IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 429A19 Filed 25 September 2020 IN THE MATTER OF: E.B. Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 834 S.E.2d 169 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019), affirming an order terminating respondent

- father’s parental rights entered on 30 November 2018 by Judge Kevin Eddinger , in District Court , Rowan County . Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 June 2020. Jane R. Thompson for petitioner

- appellee Rowan County Department of Social Services. Jeffrey L. Miller, for respondent

- appellant father.
EARLS , Justice

. Respondent

- father appeals from the Court of Appeals ’ affirmance of the trial court’s order terminating parental rights to his minor child, E.B. (Ella)

. 1 Between 12 May 2016 and 25 January 2018, the trial court conducted six p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings and entere d six orders imposing numerous conditions that

r espondent was required to satisfy prior to obtaining custody of Ella. However, as petitioners conceded before the Court of Appeals , the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings under N.C. G.S . § 7B

- 200

1 We will refer to E.B. throughout the remainder of this opinion by the pseudonym
“ Ella ” for ease of reading and to protect the privacy of the juvenile.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- because the Rowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) “failed to file a proper juvenile petition consistent with the requirements of N.C. [G.S.] §§ 7B

- 402(a) and 403(a), and thus no juvenile abuse, neglect, or d ependency action was ever commenced.” In re E.B. , 834 S.E.2d 169, 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)

. Indeed, Ella was never adjudicated to be an abused, neglected or dependent child . H er father indicated his desire to have custody of her and to care for her from the day he learned of her birth. On 30 November 2018, the trial court entered an order terminating

r espondent’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, and willful abandonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s termination order on the willful abandonment ground. I d

. at 175. Judge Hampson dissented . Judge Hampson would have held that because the facts supporting the grounds for termination as adjudicated by the trial court were “inextricably intertwined” with the concededly invalid p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings , the trial court failed to prove grounds for termination by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” I d. (Hampson, J., dissenting). W e substantially agree with Judge Hampson and hold to day that petitioners have failed to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that r espondent willfully abandoned his child. We also hold that petitioners have failed to prove that any other ground existed to terminate r espondent ’s parental rights . Accordingly, we
reverse.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- Standard of Review “A trial court is authorized to order the termination of parental rights based on an adjudication of one or more statutory grounds.” In re J.A.E.W. , 846 S.E.2d 268, 271 (N.C. 2020). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B

- 1111(a) of the General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1109(e), (f) (2019). ” Id. T he trial court found thr ee separate grounds for terminating r espondent ’s parental rights: (1) neglect, pursuant to N.C. G.S . § 7B

- 1111(a)(1); (2) failure to make reasonable progress, pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)(2); and (3) willful abandonment, pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 1111( a)(7) . We review a trial court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1109 “ to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusion of law. ” In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2 d 246, 253 (1984)

. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo

. In re C.B.C. , 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019). B ackground Ella was born on 1 8 February 2016. The next day , Ella’s mother relinquished her parental rights, placing Ella in nonsecure custody with DSS

. By relinquishing her parental rights, Ella’s mother agreed to the “transfer of legal and physical custodyI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- of the minor to the agency for the purposes of adoption. ” N.C. G.S. § 48

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- 703(a)(5) (2019) . As an exercise of that custodial authority, DSS placed Ella in foster care. Ella’s mother informed DSS that she believed r espondent was Ella’s biological father . Sometime thereafter, DSS informed r espondent that he had b een named by Ella’s mother as the putative biological father of a newborn

. When DSS contacted respondent , he reported that he was “excited” to be Ella’s father. He agreed to submit to a paternity test. Even before paternity was confirmed, r espondent expres sed his desire to be a parent to Ella

. However, until r espondent was confirmed as Ella’s biological parent, DSS possessed sole legal custody of Ella. See N.C.G.S. § 48

- 3

- 601,

- 705. On 23 March 2016, before the results of the paternity tests were known,

r espondent voluntarily entered into an o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices a greement with DSS . Respondent stated that he wanted to do “whatever [ DSS said] was necessary.” Because he was working and had his own home, he believed the reunification process “would just go over smoothly and my daughter would be released.” On 19 April 2016, a paternity test confirmed that r espondent was Ella’s biological father. Between 12 May 2016 and 25 January 2018, the trial court conducted six p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings. After each hearing, the court entered an order imposing numerous requirements on r espondent before he could be reunified with Ella

. These requirements incorporated the recommendations DSS made in the

o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices a greement
. After the first five hearings , the trial courtI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- concluded that Ella’s “ primary permanent plan shall be reunification with [ r espondent], with a secondary plan of guardianship to a relative or a court approved caretaker. ” After the final hearing, the trial court changed the primary plan to “adoption, with a secondary plan of reunification.” DSS never filed a petition seeking to have the trial court adjudicate Ella an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile pursuant to N.C. G.S. §§ 7B

- 402(a) and

- 403(a). Thus , the trial court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction to conduct p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings , and its orders lacked the force of law

. See In re T.R.P. , 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2006) (“A trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition.”). When Ella was born, r espondent was helping to raise three of his own juvenile children. Within months, r espondent became his children’s sole caregiver. Still, a s soon as he learned about Ella, r espondent expressed his desire to eventually take Ella into his custody and care. Respondent immediately began visitation with Ella

. He brought her age - appropriate snacks, clean ed her , and bonded health ily with his daughter

. After DSS raised concerns about his living situation, r espondent relocated to a new apartment. He submitted to three drug screens , two of which were negative and one inconclusive

. He completed parenting class es to improve his ability to care for an infant

.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- Respondent also named his sister, who lived in California, as a potential relative placement option , although he was initially reluctant to request that DSS place Ella with her because she lived so far away

. I n April 2016, r espondent asked DSS to initiate an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) review process, and r espondent’s sister agreed to serve as Ella’s guardian

. After the North Carolina ICPC office misplaced the initial request, causing a months

- long delay,

r espondent’s sister called DSS to request an expedited home study to facilitate quicker ICPC approval

. She visited with Ella on three occasions during her trips to North Carolina. Anticipating that she would promptly begin caring for Ella,

r esponden t’s sister purchased a crib; when the ICPC process was delayed,

r espondent ’s sister removed the crib and replaced it with a “princess bed.” Ultimately, r espondent’s sister became a licensed foster parent and was assessed and approved to assume custody of Ella through the ICPC review process

. In order to meet the ICPC’s requirements, r espondent’s sister completed parenting courses, became CPR certified, and moved her entire family out of their home into one that would be safer for Ella because it did not h ave a pool. The ICPC report noted that

r espondent’s sister possessed “considerable insight into the effects that separation and loss can have on children from her own experiences” in the foster care system. Although r espondent never disclaimed his intent to eventually assume custody of Ella, he also struggled to fully address the issues that he and DSS had identified in the voluntary o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices a greement. Respondent did not completeI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- the recommended domestic violence or substance abuse coun seling. Respondent refused to consent to ongoing drug screens , and his social media history suggested that he may have been continuing to use marijuana. He was assaulted by three men who broke into his home while his children were present, causing him to b e hospitalized for a dislocated jaw and stab wounds. He was evicted and lost his job. DSS reported that his home was cluttered and dirty. He had extended periods of inconsistent visitation with Ella, which r espondent attributed to his lack of a driver’s li cense, his injuries, and a death in the family. Eventually, r espondent informed DSS that he was not interested in continuing to engage in parenting services and that he only wanted to maintain visitation with Ella. It is undisputed that r espondent did not fully comply with all of the terms of the trial court’s orders. Respondent’s final in

- person visit with Ella occurred on 5 September 2017. On 22 January 2018, r espondent moved to California. Respondent did not inform DSS of his impending move and did not immediately provide them with an address where he could be reached. On 10 April 2018, DSS filed a petition to terminate r espondent’s parental rights , alleging grounds of neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, willful abandonment , and failure to pay child support

. Respondent did not communicate with Ella following his move to California until after DSS initiated termination proceedings

.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- Analysis We begin by noting that DSS ’s and the trial court’s actions repeatedly infringed upon r espondent’s consti tutional parental rights

. “[T]he government may take a child away from his or her natural parent only upon a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody or where the parent's conduct is inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status.” Adams v. Tessener , 354 N.C. 57, 62, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001) (citations omitted). Immediately upon learning that he was Ella’s biological father, respondent expressed his intent to parent Ella, an intent that he never disavowed. Until DSS filed a petitio n to terminate r espondent’s parental rights, DSS did not seek a judicial order establish ing that r espondent was “unfit to have custody” of Ella or that his “conduct [was] inconsistent with his . . . constitutionally protected status” as a parent. Id . Thus, as a biological father who had “seize[d] the opportunity to become involved as a parent in his child’s life,” Owenby v. Young , 357 N.C. 142, 146, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2003), r espondent enjoyed a constitutionally protected right to the “custody, car e, and nurture” of his child. Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 402, 445 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1994) . The constitutional parental right is, of course, not absolute. See , e.g. , In re C.B.C. , 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019). It is, however, a “ ‘funda mental liberty interest’ which warrants due process protection.” In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 106, 316 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1984) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 758

– 59 (1982) ).I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- The trial court substantially interfered with r espondent’s “ consti tutionally protected paramount right” to the “ custody , care, and control” of his child. Owenby v. Young , 357 N.C. at 148, 579 S.E.2d at 268
. On 17 May 2017 , r espondent , through counsel , informed the trial court that he “loves his daughter [ Ella ] and desires for her to be placed with him, or, alternatively . . . if the child is not placed with Respondent Father, he respectfully requests the child to be placed with his sister . . . immediately.” At that point in time , n either the trial court nor DS S possessed the legal authority to thwart r espondent’s wishes

. If DSS had concerns about releasing Ella into r espondent’s custody, the way to address those concerns was by filing a petition to adjudicate Ella an abused, neglected, or dependent child, or by filling a petition to terminate r espondent’s parental rights

. See N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 200 , - 904,

- 906.1
. DSS ’s failure to file such a petition deprived the trial court of the legal authority to demand that respondent demonstrate his parenting abilities to the trial court’s own satisfaction prior to taking Ella into his own custody , care, and control

. It also deprived t he trial court of the legal authority to dictate when, where, and how frequently r espondent would be permitted to interact with his child. These requirements and restrictions had no binding legal effect, but the trial court treated them as preconditions r espondent needed to satisfy , and parameters he needed to comply with , in order to exercise his constitutional parental rights

. T he trial court ult imately concluded that the conditions imposed up on

r espondent’s relationship with Ella served Ella’s best interests , and its decision toI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- reject r espondent’s demand to assume custody of his child or have her placed with his sister flowed from a commitment t o ensur ing a safe, nurturing, and loving environment for Ella

. However, the trial court did not have the authority to act on its own views of what served Ella’s best interests without first finding grounds to displace r espondent ’s constitutional parental rights to make such decisions

. See Owenby v. Young , 357 N.C. at 14 4 , 579 S.E.2d at 26 6 ( The “ Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the government does not impermissibly infringe upon a natural parent's paramount right to custody solely to obtain a better result for the child”) ; see also Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 73

– 74 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a st ate judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”)

. 2 Until the trial court entered an order granting custody of Ella to DSS and taking custody away from her father on some legally cognizable ground, DSS and the trial court ’s desire to further Ella’s b est interests ,

2 Restrictions on the State’s authority to interfere with a fit parent’s exercise of their parental right s are not merely technical requirements. In the child welfare context, these statutory and constitutional protections help mitigate the risk that parents will lose custody of their children if public officials disagree with their approach to childrearing o r because of racial, religious, gender, sexual orientation, or other bias es . In cases such as this one, the potential for these biases , whether explicit or unconscious, to interfere with the proper disposition of a custody dispute underscore s the importance of according due respect to a parent’s constitutional and statutory rights

. See, e.g. , Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762

– 63 (1982) (explaining that “[b] ecause parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or mem bers of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias ”)

.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- however well

- intentioned , provided no justification for interfering with r espondent’s exercise of his constitutional prerogatives as Ella’s parent. Notwithstanding its prior lack of jurisdiction to conduct p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings , the trial court did possess jurisdiction over DSS ’s petition to terminate r espondent’s parental rights under N.C .G.S. § 7B

- 1101
. A court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a t ermination petition does not depend on the existence of

an underlying abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding

. N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 110 1 (“ The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition or motion relating to termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child

- placing agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or motion. ”). DSS had standing to seek termination of respondent’s parental rights because Ella’s mothe r had relinquished her own parental rights and transferred legal custody of Ella to the agency. N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 1103(a)(4). Still , the trial court’s errors in conducting unauthorized p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings are significant in examining its su bsequent order terminating

r espondent’s parental rights

. Because the trial court acted without subject matter jurisdiction during the permanency planning process , the hearings it conducted and orders it entered were “void ab initio .” In re T.R.P. , 360 N.C. 588, 588, 636 S.E.2d 787, 789 (2006). A trial court cannot determine a party’s rights based on facts established in or arising from a legally void judicial proceeding

. See Hart v. Thomasville Motors,I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- Inc. , 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (19 56) ( “A void judgment is , in legal effect , no judgment. No rights are acquired or divested by it. It neither binds nor bars any one, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless.” ). If the trial court made findings sufficient to prove grounds for ter mination based on facts that were independent from the invalid p ermanency p lanning and

r eview h earings , then the mere fact that those invalid proceedings occurred would not preclude the trial court from also concluding that termination was warranted

. However, facts inextricably intertwined with a legally void proceeding are necessarily insufficient to prove grounds for termination by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

. Reviewing the record against this backdrop and evidentiary standard , we hold t hat the trial court failed to find sufficient facts independent from the legally void p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings to prove any of the three alleged grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights

.
a . Willful Abandonment T he Court of Appea ls affirmed the trial court ’s termination order by concluding that DSS had supplied sufficient evidence to prove willful abandonment . Accordingly,

w e address this ground first

. N.C. G.S . § 7B

- 1111(a)(7) provides for termination of parental rights where “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion

. ” “[A]lthough the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six

- month window in evaluating aI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- par ent’s credibility and intentions, the determinative period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition .” In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2019) ( internal quotations omitted)

.

“ [ W ] hether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.” Id (quoting I n re Adoption of Searle , 82 N.C. App. 273, 276, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986) )

. At the adjudicatory stage , the petit ioner bears the burden of proving willful abandonment by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. at 74, 833 S.E.2d at 771
. To establish w illful abandonment , the trial court must find evidence of conduct that is more serious than inconsistent attention to parental duties or less than ideal parenting practices. The trial court must instead find evidence that the parent deliberately eschewed his or her parental responsibilities in their entirety

. See In re Young , 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997)

. A bandonment requires “purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re A.G.D. , 374 N.C. 317, 319, 841 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2020) (clean ed up). Almost all of the trial court’s findings of fact in this case directly relate to the legally void p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings, focusing mostly on

r espondent’s alleged failures to comply with all of the conditions imposed by the trial

co urt’s orders. The Court of Appeals appropriately jettisons these facts, but then relies almost exclusively upon r espondent’s failure to attend p ermanency p lanningI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- hearings and scheduled visitations with Ella, mostly after his relocation to California , in finding that r espondent willfully abandoned his child

. 3 In re E.B. , 834 S.E.2d 169, 174

– 75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). R espondent’s decision to relocate to California must be assessed in the context of his ongoing efforts to take custody of Ella and bring her to California or to place Ella in the custody of his sister who lived in that state

. As r espondent stated at trial, his plan “was always for reunification. Once I had my daughter back home with me, I had plans to move to California and . . . she was su pposed to come with us.” In light of this express intent , r espondent’s actions do not “manifest a willful determination” to abandon his parental duties

. When r espondent relocated, his sister was awaiting

3 The Court of Appeals also cite d r espondent’s failure to personally attend a single child support hearing in January 2018. While failure to pay appropriate child support may be a ground for termination that is independent of an invalid underlying juvenile proceeding, the trial court did not find sufficient evidence proving that ground in the instant case. Further, a single missed child support hea ring is , standing alone, insufficient to prove willful abandonment. See Pratt v. Bishop , 257 N.C. 486, 501

– 02, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962)

.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- a pproval under the ICPC to take custody of Ella. 4 Re spondent had already informed DSS that he intended “to allow [his] sister to handle the situation , ” which the trial court recognized “refer[ed] to Ella’s care and placement.” I n this context , r espondent’s actions indicated an intent to let his sister complete the ICPC process and assume custody of Ella, not an intent to abandon Ella to DSS

. T he Court of Appeals has previously held, and we agree, that c onduct that is “subject to other explanations”

— in this case, the explanation that r espondent had long planned to relocate to California with Ella, based on his belief that he would be able to take Ella with him

or place her with his sister

— “do[es] not inherently suggest a willful intent to abandon.” In re S.R.G. , 195 N .C. App. 79, 86, 671 S.E.2d 47, 52 (2009)

. R espondent’s actions before the “determinative” six

- month window are also relevant in interpreting whether his conduct during the window signified willful abandonment. See In re K.N.K. , 374 N.C. 50, 55, 839 S.E.2 d 735, 739 (2020) (relying

4 Because the ICPC review of respondent’s sister was not completed until after DSS had filed the termination petition, DSS possessed legal authority to refuse to transfer Ella into respondent’s sister’s custody. We do not today reach the question of whether , after the trial court found grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights at the adjudicatory stage, the trial court’s decision to terminate rather than permit respondent to transfer custody to his sister was an appropriate exercise of its discretion at the dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1110. However, we note that some of the trial court’s apparent reasons for disregarding respondent’s wish to place Ella in his sister’s custody may not be sufficient, standing alone, to justify a refusal to place a child with a parent’s desired relative. In particular, the trial court’s findings that she possessed “negative attitudes” and made “negative posts on social media . . . towards the DSS and [petitioners],” her frustrations with the delayed ICPC process, a nd the fact that she authored a blog with a title that contained a sexual innuendo may not have been legally relevant in determining whether placement with respondent’s sister was in Ella’s best interests.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- on evidence of a parent’s “actions both prior to and during the determinative six

month period [to] support a reasonable inference of willfulness for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)(7) ”). Respondent’s ongoing efforts to obtain custody of Ella both before and during the determinative six

- month window are simply inconsistent with a finding that he willfully intended to forgo all parental claims and responsibilities. Other findings that the trial court relies upon cannot support w illful abandonment because they are the direct result of the trial court’s own interference with r espondent’s parental rights. The fact that r espondent stopped attending p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings and the fact that he communicated inconsistent ly with DSS after his move to California both arise directly from the trial court’s legally invalid proceedings

. A ny purported obligation r espondent had to attend the trial court’s hearings and communicate regularly with DSS was created by proceedings that the trial court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction to conduct. Similarly, r espondent’s failure to attend visitations with Ella is inextricably intertwined with the fact that the trial court impermissibly precluded him from interacting with Ella in the time and manner that he saw fit, as was his right as her parent
. T he trial court lacked authority to control r espondent ’s access to his child , and r espondent’s failure to comport with the trial court’s restrictions is insufficient to prove willful abandonm ent
. Further, it is relevant that r espondent ceased visitation during the determinative six

- month period immediately after a breakdown in his relationship with petitioners , in that there was another possible cause forI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- r espondent’s inconsistent visitation a part from a willful intent to abandon his child. Cf. In re Young , 346 N.C. at 252, 485 S.E.2d at 617 (1997) (considering finding of “ the probable hostile relationship between respondent and petitioner's family members who cared for [respondent’s child]” re levant in willful abandonment analysis ). Respondent’s actions, viewed in their appropriate context, do not clear the high threshold necessary to support a finding of willful abandonment

. See i d. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 ( “Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child .”) (emphasis added) (citation s omitted)

. The Court of Appeals makes a n unpersuasive distinction between r espondent’s “failures to comply with the terms of the void Permanency Planning Orders” and his alleged “failure to attend those proceedings [which] is nevertheless illustrative of Respondent

- Father having willfully determi ned to forgo his parental duties.” In re E.B. , 834 S.E.2d at 174 n.5. Regardless , r espondent’s failure to personally appear at the trial court’s hearings did not forfeit his ongoing claim that he should be reunified with his child. Nor did it withdraw his request to place Ella with his sister. In these circumstances , and given that r espondent never disavow ed his intent to assume custody of Ella or place her with his sister, his failure to attend p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings is insufficient to pro ve a willful intent to abandon his child. Petitioners ’ reliance on In re A.L. , 245 N.C. App. 55, 781 S.E.2d 860 (2016) , is similarly misplaced

. While the mere existence of legally void proceedings does notI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- preclude a trial court from subsequent ly entering an order terminating parental rights , a trial court may only terminate a parent’s rights when the petitioners have proven grounds for termination based on facts that are i ndependent from the circumstances created by the legally void underlying proceedings. We hold that in this case, petitioners have failed to meet their burden to prove willful abandonment by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that is not inextricably intertwined with the legally void p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings. Because petitioners need only prove a single ground for termination under N.C. G.S . § 7B

- 1111 , we address the other two grounds the trial court found in terminating r espondent’s parental rights. 5 b

. Neglect A trial court may terminate the parental rights of a parent who “has abused or neglected the juvenile

. ” N.C. G.S § 7B

- 1111(a)( 1) (2019). A neglected juvenile is statutorily defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile "whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision , or discipline; . . . or

5 This case is not appropriate for remand for furt her factual findings because our responsibility under all three grounds for removal is to determine first, whether the evidence in the case supports the trial court’s findings of fact, and then second, whether those findings support the trial court’s concl usions of law. In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984). Where, as here, we conclude that the record evidence cannot support the necessary findings , there is no justification for a remand for further factual findings. R eversal is al so appropriate because there are no material factual dispute s relevant to this Court's holding that the evidence does not support termination on any of the grounds alleged by petitioners

. Cf, IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton , 366 N.C. 456, 463, 738 S.E.2d 15 6, 160 (2013) (appropriate to resolve the substantive claim rather than remand the case where the facts are undisputed ).I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

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- who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare." N.C.G.S. § 7B

101(15) ( 2019 ). W hen , as in this case, the juvenile “has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of past neg lect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” In re D.L.W. , 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016)

. Petitioners have failed to prove either that r espondent previously neglected Ella or that there is a likelihood that he will neglect her in the future

. Respondent has never had physical custody of Ella , and she has never been adjudicated a neglected child. Since shortly after Ella’s birth, r espondent has continuously been the sole caretaker for his three other minor children , none of whom h a ve been adjudicated neglected

. While these fact s are not necessarily dispositive, together they impose upon the petitioners a burden that they have failed to carry . See In re Ballard , 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (holding that even a prior adjudication of neglect is not enough, on its own, to prove neglect in a termination proceeding)

. The trial court’s relevant findings of fact pertaining to this ground all relate t o evidence developed during the legally invalid p ermanency p lanning and r eview h earings and flow from the assessments, recommendations and requirements imposed as part of that process. There is no evidence that r espondent actually neglect ed Ella , and no ba sis to infer that he would have done so if Ella had been in his care, especially given that r espondent was , at that same time , successfully caring for three other minor children

.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

- 20

- The record was also devoid of any facts supporting a conclusion that

r espon dent was likely to neglect Ella in the future . The only relevant findings pertaining to likelihood of future neglect are that “[t]he history of [ r espondent] since [Ella] was born suggests that marijuana use, unstable housing, changing employment and confli cts raised by his lifestyle will continue to be issues for him,” that r espondent “is not in a position to care for [Ella] due to his lack of responsible decision making, substance abuse issues, parenting struggles, and lack of overall stability,” and that those issues are “barriers to a safe reunification with” Ella. From these facts, the trial court draws its conclusion that r espondent “has not corrected the risk factors within his life that would allow him to appropriately and successfully parent [ Ella ], pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)( 1).” These findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that r espondent is likely to neglect Ella in the future. Cf. In re K.N. , 373 N.C. 274, 282, 837 S.E.2d 861, 867 (insufficient evidence to prove likelihood of f uture neglect where juvenile had previously been adjudicated neglected and removed from home, parent was incarcerated, and evidence indicated parent had not fully complied with legally valid case plan). The trial court fails to analyze how these facts 6 con nect with the specific

6 Some of the facts relied upon by the trial court are contested ( for example, respondent denies marijuana use during the relevant time period), some are subjective value judgments (the assertion of “conflicts raised by his lifestyle”), and some are circumstances that respondent shares with many other parents nationwide who will never neglect their children ( “ unstable housing ” and “ changi ng employment ” ). Hence , their probative value is questionable in any event.I N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

- 21

- determinative question of r espondent’s future likelihood of neglecting Ella. Id. at 283, 837 S.E.2d at 86 7

– 68 (holding that the “extent to which a parent's incarceration or violation of the terms and conditions of probation support a finding of neglect depends upon an analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances ”) (emphasis added). Further , the trial court fail s to examine the “considerable change in conditions ” in r espondent’s life that “ had occurred by the time of the termination proceeding

. ” In re Young , 346 N.C. at 250, 485 S.E.2d at 616. Notably, in addition to r espondent’s progress addressing at least some of the “ risk factors ” he had previously identified to DSS ,
r espondent had also identified his sister as a n appr opriate alternative guardian for Ella

. Because petitioners have failed to prove that r espondent previously neglected Ella and that he was likely to neglect Ella again in the future, Section 7B

- 1111(a)(1) does not support termination of r espondent’s parent al rights

.
c . Failure to Make Reasonable Progress A trial court may terminate the parental rights of a parent who “has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) (2019). Here , t here must be a “nexus between the components of the court

- approved case plan with which [respondent] failed to comply and the co nditions which led to [the juvenile’s] removal from theI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

- 22

- parental home. ” In re B.O.A. , 372 N.C. 372, 385, 831 S.E.2d 305, 314 (2019). A parent is required to make “reasonable progress . . . in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juve nile .” N.C. G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) (2019). Petitioners essentially contend that r espondent’s voluntary o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices a greement both identifies the “conditions” which “led to the removal” of Ella from his home (e.g., DSS ’s refusal to allow r espon dent to assume custody of Ella ) and the benchmark against which the trial court could evaluate his “progress

. ” They argue that r espondent’s failure to make reasonable progress towards addressing the risk factors outlined in his voluntary o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices agreement provides sufficient factual evidence to terminate his parental rights. We reject the argument that failure to comply with a voluntary o ut
- of

- h ome f amily s ervices agreement constitutes grounds for termination under § 7B

- 1111(a)(2)

. It is settled law that “removal” as used within § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) only occurs when a court acting with appropriate jurisdiction enters an order placing a child into the custody of someone other than the child’s parents. In re J.S. , 374 N.C. 811, 845 S.E.2d 6 6, 71 (2020) (“[A]n adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) requires that a child be left in foster care or placement outside the home pursuant to a court order for more than a year at the time the petition to terminate parental rights is filed.”) (emp hasis added) (cleaned up) ; see also In re Pierce , 356 N.C. 68, 73, 565 S.E.2d 81, 85 (2002) ( determining that a child was removed within the meaning of § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) “when the trial court awarded custody of the child to DSS, and she was placed in fosterI N RE E.B. Opinion of the Court

- 23

- care”)

. As the Court of Appeals has correctly held, p ermitting this ground to apply to voluntary separations would unnecessarily subject parents to the risk of termination even when their “reasons” for transferring custody of their child do not “implicate the child welfare concerns of the State.” In re A.C.F. , 176 N.C. App. at 525, 626 S.E.2d at 733
. Further, such a broad interpretation of § 7B

– 1111(a)(2) may cause parents to avoid voluntarily seeking out much

- needed assistance from DSS for fear of permanen tly losing their parental rights. Because DSS never filed a petition to adjudicate Ella abused, dependent, or neglected , no legal ly valid order ever “removed” Ella from r espondent’s custody

. Therefore, Section 7B

- 1111(a)(2) does not support termination of r espondent’s parental rights. Conclusion Petitioners bear the burden of proving that grounds exist for terminating

r espondent’s parental rights, based on facts that arise independently from the legally void p ermanency p lanning proceedings. As we hold that petitioners have failed to meet this burden, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision

. REVERSED.Justice NEWBY concurring in result only.

I agree with the majority that because no abuse, neglect, or dependency petition was filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the initial permanency planning and review hearings here, and that the trial court’s findings that were not based on the vo id orders and proceedings are insufficient to support the termination of respondent’s parental rights. Accordingly, the matter should be remanded to the trial court. In its analysis, the majority improperly finds facts in this case, which is a job reserved for the trial court, and addresses issues unnecessary to resolve this matter, rendering much of the discussion dicta. Thus, I concur in the result only.