U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Robbery at

Automated Teller

Machines

by

Michael S. Scott

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series

No. 8

Robbery at Automated

Teller Machines

Michael S. Scott

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#99-CK-WX-K004 by the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions

contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the official position of the U.S.

Department of Justice.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series 

Guide No. 8

About the Guide Series i

About the Guide Series

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge

about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific

crime and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention

and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The

guides are written for police–of whatever rank or assignment–

who must address the specific problem the guides cover. The

guides will be most useful to officers who

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and

methods. The guides are not primers in problem-oriented

policing. They deal only briefly with the initial decision to

focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze the

problem, and means to assess the results of a problemoriented policing project. They are designed to help police

decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have

already identified. (An assessment guide has been produced

as a companion to this series and the COPS Office has also

published an introductory guide to problem analysis. For

those who want to learn more about the principles and

methods of problem-oriented policing, the assessment and

analysis guides, along with other recommended readings, are

listed at the back of this guide.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to

spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and

responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before

responding helps you design the right strategy, one that is

most likely to work in your community. You should not

blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must

decide whether they are appropriate to your local situation.

What is true in one place may not be true elsewhere; what

works in one place may not work everywhere.
ii Robbery at Automated Teller Machines

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police business.

The guides describe responses that other police

departments have used or that researchers have tested.

While not all of these responses will be appropriate to your

particular problem, they should help give a broader view of

the kinds of things you could do. You may think you

cannot implement some of these responses in your

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when

police have discovered a more effective response, they have

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving

the response to the problem.

• Understand the value and the limits of research knowledge.

For some types of problems, a lot of useful research is

available to the police; for other problems, little is available.

Accordingly, some guides in this series summarize existing

research whereas other guides illustrate the need for more

research on that particular problem. Regardless, research

has not provided definitive answers to all the questions you

might have about the problem. The research may help get

you started in designing your own responses, but it cannot

tell you exactly what to do. This will depend greatly on the

particular nature of your local problem. In the interest of

keeping the guides readable, not every piece of relevant

research has been cited, nor has every point been attributed

to its sources. To have done so would have overwhelmed

and distracted the reader. The references listed at the end of

each guide are those drawn on most heavily; they are not a

complete bibliography of research on the subject.

• Are willing to work with other community agencies to find

effective solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot

implement many of the responses discussed in the guides.

They must frequently implement them in partnership with

other responsible private and public entities. An effective

problem-solver must know how to forge genuine
About the Guide Series iii

partnerships with others and be prepared to invest

considerable effort in making these partnerships work.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,

Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia.

Even though laws, customs and police practices vary from

country to country, it is apparent that the police everywhere

experience common problems. In a world that is becoming

increasingly interconnected, it is important that police be

aware of research and successful practices beyond the borders

of their own countries.

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to provide

feedback on this guide and to report on your own agency's

experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your agency may

have effectively addressed a problem using responses not

considered in these guides and your experiences and

knowledge could benefit others. This information will be used

to update the guides. If you wish to provide feedback and

share your experiences it should be sent via e-mail to

cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series is very much a

collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary author,

other project team members, COPS Office staff and

anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide by

proposing text, recommending research and offering

suggestions on matters of format and style.

The principal project team developing the guide series

comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, University

of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, professor of

criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. Eck, associate

professor of criminal justice, University of Cincinnati;

Michael S. Scott, police consultant, Savannah, Ga.; Rana

Sampson, police consultant, San Diego; and Deborah Lamm

Weisel, director of police research, North Carolina State

University.

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw the

project for the COPS Office. Megan Tate Murphy

coordinated the peer reviews for the COPS Office. Suzanne

Fregly edited the guides. Research for the guides was

conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers

University under the direction of Phyllis Schultze by Gisela

Bichler-Robertson, Rob Guerette and Laura Wyckoff.

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members of

the San Diego, National City and Savannah police

departments who provided feedback on the guides' format

and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the line

police officers, police executives and researchers who peer

reviewed each guide.

Contents

About the Guide Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Robbery at Automated Teller Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Related Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Factors Contributing to Robbery at Automated Teller Machnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Locations/Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Current Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

General Considerations for an Effective Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Imposing Mandatory Minimum Security Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Using Civil Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Specific Responses to Reduce ATM Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Altering Lighting, Landscaping and Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Implementing Public Awareness and Education Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Using Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Targeting Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Hardening Targets and Denying Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Contents vii
viii Robbery at Automated Teller Machines

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines . . . .25

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Other Guides in This Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
The Problem of Robbery at Automated

Teller Machines

This guide addresses the problem of robbery of people using

automated teller machines (ATMs) and night cash

depositories.† The guide begins by describing the problem

and reviewing factors that increase the risks of ATM robbery.

It then identifies a series of questions that might assist you in

analyzing your local ATM robbery problem. Finally, it reviews

responses to the problem and what is known about these

from evaluative research and police practice.

ATMs were first introduced in the mid-1960s in the United

Kingdom, and in the late 1960s in the United States. The

number of ATMs has increased dramatically since. ATM users

now annually conduct billions of financial transactions, mostly

cash withdrawals. Where once one would find ATMs only on

bank premises, today one finds them almost everywhere

–along sidewalks and in airports, grocery stores, shopping

malls, nightclubs, and casinos. There are even mobile ATMs

that can be set up at disaster sites or temporary entertainment

venues like fairgrounds. Bank customers have come to expect

that they can access their funds virtually any time and any

place. To some extent, they have traded safety for

convenience.

The Problem of Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 1

† Robberies at night cash

depositories, at which cash can only

be deposited, not withdrawn, are

sufficiently similar to ATM robberies

to make most of the responses

similar. Hereafter, reference will be

made only to ATMs, but unless

otherwise noted, all information

applies equally to night cash

depositories.

ATMs have been installed in many locations such as this shopping mall and

nightclub.

Bob Heimberger
2 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

ATM services are highly profitable for banks, and banks

aggressively market the use of ATM cards.† ATMs that are off

bank premises are usually more profitable for banks because

they attract a higher volume of non-bank customers, who

must pay service fees. Unfortunately, customers using offpremise ATMs are more vulnerable to robbery.

As yet, there are no routinely collected national figures on the

incidence of U.S. ATM robberies.†† Estimates are derived

from periodic surveys of banks conducted by banking

associations.††† According to those surveys, there was an

estimated one ATM crime (including robbery) per 3.5 million

transactions.†††† Statewide surveys conducted in California

indicated there was one ATM crime per 1.9 million

transactions in 1986, one per 1.2 million in 1992, and one per

2.5 million in 1995.1 Thus, the California figures suggest that

the rate of ATM crime declined by about 50 percent during

that brief period, although we do not know how well the

bank survey data reflect the actual incidence of ATM crime.

Moreover, the surveys covered all ATM-related crimes, not

just robbery, so the figures overstate robbery rates (see below

for related crimes).

The survey figures and findings are still cited as if they reflect

current conditions, even though it is doubtful that they do.

The best one can conclude is that the overall rate of ATMrelated crime is somewhere between one per 1 million and

one per 3.5 million transactions, suggesting that such crime is

relatively rare. But the figures, without further analysis and

some comparative context, do not tell us much about the risks

of ATM robbery. Local analysis of ATM robberies will be

necessary to determine how significant the problem is in your

jurisdiction.

† It has been estimated that in 1993,

banks earned $2.55 billion in revenue

from ATMs, saved $2.34 billion in

wages for tellers and netted a profit

of $2 billion (Deitch 1994; DeYoung

1995).

†† With a little effort, most local

police agencies could compile data

on ATM robberies, but until the

FBI's National Incident-Based

Reporting System becomes standard,

the Uniform Crime Reports will not

provide national data on the

problem.

††† Most of the figures cited in the

literature on ATM crime are from

two surveys, conducted by the Bank

Administration Institute and the

American Bankers Association in

1987 and 1989, respectively.

†††† This figure is routinely cited in

the Bank Administration Institute

and American Bankers Association

surveys.
The Problem of Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 3

Related Problems 

Robbery at ATMs is only one of several related problems the

police must address. Other problems that call for separate

analysis and responses, but which are not addressed in this

guide, include:

• robbery of couriers who fill ATMs with cash,

• theft of personal identification numbers (PINs) (including

theft by "shoulder surfing"),

• theft by electronic data interception,

• theft by fraudulent electronic transactions,

• theft of money from ATMs by bank/ATM service

employees,

• burglary of ATMs (including theft of entire ATMs),

• presence of homeless people sleeping in ATM vestibules,

• vandalism of ATMs, and

• fraudulent use of ATM cards obtained from customers

through dummy ATMs that keep their cards.

Factors Contributing to Robbery at Automated Teller

Machines

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem

will help you frame your own local analysis questions,

determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key

intervention points, and select appropriate responses.
4 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines

† Among the prominent victims of

ATM robbery in recent years are a

former U.S. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, who successfully

resisted the offenders and later

identified them; the son of TimeWarner Inc.'s CEO, who was also a

popular New York City school

teacher (he was murdered after his

ATM card was taken and he was

forced to reveal his PIN); a New

York City councilwoman; police

officers; and assistant district

attorneys.

A few studies, although they are becoming dated, have

provided some data on common ATM robbery patterns.2 The

general conclusions are as follows:

• Most robberies are committed by a lone offender–using

some type of weapon–against a lone victim.

• Most occur at night, with the highest risk between midnight

and 4 a.m.

• Most involve robbing people of cash after they have made a

withdrawal.

• Robberies are somewhat more likely to occur at walk-up

ATMs than at drive-through ATMs.

• About 15 percent of victims are injured.

• The average loss is between $100 and $200.

High rates of all types of street robbery, including ATM

robbery, are likely to coincide with crack cocaine markets, as

street robbery is a quick way for addicts to get the cash they

need to buy crack, and it does not require a lot of planning or

skill.

ATM robbery attracts a lot of media attention and public

concern, most likely because the general public perceives that

it can happen to almost anyone. Legislation regarding ATM

customer safety has been introduced immediately after a

prominent person, a legislator or someone close to a legislator

has been robbed at an ATM.†

There are several additional and distinct ATM robbery

patterns, each of which presents unique challenges in

responding. As noted above, the most common pattern is for
The Problem of Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 5

the offender to rob the ATM user immediately after the

victim makes a withdrawal.3 Other patterns include the

following:

• the offender forces the victim to go to an ATM to

withdraw cash;

• the offender robs the victim of his or her ATM card, forces

the victim to reveal the PIN, and then uses the card;

• the offender robs a victim standing at an ATM of other

valuables (wallet, watch, jewelry); and

• the offender follows someone who has just withdrawn cash

from an ATM and robs him or her away from the ATM.

There is some evidence that offenders who commit street

robbery (including ATM robbery) are different from those

who commit commercial robbery.4 We do not know the

extent to which ATM robbers commit other types of street

robberies, like purse snatchings and muggings. Street robbers

are notoriously difficult to deter. They require relatively small

amounts of cash to justify their risk, they have a lot of crime

opportunities, they want cash immediately, and street robbery

does not require much skill or planning.5 Some robbers will

adapt to technological prevention measures, finding ways to

circumvent them.6 For example, surveillance equipment might

lead robbers to disguise themselves.

Understanding Your Local Problem 7

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalized

description of ATM robbery. You must combine the basic

facts with a more specific understanding of your local

problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully will help you

design a more effective response strategy.

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should ask in

analyzing your particular problem of ATM robbery, even if

the answers are not always readily available. Your answers to

these and other questions will help you choose the most

appropriate set of responses later on.

Incidents

• How many robberies are related to ATMs? (When counting

incidents, remember that a few ATM robbery victims will

also have been assaulted, raped, kidnapped, or murdered,

and the incident will be classified by the more serious

offense. These more serious offenses may not significantly

alter the statistical picture of the problem, but they may

well have a significant effect on the public's fear of ATM

robbery.) Mapping techniques alone will not reveal the

relationship between robberies and ATMs–some robberies

occur away from ATMs after offenders follow ATM

customers, while some robberies only coincidentally occur

near ATMs. You will need to review the entire police

reports to determine how robberies and ATMs are related.

• What percentage of all robberies in your jurisdiction are

ATM robberies? What percentage of street robberies are

ATM robberies?
8 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

• What percentage of ATM robberies and attempted

robberies do you estimate are reported to police?

• Is the current incidence of ATM robberies increasing or

decreasing?

• Which pattern of ATM robbery is most common? Robbery

near ATMs after withdrawals? Robbery away from ATMs

after withdrawals? Forced withdrawals? Offenders use

stolen ATM cards? Other valuables stolen at ATMs?

• Have any civil suits resulting from ATM robberies been

filed against ATM operators in your jurisdiction? If so, what

can you learn about the problem from these civil suits? (For

example, what were the specific claims against the vendors?

Did they relate to inadequate security measures or ATM

locations? Who prevailed in the suits, and on what

grounds?)

Victims

• Who are the victims? Are there any noticeable demographic

patterns among them? Age? Gender? Occupation? 

• Are there repeat robbery victims? 

• What percentage of victims are injured during robberies?

How serious are the injuries? 

• How do victims typically react to demands for their money?

Do they resist or comply? If they resist, how do they do so?

How do offenders respond to victims' actions? 

• What percentage of attempted robberies are thwarted by

the victim? By others intervening?
Understanding Your Local Problem 9

• How much money do victims typically lose?

• Do victims follow the standard safety precautions? (See

response 7 in the following section for examples of

standard safety precautions for ATM users.) If not, which

ones are not followed? Why do victims say they fail to

follow certain safety precautions?

• Are victims usually alone when robbed?

Offenders

• Do the offenders specialize in ATM robbery, or do they

commit other types of crime as well?

• What percentage of ATM robberies are committed by

repeat offenders? How prolific are the worst offenders? Are

there any common characteristics of repeat ATM robbers?

How do ATM-robber characteristics compare with those of

other robbers?

• Do offenders usually work alone?

• What types of weapons do offenders use or threaten to

use?

• What percentage of offenders commit robbery for money

to buy drugs? What percentage are intoxicated by drugs or

alcohol during the robbery? What drugs are most

commonly associated with ATM robbery? (Local data on

arrestees' drug usage, if available, may provide partial

answers to these questions.)

Locations/Times

• When do the ATM robberies occur? During the day, or at

night? Time? Day of week? Time of month? Time of year? 

• In what area do the ATM robberies occur?
10 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

• Are robberies more likely to occur at walk-up or drivethrough ATMs? At indoor or outdoor sites? On bank

premises or at off-premise sites?

• What percentage of ATM robberies occur at repeat

locations?

• Are some banks' ATMs the site of robbery more than

others'? Are some banks' ATMs much less likely to be the

site of robbery? Are there any obvious factors that

distinguish high-robbery ATMs from low-robbery ATMs?

• Are the ATMs where robberies occur most frequently in

areas otherwise considered to be at high risk for crime and

disorder? Near street drug markets?

• What security features and environmental conditions are

present at high-robbery ATMs and low-robbery ATMs (e.g.,

proper lighting, clear visibility, locked vestibules, surveillance

cameras, rearview mirrors, natural surveillance)?

• What paths do offenders take entering and escaping from

the crime scene around ATMs?

• Why do ATM operators locate high-robbery ATMs at the

particular sites (i.e., why do they believe those particular

sites will attract customers)? Do the same factors that make

ATM locations attractive for ATM operators also make

them attractive for ATM robbers? Are high-robbery sites

more or less profitable for ATM operators than the average

ATM sites?

Current Responses

• Do police and ATM operators have an effective working

relationship? Is information about ATM crime shared

freely? Are police apprised of all ATM sites within the

jurisdiction?

• Do ATM operators analyze robbery trends and respond

appropriately?
Understanding Your Local Problem 11

• Do police routinely review site plans and/or business

permit applications for ATMs?

• Does the law applying to your jurisdiction mandate

minimum ATM security standards? (See the "Imposing

Mandatory Minimum Security Standards" section below.)

Are the applicable standards adequate? Do ATMs in your

jurisdiction comply with those standards? Who is

responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance? Is it

being done adequately?

• Regardless of whether there are mandatory security

standards, do ATMs in your jurisdiction meet all or most of

the security standards discussed in this guide? If not, which

security standards are most commonly lacking?

• Do police and other criminal justice agencies operate repeat

offender programs?

• What is the clearance rate for ATM robberies? Is this figure

higher or lower than the overall norm for robberies? 

• Do ATM cameras effectively identify offenders?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your

efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify

your responses if they are not producing the intended results.

You should take measures of your problem before you

implement responses, to determine how serious the problem

is, and after you implement them, to determine whether they

have been effective. All measures should be taken in both the

target area and the surrounding area. (For more detailed

guidance on measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide

to this series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers.) 
12 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

The following are potentially useful measures of the

effectiveness of ATM robbery responses:

• number of ATM robberies and attempted robberies

reported to police,

• percentage of ATMs that are robbery-free,

• number and severity of victim injuries during ATM

robberies,

• total and average cash losses incurred by victims,

• degree to which ATM robbery is displaced geographically

or to other types of crime, and

• degree to which other crimes decrease in the areas around

ATMs (otherwise known as a diffusion of benefits).
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 13

Responses to Robbery at Automated

Teller Machines 

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better

understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you

have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline

for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible

responses to address the problem.

The following response strategies provide a foundation of

ideas for addressing your particular problem. These strategies

are drawn from a variety of research studies and police

reports. Several of these strategies may apply to your

community's problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to

local circumstances, and that you can justify each response

based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy

will involve implementing several different responses. Law

enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing

or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering

what police can do: give careful consideration to who else in

your community shares responsibility for the problem and can

help police better respond to it.

General Considerations for an Effective Strategy

1. Imposing mandatory minimum security standards.

Banks and other institutions that operate ATMs must comply

with applicable U.S. federal laws, principally the Federal

Electronic Funds Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Bank

Protection Act (Regulation P) (12 CFR § 216.1). These federal

laws, however, primarily address matters related to the security

of the ATMs themselves and to fraudulent transactions,

rather than matters related to ATM users' safety.
14 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

No federal law prohibits minimum security standards to

protect ATM users;† several states and a few cities have passed

their own laws mandating minimum security standards for

ATMs.

†† Most of these laws set minimum standards for

lighting, landscaping, visibility, security reviews, and customer

safety tips. The state of New York's law requires, in addition,

surveillance cameras and locked vestibule doors that require

an ATM card to access. Some laws provide for fines against

ATM operators for violations of the standards. Some require

annual compliance certifications for each ATM. If securitystandard laws are enacted, adequate resources must be

dedicated to inspection and compliance enforcement.††† Under

some state laws, ATM operators who comply with the security

standards are statutorily protected from civil liability. Some

laws apply retroactively to all ATMs; others, only to new

ATMs.

There are both positive and negative implications for specific

security standards. Highly specific standards leave little room

for debate about compliance, but they also inhibit

technological innovations that could provide more security

than mandated by the minimum standards.7

2. Using civil liability. Although police do not play a direct

role in civil lawsuits resulting from ATM robberies, you

should understand that ATM operators and premise owners

carefully consider their civil liability when deciding where to

place ATMs and what security measures to adopt. Much of

the published literature addresses ATM security from a legalliability perspective. Statutory and case law on liability for

injuries sustained during ATM transactions varies across

jurisdictions, so you should consult local legal counsel if you

wish to know how the law applies in your jurisdiction. As a

† Federal law would probably preempt

state and local law, and state law usually

preempts local law. Some legal

commentators believe that current federal

law already preempts state law, but as yet,

no court has made such a determination

(Knapp 1996).

†† The state of California (Cal. Fin. Code

§ 13000-070) and the city of New York

(N.Y. Admin. Code § 10-160) pioneered

minimum security standards for ATMs.

Among the other states that have enacted

similar laws are Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat.

Ann. §§ 660.115–.235), Washington (Wash.

Rev. Code Ann. § 19.174), Oregon (Or.

Rev. Stat. § 714.280–.315), Georgia (Ga.

Code. Ann. §§ 7-8-1 to 8-8), Louisiana,

Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Fin. Inst. § 1-

207), Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. §§

655.960–.965), Illinois, New York, and

New Jersey.

††† New York City documented poor

security conditions through a careful

survey of ATM sites before enacting its

legislation (City Council of New York

1991). City legislators have expressed

concern that when the state assumed

responsibility for enforcing the minimum

ATM security standards in 1996, it failed

to adequately fund the monitoring and

enforcement function (City Council of

New York 1998).
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 15

general proposition in the United States, courts take into

account the knowledge that ATM operators had, or should

have had, about the risk of robbery at particular ATMs when

determining their liability for victims' injuries. Consequently,

ATM operators are advised to consult frequently with local

police about reports of crime around ATMs. Courts will

usually hold ATM operators to the industry standards for

basic crime prevention measures, although establishing liability

also turns on other legal issues.†

Specific Responses to Reduce ATM Robbery 

Altering Lighting, Landscaping and Location

ATM operators should consider security as well as marketing

in deciding where to install ATMs. The most commonly

mentioned ATM robbery prevention measures in the

literature are those that will be familiar to crime-preventionthrough-environmental-design practitioners–lighting,

landscaping and location.†† ATM sites should be inspected

regularly to ensure that safety features have not become

compromised. ATM operators, police and bank regulators all

should share responsibility for monitoring compliance.

3. Ensuring adequate lighting at and around ATMs.

Adequate lighting at and around ATMs allows users to see any

suspicious people near the ATM, and allows potential

witnesses, including police, to see a crime in progress and get

a good look at the offender. Good lighting can deter people

from robbing ATM users in the first place. There should be

adequate light around all building corners adjacent to the

ATM, as well as for nearby parking places.

Most ATM lighting standards, including some mandated by

law, call for minimum light levels at and around ATMs.†††

† Among the legal issues concerning

ATM operators' civil liability are the

foreseeability that the crime would occur;

the standard for determining foreseeability;

the victim's expectation of protection; and

the various liability of the institution

operating the ATM, any ATM network

involved, the owner of the premise where

the ATM is located, and the victim.

†† For a review of the crime prevention

value of street lighting and closed-circuit

television (CCTV), see Painter and Tilley

(1999).

††† Typical minimums are 10 footcandles within five feet of the ATM, and

two foot-candles 50 to 60 feet away from

the ATM, measured at three feet above the

ground (Ellis 1996; CUNA Service Group

1999; Illinois Office of Banks and Real

Estate 1999).
16 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

According to lighting designers, however, most minimum

lighting standards do not address all the factors that affect

visibility. Shadows, light types, light colors, light-source

direction, light uniformity, glare, and obstructions all affect

visibility for the observer.8 A qualified lighting designer should

plan ATM lighting.

Lights should turn on automatically via photo sensors rather

than by manual or timer switches. Light levels, once set

properly, should be monitored regularly to ensure they do not

fall below acceptable levels. Long-lasting light bulbs should be

used. Automated light-detection monitors can alert the ATM

operator if light levels drop. Light fixtures must be adequately

protected so that offenders cannot disable them.

4. Ensuring the landscaping around ATMs allows for

good visibility. Trees and shrubbery should be trimmed

routinely to remove potential hiding places for offenders and

ensure the ATM is visible to passersby. Slow-growing

shrubbery that does not need trimming as often is preferable.

Obstacles such as dumpsters, benches or walls that obstruct

clear views of the ATM should be removed.

This ATM, located in a poorly lit alley and next to a wall that obstructs

the user's side view, does not allow for good visibility.

Bob Heimberger
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 17

5. Installing mirrors on ATMs. Rearview mirrors on ATMs

and adjacent building corners allow ATM users to detect

suspicious people and behavior.

6. Installing ATMs where there is a lot of natural

surveillance. ATMs should be placed in areas where there is

a lot of routine vehicle and pedestrian traffic.9 The potential

for witnesses deters offenders, and heavy traffic increases the

probability of victim assistance when a robbery occurs. ATMs

are increasingly being placed inside businesses such as grocery

and convenience stores, where there is a lot of natural

surveillance; this should help prevent ATM robberies. Some

security experts recommend that ATMs have high visibility

and activity on all three adjacent sides–ideally, with high-speed

traffic on one side, slow-speed traffic on another, and

relatively permanent observers (e.g., residents) on the third.10

Indoor ATMs should be free of sight obstructions like plants

and blinds, and should be visible from the street through

transparent windows and doors. Tinted glass should not be

used.

ATMs should be installed in locations where there is a lot of natural

surveillance as is the case for this drive-through ATM in a parking lot

adjacent to a road.

Bob Heimberger
18 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

7. Installing ATMs in police stations. Some jurisdictions

have installed publicly accessible ATMs in police stations to

attract ATM users to a safe place to conduct their business.†

While the idea has merit, many police stations might not be

able to accommodate the added vehicle and pedestrian traffic

generated by an ATM.11 Where this is a problem, ATM use

might be limited to nighttime hours when the risk of robbery

is greatest, and when the police business being conducted at

the station is at a minimum. ATMs might also be installed in

or near other government buildings such as post offices or

fire stations, where there is at least some natural surveillance.

8. Relocating, closing or limiting the hours of operation

of ATMs at high-risk sites. ATM operators should assess

crime rates and other measures that suggest the overall risk

level of the area in which they are considering installing an

ATM. ATMs should not be placed in areas known for drug

trafficking and sites near abandoned property or crime-prone

liquor establishments.12 While ATM operators should not

avoid placing ATMs in all low-income areas with higher crime

rates, it might be reasonable to restrict ATM operation to

daylight hours in such areas.13 ATM operators should consult

with local police when choosing sites and notify police of all

ATM locations. Local laws should require such consultation as

part of the routine site planning and business licensing

processes.

14

† Anne Arundel County, Md., installed

ATMs in all its police stations in response

to a rash of ATM robberies (Morgan

1997).

ATMs can be installed in police stations to give users a safe location to conduct

financial transactions during nighttime hours.

Bob Heimberger
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 19

Implementing Public Awareness and Education Initiatives

9. Providing ATM users with safety tips. ATM users

should be advised about what steps they can take to reduce

their risk of getting robbed.15 While it is unlikely that

providing safety tips will prevent any particular robbery, the

larger purpose is to change ATM users' habits. Safety tips can

be provided through mailings to cardholders, signs posted at

ATMs, messages printed on ATM receipts, messages displayed

on ATM screens, safety presentations, and public awareness

campaigns. Listed below are some standard safety tips for

ATM users:

• Be aware of your surroundings, especially between dusk and

dawn. If you notice anything suspicious–a security light out,

someone loitering nearby–consider coming back later or

using a supermarket or convenience store ATM.

• If using the ATM at night, take someone with you.

• Park in a well-lit area as close as possible to the ATM.

• At a drive-through ATM, be sure the doors are locked and

the passenger windows are rolled up.

• If you withdraw cash, put it away promptly; count it later,

in private.

• Put your ATM card and receipt away promptly; never leave

your receipt at the ATM.

• Keep your PIN secret–don't write it down, and don't share

it with anyone you don't trust absolutely. Your PIN

provides access to your account.

• Shield the keypad when entering your PIN to keep it from

being observed.

• Avoid being too regular in your ATM use–don't repeatedly

visit the same machine at the same time, the same day of

the week, for instance.16
20 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

ATM users should further be advised to close any vestibule

doors securely and not to open doors for others. In addition,

signs at ATMs should state that the site is being surveilled by

cameras.

Some victims resist during robberies either to protect their

valuables or because they believe the offender is about to get

violent. Some succeed in preventing the robbery through

resistance, while others get injured or killed. Offenders want

to get the crime over with quickly so they can escape. Any

delay increases their nervousness and, therefore, the likelihood

they will become violent.17 Robbers are usually highly agitated

and easily perceive the victim's actions as threatening.18 Drug

and alcohol use will obviously influence their emotional state.

Some use violence immediately to preempt any resistance. In

cases with multiple offenders, the risk of violence increases

because each offender is also concerned about appearing

tough and in control to the other(s).19

As with other violent crimes, victims should assess the

particular situation, taking account of nearby assistance,

weapons they are threatened with, offenders' behavior and

emotional state, their own defensive abilities, and their own

psychological need to resist. Given an imperfect

understanding of why robbers become violent, compliance is

usually the safer course of action for victims, and the best

advice for police to offer.20 Widespread victim compliance,

however, undoubtedly leads some offenders to perceive lower

risk and, therefore, increases their ATM robbery rates.

Using Surveillance

10. Installing and monitoring surveillance cameras at and

around ATMs. Surveillance cameras at and around ATMs

serve two main purposes–to deter robbery and fraud, and to

facilitate offender identification. If the experience with
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 21

surveillance cameras inside banks is any guide, they serve the

latter purpose better.21 There are two basic types of

surveillance cameras–those that capture live images (such as

CCTV), and those that merely record images that can be

viewed later. Surveillance cameras should record both closeup images of the ATM user and the view immediately behind

the user. A camera placed on or inside the ATM that is

activated when a transaction is initiated serves this purpose.

Such cameras should have wide-angle lenses not exposed to

direct sunlight and should be mounted high off the ground to

prevent vandalism. Plainly visible cameras are more effective

deterrents to robbers, but are more vulnerable to vandalism.22

Older technology uses videocassette recording; newer

technology, which costs less to maintain, provides digital color

images that are transmitted via Internet networks to remote

sites, where they can be viewed online or stored and retrieved

later.23 Dummy surveillance cameras should not be used

unless there are also working cameras at the site, because they

create a false sense of security among ATM users.24 At least

one ATM operator has installed heat sensors around the ATM

that detect the presence of people out of view of surveillance

cameras. The sensors can activate either a recorded voice

message warning the person to move away from the ATM, or

a silent alarm.25

11. Installing devices to allow victims to summon police

during a robbery. There are several mechanisms by which

ATM users can summon police quickly:

• Panic buttons installed on the ATM. Some security

consultants and police, however, worry that panic buttons

will just exacerbate the false-alarm problem that is already

burdening police resources.26

• Telephones next to the ATM.

• Live microphones in the ATM. A security company can

monitor such microphones.
22 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

• Door alarms. Door alarms can be set so that they are

automatically activated if a door to an enclosed vestibule is

left open too long.

• Reverse PIN technology. An ATM user can activate a silent

alarm by entering his or her PIN in reverse order or by

entering an additional digit after the PIN. This so-called

"reverse PIN" technology has been patented, but is not

known to be in use yet anywhere. A study of its feasibility

conducted for the state of Illinois concluded it was costprohibitive and unlikely to be effective because robbery

victims are under such extreme stress.

12. Deploying private security guards at ATMs. Security

guards can either be assigned just to high-risk ATMs or be

assigned to randomly patrol many ATMs.27 This response is

considered the least attractive to ATM operators due to the

high cost.28

Targeting Offenders

13. Controlling street drug markets. High rates of street

robbery usually coincide with high levels of street drug

trafficking, particularly in crack cocaine. Crack addicts have

frequent and immediate cravings for the drug; street robbery,

especially around ATMs, is one of the fastest ways for them

to get cash to buy the drug. Therefore, whatever you can do

to control the volume of street-level drug trafficking will also

likely reduce the street robbery rate, including ATM robbery.

14. Targeting repeat offenders. Where it can be established

that a few offenders are likely responsible for many local

ATM robberies, the offenders should be targeted by repeat

offender programs.† Detectives and patrol officers should

cultivate informants to identify and apprehend active

offenders.29 Offering rewards for information is also good

practice. Interviewing offenders after they have been

† For a thorough discussion of the

principles of repeat offender programs

and descriptions of model programs, see

Spelman (1990).
Responses to Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 23

convicted is useful both for clearing other cases and for

improving intelligence about the rate of ATM robbery

committed by a few repeat offenders.30

There are limits, however, to what arresting, prosecuting and

incarcerating ATM robbers can do to prevent ATM robbery.

Most street robbers are so highly motivated to get quick cash

that they discount the likelihood of getting caught and sent to

jail.31

15. Prohibiting loitering and panhandling near ATMs.

Some ATM robbers loiter around ATMs waiting for a suitable

victim, and some ATM robberies are extreme cases of

aggressive panhandling. Laws that prohibit loitering and

panhandling near ATMs give police authority to keep

opportunistic offenders away from potential victims.32

Hardening Targets and Denying Benefits

16. Requiring that ATMs be located in enclosed

vestibules with doors that lock. The state of New York

requires that ATMs be in enclosed vestibules with doors that

lock. Door locks can be programmed to admit only bank

customers, but given the profits to be earned from

noncustomer service fees, most banks dislike this added

security measure. Some security consultants believe that

enclosed vestibules create more problems than they prevent.33

Door locks are frequently vandalized. Moreover, ATM users

habitually open locked doors as a courtesy to others, or allow

others to follow them into the vestibule.34 An offender who

gets into an enclosed vestibule with a victim can more easily

trap the victim. Enclosed vestibules also attract homeless

people looking for a warm, dry place to sleep.
24 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

17. Setting daily cash-withdrawal limits. Bank regulations

that limit the amount of cash a customer may withdraw each

day from an ATM reduce the potential financial loss from a

robbery, and potentially discourage some robbers who decide

that the benefits of the robbery are not worth the risk of

apprehension.35 However, most street robbers do not expect

much cash from a robbery, while concluding it is worth the

risk.36 It is not known what effect raising or lowering cash

withdrawal limits would have on ATM robbery rates, but in

general, cash withdrawal limits make sound crime prevention

sense.
Appendix 25

Appendix: Summary of Responses to

Robbery at Automated Teller Machines

The table below summarizes the responses to robbery at

automated teller machines, the mechanism by which they are

intended to work, the conditions under which they ought to

work best, and some factors you should consider before

implementing a particular response. It is critical that you tailor

responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each

response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective

strategy will involve implementing several different responses.

Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in

reducing or solving the problem.

Imposing

mandatory

minimum security

standards

Using civil

liability

Ensuring

adequate lighting

at and around

ATMs

Requires financial

institutions to

adopt certain

measures to

prevent ATM

robbery

Concerns for civil

liability encourage

financial

institutions to

adopt measures to

prevent ATM

robbery

Enables ATM

users to see

suspicious people,

and potentially

deters offenders

...there are

adequate resources

to inspect ATMs

for compliance and

sanctions to

enforce regulations

...state law

governing civil

liability is

reasonably

favorable to

plaintiffs

...a qualified

lighting designer

plans the lighting

Must be sure local

regulations are not

preempted by

state law;

regulations should

be specific enough

to be effective

without stifling

potentially more

effective

innovations 

Police typically

play little role in

civil actions

Some jurisdictions

have mandated

minimum lighting

standards, but

most minimum

standards do not

address the full

range of lighting

factors that affect

visibility

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

General Considerations for an Effective Strategy

1.

2.

3.

13

14

15

Altering Lighting, Landscaping and Location
26 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Ensuring the

landscaping

around ATMs

allows for good

visibility

Installing mirrors

on ATMs

Installing ATMs

where there is a

lot of natural

surveillance

Installing ATMs

in police stations

Relocating,

closing or limiting

the hours of

operation of

ATMs at highrisk sites

Removes potential

hiding places for

offenders, enables

ATM users to see

suspicious people,

and enables

passersby to

observe crimes in

progress

Allows users to

see suspicious

people and

behavior behind

them

Increases the

probability that

witnesses will

observe crimes in

progress and

assist victims,

summon

assistance or

identify offenders;

and deters

offenders

Enables ATM

users to obtain

cash in a

protected

environment

Removes the

opportunity for

robbery in areas

where or at times

when the risk is

high

ATM operators

must balance the

desire to make

ATM sites

attractive through

landscaping against

security

considerations

Vulnerable to

vandalism;

robberies may

occur too suddenly

to allow victims to

take any preventive

action

Some locations

with high traffic,

such as street drug

markets, do not

provide reliable

witnesses

May be feasible to

operate ATMs in

police stations only

during nighttime

hours, when other

demands on the

police are lower

A simple review of

an area's total

crime rate is

inadequate to

determine ATM

robbery risks;

viable alternatives

for accessing

ATMs should be

available for people

in high-risk areas

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

...slow-growing

shrubbery is

planted and

landscaping is

regularly

monitored and

maintained

...mirrors are

properly

maintained and

ATM users

become

accustomed to

using them

...there is high

traffic volume

during times

when the risk of

robbery is high,

and witnesses are

willing and able

to assist victims

...police stations

can accommodate

the increase in

foot and vehicle

traffic

...ATM operators

can reliably

establish area risk

levels through

close consultation

with local police

Implementing Public Awareness and Education Initiatives

16

17

17

18

18
Appendix 27

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Increases the

liklihood that

ATM users will

avoid risky

behavior that can

lead to robbery

Enhances the

ability of police

to identify

offenders, and

potentially deters

offenders

Enables robbery

victims to

summon

assistance

Providing ATM

users with safety

tips 

Installing and

monitoring

surveillance

cameras at and

around ATMs

Installing devices

to allow victims

to summon

police during a

robbery

...safety tips are

simple to

understand, and

communicated

often and

through various

means to become

part of ATM

users' basic safety

consciousness

...cameras surveil

both the area

immediately in

front of the

ATM screen and

the area around

the ATM, camera

lenses are not

exposed to direct

sunlight, and

cameras and

recording

mechanisms are

routinely

monitored and

maintained

...police have the

resources to

quickly respond

to panic alarms

ATM operators may

be hesitant to call

too much attention

to robbery risks for

fear of discouraging

customers from

using ATMs

Dummy cameras

should not be used

except as a decoy to

active cameras;

cameras should be

mounted high

enough to

discourage

vandalism and be

sturdy enough to

withstand attempts

to vandalize them

Some devices are

vulnerable to

vandalism; will likely

increase the volume

of false alarms to

which police must

respond; victims

often lack the

opportunity or

ability to activate

alarms during a

robbery

9.

10.

11.

19

20

21

Using Surveillance
28 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

Response

No.

Page

No.

Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Deploying private

security guards at

ATMs

Controlling street

drug markets

Targeting repeat

offenders

Prohibiting

loitering and

panhandling near

ATMs

Deters offenders and

increases the

likelihood that

robberies will be

observed and

interrupted, or

offenders will be

identified

Potentially reduces the

demand for drugs and,

in turn, the demand

for cash to purchase

them; and

incapacitates drug

users who are likely to

commit ATM

robberies

Incapacitates

offenders who commit

or are likely to commit

the most ATM

robberies

Provides police

authority to remove

potential offenders

from potential victims

...security guards

are stationed at

high-risk locations

...the link between

local street drug

markets and ATM

robberies can be

established

...the contribution

of repeat offenders

to local ATM

robberies can be

established, and

established

principles and

methods of repeat

offender programs

are applied

...legislation is

enacted, and police

are willing and able

to enforce the laws

Costly for ATM

operators

Requires a substantial

commitment of police

and other resources

Requires a substantial

commitment of police

and other criminal

justice system

resources; requires

accurate and timely

intelligence

Legislation must be

carefully drafted to

meet constitutional

challenges; police are

unlikely to be present

just before a robbery

12.

13.

14.

15.

22

22

22

23

Targeting Offenders
Appendix 29

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Makes it more

difficult for

offenders to

surprise ATM

users

Reduces the

benefit to

offenders,

potentially

reducing the

likelihood they

will incur the risk

to obtain small

amounts of cash

Requiring that

ATMs be

located in

enclosed

vestibules with

doors that locks

Setting daily

cash-withdrawal

limits

...objects do not

obstruct visibility

into and out of

vestibules, and

door locks are

regularly

monitored and

maintained

...offenders

expect to get a lot

of cash from a

robbery, justifying

the risk of

apprehension

Added cost to ATM

operators; ATM

users habitually

allow others to enter

vestibules with

them; door locks are

often vandalized;

some door locks can

be opened with any

magnetized plastic

card; victims can

become trapped

with an offender in a

vestibule; homeless

people may use

vestibules for shelter

Especially around

street drug markets

where the demand

for small amounts of

cash is strong and

immediate, offenders

are unlikely to be

deterred by small

expected gains from

robbery; ATM users

must be willing to

accept the cash

withdrawal limits

16.

17.

23

24

Hardening Targets and Denying Benefits

Endnotes 31

Endnotes

1 California Bankers Association (1996). 2 ABA Banking Journal (1987); DeYoung (1995); Ellis (1996);

Wright (1996); Hawthorne (1991); Hudak (1988); Schreiber

(1990). 3 Wipprecht (1991); Hudak (1988). 4 Matthews (1996); Wright and Decker (1997). 5 Wright and Decker (1997). 6 Morrison and O'Donnell (1996). 7 Hoskins (1994). 8 Kaplan (1992); Goetzke (1994); Wipprecht (1991). 9 Boyle (1983). 10 Peterson (1998). 11 Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate (1999). 12 Hudak (1988). 13 Wipprecht (1991). 14 Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate (1999). 15 CUNA Service Group (1999); Schreiber (1990). 16 California Bankers Association (1996). 17 Indermaur (1996). 18 Indermaur (1996); Wright and Decker (1997). 19 Indermaur (1996). 20 Wright and Decker (1997). 21 Wipprecht (1991); Schreiber (1992). 22 Kennish (1984). 23 Courter (2000). 24 Hudak (1988); Kennish (1984). 25 Hall (1989). 26 Wipprecht (1991); Hudak (1988); Schreiber (1990). 27 Boyle (1983). 28 Hall (1989). 29 Eck (1983); Stockdale and Gresham (1998).
32 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines

30 Stockdale and Gresham (1998). 31 Wright and Decker (1997). 32 Schreiber (1994). 33 Wipprecht (1991); Hudak (1988). 34 Lewis (1992). 35 Schreiber (1990). 36 Morrison and O'Donnell (1996).
References 33

References

ABA Banking Journal (1987). "How Safe Are ATMs?"

79:44–45.

Boyle, W. (1983). ATM Security. Rolling Meadows, Ill.: Bank

Administration Institute.

California Bankers Association (1996). ATM Crime Survey

Report. www.calbankers.com/legal/atmsurv.html

City Council of New York (1998). "ATM Insecurity." Press

release, Aug. 6.

City Council of New York, Office of Oversight and

Investigation (1991). Report on ATM Security. New York: City

of New York.

Courter, E. (2000). "ATM Trends: Networking and Security."

Credit Union Management 23(5):42–44.

CUNA Service Group (1999). "ATM Security Devices Protect

Cash and Members." Credit Union Magazine 65(6):25–26.

Deitch, G. (1994). "ATM Liability: Fast Cash, Fast Crime,

Uncertain Law." Trial 30(10):34-39.

DeYoung, J. (1995). "ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial

Approach to a Bank's Liability for Third-Party Crimes

Against ATM Patrons." Valparaiso University Law Review

30:99–159.

Eck, J. (1983). Solving Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and

Robbery. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research

Forum.
Ellis, H. (1996). "ATM Safety and Security: Do You Know

Where Your Customer Is Tonight?" Bankers Magazine

179:31–34.

Goetzke, R. (1994). "Shedding New Light on ATM Security."

Security Management 38(9):57–60.

Hall, D. (1989). "ATM Security Under Scrutiny." ABA Banking

Journal 81(11):70, 72.

Hawthorne, W. (1991). "How To Increase Customer Safety at

ATMs." ABA Banking Journal 83(1):34, 37.

Hoskins, G. (1994). "Violent Crimes at ATMs: Analysis of the

Liability of Banks and the Regulation of Protective

Measures." Northern Illinois University Law Review 14:829–860.

Hudak, R. (1988). "How Safe Is Your ATM (Automated Teller

Machine)?" Security Management 32(6):41–46.

Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate (1999). ATM Safety and

Security: Report to the 91st General Assembly, Senate Resolution No.

134. Springfield, Ill.: State of Illinois.

Indermaur, D. (1996). "Reducing the Opportunities for Violence

in Robbery and Property Crime: The Perspectives of

Offenders and Victims." In R. Homel (ed.), The Politics and

Practice of Situational Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies,

Vol. 5. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press.

Kaplan, H. (1992). "Technics Focus: ATM Security Lighting."

Progressive Architecture 73(8):101-103.

Kennish, J. (1984). "ATMs–A New Breed of Security

Problems." Security Management 28(5):33–36.

34 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines
35

Knapp, R., III (1996). "Words in Collision: Preemption of the

New York ATM Safety Act After Barnett Bank v. Nelson."

New York State Bar Journal 68:30–36.

Lewis, J. (1992). "ATMs: Magnets for Crime." Trial

28(November):87–89.

Matthews, R. (1996). Armed Robbery: Two Police Responses. Crime

Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 78. London: Home

Office.

Morgan, K. (1997). "Banking Under the Watchful Eye of the

Law." American City and County 112:16.

Morrison, S., and I. O'Donnell (1996). "An Analysis of the

Decision-Making Practices of Armed Robbers." In R. Homel

(ed.), The Politics and Practice of Situational Crime Prevention. Crime

Prevention Studies, Vol. 5. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press.

Painter, K., and N. Tilley (1999). Surveillance of Public Space:

CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention

Studies, Vol. 10. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press.

Peterson, A. (1998). "ATM Security." Credit Union Magazine

64(2):42–45.

Schreiber, F. (1994). "The Future of ATM Security." Security

Management 38(3)(Suppl.):18A–20A.

(1992). "Tough Trends for ATMs." Security Management

36(4):27, 29–31.

(1990). ATM Security in the 1990s: The Final Report of the

Electronic Funds Transfer Association's ATM Security Task Force.

Alexandria, Va.: Electronic Funds Transfer Association.

References
36 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

Spelman, W. (1990). Repeat Offender Programs for Law

Enforcement. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research

Forum.

Stockdale, J., and P. Gresham (1998). Tackling Street Robbery: A

Comparative Evaluation of Operation Eagle Eye. Crime

Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 87. London: Home

Office.

Wipprecht, W. (1991). "Strike Back at ATM Crime." Journal of

California Law Enforcement 25(3):53–58.

Wright, J. (1996). "Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)." In L.

Fennelly (ed.), Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime

Prevention (3rd ed.). Newton, Mass.: ButterworthHeinemann.

Wright, R., and S. Decker (1997). Armed Robbers in Action:

Stickups and Street Culture. Boston: Northeastern University

Press.
About the Author 37

About the Author

Michael S. Scott

Michael S. Scott is an independent police consultant based in

Savannah, Ga. He was formerly chief of police in Lauderhill,

Fla.; served in various civilian administrative positions in the

St. Louis Metropolitan, Ft. Pierce, Fla., and New York City

police departments; and was a police officer in the Madison,

Wis., Police Department. Scott developed training programs

in problem-oriented policing at the Police Executive Research

Forum (PERF), and is a judge for PERF's Herman Goldstein

Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. He is the

author of Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20

Years, and coauthor (with Rana Sampson) of Tackling Crime

and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving.

Scott holds a law degree from Harvard Law School and a

bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Recommended Readings 39

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by John E. Eck (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 2001). This guide is a companion to the

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It provides basic

guidance to measuring and assessing problem-oriented

policing efforts. This is available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.
40 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999

Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document

produced by the National Institute of Justice in

collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A

similar publication is available for the award winners from

subsequent years. The documents are also available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or

ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for

Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke

(Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 1998).

Explains how crime theories such as routine activity theory,

rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have

practical implications for the police in their efforts to

prevent crime.

• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990).

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses

how a police agency can implement the concept.
Recommended Readings 41

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20

Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000).

Describes how the most critical elements of Herman

Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport

News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman (Police

Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the rationale

behind problem-oriented policing and the problem-solving

process, and provides examples of effective problemsolving in one agency.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and

Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships by

Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy

Rinehart, and Meg Townsend. (U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1998).

Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, basic

information on the SARA model and detailed suggestions

about the problem-solving process. This is available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies,

Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke (Harrow and

Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and methods of

situational crime prevention, and presents over 20 case

studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.
42 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case

Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson and

Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for

Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for

police to analyzing problems within the context of

problem-oriented policing. This is available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G.

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains

many of the basics of research as it applies to police

management and problem-solving.
Other Guides in the Series 43

Other Guides in This Series

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series (available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov):

1. Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

2. Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes.

Rana Sampson. 2001.

5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001.

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002.

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V.

Clarke. 2002.

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002.

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.

16. Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel.

2002.

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

Companion guide to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series:

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for

Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002.
44 Robbery at Automated Teller Machines 

Other Related COPS Office Publications

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for Law

Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years.

Michael S. Scott. 2001.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case

Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and Michael S. Scott.

2000.

• Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative

Justice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a Balanced

Approach to Public Safety. Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999.

• Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and Advancing

Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 2000.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and

Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships. Karin

Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and

Meg Townsend. 1998.

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series

and other COPS Office publications, please call the Department of

Justice Response Center at 1.800.421.6770 or check our website at

www.cops.usdoj.gov.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center at 1.800.421.6770

Visit the COPS internet web site by the address listed below.

e05021551 Created Date: September 09, 2002

www.cops.usdoj.gov