IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 14, 2007 Session

IN RE E.J.M. (d.o.b. 10/31/94)

LEE T. MYERS v. SANDRA BROWN

An Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelby County

No. G2405; R8527 George E. Blancett, Sp. Judge

No. W2005-02520-COA-R3-JV - Filed July 19, 2007

This case involves the third and fourth appeals (consolidated) of successive petitions to modify

custody. The mother and father of the child at issue were never married. The mother was designated

the primary residential parent for the child, and the father was given designated parenting time and

ordered to pay child support. In 2002, the father filed a petition to modify custody. The trial court

denied the father’s petition, and the decision was affirmed by this Court (“E.J.M. I”). During the

pendency of that appeal, the father filed a second petition for a change of custody based on facts that

arose after his first petition was denied. A hearing on this petition was conducted shortly after this

Court issued its decision in E.J.M. I. A juvenile court judge held that, though he might otherwise

change custody to the father, he was bound by the appellate decision in E.J.M. I to give final

decision-making authority to the mother. Nevertheless, joint custody was ordered. The father now

appeals that decision. Shortly after that, the father filed another petition to modify custody, based

on facts that arose after the decision to award joint custody. Another juvenile court judge conducted

a hearing, heard testimony, and reviewed the entire record. After doing so, the juvenile court judge

strongly criticized the father’s litigiousness and, in light of the pending appeal of the joint custody

award, dismissed the father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The father appeals that decision as

well. Both appeals were consolidated, but the appeal was dismissed due to a procedural defect

(E.J.M. II). The procedural defect was cured, and we now hear the consolidated appeal. We reverse

the conclusion by both juvenile court judges, holding that the trial court has jurisdiction and authority

to modify custody even while an appeal is pending, so long as the modification is based on new facts

and changed conditions that arose after the trial court judgment that is the subject of the appeal. The

cause is remanded for a decision on the father’s petitions to modify custody.

 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court is 

Reversed and Remanded for Further Proceedings

HOLLY M. KIRBY,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS,J., joined, and

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., did not participate.
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Mitchell D. Moskovitz and Adam N. Cohen, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lee T. Myers.

Sandra Brown, pro se (no brief filed). 

OPINION

Petitioner Lee T. Myers, D.D.S. (“Father”), and Respondent/Appellee Sandra Brown

(“Mother”) are the natural parents of the minor child, a daughter, E.J.M., born October 31, 1994.

The parents were nevermarried. In June 1995, pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity,

the Juvenile Court for Shelby County entered an order of legitimation. In 1996, after a flurry of

litigation over visitation and child support matters, Mother was designated as the primary residential

parent of the child, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support.

Since then, the child has been the subject of protracted and contentious litigation, primarily

concerning custody, visitation, and decision-making for her welfare. This consolidated appeal is the

third appeal in this case. The history between the parties is set forth in detail in the opinion in the

first appeal, In re E.J.M., No. W2003-02603-COA-R3-JV, 2005 WL 562754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.

20, 2005) (“E.J.M. I”). 

The instant matter is a consolidation of two separate appeals, referred to herein as Appeal 1

and Appeal 2, both arising from Father’s most recent petitions to obtain custody of the child.

Appeals 1 and 2 were heard by different trial judges. Both concluded that proceedings in this Court

restricted the trial court’s ability to act on Father’s petitions. However, after hearing testimony, each

appeared to have different views of the parties.

Byway of background, we will briefly explain the facts and the holding in E.J.M. I. We will

then discuss the facts which gave rise to Appeal 1. After that, we will set out the facts underlying

Appeal 2, which occurred while Appeal 1 was pending. The issues raised in both appeals will then

be considered together. 

E.J.M. I

Mother is a single mother, and E.J.M. is her only child. She works in a support position in

a pharmacy, and she and E.J.M. live in Southaven, Mississippi. Father is a dentist with a successful

practice in Memphis, Tennessee. Since approximately 2000, Father has been married to Iris Meyers,

a teacher, and they have one child several years younger than E.J.M. Father and his wife live in

Memphis, Tennessee. During extensive litigation regarding E.J.M., Father has been represented by

counsel; Mother was initially represented by an attorney, but as the litigation wore on, has had to

represent herself pro se. During much of the litigation, there has been a guardian ad litem appointed

to represent the child.

In April 2002, in order to resolve the litigation and the frequent disputes regarding E.J.M.’s

welfare, the parties reached an agreement regarding her custody and care. The agreement was
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incorporated into a comprehensive consent order entered by the Juvenile Court on April 22, 2002.

In the order, Mother remained the primary residential parent; Father had designated parenting time

and had decision-making authority in certain areas. The parties were required to consult with one

another on all major decisions regarding E.J.M.’s “health, education, extracurricular activities, and

general welfare.” The April 2002 order also provided that psychologist Peter Zinkus (“Dr. Zinkus”),

who had worked with E.J.M. for some time, would be the final arbiter on any dispute regarding such

issues. 

In the summer of 2002, not long after the consent order was entered, another dispute arose.

E.J.M. had completed the second grade at Hanley Elementary, a public school in Memphis, but was

struggling academically. In violation of a Juvenile Court order, Mother removed the child from

enrollment in the third grade at HanleyElementary, and enrolled her in second grade at Sacred Heart,

a private school. This gave rise to other disputes, and Father filed petitions for contempt, for

injunctive relief, and for a change in custody requesting that he be designated as the primary

residential parent.

In September 2002, prior to the final hearing on Father’s petitions, Father was granted

temporary custody of the child; this lasted for a period of about ten months. More petitions were

filed by the parties. In June 2003, Juvenile Court Referee Cary Woods conducted a hearing on the

parties’ outstanding petitions. Referee Woods concluded that Father had not proven a material

change in circumstances so as to warrant permanently designating him as primary residential parent.

He recommended that Mother be restored as the primary residential parent, and that the parties be

required to continue to participate in counseling with Dr. Zinkus. This order omitted the provision

in the prior consent order requiring that Dr. Zinkus be the final arbiter of the parties’ disputes.

Referee Woods’ findings and recommendations were approved by a juvenile court judge. Father

filed a request for a hearing before a juvenile court judge on Referee Woods’ decision and Father’s

request for an injunction to prevent Mother from removing E.J.M. from Hanley Elementary. See

E.J.M. I, 2005 WL 562754, at *4-*7.

In September 2003, Juvenile Court Referee Herbert Lane was appointed Special Juvenile

Court Judge. Judge Lane conducted a three-day hearing on Father’s petitions for custody and for

injunctive relief. Judge Lane found that, although Mother had interfered to some extent with

Father’s parenting time, the parties’ primary dispute was over the child’s education. Observing that

the parties “simply can’t talk to one another” and were “probably never going to be able to agree”

on E.J.M.’s school issues, he concluded that the primary residential parent, Mother, would be

permitted to make the final decisions on such issues. He said that Father would remain involved in

the child’s education and could bring any problems to the court’s attention, and he cautioned Mother

not to interfere with Father’s residential time at the risk of losing custody of E.J.M. Therefore, Judge

Lane affirmed Referee Woods’ recommendation to restore Mother as E.J.M.’s primary residential

parent. 

On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision by Referee Woods and Judge Lane. Id. at *21.

We noted that both parents had shown themselves to be fit and loving parents. We recognized that
No. W2005-02520-COA-R3-CV. 1

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the child was placed in Father’s temporary custody as a result of Mother’s disobedience of court

orders relating to E.J.M.’s placement in school, noting that Mother should not be removed as the

primary residential parent as punishment for her disobedience absent a determination that her actions

adversely affected the well-being of the child. Id. at *20-*22. Giving due deference to the Juvenile

Court’s credibility determinations, this Court concluded that the evidence did not preponderate

against the Juvenile Court’s finding that no material change in circumstances existed sufficient to

change custody to Father. Id. at *22.

In E.J.M. I, Father argued in the alternative that the Juvenile Court erred in divesting him

of final decision-making authority with respect to E.J.M.’s welfare. We agreed with the Juvenile

Court that the overwhelming evidence established the parties’ inability to compromise and work

together for the benefit of the child, with or without the help of Dr. Zinkus. Therefore, we held that,

in a situation where the parties are unable to compromise, one parent must be given the authority to

make final decisions:

Divesting one party or the other of final decision-making authority becomes the only

option, and it is in the best interest of E.J.M. at this juncture that the decision-maker

be the primary residential parent, Mother. The parties are still required to consult

with Dr. Zinkus to resolve their communication problems. If Mother refuses to

comply with the order to consult with Dr. Zinkus, the Juvenile Court can address the

issue at that time in its discretion. 

Id. at *23. Accordingly, we affirmed the decision to deny Father’s petition for a change of custody

and to designate Mother as the parent with final decision-making authority for E.J.M.

 

Appeal 11

In May 2004, while the appeal in E.J.M. I was pending, Mother began taking E.J.M. to a new

psychologist, Dr. Shirley Wilson (“Dr. Wilson”). Neither Father nor Dr. Zinkus were told that

E.J.M. was seeing Dr. Wilson. In December 2004, Mother took the child to a new physician,

Remilekun S. Adesoji, M.D. (“Dr. Adesoji”), again without informing either Father or Dr. Zinkus.

Dr. Adesoji prescribed Ritalin to E.J.M. for attention deficit disorder (“ADD”). As background, Dr.

Zinkus had previously evaluated E.J.M. and was of the opinion that she did not need such

medication. In order to prevent Father from learning that E.J.M. was taking ADD medication,

Mother gave E.J.M.’s school a supply of the Ritalin to administer to her on Father’s parenting days.

Despite Mother’s efforts, in January 2005, Father learned from the school that E.J.M. was taking

Ritalin. After discovering this, Father requested the child’s medical records from Dr. Adesoji. Dr.

Adesoji, however, refused to release the records to Father, because in the intake information given

to Dr. Adesoji, Mother had not listed anyone as E.J.M.’s father. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for

E.J.M., appointed years earlier in prior proceedings, requested that Mother sign a release so that she

could obtain the child’s medical records, but Mother refused.
Father asserted that E.J.M. had not made any Ds and was an average student.

2

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Based on Mother’s conduct, on February 1, 2005, Father filed a petition to modify custody

and to find Mother in contempt of court. Because Mother had refused to sign the release, the GAL

also filed a petition for contempt against Mother. On February 9, 2005, Father filed an emergency

motion asking the Juvenile Court to enjoin Mother from continuing to administer Ritalin to E.J.M.

The motion was granted, and Mother was enjoined from administering the medication to E.J.M.

pending a report from Dr. Zinkus. The order further required Mother to list Father as E.J.M.’s father

in Dr. Adesoji’s records.

After Father was listed as a parent on E.J.M.’s medical records, he obtained a copy of them.

When he did so, he discovered that, unbeknownst to him, Mother had been taking E.J.M. for

treatment with the psychologist, Dr. Wilson, since May 2004. Father then procured Dr. Wilson’s

records, which indicated that Mother had told Dr. Wilson that Dr. Zinkus had previously diagnosed

E.J.M. with ADHD, which he had not. Dr. Wilson’s records also indicated that Mother told Dr.

Wilson that E.J.M. was a below-average, C/D student, which Father felt was inaccurate.

2

On March 24, 2005, two weeks after the Court of Appeals issued its decision in E.J.M. I,

Referee Woods conducted a hearing on Father’s petitions. Mother, Father, and the GAL appeared

at the hearing. Father was represented by counsel; Mother appeared pro se.

At the outset of the hearing, the GAL strongly criticized Mother for having E.J.M. seen by

a psychologist other than Dr. Zinkus and for having E.J.M. placed on Ritalin without disclosing these

facts to Father or Dr. Zinkus. The GAL acknowledged, however, that since Mother’s actions came

to light, Dr. Zinkus had reconsidered his opinion, and he thought perhaps that E.J.M. would benefit

from taking Ritalin and wanted her to take it for a trial period.

At the hearing, Mother did not testify under oath, but Referee Woods asked for her position.

She admitted that she did not consult with either Father or Dr. Zinkus before taking E.J.M. to the

second psychologist, Dr. Wilson, or to the second physician, Dr. Adesoji, or before permitting the

child to take Ritalin. Mother said that she felt from the prior court proceedings that she had the

authority to seek second opinions and make decisions in E.J.M’s best interest as the primary

residential parent. She explained that the offices of Dr. Wilson and Dr. Adesoji were in Mississippi,

near where she lived and where the child went to school, and were more convenient than Dr. Zinkus’

office in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. 

Father testified at the hearing. He noted that, under the April 2002 consent order, the parties

were required to consult with one another on major issues and, in the event of a dispute, Dr. Zinkus

had final decision-making authority. He acknowledged, however, that the appellate court had

determined in E.J.M. I that Mother, as the primary residential parent, should have final decisionmaking authority. Father said that, in the spring of 2004, he and Mother consulted with Dr. Zinkus

regarding the possibility that E.J.M. had ADD or ADHD. After testing, Dr. Zinkus was of the

opinion that E.J.M.’s difficulties in school were not because of ADD or ADHD, but he
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recommended that E.J.M. be held back a grade because she had started school too early. Later,

Father said, he was surprised to learn from a school employee that E.J.M. was taking Ritalin, because

Mother not consulted with him about E.J.M. being on such medication. Father noted that he had

parenting time with E.J.M. for several days in December, and he was not told at that time that she

had been taking Ritalin. Father indicated that he was not strictly opposed to the child taking Ritalin,

but he thought that he should have been consulted first and made aware when the child was placed

on the medication. He stated, “I’m not suffering, [Mother’s] not suffering. It’s [E.J.M.] suffering

because she feels – doesn’t even feel free enough to even express to someone she’s on medication.”

Father requested that he be designated as primary parent, or that at least Mother be required to

consult him about the child’s medications and other important issues.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Referee Woods found that Mother intended to deceive

Father about the fact that E.J.M. had been prescribed medication, and that her conduct was “a blatant

violation of the [April 2002] consent order,” specifically the provision requiring the parties to consult

with one another on such issues and, in the event of a dispute, submit the issue to Dr. Zinkus to

resolve. Based on this, Referee Woods stated that he had decided to “grant the petition to modify

primary residential status of [E.J.M.] and award custody to the father.”

At that point, Mother, pro se, mentioned to Referee Woods the Court of Appeals decision

issued two weeks prior, granting her decision-making authority. Father’s counsel acknowledged the

appellate court opinion but contended that Mother was never permitted to make such decisions

without consulting Father. He noted that Mother had not only failed to consult but had in fact tried

to conceal her decision from Father. Referee Woods stated that he believed that Mother was

“endangering the well-being of [E.J.M.] by initiating, I consider, a major health issue without

consulting Dr. Zinkus and/or the father in the prescription of . . . a significant medication that affects

her well-being and mental status while at school and at home.” Referee Woods then took a recess

to review the Court of Appeals opinion in its entirety.

After reviewing the appellate court decision, Referee Woods concluded that he was bound

by it to vest final decision-making authority in Mother:

I believe I am bound by the appeals court decision. And in reviewing the matter, it

says, divesting one party or the other of the final decision-making authority becomes

the only option. And it is in the best interest of EJM at this juncture that the

decision-maker be the primary residential parent, and it says the mother.

Based on the appellate court decision, then, Referee Woods stated that he would deny Father’s

petition to modify custody to designate him as the primary residential parent. However, after further

argument and inquiries by Father’s attorney and the GAL, Referee Woods changed his mind and

granted Father’s petition in part, awarding the parties joint custody, with Mother being the primary

custodian. Mother was ordered to consult with Father on “any major decisions concerning said

child, such as educational, medical, or health decisions.” In addition, Mother was held in contempt

of court and was ordered to pay $1,000 of Father’s attorney’s fees. On the same day, Referee Woods
Initially, Father appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the Shelby County Circuit Court. The circuit court

3

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Father appealed to this Court. This Court determined that the circuit court

was correct in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, but that it erred in dismissing the case; rather than

dismissing the case, the circuit court should have transferred it to this Court. Therefore, this Court reversed and

remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions for the circuit court to enter an order transferring the case to the

Court of Appeals. In re E.J.M., No. W2005-02520-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2052713 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006)

(“E.J.M. II”). After remand, the case was transferred back to this Court.

No. W2006-00365-COA-R3-JV. 4

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issued findings and recommendations consistent with his oral ruling. Those findings and

recommendations were confirmed by the Juvenile Court Judge. Father now appeals the trial court’s

March 24, 2005 order. This appeal is referred to in this Opinion as Appeal 1. 

3

Appeal 24

The second appeal, Appeal 2, arises out of events that occurred after the hearing and order

that is the subject of Appeal 1. Mother advised Father that she wanted to take E.J.M. to Sandersville,

Georgia, for spring break. Father acquiesced to Mother’s plans. As it turned out, over spring break,

Mother actually took the child to North Carolina, rather than Georgia. Several months later, Mother

took E.J.M. to New York; Father was aware of this trip. Unbeknownst to Father, however, Mother

and E.J.M. were accompanied by Mother’s boyfriend and Mother’s aunt on the trip. Bringing the

boyfriend on the trip was contrary to Referee Woods’ admonition that Mother not expose the child

to any unrelated overnight visitors of the opposite sex. While in New York, Mother took E.J.M.

across the border to Canada to Niagra Falls on a day trip, without Father’s knowledge. Through

conversations with E.J.M., Father found out about these events. 

E.J.M.’s school year began on August 4, 2005. Under the Juvenile Court order, once school

began, Father was permitted to have overnight parenting time with E.J.M. every Wednesday that he

did not have weekend visitation. On Father’s first Wednesday, August 10, 2005, E.J.M. went to

Mother’s home with her regular carpool driver. Father’s wife went to E.J.M.’s school to pick up

E.J.M. and she was not there. When Father contacted Mother to advise her that it was his parenting

day, Mother insisted that it was not, and Father ended up missing his parenting day.

Based on these events, on August 12, 2005, while Appeal 1 was pending, Father filed another

petition to modify custody and for contempt. On November 9, 2005, while that petition was

pending, another instance occurred in which Father did not have parenting time on a Wednesday

when he was supposed to have the child after school. On another occasion, Mother called Father to

consult with him about E.J.M.’s school performance. Mother told Father that E.J.M. was failing

three of her six subjects, and that she had received multiple failing grades on assignments in the

subjects she was passing. Father’s response was to suggest that E.J.M. live with him temporarily.

This prompted an angry exchange that included Mother cursing at Father. Father then heard E.J.M.

in the background defending him to Mother, and it was clear that E.J.M. had overheard Mother’s

angry remarks to Father. 
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Father’s August 12 petition was set for an initial hearing in the Juvenile Court on November

17, 2005. On that date, however, counsel for Father was informed that Mother was not properly

served with notice of the hearing and that, consequently, the matter was stricken from the Court’s

docket. Despite this, Father, his counsel, and the GAL, in Mother’s absence, approached Juvenile

Court Referee Dan Michael and made an ex parte request for an immediate change of custody,

alleging that E.J.M. was dependent and neglected because Mother had neglected her education.

Referee Michael told them that if they returned to court the following day with a petition for

dependency and neglect and for a protective order, he would execute a protective custody order in

favor of Father. This was done, and Referee Michael granted temporary custody of E.J.M. to Father.

Referee Michael’s temporary custody order was affirmed at a preliminary hearing before Juvenile

Court Referee Cary Woods. Referee Woods ordered temporary custody to remain with Father

pending further orders of the court. The Juvenile Court reset Father’s August 12 petition for custody

and his November 18 petition for a protective order for a hearing on December 1, 2005.

The hearing commenced on December 1, 2005, as scheduled, before Juvenile Court Referee

Michael. Present were Father’s attorney, Father and his wife, the GAL, and Mother. Mother again

appeared pro se. At the outset, Mother asked for a continuance to obtain funds to hire counsel. That

request was denied, and the hearing proceeded.

At the outset of the hearing, Father’s attorney gave Referee Michael a lengthy outline of the

history of the litigation from Father’s perspective, covering the April 2002 consent order, the

requirement that disputes be submitted to Dr. Zinkus, the order of temporary custody to Father, the

restoration of Mother as primary residential parent, the appeal of that order, Mother’s actions in

taking E.J.M. to a second psychologist and physician and obtaining a prescription for ADD

medication and concealing it from Father, the decision of the appellate court in E.J.M. I, the hearing

by Referee Woods on the issues surrounding the ADD medication, Referee Woods’ reading of the

appellate court opinion in E.J.M. I and his order of joint custody, the appeal of that order in Appeal

1, and finally a detailed recitation of the events since Appeal 1 regarding Mother’s trips with E.J.M.,

disputes over Father’s parenting time and the angry telephone exchange. The GAL then told Referee

Michael that she agreed with Father’s attorney and again advocated in favor of Father’s position.

Referee Michael then asked Mother for her position, which she stated briefly. She first

alluded to the thickness of E.J.M.’s Juvenile Court file from the many court proceedings. She said

that the problems arose between Father and her, and that she had been able to co-parent with Father’s

wife, without the involvement of Father’s attorney, the GAL, or a judge. She added, “You want to

know why I don’t have any witnesses? They’re tired, Your Honor. They’re tired. Teachers can’t

teach, my friends can’t work, they can’t be parents because every time we look up we’re in court.”

Father testified first. He noted that Mother had initially told him that she and E.J.M. would

take a spring break trip to Georgia but they ended up going to North Carolina. Father emphasized

that he did not object to the destination but objected to the fact that he was not told of the change in

itinerary. Regarding the trip to New York, Father objected to the fact that he was not told they would

take a day trip to Canada and that Mother and E.J.M. were accompanied by Mother’s boyfriend and
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aunt, in violation of the prohibition against Mother exposing E.J.M. to overnight visitors of the

opposite sex. Father testified about the two Wednesdays on which E.J.M. did not come to his home

as scheduled. He also recounted the incident in which Mother telephoned him to consult regarding

E.J.M.’s failing grades, he responded by suggesting that E.J.M. stay with him, and Mother reacted

by cursing him. At the end of the conversation, Father said, he could hear E.J.M. in the background

protesting what Mother had said about Father, and then Mother hung up. Father confirmed that

E.J.M. was indeed doing poorly in school and said that joint custody was not working in light of

Mother’s refusal to co-parent. He noted that, despite the fact that he paid Dr. Zinkus’ fees, Mother

had told him that she did not want to go back to see Dr. Zinkus. Father asked to be designated as

primary residential parent.

Mother testified, partly in response to questions from the trial court and from Father’s

attorney. Mother asserted that the instances in which Father did not get his Wednesday parenting

time arose because either she or the child were confused as to the day and the transition from the

summer schedule. She confirmed that she failed to inform Father of the change in itinerary for the

spring break trip or of the day trip from New York to Niagra Falls in Canada. Referee Michael

indicated that he would enjoin Mother from having a boyfriend spend the night, either at the home

or on a trip, in the child’s presence, and Mother agreed. Father’s attorney questioned Mother at

length about each incident. In response to questions about her failure to consult with Father on the

prescription of ADD medication and other matters, Mother did not dispute that she failed to consult

with him, stating, “. . . [E]very time I discuss something with him he objects [and] we end up in

court.”

Finally, Father’s wife testified. An elementary school teacher, she described working with

E.J.M. at length on schoolwork, often making up assignments that were missed or late during

E.J.M.’s stay with Mother.

At the end of the hearing, Referee Michael told the parties that, in light of the complicated

history of the litigation, he would take the case under advisement and issue a ruling in several days.

Meanwhile, the child would remain with Father while the Court reviewed the record and considered

the testimony and evidence.

On December 13, 2005, Referee Michael issued a recommendation that Father’s August 12,

2005 petition for custody and for contempt be dismissed, and the recommendation was approved by

the Juvenile Court Judge. The order states that Father’s petition for custody was dismissed “because

the issue of custody in this matter is on appeal with the Tennessee Court of Appeals,” and because

Father had already received temporary custody of the child by virtue of the November 18, 2005

order. On December 19, 2005, without further hearings, Referee Michael issued a recommendation

that Father’s petition for a protective custody be dismissed. This recommendation was confirmed

as well. On December 20, 2005, again without further hearings, Referee Michael found that “all

matters pertaining to said child are within the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Court of Appeals . . . .”

The amended order reiterated that Father’s petition for a protective custody order was to be

dismissed. Custody of E.J.M. was returned to Mother. The order did not include an injunction
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against Mother having a boyfriend overnight in the child’s presence. This order was approved by

the Juvenile Court Judge.

On December 20, 2005, apparently unaware that the Juvenile Court had entered the

December 19 and 20 orders, Father and the GAL filed a joint motion requesting that the Juvenile

Court issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, and seeking a ruling in open court regarding the

court’s findings. This joint motion was set for a hearing on February 9, 2006. On January 10, 2006,

Father appealed the December 20 dismissal of his petition.

The February 9, 2006 hearing was held as scheduled. On that date, Referee Michael read his

findings and recommendations from a prepared text and declined to entertain questions or hear

argument, emphasizing that the hearing was only for a ruling in open court. At the outset, Referee

Michael indicated that he had reviewed and digested the entire file of litigation between the parties,

not simply the pleadings and evidence pertinent to the most recent dispute:

This Court is intimately familiar with the facts in this case as the litigation has

continued for over ten years, with the filing of no less than 30 actions for specific

relief in over 20 Orders, four appeals, two of which are currently pending. It is

instruct[ive] to note that the litigation filed to date – that of the litigation filed to date,

the mother has filed five actions, all of which concern child support. The father has

filed 25 actions, the vast majority of which allege contempt against the mother, and

a request for custody of the minor child.

Referee Michael then summarized the various petitions, motions, orders and appeals filed. He cited

caselaw indicating that, once a notice of appeal has been filed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court

attaches and the trial court loses authority to act in the case without leave of the appellate court.

Referee Michael observed that Father had filed “numerous actions” in the Juvenile Court requesting

custody “after filing notices of appeal to the Court of Appeals to challenge decisions that awarded

custody to the mother;” all were filed “without leave of the Appellate Court.” He then stated:

The sheer volume and timing of the father’s pleadings, the nature of the

allegations contained within, and the father’s inability to prevail in the majority of

his actions lead this tribunal to conclude that the father’s actions border on an abuse

of the judicial process.

The father’s relentless approach to resolving this matter through litigation

indicates an extraordinary vigilance of minor infractions of the custodial parent, and

an unbending bias against cooperation.

Referee Michael reiterated that Father’s latest petition for custody was “dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.” He added, “Parties are prohibited from filing any further actions for custody, pending

either a ruling from the Court of Appeals or by their leave.” Juvenile Court Referee Herbert Lane,

appointed as Special Judge, confirmed Referee Michael’s recommendation. Appeal 2 is Father’s

appeal of the Juvenile Court’s rulings on December 13 and 20, 2005, and February 9, 2006.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

In Appeal 1, Father contends that the Juvenile Court Referee Woods erred in finding that the

appellate court decision prevented him from designating Father as primary residential parent, and

erred in ordering only joint custody with Mother as the primary residential parent, rather than

designating Father as the primary residential parent.

In Appeal 2, Father raises several issues. First, Father contends that Juvenile Court Referee

Michael erred in holding that, in light of the pending appeal, the Juvenile Court did not have

jurisdiction to address Father’s most recent petition for custody. Father contends that Referee

Michael also erred in enjoining the parties from filing any additional petitions for custody while the

latest appeals were pending, and in failing to grant Father’s petition to be designated as primary

residential parent. He argues that Referee Michael’s characterization of Father’s repeated petitions

as “border[ing] on an abuse of the judicial process” is erroneous, and that he also erred in failing to

include in his order an injunction prohibiting Mother from having a boyfriend stay overnight in the

child’s presence.

Because both Appeal 1 and Appeal 2 involve the issue of the parameters of the trial court’s

authority to entertain a petition for custody in light of an appeal involving custody, we address that

issue first. We then address the other issues raised on appeal.

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction

We consider first the issue raised in Appeal 1 and Appeal 2, namely, the extent of the trial

court’s authority to consider a petition for custody in light of an appeal concerning custody. The

issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear a petition for custody is a question of law, which we

review de novo. Button v. Waite, 208 S.W.3d 366, 369 (Tenn. 2006).

As noted by Juvenile Court Referee Michael in the February 9, 2006 hearing, upon the filing

of a notice of appeal, jurisdiction over the case attaches to the appellate court, and the trial court

loses jurisdiction over the matter that is the subject of the appeal. First Am. Trust Co. v. FranklinMurray Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The decree which is the subject of

the appeal “is final and conclusive upon all the facts and conditions which existed and upon which

the decree was made.” Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tenn. 1975 (quoting Hicks v. Hicks,

176 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)). However, where the trial court has acquired

continuing jurisdiction over the custody and welfare of a minor child, this continuing jurisdiction

is not abrogated by the filing of an appeal. As we recognized in E.J.M. I, “events and lives have not

stood still while [the initial] custody dispute has been in the courts.” E.J.M. I, 2005 WL 562754, at

*20 (quoting Gorski v. Ragains, No. 01A01-9710-GS-00597, 1999 WL 511451, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. July 21, 1999)). “[A] change in circumstances which could justify changes in custody can

occur at any time. There are times when a second petition for changes in custody may be filed and
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heard by the trial court while the first petition is on appeal.” Frey v. Meade, 8 T.A.M. 27-13 (Tenn.

Ct. App. May 16, 1983). This Court has stated:

. . .[T]he appeal of a dissatisfied parent does not tie the hands of a Trial Judge and

prevent his continued concern and protection of a ward of the court pending appeal.

. . . Such an appeal does not transfer to the distant appellate court the continuing

supervision of the welfare of the child. Pending appeal, the day to day supervision

of [the child’s welfare] must be left to the Trial Judges. . . .

Mittwede v. Mittwede, 490 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969). Thus, if there are new facts and

changed conditions since the decree, the trial court may issue any orders necessary for the welfare

of the minor child, based on the new circumstances. See Smith, 521 S.W.2d at 51.

In the case at bar, the Juvenile Court acquired continuing jurisdiction over E.J.M. by virtue

of the original paternity action. See E.J.M. I, 2005 WL 562754, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10,

2005). Our decision in E.J.M. I was “final and conclusive upon all the facts and conditions which

existed” at the time of the order that was the subject of that appeal. Smith, 521 S.W.2d at 50. The

issuance of the appellate decision in E.J.M. I, however, did not abrogate the Juvenile Court’s

continuing jurisdiction to issue orders addressing new facts and changed conditions which arose after

the issuance of the order being appealed. Id. at 51; Mittwede, 490 S.W.2d at 536.

Therefore, although the hearing that is the subject of Appeal 1 took place shortly after

issuance of the appellate decision in E.J.M. I, Father’s petition for a change in custody was clearly

based on events that occurred after entry of the order being appeal in E.J.M. I, namely Mother’s

actions related to the Ritalin, failing to consult with Father, and concealing medical information from

Father. Consequently, the Juvenile Court had full authority to grant Father’s petition in toto, if

warranted by the change in circumstances.

Similarly, in Appeal 2, Father’s petition for custody was based on events that occurred after

entry of the order that was the subject of Appeal 1, namely, Mother’s trips taken with E.J.M.,

Father’s missed Wednesday parenting time, and Mother’s angry telephone remarks. Accordingly,

despite the fact that Appeal 1 was still pending at the time, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to hear

Father’s petition and grant the requested change in custody if it determined that these facts warranted

such a change.

Therefore, to the extent that Juvenile Court Referee Woods held that the Juvenile Court did

not have jurisdiction or authority to grant Father’s petition for a change of custody in Appeal 1, this

holding is reversed. Likewise, Juvenile Court Referee Michael’s dismissal of Father’s petition for

custody based on lack of jurisdiction in Appeal 2 is also reversed.
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Change in Designation of Primary Residential Parent

In both Appeal 1 and Appeal 2, Father contends that the Juvenile Court erred in failing to

designate him as the primary residential parent, and he urges this Court to do so on appeal. We

consider Father’s arguments on this issue in the context of both appeals. In both, Father contends

that events which occurred after the prior custody order constitute a material change in circumstances

which warrant changing custody and designating him at the primary residential parent.

The standard of review on this issue is set forth in our Opinion in E.J.M. I:

We review the Juvenile Court’s findings of fact de novo on the record, presuming

those findings to be correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Kendrick

v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002); Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554,

555 (Tenn. 1984); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review issues of law de novo, with no

such presumption of correctness. Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 569-70; Tenn. R. App. P.

13(d). In cases regarding custody, the Juvenile Court has broad discretion because

such “decisions are factually driven and require the careful consideration of

numerous factors.” Morris v. Morris, No. M2001-02275-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL

31059222, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2002) (quoting Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d

663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). The trial judge is in a position to observe the

demeanor of the witnesses and to make determinations of credibility. Id. Therefore,

the Juvenile Court’s custody determination will be reversed only if it has abused its

discretion. Id.

Custody orders are res judicata and cannot be modified unless there has been a

material change in circumstances that makes a change of custody in the child's best

interest. Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 570; Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 148

(Tenn. 2002); see also Woodard v. Woodard, 783 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1989). The “threshold issue” is whether a material change in circumstances occurred

after the initial custody determination. Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 150. The Supreme Court

has explained that “[t]here are no hard and fast rules” in making such a

determination:

While “[t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining when a

child’s circumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant a change

of his or her custody,” the following factors have formed a sound

basis for determining whether a material change in circumstances has

occurred: the change “has occurred after the entry of the order sought

to be modified,” the change “is not one that was known or reasonably

anticipated when the order was entered,” and the change “is one that

affects the child’s well-being in a meaningful way.” We note that a

parent’s change in circumstances may be a material change in

circumstances for purposes of modifying custody if such a change

affects the child’s well being.
It is curious, however, that Referee Woods stated that he felt “bound” by the appellate decision, and 5

nevertheless ordered joint custody, when the appellate opinion emphasized that the record supported Juvenile Court

Referee Herbert Lane’s conclusion that the parents simply could not work cooperatively, that the constant power struggle

between them caused the most harm to the child, and that it was therefore necessary to designate one parent or the other

as the decision-maker. See E.J.M. I, 2005 WL 562754, at *22-*23.

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Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 570 (citation omitted). Once it has been determined that a

material change in circumstances has occurred, then the issue becomes whether a

modification of custody is in the child’s best interest, considering the factors

enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-101(a). Id. “The trial court must

recognize a strong presumption in favor of continuity of placement.” Morris, 2002

WL 31059222, at *2 (quotation omitted).

E.J.M. I, 2005 WL 562754, at *16. We look now at the factual findings and the trial court’s

assessment of the demeanor and credibility of the parties in both appeals.

In the hearing in Appeal 1, Juvenile Court Referee Woods heard testimony and argument on

Mother’s actions in taking E.J.M. to see psychologist Dr. Wilson and physician Dr. Adesoji,

obtaining a prescription for ADD medication for E.J.M. and administering the medication to her, all

without consulting or even informing Father, and in giving the medication to E.J.M.’s school to

administer on Father’s parenting days, in an effort to conceal from him the fact that E.J.M. was

taking medication. After hearing Father’s testimony and Mother’s position pro se, Referee Woods

concluded that Mother intentionally deceived Father about the fact that their daughter was on ADD

medication, and that she endangered E.J.M.’s well-being by placing her on such medication without

consulting or informing Father. He found that Mother’s conduct was a sufficient change in

circumstances to warrant designating Father as primary residential parent, although he did not

ultimately do so because of a misconception about the effect of the appellate decision in E.J.M. I.

5

Referee Woods’ initial finding that Mother’s conduct was a sufficient change in

circumstances to warrant changing the designation of primary residential parent is fully supported

by the evidence. Serious problems could have arisen if E.J.M. had had a medical crisis while in

Father’s care and he was unaware that she was taking medication. E.J.M. was placed in the difficult

position of not being able to tell Father that she was taking medication. Regardless of Mother’s

reasons for her decisions, hiding from Father the fact that their child was taking such medication was

simply wrong. Father, as E.J.M.’s parent, had a right to this information, even if it resulted in

Mother being in court again or being prevented from acting on her beliefs about the cause of E.J.M.’s

continued school difficulties. This constitutes a change in circumstances sufficiently material to

justify a change in the designation of primary residential parent.

We look now at the hearing in Appeal 2 before Juvenile Court Referee Michael concerning

Mothers’ trips with E.J.M., Father’s missed parenting days, and the angry exchange in E.J.M.’s

presence when Mother telephoned Father to consult on deteriorating school performance. Initially,

Referee Michael granted emergency protective custody to Father, based on the rather puzzling

representation to the Court, apparently made by Father’s counsel and/or the GAL ex parte, that
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E.J.M. was “dependent and neglected” because Mother was purportedly “neglecting” her education.

In the subsequent hearing, Referee Michael heard an outline of the history of the case from Father’s

counsel, Father’s testimony, Mother’s pro se direct testimony and lengthy cross-examination by

Father’s attorney as well as the GAL. Commendably, Referee Michael then took the case under

advisement for the express purpose of reviewing the extensive file and considering the most recent

conflict in the context of the overall litigation. Because Referee Michael ultimately dismissed

Father’s petition to be designated primary residential parent on jurisdictional grounds, he made no

factual findings on the events which gave rise to the petition. In his order, however, he left no doubt

as to which party he viewed as being primarily responsible for the unending series of disputes. After

hearing the parties’ testimony and the lengthy examination by counsel, Referee Michael referred to

Father’s “relentless approach to resolving this matter through litigation” and his “extraordinary

vigilance for minor infractions” by Mother. He then characterized Father as having “an unbending

bias against cooperation” and said his “actions border on an abuse of the judicial process.”

Giving due deference to the trial court’s assessment of the demeanor and credibility of the

parties, and his view of the most recent conflicts in the context of the overall litigation, we must

conclude that Referee Michael’s findings are also fully supported in the record. A review of the

record corroborates Referee Michael’s impression of Father’s years of over-reliance on litigation and

his dogged cataloguing of Mother’s every failure and transgression. This results in barren ground

in which to try to cultivate a cooperative parenting relationship, as well as increased pressure on

E.J.M., who by now is surely aware that her simply recounting to Father the events on a vacation

with Mother is likely to result in more litigation between her parents over her.

Thus, in this consolidated appeal, because of the unique procedures in the Juvenile Court,

we are faced with a “trial court” below with differing views of the parties’ relative culpability. One

finds that Mother has crossed the line and that her actions to deceive Father may warrant designating

him as primary residential parent; the other clearly points to Father’s ceaseless litigation against

Mother as preventing a cooperative parenting relationship. Both trial judges heard the parties testify

and assessed their demeanor and credibility, both reached conclusions that are supported by the

record.

Under these circumstances, although we have found that the trial court has jurisdiction to

address fully Father’s petitions, we decline Father’s request that we designate him as the primary

residential parent at this juncture. Instead, we must remand the cause to the Juvenile Court to

determine this issue in light of our clarification of the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the latest

of Father’s petitions for custody. The Juvenile Court is affirmed on all other issues raised on appeal.

Therefore, we remand the case for the Juvenile Court to reconsider Father’s petition. On

remand, the Juvenile Court should take a comprehensive view of the case, including but not limited

to consideration of the parties’ longstanding pattern of non-cooperation, Mother’s most recent

deception of Father regarding the ADD medication, and Father’s unremitting litigation.

Implementation of any joint-custody arrangement in this case is discouraged. The Juvenile Court

is also directed, on remand, to re-evaluate whether there is a continued need for the GAL, Dr.
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Zinkus, and the apparatus of requiring the primary residential parent, whoever that may be, to consult

with not only the other parent, but also the GAL and/or Dr. Zinkus on significant decisions.

In the meantime, the parties are enjoined from exposing the child to overnight visits by

unrelated visitors of the opposite sex. All remaining issues raised on appeal are pretermitted.

Therefore, the Juvenile Court’s decision to award joint custody in Appeal 1, Case No.

W2005-02520-COA-R3-CV, is reversed. The Juvenile Court’s decision to dismiss Father’s petition

for lack of jurisdiction in Appeal 2, Case No. W2006-00365-COA-R3-JV, is also reversed. The

cause is remanded for consideration of the issues noted above. Costs of this appeal are assessed onehalf to Appellant Lee Meyers and one-half to Appellee Sandra Brown, for which execution may issue

if necessary.

__________________________________________

HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE