### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Ma y 9 , 2 005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ N o. 04- 1135 7 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00469 -CR- 2-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-AppelleeCr oss -Appe llant,
ve rs us D. C. W OO DS , a. k. a. D ion loy ous W oods , D ef en dant- Appe llantCross-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (M ay 9 , 200 5) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, BL A CK a nd P RY O R, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s.To avoid ex post facto issues, th e PSIused the 2001 e dition of the United States Sentencing 1 Guidelines in ca lculatingWoods’s guideline se ntence . 2 PE R CU RIA M: D ef en dant- Appe llant D
. C. W oods appe al s hi s 64 -m onth se nte nc e fo r conspiracy

to defraud the U nited States, in violation o f 18 U. S. C. § 371 ; and wire fr au d, in vio la tio n of

18 U
. S. C. §§ 2 a nd 1 344, r es ult ing f ro m his part ic ipatio n ina
m ortgage-fra

ud schem e. W oods contends th at the district court err ed in (1) im posin g a three- level upward e nhancem ent, pursuant to U. S. S. G. 3B1.1(b), based on hi s role as a supervisor; and (2) determ ining his gui deline sentence based on f ac ts tha t ne ith er

w er e ch ar ge d inhis ind ic tm en t no r fo und be y ond a re as ona ble doub t, in the li ght

of the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n inBl ak el y v. W as hin gto n, 124 S
. C t . 2 5 3 1 ( 2 0 0 4 )
. N o r e v e r s i b l e e rr o r h a s b e e n s h o w n ; w e a f

f i rm. W oods ’ s pr es en te nc e inv es tig at ionr ep ort ( “ PS I” ) re co m m en de d th at

his of fe nse s be gr oupe d to ge the r, pur suant t o U
. S. S. G
. § 3D 1. 2( d) , a nd tha t hi s ba se offense level be set at 6, pursuant to U. S. S. G. §§ 2B1.1(a)( 2) (guideline for offenses inv olv ing f

ra ud)
. T he P SI a lso r ec om m en de d a14- le ve l i nc re as e be ca use the of fe nse 1 in vo lv edap pr ox im at el y

$4 94 ,09 5 i n l os se s, p ur su an t t o U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1 (b )(1 )(H) (guideline for loss am ount s greater than $40 0,000); a 2- le ve l i nc re as e be ca use the of fe nse inv olv ed

f ra udul en t c ondu ct

dur ing abankr

upt cy pr oc ee din g, pur suant t oT h e court also ag ree d to gr ant Woods a two-level § 3E1.1( a) a djustment for ac cepta nce of 2 responsibility

afte r Woods a g ree d to withdraw a previously

filed motion to withdraw his g uilty plea. 3 U. S. S. G. § 2B1.1(b)(7)( B); a 2-level increase because the offe nse invo lved soph ist ic at ed

m eans, pur suant t o U
. S. S. G
. § 2B 1. 1( b) (8 )( C) ; a 2- le ve l i nc re as e be ca

use the of fe nse inv olv ed

the una uth or iz ed tr an sf er or use of a ny m eans o f ide nti fi catio n, pur suant t o U
. S. S. G
. § 2B 1. 1( b) (9 )( C) (i ); a nd a 4- le ve l up w ar d a dj ustm en t ba se d on hi s ag gr av at edrol e in th e o ffen se s, p ur su an t t o U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1 (a). W oods obj ec te d to a ll of

the P SI ’ s r ec om

m en de d gu ide lin e en hanc em en ts, but he di d n ot arg ue th ata jury—in st eadof t he di st ric t co ur t— sh ou ldde ci de th em . W oods a lso obj ec te d to the P SI ’ s f ai lur e to r ec om

m en d adownw ar d a dj ustm en t f or
acce ptance of re spon sibili ty , pursuant to U. S. S. G. § 3E1.1. O n the recom m ended §3B 1. 1( a) e nhanc em en t, W oods spe ci fi ca lly a rg ue d th at

( 1) the of

fe nse did not inv olv e at le as t f ive part ic ipants , a nd ( 2) the P SI did not c ont ai n sp ec if

ic a lle ga tio ns th athe di rect edth e act iv it ie s o f ot he r pa rti ci pa nt s i n t he frau d. Af ter conducting an evid entiary hearing on W oods ’ s objections, the district court overruled them , e xcept for (1) the § 2B1.1(b)(7)( B) incre ase for bankrupt cy fraud; and (2) the § 3B1. 1(a) a djustm ent for aggravating role, to the extent the court de te rm in edth aton ly a thr ee-l ev el en ha nc em en t was warran te d u nd er U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). In determ ining this role adjustm ent, the court e xplained th at “ [w ] e have at

24

le as t f ive pe opl e in the of

fe nse a nd h e is c er

ta inl y asup er vis or . B ut I w ill sus ta in the objec tion in part and aw ard three poin ts, not four points , f or his role in the offense.” Wit h a r es u l t i n g o ff

en s e l ev el o f 2 5 an da c ri m i n al h i s t o ry ca t eg o ry o f I , Wo o d s ’s guid eline range w as 57 to 71 m onth s’ im prisonm ent. T he court ultim ately sentenced him to 64 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t. I. A ggr av at ing Ro le A dj ustm en t A s di sc uss ed

above , W oods a rg ue s onappe al that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in im po si ng a th ree- le ve l § 3B 1.1 (b ) ad jus tm en t fo r be in g a su pe rv is orin th e o ffen se . He
co nte nds that the r ec or d sh ow ed that on ly thr ee pe rs ons w er e ar gua bly part ic ipants in th e fra ud , and th atth e fra ud was n ot “ ot he rwis e ex te ns iv e.” W e re vie wf

or c le ar e rr or the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n of W oods ’ s r ole in the schem e and de novo its application of the gu idelines to th at role. See United S t a t e s v . Nj au , 3 8 6 F
. 3 d1 0 3 9 , 1 0 4 1 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 )
. A c o u rti s au t h o r i z e dt o ap p l y a t h r e e - l e v e l up w a r da d

j u s t me n ti n ad e f

e n d a n t ’s b a s e o f

f e n s e l e v e l i f

h e w a s “a
m an ag er or sup er vis or . . . a nd the c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty inv olv ed f ive or m or e part ic ipants
or w as oth er

w ise e xte nsi ve . ” U
. S. S. G
. § 3B 1. 1( b)
. A“part ic ipant” is a pe rs on “ w ho i s crim inally

responsibl e for the c omm issio n of the offense, but need not have been
co nv ic te d.” U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1 , comm en t. (n .1).5

“ T he gov er

nm en t be ar s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng b y

apr ep onde ranc e of

the
ev ide nc e that the de fe ndant h ad a n a ggr av at ing r ole in the of fe nse . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Y ea ge r, 331 F
. 3d 1 216, 122 6 ( 11th C ir
. 200 3)
. I n de te rm ini ng the na tur e of the d e f e n d an t ’s r o l e , t h e c o u rtmay c o n s i d e r “ t h e e x e r c i s e o f

d e c i s i o n mak i n g au t h o r i t y, the na tur e of

part ic ipatio n inthe c om

m iss ionof

the of fe nse , the r ec ru itm en t of
ac co m pli ce s, the c la im ed

r igh t t o alarg er

share of the f ru its of the c ri m e, the de gr ee of participation in p lanning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal act iv it y , and th e d eg ree o f co nt ro l an d a ut ho rit y ex erci se d o ve r ot he rs .” U.S.S.G. § 3 B1 .1, co m

m en t. (n .4). T o th e ex te nt W oods is co nte ndi ng tha t on ly thr ee pe rs ons w er e part ic ipants in the f ra ud o r that the sc he m e w as not , oth er w ise , e xte nsi ve , K im

be rl y P at ill o, S haro n Je nki ns, a nd C ra ig D av is p le d gu ilty to the ins tant o ff

en se s. S haw n W ils on, a lth ough not c onvi ct ed

of the se of fe nse s, ve ri fi ed

to a le nde r that P at ill o ha d an a cc ount w ith N orthw es te rnMu tua l w hil e know ing that this inf orm at ionw as untru thf

ul. Mi lto n K ev in B ar

be e sim ilarl y

f al se ly ve ri fi ed that tw o “buy er s” ha d vari ous am ount s on deposit with Fir st Financial. And Melissa Skinn er w as “ crim inally responsibl e” because, in exchange for $3,000, she agre ed to pose as anoth er per son and p rovided false identification docum ents at a re al estate c losin g. T hus, the schem e involv ed at le as t fi ve pa rti ci pa nt s. See U.S.S.G. § 3 B1 .1, co m m en t. (n .1).6

T o th e ex te nt W oods a lso is ch al le ngi ng whe the r he play ed asup er vis or y or
m an ag er ia l r ole , D av is t es tif ie d a t se nte nc ing that, in ex ch an ge f or $17 , 000, W oods
re cr uit ed him to cl ean up r ea l- es ta te pr ope rt ie s, il le ga lly tur n onuti lit ie s, obt ai n f

al se id en ti fic at io n d oc um en ts , and po se as a no th er p ers on at a real -es ta te clo si ng . A ddi tio na l t es tim ony

a t se nte nc ing sho w ed

that W oods a lso dir ec te d W ils on and Barb ee to pr ovi de f

al se f inanc ia l i nf

orm at ion , w hic h in fo rm at ionW oods use d to obt ai n m or e pr ope rty . B ec au se W oods both r ec ru ite d and s upe rv ise d th es e pe rs ons’
ac tiv iti es in the sc he m e, the c ourt di d no t c le ar ly e rr in ap ply ing a§ 3B 1. 1( b) r ole ad jus tm en t. See Njau, 3 86 F.3d at 1 04 1. II
. Bl ak el y

/B ooke r E rr or W oods a lso a sse rt s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts under Blakely

by determ ining his gui deline sentence based on facts that neither we re ch ar ge d inhis ind ic tm en t no r pr ove n to aj ur y . B ec au se W oods f

ai le d to r ai se thi s constitu tional claim

in the district court, w e re view it only for plain err or. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d 12 91, 1298 (11 Cir. 2005 ) (a pply ing pl ain error

review th to B lake ly

c la im that a ppe llant f ai le d to r ai se in the dis tr ic t c ourt) , pe tit ionf or c er t. filed, N o. 04-1148 (Feb. 23, 2005 ). U nder plain error r eview, an appellate court m ay not c or re ct a n e rr or the de fe ndant f

ai le d to r ai se in the dis tr ic t c ourt un le ss the re is

“ (1 ) er ro r, ( 2) that i s pl ai n, a nd ( 3) that a ff ec ts s ubst an tia l r igh ts. ” I d. ( quot at ion s and7

internal m arks om itted). “ If a ll three condition s are m et, an appellate court m ay then
ex er ci se it s di sc re tio n to not ic e a fo rf ei te d e rr or , but

onl y if ( 4) the e rr or

se ri ousl y af fe ct s th e fa ir

ne ss, int eg ri ty , or

pub lic r ep utatio n of

j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ” I d. (q uo ta ti on s o m it te d)
. T he S upr em e Co urt de te rm ine d inAppr en di v
. N ewJe rs ey , 120 S
. Ct
. 234 8 (2 000) , that “ [o ] the r than th e fa ct of apr ior c onvi ct ion , a ny

f ac t tha t i nc re as es the pe na lty be y ond the pr es cr ibe d st at uto ry m ax im um m ust be sub m itt ed

to a j ur y , a nd proved bey ond a reasonable doub t.” Id. at 2362-63
. Af ter the district court sentenced W oods , the S upr em e Co urt c onc lud ed in Bl ak el y

that the im

posi tio n—b as ed

sol el y on the se nte nc ing j udge ’ s f

ac tua l f ind ing s—o f a se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t a bove the 53-
m onth standard range indicated in the State of W ashingt on’s S entencing Reform Ac t vio la te d th e de fe ndant’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts b ec au se the f ac ts s uppo rt ing the fi ndi ngs ne ith er

w er e adm itt ed

by the de fe ndant, nor

f ound by aj ur y . B lake ly , 124 S. Ct. at 2534-38
. The C ourt in Blakely , how ever, expressly stated that “ [t] he Feder al Gui de li ne s ar e n ot be fo re u s, an d we e xp res s n o o pi ni on on th em .” Id . at 2 53 8 n .9. The S uprem e Court in United State s v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (200 5), how ever,
re ce ntl y de te rm ine d th at

“ no d ist inc tio n of

c onst itu tio na l si gni fi canc e [e xis te d] be tw ee n th e Fe de ra l S en te nc ing G uid el ine s and the W as hin gto n pr oc ed ur es a t i ssu e [in Blakely ] .” Id. at 749. T he Court, ther efore, concluded that th e m andatory nature8

of the guidelin es rendere d them incom patible with the Sixth Am endm ent’ s guarantee to the r igh t t o aj ur

y tr ia l. I d. a t 74 9- 51. T he Co urt a lso r ea ff irm ed it s r at ion al e in Apprendi that “ [a] ny

fac t (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to supp ort
a se nte nc e ex ce ed ing the m ax im um auth or iz ed

by the f ac ts e sta bli she d by

aple a of gui lty or aj ur y ve rd ic t m

ust be a dm itt ed

by the de fe ndant o r pr ove d to aj ur y be y ond a
reas on ab le do ub t.” Id . at 7 56
. InRo dr igu ez , w e re vie w ed asim ilar ap pe al in w hic h th e ap pe llant h ad f ai le d to preserve a

Blakely /Booker objection in the district court, and the Suprem e Court had de ci de d B oo ke r whi le th e ap pe ll an t’s s en te nc e was pe nd in g o n d ire ctap pe al
. Appl y ing pla in e rr or

r ev ie w , w e de te rm ine d th at the appe llant h ad

sa tis fi ed the f ir st
e l e me n to f

p l a i n e rr o r

b y s h o w i n g e rr o r

b e c au s e , u n d e r

aman d a t o ry g u i d e l i n e s ys t e m, the appellant’ s sentence had been enhanced based on judicially determ ined factual fin di ng s t ha t wen t b ey on d t he fact s ad m it te d b y th e d efen da nt or f

ou nd by the jury. Ro dr ig ue z, 39 8 F .3dat 1 29 8. W e also determ ined in Rodrig uez that the second elem ent of plain-error review ha d be enm et . I d. A t 12 99. W e ex pla ine d th at , a lth oughthe Bo oke r er ro r ha d no t be en“pla in” w he n th e co urt ha d se nte nc ed the appe llant, “ w he re the lawa t the ti m e of trial w as settled and clearly contrary to the law at the tim e of appeal—it is enough th at the error be ‘ plain’ at the tim e of appellate c onsid eration.” Id. (quotation om itted); seeWe expl ained in fur ther d et ai l i n R o driguez that “pre -B ooker de fenda nts must establish a 3 rea sonable proba

bility that if the district c ourt had c onsidered the guidelines rang e it arr ived at using extra-ver dict enhanc ements as mer ely adviso ry , instead of mandatory , and had taken into acc ount any otherwise unc onsidered [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] fac tors, the court wo u ld have imposed a lesser sentenc e than it did.” See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1302. 9 al so B ooke r, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 76 9 ( dir ec tin g th at de ci sio n w as appl ic ab le to al l c as es on di rect ap pe al ). But we concluded in Rodriguez that no plain err or had occurred bec ause, under the thi rd e le m en t of

pla in e rr or , the appe llant h ad f ai le d to sho wthat the Bo oke r er ro r “a f f e c t [ e d ] s ub s t a n t i a l r i g h t s , ” t h a ti s , t h a tt h e e rr o r “mu s th a v e a f

f e c t e dt h e o u t c o me of the dis tr ic t c ourt pr oc ee din gs. ” Ro dr igu ez , 398 F
. 3d at 12 99, 130 6. ( quot at ion
o mi t t e d )
. We d i s c u s s e dt h a tt h e t e s tf o r s h o w i n g t h a tt h e e rr o r

“a f f e c t e dt h e o u t c o me of the district court proceedings” was the for m ulation of a r easonable probabilit y of a dif fe re nt r es ult , w hic h m eans a pr oba bil ity “ suf fi ci en t t o un de rm ine c onf ide nc e in the outcom e. ” Id. at 1299 (quo tation om itted). W e also reiter ated that, under this third el em en t, “ [i ] t i s th e de fe ndant r athe r than th e [g ] ove rn m en t w ho b ears the bur de n of pe rs ua si on wit h re sp ectto pre jud ic e.” Id . (qu ot at io n o m it te d)
. Beca us e we 3 de te rm ine d th at

the r ec or d inRo dr igu ez “pr ovi de [d ] no r ea son to b el ie ve a ny r es ult [w as ] m or e lik el y

than no t, ” w e co nc lud ed that the appe llant h ad

not m et his bur de n on the thi rd e le m en t of

pla in- er ro r re vie w . I d. a t 13 01. A nd w e co nc lud ed that w e “ ha [d ]
no o cc as ionto de ci de howhe w oul d have f ar ed und er the f ourth [ el em en t]
. ” I d.In deter mining that B ooker e rror

occur red in Rodriguez, we noted, without dec iding, that a n 4 enhanc ement for

obstruction of justice may not have be en a B ooker e rror “bec ause the jury

verdic t convictingthe appe llant of the cr imes he denie d nece ssarily , al b eitimplicitl y , found that he ha d eng ag ed in behavior that fit[] within § 3C1.1.” See Rodrigue z, 398 F .3d at 1298 n.5. In the instant c a se , h ow e ve r, Woo ds c onte ste d duri ng his ple a c oll oq uy and at se nte nc ingthe fa c ts und e rl yinghis se nte nc e e nh anc e me nts . T h e s e o th e r r e le v an t f

a c to r s in § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) in c lu d e : “ ( 1 ) th e n atu r e an d c ir c ums tances of

the 5 offe nse an d t he history

and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt; (2) the nee d for the se ntence imposed–(A) to re flec t the seriousness of the offe nse, to promote respe ct for the law, and to provide just punishm ent for the offe nse; (B ) to aff ord adequate deter

renc e to c riminal conduct; (C) to prote ct the public from f

urther c rimes of the de fenda nt; and (D ) t o provide the de fenda nt with needed educational or vocational training , medical care , or ot her corre ctional t reatment in the m ost effe ctive m a n n e r ; (3 ) t h e k i n d s o f s en t en ce s av ai l ab l e; (4 ) t h e k i n d s o f s en t en ce an d th e s en t en ci n g ra n ge established for

. . . (A) the applicable cate g ory of off ense c ommitt ed by

the applica

ble categ ory

of 10 In the instant case, W oods , in pleading guil ty , did not adm it to facts on which the court relied in enhancing his guidelin e sentence under a m andatory guidelin es sy stem . W e conclude that Booker err or occurre d and that it is n ow “plain.” S ee Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d at 129 8-99. But, sim ilar to the fac ts in Rodrigu ez, W oods has 4 not e xpl ai ne d onappe al , m

uc h le ss p ro ve n un de r the thi rd e le m en t of

pla in- er ro r
rev ie w, ho w hi s s ub st an ti al rig ht s wer e affe ct edby the co ur t’s Bo ok er erro r. In de ed , dis tr ic t c ourts s til l m ust c onsi de r gui de lin e range s. S ee Bo oke r, 125 S. Ct
. a t 76 4 ( “ W ith out

the ‘ m an da tor

y ’ pr ovi sio n, the [ Se nte nc ing Re fo rm A ct ] noneth eless requires j udges to take acc ount of the G uidelin es together with other
se nte nc ing goa ls” ). B ec au se the c ourt he ar d e xte nsi ve te sti m ony on W oods ’ s of

fe nse
co nduc t, the c ourt, a t l ea st i m pli ci tly , c onsi de re d th e na tur e an d c ir cu m stanc es of the offense and W oods ’ s charac ter. See 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(a)( 1). In im posin g a sentence 5d e f

e n d an t a s s e t f

o rth i n th e gu i d e l i n e s . . . ; ( 5 ) an y p e rt i n e n t p o l i c y s t at e m e n t [] ; ( 6) the ne e d to avoid unwar

rante d sentenc e disparities among de fenda nts with sim ilar re cords who ha ve bee n found guilty of similar conduc t; and (7) the ne ed to provide restitution to any victims of the offe nse.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -(7)
. 11 of 64 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t, ase nte nc e in the m idd le of W oods ’ s gu ide lin e range of 57 t o 71 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t, the c ourt, at l ea st i m pli ci tly , de m onst

rate d th at it
co nsi de re d th e ne ed

f or the se nte nc e im

pose d, a nd tha t i t w oul d no t have im pose d a lesser sentence, but for the then m andatory nature of the guidelines. Se e 18 U. S. S. C. § 35 53( a) (2 )- (4 ). A nd the c ourt or de re d a r es tit uti on am ount

that r ef le ct ed the los s
su st ai ne d b y

th e v ic ti m s o f th e fra ud . See 1 8 U.S.C. § 35 53 (a)( 7)
. E ve n inthe abse nc e of

the se de te rm inatio ns, the li ke lih ood of adif fe re nt
re sul t w oul d be spe cu la tiv e w ith out ac le ar state m en t or

sig n f ro m the c ourt tha t, but f or the f ac t tha t i ts d isc re tio n w as c onstra ine d un de r the f ed er al gui de lin es , it
wou ldha ve im

po se d a li gh te r se nt en ce. See Ro dr ig ue z, 39 8 F .3dat 1 30 0- 01
. W oods has not cited to su ch evidence. At best, it is unclear w hether the court
w oul d have im

pose d adif

fe re nt s en te nc e. W oods , the re fo re , ha s no t m et his burden of sho wing a re asonable probabil ity that his sentencin g would have been dif fe re nt b ut f

or the Bo oke r er

ro r, a nd w e ne ed

not de te rm ine the f

ourth e le m en t of pla in- er ro r re vie w . S ee id. a t 13 01.12

In sum , the district court er red under Booker and this error w as “plain.” W e, however, conclude that we m ay not exercise our discretion to not ice this forfeited
error because W oods has failed to car ry his burden o f showing that this pre-B ooker
er ro r af fe ct ed his sub stanti al r igh ts. W e, the re fo re , a ff irm W oods ’ s 64 -m onth
se nt en ce. AFFIR MED.