Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 NATO

U.S. Assistance to the

Partnership for Peace

GAO-01-734
Page i GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

NATO Has Expanded Four Times Since Its Inception 6

Warsaw Initiative Funds Support Five Key Programs and Target

Aspirant Countries 8

Warsaw Initiative and PfP Programs Have Had Important Results

and Benefits 12

Scope and Methodology 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Other Warsaw Initiative Interoperability Programs 22

Appendix II Other U.S. Security Assistance Provided to Partner

Countries, 1994 Through 2000 25

Appendix III Comments From the Department of State 26

Tables

Table1: Major Warsaw Initiative Program Categories by Cost,

Fiscal Years 1994 Through 2000 (millions of dollars) 9

Table 2: Regional Peacekeeping Units Formed With Assistance

From Warsaw Initiative Programs 15

Figures

Figure 1: Membership in NATO, EU, MAP and PfP 5

Figure 2: Accessions to NATO by Date, 1949 Through 1999, MAP

Countries and Other PfP Members 7

Figure 3: Distribution of $590 Million in U.S. Warsaw Initiative

Funds by Region, 1994 Through 2000 11

Figure 4: Partner Troops as a Percentage of All Troops in NATO-led

Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkans, 1996 Through 1999 13

Figure 5: Effectiveness of Selected Defense- and State-Funded

Warsaw Initiative Programs in 12 Central and Eastern

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

European Partner States, as a Percentage of Total Cost of

Programs Assessed, 1994 Through 2000 17

Figure 6: Effectiveness of Defense-Funded Warsaw Initiative

Programs in Nine New Independent States, as a

Percentage of the Total Cost of Programs Assessed, 1994

Through 2000 18
Page 1 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

July 20, 2001

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Chairman

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the United States

sought new ways to cooperate with the political and military leadership of

their former adversaries. In January 1994, NATO established the

Partnership for Peace (PfP) to increase defense cooperation with former

Warsaw Pact members and other former communist states in Central and

Eastern Europe. Supported by the United States through the Warsaw

Initiative,1

 the Partnership plays a key role in developing the military

capabilities of those states and reforming their defense establishments.

The Partnership also helps prepare aspirant countries for NATO

membership. In 1999, the partner states of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech

Republic—three former Warsaw Pact members—joined NATO. In 2002,

NATO is expected to again extend invitations for alliance membership to

partner countries. While NATO’s decisions largely will be driven by

political considerations, these decisions also will be affected by the

military capabilities and contributions of aspiring states.

Given the key role the Partnership for Peace has played in the

transformation of NATO’s relationship with these states, the significant

U.S. involvement and investment in this program through the Warsaw

Initiative, and the impending debate on potential NATO members drawn

 1

 The Warsaw Initiative is the mechanism used by the United States to provide funding and

assistance to eligible partnership countries.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

from the Partnership, we have undertaken this study to (1) provide an

historic overview of previous NATO accessions, (2) describe the cost and

content of the Warsaw Initiative, and (3) describe the results and benefits

of Warsaw Initiative programs.

To address these objectives, we combined the results of our Warsaw

Initiative cost analysis with the results of two Department of Defense

(DOD) studies on the effectiveness of Warsaw Initiative programs. We also

drew upon recent testimony from U.S., international, and military officials

and from testimony gathered from similar officials in our previous efforts

from 1995 through 1999. Comprehensive cost data collected from DOD

were not readily available for all years of the program and, in some cases,

had to be estimated or reconstructed using our previous work. This report

was completed under our basic legislative responsibilities and is

addressed to you in your capacity as the Chairman and Ranking Member

of the committee of jurisdiction.

Previous NATO accessions have been shaped by the political and strategic

circumstances of the day. Since 1949, when 12 member countries united in

response to the emerging threat from the Soviet Union, NATO has

expanded on four occasions. On the first three occasions, NATO invited

four countries to join the alliance to strengthen its military position in

confronting the Soviet Union and its allies. NATO first invited Turkey and

Greece, then West Germany, and then Spain to join despite their varying

degrees of democratic and military development and commitment to

NATO. The accession to NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Poland in 1999 differed from previous enlargements that had the goal of

strengthening NATO’s strategic position against the Communist bloc. This

accession was the culmination of NATO’s efforts to promote the political

stability and security of the newly democratic states in Eastern Europe

after the collapse of the bloc and the end of the Cold War.

Between 1994 and 2000, the Warsaw Initiative provided about $590 million

in assistance to 22 partner states to make these countries’ militaries better

able to operate with NATO and contribute to NATO missions. Most of

these resources were devoted to five programs and the 12 partner nations

that had formally declared an interest in joining NATO. In addition,

between 1994 and 2000, the United States provided to the partner states

$165 million in military assistance outside the framework of the Warsaw

Initiative but complementary to its objectives.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

The Warsaw Initiative and the Partnership for Peace have produced

important results and benefits for NATO and the Partner states. The

contributions of Partner states to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, the

formation of new peacekeeping units, and the extent to which Partnership

assistance helped to prepare the three newest NATO countries for

membership evidence the effectiveness of the Partnership and the Warsaw

Initiative. Moreover, our analysis of both program costs and other

assessments of program results demonstrates that a large portion of

Warsaw Initiative resources were devoted to programs judged effective in

enhancing the ability of recipient nations’ militaries to contribute to NATO

and to operate with NATO forces.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by 12 European and

North American countries to take measures against the emerging threat

the Soviet Union posed to the democracies of Western Europe. Of

indefinite duration, the treaty created a political framework for an

international alliance obligating its members to prevent or repel

aggression, should it occur against one or more treaty countries. Article 10

of the treaty provides for the possibility of accession by any other

European state in a position to further the principles of the treaty upon the

unanimous agreement of the current members; it contains no explicit

criteria an aspiring member must meet to join NATO.

The PfP program was a U.S. initiative launched at the January 1994 NATO

summit in Brussels as a way for the alliance to engage the former

members of the Warsaw Pact and other former communist states in

Central and Eastern Europe.2

 The objectives of the partnership, stated in

NATO’s Partnership Framework Document, are to (1) facilitate

transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; (2)

ensure democratic control of defense forces; (3) maintain the capability

and readiness to contribute to crisis response operations under the United

Nations and other international organizations; (4) develop cooperative

military relations with NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training,

and exercises for peacekeeping; search and rescue; and humanitarian

operations; and (5) develop forces that are better able to operate with

 2

 The Warsaw Treaty Organization—commonly known as the Warsaw Pact—was created in

1955 and included the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,

Hungary, Poland, and Romania. It was dissolved in 1991.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

NATO members. NATO also uses PfP to support countries interested in

NATO membership.

In July 1994, the United States launched the Warsaw Initiative to support

the objectives of the Partnership. According to joint DOD and State

Department guidance, the objectives of the Initiative are to (1) facilitate

the participation of partner states in exercises and programs with NATO

countries, (2) promote the ability of partner forces to operate with NATO,

(3) support efforts to increase defense and military cooperation with

Partnership partners, and (4) develop strong candidates for membership in

NATO. The Initiative is jointly funded and administered by DOD and the

State Department.

A total of 29 nations have joined the Partnership, and 3 have since joined

NATO. The partner states range from mature free market democracies in

the European Union, such as Finland and Sweden, which have relatively

advanced military technologies that do not receive and have no need for

Warsaw Initiative assistance, to autocratic command economies with

outdated military structures such as Uzbekistan, and others such as

Georgia that are greatly dependent on Western security assistance for their

reform efforts.3

 (Fig. 1 shows the overlapping memberships of NATO, EU,

MAP, and PfP members.)

 3

Eleven NATO states and 4 partner states comprise the European Union (EU), previously

known as the European Community, which is an institutional framework for the

construction of an economically united Europe. The European Community was created

after World War II to unite the nations of Europe economically to make war less likely. In

1999, the EU decided to establish the military capacity to perform humanitarian and rescue

tasks, peacekeeping, and the ability to deploy combat forces in crisis-management roles.
Page 5 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Figure 1: Membership in NATO, EU, MAP, and PfP

MAP = Membership Action Plan

a

Macedonia is an unofficial name for the state recognized by the U.S. government as The Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Source: GAO based on NATO data.

Each partner participates in activities to the extent it desires and

assembles a unique annual work program by selecting from a variety of

activities listed in NATO’s annual partnership work program, a

compendium of activities offered by donor countries. For those states that

have formally expressed their interest in joining the Alliance, NATO has

developed a Membership Action Plan to help them become better

candidates. (MAP countries are identified in figure 1.) The MAP builds

upon Partnership activities, helps ready these states for the full range of

NATO missions, and requires additional planning by the partner country

and review by NATO. Countries provide assistance to partner states

primarily through bilateral arrangements in order to meet the

requirements identified in the work program.4

 4

NATO also provides assistance to PfP countries through its commonly funded budgets. In

fiscal year 1999, this assistance amounted to $35 million from the civil budget and $26.9

million from the military budget. The United States contributes about 25 percent of these

funds.
Page 6 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Since the beginning of the alliance in 1949, NATO has held out the

prospect of membership to other nations as changing political and

strategic circumstances warranted. NATO has expanded on four occasions

since 1949, adding seven new European members. The first three

expansions took place during times of confrontation with the Communist

bloc, particularly the Soviet Union, and were undertaken to meet pressing

strategic and security needs. A significantly different strategic

environment marked the fourth and latest expansion, wherein NATO’s

goal was to extend stability eastward into the political vacuum left after

the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Fig. 2 shows the countries that have

joined NATO since 1949, as well as MAP and PfP members.)

In 1952, Turkey and Greece joined NATO for strategic reasons; the Korean

War was at its height, and the United States wished to shore up NATO’s

southern flank to forestall similar Communist military action in Europe.

West Germany acceded in 1955, after it agreed to maintain large NATO

forces on its territory and to place its national army within NATO’s

integrated command structure.5

 Spain joined the alliance in 1982 at

NATO’s invitation. NATO wanted to gain better access to Spain’s air and

naval bases, while the newly democratized Spain sought membership as a

means to better its chances to join the European Economic Community.

In 1991, NATO redefined its strategic concept to reflect the post-Cold War

geopolitical landscape and to pursue greater cooperation with its former

adversaries to the east. NATO committed itself in January 1994 to

enlarging its membership to include the newly democratic states of the

former Communist bloc. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

joined NATO in fulfillment of this commitment.

 5

After Germany reunited in 1990, the territory of the former East Germany became part of

NATO without a formal accession process. NATO’s military presence in this territory was

restricted by agreement with Russia until 1994.

NATO Has Expanded

Four Times Since Its

Inception
Page 7 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Figure 2: Accessions to NATO by Date, 1949 Through 1999, MAP Countries and Other PfP Members

Source: GAO based on NATO sources
Page 8 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Between 1994 and 2000, the Warsaw Initiative provided assistance worth

about $590 million to 22 partner states to support equipment grants,

training, exercises, information technology, and other activities to make

these countries’ militaries better able to operate with NATO and

contribute to NATO’s missions.6

 Moreover, a large portion of this funding

was allocated to five programs, and about 70 percent has been devoted to

the 12 partner nations that had formally declared an interest in joining

NATO. In this same time period, the United States provided to the partner

states additional security assistance totaling over $165 million outside the

framework of the Warsaw Initiative but complementary to its objectives.

About 90 percent of the approximately $590 million in Warsaw Initiative

funds ($530 million) has funded five programs. The largest program

provides nonlethal military equipment and training.7

 The other programs

support military exercises, information technology programs, a defense

education institute, and a defense resource management system.8

 See table

1 for the costs of these five programs. Appendix I contains details on other

Warsaw Initiative interoperability programs.

 6

 The total extent of bilateral PfP assistance from other countries is unknown, as donors

and recipients are sometimes reluctant to reveal the full extent of their bilateral

relationships with other partners and NATO members.

7

 This equipment and training is provided through the Department of State’s Foreign

Military Financing Program.

8

 These programs are generally categorized as interoperability programs.

Warsaw Initiative

Funds Support Five

Key Programs and

Target Aspirant

Countries

Five Key Programs

Receive Most Funding
Page 9 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Table 1: Major Warsaw Initiative Program Categories by Cost, Fiscal Years 1994 Through 2000 (millions of dollars)

Program

New NATO members and

MAP countries

Other

PfP members and

U.S. costs Total cost

Military equipment and training $290.9 $68.5 $359.4

Military exercises 54.5 61.6 116.1

Partnership Information Management System 17.8 13.2 31.0

Marshall Center 7.2 4.8 12.0

Defense Resource Management System 5.7 5.8 11.5

Subtotal 376.1 153.9 530.0

Other Warsaw Initiative activities 34.3 24.7 59.0

Total $410.4 $178.6 $589.0

Source: GAO based on DOD and State Department data.

• Funding for military equipment and training was used to provide

communications, search and rescue, mountaineering, and mapping

equipment, along with field gear, air defense radar systems, and

computers; training for English language, noncommissioned officer

development, vehicle maintenance and logistics, and other purposes.

According to State Department documents and a DOD-sponsored study,

this equipment and training have directly contributed to partner country

participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. For

example, this funding provided

• communication equipment to Romania for engineering units in the

NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia;

• air traffic management systems to Hungary, which supported

Operation Allied Force;

• fuel, supplies, and construction assistance to Ukraine to support the

initial deployment of a battalion for peacekeeping duties in the Kosovo

Force/International Security Force (KFOR) in Kosovo; and

• an automated logistics system to Poland to help deploy its military

units in peacekeeping operations.

• Of all the interoperability programs supported by the Warsaw Initiative,

military exercises were typically cited in Defense-sponsored studies and

by U.S. and international officials as the most useful of partnership

activities. Exercises range from search and rescue simulations to joint

multinational amphibious landing exercises. Exercises have grown in

complexity and sophistication as the skills and experiences of partner

participants have grown. For example, the United States annually

conducts Exercise Combined Endeavor. In the 1995 exercise, 10 countries

participated in a demonstration of the use of common communications

equipment. In the 2000 exercise, 35 countries participated in the
Page 10 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

identification, testing, and documentation of communications

interoperability between NATO and PfP communication networks.

• The Partnership Information Management System (PIMS) created an

information management and communications system among Partnership

members that stores and disseminates all types of data relevant to the PfP

community. The system has been used to support military exercises, civilmilitary emergency planning, military medical education, environmental

security activities, and provides e-mail capabilities and other basic

information management capabilities. The system currently links 18

partner capitals and NATO and is augmented by networks that include

ministries of defense, national defense academies, other international

organizations, and U.S. and NATO military commands.

• The Marshall Center is a jointly funded U.S.-German defense educational

institution that focuses on the resolution of security issues involving

Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries. The Center offers postgraduate studies, conferences, research programs, foreign area studies,

and language courses to civilian and military professionals from more than

40 countries. Warsaw Initiative funding supports the Marshall Center’s

annual conferences for PfP members on topics ranging from defense

planning and management to civil oversight of the military.

• DOD’s Defense Resource Management program creates models for

individual partner countries to help restructure their militaries. Initially,

DOD conducts a 6-month study in the subject country to help it develop a

rational defense program linked to strategic assessments and budget

constraints. Thereafter, the Department conducts short follow-up visits to

provide technical assistance and help implement a defense resource

management system. The objectives of the program include exposure of

partner countries to defense management systems similar to those of

NATO members. The program also aims to help partner states’ civilian

officials assert control over their military structures by making defense

management more transparent.

About 70 percent of the Warsaw Initiative’s approximately $590 million in

assistance has been provided to the 12 partner states that have joined or

declared their intention to join NATO. Approximately twenty-six percent

of all Warsaw Initiative assistance between 1994 and 2000, or $153 million,

went to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—the three former

Warsaw Pact states that joined NATO in 1999. Almost 44 percent of that

funding, or $258 million, has gone to the nine MAP states of Albania,

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and

Slovenia. The remaining funding, $178 million, has supported Partnership

activities in Croatia and countries that were once part of the former Soviet

Union— Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,

Twelve Partner States

Receive Large Portion of

Funding
Page 11 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan—and to support certain U.S. costs

associated with the program.9

 Figure 3 shows the distribution of Warsaw

Initiative funding.

Figure 3: Distribution of $590 Million in U.S. Warsaw Initiative Funds by Region,

1994 Through 2000

a

Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

b

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

c

The former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Source: GAO based on DOD and Department of State data.

In addition, between 1994 and 2000, the United States provided to the

partner states military assistance totaling over $165 million outside the

framework of the Warsaw Initiative but complementary to its objectives.

 9

 Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act prohibits U.S. Warsaw Initiative assistance to

Azerbaijan until it lifts its blockade of Armenia. U.S. policy prohibits Warsaw Initiative

assistance to Azerbaijan’s rival, Armenia. Most forms of U.S. assistance to the government

of Belarus, including Warsaw Initiative funding, are also suspended.
Page 12 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

This funding was distributed through three Department of State and DOD

programs that predate the Warsaw Initiative: the International Military

Education and Training Program, Cooperative Threat Reduction Defense

and Military Contacts Program, and the U.S. European Command’s Joint

Contact Team Program. Although these programs were not designed to

implement Warsaw Initiative objectives, they provide additional training to

partner militaries, facilitate military contacts, and promote closer

relationships with NATO. Appendix II provides details on these programs.

U.S. and international officials and DOD-sponsored studies provide

consistent and reinforcing views that Partnership and Warsaw Initiative

programs have had important results and benefits.

• U.S. and NATO military commanders and other international officials have

concluded that Warsaw Initiative and PfP programs have enhanced the

capabilities of partner countries to participate effectively in NATO-led

peace operations in the Balkans and have improved their ability to operate

with NATO, thus making them better candidates for membership in the

alliance.

• Warsaw Initiative funding has directly supported the creation of seven

multinational peacekeeping units composed of NATO and partner state

troops, some of which can or have been deployed to NATO-led peace

operations in the Balkans.

• According to representatives of the three newest NATO member states,

PfP and Warsaw Initiative assistance was invaluable to their preparation

for joining NATO.

• Our cost analysis, along with the DOD-sponsored studies, reinforced these

conclusions by showing that most Warsaw Initiative funding is associated

with effective programs.

U.S. and international officials noted that the growing contribution of

Partner states’ troops and other assistance to NATO-led peacekeeping

operations in the Balkans is the most significant indicator of the

effectiveness of U.S. and NATO PfP programs. Between 1995 and 1999,

NATO established three peacekeeping missions--two long-term and one

short-term--with partner state military participation. The long-term

missions are the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina

and Croatia, now known as SFOR, and KFOR in Kosovo, Macedonia, and

Albania. In 1999, NATO also established the short-term Albania Force

during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia and Montenegro to

assist and coordinate humanitarian efforts. As shown in figure 4, partner

state’s contributions of troops to these missions rose from about 5,800 in

Warsaw Initiative and

PfP Programs Have

Had Important

Results and Benefits

Partner States Provide

Trained Forces and Other

Aid to NATO-led

Operations
Page 13 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

1996 to more than 12,800 in 1999 (11 percent and 15 percent of the total

force, respectively).10 Twenty partner states contributed troops to one or

more of these missions; 9 partners contributed a battalion or more.11

Figure 4: Partner Troops as a Percentage of All Troops in NATO-led Peacekeeping

Forces in the Balkans, 1996 Through 1999

Source: GAO from DOD and NATO data.

Moreover, NATO heads of government stated in the 1997 Madrid

Declaration that without the experiences and assistance PfP had provided,

the participation of partner forces in SFOR and IFOR would not have been

as effective and efficient. Several SFOR and KFOR commanders and other

NATO officers also noted that PfP activities, particularly exercises with

NATO troops, were effective in preparing partner units to operate with

NATO forces in an integrated command structure. One NATO official

stated that every soldier a partner contributes to SFOR and KFOR means

that NATO will not have to send an additional NATO or U.S. soldier to

perform that function.

 10 Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in March 1999, for

purposes of comparison, their troop contributions are counted as part of the total Partner

country force contributions for 1999.

11 Those contributing a battalion or more included Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland,

Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine.
Page 14 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

According to DOD officials and documents, partner states also provided

logistical assistance for the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia

and Montenegro. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland offered or

provided basing rights for NATO aircraft. Along with Romania and

Bulgaria, the three newest NATO members permitted allied aircraft to

transit their airspace. Romania also helped NATO commanders direct the

bombing campaign by providing NATO air controllers access to their

NATO-compatible radar coverage system, which was procured through the

Warsaw Initiative.

U.S. officials and documents also indicate that Warsaw Initiative programs

have helped create or support seven international peacekeeping units of

battalion size or larger involving a total of 5 NATO countries (including the

2 former partners Poland and Hungary) and 16 partner countries. In 1996,

the Congress declared that some of these units should receive appropriate

support from the United States because they could make important

contributions to European peace and security and could assist participant

countries in preparing to assume the responsibilities of possible NATO

membership. Two of these units have been deployed to the Balkans. See

table 2 for details on the composition of these units and the U.S. assistance

they have received.

Warsaw Initiative

Supported Formation of

Non-NATO Peacekeeping

Units
Page 15 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Table 2: Regional Peacekeeping Units Formed With Assistance From Warsaw Initiative Programs

Unit Participants Date formed/deployed Warsaw Initiative assistance

BALTBATaEstonia

Latvia

Lithuania

1995/deployed to Bosnia

1997

Unit equipment

Communications gear

PfP exercise support

CENTRASBATbKazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

1996 Communications equipment

Trucks

PfP exercise support

POLITBATcLithuania

Poland

1999 PfP exercise support

POLUKBATcPoland

Ukraine

1996/deployed to Kosovo

2000

Exercises

Communications gear

English language training

MPFSEE/

SEEBRIGd

Albania, Bulgaria, Greece,

Hungary, Italy, Macedonia,

Romania, Turkey

1998 Equipment for Bulgarian contingent

PfP exercise support

Multinational Land ForceeCroatia, Hungary, Italy,

Slovenia

2000 PfP exercise support

Assistance to develop joint training

facilities

CENCOOP BrigadefAustria, Hungary,

Romania, Slovakia,

Slovenia, Switzerland

2000 PfP exercise support

a

BALTBAT: Baltic Battalion.

b

CENTRASBAT: Central Asian Battalion.

c

POLITBAT and POLUKBAT: Joint Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian battalions.

d

MPFSEE/SEEBRIG: Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe/South Eastern Europe Brigade.

e

Also known as the Tri-national brigade, this was a unit originally formed by Hungary, Italy, and

Slovenia which now includes Croatia.

f

Central European Nations Cooperation in Peacekeeping (CENCOOP) is a regional organization

planning to create a multinational peacekeeping brigade using forces from Austria, Hungary,

Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland.

Source: GAO based on DOD, State and DFI International data.

According to the NATO delegations of the three newest NATO members,

PfP assistance, of which the United States was their largest donor through

the Warsaw Initiative, was invaluable to their preparation for joining

NATO. In particular, PfP exercises, equipment grants, and exposure to

western military doctrine and practice boosted the ability of their forces to

operate with NATO. Members from all three delegations affirmed the value

of Partnership for Peace and Warsaw Initiative support in making them

better candidates for NATO membership. In particular, they cited

• the exposure to NATO procedures, operations, and command structures

they received through PfP exercises and programs;

Warsaw Initiative and

Partnership for Peace

Helped Prepare New

NATO Members
Page 16 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

• the professional and personal contacts that they developed to build a

defense establishment better able to operate with NATO; and

• exercise experiences and equipment grants that improved the ability of

their military forces to operate with NATO.

The Czech delegation noted that its experiences in PfP activities helped

expose the conflicts between the prerequisites for being a successful

NATO ally and the practical difficulties of achieving those prerequisites,

given their political and economic realities. For example, PfP activities

helped them (1) reconcile the theoretical need for public support for

accession at a time when political support within the government was

relatively low and (2) plan a defense strategy and budget that met the

demands of NATO interoperability goals and spending targets in a

constrained budget environment.

In 2000, DOD commissioned two studies to analyze the objectives,

activities, and accomplishments of Warsaw Initiative programs and

identify the lessons learned from program implementation and results. The

studies, conducted by DFI International, reviewed programs that

represented $409 million of the approximately $590 million in Warsaw

Initiative funding. By combining the cost data that we collected from DOD

and the State Department with the results of these studies, we determined

that, in aggregate, about $367 million, or 90 percent, of the funding

associated with the programs examined, was deemed effective or

successful in promoting the objectives of the Warsaw Initiative. The first

study, which focussed on the partner states of Central and Eastern

Europe, showed that 91 percent of the resources associated with the

programs examined were exceptionally or significantly effective. Figure 5

shows in greater detail the findings of this study.

DOD-Sponsored

Assessments of Warsaw

Initiative Programs
Page 17 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Figure 5: Effectiveness of Selected Defense- and State-Funded Warsaw Initiative

Programs in 12 Central and Eastern European Partner States, as a Percentage of

Total Cost of Programs Assessed, 1994 Through 2000

Exceptional: The program produced a positive fundamental change or supported the development of

a capability that would not have occurred otherwise; the program is unambiguously the primary

reason for progress towards Warsaw Initiative objectives. PfP military exercises constitute the entire

category.

Significant: The program provides the tools or information necessary for the target country to make

interoperability improvements, continue existing defense reform, increase its contributions to NATO,

or expand its regional cooperation. Five programs fall into this category: Civil Military Emergency

Planning, Foreign Military Financing for Equipment Grants, Foreign Military Financing for Training,

Logistics Exercises, and the Regional Airspace Initiative.

Marginal: The program provides sufficient exposure to U.S. and NATO-compatible methods such that

the target country has taken tentative steps toward implementing or accomplishing Warsaw Initiative

objectives. Four programs fall into this category: Command and Control Studies, the Defense

Resource Management System, the Navigational Aids Program, and the Partnership Information

Management System.

Minimal: The program provides a venue for familiarization with U.S. and NATO operating procedures

but did not contribute to meaningful improvements in Warsaw Initiative objectives. One program—the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Assessments—constitutes this category.

Note: Study assessed programs worth $386 million, or 94 percent, of total 1994-2000 Warsaw

Initiative costs for these countries.

Sources: GAO based on DOD, State, and DFI International data.
Page 18 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

The second study, which focussed on the Central Asian and Caucasus

partner states along with Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, showed that 67

percent of the resources associated with the programs examined were

successful or partially successful. Figure 6 shows in greater detail the

findings of this study.

Figure 6: Effectiveness of Defense-Funded Warsaw Initiative Programs in Nine New

Independent States, as a Percentage of the Total Cost of Programs Assessed, 1994

Through 2000

Successful: Programs that initiate follow-on Warsaw Initiative or Warsaw Initiative-related activities.

Furthermore, they have either caused improvements in Warsaw Initiative objectives of recipient

nation defense reform or increased ability to operate with NATO, or they have demonstrated a

significant potential to do so. Seven programs are in this category: Civil Military Emergency Planning,

Defense Planning Exchange, Defense Public Affairs Exchange, Defense Resources Planning

Exchange, Economic Adjustment Seminars, Joint Consultative Economic Committee, and Logistics

Exchange.

Partially successful: Programs at least partially satisfy the study’s measures of effectiveness.

Recipient countries initiate changes or follow-on efforts based on the information or recommendations

included in a program. The Partnership Information Management System—a large program—

constitutes this category.
Page 19 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Unsuccessful: Programs either (1) required levels of transparency, absorption capacity, or resources

for successful implementation that partner country recipients are unable to provide; or (2) did not

initiate follow-on Warsaw Initiative or Warsaw Initiative-related activities that were completed and

were unlikely to have contributed to notable amounts of defense reform or interoperability. Five

programs were included in this category: Army Corps of Engineers Assessments, Defense Resource

Management Institute Exchange, Defense Resource Management System, Environmental

Workshops, and the Inspector General Exchange.

Too recent: Three programs whose results cannot be currently measured due to extremely recent

implementation are included in this category.

Note: Study assessed programs worth $22.6 million, or 17 percent, of total 1994-2000 Warsaw

Initiative costs for these countries.

Source: GAO based on DOD and DFI International data.

In addition, both studies concluded that the Warsaw Initiative programs

need to be better focused on U.S. strategic and regional objectives and to

better take into account the capacities of the recipient states to absorb or

apply the programs. For example, the second study noted that certain

programs emphasizing NATO interoperability are not well suited for the

Central Asian states.

To prepare our overview of previous NATO accessions, we reviewed

historical texts, and for the most recent accession, interviewed numerous

U.S. and international officials and scholars. We also obtained U.S. and

NATO documents on the accession process.

To describe the cost and contents of Warsaw Initiative programs, we

obtained comprehensive cost and program data by recipient country and

year from DOD and State. We interviewed DOD and State Department

country desk officers, program managers, and fiscal officers. We obtained

historic budget and program documents from DOD and State. For

information we were unable to obtain from DOD, we drew on our previous

reports and workpapers on Partnership for Peace. For fiscal years 1994

and 1995, we extrapolated from planning documents to approximate

actual obligations by recipient country. In cases where costs were not

readily attributable to a specific country, we applied decision rules for

country allocation generated in agreement with Defense officials.

To assess the outcomes of Warsaw Initiative programs in support of

Partnership for Peace, we synthesized information we obtained from

numerous U.S. and international officials and scholars and historical

information developed for our previous reviews of NATO-led

peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. U.S. officials include cognizant

officials from the Departments of Defense and State, members of the U.S.

Scope and

Methodology
Page 20 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

mission to NATO, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. We also

interviewed and obtained documents from U.S. military officers at the U.S.

European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and from the U.S. National

Military Representative to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers

Europe, in Mons, Belgium. International officials included members of the

Czech, Hungarian, Swedish, and Polish delegations to NATO; NATO’s

International Staff in Brussels, Belgium; and the director of the

Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium.

We also reviewed the results of two studies the Department of Defense

commissioned in 2000 to analyze the objectives, activities, and

accomplishments of Warsaw Initiative programs and identify the lessons

learned from program implementation and results. One study, “Assessing

the Practical Impact of the Warsaw Initiative” examined 11 of the largest

Defense and State-funded Warsaw Initiative programs in Albania, Bulgaria,

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,

Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The other study, “Department of

Defense Engagement of the New Independent States: Developing the

Warsaw Initiative and Minimizing Risks in the Russia Relationship,”

examined all DOD-sponsored Warsaw Initiative programs and other

related DOD assistance activities in the nine New Independent States of

Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This study also looked at DOD-sponsored

security activities in three other New Independent States: the partner

states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which did not receive Warsaw Initiative

assistance between 1994 and 2000; and Tajikistan, which is not a PfP

member. Both studies evaluated the effectiveness of programs in terms of

objectives associated with the Warsaw Initiative and the Partnership for

Peace. The principal analysts of these studies briefed us on their

methodology. This methodology included the development of measures of

effectiveness and other metrics to assess the programs. To implement this

methodology, the analysts collected information from DOD and State

Department officials, including desk officers, Defense Security

Cooperation Agency officials, and U.S. embassy personnel from partner

countries. In addition to briefing us on its methodology and results, DFI

International provided us with their detailed results on each program for

each country, along with the specific criteria used in evaluating each

program.
Page 21 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

The Department of State and DOD generally concurred with the report’s

major findings, and State complimented GAO’s analysis and methodology.

In addition, both DOD and State offered technical and editorial

suggestions, which we have incorporated where appropriate. The State

Department’s written comments are presented in appendix III; DOD

provided oral comments.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional

committees. We will also send copies to the Secretary of State and the

Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon

request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions

about this report. Key contributors to this assignment were F. James

Shafer, Muriel J. Forster, B. Patrick Hickey, and Lynn Cothern.

Joseph A. Christoff

Director

International Affairs and Trade Issues

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Other Warsaw Initiative

Interoperability Programs

Page 22 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

During fiscal years 1994 through 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD)

supported numerous U.S. interoperability programs in Partnership for

Peace (PfP) nations. Among the largest dollar programs are the following

activities.

SIMNET ($9.0 million): SIMNET is an exercise simulation network focused

on peace support operations and scenarios. It is part of a U.S.-launched

effort to link defense education institutions to increase the level of

sophistication of military exercises and cooperative defense education.

Commander in Chief Conferences and Other Expenses ($13.4 million):

These two program categories combined provide funding to cover costs of

hosting PfP-related conferences or sending U.S. or partner personnel to

attend PfP-related events either in the United States or abroad.

Command and Control (C4) Studies ($6.1 million): C4 studies analyze and

document command and control interoperability of the subject country’s

forces with U.S. forces for bilateral or multilateral contingencies. The

purpose of the studies is to understand the country’s capabilities for NATO

interoperability and identify useful recommendations for improvement.

Transportation for Excess Defense Articles ($4.5 million): DOD sells or

transfers articles no longer needed by U.S. armed forces to partnership

countries. Warsaw Initiative funding can be used to support the costs of

transporting this equipment.1

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Exchanges and Assessments ($3.6 million):

The Army Corps of Engineers conducts information exchanges and

assessments in Partner countries on environmental and infrastructure

topics, such as hazardous waste and material storage and transportation,

disaster relief, and contamination control and prevention at military bases.

Civil Military Emergency Planning ($3.4 million): This initiative aims to

enhance the capabilities of partner states to work with each other, with

neighboring nations, and with the international community to prepare for

natural and technological disasters within any partner nation. Workshops

and exercises are conducted in country by traveling contact teams or

through exchanges of military personnel between units of the U.S.

National Guard and comparable units of partner armed forces.

 1

 No funds were expended to transport excess defense articles in fiscal year 2001.

Appendix I: Other Warsaw Initiative

Interoperability Programs
Appendix I: Other Warsaw Initiative

Interoperability Programs

Page 23 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Regional Airspace Initiative ($3.3 million): This program seeks to help

develop civil and military airspace regimes that are fully interoperable

with West European civilian airspace organizations. Warsaw Initiative

funds are used to study partner requirements for building and operating an

effective air sovereignty system. State Department foreign military

financing funds may be used to procure the hardware necessary to

implement the system.

Navigational Aids Program ($3.2 million): This initiative supports

assessments that document the interoperability of navigational aids and

landing systems of partner states with western military forces under

various contingencies. The assessments provide recommendations for

modernization, with a focus on interoperability.

Logistics Exchanges ($2.5 million): These exchanges consist of in-country

workshops that focus on improving partners’ understanding of NATO’s

collective logistics doctrine and logistics support requirements of NATO

operations and of hosting NATO forces.

National Military Command Centers ($1.4 million): This initiative aims to

provide modern, centralized command center support to military and civil

crises and disaster management. Its goal is to establish common command

and control information systems throughout a region.

Partnership for Peace Consortium ($1.1 million): This program primarily

supports the annual conference costs of the Consortium, which includes

representatives from 188 military academies, universities, and defense

study institutions.

Radar Interoperability and Lifecycle Upgrade Study ($1.1 million): More

than 600 radar in 14 countries remained from the Warsaw Pact military

structure. This study evaluates the utility and NATO compatibility of those

radar for integration into the evolving airspace systems in the partner

states.

Defense Resource Planning Exchanges ($1.0 million): This program

consists of small group workshops that provide an introduction to and

explanation of the DOD’s resource management system to encourage

partners to consider U.S. concepts that could be used to improve their

resource management.

National Guard ($1.0 million): In 1999, the Air National Guard supported

the Partnership for Peace program largely through military-to-military
Appendix I: Other Warsaw Initiative

Interoperability Programs

Page 24 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

contacts. This 1-year Warsaw Initiative funding supported National Guard

participation in flood preparedness workshops, exchanges for engineering

platoons, air exercise planning, field training, medical training, and other

activities.
Appendix II: Other U.S. Security Assistance

Provided to Partner Countries, 1994 Through

2000

Page 25 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

The Departments of State and Defense provided additional military

assistance to partner states totaling more than $165 million between 1994

and 2000. This funding was distributed through three programs with

objectives that complement the objectives of the Partnership for Peace

and the Warsaw Initiative. These programs are:

The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

($72.4 million): This program provides military education and training on a

grant basis to allied and friendly nations’ militaries to (1) increase their

exposure to the proper role of the military in a democratic society,

including human rights issues, and to U.S. professional military education;

and (2) help to develop the capability to teach English. The State

Department funds IMET through its Foreign Operations Appropriation,

and DOD implements the program through the Defense Security

Cooperation Agency. IMET complements or builds on Warsaw Initiative

programs by offering more advanced training to partner state defense

officials, including English language training, defense resource

management, and instruction in doctrines common to the officials of

NATO countries.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Defense and Military Contacts

Program ($40.4 million): The United States launched the Cooperative

Threat Reduction initiative in 1991 to help the nations of the former Soviet

Union eliminate, control, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. This program has assisted CTR efforts by supporting defense

and military contacts between the United States and Belarus, Georgia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and

Uzbekistan (Belarus and Turkmenistan are currently ineligible for CTR

funding). The objectives of these efforts complement the objectives of

Partnership for Peace and the Warsaw Initiative by expanding contacts

between defense establishments.

The Joint Contact Team Program ($52.9 million): This program supports

the deployment of small teams of military personnel to operate in a

number of partner states and other countries within the U.S. European

Command’s area of responsibility. The teams’ mission is to promote

stability, democratization, and closer relationships with NATO. They

exchange ideas and demonstrate operational methods to host nation

military personnel and assist their militaries in the transition to

democracies with free market economies. They do not conduct formal

training or supply equipment. According to a U.S. European command

document, 90 percent of the teams’ efforts support partner countries’ PfP

programs.

Appendix II: Other U.S. Security Assistance

Provided to Partner Countries, 1994 Through

2000
Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of State

Page 26 GAO-01-734 Partnership for Peace

Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of State

(711549)
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