Staff Research

Study

25

Office of Industries

U.S. International Trade Commission

Review of Global Competitiveness

The views expressed in this staff study are those of the authors. They are not necessarily

the views of the U.S. International Trade Commission or any of the Commissioners.

in the Pharmaceutical Industry

April 1999

Publication 3172
Office of Industries

Project Manager

Elizabeth Howlett

Principal Authors

David Michels

and

Vern Simpson, Director

Aimison Jonnard

Office of the General Counsel

Energy, Chemicals and Textiles Division

Carl Bretscher

Janis Summers

Office of Tariff Affairs and Trade Agreements

Office of Economics

Stephen Wanser and Joseph Flynn
iii

CONTENTS

Page

Executive summary ................................................ vii

Chapter 1

Introduction ......................................................... 1-1

Purpose and scope ......................................................... 1-1

Importance of pharmaceuticals ................................................ 1-2

Data sources and methodology ................................................ 1-3

Organization ............................................................. 1-3

Chapter 2

Definition of pharmaceutical products........................ 2-1

Product classes ........................................................... 2-1

International Nonproprietary Names ........................................... 2-1

New Chemical Entities ...................................................... 2-2

Chapter 3

Description of the pharmaceutical industries in 

selected countries................................................ 3-1

Industry overview ......................................................... 3-1

United States ............................................................. 3-4

Industry ............................................................. 3-4

Employment .......................................................... 3-6

Research and development expenditures ...................................... 3-7

Shipments and trade balance .............................................. 3-9

Biotechnology products .................................................. 3-10

Government policies .................................................... 3-12

Western Europe ........................................................... 3-15

Industry ............................................................. 3-15

Employment .......................................................... 3-17

Research and development expenditures ...................................... 3-18

Shipments and trade balance .............................................. 3-18

Biotechnology products .................................................. 3-20

Government policies .................................................... 3-20
iv

CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Chapter 3

Description of the pharmaceutical industries in 

selected countries—Continued

Japan ................................................................... 3-24

Industry ............................................................. 3-24

Employment .......................................................... 3-26

Research and development expenditures ...................................... 3-27

Shipments and trade balance .............................................. 3-28

Biotechnology products .................................................. 3-29

Government policies .................................................... 3-29

Chapter 4

Current issues in the pharmaceutical industry ............. 4-1

Changes in international agreements ............................................ 4-1

GATT/WTO Agreements ................................................ 4-1

Uruguay Round initiative on pharmaceuticals .............................. 4-2

IPR initiatives ...................................................... 4-4

North American Free Trade Agreement ...................................... 4-6

Tariff reductions/eliminations .......................................... 4-6

Intellectual property ................................................. 4-8

Nontariff measures .................................................. 4-10

Changes in nations’ patent laws ............................................... 4-10

Patents in the pharmaceutical sector ......................................... 4-10

Issues arising under TRIPs ............................................... 4-13

United States .......................................................... 4-13

Transition, extension, and the Waxman-Hatch Act ........................... 4-14

Pending patent legislation ............................................. 4-14

Western Europe ........................................................ 4-15

Japan ............................................................... 4-17

Chapter 5

Conclusions .......................................................... 5-1
v

CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Appendix A

Trade Tables ............................................................. A-1

Figures

2-1. NCEs approved in the United States, 1993-98 ...................................... 2-3

3-1. Domestic and foreign R&D expenditures by U.S. companies, 1993-97 .................... 3-8

3-2. Domestic R&D expenditures in 1996, by therapeutic category, in percent ................. 3-9

4-1. Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): 

U.S. domestic exports and imports for consumption, quarterly shipments 

in millions of dollars, 1992-97 .............................................. 4-3

4-2. Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834): U.S. domestic exports and imports 

for consumption, quarterly shipments in millions of dollars, 1992-97 ................. 4-4

Tables

2-1. Total number of NCEs developed, by major country or group, 

by period groupings, 1975-94 ............................................... 2-3

3-1. The top 10 pharmaceutical companies, worldwide sales in 1997, 

location of corporate headquarters ............................................ 3-2

3-2. M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, 1989-97 ..................................... 3-3

3-3. The top 10 pharmaceutical companies in the United States, 

by U.S. pharmaceutical sales, 1997 ........................................... 3-5

3-4. Employment in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, by SIC code, 1993-97 .................. 3-7

3-5. R&D spending by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, 

U.S. sales (including foreign sales), and ratio of R&D to sales, 

in millions of dollars, 1993-97 .............................................. 3-8

3-6. Pharmaceuticals: U.S. shipments, domestic exports, imports for consumption, 

merchandise trade balance, apparent consumption, exports as a 

percent of shipments, and imports as a percent of consumption,1993-97 ............... 3-10

3-7. Top products in the biotechnology industry, the developer, and 

the marketer, by 1996 sales, in millions of dollars ................................ 3-11

3-8. FDA drug application fees, by fee type, fiscal years 1993-97 ........................... 3-14

3-9. Employment in the Western European pharmaceutical industry, 1993-97 ................. 3-17

3-10. Employment and labor productivity indexes for the EU 

pharmaceutical industry, 1992-96 ............................................ 3-17

3-11. R&D expenditures by the Western European pharmaceutical industry,

in millions of dollars, 1993-97 .............................................. 3-18

3-12. Pharmaceuticals for human consumption: Western European production, 

domestic exports, imports for consumption, merchandise trade balance,

apparent consumption, ratio of exports to production, and 

ratio of imports to consumption, 1993-97 ...................................... 3-19

3-13. International pharmaceutical price indexes in the EU, 1993 ............................ 3-21
vi

CONTENTS—Continued

Page

TABLES—Continued

3-14. The top 20 Japanese pharmaceutical companies, by Japanese pharmaceutical

sales, and total sales, in millions of dollars, fiscal 1996 ........................... 3-25

3-15. Employment in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry, fiscal 1992-96 .................... 3-27

3-16. R&D expenditures by Japanese pharmaceutical companies, and ratio 

of R&D to sales, in millions of dollars, 1992-96 ................................. 3-27

3-17. Pharmaceuticals: Japanese domestic exports, imports for consumption, 

merchandise trade balance, ratio of imports to exports, 

and exports as a percent of sales, 1992-96 ...................................... 3-28

A-1. Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): 

U.S. domestic exports, in thousands of dollars, 1992-97 ........................... A-2

A-2. Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): 

U.S. imports for consumption, in thousands of dollars, 1992-97 ..................... A-2

A-3 Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834): U.S. domestic exports, 

in thousands of dollars, 1992-97 ............................................. A-3

A-4. Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834):

U.S. imports for consumption, in thousands of dollars, 1992-97 ..................... A-3
 

1

 Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals

(USITC Publication 2437, September 1991). A copy of this publication can be obtained by contacting the

U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary (202/205-1809).

 

2

 A new chemical entity, also called a new molecular entity (NME), is defined by the U.S. Food and

Drug Administration as a drug for which the active ingredient has not been previously marketed (or

approved) for use as a drug product in the United States. A global NCE is generally defined as a product

that is eventually marketed in at least seven industrialized countries.

 

3

 The EU comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1991, the U.S. International Trade Commission (the Commission) conducted a study on the

pharmaceutical industry, Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology

Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals,1 as part of a series on global competitiveness

of U.S. advanced-technology manufacturing industries requested by the Senate Committee on

Finance. Many of the findings of that study are still valid today, although significant changes

have occurred in the industry. The purpose of this report is to describe the principal factors

currently affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, particularly in

relation to the industries of Western Europe and Japan.

The pharmaceutical industry is complex, dynamic, and highly globalized; moreover, the

industry is characterized by high research and development (R&D) expenditures and extensive

regulation of its products compared with other manufacturing sectors. The industry has also

been affected by a high number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which have increased

globalization and, arguably, heightened efficiency. In the Commission’s 1991 study, the

major factors of competitiveness were found to be those that affect a company’s ability to

develop and deliver new pharmaceutical products or new chemical entities (NCEs),

particularly those NCEs successful on a global basis.2 In the United States, changes in U.S.

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) policies have led to faster approval times for NCEs,

which result in extended periods during which companies can exclusively market their

pharmaceutical products. As noted in the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, longer

periods of market exclusivity for pharmaceuticals increase sales revenues, and increased sales

revenues in turn lead to greater profits and potentially more funding for R&D.

The Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study also indicated that changes in Government

policies affect the competitiveness of pharmaceutical firms. Sweeping changes in barriers to

trade worldwide, from tariffs to intellectual property rights and patent issues, have occurred

since 1991. An initiative on pharmaceuticals, established during the Uruguay Round, was

implemented on January 1, 1995, providing duty-free treatment for about 7,000

pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical intermediates; another 496 products and

intermediates became duty-free on April 1, 1997, and negotiations are currently underway to

make further additions. There is greater participation of member countries of the World Trade

Organization (WTO), formed in 1995, including those of the European Union (EU),3 in

agreements relating to intellectual property and patents. In the Western hemisphere, the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has resulted in low or no tariff barriers and

greater protection of patents and intellectual property rights among Canada, Mexico, and the

United States. 
viii

Overall, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry seems to enjoy a domestic environment conducive

to researching and developing drugs, protecting its intellectual property, and obtaining

regulatory approval to market its products. There is also a strong trend in the United States

to invest those profits in new R&D. Recent improvements to the patent systems and

Government regulatory policies in Western Europe and Japan are likely to benefit the U.S.

industry as well. Because of the strong international component to this industry, that which

benefits the industry in any one of these three areas will likely work to the benefit of the

others. Since aging populations will only bring a rise in the demand for drug products, the

U.S. pharmaceutical industry, along with the industries of Western Europe and Japan, can

expect growing markets for their products.
 

1

 Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals

(USITC Publication 2437, September 1991). A copy of this publication can be obtained by contacting the

U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary (202/205-1809).

 

2

 A new chemical entity, also called a new molecular entity (NME), is defined by the U.S. Food and

Drug Administration as a drug for which the active ingredient has not been previously marketed (or

approved) for use as a drug product in the United States. A global NCE is generally defined as a product

that is eventually marketed in at least seven industrialized countries.

 

3

 The EU comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

1-1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Purpose and Scope

In 1991, the U.S. International Trade Commission (the Commission) conducted a study on the

pharmaceutical industry, Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology

Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals,1 as part of a series on global competitiveness

of U.S. advanced-technology manufacturing industries requested by the Senate Committee on

Finance. In the Commission’s 1991 study, the major factors of competitiveness were found

to be those that affect a company’s ability to develop and deliver new pharmaceutical products

or new chemical entities (NCEs), particularly those NCEs successful on a global basis.2

While the ability to put innovative products on the market is still considered the key to success

in the pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical companies are currently affected by several

changes, such as lower tariff and nontariff barriers, improved protection of intellectual

property rights, and global consolidation. The purpose of this report is to describe the

principal factors currently affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry,

particularly in relation to the industries of Western Europe and Japan.

The original study found that a pharmaceutical company’s research and development (R&D)

infrastructure is a major contributing factor to its competitiveness. R&D, which by its nature

is capital intensive, is necessary to create new, innovative treatments for the market. Sales

revenues generate company profits, allowing for more research, which in turn might lead to

another successful novel product. A cycle is initiated whereby profits from existing drug sales

fund the development and marketing of future drugs. The cycle may potentially be repeated

for each new drug developed and marketed.

The Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study also indicated that Government policies affect

the competitiveness of pharmaceutical firms. Sweeping changes in barriers to trade

worldwide, from tariffs to intellectual property rights and patent issues, have occurred since

1991. There is greater participation of member countries of the World Trade Organization

(WTO), formed in 1995, including those of the European Union (EU),3 in agreements relating

to intellectual property and patents. In the Western hemisphere, the North American Free

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has resulted in low or no tariff barriers and greater protection of

patents and intellectual property rights among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In the
 

4

 “The Uruguay Round Agreement on Pharmaceuticals: Developments in the Two Years After

Implementation,” International Trade and Technology Review, USITC Pub. 3071, October 1997, available

at http://www.usitc.gov/ittr.htm. See also the USITC annual report Shifts in Merchandise Trade, available

at http://www.usitc.gov/332s/332index.htm. Deficits also occurred in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

 

5

 Global Competitiveness, pp. 1-2, 1-3. In this way, data for a Japanese firm operating in the United

States would be counted in the U.S. industry data, although the firm would still be identified as Japanese.

 

6

 For the purpose of this study, Western Europe includes the EU-15 plus Switzerland and Norway.

 

7

 Opportunities and Challenges for Pharmaceutical Innovation: Industry Profile 1996, Pharmaceutical

Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), p. 1; also see The New England Journal of Medicine,

325(5):293-302 (1991); and Showstack, J., et al., The New England Journal of Medicine, 321(16), 1989.

 

8

 In this paper, “ethical” pharmaceuticals refer to those available only by prescription.

1-2

United States, changes in Government policies have also led to faster approval times for NCEs

by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). As noted in the Commission’s 1991

competitiveness study, Government policies that lead to longer periods of market exclusivity

increase the amount of sales revenues; increased sales revenues lead to greater profits and

potentially more funding for R&D. 

Another Government policy examined in this report is the initiative on pharmaceuticals

established during the Uruguay Round (see chapter 4). The agreement was implemented on

January 1, 1995, providing duty-free treatment for about 7,000 pharmaceutical products and

pharmaceutical intermediates; another 496 products and intermediates became duty-free on

April 1, 1997, and negotiations are currently underway to make further additions. The

cumulative effect of this initiative has not yet been ascertained.4

The Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study examined conditions of competitiveness in

world markets. Now, as then, the pharmaceutical industry continues to be global in scope and

any distinct delineation between a domestic and foreign firm is further blurred by continued

consolidation. In the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, country and regional data

were aggregated based on geographical location of facilities rather than the location of

corporate headquarters.5 The same practice will be used in this report, unless otherwise

specified. Overviews of the U.S., Western European,6 and Japanese industries, similar though

less extensive than in the Commission’s 1991 report, are provided for assessment of relative

competitiveness.

Importance of Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceuticals are important in all aspects of health care and have been shown to be the

most cost-effective means of treating some diseases when compared with surgical procedures.7

In the United States, emergence of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), coupled with

rising private medical care costs and Government management of Medicare and Medicaid

health programs, has contributed to a trend toward finding the most cost-effective way of

treating illnesses. As a result of these trends, consumption of both ethical8 and over-thecounter (OTC) pharmaceuticals increased during 1993-97. Increases in Western European

and Japanese consumption of pharmaceuticals also occurred during the period covered.
 

9

 Dollar-yen exchange rate data are located online at

http://www.ita.doc.gov/region/japan/exchange.html.

 

10 The legislation that implemented the URA in the United States is known as the Uruguay Round

Agreements Act (URAA).

1-3

Data Sources and Methodology

In the discussion of the U.S. industry, data on employment, R&D expenditures, imports,

exports, and domestic production are presented. Employment data used were compiled by the

Bureau of Labor Statistics, while most data related to R&D were collected by the

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a U.S. pharmaceutical

trade association. The U.S. Department of Commerce published the trade and production data

referenced in this report. The European Commission was the primary source of EU data used,

including exchange rate data for the euro. Data presented for the Western European industry

were published by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries’ Associations

(EFPIA), while European price index data were compiled by the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers

Association (JPMA) published the data on the Japan pharmaceutical industry that are included

in this report, and the exchange rates were based on data provided by the U.S. Department of

Commerce.9

The methodology used in this paper consists of an analysis of new information that

supplements the information in the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, as well as an

analysis of historical trends in trade, Government policies, and international developments

from 1991 to the present. The combined effects of these trends on the current and future

competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry are presented.

Organization

Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the pharmaceutical products covered by this study,

with a special focus on new drug approvals. Chapter 3 discusses the U.S., Western European,

and Japanese pharmaceutical industries, including (where available) employment, R&D

expenditures, the state of the biotechnology sector, and Government policies that affect each

industry. These data are helpful in updating the information presented in the Commission’s

1991 competitiveness study and in providing an understanding of the factors underlying the

trends in trade, pricing, and innovation. Where data are not available, a qualitative and

comparative analysis may be provided.

Chapter 4 includes descriptions and analysis of recent developments in international

agreements, such as the Uruguay Round Agreements10 (URA) and NAFTA, and their impacts

on the ability of U.S.-based firms to compete in the domestic and world markets. These

agreements have had a significant effect on the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, mainly by

removing tariff barriers. In the case of the URA, it also provided the global framework for
1-4

increased patent protection and intellectual property rights, which has encouraged U.S.

companies to market their products in countries that did not previously offer these securities.

Lastly, Chapter 5 presents conclusions drawn from the data and other information presented

elsewhere in the report. 
 

1

 The Standard Industrial Classification system was replaced by the North American Industry

Classification System (NAICS) effective reference year 1997. Since the data used in this report were still

presented by SIC codes, the SIC system seems more relevant to the discussion. For reference purposes, the

applicable NAICS codes are provided in parentheses.

2-1

CHAPTER 2

Definition of Pharmaceutical Products

Product Classes

For the purposes of this study, the pharmaceutical industry includes those companies that

produce therapeutic products, including antibiotics, hormones, botanical products, in vitro and

in vivo diagnostic substances, and other similar substances, used in the treatment of human

and veterinary diseases. Pharmaceutical products include those items classified within the

Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)1 code 283 (NAICS 32541) “Drugs.” The two major

categories of industry within 283 are industry 2833 (NAICS 325411), “Medicinal chemicals

and botanical products,” and 2834 (NAICS 325412, partial), “Pharmaceutical preparations.”

Other industry groupings include SIC 2835 (NAICS 325412, partial, and 325413), “In vitro

and in vivo diagnostics,” and 2836 (NAICS 325414), “Biological products except

diagnostics.”

SIC 2833 covers most active bulk ingredients, whereas the products classified in SIC 2834

consist of pharmaceutical preparations, including OTC products and ethical preparations.

OTC preparations include many familiar items such as antihistamine preparations and cold,

cough, and fever remedies. Ethical preparations, medications prescribed or administered by

a physician, include the products mentioned above as well as intravenous solutions,

antibiotics, and general anesthetics. In both the OTC and ethical categories, products can be

either brandname or generic.

International Nonproprietary Names

In addition to chemical nomenclature and naming conventions commonly used in the

pharmaceutical and chemical industries, the World Health Organization (WHO) established

the International Nonproprietary Names (INN) system for pharmaceuticals. The system for

designating INNs creates similar names in English, French, Spanish, and Russian, as well as

a “universal” INN in Latin. For example, Abamectin is an English INN for a product used

as an antibiotic; the French INN is Abamectine, while the Spanish INN is Abamectina, and
 

2

 International Nonproprietary Names (INN) for Pharmaceutical Substances, World Health

Organization (WHO), Geneva, Switzerland, 1992, p. 1.

 

3

 INNMs consist of an INN with a modifier or “radical,” representing a salt, ester, complex, or other

derivative of the basic INN. These modifiers may exist as common chemical prefixes or suffixes, such as

“sulfate,” “chloride,” or they may represent more complex chemical derivative names. 

 

4

 Also called “new molecular entity” (NME).

 

5

 PhRMA, New Drugs Approvals in 1998, p. 1.

 

6

 PhRMA, New Drugs Approvals in 1998, p. 1.

 

7

 EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1997, pp. 22-23.

2-2

the “Universal” name is Abamectinum.

2

 The WHO also has a nomenclature system for

chemically modified INN products known as INNMs.3

New Chemical Entities

NCEs4 are defined by the FDA as those drugs whose active ingredients have not been

previously approved in the United States for use as a pharmaceutical. The term “global NCE”

refers to an NCE that has been approved or marketed in at least seven industrialized countries.

NCEs do not include either biological drugs or diagnostic drugs. According to FDA data, 197

NCEs were approved in the United States between the years 1993 and 1998.5

As shown in figure 2-1, the number of new products decreased from 25 in 1993 to 22 in 1994,

before increasing to 53 in 1996. This represents an increase of 112 percent during 1993-96.

The types of NCEs approved in 1998 represented a wide variety of specific therapeutic

categories, including antiviral agents (three for AIDS-related disease), respiratory drugs, and

erectile dysfunction treatments. A major factor that has resulted in the large increase seen for

AIDS drugs, as well as for all drugs, is the more expeditious FDA approval process for new

drug applications (NDAs).6 This increase in the approval process is largely the result of

increased company involvement through programs such as the Prescription Drug User Fee Act

(PDUFA) and the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),

which will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

On a regional basis, Western European companies have developed a large share of the newly

marketed drugs. Data available for drugs developed during 1985-89 indicate that the

European firms developed 129 NCEs compared with 77 for the United States and 70 for

Japan. During 1990-94, however, the most recent period of record, European drug

development slowed to a total of 94 while the United States had a total of 84, and Japan

developed 77 NCEs.7

The comparison of NCE development data is shown in table 2-1. During the 5-year periods

for which data are available, European companies as a group recorded the largest number of

NCEs. The total of all reported NCEs increased only by about 5 percent over the 20-year

period, although the number recorded for Europe dropped by about 37 percent from 149 to

94. The United States, however, gradually increased from 66 to 84 during the same 20
 

8

 Ibid.

2-3

Source: Official statistics of the FDA.

years, an increase of 27 percent. Japan increased the most in terms of percent growth, from

28 during 1975-79 to 77 during 1990-94.8

Table 2-1

Total number of NCEs developed, by major country or group, by period groupings, 

1975-94

Country

Total NCEs developed

1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94

Western Europe 149 126 129 94

Japan 28 57 70 77

United States 66 63 77 84

Other countries 4 2 1 4

Total 247 248 277 259

Source: EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1997, p. 22.
 

9

 Ibid.

2-4

A more “research-friendly” environment is considered to have helped the United States in the

relatively robust growth in the number of NCEs approved over the past 20 years, and it could

explain why the United States has an increasingly larger share of the total NCEs approved.

In the most recent period, the United States introduced more than 32 percent of total NCEs

approved in the survey. By contrast, European pharmaceutical firms have been responsible

for a decreasing portion of the approved items. It has been argued that European firms have

not been able to keep pace with development of new drugs because of diminishing R&D

investment.9

It is evident from the NCE data presented above that the United States, Western Europe, and

Japan are the primary developers of innovative pharmaceutical products. The following

chapters explain the factors that have affected the success and competitiveness of the

industries in these countries, particularly the United States.
 

1

 As noted in Chapter 1, this report defines the nationality of a pharmaceutical company by the

geographic location of its headquarters, although country data are generally reported for the activities of all

companies operating within a nation.

 

2

 Because of rising R&D costs, it is increasingly important for pharmaceutical companies to maximize

the period of time that products are marketed under patent exclusivity. To get products to market quickly, a

company must expedite every aspect of product development; because many of the chemicals and processes

involved in the pharmaceutical industry are highly specialized, more drug companies are focusing their time

and resources on R&D while outsourcing the production of complex intermediates and active ingredients to

other firms.

 

3

 PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, p. 70. These data are presented in the following regional/country

breakout: Africa, Australasia, Canada, Europe, Japan, Latin America, Middle East, Southeast Asia &

China, and the United States.

 

4

 Feliza Mirasol, “Pharma Industry is Poised for Double-Digit Growth,” Chemical Market Reporter,

April 13, 1998, p. 15.

3-1

CHAPTER 3

Description of the Pharmaceutical Industries in

Selected Countries

Industry Overview

The pharmaceutical industry is complex, dynamic, and highly globalized, with many

pharmaceutical companies operating in multiple countries.1 Adding to the international nature

of the industry, there is a continued trend toward outsourcing2 various stages of the

development and production of a single pharmaceutical product, including intermediate and

active ingredient process development; as a result, a single finished product may be the result

of materials manufactured in more than one country. In addition to its global aspect, the

pharmaceutical industry continues to be characterized by high R&D expenditures and

extensive regulation of its products compared with other manufacturing sectors.

The most established pharmaceutical industries are located in the United States, Western

Europe, and Japan. The top 10 pharmaceutical companies based on worldwide sales in 1997

(table 3-1) are headquartered in either the United States or Western Europe. While no

Japanese firms are among the top 10 companies, several firms fall in the next tier of top

worldwide pharmaceutical sales.

Demand for pharmaceutical products is highest in the United States, Western Europe, and

Japan. The United States accounted for approximately 33 percent of the total world market

for ethical (prescription) pharmaceuticals in 1996, while Europe’s share amounted to about

29 percent; Japan’s share was nearly 18 percent.3

Based on reports of growth rates of over 10 percent for 1997, and estimates of similar growth

for 1998, the pharmaceutical industry appears to be performing well.4 A recent review of the

major pharmaceutical companies reveals several factors contributing to the
 

5

 “The Pressure is Still On,” Medical Advertising News, Sept. 1996, p. 3.

 

6

 Ibid.

 

7

 “Business: The Mother of All Mergers,” The Economist, Feb. 7, 1998, p. 63.

 

8

 Wayne Koberstein, “Pharma Mergers — Point/Counterpoint: A Conversation with Frederick Frank of

Lehman Brothers,” Pharmaceutical Executive, June 1998, p. 78.

 

9

 “Business: The Mother of All Mergers,” p. 63.

3-2

Table 3-1

The top 10 pharmaceutical companies, worldwide sales in 1997, and location of corporate

headquarters

Company

Sales

(billions of dollars)

Location of 

corporate headquarters

Merck 11.3 United States

Glaxo-Wellcome 10.9 United Kingdom

Novartis 10.5 Switzerland

Bristol-Myers Squibb 9.1 United States

Johnson & Johnson 8.6 United States

Pfizer 8.3 United States

American Home Products 8.1 United States

SmithKline Beecham 7.2 United Kingdom

Hoechst Marion Roussel 6.9 Germany

Lilly 6.4 United States

Source: “Much Promised, but Little Delivered in ‘98,” European Chemical News, Nov. 30, 1998, p. 23.

success of the industry on a worldwide basis.5 Improved R&D productivity has brought

recent opportunities for growth, and many contend that consolidation and restructuring have

also been beneficial for pharmaceutical companies.6

Several large, high-profile pharmaceutical companies have recently sought to improve their

competitive posture and overall company performance by developing promising product lines

through licensing, engaging in joint ventures, divesting (or “spinning off”) unprofitable

business segments, and negotiating mergers and acquisitions (M&As).7 M&As, which result

in industry consolidation, arguably have the most significant effect on the pharmaceutical

industry as a whole.

The motivating factor behind M&As has evolved since the 1960s and 1970s, when the

primary impetus was diversification of products. The incentive changed in the 1980s, when

companies merged and acquired other firms to increase international presence and

infrastructure. Currently, most M&As are intended to maximize the benefits of economies

of scale.8 By combining the resources of two organizations, administrative staff can be cut

and inefficient factories closed, resulting in cost savings; additionally, specialized sales forces

and R&D capabilities of each company can complement one another, strengthening overall

performance in these areas for the newly formed enterprise.9 Table 3-2 outlines some of the

more significant pharmaceutical industry M&As in recent years.
3-3

Table 3-2

M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, 1989-97

Year Companies Result

1997 Roche and Boehringer Mannheim Roche

1996 Elan and Athena Neurosciences Elan

1996 Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Novartis

1995 Schwarz Pharma and Reed & Carnrick Schwarz Pharma

1995 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and Fisons Rhone-Poulenc Rorer

1995 Pharmacia and Upjohn Pharmacia & Upjohn

1995 Hoechst-Roussel and Marion Merrell Dow Hoechst Marion Roussel

1995 Gynopharma and Ortho-McNeil Gynopharma

1995 Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome Glaxo-Wellcome Plc.

1995 Knoll and Boots Knoll 

1994 SmithKline Beecham and Sterling SmithKline Beecham

1994 Sanofi and Sterling Sanofi

1994 Pharmacia and Ergamont Pharmacia

1994 Hoffmann-LaRoche and Syntex Roche Holding Ltd.

1994 American Home Products and American Cyanamid American Home Products

1990 Boots and Flint Boots

1990 Pharmacia and Kabi Pharmacia

1990 Rhone-Poulenc and Rorer Rhone-Poulenc Rorer

1989 American Home Products and A.H. Robins American Home Products

1989 Bristol-Myers and Squibb Bristol-Myers Squibb

1989 Merrell Dow and Marion Marion Merrell Dow

1989 SmithKline and Beecham SmithKline Beecham

Source: Compiled from information presented by PhRMA in Industry Profile, 1997, p. 41, Ann M. Thayer,

“Pharmaceuticals: Redesigning R&D,” Chemical and Engineering News, Feb. 23, 1998, p. 26, and information

from the SmithKline Beecham home page (www.sb.com/company/hist_01.htm) obtained on Nov. 12, 1998.
 

10 Kevin Gopal, “Megamergers — Boon or Bust?” Pharmaceutical Executive, Nov. 1996, pp. 34-36.

 

11 Klaus Veitinger, “Midsized Player — A Model for the 21st Century,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Oct.

1998, pp. 86-94.

 

12 Chapter 2 of the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study addresses the importance of R&D as a

factor affecting a company’s ability to develop innovative ethical drugs.

 

13 Official statistics of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce; estimate by USITC staff.

3-4

Analysts have noted one negative result of these M&As. Reportedly, a new product must be

capable of generating significant sales revenues to attract the resources of a very large

pharmaceutical company, primarily because the firm’s overall revenues are too high to be

affected noticeably by small increases. Products with lower sales value may be overlooked

by these large merged pharmaceutical companies, even though the vast majority of

pharmaceutical sales do not involve the top selling drugs.10 However, this trend can work to

the advantage of medium-sized pharmaceutical companies. In focusing their business on the

development of potential products discovered by other firms (to avoid costly research

expenditures), middle tier companies are often able to attract product development from larger

firms who may only be willing to devote marketing resources to blockbuster drugs. Also,

medium-sized companies are typically more flexible in making deals than larger firms, as

reflected in how deals are structured and the timeliness with which the deals are closed.11 In

this way, the effect of M&As on the pharmaceutical industry seems to be somewhat balanced,

even though it is evolving.

Because of the importance of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as both suppliers

and consumers of pharmaceuticals, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the

pharmaceutical industries in these three geographic areas. The following sections provide, to

the extent possible, an overview of the industry of each country/country group. There is a

review of employment trends for each area. R&D expenditures are also evaluated as a strong

indicator of the competitiveness of each industry.12 The state of the biotechnology industry,

widely considered one of the most rapidly developing research areas within the pharmaceutical

sector, is assessed as evidence of an industry’s ability to invest in risky R&D activities and

successfully commercialize the scientific findings. Additionally, relevant Government policies

are examined as another critical factor for competitiveness, particularly those policies that

affect the rate of drug approval, the extent of patent protection, or the pricing and prescribing

behavior in the market. As discussed in the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study,

factors that affect a firm’s profitability have a significant effect on that firm’s ability to invest

in the R&D necessary to develop innovative products.

United States

Industry

The pharmaceutical industry in the United States, composed of approximately 700 companies

that develop, manufacture, and market ethical pharmaceutical products, including both

proprietary (brandname) and generic medicines, appears competitive. Reflecting a 10-percent

rise over 1996, the value of U.S. shipments of pharmaceutical products in 1997 was estimated

at nearly $83 billion.13 This increase can be attributed to the recent success of new products
 

14 "Pharmaceutical Rankings Change as New Products Enter the Scene,” Chemical Market Reporter,

Mar. 9, 1998, p. 35.

 

15

 Ibid. Introducing a product to market is distinct from gaining approval for an NCE (compare with

figure 2-1).

 

16 Information obtained from the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association (NDMA) website

(www.ndmainfo.org/facts) on July 21, 1998.

3-5

and product line extensions as opposed to increases in price or sales volume of existing

products.14 Reportedly, 61 new pharmaceutical products were introduced to the market in

1997, compared with 53 items in 1996.15

The domestic market for OTC medications, although significant, is smaller than the market

for prescription medications. In 1997, there were an estimated 100,000 OTC products on the

market, in a variety of sizes and dosage forms, with sales reaching an estimated $16.6 billion.

The extremely competitive market for OTC medications has resulted in an average cost of

about $5.00 per package, compared with an average price of an ethical drug of about

$22.00.16

In table 3-3, the top 10 companies that have operations in the United States are listed, based

on sales from their U.S.-based operations only. It should be noted that not all of the

companies on the following list are headquartered in the United States, which indicates the

strong multinational presence that is common among drug companies. Because firms may

have extensive operations outside of the United States, the ranking order at the world level

(table 3-1) is sometimes different from its rank among domestic producers.

Table 3-3

The top 10 pharmaceutical companies in the United States, by U.S. pharmaceutical sales, 1997

Rank Company

U.S. pharmaceutical sales 

(in billion dollars)

1 Bristol-Myers Squibb (US) 5.70

2 Johnson & Johnson (US) 5.66

3 Merck & Co. (US) 5.65

4 Glaxo-Wellcome (UK) 5.54

5 American Home Products (US) 5.33

6 Pfizer (US) 4.95

7 Lilly (US) 4.39

8 SmithKline Beecham (UK) 4.02

9 Novartis (Swiss) 3.99

10 Schering-Plough (US) 3.81

Source: “Pharmaceutical Rankings Change as New Products Enter the Scene,” Chemical Market Reporter (New

York), Mar. 9, 1998, p. 35.
 

17 Bruce Gain, “U.S. Lags Europe in Outsourcing Capacity,” Chemical Week, Sept. 10, 1997, p. 44.

 

18 Andrea Foster, “FDA Foreign Inspections Faulted,” Chemical Week, May 13, 1998, p. 54. In a March

29, 1999 discussion with an FDA official, he stated that both foreign and domestic inspections of facilities

for an NDA are identical; however, limited resources result in less frequent routine “follow-up” inspections

of overseas facilities as compared with inspections of facilities located in the United States.

 

19

 Ibid.

 

20 Sean Milmo, “EU Court Ruling Deals a Setback to Generics Arm,” Chemical Market Reporter, Aug.

4, 1997, p. 7.

 

21 Matthew Lerner, “Bulk Pharma Taking Root in Americas,” Chemical Marketing Reporter, May 20,

1996, p. 5.

 

22 Bill Macdonald, “Asian Plants Relish in Custom Synthesis,” Asia-Pacific Chemicals, May 1998, p.

31.

3-6

The U.S. pharmaceutical industry, particularly the research-based companies, has played a

significant role in the increased use of outsourcing within the sector. The world market for

outsourced services in the patented and brandname pharmaceutical industry is estimated to

have been $4 billion for 1997; of this total, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry demand for

outsourcing accounted for about 60 percent. However, U.S. capacity for outsourced services

to support the pharmaceutical industry was about 20 percent of the total world capacity and

equaled only one-third of European outsourcing production capacity.17 Reportedly, U.S.

chemical companies are discouraged from establishing themselves in the pharmaceutical

outsourcing market at least in part because of the disparity in FDA inspection standards for

domestic versus overseas facilities.18 As a result, there is a shortage of U.S. fine chemical

facilities that have FDA approval and can also perform the highly specialized processes that

are required for the complex chemicals used by drug companies.19

The outsourcing market for generics is slightly different than for brandname products.

Although many producers of bulk active ingredients are located in Europe, import competition

also comes from low-cost sources, such as Asia. Also, the recent ruling on patent laws in the

EU has made it illegal for companies in member states to sell active ingredients for products

that are still under patent anywhere in the world.20 In many countries, including the United

States, it is legal to sell patented active ingredients for the development and clinical trials of

generic products, even though the generics may not be sold on the market until the expiration

of the patent. As a result, U.S. generics manufacturers who had been traditionally supplied

by European producers must find alternative sources of patented active ingredients in order

to begin marketing a product immediately after patent protection ends for the brandname

product.21 Although imports from Europe are still strong and shipments from India and China

are increasing, the domestic pharmaceutical industry is optimistic that this advantage over the

Europeans will encourage the U.S. fine chemicals industry to develop its outsourcing services

for bulk active ingredients.22

Employment

Employment during 1993-97 is shown by 3-digit and 4-digit SIC codes in table 3-4. In 1997,

total employment in the pharmaceutical industry (SIC 283) reached the highest recorded levels

for the period with 267,200 employees, following a gradual decline in employment during

1993-95. The decrease has largely been attributed to the rationalization of the industry, by

which mergers and buyouts resulted in the elimination of many redundant
 

23 Based on data reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

 

24

 Ibid.

 

25 Commission’s 1991 Competitiveness Study, p. 2-1.

 

26 A "me-too” preparation, broadly defined, is one that is similar, either therapeutically or chemically, to

an existing pharmaceutical product.

 

27 PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, p. 90.

3-7

structures. After a period low of 259,800 employees in 1995, employment for SIC 283

increased during 1996-97.23 The upward trend is likely a result of the new products and

product line extensions that encouraged growth in the industry. 

Table 3-4

Employment in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, by SIC code, 1993-97

SIC Description 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

283 Medicinal Chemicals (Drugs) 264,400 263,000 259,800 260,600 267,200

2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 215,800 213,300 209,500 207,900 211,100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Employment for SIC 2834 (pharmaceutical preparations), the largest group, consisting of

finished ethical and OTC generic and brandname preparations, decreased from 215,800 to

207,900 employees during 1993-96. Although employment in SIC 2834 did not return to its

peak of 1993, the 1997 total of 211,100 employees reflected the first increase in employment

levels over the five-year period.24 As in SIC 283, it is likely that employment in SIC 2834 is

growing in conjunction with the increasing number of new products and expanded product

lines introduced by the pharmaceutical industry.

Research and Development Expenditures

A long-standing measure and determinant of competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry

is the amount spent on R&D.25 Other factors, such as pricing, profit rates, and marketing

expenditures have been put forth as measures of competitiveness, but R&D expenditures are

associated with the development of newer, proprietary drugs. R&D affords companies the

opportunity to develop a drug with unique therapeutic value rather than having to compete on

a price basis with OTC, generic, or so-called “me too”26 preparations; innovative drugs bring

higher profits, allowing more investment in R&D.

Trends in R&D spending for 1993-97 are shown in figure 3-1. With an increase in the costs

to develop NCEs, the amount spent on R&D also increased. It is estimated that in 1997

companies spent $15.5 billion domestically on R&D to develop ethical pharmaceuticals,

compared with $13.6 billion in 1996. An additional $3.5 billion was spent by U.S. companies

on R&D overseas in 1997. Domestic R&D expenditures for 1998 are expected to reach $17.2

billion, a rise that further reflects the increasing costs of drug development.27
3-8

Note.—Data for 1997 are estimated.

Source: PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, p. 90.

Surveys by PhRMA show that the percentage of sales reinvested in R&D during 1993-97 was

fairly consistent, ranging from a low of 19.4 percent in 1995 to a high of 20.4 percent in 1994.

The estimated ratio of R&D to sales for 1997 is 20.3 percent (table 3-5).

Table 3-5

R&D spending by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, U.S. sales (including foreign sales), and

ratio of R&D to sales, in millions of dollars, 1993-97

Year Domestic U.S. R&D

expenses

U.S. sales, including foreign sales Ratio of R&D to sales

1993 10,473 52,573 19.9%

1994 11,101 54,346 20.4%

1995 11,834 61,138 19.4%

1996 13,576 68,536 19.8%

19971 15,422 75,788 20.3%

1 Data estimated for 1997.

Source: PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, p. 91.
3-9

Source: PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, p. 96.

A breakdown of domestic R&D expenditures for the pharmaceutical industry is shown by

therapeutic category in figure 3-2. The categories with the greatest amounts of R&D spending

in 1996 were drugs affecting the central nervous system, followed by drugs to treat

neoplasms, the endocrine system, and metabolic diseases. Antiinfectives and cardiovascular

drugs were third and fourth, respectively, with the four categories together accounting for over

73 percent of R&D spending.

Shipments and Trade Balance

U.S. shipments in the pharmaceutical industry reached a level of approximately $82.6 billion

in 1997, an increase of 41 percent from $58.4 billion in 1993. As shown in table 3-6, total

trade in pharmaceuticals also increased during those years. U.S. imports increased

dramatically, from $6.1 billion in 1993 to $12.8 billion in 1997, an increase of about 110

percent. U.S. exports did not increase as quickly as imports, rising from about $7.2 billion

to $9.6 billion (33 percent) over 1993-97. These changes in trade resulted in a deteriorating

trade balance for the United States, ranging from a $1.1 billion surplus in 1993 to a $3.2
 

28 Data from the official statistics of the Department of Commerce.

 

29 The trend in outsourcing various stages of pharmaceutical production is discussed earlier in this

chapter.

 

30 See USITC Pub. 3120, Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade in 1997, July 1998, pp. 7-6, 7-7. This report

is available online at http://www.usitc.gov/332s/332index.htm.

 

31 "Finding the Cure,” Chemical Marketing Reporter, April 14, 1997, p. SR-3.

3-10

billion deficit in 1997.28 The most significant increase in imports came from Western Europe,

the primary source of imported pharmaceutical products for the United States. There are

several factors that contributed to the increase in products from Europe, including related

party trade, greater capacity for outsourced29 production as compared with the United States,

favorable high technology business policies (e.g., tax incentives) in Ireland, and Government

health care policies that have reduced local demand in certain European countries.30

Table 3-6

Pharmaceuticals: U.S. shipments, domestic exports, imports for consumption, merchandise

trade balance, apparent consumption, exports as a percent of shipments, and imports as a

percent of consumption, 1993-97

Year Shipment

s

Exports Imports

Trade

balance

Apparent

consumption

Exports as a

percent of

shipments

Imports as a

percent of

consumption

(millions of dollars) (percent)

1993 58,428 7,222 6,094 1,128 59,556 12.4 10.2

1994 60,811 7,565 6,966 599 61,410 12.4 11.3

1995 68,473 7,996 8,583 -587 67,886 11.7 12.6

1996 75,047 8,889 11,161 -2,272 72,775 11.8 15.3

1997 182,550 9,600 12,836 -3,236 79,314 111.6 16.2

1 Estimated by USITC staff.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.

Biotechnology Products

With advancements in the study of genetically modified organisms and improved recombinant

research methods, the field of biotechnology has become increasingly important to the

pharmaceutical industry. Biopharmaceutical products with marketable value, such as

antiviral compounds used in the treatment or prevention of AIDS and new cancer and

cardiovascular disease diagnostics, have changed the medical field by offering innovative,

highly effective treatments for serious ailments.31

Returns on investment in the U.S. biotechnology industry were not generally realized until

1997, when profits from the successful commercialization of biopharmaceuticals began to
 

32 Joseph Chang, “Biotech Industry Comes of Age: Sales Surged 15 Percent in ‘97,” Chemical Market

Reporter, June 22, 1998, p.1.

 

33 “Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing Moves Into the Custom Arena,” Chemical Market Reporter, Jan.

19, 1998, p. F22.

 

34 Feliza Mirasol, "Biopharmaceuticals Shine, Break-Even Point in Sight,” Chemical Market Reporter,

June 22, 1998, p.16.

 

35 There are a reported 1,287 companies involved in the biotechnology industry in the United States, a

number that includes private corporations, firms whose primary activities lie in other (often tangential)

fields, and biotech firms that focus on non-pharmaceutical applications in their research. 

“Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing,” p. F20. For information about the strong links among Government

research agencies, universities, and the biotech industry, please refer to the Commission’s 1991

Competitiveness Study.

 

36 Chang, “Biotech Industry,” p. 21.

3-11

compensate for high R&D expenditures. Sales for 1997 reached more than $5.7 billion,

reflecting a 15.5 percent increase over 1996.32 Continued sales growth is expected. While

there are over 40 biopharmaceuticals and vaccines currently approved by the FDA, 272

biopharmaceutical drugs are in human clinical trials, with countless others in the preliminary

stages of development.33 The top ten biotechnology products, along with their producers, are

listed on table 3-7; three of the top firms in the United States are Amgen, Genentech, and

Biogen.34

Table 3-7

Top products in the biotechnology industry, the developer, and the marketer, by 1996 sales, in

millions of dollars

Product Developer Marketer

1996 sales

($ million)

Epogen Amgen Amgen 1,150

Neupogen Amgen Amgen 1,017

Procrit Amgen Ortho Biotech 995

Humulin Genentech Eli Lilly 884

Engerix-B Genentech SmithKline Beecham 568

Intron A Biogen Schering-Plough 524

Betaseron Chiron/Berlex Berlex/Schering AG 353

Epivir Biochem Pharma/Glaxo Wellcome Glaxo Wellcome 306

Activase Genentech Genentech 284

Humatrope Genentech/Eli Lilly Eli Lilly 268

Total 6,349

Source: Feliza Mirasol, “Biopharmaceuticals Shine, Break-Even Point in Sight,” Chemical Market Reporter, June

22, 1998, p. 16.

There are currently about 350 publicly held biotech companies in the United States,35 which

industry analysts have reported to be excessive given the investment dollars available.36 While

several of the larger biotech companies are now able to bring their products to market, smaller
 

37 "Beyond the Behemoths,” The Economist, Feb. 21, 1998, p. 16.

 

38 Chang, “Biotech Industry,” p. 21.

 

39 "Biotech Industry Sees Dealmaking Double over the Past Eight Years,” Chemical Market Reporter,

June 22, 1998, p. 18.

 

40 DNA sequences provide the genetic coding for an organism.

 

41 See the Commission’s 1991 Competitiveness Study and “Regulations are Making Europe a Biotech

Dinosaur,” European Chemical News, March 23-29, 1998, p. 8.

 

42 21 USC §301 et seq.

 

43 Commission’s 1991 Competitiveness Study, p. viii.

 

44 Patents protect a company’s right to exclusively market a particular product for a specified length of

time; if that product cannot be legally sold because it has not received approval from the FDA, the period of

exclusivity is shortened. As a result, the company’s profits from monopoly (i.e., patent protected) sales are

diminished.

3-12

firms are generally still in need of larger pharmaceutical firms, or another biotech firm, to see

their biopharmaceuticals through the final phases of development and marketing.37 As a

result, an increased number of future consolidations and strategic partnerships within the

industry are anticipated.38 Formal collaborations in the biopharmaceutical field increased

from 320 business arrangements in 1989 to 628 in 1997.39

Overall, the United States is widely considered the world leader in the biotech industry. About

65 percent of worldwide patents on biopharmaceutical products are held by U.S. companies,

and of the applications for patents on DNA sequences,40 about 63 percent of the worldwide

total were submitted by U.S. firms. The U.S. success in this field has been attributed to the

availability of funds, an environment conducive to an entrepreneurial spirit in scientific areas,

and the relatively efficient review processes of the FDA.41

Government Policies

Historically, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA) has played an important role

in maintaining the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals and protecting consumer health.42

Several changes to these regulations have occurred since the Commission’s 1991

competitiveness report was published, the last of which came under the Food and Drug

Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). The most significant modifications

have resulted in a shorter FDA approval process for new drug applications (NDAs) and a

limited scope of legal action that is allowable against a manufacturer of a drug (or device)

found to be defective. Some significant regulations on the industry identified in the

Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, such as restrictions on biological products and the

Orphan Drug Act, which governs approval of drugs for treatment of diseases affecting

200,000 or fewer people, have changed very little since that time.

As reported in the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, the ability of a company to

compete successfully is dependent upon its ability to innovate, or provide new products.43

Because any new drug to be marketed in the United States requires approval from the FDA,

the time taken by the approval process reduces the effective patent “life” of the new drug.44

This reduced period of exclusivity subsequently reduces the amount of time available to

recover funds invested in R&D.
 

45 The approval process includes preclinical testing, 3 phases of clinical trials, and the submission of an

NDA. Preclinical testing involves laboratory and animal testing of a chemical to gauge its safety for testing

in humans. Phase I of the clinical trials, which is conducted on 20-100 healthy volunteers, is intended to

test for potential side effects and a safe but effective dosage range. Phase II involves 100-300 volunteers

who are afflicted with the targeted disease; this stage is used to monitor efficacy and side effects. Phase III

expands the number of volunteers to a minimum of 1,000-3,000 patients to further determine the safety and

efficacy of the drug. If the data from these trials indicate satisfactory performance, the company then

submits an NDA to the FDA. PhRMA Industry Profile, 1997, pp.18-19.

 

46

 PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, pp. 24-25.

 

47 21 U.S.C.A. §379(g) and §379(h).

 

48 Fourth Annual Performance Report: Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Food and Drug

Administration, Dec. 1, 1996, downloaded from www.fda.gov, Nov. 3, 1997. 

3-13

The average length of the drug approval process45 during 1990-96 was 14.9 years, increasing

from 14.2 years during the 1980s. Using 14.9 years as the base, the approval process consists

of an average of 6.0 years for pre-clinical phase testing of the drug, another 6.7 years for the

FDA-required clinical trials, and 2.2 years for the final FDA approval phase. The clinical

trial phase of drug development increased since the 1980s average of 5.5 years, whereas the

other two phases of drug development decreased. The lengthening of the clinical phase has

been attributed to both the rising average total of clinical trials performed for each NDA as

well as the increasing number of medical procedures that each clinical trial patient

undergoes.46

During the 1990s, the FDA has embarked on several strategies to speed the approval of new

drugs. The first major development was the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992

(PDUFA), which was effective through September 30, 1997. The primary purpose of the

PDUFA was to promote efficiency in the approval process in order to make medicines

available to patients more quickly. Specifically, the PDUFA helped establish a new

framework for accelerated approval times and provided the FDA with additional resources for

the FDA Center for Biologics.47

The PDUFA established user fees for the drug application and NDA approval process. The

experimental fees were based on an upward sliding scale from 1993 to 1997, when sunset

provisions terminated the requirement. The fee scale is shown in table 3-8. To provide for

situations where a small company may not have been able to meet application fees or other

establishment or product fees, the PDUFA provided that a business with fewer than 500

employees was responsible for only one-half of the standard amounts shown when submitting

a human drug application. Initial drug application fees were set to total as much as $385,000

by the end of the user fee program in fiscal year 1997.

The PDUFA also established for the FDA a number of performance goals for the accelerated

approval of drugs. These include on-time review performance goals for NDAs as well as

Product License Applications (PLAs). Other goals making up the management framework

of the PDUFA are all geared towards the elimination of overdue backlogs, building excellence

into the review process, and achieving measurable, high performance.48 The third report on

the PDUFA, completed in 1995, showed that the FDA was more than one year ahead in

meeting its goals overall and was performing three years ahead of scheduled
 

49

 Third Annual Performance Report: Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Food and Drug

Administration, Dec. 1, 1995, downloaded from www.fda.gov, Apr. 18, 1997.

 

50 PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 1998, p. 22.

 

51 In chapter 3 of the PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, obtained from the PhRMA website

(www.phrma.org) on July 30, 1998, the mission is summarized: “to promote public health by the timely

review of applications for new products and to protect public health by ensuring the regulated products are

safe, effective, and properly labeled.” A complete version can be found in Public Law 105-115, Section

406.

 

52 Public Law No. 105-115.

 

53 Industry sources have suggested that a closer estimate may be in the range of $1-1.5 billion.

3-14

goals in new drug approvals.49 This trend has continued. The 23-month median approval

time for NDAs that existed in the early 1990s gradually decreased to a median approval time

of 11.7 months in 1998.50

Table 3-8

FDA drug application fees, by fee type, fiscal years 1993-97

Fee Type

Fiscal Year—

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

(thousands of dollars)

Annual establishment fee 60 88 126 131 138

Annual product fee 6 9 12.5 13 14

Application fee under subsection

(a)(1)(A)(I)1

100 150 208 217 233

Application fee under subsection

(a)(1)(A)(ii)2

50 75 104 108 116

Total under subsection (a)(1)(A)(I) 166 247 346.5 361 385

Total under subsection (a)(1)(A)(ii) 116 172 242.5 252 268

1

 Application for which clinical data with respect to safety or effectiveness are required for approval.

2

 Application for which clinical data with respect to safety or effectiveness are not required for approval.

Source: U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Legislation (eventually known as FDAMA) to significantly amend the FDCA was introduced

around the expiration date of PDUFA. When FDAMA became law on November 21, 1997,

it changed the FDA’s mission;51 added 6 months of patent exclusivity for drugs requiring

further review for pediatric applications; provided a fast track approval process for drugs

intended to treat patients with serious illnesses, such as rare forms of cancer, that do not have

satisfactory alternative treatments; and established several other important policies and

procedures intended to improve regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the United

States.52

The FDA has recently put forth a draft guidance for direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertisement

of prescription drugs over radio and television media. Although the final FDA ruling on all

types of promotional activities, including print advertisements, has not yet been finalized, the

new guidelines have already affected industry investment in advertising. It was projected that

the U.S. pharmaceutical industry would spend $1.8 billion53 on ethical drug DTC promotion

in 1998; if this estimate is accurate, spending will have increased by 80 percent over 1997
 

54 "Pharmaceutical Advertising Goes Directly to the Consumer,” Chemical Market Reporter, April 6,

1998, p. 11.

 

55 Mark Peyrot, Neil M. Alperstein, Doris Van Doren, and Laurence G. Poli, “Direct-to-Consumer Ads

Can Influence Behavior,” Marketing Health Services, Summer 1998, pp. 26-32.

 

56 FDA press release (P97-26), “FDA to Review Standards for All Direct-to-Consumer Rx Drug

Promotion,” Aug. 8, 1997. The ruling is expected during 1999.

 

57 "No EC Harmony on Drug Harmonization,” European Chemical News, May 24, 1993, pp. 29-30.

 

58

 Ibid. EU Council Directives 92/25/EEC, 92/26/EEC, 92/27/EEC, and 92/28/EEC, all enacted on

Mar. 31, 1992; information obtained from the European Union website

(europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/reg/en_register_133015.html) on March 31, 1999.

3-15

levels, the majority of which was spent for respiratory drugs.54 Notably, studies indicate that

DTC ads are affecting patients’ willingness to request products by name.55

Under the FDCA, DTC drug advertisements are required to provide a “brief summary” of

significant information about the product (i.e., side effects, contraindications) as well as a

“major statement” to enumerate the risks linked with usage of the product. While print

advertisements are able to meet these requirements fairly easily, broadcast advertisements are

hindered by the time constraints of short advertising spots. Most radio or television

advertisements prior to the recent draft guidelines only mentioned a product by name, with no

medical claims or performance comparisons mentioned. The FDA guidance outlines

acceptable methods for drug companies to refer the public to a source of significant

information about the drug, in effect fulfilling the “brief summary” requirement of the FDCA,

and has therefore made advertising on the radio or television much more cost-effective. Many

firms now provide a Web site or toll-free number in their advertisements to allow consumers

access to more complete information about the product in question instead of including the

lengthy “brief summary” in the advertisement itself. After reviewing the response to these

temporary guidelines, the FDA will issue a final guidance that will also address new concerns

such as drug advertising on the Internet.56

Western Europe

Industry

Western Europe has an internationally competitive pharmaceutical industry, including both

research-based firms and bulk active ingredient producers. Many of the world’s top

pharmaceutical companies, such as those shown in table 3-1, are active as major producers

in the Western European market and industry. Like the leading U.S. drug companies, leading

Western European companies are mainly large, multi-product, multinational companies that

produce a variety of heath care equipment and pharmaceuticals. Industry sources indicate that

companies headquartered in Western Europe tend to have facilities located in economically

advantageous areas, as is the general practice throughout the pharmaceutical industry.

Although the EU has effectively harmonized member country laws and regulations in many

areas, creating a single market for pharmaceuticals has proven to be problematic.57

Nonetheless, certain progress has been made. In 1992, harmonization in pharmaceuticals was

established in four major areas: wholesale distribution of products, classification of medicines

as prescription or OTC, labeling and packaging, and advertising.58 The means to extend the
 

59 "No EC Harmony on Drug Harmonization,” pp. 29-30.

 

60

 Ibid., and “European Generics Threatened by SPC,” European Chemical News, Jan. 18, 1993.

 

61 Information obtained from the EMEA website (www.eudra.org/abouemea.htm) on January 7, 1999.

 

62 Dr. Philip Brown, “Bringing Order to Pharmaceutical Pricing,” Scrip Magazine, June 1997, p. 3.

 

63 Parallel importing is a term applied to the importing of products into a country where those goods are

relatively low-priced (typically set low artificially), and the subsequent exporting of those goods to a

country with a higher priced market for the same products. Because health care is under the auspices of

national Governments, EU countries are allowed to set their own pricing terms; however, the free trade of

goods is protected by single market regulations, thereby allowing cheaply purchased drugs to be exported

for profit to higher priced countries. This practice benefits the importers/exporters, not pharmaceutical

companies. (“Commission Set to Tackle Parallel Pricing Policies,” European Chemical News, Oct. 19-25,

1998, p. 6.)

 

64 Bill Macdonald, “Middle Management,” European Chemical News, June 9, 1997, pp. 28, 30.

 

65

 Ibid.

 

66 Gain, “U.S. Lags Europe,” p. 34.

 

67 Sean Milmo, “Outsourcing in Europe Adapts,” Chemical Marketing Reporter, Aug. 5, 1996, p. SR8.

3-16

patent life of pharmaceuticals, which hurt the generic drug producers but was highly beneficial

to research-based companies, was also adopted in 1992 by European Council Regulation

(EEC) No. 2309/93.59 At that time generics were pushed only by Germany, the United

Kingdom, and the Netherlands, though these countries were later joined by other member

states.60 Additionally, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products

(EMEA) was established in 1995, providing a unified system for the approval of new drugs.61

This new system is discussed below.

All Western European countries, including the 15 member of the EU, have their own national

health care systems as well as their own distinct drug regulatory agencies. In spite of the

overarching single market of the EU, disparities in pricing (market pricing is not the norm),

reimbursement policies, and prescribing practices among the countries require the

pharmaceutical industry to approach each country differently.62 Moreover, the industry faces

problems such as parallel importing as a result of the combination of national and

supranational laws that affect pharmaceuticals.63 Recent efforts to facilitate greater

harmonization for the EU pharmaceutical market are detailed in the section on Government

Policies.

Outsourcing has become increasingly important to the Western European pharmaceutical

industry. As in the United States, many European pharmaceutical companies are channeling

internal resources toward R&D and marketing while contracting out the manufacture of

intermediates and active ingredients to fine chemical producers, who are often able to produce

complex chemicals more quickly and efficiently than drug producers.64 After years of limited

interaction between drug companies and fine chemical producers, trust and established

expertise have led to the development of longterm strategic partnerships, with the chemical

manufacturers involved earlier in the process of drug development.65

Although Europe has about 60 percent of the global capacity to provide outsourced services

to the patented and brandname pharmaceutical industry, demand from European

pharmaceutical firms for outsourcing services accounts for only 30 percent of world

demand.66 With the trend towards establishing relationships between intermediate suppliers

and drug producers, the European pharmaceutical industry expects to increase its outsourcing

demand in the future.67
 

68 EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, p. 31.

 

69 European Commission, Panorama of EC Industry 1996, p. 7-35.

 

70 "Pharma Sector Puts Brake on European Performance,” European Chemical News, Dec. 1-7, 1997, 

p. 4.

3-17

Employment

Employment levels in the Western European pharmaceutical industry have varied in recent

years. During 1985-92, many firms expanded their hiring of new employees, which resulted

in an increase of about 79,000 workers to total more than 516,700 employees across the

sector. However, with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty, which provided countries with

strict fiscal goals for economic and monetary union, and the numerous M&As throughout

industry in the years following, employment dropped from 523,000 to 509,500 during 1993-

94 (table 3-9). Employment increased to 520,600 employees by 1996, likely the result of

increased exporting by the industry. EFPIA estimates that 1997 employment, at 520,000, was

down slightly from 1996 levels.68

Table 3-9

Employment in the Western European pharmaceutical industry, 1993-97

1993 1994 1995 1996 19971

No. of employees 523,000 509,500 516,100 520,600 520,000

1

 Estimated by EFPIA.

Source: EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, p. 31.

Based on data for pharmaceutical employees in EU member states only, the labor productivity

index rose from 111.7 to 131.2 during 1992-94 (table 3-10). Similarly, the unit labor cost

index decreased from 100.9 in 1992 to 88.5 in 1994. These data reflect relatively stable

output by the pharmaceutical industry in spite of decreasing numbers of employees.69

However, it is also noteworthy that European labor productivity in pharmaceuticals for 1997

equaled only 72 percent of U.S. productivity levels.70

Table 3-10

Employment and labor productivity indexes for the EU pharmaceutical industry, 1992-96

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Employment

(thousands)

429 422 409 1397 1421

Labor Productivity

Index2 (1990=100)

111.7 118.7 131.2 (

3

) (

3

)

Unit Labor Cost

Index4 (1990=100)

100.9 95.9 88.5 (

3

) (

3

)

1

 Estimate/forecast.

2

 Index of production/index of employment.

3 Not available.

4 Index of labor costs/index of production.

Source: European Commission, Panorama of EC Industry 1996, p. 7-35. 
 

71 EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, p. 21.

 

72 Based on information obtained from the PhRMA website (www.phrma.org/facts/phfacts/8_97a.html) 

on July 30, 1998.

 

73 Kevin Gopal, “Home-court Advantage,” Pharmaceutical Executive, July 1998, pp. 34, 36.

 

74 EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, pp. 17, 29.

3-18

Research and Development Expenditures

For the Western European pharmaceutical industry, R&D expenditures gradually increased

during 1993-96, reaching just over $14.4 billion in 1996 (table 3-11). Between 1993, when

expenditures totaled $11.6 billion, and 1996, R&D expenditures (in dollar value) increased

by approximately 25 percent. Although estimated 1997 R&D expenditures in dollar value

show a decrease from reported 1996 levels, the estimated euro value indicates a slight rise in

R&D funding during 1996-97.71

Table 3-11

R&D expenditures by the Western European pharmaceutical industry, in millions of dollars,

1993-97

1993 1994 1995 1996 19971

R&D expenditures

(millions of dollars) 11,559 12,262 13,943 14,424 13,608

1

 Estimated by EFPIA.

Source: EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, p. 21.

Among the countries of Western Europe, the pharmaceutical industries of certain countries

have particularly high pharmaceutical R&D spending levels compared with the rest of the

world. As a percent of 1995 pharmaceutical R&D expenses worldwide, Germany (10

percent), France (9 percent), the United Kingdom (7 percent), and Switzerland (5 percent)

ranked third through sixth, respectively, behind the United States (36 percent) and Japan (19

percent).72 Germany in particular has been actively promoting itself as an ideal location for

conducting research. According to the German pharmaceutical trade association, Verband

Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller, its member companies increased R&D spending by nearly

30 percent during 1994-97.73

Shipments and Trade Balance

As shown in table 3-12, Western European pharmaceutical production increased from $92.1

billion in 1993 to an estimated $111.1 billion in 1997, or by 21 percent during the period.

Western European exports also increased from $40.5 billion in 1993 to $62.1 billion in 1996,

a change of about 53 percent. Industry sources indicate that large, world-scale plants have

been built in certain Western European countries, such as Ireland, that offer low capital costs

and access to a low-cost, skilled labor force. Moreover, Western Europe has several large

pharmaceutical production facilities that serve as the base for world distribution of specific

types of drugs, including cardiovascular and antiinfective agents; this fact is underscored by

the rise in the ratio of exports to production from 44.0 percent in 1993 to 52.3 percent in

1996.74
 

75

 Ibid., pp. 27, 29.

 

76 Compare apparent consumption, tables 3-6 and 3-12. However, the United States is the leading

market for prescription drugs. See pp. 3-3, 3-4.

 

77

 PhRMA Industry Profile, 1997, p. 48.

 

78 European Commission, Panorama of EC Industry 1996, pp. 7-34 - 7-37.

3-19

Table 3-12

Pharmaceuticals for human consumption: Western European production, domestic exports,

imports for consumption, merchandise trade balance, apparent consumption, ratio of exports

to production, and ratio of imports to consumption, 1993-97

Year

Production Exports1Imports1

Trade

 balance

Apparent

Consumption

Ratio of

Exports to

Production

Ratio of

Imports to

Consumption

(millions of dollars) (percent)

1993 92,069 40,537 27,523 13,013 79,055 44.0 34.8

1994 99,007 46,712 31,766 14,946 84,061 47.2 37.8

1995 114,038 57,594 39,480 18,115 95,923 50.5 41.2

1996 118,731 62,115 42,711 19,404 99,326 52.3 43.0

1997 2111,136 (

3

) (

3

) (

3

) (

3

) (

3

) (

3

)

1

 Trade data include exports and imports within Europe. 

2

 Estimated by EFPIA.

3

 Not available.

Source: EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, pp. 17, 29.

Because the trade data presented in table 3-12 include exports and imports within Western

Europe, the ratio of exports to imports is lower than if intra-regional trade were not included.

Based on the data in table 3-12, the ratio is around 1.5 for 1996; when data on trade

exclusively outside of the region are used, the ratio is about 3.1 for the same year. The

significant disparity in these ratios reflects the high level of trade in pharmaceuticals within

Western Europe.75

The Western European market for pharmaceuticals, in terms of value, is the largest in the

world.76 The value of Western European consumption of pharmaceuticals increased from

about $79.0 billion to $99.3 billion during 1993-96, and the imports-to-consumption ratio

fluctuated between 34.8 and 43.0 percent during 1993-96. Western Europe has a higher

population than the United States, and per capita expenditures for health care in Germany and

France, two of the most developed European countries, are higher. According to recent data,

the United States spends less on pharmaceuticals as a percent of total health care spending

than any industrialized EU country.77 Western European production and consumption trends

observed during 1993-97 are expected to continue in the next few years.78
 

79 "Europe’s Biotechnology Sector is Booming,” European Chemical News, 13-19 April 1998, p. 40.

 

80 "European Entrepreneurial Life Sciences Surge Ahead,” Chemical Market Reporter, June 1, 1998, p.

9.

 

81 Alex Scott, “Europe Approves Patent Law,” Chemical Week, May 20, 1998, p. 19.

 

82 "Shot in the Arm for Biotech R&D,” The Economist, Nov. 9, 1996, p. S12B.

 

83 "International Competition,” Pharmaceutical Executive, May 1998, p. 32.

 

84 "Regulations are Making Europe a Biotech Dinosaur,” European Chemical News,” 23-29 March

1998, p. 8.

 

85 EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 1998, p. 10.

3-20

Biotechnology Products

For some years the United States has been a recognized leader in biotechnology, but recently

the industry in Europe has begun to emerge as a contender. Industry surveys indicate that the

number of European biotechnology companies increased by 25 percent during 1997, with a

35 percent rise in employment.79 Moreover, R&D expenditures per biotech employee are

comparable in the United States and Europe.80 The recent increase in European activity can

be attributed to a combination of factors. Most importantly, the various national patent laws

of member states were homogenized under EU-wide legislation to permit patents on

genetically engineered plants and animals, which met with strong opposition from the so-called

“green” movement among others.81 Also of importance is Germany’s formal commitment to

developing its biotech industry, which was underscored by $1.14 billion in Government and

private support for biotech projects in 1995.82

The European biotech industry still faces some significant challenges. In fact, it has been

argued that European biotech companies are more involved in the production of equipment

and basic chemical and biological building blocks used in the industry than in the development

of biopharmaceutical applications.83 There are also assertions that the EU regulatory agency,

the EMEA, is a problem for this sector in particular. Compared with the FDA approval

process, the European system is said to lack the speed and transparency necessary for a truly

competitive biotech industry.84

Government Policies

Since the member states of the EU are responsible for determining their own health care

policies, and pharmaceutical expenditures are a category of a health care budget, each nation

has its own system of pricing drugs. In general, there are several factors that influence a drug

pricing system. The Government funding allocated for health care, which is often a reflection

of the social policy of a country, puts an overall constraint on how much the Government can

budget for drugs. The financial goals established under the Maastricht Treaty provided

considerable incentive for Governments to reduce expenses across all sectors, and

pharmaceuticals were affected by these cost-cutting measures.85 Additionally, the cost of

living in a country often affects the perception of what is considered to be a reasonable price

for pharmaceutical product. As a result of the differences in budget size, social policies, and

wealth among the EU-15, pharmaceutical prices vary widely (table 3-13) from country to

country.
 

86 Per Wold-Olsen, “Completing the Single Market for Medicines in Europe,” Scrip Magazine,

July/Aug. 1998, pp. 11- 12.

 

87 Kevin Gopal, “In Search of Direction,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Aug. 1998, pp. 30-34.

 

88 Wold-Olsen, “Completing the Single Market for Medicines,” pp. 11- 12.

3-21

Table 3-13

International pharmaceutical price indexes in the EU, 1993

Country OECD1 ABDA2

Denmark 164 133

Germany 152 105

Netherlands 152 148

Austria 129 NA

Ireland 128 133

Belgium 113 116

United Kingdom 111 123

Luxembourg 110 97

Finland 108 NA

Sweden 108 NA

EU-15 average 100 100

Portugal 77 67

France 76 63

Italy 72 96

Spain 63 94

Greece 51 85

1

 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

2

 ABDA is the German pharmacists’ association.

Source: Ian Senior, “International Medicine Prices — Is a New Index Needed?” Scrip Magazine, Sept. 1996, 

p. 13.

A subcommittee of the EU Council of Ministers, the Internal Market Council (IMC), recently

acknowledged that the competitiveness of the EU pharmaceutical industry is negatively

affected by the combination of the right to the free trade of goods, protected under EU law,

and national pharmaceutical pricing systems. In its report to the European Commission, the

IMC suggested ways to reduce price differentials across the Common Market.86 The IMC

recognized that pharmaceutical pricing is largely a function of national social policy and the

size of a country’s health budget, making an EU-wide pricing policy impractical; however,

the IMC noted that within the pharmaceutical sector there are different product groupings,

such as OTC products and generics, that might be reasonable candidates for longterm

deregulation plans.87 The importance of R&D was also emphasized as a means to minimize

health care costs by offering innovative, more efficient treatments.88
 

89

 Ibid., p. 12.

 

90 Dr. Eckhard Kucher, “An International Strategy for Pricing and Profits,” Scrip Magazine, September

1997, p. 30.

 

91 Kevin Gopal, “The State of Europe: An Expanded European Report,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Jan.

1999, p. 34.

 

92

 Ibid., pp. 33-37.

 

93 Information obtained from the EMEA website (http://www.eudra.org/abouemea.htm) on January 7,

1999.

 

94 Stef Eckman, “The Wheels are Finally Starting to Turn at the EMEA,” Medical Marketing and

Media, Jan. 1995, p. 32.

3-22

Notably, the European Commission has been clear that it will not underscore the EU objective

of competitiveness to the detriment of the right to free movement of goods, thereby securing

the right to continue parallel importing.89 In the pharmaceutical market in particular, where

each EU country determines its own drug pricing, price differentials are not likely to be

diminished through free trade.90 Based on the work of the IMC, in November 1998 the

European Commission issued a communication on harmonization for the pharmaceutical

market. From the perspective of the EFPIA, the European Commission did not present a

vision for harmonizing the pharmaceutical market as had been expected, but rather provided

a listing of suggested cost-containment measures relating to pharmaceuticals.91 Recent

meetings involving the industry, the 15 member states, and the European Commission to

resolve these disputes and design a coherent framework for the single market for

pharmaceuticals have only met with moderate success.92

The EMEA began operations in 1995, establishing a new system for the approval of

pharmaceutical products in the EU. The EMEA, which is headquartered in London, England,

has several important functions. Primarily, it is intended to provide multinational expertise

for EU-wide procedures to authorize, monitor, and withdraw pharmaceutical products. The

EMEA also advises pharmaceutical companies on research activities and coordinates the

efforts of the national agencies that maintain the quality and safety of pharmaceutical

products. Additionally, the EMEA is responsible for coordinating information systems across

the EU for the purpose of facilitating informed drug use.93

Along with the creation of the EMEA came the introduction of two new drug approval

procedures. The first is the centralized procedure, which results in EU-wide authorization.

Centralized approval is required for all biotechnology products and certain veterinary

pharmaceuticals. Under this process, an application is submitted by a company directly to

the EMEA, which then sends the application on to its Committee for Proprietary Medicinal

Products (CPMP) for its review. The CPMP evaluation is due for delivery to the European

Commission, the member states, and the applicant within 210 days. The European

Commission then has 30 days to draft its decision on whether or not to approve the proposed

pharmaceutical.94

In the decentralized procedure, an application is submitted directly to the national drug

regulatory agency of the applicant’s choice. The national authorizing agency uses its normal

assessment procedure to render an opinion on the application. The agency must supply an

exhaustive report for any products it approves, in addition to granting approval to the text of

the product label and patient information leaflet. The applicant then has the opportunity to

forward that exact application on to the regulatory agencies of other member states, who have

90 days to review the report from the original authorizing agency and render their own
 

95

 Ibid., and Martin Harvey, “EMEA Open for Business,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Mar. 1995, p. 24.

 

96 Dr. John Griffin, “Is Change Needed in the EMEA Drug Approvals Process?” Scrip Magazine,

September 1998, p. 27.

 

97 Harvey, “EMEA Open for Business,” p. 24.

 

98 “EU in Move to Encourage ‘Orphan Drug’ Development,” European Chemical News, July 26, 1998, 

p. 8.

 

99 Because the national Governments of EU member states have control of fiscal policy, EU-mandated

incentives such as tax credits are not possible. Ibid.

 

100 “Business: Safety in Numbers,” The Economist, May 30, 1998, pp. 64-65.

 

101 “EU to Encourage ‘Orphan Drug’ Development,” p. 8.

 

102 “Business: Safety in Numbers,” pp. 64-65.

3-23

judgements. In the event that any country rejects an approved application, the EMEA is

responsible for settling the points of conflict.95

The EMEA and CPMP are under the auspices of the EU’s Directorate General (DG) III, the

directorate in charge of industry affairs. As a result, certain critics have suggested that the

EMEA’s ability to protect public safety is constrained by its obligation to maintain both the

competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry as well as free trade of pharmaceutical

products. Because of these assertions, a separate Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products

and Medicinal Devices (SCMPMD) was established under DG XXIV, the directorate for

Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection, in November 1997. Although both the

CPMP and SCMPMD currently seem to have distinct and useful functions, this situation may

be complicated if DG V, the directorate for public health, goes forward on proposals to create

its own committee to advise on pharmaceuticals.96

The national drug approval agencies are still important, even with the existence of the EMEA.

National agencies are the primary actors in the EMEA’s decentralized procedure, and national

authorization procedures are still available for drugs marketed solely in one member state.

However, by coordinating and monitoring the activities at the national level, the EMEA is

expected to improve the regulatory environment for the European pharmaceutical market by

minimizing the fees and the time investments associated with drug approval.97

The EU is currently reviewing legislation that would establish orphan drug incentives under

the EMEA. Under current policies, the EMEA may waive its fees, which typically total about

$222,000, when processing drugs intended for the treatment of rare diseases. However, the

EMEA’s limited funding curbs the number of drugs for which fees can be exempted, and the

EU affords no particular market protection to orphan drugs.98 By comparison, the United

States offers orphan drug developers several incentives, including research grants, tax

incentives,99 and a guarantee of 7 years of market exclusivity. The EU has recognized its need

to develop comparable policies if it is to become more competitive in the orphan drug market

segment.100

According to the latest proposals, the new EU orphan drug regulations will likely result in all

orphan drugs being processed through the EMEA at no cost to the applicants. There will also

be provisions for 10 years of market protection, with certain caveats for drugs initially

developed for rare diseases but later found to have more broadly based applications.101

Additionally, patients will be represented on the EMEA committee responsible for determining

which drugs qualify as orphan drugs, reflecting an unprecedented level of inclusion of EU

patients in drug policy-making. These proposals are expected to be refined and eventually

adopted by the 15 EU countries by the end of 2000.102
 

103 “Update for EU Advertising Rules,” Scrip, No. 2378, Oct. 14, 1998, p. 4.

 

104 “JETRO Identifies Japanese Entry Barriers,” Scrip, No. 2352, July 15, 1998, p. 17.

 

105 Robert Triendl, “Japan’s Drug Manufacturers Edge toward Globalization,” Research Technology

Management, Sep./Oct. 1998, p. 8.

 

106 Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA), Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-10, and

Yakugyo Jiho, Pharmaceutical Handbook ‘98, p. 114. As indicated, this ranking is qualified because data

for Novartis, which are likely to include non-pharmaceutical products, are compared with data for

pharmaceutical-only sales by Japanese companies.

 

107 A global NCE is one that has been marketed in at least seven industrialized countries.

 

108 “‘Drug Lag’ a Growing Problem in Japan,” Scrip, No. 2356, July 28, 1998, p. 18.

3-24

The EU is considering the elimination of its current ban on DTC advertising. The recent

loosening of regulations on DTC advertisements in the United States has significantly

increased the amount of information on prescription drugs available via the Internet, thereby

giving Europeans access to information posted online in other countries. European

pharmaceutical companies, however, are prohibited from disseminating information in this

matter, putting them at a disadvantage in the market. It is expected that initial policy

changes on this issue will likely involve increased freedom to distribute product information

to patients, while a more formal directive on advertisements will probably take several years

to finalize.103

Japan

Industry

Japan’s pharmaceutical market is the third largest in the world behind the United States and

Western Europe. In fiscal 1996, the Japanese spent about $53.5 billion on pharmaceuticals

of all types, with nearly $42.5 billion (about 80 percent) spent on prescription drugs alone.104

As such a large market, it would seem likely to attract foreign interest. However, the

pharmaceutical industry in Japan is decidedly more domestic in nature than the industries of

Western Europe and the United States.105

The top 20 Japanese pharmaceutical firms, based on sales in Japan, are listed in table 3-14.

For this market, it is difficult to compare non-Japanese with Japanese companies, because

sales data for U.S. and Western European pharmaceutical firms in Japan are likely to include

sales of other, non-pharmaceutical products by the companies. Novartis (Switzerland), with

the highest total 1996 sales in Japan among non-Japanese pharmaceutical companies, ranks

no higher than thirteenth when its total sales ($1.2 billion) are compared with pharmaceuticalonly sales by Japanese companies.106 By comparison, the U.S. and Western European

markets reflect a more globalized pharmaceutical industry, as U.S. and European firms

typically sell their products in multiple foreign markets.

Although Japan is open to foreign pharmaceutical firms, according to a report by the Japan

External Trade Organization (JETRO), non-Japanese companies seem to encounter significant

hindrances to entering the Japanese market. Among the 230 global NCEs107 introduced since

1985, only 100 have been marketed in Japan.108 The JETRO 1998 report “Survey on Actual

Conditions Regarding Access to Japan” outlines several factors that
 

109 “JETRO Identifies Japanese Entry Barriers,” p. 18.

3-25

Table 3-14

The top 20 Japanese pharmaceutical companies, by Japanese pharmaceutical sales, and total

sales, in millions of dollars, fiscal 1996

Company

Pharmaceutical sales, 1996

(in million dollars)

Total sales, 1996

(in million dollars)

Takeda 4,226 5,858

Sankyo 3,644 4,070

Yamanouchi 2,831 2,872

Eisai 2,157 2,371

Daiichi 2,047 2,106

Taisho Pharmaceutical 1,971 2,185

Fujisawa 1,866 2,065

Shionogi 1,828 2,112

Chugai 1,569 1,569

Tanabe 1,518 1,709

Kyowa Hakko 1,509 3,106

Banyu 1,338 1,341

Ono Pharmaceutical 1,105 1,163

Dainippon 1,013 1,264

Meiji Seika 754 2,351

Yoshitomi 706 992

Santen 674 690

Tsumura 685 851

Mochida 586 668

The Green Cross1 575 657

1

 The Green Cross was acquired by Yoshitomo in April 1998. (Robert Triendl, “Japan’s Drug Manufacturers

Edge toward Globalization,” Research Technology Management, Sept./Oct. 1998, p. 9.)

Source: JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-10.

are affecting entry of foreign firms into the Japanese pharmaceutical market. First, companies

entering the market must acquire licenses for importing and sales, manufacturing, and

wholesaling of pharmaceutical products. Comparatively, entry into the U.S. and European

markets is a more streamlined, less bureaucratic process.109 The Japanese drug approval
 

110 Information obtained from industry contacts, February 1999.

 

111 “JETRO Identifies Japanese Entry Barriers,” p. 18.

 

112 Ibid.

 

113

 Ibid.

 

114 “Much Promised, but Little Delivered in ‘98,” European Chemical News, Nov. 30, 1998, p. 23.

 

115 Triendl, “Japan’s Drug Manufacturers Edge toward Globalization,” p. 8.

3-26

process can also be problematic for foreign companies. In the past, the primary obstacle has

been the mandatory repeating of costly clinical trials in Japan to establish data for the local

population, which the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) argues has critical biological

and dietary differences from U.S. and European patients; however, recent policy revisions

have mitigated this factor considerably.110 Also, the establishment of “good clinical practices”

(GCP) has challenged researchers, who are still adapting to the new requirements.111

The Japanese pricing system has also been identified by JETRO as a disincentive for foreign

innovative pharmaceutical companies. Although a new system will be in place by the year

2000, the current reimbursement price scheme (described in the Government Policies section)

allows the Government to set reimbursement prices that do not always reflect the high R&D

costs of innovative drugs. By comparison, “me-too” products reportedly gain

disproportionately from the current price system.112

Lastly, the Japanese pharmaceutical market requires a large sales presence to maintain

sufficient contact with physicians. For a foreign company not already established in the

market, the added costs of a large staff of sales representatives can be a strong disincentive

to market entry, particularly in conjunction with the other factors noted above.113

Just as foreign firms are not widely represented in the Japanese market, Japanese firms could

be considered under-represented in the global pharmaceutical market. For example, the top

two Japanese pharmaceutical companies, Takeda and Sankyo, are ranked twentieth and

twenty-second behind companies headquartered in the United States or Western Europe (table

3-1).114 However, there are indications that Japanese companies may be growing more global

in their outlook. In particular, Takeda has established a wholly owned subsidiary in the

United Kingdom (Takeda UK), plus holding companies in other European countries and the

United States. Reportedly, other firms have plans to increase foreign operations, including

expansions within East Asia.115

Employment

Because company layoffs are an anomaly in the Japanese culture, employment data for a

given period are not an effective means of monitoring the overall health of an industry.

Nonetheless, table 3-15 shows employment in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry during

1992-96. It should be noted that only 1995 data are inclusive of all Japanese pharmaceutical

companies.
 

116 JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-32.

3-27

Table 3-15

Employment in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry, fiscal 1992-96

19921 19931 19941 19952 19963

Pharmaceutical employees 149,100 159,600 160,300 244,774 152,699

1

 Based on a survey of the top 100 companies; in 1992, only 96 companies responded.

2

 Data inclusive of all Japanese pharmaceutical companies.

3

 Based on a survey of the 86 JPMA firms.

Source: JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-3.

Research and Development Expenditures

R&D expenditures by the Japanese pharmaceutical industry increased from $5.1 billion in

1992 to $6.1 billion in 1996, with a peak of $6.8 billion in 1995 (table 3-16). However, the

ratio of R&D to sales for Japanese companies decreased marginally during 1992-96, from 8.7

percent to 8.1 percent. In 1994 the ratio was at its lowest, 7.8 percent.116

Table 3-16

R&D expenditures by Japanese pharmaceutical companies, and ratio of R&D to sales, in

millions of dollars, 1992-96

Year Japanese R&D expenses 

(millions of dollars)

Ratio of R&D to sales

(percent)

1992 5,080 8.7

1993 5,658 8.2

1994 6,191 7.8

1995 6,828 8.0

1996 6,133 8.1

Source: JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-32.

Over the five-year period, the total amount spent on pharmaceutical R&D by Japanese

companies was considerably lower than expenditures by U.S. firms. Similarly, the ratio of

Japanese pharmaceutical companies’ R&D expenditures to sales was significantly lower than

the same ratio for U.S. companies (table 3-5). These data may support the claims by some

industry analysts that conditions in Japan, including regulatory and pricing policies, are less

conducive to innovative pharmaceutical research than those of the United States.
 

117 Genomics is the study of genes and their functions. Combinatorial chemistry is a research technique

involving the systematic combination of molecules and molecular building blocks to develop thousand of

new compounds, which are then tested for potential use as pharmaceutical products, in a short period of

time.

 

118 Triendl, “Japan’s Drug Manufacturers Edge toward Globalization,” p. 8.

 

119 “‘Drug Lag’ in Japan,” p. 18.

 

120 JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, p. 1-19.

3-28

Although the Japanese pharmaceutical industry has traditionally been domestically focused,

the trend toward globalization is even affecting R&D. Pharmaceutical R&D increasingly

involves highly complex research tools (such as genomics and combinatorial chemistry117) that

are used extensively by European and U.S. scientists. Because Japanese scientists are

generally less experienced with these tools, some Japanese companies have begun to conduct

research activities in Western Europe and the United States.118 Furthermore, Japanese

companies have not yet adapted fully to GCP, which was established by the MHW in 1997.

These guidelines were introduced to make Japanese drug development practices consistent

with the standards of the United States and Western Europe. However, the formal

incorporation of GCP into the behavior of clinical researchers takes time and training, which

has created further incentive for the use of foreign clinical research facilities.119

Shipments and Trade Balance

During 1992-96, Japan was a net importer of pharmaceuticals, with a trade deficit ranging

from a low of $1.9 billion in 1992 to a high of $3.1 billion in 1995 (table 3-17). Japanese

exports rose steadily from $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion during the five-year period, whereas

imports reached a peak of $5.0 billion in 1995, declining to $4.6 billion in 1996.120 Japanese

shipment data for pharmaceuticals were not available at the time this report was prepared.

Table 3-17

Pharmaceuticals: Japanese domestic exports, imports for consumption, merchandise trade

balance, ratio of imports to exports, and exports as a percent of sales, 1992-96

Year

Exports Imports Trade balance Ratio of

imports to

exports

Exports as a

percent of

sales1

(millions of dollars)

1992 1,447 3,396 -1,949 2.35 4.4

1993 1,562 3,972 -2,410 2.54 3.8

1994 1,646 4,251 -2,605 2.58 2.3

1995 1,962 5,014 -3,052 2.56 2.5

1996 2,097 4,591 -2,494 2.19 2.5

1

 Based on JPMA companies only.

Source: JPMA, Data Book 1997/98, pp. 1-19, 1-21.

Japanese exports comprise a small percentage of total pharmaceutical sales compared with

the United States (table 3-6). During 1992-96, this ratio reached a high of 4.4 percent in
 

121

 Ibid., p. 1-21.

 

122

 Ibid., p. 1-20.

 

123 "Biotechnology in Japan: Alien Culture,” The Economist, Nov. 18, 1995, p. 79.

 

124

 Ibid.

 

125 "Biological Warfare: How the U.S. Triumphed and Japan Beat Itself,” Fortune, April 1, 1996, p. 40. 

Also, for more information see the Commission’s 1991 Competitiveness Study.

 

126 "Biotechnology in Japan,” The Economist, p. 79.

 

127 P. Reed Maurer, “Understanding Japan’s Changing Rules,” Scrip Magazine, Feb. 1998, p. 37.

 

128 “Japanese Groups Renew Call for Free Pricing,” Scrip, No. 2365, Aug. 28, 1998, p. 12.

3-29

1992, falling to 2.3 percent in 1994.121 By comparison, the U.S. industry ratio of exports to

shipments was approximately 12 percent throughout the period. These data seem to

underscore the domestic orientation of the Japanese industry.

Japan’s trading partners in pharmaceuticals are primarily the United States and Western

Europe. In 1996, the key pharmaceutical export markets for Japan were the United States (30

percent), Germany (10 percent), and France (9 percent). In the same year, Japan imported

pharmaceuticals principally from Germany (20 percent), the United States (20 percent), and

the United Kingdom (11 percent).122

Biotechnology Products

The Japanese biotechnology industry has not met the high expectations of the Ministry of

International Trade and Industry (MITI), which in 1981 declared it to be one of three high

priority industries.123 One weakness is that compared with the United States, Japan has less

funding available for the basic research on which biotechnology thrives.124 Additionally,

biotechnology is a fast-paced field where scientists move around among different laboratories,

which is inconsistent with the scientific culture in Japan.125 Eighty percent of Japan’s demand

for all biotechnology products, which is similar in size to the U.S. market, must be supplied

by imports; this reflects a significant missed opportunity for the Japanese biotech industry.126

Government Policies

When the Japanese health care system was originally established in 1961, it was appropriately

designed to serve a young population with greater needs for acute rather than chronic care.

As the population aged, and Japan’s economic growth slowed, the Japanese Government

began to look for ways to reduce health care costs. For example, beginning in September of

1997, patients faced higher insurance copayments, a move the Government hoped would curb

demand for medical products and services. However, sufficient change could not be affected

through modifications to the established system, and the MHW mandated a reform plan to

incorporate several objectives.127 A formal health care reform bill is expected in the spring

of 1999.128

Given the changing demographics of Japan, one intended reform is the establishment of clear

delineations in insurance programs for old versus young patients and acute versus chronic

conditions. Additionally, fee-for-service insurance policies are to be eliminated in favor of

flat-sum reimbursements. However, the most significant revision from the perspective of the
 

129 Maurer, “Understanding Japan’s Changing Rules,” p. 37.

 

130 “Japanese Groups Renew Call for Free Pricing,”Scrip, p. 12.

 

131 This summary of the Japanese pricing system is based on discussions with various industry sources;

similar information can be found in trade journal articles.

 

132 P. Reed Maurer, “A Watershed for the Industry in Japan,” Scrip Magazine, April 1996, p. 42.

 

133 Peter O’Donnell, “Are Japanese Cuts Starting to Bite?” Pharmaceutical Executive, Sept. 1996, p. 36.

 

134 “Japanese Groups Renew Call for Free Pricing,” Scrip, pp. 12-13.

 

135

 PhRMA Industry Profile 1998, p. 72.

3-30

pharmaceutical industry is the planned revamping of the pricing system.129 Notably, both

foreign and domestic industry groups have been consulted in the development of the new

system.130

The pharmaceutical pricing system in Japan is based on set reimbursement prices, which are

paid to health care providers for products disbursed, and the actual prices charged by

wholesalers for those products. The difference between these two prices is a profit for the

physician, a system which encourages excessive prescribing and negotiations of discounts

from the wholesalers. The Government has undertaken certain measures to mitigate these

factors, such as setting the reimbursement price as a percent of the physician’s actual price

and reducing reimbursement prices when the number of prescriptions exceeds a predetermined limit. Nonetheless, the history of reimbursement pricing has played a significant

role in shaping the innovative pharmaceutical industry.131

Because the Japanese market puts a high premium on new drugs, pharmaceuticals are

introduced at a higher price than in the U.S. or Western European market. However, Japanese

prices drop off fairly quickly, as the MHW revises the reimbursement prices to reflect the

actual costs negotiated by health care providers. In this way, companies have an incentive to

introduce new products to maximize price advantages.132 However, it has been argued that

instead of truly innovative drugs, in some cases reimbursement pricing encouraged the

introduction of “me too” drugs.

But industry analysts differ in their views on the value of truly unique, innovative drugs versus

newly improved versions of existing products. Some would argue that the disproportionate

emphasis on the former neglects the significant impact that small modifications to a

pharmaceutical product can have on drug treatment. As “me too” drugs have somewhat fallen

into disfavor with the price setting regime, there have been reports of Japanese companies

dropping development plans for effective new drugs in clinical trials because those products

were not expected to be considered innovative enough for top-level pricing.133

It is anticipated that Japan will replace reimbursement pricing with a reference pricing

system.134 With reference pricing, a Government sets a ceiling on the amount to be

reimbursed for the purchase of a pharmaceutical product, leaving the patient or his insurer

responsible for any difference between the actual price and the reference price. In setting

these price ceilings, the Government typically classifies products together in groups based on

chemical structure or therapeutic application, and all products included in a particular group

are assigned the same price. As a result, patented products and generic products may be given

the same price value, diminishing the advantage of market exclusivity for a new drug.135

The innovative pharmaceutical companies have responded negatively to the proposed

reference pricing for patented products, asserting that such a system is essentially an
 

136 Now that patient consent is required for clinical trials, some potential trial candidates are hesitant to

agree to participate when there is a similar product already on the market. “Japanese Groups Renew Call

for Free Pricing,” Scrip, pp. 12-13.

 

137 "Japan: New Pharmaceutical Bureau,” East Asian Executive Reports, June 15, 1997, p. 6.

 

138 P. Reed Maurer, “Crisis at Koseisho: Japan’s Mega-Agency Finally Faces Change,” Pharmaceutical

Executive, January 1997, p. 60, and “Cleaning House,” Pharmaceutical Executive, January 1997, p. 61.

 

139 Maurer, “Crisis at Koseisho,” pp. 60-61.

 

140 "Japan: New Pharmaceutical Bureau,” p. 6.

 

141 “Japan to Speed Up Product Approvals,” Scrip, No. 2338/39, May 27/29, 1998, p. 21, and PhRMA

press release, “U.S.-Japan Agreement Will Bring Innovative Medical Products to Japanese Patients Sooner,

Says PhRMA,” May 15, 1998, obtained from the PhRMA website (www.phrma.org/news/5-15-98.html) on

June 23, 1998.

3-31

infringement of IPR. The Japanese Government has stated that granting unique pricing status

to patented drugs could result in a rise in “me-too” products, already considered by some to

be a problem under reimbursement pricing. However, the pharmaceutical companies have

rebutted that argument, noting that “me-too” drug development in Japan has slowed, largely

as a result of international harmonization policies such as patient consent requirements for

clinical trials and improved data reviews.136

In addition to the planned reforms to the health care system, the MHW itself has also been the

focus of change. In the wake of scandals relating to the pharmaceutical industry, a major

reorganization of the MHW went into effect on July 1, 1997. The now-defunct

Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau (PAB), once responsible for both the regulation and the

promotion of the pharmaceutical industry, has been replaced by a new entity, the

Pharmaceutical and Medical Safety Bureau (PMSB). The PMSB is responsible primarily for

safety and efficiency in the approval process and post-market regulation of drugs, cosmetics,

and medical devices, while the Health Policy Bureau of MHW has taken on the task of

promoting the industry.137 Under the former structure one bureau was responsible for

regulating and promoting the same industry, often creating an inappropriately close

relationship between PAB bureaucrats and Japanese pharmaceutical companies.138 The new

organizational structure of the MHW is expected to give foreign companies a more level

playing field in the drug approval process due to improved transparency; moreover, the

approval process itself is expected to be harmonized with U.S. and European processes, which

will also benefit foreign companies.139 This new bureaucracy has been well-received by the

U.S. industry as a move forward for the Japanese market.140

Based on the terms of the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition,

which was signed at the G8 summit held in May 1998, several modifications to the Japanese

drug approval process will be implemented over the next few years. The processing of new

drug applications will be expedited, with the goal of reducing review periods to 12 months by

April 2000. The agreement also requires the Japanese to accept foreign clinical trial data in

accordance with the terms of the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH). More

generally, the Japanese Government expressed its commitment to acknowledge the merit of

innovative products and to consult with foreign pharmaceutical firms on issues for which the

domestic industry is consulted.141
 

142 In the pharmaceutical industry, CROs typically run clinical trials for pharmaceutical firms seeking

new drug approval. By specializing in this stage of product development, CROs can save companies both

time and expense by carefully constructing the trials so that the highest quantity of useful information can

be obtained in the fewest number of trials. Furthermore, CROs have experience in presenting clinical trial

data clearly and efficiently to regulatory agencies, enhancing the likelihood and speed in receiving approval

for a product. (Geoffrey Carr, “Survey: The Pharmaceutical Industry: Trials and Tribulations,” The

Economist, Feb. 21, 1998, p. S13-S15.)

 

143 Stephen Barker, “Reforming the Clinical Trials Process in Japan,” Scrip Magazine, June 1997, p. 14.

 

144 Stephen Bentley, “CROs in Japan — New Tools for Industry,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Nov.

1997, pp. 80-84.

3-32

The Japanese Government has also loosened regulations related to the use of contract research

organizations (CROs)142. Although CROs have played an important role in the

pharmaceutical industries of Western Europe and the United States, where their work is held

in high esteem, Japan considered data provided by these organizations to be of lower quality

than data of the pharmaceutical companies. As of June 1997, there were approximately 700

CROs operating in the United States and Europe, while Japan only had about 13.143 However,

as the result of a 1996 MHW report, there is a more positive perception of CROs, and

allowances have been made to incorporate them fully into the development stage for

pharmaceuticals in Japan. By facilitating the final stages of product development, particularly

clinical trials, for foreign companies, this could prove to be a significant step toward increased

access to the Japanese market.144
 

1

 The legislation that implemented the URA in the United States is known as the Uruguay Round

Agreements Act (URAA).

 

2

 Theresa Beeby Lewis, “Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Survey of the Patent Laws of

Various Countries,” Int’l Lawyer, 30, pp. 835, 845 (winter 1996). The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers

Association (now “PhRMA”) estimated that patent piracy accounted for $6.4 billion in yearly losses

worldwide for the U.S. drug industry. Ibid. at 844-45. These estimates are typically calculated by

multiplying the estimated number of pirated copies sold by the price of the item set by the patent holder or

licensee. Consequently, these figures are frequently considered to be inflated because they do not take into

account that demand for the product drops as the price rises.

 

3

 The EU-15, Canada, Czech Republic, Japan, Norway, Slovak Republic, and Switzerland. However,

some of these countries decided to stage tariffs down to zero gradually as opposed to an immediate

elimination.

4-1

CHAPTER 4

Current Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Since the Commission’s 1991 competitiveness study, two major trade agreements have

affected the U.S. economy: the Uruguay Round Agreements1 (URA) which entered into force

on January 1, 1995, and NAFTA, which entered into force on January 1, 1994. Both of these

agreements affected the pharmaceutical industry, largely by reducing tariffs and enhancing

intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Stronger IPR protection should particularly

benefit the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in its ability to compete, as losses due to

unauthorized copying of patented drug products amount to an estimated $2-5 billion per year.2

However, it could be argued that the most significant change came from the URA, under

which the United States and 21 other countries3 agreed to eliminate tariffs on pharmaceutical

finished products, certain active ingredients, and certain approved chemicals used by the

pharmaceutical industry. 

The following section describes the duty reductions and enhanced protection of IPR negotiated

during the Uruguay Round and NAFTA. The section also includes an analysis of trade data

during 1992-97 to assess the effect of duty reductions on trade flows. The last section

provides an overview of the significant changes that have occurred in national IPR and patent

policies worldwide as a result of international agreements.

Changes in International Agreements

GATT/WTO Agreements

GATT was originally negotiated in 1947. The legal framework of the GATT established

basic disciplines in international trade, liberalized markets by reducing tariff and nontariff

barriers, and provided a forum for dispute settlement, among other objectives. The agreement

rests on the legal pillars of nondiscrimination and national treatment and is accompanied by
 

4

 The schedules largely consist of commitments known as "bindings" to maintain normal-trade-relations

(NTR, formerly most-favored-nation) tariff rates at no higher than the stated level. The schedules also

indicate how concession rates will be reduced following negotiations.

 

5

 Significant among these codes, which GATT 1947 members were not and are not obliged to ratify, are

those negotiated during the Tokyo Round concerning customs valuation, antidumping and countervailing

duty measures, trade in civil aircraft, Government procurement, and other nontariff barriers to trade.

 

6

 Federal Register, Vol. 62, No. 64, April 3, 1997, pp. 16039-16048.

4-2

schedules of tariff concessions negotiated by the parties and by subsidiary specialized codes.4

The GATT was supervised over the years by a small secretariat body, which conducted

regular meetings of the contracting parties and provided general legal and technical support.

Following several rounds of multilateral tariff negotiations and a significant expansion of

membership over time, the latest round opened in Uruguay in 1994.5 The established basis

for the Uruguay Round was that the GATT and its subsidiary agreements were designed to

succeed or fail as a unit, and the eventual package was to be adopted by means of a single

instrument. Countries would eventually have the choice of remaining as parties to the 1947

GATT, with membership in subsidiary agreements optional, or of joining the new 1994 WTO

Agreement with all rights and obligations entailed in the package. The signatories to the WTO

Agreement reserved the right to adopt differential treatment toward nonsignatories, with a

view toward greater adherence to the broadened obligations, enhanced dispute resolution, and

the reduction of "free ridership" on the part of nonmembers.

Uruguay Round Initiative on Pharmaceuticals

During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States and several other GATT members

sought the reciprocal elimination of duties on all pharmaceutical products, including certain

chemical intermediates used in the production of pharmaceuticals. The elimination of duties,

it was argued, would serve to increase trade with fewer Government-imposed tariffs. 

As a result of the negotiations, the United States and 21 trading partners agreed to the

elimination of duties on nearly 7,000 pharmaceutical products. These products included

approved INNs from WHO Lists 1-69, certain other active ingredients for which INNs had

not been established, and certain chemical intermediates used in the production of

pharmaceutical products. The initiative also listed certain chemical prefixes and suffixes that

may be combined with any of the approved INNs to produce INNMs. As a result, the

derivatives of INNs, such as salts and esters, are also granted duty-free entry. In the United

States, the results of this agreement were incorporated into the HTS as the Pharmaceutical

Appendix, effective January 1, 1995.

Because of continued development of new chemical intermediates and downstream

pharmaceutical products, many new items have been proposed for incorporation into the list

since its initial formulation. However, it was noted by many WTO members that certain

products, although having an approved INN designation, had a predominating industrial use

outside of pharmaceutical applications and therefore should be excluded from this initiative.

As a result of further negotiations, subsequent modifications to the original WTO list were

made in 1996 and adopted by the United States and other major WTO member countries on

April 1, 1997.6 WHO Lists 70-73 were included in this first review.
 

7

 Data tables for 1992-97 U.S. trade in pharmaceuticals with its primary trading partners can be found

in appendix A of this report.

 

8

 For more information on the effect that this initiative and other factors have had on trade, please refer

to: “The Uruguay Round Elimination of Duties on Pharmaceuticals: Developments in the 2 Years Since

Implementation,” Industry Trade and Technology Review, USITC Pub. 3071, October 1997, pp. 1-12. This

report is available online at http://www.usitc.gov/ittr.htm.

4-3

400 

600 

800 

1,000 

1,200 

1,400 

1,600 

1,800 

2,000 

Millions of dollars

'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97

Quarterly shipments (1992-97)

Exports Imports

Figure 4-1

Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): U.S. domestic exports and imports

for consumption, quarterly shipments in millions of dollars, 1992-97

A second review to amend the approved list of duty-free items is currently underway.

Included in the discussions are WHO Lists 74-78 of INNs, as well as approximately 370

chemical prefixes and suffixes and chemical intermediates used in the production of drugs.

It is anticipated that the additions to the list will be officially incorporated into tariff schedules

in mid-1999.

Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the rise in trade that has occurred since the 1995 elimination of

tariffs.7 In particular, there has been a significant increase in U.S. exports and imports of bulk

pharmaceutical products. As the bulk pharmaceutical market is more price sensitive than the

market for finished drug products, it is not surprising that the elimination of tariffs would have

a more noticeable effect on SIC 2833. Although there are other factors that also affected

trade during this period,8 the zero-for-zero negotiations seem to have had a positive influence

on international trade in this sector.

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
4-4

400 

600 

800 

1,000 

1,200 

1,400 

1,600 

Millions of dollars

'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97

Quarterly shipments (1992-97)

Exports Imports

Figure 4-2

Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834): U.S. domestic exports and imports for consumption,

quarterly shipments in millions of dollars, 1992-97

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce.

IPR Initiatives

The United States set forth a number of objectives regarding intellectual property when it

entered into the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The objectives included:

(1) in all member nations, the enactment and effective enforcement of laws that adequately

protect intellectual property; (2) the establishment within GATT of effective standards for the

protection of intellectual property standards, procedures to enforce such standards both within

member nations and at their borders, and improved dispute settlement procedures within the

GATT; (3) assurances that the standards and procedures within GATT would not prejudice

other complementary initiatives in other international organizations; and (4) supplementation

and strengthening of intellectual property protection in existing intellectual conventions
 

9

 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(b)(10), 102 Stat.

1107, 1123-24 (statement of principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding intellectual

property) (1988). 

 

10 The agreements resulting from Uruguay Round, which include TRIPs, were signed by the leaders of

the member nations on April 15, 1994.

 

11

 TRIPs, art. 68.

 

12 Monique L. Cordray, “GATT v. WIPO,” Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society

(JPTOS), 76, pp. 121, 122-24, 131-32 (February 1994).

 

13

 Ibid., p. 313.

 

14

 Statement of Admin. Action, p. 317.

 

15 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1997 supplement), as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act

(URAA), P.L. 103-465, § 532(a)(2) (December 8, 1994).

4-5

administered by other international organizations.9 Pharmaceuticals was one industry sector

that the United States specifically addressed in the areas of patents and IPR.

The agreement that resulted from these negotiations is called “Trade-Related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPs).10 TRIPs is administered by the WTO with the special

assistance of the Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.11 TRIPs

relationship to the WTO makes it distinct from many other multilateral agreements on

intellectual property, such as the Paris and Berne Conventions, which are administered by the

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations.

According to one analyst, the United States sought to shift intellectual property protection

from WIPO to the WTO due to the perceived weakness of WIPO’s enforcement procedures

and the historically greater influence of the United States in GATT, the predecessor to the

WTO.12 The TRIPs Agreement contains wide-reaching obligations on normal trade relations

(NTR, formerly most-favored-nation) and national treatment, and it confers rights on nationals

of the member countries with respect to covered intellectual property matters.13 

Of particular importance to the pharmaceutical industry are the provisions on patents. Each

WTO country is required to make patents available with respect to inventions in all fields of

technology, with a few narrowly stated exceptions. Pharmaceuticals, micro-organisms, and

non-biological and microbiological processes can all be patented, though members can deny

patents to plants and protect them by other means. 

In addition, special provisions have been made for countries with less established patent

regimes. Each such country must immediately provide an interim system that permits patent

applications for these products to be filed. When the application is examined, novelty is

determined as of the date of that filing. If a product is the subject of an application under this

interim system, the country in question must provide exclusive marketing rights for a period

of five years after the product receives marketing approval, or until a patent is granted or

rejected, whichever period is shorter. To qualify for market exclusivity, the product must also

be patented in another WTO member country and approved for marketing there.14

As a result of the agreement, the U.S. patent laws required changes in several respects. The

most significant impact of TRIPs is that the term for a U.S. patent has been changed from 17

years from the date the patent issued to 20 years from the date the patent application was

filed.15 As a result of this amendment, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and some

industry representatives believe that many U.S. patents will now have terms longer than under

previous law because most patents are issued less than two years after the application was
 

16 Karen Tripp and Linda Stokley, “Changes in U.S. Patent Law Effected by the Uruguay Round

Agreements Act -- The GATT Implementation Legislation,” Intellectual Property Journal, 28 3, 5 n.14

(1996). In FY 1996, the average time for prosecuting a patent application was 20.8 months. This

represents an increase of 1.2 months over the preceding year, due to a surge in applications, shortages of

personnel, and budget cutbacks. USPTO FY 1996 Annual Report.

 

17 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), added by the URAA § 532(a)(4).

 

18 See Kenneth Burchfiel, U.S. GATT Legislation Changes, JPTOS 77 222, 223-24 (March 1995). 

Prosecution refers to the process of getting a patent to issue from an application.

 

19 Article 28.1 requires that product patents allow owners the right to stop anyone from making, using,

offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented product; article 28.2 holds that process patents must give

owners the right to stop anyone from using the protected process, and from using, offering for sale, selling,

or importing a product obtained directly therefrom. Statement of Admin. Action, p. 335.

 

20

 Ibid., p. 322.

 

21 In the United States, the U.S. Congress enacted the North American Free Trade Agreement

Implementation Act.

4-6

filed.16 Also, the patent term may be extended by up to five years to compensate for court

appeals, interference actions, and certain other delays.17 This latter provision may help

alleviate some of the concerns regarding pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents, which are

routinely subject to extended delays.18 Inventive activity in any WTO member country can

now be counted to support the claimed date of invention, patent terms are longer, "infringing

activities" are defined as the term relates to patents,19 and access is made available to courts

as well as to the Board of Patent Appeals or Interferences. Various other changes were made

regarding the patent application system, including establishment of a provisional patent

application structure.20

North American Free Trade Agreement

NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994, following the adoption of necessary domestic

measures by the three parties, Canada, Mexico, and the United States.21 Under the NAFTA,

tariffs on goods originating in the NAFTA region and barriers to trade in goods among the

three parties are being eliminated as provided in the countries' schedules of concessions and

other legal instruments. In addition, NAFTA obligates its signatories to nondiscriminating

between domestic and NAFTA goods, along with many other legal requirements, which

applies to the parties' state and local Government entities as well as to federal organizations,

except as explicitly provided for, or "grandfathered," by schedules of existing subfederal

exempted measures. In that respect, NAFTA differs from the GATT/WTO, with the latter

generally applicable to national-level units and only in limited cases to subnational ones. The

NAFTA contains specific statements of legal obligations that already appear in the GATT,

because in many instances the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism supplants that of the

WTO in terms of jurisdiction in matters affecting the parties, and because of the subfederal

application of many such obligations.

Tariff Reductions/Eliminations

NAFTA did not establish a common external tariff for Canada, Mexico, and the United

States, or eliminate disparities in rates on particular goods among the parties during the

staging period. Many goods were immediately assessed a “free” rate of duty, but some goods

will still be dutiable for up to 15 years because of the agreed duty rate staging. Tariff
 

22 The term “originating goods” refers to products determined to have originated within Canada, the

United States, or Mexico. Specific rules set out in the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States

are used to determine the origin of the product before the NAFTA (or other) rate of duty may be applied.

 

23 In the case of the United States, commitments were made in both the CFTA and the NAFTA to give

mandatory duty-free entry to goods covered by existing or recently expired duty suspension legislation. In

addition, the United States agreed to bind duty-free access for goods of Mexico that had been entering free

of duty under the Generalized System of Preferences.

 

24 In the case of the HTS, the rules of origin for the NAFTA are set forth in general note 12, primarily in

subdivision 12(t). (See also Annex 302.2 to the NAFTA at paragraphs 12 and 13.) The change-of-tariffclassification rules in that subdivision apply to goods that contain non-NAFTA inputs; these foreign inputs

must be classified for tariff purposes when they enter the NAFTA region, and then undergo sufficient

processing in one or more NAFTA countries to change classification into a finished good, in a combination

4-7

reductions on originating goods22 under the NAFTA were negotiated in various categories:

those duty rates that were to be immediately eliminated, those reduced in five or ten equal

annual cuts, and those on import-sensitive goods taking effect over fifteen years. For a very

few goods, different schedules (such as seven or twelve years) were adopted. Because the

NAFTA replaced the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA") between those

two parties, with an ongoing schedule running from 1989 through 1998, rates of duty on

goods traded between the United States and Canada were lower when NAFTA became

effective than rates on goods traded between Mexico and either of the other parties. The rates

applicable to goods of Mexico have independent staging commitments.

In the case of pharmaceutical products, both parties' CFTA schedules of concessions for

goods of chapter 30 (i.e., finished, dosage-form products) of the Harmonized Commodity

Description and Coding System ("HS") either accorded 10-year staging (with duties eliminated

as of January 1, 1998) or continued existing duty-free treatment. Pharmaceuticals and

pharmaceutical intermediates falling elsewhere in the HS were generally accorded 5-year

staging by both parties (with duty-free entry effective on January 1, 1993) or were the subject

of commitments to continue existing duty-free entry. These commitments were incorporated

by reference into the NAFTA. 

In the U.S. schedule of concessions to the NAFTA, some Mexican products classified in

chapter 30 were accorded 10-year staging (to be free of duty on January 1, 2004) while others

continued to receive existing duty-free treatment or were accorded immediate duty-free status.

Many Mexican pharmaceutical goods falling outside chapter 30 were given 10-year staging

and others 5-year staging; the remainder continued to enter free of duty.23

Canada's concessions on goods of Mexico were generally similar in terms of staging periods

to those of the United States, though not identical with respect to specific goods. Mexico's

schedule of concessions contains two columns, one with rates applicable to goods of Canada

and the other to goods of the United States; for goods covered by this report, the rates are

essentially identical. The overall duty staging for pharmaceutical products of chapter 30 binds

existing free rates and uses 10-year staging for other goods. Dutiable goods falling outside

chapter 30 seem to have been given predominantly 10-year staging.

Because the three countries do not maintain common NTR rates of duty or have identical

NAFTA staging schedules, it is necessary during the transition period to have rules to

determine the appropriate preferential rate of duty for each originating good. These rules,

known as the "marking rules," are applied only when it has already been determined that a

good originates in one or more NAFTA countries.24 In July 1996, the Commission published
of tariff categories prescribed by the note, before being shipped to another NAFTA party. The objective of

these rules is to ensure that tariff preferences or other special treatment are accorded only to goods that are

"products of" the NAFTA region, and to make the nonpreferential substantial transformation standard more

objective by representing it in the form of particular changes of tariff classification. However, it should be

noted that the NAFTA origin rules, linked as they are to granting a duty preference, do not set forth every

possible tariff-linked representation of substantial transformation--only those where the parties agreed to

give a duty preference. Goods that do not meet the rules of origin of general note 12 will continue to be

dutiable even after the staging period, including those that might be deemed "substantially transformed" in

Mexico or Canada for nonpreferential purposes.

 

25

 Country-of-Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices, USITC Publication No.

2975.

 

26 The pertinent provision of statute is 19 U.S.C. 1304, as amended, which requires that all imported

goods be marked as to their origin, unless they are incapable of being marked or would not reach their

"ultimate consumer" in the United States in that form because of processing that results in their substantial

transformation.

 

27 See p. 6-22 of above-cited report.

 

28 See table F-3 of above-cited report.

 

29 Noah, Lars, "NAFTA's Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals," Houston Law Review, 33 (1997), pp.

1293-1326.

4-8

its report on Investigation No. 332-366,25 which, at the request of the Committee on Ways

and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, included sections focusing on the impact and

application of such rules with respect to pharmaceutical products. The report covered all

country-of-origin marking rules and rulings, whether applicable to NTR trade26 or to

preferential-program shipments. It also included discussions of rules applied by the FDA as

the primary domestic regulatory body. For this sector, the standards used and the type of

information generally required by the FDA and the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) for

imported goods are not identical. While many companies reportedly have not considered any

additional wording desired by Customs as significant,27 others saw the lack of harmonization

between Customs and FDA as having an adverse effect on this industry and were hopeful that

the Agreement on Rules of Origin under the auspices of the WTO could lead to harmonized

global rules.28

Intellectual Property

With respect to intellectual property in general, and particularly patents, the NAFTA

represents considerable progress, but concerns about certain parallel imports (e.g., imports

not authorized by the domestic patent holder that are intended to be relabeled as "domestic"

in an effort to undercut domestic sales by the patent holder) nonetheless remain.29 The

pharmaceutical industry, with its heavy R&D costs and multinational production, places

special emphasis on obtaining additional protections and enforcing existing ones to recoup the

investments made to develop new drugs.

The IPR provisions under NAFTA are based on the principles of nondiscriminatory or

national treatment and of open access to enforcement mechanisms. For the first time at the

international level, NAFTA requires the parties to make patent protection available for

pharmaceutical products, upon request, for at least the same length of time as is remaining on

the patent if any one of the parties has already issued a patent on such a product and it is

being marketed in either of the other parties for the first time. This commitment is referred

to as "pipeline protection." (Government agencies are also forbidden from disclosing test data

submitted to them for regulatory approval.) In addition, however, NAFTA allows the parties
 

30

 Statement of Administrative Action, Ch. 17: A.5., p. 186.

 

31

 Ibid., p. 189.

 

32

 Ibid., p. 192.

 

33

 Ibid.

 

34 The changes required in U.S. law were (1) the extension of protection to holders of patents issued by

Mexico and Canada where no U.S. patent existed (as noted above) and (2) the recognition of inventive

work done in the other 2 parties when application for U.S. patents are filed.

 

35 See Noah article at p. 1299 et seq.

 

36

 An Act to Amend the Patent Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 2, sec. 3 (Can.); Noah, p. 1300.

 

37 See Weissman, Robert, "A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize

Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World

Countries," U.Pa.J. of Int'l. Econ. L., 17 (1996), p. 1069, at 1080-1082.

 

38

 Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propiedad Industrial (Law for Development and Protection of

Industrial Property), 453 D.O. 4, June 27, 1991.

 

39 Noah, p. 1302.

4-9

"to exclude certain limited subject matter from patentability, including some plants and

animals that are patentable under U.S. law."30 NAFTA imposes specific limits or conditions

on other aspects of patent-related legal procedures, allows an inventor to count creative work

in Canada or Mexico in establishing the date of an invention, and does not create a right to

engage in "parallel imports" and in some circumstances puts the burden of proof as to alleged

infringements of process patents on the defendant.31 Last, the provision "limits the extent to

which NAFTA Governments may grant 'compulsory licenses,' that is, permit use of a patented

product or other subject matter without the patent owner's permission."32 However, because

of other domestic legal limitations, this protection is largely inapplicable to the pharmaceutical

sector.33

NAFTA resulted in significant changes in some provisions of the domestic law of the parties,34

and for the first time brought about protection in Canada for patents on pharmaceutical

products. Under its prior law, Canadian firms could pay minimal royalties to patent holders

and then sell generic copies of drugs patented in other countries even while the patent terms

continued.35 In 1987, Canada modified this scheme to give exclusivity to the foreign patent

holder, but only during the first seven years of the patent term. This compulsory licensing

system had the effect of depressing domestic prices in Canada, which interfered with drug

companies’ ability to recoup R&D costs. While the CFTA did not alter this situation, in 1993

Canada passed legislation (retroactively effective from December 20, 1991) that extended

patent life to 20 years and largely ended the licensing system. This status is now bound under

NAFTA obligations.36 The changes in patent laws during 1987-1993 did not occur without

substantial opposition and bitter fighting in the Canadian Parliament.37

Similarly as a result of the NAFTA accord, Mexico was required to make substantial changes

in what had been viewed as a very weak IPR system. Until the agreement, the Government

had failed to recognize product patents for pharmaceutical products and had little enforcement

power. With the NAFTA negotiations beginning, Mexico enacted the Industrial Property

Law38 in 1991 and began the modernization of its patent laws. During 1993-1994, with

NAFTA about to be implemented, Mexico amended the 1991 act and began to recognize

product patents. Mexico also acted to limit loopholes concerning the protection of process

patents.39 The 1994 amendments also established the Mexican Institute for Industrial

Property and gave it authority to administer all patent-related laws. Moreover, the NAFTA

requires Mexico to provide access to injunctive relief in appropriate circumstances to enforce
 

40

 Ibid.

 

41 Pub. L. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended and codified at 21 U.S.C. secs. 321-393;

Noah, p. 1304.

 

42 Pub. L. 89-74, sec. 9, 79 Stat. 226, 234-35 (1965).

 

43 Pub. L. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1988).

 

44 See NAFTA, arts. 309, 712, and 904.

 

45 Noah, pp. 1317 et seq.

 

46 21 CFR 207.40.

4-10

patent rights40 and elevates all of the IPR protections to the level of treaty obligations. Along

with NAFTA, Mexico also joined major international organizations that have treaty-related

authority over IPR matters, so that those instruments' rights and obligations likewise

influenced domestic law.

NAFTA does not, however, regulate parallel imports. In the United States, firms rely

primarily on FDCA,41 as enforced by the FDA, to control such parallel imports. The FDCA

requires manufacturers and sellers of drugs to register with the FDA and comply with FDA

rules; it applies also to firms that relabel drugs and covers imports as well as domestically

made drugs. U.S. law also prohibits counterfeit drugs from being marketed in the United

States, and this also would apply to parallel imports.42 Another statute, the Prescription Drug

Marketing Act of 1987,43 bars the reimportation of prescription drugs made in the United

States by any person other than the original manufacturer. Its provisions restrict, if not bar,

imports of relabeled drugs, and imposes recordkeeping burdens on wholesale distributors

concerning sales of prescription drugs to establish a chain of title.

Nontariff Measures

NAFTA's provisions on the elimination of nontariff barriers to trade contain an exception for

standards adopted for health and safety purposes.44 Few changes in Canadian law were

required by NAFTA, and Mexico is now accepting FDA documentation as proof of drug

safety and effectiveness and is phasing out local production requirements.45 However, the

more complex and rigorous U.S. laws--though largely preserved under NAFTA based on

FDA's involvement in the negotiations--might at some point be challenged as nontariff barriers

not required for or linked to public health. One such provision is the regulatory requirement

that only FDA personnel conduct site inspections, even in foreign facilities.46 Other U.S.

regulations linked to the goal of reducing usage of environmentally hazardous or ozonedepleting substances might be challenged as falling outside the public health exception as well.

Changes in Nations’ Patent Laws

Patents in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Until the TRIPs agreement's obligations are completely implemented in 2006, the

pharmaceutical sector continues to face widely varying patent and IPR systems worldwide.

The U.S. patent regime, for example, has allowed patent holders to use or license covered
 

47 Weissman, Robert,"A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global

Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives to Third World Countries," U.Pa.

J. of Int'l. Econ. L., 17 (1996), p. 1069 et seq., at 1072.

 

48

 Ibid.

 

49

 Ibid., p. 1073. See also "Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPs Agreement: The

Case of India," Adelman, Martin J. and Sonta Baldia, Vanderbilt J. of Transnat. L. (1996), p. 507 et seq. 

This article states that India was a "free rider" on other countries' technological developments until changes

were mandated by the TRIPs agreement. The article also describes the agreement's effort to regulate

compulsory licensing systems in signatory countries. These changes are said to be of great future

importance, once phased in, given India's position as a major producer and net exporter of many bulk drugs. 

Under India's patent laws, which must be changed to comply with TRIPs by 2006, firms could obtain new

drugs, re-engineer their production processes, and sell them domestically; the sector had price controls and

high tariffs to protect them from imports, plus lower capital costs. The authors comment, however, that

Indian drug producers have focused on making drugs for export, rather than on making drugs for conditions

such as malaria and leprosy that affect the Indian people.

 

50

 Ibid., p. 1077.

 

51

 Ibid., pp. 1098-1099.

4-11

goods or processes or to allow the patent to lie idle over its entire life.47 At the same time,

there are countries that have given no patents, including Argentina, with respect to

pharmaceuticals.48 In such countries, firms could legally produce and sell any drug, even if

the drug were patented in another country. Other countries have varying degrees of patent

protection. Some have issued patents on products but not on processes. Conversely, India

issues patents on processes but not products, allowing other producers to make the same drug

by other processes.49 In some other countries, another provision of concern to patent holders

includes "work the patent" requirements. These requirements state that firms must do some

production (not just selling) in those countries or lose patent protection there.

In light of these variations, many pharmaceutical companies in the United States, Japan, and

the EU have tried to get countries that have little or no patent protection to remake their patent

laws and accord at least some of the patent protections contained in U.S. law. Through

vigorous lobbying, U.S. pharmaceutical trade associations and firms have had high-profile

roles in influencing Congress and USTR in developing U.S. policy, seeking to enforce their

rights through mechanisms such as section 301 and the "special 301" section of the Trade Act

of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411).50 Pharmaceutical firms and associations generally support the

GATT Uruguay Round effort to require other WTO signatories to strengthen their laws.

The patent scheme options available to developing countries are generally more conservative

under the TRIPs agreement. Many features tend to mirror the extent of protection afforded

in the United States. Developing countries can use certain nondiscriminatory taxes and price

controls, and even highly regulated compulsory licensing, provided that particular measures

fall under the "public health" or "environmental protection" exceptions.51 Countries can deny

patents on any drug, or produce or obtain them non-commercially, and distribute them through

public health authorities or non-profit entities, provided that the restriction can be shown to

be "necessary" (i.e., the "least-trade-restrictive measure"). To be acceptable under TRIPs,

countries' approaches must be balanced and take into account the legitimate interests of third

persons, and avoid unreasonably or excessively restricting patent-holders' rights. 

Moreover, countries can adopt special measures to encourage trade in pharmaceuticals used

as orphan drugs and similar limited-impact goods. They can also employ measures that allow

certain uses if the patent holder is contacted but does not reply within a reasonable time,

circumstances surrounding the license grant later change, or a license is improperly restricted.
 

52

 Ibid., pp. 1114-1115.

 

53

 Ibid., pp. 1090-1091, citing other authors.

 

54

 Ibid., p. 1092.

 

55

 Ibid., p. 1092.

4-12

Because patent holders may not wish to grant every licensing request, the issue of what

constitutes appropriate remuneration might become a subject of dispute.52 

Inadequate patent systems in developing countries can also affect companies’ development of

new products based on plants and plant extracts. Many new developments in pharmaceuticals

have been or likely will be prompted by discoveries of, or based upon, naturally occurring

substances or plants, and much of the discovery work occurs in developing countries.

However, most of these discoveries are the result of efforts by the large, multinational firms,

rather than the small domestic firms in those countries. While the natural substances cannot

be patented, processes to synthesize naturally occurring drugs, or more effective derivatives,

can be patented in many cases. One analysis noted:

The image of the adventurous pharmaceutical company explorer-genetic prospector

superficially suggested by the corporate effort to survey Third World genetic

resources is inaccurate. Company representatives do not wander into the rain forest

jungle to collect samples. Instead, corporate botanists and anthropologists rely on

Third World farmers and herbalists, especially from indigenous communities that

make their home in or live off of the rain forest, to direct them to plants that they use

in local medicines. Over centuries, these farmers and herbalists have identified,

cultivated, bred, and protected the plant varieties. These informal innovations are not

patentable, however, because they are not "new." More obviously, a Kayapo farmer

in Brazil and a Sakai herbalist in Indonesia have no practical means to patent their

innovations. . .

Recognition of this reality undermines the pharmaceutical companies' moral claim to

strict patent rules in every country. Furthermore, calling attention to the Third

World's unacknowledged contribution to the development of pharmaceuticals also

raises the possibility of alternative approaches to patent policy.53

On the issue of public domain and the scope of patents, the comment continues:

What is defined as public and what is defined as private is thus an ultimate issue of

patent law. It is in the pharmaceutical companies' interest to define the biological

resources of the Third World as “the common heritage of mankind.” That makes the

resources public, and thus unpatentable. If the biological resources are not

patentable, then Third World countries are basically unable to capture any of the

wealth-producing benefits of their industrial development.54

One possible driving force to encourage developing countries to adopt restrictions on patents

for plant-derived drugs might be that the granting of pharmaceutical patents may still not

promote domestic investment. Drug companies frequently wish to produce particular drugs

in only one or a handful of locations worldwide. Thus, as noted by one source, granting

patents may serve only to limit competition in the developing country's own market, to restrict

growth, and to raise consumer prices.55
 

56

 World Intellectual Property Report ["WIPR"], 10 (Sept. 1996), p. 283.

 

57

 WIPR, vol. 11 (Jan. 97), p. 22.

 

58

 WIPR, vol. 10 (June 1996), p. 167; vol. 11 (Jan. 1997).

 

59

 WIPR, vol. 12 (Feb. 1997).

 

60 Pres. Proclamation 6988 of April 11, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 19017 (Apr. 17, 1997). The action affects

goods in several sectors and HTS sections.

 

61

 Not discussed here are the recent changes to section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19

U.S.C. § 1337, which is administered by the U.S. International Trade Commission.

4-13

Issues Arising Under TRIPs

As the TRIPs transition period continues, several matters of concern to the United States have

been under discussion with other WTO members. One such matter involves India's alleged

violation of TRIPs patent provisions. The country has been described as “ . . . a ‘haven’ for

bulk pharmaceutical manufacturers who ‘pirate’ the intellectual property of the world's

pharmaceutical industry."56 An investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as

amended, was opened on July 8, 1996, based on a complaint to USTR by PhRMA that India

has no "mailbox" designated for filing applications for patents, and that legislation to correct

patent-related problems had not been adopted after initial U.S. inquiries. The United States

also called for the formation of a WTO investigative panel concerning pharmaceuticals and

agricultural chemicals when 22 months of bilateral consultations failed to resolve outstanding

issues. India agreed to the formation of such a panel.57 The EU reserved the right to

participate as a third party.

Another concern of the pharmaceutical industry has involved Argentina, which was charged

under section 301 with failure to protect trade secrets relating to pharmaceuticals. After

finding a March 1996 confidentiality law unacceptable, the United States threatened to invoke

trade sanctions if an acceptable confidentiality law was not enacted by December 20, 1996.

The United States had already acted to bar access to certain Argentine products and opted not

to honor commitments to buy Argentine beef and peanuts. Argentina responded that the U.S.

demand for protection of all industrial and trade information (including that already obtained)

exceeded the obligation under TRIPs for prospective coverage as to new products only.58

Foreign pharmaceutical laboratories located in Argentina had alleged that local firms trying

to get drugs approved for sale were obtaining technical information from Argentine

Government files. New legislation passed the Lower House of the Argentine legislation on

December 12, 1996, and received Senate approval on December 18. However, USTR

continued to review a possible revocation of certain benefits under the Generalized System of

Preferences (GSP) valued at $30-40 million annually, based upon concerns about how the new

law's language would be interpreted and applied.59 Subsequently, the President proclaimed

the removal of GSP benefits for a wide range of Argentine products, effective as of May 17,

1997.60

United States

The United States has made a number of important amendments to its patent laws as a result

of TRIPs and, to a lesser extent, NAFTA. Select changes are summarized below.61
 

62 35 U.S.C. § 154(c), as amended by the URAA, P.L. 103-465, § 532(a)(4).

 

63 Formally known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, P.L. 98-

417, the Waxman-Hatch Act is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156.

 

64 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(B). Only one extension may be obtained, and the effective patent term may

not exceed 14 years following FDA approval of the new drug. Ibid. § 156(c)(3).

 

65 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(B).

 

66 There was no dispute that a patent issued after June 8, 1995, on a transition application filed before

that date was entitled to add the Waxman-Hatch extension to either the 17-year or the 20-year term,

whichever was longer.

 

67

 Merck, 80 F.3d 1543. According to the court, the only exception is for pharmaceutical patents that

were in force on June 8, 1995 solely because of a previous Waxman-Hatch extension; such patents are not

entitled to apply an extension to a 20-year term. Ibid.

4-14

Transition, Extension, and the Waxman-Hatch Act

To accommodate the transition from a 17-year to a 20-year patent term, measured from the

date of filing and not issuance, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) provides that

any patent that was either in force on or resulted from an application filed prior to June 8,

1995 (the effective date of the change in the patent term) will have a term that is 17 years from

the year of issuance or 20 years from the date of filing, whichever is longer.62 A conflict arose

as to how this transition was to be applied to pharmaceutical patents that were entitled to

patent term restoration under the Waxman-Hatch Act.63 The Waxman-Hatch Act entitles the

holder of a pharmaceutical patent to extend the term of patent protection by up to five years

in order to compensate for delays caused by the FDA’s premarket approval process.64 Patent

term extension was given to the patent holders in exchange for a provision authorizing generic

producers to rely on safety and efficacy testing submitted earlier by the original patent holder,

thus expediting the marketing of lower cost generic drugs by eliminating the need for generic

producers to submit their own test data to the FDA.65

The PTO and the FDA, supported by generic drug producers, took the position that for

pharmaceutical patents issued prior to June 8, 1995, the term of the patent would be the longer

of: (a) 17 years from the date of filing plus the Waxman-Hatch extension; or (b) 20 years

from the issuance.66 Brandname pharmaceutical manufacturers, on the other hand, argued

that the Waxman-Hatch extension should be added to either a 17-year from issuance or a 20-

year term from filing, whichever was longer. This controversy resulted in litigation that went

before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the case Merck & Co., Inc. v.

Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996). After reviewing the statutory provisions in the

URAA and the Waxman-Hatch Act, the Federal Circuit agreed with the pharmaceutical

industry that pharmaceutical patents in force as of June 8, 1995, were entitled to have a

restoration extension added to the longer of a 17-year term from the date of issuance or a 20-

year term from the date of filing.67

Pending Patent Legislation

Congress is presently considering legislation to further amend U.S. patent laws, partly as a

result of two bilateral patent accords recently negotiated between the United States and Japan,

as discussed below. On April 23, 1997, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 400, the

“21st Century Patent System Improvement Act.” On May 22, 1997, the Senate
 

68 As of March 28, 1999, the last action on H.R. 400 was a March 23, 1998 report to the Senate from

the Committee on Judiciary; on S. 507, the last action was the introduction of the Leahy Amendment No.

3174 on July 16, 1998 (http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d105query.html).

 

69 H.R. 400, § 208; S. 507, § 301 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)).

 

70 H.R. 400, § 202; S. 507, § 202 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 122). The House bill would exempt from

publication applications filed by small entities, individual inventors, and institutions of higher education. 

The Senate bill contains no such exemption. Most other countries, including Canada, Mexico, and Japan,

publish patent applications 18 months after they have been filed with the national patent office.

 

71 H.R. 400, § 204; S. § 204 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154).

 

72 Bob Gravely, Patent Bill Gets Committee Nod, Congressional Quarterly, March 15, 1997, at 590.

 

73 Herwig von Morze & Peter Hanna, “Critical and Practical Observations Regarding Pharmaceutical

Patent Term Restoration in the European Communities” (Part I), JPTOS 479, 77, 479-80 (June 1995). 

France and Italy enacted their own laws on pharmaceutical patent term restoration in January 1993. Ibid.

Creation of a uniform system of patent term restoration in Europe was intended in part to avoid the

development of disparate national laws. Ibid.

4-15

Judiciary Committee reported out a similar bill, S. 507, the “United States Patent and

Trademark Organization Act of 1997.” Final passage of the legislation is pending.68

Both bills would make the PTO, currently under the Department of Commerce, an

independent agency and ensure that fees collected by the PTO were used only to support the

PTO and its mission. In addition, both bills would guarantee that the term for a patent would

be at least 17 years from the date of issue by extending the patent term for up to 10 years to

compensate for delays caused by judicial appeals, and up to three years to compensate for

“unusual delays” during the PTO’s processing of an application.69

More controversial is the section that would require the PTO to publish patent applications

within 18 months of filing, rather than keeping them secret until the patent has issued, as

required by current law.70 However, applicants would be entitled to receive a “reasonable

royalty” from any person who makes, uses, sells, or imports the claimed invention during the

period between the date of publication and the date the patent is issued.71 Supporters of

publication, which include the PTO, major industry associations, and certain intellectual

property bar associations, argue that early publication would allow U.S. inventors to utilize

technological advances more quickly, including advances disclosed in applications from which

patents never issued, and would thus lead to more efficient use of research resources. Critics

argue that early publication would weaken the ability of inventors to protect their innovations

and facilitate exploitation of U.S.-developed technology by other countries.72

Western Europe

In response to rising development costs and regulatory delays required to bring new

pharmaceutical products to market, the European Community (now the EU) approved a new

regulation (Regulation (EEC) 1768/92) that permits member nations to extend the patent term

for medical products by up to five years through the issuance of Supplementary Protection

Certificates (SPCs). This regulation is intended to make European-based pharmaceutical

companies more competitive with companies in the United States and Japan, where patent

term extensions are already available.73

SPCs are available for any patented “medicinal product,” which is defined as any substance

or combination of substances for treating or preventing disease in humans or animals, or
 

74 Regulation 1768/92, art. 1(a) (definitions).

 

75

 Ibid., art. 3.

 

76

 Ibid., art. 7.

 

77

 Ibid., art. 9.

 

78

 Ibid., art. 10.

 

79

 Ibid., art. 13. One commentator summarizes the patent term extension by the formula: extension =

date of authorization - (date of filing patent application + 5 years) < 5 years. For example, if the marketing

authorization were granted 9 years after the patent application had been filed, then the patent term would be

extended by 9 - (0 + 5) = 4 years. However, if the marketing authorization were issued 11 years after the

patent application had been filed, then the formula would yield 11 - (0 + 5) = 6 years, but the patent term

extension would be capped at 5 years. George Metaxas-Maranghidis, “The European Dimension,”

Intellectual Property Laws of Europe (John H. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995; George Metaxas-Maranghidis,

ed.) at 22-23.

 

80 Herwig von Morze and Peter Hanna, “Critical and Practical Observations Regarding Pharmaceutical

Patent Restoration in the European Communities” (Part II), JPTOS ,77, 505, 517 (July 1995).

 

81

 Ibid. at 517-18.

 

82 Regulation 1768/92, art. 4. Article 4 is somewhat ambiguous, for it is unclear whether the SPC

covers only uses of the product authorized up to the time the SPC was granted or whether its scope may be

“expanded” to include uses authorized after the SPC is granted but before it expires. von Morze and Hanna

(Part I), supra note 118, at 495-97. The authors believe the former interpretation is the better view. Ibid.

at 496-97.

 

83 Von Morze and Hanna (Part II), supra note 125, at 523-24, 526 (table). SPCs were not immediately

made available in Spain, Greece, and Portugal because these countries did not provide patent protection for

pharmaceutical products per se until 1992. Pursuant to the terms of the Regulation, SPCs became available

in these countries five years after the Regulation entered into force, i.e., January 1998. See Regulation

4-16

administered for making a medical diagnosis or restoring, correcting, or modifying

physiological functions in humans or animals.74 To qualify for an SPC, four conditions must

be met: (a) the product in question must be protected by a patent in force in an EU member

country; (b) the product must be subject to a valid authorization to market the product as a

medicinal product; (c) such marketing authorization must be the first to place the product on

the market as a medicinal product; and (d) the product must not already be the subject of an

SPC.75

To apply for an SPC, an application must be filed within six months from the date the

marketing authorization was granted or from the date the patent issued, whichever is later.76

The application is filed with the member state that granted the patent or on whose behalf it

was granted and in which the marketing authorization was obtained.77 If the application and

product meet the conditions laid down in the regulation, the member state is to grant the

SPC.78

The SPC extends the patent term by a period, not to exceed five years, that is equal to the

period that elapsed between the date the patent application was filed and the date the first

marketing authorization was approved, less five years.79 This provision puts a premium on

completing the development of a medicinal product and obtaining marketing approval within

10 years of the date the patent was filed because any period after that date will not be matched

by a further patent extension.80 Because this term is based on the date the first marketing

authorization was approved, an effective strategy to maximize the effectiveness of the patent

term should focus on obtaining the earliest approvals in the largest number of major markets,

rather than obtaining market approval first in the smaller markets.81 Finally, it is important

to note that the SPC does not extend the scope of the patent as a whole, but only with respect

to the product and uses covered by the marketing authorization.82 SPCs are presently

available throughout the EU.83
1768/92, art. 21.

 

84 “Japan-U.S. Mutual Understanding on Patents,” Jan. 20, 1994, I.L.M. 33, 313 (1994).

 

85 “Japan-United States: Exchange of Letters Containing Patent Systems Agreement, August 16, 1994,"

I.L.M, 34 121 (1995). These agreements were the result of discussions conducted under the U.S.-Japan

Framework for a New Economic Partnership, signed by President Clinton and then-Prime Minister

Hosakawa on July 10, 1993. Ibid. 

 

86 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign

Trade Barriers, pp. 183, 201.

 

87

 See subsection on pending legislation under the United States section, supra.

 

88 Lesavich, supra note 62, at 173-74.

 

89 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 135.

 

90 Lesavich, supra note 62, at 157.

 

91

 Ibid. at 174-75. Some U.S. companies also argue that the pre-grant opposition system is

discriminatory because Japanese companies have collaborated to block the issuance of patents, primarily to

foreign applicants. Ibid. Elimination of pre-grant opposition is expected to give foreign inventors better

protection for their inventions in Japan. Ibid.

4-17

Japan

Since 1991, representatives of the United States and their counterparts in Japan have entered

into two agreements to initiate reforms to their respective patent laws and procedures in order

to resolve long-standing disputes. The first agreement, the Japan-U.S. Mutual Understanding

on Patents, was signed by the heads of the U.S. PTO and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO)

on January 20, 1994.84 The second agreement, the New Patent Accord, was signed by the

U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the Japanese ambassador on August 16, 1994.85 The

Japanese Diet has already passed legislation to implement both these agreements,86 while the

U.S. Congress is still considering such legislation.87

Under the Japan-U.S. agreement, the JPO agreed to: (1) permit foreign nationals to file patent

applications in English, with a Japanese translation to follow within two months; (2) permit

the correction of translation errors from the original English document; and (3) permit the JPO

to charge reasonable fees for these procedures. These changes are significant because under

previous Japanese law, a translation error could not be corrected if the correction would

change the essence of the invention. In one well-publicized case, for example, a U.S. chemical

company lost an infringement case in Japan because “boron” had been mistranslated as

“bromine,” an error that rendered the patent worthless.88 These changes would also make

Japanese patent law more similar to that of the United States, which already permits

applications to be filed in a foreign language, provided an English version is filed within two

months.89 In exchange, the PTO agreed to propose legislation to change the term of U.S.

patents from 17 years from the date of issue to 20 years from the date of filing, a change

already anticipated by TRIPs.90

The New Patent Accord is an extension of the Japan-U.S. agreement. The U.S. Department

of Commerce agreed to propose legislation: (1) to make patent applications public 18 months

after filing; (2) to expand the grounds for reexamining a patent and to allow third parties an

opportunity to comment in such proceedings; and (3) to prevent the PTO from granting

compulsory licenses, a practice rarely followed by the PTO anyway. In exchange, the JPO

agreed to make or pursue three changes in its patent procedures. First, the JPO agreed to end

its current practice of allowing third parties to oppose a competitor’s patent before it is

granted, a practice that has been criticized as cumbersome and as resulting in lengthy delays

in the issuance of Japanese patents.91 Secondly, the JPO agreed to accelerate the patent
 

92

 Ibid. at 175-76. Decreasing the processing period for a patent will also shorten the time competitors

have to review a pending application, which is published after 18 months, before patent protection is finally

issued. Ibid. at 176.

 

93

 Ibid. at 177-79.

 

94 Thorson and Fortkort, supra note 62, at 306-09.

 

95

 Fact Sheets: “Special 301" on Intellectual Property Rights and 1996 Title VII Decisions, Office of

the U.S. Trade Representative, pp. 3, 4 (June 13, 1997); and 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on

Foreign Trade Barriers, pp. 200-201.

 

96

 Ibid.

4-18

examination process to enable applicants to obtain disposition of their patent applications

within 36 months. This will have the effect of lengthening the effective term of a patent,

which is measured from the date of filing.92 Finally, the JPO agreed to end the practice of

issuing compulsory licenses to Japanese competitors. Under previous procedures, the JPO

could issue a compulsory license when the patented invention had not been “worked” (defined

as “used in manufacture”) for more than three years or when a strong need existed to exploit

the patent in furtherance of the public interest. Although Japanese companies rarely sought

compulsory licenses, the threat of such licenses alone and the fear of costly and protracted

patent prosecution in the face of a competitor’s opposition led many foreign companies to

enter into voluntary cross-license agreements with Japanese competitors. With the threat of

compulsory licenses removed, U.S. companies may be less willing to transfer valuable

technology to Japanese competitors.93

Despite Japan’s implementation of these two agreements, USTR has raised complaints with

other aspects of Japan’s patent system, particularly with respect to the narrow claiming

encouraged by the JPO and Japanese courts. In the United States and many other countries,

patent claims cover not only what it literally described in the claims and specification, but also

embodiments that deviate in only insubstantial ways from the patent (the so-called “doctrine

of equivalents”). While Japanese courts have not expressly disavowed the doctrine of

equivalents, the doctrine is rarely applied.94 Thus, a Japanese patent must literally cover an

accused device in order for the device to be found infringing. Similarly, the JPO limits claims

only to what is literally set forth in the application and examples that have actually been

produced (“reduced to practice”). This is problematic, especially in the chemicals area, where

a compound may have thousands of variations and it is impractical to list each example after

reducing it to practice. These narrow claiming practices have encouraged “patent flooding,”

in which companies flood the JPO with applications that deviate only marginally from an

original application, thus contributing to the backlog at the JPO and creating uncertainties

regarding the scope of patent rights.95

The JPO alleviated these concerns somewhat in 1995 by issuing revised guidelines to its

patent examiners. These guidelines directed examiners to grant patent rights that go beyond

actual examples set forth in the application if the applicant has shown how one skilled in the

relevant technological art can make variations on these examples and such variations are not

otherwise known to the public. These guidelines, which will be applied retroactively to

pending as well as new applications, will bring JPO procedures more closely in line with

procedures in the United States and other countries.96

Some commentators are of the view that these problems are more the result of the failure of

U.S. business to understand and adapt to Japan’s unique patent system than to weakness in

the system itself. For example, foreign patent applications are often subject to delays in
 

97 Thorson and Fortkort, supra note 62, at 293-94.

 

98

 Ibid. at 298, 301-06.

 

99 William C. Revelos, “Patent Enforcement Difficulties in Japan: Are There Any Satisfactory Solutions

for the United States?,” 29 Geo. Washington Journal of Law and Economics 503 (1995).

4-19

prosecution due to failure to comply with Japanese legal requirements; failure to use proper

Japanese technical terminology; or poor translations.97 U.S. companies are also advised to

emulate their Japanese competitors by regularly reviewing patent applications to learn the

latest technology and by filing multiple claims to cover numerous variations of an invention

in order to compensate for the absence of a doctrine of equivalents.98 Other observers,

however, have recounted the numerous difficulties encountered in enforcing patent rights in

Japan.99

 

1

 See the Commission’s 1991 Competitiveness Study.

5-1

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

As we enter the twenty-first century, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry appears to be in a

strong competitive position. Over half of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies of 1997 (table

3-1) are headquartered in the United States, which indicates that U.S. firms are highly

competitive with foreign companies. Additionally, NCE approvals are on the rise in the

United States (figure 2-1, table 2-1), pointing to a regulatory environment that is particularly

conducive to innovation.

In assessing the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry, starting with the premise that

the ability to develop and market NCEs is the best indicator of success,1 two aspects of the

industry must be separated: the R&D aspect and the regulatory and marketing aspect.

Research in the pharmaceutical industry is complex, time-consuming, and expensive, all of

which necessitate top quality employees and facilities. On this basis, it seems that the United

States, Japan, and Western Europe are similarly equipped to produce high quality R&D.

However, the biotechnology industry, a particularly innovative and high-tech field, has

demonstrated certain strengths of the U.S. industry. Specifically, entrepreneurial initiative and

inventiveness are encouraged in the United States, much more so than in Japan. These

qualities have led to the development of many small, cutting-edge firms in the United States,

in part because the U.S. scientific community generally accepts mobility of scientists among

firms and the barriers to enter the market are low. Although these firms typically require the

support of a large pharmaceutical firm to assist in bringing products to market, there are

significant scientific benefits to conducting research at the level of a small firm (e.g.,

flexibility). Overall, the success of the U.S. biotech industry appears to be a strong indicator

of an outstanding technical environment for pharmaceutical R&D in the United States.

The U.S. patent system also seems to be effective in protecting the interests of innovative

pharmaceutical companies. Japan and the EU also offer reasonable protection for patented

items, especially since the implementation of several new policies. The Japanese patent

system is becoming more usable for foreigners, and the EU now allows for the issuance of

patents on biotechnology products. Although each of the three systems is distinct, the general

trend is toward harmonization, which would be extremely beneficial to pharmaceutical

companies.

Just as sufficient patent protection is important to allow companies to recoup their investment

in R&D, it is equally important for Government regulatory agencies to complete the new drug

approval process in time for drugs to be marketed under patent protection. If the approval

process becomes excessively time consuming, the drug developers may face significantly

abbreviated protection. The disparity in approval processes across Western Europe has at

times proven to be a hindrance to companies, but the establishment of the EMEA is intended
 

2

 PhRMA Industry Profile, 1998, pp. 69-70.

5-2

to facilitate drug approvals in a timely, more economical manner. Japan’s newly established

regulatory agency structure should be a great benefit to foreign companies, particularly U.S.

firms, who were often at a disadvantage under the old system. Moreover, the U.S. system has

been overhauled, and the FDA performance, especially its rate of drug approvals, has

dramatically improved as a result. While these national agencies regulate all companies,

foreign and domestic, and do not serve to discourage the U.S. industry in particular, the

overall health of the pharmaceutical industry is adversely affected by impediments to drug

approval in any of these three significant markets. 

From the point of view of industry, the next step in recouping R&D costs, and thereby

providing the profits for future R&D, comes through a company’s ability to set a reasonable

price for its product. As a result of various Government drug pricing policies across Western

Europe, there can be a negative effect on profitability. If prices are set too low, or other less

expensive drugs are deemed equivalent to an innovative new product, companies can be

discouraged from R&D-intensive activities.2 Companies doing business in the EU also face

the controversial issue of parallel importing, which decreases profits and diminishes the

incentive for investment in R&D. Japan has also moved to more regulated price controls for

pharmaceutical products, which is not a positive change for the industry.

Globally, the pharmaceutical industry benefited from the tariff eliminations negotiated during

the Uruguay Round. Lowering the costs of production is a boon at the company level,

although country-specific data may indicate diminishing competitiveness. It is clear from the

level of investment in R&D by U.S. firms that scientific and technical development is still

being conducted locally, even though some production has moved to countries with lower

labor costs.

One area that may prove to hinder the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is the inadequate number

of domestic FDA-approved fine chemical facilities that are capable of producing the

intermediates and other complex chemicals used to make drugs. There are significant benefits

to outsourcing these tasks to local operations, where a synergy between the drug company and

fine chemical firm can be cultivated from the early stages of product development. The

Western Europeans presently have an advantage in this area, although the U.S. chemical

industry is technically capable of developing outsourcing services for the pharmaceutical

industry.

Overall, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry seems to enjoy a domestic environment conducive

to researching and developing drugs, protecting their intellectual property, and obtaining

regulatory approval to market these products. There is also a strong trend in the United States

to invest those profits in new R&D. Recent improvements to the patent systems and

Government regulatory policies in Western Europe and Japan are likely to benefit the U.S.

industry as well. Because of the strong international component to this industry, benefits to

the industry in any one of these three areas will likely work to the benefit of the others. Since

aging populations will only bring a rise in the demand for drug products, the U.S.

pharmaceutical industry, along with the industries of Western Europe and Japan, can expect

growing markets for their products.
APPENDIX A

TABLE TABLES
A-2

Table A-1

Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): U.S. domestic exports, in

thousand dollars, 1992-97

Major trading 

partners

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Percent of

(Thousand dollars) total 1997 trade

EU-15 1,354,622 1,249,056 1,194,080 1,243,464 1,245,141 1,490,525 50.7

 Netherlands 168,379 155,404 164,526 231,720 272,680 446,393 15.2

 France 227,429 234,246 270,514 226,788 173,874 254,901 8.7

 United

 Kingdom 149,880 129,547 134,888 226,588 216,458 195,824 6.7

 Germany 184,493 128,292 145,058 114,804 153,744 169,794 5.8

 Belgium 149,029 152,822 170,181 193,143 159,869 162,247 5.5

 Italy 233,621 219,911 150,391 148,778 143,717 135,198 4.6

 Ireland 141,700 128,246 52,811 31,666 45,183 46,962 1.6

 Other EU 100,091 100,588 105,711 69,977 79,616 79,206 2.7

Japan 331,331 345,008 274,772 346,780 313,872 416,292 14.1

Canada 99,402 139,144 151,045 170,838 186,406 230,621 7.8

Brazil 60,108 82,233 87,554 96,979 124,815 105,376 3.6

Mexico 79,323 84,591 81,252 69,092 84,110 93,471 3.2

All others 518,808 500,919 492,658 517,774 557,076 605,991 20.6

Total 2,443,594 2,400,951 2,281,361 2,444,927 2,511,420 2,942,276 100.0

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Table A-2

Bulk medicinal chemicals and botanical products (SIC 2833): U.S. imports for consumption, in

thousand dollars, 1992-97

Major trading 

partners

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Percent of

(Thousand dollars) total 1997 trade

EU-15 1,591,678 1,615,461 1,931,055 2,883,905 3,959,589 4,798,700 65.8

 Ireland 172,312 229,952 257,367 443,578 995,691 1,528,945 21.0

 United 

 Kingdom 339,984 572,718 655,225 775,358 900,568 1,070,002 14.7

 Germany 650,825 319,031 377,151 686,629 886,654 885,785 12.1

 Italy 178,602 220,600 225,700 406,985 440,405 413,068 5.7

 France 58,917 87,752 190,977 265,154 259,328 303,355 4.2

 Belgium 25,742 13,576 23,562 63,199 128,242 210,112 2.9

 Other EU 165,296 171,832 201,073 243,003 348,700 387,433 5.3

Switzerland 311,283 374,564 372,339 528,344 612,412 741,071 10.2

Japan 538,737 485,959 526,282 589,448 739,408 672,836 9.2

Singapore 21,832 28,993 50,348 37,794 172,587 313,282 4.3

China 89,405 114,028 118,950 159,112 200,462 211,241 2.9

Mexico 151,433 58,203 58,777 60,557 58,785 121,702 1.7

All others 572,346 424,018 308,175 372,996 377,556 439,133 6.0

Total 3,276,714 3,101,226 3,365,926 4,632,156 6,120,799 7,297,965 100.0

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
A-3

Table A-3

Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834): U.S. domestic exports, in thousand dollars, 1992-97

Major trading 

partners

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Percent of

(Thousand dollars) total 1997 trade

EU-15 567,565 558,922 696,120 683,278 997,768 1,375,745 41.3

 United

 Kingdom 63,306 112,328 190,109 150,777 280,567 389,661 11.7

 Netherlands 74,999 53,410 83,244 76,180 132,717 358,594 10.8

 Italy 77,763 69,008 46,447 93,961 169,840 238,445 7.2

 Germany 92,258 94,721 109,046 111,713 128,966 123,010 3.7

 France 118,112 89,279 79,303 101,469 120,417 76,176 2.3

 Ireland 26,702 24,176 59,564 20,050 32,617 64,970 1.9

 Belgium 26,974 31,273 35,419 58,024 57,413 56,573 1.7

 Other EU 87,451 84,727 92,988 71,104 75,231 68,316 2.0

Canada 487,710 574,259 590,484 639,508 752,804 861,008 25.8

Japan 237,876 272,685 259,804 284,843 245,896 193,530 5.8

Brazil 20,848 27,126 34,402 46,186 76,658 125,428 3.8

Australia 51,124 68,765 61,024 53,279 61,601 88,863 2.7

Switzerland 52,982 74,414 241,564 68,938 60,441 61,456 1.8

All other 400,362 451,102 431,479 471,108 523,183 628,672 18.9

Total 1,818,467 2,027,273 2,314,877 2,247,140 2,718,351 3,334,702 100.0

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Table A-4

Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834): U.S. imports for consumption, in thousand dollars,

1992-97

Major trading 

partners

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Percent of

(Thousand dollars) total 1997 trade

EU-15 1,191,434 1,452,968 1,682,796 1,898,157 2,443,790 3,717,223 69.4

 Germany 105,672 183,031 269,678 434,548 367,293 1,343,960 25.1

 United 

 Kingdom 494,963 576,995 720,805 747,634 1,114,185 1,287,589 24.0

 Italy 80,934 160,170 155,584 120,928 203,015 271,566 5.1

 Ireland 110,282 120,942 104,901 74,613 165,536 157,203 2.9

 France 102,678 113,240 71,150 80,785 116,941 156,359 2.9

 Belgium 68,044 80,908 82,677 84,073 81,165 108,962 2.0

 Netherlands 12,473 27,403 21,809 22,074 17,858 49,491 0.9

 Other EU 216,388 190,279 256,192 333,502 377,797 342,093 6.4

Canada 82,455 103,556 201,503 245,044 323,573 521,790 9.7

Switzerland 415,766 324,800 359,952 430,704 433,609 454,947 8.5

Japan 121,513 125,071 129,579 210,380 297,221 387,085 7.2

Israel 17,833 60,328 108,354 53,697 138,354 204,227 3.8

All others 30,445 29,243 35,161 39,303 65,680 72,895 1.4

Total 1,859,446 2,095,966 2,517,345 2,877,285 3,702,227 5,358,167 100.0

Source: Official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.