UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHRISTINA ROSSI, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. F. EDWARD DUDEK, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; KRISTEN A. KEEFE, an individual, in her official and individu al capacities; JOHN A. WHITE, an individual, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants - Appellants, and UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, Utah state educational institu tion; JEFFREY J. EKSTRAND, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; BRADLEY GREGER, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; JEFFREY BOTKIN, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. No. 20-4062 (D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00767-CW-DAO) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , MORITZ , and EID , Circuit Judges.

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 5, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 12 ________________ _________________ Christina Rossi was a Ph.D . student at the Univers ity of Utah from 2008 until 2014. Her dissertation committee dismi ssed her for failing to meet academic standards and the administrative appeals pr ocess upheld that decision. Rossi sued, alleging a due process violation, and the dist rict court denied qualified immunity to several members of her comm ittee. They now appeal. Exercising jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1291, we reve rse the denial of qualified immunity.
I.

a. When reviewing the denial of a summa ry judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, we must accept “the district c ourt’s conclusions as to what facts the plaintiffs may be able to prove at trial.” Fancher v. Barrientos , 723 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013). Co nstruing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rossi, the district court determined that a reasona ble jury could find the following facts. Christina Rossi attended Bo ston University (“BU”) for college. During her freshman year, Rossi began working in th e laboratory of Dr. Michael Hasselmo, a BU professor. After Rossi obtained her b achelor’s degree, she entered BU’s Ph.D. program and continued in Hasselmo’s lab. Two years later, she withdrew from the program. According to Rossi, another gradua te student treated he r like a technician, which interfered with her work. Althoug h she brought the is sue to Hasselmo’s attention, he declined to address it. Becau se of this, and because she was working on Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 23 a “fluff project” that had run out of fundi ng, she opted to depart, having earned a master’s degree. App’x Vol. VII at 1618. Rossi still wanted to pursu e a Ph.D., and Dr. Raymond P. Kesner’s lab at the University of Utah (“Univer sity”) caught her attention. Rossi believed working in Kesner’s lab would be “a natural extension of . . . the general area that [she] was working with . . . in the Hasselmo Lab,” a nd her understanding was that Kesner “had a good relationship with the Hasselmo Lab. ” App’x Vol. V at 1036–37. Rossi applied to the University’s Inte rdepartmental Neuroscience Program. Dr. John A. White, a bioengine ering professor at the Un iversity who worked at BU until 2007, had heard that Rossi’s time in BU’s Ph.D. program had not gone well. Hasselmo told White that Rossi was a “mediocre” or “poor” student who would “struggle in many environments.” Id. at 1057. But Hasselmo also said that the University was a good fit for Rossi and th at he was uncomfortable arguing that she should not be admitted. White reported these concerns to the program director at the University, and Rossi was admitted. In 2008, Rossi matriculated at the Univ ersity. She started in Kesner’s lab, where she studied learning and memory in rats. During her second year, she switched to the lab run by Dr. F. Edward Dudek, a professor in the University’s Department of Neurosurgery. Rossi aske d Dudek, Kesner, White, Dr. Kristen A. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 34 Keefe, 1 and Dr. Bradley E. Greger to serve on her dissertation co mmittee. Keefe was a professor in the University’s College of Pharmacy and the Director of the Interdepartmental Program in Neuroscience . Greger was brought on for his expertise with analyzing electrical signals. Dude k chaired the committee and became Rossi’s

mentor. Until early 2013, by all accounts, Rossi succeeded at the University. She earned good grades. She received a stipe nd. She represented Dudek’s lab at a neuroscience conference. According to her committee, Rossi was making progress and would likely defend her di ssertation—essentially the fi nal step toward receiving her Ph.D. degree—by mid-2013. Rossi obtained several glowing lette rs of recommendation from committee members during this time. Keefe wrote two such letters. In the fi rst, she stated that, “relative to other graduate students at th is stage in their development,” Rossi stood

out. Id. at 1051. In the second, Keefe char acterized Rossi’s work as “scholarly, well[]written,” and “well defended by referen ce to the literature or her own research findings.” App’x Vol. VI at 1248. Dudek wrote Rossi a letter of recommendation to support her application for a post-doctoral position at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”). In the letter, Dudek said that Rossi’s experiments were unique and would yield interesti ng results. Rossi was “a dedicated and thoughtful

1 Keefe’s first name is misspelled as “Kristin” throughout this litigation, including in the caption on appeal. We use the correct spelling in this order, and direct the Clerk’s Office to co rrect the case caption as well. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 45 researcher,” as well as “a hard worker who . . . work s well with others and is well[]liked and highly respected.” Id. at 1250. Rossi received the post-doctoral position, pending the outcome of her dissertation defense. White wrote a letter to support Rossi’s application for a fellowship to fund the MIT position. He described Rossi’s resear ch as “a challengi ng project, involving elaborate surgeries, instrumentation, data collection a nd processing, and immunocytochemistry.” Id. at 1364. Rossi had “sys tematically mastered these disparate techniques,” and “[t]he results and quality of the story [we]re more impressive at each committee meeting.” Id. Rossi did not get the fellowship. 2 Around this time, Dudek co-invented th e “Epoch,” a wireless recording device that could obtain electrophysiological data from animals. Dudek partnered with the University’s Technology Commercialization O ffice to develop it. Dudek claims this was “a scientific endeavor” and he “never really thought [he wa s] going to make any money selling telemetry devi ces for rats and mice.” App’x Vol. V at 1192. However, the University determined that the device had commercialization potential, so those involved could gain financially from its succ ess, which would create pressure to produce favorable results. In 2009, Dudek receiv ed a grant from the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) to st udy Epoch. The gran t required Dudek to “have a written administrative process to identify and mana ge financial conflict of

2 White later tried to retract this letter of recommendation. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 56 interest and [to] inform [res earchers] of the conflict of in terest policy.” App’x Vol.
VI at 1220. Dudek created Epoch as Rossi’s di ssertation was undergoing significant changes. Rossi began with a focus on learning and memory, which she had been studying since BU. At Dudek’s direction, Rossi eliminated all components of her project involving memory and shifted focus to whether interneur on loss in a certain area of the hippocampus cause d progressive epilepsy. Th is was a generally accepted hypothesis in Dudek’s area of interest. To test it, Dudek pushed Rossi to record her data with Epoch rather than a traditional te thered device, and to use mice instead of rats. The switch to mice was important b ecause Epoch had not been validated in mice for Rossi’s intended use. If Epoch work ed, that would help Dudek. But Epoch was a risk for Rossi if it failed. Rossi also later learned that Du dek did not expect the studies that used Epoch during this time to produ ce publishable findings. Rossi was aware of Dudek’s stake in E poch, but claims she did not know the device was in a “primitive” state. A pp’x Vol. V at 1122. Despite the NIH requirements, Dudek did not provide Rossi with formal notice of his Epoch conflict until after she had completed he r data collection. The noti ce informed Rossi that she could use a different device for her expe riments. Because Rossi had already completed her data collecti on by this point, switching to another device would have required her to restart. In late 2012, Rossi reported to Dudek that, contrary to their hypothesis, the experimental tr eatment did not induce seizures. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 67 In September 2012, Rossi’s committ ee indicated that she would likely complete her degree in June 2013. But in October 2012, Dude k started to take a contrary view. He told White over email that he thought Rossi would need more time to address issues the committ ee identified. In a letter submitted on Rossi’s behalf the same month, Dudek stated th at Rossi would “probably need another year to complete the studies and write two or three full-le ngth papers.” App’x Vol. VI at 1250. Around this time, Rossi began to feel th at Dudek’s support was fading, and she reports that they had minimal contact ove r the next five or six months; Dudek disputes her account. On April 2, 2013, Dudek finally gave Rossi feedback on the key papers she was preparing for her dissertation project. On April 10, 2013, the submission dead line for Rossi’s dissertation was near, with her defense scheduled for April 25. Rossi had recently rearranged her committee, replacing Kesner with Dr. Jeffrey J. Ekstrand, a professor who specialized in seizures. Dudek was out of town and had not reviewed Rossi’s latest revisions. Rossi emailed the other committee members, aski ng if they wanted to see her papers anyway. On April 15, 2013, Rossi asked White how she should proceed. White advocated for postponin g the defense and suggested talking to Keefe. Keefe recommended asking others to review the project. Keef e also warned Rossi that, without responding to feedback , she risked failing the defense. Rossi told Keefe that other Dudek lab members had been involved, and that Dudek himself had reviewed the dissertation with her that night. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 78 On April 16, 2013, Dudek emailed Rossi with several serious concerns about her dissertation. Dudek urged Rossi to postpone her defense, saying it would not impact her postdoctoral fellowship becau se a delay “happens all the time.” Id. at 1386. Dudek claimed he had previously questioned whether defending before November 2013 would be feasib le. He said that while the committee would be fair, the defense would be rigorous. Rossi ignored her mentors’ recommendatio ns to postpone. She complained to Dudek that she had “tried multiple times to . . . get some in -depth guidance” from him, but he had not been available. Id. at 1385. She explaine d she was prepared to defend her project and believed the comm ittee members knew epilepsy was not her “main field.” Id. On April 19, 2013, Rossi told Du dek that all other members of her committee supported her proceeding to her de fense without delay. She claimed that they considered her work “en ough to graduate, and that they [did not] anticipate any problems with [her] writing.” Id. at 1407. On April 22, 2013, three days before the defense, Dudek accused Rossi of falsifying data and told her that she could no longer access his lab without an escort. Rossi reported this to Keefe and White, se eking their help. Keefe responded that neither she nor White could resolve the pr oblem because they were both on Rossi’s committee. Keefe advised Rossi and Dudek to “work civilly together to reach” a solution and, if that failed, cont act University administration. Id. at 1405. Keefe also told Rossi and Dudek to decide whether Ro ssi’s defense should pr oceed as planned. Dudek replied twenty minutes later. He quoted from Ro ssi’s April 19, 2013, email Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 89 that incorrectly claimed th at the entire committee supported Rossi proceeding with her defense, saying: “You all have made a d ecision, and it is clear that you all want to go forward.” Id. at 1407. Later that evening, White responded, stating: “This situation is unprecedented in my career. If the defense goe s forward, I will do my part. However, I want to go on record that this defense s hould be postponed (if necessary) until [Rossi and Dudek] agree that the work is ready to defend.” Id. at 1409. These developments impacted how th e committee members saw Rossi. In White’s view, Rossi acted in a “slippery and manipula tive” manner because “she went to committee members individually and told [them] different stories.” App’x Vol. VII at 1596–97. He also believed Rossi misrepresented Dudek’s availability. Her conduct “reflected poorly on her professional character.” Id. at 1597. And White had already been hesitant to serv e on Rossi’s committee, having never let go of his concerns about her time at BU. Me anwhile, Keefe felt Rossi had engaged in “a blatant misrepresentation” about committ ee members’ positions on delaying Rossi’s defense. App’x Vol. V at 1076. Despite the growing tension, Rossi went forward with her dissertation defense as scheduled. On the day of the defe nse, Dudek emailed Vicki Skelton, an administrative assistant. Dudek told Ske lton that he thought the defense would be “unpleasant,” but he would “hold [his] nose a nd try to ‘do the right thing.’” App’x Vol. VI at 1416. Although he had c onsidered resigning from the committee, he indicated he was leaning against it and would see how the defense went. Dudek Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 910 stated: “I am almost certainly going to vot e to fail, because [Ro ssi] does not have an adequate thesis.” Id. Dudek was not the only comm ittee member with concerns. White later called Rossi’s submission the “wor st dissertation [he] had ever read.” App’x Vol. V at 1062. Rossi’s defense went poorly. White call ed it the “worst defense [he] had ever attend[ed].” Id. Asked how many days of seizure data she analyzed , Rossi replied (according to the committee) th at she analyzed seizure data for only the fifth day. Rossi contends that she said she analyzed all thirty days of recorded data, but “had observed seizures mainly on the fifth da y of experimentation, hence the figure focusing on that day.” Id. at 1123. The evidence supports Rossi’s position that she analyzed more than a single day’s data, but the impression that Rossi analyzed only day-five data proved fatal. White called it “an extremel y important moment that led to . . . her failure at the defense.” App’x Vol. VII at 1600. Keef e similarly described that moment: “We were all floored by the fact that [Rossi] answered . . . she had only analyzed day five, because th at was not the impression give n at all the way she wrote her dissertation.” App’x Vol. IV at 546. Based on the perceived weaknesses in Rossi’s dissertation and the misunderstanding about day five , the committee did not let Ro ssi proceed to the oral examination. Because Rossi had expresse d concerns about Dudek’s mentorship, the committee agreed not to formally fail her. Instead, the committee gave Rossi the first of several second chances, cl arifying its concerns in wr iting and providing feedback on how to fix the problems identified at the defense. Keefe info rmed Rossi that she Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1011 could no longer contact committee members individually. All communications were to be sent to the entire co mmittee because it was clear th at Rossi had misrepresented committee members’ views. Over the next six months, Rossi attempte d to improve her dissertation, but her efforts were largely unsuccessful. She had limited authorization to use Dudek’s lab, and was denied access to her data for a bout a month. Meanwhile, the advice Rossi received about what steps to take and what methodo logical techniques to use to improve her dissertation was sometimes difficu lt to follow. On November 20, 2013, the committee dismissed Rossi from the program. Keefe promised a formal letter of dismissal that would explain the decision. Before such a letter was sent, Dudek spoke with th e University’s general counsel. On the advice of c ounsel, the committee conclude d it needed to give Rossi (1) “another chance with very clearly defined dates and expectations” and (2) “written warning that he r performance” was “not mee ting academic standards.” Id. at 557. On November 22, 2013, Keef e informed Rossi th at the committee had engaged in “considerable additional deliber ation” and “decided to not move forward with dismissal.” App’x Vol. II at 345. Keefe attached a letter detailing the committee’s expectations going forward and se tting deadlines for Rossi’s progress. The committee never revealed its concern that it could not legally dismiss Rossi without giving her another chance. On November 27, 2013, Rossi filed a grie vance with the Univer sity stating that her committee was not providing her “clear support, feedback , and constructive Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1112 criticism.” Id. at 353. She incorrectly maintain ed that the committee had supported her proceeding with her scheduled defense, and that she had received no negative feedback on her suggested plan. On December 9, 2013, the first deadline set by the November 22 letter, Rossi submitted another draft of he r methods section to the co mmittee. Several committee members expressed concerns over email. Keefe pointed out that the committee had, back in July, approved parts of Rossi’s a pproach. Keefe asked if the committee was “obligated to help” Rossi by “provid[ing] a bit more direction.” App’x Vol. III at 416. Dudek responded that it was clear wh at methods Rossi shoul d use, as he had told Rossi to use them before her defens e. Keefe and the rest of the committee informed Rossi that the me thods needed more work. The committee was also not impressed by the next round of submissions under the plan set out in the November 22 lette r. Over email, White called Rossi’s revisions “rote and uninspir ed,” saying he could not u nderstand how she made so little progress since the defense. 3 App’x Vol. VI at 1497. In his view, Rossi did the “bare minimum,” described questionabl e methods, and did not support her conclusions with analysis. Id. He reminded the comm ittee members that she

3 We can recount additional comments in emails quoted by the district court in part, as well as replies fro m fellow committee members, even though the district court did not specifically c ite these details below. See Fogarty v. Gallegos , 523 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Those facts explicitly found by the district court, combined with those that it likely assumed, then form the universe of facts upon which we base our legal review of whet her defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”). Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1213 defended against their advice, and catalogued repeated “ev idence of low character,” including her misrepresent ations about committee members’ positions, the “circumstances under which she left BU,” and an “infamous Facebook posting.” Id. He concluded that Rossi was “not capable of the level of inde pendent work needed for a PhD.” Id. While he was open to being pers uaded otherwise, in his opinion the “time ha[d] come to remove her from the PhD program.” Id. Ekstrand agreed. As did Dudek. Keefe summed up the situation: “I think we all know what the next step is.” Id. at 1500. The committee dismissed Rossi from the program on January 13, 2014. By letter, it informed her that (1) she had “faile d to demonstrate competence in independent research,” (2 ) her work since the defens e was untimely, and (3) she lacked professional character. App’x Vol. IV at 456. Th e dismissal letter did not allude to the concerns that White had abou t her time at BU, or that Dudek had raised about academic integrity. 4 After the committee dismissed Rossi, sh e appealed the decision internally, following the University’s establ ished administrative procedures. 5 Rossi’s appeal

4 In the months leading up to Rossi’s dismissal, Dudek had formally, but privately, accused Rossi of fa lsifying data. In November 2013, Dudek contacted the University’s Research Integr ity Officer, Dr. Je ffrey Botkin, concer ned that Rossi did not have some of the data that she claimed supported her thesis. Dudek was simultaneously attempting to obtain Rossi’s data and analysis for potential future use by his lab. In December 2013, Botkin to ld Dudek that he would not pursue the allegations against Rossi further; the allege d flaws in her research that Dudek brought to his attention would not amount to acad emic misconduct under University policy. 5 We discuss Rossi’s administrative app eals in somewhat gr eater detail than the district court because they are important to understanding the process Rossi received. See id. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1314 went through three different le vels: first, to Dr. Richard I. Dorsky, the Director of the Interdepartmental Program in Neurosci ence; then, to the Academic Appeals Committee for the School of Medicine, wh ich made a recommendation to Dr. Dean Y. Li, Associate Vice President for Resear ch and Chief Scientif ic Officer, Health Sciences; and finally, to Dr. Vi vian S. Lee, Senior Vice Pr esident for Health Sciences and Dean of the School of Medicine. As part of the monthslong appeals process, Rossi received a hearing at which she was represented by counsel. The committee’s initial decision to dismiss Rossi was affirmed at each level of the appeal. In the end, Dean Lee concluded that Rossi was dismissed due to “her continuing failure to meet the Program’s academic requirements,” speci fically her “failure to attend to the substantive feedback she was given by expe rienced scientists a nd mentors,” and her “inability to analyze her data and tie her conclusion to the data in the appropriate scholarly fashion necessary to obtain a Ph.D. degree.” Id. at 472–73. Dean Lee stated that the members of Rossi’s committee had “strong es tablished track records of mentoring graduate student s,” and their decision “was neither arbitrary nor capricious.” Id.
b. In October 2015, Rossi sued, among ot hers, the members of her committee. She alleged that they violated her Four teenth Amendment due process rights when they dismissed her. The district court di smissed Greger, Ekstrand (in his individual capacity), and the University . Dudek, Keefe, White, a nd Ekstrand (in his official capacity) moved for summary ju dgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1415 court dismissed all four in their official capacities, which left Dudek, Keefe, and White in their individual capac ities. The court found that Rossi’s due process claims failed to the extent they were premised on stigmatizati on or an infringement of her liberty interests. Bu t it concluded that Rossi had a pr otected property interest in continued enrollment in the Ph .D. program. It held that Dudek, Keefe, and White violated clearly established law pertaining to academic di smissals. Dudek, Keefe, and White appeal. See Morris v. Noe , 672 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2012) (denial of qualified immunity is immedi ately appealable under collateral order doctrine).
II. Dudek, Keefe, and White maintain that th e district court erre d for two reasons. First, they argue that Rossi’s clearly established rights were not violated because “the University . . . gave Rossi extensive process” by allowing her to pursue an “academic appeal . . . through [multiple ] different levels.” Aplt. Br. at 43–44. Second, they contend that, even ignoring the administrative appeals, their own conduct did not violate clearly established law. We begin by discu ssing the applicable legal framework. We then resolv e this appeal on the first ground without reaching the second.

a. This appeal turns on qualified immun ity. “[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields governmen t officials performing disc retionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 unless their conduct violates clearly Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1516 established statutory or constitutional rights.” Janny v. Gamez , 8 F.4th 883, 913 (10th Cir. 2021) (alterati on in original) (quoting DeSpain v. Uphoff , 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001)). “‘We employ a two-part test to analyze a qualified immunity defense,’ asking ‘whether the fa cts that a plaintiff has alle ged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and whet her the right at issue was clearly established at the time of [the official’s ] alleged misconduct.’” Dalton v. Reynolds , 2 F.4th 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brown v. Montoya , 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011)). “After a defendant asserts a qualified imm unity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff.” Medina v. Cram , 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy ei ther part of the two-part inquiry, the court must grant the defendant qualified immunity.” Id. Our review is de novo. Sawyers v. Norton , 962 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2020). “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” District of Columbia v. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). To demonstrate such founda tion, “the plaintiff must point to ‘a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.’” Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty. , 806 F.3d 1022, 1027 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez , 745 F.3d 405, 427 (10th Cir. 2014)). Relevant cases cannot merely suggest an answer ; rather, “‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu tional question beyond debate’ to clearly Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1617 establish a right.” Halley v. Huckaby , 902 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10t h Cir. 2018) (quoting Redmond v. Crowther , 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018)). “The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the le gal principle clearly prohibit the [official’s] conduct in the pa rticular circumstances before him.” Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590. In other wo rds, “[t]he rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable [o fficial] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “This requires a high ‘degree of specificity.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)). “We do not re quire a case directly on point.” Ashcroft v. alKidd , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). But we do require that “the precedent . . . be particularized to the facts.” Apodaca v. Raemisch , 864 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017). “A rule is too gene ral if the unlawfulness of th e officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’” Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590 (altera tion in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). That said, “‘general statements of the law’ can clearly establish a right for qualified immunity pur poses if they apply ‘with obvious clarity to the specific conduc t in question.’” Halley , 902 F.3d at 1149 (alteration omitted) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
b. Rossi’s constitutional claims sound in due process. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prov ides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, wit hout due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1718 A party claiming a due process violation must allege that the government “has deprived [her] of an interest in liberty or property” that is constitutionally cognizable. Harris v. Blake , 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1986). “A protected interest in liberty or property may have its source in either federal or state law.” Elliott v. Martinez , 675 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012). On appeal, the pa rties do not dispute that Rossi had a constitutionally protected propert y interest in enroll ment in her Ph.D. program that triggered the re quirements of due process. A student with a constitutionally prot ected interest in attending a public academic program may not be dismissed fr om the program without due process of law. See Bd. of Curators of Un iv. of Mo. v. Horowitz , 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978). The process that is due depends on whet her the dismissal is based on academic performance or is disciplinary in nature. See Harris , 798 F.2d at 423. Where, as here, a student is dismissed on academic grounds—another asp ect of this case uncontested on appeal—our review of the decision is highly deferential. See id. (explaining that “less stri ngent procedural requirements attach” to academic dismissals). “[T]he determ ination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administra tive decisionmaking.” Horowitz , 435 U.S. at 90. “When judges are asked to re view the substance of a genuinely academic decision, . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.” Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing , 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); see also Horowitz , 435 U.S. at 92 (“Courts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1819 performance.”); Gaspar v. Bruton , 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975) (“The courts are not equipped to review academic reco rds based upon academic standards within the particular knowledge, experience and expertise of academicians.”). A student alleging a due process viol ation can bring a procedural or substantive challenge. Proce dural due process as applie d to academic dismissals ordinarily “requires no more than that ‘t he student [have] pr ior notice of faculty dissatisfaction with his or her performance and of the possibility of dismissal, and [that] the decision to dismiss the stude nt [be] careful and deliberate.’” Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of N.M. , 219 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000) (alterations in original) (quoting Schuler v. Univ. of Minn. , 788 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1986)). That said, “the notion of judicial defere nce to academic decisi ons loses force when . . . the decisionmaker is ‘accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally impermissible reasons’ for its action.” Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ. , 245 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ewing , 474 U.S. at 225). Even if the requirements of proced ural due process are otherwise satisfied, “the court may grant relief . . . [when] the student pres ents positive evidence of ill will or bad motive.” Gaspar , 513 F.2d at 851. Substantive due process also prohibits academic officials from dismissing a student because of improper motives. “U nder Supreme Court authority, a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process claim based on an academic decision must show that the decision was the product of arbitrar y state action rather than a conscientious, careful and deliberate exercise of professional judgment.” Gossett , 245 F.3d at 1182. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 1920 “A plaintiff may make such a showing by evidence that the challenged decision was based on ‘nonacademic or constitutionally im permissible reasons,’ rather than the product of conscientious a nd careful deliberation.” Id. (quoting Ewing , 474 U.S. at 225). The parties suggest that the procedural and substantive due process standards are effectively the same in a case like this, as Rossi alleges she was dismissed for impermissible reasons. See Aple. Br. at 36; Reply Br. at 1 n.1. We agree, so we analyze Rossi’s due process challenges t ogether, focusing on wh ether it was clearly established that the decisi on to dismiss her was anythi ng other than careful and deliberate. We conclude that, because the University provided an extensive administrative appeals process which Rossi does not directly charge with bias, Rossi cannot show that her clearly es tablished rights were violated.

c. When assessing whether a dismissed student’s due process rights were violated, we ask whether “the decision to dismiss the student [was] careful and deliberate.” Trotter , 219 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Schuler , 788 F.2d at 514). Our focus is not on whether any given academic offici al’s actions comported with due process in isolation—it is on whether the decision itself did so. See id. Our analysis thus encompasses the entire pro cess that rendered the decisi on final, which includes any opportunities that the instituti on provided to the student to revisit or overturn it. See id. (“The number of appeals and review hear ings afforded [the student] convince us that the [university’s] deci sion was careful and deliberate.”). The degree to which Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 2021 that review process may have been compromi sed is critical to wh ether it can produce a careful and deliberate decision, as two of our cases illustrate.
In Harris v. Blake , a university student studyi ng psychology withdrew from a counseling course over the professor’s objection. Harris , 798 F.2d at 420. The professor wrote a letter calling the st udent “incompetent and unethical.” Id. The letter was placed in the st udent’s academic file, wh ere it was seen by other instructors. Id. at 421. Two professors who read the letter gave th e student poor grades, pushing his grade point average be low the required minimum and compelling him to withdraw. Id. The student brought suit, claimi ng he had been deprived of his constitutionally protected in terest in attending the academic program without procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 422. On appeal, we acknowledged that “[a]rguably, both the . . . letter and the poor grades [the student] received were not careful evaluations.” Id. at 423. But the letter a nd the grades were not what mattered. What mattered was that the unive rsity had allowed the student to lodge an official grievance, culminating in a heari ng before the university’s academic appeal board. See id. We explained that “the procedur es [the student] received were more than adequate to protect his property in terest in continued enrollment” because (1) the university had “provided an esta blished appeals procedure” that allowed Harris to “participate[] personally in the hearing to challenge his grades,” and (2) that “[i]ndependent review confirmed the pr opriety of the grades and further demonstrated that the ultimate decision concerning his case was a careful one.” Id. We observed that it was the decision of the academic appeal boa rd “that ultimately Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 2122 resulted in [the student’s] fo rced withdrawal,” and the st udent “failed to show that this decision was not made with conscien tious deliberation through the exercise of professional judgment.” Id. at 425. Similarly, Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bo ard of Regents for Langston University involved a student who involuntarily withdrew from a university nursing program and then brought suit, a lleging due process violations. Gossett , 245 F.3d at 1175. The student maintained that the de cision to require his withdrawal was the product of gender discrimination, so it was not careful and deliberate. Id. at 1181– 82. We agreed with the student that he had raised a question of fact. Id. And, this time, it did not prove sufficien t that the student had been afforded an administrative appeal. See id. at 1176. Although we did not address the import of the administrative appeal direct ly, we observed in a footnote that the appeal had been potentially tainted, as the student “claim[ed] that illegal discrimi nation played a role in his unsuccessful grade contest proceedings and in his failure to be readmitted.” Id. at 1182 n.7. Under Gossett , an academic decision may not be careful and deliberate—notwithstanding a student’s ad ministrative appeals—where it is the product of a process “motivated by impermis sible gender discrimi nation rather than based on an exercise of pr ofessional judgment as to . . . academic ability.” Id. at 1182. Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to Rossi, this case falls, at best, somewhere between Harris and Gossett . Like in Harris and unlike in Gossett , Rossi makes no claim that th e University officials who decided her administrative Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 2223 appeals, which rendered final the decision to dismiss her, were biased or otherwise unqualified in any respect—and certainly not with respect to gender discrimination, the only impermissible motive that Gossett clearly establishes. However, in contrast

to Harris , there was arguably not a completely i ndependent review of the decision to dismiss Rossi. There appears to have been de novo review of Rossi’s bias allegations. See App’x Vol. IV at 469. And, on th e merits of the academic decision, Dean Lee stated that Rossi ’s dismissal “was based on failure to attend to the substantive feedback she was given” and her “inability to analyze her data and tie her conclusions to the data in the appropriate scholarly fashion necessary to obtain a Ph.D. degree.” Id. at 472–73. But Dean Lee also afforded some deference to Rossi’s committee, noting its members had “strong es tablished track reco rds of mentoring graduate students,” and upholding the dismissa l as “neither arbitrary nor capricious.” Id. To the extent th e University’s administrative re view reaffirmed the committee’s judgment, which Rossi alleges was based on impermissible moti vations, it is not implausible to suggest that the review ma y not have been entirely independent under
Harris . However, this notion is undermin ed by the administrative reviewers’ knowledge of Rossi’s allegations c oncerning the committee’s motivations. On the merits, our typical task would be to consider the principles that underlie our past decisions and determine whether the administrative a ppeals in this case make it more like Harris or Gossett . Reviewing a denial of qualified immunity, however, we have a slightly different ta sk: we must determine whether Rossi has shown a violation of her clearl y established rights. To be clearly established, “[w]e Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 2324 do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741. Precisely because, when construed most favor ably to Rossi, this case sits between our relevant precedents, Rossi cannot make that showing. It was not clearly established that an administra tive appeals process fails to produce a careful and deliberate decision just because it may not have involved de novo revi ew of all aspects of an academic determination that is alleged to have been based on nonacademic factors. 6 The district court erred by failing to cons ider Rossi’s administ rative appeals. Because of them, we need not dissect the committee’s initial decision to dismiss her. Unlike in Gossett , Rossi raises no concern about the administrative reviewers’ impartiality regarding her gender, nor a ny other shortcoming that our precedent clearly establishes as improper. Rossi fa ils to state a constitu tional claim sufficient to defeat the assertion of qualified immuni ty. Dudek, Keefe, and White are entitled to qualified immunity.

6 Rossi points to several out-of-circuit cas es where, she says , courts permitted due process claims to proceed even th ough “the educational institution ha[d] administratively affirmed its initial discipline of the st udent.” Aple. Br. at 41. However, as Rossi acknowledges, all these cases concerned discipline. Id. Our due process inquiry is much more demanding for disciplinary decisions than for academic dismissals. See Harris , 798 F.2d at 423. Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 2425 III. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying Dudek, Keefe, and White qualified immunity.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 20-4062 Document: 010110680247 Date Filed: 05/05/2022 Page: 25