GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control,

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

9:00 a.m., EST

Wednesday,

February 24, 1999

DRUG CONTROL

Update on U.S.-Mexican 

Counternarcotics Efforts

Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International 

Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and 

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-86

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-86 Drug Control

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the counternarcotics 

efforts of the United States and Mexico. My statement today will highlight 

the findings from our ongoing effort to update our June 1998 report,1

 as 

requested by Senator Grassley and Congressman Hastert. I will discuss 

two broad issues: (1) Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat and

(2) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico.

Summary At last year’s hearing on U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts,2

 I 

stated that Mexico was the principal transit country for cocaine entering 

the United States. That has not changed. Mexico is one of the largest 

centers for narcotics-related business in the world. It is either a producer, 

refiner, or transit point for cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and 

heroin, and is a major hub for the recycling of drug proceeds. U.S. law 

enforcement officials have told us that the Juarez drug trafficking 

organization is as powerful and dangerous as the Medellin and Cali cartels 

used to be. The porous 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border and the daunting 

volume of legitimate cross-border traffic—86 million cars and 4 million 

trucks and railcars entered the United States from Mexico in 1998—provide 

near limitless opportunities for the smuggling of illicit drugs and the 

proceeds from the sale of these drugs. The United States and Mexico face a 

formidable challenge in combating illicit drug-trafficking.

Last year I testified that, with U.S. assistance, Mexico had taken steps to 

improve its capability to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United 

States. I also said that it was too early to determine the impact of these 

actions and that challenges to their full implementation remained. While 

some high-profile law enforcement actions were taken in 1998, major 

challenges remain. New laws passed to address organized crime, money 

laundering, and the diversion of chemicals used in narcotics manufacturing 

have not been fully implemented. Moreover, during 1998, opium poppy 

eradication and drug seizures remained at about the same level as in 1995. 

In addition, no major Mexican drug trafficker was surrendered to the 

United States on drug charges. 

1Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, 

June 30, 1998).

2

Drug Control: Status of Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-129, Mar. 18, 1998).

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Mexican government counternarcotics activities in 1998 have not been 

without positive results. One of its major accomplishments was the arrest 

of two major drug traffickers commonly known as the “Kings of 

Methamphetamine.” Although all drug-related charges against the two 

have been dropped, both are still in jail and being held on U.S. extradition 

warrants. The Mexican foreign ministry has approved the extradition of 

one of the traffickers to the United States, but he has appealed the decision. 

In addition, during 1998 the Organized Crime Unit of the Attorney General's 

Office conducted a major operation in the Cancun area where four hotels 

and other large properties allegedly belonging to drug traffickers 

associated with the Juarez trafficking organization were seized. Mexico 

also implemented its currency and suspicious transaction reporting 

requirements.

In addition, the Mexican government has proposed or undertaken a 

number of new initiatives. For example, it has initiated an effort to prevent 

illegal drugs from entering Mexico, announced a new counternarcotics 

strategy and the creation of a national police force.

One of the major impediments to U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics 

objectives is Mexican government corruption. Corruption remains 

widespread within Mexican government institutions, including the criminal 

justice system. According to one U.S. estimate, Mexican narcotics 

traffickers spend as much as $6 billion a year to suborn government 

officials at all levels. Recognizing the impact of corruption on law 

enforcement agencies, the President of Mexico (1) expanded the role of the 

military in counternarcotics activities and (2) introduced a screening 

process for personnel working in certain law enforcement activities. 

However, neither of these initiatives can be considered a panacea for the 

narcotics-related problems confronting the United States and Mexico. 

Since these initiatives, a number of senior military and screened personnel 

were found to be either involved in or suspected of drug-related activities.

Since 1997, the Departments of State and Defense have provided the 

government of Mexico with over $112 million worth of equipment, training, 

and aviation spare parts for counternarcotics purposes. The major 

assistance included UH-1H helicopters, C-26 aircraft, and two Knox-class 

frigates purchased by the government of Mexico through the Foreign 

Military Sales program. Last year I testified that some of the assistance 

provided to the Mexican military was of limited usefulness due to 

operational and logistical support problems. In the past year, the two 

frigates have become operational. Unfortunately, the situation with the 

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helicopters has worsened. Since late March 1998, all of the 72 UH-1H 

helicopters provided to the Mexican military have been grounded because 

of airworthiness concerns.3

 In addition, the four C-26 aircraft are still not 

being used for counternarcotics operations. 

Background The United States has assisted the Mexican government in its 

counternarcotics efforts since 1973, providing about $350 million in aid. 

Since the late 1980s, U.S. assistance has centered on developing and 

supporting Mexican law enforcement efforts to stop the flow of cocaine 

from Colombia, the world's largest supplier, into Mexico and onward to the 

United States. According to U.S. estimates, Mexican narcotics-trafficking 

organizations facilitate the movement of between 50 and 60 percent of the 

almost 300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in the United States annually. 

In the early 1990s, the predominant means of moving cocaine from 

Colombia to Mexico was by aircraft. However, a shift to the maritime 

movement of drugs has occurred over the past few years. In 1998, only two 

flights were identified as carrying cocaine into Mexico. According to U.S. 

law enforcement officials, most drugs enter Mexico via ship or small boat 

through the Yucatan peninsula and Baja California regions. Additionally, 

there has been an increase in the overland movement of drugs into Mexico, 

primarily through Guatemala.

Since 1996, most U.S. assistance has been provided by the Department of 

Defense to the Mexican military, which has been given a much larger 

counternarcotics and law enforcement role. On the other hand, the 

Department of State’s counternarcotics assistance program has been 

concentrating on supporting the development of specialized law 

enforcement units, encouraging institutional development and modernizing 

and strengthening training programs. Table 1 provides additional 

information on U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the government of 

Mexico since 1997.

3

In March 1998, the U.S. Army issued a "safety of flight" message that grounded all of its UH-1H 

helicopters due to mechanical failures in the engine. The Mexican military subsequently grounded its 

72 UH-1H helicopter fleet, while the Mexican Attorney General’s Office continued to fly most of its

UH-1H helicopters on a restricted basis according to guidelines outlined by the manufacturer and the 

U.S. Army.

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Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Provided to the Government of Mexico 

(fiscal years 1997-99)

aSection 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(2), 

authorizes the President to approve the provision of U.S. military goods and services to a foreign 

country for counternarcotics assistance when it is in the U.S. national interest. 

bSection 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended

(P.L. 101-510) authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide counternarcotics training and other 

types of assistance to drug-producing countries. 

c

Section 1031 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 1997 (P.L. 104-201) 

authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide $8 million in counternarcotics assistance to Mexico in 

fiscal year 1997. 

dFor fiscal year 1999, the reduced U.S. training program will focus on providing Mexican personnel with 

more technical skills such as helicopter pilot training and helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft 

maintenance.

Sources: U.S. embassy in Mexico, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the 

Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense. 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to 

certify annually that major drug-producing and -transit countries are fully 

cooperating with the United States in their counternarcotics efforts.4

 As 

part of this process, the United States established specific objectives for 

evaluating the performance of these countries. According to State 

Department officials, as part of the March 1999 certification decision, the 

United States will essentially use the same objectives it used for evaluating 

Dollars in millions

Source of Assistance FY 1997

FY 1998

(estimated)

FY 1999

(estimated)

Department of State $ 5.0 $ 5.0 $ 8.0

Department of Justice 2.0

Department of Defense

 International Military

 Education and Training 1.0 0.9 1.0

 Section 506 drawdowna 24.0 1.1

 Section 1004b 28.9 20.1 7.9

 Section 1031c 8.0

Subtotal, Defense $61.9 $22.1 $ 8.9d

Total $66.9 $27.1 $18.9

4

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(j)), requires the 

President to certify by March 1 of each year which major drug-producing and transit countries 

cooperated fully with the United States or took adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance 

during the previous year with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations 

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

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Mexico's counternarcotics cooperation in March 1998. These include

(1) reducing the flow of drugs into the United States, (2) disrupting and 

dismantling narcotrafficking organizations, (3) bringing fugitives to justice, 

(4) making progress in criminal justice and anticorruption reform,

(5) improving money-laundering and chemical diversion control, and

(6) continuing improvement in cooperation with the United States. 

Mexico's 

Counternarcotics 

Efforts

Although there have been some difficulties, the United States and Mexico 

have undertaken some steps to enhance cooperation in combating illegal 

drug activities. Mexico has also taken actions to enhance its 

counternarcotics efforts and improve law enforcement capabilities. There 

have been some positive results from the new initiatives, such as the arrest 

of two major drug traffickers and the implementation of the currency and 

suspicious transaction reporting requirements. Overall, the results show:

• drugs are still flowing across the border at about the same rate as 1997, 

• there have been no significant increases in drug eradication and 

seizures, 

• no major drug trafficker has been extradited to the United States, 

• money-laundering prosecutions and convictions have been minimal, 

• corruption remains a major impediment to Mexican counternarcotics 

efforts, and 

• most drug trafficking leaders continue to operate with impunity. 

U.S.-Mexico 

Counternarcotics 

Cooperation

The United States and Mexico have cooperated in the development of a 

binational counternarcotics drug strategy, which was released in February 

1998. This strategy contains 16 general objectives, such as reducing the 

production and distribution of illegal drugs in both countries and focusing 

law enforcement efforts against criminal organizations. Since the issuance 

of the binational strategy, a number of joint working groups, made up of 

U.S. and Mexican government officials, have been formed to address 

matters of mutual concern. A primary function of several of these working 

groups was to develop quantifiable performance measures and milestones 

for assessing progress toward achieving the objectives of the strategy. The 

performance measures were released during President Clinton’s 

February 15, 1999, visit to Mexico. A binational law enforcement plenary 

group was also established to facilitate the exchange of antidrug 

information. 

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Despite these cooperative efforts, information exchange remains a concern 

by both governments because some intelligence and law enforcement 

information is not shared in a timely manner, which impedes drug 

trafficking operations. Operation Casablanca5

 created tensions in relations 

between the two countries because information on this undercover 

operation was not shared with Mexican officials.

In the aftermath of Operation Casablanca, the United States and Mexico 

have taken action to strengthen communications between the two 

countries. An agreement reached by the U.S. and Mexican Attorneys 

General (commonly referred to as the “Brownsville Letter”) calls for

(1) greater information-sharing on law enforcement activities; 

(2) providing advance notice of major or sensitive cross-border activities of 

law enforcement agencies; and (3) developing training programs 

addressing the legal systems and investigative techniques of both 

countries.6

Data for 1998 show that Mexico has, for the most part, not significantly 

increased its eradication of crops and seizures of illegal drugs since 1995. 

While Mexico did increase its eradication of opium poppy, eradication of 

other crops and seizures have remained relatively constant. Cocaine 

seizures in 1998 were about one-third lower than in 1997. However, the 

large seizure amount in 1997 was attributable, in part, to two large cocaine 

seizures that year. 

Executive and Legislative 

Action

Last year I testified that the government of Mexico took a number of 

executive and legislative actions, including initiating several anticorruption 

measures, instituting extradition efforts, and passing various laws to 

address illegal drug-related activities. I also said that it was too early to 

determine their impact, and challenges to their full implementation 

remained. While some progress has been made, implementation challenges 

remain. 

5Operation Casablanca, a 3-year undercover operation led by the U.S. Customs Service that targeted 

money-laundering operations in Mexico, netted about $100 million in illicit drug proceeds.

6

On February 15, 1999, the Attorneys General of Mexico and the United States signed a follow-up 

agreement. The new agreement established points of contact, timing, and forms of notification and 

provides for the exchange of annual reports by the two Attorneys General on compliance.

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Anticorruption I testified last year that corruption was pervasive and entrenched within 

the justice system—that has not changed. According to U.S. and Mexican 

law enforcement officials, corruption remains one of the major 

impediments affecting Mexican counternarcotics efforts. These officials 

also stated that most drug-trafficking organizations operate with impunity 

in parts of Mexico. Mexican traffickers use their vast wealth to corrupt 

public officials and law enforcement and military personnel, as well as to 

inject their influence into the political sector. For example, it is estimated 

that the Arelleno-Felix organization pays $1 million per week to Mexican 

federal, state, and local officials to ensure the continued flow of drugs to 

gateway cities along Mexico’s northwest border with the United States. A 

recent report by the Attorney General's Office of Mexico recognized that 

one basic problem in the fight against drug trafficking has been "internal 

corruption in the ranks of the federal judicial police and other public 

servants of the Attorney General's Office."

As we reported last year, the President of Mexico publicly acknowledged 

that corruption is deeply rooted in the nation's institutions and general 

social conduct, and he began to initiate reforms within the law 

enforcement community. These include (1) reorganizing the Attorney 

General’s office and replacing the previously discredited drug control office 

with the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes Against Health; (2) firing or 

arresting corrupt or incompetent law enforcement officials;

(3) establishing a screening process to filter out corrupt law enforcement 

personnel; and (4) establishing special units within the military, the 

Attorney General’s Office, and the Secretariat of Hacienda—the Organized 

Crime Unit,7

 the Bilateral Task Forces8 and Hacienda’s Financial Analysis 

Unit—to investigate and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico 

and along the U.S.-Mexico border and investigate money-laundering 

activities. Additionally, the President expanded the counternarcotics role 

of the military.

The Organized Crime Unit and the Bilateral Task Force were involved in 

several counternarcotics operations in 1998, for example, the capture of 

two major narcotics traffickers and the recent seizure of properties 

7The Organized Crime Unit was established through the organized crime law to conduct investigations 

and prosecutions aimed at criminal organizations, including those involved in drug-trafficking 

activities.

8

The Bilateral Task Forces are specialized units within the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes 

Against Health and are responsible for investigating and dismantling the most significant 

drug-trafficking organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border.

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belonging to alleged drug traffickers in the Cancun area, as well as the 

seizure of money, drugs, and precursor chemicals at the Mexico City 

Airport.

However, many issues still need to be resolved—some of them the same as 

we reported last year. For example,

• there continues to be a shortage of Bilateral Task Force field agents as 

well as inadequate Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel, 

and salary supplements for the agents. (Last year the Drug Enforcement 

Administration provided almost $460,000 to the Bilateral Task Forces to 

overcome this lack of support);

• the Organized Crime Unit remains significantly short of fully screened 

staff;

• there have been instances of inadequate coordination and 

communications between Mexican law enforcement agencies, and

• Mexico continues to face difficulty building competent law enforcement 

institutions because of low salaries and the lack of job security.

Additionally, increasing the involvement of the Mexican military in law 

enforcement activities and establishing screening procedures have not 

been a panacea for the corruption issues facing Mexico. A number of 

senior Mexican military officers have been charged with cooperating with 

narcotics traffickers. One of the most notable of these was General Jesus 

Gutierrez Rebollo, former head of the National Institute for Combat 

Against Drugs—the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration. In addition, as we reported last year, some law 

enforcement officials who had passed the screening process had been 

arrested for illegal drug-related activities. In September 1998, four of the 

Organized Crime Unit's top officials, including the Unit's deputy director, 

were re-screened and failed. Two are still employed by the Organized 

Crime Unit, one resigned, and one was transferred overseas.

Extradition Since my testimony last year, no major Mexican national drug trafficker has 

been surrendered to the United States. In November 1998, the government 

of Mexico did surrender to the United States a Mexican national charged 

with murdering a U.S. Border Patrol officer while having about 40 pounds 

of marijuana in his possession. However, U.S. and Mexican officials agree 

that this extradition involved a low-level trafficker who, unlike other 

traffickers, failed to use legal mechanisms to slow or stop the extradition 

process. According to the Justice Department, Mexico has approved the 

extradition of eight other Mexican nationals charged with drug-related 

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offenses. They are currently serving criminal sentences, pursuing appeals, 

or are being prosecuted in Mexico. 

U.S. and Mexican officials expressed concern that two recent judicial 

decisions halting the extradition of two major traffickers represented a 

setback for efforts to extradite Mexican nationals. The U.S. officials stated 

that intermediate courts had held that Mexican nationals cannot be 

extradited if they are subject to prosecution in Mexico. U.S. officials 

believe that these judicial decisions could have serious consequences for 

the bilateral extradition relationship between the two countries

In November 1997, the United States and Mexico signed a temporary 

extradition protocol. The protocol would allow suspected criminals who 

are serving sentences in one country and are charged in the other to be 

temporarily surrendered for trial while evidence is current and witnesses 

are available. To become effective, the protocol required approval by the 

congresses of both countries. The U.S. Senate approved the protocol in 

October 1998; however, the protocol has not yet been approved by the 

Mexican congress. 

Organized Crime Law According to U.S. and Mexican officials, the 1996 organized crime law9

 has 

not been fully implemented, and its impact is not likely to be fully evident 

for some time. According to U.S. law enforcement officials, Mexico has 

made some use of the plea bargaining and wiretapping provisions of the 

law. However, U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials pointed to 

judicial corruption as slowing the use of the wiretapping provision and 

have suggested the creation of a corps of screened judges, who would be 

provided with extra money, security, and special arrangements to hear 

cases without fear of reprisals. Additionally, results of Mexico's newly 

created witness protection program are not encouraging—two of the six 

witnesses in the program have been killed.

U.S. and Mexican officials continue to believe that more efforts need to be 

directed toward the development of a cadre of competent and trustworthy 

judges and prosecutors that law enforcement organizations can rely on to 

9

The organized crime law was passed in November 1996 and authorized the use of plea bargaining and 

confidential informants, established a witness protection program, and allowed for the use of 

controlled deliveries and court-approved wiretaps. The Law also has provisions for asset seizures and 

forfeiture.

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Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-86 Drug Control

effectively carry out the provisions of the organized crime law. U.S. 

agencies continue to provide assistance in this area.

Money Laundering Mexico has begun to successfully implement the currency and suspicious 

transaction reporting requirements,10 resulting in what U.S. law 

enforcement officials described as a flood of currency and suspicious 

transaction reporting. Mexican officials also indicated that Operation 

Casablanca resulted in a greater effort by Mexican banks to adhere to antimoney-laundering regulations. However, U.S. officials remain concerned 

that there is no requirement to obtain and retain account holders’ 

information for transactions below the $10,000 level. No data is available 

on how serious this problem is and there is no reliable data on the 

magnitude of the money-laundering problem.11

Between May 1996 and November 1998, the Mexican government issued

35 indictments and/or complaints on money-laundering charges; however, 

only one case has resulted in a successful prosecution. The remaining

34 cases are still under investigation or have been dismissed. 

Chemical Controls Last year we reported that the new chemical control law12 was not fully 

implemented due to the lack of an administrative infrastructure for 

enforcing its provisions. This is still the case. Mexico is currently in the 

process of developing this infrastructure as well as the guidelines 

necessary to implement the law. However, U.S. officials remain concerned 

that the law does not cover the importation of finished products, such as 

over-the-counter drugs that could be used to make methamphetamines. 

10In May 1996, money laundering was made a criminal offense, with penalties of up to 22 years in 

prison. In March 1997, Mexico issued regulations requiring banks and other financial institutions to 

report currency transactions of over $10,000 U.S. dollars and to report suspicious transactions. Under 

the prior law, money laundering was a tax offense, there was no reporting requirement, and violators 

were only subject to a fine.

11We recently issued a report on alleged money laundering involving Raul Salinas.

Private Banking: Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money Laundering (GAO/OSI-99-1, Oct. 30, 1998).

12In May 1996, trafficking in drug precursor and essential chemicals was made a criminal offense. 

Although some chemicals that the United Nations recommends be controlled were not included in the 

law, Mexico passed additional legislation in December 1997 that included all chemicals, thus bringing 

Mexico into compliance with the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and other international agreements. Mexico has also taken further 

action to control chemicals by limiting the legal importation of precursor and essential chemicals to 

eight ports of entry and by imposing regulatory controls over the machinery used to manufacture drug 

tablets or capsules.

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New Initiatives Over the past year, Mexico has announced a new drug strategy and 

instituted a number of new counternarcotics initiatives. The government 

of Mexico also reported that it has channeled significant funds—$754 

million during 1998—into its ongoing campaign against drug trafficking. 

Mexico also indicated that it will earmark about $770 million for its 1999 

counternarcotics campaign.13

During 1998 and 1999, the government of Mexico announced a number of 

new initiatives. For example, 

• a federal law for the administration of seized, forfeited and abandoned 

goods that will allow authorities to use proceeds and instruments seized 

from crime organizations for the benefit of law enforcement is being 

considered,

• a federal law that will establish expedited procedures to terminate 

corrupt law enforcement personnel is also being considered, and

• the government of Mexico recently announced the creation of a new 

national police force.

In addition, the government of Mexico has initiated an operation to seal 

three strategic points in Mexico. The purpose of the program is to prevent 

the entry of narcotics and diversion of precursor chemicals in the Yucatan 

peninsula, Mexico's southern border, and the Gulf of California.

Furthermore, the Mexican government recently announced a 

counternarcotics strategy to crack down on drug traffickers. Mexico 

indicated that it plans to spend between $400 million and $500 million over 

the next 3 years to buy new planes, ships, radar and other military and law 

enforcement equipment. In addition to the new spending, Mexico reported 

that its new antidrug efforts will focus on improving coordination among 

law enforcement agencies and combating corruption more efficiently. A 

senior Mexican government official termed this new initiative a “total war 

against the scourge of drugs.”

Status of U.S. 

Assistance

Last year we noted that while U.S.-provided assistance had enhanced the 

counternarcotics capabilities of Mexican law enforcement and military 

organizations, the effectiveness and usefulness of some assistance were 

13Prior years’ funding information for Mexican counternarcotics activities is not available. 

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limited. For example, two Knox-class frigates purchased by the 

government of Mexico lacked the equipment needed to ensure the safety of 

the crew, thus making the ships inoperative. We also reported that the

73 UH-1H helicopters provided to Mexico to improve the interdiction 

capability of Mexican army units were of little utility above 5,000 feet, 

where significant drug-related activities and cultivation occur. In addition, 

we noted that four C-26 aircraft were provided to Mexico without the 

capability to perform intended surveillance missions and without planning 

for payment for the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. 

Mr. Chairman, let me bring you up to date on these issues. The two

Knox-class frigates have been repaired and are in operation. According to 

U.S. embassy officials, the government of Mexico is considering the 

purchase of two additional frigates. However, other problems remain. For 

example, in late March 1998, the U.S. Army grounded its entire UH-1H fleet 

until gears within the UH-1H engines could be examined and repairs could 

be made. The government of Mexico followed suit and grounded all of the 

U.S.-provided UH-1H helicopters until they could be examined.14 The 

helicopters were subsequently tested, with 13 of the Attorney General’s

27 helicopters and 40 of the military’s 72 helicopters receiving passing 

grades. According to Department of Defense officials, the helicopters that 

passed the engine tests could be flown on a restricted basis. U.S. embassy 

officials told us that the Office of the Attorney General has been flying its 

UH-1H helicopters on a restricted basis, but the Mexican military has 

decided to keep its entire fleet grounded until all are repaired. Finally, the 

four C-26 aircraft still are not being used for counternarcotics operations.

This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any 

questions you may have.

14To assist the government of Mexico in its drug interdiction and eradication efforts, the United States 

has provided 33 UH-1H helicopters to the Attorney General’s Office and 73 UH-1H helicopters to the 

Ministry of Defense since 1989. One Ministry of Defense helicopter and 6 Attorney General helicopters 

were subsequently destroyed in accidents.

(711363)
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