13-3337 Contreras v. Perimenis 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14 thday of April, two thousand fourteen. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNIS JACOBS, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges

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_________________________________________ Olga P. Contreras, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 13-3337 Georgette Perimenis, Jill Edgar, Doctor, Magdalena Castro, Brianne White, Hensley Flash, Defendants-Appellees

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_________________________________________ FOR APPELLANT: Olga P. Contreras, pro se , Greenwich, CT FOR APPELLEES: Zenobia G. Graham-Days, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, on behalf of

Georgette Perimenis. Jonathan B. Orleans (Nathaniel J. Gentile, on the brief ), Pullman & Comley LLC, Bridgeport, CT, on behalf of Jill Edgar.John E. Tucker (Benjamin Zivyon, on the brief ), for George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, on behalf of Magdalena Castro, Brianne White, and Hensley Flash. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 1 Connecticut (Thompson, J. ). 2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 3 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 4 Appellant Olga P. Contreras, pro se , appeals from the district court’s judgment 5 dismissing her amended complaint against the Appellees. We assume the parties’ 6 familiarity with the underlying facts, proceduralhistory of the case, and issues on appeal. 7 We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Jaghory v. New 9 York State Dep’t of Educ. , 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997); Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 10 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead 11 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 12 Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 13 Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is 14 “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. 15 While all complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the 16 plausibility standard, we look for such allegations in pro se complaints by reading them 17 with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they 18 suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per 19

2curiam) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). In addition to the requirement 1 that pro se complaints be liberally construed, district courts should generally not dismiss 2 them without granting the plaintiff leave to amend at least once. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu , 3 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). A district court may deny leave to amend, though, when 4 such an amendment would be futile. See Pangburn v. Culbertson , 200 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d 5 Cir. 1999). We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See id. at 70. 6 Having conducted an independent and de novoreview of the record in light of 7 these principles, we conclude that the di strict court properly dismissed Contreras’s 8 amended complaint for failure to state a claim against any defendant. To the extent that 9 Contreras asks us simply to reverse the finding of the state court that she neglected her 10 child, we simply lack the jurisdiction to review a state court judgment of this kind. See 11 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983); Rooker v. 12 Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). To the extent she seeks other relief, her 13 conclusory allegations of intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin are 14 insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. 15 Moreover, the district court properly concluded that Assistant Attorney General 16 Hensley Flash was entitled to absolute immunity because he was sued in his capacity as a 17 government advocate prosecuting child welfare cases. See Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 18 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1984) (extending absolute immunity to of government attorneys 19 initiating and prosecuting child protection litigation). The district court further did not 20 abuse its discretion in denying Contreras leave to amend her complaint for a second time, 21 as amendment would have been futile. 22 23 3For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Contreras’s arguments, we 1 hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 2 FOR THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4 5

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