United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1998 DEFENSE

CONTRACTOR

RESTRUCTURING

Benefits to DOD and

Contractors

GAO/NSIAD-98-225

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278554 

September 10, 1998

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

United States Senate

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney

The Honorable Bernard Sanders

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith

House of Representatives

As a result of declining defense expenditures, contractors have been

consolidating and restructuring their operations to reduce costs through

activities such as disposing of facilities, combining operations and

systems, relocating workers and equipment, and reducing workforce

personnel. As you requested, we reviewed seven defense contractor

business combinations to determine whether the Department of Defense

(DOD) is realizing savings as a result of such restructuring activities.

Specifically, we (1) identified the amount of restructuring savings

expected by DOD from the seven business combinations, (2) assessed the

impact of selected restructuring activities on the contractors’ cost of

operations, and (3) determined if savings could be traced to contract

prices. Our report is based on data from 10 individual contractor business

segments, including at least 1 segment from each of the 7 business

combinations.

Background To encourage defense contractor consolidations, DOD announced in

July 1993 that it would pay for restructuring costs on transferred flexibly

priced contracts in certain circumstances.1

 These circumstances were that

(1) the restructuring costs were allowable under the Federal Acquisition

Regulation and (2) a DOD contracting officer determined that the business

combination was expected to result in overall reduced costs to DOD or

preserve a critical defense capability.

Concerns over the payment of restructuring costs led Congress in 1994 to

pass section 818 of Public Law 103-337, requiring that certain conditions

be met before DOD could reimburse defense contractors for

1

After a business combination, contracts are transferred from one contractor to another through

written agreements executed by the seller, buyer, and government. These agreements cite the

government’s approval to transfer its contracts. Flexibly priced contracts are those under which the

total amount paid to the contractor depends on the allowable costs the contractor incurs in performing

the work.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

restructuring-related expenses. The legislation required that a senior DOD

official certify that projections of restructuring savings were based on

audited cost data and that the projected savings should result in overall

reduced costs to DOD. The legislation also required the Secretary of

Defense to report annually to Congress on DOD’s experience with defense

contractor business combinations, including whether savings associated

with each restructuring actually exceeded restructuring costs.

In 1996, Congress passed section 8115 of Public Law 104-208, which

stipulated that for business combinations occurring after September 30,

1996, projected savings had to (1) be at least twice the amount of costs

allowed or (2) exceed the costs allowed, provided the Secretary of

Defense determined that the combination would result in the preservation

of a critical capability. In November 1997, section 804 of Public

Law 105-85 made these requirements permanent. None of the seven

business combinations we examined were subject to the two-to-one ratio

requirement because they occurred before this requirement was

established.

We have issued several products on defense contractor restructuring. See

Related GAO Products for specific references.

Results in Brief For the seven business combinations we reviewed, DOD expects that it will

save about $3.3 billion from contractor restructuring activities, such as

laying off workers, closing facilities, and relocating employees and

equipment. Our assessment of selected restructuring activities showed

that they had lowered the cost of operations at the seven business

combinations by hundreds of millions of dollars. Such reductions

benefited DOD because the costs of defense contracts were lower than they

would have been if the restructuring activities had not occurred.

Determining the precise impact of restructuring on specific contract prices

requires isolating the impact of these activities from nonrestructuringrelated factors, such as changes in business volume, quantities purchased,

and accounting practices. DOD, selected business segments, and we were

generally not able to isolate the effects of restructuring from those of other

factors.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

Expected

Restructuring Savings

DOD expects that it will save $3.3 billion between 1993 and 2000 as a result

of restructuring activities carried out by the seven business combinations

we examined. Table 1 shows total projected restructuring savings and

DOD’s share of these savings for each of the seven business combinations.

Table 1: Projected Restructuring

Savings

DOD sharea

Dollars in millions

Business combination

Total

savings

Gross

savings

Net

savings

Hughes - General Dynamics

missile operationsb $832.9 $505.8 $373.3

United Defense Limited Partnership 110.8 79.7 50.6

Martin Marietta - General Electric

Aerospace 524.1 305.4 149.1

Northrop - Grumman - Vought 440.2 263.4 216.7

Martin Marietta - General Dynamics

Space Systems Division 196.6 139.6 88.9

Lockheed - Martin Marietta 4,224.8 2,675.8 2,269.9

Hughes - CAE-Link 211.5 148.1 113.1

Total $6,540.9 $4,117.8 $3,261.6

Note: With the exception of Hughes - General Dynamics, all savings figures reflect the values

used in DOD’s certification decision.

aRestructuring savings are allocated to all of the contractors’ customers; accordingly, DOD’s

share of savings will depend on its share of the contractors’ business base. Net savings are

DOD’s gross savings less its share of restructuring costs.

bBecause the Hughes - General Dynamics combination occurred before the requirement for DOD

to certify that savings will exceed costs, Hughes did not initially prepare a comparable figure for

total restructuring savings. The total amount and DOD share of savings associated with this

combination reflect a March 1997 estimate prepared by Hughes. We derived the net savings by

subtracting Hughes’ original cost estimate from its March 1997 savings estimate.

As part of the process to ensure that expected restructuring savings

exceed projected costs, DOD regulations require contractors to submit a

proposal that includes details on planned restructuring activities,

projected costs, and anticipated savings. The regulations do not require

contractors to propose or demonstrate savings on individual contracts or

use any particular method or approach in estimating restructuring savings.

As a result, the seven business combinations used a variety of estimating

methods. These methods included

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

• estimating the savings on eight contracts and subsequently extrapolating

the estimate across the contractor’s entire business base (over 1,000

contracts),

• comparing incurred costs at two companies before their combination with

the projected costs at the restructured company,

• computing average salary and fringe benefits for employees to be laid off

due to restructuring activities and multiplying these averages by up to

5 years,

• estimating reductions in operational costs from closing facilities and

disposing of equipment, and

• projecting the impact that transferring work from the acquired company

had on the overhead costs charged to the acquiring company’s existing or

anticipated contracts.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) guidance on reviewing

restructuring proposals states that the contractor is responsible for

establishing and supporting the reasonableness of the restructuring

savings estimates.2

 In April 1998, we reported that the broad framework

provided under this guidance may result in DOD accepting proposed

savings that are not directly attributable to restructuring.3

 We noted that

our work at Lockheed Martin’s Space & Strategic Missiles sector indicated

that some of the operational improvements and their associated savings

could have been accomplished without restructuring. Subsequently, we

found that Lockheed Martin did not fully consider the impact of normal

downsizing activities when estimating restructuring savings. For example,

Lockheed Martin attributed 1,153 support personnel reductions at its

Missiles & Space segment in 1995 to restructuring activities. However,

before its merger with Martin Marietta was complete, Lockheed had

forecasted that its total personnel level at this segment would decrease by

849 in 1995. Because Lockheed Martin did not consider reductions that

were already planned, the amount of savings that was directly attributed to

restructuring for 1995 may be overstated by $170 million.4

 Lockheed

Martin officials pointed out that this amount would not have affected DOD’s

2

DCAA is responsible for auditing contractors’ restructuring proposals and providing a report on the

results of its audit to the Defense Contract Management Command’s (DCMC) contracting officers.

3

This report also noted that DCAA’s guidance may not provide sufficient criteria to evaluate

restructuring savings, particularly those that may have been achieved without restructuring. Although

we recommended that DOD clarify DCAA guidance on evaluating restructuring savings, DOD did not

believe any changes to the guidance were needed.

4

Lockheed’s estimate did not identify how many of the 849 persons that were expected to leave in 1995

were support personnel. We estimated this number by (1) taking the ratio of support personnel to total

personnel that actually left in 1995 (57.2 percent) and (2) multiplying this ratio by 849. We then

multiplied the resulting figure by the contractor’s estimate of the average monthly salary and fringe

benefit costs to determine the overstated amount.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

decision to pay restructuring costs because of the large amount of

projected savings from the business combination.

DOD realizes benefits from restructuring when its contract prices are lower

than they would have been if restructuring had not occurred. The price of

a typical government contract consists of indirect and direct costs.5

Restructuring activities that reduce indirect costs generally result in lower

forward pricing rates and lower contract prices.6

 Similarly, restructuring

activities that reduce direct costs will be reflected in contract prices in the

form of lower costs for such elements as direct labor or material costs.

Five of the contractor business segments we visited included only indirect

cost reductions in their estimated restructuring savings, whereas the other

five segments included both direct and indirect cost reductions.

Restructuring

Activities Lowered

Contractors’

Operating Costs

Restructuring activities have enabled contractors to reduce their projected

operating costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. The following four

examples illustrate how restructuring enabled reductions in projected

operating costs:

• The Hughes - CAE-Link business combination led to closing most of

CAE-Link’s Binghamton, New York, operations and terminating 548

employees. The projected savings resulting from these activities—about

$212 million—was computed by taking the total operating costs of the

segments of the two companies that were to be combined and comparing

that amount with the projected operational costs after restructuring.7

 For

example, in the year before restructuring, the two segments had combined

operating costs of $195.3 million. Hughes subsequently projected that the

operating costs for these segments would decrease to about $161.9 million

in the first year of restructuring and about $150.8 million annually for the

next 4 years. We verified that these lower costs were reflected in Hughes’

5

Indirect costs, also called overhead costs, cover general business costs such as depreciation,

maintenance, and general office expenses that are applicable to a contractor’s business. These costs

are allocated to all contracts. Conversely, direct costs are associated with a specific program or

contract and are charged directly to that program or contract. Examples of direct costs include

expenses for engineering and manufacturing labor, subcontractors, and raw materials.

6

Forward pricing rate agreements are used by DOD and defense contractors to facilitate the pricing of

contracts. Contractors typically project the amount of indirect costs that are expected to be incurred

over the next several years and then compute forward pricing or overhead rates, which are generally

stated in percentages. To price a contract, the rates are applied against the contract’s direct cost

elements to estimate the amount of overhead costs to be allocated to that contract. If no changes have

occurred in the contractor’s projected business base, restructuring activities that reduce indirect costs

will result in lower forward pricing rates. Applying these lower rates to the contract’s direct cost

elements will result in a lower contract price.

7

The savings figures used throughout this section refer to total estimated restructuring savings.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

forward pricing rates that were made available to DOD contracting officers

to price contracts.

• For the Northrop - Grumman - Vought business combination, we reviewed

proposed savings from reductions in corporate overhead costs. After the

business combination, several restructuring activities were undertaken,

including closing Grumman’s headquarters in Bethpage, New York.

Northrop Grumman estimated that closing this facility would save about

$215 million over a 5-year period. About $100 million of the savings

represented the labor and fringe benefit costs associated with laying off

approximately 250 workers. Consequently, the amount of corporate

overhead costs allocated to Northrop Grumman’s B-2 bomber program

was less after restructuring than it would have been if restructuring had

not occurred.

• After its acquisition of General Electric Aerospace, Martin Marietta

restructured the operations of its Electronics & Missiles segment, thereby

reducing projected overhead costs by $101 million over a period of about 

5 years. The reductions consisted of (1) $68 million for vacating facilities,

consolidating activities, eliminating jobs, and obtaining concessions in

property taxes; (2) $18 million in concessions for employee wages and

benefits, water, sewage, and electricity charges; (3) $11 million for

relocating data processing activities and personnel; and (4) about 

$4 million in concessions in long-distance telephone rates. We traced these

savings into the contractor’s overhead expense pools and its forward

pricing rates. The lower rates were made available to DOD contracting

officers to price contracts.

• After the merger of Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Lockheed Martin’s

Missiles & Space business segment restructured its operations, including

reducing overhead and support personnel and consolidating various

administrative functions.8

 As a result, the contractor was able to reduce its

projected indirect labor costs by $739 million. Lockheed Martin reflected

these indirect labor cost reductions in its August 1996 forward pricing

rates.

Impact of

Restructuring on

Contract Prices Is

Difficult to Determine

Determining the impact that restructuring activities had on a contract

price requires isolating the effect of restructuring from nonrestructuringrelated factors, such as changes in quantities or improvements in

manufacturing efficiencies. In its annual reports to Congress, DOD has

acknowledged that other factors, such as inflation, business fluctuations,

accounting system changes, and subsequent reorganizations, also impact

the contractors’ overall cost of operations. DOD noted that it is not feasible

8

Some of the personnel reductions may have been due to normal downsizing rather than restructuring.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

to precisely isolate the impact of restructuring from the impact of these

other factors. Our work substantiates DOD’s position.

United Defense provided the clearest example of a contract price

reduction related to restructuring. For a fixed-price foreign military sales

contract for self-propelled howitzers, the contracting officer had included

a “reopener” clause,9

 requiring the contractor to reduce the contract price

after restructuring its operations. The contracting officer negotiated a

$1.8 million reduction—or about 4 percent—to the contract’s $48.5 million

price.10 This reduction was negotiated based on a proposal developed by

the contractor that showed the impact of restructuring on the contract.

Contractors offered other examples that they believed demonstrated how

contract prices were affected by restructuring. However, we were unable

to isolate the impact of restructuring from the impact that other factors

had on the contract prices. For example, our analysis of Hughes Aircraft

Company contract data showed the Army purchased 12,600 Tube-launched

Optically-tracked Wire-guided (TOW) antiarmor missiles at an average unit

price of $16,800 before restructuring and 8,758 TOW missiles at a unit price

of $15,677 after restructuring in 1993. Despite the 30-percent decrease in

quantities, the average unit price of the missile was $1,123, or almost

7 percent, lower after restructuring. Hughes officials attributed the

reduction in part to lower overhead rates after Hughes’ acquisition of

General Dynamics’ missile operations. However, Hughes officials pointed

out that other factors, such as changes in quantities and production rates,

learning curve efficiencies, and fluctuations in business volume, also

affected the unit price of the missile. Neither we nor the contractor could

isolate the effect of restructuring from the influence of these other factors

on the unit price.

After its acquisition of General Electric Aerospace, Martin Marietta

officials provided information showing that the Navy purchased 25 test

equipment items at a unit price of $1,270,524 before restructuring and 25 of

the same test equipment items at a unit price of $1,246,230 after

restructuring. Even though the unit price was $24,294 lower after

restructuring, we could not isolate the impact of restructuring from the

9

A reopener clause permits a downward-only price adjustment to a fixed-price contract whose price

did not reflect the impact of restructuring. Once the contractor has determined the impact of

restructuring, DOD can use the clause to reduce the price of that contract and thereby recoup its share

of restructuring savings.

10In our July 1998 report, we pointed out that, despite repeated recommendations from DCAA and

DCMC personnel, contracting officers rarely included reopener clauses in contracts awarded before

contractors incorporated estimated restructuring savings into their forward pricing rates.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

influence of other factors, such as learning curve improvement and

business volume changes. Contractor officials believe the reduction is

attributable in part to restructuring activities but acknowledged that the

other factors also affected the unit price.

Similarly, United Defense’s unit price for refurbishing the Bradley Fighting

Vehicle was between 8 and 16 percent lower after restructuring than

before restructuring. The unit price range is primarily due to differences in

the number of items to be refurbished and the inflation rate used to adjust

the unit price before restructuring. Army procurement officials believe the

lower unit price resulted from both restructuring and normal downsizing,

whereas contractor officials believe most of the reduction resulted from

restructuring.

Lockheed Martin officials reported that restructuring after the Martin

Marietta - General Dynamics Space Systems Division combination resulted

in significant savings to the Air Force’s Titan launch vehicle program. After

the combination, Martin Marietta closed General Dynamics’ San

Diego-area manufacturing facilities and relocated the Atlas and Centaur

launch vehicle programs to its Titan production facility in Denver.

According to contractor officials, producing all three launch vehicles in

Denver enabled Martin Marietta to eliminate redundant engineering,

manufacturing, and quality assurance personnel. Contractor officials

reported that these activities resulted in a total of $223 million in

reductions to the estimated cost to complete three Titan contracts. These

reductions—which ranged between 3.7 and 5.6 percent of the cost to

complete the contracts—were reflected in various contractor cost

performance reports submitted to the Air Force. Titan program officials

agreed that restructuring reduced projected program costs but noted that

it was not possible to precisely quantify the impact of restructuring

separate from the impact of other factors. The officials explained that a

number of changes were occurring concurrently on the Titan program,

including a reduction in the number of launch vehicles and the

implementation of various acquisition reform initiatives.

Contract prices may not always be lower after restructuring, even though

DOD benefited from restructuring. For example, the Northrop - Grumman -

Vought business combination reduced the amount of corporate overhead

costs being charged to the B-2 bomber program. We estimated that the

B-2’s general and administrative overhead rate—to which corporate

overhead costs are allocated—was about 1 percent less than it would have

been if restructuring had not occurred. Nevertheless, the B-2’s general and

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

administrative overhead rate rose significantly from 1993 to 1996,

principally due to decreases in the planned procurement of B-2s.

Consequently, the nonrestructuring-related changes to the B-2 program

more than offset the benefit of restructuring.

In another case, even though savings from restructuring activities

contributed to a 7-percent reduction in the 1993 unit price of the TOW

missile, the 1994 unit price of $19,498 was actually $3,821 more than the

1993 unit price of $15,677. Although restructuring savings associated with

the acquisition of General Dynamics’ missile operations led to a lower

amount of overhead costs being applied to the contract, our analysis

indicates that increases in material and armament subcontract costs that

were unrelated to restructuring more than offset restructuring savings.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings.

DOD’s comments are provided in appendix I. The Aerospace Industries

Association (AIA) provided comments on our report on behalf of the

business combinations we reviewed. AIA stated that the report objectively

and fairly attempted to trace restructuring savings to individual programs

or contracts. AIA’s comments are provided in appendix II.

Scope and

Methodology

To identify the amount of restructuring savings expected by DOD, we

identified each of the business combinations for which DOD had certified

that estimated restructuring savings should exceed projected restructuring

costs. As of June 1, 1998, DOD had issued nine certifications associated

with six business combinations:

• United Defense Limited Partnership, a joint venture between FMC

Corporation’s Defense Systems Group and Harsco Corporation’s BMY

Combat Systems Division;

• Martin Marietta Corporation’s acquisition of General Electric Company’s

aerospace and other business segments;

• Martin Marietta’s acquisition of General Dynamics Corporation’s Space

Systems Division;

• Northrop Corporation’s acquisitions of the Grumman Corporation and the

Vought Aircraft Company to form the Northrop Grumman Corporation;

• the merger of the Lockheed Corporation and Martin Marietta to form the

Lockheed Martin Corporation; and

• Hughes Electronics’ acquisition of CAE-Link Corporation.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

To determine the amount of savings expected for each of these business

combinations, we reviewed the information prepared during DOD’s

certification process, including the contractor’s restructuring proposal,

DCAA audit reports, negotiation memorandums, and other pertinent

information.

We also reviewed restructuring savings associated with Hughes Aircraft

Company’s August 1992 acquisition of General Dynamics’ missile

operations. Even though this business combination occurred before the

requirement for DOD to certify that savings should exceed costs, DOD

included the estimated savings and costs in its reports to Congress on

defense industry restructuring. Hughes did not initially prepare an

estimate of total expected savings that was audited by DCAA. Consequently,

we used data that was submitted to DOD by Hughes in March 1997 that

projected the overall impact of restructuring activities. This data was

subjected to a limited review by DCAA, which tested the mathematical

accuracy of cost and savings computations and assessed the

reasonableness of the contractor’s estimating methods. For each business

combination, we also obtained updated information on estimated

restructuring savings from the cognizant DCMC offices and reviewed DOD’s

reports to Congress on defense industry restructuring.

To assess the impact of restructuring activities on the contractors’

operational costs, we reviewed restructuring activities at 10 contractor

business segments, including at least 1 segment from each business

combination. We generally selected those business segments with the

largest projected amount of restructuring savings. These 10 segments were

expected to generate about $2.4 billion, or over 70 percent, of the

projected $3.3 billion in net savings to DOD. We did not attempt to validate

that the reported restructuring savings were directly attributable to

restructuring activities.

We used multiple approaches to determine if restructuring had reduced

the contractors’ cost of operations. At Northrop Grumman, where a large

part of projected restructuring savings were generated at the corporate

level, we reviewed the corporate overhead costs to its B-2 business

segment to determine if such charges were lower after restructuring. At

other locations that proposed indirect cost reductions, we determined

how such estimates were developed and whether such reductions had

been reflected in overhead cost accounts.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

In assessing whether restructuring savings could be traced to contract

prices, we determined if DOD contracting officers had included

downward-only reopener clauses in fixed-price contracts negotiated

before the contractors had adjusted their forward pricing rates to reflect

the impact of restructuring. For those contracts containing such clauses,

we determined whether the contracting officer had exercised the clause

and, if so, the amount by which the contract’s price was reduced. For

contractors whose savings reflected reductions in indirect costs, we tried

to compare the overhead rates that were in effect before restructuring

with the rates that were in effect after restructuring. We also determined

whether such rates were made available to contracting officers to price

contracts. For those contractors that included direct costs as restructuring

savings, we examined contract-related documents to determine if these

costs were less than before restructuring.

In addition, we requested that contractor officials identify comparable

items that DOD purchased before and after restructuring. We accepted the

items the contractors identified and did not make an independent

evaluation to determine whether they identified all available comparable

items. We compared the prices DOD paid for these items before and after

restructuring to determine if the prices had been impacted by

restructuring or other factors.

Finally, we discussed the results of our analyses with officials from the

business combinations, DOD, DCMC, and DCAA.

We performed our work between May 1997 and July 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 7 days after its issue date. At that time, we

will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the

Commander, DCMC; the Director, DCAA; the Director, Office of Management

and Budget; and interested congressional committees. Copies will also be

made available to others upon request.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
B-278554 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III.

David E. Cooper

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

16

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Aerospace Industries

Association

17

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

18

Related GAO Products 20

Table Table 1: Projected Restructuring Savings 3

Abbreviations

AIA Aerospace Industries Association

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DOD Department of Defense

TOW Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Appendix II 

Comments From the Aerospace Industries

Association

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

John K. Harper

Timothy J. DiNapoli

Paula J. Haurilesko

John D. Heere

Atlanta Field Office George C. Burdette

Erin B. Baker

Beverly A. Breen

Los Angeles Field

Office

Dorian R. Dunbar

Kenneth H. Roberts

Thaddeus S. Rytel, Jr.

San Francisco Field

Office

Ruth-Ann Hijazi

Donald Y. Yamada

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Related GAO Products

Defense Contractor Restructuring: DOD Risks Forfeiting Savings on

Fixed-Price Contracts (GAO/NSIAD-98-162, July 17, 1998).

Defense Industry Restructuring: Updated Cost and Savings Information

(GAO/NSIAD-98-156, Apr. 30, 1998).

Defense Industry Restructuring: Clarification of Cost and Savings Issues

(GAO/NSIAD-97-186R, June 17, 1997).

Defense Industry Restructuring: Cost and Savings Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-141,

Apr. 15, 1997).

Defense Restructuring Costs: Information Pertaining to Five Business

Combinations (GAO/NSIAD-97-97, Apr. 1, 1997).

Defense Restructuring Costs: Projected and Actual Savings From Martin

Marietta Acquisition of GE Aerospace (GAO/NSIAD-96-191, Sept. 5, 1996).

Defense Contractor Restructuring: First Application of Cost and Savings

Regulations (GAO/NSIAD-96-80, Apr. 10, 1996).

Defense Restructuring Costs: Payment Regulations Are Inconsistent With

Legislation (GAO/NSIAD-95-106, Aug. 10, 1995).

Overhead Costs: Defense Industry Initiatives to Control Overhead Rates

(GAO/NSIAD-95-115, May 3, 1995).

Defense Industry Consolidation: Issues Related to Acquisition and Merger

Restructuring Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-247, July 27, 1994).

(707249) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-225 Defense Restructuring Savings
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100