United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

November 1998 MILITARY BASES

Review of DOD’s 1998

Report on Base

Realignment and

Closure

GAO/NSIAD-99-17

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-279509 

November 13, 1998

Congressional Committees

Section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) required that the Secretary of Defense prepare and

submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the costs and

savings attributable to the rounds of base realignments and closures

(BRAC) conducted under special legislative authorities between 1988 and

1995 and on the need, if any, for additional BRAC rounds. The legislation

also required us to review the Secretary’s report.

In completing our review, we made an overall assessment of the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) responsiveness to the individual 

section 2824 reporting requirements and assessed individual reporting

topics, including the costs and savings of prior BRAC rounds and estimated

costs and savings of future BRAC rounds, the impact of prior BRAC rounds

on military capabilities, excess capacity, base reuse and economic

recovery of communities affected by BRAC actions, and processes DOD

would use to select bases for closure or realignment should further BRAC

rounds be authorized.

Background After four BRAC rounds between 1988 and 1995, the Secretary of Defense

and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD still retained

excess facilities infrastructure. Both cited the need for future BRAC

authority. Subsequently, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and the

1997 report of the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel

addressed the problem of remaining excess infrastructure within DOD and

recommended that additional BRAC rounds be conducted. In DOD’s May 19,

1997, report to the Congress on the results of the Quadrennial Defense

Review, the Secretary announced that DOD would ask the Congress to

authorize two additional BRAC rounds.

In considering the Secretary’s request for additional BRAC round authority

in 1997, various Members of Congress questioned the need for any future

rounds. As a result, the Congress enacted section 2824 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, which required that the

Secretary of Defense provide the Congress with a comprehensive report

on a range of BRAC issues and described the manner in which the data were

to be presented in the report. That legislation also required the Secretary

to submit the report not later than the date on which the President

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submitted to the Congress the budget for fiscal year 2000 and prohibited

DOD from spending funds to plan for subsequent BRAC actions until the

report was delivered. DOD submitted its report, The Report of the

Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure, on April 2, 1998.

In submitting DOD’s report to the Congress, the Secretary reemphasized

that DOD has substantial excess capacity in its base infrastructure. The

Secretary stressed that DOD needs the money that could be saved from

closing unneeded infrastructure to sustain high force readiness and a

robust weapon systems modernization program. Accordingly, the

Secretary requested two additional BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005. The

Secretary also noted DOD’s assistance in facilitating economic growth and

development for communities affected by BRAC actions.

Results in Brief DOD’s report to the Congress provided most, but not all, of the information

required in section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1998. For example, while DOD provided aggregate estimates of

savings in support costs due to base closures and realignments, it did not

provide this information by service, type of facility, and fiscal year. In

selected instances, usually because data were not available, DOD either did

not provide the information required or did not provide it in the level of

specificity required. For example, it provided estimated rather than actual

savings data because data on actual savings does not exist. For this

reason, DOD’s report did not provide much information that had not been

reported previously.

DOD’s report concludes that the four prior BRAC rounds, taken in aggregate,

are saving DOD billions of dollars annually. Our prior work examining BRAC

cost and savings and related issues affirms that past BRAC

recommendations will result in substantial savings once implementation

costs have been offset and net savings begin to accrue.1

 However, because

of data and records weaknesses, DOD’s report should be viewed as

providing a rough approximation of costs and savings rather than a precise

accounting. DOD’s data systems do not capture all savings associated with

BRAC actions, nor has DOD established a separate system to track BRAC

savings. DOD’s estimates of costs and savings for future BRAC rounds should

also be viewed as rough estimates because there is no assurance that the

cost and savings experiences from prior BRAC rounds will be precisely

1

Savings can begin to accrue even as costs are being incurred to implement a BRAC decision. One-time

implementation costs may increase or decrease from initial estimates during the implementation

period and can affect the point at which savings exceed implementation costs and net savings begin to

accrue on an annual recurring basis.

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replicated in the future. For example, in previous BRAC rounds, the military

services, in selecting bases to close among those ranking low in military

value, often chose those that were relatively less expensive to close.

Therefore, costs for future rounds may be higher than the average cost of

previous rounds.

Because the methodology used to identify excess capacity has a number of

limitations, DOD’s report gives only a rough indication that excess capacity

has increased relative to force structure since 1989. For example, DOD did

not try to determine to what extent excess capacity may have existed in

1989. However, other DOD studies, statements by DOD officials, and our

prior work support the report’s general conclusion that DOD continues to

retain excess capacity. Our work has shown this to be the case,

particularly in maintenance depots and in research, development, test, and

evaluation facilities.

DOD’s analysis of operational and readiness indicators have shown no

long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to

BRAC actions. This general conclusion is also consistent with our prior

work.

DOD’s report emphasizes that communities affected by prior BRAC actions

appear to be rebounding economically. We have also found this to be the

case, although our work also shows that some communities are faring

better than others.

DOD’s report suggests that proposed BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 would

be conducted like prior rounds. DOD’s legislative proposal requesting

authority to conduct two additional BRAC rounds provides a good starting

point for considering future legislation, should the Congress decide to

authorize additional rounds.

DOD’s Report

Provides Most of the

Required Information

Section 2824 required DOD to provide information on costs and savings and

other aspects of prior BRAC rounds. Likewise, it required an analysis of

excess capacity and an assessment of the need for future BRAC rounds and

projections of costs and savings that could be expected. It also required a

description of the process and methodologies that would be used in future

BRAC decision making. Further, the legislation prescribed how DOD’s

analysis should be presented, requiring several levels of detail and

comparative analyses.

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DOD’s report provides most, but not all, of the information required in

section 2824. Data limitations and other factors2

 prevented DOD from

providing some required information. In some instances, there were

limitations in the degree of coverage DOD provided in responding to

individual reporting requirements. In a few instances, coverage could have

been more comprehensive had DOD involved the services, for example, in

updating savings estimates from prior BRAC rounds. DOD’s assessment

provided only a rough indication of excess capacity. Table 1 details the

legislative and presentation requirements for DOD’s report, indicates the

pages in DOD’s report where the issues are addressed, and provides our

observations on the extent to which DOD provided the information required

by each subsection. A more thorough discussion of DOD’s response to the

legislative requirements is provided in appendix I.

Table 1: GAO Assessment of Legislative and Presentation Requirements for DOD’s BRAC Report, by Topic

Section 2824

citation Requirement DOD reporta

GAO assessment of information

provided

Costs and savings of prior BRAC rounds

(b)(1) A statement, using data consistent with budget data, of

actual costs and savings (to the extent available for prior

fiscal years) and estimated costs and savings (in the

case of future fiscal years) attributable to BRAC actions

Costs: pp. iv-v,

29-43; Detailed

tables, Parts 2-3;

Savings: pp. iv-vi,

45-53; Detailed

tables, Part 1

DOD provided budget estimates

along with obligational data because

actual savings data do not exist.

DOD has not established a system to

track and update savings.

(b)(2) A comparison of actual costs and savings, by BRAC

round, to estimates of costs and savings submitted to the

BRAC commissions as part of the base closure process

Detailed tables,

Part 1, pp. 2-3;

Part 3, COBRA

cost estimates,

pp. 1-16

DOD provided a partial list of COBRA

estimates, but because not all

relevant COBRA documents were

available, DOD could not provide a

full and meaningful comparison.

(c)(1)b Operation and maintenance costs, including costs

associated with expanded operations and support,

maintenance of property, administrative support, and

allowances for housing at military installations to which

functions are transferred, set forth by service, type of

facility, and fiscal year

Detailed tables,

Parts 2 and 3

DOD provided budget estimates by

type of facility, service, and fiscal

year for operation and maintenance

but was unable to measure costs at

bases to which functions were

transferred.

(continued)

2

DOD’s basic report was accompanied by three volumes of supporting data to meet the reporting

requirements. The three volumes provide detailed cost and savings data comparing BRAC cost

estimates by service and BRAC round; a comparison of budget estimates by budget category (such as

costs and savings from military construction and operations and maintenance) sorted by service,

BRAC round, installation type, and budget category; and cost of base realignment actions (COBRA)

cost estimates sorted by service and BRAC round. This generally represents information drawn from

DOD’s prior budget submissions to the Congress. DOD derived initial BRAC costs and savings

estimates from the COBRA model during each BRAC round. COBRA analyses provided a means to

compare alternative closure actions but was not intended to produce the budget-quality data that was

developed after a BRAC decision became final.

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Section 2824

citation Requirement DOD reporta

GAO assessment of information

provided

(c)(2)b Military construction costs, including costs of

rehabilitating, expanding, and constructing facilities to

receive personnel and equipment set forth by service,

type of facility, and fiscal year

Detailed tables,

Part 2

DOD provided budget estimates by

type of facility, service, and fiscal

year for military construction but was

unable to measure costs at bases to

which functions were transferred.

(c)(3)b Environmental cleanup costs, including costs associated

with assessments and restoration set forth by service,

type of facility, and fiscal year

p. v; Detailed

tables, Parts 2

and 3

DOD provided aggregate estimated

costs for assessments and

restoration.

(c)(6)b Costs associated with military health care set forth by

service, type of facility, and fiscal year

pp. 41-43 DOD did not provide the required

information because data available

did not allow health care costs to be

isolated from other costs.

(c)(7)b Savings attributable to changes in military force structure

set forth by service, type of facility, and fiscal year

Not provided DOD did not provide the required

information because, according to

DOD officials, no costs and savings

were attributable to changes in

military force structure in BRAC

accounts.

(c)(8)b Savings due to lower support costs resulting from

closure or realignment of installations set forth by

service, type of facility, and fiscal year

Not provided DOD did not provide the required

information by category, although

lower support costs are included in

overall savings estimates.

(b)(3) A comparison, set forth by BRAC round, of actual costs

and savings to the annual estimates of costs and savings

previously submitted to Congress

Detailed tables,

Parts 1, 2, and 3

DOD compared obligations by BRAC

round and fiscal year with the initial

and most current estimates. DOD did

not provide a similar comparison of

savings.

Estimated costs and savings of future BRAC rounds

(b)(10) An estimate of costs and savings from future BRAC

rounds by service and year

pp. iv, 21-22,

117-121

DOD provided an estimate for two

future BRAC rounds by year but not

by service.

(b)(11) An assessment of whether costs and estimated savings

from new BRAC actions are in the current Future Years

Defense Program

p. 22 The outyears of the current Future

Years Defense Program (1999-2003)

begin to reflect the costs and savings

from an anticipated BRAC round in

2001.

Military capabilities

(b)(6) An assessment of the effect of previous BRAC actions on

military capabilities and the services’ ability to fulfill the

National Military Strategy

pp. ii, 9, 99-108 DOD provided the required

assessment.

Excess capacity

(b)(4) A list of each military installation with 300 or more

authorized civilian personnel, by service

pp. 135-144 DOD provided the required

information.

(continued)

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Section 2824

citation Requirement DOD reporta

GAO assessment of information

provided

(b)(5) An estimate of current excess capacity at all military

installations as a percentage of the total capacity of (A)

all the services’ military installations, (B) each service’s

military installations, and (C) types of military installations

pp. iii-iv, 13-18,

109-116

DOD provided an estimate of excess

capacity as required by subsections

(A) and (B) but did not provide the

information required in subsection

(C).

(b)(7) A description of the types of military installations that

would be recommended for closure or realignment by

service in the event of one or more additional BRAC

rounds

pp. 15-17 DOD did not make any distinction

among the types of facilities that

would be recommended for closure

or realignment. DOD said all bases

would be considered.

Base reuse and economic recovery

(c)(4) Economic assistance costs, including expenditures on

DOD demonstration projects; expenditures by the Office

of Economic Adjustment; and to the extent available

expenditures by the Economic Development

Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and

the Department of Labor, set forth by service, type of

facility, and fiscal year

pp. 37-39, 42-43 DOD provided the required

information in summary form by

funding agency and fiscal year.

(c)(5) To the extent information is available, unemployment

compensation costs, early retirement benefits, and

worker retraining expenses under the Priority Placement

Program, the Job Training Partnership Act, and any other

federally funded job training program set forth by

service, type of facility, and fiscal year

pp. 37-41,

129-132

DOD provided some aggregate

estimates, but data did not

specifically identify beneficiaries who

lost their jobs as a result of BRAC

actions as opposed to other

downsizing efforts.

Processes DOD would use in future BRAC rounds

(b)(8) The criteria the Secretary of Defense would use in

evaluating installations for realignment or closure in

future BRAC rounds

pp. iv, 124 DOD provided the required

information.

(b)(9) The methodologies the Secretary of Defense would use

in evaluating installations for closure or realignment in

future BRAC rounds

pp. iv, 23-27,

65-97

DOD provided the required

information.

aDetailed tables were provided as appendixes to DOD’s report.

bRequirement applies only to the statement and comparison required by subsections (b)(1) and

(b)(2).

Substantial Savings

From BRAC Are

Likely, but Amounts

Are Not Precise

Data from DOD’s most recent budget submission was incorporated in its

section 2824 report to indicate that the four previous BRAC rounds will cost

about $23 billion to implement from 1988 to 2001. The data also show that

BRAC actions will net $14 billion in savings during implementation and are

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expected to produce recurring savings of about $5.7 billion or more each

year thereafter.3

DOD assessed its costs and savings data from several vantage points to

affirm its position that prior BRAC rounds are saving billions of dollars in

operating costs. These included (1) analyzing data drawn from DOD’s

annual budget submissions to the Congress; (2) completing a new analysis

that relied heavily on an analysis of personnel reductions as a basis for

estimating savings; (3) summarizing reviews by external groups, such as

the DOD Inspector General (IG) and Army Audit Agency audits of selected

BRAC rounds and BRAC actions; and (4) citing reports by the Congressional

Budget Office (CBO) and GAO.

We and CBO have reported that BRAC reductions provide the basis for

recurring savings once implementation costs have been offset.4

 Our

assessment that substantial savings are expected is based on our reviews

of BRAC issues, which have included examining DOD data that showed

reductions in spending on base support programs and personnel. Many

bases are aging, and base closures offer an opportunity to avoid capital

improvement costs in the future. However, our analysis of DOD’s report and

its supporting documentation and our previous work on this issue also

indicate that DOD’s cost and savings data are not precise. The data exclude

some costs and savings, which if included would cause some increase in

the time required for savings to exceed implementation costs and for net

savings to begin. Reviews by the DOD IG and the Army Audit Agency have

also pointed out the imprecision in DOD’s estimates of costs and savings,

though they reinforced the view that BRAC actions result in net savings.

While DOD has required the military services to update costs and savings,

the services seldom updated BRAC savings estimates.5

 In addition, DOD’s

estimates may not capture all costs and savings—including the avoidance

3

DOD reported the expected annual savings at $5.6 billion, but because recurring savings estimates for

the Navy were underreported by $100 million in the fiscal year 1999 budget request, the savings

estimate should be $5.7 billion.

4

See Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily Quantified

(GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996) and Review of The Report of the Department of Defense on Base

Realignment and Closure, Congressional Budget Office, July 1, 1998.

5

We have previously reported on the need for DOD components to have and follow a clear and

consistent process for updating savings estimates associated with prior BRAC decisions, and we

recommended that the Secretary of Defense provide guidance to ensure that components follow that

process. The current situation affirms the continuing need for DOD to take this action. Such action

would be equally important in the future, should the Congress decide to authorize additional BRAC

rounds. See Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds (GAO/NSIAD-97-151,

July 25, 1997).

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of some costs associated with base closures, such as the costs of

long-term capitalization improvements that will not have to be undertaken.

Additionally, in making its estimates, DOD assumed that all BRAC

recommendations would be implemented and initial savings projections

realized. In selected cases, bases recommended for closure or realignment

have been scheduled for privatization in place, or operation of the

installations will be turned over to private contractors. As we have

reported, privatization does not always produce savings or reduce excess

capacity.6

DOD supplemented its estimates of savings with a separate analysis that

focused primarily on calculating savings from personnel reductions; it

estimated an annual recurring savings of about $7 billion. This analysis is

not precise because (1) the personnel costs used in the calculation were

estimates and were not tied to the actual salaries of positions eliminated

and (2) while BRAC actions have clearly produced significant personnel

reductions and savings, we cannot be sure of the extent to which all

personnel reductions DOD cited are fully attributable to BRAC actions, as

opposed to other force structure reductions during this period of

downsizing. See appendix II for a more detailed analysis of DOD’s reporting

on cost and savings from prior BRAC rounds.

DOD’s report projects that additional BRAC rounds would also save

resources that it could use for higher priorities, such as weapon systems

modernization. DOD estimated the net recurring savings after implementing

two future BRAC rounds to be $3.4 billion annually. DOD arrived at this

estimate by averaging estimated costs and savings for the most recent two

rounds, in 1993 and 1995, and applying this average to proposed BRAC

rounds in 2001 and 2005. DOD did not present estimates of future costs and

savings by service in its report, as required.

Also, the method of estimating cost and savings for future BRAC rounds is

limited, principally because it assumes that savings from future base

closures will be the same as savings from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds,

adjusted for inflation. While DOD’s estimate may be appropriate for

planning purposes, its precision is limited because the costs of future BRAC

rounds might not parallel the costs from prior rounds. For example,

among facilities rated low in military value, bases closed in prior rounds

frequently were among those least costly to implement and requiring the

shortest time for savings to offset implementation costs. Generally, those

6

See Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville,

Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202, Sept. 18, 1996) and Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing

Louisville Operations in Place Is Not Cost-Effective (GAO/NSIAD-97-52, July 31, 1997).

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costing more to implement and requiring a longer time to recover savings

were not selected for closure. Therefore, DOD’s estimate represents only a

rough gauge of future savings. More information on DOD’s methodology for

estimating future costs is provided in appendix II.

If future BRAC rounds were held as requested, DOD would begin to incur

implementation costs in 2002. However, some questions have been raised

regarding whether DOD already is incorporating costs and savings from

future BRAC rounds into its Future Years Defense Program.7 DOD has

incorporated net estimated costs in the last 2 years (2002 and 2003) of its

1999-2003 Future Years Defense Program. The costs represent a net

amount, since DOD anticipates savings from the avoidance of military

construction and the cessation of some operations and maintenance

activities. These planned costs are presented in the aggregate at the DOD

level.

Prior BRAC Rounds

Do Not Appear to

Have Limited Military

Capabilities

The 1998 act required DOD to assess the impact of previous base closures

on military capabilities. DOD’s report concludes that previous BRAC rounds

had a positive effect on military capabilities. The commanders in chief of

the combatant commands, the service chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

concurred with the conclusion that previous BRAC rounds have not harmed

military capabilities and have had a net positive impact on operations.

While readiness can be temporarily affected as individual BRAC decisions

are being implemented, available data does not provide us with any basis

to disagree with DOD’s conclusions concerning any long-term impact.

DOD looked to a number of indicators and studies to determine whether

any operational and readiness problems could be linked to BRAC actions.

DOD officials reviewed operational and readiness records dating from 1991

to the time they completed their report, including the joint monthly

readiness reports, the joint uniform lessons learned reports, commanders

in chief integrated priority lists, and the combat support agency review.8

DOD concluded from its review that BRAC actions had not adversely affected

military capabilities.

7

The Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure,

costs, and personnel levels that has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The program displays

resources and personnel levels by program and activities.

8

These various reports, some of which are developed based on input from operating levels, provide

indications of unit performance and problems that might have an impact on readiness levels and

operating capabilities.

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This view was supported by the results of monthly senior-level Office of

the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff forums, during which

issues affecting military capabilities are considered under varying

operational scenarios. These assessments incorporate input from affected

combatant commanders in chief, and any BRAC-related problems might

surface in these assessments. According to a military official associated

with these forums, some temporary problems associated with transitions

during domestic BRAC closings have been identified, but no long-term

problems or deficiencies that related to domestic BRAC activities have

surfaced.9

 This conclusion is consistent with statements from other senior

military officials after previous BRAC rounds. For example, in a 1997 letter

to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff unanimously supported additional domestic base closures.

Our reviews of readiness issues over the years have not identified any

long-term readiness problems that were related to domestic base

realignments and closures.

DOD took several actions to minimize potential negative impacts to military

capability in previous BRAC rounds, including stressing military value in

deciding on bases to recommend for closure and realignment. In addition,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders in chief reviewed the

Secretary of Defense’s closure and realignment recommendations to

prevent degradation of military capability and endorsed the

recommendations. Using such an approach in the future, should the

Congress decide to authorize any future BRAC rounds, may help to avoid

long-term adverse effects on military capabilities.

DOD’s Analysis

Provides a Rough

Measure of Excess

Base Capacity

DOD identified those installations (bases) with 300 or more authorized

civilians. It also assessed excess capacity as required, which involved

many of the same bases. DOD reported increased capacity in 2003 relative

to 1989 for DOD, for each service, and for types of installations within each

service and reported an overall increase in excess capacity of 23 percent.

In using 1989 as a baseline for its excess capacity analysis, DOD did not

assess excess capacity that might have existed in 1989. Additionally, the

analysis did not take into account the possibilities of joint cross-servicing

and the potential impacts of management initiatives discussed in the

9

Short-term problems identified included backlogs of maintenance. For a discussion of lessons learned

in one workload transfer, see Depot Maintenance: Lessons Learned From Transferring Alameda Naval

Aviation Depot Engine Workloads (GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR, Mar. 25, 1998).

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Secretary’s report on defense reform initiatives10 or by the BRAC 1995 joint

cross-service group’s report. Such initiatives could result in consolidation,

reorganization, or regionalization of activities and potentially reduce the

amount of infrastructure capacity required in the future.

The services generally agreed with the magnitude of excess capacity

shown by the analysis. Because of differences in the types of installations

among the services and in the way capacity was measured, DOD did not

report capacity as a percentage of the total capacity by types of

installations, such as the total capacity in all depots. Such an analysis of

excess capacity would allow a comparison among types of installations,

which is what the legislation appears to envision. Further, DOD did not

present a description of the types of installations that would be

recommended for closure or realignment, by service, in one or more future

BRAC rounds as required. Rather, DOD indicated that all bases would be

considered for closure or realignment in any future BRAC round. 

Appendix III provides additional details on DOD’s methodology for

identifying bases that are authorized 300 or more civilian employees and

for computing excess capacity.

DOD officials said that its analysis was not designed to identify bases that

would be closed in additional BRAC rounds. According to DOD officials,

individual base-level data, such as that collected for a BRAC round, would

be required to specify the types of installations that would be

recommended for closure. They also said that section 2824(f) of the 1998

act prohibited DOD from expending resources to conduct such

data-gathering efforts. DOD’s view has some merit; however, it appears that

DOD could have taken additional steps to illustrate more clearly how much

excess capacity existed within categories of bases. For example, while

DOD’s analysis shows no increase in the excess capacity between 1989 and

2003 in the category of Army depots, our previous work has shown—and

DOD officials have agreed—that depots have excess capacity. Further,

while a definitive picture regarding actual numbers of bases to be closed

in any future BRAC round would not be known until the analysis associated

with a specific round occurred, we believe DOD could have provided a

clearer picture of the types and potential amount of excess capacity it has

within its basing infrastructure. This could be part of a broader strategic

plan for the future, one which better delineates future requirements,

excess capacity, and plans for revitalizing remaining infrastructures. We

10Defense Reform Initiative Report, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 1997. The report outlines plans for

significant additional personnel reductions, reengineering of existing business processes, expanded

use of the private sector for support services, and other actions that could decrease facility

infrastructure requirements.

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have previously suggested the need for such a plan and suggested that it

be presented to the Congress in much the same way DOD presented its plan

for force structure reduction in the Bottom-Up Review.11

Many Communities

Are Rebounding

Economically From

Base Closures

The 1998 act required DOD to report on the cost of economic assistance

provided to communities adversely affected by BRAC actions—funding that

has been provided outside of DOD’s BRAC implementation budgets or by

other federal agencies. DOD estimated these costs to be $955.9 million

between 1988 and 1997; these costs are discussed in appendix II.

Additionally, while not specifically required to do so, DOD’s report expands

on the subject of economic assistance and credits public and private

reinvestment in the affected communities with facilitating base reuse and

economic recovery. The report states that for bases closed more than 

2 years, nearly 75 percent of the lost civilian jobs have been replaced. It

also cites a number of examples in making the point that most

communities are rebounding.

Our prior and ongoing work also found indications of economic recovery

in many communities, although some are faring better than others.12 We

found that federal assistance provided to communities affected by base

closures has helped to cushion the negative economic impact and

supports DOD’s contention that the redevelopment of base property has

successfully created thousands of jobs. However, the reuse of bases

appears to be only one aspect of economic recovery for most

communities. The strength of the national economy and the level of

economic diversity in the affected communities played a strong role in

determining how well they survived a base closure. Without a growing

economy, some communities might not have been as successful at

attracting industries and jobs to redevelop base properties. The same

would be true for communities affected by future BRAC rounds.

11High Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997) and Defense Infrastructure:

Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, Mar. 18, 1998.)

12Based on a separate congressional request, we are conducting a more in-depth assessment of

selected issues associated with the implementation of prior BRAC decisions. That report will provide

more specific information on how local communities affected by base closures have fared and will

include data on unemployment rates and per capita income.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
B-279509 

Any Future BRAC

Rounds Could Build

on Processes

Developed for Prior

BRAC Rounds

The 1998 act required that DOD report on the criteria and methodologies

the Secretary would use to evaluate military installations for future

closures or realignments. DOD’s report indicates that future BRAC

procedures and methodologies would be similar to those used in prior

rounds. DOD proposed legislation for new BRAC authorities to the Congress

in February 1998; that proposal was also included in DOD’s required report

to the Congress.

Congressional authority for two additional BRAC rounds modeled on

processes used in recent BRAC rounds is DOD’s preferred alternative for

reducing its excess infrastructure. DOD states that legislation modeled on

authorities provided to execute recent BRAC rounds is superior to

provisions contained in 10 U.S.C. 2687, which placed many study and

reporting requirements upon DOD in connection with efforts to close

military bases. We previously reported that section 2687, enacted in the

1970s, greatly impeded efforts to close military bases until special

legislation authorizing recent BRAC rounds was enacted.13 We also reported

that legislation enacted in 1990, which expired in 1995, was seen by many

officials as a starting point for considering new legislation should the

Congress decide that it wants to authorize future BRAC rounds.14 Some

individuals expressed concern over the role of politics in the process. We

recognize that no public policy process such as that used for base

realignment and closure can be completely removed from the U.S. political

system. However, the processes used between 1988 and 1995 had several

checks and balances to keep political influences to a minimum. Ultimately,

however, the success of these processes requires the cooperation of all

participants.

As DOD and previous BRAC commission officials have noted, key elements

of the 1990 BRAC legislation, as amended, contributed to the success of

prior rounds. These elements included (1) the establishment of an

independent commission and nomination of commissioners by the

President, in consultation with the congressional leadership; (2) the

development of clearly articulated, published criteria for decision making;

(3) the use of data certified as to its accuracy; (4) the requirement that the

President and the Congress accept or reject in their entirety the lists of

closures adopted by a BRAC commission; and (5) the creation of tight time

frames to force timely decisions. The legislation also required that we

analyze DOD’s BRAC decision-making process and recommendations.

13Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment

(GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

14Military Bases (GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

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B-279509 

Additional audit coverage by the DOD IG and service audit agencies

associated with the process helped ensure the accuracy of data and

analyses associated with the decision-making process.

DOD’s legislative proposal contains, with minor exceptions, essentially the

same provisions as those contained in the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, as amended) for making decisions

on which bases to close and realign. One exception is that it gave 2 months

more than was available in BRAC 1995 for the Secretary of Defense to

publish the proposed list of bases to be closed. The publication date would

be May 1 rather than March 1 of the year in which the BRAC round is

conducted. Other decision points outlined in the legislation also shifted 

2 months. Another difference is that the proposed legislation would reduce

the amount of time available for us to review and report to the Congress

and the BRAC commission on the Secretary’s proposals from 45 days as in

BRAC 1995 to 30 days.

Alternatives to New BRAC

Authority

DOD’s report notes that actions may be required to reduce base capacity,

such as demolishing buildings that are no longer needed and conducting

reorganizations and consolidations that do not require BRAC actions or

invoke provisions of section 2687.15 We have reported on a number of

initiatives available to DOD to help it reduce excess infrastructure costs and

free up funds for other priorities.16 The Secretary also has noted the less

desirable alternative of deferring maintenance and upkeep of facilities as a

way of minimizing infrastructure costs. Available data suggests that DOD

has taken such actions for several years as it made trade-offs in funding

priorities.17 For example, we reported that over a 10-year period, from

fiscal year 1987 to 1996, DOD’s total operations and maintenance funding

obligations for facilities maintenance and repair, excluding family housing,

declined by 38 percent on average in real terms.18 The Army had the

15Closures of installations with 300 or more civilian personnel authorized to be employed and

realignments with respect to any military installation involving a reduction by more than 1,000 or by

more than 50 percent in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed trigger the

reporting requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2687.

16See, for example, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Reform Initiatives

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, Mar. 18, 1998).

17Deferred Maintenance Reporting: Challenges to Implementation (GAO/AIMD-98-42, Jan. 30, 1998).

18Defense Infrastructure: Demolition of Unneeded Buildings Can Help Avoid Operating Costs

(GAO/NSIAD-97-125, May 13, 1997).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
B-279509 

steepest decline of all the services, about 49 percent. Available data also

indicated that, although servicewide maintenance and repair obligations

had fallen about 38 percent over a 10-year period, the reduction in square

footage of space owned and managed by the services was much

less—about 10 percent.

Conclusions DOD submitted the report required by the Congress and requested

legislative authority for additional BRAC rounds. It stated that the rounds

would close unneeded bases and free up resources for higher priorities.

DOD provided most, but not all, of the information the Congress requested.

Some data were not readily available. In other cases, DOD decided not to

collect the detailed data that would be required to address specific

sections of the act.

DOD used budget data previously presented to the Congress and

subsequent obligational data to estimate costs and savings from prior BRAC

actions and applied these to future BRAC actions. However, these estimates

are not precise because DOD does not update or track savings estimates

from BRAC rounds on a regular basis. DOD collected some new data for its

excess capacity analysis, but the methodology it used did not compare

capacity to future requirements or lend itself to identifying the types of

installations that needed to be closed. Further, DOD’s conclusion that

military capability has not suffered adverse long-term effects because of

BRAC actions appears to be reasonable. Finally, DOD’s proposal for using

processes used in prior BRAC rounds represents a good starting point for

considering future BRAC legislation.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our

conclusions on savings from previous BRAC recommendations, remaining

excess capacity, the impact of previous BRAC actions on military capability,

and economic impact on local communities. In addition, DOD agreed that

the process used to conduct prior BRAC rounds is a good starting point for

considering future BRAC legislation. At the same time, DOD expressed three

principal areas of major concern. These related to (1) whether DOD’s report

had completely addressed all reporting requirements, (2) the precision of

savings estimates, and (3) how well DOD had identified excess capacity.

DOD disagreed with our assessment that it had not addressed all the

legislative requirements of section 2824. According to DOD, in some cases it

was not possible to provide some information and its report indicated the

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
B-279509 

reasons that it did not provide the information. Our assessment of whether

all information was provided is presented in table 1. This table shows

several areas in which DOD’s report did not provide information as

requested and additional areas where DOD could have provided more

information. For example, DOD did not report estimated savings from

future BRAC rounds by service as the legislation required.

In stating that the savings data it cited are the best available, DOD notes

that the data are imprecise indicators of the actual savings. We have

consistently recommended to DOD that it periodically update its savings

estimates.19 However, absent additional efforts to update service savings

estimates, the data presented may be the best available. If the efforts to

improve future savings reporting DOD cites in its comments are successful,

then DOD should be able to provide more accurate estimates in the future.

DOD took issue with our observation that it had not reported excess

capacity by type of military installation across all DOD components. DOD

believes that such an analysis of excess capacity was not required by the

statute and, because of differences in types of installations among the

services, was not practical to conduct. DOD said that reporting on excess

capacity across all DOD components would have required an effort similar

to a full BRAC analysis. DOD therefore reported on excess capacity by type

of installation only within each military service and the Defense Logistics

Agency. As discussed previously in this report, having an estimate of

Department-wide excess capacity by type of military installation across all

DOD components would have permitted a fuller assessment of excess

capacity and would not have required a full BRAC analysis.

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV along with our

additional observations on selected points. Our objectives, scope, and

methodology are in appendix V.

We conducted our review between January and July 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Majority and Minority

Leaders; the House Minority Leader; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army,

the Navy, and the Air Force; the DOD Inspector General; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to

others upon request.

19Military Bases (GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
B-279509 

This report was prepared under the direction of David R. Warren, Director,

Defense Management Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-8412 if you

or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors

to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
B-279509 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Section 2824

Legislative

Requirements and

Presentation of

Information in DOD’s

Report

22

Assessment of Limitations in DOD’s Response to Legislative

Requirements

22

Appendix II 

Costs and Savings

From BRAC Rounds

26

Estimated Costs and Savings Due to BRAC Actions 26

DOD’s Estimates of Prior Costs and Savings Data 26

Some BRAC-Related Costs Not Counted in Savings Calculations 31

Costs and Savings Estimates for Future BRAC Rounds 32

Appendix III 

DOD’s Methodology

for Identifying Excess

Capacity

33

Sample Base Selection 33

DOD’s Methodology for Its Analysis of Excess Capacity 33

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

35

Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

45

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Contents

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

48

Related GAO Products 49

Table Table 1: GAO Assessment of Legislative and Presentation

Requirements for DOD’s BRAC Report, by Topic

4

Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure

CBO Congressional Budget Office

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DOD Department of Defense

IG Inspector General

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix I 

Section 2824 Legislative Requirements and

Presentation of Information in DOD’s Report

Section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) set out required elements (subsection (b)) and

methods of presentation (subsection (c)) for the Department of Defense’s

(DOD) report on base realignment and closure (BRAC) issues. Table 1 (see 

p. 4) summarizes the legislative reporting requirements for DOD’s report,

indicates where DOD’s report provides the required information, and

summarizes our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s report provides

the required information. This appendix discusses limitations in the level

of detail and method of presentation in relation to the legislative

requirements.

Assessment of

Limitations in DOD’s

Response to

Legislative

Requirements

DOD’s report provides most, but not all, of the information required by

section 2824. In selected instances, certain information is either not

provided or not provided in the level of specificity required. The following

are our summary observations, grouped by topic, concerning information

DOD provided in response to the reporting requirements and its rationale

for why it was unable to provide required information in selected

instances.

Costs and Savings of Prior

BRAC Rounds

DOD responded to the requirement to provide costs and savings data in

four different categories: (1) costs and savings of bases already closed or

realigned during the previous four BRAC rounds, (2) costs and savings

during the implementation periods for each of the four previous BRAC

rounds, (3) net savings on an annual recurring basis after the BRAC

implementation period, and (4) estimated costs and savings from two

future BRAC rounds. While the legislation called for DOD to provide actual

cost data, only estimated data was available.

DOD provided budget estimates and obligational data rather than actual

outlay data in responding to provisions in subsection 2824(b)(1).1

 Also,

DOD did not provide complete information in response to provisions in

subsection 2824(b)(2) because it said complete information was not

readily available to compare estimated costs by fiscal year, spending

category, and installation type, in part because of the need to retrieve

historical data and differences in the ways the services develop budget

data. Similarly, DOD did not provide precise information required by

subsection 2824(b)(3) and did not provide a similar comparison of savings.

As we have previously noted, actual savings data do not exist (savings data

1

DOD financial regulations define obligations as amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services

received, and similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment. They may be

viewed as estimated rather than final costs pending liquidation of all obligations.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix I 

Section 2824 Legislative Requirements and

Presentation of Information in DOD’s

Report

are estimates), and the services generally have not updated their savings

estimates regularly.

To respond to subsections 2824(b)(2) and (b)(3), DOD submitted a series of

detailed tables on each base closure round, by service, type of facility, and

funding activity (such as operations and maintenance, military

construction, and the environment). DOD used the budget justification

books it submitted to the Congress as the source of the projected costs

and savings information in the BRAC accounts and for DOD costs outside of

BRAC accounts. DOD officials indicated that data were not available on some

indirect costs outside the BRAC accounts. What DOD termed actual costs are

BRAC budget account obligations provided by the military departments,

defense agencies, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.2

 We

have not independently verified this data. DOD officials told us that they

were not able to present obligations for the Navy or DOD agencies by type

of installation because they develop their budgets by function rather than

by installation.

In responding to subsection 2824(b)(2), DOD did not compare its budgeted

costs and savings to DOD submissions to the BRAC commissions. DOD

reported it could not meet this requirement because the estimates it

submitted to the commissions were based on the Secretary of Defense’s

recommendations and were not the commissions’ final, approved BRAC

recommendations to the President and the Congress. According to DOD,

differences in the Secretary’s recommendations and the commissions’ final

BRAC actions created differences, sometimes significant, in costs and

savings estimates. In addition, DOD’s estimates of costs and savings

submitted to the commissions excluded the costs associated with

environmental restoration, since the BRAC criteria purposely excluded

these costs as closure and realignment recommendations were developed.

Environmental restoration costs were added to budget estimates for BRAC

costs and savings after all BRAC actions became final.

In general, DOD provided information on presentation requirements in

subsections 2824(c)(1) through (c)(8) where data were available, but often

the information is incomplete. For example, DOD did not display its savings

data by service, BRAC round, type of facility, fiscal year, and budget

category as required because it had difficulty locating specific cost of base

realignment actions (COBRA) analyses that were needed to develop

complete comparisons. DOD did not have complete information available to

compare costs by fiscal year, spending category, and installation type as

2

Our prior work indicates that obligational data does not necessarily reflect actual final costs.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix I 

Section 2824 Legislative Requirements and

Presentation of Information in DOD’s

Report

required by subsections 2824(b) and (c). This type of comparison would

require the specific COBRA analysis associated with each recommendation

that the Secretary of Defense sent to the commissions (and each final

COBRA analysis performed by the commissions).

DOD officials told us they did not provide the information prescribed in

subsection 2824(c)(6) because data available did not allow health costs to

be isolated from other costs. DOD also did not provide the required

information in subsection 2824(c)(7), which required it to report savings

attributable to changes in military force structure. According to a DOD

official, BRAC accounts contained no costs or savings attributable to

military force structure reductions. Finally, DOD did not provide the

required information in subsection 2824(c)(8), which required it to show,

by service, fiscal year, and type of facility, the savings due to lower

support costs for military installations that were closed or realigned. DOD

did, however, include an aggregate estimate of lower support costs in its

savings estimates.

Estimated Costs and

Savings From Future

BRAC Rounds

DOD provided an estimate, by fiscal year, of costs and savings from two

future BRAC rounds in response to subsection 2824(b)(10), but it did not

report amounts by service. DOD did not report the aggregate estimate by

service because, according to DOD officials, the costs and savings for each

service would depend on the specifics of each individual base closure.

Because DOD cannot predict the BRAC actions that would be approved for

each service, DOD officials said they did not have a reliable basis for

allocating future costs and savings among the services.

Base Use and Economic

Recovery

Costs for worker retraining under the Job Training Partnership Act are

included in the report as required by subsection 2824(c)(5), but DOD did

not include any expenses for its Priority Placement Program, which tracks

job opportunities for civilians released for any reason but does not provide

any retraining.

Excess Capacity DOD did not provide an estimate of excess capacity as a percentage of

types of military installations as required by subsection 2824(b)(5)(C). DOD

gathered data on multiple categories of installations to determine the

extent to which reductions in base structure since 1989 have kept pace

with reductions in the force and its supporting services. DOD stated it did

not develop an estimate of excess capacity across types of installations

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix I 

Section 2824 Legislative Requirements and

Presentation of Information in DOD’s

Report

because the services categorize activities differently, which limits the

usefulness of categories for analysis. In addition, the services sometimes

used different measures of capacity on similar activities, so developing an

overall estimate would not be possible.

DOD did not provide all the information required by subsection

2824(b)(7) to provide a description of the types of installations it would

recommend for closure in the event of any future BRAC rounds. DOD’s

analysis of excess capacity was not comprehensive, which would make it

difficult to identify specific bases that might be closed in future BRAC

rounds. DOD stated it did not identify excess capacity by individual

installation or make any distinction among installations that may be closed

or realigned in any future BRAC round because it did not want to identify

potential closure and realignment actions without benefit of a BRAC

analysis. In addition, DOD officials told us that data collection associated

with such an analyses would be prohibited by subsection 2824(f). DOD

indicated that all bases would be considered for closure or realignment in

future BRAC rounds.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

Estimated Costs and

Savings Due to BRAC

Actions

DOD’s most recent budget submission indicates that the four previous BRAC

rounds will cost about $23 billion to implement from 1988 to 2001, will net

about $14 billion in savings during the implementation periods, and will

produce annual recurring savings of about $5.7 billion each year

thereafter.1 DOD’s report indicates that net savings will be $3.7 billion in

fiscal year 1999.

DOD applies estimated savings to future annual budgets. However, DOD’s

method for including costs and savings in future budgets begins with BRAC

estimates, and the services’ and defense agencies’ implementation budgets

differ in important ways from the BRAC costs and savings estimates. For

example, budget data are reported in inflated dollars, while estimates were

expressed in constant dollars. Although components update cost data

during the budget process, their budgets do not include environmental

restoration costs after 2001 or costs not funded by DOD. Including these

costs has the effect of reducing net savings or delaying the accrual of net

savings.

DOD’s Estimates of

Prior Costs and

Savings Data

For its report, DOD assessed its costs and savings data from several vantage

points to affirm its position that prior BRAC rounds are saving billions of

dollars in operating costs. These included (1) analyzing data drawn from

DOD’s annual budget submissions to the Congress, (2) completing what it

termed a new analysis that relied heavily on an analysis of personnel

reductions as a basis for estimating savings, and (3) summarizing reviews

by external groups such as the DOD Inspector General (IG) and Army Audit

Agency audits of selected BRAC rounds and BRAC actions.

DOD’s Analysis of Its

Budget Data

In the executive summary of its report, DOD used budget estimates and

obligational data to conclude that actual one-time implementation costs

for the prior BRAC rounds were close to or less than DOD’s initial budget

estimates; that actual DOD-wide costs for BRAC 1988 and BRAC 1993 bases

through fiscal year 1997 were substantially less than DOD’s original budget

estimates; and that for BRAC 1991 and BRAC 1995 bases, actual costs were

essentially equal to initial estimates.

DOD drew these conclusions from its analysis of its BRAC budget estimates

and obligational data through fiscal year 1997. However, DOD’s conclusions

did not reflect the following key factors.

1

For fiscal year 1993 and thereafter, the BRAC 1990 legislation required that DOD submit annual

budgets with estimates of costs and savings of each closure or realignment as well as the period in

which savings were to be achieved.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

DOD’s implementation costs, especially for earlier BRAC rounds, have been

much greater than originally expected because revenue from land sales

has been substantially less than originally expected. DOD’s report briefly

noted the exclusion of revenues from land sales but did not explain its

impact on DOD’s costs. Likewise, our analysis shows that cost estimates

have changed over time. For example, in the fiscal year 1997 budget, DOD

projected total 6-year implementation costs for BRAC 1995 to be 

$6.1 billion; in the current fiscal year 1999 budget, DOD projects that those

same 6-year costs will be $1 billion higher, or $7.1 billion. Air Force

officials recently told us that they have a requirement for approximately

$335.4 million in BRAC funding between fiscal year 1998 and 2003 to

implement closure and realignment actions at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas,

and McClellan Air Force Base, California. This funding has not been

included in previous budget requests.

DOD’s comparison of obligational data to budget estimates excluded

additional direct BRAC implementation costs that were not funded through

the BRAC budget accounts. DOD’s report notes elsewhere that while such

costs exist, they are a small percentage of BRAC costs. However, our

analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 1999 budget shows that they total $936 million

(4 percent) through fiscal year 2001. These costs, along with others noted

below, cumulatively have an impact on total implementation costs and the

timing of the accrual of net savings.

The budget estimates from which DOD drew its conclusions did not include

an estimated $2.4 billion in environmental restoration costs that DOD

expects to incur beyond the 6-year implementation period ending in 2001.2

The federal government has also incurred over $1 billion in indirect costs

for economic assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC

actions. (This issue is addressed more fully later in this appendix.)

These issues do not negate the fact that DOD can expect substantial savings

from BRAC, although they have had some effect on overall savings and, if

included in DOD’s accounting, would cause some increase in the time

required for savings to fully offset costs.

2

The current estimates of $2.4 billion represent a reduction from the $3.3 billion in environmental costs

beyond 2001 that DOD projected in 1997. Based on a congressional request, we are preparing a

separate report on BRAC implementation issues that will include a more in-depth discussion of

environmental restoration issues.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

DOD’s New Analysis of

Recurring Savings Starting

in 2001

DOD conducted what it termed a new analysis to evaluate the budget

estimate of annual recurring savings. From this analysis, DOD concluded

that annual recurring savings from the four previous BRAC rounds could

reach $7 billion—$1.4 billion more than previously indicated in its annual

budget submission. DOD based these savings estimates on an analysis of

military and civilian personnel reductions and associated support costs. In

providing this new analysis, DOD was, in large measure, using personnel

data drawn from its budget submissions and applying a standard cost

factor to it to derive a new estimate of savings. While DOD’s method is

straightforward, the data on the cost of personnel it used to make the

estimate are not precise. The services’ personnel and accounting systems

do not permit a complete tracking and validation of reductions apart from

reductions made for other purposes.

DOD’s analysis used personnel reduction figures of 70,969 civilians and

39,800 military positions eliminated as reported in its budget. Military and

civilian personnel reductions account for 83 percent ($5.8 billion) of the

projected savings from DOD’s new analysis.

DOD estimated personnel costs of $48,000 in average annual pay and

benefits per position for military personnel3

 and $55,000 in average annual

pay and benefits per position for civilian personnel.4

 However, average

military pay does not reflect actual positions eliminated or the costs of all

housing, education, commissary and exchange benefits, and average

military personnel costs and savings could thus be understated. On the

other hand, the average civilian cost was based on an average of all

civilian employees wages and was not developed from data on bases

closed by BRAC actions. Thus, savings from BRAC actions could be

overstated because civilian personnel released in BRAC actions were

low-wage employees, according to Office of the Secretary of Defense

(Comptroller) officials. Additionally, DOD’s new analysis also ignored some

of the costs of civilian pensions and other personnel costs. The net effect

of these factors is not clear.

Concerning the total number of military and civilian personnel reductions

actually eliminated due to BRAC actions, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force were able to provide us with some, but not complete, supporting

3

Military compensation includes basic pay, bonuses, retirement, payroll taxes, unemployment

insurance, and most permanent-change-of-station costs (administration for these costs is handled in a

separate account). Other military personnel compensation costs include subsistence, medical,

housing, education benefits, training, and base commissary and exchange privileges.

4

Civilian compensation includes salary, locality adjustment, health coverage, life insurance, bonuses,

payroll taxes, unemployment insurance, and pension contributions.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

documentation that military and civilian positions eliminated as a result of

BRAC actions were, in fact, fully eliminated from the services’ end strength.

Army BRAC and manpower officials indicated that they cannot tie specific

BRAC actions to end strength reductions.

The Navy’s budget and personnel systems do not track specific military

personnel reductions at the installation level and the Navy, therefore,

cannot document that its end strength was reduced. However, the Navy’s

budget system does track specific civilian personnel reductions at the base

level.

Of the services, the Air Force was the most successful in linking military

and civilian personnel reductions due to BRAC actions to its budget. The Air

Force provided us with the most detailed documentation of manpower

changes that supports its budget justification estimates. Nonetheless,

civilian end strength reductions due to BRAC actions lose their visibility in

the budget process because civilian end strength figures are included in

the Air Force’s operations and maintenance “base infrastructure changes”

budget category and are not identified separately.

Audits of Costs and

Savings Estimates

DOD’s report cited three audit reports that it said confirmed the

reasonableness of initial costs and savings estimates, two from the IG and

one from the Army Audit Agency. The audits indicate that savings

estimates are not precise.

The IG’s report on bases closed during BRAC 19935

 found that for the

implementation period, savings will overtake costs sooner than expected.

DOD’s original budget estimate indicated costs of $8.3 billion and annual

recurring savings of $7.4 billion during the implementation period for a net

cost of $900 million. The IG review concluded that the costs potentially

could be reduced to $6.8 billion and that savings could reach $9.2 billion,

which would result in up to $2.4 billion in net savings during the

implementation period. The IG’s report indicated that the greater savings

were due to factors such as reduced obligations for one-time

implementation costs (which were never adjusted to reflect actual

disbursements), canceled military construction projects, and less of an

increase in overhead costs than originally projected at a base receiving

5

Audit Report: Cost and Savings for 1993 Defense Base Realignments and Closures, Department of

Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

work from a closing base.6 Additionally, some undefined portion of the

savings included personnel reductions. IG officials told us that they could

not differentiate between force structure and BRAC reductions in

examining funding reductions for personnel. Accordingly, we are

uncertain about the extent to which the IG’s report captures personnel

savings attributed solely to BRAC actions.

The IG’s review of selected BRAC 19957

 closures also showed great variation

between budget estimates and implementation experience. DOD’s report

cited the IG’s review of 23 bases closed during BRAC 1995 and noted that

savings during the implementation period were overstated by 1.4 percent

and costs were overstated by 4.3 percent of initial budget estimates.

However, the IG’s analysis excluded costs and savings from the two

activities that were privatized in place.8

Our previous assessments of BRAC actions involving privatization in place

have raised questions about whether these actions were cost-effective and

whether they reduced excess capacity.9

 For example, in our 1996 review of

the Louisville privatization, we found that the Navy’s plan for privatizing

the workloads in place at Louisville would not reduce excess capacity in

the remaining public depots or the private sector and might prove more

costly than transferring the work to other depots.

Finally, DOD’s report references the Army Audit Agency’s July 1997 report

on BRAC costs and savings.10 The Army Audit Agency concluded that

savings will be substantial after full implementation for the 10 BRAC 1995

sites it had examined but that estimates were not exact. For example, the

Agency reported that annual recurring savings beyond the implementation

period, although substantial, were 16 percent less than the major

commands’ estimates.

6

While the IG’s report suggested unobligated balances could be liquidated to increase savings, DOD

officials have stated, and we agree, that much of the funds may yet be required to implement BRAC

actions. The Congress, in appropriating funds for base closure implementation, has given DOD the

flexibility to allocate, reprogram, and redistribute unobligated funds, as appropriate, to complete

BRAC implementation actions.

7

Memorandum for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations) from

Inspector General, Department of Defense, March 20, 1998.

8

The two installations were the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana, and

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky.

9

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly While Excess Capacity Exists

(GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

10Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 

Audit Report AA 97-225, July 31, 1997.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

Some BRAC-Related

Costs Not Counted in

Savings Calculations

DOD’s report recognizes that some one-time costs, while not directly

funded from BRAC accounts, are related to BRAC actions. These include, but

are not limited to, costs federal agencies incurred for economic assistance

to communities affected by BRAC actions and other indirect assistance

costs directed toward providing individuals with unemployment

compensation, early retirement and voluntary separation, and military

health care benefits. To the extent that some of these costs are not

considered in BRAC cost and savings computations, there is an

overstatement of DOD-reported net savings attributable to BRAC actions and

an extension in the time required for BRAC savings to outweigh costs.

The largest single category of costs that is not considered as a BRAC cost

appears to be federal agency economic assistance to communities affected

by BRAC actions. As noted in DOD’s report, a number of federal

agencies—DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department of

Commerce’s Economic Development Administration, the Department of

Labor, and the Federal Aviation Administration—provide financial

assistance to communities affected by BRAC actions. This assistance comes

in numerous forms: planning assistance to help communities determine

how best to develop base property, training grants to provide the

workforce with new skills, and grants to improve the infrastructure on

bases.

These funds are provided by federal agencies and are not in the BRAC

accounts. DOD does not consider them as costs when computing net

savings from BRAC actions. DOD data show that about $955.9 million was

provided to communities through assistance programs between 1988 and

1997. However, the amount of this assistance was about 10 percent higher

than DOD reported, based on the data we reviewed.

As DOD’s report indicates, additional BRAC-related costs are associated with

unemployment compensation, early retirements and voluntary

separations, and military health care. DOD’s report suggests that

unemployment compensation costs are difficult to measure and are

expected to be relatively small for the four BRAC rounds (about

$90 million). DOD further estimates that the cost of early retirements at

BRAC bases was $107 million from 1989 to 1997, while voluntary separation

costs are estimated at $333 million from 1993 to 1997. For military health

care, DOD recognized that the impact assessment was complex and stated

that it was unable to provide the cost. Our examination of this issue

indicates that it is difficult to separate BRAC-related costs from total

defense costs for this assistance.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix II 

Costs and Savings From BRAC Rounds

Costs and Savings

Estimates for Future

BRAC Rounds

To estimate the costs of two future BRAC rounds, DOD averaged the costs

and savings from BRAC 1993 and BRAC 1995 and applied this average to the

future implementation periods and beyond. DOD assumed costs and

savings of the proposed 2001 round would begin in fiscal year 2002, and

the proposed 2005 round would begin in fiscal year 2006. Each round

would have an initial implementation period of 6 years (as estimated for

the two previous rounds) and would begin to produce annual recurring net

savings beginning in year 4. The estimated value of recurring net savings

after year 6 is $1.7 billion for each round, totaling $3.4 billion (in fiscal 

year 1999 dollars) annually for years 2012 and beyond, when both future

rounds are projected to be complete. DOD estimated future savings based

on the assumption that future costs and savings will be similar to those of

the BRAC 1993 and BRAC 1995 rounds.

While DOD’s estimate may be appropriate for initial planning purposes, the

precision of the estimate is limited by weaknesses in data and

assumptions. First, DOD developed its projections using prior costs and

savings data that, as we have indicated, have some limitations. Second, the

notional size and characteristics of bases closed in previous BRAC rounds

may not accurately depict future rounds, as stated in the DOD report. For

example, the Quadrennial Defense Review report states that future rounds

must also include laboratories and test ranges that support research,

development, test, and evaluation. Third, DOD did not consider all costs

associated with BRAC implementation, such as non-DOD costs, or the extent

of environmental restoration and other costs that would be incurred

beyond the 6-year implementation period. Finally, remaining bases may be

more costly to close than the previous bases closed. In previous BRAC

rounds, the military services often chose to close or realign bases being

relatively less expensive to close and requiring shorter time periods for

savings to offset the closure and realignment costs. Therefore, costs for

future closures may be higher than the average cost of previous rounds.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix III 

DOD’s Methodology for Identifying Excess

Capacity

DOD measured increases in excess capacity in a number of categories over

time for a sample of bases. We reviewed the sample selection and capacity

analysis methodology. Our observations below indicate that DOD’s analysis

provides only a rough indication of excess capacity that continues to exist.

Sample Base

Selection

DOD provided its fiscal year 1996 base structure report, which details

numbers and locations of major bases, as a starting point for the military

services to use in selecting bases for their excess capacity analyses. The

report identifies 495 bases as DOD’s domestic base structure baseline as of

September 1989 and indicates 398 bases will remain after the four BRAC

rounds have been completed in 2001. The services did not rely completely

on the base structure report to select bases for the capacity analysis

because they did not agree with the information as presented or opted to

use more current information.

DOD’s Methodology

for Its Analysis of

Excess Capacity

The 1998 act required DOD to estimate the current excess capacity at

military installations as a percentage of the total capacity of all military

installations, each service, and types of installations. DOD addressed the

first and second of these requirements by comparing capacity relative to

the force structure in 2003 with capacity relative to the force structure in

1989 for DOD, for each service, and for types of installations within each

service. The types of installations included were not the same for each

service. Also, capacity was often measured differently for each service.

For example, the Air Force and the Army reported data for test and

evaluation facilities in terms of physical space (square feet), while the

Navy reported its capacity for test and evaluation facilities in terms of

workyears. As a result of both these variances, DOD did not report excess

capacity as a percentage of the total capacity of types of installations as

required.

To perform the capacity analysis, the services compared capacity in a

sample of 371 bases in 1989 to the capacity for 259 bases that will remain

in 2003 after all scheduled BRAC actions are implemented. The sample

included most installations with over 300 authorized civilians and a small

number of additional bases considered significant because of factors such

as location or military function. The services then categorized the bases

according to their primary missions and defined indicators of capacity, or

metrics, for each category. Varied metrics were used as surrogates for

defining capacity. For example, metrics included maneuver acres per

maneuver brigades for Army training bases, square feet of parking apron

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix III 

DOD’s Methodology for Identifying Excess

Capacity

space per aircraft for Air Force bases, or capacity direct labor hours

compared to budgeted or programmed direct labor hours for Navy

aviation depots. For several categories of bases, DOD used two metrics that

established a range of potential excess capacity based on the different

indicators’ values.1 DOD divided the metric by measures of force structure

to determine a ratio and calculated the extent to which the ratio of

capacity in 2003 exceeded the ratio in 1989. DOD then weighted and

averaged each categories’ excess capacity to create a range—minimum

and maximum—for each service. The weighted totals were averaged to

give an overall increase in excess capacity of 23 percent.

By using 1989 as a baseline, DOD did not take into account the excess

capacity that existed in that year (prior to closing bases in previous BRAC

rounds); as a result, the percentage of increased excess capacity reported

understated actual excess capacity by an unknown amount for some

categories and may have overstated excess capacity for others. For

example, while DOD’s analysis shows no increase in the excess capacity

between 1989 and 2003 in the category of Army depots, our previous work

has shown—and DOD officials have agreed—that DOD has excess depot

capacity. At the same time, the analysis could overstate actual excess

capacity to the extent there was a deficit of capacity in 1989. For example,

the analysis shows a 16-percent increase in excess capacity in Marine

Corps bases. As the report explains, the Marine Corps acquired additional

acreage during the 1990s to meet shortfalls. However, the methodology

DOD used does not recognize this increase in capacity as a valid

requirement.

DOD only computed increases as indicating excess capacity after force

structure reductions and BRAC closings. Therefore, decreases in capacity

are termed “no increase.” For example, DOD’s analysis shows that excess

depot capacity decreased slightly, by 6.2 percent, but this is labeled “no

increase” rather than a decrease.

1

Two metrics were used in cases where more than one resource was identified as important in

measuring capacity. For example, the Air Force used both classroom space and parking apron space

as metrics for its education and training category because each represents a different capacity

requirement.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See pp. 15-16.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated October 6, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We revised our report language to clarify our point that DOD did not

provide all of the information required by section 2824. In some cases, DOD

explained why it could not provide such information, and we noted these

reasons in our report. However, we pointed out other cases in which

required information was not provided without any explanation from DOD.

In its comments, DOD maintained that it addressed all requirements and

provided explanations for why it did not provide all of the required

information. Yet, in some other instances DOD’s report did not provide

required information and was silent on the reasons.

2. DOD could have allocated future costs and savings from future BRAC

rounds by fiscal year and by military service by applying the same

methodology it used to estimate the total costs of future rounds, that is,

using the costs and savings from previous rounds by service and applying

them to future rounds by service. As noted in our report, DOD’s rationale

for not allocating estimates of future costs and savings by service was that

it had no basis on which to allocate these costs. This rationale that past

costs may not be like future costs is applicable to the aggregate estimate

as well. Allocating estimates by service could have been done and would

have met the legislative requirements, although how useful that

information would have been is unclear, given limitations we noted with

the aggregate estimate.

3. We clarified our report to indicate more clearly that the military services

have seldom updated cost and savings data, even though DOD may have

requested that the services conduct such updates.

4. While our report does not disagree with DOD that using historical data as

a basis for projecting future costs is a reasonable approach, we point out

weaknesses in the data and DOD’s assumptions about future BRAC rounds

that make it unlikely that future costs will mirror costs from previous BRAC

rounds. For example, during the last BRAC round, relatively lower

implementation costs and quicker offset of closure costs were frequently

factors in DOD’s closure and realignment decisions. Our intent is to suggest

that there are reasons to expect greater costs to close bases during any

future implementation period than during previous BRAC rounds because

many bases with lower implementation costs and quicker offset of closure

costs have already been realigned or closed. DOD agreed that costs are

likely to be higher than in previous BRAC rounds. These costs could reduce

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

the net savings achieved during the implementation period. Nevertheless,

we believe there still can be significant savings from future BRAC rounds.

5. While we believe there can be significant savings from future BRAC

rounds, we point out in our report that the future costs DOD estimated do

not include costs that extend past the 6-year implementation period. DOD’s

comments offer a fuller explanation of why it did not include such costs in

its estimates.

6. DOD’s comments provide a fuller explanation of DOD’s experience with

revenue from land sales.

7. DOD took issue with our statement that it had not reported excess

capacity by type of military installation across all of the services, as

required. DOD believes that such a breakdown of excess capacity was not

required by the statute and, because of differences in types of installations

among the services, was not practicable to include in the report. DOD

therefore reported on excess capacity by type of installation only within

each military service. The requirement in section 2824(b)(5)(C) to report

excess capacity by “type of military installations” is not limited, however,

to types of installations within the services. Rather, we believe that the

section contemplated a DOD-wide approach because it does not specify

that the information should be provided by service.

8. In its comments, DOD indicated that its analysis of excess capacity

provides the required information on the types of bases that might be

closed in future BRAC rounds by providing an indication of areas where

excess capacity continues to exist relative to 1989 levels. DOD reiterated

that it would need to use the detailed analyses typical of a BRAC round to

identify specific bases that might be closed or realigned. While we agree

that more detailed analyses would be required to identify individual bases

to close or realign, DOD could have been clearer about the types of bases

that might be closed or realigned if it had a strategic plan that delineated

future requirements, excess capacity, and plans for revitalizing remaining

infrastructure.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To provide our analysis of DOD’s report on base realignment and closure,

we made an overall assessment of DOD’s responsiveness to the individual

section 2824 reporting requirements and assessed individual reporting

topics, including the costs and savings from prior BRAC rounds and

estimated costs and savings from future BRAC rounds, the impact of prior

BRAC rounds on military capabilities, excess capacity, base reuse and

economic recovery of communities affected by BRAC actions, and

processes DOD would use to select bases for closure or realignment should

further BRAC rounds be authorized.

To assess DOD’s estimates of the costs and savings associated with

previous BRAC rounds, we reviewed the methodology and original budget

justification estimates DOD provided to the Congress. For BRAC 1988 and

BRAC 1991 inputs, we interviewed representatives of the Logistics

Management Institute, which assisted DOD in developing its report and new

analysis, to obtain information on how they developed the new analysis of

costs and savings estimates. For BRAC 1993 and BRAC 1995 inputs, we

interviewed DOD IG officials and reviewed IG documents, which were used

to support DOD’s estimates. Also, we compared DOD’s conclusions with our

previous work on BRAC costs and savings, information previously reported

for certain BRAC actions and accounts, and the fiscal year 1999 Future

Years Defense Program. In addition, we discussed the costs and savings

estimates with DOD program and financial officials.

We reviewed certain costs related to BRAC that are not contained in the

BRAC budget. To assess federal agencies’ economic assistance provided to

communities, we met with representatives of the Logistics Management

Institute to discuss data sources and reliability. We compared data DOD

gathered from other agencies with our own analysis of agency data on

unemployment compensation, early retirements and voluntary

separations, and military health care.

We verified that DOD’s military and civilian personnel reduction numbers

generally matched those reported in DOD’s budget justification estimates

and discussed with DOD and service officials how personnel reductions are

captured in budget documents. We tested the accuracy of savings

estimates attributed to military and civilian personnel reductions by asking

each of the services to select one example of a base closure from each of

the four previous BRAC rounds and provide supporting documentation, if

available, that personnel were, in fact, reduced from the services’ end

strengths as a result of these BRAC actions. Similarly, we asked the services

to provide the same information for each base closure in BRAC 1993,

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

because that BRAC round represented the most complete data. (Data from

1988 and 1991 is incomplete, and BRAC 1995 is still being implemented.)

However, the services were unable to provide complete supporting

documentation to track these personnel reductions through the budget

process because they do not have adequate systems to fully separate BRAC

actions from other reductions. Thus, the services were unable to fully

document the extent to which authorized end strengths of military and

civilian personnel were actually reduced as a result of BRAC actions versus

other actions.

To analyze DOD’s estimate of potential costs and savings from future BRAC

rounds, we examined DOD’s methodology and assumptions. We did not

verify the accuracy of the estimates of previous costs and savings because,

as DOD’s report points out, data on actual savings do not exist. We traced

the estimated net costs from DOD’s analysis of future costs and savings to

its 1999-2003 Future Years Defense Program.

To assess DOD’s conclusions about the impact of base closures on military

capabilities, we discussed the analysis with Joint Staff officials and

reviewed documentation on the analysis’ methodology. We reviewed

previously published studies and reports, which formed the basis for the

report’s conclusions, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the

Defense Reform Initiative, and our previous reports. We also discussed the

report’s conclusions with Joint Staff officials and reviewed comments

from the Commanders of the Special Operations Command, the Pacific

Command, and the Transportation Command.

To assess DOD’s statements on base reuse and economic recovery, we

relied on the results of our prior and ongoing work. We have been

requested to provide a separate report that includes an assessment of the

economic status of communities affected by BRAC actions and address

other BRAC issues.

To assess DOD’s estimates of excess capacity, we interviewed DOD and

service officials and reviewed documentation describing DOD’s

methodology. We verified DOD’s calculations of increases in excess

capacity, but we did not independently verify the data reported by the

services. To understand how DOD developed its sample of bases for its

analysis, we interviewed service officials and compared the sample bases

with previously reported base structure plans. We reviewed

documentation pertaining to sample bases and the comparison of the ratio

of capacity to force structure in 1989 and 2003. We compared the

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

conclusions of DOD’s current analysis with previously reported measures of

excess capacity. We discussed the analysis and its conclusions with DOD

and service officials.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Barry W. Holman, Associate Director

Mark A. Pross, Evaluator-in-Charge 

David F. Combs, Senior Evaluator

Kay D. Kuhlman, Senior Evaluator

Margaret G. Morgan, Senior Evaluator

James R. Reifsnyder, Senior Evaluator

Donald C. Snyder, Economist

Office of the General

Counsel, Washington,

D.C.

William T. Woods, Assistant General Counsel

San Francisco Field

Office

Julie M. Hirshen, Senior Evaluator

Randolph D. Jones, Senior Evaluator

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Related GAO Products

Future Years Defense Program: Substantial Risks Remain in DOD’s

1999-2003 Plan (GAO/NSIAD-98-204, July 31, 1998).

Military Base Closures: Issues Related to the Fiscal Year 1999 Budget

Request (GAO/NSIAD-98-169, July 30, 1998).

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Reform

Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, Mar. 18, 1998).

Defense Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense

Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122, Mar. 13, 1998).

Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions

Without Reducing Mission Capability (GAO/NSIAD-98-64, Feb. 26, 1998).

Air Force Aircraft: Reorganizing Mobility Aircraft Units Could Reduce

Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-55, Jan. 21, 1998).

Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully Reducing Unneeded

RDT&E Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8, 1998).

Air Force Privatization-in-Place: Analysis of Aircraft and Missile Guidance

System Depot Repair Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-35, Dec. 22, 1997).

Military Sealift Command (GAO/NSIAD-98-40R, Oct. 9, 1997).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing Louisville Operations in Place Is Not

Cost-Effective (GAO/NSIAD-97-52, July 31, 1997).

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds

(GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

Military Base Closures: Detailed Budget Requests Could Improve Visibility

(GAO/NSIAD-97-170, July 14, 1997).

Defense Infrastructure: Demolition of Unneeded Buildings Can Help Avoid

Operating Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-125, May 13, 1997).

Army Aviation and Troop Command (GAO/NSIAD-97-142R, Apr. 22, 1997).

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Related GAO Products

Defense Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in

Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111, Mar. 18,

1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly

While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,

Sept. 18, 1996).

Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing

Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Acquisition Infrastructure: Changes in RDT&E Laboratories and

Centers (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept. 13, 1996).

Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup

Requires Difficult Choices (GAO/NSIAD-96-172, Sept. 5, 1996).

Military Bases: Update on the Status of Bases Closed in 1988, 1991, and

1993 (GAO/NSIAD-96-149, Aug. 6, 1996).

Military Bases (GAO/NSIAD-96-216R, July 29, 1996).

Military Bases: Potential Reductions to the Fiscal Year 1997 Base Closure

Budget (GAO/NSIAD-96-158, July 15, 1996).

DOD Infrastructure: DOD Is Opening Unneeded Finance and Accounting

Offices (GAO/NSIAD-96-113, Apr. 16, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Army Aviation Testing: Need to Reassess Consolidation Plan

(GAO/NSIAD-96-87, Mar. 15, 1996).

DOD Infrastructure: DOD’s Planned Finance and Accounting Structure Is Not

Well Justified (GAO/NSIAD-95-127, Sept. 18, 1995).

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Related GAO Products

Military Bases (GAO/NSIAD-95-215R, Sept. 8, 1995).

Military Bases: Case Studies on Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-139, Aug. 15, 1995).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Military Bases: Challenges in Identifying and Implementing Closure

Recommendations (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-107, Feb. 23, 1995).

Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations

(GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

Aerospace Guidance/Metrology Center: Cost Growth and Other Factors

Affect Closure and Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60, Dec. 9, 1994).

Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-3, Nov. 1, 1994).

Navy Laboratories: Concerns Regarding the Naval Undersea Warfare

Center’s Suffolk Facility (GAO/NSIAD-94-143, June 22, 1994).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection Process

for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

Military Bases: Revised Cost and Saving Estimates for 1988 and 1991

Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-161, Mar. 31, 1993).

Military Bases: Transfer of Pease Air Force Base Slowed by Environmental

Concerns (GAO/NSIAD-93-111FS, Feb. 3, 1993).

Military Bases: Army Revised Cost Estimates for the Rock Island and

Other Realignments to Redstone (GAO/NSIAD-93-59FS, Nov. 23, 1992).

Military Bases: Varied Processes Used in Proposing Base Closures and

Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-133, Mar. 1, 1991).

Military Bases: Process Used by Services for January 1990 Base Closure

and Realignment Proposals (GAO/NSIAD-91-109, Jan. 7, 1991).

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
Related GAO Products

Military Bases: Response to Questions on the Realignment of Forts Devens

and Huachuca (GAO/NSIAD-90-235, Aug. 7, 1990).

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and Closure

Recommendations (GAO/NSIAD-90-42, Nov. 29, 1989).

(709325) Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-17 Review of DOD’s BRAC Report
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