J-A09010-15

2015 PA Super 240

IN RE: ESTATE OF MARIO SACCHETTI, 

DECEASED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

APPEAL OF: LINDA SACCHETTI,

No. 3443 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order November 27, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Orphans' Court at No(s): O.C. NO.: 1122 DE OF 2011

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND STABILE, JJ.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2015

This declaratory judgment action was instituted in the orphans’ court 

division by Appellee Charles Sacchetti (“Charles”), in his capacity as 

executor of the Estate of Mario Sacchetti (“Mario”), deceased. The court 

ordered Appellant, Kai Mui Yau a/k/a Linda Sacchetti (“Ms. Yau”),1to return 

to the estate certain assets that she transferred to herself and assets that 

____________________________________________

1

 We refer to Appellant as Ms. Yau because Kai Mui Yau is the name that 

Appellant used in all legal documents of record herein, including a prenuptial 

agreement, two checking accounts she held in joint names with Mario, 

checks she made payable to herself and endorsed using that name, and all 

deeds to real estate that she owns in this country, including the deed 

invalidated in the present action. Kai Mui Yau was also the name that 

Appellant used to obtain a marriage license in Pennsylvania and to initiate a 

legal action that she filed in Pennsylvania. 
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were transferred to her by Mario. It also declared two specific bequests to 

Ms. Yau in Mario’s will to be void. We affirm. 

This action was instituted by a petition filed by Charles in the orphans’ 

court division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. In that 

petition, Charles asked for issuance of a citation to Ms. Yau to show cause 

why she should not be required to give him access to the final residence of 

Mario in order to administer personal property belonging to the estate. 

Charles averred the following. Mario, a resident of 2827 Bittern Place, 

Philadelphia, died testate on June 2, 2011. On June 22, 2011, Mario’s will 

was probated and letters testamentary were granted to Charles, his nephew. 

The dispositive provision of Mario’s last will and testament states, “I give, 

devise, and bequeath the following assets: Real Estate and $25,000 in cash, 

to my wife Linda Sacchetti, who has agreed to our Prenuptial Agreement, 

should she survive me for thirty days. The remainder of my Estate, I devise 

and Bequeath to my nephew, Charles Sacchetti[.]” Petition of the 

Executor of the Estate of Mario Sacchetti for a Decree giving him access to 

Inspect, Inventory and Take Custody of Estate Personal Property, 8/8/11, at 

Exhibit B (Last Will and Testament of Mario Sacchetti, 12/9/08) at 1 

(emphases in original). Charles’ wife and children were the alternative 

residual beneficiaries under Mario’s will. 

In the August 8, 2011 petition, Charles averred that Ms. Yau had 

prevented him from accessing any of decedent’s personal property located in 
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the home. Specifically, he claimed the “alleged widow of Mario Sacchetti, 

Linda Sacchetti aka Kai Mui Yau” had changed the locks on the residence 

and, despite arrangements made through counsel, refused to allow Charles 

into the house. 

Based upon the averments in this petition, the orphans’ court issued a 

citation to Ms. Yau to show cause why Charles should not be permitted into 

2827 Bittern Place in order to initiate administration of personal property 

located therein. Personal service of the citation was effectuated on Ms. Yau 

on October 13, 2011, at 429 Ritner Street, Philadelphia. 

On November 1, 2011, Charles filed a second petition in this action, 

asking that the marriage between Mario and Ms. Yau be declared invalid and 

that the specific bequests to Ms. Yau in the will be determined null and void. 

That petition was amended on November 14, 2011. Therein, Charles 

requested that any bequests to Ms. Yau be invalidated and that certain inter 

vivos transfers made to Ms. Yau be declared void. The allegations were as 

follows. On December 6, 2008, Mario purportedly entered into a marriage 

with Ms. Yau. Three days later, on December 9, 2008, Mario executed the 

aforementioned last will and testament set forth. When he executed that 

will, Mario did so based on the “assumption and belief that Linda Sacchetti 

aka Kai Mui Yau was his legal spouse.” Petition of the Executor of the Estate 

of Mario Sacchetti for a Decree Declaring the Purported Marriage of 

Decedent and Linda Sacchetti aka Kai Mui Yau Null and Void and that the 
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specific Bequests to Linda Sacchetti be Determined Null and Void, 11/14/11, 

at ¶ 7. Charles’ petition outlined that the marriage was void ab initio

because, on December 6, 2008, Ms. Yau was legally married to another 

man. 

On December 17, 2010, two years after she allegedly married Mario, 

Ms. Yau “filed for divorce in the Cameron County Court of Common Pleas of 

Pennsylvania seeking to be divorced from one Chan Cheung Kai.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

On February 16, 2011, the Court of Common Pleas of Cameron County 

issued a divorce decree declaring that Ms. Yau and Chan Cheung Kai were 

divorced. Id. at Exhibit D. 

Two months later, on April 5, 2011, the decedent, Mario Sacchetti 

“filed a complaint in annulment against the said Kai Mui Yau aka Linda 

Sacchetti in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family 

Division.” Id. at ¶ 5. The annulment was requested due to the fact that the 

December 6, 2008 marriage between Mario and Ms. Yau was invalid since, at 

that time, Ms. Yau was legally married to another man. Id. at Exhibit E. 

Mario died less than two months later.

Mario had previously deeded to Ms. Yau the real estate mentioned in 

the will, which was located at 2827 Bittern Avenue. One day after Mario 

died, Ms. Yau negotiated two checks payable to herself; each check was in 

the amount of $25,000. One was drawn on a joint account owned by Mario 

and Charles and contained the signature Mario Sacchetti. The other check 
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was drawn on a joint account that required both Mario’s and Ms. Yau’s 

signatures. Charles averred that Mario’s signature on both checks was 

forged. Charles asked the court to order the real estate and money that Ms. 

Yau received be returned to the estate for distribution to the residuary 

beneficiaries under the will. 

In response, Ms. Yau filed a petition for citation to show cause why 

Charles should not be removed as executor of Mario’s estate. Ms. Yau also 

answered Charles’ November 14, 2011 petition as follows. Prior to their 

marriage, Mario and Ms. Yau entered a prenuptial agreement whereby she 

was to receive the house on 2827 Bittern Avenue and $25,000 if Mario 

predeceased her. Ms. Yau claimed that she was never legally married to Mr. 

Kai in Hong Kong. She reported that they resided together for 

“approximately fifteen (15) years and [she] held him out to be her 

husband.” Linda Sacchetti’s Answer and New Matter to the November 14, 

2011 Amended Petition of the Executor, 12/5/11, at ¶ 13. They also had 

children together. Ms. Yau conceded that, when she entered the United 

States in 2002, she reported her marital status on her visa application as 

married. Id. at 3. 

Ms. Yau’s response also related the following. After Ms. Yau married 

Mario, Mario applied for a green card for Ms. Yau since the federal 

government permits permanent residence in the United States for aliens 

married to United States citizens. Ms. Yau would have qualified for a green 
J-A09010-15

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card if she was legally married to Mario. The United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services denied her a green card on the ground that the 

marriage between Mario and Ms. Yau was invalid since Ms. Yau already was 

married to Chan Cheung Kai. Ms. Yau denied that she was married to Chan 

Cheung Kai and claimed that the divorce lawsuit instituted against him was a 

mere formality instituted so that she could obtain a green card. 

Alternatively, Ms. Yau averred that, even if she was married to Mr. Kai when 

she married Mario, her marriage to Mario became valid under 23 Pa.C.S. § 

1702(a), set forth infra, following her February 16, 2011 divorce from Mr. 

Kai. 

Charles thereafter filed a series of petitions against Ms. Yau. His 

petitions requested the orphans’ court to: 1) set aside the deed whereby 

Mario transferred 2827 Bittern Avenue into the joint names of Ms. Yau and 

Mario; 2) void the prenuptial agreement and a transfer of title to a bank 

account at Prudential Savings Bank from Mario’s sole name into the joint 

names of Ms. Yau and Mario; 3) order Ms. Yau to return to the estate nearly 

$27,000 that she stole from a bank account held in the joint names of Mario 

and Charles using forged checks; and 4) order Ms. Yau to return to the

estate $10,000 in coins that were located in Mario’s home at the time of his 

death. 
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This action proceeded to a hearing on November 26, 2012. An 

interpreter was present for Ms. Yau. N.T. Hearing, 11/26/12, at 4-5.2 

Charles testified as follows. Mario was his uncle and “more of a second 

father” to him. Id. at 8. Mario was born on March 4, 1925, and was 

married to Rita Sacchetti for twenty years, until her death. He had no 

children. After Rita died in 1982, Charles saw Mario at least once a week 

and spoke to him on the telephone three to four times a week. After 1982, 

Mario did not date any women and typically passed his time playing poker 

and creating a coin collection, which occupied one of the bedrooms in the

house at 2827 Bittern Avenue. Charles, who has a bachelor’s degree in 

accounting and business administration, took care of Mario’s finances, took 

him to see his cardiologist, coordinated his medicines, and picked up 

incidental items for him. 

In 2008, at age eighty-three, Mario’s health began to decline. Mario 

introduced Ms. Yau to Charles about six months before their December 6, 

2008 marriage ceremony. After they were introduced, Ms. Yau and Charles 

carried on regular conversations in English, and she “seemed to have no 

trouble understanding” Charles. Id. at 16. Mario told Charles that he liked 

Ms. Yau and had decided to marry her. Mario told Charles that the marital 

____________________________________________

2

 At no point in the proceeding did Ms. Yau indicate that she was unable to 

understand the interpreter.
J-A09010-15

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arrangement was as follows. Mario was to “help [Ms. Yau] . . . become a 

citizen,” and would give her $25,000 and his 2827 Bittern Avenue home 

when he died. Id. at 14. In return, Mario “expected to have someone as a 

companion, . . . and he also expected her to take care of him, watch out for 

him, clean and cook.” Id. at 14-15. Mario explained that there could be no 

sexual activity on his part. At the time, Mario was in his eighties, and he 

also suffered from congestive heart failure and diabetes. Mario nevertheless 

wanted the ceremony to be held in a Catholic church. Charles contacted his 

priest, who refused to perform the marriage ceremony since “it was really 

more of a business arrangement and not a marriage[.]” Id. at 16. 

Charles recommended that a prenuptial agreement be entered. There 

was a delay in obtaining a prenuptial agreement because Ms. Yau did not 

want to reveal the extent of her assets.3 After the prenuptial agreement 

____________________________________________

3 Those assets included: 

Bank CDs Approximate Value $20,000

Checking Account Approximate Value $500

Savings Account Approximate Value $2,500

Real Properties in Philadelphia County, PA

429 Ritner St. Approximate Value $150,000

730 Hoffman St. Approximate Value $70,000

616 Fernon St. Approximate Value $110,000 

(50% ownership only)

1941 S. 6th St. Approximate Value $135,000 

(50% ownership only)

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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was signed, the parties obtained a marriage license; therein, Ms. Yau 

claimed that she had not been previously married. Trial Exhibit 1.

Ms. Yau and Mario purported to enter into a marriage on December 8, 

2008; the guests included Charles, his wife, his aunt Olga, his cousin 

Vincent, and Ms. Yau’s daughter. After that event, Charles communicated 

with Mario with the same frequency; Charles visited weekly and called often. 

Charles testified that Ms. Yau never moved to 2827 Bittern Avenue. She 

performed the housekeeping for a short period, but ceased performing that 

function soon after the marriage. N.T. Hearing, 11/26/12, at 20-21. In fact, 

shortly after the marriage ceremony, Ms. Yau was rarely present when 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

807 Snyder Ave. Approximate Value $120,000 

(50% ownership only)

Real Properties in Hong Kong, 

People's Republic of China

2 Flats in Kowloon Approximate Value $800,000 

(50% ownership only)

Bank CDs in Hong Kong, 

Approximate Value $60,000 

(50% ownership only

LIABILITIES

None

INCOME

None (rental income only)

Trial Exhibit 3. 
J-A09010-15

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Charles visited. Id. at 24. Since Ms. Yau did not take Mario to his doctor 

appointments, Charles continued to fulfill that function.

Mario discovered that his marriage was invalid two years later after 

Charles took Mario to obtain a green card for Ms. Yau. Charles introduced 

into evidence the December 17, 2010 divorce complaint filed by Ms. Yau as 

well as other documents indicating that Ms. Yau was married to Chan 

Cheung Kai when she attempted to marry Mario. Specifically, Ms. Yau 

purchased 1941 S. 6th Street, Philadelphia on March 9, 2006. The grantees 

in the deed were “Kai Mui Yau and Chan Cheung Kai.” Petition for Rule to 

Show Cause Why Prenuptial Agreement, Deed and Joint Bank Accounts 

Should Not Be Set Aside at Exhibit C; Trial Exhibit 22. Charles presented 

evidence that Chan Cheung Kai received mail at that residence through a 

postal form that indicated that Mr. Kai wanted his mail held for a period of 

time. In a mortgage note and in a release of mortgage for one of her 

properties, Ms. Yau was listed as “Kai Mui Yau, a married woman.” Trial 

Exhibits 19, 20. 

Toward the end of 2010, Mario’s cardiologist told Charles not to leave 

Mario alone. Charles conveyed this warning to Ms. Yau, who ignored the 

request to stay with Mario. Charles arranged for Mario to obtain a device 

that alerted an ambulance if a health issue arose. 

In February 2011, Mario’s health began to decline rapidly, and it 

became evident that he would soon die. On February 16, 2011, the Court of 
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Common Pleas of Cameron County issued a divorce decree declaring that 

Ms. Yau and Chan Cheung Kai were divorced. After Ms. Yau obtained a 

divorce from Mr. Kai, Mario made no attempt to reaffirm the marriage. N.T. 

Hearing, 11/26/12, at 37. Instead, he filed for annulment. Trial Exhibit 25. 

After February 16, 2011, Ms. Yau did not perform any housework and 

rarely visited.4 She did not care for or provide companionship for Mario. 

Charles reported that, occasionally, Ms. Yau would make meals for Mario, 

but the majority of the time Charles and his family made sure that Mario had 

food. They had a small family celebration for his eighty-sixth birthday on 

March 4, 2011. Ms. Yau was invited, but did not attend. 

After Mario died on June 2, 2011, Ms. Yau changed the locks on the 

house so that Charles was prevented from entering it to obtain estate 

property. Ms. Yau also took Mario’s car, which was solely in his name and 

was purchased prior to the purported marriage. The car was found in front 

of a property owned by Ms. Yau. Charles never recovered the coin 

collection, which Mario had assembled prior to his December 2008 marriage 

to Ms. Yau. 

____________________________________________

4 Charles’ representations that Ms. Yau was seldom present at Mario’s home 

and did not care or clean for him were supported by testimony from Mario’s 

sister Olga and Charles’ wife. They also confirmed Charles’ report that Ms. 

Yau infrequently cooked for Mario. 
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Charles also established the following. Mario and Charles had a joint 

banking account at Prudential Savings Bank (number 0014512405). The 

account was not titled in Ms. Yau’s name. On March 7, 2011, a check made 

payable to cash in the amount of $1,338.25 was negotiated by Kai Mui Yau. 

Mario’s name was signed to this check. On June 3, 2011, the day after Mario 

died, Ms. Yau negotiated a check made payable to herself in the amount of 

$25,000 from that joint account. Mario’s signature appeared on the 

signature line. 

At the hearing, Charles presented J. Wright Leonard, a forensic 

document/handwriting examiner who was board certified by the federal, 

state, and local courts. Ms. Leonard opined that Mario’s signature was 

forged on the $25,000 and $1,333.25 checks issued on the account in the 

names of Mario and Charles and negotiated by Ms. Yau. 

In addition to the bank account owned by Mario and Charles, Mario 

had another bank account at Prudential Savings Bank (number 

0012101713). That account originally was in Mario’s name alone, but, after 

the marriage ceremony with Ms. Yau, he placed her name on the account. 

The terms of the account required both Ms. Yau and Mario to execute a 

check in order for it to be negotiable. On June 3, 2011, Ms. Yau negotiated 

a $25,000 check payable to herself on that account. Kai Mui Yau and Mario 

both allegedly signed that check. Ms. Leonard reported that Mario’s 

signature on that check was forged. 
J-A09010-15

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In her defense, Ms. Yau denied that she was married to Chan Cheung 

Kai, whom she maintained was her boyfriend. However, at one point in the 

proceeding, she called Chan Cheung Kai her “husband in Hong Kong.” Id. at 

133. Ms. Yau also admitted that she and Mr. Kai had four children together 

and that he was the co-owner of two apartments that she owned in Hong 

Kong. The agreement of sale for one of the flats indicated that the buyers 

were Chan Cheung Kai and Kai Mui Yau, and immediately after her name 

were the words “married woman.” Id. at 160. Finally, on her 2002 visa 

application to enter the United States, Ms. Yau reported her marital status as 

married. Ms. Yau claimed that the divorce litigation against Mr. Kai was 

pursued merely to obtain a green card, and that Mario asked for an 

annulment not to void the marriage but to reaffirm it. 

Ms. Yau testified under oath that, with the exception of when she was 

injured in a car accident, “every day I was with Mario at home.” N.T. 

Hearing, 11/26/12, at 142. She represented that she and her daughter did 

everything for Mario when he was sick and that she slept in his bed and had 

a sexual relationship with him. Id. at 135-136. 

Following this evidence, the orphans’ court issued a series of decrees 

on June 28, 2013. It considered the testimony offered at the hearing and 

stated: “[A]s finder of fact I found the testimony of Charles Sacchetti, 

Decedent’s Nephew . . . to be credible, clear and convincing. On the other 

hand, I found the testimony of Ms. [Yau] to be wholly incredible and 
J-A09010-15

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unconvincing.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/22/14, at (unnumbered page) 6. 

The orphans’ court also specifically credited the testimony of Ms. Leonard 

and concluded that Mario’s signature on the three checks negotiated by Ms. 

Yau were forged. 

The orphans’ court ruled that the following were null and void: 1) the 

marriage between Appellant and Ms. Yau on December 6, 2008; 2) the 

prenuptial agreement entered between Mario and Linda Sacchetti a/k/a Kai 

Mui Yau; 3) all gifts, devises and bequests made to Linda Sacchetti a/k/a Kai 

Mui Yau in Mario’s will; 4) all gifts, devises and bequests made to Linda 

Sacchetti a/k/a Kai Mui Yau by Mario; 5) the deed dated February 27, 2009 

transferring 2827 Bittern Place from Mario to the joint names of Mario and 

Linda Sacchetti a/k/a Kai Mui Yau; and 6) the bank document transferring 

Prudential Bank Account 0012101713 from Mario’s name into the names of 

Mario and Linda Sacchetti a/k/a Kai Mui Yau. The real property, gifts, and 

bank account transferred to Ms. Yau were ordered returned to the estate. 

Ms. Yau filed exceptions to all the June 28, 2013 decrees. On November 25, 

2013, the orphans’ court dismissed the exceptions, and this appeal followed. 

On appeal, Ms. Yau avers:

1. Even if Decedent and Appellant were not lawfully 

married, were: 

(a) Decedent’s inter vivos conveyance of 

realty, (b) his testamentary bequests of land 

and cash, and (c) their joint bank accounts 

nevertheless effective and valid?
J-A09010-15

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2. Did the trial court erroneously declare the marriage 

between Decedent and Appellant to be invalid: (a) because 

Appellant and the father of her children never celebrated a 

marriage in Hong Kong or elsewhere?

(b) because the lower court failed to balance 

various presumptions in the interests of 

justice?

(c) because the allegedly invalid marriage 

subsequently became valid when Appellant 

obtained a divorce from the father of her 

children?

3. Did the trial court err by permitting the hearing to 

proceed after the interpreter announced that she could not 

understand Appellant because they spoke different 

dialects?

Ms. Yau’s brief at 5.

Before addressing the above claims, we must set forth the applicable 

standard of review herein. 

 Our standard of review of an orphans' court's decision is 

deferential. In re Estate of Strahsmeier, 54 A.3d 359, 362 

(Pa.Super. 2012). When reviewing an orphans' court decree, 

this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal 

error and whether the orphans' court's findings are supported by 

the record. Id. at 362–363. Because the orphans' court sits as 

the finder of fact, it determines the credibility of the witnesses 

and, on review, this Court will not reverse its credibility 

determinations absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 363. 

However, this Court is not bound to give the same deference to 

the orphans' court conclusions of law. Id. Where the rules of 

law on which the orphans' court relied are palpably wrong or 

clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court's decree. Id. 

Moreover, we point out that an abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment. However, if in reaching a conclusion, the 

court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised 

is shown by the record to be manifestly unreasonable or the 
J-A09010-15

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product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, discretion has 

been abused. Id.

In re Estate of Zeevering, 78 A.3d 1106, 1108 (Pa.Super. 2013).

We first address Ms. Yau’s final allegation, which is that the “lower 

court erroneously permitted the hearing to proceed after the interpreter 

announced that she could not understand Appellant because they spoke 

different dialects.” Appellant’s brief at 42. We examine this position initially 

since, if meritorious, it would require a remand for another hearing. 

The record belies Ms. Yau’s representation that the interpreter and Ms. 

Yau spoke different dialects. After the qualifications of the interpreter were 

outlined, the proceedings began. At no point did Ms. Yau protest to the 

orphans’ court that she could not understand the interpreter. Conversely, 

the interpreter never said that he did not understand Ms. Yau’s dialect of 

Chinese. 

When Ms. Yau, who was pro se at the hearing, began her crossexamination, problems arose because Ms. Yau was not conducting proper 

impeachment. Instead, she would call a witness a liar, argue with the 

witness, or start to testify as to her version of events. The court continued 

to interrupt Ms. Yau and instruct her that she had to ask questions and that 

she would have an opportunity to present her testimony later in the 

proceeding. These interruptions became admonishments since Ms. Yau 

continued to engage in prohibited argument and accusations. At one point, 
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Ms. Yau, without explaining this astonishing assertion, told the orphans’ 

court that she was not able to ask questions, even though she appeared to 

be quite adept at being argumentative. The translator, during the 

exchanges between Ms. Yau and the orphans’ court, had difficulty keeping 

up with the conversation, not understanding Ms. Yau’s dialect. He thus 

asked Ms. Yau to speak more slowly on a couple of occasions and was able 

to translate once she did so. Id. at 135, 137. 

It is not until Ms. Yau’s daughter, Nga Ting Chan, began to testify that 

the interpreter stated, “She is speaking in another language[.] I don’t 

understand the dialect in Chinese.” Id. at 118. This statement related 

solely to Nga Ting Chan. At that point, Ms. Yau translated her daughter’s 

testimony into English. Id. at 119-126. 

In addition, Charles testified that Ms. Yau had a firm grasp of the 

English language and had taken English lessons. This testimony was 

reinforced by the orphans’ court’s observations. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

5/22/14, at (unnumbered page) 6 (“I observed [Ms. Yau] speaking English 

just fine without an interpreter. Ms. [Yau’s] difficulties with the language 

seemed to come and go as she needed them.”). Ms. Yau earned her living 

by managing her rental properties, and thus, she had the ability to engage 

in financial dealings here in the United States. Given those facts and Ms. 

Yau’s translation of her daughter’s testimony, we concur with the orphans’ 

court assessment that Ms. Yau did not need an interpreter in the first 
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instance. We therefore conclude that Ms. Yau is not entitled to a new 

hearing due to the interpreter’s purported inability to speak her dialect of 

Chinese. 

We next address Ms. Yau’s position that she was legally married to 

Mario. We do so since, if Ms. Yau and Mario’s marriage was valid for any 

reason, we need not address whether the orphans’ court properly revoked 

the gifts and bequests that Mario made to Ms. Yau.5 In this respect, Ms. Yau 

first claims that she was never married in Hong Kong to Chan Cheung Kai. 

We conclude that the orphans’ court finding that Ms. Yau was married 

to Chan Cheung Kai was amply supported by the record and, thus, we 

cannot reverse that determination. On December 17, 2010, Kai Mui Yau 

filed a complaint in divorce against Chan Cheung Kai, who was then residing 

in Hong Kong. Petition of the Executor of the Estate of Mario Sacchetti for a 

Decree Declaring the Purported Marriage of Decedent and Linda Sacchetti 

aka Kai Mui Yau Null and Void and that the specific Bequests to Linda 

Sacchetti be Determined Null and Void, 11/14/11, at Exhibit C ¶¶ 1, 2; Trial 

Exhibit 4. The divorce complaint stated that Ms. Yau and Mr. Kai were 

____________________________________________

5 We note that this appeal pertains solely to the joint account created by 

Mario in his and Ms. Yau’s joint names and the transfer of 2827 Bittern 

Avenue into the joint names of Mario and Ms. Yau. Ms. Yau levels no 

challenge to the court’s finding that she must return the coin collection and 

the money that she stole from the joint account that was owned by Mario 

and Charles.
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“married on June 15, 1971 in Hong Kong.” Id. Ms. Yau personally verified 

that the contents of the complaint were true and correct and that the 

statements were made subject to penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904, which 

pertains to unsworn falsification to authorities. 

We observe that factual statements by a “party in pleadings . . . made 

for that party's benefit, are termed judicial admissions and are binding on 

the party.” Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288, 1292 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Judicial admissions are automatically considered “true and cannot be 

contradicted by the admitting party.” Id. Judicial admissions are 

“conclusive in the cause of action in which they are made—and any appeals 

thereof—and the opposing party need not offer further evidence to prove the 

fact admitted.” Id. In the present case, the facts set forth in the divorce 

complaint may not be considered as binding, since this action is different 

from the divorce lawsuit. Nevertheless, Ms. Yau swore to the veracity of the 

averments in the divorce proceedings upon penalty of criminal sanctions. 

She gave a precise date for her marriage to Mr. Kai. The orphans’ court 

thus was entitled to give great weight to the representations that Ms. Yau 

made in the divorce case. 

Additionally, Ms. Yau’s verified factual assertions in her divorce 

complaint filed against Mr. Kai were confirmed by other proof. For example, 

Ms. Yau called Mr. Kai her husband at the evidentiary hearing and admitted 

that, after she and Mario were refused a marriage license in 2007, she 
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attempted to obtain copies of her marriage license and divorce certificate 

with respect to Mr. Kai. In addition, Ms. Yau applied for a visa in 2002 and 

stated in that application that she was married. A deed and mortgage 

documents prepared prior to 2008 reported that Ms. Yau was a married 

woman. Finally, Ms. Yau admitted that the agreement of sale of one of her 

apartments in Hong Kong listed as buyers Chan Cheung Kai and Kai Mui Yau 

and that she was characterized therein as a married woman. The orphans’ 

court was not required to accept Ms. Yau’s testimony to the contrary.

On appeal, Ms. Yau relies upon a document that she attached to her 

answers to Charles’ various petitions. It was a copy, not an original, of a 

document purporting to be from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages for Hong 

Kong. It indicated that there was no record of a marriage for Ms. Yau from 

1945 to 2010 in Hong Kong. Contrary to Ms. Yau’s position in her brief, this 

document was never introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 

Appellant’s brief at 30 n. 9 (citing N.T.Hearing, 11/26/12, at 139-40). 

Instead, the record establishes that, at pages 139-40 of the transcript, 

Ms. Yau proffered a document containing three pages. The first page was a 

copy of the marriage ordinance enacted in Hong Kong, and the “next two 

pages are two pages from a larger document that was marked as an exhibit 

but the exhibit sticker has been pulled off and it purports to be a legal 

analysis of whether [Ms. Yau] entered a common law marriage when she 

cohabitated with her then boyfriend from 1975 to 1990 in Hong Kong.” N.T. 
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Hearing, 11/26/12, at 139. However, the document from the Deputy 

Registrar of Marriages of Hong Kong was never introduced into evidence. 

The document contained in the record and attached to Ms. Yau’s answers is 

a black and white copy. We decline to give any weight to the 

unauthenticated document that was never admitted at the evidentiary 

hearing herein. 

Ms. Yau’s second position about the validity of her marriage is that, 

“Even if Ms. Yau and Chan were legally married, the lower court was 

required to balance various presumptions in the interests of justice.” 

Appellant’s brief at 32. This position was never raised before the orphans’ 

court and was not addressed by it. In responses to Charles’ petitions, during 

the orphans’ court hearing and in her exceptions, Ms. Yau’s position was 

two-fold: 1) she never was married to Chan Cheung Kai; and 2) if she was 

married to Chan Cheung Kai, her marriage to Mario became valid after she 

divorced Chan Cheung Kai. Hence, this contention is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a). 

Ms. Yau’s third attempt to validate her marriage to Mario is premised 

on the following argument. Even if she had been legally married to Chan 

Cheung Kai when she married Mario, her marriage to Mario became valid as 

of February 16, 2011, the date she obtained a divorce from Chan Cheung 

Kai. In this connection, Ms. Yau relies upon this statute: 
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(a) General rule.--If a married person, during the lifetime of 

the other person with whom the marriage is in force, 

enters into a subsequent marriage pursuant to the 

requirements of this part and the parties to the marriage 

live together thereafter as husband and wife, and the 

subsequent marriage was entered into by one or both of 

the parties in good faith in the full belief that the former 

spouse was dead or that the former marriage has been 

annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge 

of the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to 

their marriage has been removed by the death of the other 

party to the former marriage or by annulment or divorce, if 

they continue to live together as husband and wife in good 

faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been 

legally married from and immediately after the date of 

death or the date of the decree of annulment or divorce.

23 Pa.C.S. § 1702(a). 

This provision was interpreted in Covington v. Covington, 617 A.2d 

1318 (Pa.Super. 1992), where the parties married based upon the belief that 

they were both legally divorced from their prior spouses. Husband’s divorce 

decree from his first wife, however, was not actually entered until thirteen 

days after the Covingtons’ May 29, 1971 marriage ceremony. Except for a 

brief separation in 1978, “the parties lived together as husband and wife” 

from May 29, 1971, until September 15, 1989, when Mrs. Covington filed a

divorce action against Mr. Covington. Id. at 1319. 

Mr. Covington requested and was awarded alimony pendente lite, 

which Mrs. Covington refused to pay. She maintained that their marriage 

was void since it was entered before Mr. Covington was actually divorced. 

He invoked 23 Pa.C.S. § 1702(a), and we affirmed the trial court’s 
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application of that section. We noted that Ms. Covington acknowledged that 

she had lived with Mr. Covington as husband and wife for years after he 

obtained the divorce decree from his previous wife. We rejected Ms. 

Covington’s assertion that she had to know about the impediment to her 

marriage and assent to the continued validity of the marriage once the 

impediment was removed. Thus, the fact that the Covingtons continued to 

live together as husband and wife after his divorce was granted was 

sufficient to satisfy § 1702(a). 

In order to properly fall within the express statutory language of § 

1702(a), Ms. Yau had to prove that she “lived together as husband and wife” 

with Mario after she obtained her divorce from Mr. Kai on February 16, 

2011. The orphans’ court rejected the application of § 1702(a), concluding 

that Ms. Yau did not live together with Mario as husband and wife after Ms. 

Yau’s divorce. It premised this ruling first on the fact that Mario filed 

annulment papers within two months of the divorce decree. The orphans’ 

court viewed this fact as compelling evidence that Mario did not live together 

with Ms. Yau as husband and wife. Alternatively, the orphans’ court refused 

to view the arrangement at issue herein as one that could be considered as 

“living together as husband and wife” within the meaning of the statute. 

We hold that the orphans’ court’s finding that the statute was not 

satisfied herein is amply supported by the record. We first observe that the 

orphans’ court specifically credited Charles’ testimony in total and rejected 
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as utterly incredible everything that Ms. Yau said at the hearing. We must 

accept this credibility determination unless it constituted an abuse of 

discretion. Ms. Yau forged three checks. In the face of her own admissions 

in a lawsuit and visa application as well as numerous legal documents 

proving the contrary, Ms. Yau, under oath at the evidentiary hearing, denied 

that she was married to Mr. Kai in Hong Kong. Thus, the orphans’ court did 

not abuse its discretion in rejecting Ms. Yau’s assertions that she moved into 

Bittern Avenue after the marriage and that she and Mario had a full conjugal 

relationship. 

The court, instead, found that Charles’ testimony was an accurate 

description of the events that occurred after February 16, 2011. In light of 

that testimony, we cannot overturn the orphans’ court’s finding that Ms. Yau 

and Mario did not “live together as husband and wife” at all. Charles 

testified unequivocally that Ms. Yau never moved to 2827 Bittern Avenue at 

any point and instead continued to live at her own property. Charles was 

asked, “At any time did you see [Ms. Yau] move into Bittern Place with a 

moving truck and all her personal possessions?” N.T. Hearing, 11/26/12, at 

20. Charles responded, “No.” Id. 

The language of the statute is clear and unequivocal. It provides that, 

in order for a marriage that is invalid due to the existence of a prior 

marriage by one party to become valid after the impediment is removed, the 

parties must continue to “live together as husband and wife.” Simply put, 
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Mario and Ms. Yau never lived together at all. We are aware that marital 

relationships between people can have various iterations. Spouses can live 

separately for years but remain married legally, and sex may or may not be 

a component of a marital relationship. However, we cannot ignore the 

statutory language involved herein. At the very least, Mario and Ms. Yau 

were required to live together to satisfy § 1702(a)’s terms. 

In addition, even if we viewed the statute as permitting a marriage to 

arise based upon how the parties envisioned their marriage would operate, 

the evidence herein clearly established that this result did not occur in the 

present case. Charles’ testimony proved the following. The marriage was 

to be a business arrangement. Mario would obtain legal status for Ms. Yau 

in the United States and would give Ms. Yau $25,000 and the 2827 Bittern 

Avenue house after his death. In return, Mario “expected to have someone 

as a companion. He had been very lonely for many years. So he was 

looking for a companion and he also expected her to take care of him, 

watch out for him, clean and cook.” N.T. Hearing, 11/26/12, at 14-15 

(emphases added). 

The evidence conclusively established that Mario fulfilled his end of the 

bargain by transferring the home on Bittern Avenue into Ms. Yau’s name and 

by giving her $25,000 in his will. Mario also attempted to obtain a green 

card for Ms. Yau but was prevented from obtaining one due to Ms. Yau’s 

prior marriage. On the other hand, Ms. Yau failed to perform any of the 
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obligations imposed upon her under the terms of the agreed-upon marriage 

arrangement. Charles testified that, after the marriage ceremony on 

December 6, 2008, Ms. Yau performed housekeeping briefly and quickly 

ceased that acitivity. Id. at 20-21. Shortly after the marriage ceremony, 

Ms. Yau was rarely present when Charles visited, and she thus did not 

provide Mario companionship or care. Id. at 24. Charles continued to take 

Mario to his doctor appointments.

Toward the end of 2010, Mario’s cardiologist told Charles not to leave 

Mario alone. Charles conveyed this warning to Ms. Yau, who ignored the 

request to stay with Mario. On February 16, 2011, the Court of Common 

Pleas of Cameron County issued the divorce decree declaring that Ms. Yau 

and Mr. Kai were divorced. After that date, Ms. Yau did not perform any 

housework and rarely visited. Charles reported that, occasionally, Ms. Yau 

would make meals for Mario, but the majority of the time, Charles and his 

family ensured that Mario had food. 

Mario fulfilled his portion of the marital arrangement, but Ms. Yau 

utterly failed in her responsibility to provide care and companionship for him. 

Thus, the parties did not even live together as husband and wife in 

accordance with the agreement reached between them as to how the 

marriage was to operate. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

orphans’ court’s refusal to apply § 1702(a).
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We now address Ms. Yau’s position that, even in the absence of a valid 

marriage between her and Mario, the gifts of realty and the Prudential 

Savings Bank account as well as the testamentary bequests were valid. She 

first avers that the gift of 2827 Bittern Avenue to her should not be 

overturned since the ownership of the real estate should be considered a 

joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Ms. Yau maintains that, even if the 

marriage was void, the conveyance of real estate to Mario and Ms. Yau as 

tenants by the entireties operated to convey a joint estate with right of 

survivorship. Ms. Yau relies upon case authority involving a transfer of real 

estate to two unmarried people as joint tenants by the entireties. Since an 

entireties estate cannot be held by unmarried persons, the law provides that 

the appropriate form of tenancy in such circumstances is to be determined 

by the intention of the parties, “the ultimate guide by which all deeds must 

be interpreted.” Riccelli v. Forcinito, 595 A.2d 1322, 1325 (Pa.Super. 

1991) 

The first flaw with Ms. Yau’s attempt to invoke this principle is that she 

presented no proof that Mario would have bestowed on her survivorship 

rights to his property if he had known that she fraudulently induced him to 

marry her and would not perform her marital obligations. The evidence 

clearly established that Mario did not know that Ms. Yau was married to Mr. 

Kai when he married her. In addition, Ms. Yau fraudulently induced Mario 

into believing that, in return for Bittern Avenue and $25,000, she would 
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provide companionship and cook and clean for him during what was 

intended to be a marriage of short duration, given Mario’s advanced age, 

heart problems, and diabetes. As outlined above, Ms. Yau failed to perform 

those functions for Mario. Hence, Ms. Yau’s reliance upon this law is 

misguided. 

The authority cited by Ms. Yau is inapposite for an additional reason. 

The orphans’ court invalidated the entire transfer of 2827 Bittern Avenue to 

Mario and Ms. Yau based upon application of a different principle. In 

concluding that the gift of Bittern Avenue was void, the orphans’ court relied 

upon Restatement (First) of Restitution § 58 (Gifts Made in Reliance on a 

Relation), which we applied in Lindh v. Surman, 702 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. 

1997), aff'd, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999). Therein, we discussed case law 

regarding conditional gifts as outlined in § 58, which provides, 

A person who has conferred a benefit upon another, manifesting 

that he does not expect compensation therefor, is not entitled to 

restitution merely because his expectation that an existing 

relation will continue or that a future relation will come into 

existence is not realized, unless the conferring of the benefit 

is conditioned thereon.

Restatement of Restitution, § 58 (emphasis added). 

The comments to that provision extrapolate: 

(b) Conditional gifts. The gift may be conditional upon the 

continuance or creation of a relation, and if conditional the donor 

is entitled to its return if the relation terminates or is not entered 

into. The condition may be stated in specific words or it may be 

inferred from the circumstances. Likewise, as in the case of 
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engagement and wedding gifts, justice may require the creation 

of a condition although the donor had no such condition in mind.

Restatement of Restitution, § 58 comment b. 

The orphans’ court found, and the evidence supports, that Mario 

transferred Bittern Avenue to Ms. Yau based upon his belief that they were 

actually married and that she would care, cook, clean, and provide 

companionship for him. It observed, “These gifts [of Bittern Avenue and the 

joint bank account at Prudential Savings Bank] were conditional because 

they were conditioned on Decedent’s belief that he would be married to [Ms. 

Yau] and she would then take care of him. Neither of these conditions were 

satisfied.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/14, at (unnumbered page) 10. 

The evidence revealed that the Bittern Avenue house would be 

transferred to Ms. Yau after they married and that the gift was in reliance 

upon an arrangement whereby the parties were married and Ms. Yau cared 

and provided companionship for Mario. The marriage was invalid, and Ms. 

Yau did not take care of or provide companionship to Mario. Since the gift 

was made in reliance upon conditions that decidedly did not occur, the 

orphans’ court properly applied the law of conditional gifts and voided the 

transfer of 2827 Bittern Avenue to Ms. Yau. 

The orphans’ court decision is supported by the reasoning in Semenza 

v. Alfano, 279 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1971), where Semenza bought property and 

placed it in his and Alfano’s name because Alfano promised to marry him if 
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he bought her a home. After Alfano refused to marry Semenza, he 

successfully voided the transfer of the real estate based upon application of 

the law governing conditional gifts. Therein, our High Court noted, “A gift to 

a person to whom the donor is engaged to be married, made in 

contemplation of marriage, although absolute in form, is conditional; and 

upon breach of the marriage engagement by the donor the property may be 

recovered by the donor.” Id. at 31; see also Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 

136 A.2d 127, 128-32 (Pa. 1957) (gifts were voided under law of conditional 

gifts since gifts were made based upon misrepresentations of recipient that 

she intended to marry donor); Nicholson v. Johnston, 855 A.2d 97 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (affirming that money for down payment and closing costs 

for purchase of real estate made by payor constituted a conditional gift 

contingent upon a marriage occurring so that those monies were returned to 

payor in partition action even though real estate was placed in joint names 

of payor and his then fiancée).

The gifts of the house and bank account, conditioned on events that 

did not occur, are void under the applicable law. We find irrelevant that 

Mario did not undertake to undo the gifts during his lifetime. None of the 

legal principles applied in this area of the law requires that the person take 

an affirmative action while alive before a gift will be considered conditional. 

Additionally, we cannot make any inference from the evidence presented 

herein that Mario’s failure to seek, through litigation, to reverse the gifts 
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renders them valid. Charles reported that, when Mario discovered that his 

marriage was invalid, Mario’s health began to decline steeply. In addition, 

two months before he died, Mario did file an annulment action, seeking to 

set aside the fraudulent marriage upon which the gifts were conditioned. 

Ms. Yau next asserts that the testamentary gifts of the home on 

Bittern Avenue and $25,000 nevertheless were valid despite the fact that 

she and Mario were not lawfully married. She relies upon the general rule is 

that “a disposition in a will, even though made by reason of a mistake of 

fact, remains valid.” Appellant’s brief at 18. See In re Estate of Angier, 

552 A.2d 1121 (Pa.Super. 1989) (the fact that testator may have mistakenly 

believed that will contestant was not his biological daughter did not 

invalidate will wherein testator left his estate to a friend who cared for him 

for years). 

However, a mere mistake of fact is distinct from actual fraud. 

Standard Pennsylvania Practice provides an apt summary of the applicable 

law:

Generally speaking, fraud with respect to a will consists in 

anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or 

combination, or by suppression of truth, or a suggestion of what 

is false, whether it be direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech 

or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture, by which a person 

is deceived to his or her disadvantage. However, to invalidate a 

will, the fraudulent act must have the effect of misleading the 

testator, which can occur only if the testator relies on it. Thus, if 

the testator to whom a misrepresentation was made knew the 

truth at the time he or she executed the will, it cannot be said 

that the testator relied on such representation, and fraud is not 
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established. In order to establish that a will was fraudulently 

induced, it must also be shown that: (1) the testator had no 

knowledge of the concealed or misstated fact; and (2) the 

testator would not have made the same bequest had he or she 

known the truth.

Illustration:

Where a testatrix bequeathed a large sum to a 

trust company believing that such bequest was a 

legal means of providing for the distribution of the 

funds to specified charities, the scrivener, a trust 

officer who failed to warn the testatrix that the 

bequest was absolute, engaged in constructive fraud

which served to invalidate the bequest.

31 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 148:76 (footnotes omitted). 

Thus, fraud can invalidate both an entire will and a specific bequest. 

As our Supreme Court observed in In re Alexander's Estate, 55 A. 797 

(Pa. 1903), a bequest in a will can be voided where the testator was misled 

and was clearly mistaken in connection with the disposition made in a will. 

Our High Court followed this precept in In re Stirk's Estate, 81 A. 187 (Pa. 

1911), when it invalidated a specific bequest procured by misrepresentation. 

Therein, the testatrix was led to believe by an agent of a trust company that 

a bequest made to a trust company in her will would inure to the benefit of 

certain charities, which were unquestionably the intended recipients of the 

testatrix’s money. However, the language of the will left the property 

absolutely to the trust company. 

The Stirk’s Court refused to enforce the bequest to the trust 

company, finding that the terms of the will “produced a testamentary act the 
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legal effect of which was wholly misapprehended by the testatrix.” Id. at 

191. Therein, there was no doubt that the testratix believed that the trust 

company would be “a medium through which the charities she had indicated 

would receive her bounty,” but that the language of the will did not 

effectuate that intent. Id. Based upon the fact that the scrivener of the will 

misled the testatrix into believing that the language of the will was in accord 

with what she wanted, the court concluded that the bequest was procured 

by constructive fraud and therefore unenforceable. Id. 

More recently, in In re Estate of Glover, 669 A.2d 1011 (Pa.Super. 

1996), this Court struck down a specific bequest of money to a person who 

stole money from the decedent. Therein, the testatrix was survived by her 

husband, a brother, her brother’s children, and her husband’s and nieces 

and nephews. Her husband had executed an antenuptial agreement and 

received two million dollars of decedent’s eight million dollar estate. 

Decedent’s brother and his children (the “Glovers”) were the decedent’s 

intestate heirs and residuary beneficiaries under a will that made various 

specific bequests of substantial sums. 

One of decedent’s friends, Lynn Hurley, was given a specific bequest of 

$50,000 in the will. After Ms. Glover and Hurley became friends, Hurley 

became signatory on some of Ms. Glover’s bank accounts and began to write 

checks on the accounts without the approval of Ms. Glover. While this Court 
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refused to invalidate the entire will based upon undue influence or fraud, we 

did conclude that the bequest to Hurley was invalid due to Hurley’s fraud. 

In Glover, we noted that, in order to strike a bequest, the contestant 

must establish two elements: “(1) the testatrix had no knowledge of the 

concealed or misstated fact, and (2) the testatrix would not have made the 

same bequest had she known the truth.” Id. at 1016. We concluded that 

there was no question that Ms. Glover was not aware that Hurley was taking 

money from her. We also held that “it would be ‘absurd’ to suggest that, 

had [Ms. Glover] been aware of Hurley's massive misappropriation of funds, 

this gift would have stood.” Id. We thus ruled that the $50,000 bequest to 

Hurley was invalid. 

The Glover decision applies herein. To avoid this case authority, Ms. 

Yau claims that the orphans’ court never found that she committed fraud. 

She is mistaken. Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/14, at (unnumbered page) 10 

(gifts of house and bank account should be void due to Ms. Yau’s “fraudulent 

representation that she was legally able to be married to Decedent”). 

Likewise, the evidence provided by Charles, and credited by the orphans’ 

court, was that Ms. Yau committed fraudulent acts that voided the specific 

bequests. She falsely led Mario to believe that she was free to marry him 

and would be a companion and care for him. Further, she stole nearly 

$27,000 from an account that Mario owned with Charles as well as his coin 

collection and car, which was recovered by Charles in front of her home. 
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Thus, the record fully supports the orphans’ court finding that Ms. Yau 

committed fraud upon Mario and that Mario, had he known about the fraud 

when he executed the will, would not have left Ms. Yau either the home on 

Bittern Avenue or $25,000. The specific bequests to Ms. Yau in Mario’s will 

were properly struck down under the noted authority. 

Appellant next avers that she owns the assets in the Prudential 

Savings Bank account that Mario transferred from his name into his and her 

names due to the operation of 20 Pa.C.S. § 6304(a), which states:

(a) Joint account.--Any sum remaining on deposit at the 

death of a party to a joint account belongs to the surviving party 

or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is 

clear and convincing evidence of a different intent at the time the 

account is created. If there are two or more surviving parties, 

their respective ownerships during lifetime shall be in proportion 

to their previous ownership interests under section 6303 (relating 

to ownership during lifetime) augmented by an equal per capita 

share for each survivor of any interest the decedent may have 

owned in the account immediately before his death; and the right 

of survivorship continues between the surviving parties.. 

Ms. Yau’s position in this respect suffers from the same problems as 

that involving the deed. The orphans’ court, applying the law of conditional 

gifts, invalidated the transfer of the Prudential Savings Bank account assets 

from Mario’s name into the joint names of Ms. Yau and Mario in the first 

instance. Since the transfer was void, the statutory presumption outlined in 

the Act was not operative in the first instance.

Additionally, we conclude that § 6304(a) was inapplicable for a 

different reason. This provision of the Multiple Party Account Act (the “Act”) 
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at 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301–6306 outlines a statutory presumption, which can be 

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Estate of Cella, 12 

A.3d 374 (Pa.Super. 2010). “The purpose of the presumption is to provide 

financial institutions with ‘the certainty and regularity required for the 

general course of human commerce’ and to avoid ‘the protracted resolution 

of family disputes[.]’” Id. at 380 (partially quoting In re Novosielski, 992 

A.2d 89, 106-07 (Pa. 2010)). Thus, the statutory presumption can be 

overcome. Indeed, in In re Estate of Strahsmeier, 54 A.3d 359 

(Pa.Super. 2012), we concluded that another statutory presumption in the 

Act, which involved the ownership of “in trust for” accounts following a 

person’s death, was overcome by the evidence presented and that the 

person who should have received the account following the death of the 

account’s owner was not entitled to the account assets. The clear and 

convincing evidence of Ms. Yau’s fraud and the theft of Mario’s money was 

sufficient to overcome any presumption that he intended her to receive the 

assets in the joint account. 

Finally, Ms. Yau avers that the court erred in applying the law of 

conditional gifts because the gifts occurred after the marriage ceremony 

between her and Mario. She overlooks the fact that she and Mario executed 

a prenuptial agreement. The gifts were made in fulfillment of that 

agreement, which was executed prior to the marriage ceremony. The gifts 

also were made while Mario was unaware that his marriage to Ms. Yau was 
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invalid and that she would neglect him. We thus reject this challenge to the 

orphans’ court’s application of the law of conditional gifts.

As the orphans’ court correctly applied the law, we have no basis upon 

which to reverse its rulings. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2015