POLICY ISSUE 

NOTATION VOTE 

June 5, 2011 SECY-11-0073

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: STAFF PROPOSAL TO REINTEGRATE SECURITY INTO THE 

 ACTION MATRIX OF THE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS 

 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this paper is to obtain Commission approval of a staff proposal to reintegrate 

security inspection findings and performance indicators (PIs) as inputs to the Action Matrix of 

the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for commercial nuclear power licensees to present an 

integrated assessment of licensee performance. 

SUMMARY: 

As a consequence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ROP underwent a number 

of changes to ensure that individuals could not obtain and use sensitive, security-related 

information about a nuclear facility’s design, operation, and protective capabilities for malevolent 

purposes. In its efforts to protect security-related information by withholding it from public 

disclosure, the staff developed and now applies a security assessment process separate from 

CONTACT: Armando S. Masciantonio, NRR/DIRS 

 301-415-1290 
The Commissioners 2 

the safety cornerstones within the ROP framework. However, the staff recognizes that the 

application of separate assessment processes has the potential to programmatically constrain 

its regulatory response. The staff proposes that security assessment inputs (security inspection 

findings and performance indicators) be reintegrated into one ROP Action Matrix that would 

include inputs from all seven ROP cornerstones, consistent with the original design of the ROP 

framework. A single Action Matrix would more accurately reflect a holistic representation of 

licensee performance, and the NRC’s response to performance would be dictated by a column 

designation commensurate with an integrated assessment of licensee performance. Under the 

current assessment process, the security assessment letters and licensee performance 

meetings are independent of the assessments, letters, and meetings that the NRC conducts for 

the other six ROP cornerstones. The staff proposal would also recombine the safety and 

security ROP mid-cycle and end-of-cycle NRC assessment letters and public meetings on 

licensee performance, thereby enhancing communication of an integrated assessment and 

associated agency response. The staff estimates that its proposal can be implemented within 

existing budgeted resources for fiscal year 2011 and beyond. 

BACKGROUND: 

The ROP provides a framework for the regulatory oversight of operating nuclear power facilities 

across seven cornerstones of safety that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

established when it first developed the framework. Those seven cornerstones continue to frame 

the ROP today. Fundamental to the ROP is the premise that licensee performance that meets 

the objectives and key attributes of each of these cornerstones would provide reasonable 

assurance that the overall NRC mission of adequate protection of public health and safety is 

met. The NRC chose the cornerstones of safety to focus licensee efforts on the following: 

(1) minimize the frequency of initiating events; (2) ensure the availability, reliability, and 

capability of mitigating systems; (3) ensure the integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant 

system, and containment boundaries; (4) ensure the adequacy of the emergency preparedness 

functions; (5) protect the public from exposure to radioactive material releases; (6) protect 

nuclear plant workers from exposure to radiation, and (7) provide assurance that the physical 

protection system can protect against the design-basis threat of radiological sabotage. Implicit 

in the framework is the recognition that physical protection of the facility is necessary to ensure 

safety. 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ROP underwent a number of changes 

to ensure that individuals could not obtain and use sensitive, security-related information about 

a nuclear facility’s design, operation, and protective capabilities for malevolent purposes. In a 

staff requirements memorandum (SRM), (SRM-SECY-04-0020, “Treatment of Physical 

Protection Under the Reactor Oversight Process” dated March 29, 2004, the Commission 

directed the staff to develop a separate but parallel ROP for the physical protection (now 

security) cornerstone. In SECY-05-0082, “Revised Assessment Process for the Security 

Cornerstone of the Reactor Oversight Process,” dated May 12, 2005, the staff described the 

new security oversight process that it had developed as separate from the ROP but still within 

the ROP framework. On August 22, 2005, the staff issued Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 

0320, “Operating Reactor Security Assessment Program,” thereby implementing the new 

program. 
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In SECY-07-0008, “Evaluation of Revised Security Oversight Process for Nuclear Power 

Reactors,” dated January 9, 2007, the staff informed the Commission that it planned to make 

one change to the publicly available cover letters for security inspection reports to align them 

with the then recent changes in the ROP on the identification of substantive cross-cutting issues 

(SCCIs). The staff subsequently made the necessary program modifications to allow the cover 

letters for security inspection reports to mention whether any security findings had cross-cutting 

aspects associated with them. This change enabled the staff to identify SCCIs across all 

cornerstones of safety based on publicly available information. 

DISCUSSION: 

As described in the preceding section, the NRC conducts security performance assessments 

separately from the other ROP cornerstones and withholds security-related information from 

public disclosure, as directed by the Commission in the SRM dated March 29, 2004. However, 

the staff recognizes that the application of separate assessment processes has the potential to 

programmatically constrain its regulatory response. In its calendar year (CY) 2010 ROP 

self-assessment (SECY-11-0054, “Reactor Oversight Process Self-Assessment for Calendar 

Year 2010”), the staff further characterized this potential constraint as a consequence of ROP 

changes that were largely driven by a desire to protect security-related information following the 

September 11 terrorist attacks. 

The ROP framework provides for the assessment of licensee performance in cross-cutting 

areas. The staff and the Commission have long recognized the potential for cross-cutting 

issues to impact licensee performance across all cornerstones of safety. The current ROP 

framework considers security findings with cross-cutting aspects along with all other crosscutting aspects in the other ROP cornerstones in the identification of a cross-cutting theme and 

SCCI. 

Similarly, when the NRC developed the ROP, it had assessed indications of licensee 

performance from all seven cornerstones of the Action Matrix together to provide a complete 

picture of overall licensee safety performance. However, the current segmentation of greaterthan-green security findings from other Action Matrix inputs precludes (by process) the staff 

from formulating and communicating a holistic assessment of licensee performance and 

determining its regulatory response commensurate with that performance. 

The ROP was founded on a principle of seven cornerstones of safety which serve as the 

fundamental building blocks. Acceptable licensee performance in these cornerstones provides 

reasonable assurance that licensees are taking appropriate actions to ensure adequate 

protection of public health and safety. In a post-September 11 environment, the role of security 

is integral to ensuring reactor safety. Yet, separate assessment of performance deficiencies 

within the Security Cornerstone does not fully acknowledge or clearly communicate the role of 

security in ensuring safety and is inconsistent with the ROP regulatory framework, which was 

designed to establish predictable, objective, and transparent regulatory responses to an 

integrated representation of licensee performance across all seven ROP cornerstones. 

The current approach may cause the NRC’s oversight of some licensees to not consider 

indications of declining performance that would be apparent under an integrated assessment 

process that offers a complete representation of licensee performance. For example, a plant 

can be in the degraded cornerstone column of the Action Matrix because of reactor or radiation 
The Commissioners 4 

safety inspection findings or PIs, and receive two white findings or a yellow finding in the 

security cornerstone, but it will not be treated as having multiple degraded cornerstones. The 

plant would not transition to Column 4 in either the ROP Action Matrix or the security Action 

Matrix, and the NRC would conduct two separate inspections at the plant in accordance with 

Inspection Procedure (IP) 95002, “Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or 

Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area.” 

Prior to 2010, only one plant had entered the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Security 

Action Matrix. However, in CY 2010, three plants transitioned to this column. If safety 

performance issues at these plants had simultaneously placed them in the Degraded 

Cornerstone Column of the ROP Action Matrix, they would not have received the more 

comprehensive inspection under IP 95003, “Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded 

Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,” 

which provides for the assessment of safety culture to ensure that any organizational causal 

factors are identified and resolved before further declines in performance become detrimental to 

safe plant operations. As such, the NRC’s current structure requires workarounds to ensure we 

are responding appropriately to licensee performance. 

To rectify these issues, the staff proposes to reintegrate security assessment inputs from 

inspections conducted in the security cornerstone into the ROP and thereby include any 

greater-than-green security PIs and inspection findings as inputs to the ROP Action Matrix. The 

staff recognizes that, under the current approach to assessments, it can invoke the Action 

Matrix deviation process to ensure an appropriate level of regulatory response if it perceives 

that such a response is necessary. Therefore, the staff has retained in this SECY the option to 

maintain the status quo. 

The Commission’s direction to the staff in the resulting SRM related to this SECY will determine 

if or how the NRC will revise IMC 0305, “Operating Reactor Assessment Program,” dated 

December 24, 2009; IMC 0320; and other ROP guidance. 

Staff Proposal 

The staff proposes that security assessment inputs (security inspection findings and PIs) be 

integrated into one ROP Action Matrix. The use of the security Action Matrix in IMC 0320 would 

be suspended, and IMCs 0305 and 0320 would be revised to reflect the reintegration of the 

security assessment inputs into the ROP Action Matrix (which would now include inputs from all 

seven ROP cornerstones). A single Action Matrix would reflect licensee performance, and the 

NRC’s response to performance would be dictated by a column designation commensurate with 

an integrated assessment of licensee performance. 

This proposal would recombine the safety and security ROP mid-cycle and end-of-cycle NRC 

assessment letters and public meetings on licensee performance, thereby enhancing 

communication of an integrated assessment. Under the current process, the security 

assessment letters and licensee performance meetings are independent of the assessments, 

letters, and meetings that the NRC conducts for the other six ROP cornerstones. The NRC 

separated these security activities to help ensure effective control of sensitive security 

information. However, meeting this objective is also possible under an integrated assessment 

process. 
The Commissioners 5 

The staff’s proposal would not result in release of sensitive security information beyond what is 

already publicly available. Under the staff's proposal, the publicly available inspection report 

cover letters would continue to acknowledge any greater-than-green inspection findings but not 

discuss the attributes or specific vulnerability identified by the finding. Mid-cycle and 

end-of-cycle assessment letters would be publicly available, and annual assessment public 

meetings would address licensee performance in all cornerstones. Sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards information and safeguards information would not be discussed in correspondence 

or in public meetings, consistent with NRC policy. 

Should there be the need to communicate sensitive security information, as is the current 

practice, a controlled non-public attachment can be issued to the licensee, and a breakout 

session or separate non-public meeting can be held to discuss sensitive security-related 

information. Sensitive details associated with security inspection findings and their significance, 

inspection procedures, and inspection reports would still be withheld from public disclosure and 

issued separately. 

This proposal is consistent with and supports the NRC Principles of Good Regulation. Final 

assessment decisions will be based on the objective consideration of all information, and will be 

documented in accordance with a clearly understood process. Efficiency is improved by 

combining independent and duplicative assessment activities into one process. Clarity will be 

enhanced by an assessment process that establishes a clear nexus between licensee 

performance in all ROP cornerstones and the NRC response as defined in the ROP Action 

Matrix. By including security in the assessment of licensee performance, the public is better 

informed about an integrated performance assessment process and corresponding regulatory 

action; thus, openness and public understanding are increased. Finally, reliability is increased 

by minimizing the potential for inconsistent and unpredictable regulatory outcomes via 

deviations from the ROP Action Matrix, which may be pursued to achieve an appropriate level of 

oversight if two of seven cornerstones are degraded. The NRC level of inspection will be 

determined using the best available information taking into account licensee performance in all 

ROP cornerstones. 

Implications of Maintaining the Status Quo

The current approach maintains a limited interface of the security cornerstone within the ROP. 

The only aspects of the ROP used in the security cornerstone under the current approach are 

the SCCI process and programmatic components of the ROP framework (e.g., internal feedback 

processes, ROP self-assessment activities, administration of the inspection program, and 

inspection procedure processing). 

Currently, the NRC performs security assessments separately from the other ROP 

cornerstones. The ROP Action Matrix does not integrate the results of security cornerstone PIs 

and inspection findings (i.e., the NRC does not use greater-than-green PIs and findings from the 

security cornerstone to determine the ROP Action Matrix column in which a plant belongs). 

However, the current framework does allow the staff to request a deviation from the ROP Action 

Matrix to consider security-related inspection findings and PIs in determining an appropriate 

agency response. The deviation process is applied at the discretion of NRC management. 

Therefore, invoking the deviation process introduces a measure of uncertainty and 

unpredictability in a framework that was intended to be stable and predictable. For this reason, 

when used, application of the deviation process must be authorized by the Executive Director 
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for Operations (EDO). In an effort to restore program stability and predictability, the staff 

assesses deviations annually to determine if program adjustments are needed to preclude 

future deviations for similar reasons. 

Because deviations from the Action Matrix incur uncertain and unpredictable outcomes for 

licensees, the deviation must be transparent to preclude the appearance of arbitrary and 

capricious regulatory decision-making. As such, EDO approval is documented in a 

memorandum that is publicly available in ADAMS and posted on the NRC’s public website. 

Guidance in IMC 0305, “Operating Reactor Assessment Program,” is being clarified to 

emphasize the need for transparency in the Action Matrix deviation process. Specifically, 

guidance will require that approval memoranda include a synopsis of the licensee performance 

deficiencies, the required NRC actions per the Action Matrix for these inputs, the approved 

alternative actions, and the rationale for requesting the deviation. For security-related findings, 

the approval memoranda would acknowledge potential greater-than-green security issues but 

would not discuss the attributes or specific vulnerabilities associated with the issues. Therefore, 

a deviation would make available to the public the same information that would be available with 

a reintegrated Action Matrix that includes inspection findings and performance indicators from 

the security cornerstone. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The staff recommends the proposed change because it represents a comprehensive process to 

integrate security inspection findings and PIs into the ROP Action Matrix. This action permits a 

complete, integrated NRC assessment of commercial power reactor licensee performance that 

includes input from all ROP cornerstones of safety and security and will ensure an appropriate 

regulatory response in a stable, predictable, and consistent manner. The staff would implement 

this recommended change without releasing sensitive security-related information to the public. 

In addition, an integrated approach to licensee performance assessment would reduce 

redundant staff activities and, thereby, improve efficiency. The staff also recommends that this 

proposal be considered, where applicable and appropriate, for other NRC security inspection 

and oversight programs, such as reactors under construction. 

RESOURCES: 

The ROP performance assessment activities are budgeted in Planned Accomplishment (PA) 

Number 115-139F, “Reactor Performance Assessment” program area. The current FY 2011 

budget for these activities is 14.5 FTEs for regions, 6.0 FTEs for HQ, and $660,000. The 

budget request for FY 2012 is 14.5 FTEs for regions, 6.0 FTEs for HQ, and $685,000. 

The staff estimates that either the recommended action or the current approach can be 

accomplished within existing budgeted resources for fiscal year 2011 and beyond. 
The Commissioners 7 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has 

no objections. The staff position recommended in this paper has been coordinated with the 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response and the Regional Offices. 

 /RA by Martin J. Virgilio for/ 

R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 
The Commissioners 7 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has 

no objections. The staff position recommended in this paper has been coordinated with the 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response and the Regional Offices. 

 /RA by Martin J. Virgilio for/ 

R. W. Borchardt 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

EDATS: NRR-2011-0028 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML110590781 *Concurred by e-mail 

OFFICE NRR/DIRS/IPAB BC:NRR/DIRS/IPAB Tech Editor* D:NSIR D:NRR/PMDA 

NAME AMasciantonio RFranovich KAzariah-Kribbs PHolahan MGivvines 

DATE 02/23/11 03/02/11 02/17/11 04/25/11 04/14/11 

OFFICE D:NRR/DIRS OCFO* OGC (NLO)* D:NRR EDO 

NAME FBrown 

(BWestreich for) DWilliams EBowdenBerry ELeeds 

 (BBoger for) 

RBorchardt 

(MVirgilio for) 

DATE 04/06/11 04/14/11 05/04/11 05/24/11 06/05/11 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY