GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Military Research and Development, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

March 1999 CRUISE MISSILE 

DEFENSE

Progress Made but 

Significant Challenges 

Remain

GAO/NSIAD-99-68

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

GAO

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278428 Letter

March 31, 1999

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Military Research and 

 Development Subcommittee

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Because of the Committee’s concerns that the Department of Defense 

(DOD) might not be giving sufficient emphasis to cruise missile defenses, 

you asked us to review DOD’s progress in establishing adequate 

mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile defense programs.1 Our 

objectives were to (1) identify the organizational structure and 

mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts, (2) determine 

potential measures of the progress of coordination efforts, (3) assess the 

progress of coordination using these measures, and (4) identify the 

challenges that DOD officials believe still must be overcome. Because of 

your interest, this report focuses on defense against land attack cruise 

missiles.

You also asked us to identify the systems that have or will have cruise 

missile defense capabilities and the amount of funding being requested or 

planned for these programs. We agreed to provide the system and funding 

information in a separate briefing.

Results in Brief The organizational structure for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts 

across all services consists of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense 

Organization and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization supported by a 

three-tiered set of integrated product teams. The Joint Theater Air and 

Missile Defense Organization is to focus on operational requirements 

issues, while the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is to focus on 

acquisition issues. These organizations are to work closely together, using 

1

A cruise missile is an unmanned, armed aircraft that can be launched from another aircraft, ship, 

submarine, or ground-based launcher to attack ships (antiship cruise missiles) or ground-based targets 

(land attack cruise missiles).
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a three-tiered set of teams2 comprised of personnel from all organizations 

involved in theater air and missile defense development, acquisition, and 

operations. These teams are to develop and refine the overall mechanism 

for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts—the Theater Air and Missile 

Defense Master Plan. The individual military services are primarily 

responsible for funding and developing systems and modifications for 

cruise missile defense.

DOD officials told us the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of the 

coordination process would be the fielding of a cost-effective, 

interoperable3 cruise missile defense capability. However, full 

accomplishment of this goal is several years away, and DOD has not 

specified interim measures of progress toward the goal. Progress can be 

measured in terms of both the process and the outputs or results of the 

process. We identified some process measures, for example, whether 

affected organizations were involved. We also identified, through 

discussions with senior-level officials, some outputs and results that would 

indicate progress toward coordinating these efforts. These measures are 

(1) developing and refining an overall defense strategy and options for 

implementing the strategy (the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master 

Plan), (2) gaining acceptance of the master plan by affected organizations, 

(3) developing and approving overall requirements for a family of theater 

missile defense systems, (4) planning and conducting joint demonstrations 

of the systems, (5) achieving agreement between the master plan and the 

services' proposed budgets, and (6) establishing investment priorities.

DOD has made initial progress toward coordinating its cruise missile 

defense efforts based on both the process and output measures. The

three-tiered team approach is improving coordination through joint efforts 

to define and reach consensus on the issues. Through December 1998, the 

teams had prepared four iterations of the master plan, each revising and 

expanding on prior versions. Future iterations are planned on an annual 

basis. One of the teams also significantly contributed to the development 

of the Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document, which 

was approved in July 1998. The Capstone Requirements Document 

2The three-tiers—working level, integration, and overarching—are staffed by progressively higher 

levels of DOD management. Each team includes representatives from DOD, the Joint Staff, each of the 

military services, the theater combatant commands, and other organizations involved with the air and 

missile defense mission.

3

The ability of two or more systems to exchange information and use that information to work together 

toward accomplishing the mission. 
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contains the overall requirements for the family of theater missile defense 

systems. In addition, although the master plans and the services’ budgets 

are not yet in full agreement, the new coordination process has affected 

budgets and acquisition programs to a limited extent, and other budget 

issues have been identified for future resolution. 

Even though progress has been made, DOD officials recognize they still 

face coordination challenges in acquiring a cost-effective cruise missile 

defense. These include getting the services to work together to resolve 

issues in a joint fashion; identifying, defining, and obtaining service 

agreement on the threat; and funding the technologies most vital to an 

effective cruise missile defense.

In addition, there are technical challenges to be overcome. The technical 

challenges identified by the senior level officials include developing 

mechanisms to enhance warfighters’ ability to fight jointly and a capability 

to intercept cruise missiles outside the view of weapon system operators, 

improving sensors’ abilities to detect and track low observable (stealthy) 

cruise missiles, fielding interoperable systems, and developing low-cost 

defense systems to counter attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated 

cruise missiles.

We recommend in this report that DOD develop a time-phased set of 

interim measures to assess progress toward DOD’s goal of a cost-effective, 

interoperable family of cruise missile defense systems and that DOD report 

such progress to the Congress in a timely manner for annual budget 

deliberations.

Background Land attack cruise missiles, most of whose ranges vary from about 90 to 

190 miles, may be sufficiently accurate to impact within a few feet of their 

intended targets. Defending against these cruise missiles will stress air 

defense systems because these missiles are very difficult to detect, track, 

and intercept under the best conditions. Cruise missiles are smaller, and 

therefore much less visible to radar than aircraft or ballistic missiles, and 

can fly at low altitudes to stay below radar coverage. For example, due to 

the earth’s curvature, a ground based radar can detect a low flying cruise 

missile that is about 20 miles away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 

10,000 feet can be detected when it is about 150 miles away. Newer 

missiles are incorporating stealth features to make them even less visible to 

radars and infrared detectors. A picture of a cruise missile is shown in 

figure 1.
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Figure 1: Cruise Missile

Source: National Air Intelligence Center.

DOD officials believe that a credible land attack cruise missile threat does 

not yet exist but that the threat could emerge rapidly. Threat planners 

believe that, because of the Tomahawk’s apparent success during the 

Persian Gulf War, development of cruise missiles will greatly increase. 

According to a 1998 report by the National Air Intelligence Center, only 

three countries currently have operational land attack cruise missiles, but 

the threat will increase after the year 2000 when several countries will start 

production, and probably export a new generation of land attack cruise 

missiles.

Countries interested in acquiring cruise missiles can do so by developing 

new systems, modifying antiship cruise missiles or unmanned aerial 

vehicles, or purchasing them directly. A 1994 Defense Science Board 

Summer Study4

 concluded that, while land attack cruise missiles are not 

4

Report of the 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Cruise Missile Defense.
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widely available, potential adversaries have the motives and means to 

acquire them. The study group also concluded that coping with the threat 

would require a comprehensive strategy to prevent or delay possession and 

to deter and defend against their use. According to the group’s report, 

cruise missile defense should be pursued within the concept of overall 

theater air defense. The report identified an overall acquisition strategy 

based on (1) improving the capabilities of existing air defense systems to 

share data and work together, (2) upgrading selected sensors and missiles 

to deal with stealthy cruise missiles, and (3) fielding new airborne 

surveillance and fire control systems. The report noted that effective joint 

air defense required two centers of expertise—one for joint doctrine, 

requirements, and concepts of operations and the other for systems 

engineering and battle management command, control, and 

communications.

The Fiscal Year 1996 Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to 

undertake an initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile 

defense programs to ensure that the United States develops and deploys 

affordable and effective defenses. The act directed the Secretary to ensure, 

to the extent practicable, that cruise missile programs and ballistic missile 

defense programs are coordinated and mutually supporting. The act 

required DOD to prepare a plan to carry out the initiative, including 

organization and management changes that would strengthen and further 

coordinate cruise missile defense programs. The act also directed the 

Secretary to ensure that the appropriate existing and planned air defense 

systems be upgraded to provide an affordable and operationally effective 

defense against existing and near-term cruise missile threats. The Fiscal 

Year 1997 report of the House Committee on Appropriations, issued in June 

1996, expressed concern that each of the services and the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency were developing unique cruise missile 

defense systems rather than building systems optimized to meet the needs 

of the theater combatant command Commanders in Chief in joint service 

operations.

In July 1996, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 

Technology advised the Chairman, House Committee on National Security, 

that the key elements of a land attack cruise missile defense program had 

been identified. The key elements are

• an advanced mix of airborne sensors (aerostats and fixed-wing aircraft 

systems); 
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• using the airborne sensors to direct surface- to-air weapons such as 

Patriot and Aegis;

• fighters with air-to-air missiles supported by airborne sensors;

• missile seekers with improved low altitude target performance;

• networking sensors and weapons by the way of the Joint Tactical 

Information Distribution System, the Cooperative Engagement 

Capability, and other similar systems;

• integration of land attack cruise missile defense with air defense and 

ballistic missile defense into a joint theater defense; and

• a strong technology program to demonstrate advanced sensor and 

missile seeker concepts.

A 1997 Defense Science Board5

 report recognized that DOD had made 

progress but expressed concern that DOD still had neither joint concepts of 

operation nor mechanisms to prioritize investment options. It also noted 

that the system engineering to integrate the available defense assets was 

missing. Such integration is necessary to allow the theater combatant 

commanders to deal effectively with the cruise missile threat. 

Current Defense Planning Guidance requires the military services to field 

the full cruise missile defense capabilities by 2010 and provide a capability 

to defend against emerging threats in the near term. Each service is 

developing unique capabilities to address cruise missile and other threats 

in the different combat environments that are specific to that service. 

These unique capabilities are normally part of multimission weapon 

systems that provide defense against a wide range of threats. For example, 

the Navy Aegis is expected to engage theater ballistic missiles, aircraft, 

cruise missiles, surface targets, and submarines. The first service to enter 

an emerging combat arena must be able to provide a credible capability to 

protect its own assets and meet the critical needs of the theater combat 

commander. However, the services’ unique capabilities must also be able 

to operate together with those of the other services to provide an 

interoperable cruise missile defense capability.

5

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense, dated May 

1997.
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Organizational 

Structure and 

Coordination 

Mechanisms 

Established 

In late 1996, DOD created an organizational structure for coordinating 

theater air and missile defense activities, including cruise missile defenses. 

The structure consists of a partnership between a new organization—the 

Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO)—and an 

existing one—the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)—

supported by a three-tiered set of integrated product teams. The teams 

consist of representatives of those organizations and activities responsible 

for planning, acquiring, and using theater air and missile defense systems. 

Together, these organizations are to develop and refine a theater air and 

missile defense master plan. The individual military services’ continue to 

be responsible for funding and developing systems and modifying existing 

systems for cruise missile defense. 

New Management 

Arrangement Created

DOD established JTAMDO as the warfighters' (theater commanders, Joint 

Staff, and the services) focal point for developing joint operational 

architectures,6

 overall requirements, and operational concepts.7 JTAMDO 

is also responsible for validating the capabilities through simulations and 

demonstrations. It reports to the Joint Staff's Director for Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment. 

DOD also directed BMDO to assume the role of integration systems 

architect. Working jointly with JTAMDO, BMDO is to translate the 

operational architectures into system architectures,8

 perform systems 

engineering at the architecture level, plan and ensure integrated testing of 

defense architectures, and lead program acquisition activities. For 

example, BMDO is to work with the services and the joint program offices 

to develop an overall plan for acquiring systems with integrated 

capabilities.

DOD directed that the two organizations work closely together and with 

others involved in air and missile defense requirements, acquisitions, and 

operations, using a three-tiered integrated product team approach—

6

An operational architecture describes the basic framework and structure of what is to be built and 

defines the field deployment of system components to the force. It describes who needs to exchange 

information, what information needs to be exchanged, and how that information will be used. 

7An operational concept is a description of how to fight and how to use the equipment.

8

A systems architecture is a description of the specific systems (hardware and software) and 

interconnections necessary to fight a battle.
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working level, integration, and overarching teams. The teams are 

composed of representatives from JTAMDO, BMDO, the Joint Staff, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the services, the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 

theater combatant commands. Their goal is to achieve coordination 

through collaboration and consensus building. The structure of the 

coordination process is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Coordination Process Structure

Source: JTAMDO.

There are eight working level integrated product teams: threat; 

requirements; operations and architecture; battle management command, 

control, communications, computers, and intelligence (BMC4I); systems 

integration; demonstration; cost; and attack operations. The 

responsibilities of each team are shown in table 1.

Executive

Committee

Overarching

Integrated Product Team

Integration

Integrated Product Team

JTAMDO

Requirements

BMDO

Acquisition

Working Level Integrated Product Teams

Demonstration BMC4I

Requirements Threat

System Integration Cost

Attack Operations Operations and

 Architectures 

Joint Staff

Combatant

Commands

Army

Navy

Air Force

Defense Advanced Research Marine Corps Projects Agency

Others

BMDO

JTAMDO
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Table 1: Working Integrated Product Team Responsibilities

Each team was chartered to develop and refine its assigned part of the 

overall master plan for theater air and missile defense, identify and 

investigate the issues related to its area, and resolve those issues in a 

collaborative manner. Their goal is to reach a consensus at the lowest 

possible level. To more expeditiously accomplish the tasks, most teams are 

broken into subgroups, but their products or issues are addressed and 

approved by the full team. Personnel from JTAMDO and BMDO lead most 

of the teams, but, in some cases, teams are led by personnel from the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Atlantic Command9

when the subject matter warrants. For example, the threat working-level 

team is co-chaired by representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency 

and JTAMDO, and the requirements team is co-chaired by representatives 

from JTAMDO and the Atlantic Command, a combatant command.

The integration integrated product team, co-chaired by the Deputy 

Director, JTAMDO, and the Deputy for Theater Air and Missile Defense, 

BMDO, provides management guidance and focus; directs the coordination 

of the requirements and acquisition activities; builds consensus among the 

services and other participants; and approves the master plan before it 

Team Responsibilities

Operations and 

architecture

Develop operational and battle management concepts and 

associated architectures.

Cost Develop cost estimates and perform trade-off analyses.

Threat Obtain comprehensive threat intelligence.

Systems integration Coordinate, establish, and maintain system-level architectures 

for an interoperable family of systems.

Requirements Document theater air and missile defense-related 

requirements and assist in developing the Theater Missile 

Defense Capstone Requirements Document.

BMC4I Produce a BMC4I architecture to describe the interfaces to 

achieve a joint integrated air and missile defense system.

Attack operations Integrate attack operations data into joint theater air and 

missile defense plans.

Demonstration Develop approaches and a plan for validating the family of 

system capabilities.

9

The Atlantic Command has been assigned responsibility to help enhance joint force capabilities 

through a blending of technology, systems, and doctrine. See U.S. Atlantic Command: Challenging Role

in the Evolution of Joint Military Capabilities (GAO/NSIAD-99-39, Feb. 17, 1999).
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goes to the next level. The overarching integrated product team—

co-chaired by the Director for Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the 

Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Joint Staff—

provides policy and financial guidance, receives and refines the 

recommendations from the integration integrated product team, examines 

any germane issues, and suggests a review of appropriate cruise missile 

defense issues by the Executive Committee. The Theater Air and Missile 

Defense Executive Committee, co-chaired by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Vice-Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, provides DOD level guidance. 

Master Plan Is to Be Overall 

Coordination Mechanism

The Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan is to be the overall 

mechanism for achieving coordination. The plan, which is to be updated 

annually in the future, is designed to develop and articulate the rationale 

for improving the defense capabilities and to focus attention upon the 

decisions necessary to implement the improvements. It outlines a concept 

for joint theater air and missile defense operations (including cruise missile 

defense), describes a family of systems to accomplish the mission, 

identifies current and future shortcomings, defines the demonstrations 

needed to validate the family of system capabilities, and makes specific 

recommendations for implementing future capabilities. The plan is 

intended to (1) better focus service and BMDO proposed budgets and 

procurement of new systems and (2) influence service priorities for 

upgrades to existing systems. 

According to the former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 

Technology) and the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

coordination process is not intended to alter the services’ traditional 

responsibilities for program execution and resource management. Unlike 

the case for ballistic missile defense programs, neither JTAMDO nor BMDO 

controls most cruise missile defense funding; rather it is included in the 

services' budgets. Therefore, obtaining funding for specific cruise missile 

defense programs often requires influencing the services to include funding 

in their budget proposals.
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Potential Interim 

Indicators to Assess 

Progress

Many senior-level officials told us the ultimate measure of coordination 

would be to field a cost-effective, interoperable cruise missile defense, but 

that goal is not scheduled to be accomplished until 2010. In the interim, 

DOD has not specified time-phased measures that can be used to gauge 

whether the coordination process is on track to accomplish its goal. 

Coordination progress can be measured both in terms of extent to which 

the process has been implemented (process measures) and the outcomes 

and results of the progress (output measures). We identified two process 

measures—whether issues were being discussed in a collaborative manner 

and whether the affected organizations are involved in the process. To 

identify some potential output measures, we solicited opinions regarding 

interim measures of coordination progress from 22 current and former 

senior-level officials. These officials currently are or have been involved in 

development, acquisition, or operation of air and missile defenses. The 

primary indicators follow:

• Maturation of the master plan. Many officials, including co-chairs of the 

integration and overarching integrated product teams, believed that 

obtaining a coordinated master plan and maturation of the master plan 

over time would be a progress indicator. For example, successive 

iterations of the master plan should better define the family of systems 

needed, the joint demonstrations needed to validate the capabilities, the 

priority of acquiring these systems, and the estimated cost. 

• Acceptance of the master plan by the services. The Director, BMDO, the 

Director for Theater Air and Missile Defense, BMDO, and one service 

representative told us that cruise missile defense coordination progress 

will occur as the services increasingly "buy into" the master plan, 

approaching cruise missile defense with complete agreement regarding 

establishing priorities and making trade-off decisions.

• Development and approval of a Theater Missile Defense Capstone 

Requirements Document. This document identifies overall 

requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems and is to 

guide the services in developing (1) system operational requirements 

documents and (2) systems that will work together. Several officials 

stated that development and approval of this document indicates 

progress is being made in coordinating cruise missile defense efforts.

• Joint demonstrations of systems. Several officials said that, since 

fielding the joint cruise missile defense is several years away, an interim 

measure of progress would be to plan and successfully conduct joint, 

cross-service demonstrations of systems that work together.
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• Agreement between the master plan and the services’ budgets. Several 

DOD and service officials said that, if progress is occurring, the master 

plan and the services' budgets for cruise missile defense activities 

should agree. The Director, JTAMDO, told us that the December 1998 

version of the master plan should provide sufficient information for the 

services to make decisions regarding their proposed budgets.

• Development of investment priorities. The Director of Strategic and 

Tactical Systems told us that an agreement on investment priorities and 

the ability to cancel some programs and accelerate others would 

indicate progress. According to this official, priorities cannot be 

established in a few years, but if cruise missile defense priorities are not 

established, the process will not be effective.

The need for output measures is consistent with the provisions of the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P. L. 103-62). The 

Results Act requires federal agencies and activities to clearly define their 

missions, set goals, link activities and resources to goals, prepare annual 

performance plans, measure performance, and report on their 

accomplishments. The Senate and House reports on the Results Act 

legislation anticipated that the act’s principles would be institutionalized 

and practiced at all organizational levels.

Initial Progress Has 

Been Made

DOD is making progress toward coordinating cruise missile defense efforts 

both in terms of implementing the process and outcomes resulting from the 

process. In terms of process, the three-tiered integrated team approach is 

improving coordination by more intensive examination of air and missile 

defense issues, collaboration on these issues, and attempts to reach 

consensus. And, although still limited, JTAMDO has obtained more 

involvement by theater combatant command representatives responsible 

for wartime operations. In terms of outcomes, joint planning documents to 

enhance coordination have been prepared or assisted by the coordination 

process. Although the services’ budgets do not yet fully support the master 

plan, budgets and programs have been affected to a limited extent, and 

other budget issues have been identified. 

Issues Are Being Identified 

and Discussed

Most working level team members we spoke with believe that coordination 

has been enhanced. They cited the following examples: (1) issues are 

addressed jointly, (2) the varying team members obtain information 

regarding the other organizations' positions and rationale on the issues,

(3) each team member is responsible for coordinating with his/her 
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respective organization, and (4) they attempt to resolve the issues at the 

lowest possible level. They said this process requires collaboration and 

builds consensus.

Each working level integrated product team is responsible for drafting a 

specific section of the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan. As a 

part of this process, the working level teams and subgroups identify issues 

related to their part of the master plan, examine the issues, and attempt to 

resolve them to all members' satisfaction. For example, during a meeting, 

the requirements team discussed a set of effectiveness values, but one 

service representative expressed concern about the values. As a result, 

JTAMDO and BMDO provided funds for the service to perform a further 

analysis; the service presented its results during the next team meeting. 

New values were subsequently adopted. The team member, who raised the 

issue, informed us that had the issue not been resolved, the dissenting view 

would have been raised to the next tier—the integration integrated product 

team.

In addition, the master plan and other products developed are examined 

and approved by the integration integrated product team and the 

overarching integrated product team. This process provides oversight on 

product development and guidance regarding the products and permits 

consensus building at levels higher than the working-level teams. The 

higher tier teams are composed of higher level representatives from each of 

the services and the other organizations associated with theater air and 

missile defense.

Affected Organizations Are 

Involved

The three-tiered integrated product teams include representatives from the 

organizations responsible for determining requirements and developing, 

acquiring, and operating theater air and missile defense systems. Also, the 

theater combatant commanders—responsible for operational control of 

military forces in a specific theater or region of the world10—are becoming 

more involved in the theater air and missile defense coordination process. 

According to the commanders' representatives, their involvement in the 

coordination process has been limited because of the high cost of travel 

and the lack of staff to fully participate. However, JTAMDO and BMDO 

have obtained combatant command comments on the iterations of the 

10A combatant command is comprised of forces from two or more services.
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master plan, and the combatant commands provided input to the Capstone 

Requirements Document. 

In addition, JTAMDO and BMDO have begun a program to obtain more 

involvement in the coordination process by the combatant commands' 

representatives. Under this program, JTAMDO and BMDO visited each 

theater command to increase awareness of the coordination process and 

invited all representatives to a week-long meeting to (1) inform the 

representatives about the air and missile defense initiatives and future 

direction and (2) provide opportunities for the representatives to express 

their opinions concerning direction and focus. JTAMDO also has initiated a 

newsletter to keep theater commands better informed about the key issues 

addressed at working-level team meetings, and it has placed a 

representative in each theater. The representative is to assist the theater 

command with and provide expertise on emerging issues and facilitate the 

exchange of information among JTAMDO, BMDO, and the combatant 

commands.

Joint Planning Documents 

Have Been Started 

The integrated product teams have produced or assisted in producing 

several joint planning documents to enhance coordination. These 

documents include the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan, the 

Joint Theater Air and Missile Demonstration Plan, and the Theater Missile 

Defense Capstone Requirements Document.

Through December 1998, the master plan had been published in four 

iterations, each revising and expanding on prior versions. The initial 

master plan was published in May 1997. The April 1998 version provides 

better-defined and updated information about requirements and systems as 

well as an acquisition roadmap not included in previous versions. The 

December 1998 version makes additional improvements, including revised 

and more refined analyses of the system architecture and additional 

information about the single integrated air picture. As of January 1999, the 

Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Executive Committee had not 

approved this plan. The master plan is to be updated annually in the future. 

Future iterations, for example, are to include a refined cruise missile 

defense architecture to support the current strategy that accommodates 

emerging threats in the near term.

Another document is the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense 

Demonstration Plan, which is incorporated into the master plan, and 

identifies the joint demonstrations necessary to validate the family of 
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systems capabilities, using cross-service capabilities. Several joint 

demonstrations are scheduled annually between 1998 and 2004, including 

eight specifically related to cruise missile defense. These demonstrations 

are to be conducted at already planned exercises and test events by adding 

features to demonstrate joint cruise missile defense capabilities. 

The requirements working level team assisted the Atlantic Command in 

producing the Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document. 

The document not only identifies the overall requirements for a family of 

theater missile defense systems (including cruise missile defense) to 

protect forces and critical assets in a theater or region from missile attacks 

but also establishes joint warfighting standards for defense capabilities to 

be provided to the theater commanders. It is intended to (1) guide the 

services in developing operational requirements for future systems and

(2) facilitate development of interoperable systems. The requirements 

apply to any service or other acquisition authority. It was approved by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council in July 1998. Now the services must 

modify their formal requirements for new defense systems and 

improvements to existing defense systems to achieve the requirements in 

the capstone document. In some cases, incorporation of the capstone 

requirements will necessitate modifications to existing systems such as 

changes needed to achieve required levels of interoperability. In addition, 

the Atlantic Command has drafted a Mission Need Statement for Theater 

Air and Missile Defense, and the draft is currently being coordinated.11 

Budgets and Programs Have 

Been Affected to a Limited 

Extent

According to JTAMDO and BMDO officials, the services’ budgets do not yet 

fully support the master plan. For example, the budgets do not include the 

amounts these officials believe are required for the single integrated air 

picture—a mechanism to enhance the services’ ability to fight jointly. 

However, the coordination process has affected budgets and programs to a 

limited extent. For example, in the fiscal year 1998 budget process, 

JTAMDO identified disconnects between the master plan and one service's 

proposed budget for funding key technology upgrades. JTAMDO officials 

briefed DOD leadership on the disconnects and proposed funding

11A mission need statement is a statement of operational capability required to perform an assigned 

mission. 
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alternatives to correct the problem. As a result, DOD issued a program 

budget decision that realigned the funding for the upgrades.12 

In addition, JTAMDO officials conducted a cruise missile defense study 

that identified disconnects between the services’ fiscal year 1999 budgets 

and the demonstration plan; many of the disconnects were resolved. We 

were informed that one service was asked to provide funding to eliminate 

the remaining disconnect, but the matter has not yet been fully resolved.

Challenges Remain While there has been progress toward coordinating cruise missile defense 

efforts, the senior level officials with whom we spoke and documents we 

reviewed recognize that challenges remain—both managerial and 

technical—which must be overcome before achieving a cost-effective, 

coordinated cruise missile defense. Managerial challenges must be met to 

ensure continued coordination progress. Technical improvements are 

required because (1) more countries are expected to obtain cruise missiles 

and (2) the newer cruise missiles are expected to be more difficult to detect 

and track than current cruise missiles. 

Managerial Challenges One of the challenges for continued coordination progress identified by the 

senior level officials is getting services to work together. Many of the 

officials told us that one of the more formidable challenges is obtaining a 

genuine commitment from the services to develop a joint, interoperable 

cruise missile defense. One official said getting the services to work 

together on the joint mission, rather than being advocates for a specific 

system or plan, is the challenge; however, he acknowledged that, as the 

process has matured, the services are working together better than at the 

beginning. Another official believed that the greatest challenge is 

overcoming the interservice rivalry for funds in a tight budget environment. 

Another official said that the challenge is obtaining agreement on joint 

tactics, procedures, and rules of engagement that may require changing 

some service procedures. We reported on the conflicts of service-oriented 

priorities in the context of the Atlantic Command’s mission in our February 

1999 report. 

12Further details are not included because of the classified nature of these upgrades.
B-278428

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Another challenge is correctly defining the threat. According to the

co-chair of the overarching integrated product team, identifying and 

characterizing the threat and timing the acquisition of defense capabilities 

to that threat is a major challenge. The Director, BMDO, and the co-chairs 

of the integration integrated product team also identified determining the 

correct threat as a major challenge. The land attack cruise missile threat 

has been limited, but it could emerge rapidly through development of new 

systems, conversion of antiship cruise missiles, or purchase of advanced 

systems from other countries. Although the threat is expected to increase, 

changes could be difficult to detect. The threat information could be vital 

to timing the development of cruise missile defense capabilities.

A third challenge is adequately funding the most vital programs. According 

to the 1997 Defense Science Board report, funding for all of the promising 

concepts being pursued by the services is insufficient. The report further 

stated that if priorities are not set and choices are not made, none of the 

concepts are likely to move forward rapidly enough to be in place when 

needed. However, the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, told us that 

canceling programs would be a difficult task. Neither JTAMDO nor BMDO 

can ensure that funding is requested for the items considered most vital to 

cruise missile defense because most funding requests are included in the 

services’ proposed budgets, not in JTAMDO’s or BMDO’s budget request. 

Therefore, the funding for the priority items must be obtained by 

influencing the services to include the funding requests in their proposed 

budgets. According to the Director, JTAMDO, the goal is to provide 

sufficient rationale and support to convince the services to adequately fund 

recommendations in the master plan.

Technical Challenges A number of technical challenges must be overcome before the effective 

defense envisioned for 2010 is possible. Some were identified as key 

elements of a land attack cruise missile defense by the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in 1996 (see p. 5).

Senior level officials identified acquiring the capability to develop and 

share a single integrated air picture as a technical challenge. Future 

employment concepts will view individual weapon systems (whether air, 

sea, or land based) as just contributing elements to an overall defense 

capability. The real time execution of an integrated defense plan will 

require a level of coordination and communication far beyond that 

currently available. At its core is an air picture that will allow each member 

of the force to make decisions based on the same information. This is the 
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

single integrated air picture. The single integrated air picture will merge 

data from multiple sensors and provide all system operators and

decisionmakers with one common set of information about each airborne 

target in the battle area.

Another identified challenge is to improve sensor technologies to meet 

future threats. To counter the future threat, sensor technology will need to 

be improved to detect stealthy cruise missiles at longer ranges, distinguish 

them from friendly aircraft, and intercept them over enemy territory. 

Defense Science Board reports and current and former theater air and 

missile defense officials stated that this capability would require significant 

upgrades to surveillance sensors, tracking sensors, and interceptor missile 

sensors as well as the acquisition of additional improved elevated 

(airborne) sensors. The upgrades and new systems are to ensure the early 

detection and engagement that is needed to (1) provide the maximum 

number of potential engagements and (2) destroy cruise missiles carrying 

weapons of mass destruction while they are still over enemy territory.

A third challenge is to achieve over the horizon intercepts. To intercept 

cruise missiles at longer ranges, the sensors will need to be connected to 

enable an over the horizon intercept. Elevated sensors (such as the 

Airborne Warning and Control System, the E-2C, and the Joint Land Attack 

Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System) would detect the 

target; the sensors would notify a sea-based or ground-based system (such 

as the Patriot) where to fire the interceptor; the system would fire the 

interceptor; and the interceptor would be guided to a target not visible to 

its ground-based radar. This concept is referred to as air-directed,

surface-to-air missile operations.

A fourth challenge is to develop interoperable weapon systems. Most 

existing air and missile defense systems were developed with the premise 

that each service would direct the use of its own weapons; however, the 

systems must now operate jointly with other services’ systems under the 

direction of the Commanders in Chief of the combatant commands and 

with allied forces. Some theater combatant command representatives said 

that the Commanders in Chief have systems that do not interoperate with 

U.S. forces or with allies and that they have been forced to develop tactics, 

techniques, and procedures to compensate for the lack of interoperability. 

In a July 1998 meeting to discuss joint theater air and missile defense 

issues, most of the theater combatant command representatives stated that 

interoperability of current and future air and missile defense systems is 

their highest priority.
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

The final challenge identified by the senior level officials was developing a 

defense against massive attacks. A Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency official told us that one challenge is to develop low-cost cruise 

missile defense systems capable of engaging massive attacks by 

unsophisticated cruise missiles. The Director of that agency said that the 

proliferation of inexpensive cruise missiles with improved accuracy and 

range gives adversaries the option of trying to overwhelm U. S. defenses 

with large numbers. However, he believes that one manner of addressing 

the threat is to build low-cost interceptors that would not have the 

capabilities against high-performance cruise missiles but could contribute 

where an enemy attack includes large numbers of inexpensive missiles. 

The agency is studying this issue, and it will continue its efforts until 2001.

Conclusions DOD has established the mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile 

defense efforts by creating a new arrangement for managing theater air and 

missile defense. Senior level officials generally agreed that the ultimate 

measure of coordination effectiveness would be to field a cost-effective, 

interoperable cruise missile defense, and they suggested some interim 

measures of progress toward that goal. While DOD is making progress 

toward coordinating its cruise missile defense efforts, it has not yet 

specified time-phased interim measures of coordination progress. In 

addition, there are still challenges—both technical and managerial—to be 

overcome before a coordinated, cost-effective cruise missile defense can 

be achieved.

We believe that the development of time-phased interim measures of 

coordination progress is warranted. Such measures would be consistent 

with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which call for 

performance planning to include measures to help assess whether goals 

and missions are being accomplished. We also believe that the interim 

measures of outputs and results identified in this report are a sound 

building block for the establishment of such measures of coordination 

progress.

Recommendations Because the final results of the coordination process will not be known for 

several years, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a

time-phased set of interim measures that can be used to assess progress 

toward a cost-effective, interoperable family of cruise missile defense 

systems. These measures should include, as a minimum, metrics that will 
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Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

show progress toward developing the operational and system architectures 

required, resolution of the technical and managerial challenges, 

demonstration of needed technology, and investment priorities.

To enable congressional committees responsible for funding and oversight 

of theater and missile defense activities to have information with which to 

assess DOD’s progress and make appropriate policy and funding decisions, 

we recommend that the Secretary (1) incorporate these time-phased 

measures into the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan and

(2) provide the most recently approved master plan to the Congress in a 

timely manner for annual budget deliberations.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In its comments responding to a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed 

with our recommendation to develop a set of interim measures to assess 

progress toward achieving cost-effective and interoperable theater air and 

missile defense systems. DOD stated, however, that the measures should 

be broad in nature because air and missile defense are complex mission 

areas supported by multimission systems. DOD said that allocating a 

system cost for each mission supported by multimission systems, such as 

Patriot, F-22, and Aegis, would be difficult and counterproductive. We 

agree and have modified our recommendation to delete cost as a measure. 

We also agree that the measures may have to be somewhat broad; however, 

we believe that they should be sufficiently specific to permit an objective 

assessment of progress.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to use the measures in 

conjunction with the annual budget requests to provide the Congress with 

reports of progress being made. DOD said that its progress toward 

achieving a cost-effective and interoperable family of systems for air and 

missile defense will be documented each year in the Theater Air and 

Missile Defense Master Plan. DOD also said that the master plan includes 

the measures we recommended. Our understanding is that the master plan 

has not, until now, been provided to the Congress, nor has it included

time-phased measures of progress. DOD’s future use of the master plan as 

a vehicle to communicate progress to the Congress could meet the intent of 

our recommendation. However, DOD would need to ensure that

(1) time-phased measures of progress are incorporated in the master plan 

and (2) the master plan is submitted in a timely manner for consideration 

during budget deliberations. We have modified our recommendation to 

reflect such clarification.
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Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

DOD also provided additional technical comments, which have been 

incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are included in appendix II.

Scope and 

Methodology

To identify the coordination mechanisms, assess the progress of 

coordination efforts, and identify challenges, we reviewed theater air and 

missile defense plans, held discussions with appropriate officials, and 

attended team meetings. To identify results oriented progress measures 

and to obtain additional information regarding the progress to date and the 

challenges, we identified and interviewed 22 current and former

senior-level DOD, service, and theater combatant command officials who 

are or have been involved in the development, acquisition, or operation of 

air and missile defenses. See appendix I for additional information about 

our scope and methodology.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other 

interested congressional committees; the Honorable William Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. 

Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Rear Admiral Herbert 

Kaler, Director, JTAMDO; Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director, BMDO, and the 

Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies 

will also be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were

Lee Edwards, Wayne Gilliam, Mark Lambert, and Reginia Grider. 

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues 
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Scope and 

Methodology

23

Appendix II

Comments From the 

Department of Defense 

26

Figures Figure 1: Cruise Missile 4

Figure 2: Coordination Process Structure 8

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

BMC4I Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers and Intelligence

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

JTAMDO Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApenIxdi

We obtained information regarding the process and mechanisms for 

coordinating cruise missile defense efforts by (1) reviewing the directives 

establishing the theater air and missile defense management process and 

the charters for the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization 

(JTAMDO) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO);

(2) reviewing various iterations of the Theater Air and Missile Defense 

Master Plan; and (3) discussing the process and mechanisms with officials 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, JTAMDO, 

BMDO, each of the services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Atlantic, Central, European, 

and Pacific Commands.

We obtained information regarding the organizational progress by

(1) reviewing various iterations of the master plan and other joint planning 

documents; (2) discussing the process progress with officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, JTAMDO, BMDO, and 

integrated product team members from each of the services, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; 

and (3) observing selected integrated product team meetings. To identify 

interim output measures of coordination progress, we interviewed

22 current and former senior level officials who are or have been involved 

with the development, acquisition, or operation of air and missile defense 

programs. These officials are listed below.

• Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (Co-chair of the Overarching 

Integrated Product Team).

• Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, Office of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Co-chair of Overarching Integrated Product Team).

• Director, JTAMDO (former co-chair of the Integration Integrated 

Product Team).

• Director, BMDO (member of the Executive Committee).

• Deputy Director, BMDO (member of the Overarching Integrated Product 

Team).

• Deputy for Theater Air and Missile Defense, BMDO (Co-chair of the 

Integration Integrated Product Team).

• Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Programs, Institute for Defense 

Analysis (Co-chair of the 1994 Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Cruise Missile Defense and Chair of the 1996 Task Force).

• Former Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

Department of the Army (former member of the Integration Integrated 

Product Team).
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

• Program Manager, Advanced Technology and Overland Cruise Missile 

Defense, Program Executive Office for Theater Surface Combatants, 

Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 

and Acquisition (member of the Integration Integrated Product Team).

• Deputy Chief, Theater Air Defense Division, Director of Global Power 

Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Acquisition).

• Program Manager for Ground-based Air Defense Systems, U.S. Marine 

Corps Systems Command.

• Chief, Theater Missile Defense Branch, U.S. Central Command.

• Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Directorate, U.S. European 

Command.

• Director for Operations, U.S. Pacific Command.

• Chief, Theater Air and Missile Defense Operations Division, U.S. 

Atlantic Command.

• Director, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Air Defense 

Artillery School.

• Director, Sensor Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Office (member of the Overarching Integrated Product Team).

• Director, Strategic Defense and Space Programs, Program Analysis and 

Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (member of the 

Integration Integrated Product Team).

• Former Commander (August 1992–August 1994), U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command.

• Former Commander (August 1994–August 1996), U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command.

• Former Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (former 

member of the Executive Committee).

• Former Director, Sensor Technology Office, Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (former member of the Overarching 

Integrated Product Team and member of the 1996 Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Cruise Missile Defense).

We obtained information regarding the progress of coordination efforts 

through (1) reviewing various versions of the master plan, the Theater 

Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Documents and other documents 

such as minutes of integrated product team meetings; (2) attending an 

integration integrated product team meeting and a working level team 

meeting; and (3) discussing progress with the co-chairs and selected 

members of each of the working level teams as well as the 22 officials listed 

above.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

We obtained information concerning the technical and managerial 

challenges by reviewing the master plan and other documents such as 

minutes of the integrated product team meetings and discussions with 

JTAMDO and BMDO officials and the 22 officials listed above.

We conducted our work from October 1997 through January 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIdi

(707297) Lert
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