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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SUSAN R. FRITZ, 

 Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 22, 2016 

v No. 330049 

Allegan Circuit Court 

SANDY PINES WILDERNESS TRAILS, LC No. 15-054994-CZ 

 Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SAWYER and MARKEY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of 

defendant on plaintiff’s claim alleging, among other things, breach of contract. We affirm. 

 Defendant is a member-owned non-profit corporation that operates a campground and 

resort in Allegan County. Prior to June 20, 2010, plaintiff had a membership interest in Sandy 

Pines which allowed her use of Lot N-68. After disputes arose, plaintiff voluntarily transferred 

her membership to her daughter and son-in-law, Todd and Deborah Bogardus. She also sold her 

pontoon boat and other personal property to the Bogarduses, retaining a security interest in the 

boat. Most relevant to this case is the fact that she did not retain a security interest in the 

transferred membership. This is particularly relevant because the Bogarduses failed to pay their 

membership dues and defendant ultimately terminated their membership. 

 This dispute was the subject of previous litigation, which plaintiff lost at trial and on 

appeal. See Fritz v Sandy Pines Wilderness Trails, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket 

Nos. 317144 and 317336, issued November 20, 2014). In that opinion, this Court observed that 

plaintiff had voluntarily transferred her membership to her daughter and son-in-law on June 30, 

2010, a fact which was relevant to the Court’s decision in the prior case. Id., slip op at 2. 

Additionally, in 2012, a proposed Membership Transfer Application seeking to transfer the 

membership from the Bogarduses to plaintiff as trustee of the BER Vacation Family Trust was 

submitted to defendant, but was rejected by defendant’s board. 

 Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant action, alleging various counts. Most relevant to this 

appeal is that she once again claims a breach of contract by defendant, resulting in the loss of the 
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return of the membership from the Bogarduses to her, as well as the personal property left on the 

campsite. With regard to the personal property, defendant has consistently maintained, both in 

the trial court and in this Court, that they wish the personal property removed and would 

accommodate plaintiff’s arranging for a third-party to come to Sandy Pines and remove the 

property on plaintiff’s behalf.1 Accordingly, we are left with the issue of plaintiff’s claimed 

equitable lien interest on the membership. 

 The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, concluding that the 

issue of any right of plaintiff to the membership was resolved in the prior litigation: 

 The only support and the only issue that the Court sees that goes beyond 

the trial this Court heard is the issue of a membership transfer—alleged—the 

membership issue from 2012. The membership transfer agreement. The Plaintiff 

has been very successful in using every manipulation that she can think of to 

counteract the Court’s decision in the original trial and the Court of Appeals 

decision that supported the trial Court’s determination. 

 Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, I don’t believe her manipulations have 

been successful. I don’t think there is a significant enough dispute of fact in this 

case to survive summary disposition. Just saying something without supporting 

documents that should be available, if in fact there was a perfected lien in some 

type of membership interest, when in fact it’s clear there is a perfected lien in 

regards to the pontoon boat and the trailer, is telling to the Court and significant to 

the Court. 

* * * 

 There is no dispute of fact that’s been presented to this Court in regards to 

that membership interest, there is nothing that’s changed since the trial date in 

regards to her membership interest. If and in fact the Bogardis’s [sic] had not 

relinquished their rights to that particular property, the Bogardis’s may have had 

some ability to challenge their membership or deal with that, but they defaulted 

that membership and they—they let that membership go. 

 So the Court doesn’t believe there is a dispute of fact of any significance. 

There certainly isn’t anything in the documents or pleadings that have been 

presented to the Court to prove that there is a dispute of fact. The Court of 

Appeals decision affirming the trial Court’s decision that there was—that Ms. 

Fritz has no interest in lot 68 continues and motion for summary disposition is 

granted. 

 

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 Given the history between the parties, defendant does not wish for plaintiff herself to come 

onto the premises and remove the property herself. 
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 MR. BOSCH [plaintiff’s counsel]: Your Honor, as a point of 

clarification—and assuming that the Court is ruling that not only does my client 

not have a membership interest, she doesn’t have a lienholder’s interest either. 

 THE COURT: I have no proof that she has a lienholder’s interest other 

than her own statements. 

 On appeal, plaintiff points to no evidence that the trial court overlooked in determining 

that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding any claimed interest that plaintiff would 

have in the membership. As both the trial court and defendant point out, this issue was resolved 

in the prior litigation and there is no basis to revisit it. See Chestonia Twp v Star Twp, 266 Mich 

App 423, 429; 702 NW2d 631 (2005) (“Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same 

parties when the facts or evidence essential to the action are identical to those essential to a prior 

action.”). As this Court explained in Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 

10; 672 NW2d 351 (2003): 

 Res judicata requires that: (1) the prior action was decided on the merits; 

(2) the decree in the prior action was a final decision; (3) the matter contested in 

the second case was or could have been resolved in the first; and (4) both actions 

involved the same parties or their privies. Baraga County v State Tax Comm, 466 

Mich 264, 269; 645 NW2d 13 (2002); Kosiel v Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 

374, 379; 521 NW2d 531 (1994). Michigan law defines res judicata broadly to 

bar litigation in the second action not only of those claims actually litigated in the 

first action, but claims arising out of the same transaction which the parties, 

exercising reasonable diligence, could have litigated but did not. Dart v Dart, 460 

Mich 573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). 

All of these requirements have been met in the case at bar. 

 Similarly, as defendant points out in its brief, plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel because the underlying factual issues were resolved in the prior 

litigation. See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-685; 677 NW2d 843 (2004). 

 Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant. 

 Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Jane E. Markey