theater wars.10 But if

forces have lost their skills, and require time and

resources to sharpen them again, this can restrict

their ability to redeploy quickly to a combat environment.11

Not only can peace operations dull combat

skills, but when forces are deployed to such missions, the amount of time available for combat

training is sharply curtailed. The pace of the operation may not allow for training time, or the situation might be exacerbated by training exercises that

could appear hostile.12 The lack of combat training

can lead to a long-term degradation of readiness.

Air Force operational support forces may not be severely affected by this, because the functions they

perform in peace operations are very similar to their

duties in a wartime environment. Combat aircrews,

however, may remain technically qualified to fly

combat but may not have the same degree of skill

they would have otherwise had.

The ability to redeploy from a small contingency to a major theater war allows the United

States to conduct operations that prevent or limit
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 52

conflicts while at the same time being prepared to

face more serious threats to national interests. One

potential problem with maintaining this ability is

that many of the forces required to initiate a new

operation are also required to terminate the participation in smaller contingencies. Air mobility support personnel operate both the aerial ports of debarkation for the new crisis and the aerial ports of

embarkation for forces leaving smaller contingencies.13 Civil engineers are required to build new

forward bases while tearing down and moving

equipment from the old. As long as there are military personnel at a base, whether departing or arriving, there will be a need for security forces, personnel specialists, medical staff, and many other functional areas. These forces will be spread very thin

during the early days of a newly emerging crisis,

and this will continue until the smaller contingency

has been terminated. Personnel at Tuzla AB suggested that they could close down very quickly and

redeploy, leaving facilities behind rather than tearing them down, but that is an operation consisting

of less than 250 people.14 It would be very different to suspend Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

and move thousands of personnel out of Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries. In any event, Tuzla

AB could not begin to close down until the thousands of US Army personnel had been processed

out of the country.

The biggest redeployment problems may be

faced by intertheater airlift assets that move personnel and equipment not only from the United States

but also from other points around the world. The

schedule of inter- and intratheater airlift must be

closely coordinated to ensure maximum efficiency

in the use of these assets, but such close coordination may be difficult to achieve in the fast pace of

an emerging crisis.

The current operations tempo has reportedly

left the military with less time and fewer resources

for training. In units for which this is the case, inclusion of new training tasks might require a tradeoff, forcing units to cancel traditional combat training to incorporate peace operations-specific training. This could lead to a reduction in combat readiness. For units suffering from reduced training

time or resources, the challenge is to find ways to

develop peace operations skills while at the same

time maintaining combat readiness. Innovative

training techniques, better scheduling methods, and

a thorough review of combat requirements may be

required to ensure that forces maintain the skills

and the versatility required to meet modern threats.

Maintaining Readiness

There is a justifiable concern that participating

in peace operations may reduce a force’s combat

effectiveness. The number of forces actively participating in peace operations at any given time

tends to be but a tiny percentage of the force, but

because of the long duration of these missions, the

number of forces that will participate over time

tends to be quite large. While the negative impact

of peace support operations is difficult to quantify,

there is definitely a perception that such an impact

exists. Military commanders should take steps to

eliminate or reduce negative effects from these operations.

Basic Skills Maintenance

One of the best methods available is the continuation of basic skills training (e.g., marksmanship)

while participating in an operation. BG Stanley

Cherrie comments on the methods for maintaining

his forces’ skills while part of Task Force Eagle in

Bosnia:

I believe that continuing to train in conventional ways to the extent possible as we did

with our tanks, Bradleys and dismounted

rifle squads in Hungary, and our small arms

in-country, helps reduce conventional warfighting “decay.” This “on deployment”

training helps to reduce the time it takes to

get back into major theater warfighting fitness. After the 1st AD completes its training package, we will be able to assess about

how long it takes to “come back” from PE

to conventional readiness.15

This sort of training is not always possible. The

situation may not allow for it; the area may be too

volatile, or perhaps the country in which it is taking

place will not allow training facilities to be built.

Given that peace missions will typically employ the

fewest people possible, there may not be time to remove personnel from daily operations to conduct

continuation training. Aircrews at Aviano AB, Italy, participating in Operation DELIBERATE

GUARD, were flying one training sortie for every

two operational sorties, giving them far less training time than they would normally receive. This
53 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

situation got worse as training was further curtailed

following the Marine Corps EA-6B accident in

early 1998 in which 20 Italian civilians were

killed.16

Sometimes this training can be used to advance

the mission’s objectives. Exercise DYNAMIC RESPONSE in early 1998 served not only as an opportunity for forces in Bosnia to conduct joint training, but also as a show of force demonstrating

SFOR’s capabilities to all of the entities involved in

the conflict who were invited to send observers.

The effect of those observations on the different entities, especially the demonstration of airpower’s

effectiveness, was sobering to say the least.17

Basic skills training by itself does not keep

forces combat ready. Army forces in particular

function as part of a division, yet it is difficult if not

impossible to practice large-scale maneuvers while

engaged in a contingency. But if basic skills can be

maintained, that is one thing that does not need to

be re-learned; post-operation mission training can

then focus on required training that could not be

conducted during the operation.

Post-Mission Refresher Training

Unit commanders must allow sufficient time for

refresher training to redevelop abilities that have

unavoidably been affected by the nature of a peace

support mission. This will require a training program to hone the skills necessary for a unit to be

combat ready. Such a program may include anything from refresher training in marksmanship up

through divisional maneuver exercises at a major

training center. In addition to sharpening skills,

such training may also return individuals to a combat-oriented mindset that will likely be different

from the restrained environment of a peace operation.

Commanders will need to evaluate the impact

that the mission had on their essential tasks. This

evaluation should be an on-going process from the

time the unit begins preparing for its deployment

until it has returned to its home station, so that

training plans can be developed and implemented

quickly. Army training centers such as the Combat

Maneuver Training Center in Germany have been

used to help improve unit skills upon their return

from peace support missions. The staff at such

centers can help tailor retraining efforts to improve

shortfalls identified during and after a deployment.18

Common Equipment

One readiness concern is that deploying units

will have to bring their equipment back up to standards in order to be combat ready when they return

to their home station.19 An alternative is to leave

equipment in the theater and allow it to be used by

successive personnel rather than rotating it each

time units arrive and depart (this would have the

secondary benefit of reducing the logistical burden

each time a new unit replaces another in the theater). Maintenance could be performed in-theater,

and equipment could be moved out for depot-level

maintenance as required.

This idea would be easier for Air Force support

units that deploy as individuals to an expeditionary

unit. Forces that deploy as part of a larger standing

unit might not find it so easy to transfer their equipment to another organization, but it might be possible for units which deploy as a subset of a larger

unit. For instance, the 1st Armored Division provided many of the land forces in Bosnia; battalions

that rotated in and out of theater could have merely

transferred equipment between units rather than

bringing their own in and out of the country with

them. Air Force wings that rotate squadrons

throughout a contingency could transfer equipment

back and forth between the subordinate units while

still maintaining ownership within the wing. This

would allow personnel to return to their home station to equipment that has been maintained in combat-ready status.

Making Use Of Deployment Experience

Military members who have deployed often

have a wealth of experience that can aid them in the

performance of their daily duties at their home station, as well as in a combat environment. In many

cases they have learned new means of accomplishing their primary tasks that may be more effective

or efficient. They also may have learned new skills

in a different field, perhaps to a level that would

have seen them awarded a new specialty code had

they completed a formal training program. The

401st EABG commander made a point of using

squadron members with deployment experience at

his home station when he was an Aerial Port

Squadron commander. Often he would have these

individuals conduct training sessions in the squadron in order to spread their experience to other

members. He was also more likely to move mem-
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 54

bers with experience into leadership positions

ahead of those without it.20

The additional skills that members gain during

a deployment could be very useful in later deployments. Unfortunately, the Air Force has no system

for tracking such on-the-job training. Though it

may be mentioned in an individual’s letter of

evaluation or performance report, there is really no

way that they can be identified as possessing additional skills. Much as the Air Force evaluates and

tracks foreign language ability, it should consider

doing the same for additional skills and experience

gained during contingency operations so that these

capabilities may be effectively employed when

needed in the future.

Conclusions

The debate continues over the effect that peace

operations will have on forces’ combat readiness.

The American military must be prepared to fight

and to win wars, but they must also be able to conduct other missions that support national interests.

Planners and commanders must identify both the

negative and positive effects of peace operations in

order to minimize the former and take full advantage of the latter. The possibility exists that military readiness can be degraded by peace operations.

It is the responsibility of military leaders at all levels to ensure that is not allowed to happen.

Notes

1

Capt William C. Thomas, USAF and 2Lt Jeremy D. Cukierman, USAF, The

Next Peace Operation: US Air Force Issues and Perspectives, Colorado

Springs: USAF INSS, Occasional Paper #25, May 1999.

2

Interviews with US Military Observer Group – Washington Office

(USMOG-W) personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 May

1998.

3

Interviews with USMOG-W personnel, 14 May 1998.

4

Interviews with 401st Expeditionary Air Base Group personnel, April 1998. 5

Interviews with CAOC personnel, April 1998.

6

SGM Ronald Hill, USA, “Troop-Leading Procedures and the NCO,” Center

for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter (April 1998), 11. 7

United States General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Effect of

Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD96-14, October 1995), 26.

8

GAO, Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors

on Unit Capability, 21. 9

CPT Louis B. Rago, USA, “Putting the Tactical Back in the TOC,” Center

for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter , April 1998, 23. 10GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA, National Military Strategy (Washington,

DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). Available via the World Wide Web at

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms.

11GAO, Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors

on Unit Capability, 26. Army commanders generally estimate a 3-6 month

period after a peace operation to restore a unit’s warfighting readiness fully.

Aviation units require less time than ground combat units, but some time is

still required.

12United States General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Heavy Use of

Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD95-51, March 1995), 31.

13GAO, Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, 42. 14Interviews with 401st EABG personnel, April 1998. 15BG Stanley F. Cherrie, USA, “Task Force Eagle,” Military Review (JulyAugust 1997), 72.

16Interviews with CAOC personnel, April 1998.

17Interviews with CAOC C-5 personnel, April 1998.

18MAJ Ken Deal, USA, “Return to High-Intensity Conflict: Return to Basics,” Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter (April 1998), 21. 19GAO, Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, 48. 20Interview with 401st EABG commander, April 1998.

Biography

Major William Thomas is a Senior Space and Missile Officer who served from 1993-1997 as Assistant Professor of

Military Art and Science at the US Air Force Academy.

During the next two years he was the chief of the Military

Operations Other Than War Branch at the Air Force Doctrine Center, where he was the principal author of the Air

Force’s doctrine for MOOTW. Maj Thomas holds a

bachelor’s degree from the University of Virginia and a

master’s degree from Regis University in Denver. He is

currently pursuing a PhD in Public Policy at George Mason University on an AFIT-sponsored fellowship, and he is

a graduate of the correspondence programs of the Air

Command and Staff College and the US Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School.
55 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001
Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 56
57 Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001

Next in Airman-Scholar:

The Fall 2001 issue of Airman-Scholar will feature several articles on regional strategic

appraisal to the Year 2015 prepared in association with the Air Force Institute for National

Security Studies (INSS). We are also looking for other proposals dealing with the journal’s

broad purpose of stimulating discussion on current military issues and domestic and international affairs. We intend as well to publish worthwhile papers prepared in the context of

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Airman-Scholar invites both full-length articles and short “letters to the editor” comments.

Please submit in accordance with the following guidelines:

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2. Articles should be submitted as hard copy with accompanying 3.5 inch disk (not returned).

3. Articles will be edited to conform with Airman-Scholar format; proofs will not be sent

to authors prior to publication.

4. Articles are encouraged from all knowledgeable members of the academic and military

communities. Publication of outstanding papers by USAFA cadets and other service

academy students is a particular goal of Airman-Scholar.

5. Articles must be received by 1 November 2001.

6. Send articles to:

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Airman-Scholar ● Spring 2001 58

34th Education Group

Att: Airman-Scholar

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2

USAF Academy CO 80840-6264