United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Committee on

Appropriations, House of

Representatives

November 1998 MILITARY SATELLITE

COMMUNICATIONS

Concerns With

Milstar’s Support to

Strategic and Tactical

Forces

GAO/NSIAD-99-2

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278426 

November 10, 1998

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) multiservice Milstar system is intended

to provide the National Command Authorities, chief military commanders,

and strategic and tactical military forces with a highly protected and

survivable means of communications that would be operable nearly

worldwide and throughout all levels of military conflict.1

 The Milstar

program involves the acquisition of satellites; a mission control capability;

and specially designed Army, Navy, and Air Force terminals for a variety of

users operating from ground-mobile vehicles, ships, submarines, aircraft,

and fixed-ground locations.

As you requested, we evaluated (1) the Milstar system’s capabilities to

support strategic and tactical missions and (2) the extent to which DOD has

provided assurance of continuing comparable satellite communications

among the users after the Milstar satellites under development are

launched.

Background DOD initiated the Milstar program under Air Force management in the early

1980s. Milstar is intended to be DOD’s most robust communications

satellite system. It is designed to operate in the extremely high frequency

(EHF) radio spectrum, although it has super high frequency and ultra high

frequency capabilities, and it was originally designed to transmit signals at

low data rates (LDR).2

 Milstar employs computer processing capabilities on

the satellites and several different radio signal processing techniques that

provide resistance to electronic jamming. Computer processing associated

with other DOD communication satellite systems is primarily performed

1

The National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly

deputized alternates or successors. Protected and survivable communications means that the system is

relatively resistant to electronic jamming and some effects of nuclear detonations. For Milstar, nearly

worldwide communications means satellite coverage of the earth within 65 degrees south and

65 degrees north latitudes.

2

EHF radio signals range from 30 to 300 gigahertz within the electromagnetic spectrum. Super high

frequencies range from 3 to 30 gigahertz and ultra-high frequencies range from 300 to 3,000 megahertz.

Milstar’s LDR transmissions are at speeds of 75 to 2,400 bits per second.

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B-278426 

with ground-based equipment and is considered to be less resistant to

electronic jamming.

In 1990, as the Cold War subsided, the Congress directed DOD to either

restructure the Milstar system or develop an alternative advanced

communications system to (1) substantially reduce the cost of the Milstar

program, (2) eliminate unnecessary capabilities for protracted nuclear

war-fighting missions and operations, and (3) increase the usefulness of

the program for tactical forces. DOD chose to restructure the system. As a

result of the 1991 Gulf War experience, DOD established a basis for

increased Milstar support to tactical forces by using a medium data rate

(MDR) communications capability.3

Currently, there are two Milstar satellite designs—the LDR version, called

Milstar I, and a combined LDR and MDR version, called Milstar II. A total of

six satellites are included in the program—two Milstar I satellites were

launched in 1994 and 1995, and four Milstar II satellites are being

fabricated and are scheduled to be launched in fiscal years 1999 through

2002. As a follow-on effort, DOD has initiated an advanced EHF satellite

communications program to replace the Milstar I and II designs, with plans

to launch the first advanced satellite in fiscal year 2006.

Since program inception, DOD has spent several billions of dollars to

acquire the Milstar I and II satellites, a mission control capability, and a

variety of user terminals.4

 In total, DOD has procured, or plans to procure,

over 3,500 terminals. In addition, it is planning to spend several more

billions of dollars for the advanced EHF satellite system.

Results in Brief There are several limitations associated with the Milstar system’s

capabilities to support strategic missions. Although the Milstar I system,

which is primarily for strategic communications purposes, has been

deployed for over 2 years, a May 1998 draft operational test report

revealed that system support could be limited in some critical strategic

mission areas. First, operational testing showed that military commanders

could not communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner, when

using the low data rate capabilities. The purpose of such voice

3

Milstar’s MDR transmissions are to be at speeds ranging from 4,800 to 1,544,000 bits per second, thus

significantly increasing the volume of data processed through the satellites. For background on Milstar

program restructuring, see Military Satellite Communications: Milstar Program Issues and Cost-Saving

Opportunities (GAO/NSIAD-92-121, June 26, 1992).

4

For national security reasons, the total amount of funds invested in Milstar cannot be disclosed.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
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communications is to discuss whether a ballistic missile launch threatens

North America, and if so, to determine the appropriate retaliatory

response. This limitation was attributable to inherent characteristics of

Milstar’s low data rate technology and associated peripheral equipment

(referred to as input-output communication devices). Second, operational

testing of the missile warning teletype network was planned, but not

performed, to verify that accurate and timely ballistic missile alert

messages could be transmitted from the North American Aerospace

Defense Command to other strategic command centers. A subsequent Air

Force test of this teletype network determined that a required redundancy

check for data accuracy could not be performed without software

modifications. Third, operational testing revealed a Milstar system

endurance issue, associated with the nuclear bomber force, that must be

resolved because of the requirement for continuous communication

capabilities if the bomber force needed to be recalled or redirected.

Fourth, testing showed that the configuration of peripheral equipment and

its accompanying software has not been effectively controlled or fully

certified to ensure communications interoperability with the Milstar

system. DOD has identified corrective actions for the limitations in these

four areas. However, final resolutions are dependent on approval of

requirements, verification through testing, a certification process, or

obtaining necessary funds.

Regarding tactical missions, the Air Force has encountered schedule

delays related to software development for a critical Milstar

component—called the automated communications management

system—that could adversely affect Milstar II’s timely support to tactical

forces. This management system is intended to allocate and apportion

Milstar’s limited communication capabilities among multiple system users.

A previous Air Force effort to develop such a management system

encountered technical difficulties, resulting in the contractual work being

canceled. Delays in delivering the current software have caused the Army

to independently initiate an upgrade to the less sophisticated Milstar I

communications management system for use with Army terminals. This

upgrade effort, while compatible with the Army’s terminal testing

schedule, will require the Army to reconfigure its equipment and software

and retrain its forces when the automated communications management

system becomes available at a future date.

DOD has not provided assurance that the continuity of protected medium

data rate satellite communication capabilities will be maintained for

tactical forces after the four Milstar II satellites are launched. The satellite

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B-278426 

constellation’s communication capabilities, in terms of total capacity, are

predicted to degrade below a minimally acceptable level in fiscal

year 2003, before the advanced satellite system is expected to be available

in fiscal year 2006. This prediction is based on computer modeling that

takes factors such as satellite component reliability into account. In

addition, the deployment of Milstar II tactical user terminals is expected to

be completed in 2003, and tactical forces will have become dependent on

the Milstar II system. This situation, coupled with the degraded satellite

constellation’s capabilities, could result in users not having the

communications capacity they require or expect to execute their missions.

Although DOD has been aware of this potential degradation in satellite

communications for several years, it has not fully assessed the associated

operational risks to tactical forces.

Milstar I Support to

Some Critical

Strategic Mission

Areas Could Be

Limited

The Milstar I system is expected to provide communication networks in

support of designated strategic mission areas. For example, in regard to

strategic ballistic missile threats to North America, the system is expected

to (1) transmit missile warning data from sensor processing sites to

command centers, (2) provide commanders a means of exchanging

information about ballistic missile attack assessments, and (3) disseminate

critical messages to forces on how to respond to missile attacks. However,

a May 1998 draft operational test report, prepared by the Air Force

Operational Test and Evaluation Center, concluded that although the

Milstar system was found to be effective for communications during

normal operations, numerous deficiencies would require corrective action

before the full nuclear wartime strategic capabilities could be realized.

Deficiencies in three areas were highlighted—(1) military commanders’

voice conference network, (2) missile warning teletype network, and

(3) emergency action message dissemination and force direction network.

The deficiencies were associated with system connectivity—a critical

operational issue that addresses the primary mission of Milstar to provide

minimum essential worldwide communications among all services at all

levels of military conflict.

The purpose of the operational test was to evaluate the effectiveness and

suitability of the in-orbit Milstar I satellite system. According to

operational test officials, testing was hampered because, in some

instances, the evaluation criteria were based on ambiguous operational

requirements. DOD has not yet completed efforts to validate updates to the

Milstar 1992 operational requirements. In addition, more recent testing

revealed that peripheral equipment and software to be used with Milstar

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B-278426 

has not been effectively controlled to ensure communications

interoperability with other systems. DOD regulations require such

interoperability.

Military Commanders’

Voice Conference Network

The purpose of the military commanders’ voice conference network is to

enable commanders to discuss whether a ballistic missile launch threatens

North America, and if so, to determine the appropriate retaliatory

response. However, operational testing and subsequent military exercises

relative to this network determined that the National Command

Authorities and the chief military commanders would be unable to

communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner.

Program officials stated that communication signal delays and poor voice

quality are inherent characteristics in Milstar LDR technology and

associated peripheral equipment. However, they believe that voice

conference quality can be improved by (1) assigning additional

communication channels to the strategic commanders, thereby simplifying

time consuming hand-over procedures and improving timeliness;

(2) consolidating voice signals through communication switches to make

conferencing more efficient and user friendly; and (3) upgrading software

algorithms to improve voice intelligibility. According to Joint Staff

representatives, requirements and funding issues must be resolved before

a date can be established for making these corrections.

Missile Warning Teletype

Network

The purpose of the missile warning teletype network is to provide alert

messages of a pending ballistic missile attack. Transmitting accurate and

timely messages from the North American Aerospace Defense Command

to other strategic command centers is critical to ensuring a timely

retaliatory response to an attack. However, operational testing of this

network was not performed. In our attempt to determine the reason, we

were provided with two viewpoints—(1) Milstar support to the missile

warning and assessment mission area had not been approved for testing

by Milstar program officials and (2) there was a conflict with another

operational test being performed at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. The

result was that operational test officials could not verify that ballistic

missile alert messages could be reliably transmitted by the Milstar system.

The Air Force Space Command subsequently tested the missile warning

teletype network and identified that a required redundancy check could

not be performed to ensure data accuracy. The Command concluded that

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

software modifications were necessary to ensure such accuracy before the

network could be used without restrictions. A U.S. Space Command

representative stated that a plan had been approved to make the necessary

software modifications, but network certification is not expected until

May 2000.

Emergency Action

Message Dissemination

and Force Direction

Network

The purpose of the emergency action message dissemination and force

direction network is to provide a means for instructing the strategic forces

on an appropriate retaliatory response to a ballistic missile attack on

North America. Operational testing of this network revealed that the

bomber force could not sustain ultra high frequency radio access to

Milstar satellites because the radios’ batteries were not sufficiently reliable

or endurable. Battery life is one of several Milstar endurance issues and is

integrally linked with the Milstar system’s endurance requirement. This

requirement is the length of time that the system needs to be operational

during and after a nuclear conflict. Continuous communication

capabilities with deployed bomber forces are required if it became

necessary to recall or redirect these forces.

The endurance deficiency may have resulted from a disagreement about

the interpretation of operational requirements. Milstar program officials

stated that the system satisfied the 1992 Milstar requirements for

endurance and that additional requirements are being imposed on the

system. However, U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that recent

changes to Milstar operational requirements only clarify endurance

requirements and that the system should have performed in a manner

consistent with these requirements. DOD does not expect to resolve this

endurance issue until 2002. Ongoing DOD actions include (1) the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council’s approval of updated Milstar operational

requirements (which are to clarify endurance requirements) by April 1999,

(2) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s directions for a full

test of endurance requirements, and (3) addressing funding shortfalls

associated with endurance solutions.

Additional Software and

Equipment Concerns

The Milstar system supports multiple communication networks, and user

access to these networks is through peripheral equipment such as

telephone handsets, computers, facsimile machines, and teletypes

(referred to as input-output communication devices). However, testing by

the Joint Staff, completed in March 1998, revealed that the configuration of

this equipment and its accompanying software had not been effectively

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B-278426 

controlled to ensure communications interoperability. For example, the

test report stated that network command centers were using software,

which had not been formally approved, to interface with the Milstar

system. A test representative told us that unless this situation is corrected,

the probability increases that Milstar’s effectiveness could be degraded.

Ensuring interoperability of peripheral equipment and software supporting

Milstar and associated networks is critical to system operational

effectiveness. According to DOD representatives, 238 equipment and

software configurations that are to interoperate with Milstar terminals

have been identified, but only 5 configurations have been approved for use

and none have been fully certified. DOD requires that all military command,

control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems must be

certified as interoperable with other systems with which they share

information.5

 However, DOD representatives stated that they were

uncertain as to when the approval and certification process would be

completed.

Milstar II’s Support to

Tactical Forces Could

Be Adversely Affected

by Software

Development Delays

In fiscal year 1999, the Air Force plans to initiate operational tests to

determine the effectiveness and suitability of the Milstar II satellite

system. In addition, the Army and the Navy plan to operationally test their

tactical terminals’ capabilities to support tactical forces. However,

schedule delays related to software development for a critical component

of the Milstar II system could adversely affect these tests and plans for

tactical forces to transition from older communication systems to the new

Milstar II system. The component, called the automated communications

management system (ACMS), is critical to efficient Milstar operations. ACMS

is expected to allocate and apportion the system’s limited LDR and MDR

communication capabilities among multiple system users while permitting

decentralized execution of communications planning and management

functions by these users.

In 1989, the Milstar program office initiated efforts to develop

communications planning and resource management software, called the

Mission Planning Element. According to a program official, the effort was

canceled in 1994 because of technical difficulties that the contractor could

not overcome. In 1995, the program office signed an agreement with a

Navy development organization for ACMS, which was to perform functions

similar to the Mission Planning Element. Schedule delays since this ACMS

5

DOD’s interoperability guidance is contained in DOD Directive 4630.5, Nov. 12, 1992; DOD

Instruction 4630.8, Nov. 18, 1992; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.01A,

June 30, 1995.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

agreement was signed have totaled about 7 months. ACMS is currently

scheduled to be delivered in April 1999.

This April 1999 delivery date will not provide sufficient time for ACMS to be

integrated with the ground control station and allow for systems

operational testing with the first Milstar II satellite, which is to be

launched in January 1999. In addition, program officials stated that ACMS

software development is on a compressed schedule—a reduction from 

24 months to 12 months—increasing the risk that the April 1999 delivery

date may not be met. This creates the potential for ACMS not being

available to support operations with the second Milstar II satellite to be

launched in December 1999, if an additional delay occurs. According to an

Air Force official, an independent study team, chartered by the Joint Staff,

is assessing the effect of possible delays in the ACMS schedule, including

the feasibility of meeting the planned Milstar II launch schedule.

According to Army representatives, ACMS will not be available to support

operational testing of Army terminals, which is scheduled to start in

September 1999. The Army’s intentions were to use these test results to

decide on terminal deployment and on transitioning its tactical forces to

Milstar II. Concerned that ACMS delivery will be further delayed, the Army

is independently upgrading the less sophisticated, communications

management system, which was developed for Milstar I. However, such an

upgrade would only be able to support the small number of tactical

terminals expected to be deployed for the first Milstar II satellite. The

upgrade cannot support the increased number of tactical terminals that

are expected to be deployed after the launch of the second Milstar II

satellite in December 1999. At that time, the need for ACMS would be

critical. When ACMS becomes available, the Army will have to reconfigure

its equipment and software and retrain its forces.

Continuity of

Communication

Capabilities for

Tactical Forces Has

Not Been Assured

DOD predicts that MDR communication capabilities of the Milstar II

constellation will begin degrading in 2003—3 years before the planned first

launch of an advanced EHF satellite in fiscal year 2006. The year 2003 is

also when the deployment of MDR terminals to tactical forces is to be

completed and tactical forces will have become dependent on the

Milstar II system. This situation, coupled with the degraded capabilities,

could result in users not having the communications capacity they require

or expect to execute their missions. Therefore, if a military conflict were

to occur during this 3-year period, communications for the command and

control of tactical forces, using Milstar, could be adversely affected.

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B-278426 

The House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern about DOD

not giving adequate attention to operational risk during the transition

period from the Milstar II system to an advanced system, including

consideration that hundreds of Milstar terminals would be deployed by

that time. The Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a

report by March 31, 1999, to the congressional defense committees on the

effects of the communications degradation, including suggested

alternatives to minimize any adverse operational effects.6

 Although DOD is

aware of this potential degradation in Milstar communications capabilities,

it has not fully assessed the associated operational risks.

Constellation Predicted to

Degrade Before Advanced

System Is Available

In 1993, DOD performed a comprehensive assessment of U.S. defense needs

in the post-Cold War international security environment—called the

Secretary of Defense’s Report on the Bottom-Up Review. The issues of

Milstar affordability and alternative satellite designs were included in the

report. At that time, DOD decided to limit the total number of Milstar II

satellites to four, launch them in 1-year intervals from fiscal years 1999

through 2002, and begin launching advanced EHF satellites in fiscal year

2006.

In 1995, DOD predicted that Milstar II’s MDR communication capabilities

could begin to degrade below a minimally acceptable level in 2003—

3 years before DOD plans to replace the system with an advanced EHF

system. In the absence of a major failure, satellites usually degrade

gradually while in orbit, and their useful lives can be estimated based on

such factors as component reliability and fuel availability. DOD used a

computer simulation model, known as the Generalized Availability

Program, to predict a 70-percent probability that MDR capabilities would be

maintained at a minimally acceptable operational level until 2003. This

probability was predicted to decrease annually to about 35 percent in

2006.7

 A 1998 degradation analysis confirmed the 1995 results.

To describe the predicted degradation in more practical terms for Milstar

users, the Air Force converted the probabilities into a predicted loss of

MDR communication channels. Of the 128 planned MDR channels for the

four Milstar II satellites (32 channels per satellite), 16 channels, or

6

Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1999 (House

Report 105-591, June 22, 1998, p. 220).

7

LDR capabilities are predicted to have a 70-percent probability of maintaining a minimally acceptable

operational level until 2007 because all six satellites (Milstar I and II) will contain the LDR capability,

whereas only four satellites (Milstar II) will contain the MDR capability.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

12 percent, could fail by 2003, and 41 channels, or 32 percent, could fail by

2006.

The Army and the Navy—the predominant planned users of Milstar II’s

MDR capabilities—have expressed concern about the communications

degradation during the 3-year period. In 1996, the Army Vice Chief of Staff

stated that accepting the 70-percent prediction criterion placed protected

EHF communications, provided by the Milstar system, at an unacceptable

level of risk to the Army’s operational forces. Army representatives

informed us that they remained concerned about the degradation

adversely affecting tactical operations. Navy representatives informed us

that Navy Milstar terminals would have to compete for fewer MDR

resources during the 3-year period. However, they added that a concept of

operations must be updated for using MDR terminals and that an analysis

must be performed before the full operational effect of the degradation

can be known.

Tactical Forces Will

Become Increasingly

Dependent on Milstar II by

2003

In 2003, when Milstar II satellite capacity is predicted to degrade below the

minimum acceptable level, tactical forces (especially Army and Navy

forces) are expected to complete their deployment of MDR terminals. By

2004, the Army and the Navy intend to complete their transition from older

communications capabilities to Milstar II. Therefore, these forces will have

become highly dependent on Milstar II for protected satellite

communications.

The Army has maintained that existing tactical communication systems

were not mobile enough during the 1991 Gulf War to engage in rapid

offensive operations. Thus, the Army intends to use Milstar’s unique

capabilities to extend the range of protected battlefield communications,

allowing forces to operate farther from command posts than is possible

with existing communications systems. The Army plans to acquire 209

mobile terminals (called Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical

Terminals) and deploy them by the end of 2003, replacing older, larger,

and less mobile terminals that operate with the Defense Satellite

Communications System at super high frequency.

The Navy plans to upgrade about 90 percent of its 350 LDR terminals with

the MDR capability for ships, submarines, and shore installations. The first

Navy battle group is scheduled to be equipped with the MDR upgrades in

fiscal year 1999, and the remaining battle groups are expected to transition

to Milstar II through fiscal year 2003.

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Potential Adverse Effects

of System Degradation

Have Not Been Addressed

Since 1993, DOD’s efforts to develop and refine its future military satellite

communications architecture have reaffirmed the acquisition decision

documented in the Secretary of Defense’s Report on the Bottom-Up

Review. However, these efforts have also cited a need to analyze the

operational effects of degradation in MDR satellite capacity on tactical

forces.

In 1995, a DOD satellite communications architecture study, led by the

Defense Information Systems Agency, found that delaying the launch of

follow-on Milstar satellites beyond 2003 would create a risk in satisfying a

significant portion of DOD’s satellite communication requirements. Also in

1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

directed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence and the DOD Space Architect to develop

recommendations that would mitigate possible shortfalls in EHF service to

be provided by Milstar II. The Deputy Assistant Secretary responded to

that direction, in a draft program plan, by presenting degradation

avoidance and mitigation measures but stated that more analyses was

needed. He recommended that the DOD Space Architect conduct a

thorough analysis of the operational effects of the degradation.

In 1996, the DOD Space Architect stated that an acceptable approach to

making the transition from Milstar II to an advanced EHF system was to

plan military operations assuming less than a fully populated constellation

of four Milstar II satellites. This apparent recognition of operational risk

presumed that (1) because of the fiscal environment, the year 2005 would

be the earliest that an advanced system could be developed and launched

and (2) the Milstar II constellation would probably fall below its planned

capability of four satellites before 2005 because of launch or in-orbit

failures.

In 1997, representatives of unified commands and military satellite

acquisition organizations met to refine the future military satellite

communications architecture and develop an affordable transition and

implementation plan for that architecture. These representatives

acknowledged the risk of the Milstar constellation capacity degradation.

However, they stated that work remains to be done in modeling the effect

of information flow on combat operations.

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Conclusions Considering the importance of the Milstar system and the billions of

dollars that have been invested in the program, it is essential for DOD to

ensure that Milstar I and II capabilities will be operationally effective and

able to adequately support strategic and tactical forces in a timely manner.

Several actions could be taken to better substantiate the effectiveness of

Milstar capabilities—clarifying operational requirements; modifying

software to ensure network communications connectivity; certifying

peripheral equipment and associated software to affirm communications

interoperability; and ensuring timely development of the automated

communications management system.

Because the Milstar II satellite constellation’s communications capacity is

predicted to degrade from fiscal years 2003 through 2006, when an

advanced capability is to be available, the continuity of protected and

mobile satellite communications capacity is a potentially significant issue.

In addition, because the deployment of Milstar II terminals is expected to

be completed by fiscal year 2003, such degradation in communications

capacity could result in users not having the capabilities they require or

expect to execute their missions. Until DOD assesses the potential

operational risk to tactical military forces for this 2003 to 2006 satellite

transition period, as directed by the House Committee on Appropriations,

the seriousness of this matter will be unknown.

Recommendations In conjunction with the report that DOD is directed to provide by March 31,

1999, to the congressional defense committees on the effects of Milstar

communications degradation, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense provide information on the status and progress of DOD’s efforts to

resolve Milstar I operational issues and Milstar II developmental issues.

This information should include technical, schedule, testing, and funding

matters pertinent to (1) achieving user-to-user strategic communication

network connectivity and (2) managing the development difficulties

associated with the automated communications management system.

In assessing the operational risks associated with the predicted

degradation of Milstar communications, as directed by the House

Committee on Appropriations, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense specifically address (1) the minimally acceptable level of

extremely high frequency satellite communications needed to support

tactical forces and (2) the capability of the Milstar system to provide this

minimum level of communications until an advanced extremely high

frequency communications capability is deployed.

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Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD disagreed with our recommendation in the draft report that the

Secretary of Defense provide the necessary directions to the military

services and commands for (1) resolving the disagreements over

operational requirements, (2) ensuring the availability of necessary

software, (3) completing the certification process for interoperable

equipment and software, and (4) managing the difficulties in developing

the automated communications management system. DOD stated that

although our draft report was essentially correct in describing Milstar

issues during the 1997 operational test period, additional Secretary of

Defense directions to resolve these issues are unnecessary. DOD claimed

that the issues were being resolved and corrective actions were being

taken through standard DOD processes and procedures associated with

developing and fielding new capabilities. For example, DOD mentioned

general officer level forums that were (1) providing ongoing oversight of

operational, programmatic, and management issues affecting Milstar and

(2) tracking issues to fulfill Secretary of Defense guidance for the

transition of strategic users to Milstar by 2003.

In acknowledging the Milstar I issues identified during operational testing,

DOD emphasized that the Milstar system passed 14 of 17 threshold

parameters. However, according to operational test officials, these

parameters were more representative of system specifications than

operational requirements that would permit a judgment about Milstar’s

support to strategic mission areas. DOD identified several matters that

remain to be resolved for achieving an effective strategic and tactical

communications system. The matters were (1) funding for voice

conferencing network upgrades to improve timeliness and voice quality;

(2) completing software upgrades, equipment installations, and

certification of the missile warning teletype network; (3) performing

operational testing of nuclear bomber force communications and

endurance requirements; (4) implementing a new Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Instruction, that addresses the management of satellite

communications, to ensure interoperability certification of input-output

communication devices, which are critical for user-to-user

communications connectivity; and (5) completing ACMS development and

performing tests to demonstrate the complex function of allocating and

apportioning the fixed amount of Milstar communications capabilities.

Considering the number and variety of Milstar matters that still need

attention, we believe DOD should provide status and progress information

for resolving these matters to the congressional defense committees.

Accordingly, we modified our recommendation to the Secretary from

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

providing directions to the services to reporting on the status and progress

of resolving operational and developmental issues.

DOD also disagreed with our recommendation dealing with the minimum

level of extremely high frequency satellite communications needed to

support tactical forces and the extent that Milstar could provide that level

of communications until an advanced extremely high frequency

communications capability is deployed. DOD stated that (1) it previously

addressed the operational risk to tactical forces associated with the

planned transition from Milstar to the advanced extremely high frequency

satellite system; (2) another satellite system could provide some, but less

effective, protected communications during the transition period; and

(3) an additional review of this issue by the Secretary of Defense is

unnecessary. DOD cited (1) the Joint Space Management Board as having

approved military satellite communications architecture goals, strategy,

and milestones; (2) the Defense Resource Board as having funded military

satellite communication systems consistent with the architecture; and

(3) the Joint Requirements Oversight Council as having endorsed an

architecture transition plan based on a general officer level forum’s

evaluation of all future military satellite communication satellite

requirements and capabilities through 2010.

DOD has apparently given considerable high-level attention to the predicted

degradation in Milstar communication capabilities for the 2003 to 2006

period. Also, there is evidence that the operational risk accepted for this

time period was based on financial, and possibly technical, reasons as to

when an advanced extremely high frequency capability could be made

available. Although this decision was originally made in 1993, and

subsequently reaffirmed by various DOD authorities, it does not overcome

the potential condition of insufficient protected communications for

tactical forces during the 3-year transition period. DOD did not specifically

address our point regarding what minimum level of extremely high

frequency communications would be needed during the period, other than

to state that the tactical requirement for protected communications far

exceeds Milstar capabilities and tactical forces are not totally dependent

on Milstar for protected communications. Nor did DOD address whether

Milstar could provide that minimum level until an advanced capability is

deployed. Accordingly, we reaffirm our recommendation.

DOD also provided technical comments on the draft report, which we have

incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments on a draft of this report are

reprinted in their entirety in appendix I.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

Scope and

Methodology

Our review focused on Milstar system effectiveness and DOD’s plans to

provide continuing comparable EHF communications capabilities after the

existing system degrades. Specifically, we evaluated the Milstar I system’s

operational effectiveness in supporting DOD strategic missions by

reviewing the results of operational testing and exercises and comparing

the identified deficiencies with system operational requirements. We

obtained explanations of these deficiencies through discussions with

tester, user, and program representatives. Additionally, we evaluated the

Milstar II system’s potential effectiveness to support DOD tactical missions

by reviewing program schedules and comparing the status of critical

development activities with the schedules. We obtained an explanation of

delays from program and user representatives. Finally, we evaluated Air

Force assessments of the Milstar satellite constellation’s expected

availability by reviewing the results from a computer simulation model

used to predict satellite replenishment needs. We discussed the

interpretation of the model results with program analysts. We performed

our work primarily at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center in

El Segundo, California, and the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands in

Colorado Springs, Colorado, which included acquiring and assessing

information from acquisition and budget documents, management reports,

and internal memoranda.

To gain an additional understanding of these matters, we reviewed

information provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Technology; DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test

and Evaluation; the Joint Staff; and the Departments of the Air Force, the

Navy, and the Army in Washington, D.C. We also reviewed information

provided by the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base,

Nebraska; the Air Force’s Operational Test and Evaluation Center at

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; the Army’s Program Executive Office

for Communications Systems at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the Army’s

Signal Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia; the Navy’s Space and Naval

Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, California; and the Air Force’s

Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

We performed our review from August 1997 to August 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
B-278426 

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on National Security, House Committee on Appropriations;

and to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House

Committee on National Security; the Senate Committee on Armed

Services; and the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on

Appropriations. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense,

the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director, Office of Management and

Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call

me at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

20

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

25

Abbreviations

ACMS automated communications management system

DOD Department of Defense

EHF extremely high frequency

LDR low data rates

MDR medium data rate

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 13-14.

See p. 14.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 12.

See pp. 13-14.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 12.

See p. 14.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Homer H. Thomson

James A. Elgas

James P. Tallon

Los Angeles Field

Office

Dale M. Yuge

Samuel L. Hinojosa

(707293) Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-2 Military Satellite Communications
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