J.S29043/16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.J.F.-Z., A/K/A 

B.F.-Z., A MINOR 

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

:

APPEAL OF: T.F. :

:

 : No. 1900 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court 

at No. CP-02-AP-0000100-2015 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: I.J.F.-Z., A/K/A 

I.F.-Z., A MINOR 

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

:

APPEAL OF: T.F. :

:

 : No. 1901 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court 

at No. CP-02-AP-0000101-2015 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2016 

T.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders dated November 12, 2015, 

and entered on November 16, 2015, granting the petitions filed by the 

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) to 

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her minor children, B.F.-Z. 

(born in June of 2011), a male, and I.F.-Z. (born in February of 2013), a 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
J.S29043/16 

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female (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), 

(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 

We affirm. 

We adopt the trial court recitation of the relevant history of this case. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 1/8/16, at 2-6 (unpaginated). Importantly, on June 11, 

2015, CYF filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother to the 

Children. On June 25, 2015, October 8, 2015, and November 12, 2015, the 

trial court held hearings on the petitions. 

In orders dated November 12, 2015, and entered on November 16, 

2015, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights.2 On December 4, 

2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

On December 21, 2015, this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals. 

Mother raises the following issues on appeal: 

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in finding that Allegheny County Children, 

Youth and Families proved by clear and convincing 

evidence grounds for the involuntary termination of . . . 

 

1

 In these orders, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.A.Z., 

the Children’s father (“Father”), and any unknown father, pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Neither Father nor any unknown 

father has filed an appeal or is a party to the present appeal. 

2 See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 508-09 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating an order 

is not appealable until it is entered on the docket with the required notation 

that appropriate notice has been given).
J.S29043/16 

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Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8)[?] 

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County 

Children, Youth and Families met its burden of proving that 

termination of . . . Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence[?] 

Mother’s Brief at 6. 

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of 

a petition for termination of parental rights. As in 

dependency cases, our standard of review requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by 

the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 

(2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, 

an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id. 

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate 

courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the 

child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court 

must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and 

impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the 
J.S29043/16 

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factual findings are supported by the record and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. 

 

In re S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012) (some 

citations omitted). 

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained: 

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” 

Id. This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

We will focus our review on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide 

as follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

* * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
J.S29043/16 

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being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent. 

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights 

under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under Section 2511(b), the 

focus is on the child. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(en banc). The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 

2511(a)(2) as follows. 

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by 

clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

parent has caused the child to be without essential

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . . 

[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity sufficient 

for termination under § 2511(a)(2): 
J.S29043/16 

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A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be 

made lightly or without a sense of compassion for 

the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when 

termination is based upon parental incapacity. The

legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption

Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of 

performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit 

as one who refuses to perform the duties. 

In re S.P., 616 Pa. at 326-27, 47 A.3d at 827 (citation omitted). 

Instantly, the record substantiates the trial court’s assessment of the 

evidence regarding Mother’s incapacity to parent Children, and her inability 

to remedy the conditions and causes of her incapacity to parent Children, 

which we adopt herein. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (unpaginated). 

In her brief, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that the 

grounds for termination existed under Section 2511(a)(2). She 

acknowledged her mistakes with Children and recognized that she needs to 

make better and healthier choices regarding smoking and using drugs and 

alcohol. Mother’s Brief at 13-15. This Court, however, has stated that a 

parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 

(Pa. Super. 2002). A “parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of 

uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Id. As the trial court’s 

factual findings, including Mother’s longstanding recalcitrance, are supported 

by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error 

of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with 
J.S29043/16 

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regard to subsection (a)(2). In re S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-

27. 

 Next, we review the termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

Section 2511(b). Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows. 

 [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs 

and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 

2012). In In re E.M., [533 Pa. 115, 122, 620 A.2d 481, 

485 (1993)], this Court held that the determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The 

“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect 

on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-29, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). 

The trial court considered the needs and welfare of the Children and 

set forth its bond-effect analysis at length. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 

(unpaginated). Again, as the trial court’s factual findings and credibility 

determinations are supported by the record, and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s decision with 

regard to subsection (b). In re S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

Mother argues that Children recognize her as their mother and engage 

in a loving relationship with her. Mother’s Brief at 21. As we stated in In re 

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010), a child’s life “simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 
J.S29043/16 

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responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Rather, “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her 

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in 

a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 

856 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/5/2016 
On June 10, 2015, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and 

Families ("CYF"} filed petitions for involuntary termination of the parental rights of 

the natural parents of I. F-Z. and B. F-Z, (''the children"). Appellant, TW F. 

("Mother''} is the natural mother of the Children. 

Hearings on the petition to terminate parental rights ("TPR") were held on 

June 25, 2015, October 8, 2015 and November 12, 2015 regarding both Children. 

At the time of the June 25, 2015 "show up" hearing, the Children had been in 

care for over 15 months. At the conclusion of the November 12, 2015 hearing, I 

found CYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for 

termination existed and that termination best served the needs and welfare of 

the Children. Accordingly, on November 12, 2015, I issued Orders terminating 

the parental rights of the natural parents to the Children. Mother timely 

appealed and filed her l 925(b} Statements. 

January 8, 20 l 6 Judge Cathleen Bubash 

OPINION 

1900 WDA 2015 

1901 WDA 2015 

T .. F., 

Natural mother 

APPEAL OF: Superior Court Nos: 

TPR CP-02-AP-0000100-2015 & 

I.F~Z. and B. F-Z. CP-02-AP-000010l-2015 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION 

Circulated 04/19/2016 02:09 PM
I Neither named father nor any unknown father participated in the proceedings but each had counsel who 

participated. 

Mother has two other children who are not part of these proceedings. An older daughter lives with her biological 

father and has not been adjudicated dependent. A younger sibling has also been removed from Mother. That child 

has been adjudicated dependent at CP-02-DP-0001055-2015. Mother has refused to name that child's father. 

Statement of Facts 

BF-Z. was born on 6/2/11 and IF-Z. was born on 2/14/ 13.28 The family first 

became involved with CYF in July of 2013 after a domestic dispute. (TR. 10/8/15, 

p. 40). CYF again became involved in November of 2013 after receiving a call 

regarding Mother's homelessness, neglect of the children, and unresolved drug 

and alcohol issues (TR. 10/8/15, p. 41). 

Although she was very resistant to assistance, Mother was provided with 

intensive crisis in-home services on December 12, 2013. Mother was given a 

Family Service Plan {"FSP") on December 17, 2013 which she signed on January 

3, 2014. The goals set forth under the FSP were: 

I) recovery from substance abuse; 2) eliminate verbal and physical 

family abuse; 3) supervision of children. including baby gates and 

appropriate caregivers; 4) appropriate medical and dental care, 

including immunizations; 5} maintain contact and cooperate with CYF; 

6}meet basic needs of food and clothing; 7) safe living conditions and 

Matters Complained of on Appeal 

Mother raises identical issues in both appeals. She avers that I abused my 

"discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in finding that Allegheny County 

Children, Youth, and Families proved by clear and convincing evidence 

grounds for the involuntary termination of Birth Mother's parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2), (5), and (8)." She further avers that I abused my 

"discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County 

Children, Youth, and Families met its burden of proving that termination of Birth 

Mother's parental rights would meet the needs .ond welfare" of the children, 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l (b). 

For the reasons set forth below, my decision to terminate Mother's 

parental rights to the Children should upheld and my Orders be affirmed. 1 
Little progress was made in Mother's parenting. For example, during an inhome visit by CYF the two year old son fell down the stairs. Mother did not go to 

the child when he fell, remaining sitting on a couch. When asked why she did 

not go to him, Mother answered, "Boys fall". (TR. I 0/8/15, p. 42-44). CYF then 

provided Mother with baby gates but she would not utilize them. Further, 

Mother continued to engage in domestic violence, including a December 24, 

2013 incident involving a knife where Mother was the aggressor. The Children 

were present during that incident. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. 44-45). 1 n-home services 

remained in place until February of 2014, when they were discontinued due to 

Mother's non-compliance. 

The subject Children were removed from Mother's care on February 18, 

2014 pursuant to an Emergency Custody Order due to concerns of neglect, 

parenting deficiencies including medical neglect, inadequate supervision, no 

food in home, and Mother's unresolved substance abuse and mental health 

issues. (TR. 6/25/ 15, p. 72). Bryn Albee, the caseworker who was present when 

the Children were removed, testified that Mother's home smelled of marijuana 

and alcohol and no food was found in the home. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 45-46). Mother 

was highly agitated, combative, overly rough with her infant, and verbally 

abusive. She refused a requested urine screen. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 83-85). 

The Children were placed into emergency foster care. CYF filed a 

Dependency Petition on February 25, 2014 and the Children were adjudicated 

dependent on March 27, 2014. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 47). later that month, the 

Children were moved to the foster home where they still reside with preadoptive foster parents. 

Mother did not attend the next two FSP meetings scheduled on March 26, 

2014 and August 14, 2014. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 48). A pattern of missed or cancelled 

drug screens and missed appointments required by the FSP followed and 

housing; 8) understand age appropriate behavior and expectations for 

children. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 49-52). 
Mother otherwise refused to cooperate with the agency. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 56-57, 

60-6 I). Mother often could not be reached by phone. Over the fifteen months 

between removal of the Children and the first TPR hearing, Mother made little 

progress toward meeting the majority of the FSP goals set for her. 

Additionally, Mother failed to be forthright with her caseworkers or the 

court. She claimed to be attending parenting classes at McKeesport Family 

Support Center but would not provide releases for CYF to acquire information on 

her attendance. Once she did sign the release, CYF found there was no record 

of her attending. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 54). 

Mother also refused to attend a domestic violence class after the 

December 24, 2013 incident and, in fact, did not attend until September of 

2014. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. 58). Moreover, Mother has stated that she does not 

understand how domestic violence might affect her Children. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 

58). Mother did not attend domestic violence classes from September 14, 2014 

until March 15, 2015, which she asserted was due to incarceration. Her time in 

jail was, however, only from December 7, 2014 through January 13, 2015. (TR. 

6/25/ 15, p. 40-41 ) . 

After refusing to attend her first scheduled court-ordered psychological 

evaluation on May 30, 2014, Mother was evaluated by Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D. of 

Allegheny Forensic Associates on October 22, 20 l 4, at which time she was 

minimally cooperative. Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed Mother with Oppositional 

Defiant Disorder and Adjustment Disorder. He recommended that she seek 

mental health treatment once a week, as well as anger management. Mother 

did not complete her intake for mental health until May of 2015. (TR. 6/25/15, p. 

15, 29-30). 

Mother has been provided throughout these proceedings with two weekly 

supervised visits with her Children. Due to her inconsistent attendance, Mother 

was required to provide 24 hours notice of whether she would attend a 

scheduled visit to avoid the Children being transported and subsequently 
4 In her infant son's separate dependency matter, Mother demonstrated her continued lack of judgment and lack of 

credibility by colluding with a great-aunt to retain custody of that child against court orders, despite the woman's 

inappropriateness as a care-giver. After suggesting the great-aunt take custody, Mother then referred to her as 

unsafe. This subterfuge resulted in the baby being left by the great-aunt in the care of an unknown person. See TR. 

l0/8/15, p. 95-101. 

3 This behavior changed and improved after the filing of the TPRs when Mother began taking her parenting classes 

more consistently. Mother has requested that her parenting classes continue as she believes they are helping her and 

the evidence supports that. (6/25/15 T. p. 34-35, 49-50) 

It was only after the filing of the TPR petitions on June l 0, 2015 that 

Mother's behavior with the Children began to improve. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 157). 

Much of Mother's behavior remains troubling and her credibility has not 

improved. Mother has told her caseworkers that she lives independently, but 

has refused to show them her lease despite being requested to do so. (TR. 

l 0/8/ 15, p. 65; TR. 11 I 12/ J 5, p. 42, 73). Mother, who has a history of domestic 

violence, has denied being in a new relationship but has changed her social 

media "stotus" to "in a relationship'1 and has adopted the last name of a man 

she refers to as a neighbor. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 89-91; TR. 11/12/15, p. 28, 30-31).4 

Mother remains inconsistent in attending meetings with the service 

providers and will focus only on meeting her housing goals. She will not address 

other FSP goals, such as parenting issues. She refuses to understand why CYF 

became involved. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 85-86}. Especially troubling considering her 

disappointed. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 65). Of the 190 visits Mother was offered, 133 were 

completed. Of those, only 78 began on time, and 35 visits were cancelled due 

to no confirmation from Mother. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p, 155- 156). 

Susan Rosati, case specialist, testified that during visits, Mother was often 

inattentive to the Children, did not interact with them, and spent most of her 

time "on her phone." (TR. 6/25/15, p. 44).3 Often, when she was asked by the 

Children to read to them or to play, she declined. (TR. l 0/8/15, p. 165). Mother 

often displayed a negative attitude toward the staff. (TR. l0/8/ 15, p. 157). 

Mother left her infant in an unbuckled car seat on a table when she left the 

visiting room without securlnq anyone to watch the baby. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. l 60- 

1 6 l). 
CYF seeks to terminate Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511 (a)(2},(5), and (8). The statute provides for the involuntary termination of 

parental right if the petitioner can establish any one of the following grounds: 

"251 l .(a) General rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

******** 

Discussion 

history, Mother has continued to state to her caseworker, Bryn Albee, that she 

does not understand how her domestic violence affects the Children. (TR. 

10/8/15, p. 58) 

At trial, a number of witnesses testified, including Dr. Neil Rosenblum who 

conducted a series of individual assessments, evaluations and interactional 

interviews with Mother and the Children, and the foster parents and the 

Children. His expert reports were also admitted into evidence. 

Dr. Rosenblum testified that the Children were bonded to their foster 

parents and saw them as role models. (TR. 10/8/ l 5, p. 118-12 I]. He testified that 

the Children had no strong attachment to Mother but did have a strong 

attachment to the foster parents. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. 129-134). Dr. Rosenblum further 

testified that termination and adoption would enhance the Children's stability 

and be the "best choice for the Children and the choice that would be most 

consistent with their needs and welfare." (TR. 10/8/15, p. 136). He testified that 

the attachment to the foster parents was the Children's primary attachment 

and that it would be worse for the Children to lose their foster parents than it 

would be to lose Mother. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 142-148) . 

. Additionally, Dr. Rosenblum testified that Mother's denial of her mental 

health issues as well as her denial of the risk factors she was creating for her 

Children; limit her ability to correct her parenting deficiencies. He testified that, 

since Mother's mental conditions and attitudes continue to exist, the Children 

would continue to be at risk if in her care. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 124, 139-140). 
The record in this matter reveals Mother's repeated and continuing 

incapacity to care for her Children so as to be reunited with them. Close to two 

years have passed since these young Children were removed from Mother's 

Once the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights 

have been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the Court must next 

consider the next step of the process and determine whether the termination 

would meet the needs and welfare of the child under sub-section 251 l (b): 

(b) Other considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of a parent 

shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not 

be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if 

found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of 

the petition." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I. (emphasis added) 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have 

elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,(Pa. 

Super. 2006) 

****** 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six 

months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

* * * * * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 
The testimony establishes that Mother was offered a multitude of services 

to assist her in remedying the conditions which led to the removal of her 

Children. lt also demonstrates that she did not actively participate in those 

services and, in fact, often refused to participate or lied about her participation. 

Grounds for terminating parental rights are not limited to affirmative conduct, 

but may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95(Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, Mother was provided 

care. The youngest has spent more than half of her life in placement. Mother 

did not meaningfully or consistently participate in the FSP process until after the 

TPR petitions were filed, more than fifteen months after her Children were 

removed. The conditions which led to the removal continue to exist. 

Mother has, throughout these proceedings, demonstrated a lack of 

understanding of the consequences of her actions on her Children. Mother has 

failed, and often belligerently refused, to communicate and cooperate with 

CYF or to address the majority of the issues which led to the removal of her 

Children. 

Despite Mothe(s recent efforts, she has not been able to meet her FSP 

goals to a degree that return of the Children to her care would be appropriate 

or feasible. Additionally, any progress she has made did not occur until June of 

2015, after the filing of the TPR petitions and more than fifteen months after her 

Children were placed in foster care. 

As the Superior Court has acknowledged: 

"The application of Section (a){8) may seem harsh when the parent 

has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had 

led to removal of her children. By allowing for termination when the 

conditions that led to removal continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance 

while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's 

claims of progress and hope for the future." fn re J.F.M., 7 I A.3d 989, 

997 (Pa. Super. 2013}. 
time to remedy the conditions which led to removal and chose not to do so until 

the Children had been in care or over 15 months. I found that, even if Mother 

was offered additional services and more time, she would not be able to 

remedy the conditions in a reasonable amount of time. 

In determining that termination of Mother's parental rights best served the 

needs and welfare of her Children, I considered the history of the case 

presented by her caseworkers and I relied heavily upon the testimony of Dr. Neil 

Rosenblum, who completed numerous evaluations in this case. 

In his May 30, 2014 evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum found the Children to be 

thriving, and primarily attached with their pre-adoptive foster parents. with 

whom they have a primary bond and who they refer to as Mom and Dad. He 

found their attachment with Mother to be much less strong when he performed 

an interactional evaluation on October 22, 2014, and opined that the trauma of 

losing their relationship with their Mother would be less severe than what they 

would suffer should they be removed from their foster parents. Dr. Rosenblum 

concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by the 

foster parents was in the best interest of the Children. I agreed, finding the 

evidence clearly established that termination of Mother's rights to the Children 

best served their needs and welfare. 

I recognize that these Children have a relationship with Mother and I do 

not doubt the sincerity of Mother's love for her Children. However, a parent's 

emotional bond with her Children is only one of many factors to be considered 

in determining what is in the best interest of the Children. "Intangibles such as 

love, comfort. security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and 

welfare of the child." In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005). In this 

type of case, there is a dichotomy when a bond may exist between a parent 

and child, but the parent is either unwilling or unable to satisfy the minimum 

requirements of parenting. The issue is not whether there is a bond that exists. 

between the parent and child that would be harmful if severed; the issue is what 
is in the child's best interests and welfare under the totality of the circumstances. 

In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920-921 (Pa.Super.2008} 

Here, Dr. Rosenblum credibly described the lack of bond the Children 

have with Mother and the destabilizing effect termination of the bond with 

foster parents would have on the Children. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 144-145). Based on 

Dr. Rosenblum's evaluations and testimony, viewed in light of the other 

evidence presented, I found that severing the bond with Mother would be less 

detrimental and traumatizing to the Children and would best serve their needs 

and welfare based on the totality of the circumstances. 

The Children have been living together in a stable and loving home since 

February of 2014, a significant part of their young lives. Although the Children 

may have some bond with Mother, their primary bond and attachment is with 

their foster parents who are ready, willing, and able to adopt them. Clearly, the 

Children's emotional, educational and medical needs are all being met in this 

home and, in fact, removal from this home would be harmful to them. 

Prior to filing for termination, CYF made more than reasonable efforts keep 

Mother with her Children, and to reunite Mother with them after removal, efforts 

which Mother actively and stubbornly resisted until much too late. The 

Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts at reunification, but it 

"does not have an obligation to make such efforts indefinitely. The 

Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but also in each 

child's right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment, and the two interests 

must both be considered." In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. 

Super 2003). The record demonstrates that forcing these Children to wait any 

longer for stability would not be in their best interests. In light of Mother's 

unreliable efforts, these Children's need for a permanent. stable, and loving 

home must take precedence. 
Date: I J, 

BY THE COURT: 

Conclusion 

After a careful review of the evidence, I found that CYF had clearly and 

convincingly established grounds for termination under 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 

251 l (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) and that termination of Mother's parental rights 

best serves the needs and welfare of both children. For these reasons, my 

Orders should be affirmed.