### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-30516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. PAUL W. MILLER, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:10-CR-102-1

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * A jury convicted Paul W. Miller o f two counts of sexual explo i t a t i o n o f a minor and one count of possession of c h ild pornography. The district court sentenced him to 70 years in prison and fined him $15,000. Miller a ppeals his conviction and fine. We AFFIRM. M i l l e r contends the district court improperly barred him from cross examin i ng the two young victims about their juvenile criminal records and probation statuses. The Confrontation Clause secures the defendant’s right of U n i t e d S t a te s C o u rt o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Aug ust 12, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-30516 Document: 00512338777 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/12/2013No. 12-30516

cross- e x a mination, particularly in order to expose a witness’s m otivation for testifying. Delaware v . Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 6 78-79 ( 1986). Nonetheless, the district court retains “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross-examination due t o c o n cerns about “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,

. . . or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 679. Alleged vi o l a t i o n s of the Confrontation C lause are reviewed de novo , subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Jimenez , 464 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2006).Miller offers o nly v a gu e s p e c u l ation about the possible impeachment value of the proposed cross-examination. H e relies on Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 (1974), f or the proposition that cross-examination about juvenile probation was warranted. Miller’s case i s dis t inguishable from Davis

. There, crosse x a mination about the witness’s probation could have exposed an incentiv e t o deflect suspicion away from himself and t oward Davis. See id. at 311-19. The victims in this case were not on probation at the time of the crime, nor w ere they suspects with an incentive to shift blame onto Miller. Moreover, nothing in the record o r pleadings suggests that the federal prosecutor could have i nf luenced any state juvenile-court proceedings a n d th e r eb y p rovided an inducement for the victims to testify in the federal trial. See United S tates v. Thorn , 9 17 F .2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming preclusion of impeachment with s tate i ndictments because the defendant offered no evidence that the Government could i nfluence the state proceedings). In addition, the impeachment value o f t h e p roposed cross-examination was minimal because ot her witnesses c o rroborated the victims’ materi a l t e s timony. See Kopycinski v. Scott , 6 4 F.3d 223, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1995) (concerning withheld evidence and n o ting that strong c o rroboration

can make t estimony unimpeachable). Miller’s speculative cross-examination of the young witnesses about their juvenile c onduct would h ave been marginally relevant, at best. See Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. at 679.

2 Case: 12-30516 Document: 00512338777 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/12/2013No. 12-30516

Regardless, any error in limiting c r oss-examination was harmless beyond

a reas onable d oubt. See id. at 684. The victims’ testimonies were not indispensable i n l ight of other evidence that was corroborative on points material to Miller’s conviction. The only evidence c ontrary to the vic t i ms’ testimony was M iller’s uncorroborated denial of wrongdoing. Under the totality of circumstances, the G overnment’s case against M i l ler w a s very strong. See id. (identifying factors relevant to harmless error review). Miller also asserts that it was p lain error to impose a $15,000 fine where the presentence report n oted that he would likely be unable to pay a fine within the Guideline range. The applicable fine under the Guidelines was $25,000 to $250,000. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). The f ine was below the Guideline range, and Miller offers no evidence or argumen t t h a t he will be unable to e arn money toward p ayment of the fine while he works in prison for the rest of his life. He has not shown that the imposition of the fine was a plain error. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

3 Case: 12-30516 Document: 00512338777 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/12/2013