F OR P UBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

T A R L A M A K A E F F , on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-counter-defendant - Appellant

,

and

B R A N D O N K E L L E R ; E D O B E R K R O M ; P A T R I C I A M U R

P H Y , Plaintiffs

,

v

.

T R U M P U N I V E R S I T Y , L L C, a New York limited liability

company , AKA Trump Entrepreneur I nitiative, Defendant-counter-claimant -

A ppellee

,

and

D O N A L D J

. T R

U M P , Defendant

. N o. 11-55016

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00940- I EG-W V G

ORDER DENYI NG THE PETI TI ON F OR REHEARI

NG EN B ANC

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California I rma E. Gonz alez , Chief District J u dg e, PresidingM A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 2

Arg ued and Submitted

J anuary 18, 2012—I rvine, California

F iled November 27, 2013

B e fore: Alex K oz inski, Chief J u dg e, Kim McL ane W ardlaw and Richard A. Paez , Circuit J udg es.

Order; Concurrence by

J udg es W ardlaw and Callahan; Dissent by

J udg e W atford

SUMMARY *

Calif ornia Anti-SLAP P Statute

The panel denied a petition for panel r ehearing and denied a petition for rehearing

en banc on behalf of the court.

Concurr i ng in the denial of r ehearing en banc, J udg e W a r dlaw and Callahan, joined by J udge s W

. F letcher a nd Gould, rejected the d issent’s assertions t h a t t h e motion to strike provision of California’s anti-SL APP statute collides with F ederal Rules 12 and 56 and tha t t h i s case needs to be taken e n banc to overrule U nited States ex rel

. N

e w s h a m v

. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
, 1 90 F .3d 963 ( 9 th Cir. 1999), and Batzel v . Smith , 333 F .3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 3

Dissenting from the denial o f rehearing en banc, J udg e W a tford, joi ned by Chief J udg e Koz inski and J udg es Paez and B ea, stated that California’s a nti-SL APP statute impermissibly supplemen t s t he F ederal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial d ismissal of an action. J udg e W atford believes that the court should have taken this c ase en banc to bring its line of c ase law in line with Shady Grove Orthopedic A ssocs., P.A. v. Allstate I

ns. Co.
, 559 U.S. 393, 3 9 8 ( 2 0 1 0 ), a nd the Supreme Court’s decisions e stablishing the proper scope o f the collateral order doctrine.

ORDER

Chief J udg e Koz inski and J udg e Paez have voted to g rant the petition for rehearing en banc. J udg e W a rdlaw has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc.

The full court w as advised of the petition for rehearing en b a nc. A judg e requested a vote on whether to reh e a r t h e matter en banc. T he matter failed to receive a majority of the
votes of the nonrecused active judg es in favor o f e n b a n c consideration. F ed. R. App. P. 35(f).

Appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc, filed April 30, 2013, is denied

. J udg e Watf o r d ’ s d issent from denial of en b a nc rehearing

, and J udg es W ardlaw and Callahan’s

c o ncurrence in the denial of en banc rehearing

, are f i l e d concurrently

with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED

.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 4

W A RDL AW and CAL L A HAN, Circuit J udg es, with whom J udg e s F L ETCHER and GOUL D join, concurring in the denial of rehearing

en banc:

“En banc c ourts are the ex ception, not the rule.” United S tates v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp.
, 363 U.S. 685, 689 (19 6 0 )

. T h e y are “not favored,” F ed. R. App. P. 35, a nd “convened o nly when ex traordinary circumst a n c es ex ist,” American-Foreign S.S. Corp. , 363 U.S. at 689. B ecause the panel opinion f

aithfully foll ows our circuit’s precedent,
creates no inter-circuit sp lit, does not present an issue o f

ex c e pti o n al importance, and because the contrary result would create a circuit split, a cal l t o r e hear this appeal en banc failed to g ain the support of a majority of our acti ve judg es. W e concur.

Our dissenting colleag ues urg e us to overrule our decisions in United States ex rel. Newsh a m v

. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
, 190 F .3d 963 (9th Ci r

. 1 9 9 9), a nd Batzel v. Smith

, 333 F .3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). I n Newsham

, we held that the mo t i o n t o strike a nd attorney s’ fees provisions of C a l i fornia’s anti-SL APP statute apply in diversity cases; in Batzel

, w e held that the denial of an antiSL APP motion is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Newsham a nd Batzel w ere correctly decided. Not only is the dissent’s desire to u se this appeal as a vehicle
to chang e our circuit’s law based on a misreading of Supreme Court precedent; it also distorts our standard for rehearing an appeal en banc.

I.

The dissent asserts that the motion to strike provision o f California’s anti-SL A PP statute collides with F ederal Ru l e sM A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 5

12 and 56. This was ex a c tly the arg ument advanced by the SL APP plaintiff in Newsham

. There, we concluded that there

w a s no “direct collision” because the motion to strike a n d attorney s’ fees provisions o f the anti-SL APP statu t e a n d Rules 1 2 and 56 “‘can ex ist side by side

. . . each controlling its own intended sphere of cover a ge without c onflict.’” New s h a m , 190 F .3d a t 972 (ellipsis in orig inal) (quoting W alker v. Armco Steel Corp.
, 446 U.S. 740, 7 52 (1980)). W e

reaso n e d that, under the anti-SL APP statute, a SL APP defendant may bring a special motion to strike. I f he is successful, the S L APP counterclaim will be dismissed a nd the plaintiff-counter-defendant may be e nt i t l e d to attorney s’ fees. I f he is u nsuccessful, h e “remains free to bring a Rule 12 motion t o d i smiss, or a Rule 56 motion for summary judg ment.” Id

.

The S upreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Ins u rance Co.
, 559 U.S. 393 (2010), does n ot c hang e this reasoning. T h e r e, the Supreme Court addressed whether a N ew York stat u t e t h at precluded class actions in suits seeking p enalties or statutory minimum dam a ge s collided with F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court f ramed the “direct collision” inquiry in a new way : it as k e d w h e ther the state statute at issue “attempts to answe r the same q uestion” a s the F ederal Rule. Id

. at 399. To determine t h e q uestions answered b y Rule 23
, the Court looked to the plain lang uag e of the Rule, which “states that ‘ [ a] class action may be maintained’ if two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) ( i.e.
, numerosity , commonality , ty p icality

, and adequacy o f representation), a nd it also must fit into o ne of the t h re e categ o ries described in subdivision (b).” Id

. at 398 ( alteration i n orig inal) (quoting F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)).M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 6

F ocusing on Rule 23’s u se of the words “may be maintained,” the Court continued:

B y its terms this c rea t e s a c ateg orical rule
ent i t l ing a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a c lass action. ( The F ederal Rules reg ularly use “may ” to confer categ orical permis s i o n, see, e.g. , F ed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(d)(2)-(3), 14(a)(1), 18(a)-(b), 2 0(a)(1)-(2), 27(a)(1), 30(a)(1), as do federal statutes th a t establish procedural entitlements, see, e.g. , 2 9 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).)

Id

. at 398–99. The Rule “provides a one-siz e-fits-all formula for d e ciding the class-action question.” Id

. at 399. The state statute directly conflicted with Rule 23’s categ orical rule because it “states that Shady Grove’s su i t ‘m a y not be maintained as a class action’ (emphasis added) because o f the relief it seeks,” e ven if Shady Grove’s suit meets the requirements of Rule 23. Id

.

The dissent’s assertion that Rules 12 an d 56 tog ether define a cohesive sy stem for w eeding out meritless c laims that is akin to Rule 23’s categ orical rule turns Shady Grove ’s lens into a kaleidoscope. This assertion o verlooks the Court’s relianc e o n tex tual analy sis in Shady G rove. Rule 23 states that “ [ a ] class action may be maintained” if c ertain requirements are met. Therefore, Rule 23 provides a categ orical rule : i

f the requirements are met, then a p laintiff is entitled to maintain his suit as a class action.

I n contrast, Rules 12 and 56 do not provide that a p laintiff is entitled to maintain h is suit if t h e i r r e quirements are met;M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 7

instead, they p rovide various theories upon which a suit may be disposed of before trial. California’s anti-SL A PP statute, by creating a sep a r a t e a nd additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits m a y be disposed of b efore trial, supplements rather than conflicts with the F ederal Rules. 1

Rule 12 provides a mechanism to test the leg al sufficiency of a complaint. The question asked b y Rule 12 is whether the plaintiff has stated a claim that is plausible on its face a nd
upon w hich relief can b e g ranted. California’s a nti-SL APP
statute d oes not attempt to a nswer this questio n ; instead, California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, the sta te statutory a

nalog o f R u le 12, does. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10. 2 That the Calif o r n ia leg islature e nacted both an

1 Cf. Go din v. S

ch en cks

, 6 2 9 F.3 d 7 9
, 9 1 (1 st C ir. 2 0 1 0 ) (“ Neith er Ru le 1 2 n o r Ru le 56 o f th e f

ed eral ru les o f p ro ced u re p u rp o rt to b e so b ro ad as to p reclu d e ad d itio n al m ech an i sm s m ean t to cu rta i l rig h ts- d am p en in g litig atio n th ro u g h th e m o d if

icatio n o f p lead in g stan d ard s .”).

2 Sectio n 4 3 0 .1 0 p ro v id es:

T h e p arty ag ain st w

h o m a co m

p lain t o r cro ss- co m

p lain t h as b een fi l e d m ay ob

j ect, b y d em

u rrer o r an sw er as p ro v id ed in Sectio n 43 0 .3 0
, to th e p lead in g o n an y on e

o r m ore o f

th e f ollo w in g g ro u n d s:

(a) T h e co u

rt h as n o j u risd ictio n o f th e su b j e c t o f th e

cau se o f actio n alleg ed in th e p lead in g

. (b ) T h e p erso n w

h o f i led th e p lead in g d o es n o t h av e th e leg al cap acity

to su e.

(c) T h ere is an o th er actio n p en d in g b etw een th e sam e p arties o n th e sam e cau se o f

actio n

. (d ) T h ere is a d ef

ect o r m isj o in der o f

p arties.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 8

analog to Rule 12 and, a d ditionally

, an anti-SL APP statute is strong evidence that t h e provisions a r e intended to serve differe nt purposes a

nd control different spheres. Moreover, the anti-SL APP statute asks an entirely different question: whether the claims rest on the SL A PP d e fendant’s protected F irst Amendment activity and whether the plaintiff can meet the substantive requirements California h as created to protect such activity

from strateg ic, retaliatory lawsuits.

F urthermore, the c o ntention that California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 imposes a probability requirement at the pleading stag e ig nores California Supreme Cour t p recedent. Althoug h § 4 2 5

. 1 6 asks courts to determine whether “the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim,” ( emphasis added)

, t h e California Supreme Court has held that:

past [ California state] cases interpreting this provision establish that the L eg islature did not

(e) T h e p lead i n g d o es n o t s t a t e f acts su f f icien t to

co n s titu te a cau se o f

actio n

. (f ) T h e p lead i n g is u n certain

. A s u s e d in th is

su bd iv is i o n , “ u n certain ” in clu d es am b ig u o u s an d

u n in tellig ib le.

( g ) In an actio n f

o u n d ed u po n a co n tract, it can n o t b e ascertain ed f

ro m th e p l ead in g w

h eth er th e co n tract is

w ritten , is o ral, o r is im

p lied b y co n d u ct.

(h ) No certif

icate w as f

iled as req u ired by Sectio n 4 1 1 .3 5.

(i) N o certif

icate w as f

iled as req u ired b y Sectio n 4 1 1 .3 6.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 9

i n t e n d that a court

. . . would weig h conflicting evidence to determine whether it is

more probable than not that p laintiff will prevail on the cl a i m, but rather intended to establish a summary -judg ment-like procedure available at an early stag e o f litig ation that
poses a p otential chilling effect on speechrelated activities.

Taus v. Loftus , 40 Cal. 4th 683, 714 (2007). I n other words, a reviewing court “should g rant the motion if, as a matter of law , the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish e videntiary support for the claim.” Var

g a s v. City of Salinas

, 46 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, even if w e w e r e to conclude that § 425.16 a

nd Rule 12 serve sim ilar purposes, a t w orst, a motion to strike functions merely as a mechanism for considering summary judg ment at the p leading stag e as is permitted under Rule 12(d). S e e F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

California also has a state statutory equivalent to Rule 56. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 4 3 7 c (c )

. (“The motion for
summary judg ment shall b e g r anted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact a nd tha t t h e m o v i ng party is e ntitled to a judg ment as a matter of law.”). And as already ex plained, the test f or leg al sufficiency embodied in § 425.16 conflicts with neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
, 337 U.S. 541 (1949), is instructive. I n Cohen

, the S u p reme Court determined that a New J ersey statute that required cer t ai n p l aintiffs to post a bond in shareholder derivative suits could be enforced consistent withM A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 10

former F ederal Rule 2 3 ( n o w R u le 23.1). 337 U.S. at 557. New J ersey enacted the statute at i ssue in Cohen to protect ag ainst so called “strike suits,” that i s , s uits “broug ht not to redress real wrong s, but to realiz e upon their nuisance value.” I d

. at 547–48. The Court recog niz ed that former Rule 2 3 “deals with plaintiff’ s r ig ht to maintain such a n action in federal c ourt,” and places certain requirements o n s h areholder derivative suits, including that the stockholder’s complaint be verified by oath and show that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction at issue, and that the action not be dismissed w ithout approval of the court and notice to all parties. Id

. at 556. H o w e ver, f ormer Rule 23, like current Rule 2 3.1, did not p rovide that a s h a r e holder d erivative suit “may be maintained” if the requirements were met. I nstead, it set forth minimum requirements that were prerequisites—
necessary , but not necessarily sufficient—to maintain a suit. Despite the fact that the state statute c r eated an additional a nd indeed o ne r o u s requirement for the maintenance of a shareholder derivative suit, the Court determined that the
state statute did not conflict with the requirements of Rule 23 and therefore should apply in federal court.

J ust a s t h e N e w J ersey statute in Cohen soug ht to limit frivolous strike su i t s , California’s anti-SL APP statute seeks
to limit fri volous suits broug ht primarily for the purpose o f chilling the v alid ex ercise of F irst Amendment rig hts. And, just as the state statute in Cohen did not conflict with f ormer Rule 23 even thoug h it created supplemental, ev en onerous requirements for certain plaintiffs, the motion to strike a nd attorney s’ fees provisions of California’s anti-SL APP statute do not conflict with Rules 1 2 and 5 6 even thoug h they c reate supplemental requirements for certain plaintiffs.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 11

California’s interest in securing its c itiz ens’ free speech rig hts also cautions ag a inst finding a direct collision with the Fe d eral Rules. I n Shady G rove , a majority of the justi c e s recog niz ed that state interests are sig nificant, e v en in determining whether there is a conflict. 559 U.S. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J

. , c oncurring in part and concurring in the judg ment) (indicating that he ag r eed with the four dissenting justices that the F ederal Rules must be interpreted in lig ht o f considera t i o ns including “sensitivity to important state interests”). I ndeed, in Godin

, the F irst Circuit thoroug hly a nd persuasively an a ly

z ed Shady Grove before concluding that Maine’s anti-SL A PP l aw was enforceable in federal court. 629 F .3d at 86–91.

W h ere there is no direct c ollision between a F ederal Rule and a state statute, we must make the “ty p i c a l, relatively
ung uided Erie Choice.” H anna v. Plumer

, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Every circuit that has considered the issue has ag reed with our conclusion in Newsham that anti-S L A P P statutes like California’s confer substantive rig hts under Erie. 3 I f we

3 S ee L i berty S

yn erg i s tics In c. v. Micro

flo Ltd

. , 7 1 8 F.3 d 13 8
, 1 4 4

– 4 8 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 3 ) (“ [T ]h e asp ects o f Calif o rn ia’ s an ti- SL A P P ru l e co n sid ered

su b stan tiv e b y f

ed eral law co n tin

u e to ap p ly in t

h is case

. . . . Calif

o rn ia’ s

an ti- S LAP P r u le ref

lects a su

b s tan tiv e p o licy f

av o rin g th e sp ecial
p ro tectio n of certain d ef

en d an ts f ro m th e b u rd en s o f litig atio n b ecau s e th ey en g ag ed in co n stitu

tio n ally p ro tected activ ity .”); Go d in
, 6 2 9 F.3 d at 8 7

– 8 8 (“ [W ]e h old th at th e d u al p u r p o s e s o f Erie are b est serv ed b y

en f o rcem en t o f [Main e’ s an ti- SL A P P s tatu te] in f ed eral co u rt.

. . . Main e h as n o t created a su

b s t itu te to t

h e Fed eral Ru l e s , b u t i n stead created a

su p p lem en tal an d su

b stan tiv e ru le to p ro v i d e ad d ed p ro t e c t i o n s, b ey o n d th o se in Ru les 1 2 an d 5 6, to d ef en d an ts w h o are n am ed as p arties b ecau s e

o f co n stitu

t io n al p etitio n in g activ i t i es.”); H en ry v. La ke Ch a rles Am. Press, L.L.C.
, 5 6 6 F .3 d 16 4
, 1 6 8

– 6 9 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) (“ L o u isian a l aw , in clu d in g th e n o m i n ally

- p ro ced u ral [Lo u isian a an ti- SL A P P ] s tatu te, g o v ern s th is d iv ersity

case.” (citin g Newsh a m , 1 9 0 F.3 d at 9 7 2– 7 3)).M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 12

had taken this appeal en banc, and decided the o ther way (as

our colleag ues advocate in their concurrence s )

, we would h a v e c reated an inter-circuit split; a result at odds with Ru l e 35 of the F ederal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.

Our colleag ues also wa n t us to overrule Batzel— not becau s e of a

ny intervening Supreme Court decision o r conflicting circuit opinion, but because they find B a tzel ’s reasoning “unpersuasive.” 4 I n Batzel

, we held that the denial of an anti-SL A PP motion to strike is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 3 3 3 F .3d at 1024–26. F o r the collateral order doctrine to apply

, the order must (1) “conclusively determine the disputed question,” (2) “ resolve

an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,” and (3) “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from

a final judg ment.” W

ill v. Hallock

, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n the dissent’s view, the denial o f a

n anti-SL APP motion to strike fails the second a nd third prong s of the test.

4 J u d g e P aez’ s co n cern o v er th e “ sig n i fi can t state- b y

- state v ariatio n s

w ith in th e circu it” reg ard in g w h eth er th e d en ial o f an an ti- SL A PP m o tio n is im m ed iately ap p ealab le, Ma ka eff v. Tru mp Un iv., LLC , 7 1 5 F.3 d 2 5 4
, 2 7 5 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 3 ) (P aez, J
., co n cu rrin g , an d K o zin sk i, C.J
., co n cu rrin g ), ig n o res o u r in stru ctio n th at alth o u g h th e s tate “ statu tes h av e co m m on elem en ts, t

h ere are sig n if

ican t d if f eren ces as w ell, so th at each state’ s statu to ry s ch em e m

u st b e ev alu ated sep arately ,” Meta b o l ic Resea rch

, In c.

v. Ferrell

, 6 9 3 F.3 d 7 9 5
, 7 9 9 (9 th C ir. 2 01 2 ). Fo r in stan ce, in Ferrell w e

co n clu d ed th at Nev ad a’ s an ti- SL A P P statu te did n o t satisf y th e co llateral

o rd er d o ctrin e b ecau se “ its u n d erly in g v alu es an d p u rp o se are satisf ied

w ith o u t reso rt to an im

m ed i ate ap p eal.” Id

. at 8 00

– 0 1

.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 13

I n Batzel

, w e determined that a denial of an anti-SL APP motion resolves a question separat e f r o m the merits in that the p u rpose of an anti-SL APP motion is to determine whether

a party suffers harassment by the prosecution of a frivolous lawsuit desig n ed to chill otherwise constitutionally -protected

ex p ressive conduct. 3 3 3 F. 3d at 1024–25. I n c ontrast, the question on the merits is whether the d efendant is ultimately liable for defamation (or whatever the underlying claim mig ht be). Id. at 1025.

F or ex ample, here T arla Makaeff sued Trump University accusing it of, among other thing s, deceptive busine s s practices. M

a k a eff

, 715 F .3d at 2 60. Trump University counterclaimed, alleg ing that Makaeff’s lett e r s a nd online posting s, written months prior to the filing of this action a nd complaining of Trump Univer s ity ’s business practices, constituted defamation. Id. Using California’s a nti-SL APP law, Makaeff moved to strike Trump University ’s defamation counterclaim. 5 Id

. at 260, 270–71. T r u mp University ’s counterclaim was obviously desig ned to overwhelm Makaeff by making it more b u r densome and ex pensive f or her to pursue her deceptive b usiness p ractices claims ag ainst Trump University

. Makaeff’s motion to stri k e c oncerned the frivolity o f Trump University ’s al leg ation that her speech about its d eceptive business p rac t i c e s was defamatory ; its
very p u r p ose was to determine whether Trump University ’s counterclaim was d esig ned to chill Makaeff’s valid ex ercise

5 We rev ersed th e d en ial o f th e an ti- SL A P P m otio n b ecau se th e d istrict

co u rt erro n eo u s l y c o n clu d ed th at T ru m p Un iv ersity w as n o t a p u b l ic f ig u re, an d th eref

ore w as req u ired to d em on strate actu al m alice. S ee New Yo rk Times Co

. v. S

u lliva n , 3 7 6 U.S. 2 5 4 (1 9 6 4 ). T ru m p Un iv ersity m ay

u ltim ately d em o n strate a c t ual m alice u p o n rem an d, h ow ev er, th is is a d em an d in g stan d ard to m eet.M A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 14

of her F irst Amendment rig hts. 6 The issue adjudicated throug h the mechanism o f the motion to strike w as not whether Makaeff was liable for defamation becau s e of her

s t a t e m e n t s c o n d e m n i ng Trump University ’s alleg ed decep t i v e business p ractices—the q uestion at t h e heart o f Trump University ’s underlying c o u n t e rclaim. 7 Thus, while the inquiry on the m o t i o n t o strike may g lance at the merits, its central purpose i s t o provide an added statutory protection fr o m the burdens of litig ation that is unavailable d uring the ultimate merits inquiry

.

The Supreme Court has held that i s s u es concerning immunity from suit are often separate from the merits of the underly ing dispute in the li tig ation, even thoug h p a rt of the traditional inquiry touches o n the merits: whether a particular constitutional rig ht was clearly established at the time of the alleg ed g overnmental misconduct. See, e.g. , Mitchell v

. Forsyth

, 472 U.S. 511, 527–28 (1985) (noting that a claim o f

6 Li k e in Ba tzel

, th e an ti- SL A P P in q u iry h ere tested w h eth er th e d ef am atio n claim w as “ b ro u g h t to d eter co m m o n citizen s f

ro m ex ercisin g th eir p o litical o r leg al rig h t s o r t o p u n ish th em f o r d o in g so .” 3 3 3 F.3 d at 1 0 2 4

. T h at w as t

h e u ltim ate q u estio n

. A ssessm en ts o f w h eth er Mak aef

f ’ s alleg ed ly d e f

am ato ry s tatem en ts w ere p ro tected activ ity u n d er § 4 2 5 .1 6

o r w h eth er T ru m

p Un iv ersity h ad a reas on ab l e p ro b ab i lity o f prev ailin g

o n its d ef am atio n claim w ere m erely in term ed iate ste p s u s ed to an sw er th at co re in q u iry

—w as T ru m

p Un iv ersity ’ s d ef

am atio n co u n terclaim f

iled
to ch ill Mak aef

f ’ s sp eech

.

7 W h i le th e o rig in al actio n w as Mak aef

f ’ s decep tiv e b u sin ess p ractices

su it, th e u n d erly in g actio n f or p u rp o ses o f th e sep araten ess in q u iry u n der th e co llateral o rd er d o ctrin e i s T ru m p Un iv ersity ’ s d ef

am atio n

co u n terclaim

. If

, a rg uen d

o , w e co m

p are d t h e d istrict co u rt’ s o rd er d en y in g Mak aef

f ’ s an ti- SL A P P m otio n t o th e m erits o f Mak a e ff’s d ecep t iv e b u sin ess p ractices claim

, th e div id e s ep aratin g th o s e tw o is ev en g reater.M A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 15

qualified immunity “is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plain t i f

f’s claim”); A b ney v

. U

nited States
, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (holdi n g that denial of a claim of double j e o pardy immunity is separate from the question o f whe t h e r t h e defendant is g uilty of the charg ed c rime). A s the F i f t h Circuit reasoned in it s s eparability analy sis concerning an analog ous L o uisiana anti-SL APP statute:

The i m m u n ity decisions indicate that some involvement with the underly ing facts is acceptable, as the Court has found the issue o f immunity to be separate f

r om the merits of the underly ing dispu te “even thoug h a reviewing
court must consider the plaintiff’s f actual alleg ations in resolving the immunity issue.”

Henry
, 566 F .3d at 175 (quoting Mitchell

, 472 U.S. at 529). I n o t h e r w ords, a

n order can touch on the merits and still be sufficientl y separate from the merits to satisfy the requiremen t s of the collateral order doctrine. As we concluded in Batzel

, “[ t] h e purpose of an anti-SL APP motion is to determine whether the defendant is being f o rc ed to defend ag ainst a meritless cla im,” n o t to determine whether the d efendant actually c o m m itted the relevant tort. Batzel

, 333 F

. 3d a t 1025. The motion to strike thus “ex ists separately from the me r i t s of the defamation claim itself.” Id

. F urthermore, § 425.16 does n o t conflict with Johnson v

. Jones
, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), b ecause the “probability ” inquiry asks a purely leg al question: “whet h e r the f acts alleg ed

. . . support a claim” that survives a motion to strike. Id. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the sufficiency o f evidence inquiry at issue in Johnson

, it does “not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Id.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 16

F inally

, the policy animating the separability r equirement favors our determination in Batzel that the motion to strike inquiry is separable. As the F ifth Circuit observed in Henry
, the separability r equirement f urthers the purpose of the final

o r d e r rule “by preventing appeals on issues that will b e d e finitively decided later in the case.” 566 F .3d a t 1 7 6

. However, issues that are d ecided b e f ore trial and t h e n n o t normally revisit ed, such as immunity

, do n ot implicate this

concern. T he denial o f a n anti-SL APP motion is similar: “althoug h an [anti-SL APP] mot i on looks to the plaintiff’s probability of success, the court decides it before proceeding to trial and then moves on.” Id

.

W e recently reaffirmed the v alidi ty of Batzel in lig ht o f the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). See DC Comics v. P ac. Pictures Corp.
, 706 F .3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2013). W e remarked that Mohawk Industries re d i r e c ted o ur focus towards “whether delay

ing review would imperil a s u b s t a n tial public interest or some particular value of a hig h order.” Id

. at 1015 (internal quotation marks and ci t a t i o ns omitted). Apply ing this rule, we held:

[ T] he denial of a motion to strike made pursuant to Californ i a’s anti-SL APP statute remain s among the class of o rders for which

an immediate a p p e al is a vailable. This is especially so g iven the particular public interests that the anti-SL APP statute attempts to v indicate. I t woul d b e d i fficult to find a

v a lue of a “ h ig h[ er] order” than th e

c o n s t i t u t ionally -protected rig h ts to free s p e e c h and petition that are at the heart o f California’s a

nti-SL APP statut e

. SuchM A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 17

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i gh t s d e s e r v e p a r t i c u l a r solicitude within the framework of t he collateral order doctrine

. The California l e gi s l at u r e’s determin a t i o n , t h r o u gh i t s enactment o f the anti-SL APP statute, that such constitutional rig hts would be imperiled absent a rig ht of interlocutory appeal deserves respect. W e must make particular e f fo r ts to accommodate the substantive aims of states when, as here, we entertain state law claims a s a federal court sitting

in diversity

.

Id

. at 1015– 1 6 ( second a lteration in orig inal; citation omitted).

III.

Throug h anti-SL A PP laws, the leg islatures of Ariz ona, California, G uam, Hawaii, Nevada, O reg on, and W ashing ton have decided to impose substantive limi t a t i ons o n c ertain
state law a ctions. See T h omas R. B urke, Anti-SLAPP Litigation App. B (2013) (listing the tex t of each state’s antiSL APP statute). Refusing to r ec o gniz e these limitations in federal court is bad policy

. I f w e ig nore h ow states have limited actions under their o wn laws, w e not only flush away state leg islatures’ considered decisions on matters of state law, 8 but we also put the federal courts at risk of being swept

8 No tab ly

, u n d er th e Ru les E n a b lin g A ct, t h e Fed eral Ru les o f Civ i l P ro ced u re can n ot “ ab rid g e, en larg e o r m od if y an y s u b s t an tiv e rig h t.” 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 0 72 (b ). T h e f ailu re to en f

o rce th e an ti- SL A P P law s w ou ld
arg u ab ly en larg e state l aw cau ses o f actio n an d ab rid g e state law sp eech
p ro tectio n s

. S

ee S h a d y Gro ve , 5 5 9 U.S. at 4 16

– 17 (Stev en s, J
., co n cu rrin g in p art an d co n cu r r i n g i n t h e j u d g m en t) (ag reein g th at “ t h ere are so m e state pro ced u ral ru les th at f ed eral co u rts m

u st ap p ly in div ersity casesM A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 18

away in a r ising tide of frivolous stat e a ctions that w o uld be f iled in our circuit’s f

e d eral courts. W ithout anti-SL AP P protections in f

ederal courts, SL APP plaintiffs would have an incentive to f

ile or remove to federal courts stra teg ic, retaliatory lawsuits that are more likely to have the desired

e f fect of suppressing a SL APP defendant’s speech-related activities. 9 Encourag ing such forum-shopping chips away at “one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism.” Hanna
, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J

. , concurring ).

* * *

N e wsham and Batzel were correctly decided. Every circuit to consider these issues has ag r eed w ith our holding s in these cases, concluding that similar anti-SL APP provisions apply in federal court and r u l ing s o n the motions a re immediately appealable. Our dissent i n g colleag ues wanted
to take this c ase en b anc to overrule Ne w s h a m , Batzel

, a nd their prog e n y , and, in so doing

, create an inter-circuit split. B ut o ur circuit h as already held that c i t i z ens o f the seven jurisdictions within our circuit that h a v e anti-SL APP laws should not be stripped of their state’s free speech p rotections whenever they

step inside a federal court.

En banc review is not an opportunity for us to dig throug h

our circuit’ s trove of opinions and c all cases that we would

b ecau se th ey f

u n ctio n as part o f th e State’ s d e fi n i t i o n o f t h e su b s tan tiv e rig h ts an d rem ed i es”).

9 S ee, e.g

. , Eliza Krig m an , Yelp Pu sh es fo r Fed era l An ti-S LAPP L a ws , P o litico (J an

. 4
, 2 01 3
, 4 : 4 0 A M), h t tp ://w w w .p olitico .co m

/sto ry /2 0 1 3/0 1 /
y elp

- p u sh es- f

or- f ed eral- an ti- slap p

- law s- 85 7 3 7 .h tm l (n o tin g th at a l aw su i t

w as f iled in Virg in ia in stead o f th e District o f Co lu m b ia becau se Virg in ia h ad n o an ti- SL A PP law ).M A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 19

have decided differently

. “W e must recog niz e that w e are an intermediate appellat e court,” Miller v. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 900 ( 9th Cir. 2003) (en ba n c )

, a n d that we should only invoke the en banc process t o secure or maintain uniformity of our decisions or because a q u es t i o n o f ex ceptional importance is involved. S ee F e d. R. App. Proc. 3 5. Supreme Court precedent d o es not require us to chang e course and the majority of active judg es in our court wisely refused to g rant en banc consideration.

W A TF ORD, Circui t J udg e, joined b y KOZ I NSKI
, Chief J udg e , and PAEZ and B EA, Circuit J udg es, dissenting from the denial of rehearing

en banc:

I n United States e

x rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space C o

. , 190 F

. 3 d 9 6 3 ( 9th Cir. 1999), we held that C alifornia’s anti-SL APP statute must b e applied in fed e ra l
court. Id. at 972–73. I n B a tzel v. Smith , 333 F .3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), we compounded that mistake by holding that litig ants a re entitled to take interlocutory appeals from ruling s

o n anti-SL APP motions. Id. at 1024–26. N either of those decisions is consistent with c ontrolling Su p reme Court precedent, and b o t h w arranted r eex amination by the court sitting en banc.

I

The Supreme Court has long held that federal c ourts may not apply state statutes that interfere with the operation of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure. I n Hanna v

. Pl u mer , 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court established the g overning test. “W h e n a situation is c o vered by one of the F ederal Rules,” aM A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 20

f e deral court must apply the F ederal Rule, notwithstandin g the ex ist e n c e o f a conflicting state statute. Id. at 471. The F ederal Rule g overns so long as it “trang resses neither the
te r m s o f the [ Rules] Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.” Id. ; see also S ibbach v. W

ilson & Co.
, 312 U.S. 1
, 1 4 ( 1 9 41); 19 Charles Alan W rig ht, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H

. Cooper, Federal P ractice and Procedure § 4510,
p. 2 93 (2d ed. 1996). Only if the F e deral Rule is inapplicable

or invalid must the court “wade into E rie ’s murky w a t ers.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P .A. v. Allstate I n s

. Co.
, 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010).

T h e Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shady Gr o v e sheds new lig ht on how this c onflict analy sis should proceed. That case concerne d a challeng e to a New York statute precluding class certification of any action seeking penalties

or statutory minimum damag es. Id

. a t 396–97 & n.1. The Court h eld that the statute conflicted with Fe d e ral Rule o f Civil Procedure 23. The conflict arose because Rule 23 sets out “a categ orical rule entitling a p laintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a c l a s s action,” wh i l e t h e New York statute “attempts to answer the same question— i.e.
, it states th a t S h ady G rove’s suit ‘may not be maintained as a class action’ (emphasis added) because o f the relief it se e k s

. ” Id. a t 398–99. The Court f ound a conflict between the two provis i o n s because it viewed Rule 23 a s establishing an ex clusive set o f criteria g overning class certification that States may not supplement. See id. at 398–400.

Vie w e d throug h Shady Grove ’s lens, California’s antiSL APP statute conflicts with F ederal Rules 12 and 56. Taken tog ether, those rules establish the ex clusive criteria for testing the leg al a

nd factual sufficiency o f a claim in fede ra l c o urt.M A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 21

See Mak a e f f v. Trump Univ., LLC
, 715 F .3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Koz inski, C.J
., concur ring ) (“The F ederal Rules aren’t just a series of disconnected procedural d e v i ces. Rather, the Rules provide an integ rated prog ram of pre-trial, tri a l a nd post-trial procedures

. . . . ”). California’s antiSL APP statute impermissibly supplements the F ederal R ules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action.

L et’s take the conflict with Rule 12 first. Rule 12 provides the sole means o f challeng ing the leg al sufficiency of a claim before discovery co m m e n c e s

. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—the closest Rule 12 analog to an anti-SL A PP motion to strike—the plaintiff must alleg e facts stating a claim that is “ plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This standard “does

no t impose a probability requirement at the pleading stag e.” Id. at 556. I ndeed, “a well-pleaded comp l a int may proceed

even if it strikes a savvy judg e that actual proof of those facts is improbable .” Id. ( emphasis added); see also Ashcroft v

. Iqbal

, 5 56 U .S. 662, 678 (2009) (“The p l a usibility standard is not akin to a probability r equire m e n t

. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Any attempt to impose a prob a b ility requirement at the pleading stag e would obviously conflict with Rule 12. Y et that is ex actly what California’s anti-SL APP statute does. I t bars an a c tion from proceeding bey ond the pleading stag e “unless the court determines that the plaintiff has e stablished that there is a p robability that the p laintiff will prevail on the claim.” Cal. Ci v

. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (emphasis added). B y forci n g t h e plaintiff to establish that success is
not merely plausible b ut probable, the anti-SL APP s t at ute effectively stiffens the Rule 12 standard for t e sting the leg al sufficiency of a claim. J u st as the New York statute in ShadyM A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 22

Grove impermissibly barred class actions when Rule 2 3 would permit them, so t oo California’s anti-SL APP statute bars claims at the pleading stag e when Rule 12 would allow them to proceed.

Simila r problems plag ue the interaction b etween Cal i f o r n ia’s anti-SL A PP statute and Rule 56. Motions to strike almost invariably require consideration of matters outside the pleading s, and in those circumstances the F ederal Rules state that “the motion must b e treated as one f o r

su m m a r y judg ment under Rule 56.” F e d. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (emphasis added). U n d er Rule 56, a party is entitled to summary judg ment only “ if the movant shows that there is no g enuine dispute as to any materia l f a ct and the movant is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law.” Fe d

. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Conversely

, to avoid summary judg ment, the nonmovant need only “desig nate specific facts showing that there is a g enuine issue for trial.” Celot e x Corp. v. Catrett
, 477 U.S. 3 17, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The anti-SL APP statute eviscerates Rule 56 b y requiring the plaintiff to p rove that she will p robabl y prevail if the case proceeds to trial—a showing considerably more string ent than identify ing material f a ct u al disputes that a jury could reasonably

resolve in the plaintiff’s favor.

Our decision in Metabolife International, Inc. v. W ornick

, 2 6 4 F. 3 d 832 (9th Cir. 2001), further hig hlig hts the confli ct between the anti-SL APP statute and Rule 56. Ca l i f ornia’s anti-SL A PP statute mandates a stay of all discovery pending the court’s resolution of a m otion to strike. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g ). I n Meta b o l i fe

, we held that “the discovery -limiting aspects of § 425.16(f) and (g ) collide with the d iscovery -allowing aspects of Rule 56,” and w e therefore refused to apply the statute’s discovery provisions in federalM A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 23

court. Metabolife

, 264 F .3d at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, however, we allowed the motionto-strike reg ime to stand. As Chief J u dg e Koz inski h as n oted, th e r esulting amalg amation o f anti-SL APP and Rule 56 procedures has “crippled” the anti-SL APP statute, leaving us with “a h y b rid procedure where neither the F e deral Rules nor the state anti-SL A PP statute operate as desig ned.” Makaeff

, 715 F .3d at 275 (Koz inski, C.J ., concurring ).

I n short, California’s anti-SL A PP statute creates the same conflicts w ith the F ederal Rules that a nimated t h e Supreme Court’s ruling in S

hady Grove

. That intervening decision should have l ed us to revisit—and reverse—our p recedent permitting application of state anti-SL APP statutes in federal
court.

I I

Even if ant i

- S L APP motions may be broug h t in federal court, we should stop entertaining interlocutory appeals from ruling s on such motions. I n B atzel

, we held that interlocutory appeals a re authoriz e d u nder the c o llateral order doctrine, which applies only if three conditions are met. The order
must “ [ 1] c onclusively dete r m ine the disputed question, [ 2] resolve an import a n t issue completely separate from the merits of th e a c t i o n, and [ 3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg ment.” W ill v. Hallock

, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation m a r k s omitted); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v

. Carpenter
, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009). Orders g r anting or deny ing anti-SL APP motions don’t satisfy the second condition of this test, because California’s antiS L APP statute requires courts to a ssess the merits o f t h e action when ruling

on a motion to strike.M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 24

California’s anti-SL APP statute states that a motion to strike shall be g ranted “unless the court determine s t h a t the plaintiff has e stablished that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on th e cl a i m

. ” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 4 2 5.16(b)(1). I n Batzel

, w e held that a ruling under t h i s provision involves a question completely separate from the merits because “it m e r e l y finds that such merits may ex ist, without e valuating w hether the plaintiff’s claim will succeed.” Ba t

z e l

, 333 F .3d at 1025. Batzel ’s reasoning on this point is unpersuasive

. A court cannot g aug e the probability o f success on a claim without assessing the merits of the claim itsel f

. S u c h a predictive analy sis may not amount to deciding the c laim on the merits, b u t t h e r e’s no credible arg ument that it’s “ comp l e t e l y separate f

rom the merits.” W

ill

, 546 U .S. at 3 49 (emphasis added). F or proof,

we need look no further than the panel’s opinion in this c ase, which eng ag e s in an e x haustive an a ly sis of the merits o f Trump University ’s defamation claim. See Makaeff

, 7 1 5 F .3d at 261–71.

The a bsence of an issue completely separate from the merits is sufficient, without more, to preclude application o f the collateral o rder doctrine, sinc e all three of the doctrine’s conditions must be met. B u t hold on, some have objected,
t hat can’t be rig ht. California’s anti-SL APP statute is inte n d e d to afford an immunity from trial

, not just from liability , and without the ability to take an immediate appeal that immun i t y m a y well be lost. However, even if California’s anti-SL APP statute provides an immu n i t y from trial, as w e concluded in Batzel

, 333 F .3d at 1 025–26, that doesn’t make anti-SL APP ruling s immediately app e a lable. ( A s J udg e Paez h as n oted, we’ve held that similar a n t i

SL APP statutes in other States do not afford immunity from trial a nd thus do n ot trig g er application of the collateral orderM A K A E F F V

. T R

U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 25

doctrine. See Makaeff

, 715 F .3d at 276 (Paez

, J

. , concurring ). That has added y e t another lay er of i n c o h erence to our circuit’s anti-SL APP jurisprudence.)

The Supreme Court has specifically resisted the notion
t h a t a l l claims of a r ig ht to avoid trial satisfy the collateral order doctrine’s requirements. I n W ill

, the Court cautioned: “Those seeking immediate ap p e al therefore naturally a rg ue that any order d eny ing a claim of rig ht to prevail without trial satisfies the third condition. B ut this g eneraliz ation is too easy to be sound and, if accepted, would leave the final order requirement of § 1291 in tatters.” 546 U.S. a t 350–51. Thus,

e v e n c a s es squarely presenting a claimed rig ht not to stand trial must be treated with skepticism. See D igital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. , 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).

W e should be skeptical here. The Supreme Court h a s permitted immediate appeals of immuni ty ruling s in part because immunity questions g e nerally involve issues d istinct from the merits a

nd d on’t require ex tensiv e f a ctual inquiry

. Fo r ex ample, the Court has allowed immediate a ppeals o f absolute and Eleventh A mendment immunity determi n a t i o n s, both of which turn on the l e ga l status of the defendant. See P.R. A queduct & S

e wer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
, 506 U.S. 139, 142–47 (1993); Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1982).

Similarly

, the Court has allowed immediate appeals o f
many , but n ot a ll, q

ualified immunity determinations. Under Harlow v. Fitzge r a l d

, 457 U.S. 800 ( 1982), courts must determine whether the law t h e d efendant alleg edly v iolated

was “clearly e stablished

. ” I d. at 8 18. I n holding that such d e t erminations are immediately appealable under the collateral o rd e r doctrine, the Court stressed: “An appellateM A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 26

court reviewing the d enial of the defendant’s claim o f immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts

, nor even determine wh e ther the pl aintiff’s a lleg a tions actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law

. . . .” Mitchell v. F orsyth

, 472 U.S. 5 1 1
, 528 ( 1985) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).

I n cases where the qualified immunity inquiry stray s bey ond a purely leg al question, howeve r , t he Court has refused to entertain immediate appeals. I n Johnson v. Jones
, 515 U.S. 3 04 (1995), the Court held that defendants asserting qualified immunity may not appeal “a fact -related dispute”—sufficiency of the e vide n ce—under the collateral order d o c t ri n e

. Id. at 307. T he Court later ex plained that Jo h n s o n ’ s holding is rooted in separability concerns: “[ I ] f what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is n oth i n g more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is n ot truly ‘separable’ from the plaintiff’s claim

. . . .” Behrens v

. Pelletier , 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996).

This ty p e of determination—“whether the evidence could support a finding that parti cular c onduct occurred”—is

ex a c tly w hat California’s anti-SL AP P statute requires. T o

a s s e s s the “probability that the plaintiff will prevail,” Cal. Civ. Pr o c

. Code § 425.16(b)(1), the reviewing court must

assess the streng th o f the evidence supporti n g the plaintiff’s alleg ations. The statute clearly c ontemplates such a factbound inquiry : “I n making its determination, the court shall consider the pleading s, an d supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” § 425.16(b)(2). I n deed, in this very case the panel characteriz ed the anti-SL A PP inquiry as “inherently fa ct

-M A K A E F F V

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U M P U N I V E R S I T Y 27

intensive.” M

akaeff

, 715 F .3d a t 271. E n ga gi n g in this

ex e r cise under the collateral order doctrine is p lainly a t odds with Johnson

.

The Court recog niz ed in Johnson that deny ing immediate appeals of q

ualified immunity decisions “th r e atens to undercut the very policy (protecting public o fficia l s fr om lawsuits)” that would o rdinarily justify i mmediate appellate review. Johnson

, 5 15 U.S. at 317. B u t the Court concluded that when the immunity issues are not distinct from t h e

me r its, “precedent, fidelity to statute, and underly ing policies” do not permit interlocutory appeals. Id. Thus, even if California’s anti-SL APP statute confers a rig ht n o t to stand trial, that fact alone is not enoug h to satisf y the collateral order doctrine’s requirements.

* * *

Our circuit’s anti-SL APP jurisprudence runs afoul of two separate lines of Supreme Court precedent, b o t h of which involve matters fundamental to the o peration of the federal courts. W e should have taken this case en banc to bring our

case law in line with Shady G rove and the S u p r eme Court’s decisions establishing the proper scope o f the collateral order doctrine.