NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, theref ore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran , 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT 20

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A.L.

vs . C.D. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0 The defendant, C. D. , appeals from the order den ying his motion to modify a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order entered against him and from the order den ying his motion for reconsideration

. 1 We affirm. Background

. On January 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application for an abuse protection order under c. 209A

. A one day temporary order was entered, and after a series of extensions , on January 29, 2010, the order was made permanent. The order required the defendant to stay away from, and not to contact, the plaintiff and the parties' minor child. In 2013, the defendant successfully move d to modify the order to terminate the provisions requiring him to stay away from the

1 The plaintiff did not file a brief.2 child

. In 2017, the defendant 's motion to vacate the remaining portion of the order was denied

. The defendant appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed the order. See A.L . v. C.D ., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2018). On August 26, 2019, the defendant moved to modif y the abuse prevention order to make it "mutual." On August 28, 20 1 9, a judge denied the motion on the ground that the defendant had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the order was no longer necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse

. The defendant filed a m otion for reconsideration on September 20, 2019, emphasizing that the application of c. 209A in this

case violated his equal protection right s , and that a mutual order was necessary to protect him from harm

. T he judge denied the motion in an order entered on September 24, 2019, stating, "There is no basis for a mutual order." The defendant appeals. Discussion

. The defendant claims that the judge abused her discretion and violated his right to equal protection of th e laws when she denied his motion to make the existing order mutual

. We review a judge's decision denying a c. 209A order or denying a motion to vacate c. 209A order for abuse of discretion. See MacDonald v. Caruso , 467 Mass. 382, 391 (2014);
S.V . v. R.V ., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 813 (2019). To be entitled to a mutual order, the defendant was required to establish his own entitlement to relief under3 c. 209A. "[A] pplications for retaliatory abuse prevention orders should only be allowed if the predicate conditions are shown and not as a prophylactic agent to prevent putative violations." Uttaro v. Uttaro , 54 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 87 5 (2002). Therefore, t he defendant was required to establish that he was "suffering from abuse." Iamele v. Asselin , 444 Mass. 734, 736 (2005), quoting G. L. c. 209A, § 3. In support of his motion, the defendant stated that he was " harmed " because the existing order prevented him from obtaining parole

. This is not the type of harm contemplated by c . 209A. See Iamele , supra at 736

- 737 ("abuse" under c. 209A involves physical harm, involuntary sexual relations, or placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm) ; Uttaro , supra at 87 3 ( obtaining abuse prevention order "requires proof of some act that places the complainant in reasonable apprehension that force may be used"; fear of arrest due to plaintiff's selective enforcement of abuse prevention order insufficient). As the defendant made no showing of abuse , the judge did not abuse her discretion by declining to make the order mutual. As to the defendant 's e qual protection claim, we discern no

error. H is motion for a mutual order was evaluated under the same definition of "abuse" that was applied to the plaintiff's application. To the extent the defendant argues that the judge s issuing or extending the original c. 209A order did not properly4 apply the standard, or erroneously issue d the order " simply because it seem[ed] to be a good idea," Smith v. Jo yce , 421 Mass. 520, 523 n.1 ( 1995), his time to challeng e the original order has long passed. See MacDonald , 467 Mass. at 3 8 7

- 3 8 8; Iamele , 444 Mass. at 7 4 2

. To modif y or terminat e the order, the defendant was required to "s how by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of a significant change in circumstances, it is no longer equitable for the order to continue because the protected party no longer has a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm " (emphasis ad ded). Cordelia C . v. Steven
S ., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 635, 639 (2019), quoting MacDonald , supra
at 38 2

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. The defendant made no such showing. See MacDonald , supra at 393 (defendant's affidavit stating he had "moved on with his life" insufficient to demonstrate he had "' moved on ' from his history of domestic abuse and retaliation " ). T he possibility that the existing order hurt his chan c es of obtaining parole was no t a relevant consideration

. Conclusion . The order d ocketed August 28, 2019, denying the motion to modify , is affirmed. The order d ocketed September5 24, 2019, denying the motion for reconsideration , is affirmed. So ordered

. By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Singh, JJ. 2 ),

Clerk

Entered: August 3, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.