# IN T HE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF T EX AS

NO. P D-0724-12

LIONEL GONZ ALES, Ap pellant

v. THE S TATE O F TEXAS

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW F ROM THE FOUR TH COURT OF AP P EALS,

BEXAR COUNTY
Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which Ke ller, P.J ., and Price , J ohnson, Kea sler, He rvey , Cochran, a nd Alcala , J J ., joined. Mey ers, J., did not participa te.
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appea ls improperly place d the burde n on the appe llant to demonstrate that he w as pre judiced by

the excessive dela

y betwee n his indictment and trial. Holding that the Court of Appe als err ed, we reve rse its judg ment and

rema nd this case to that cour

t for conside ration of the a ppellant’s cla im under the c orre ct standard.

## The a ppellant was c harg ed by

indictment on March 17, 2004, w ith injury to a child and indece ncy with a child. He w as not arr ested until April 21, 2010, and soon there afte r he f iled a motion to di smiss for lack of a speedy trial. I n deter mining whe ther a

n acc used has be en denie d his right to a spe edy trial under the state and f

eder al constitutions, Tex as cour ts use the balanc ing te st created by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v . W ingo
. The fa ctors to be we ighe d include, but ar e not limited to: (1) 1 

## the leng th of the dela

y ; (2) the r eason f

or the de lay ; (3) the de fenda nt’s asser tion of the rig ht; and (4) the pr ejudice to the de fenda nt resulting f

rom the dela

y . 2 

## I n the instant case , the trial cour t ruled that the a

ppellant was not de nied his rig ht to a speedy trial bec ause he failed to satisfy the third and four

th prong s. The Court of Appe als disag ree d as to the third prong , but held that the appe llant’s failure to demonstrate pr ejudice nonetheless outwe ighe d the first three fac tors. I n so doing, the Court of Appea ls, ostensibly 3 

## rely ing on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Doggett v. United States , held that “e ven in the ca se 4 

## wher e the de lay

is presumptively

prejudicia l – as we c onclude it is here – the appe llant must

never theless show that he w as pre judiced by

the delay .” 5 

## Now, on appe al to this court, the appe llant contends – and the State conce des – that, wher e the de lay

is presumptively

prejudicia l, Doggett absolves the a ccuse d from the r equire ment to demonstrate pr ejudice. T he appe llant further contends – a

nd the State ag ain conc edes – tha t it

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## is the State that must rebut or extenuate the pr esumption of prejudice

.

We ag ree . I n the instant case , the six -y ear delay betwee n the appe llant’s indictment and his arre st “presumptively compromise[d] the re liability of a tria l in way s that neither pa rty can prove or , for that matter , identify .” Acc ording ly , the Court of Appe als should have r eviewe d the 6



## rec ord not for pr oof of pr ejudice but r ather the re buttal or extenuation of prejudice

. 7 

## The Court of Appe als improperly place d the burde n on the appe llant to demonstrate prejudice . We reve rse its judg ment and re mand this case to that c ourt to conduct the Barker balanc ing te st under the c orre ct standar d for de termining prejudice

.

Deliver ed F ebrua

ry 27, 2013. Do not publish.

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