United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1999 MILITARY SAFETY

Army M939 5-Ton

Truck Accident History

and Planned

Modifications

GAO/NSIAD-99-82

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282071 

April 9, 1999

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

United States Senate

The Honorable Rosa L. Delauro

House of Representatives

In April 1997, two U.S. Army Reserve soldiers were fatally injured during a

training exercise at a U.S. Army installation. Both were passengers in a

M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck that overturned. In response to your

request, this report identifies (1) the extent to which accidents involving

the M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck have occurred and (2) the results

of Army studies on the truck’s design and its plans to address any

identified deficiencies. You also asked us to evaluate the adequacy of the

Army’s training program for the drivers of the M939 truck because

inadequate training could be a contributing factor in accidents. This issue

will be addressed in a later report.

Background The Army classifies its vehicles on the basis of such factors as function

and physical characteristics. For example, tracked vehicles (Abrams

Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles) are classified as Army combat

vehicles; wheeled vehicles (trucks, automobiles, cycles, and buses) are

classified as Army motor vehicles. Within the Army motor vehicle

grouping, vehicles are further separated into tactical and non-tactical

categories and within the tactical grouping, into light, medium, and heavy

classifications based primarily on vehicle weight. The M939 series trucks

are accounted for as part of the Army motor vehicle’s medium tactical

fleet.

The Army reviews operational requirements for its vehicle fleet in an effort

to improve readiness. From January 1983 through October 1993, the Army

upgraded its 5-ton medium tactical fleet by purchasing about 34,900 M939s

to replace aging and obsolete trucks. The new truck, designed to operate

on and off road, maintained the basic design of its predecessors but came

equipped with such first-time standard equipment as air-brakes and

automatic transmissions. At present, the Army has three variations and

nearly 40 different models of the M939 in its inventory. Depending on the

model, the truck performs multiple duties that include hauling cargo,

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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collecting refuse, transporting troops, and operating as a tractor or

wrecker. The last M939s were fielded in late 1993.

Figure 1: M939A2 5-Ton Tactical Cargo

Truck

Source: U.S. Army.

Should vehicles or equipment prove dangerous or unsafe to operate, the

Army Safety Center, Transportation School and Center, and

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) are responsible for

identifying problems and disseminating information. Among other duties,

the commands collect and evaluate information from accident

investigations and field reports. They also issue Army-wide safety alerts,

precautionary messages, and other information warning of identified

dangers with equipment and vehicles.

Results in Brief Our analyses and an Army analysis indicate a higher rate of accidents

involving the M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck than other comparison

vehicles. Specifically, our analysis of January 1987 through June 1998

accident data showed that, while M939s made up an average of about 

9 percent of the Army motor vehicle fleet during that time, about 

34 percent of the fleet’s accidents resulting in fatalities of vehicle

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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occupants involved these trucks. Moreover, 44 percent of accidents that

involved a rollover and resulted in fatalities of vehicle occupants involved

the M939. Furthermore, our comparison of U.S. Department of

Transportation accident statistics and M939 accident statistics showed

that over a 10-year period, the fatality rate of occupants of the M939

averaged about 30 times higher than the fatality rate for occupants of

comparably sized commercial trucks. Finally, an Army Safety Center

analysis found that the chance of a fatality in a M939 was 3 to 21 times

higher than in other similar military trucks in the Army motor vehicle

fleet—the M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton trucks.1

The Army plans to spend an estimated $234 million on various

modifications to improve the M939’s safety and operational performance.

Based on the results of studies into the root causes of M939 accidents, the

Army concluded that the overall truck design was sound, but some

modifications were necessary. The Army plans to use the $234 million to

add anti-lock brake kits, alter brake proportioning specifications, upgrade

the truck’s tires, install cab rollover crush protection, and modify

accelerator linkage. Most modifications will be complete by 2005. The

M939s will remain in service as these modifications are made.

Three Different

Analyses Point to

High M-939 Accident

Rates

Our two analyses and the analysis conducted by the Army Safety Center all

involved comparisons of different types of accident data collected over

different time frames. Nevertheless, all of the analyses showed that the

M939 had a higher accident rate than each type of comparison vehicle.

Comparison of M939 With

Army Motor Vehicles

In our first analysis, we reviewed data from January 1987 through

June 1998 and compared selected M939 accident statistics with those of

the rest of the Army motor vehicle fleet. We reviewed the accident

categories in terms of “fatal accidents,” defined as any accident event in

which at least one occupant of an Army motor vehicle died; “occupant

deaths,” defined as the total number of Army motor vehicle occupants

killed; “rollovers,” defined as any vehicle that did not remain upright as the

result of an accident; and “rollover deaths,” defined as those occurring to

occupants of Army motor vehicles that rolled over as a result of an

accident.

1

The latter two analyses were based on accident rates per million miles driven.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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In analyzing this selected accident information compiled by the Army

Safety Center, we found the frequency of M939 accidents high in each

instance. For the 11-1/2 year period reviewed, the M939 series truck

inventory averaged 26,991, or about 9 percent of the average annual Army

motor vehicle inventory of about 314,000 vehicles, and accounted for

about 15 percent of the total Army motor vehicle accidents.2

 Appendix I

shows the actual figures by year, 1987-1998.

Our comparison of M939 accident statistics with accident statistics for the

rest of the Army motor vehicle fleet showed that the M939 accounted for

about 34 percent of all Army motor vehicle fatal accident events, and

34 percent of all Army motor vehicle occupant deaths. Comparative

rollover statistics revealed much the same. The M939 rollovers accounted

for 17 percent of the total Army motor vehicle rollovers, and 44 percent of

the total Army motor vehicle rollover fatalities. Figure 2 shows these

accident statistics.

2

Army Regulation 385-40 establishes the criteria for Army motor vehicle classification of a motor

vehicle involved in an accident. A vehicle’s general purpose must be to transport cargo or personnel,

and be under full operational control of the Army. A vehicle can include a passenger car, station

wagon, truck, ambulance, bus, motorcycle, fire truck, or refueling truck.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Figure 2: Comparison of Selected

M939 Accident Statistics to Remaining

Army Motor Vehicle Fleet, 1987-1998

AMV Accidents

Fatal Accidents

Occupant Deaths

All Rollovers

Rollover Deaths

AMV Fleet

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Categories

In percent 

M 939s Remaining AMVs

Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.

Comparison of M939s With

Commercial, Single-Unit

Medium and Heavy Trucks

In our second analysis, we used Department of Transportation published

data for years 1987-1996 and compared the accident rate for M939s with

the rate for single-unit medium and heavy commercial trucks (which are

physically similar to M939s). According to an agency official, the

Department of Transportation defines “fatal crashes” as any event in

which someone is killed in a crash—vehicle occupant or otherwise—and

“truck occupant fatalities” as a fatality of an occupant of a single-unit

truck. These comparisons revealed that the accident rates for the M939

were substantially higher than those found for the commercial trucks.

However, Army officials point out that commercial trucks are driven

almost exclusively on paved roads; the M939 is driven on both paved and

unpaved roads.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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We found that over the 10-year period, 1987-1996, the frequency rates of

fatal crashes per million miles driven for M939s averaged about seven

times higher than those for commercial trucks. The M939 accident rate

ranged from a high of 12 to a low of 3 times higher than the commercial

truck rate. In 1988, the M939’s accident rate was 0.23 and the commercial

truck rate was 0.02—about 12 times higher; and in 1992, the M939 accident

rate was 0.056 and the commercial truck rate was 0.018—about 3 times

higher. Figure 3 shows these statistics.

Figure 3: Comparison of Rate of Commercially Driven Single-Unit Medium and Heavy Trucks Fatal Crashes With Related

M939 Statistics, 1987-1996

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

 Calendar year

Fatal crashes per 1,000,000 miles

M939 Commercial

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety Center, and

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.

We also found that, over this same 10-year period, the M939 occupant

fatality rate averaged about 30 times higher than those for commercial

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
B-282071 

trucks. The M939 occupant fatality rate ranged from a high of 59 to a low

of 13 times higher than the commercial truck rate. In 1995, the M939

occupant fatality rate was 0.165 and the commercial truck rate was

0.0028—about 59 times higher; and in 1989, the M939 rate was 0.046 and

the commercial truck rate was 0.0035—about 13 times higher. Figure 4

shows these statistics.

Figure 4: Comparison of Rate of Commercially Driven Single-Unit Medium and Heavy Trucks Occupant Fatalities With

Related M939 Statistics, 1987-1996

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

Calendar year

Occupant fatalities per 1,000,000 miles

M939 Commercial

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety Center, and

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Comparison of M939s With

2-1/2 Ton Tactical Army

Trucks

The Army Safety Center’s analysis reviewed accident data from October

1990 through June 1998. In this analysis, the accident rate of the M939 was

compared with accident rates for another series of trucks—the M34/M35

series 2-1/2 ton truck. Army officials advised us that this truck was most

comparable with the M939. The analysis reviewed accidents categorized as

Class A mishaps. Army Regulation 385-40 defines a “Class A” mishap as an

accident where total property damage equals $1 million or more; an Army

aircraft or missile is destroyed, missing or abandoned; or an injury and/or

occupational illness resulting in a fatality or permanent total disability.

Because an M939 costs significantly less than $1 million, almost all Class A

mishaps involving an M939 are so classified because they result in a death

or permanent total disability.

The Army Safety Center’s analysis found accident rates for M939s to be

higher than the comparison vehicles. The analysis showed M939 Class A

mishap frequency rates per million miles driven to be 3 to 21 times higher

than those of similar M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton trucks.3

 For example, the

1995 Class A mishap rate for the M939 was 0.21 and for the 2-1/2 ton

M34/35s, it was 0.01 per million miles driven—about a 21-fold difference.

Figure 5 shows this comparison.

3

The M939, M34, and M35 series trucks are all classified as medium tactical vehicles. Army records

indicate that for the 1991-98 time frame, these three truck series comprised around 70 percent of all

vehicles similarly categorized.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Figure 5: Comparison of Rate of Class A M939 and M34/35 Truck Mishaps, 1991-98

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Fiscal year

Class A mishaps per 1,000,000 miles

M939 M34/35

Note: For years 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998, the M34/35 had no Class A mishaps.

Source: 1998 Army Safety Center Analysis.

Army Plans to Spend

$234 Million to

Improve M939 Safety

Performance

The Army has initiated a program to improve the M939’s safety

performance and, according to TACOM estimates, plans to spend around

$234 million for various modifications. Most of the modifications are the

direct result of corrective actions suggested in studies. These studies

focused on identifying root causes of M939 accidents based on

information contained in accident investigation reports. On the basis of

the studies’ findings, the Army concluded that the overall truck design was

sound but that some modifications were necessary to improve the truck’s

safety performance. Planned modifications include $120 million for

upgrading the trucks tires, altering brake proportioning specifications, and

adding anti-lock brake kits. Other modifications include $114 million to

install cabs equipped with rollover crush protection systems and improve

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
B-282071 

accelerator linkage. The modifications, for the most part, will be

completed by 2005 with the M939s remaining in service during the process.

Higher Accident Frequency

and Injury Severity Rates

Give Rise to M939 Causal

Studies

To identify possible mechanical problems or performance limitations

contributing to M939 accidents, the Army conducted two studies and a

computer simulated modeling analysis. Although M939 trucks have been in

service since 1983, Army Safety Center personnel stated that no aberrant

accident statistics appeared before early 1992. However, during 1990-91,

with the increased operating tempo associated with Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, there was an increase in fatal accidents and deaths attributable to

M939s.4

 In August 1992, TACOM issued Safety of Use Message 92-20

discussing M939 performance limitations. This message warned of the

truck’s sensitive braking system—specifically that, when the truck is

lightly loaded and on wet pavement, aggressive braking could cause rear

wheel lockup, engine stall-out, power steering inoperability, and

uncontrolled skidding.5

The Army began taking a closer look at the M939’s accident history after

circulating Safety of Use Message 92-20. Between 1993 and 1995, TACOM,

the Army Safety Center, and the Army Transportation School and Center

initiated a review of M939 accident reports and began putting together

evidence that validated the need for the studies. Also, in an effort to

reduce the number and severity of M939 accidents, the Army issued

Ground Precautionary Message 96-04 in December 1995, limiting M939s to

maximum speeds of 40 miles per hour on highway and secondary roads

and 35 miles per hour over cross-country roads.

Between September 1995 and June 1997, TACOM conducted two studies and

a computer simulation analysis. The studies among other things, recreated

and analyzed repetitive events cited in many accident investigation reports

and discussed in Safety of Use Message 92-20. The two studies and

modeling analysis focused on tire and air brake performance under

various conditions. On the basis of the project’s findings, TACOM concluded

the overall truck design was sound and nothing was significantly different

between the M939 and its commercial counterparts produced during the

4

We previously noted this increase in vehicle related fatal accidents during the Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm time period in our report, Military Safety: Analysis of DOD’s On-duty Non-aviation

Accident Fatalities (GAO/ NSIAD-99-14, Oct. 16, 1998).

5

The Army uses Ground Precautionary Messages and Safety of Use Messages to disseminate

servicewide safety information.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
B-282071 

same time period. However, the studies found that improvements to some

vehicle subsystems would enhance the truck’s safety performance.

The tire study completed in October 1996, together with other information

relating to M939 usage, confirmed that the M939s were being used on-road

more than originally planned. The original intent was for M939s to be

driven on-road 20 percent and off-road 80 percent of the time. In some

Army units, especially reserve units, this no longer held true. Some units

were using the M939s on-road as much as 80 to 90 percent of the time. The

truck’s original tire, designed for maximum efficiency during off-road

usage, performed less efficiently on-road, especially during inclement

weather. The increased on-road usage enhanced the probability of the

M939’s being involved in an accident. On the basis of this scenario, TACOM

tested several different tire designs looking to improve on-road traction

under all environmental conditions, while retaining required off-road

capabilities. The study recommended that all M939s be equipped with

radial tires.

The brake study, completed in June 1997, concluded that the air brake

system may lock up more quickly than drivers expect, especially when the

vehicle is lightly loaded. In tests, the Army found that aggressively applied

pressure to the brake pedal caused the sequence of events found in many

accident reports: wheel lockup, engine stall-out, loss of power steering,

and uncontrolled skidding, often culminating in rollover. The probability

of spin-out and rollover increased on wet or inclined surfaces. To lessen

the likelihood of wheel lockup and the resulting chain of events, the study

suggested (1) modification of all brake proportioning systems and

(2) installation of anti-lock braking kits.

The modeling analysis used computer technology to recreate the truck’s

probable behavioral characteristics in a simulated environment and also to

validate conditions being tested in the studies. According to TACOM

officials, the modeling results correlated with actual testing results

compiled during the tire and brake studies.

Besides the recommended improvements from the studies, the Army

identified others it considered necessary. The Army decided to replace

M939 cabs when they wore out with ones outfitted with a rollover crush

protection system and also to modify the accelerator pedal resistance on

the A2 variant of the M939. Both TACOM and Army Safety Center personnel

stated that installation of the reinforced cab rollover crush protection

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
B-282071 

system, while not an industry standard or required by law, would better

protect M939 occupants in the event of a rollover.

Ongoing or Scheduled

M939 Modifications

According to TACOM officials, the scheduled M939 modifications will cost

around $234 million. The Army estimates that tire upgrades, brake

proportioning, and anti-lock brake system improvements will cost about

$120 million or about $3,800 per truck; adding cab rollover protection and

modifying the A2’s accelerator linkage will cost another $114 million or an

additional $3,600 per truck. With respect to the current schedule for

completing M939 modifications, brake proportioning and accelerator

linkage equipment modifications will be completed by the end of fiscal

year 1999; all remaining modifications, except for cab replacement, are

scheduled for completion around 2005. Because the truck cabs will be

replaced as they wear out, a precise schedule for completing this

modification cannot be estimated at this time.

Even though some of the M939s have been in service for 15 years, the

decision to spend $234 million on modifications and equipment upgrades

is based on the need to improve the vehicles’ safety because the Army

expects these trucks to be in service for at least 30 years. According to

TACOM, the June 1998, M939 inventory was around 31,800 trucks. All M939s

will be equipped with radial tires, brake reproportioning, anti-lock brake

kits installation, and reinforced cab replacements. However, the

accelerator linkage improvements are needed only on the 16,800 A2

variant of the trucks. Table 1 shows the schedule for the planned

modifications.

Table 1: Scheduled M939

Modifications, Costs, and Completion

Dates

Dollars in millions

Scheduled action Estimated cost

Completion date

(fiscal year)

Upgrade tires $39.5 2003

Realign brake proportioning 3.5 1999

Install anti-lock brake kits 77.4 2005

Add rollover crush protection cabs 112.0 2005a

Modify accelerator linkage 2.0 1999

Total $234.4

aReplacement of all M939 cabs may not be completed by the end of fiscal year 2005 because

they are being replaced when they wear out.

Source: Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Although most scheduled modifications will not be completed until fiscal

year 2005 or later, TACOM and Army Safety Center personnel noted that

accident rates have declined significantly since the reduced speed limits

instituted by the December 1995 precautionary message. Figure 6 shows

the drop in the number of mishaps since 1995.

Figure 6: M939 Class A Incident Rates

Since 1995

1995 1996 1997 1998

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Fiscal year

Class A incidents per 1,000,000 miles

M939

Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.

Army officials believe the modifications being made to the M939s will

improve their safety performance and reduce severe accidents, rollovers,

and fatalities.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD stated that

it concurred with this report and noted that the report accurately

describes problems the Army found to be causing M939 accidents.

Scope and

Methodology

To analyze the accident history of the M939 series 5-ton tactical vehicle,

we obtained specific information from the Army Safety Center, Fort

Rucker, Alabama; TACOM, Warren, Michigan; the Department of

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.; and

the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

To identify any accident anomalies associated with the M939s, we

conducted two analyses and reviewed another conducted by the Army

Safety Center. Our first analysis compared selected M939 accident

statistics with similar information for the overall Army motor vehicle fleet

(of which M939s are a subset). Our second analysis compared M939

accident statistics per million miles driven to Department of

Transportation accident statistics for comparable commercial trucks. The

Army Safety Center study we reviewed compared various M939 accident

frequency rates per million miles driven with rates for comparable military

tactical trucks.

The number of years used in each comparison varied on the basis of the

data available. Army motor vehicle fleet to M939 comparisons did not

include events prior to 1987 because some accident statistics were not

readily available. Our comparison of rates of M939 fatal accident events

and vehicle occupant fatalities with rates for corresponding commercial

sector trucks was limited to 1987-1996 due to the unavailability of accident

data for commercial sector vehicles after 1996. Lastly, the Army Safety

Center study comparing M939 Class A accident rates with rates for other

similar Army tactical vehicles only included events occurring between

October 1990 and June 1998. The extent to which other factors, such as

human error, driver training, and off-road versus on-road usage, may have

contributed to disparate accident rates was beyond the scope of this

review.

To assess Army initiatives directed at identifying M939 performance,

mechanical, or systemic problems and limitations, as well as

recommended corrective actions, we obtained or reviewed relevant Army

studies. We also interviewed officials at the Army Safety Center and TACOM

about these studies but did not assess or validate the findings, estimated

costs, or recommendations resulting from these studies.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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Although we worked with personnel from the Army Safety Center, TACOM,

Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Army during

data gathering and reviewed those results for reasonableness, accuracy,

and completeness, we did not validate the accuracy of accident statistics

contained in various databases or other published information. However,

this data is used to support the management information needs of both

internal and external customers and is periodically reviewed internally by

each organization for accuracy, completeness, and validity.

We conducted our review from July 1998 through February 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army,

and interested congressional committees. Copies will also be made

available to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were

Carol R. Schuster; Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Kevin C. Handley; and Gerald L.

Winterlin.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

M939 Selected

Accident Statistics

Compared to All

Other Army Motor

Vehicles, 1987-1998

18

Appendix II 

M939 Fatal Crash and

Occupant Fatality

Statistics Compared

to Commercial,

Single-Unit Medium

and Heavy Trucks,

1987-1996

19

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

20

Table Table 1: Scheduled M939 Modifications, Costs, and Completion

Dates

12

Figures Figure 1: M939A2 5-Ton Tactical Cargo Truck 2

Figure 2: Comparison of Selected M939 Accident Statistics to

Remaining Army Motor Vehicle Fleet, 1987-1998

5

Figure 3: Comparison of Rate of Commercially Driven Single-Unit

Medium and Heavy Trucks Fatal Crashes with Related M939

Statistics, 1987-1996

6

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Contents

Figure 4: Comparison of Rate of Commercially Driven Single-Unit

Medium and Heavy Trucks Occupant Fatalities with Related

M939 Statistics, 1987-1996

7

Figure 5: Comparison of Rate of Class A M939 and M34/35 Truck

Mishaps, 1991-98

9

Figure 6: M939 Class A Incident Rates Since 1995 13

Abbreviations

AMV Army Motor Vehicles

DOD Department of Defense

SUMHT single-unit medium and heavy trucks

TACOM Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Appendix I 

M939 Selected Accident Statistics Compared

to All Other Army Motor Vehicles,

1987-1998

Total accidents Fatal accidents Occupant deaths Total rollovers Rollover deaths

Year M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV

1987 258 2264 3 22 3 23 25 344 2 12

1988 191 1867 8 22 8 24 30 292 7 15

1989 164 1239 3 18 3 18 29 250 2 12

1990 149 1054 9 29 12 31 28 178 10 16

1991 175 958 12 41 13 51 44 179 13 30

1992 138 618 4 14 4 14 40 140 3 12

1993 130 543 10 22 10 23 39 117 9 18

1994 102 464 3 6 3 6 30 105 3 3

1995 84 415 8 16 10 19 24 85 6 14

1996 84 353 3 9 3 9 18 85 3 6

1997 62 311 4 4 5 5 9 52 2 2

1998 21 117 2 2 2 2 4 24 2 2

Total 1,558 10,203 69 205 76 225 320 1,851 62 142

Note: “Fatal accidents” are defined as any accident event in which at least one occupant of an

Army motor vehicle (AMV) died. For all other definitions, see page 3 of this report.

Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Appendix II 

M939 Fatal Crash and Occupant Fatality

Statistics Compared to Commercial,

Single-Unit Medium and Heavy Trucks,

1987-1996

Fatal crashes Occupant fatalities Million miles driven

Year M939 SUMHTa M939 SUMHTa M939 SUMHTa

1987 8 1,118 3 177 56.8 49,537.

1988 13 1,014 8 180 56.5 51,239.

1989 6 1,056 3 187 65.8 52,969.

1990 11 979 12 185 87.4 53,443.

1991 17 1,072 13 168 109.2 53,787.

1992 5 987 4 156 88.6 53,691.

1993 12 1,054 10 159 70.3 56,781.

1994 4 1,188 3 193 58.7 61,284.

1995 12 1,133 10 176 60.7 62,705.

1996 5 1,159 3 174 85.5 63,967.

aSingle-unit medium and heavy trucks.

Note: “Fatal crashes” are defined as any event in which someone is killed in a crash—vehicle

occupant or otherwise—and “truck occupant fatalities” as a fatality of an occupant of a single-unit

or M939 truck.

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety Center, and

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

(703276) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
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