Demographic and Socioeconomic Change

in Appalachia

CHANGING PATTERNS OF POVERTY AND SPATIAL 

INEQUALITY IN APPALACHIA

by

Daniel T. Lichter and Lori Ann Campbell

Ohio State University

April 2005
About This Series

“Demographic and Socioeconomic Change in Appalachia” is a series of reports that examine

demographic, social, and economic levels and trends in the 13-state Appalachian region. Each 

report uses data from the decennial censuses of 1990 and 2000, plus supplemental information from

other data sources.

Reports in the series include:

• “Appalachia at the Millennium: An Overview of Results from Census 2000,” by Kelvin M. 

Pollard (June 2003).

• “Housing and Commuting Patterns in Appalachia,” by Mark Mather (March 2004).

• “The Aging of Appalachia,” by John G. Haaga (April 2004).

• “Households and Families in Appalachia,” by Mark Mather (May 2004).

• “Educational Attainment in Appalachia,” by John G. Haaga (May 2004).

• “A ‘New Diversity’: Race and Ethnicity in the Appalachian Region,” by Kelvin M. Pollard 

(September 2004).

• “Labor Market Performance, Poverty, and Income Inequality in Appalachia,” by Dan A. Black 

and Seth G. Sanders (September 2004).

• “Population Growth and Distribution in Appalachia: New Realities,” by Kelvin M. Pollard 

(January 2005).

• “Emerging Patterns of Population Redistribution and Migration in Appalachia,” by Daniel T. 

Lichter, Jillian Garratt, Mary L. Marshall, and Michael Cardella (April 2005).

• “Changing Patterns of Poverty and Spatial Inequality in Appalachia,” by Daniel T. Lichter and 

Lori Ann Campbell (April 2005).

You can view and download the reports by visiting either www.prb.org or www.arc.gov. 

For more information about the series, please contact either Kelvin Pollard of the Population 

Reference Bureau (202-939-5424, kelvinp@prb.org) or Gregory Bischak of the Appalachian 

Regional Commission (202-884-7790, gbischak@arc.gov).

The authors wish to thank the Appalachian Regional Commission for providing the funding for this

series.

Population Reference Bureau

1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 520

Washington, DC 20009-3728

The Population Reference Bureau is the leader in providing timely and objective information

on U.S. and international population trends and their implications.

Appalachian Regional Commission

1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 700

Washington, DC 20009-1068

The Appalachian Regional Commission’s mission is to be an advocate for and partner with

the people of Appalachia to create opportunities for self-sustaining economic development and

improved quality of life.
1

CHANGING PATTERNS OF POVERTY AND SPATIAL INEQUALITY IN

APPALACHIA

Daniel T. Lichter and Lori Ann Campbell

Ohio State University

Introduction

The 1990s were marked by unusually rapid fluctuations in the size of the poor population 

in the United States (Lichter and Crowley 2002). Indeed, nearly 40 million Americans were poor 

as recently as 1994. Yet by the end of the decade, the number of poor people in the United States

had declined to roughly 32 million according the U.S. Census Bureau, a number that was little

different from the beginning of the decade (Danziger and Gottschalk 2004). The good news, if 

there is any, is that the percentage of America’s people in poverty—11.3 percent—was lower 

than any other time since the late 1970s.

1

 

The rapid declines in America’s poverty rate during the last half of the decade

presumably reflected several factors: the long economic expansion of the 1990s, which fueled 

unprecedented job growth and low unemployment (Iceland 2003); the effects of the Earned 

Income Tax Credit (EITC) in lifting the working poor from poverty; and new welfare reform

legislation that has emphasized “work first” and placed strict time limits on the receipt of cash 

public assistance. 

Economic growth and declining poverty rates, however, have not been uniform across the

United States. As we document in this report, the Appalachian region—which has a longstanding 

 

1

The official poverty rate compares families’ pre-tax cash income to poverty thresholds that were adopted 

by the Social Security Administration in 1965 and which are updated each year for changes in the cost of living.
2

history of economic stagnation, job loss (especially in extractive industries), and poverty—tells a

story of economic winners and losers (McLaughlin et al. 1999). Whether inequality in 

Appalachia can be characterized in such stark terms is an empirical question. As with the nation 

as a whole, did Appalachia experience declines in poverty rates during the 1990s? If so, were

declines in poverty restricted to some population groups or regions of Appalachia? Or were the

people of Appalachia—or some segments of the Appalachian population—“left behind” during 

the recent economic boom? This report addresses such questions about the extent of 

socioeconomic inequality and poverty in Appalachia during the economic boom period of the

1990s. The goal is to provide a first look at Appalachian poverty based on new data from the

2000 decennial census. 

Our statistical portrait of poverty in Appalachia focuses on changing rates of poverty

along several important dimensions: age, education, race and ethnicity, labor force participation, 

and family structure. Where relevant, we also compare residents of Appalachia to residents of the

non-Appalachia United States. We highlight significant geographic differences within 

Appalachia by contrasting recent poverty trends in the various regions of Appalachia (i.e., 

Northern, Central and Southern); in rural and urban areas; and across counties with different

histories of economic distress and development (i.e., the Appalachian Region Commission’s

typology of distressed, transitional, competitive, and attainment counties). As defined by the

Appalachian Regional Commission, the Appalachia region includes almost 23 million people in 

 

In 2000, a two-parent, two-child family would need just $17,463 to be counted among the nonpoor. By 

contrast, the median family income in 2000 was $50,891.
3

13 different states and 410 counties, the majority of which (301 out of 410) are classified as nonmetropolitan in 2000. 

Poverty in America: The Big Picture

The 1990s ushered in a changing profile of America’s poor while also raising new public

policy questions and concerns about the adequacy of America’s safety net for some groups. As

Danziger and Gottschalk (2004) suggest, the common aphorism in the 1960s and 1970s that “a

rising tide lifts all boats” has been replaced by “uneven tides,” characterized by the diverging 

fortunes of people and places. The welfare poor, for example, were replaced in the 1990s with a

growing share of working poor (Lichter and Crowley 2002; Shipler 2004). Indeed, earnings from

work replaced government cash assistance during the decade as the single largest share of 

income among the poor. A growing fraction of all poor people, including single mothers, became

part of the paid labor force. In addition, family change—especially the rise in single parent

families—slowed significantly in the 1990s and was no longer giving demographic impetus to 

rising poverty among America’s children (Iceland 2004). The 1990s was also a period of 

growing income inequality, as income growth accelerated rapidly among American families at

the top of the income distribution while the income of those at the bottom stagnated. In 1979, for 

example, the income of families at the 90th percentile was 6.8 times the poverty threshold; 20 

years later, this figure had risen to 9.5 times the poverty threshold (Danziger and Plotnick 2004). 

For families at the 10th percentile, however, family income changed little as a percentage of the

poverty threshold over the same period (from 0.9 in 1979 to 1.0 in 1999). Indeed, the average
4

income of poor families changed little over these 20 years, remaining at roughly one-half the income

poverty threshold (Lichter and Crowley 2002).

Not surprising, the 1990s brought new concerns that economic growth and declining poverty 

rates were unevenly distributed across the United States. Indeed, growing income inequality has

manifested itself in many other dimensions of everyday life. For example, the growing gap between 

rich and poor has exacerbated differences in family and fertility patterns, access to good schools, 

wealth and assets, health care and insurance, and political participation (Neckerman 2004). Income

inequality has also contributed to growing economic balkanization across geographic space (Lobao 

2003). As we argue here, growing income equality also has a geographic dimension; individual

fortunes are tied closely to fortunes of the communities or regions in which they live and work. This

axiom is true in Appalachia, just as it is true in the rest of the nation. The 1990s brought increasing 

attention to America’s bicoastal economic boom, while middle America and rural areas continued in 

the decade to face economic stagnation and job loss. The so-called “rust belt” implies declining 

employment in the manufacturing sector. Other historical distressed regions such as Appalachia, the

“Black Belt” crescent (extending from Mississippi to North Carolina), and Indian reservations

remain largely outside the economic and cultural mainstream. America’s economic landscape may 

be increasingly characterized by economic “winners” and “losers,” as local and regional economics

have responded or failed to respond successfully to globalization and unprecedented competition in 

labor and consumer markets (Danziger and Plotnick 2004).
5

Poverty in Appalachia—Is the Past Prelude?

President Lyndon B. Johnson began the “War on Poverty” in an Appalachian county in West

Virginia in 1964, at a time when poverty rates in some parts of Appalachia exceeded rates for the

nation by two or three times. But simple statistical comparisons based on the official poverty rates

cannot adequately portray the long history of economic deprivation in Appalachia. Poverty in rural

Appalachia cannot be measured simply by comparing family income to some arbitrary income

cutoff. The low income of the people and communities in Appalachia manifests itself in many ways:

in dilapidated and crowded housing; a lack of plumbing and clean running water; limited access to 

public utilities, social services, and medical care; geographic isolation born of poor transportation 

systems; and inadequately staffed and poorly funded schools. Not surprisingly, poverty in the region 

has often run in families—passed along successive generations connected by the common threads of 

low education, few job skills, and the lack of good jobs. 

Poverty Trends in Appalachia. Fortunately, these common stereotypes of chronic poverty in 

Appalachia seem to have changed during the 1990s. As shown in Table 1 (page 6), the poverty rate

in Appalachia declined by nearly two percentage points, from 15.4 percent in 1990 to 13.6 percent in 

2000. More than 100,000 fewer people in Appalachia lived in poverty at the end of the 1990s than at

the beginning. Over the same period, the poverty rate in the rest of the nation decreased from 12.9 

percent in 1990 to 12.3 percent in 2000. Not only did poverty rates in Appalachia decline during the

1990s, but Appalachian poverty rates converged with the rest of the country.

To be sure, poverty rates may mask significant differences between Appalachia and the rest

of the nation in “deep poverty”; at the other end of the socioeconomic ladder, they may also 

misrepresent the level of economic “comfort” in a given population. Deep poverty rates are defined 
6

by the percentage of families with incomes that fall below one-half the poverty income threshold. 

Rates of economic comfort are measured generously as the percentage of families with incomes of 

more than twice the poverty income threshold. As the results in Table 2 (page 7) suggest, the

percentages of population that are in deep poverty are very similar in Appalachia and nonAppalachia United States (i.e., 5.8 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively). These percentages account

for roughly that same percentages of the poor population within and outside of Appalachia. And 

while more than 70 percent of the non-Appalachian population lives in “comfort,” the figure is

nearly as high in Appalachia (66 percent). Clearly, in the aggregate, rates of poverty and comfort are

surprisingly similar between Appalachia and the rest of the country. This parity is seemingly a

significant departure from historic patterns.

Of course, the decennial census data used here do not pick up the effects of the economic

recession after 2000. For three straight years from 2000 to 2003, the national poverty rate has

increased from 11.3 percent to 12.5 percent (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Mills 2004). The number of 

persons in poverty in the United States also has increased from 31.6 million in 2000 to 35.9 million 

in 2003 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2004). Given these recent trends in national data, it remains to be seen 

Table 1

Number and percent in poverty, United States, Appalachia, and non-Appalachian

United States, 1990 and 2000

YEAR UNITED STATES

TOTAL APPALACHIA

NONAPPALACHIAN

UNITED STATES

Number (1000s) 31,743 3,133 28,610 1990

Percent of total population 13.1 15.4 12.9

Number (1000s) 33,900 3,031 30,869 2000

Percent of total population 12.4 13.6 12.3

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
7

Table 2

Percent of persons in deep poverty and economic comfort, United States,

Appalachia, and non-Appalachian United States, 2000

UNITED STATES

TOTAL APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIANUNITED STATES

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

Deep Poverty 15,337 5.6 1,279 5.8 14,058 5.6

Comfort 192,687 70.3 14,721 66.3 177,967 70.7

NOTE: A family in “deep poverty” has an income below one-half the poverty income threshold. A

family in economic “comfort” has an income more than twice the poverty income threshold.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.

Figure 1

Poverty rates across Appalachian counties, 1990

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 census.
8

whether the economic gains made by Appalachia during the 1990s will persist into the future or 

return to levels observed before the 1990s economic boom. 

Geographic Variation in Poverty. Broad generalizations, of course, may hide large or even 

growing geographic disparities within Appalachia. Some part of Appalachia may be left behind in 

the new economy. Yet, based on our data, this scenario does not appear to be the present case. While

the northern and southern subregions of Appalachia had significantly lower rates of poverty than 

central Appalachia (12.8 percent versus 21.1 percent), all three subregions experienced declining 

poverty rates during the 1990s. Still, central Appalachia had a poverty rate that was nearly twice the

Figure 2

Poverty rates across Appalachian counties, 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
9

rate for the rest of the nation in 2000. Geographic variation and change in poverty can be observed in 

Figures 1 and 2 (pages 7 and 8, respectively), which shows county-to-county variation in high 

poverty rates (i.e., rates over 20 percent) in 1990 and 2000. The number of high poverty counties in 

the region declined from 152 in 1990 to 92 in 2000. On a percentage point, these declines were most

rapid in the Central subregion, which historically has had some of the most economically depressed 

counties in Appalachia (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Change in poverty rates across Appalachian counties, 1990-2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
10

For the nation as a whole, poverty rates in rural regions, states, and counties have been higher 

than rates in metropolitan areas historically, especially in areas outside of central cities (i.e., suburbs

and exurbs). In fact, recent data from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey indicated that

Louisiana, West Virginia, Mississippi, and New Mexico—all largely rural states—had the highest

state poverty rates in 1999. Nonmetro poverty in 2000 also exceeded metropolitan rates for the same

year—13.4 percent compared with 10.8 percent (Lichter and Crowley 2002).

A similar pattern of differential nonmetro poverty is revealed in Appalachia (see Table 3). In 

the aggregate, the 301 nonmetro counties in Appalachia experienced declining poverty in the 1990s, 

albeit rates of poverty remained higher in these counties in both 1990 and 2000 than in their 109 

metropolitan regional counterparts. Moreover, the extent of economic deprivation in nonmetro 

Appalachia exceeded nonmetro poverty rates for the nation. The ratio of Appalachia-to-nonAppalachian poverty rates also was much greater in nonmetro areas than in metro areas. Rural

Table 3

Percent of persons in poverty, Appalachia, by sub-region, metropolitan status,

and economic distress code, 1990 and 2000

AREA 1990 2000

Northern Appalachia 14.1 12.8

Sub-Region Central Appalachia 25.9 22.1

Southern Appalachia 14.4 12.8

Metropolitan 12.8 11.6 Metropolitan Status

Nonmetropolitan 18.9 16.4

Distressed counties 27.4 23.1

Transitional counties 14.7 13.3

Competitive counties 10.1 10.0

Economic Distress Code

Attainment counties 10.3 9.7

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
11

Appalachians experienced a rate of poverty than was 40 percent higher than the rate in metro 

Appalachia in 2000. For the nation as a whole, nonmetro poverty was roughly 25 percent higher than 

poverty in metropolitan areas.

In Table 3 (page 10), we also evaluate geographic disparities in poverty among Appalachian 

counties classified according to the Appalachian Regional Commission’s distress code. Distressed 

counties include counties with high unemployment rates, low income, and poverty rates exceeding 

150 percent of the U.S. average (McLaughlin et al. 1999). The link between poverty and economic

underdevelopment is unmistakable. Distressed counties in Appalachia continued to have

exceptionally high poverty rates (23.1 percent) in 2000, a figure well in excess of regional and 

national averages. On a positive note, the poverty rates in distressed counties declined by more than 

four percentage points during the 1990s.

Poverty Concentration. In America’s largest cities, the 1980s brought significant increases in 

the concentration of neighborhood poverty. Growth in the “urban underclass” reflects the increasing 

percentage of high poverty neighborhoods and the growing share of poor people who live in them. 

Racial and ethnic minorities disproportionately comprise these neighborhoods. Two new reports

based on neighborhood data from the 2000 decennial census indicate that the concentration of urban 

neighborhood poverty in the United States slowed or even reversed in the 1990s (Kingsley and Pettit

2003; Jargowsky 2003). 

Poverty is distributed unevenly across the geographic landscape (Weber and Jensen 2004). 

History tells us that poverty has also been highly concentrated in distressed counties in Appalachia, 

especially in rural parts of the central sub-region. In this report, we consider a measure of poverty 

concentration based on the index of dissimilarity, which indicates the minimum proportion of the
12

poor who would have to move to a different county in order for the poor to be distributed evenly 

across Appalachia.

2

 The index varies between 0 and 100, where a value of 0 shows no 

concentration and a value of 100 indicates complete concentration. 

Table 4 demonstrates that the poor are slightly less concentrated than the nonpoor in 

Appalachia, both in 1990 and 2000. In 2000, 31 percent of the Appalachian poor would have to 

 2 Formally, the concentration index at time t, Ct, is calculated as:

n

Ct = 1⁄2 Σ |Pti - Lti|,

i=1

where Pti is the percentage of Appalachia’s poor in county i and Lti is the percentage of Appalachia’s land area in 

county i. Poverty concentration is thus measured by comparing the distribution of poor people across Appalachian 

counties with the distribution of land areas.

Table 4

Poverty concentration and poverty segregation indices, Appalachia and

non-Appalachian United States, 1990 and 2000

CONCENTRATION INDICIES

(0=Lowest, 100=Highest)

Appalachia

Non-Appalachian United

States Year

Concentration

of Poor

Concentration

of Nonpoor

Concentration

of Poor

Concentration

of Nonpoor

1990 30 38 64 69

2000 31 37 66 68

POOR-NONPOOR SEGREGATION INDICES

(0=Lowest, 100=Highest)

Year Appalachia

Non-Appalachian United

States

1990 17 21

2000 15 20

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
13

move to another county in order to give all Appalachian counties the same percentage of poor 

people. Clearly, poverty is highly dispersed in Appalachia, largely reflecting its rural character. 

In contrast, poverty concentration (and population generally) is much more spatially

concentrated outside of Appalachia, reflecting the fact that the poor are disproportionately 

concentrated in urban areas.

Table 4 (page 12) also provides the poor-nonpoor segregation index across counties. This

index compares the distribution of poor people across counties with the distribution of nonpoor 

people. If the poor and nonpoor are distributed similarly across counties, then the percentage

poor in each county would be equal to the overall Appalachia percentage poor. Any deviation 

from equal percentages across counties obviously suggests some unevenness in the distribution 

of poor and nonpoor people. As the data in Table 4 suggest, only 15 percent of poor people in 

Appalachia in 2000 would have to move to another county in order to achieve the same poverty 

rate in each county. This percentage represents a slight decline from the levels of 1990 and is

lower than the poor-non-poor segregation index outside of Appalachia. Clearly, at the county 

level, there is significant blending of the poor and nonpoor populations across geographic space

in the region. 

To place these levels of county segregation in perspective, they can be compared with 

neighborhood segregation of the poor within some selected Appalachian cities. Illustrative data

are available from the Mumford Center at the University at Albany, State University of New

York. Here the poor are defined by family incomes of less than $30,000 in 2000, the middle class

includes persons in families with incomes between $30,000 to $59,999, and the affluent includes

persons in families with incomes exceeding $60,000. In Cortland, N.Y., a small metropolitan city 
14

in Central New York State, the neighborhood segregation index in 2000 between the poor and 

the affluent was 28, up from 20 in 1990. In Pittsburgh, Pa., the poor-affluent segregation index 

was 34, only slightly lower than it was in 1990. Moreover, the Pittsburgh poor were also much 

more segregated from the middle class (23 in 1990 and 20 in 2000) than was the case in Cortland 

(9 in 1990 and 8 in 2000). These figures for Pittsburgh also are very similar to those observed in 

Wheeling, W. Va., where 32 percent of the poor would have to move to affluent neighborhoods

in order for the poor and affluent to be distributed equally across neighborhoods. Clearly, these

city-level figures are higher than those observed at the county level, which can hide the extent of 

segregation among the poor living in its various communities and neighborhoods. 

Demographic Differentials in Poverty

The uneven economic fortunes of different geographic parts of Appalachia go hand-inhand with parallel patterns of economic inequality among the different population groups living 

in these different geographic categories. In this section we examine how poverty rates in 2000 

differ across age, race, and family type in Appalachia and the rest of the nation.

Age Differences in Poverty. The poverty rate for children exceeds that of any other age

group, although it has fluctuated since 1959, the first year for which national data are available. 

The U.S. child poverty rate was at its highest in 1959 (about 27 percent), declining steadily and 

remaining relatively stable through the 1970s at about 16 percent (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2004). 

Between 1979 and 1982, the poverty rate for children increased from about 16 percent to about

22 percent, fell slightly during the 1980s, and rose again to nearly 23 percent in 1993. For the

nation, the late 1990s marked a dramatic and unprecedented change in the economic fortunes of 
15

America’s children (Lichter and Crowley 2004). Indeed, by the end of 1990s, the poverty rate

among children was its lowest since the late 1970s (16.6 percent), but nevertheless remained 

higher than rates for the elderly (8.5 percent among those ages 65 to 74 and 11.5 percent among 

those age 75 and older) as well as for the nation’s population as a whole (12.4 percent) (Bishaw

and Iceland 2003). For America’s seniors, poverty rates have declined substantially and steadily 

since 1965, when nearly 30 percent of the elderly lived in poverty. Poverty rates across the

country for those age 65 and older have hovered between 10 percent and 13 percent in the last 20 

years (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2004). 

These striking U.S. age patterns of poverty in 2000 were much the same in Appalachia

(Table 5). Indeed, poverty rates among children and adults (ages 18-64) were only slightly higher 

in Appalachia than the rest of the nation. The largest disparity from the rest of the nation 

occurred among the elderly (12.0 percent versus 9.6 percent), a poverty difference of 2.4 

percentage points. Still, like the nation as a whole, poverty rates among the Appalachia elderly 

were lower than for most other age groups.

Table 5

Persons in poverty by age, United States, Appalachia, and non-Appalachian

United States, 2000

UNITED STATES

TOTAL APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIANUNITED STATES AGE GROUP

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

Under age 18 11,747 16.6 944 17.7 10,803 16.5

Ages 18 to 64 18,865 11.1 1,713 12.5 17,152 11.0

Ages 65 and over 3,288 9.9 374 12.0 2,914 9.6

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
16

Race Differences in Poverty. The 2000 census revealed that the poverty rate among 

African Americans (24.9 percent) was about three times greater than among non-Hispanic whites

(8.1 percent) (Bishaw and Iceland 2003). In Appalachia, the poverty rate among Blacks was 27 

percent, compared with 12.1 percent among non-Hispanic whites (Table 6). If poverty is our 

measure of well-being, racial and ethnic inequality clearly persists in Appalachia. These data

also indicate that the poverty rates of each racial and ethnic group were higher in Appalachia

2000 than in the non-Appalachian United States. 

As with the official poverty rates, rates of deep poverty were lowest in Appalachia among 

whites and Asians, and highest among blacks (Table 6). Hispanics occupied a middle ground. 

Moreover, less than one-half of blacks and Hispanics had enough income in 2000 to live in 

comfort (i.e., were at or above twice the poverty threshold). Clearly, racial economic inequality 

remains large in Appalachia, as it does in the rest of the nation. But unlike other economically 

Table 6

Persons in deep poverty, poverty, and economic comfort, by race, Appalachia and

non-Appalachian United States, 2000

APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIAN UNITED STATES

White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian

TOTAL (1000s) 19,587 1,711 408 165 170,199 30,309 33,934 9,569

Percent in:

Deep Poverty 4.9 13.0 11.5 8.7 3.3 12.5 9.7 6.3

Poverty 12.1 27.0 24.0 14.4 7.7 24.7 22.6 12.5

Comfort 68.5 48.0 46.2 68.5 78.8 52.6 48.6 72.5

NOTE: A family in “deep poverty” has an income below one-half the poverty income threshold. A family in

economic “comfort” has an income more than twice the poverty income threshold. “White,” “Black,” and “Asian”

figures do not include Hispanics. (Hispanics may be of any race.)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
17

distressed regions (e.g., Indian reservations, the Mississippi Delta, or the Colonia in the lower 

Rio Grande Valley), poverty in Appalachia does not reflect high concentrations of disadvantaged 

minorities. The large majority (95 percent) of Appalachia’s population is non-Hispanic white.

Among racial and ethnic minorities in Appalachia, poverty preys disproportionately on 

children (see Table 7). Over one-third of black children in Appalachia were poor, based on data

from the 2000 census. Over 27 percent of Hispanic children were poor. High poverty rates for 

children are associated with adverse cognitive outcomes (e.g., school achievement) and 

behavioral problems, especially during adolescence; such rates are also associated with higher 

rates of poverty and low income when these children reach early adulthood, reflecting the

intergenerational dimension of poverty. At the other end of the age distribution, elderly blacks in 

Appalachia also have unusually high rates of poverty in comparison with white and Asian elderly 

persons. Black elderly poverty rates in 2000 were roughly as high as they were for the total

elderly population in the late 1960s (U.S. Census Bureau 2005c).

Table 7

Persons in poverty, by race and age, Appalachia, 2000

WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN

Number (1000s) 677 191 38 4 Under age 18

Percent of total 15.1 35.7 27.4 10.4

Number (1000s) 1,369 229 58 19 Ages 18 to 64

Percent of total 11.2 22.5 22.5 16.0

Number (1000s) 325 41 2 1 Ages 65 and over

Percent of total 11.1 26.4 16.9 12.6

NOTE: “White,” “Black,” and “Asian” figures do not include Hispanics. (Hispanics may be of any 

race.)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
18

Family Structure and Poverty. Changes in family structure—especially the rise in 

female-headed families—have played a large role in accounting for long-term increases in 

poverty, especially among children (Lichter and Crowley 2004; Iceland 2003). The 2000 census

revealed that 34.3 percent of female-headed families in the United States with minor children 

were poor (Bishaw and Iceland 2003). This figure compares with a poverty rate of 4.9 percent

among the nation’s married couple families. More significantly, the largest declines in family 

poverty during the 1990s occurred among female-headed families with children. Nationally, 

poverty rates for these families dropped by eight percentage points over the decade of the 1990s. 

For married couple families, the drop in poverty was less than 1 percent. The slowdown in 

family change in the 1990s coupled with declining poverty rates among America’s most

vulnerable families has had a salutary effect on overall poverty in the 1990s. Given the statistical

evidence, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the recent debate over the reauthorization of the

1996 welfare reform has centered on state efforts, as part of the Temporary Assistance for Needy 

Families program (TANF), to promote marriage as a family context for childbearing and child 

rearing. 

In Appalachia, the poverty rate among married couple families was about 6.0 percent in 

Appalachia, compared with 4.8 percent in non-Appalachian America (Table 8, page 19). Married 

Appalachian couples with children, however, had slightly higher rates of poverty than those

without children (7.7 percent versus 4.7 percent). And families headed by single females in the

region, especially those with minor children, had exceptionally high rates of poverty—five to six 

times the rate of married couple families. The obvious policy implication is that efforts to 

promote marriage and reduce nonmarital fertility, if successful, may help reduce poverty and 
19

keep welfare caseloads low. Critics of marriage promotion programs, however, view the growth 

of single-parent families as a consequence of economic problems and poverty, rather than as

their cause. If these critics are correct, the best way to promote strong and lasting families may 

be to encourage the growth of good jobs that pay a living wage. 

The results outlined above also suggest that any explanation of persistent racial and 

ethnic differences of poverty cannot ignore the implications of large racial differences in 

marriage and unwed childbearing (Iceland 2003; Lichter and Crowley 2004). Indeed, among 

black families with children, only 37.9 percent were headed by married couples in 2003. The

Table 8

Families in poverty, by family type, Appalachia and non-Appalachian United

States, 2000

APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIAN

UNITED STATES FAMILY TYPE

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

ALL FAMILIES

Married couple 300 6.0 2,419 4.8

Single male 53 15.9 533 13.4

Single female 287 29.7 3,029 26.3

WITH CHILDREN UNDER AGE 18

Married couple 170 7.7 1,597 6.5

Single male 40 20.9 408 17.5

Single female 248 39.9 2,693 33.9

NO CHILDREN UNDER AGE 18

Married couple 129 4.7 822 3.2

Single male 13 9.2 125 7.6

Single female 39 11.4 336 9.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
20

national figure was 68.1 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Moreover, while one-third of 

America’s children today are born outside of marriage, the figure is much higher among African 

Americans (i.e., nearly 70 percent). But despite sharing high rates of poverty with African 

Americans, nearly two-thirds of Hispanic families with children are headed by married couples. 

Culture may trump economics. Indeed, jobs by themselves cannot account for persistent racial

differences in poverty.

But it also is true that changing family structure alone has not been responsible for higher 

rates of African American poverty. In Appalachia—as well as the rest of the nation—African 

Americans and other minorities have higher rates of poverty than whites regardless of family

type (Table 9, page 21). For example, the poverty rate in Appalachia among black marriedcouple families with children was both very high and roughly 25 percent greater than the

corresponding poverty rate among whites (46.4 percent versus 37.4 percent). Despite higher rates

of poverty among Hispanic married couples than among other racial and ethnic groups, 

Hispanics had lower rates of poverty than blacks overall, in part because a much higher 

percentage of families were headed by married couples than “at risk” single-parent families. 

Human Capital and Poverty

Historically, low levels of education and chronic unemployment and underemployment

have been a singular characteristic of poverty in the Appalachia region. But the educational

disparity (if measured by the percentage of high school dropouts) seems to have narrowed in the

1990s. In 2000, for example, slightly less than 23 percent of Appalachia’s population (age 25 and 

older) was a high school dropout (data not shown); the national figure was 19.6 percent (U.S. 
21

Census Bureau 2005b). On the other hand, a much smaller percentage of Appalachians hold 

bachelor’s degrees—17.9 percent—than the percentage nationwide (24.4 percent). 

From a strictly economic standpoint, the importance of education cannot be understated. 

In 2001, the percentage difference in wage rates between college and high school educated men 

(ages 22 to 62) was 44 percent (Danziger and Plotnick 2004). Significantly, the benefits of 

education have grown rapidly over the past 20 years; college educated men made only 23 percent

more than high school educated in 1981. The interplay between education and migration is

Table 9

Families in poverty, by race of householder and family type,

Appalachia, 2000

WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN

FAMILY TYPE Number

(1000s)

Percent Number

(1000s)

Percent Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

ALL FAMILIES

Married couple 263 5.7 19 9.0 60 15.2 3 8.0

Single male 41 14.8 8 22.8 12 18.8 * 12.8

Single female 197 26.7 78 39.7 12 42.2 1 24.4

WITH CHILDREN

UNDER AGE 18

Married couple 146 7.3 12 9.8 43 17.4 2 8.3

Single male 31 19.6 6 28.2 7 23.6 * 16.9

Single female 168 37.4 69 46.4 9 48.0 1 27.1

NO CHILDREN

UNDER AGE 18

Married couple 118 4.5 7 8.0 17 9.7 1 7.4

Single male 10 8.3 2 14.6 5 12.7 * 9.5

Single female 29 10.0 9 18.7 2 16.6 * 19.2

*Fewer than 500 families in category.

NOTE: “White,” “Black,” and “Asian” figures do not include Hispanics. (Hispanics may be of any race.)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
22

important to understanding the perpetuations of poverty in the Appalachian region. For decades, 

Appalachia has been on the losing end of migration patterns: more people left the region than 

entered it, and more of Appalachia’s “best and brightest” fled for better economic opportunities, 

leaving behind the less educated, the unemployed, and the impoverished. Between 1995 and 

2000, about 25,000 more college-educated persons left Appalachia than entered it (Lichter, 

Garratt, Marshall and Cardella 2005). Despite the region’s increase in migration during the

1990s, much of the growth was among the less educated—those lacking a college degree. In 

Appalachia, the common perception is that the “returns” or benefits of education are dampened 

by too few employment opportunities, which in turn create disincentives for communities to 

invest in education and for people to pursue more education. The belief among many in the

region is that investing in education simply does not pay. 

Education and Poverty. In this section, we examine links between education, work, and 

poverty in Appalachia. Table 10 provides rates of poverty in 2000 for different education groups

Table 10

Persons ages 25 and over in poverty, by education, United States, Appalachia, and

non-Appalachian United States, 2000

UNITED STATES APPALACHIA

NONAPPALACHIAN

UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

LEVEL

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

Less than high school diploma 7,485 21.9 778 22.9 6,707 21.8

High school diploma only 4,971 9.7 548 10.2 4,423 9.7

Some college, no four-year degree 3,123 6.3 236 6.7 2,887 6.3

Four-year college degree or more 1,476 3.4 87 3.2 1,389 3.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
23

in Appalachia and non-Appalachia. These data reveal the familiar poverty gradient with rising 

levels of education. Nationally, only 3.4 percent of college educated persons are poor, compared 

with a poverty rate of nearly 22 percent among high school dropouts. More significantly, the

association between education and poverty is very similar in Appalachia and non-Appalachia. 

One clear implication—an unexpected one—is that “returns” to education in Appalachia, if 

measured by lower rates of poverty, are little different from the rest of the nation.

A closer look at geographic variations within the Appalachian region, however, suggests

a more complex picture of educational inequality. In Table 11 (page 24), poverty rates are

provided for different types of counties identified by the “Beale code.” As a typology, the Beale

codes (0-9) lay along a continuum of urbanization, from population in counties with very large

metropolitan cities over 1 million population to completely rural counties. Our data clearly 

indicate the vulnerability of the least educated groups in less densely settled parts of Appalachia. 

For example, in completely rural counties—those that are nonadjacent to a metropolitan area

(code 9)—the poverty rate was nearly twice as large as the poverty rate in the largest core

metropolitan counties (30.9 percent versus 16.8 percent). A similar geographic differential in 

poverty exists for high school graduates. To be sure, these data, regardless of location, show that

education is strongly linked to lower rates of poverty. But significantly, the association between 

education and poverty is strongest in the most remote rural parts of Appalachia. The strong 

association does not reflect the large benefits derived from a college education in rural

Appalachia (relative to urban parts), but shows instead that the consequences of low education 

are expressed in much higher rates of poverty.
24

Work and Poverty. Employment—or more precisely, the lack of employment—is

inextricably associated with poverty. Table 12 (page 25) shows that married persons in the

United States who work full-time have a rate of poverty that is virtually nonexistent—less than 2 

percent. For this group of workers, patterns of poverty in Appalachia and non-Appalachian areas

Table 11

Persons ages 25 and over in poverty, by metropolitan status (Beale code) and education,

Appalachia, 2000

LESS THAN HIGH

SCHOOL DIPLOMA

HIGH SCHOOL

DIPLOMA ONLY

SOME COLLEGE,

NO FOUR-YEAR

DEGREE

FOUR-YEAR

COLLEGE

DEGREE OR

MORE TYPE OF AREA

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

METROPOLITAN

Metro population of 1 million or more

Central counties 45 16.8 54 8.2 27 5.4 15 3.0

Fringe counties 23 18.0 19 8.0 7 4.7 3 2.7

Metro population of 250,000 to 999,999 193 21.5 137 9.6 68 6.2 26 2.9

Metro population of fewer than 250,000 71 21.0 66 9.8 29 6.9 10 3.4

NONMETROPOLITAN

Urban population of 20,000 or more

Adjacent to a metropolitan area 49 21.5 40 9.5 15 6.7 4 3.1

Not adjacent to a metropolitan area 25 24.6 18 12.0 9 8.6 5 4.8

Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999

Adjacent to a metropolitan area 130 23.1 85 10.3 32 7.1 9 3.2

Not adjacent to a metropolitan area 136 27.9 75 13.1 29 9.0 8 4.0

Rural (urban population of fewer than

2,5000)

Adjacent to a metropolitan area 31 26.0 19 11.6 6 7.3 2 4.2

Not adjacent to a metropolitan area 62 30.9 30 14.9 10 9.8 2 4.2

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
25

are similar. Poverty rates were much higher (nearly 14 percent) among married persons in 

Appalachia who are not in the labor force. That the poverty rate is not higher in this case reflects

the fact that most married persons have a second earner in the family—their spouse. Indeed, 

when we restrict our analyses to single persons, the rates of poverty among nonworkers, 

especially females, are considerably higher. For single women working full-time in Appalachia, 

the poverty rate is nearly 10 percent, roughly equal to the national average. If these women are

not working full-time, their poverty rates exceed 40 percent. Clearly, employment is a defense

against poverty, especially in families with one worker. 

Table 12

Families in poverty, by family type and employment status of householder,

Appalachia and non-Appalachian United States, 2000

APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIAN

UNITED STATES FAMILY TYPE

Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILY

Householder worked full time 52 1.8 476 1.6

Householder worked part time 82 8.9 814 7.8

Householder did not work 166 13.9 1,130 11.3

SINGLE MALE-HEADED FAMILY

Householder worked full time 8 4.6 90 4.0

Householder worked part time 19 25.4 209 20.8

Householder did not work 26 32.3 235 32.1

SINGLE FEMALE-HEADED FAMILY

Householder worked full time 35 9.6 363 7.5

Householder worked part time 121 44.4 1,300 36.9

Householder did not work 131 40.2 1,366 43.9

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
26

It also is evident from our statistical analysis that the large racial differences in poverty 

do not simply reflect racial differences in work effort. Among married persons, blacks and 

Hispanics experienced poverty rates that were substantially higher than rates among whites and 

Asians who are not in the labor force (see Table 13). Among married Hispanics in Appalachia, 

nearly 40 percent of those not in the labor force were poor. Hispanic women, especially mothers, 

have very low educational levels and employment rates. Perhaps more than any other racial or 

ethnic group, Hispanic married women depend on the incomes of their husbands, who 

unfortunately typically work at low-skill, low-wage jobs. Among African Americans, in contrast, 

Table 13

Families in poverty, by race, family type, and employment status of householder,

Appalachia, 2000

WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN

FAMILY TYPE Number

(1000s)

Percent Number

(1000s)

Percent Number

(1000s) Percent Number(1000s) Percent

MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILY

Householder worked full time 45 1.7 2 2.1 3 7.5 1 2.4

Householder worked part time 71 8.5 5 11.3 4 20.5 1 11.2

Householder did not work 148 13.2 12 24.3 3 38.4 1 39.4

SINGLE MALE-HEADED

FAMILY

Householder worked full time 6 4.2 1 7.2 1 8.8 * 2.8

Householder worked part time 15 25.2 2 29.8 1 20.2 * 16.9

Householder did not work 20 29.6 4 43.4 1 61.3 * 53.8

SINGLE FEMALE-HEADED

FAMILY

Householder worked full time 23 8.0 11 15.3 1 16.7 * 4.3

Householder worked part time 84 41.9 32 52.0 2 51.6 * 28.9

Householder did not work 90 35.5 35 56.7 2 69.0 * 57.7

*Fewer than 500 families in category.

NOTE: “White,” “Black,” and “Asian” figures do not include Hispanics. (Hispanics may be of any race.)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
27

the comparatively high rate of poverty among married persons (24.3 percent) reflects

employment related problems. Blacks are much more likely than whites to be “discouraged 

workers,” i.e., they stop looking for employment because jobs are scarce or the quality of the job 

is poor. 

Among single black or Hispanic women working full-time, poverty rates are quite low, 

but still roughly double those observed among whites and Asians. For single women not in the

labor force, minority women had exceptionally high rates of poverty, rates that were well in 

excess of the rates among their white and Asian nonworking counterparts. The poverty rates

among black and Hispanic single women not in the labor force were 57 and 69 percent, 

respectively. These are high rates of poverty by any standard.

Public Assistance among the Poor. Among the Appalachian poor, 44.5 percent received 

cash public assistance in 2000. Perhaps surprisingly, the majority of Appalachia’s poor did not

receive cash assistance through TANF. In contrast, the trend differs for other federal assistance

programs. Other research in this series shows that per person payments for food stamps and 

Supplementary Social Security Income (SSI) were higher in Appalachia than the United States in 

2000 (Black and Sanders 2004). Further, Appalachia experienced much higher growth in its use

of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI): While the use of this program increased 12 

percent in the United States as a whole, the use in Appalachia increased 20 percent (Black and 

Sanders 2004). A slight majority of poor Appalachian blacks—and half of poor blacks outside of 

Appalachia—received welfare income (Table 14, page 28). The overall conclusion is clear: A

large share of poor people do not rely on government cash handouts. These figures belie the

conventional wisdom that the poor—especially in chronically depressed regions like
28

Appalachia—depend heavily over government assistance to make ends meet. These results

suggest otherwise.

Discussion and Conclusion

Appalachia as a region has come a long way economically since President Johnson 

declared his “War on Poverty” in West Virginia in 1964. Indeed, as our analysis suggests, the

1990s have been a watershed period for the region. Poverty rates declined faster in Appalachia

during the 1990s than they did in the rest of the nation. More significantly, some of the fastest

declining poverty rates in Appalachia were experienced in counties and among populations that

historically have been at the bottom of the economic ladder. These counties included the

historically impoverished counties in the Central Appalachian region; isolated rural areas; and 

economically distressed counties (as defined by the Appalachian Regional Commission).

Table 14

Persons in poverty who received any public assistance, by race, Appalachia and

non-Appalachian United States, 2000

APPALACHIA NON-APPALACHIAN

UNITED STATES

RACE

Number

(1000s)

Percent of

poverty

population

Number

(1000s)

Percent of

poverty

population

White 290 43.4 1,305 32.8

Black 54 51.3 968 50.0

Hispanic 4 44.6 586 45.3

Asian 1 22.4 93 28.8

NOTE: “White,” “Black,” and “Asian” figures do not include Hispanics. (Hispanics may be of any race.)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 census.
29

Moreover, Appalachia’s disadvantaged populations—especially racial and ethnic

minorities, children, and single family heads—now have rates of poverty today that are

remarkably similar to the rest of the nation. Clearly, the case for economic exceptionalism in 

Appalachia is more difficult to make in 2000 than in previous decades.

Indeed, our results indicate that the 1990s was a period of convergence in patterns of

poverty between Appalachia and the nation. At the same time, our results reinforce common 

notions about the importance of education and work in reducing poverty in Appalachia and 

elsewhere. We find little evidence that education “doesn’t pay” in Appalachia; in fact, poverty 

rates are not only very high among the least educated Appalachians, but these rates often 

exceeded poverty rates for their counterparts outside the region. Nationally, there also is the

common perception that poverty results from the bad choices of disadvantaged people (including 

many minorities) regarding their decisions to become unwed parents or to divorce. Our results

suggest that family change in Appalachia—an overwhelmingly white, native-born population 

region—also has been inextricably linked to recent poverty trends. Poverty rates among single

mothers are very high in Appalachia. 

On balance, our results suggest that the national policy prescriptions to ending poverty, 

including welfare reform policies that emphasize work and healthy marriages, may also be more

applicable than ever before in Appalachia. Whether further reductions in poverty can be

achieved, however, is uncertain. Recent labor market conditions, growing inequality in income

and wealth, and the lack of political will to effect new government anti-poverty policies all

suggest that poverty in America—and in Appalachia—is not likely to be eliminated anytime

soon (Danziger and Gottschalk 2004). 
30

REFERENCES

Bishaw, Alemayehu, and John Iceland. 2003. “Poverty: 1999.” Census 2000 Brief. C2KBR-19. 

Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau.

Black, Dan A., and Seth G. Sanders. 2004. “Labor Market Performance, Poverty, and Income

Inequality in Appalachia.” Demographic and Socioeconomic Change in Appalachia.

Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau and Appalachian Regional Commission. 

Danziger, Sheldon, and Peter Gottschalk. 2004. Diverging Fortunes: Trends in Poverty and 

Inequality. The American People, Census 2000 series. New York and Washington, D.C.: Russell

Sage Foundation and Population Reference Bureau.

DeNavas-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette Proctor and Robert J. Mills. 2004. “Income, Poverty and 

Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2003.” U.S. Census Bureau, Current

Population Reports, P60-226. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 

Iceland, John. 2003. “Why Poverty Remains High: The Role of Income Growth, Economic

Inequality, and Changes in Family Structure, 1949-1999.” Demography 40: 499-519.

Jargowsky, Paul. 2003. “Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline in 

Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s”. The Living City Census Series (May). Washington, D.C.:

Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, Brookings Institution. 

Kingsley, G. Thomas, and Kathryn L. S. Pettit. 2003. “Concentrated Poverty: A Change in 

Course.” Neighborhood Change in Urban America (No. 2, May). Washington D.C.: Urban 

Institute.

Lichter, Daniel T., and Martha Crowley. 2002. “Poverty in America: Beyond Welfare Reform.”

Population Bulletin 57, no. 2. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau.

Lichter, Daniel T., and Martha Crowley. 2004. “Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of 

Maternal Employment, Marriage, and Cohabitation.” Social Science Research 33: 385-408.

Lichter, Daniel T., Jillian Garratt, Mary L. Marshall, and Michael Cordella. 2005. “Emerging 

Patterns of Population Redistribution and Migration in Appalachia.” Demographic and 

Socioeconomic Change in Appalachia. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau and 

Appalachian Regional Commission. 

Lobao, Linda. 2004. “Continuity and Change in Place Stratification: Spatial Inequality and 

Middle-Range Territorial Unites.” Rural Sociology 69: 1-30.
31

McLaughlin, Diane K., Daniel T. Lichter, and Stephen A. Matthews. 1999. Demographic

Diversity and Economic Change in Appalachia. “University Park, Pa.: Population Research 

Institute.

Neckerman, Kathryn M. (Ed.) 2004. Social Inequality. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

O’Hare, William P. 2004. Trends in the Well-Being of America’s Children. The American 

People, Census 2000 series. New York and Washington, D.C.: Russell Sage Foundation and 

Population Reference Bureau.

Shipler, David K. 2004. The Working Poor: Invisible in America. New York: Knopf.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2005a. “Table FM-2. All Parent/Child Situations, By Type, Race, and 

Hispanic Origin of Householder or Reference Person: 1970 to Present.” Accessed online at

www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabFM-2.pdf, on Jan. 3, 2005.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2005b. American Factfinder. “QT-P20. Educational Attainment by Sex:

2000.” Accessed online at factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-

qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP20&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-_sse=on, 

on Jan. 29, 2005.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2005c. “Historical Poverty Tables (Table 3).” Accessed online at

www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/hispov/hstpov3.html, on Jan. 21, 2005).

Weber, Bruce, and Leif Jensen. 2004. “Poverty and Place: A Critical Review of Rural Poverty 

Literature.” RPRC Working Paper 04-03. Columbia Mo.: RUPRI Rural Poverty Research 

Center.