The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons 

of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 

17, 1998). That Act directed that a federally funded research and development center provide 

research, analytical, and other support to the Advisory Panel during the course of its activities 

and deliberations. RAND has been providing that support, under contract from the Department 

of Defense, since the Advisory Panel’s inception. A full description of the Advisory Panel’s 

deliberative process, research methods, and work plan appears as Appendix C. 

This Second Annual Report is a document of the Advisory Panel, not a RAND publication. It was 

prepared and edited by RAND professional staff and is being submitted for review and comment 

within the U.S. Government Interagency process. It is not copyrighted but does contain material 

from copyrighted sources. Copies of the report may also be obtained via the Internet at: 

http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel

About RAND 

RAND’s mission is to improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. 

Though RAND confronts different policy challenges over time, its principles remain constant. 

RAND research and analysis aim to: 

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• Serve the public interest by widely disseminating research findings. 
15 December 2000 

II. TOWARD A II. TOWARD A I. TOWARD A 

NATIONAL STRATEGY NATIONAL STRATEGY 

FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC 

RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION

Second Annual Report to 

The President and The Congress 

Of the
James S. Gilmore, III 

Chairman 

James Clapper, Jr. 

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer 

Raymond Downey 

Richard Falkenrath 

George Foresman 

William Garrison 

Ellen M. Gordon 

James Greenleaf 

William Jenaway 

William Dallas Jones 

Paul M. Maniscalco 

John O. Marsh, Jr. 

Kathleen O'Brien 

M. Patricia Quinlisk 

Patrick Ralston 

William Reno 

Joseph Samuels, Jr. 

Kenneth Shine 

Hubert Williams 

Ellen Embrey* 

* U.S. Department of 

Defense Representative 

 

 

December 15, 2000 

To Our Readers: 

I am pleased to provide the Second Annual Report of the 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, as our 

Congressional mandate requires. 

Contemplating the specter of terrorism in this country is a 

sobering—but critically necessary—responsibility of government 

officials at all levels. It is a truly "national" issue that requires 

synchronization of our efforts—"vertically" among the federal, 

state, and local levels, and "horizontally" among the functional 

constituent stakeholders. The individual capabilities of all 

critical elements must be brought to bear in a much more 

coherent way than is now the case. That fundamental tenet 

underlies our work over the last two years. 

We are impelled by the stark realization that a terrorist attack on 

some level inside our borders is inevitable and the United States 

must be ready. We are similarly convinced, however, that much 

of the legitimate fear associated with the prospect of a terrorist 

attack can be substantially reduced. 

Improving our ability to address the threat and reducing the fear 

of citizens and government leaders is possible if—and only if—

we are willing to take bold action as a nation. Specifically, we 

must: 

• craft a truly "national" strategy to address the threat of 

domestic terrorism—conventional, cyber, chemical, 

biological, radiological and nuclear—from the 

perspectives of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and 

response; 

• empower a senior authority to be in charge of our overall 

planning and preparation in the Federal Executive 

Branch, with special emphasis on preserving our civil 

liberties in a time of emergency; 

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

 TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
James S. Gilmore, III 

Chairman 

James Clapper, Jr. 

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer 

Raymond Downey 

Richard Falkenrath 

George Foresman 

William Garrison 

Ellen M. Gordon 

James Greenleaf 

William Jenaway 

William Dallas Jones 

Paul M. Maniscalco 

John O. Marsh, Jr. 

Kathleen O'Brien 

M. Patricia Quinlisk 

Patrick Ralston 

William Reno 

Joseph Samuels, Jr. 

Kenneth Shine 

Hubert Williams 

Ellen Embrey* 

* U.S. Department of 

Defense Representative 

• consolidate the Congressional approach to legislation 

governing domestic preparedness for such attacks; 

• concentrate much more serious attention on state and 

local concerns and capabilities; and 

• strengthen functional capabilities across all levels of 

government for intelligence collection and information 

sharing; planning; training, equipping and exercising; 

research and development; health and medical; and across 

all first responder stakeholders—fire, law enforcement, 

emergency medical services and emergency management. 

These five imperatives represent the major themes in this report. 

We stress in the strongest terms that their implementation must 

always hold in strict regard the preservation of our Constitution 

and the complete protection of our civil liberties. We steadfastly 

adhere to the bedrock principle that these considerations must 

always transcend what might be more efficient or expedient. 

It is clear to us that our nation collectively will have to make 

some significant resource commitments and overcome daunting 

technological challenges if we are successfully to confront this 

threat in all dimensions. I submit, however, that our most 

imposing challenge centers on policy and whether we have the 

collective fortitude to forge change, both in organization as well 

as process. We are convinced the changes we recommend are 

essential to ensure the safety and security of our nation. 

Respectfully, 

James S. Gilmore, III 

Governor of Virginia 

Chairman 

Please address comments or questions to: 

RAND 

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone 703-413-1100 FAX 703-413-8111 

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 i

CONTENTS 

Letter from the Chairman 

Contents................................................................................................................................ i 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ii

Chapter One—Forging a National Strategy........................................................................ 1 

 Identifying the Ends of Strategy: National Goals ....................................................... 5 

 Developing the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities........................ 6 

Chapter Two—Getting the Federal House in Order ........................................................... 7 

 Improving Federal Executive Branch Coordination ................................................... 7 

 Improving Coordination in the Congress.................................................................. 16 

Chapter Three—Improving Functional Capabilities......................................................... 19 

 Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information...................... 19 

 Planning, Coordinating, and Operating Cooperatively............................................. 23 

 Training, Equipping, and Exercising......................................................................... 29 

 Improving Health and Medical Capabilities ............................................................. 32 

 Promoting Better Research and Development and 

 Developing National Standards..................................................................... 36 

 Enhancing Efforts to Counter Agricultural Terrorism .............................................. 39 

 Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism............................................................ 40 

 

Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 45 

 

Table of Appendices.......................................................................................................... 46

List of Key Recommendations................................................................ Inside Back Cover 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 ii

Executive Summary 

We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents in this country—

however tragic—have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or 

our form of government have not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential 

for terrorist attacks inside the borders of the United States is a serious emerging 

threat. There is no guarantee that our comparatively secure domestic sanctuary 

will always remain so. Because the stakes are so high, our nation’s leaders must 

take seriously the possibility of an escalation of terrorist violence against the 

homeland. 

The continuing challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to 

detect and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, local, 

State, and Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate the 

consequences of the attack. 

To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks effectively, the United 

States needs changes in the relationships among all levels of government. Our 

ability to respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of government. 

Rather we need a national approach, one that recognizes the unique individual 

skills that communities, States, and the Federal government possess and that, 

collectively, will give us the “total package” needed to address all aspects of 

terrorism. 

The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in its first report, of 

the terrorist threat. The Panel stands by its conclusions from one year ago. 

In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis from threat 

assessment to broad program assessment. The Advisory Panel addressed 

specific programs for combating terrorism and larger questions of national 

strategy and Federal organization. While the Advisory Panel found much to 

commend, it also found problems at all levels of government and in virtually 

every functional discipline relevant to combating terrorism. The Panel believes 

these problems are particularly acute at high levels of the Federal Executive 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 iii

Branch. Hence, the present report highlights the related issues of national 

strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions for these and 

other problems. 

Finding 1: The United States has no coherent, functional national 

strategy for combating terrorism. 

The United States needs a functional, coherent national strategy for domestic 

preparedness against terrorism. The nation has a loosely coupled set of plans 

and specific programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain specific 

preparedness objectives. The Executive Branch portrays as its strategy a 

compilation of broad policy statements, and various plans and programs already 

under way. Many programs have resulted from specific Congressional earmarks 

in various appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch budget 

requests; they are the initiatives of activist legislators. Although Federal 

agencies are administering programs assigned to them, the Executive Branch 

has not articulated a broad functional national strategy that would synchronize 

the existing programs and identify future program priorities needed to achieve 

national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism. Given the structure 

of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a 

national strategy. 

Recommendation 1: The next President should develop and present to 

the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one 

year of assuming office. 

A national strategy is a high-level statement of national objectives coupled 

logically to a statement of the means that will be used to achieve these 

objectives. In a coherent strategy, program details are analytically derived from 

the statement of goals. The next Administration should begin a process of 

developing a national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals, 

encompassing deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response. 

Ends. The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the 

Executive Branch to define a meaningful, measurable expression of what it is 

trying to achieve in combating terrorism. To date, the Federal government’s 

goals have been expressed primarily in terms of program execution. Rather, the 

national strategy must express goals in terms of the “end state” toward which the 

program strives. Since there exists no ready-made measure of a country’s 

preparedness for terrorism (especially domestically), the Executive Branch must 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 iv

develop objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its 

progress, to determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know 

when the desired “end state” has been achieved. 

Means. With meaningful objectives, logical priorities and appropriate policy 

prescriptions can be developed. That is the essence of any coherent strategy. 

Setting priorities is essential and can only be done after specific objectives have 

been clearly defined. For instance, should the nation seek a higher level of 

preparedness for its large urban centers than for its rural areas and, if so, how 

much higher? In the broad area of terrorism preparedness, what should be the 

relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, radiological incidents, 

chemical weapons, or biological weapons? With respect to biological weapons, 

which pathogens deserve priority? What priority and commensurate resources 

need to be devoted to defending against cyber attacks? A proper national 

strategy will provide a clear answer to these and many other questions. With 

these answers in hand it will be possible to design and manage an appropriate 

set of programs. The country is at a disadvantage, of course, in that a large 

number of programs have already been established and may have to be 

reconfigured—an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins. 

Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive 

Functional Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

NATIONAL IN SCOPE, NOT JUST FEDERAL

APPROPRIATELY RESOURCED AND BASED ON 

MEASURABLE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

 

FOCUSED ON THE FULL RANGE OF DETERRENCE, PREVENTION, 

PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE ACROSS THE 

SPECTRUM OF THREATS—DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUILT ON REQUIREMENTS FROM AND FULLY 

COORDINATED WITH RELEVANT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 v

Finding 2: The organization of the Federal government’s programs for 

combating terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically 

unaccountable. 

The lack of a national strategy results in part from the fragmentation of Executive 

Branch programs for combating terrorism. These programs cross an 

extraordinary number of jurisdictions and substantive domains: national security, 

law enforcement, intelligence, emergency management, fire protection, public 

health, medical care, as well as parts of the private sector. 

No one, at any level, is “in charge” of all relevant capabilities, most of which are 

not dedicated exclusively to combating terrorism. The lack of a national strategy 

is inextricably linked to the fact that no entity has the authority to direct all of the 

entities that may be engaged. At the Federal level, no entity has the authority 

even to direct the coordination of relevant Federal efforts. 

Recommendation 2: The next President should establish a National 

Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, 

and should seek a statutory basis for this office. 

The office should have a broad and comprehensive scope, with responsibility for 

the full range of deterring, preventing, preparing for, and responding to 

international as well as domestic terrorism. The director of this office should be 

the principal spokesman of the Executive Branch on all matters related to 

Federal programs for combating terrorism and should be appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate. The office should have a substantial 

and professional staff, drawn from existing National Security Council offices and 

other relevant agencies. It should have at least five major sections, each headed 

by an Assistant Director: 

1. Domestic Preparedness Programs 

2. Intelligence 

3. Health and Medical Programs 

4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National 

Standards 

5. Management and Budget 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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The National Office for Combating Terrorism should exercise program and 

budget authority over Federal efforts to combat terrorism. It should have the 

authority to conduct a review of Federal agency programs and budgets to ensure 

compliance with the priorities established in the national strategy, as well as the 

elimination of conflicts and unnecessary duplication among agencies. The 

National Office should administer a budget certification/decertification process 

with the authority to determine whether an agency’s budget complies with the 

national strategy and to appeal ultimately to the President to resolve disputes. 

In addition to developing and overseeing the national strategy, the National 

Office for Combating Terrorism should oversee terrorism-related intelligence 

activities. The office should coordinate Federal programs designed to assist 

response entities at the local and State levels, especially for planning, training, 

exercises, and equipment. The office should provide direction and priorities for 

research and development, and related test and evaluation (RDT&E) for 

combating terrorism, as well as for developing nationally recognized standards 

for equipment and laboratory protocols and techniques. It should coordinate 

programs designed to enhance the capabilities of and coordination among the 

various health and medical entities at all levels. 

The National Office for Combating Terrorism should not be an operational entity 

in the sense of exerting direct control over Federal assets in operations to 

combat terrorism. 

Finally, the director of the National Office should establish an Advisory Board for 

Domestic Programs to assist in providing broad strategic guidance and to serve 

as part of the approval process for the domestic portion of strategy, plans, and 

programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism. This board should be 

composed of one or more sitting State governors, mayors of several U.S. cities, 

the heads of several major professional organizations, and nationally recognized 

subject matter experts in combating terrorism, in addition to senior 

representatives of the major Federal entities that have responsibility for 

combating terrorism. The President and the Congress should each appoint 

members to this board. 

Finding 3: The Congress shares responsibility for the inadequate 

coordination of programs to combat terrorism. 

The Congress’s strong interest in, and commitment to, U.S. efforts to combat 

terrorism is readily apparent. The Congress took the initiative in 1995 to improve 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 vii

the nation’s domestic preparedness against terrorism. But the Congress has 

also contributed to the Executive Branch’s problems. Over the past five years, 

there have been a half-dozen Congressional attempts to reorganize the 

Executive Branch’s efforts to combat terrorism, all of which failed. None enjoyed 

the support of the Executive Branch. At least 11 full committees in the Senate 

and 14 full committees in the House—as well as their numerous 

subcommittees—claim oversight or some responsibility for various U.S. 

programs for combating terrorism. Earmarks in appropriations bills created many 

of the Federal government’s specific domestic preparedness programs without 

authorizing legislation or oversight. The rapidly growing U.S. budget for 

combating terrorism is now laced with such earmarks, which have proliferated in 

the absence of an Executive Branch strategy. The Executive Branch cannot 

successfully coordinate its programs for combating terrorism alone. Congress 

must better organize itself and exercise much greater discipline. 

Recommendation 3: The Congress should consolidate its authority over 

programs for combating terrorism into a Special Committee for 

Combating Terrorism—either a joint committee between the Houses or 

separate committees in each House—and Congressional leadership 

should instruct all other committees to respect the authority of this new 

committee and to conform strictly to authorizing legislation. 

The creation of a new joint committee or separate committees in each House is 

necessary to improve the nation’s efforts to fight terrorism. The committee 

should have a substantial standing staff. The new National Office for Combating 

Terrorism must establish a close working relationship with the committee, and 

propose comprehensive and coherent programs and budget requests in support 

of the new national strategy. The new joint or separate committee should have 

the authority to dispose of the Executive Branch request and to oversee the 

execution of programs that it authorizes. For this to work, other Congressional 

authorizing committees with an interest in programs for combating terrorism must 

recognize the concurrent, consolidated authority of the joint or separate 

committee; and relevant appropriations committees must exercise restraint and 

respect the authorizing legislation of the new structure. We recognize that this 

task is no less daunting than the Executive Branch reorganization that we 

propose above, but it is no less needed. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 viii

Finding 4: The Executive Branch and the Congress have not paid 

sufficient attention to State and local capabilities for combating terrorism 

and have not devoted sufficient resources to augment these capabilities 

to enhance the preparedness of the nation as a whole. 

The foundation of the nation’s domestic preparedness for terrorism is the network 

of emergency response capabilities and disaster management systems provided 

by State and local governments. “Local” response personnel—community and 

State law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, 

hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency 

managers—will be the “first responders” to virtually any terrorist attack anywhere 

in the nation. Federal resources may not arrive for many hours—if not days—

after the attack. A disproportionately small amount of the total funds 

appropriated for combating terrorism is being allocated to provide direct or 

indirect assistance to State and local response efforts. This level of Federal 

funding for non-Federal capabilities is not commensurate with the importance 

that State and local capabilities will have in any operational response to a major 

terrorist attack inside our borders. 

Any coherent national strategy for combating terrorism domestically must 

recognize the critical need to build on the nation’s existing emergency response 

and management systems for the pragmatic reasons of viability and costeffectiveness. 

Recommendation 4: The Executive Branch should establish a strong 

institutional mechanism for ensuring the participation of high-level State 

and local officials in the development and implementation of a national 

strategy for terrorism preparedness. 

To be consistent with the Federal structure of our government, the President 

should work in closer partnership with State and local governments as they 

collectively strive to achieve higher levels of domestic preparedness for terrorism. 

The domestic portion of a national strategy for combating terrorism should 

emphasize programs and initiatives that build appropriately on existing State and 

local capabilities for other emergencies and disasters. The Executive Branch, 

therefore, should develop the national strategy in close partnership with highlevel State and local officials drawn from key professional communities: elected 

officials, law enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical technicians, public 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 ix

health officials, hospital medical care providers, and emergency managers. 

State and local officials should, in particular, have substantial responsibility for 

the detailed design and oversight of the Federal training, equipment, and 

exercise programs. The Advisory Board for Domestic Programs, proposed 

earlier, should provide advice for these functions, augmented as necessary by 

State and local representatives assigned to the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism. 

Finding 5: Federal programs for domestic preparedness to combat 

terrorism lack clear priorities and are deficient in numerous specific 

areas. 

We have a number of recommendations about selected aspects of current U.S. 

programs for domestic preparedness to combat terrorism. The lack of clear 

priorities is an obvious byproduct of the lack of a strategy. Thus, many of our 

specific recommendations reflect criticisms that are subordinate to our macrocritique that the United States lacks a coherent national strategy. We recognize 

the problem of offering detailed programmatic recommendations in advance of a 

national strategy. Through its deliberations, the Advisory Panel has, 

nevertheless, reached consensus on a number of specific findings and 

recommendations, summarized below and detailed in the full report. 

 Specific Functional Recommendations. 

Our focus continues to be on the needs of local and State response entities. 

“Local” response entities—law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical 

technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and 

emergency managers—will always be the “first response,” and conceivably the 

only response. When entities at various levels of government are engaged, the 

responsibilities of all entities and lines of authority must be clear.

1. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information. The 

National Office for Combating Terrorism should foster the development of a 

consolidated all-source analysis and assessment capability that would provide 

various response entities as well as policymakers with continuing analysis of 

potential threats and broad threat assessment input into the development of the 

annual national strategy. That capability should be augmented by improved 

human intelligence collection abroad, more effective domestic activities with a 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 x

thorough review of various Federal guidelines, and reasonable restrictions on 

acquisition of CBRN precursors or equipment. The National Office should also 

foster enhancements in measurement and signature intelligence, forensics, and 

indications and warning capabilities. To promote the broadest possible 

dissemination of useful, timely (and if necessary, classified) information, the 

National Office should also oversee the development and implementation of a 

protected, Internet-based single-source web page system, linking appropriate 

sources of information and databases on combating terrorism across all relevant 

functional disciplines. 

2. Operational Coordination. The National Office for Combating Terrorism 

should encourage Governors to designate State emergency management 

entities as domestic preparedness focal points for coordination with the Federal 

government. The National Office should identify and promote the establishment 

of single-source, “all hazards” planning documents, standardized Incident 

Command and Unified Command Systems, and other model programs for use in 

the full range of emergency contingencies, including terrorism. Adherence to 

these systems should become a requirement of Federal preparedness 

assistance. 

3. Training, Equipping, and Exercising. The National Office for Combating 

Terrorism should develop and manage a comprehensive national plan for 

Federal assistance to State and local agencies for training and equipment and 

the conduct of exercises, including the promulgation of standards in each area. 

The National Office should consult closely with State and local stakeholders in 

the development of this national plan. Federal resources to support the plan 

should be allocated according to the goals and objectives specified in the 

national strategy, with State and local entities also providing resources to support 

its implementation. 

4. Health and Medical Considerations. The National Office for Combating 

Terrorism should reevaluate the current U.S. approach to providing public health 

and medical care in response to acts of terrorism, especially possible mass 

casualty incidents and most particularly bioterrorism. The key issues are 

insufficient education and training in terrorism-related subjects, minimum 

capabilities in surge capacity and in treatment facilities, and clear standards and 

protocols for laboratories and other activities, and vaccine programs. A robust 

public health infrastructure is necessary to ensure an effective response to 

terrorist attacks, especially those involving biologic agents. After consultation 

with public health and medical care entities, the National Office should oversee 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 xi

the establishment of financial incentives coupled with standards and certification 

requirements that will, over time, encourage the health and medical sector to 

build and maintain required capabilities. In addition, Federal, State, and local 

governments should clarify legal and regulatory authorities for quarantine, 

vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures. 

5. Research and Development, and National Standards. The National Office for 

Combating Terrorism should establish a clear set of priorities for research and 

development for combating terrorism, including long-range programs. Priorities 

for targeted research should be responder personnel protective equipment; 

medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid 

readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications interoperability. 

The National Office must also coordinate the development of nationally 

recognized standards for equipment, training, and laboratory protocols and 

techniques, with the ultimate objective being official certification. 

6. Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism. Cyber attacks inside the United 

States could have “mass disruptive,” even if not “mass destructive” or “mass 

casualty” consequences. During the coming year, the Advisory Panel will focus 

on specific aspects of critical infrastructure protection (CIP), as they relate to the 

potential for terrorist attacks. In our discussions thus far, we have identified 

several areas for further deliberation, including CIP policy oversight; standards; 

alert, warning, and response; liability and other legal issues, and CIP research. 

We will make specific policy recommendations in our next report.
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 1

Chapter One 

Forging a National Strategy 

We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents in this country—however 

tragic—have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or our form of 

government have not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist attacks 

inside the borders of the United States is a serious emerging threat. There is no guarantee 

that our comparatively secure domestic sanctuary will always remain so. Because the 

stakes are so high, our nation’s leaders must take seriously the possibility of an escalation 

of terrorist violence against the homeland. 

The continuing challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to detect 

and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, local, State, and 

Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate the consequences of the 

attack. 

To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks effectively, the United States 

needs changes in the relationships among all levels of government. Our ability to 

respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of government. Rather we need a

national approach, one that recognizes the unique individual skills that communities, 

States, and the Federal government possess and that, collectively, will give us the “total 

package” needed to address all aspects of terrorism. 

The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in its first report, of the 

terrorist threat, with a focus on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

weapons. There we said: 

The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum 

of potential terrorist threats – both the unprecedented higher-consequence 

attack, as well as the historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist 

attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near term. Conventional 

explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the 

terrorist weapon of choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale 

CBRN or conventional, any such lower-consequence event—at least in terms 

of casualties or destruction—could, nevertheless, accomplish one or more 

terrorist objectives: exhausting response capabilities, instilling fear, 

undermining government credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 2

government. With that in mind, the Panel’s report urges a more balanced 

approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be considered, 

but that increasing attention must now also be paid to the historically more 

frequent, more probable, lesser-consequence attack, especially in terms of 

policy implications for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, 

to optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on preparing for an 

event potentially affecting thousands or tens of thousands may result in a 

smaller, but nevertheless lethal attack involving dozens failing to receive an 

appropriate response in the first critical minutes and hours. 

While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists 

to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, the report also describes the 

current difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, 

testing, transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to 

cause “mass casualties.”1

The Panel stands by its conclusions from one year ago. 

In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis from threat assessment to 

broad program assessment. While the Advisory Panel found much to commend, it also 

found problems at all levels of government and in virtually every functional discipline 

relevant to combating terrorism. The Panel believes these problems are particularly acute 

at high levels of the Federal Executive Branch. Hence, the present report highlights the 

related issues of national strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions 

for these and other problems. 

The United States needs a functional, coherent national strategy for domestic 

preparedness against terrorism. A national strategy is a high-level statement of national 

objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means to be used to achieve these 

objectives. In a coherent strategy, programmatic details are analytically derived from the 

statement of goals. Currently, there is no overarching statement of what the United States 

is trying to achieve with its program to combat terrorism . Goals must be expressed in 

terms of results, not process. Government officials currently speak of terrorism 

preparedness goals in terms of program execution. Administrative measurements of 

program implementation are not meaningful for the purposes of strategic management 

and obscure the more fundamental and important question: To what end are these 

programs being implemented? 

Instead of a national strategy, the nation has a loosely coupled set of plans and specific 

programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain particular preparedness objectives. 

Senior U.S. officials state that several official broad policy and planning documents that 

have been published in recent years—Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the 

 

1 The First Annual Report to the President and the Congress: I. Assessing the Threat (the “First Report”), 

p. viii. The First Report was delivered on December 15, 1999. For a complete copy of the report, see 

http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 3

Attorney General’s 1999 Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime 

Plan, and the most recent Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism2

—taken 

as a whole, constitute a national strategy. These documents describe plans, the 

compilation of various programs already under way, and some objectives; but they do not 

either individually or collectively constitute a national strategy. 

Many of the current programs have resulted from specific Congressional earmarks in 

various appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch budget requests. 

They are the initiatives of concerned and proactive Senators and Representatives. 

Although Executive Branch agencies are administering programs assigned to them in the 

appropriations legislation, the Executive Branch has not articulated a broad national 

strategy that would synchronize the existing programs or identify future program 

priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism. 

Given the structure of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce 

such a national strategy. 

The Advisory Panel therefore recommends that the next President develop and 

present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year 

of assuming office.3

 The next Administration should begin this process of developing a 

national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals (ends) of the program, 

focusing on results rather than process. The structure and specifics of the national 

program should derive logically and transparently from the goals, not the other way 

around. 

Basic Assumptions 

The Advisory Panel agreed on several basic assumptions to guide its approach to strategy 

development. 

First, “local” response entities—law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical 

technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency 

managers, in any of several combinations depending on the nature of the attack—will 

always be the “first ”—and conceivably only—response. “Local” entities in this context 

can include elements of incorporated and unincorporated municipalities, counties, and 

State organizations. In every case, some combination of those entities will inevitably be 

involved. 

Second, in the event of a major terrorist attack, however defined—number of fatalities or 

total casualties, the point at which local and State capabilities are overwhelmed, or some 

 

2

 The Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including 

Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure 

Protection, May 18, 2000. 3

 The Advisory Panel made essentially the same recommendation in its first annual report: “A national 

strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents involving CBRN 

and other types of weapons is urgently needed.” First Report, p. 54. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 4

other measure—no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to such an 

attack without outside assistance. This assumption is critical to understanding the need 

for mutual aid agreements and coordinated operations. 

Third—and perhaps most important—there are existing emergency response and 

management capabilities, developed over many years, for responses to natural disasters, 

disease outbreaks, and accidents. Those capabilities can and should be used as a base for 

enhancing our domestic capability for response to a terrorist attack. We are not, as some 

have asserted, “totally unprepared” for a major terrorist attack, even with a biological 

weapon. We can strengthen existing capabilities, without buying duplicative, costprohibitive capabilities exclusively dedicated to terrorism. Similarly, our capabilities to 

deter, prevent, or respond to a terrorist attack correspondingly enhance capabilities 

against attacks from nation-states. 

 

The national strategy should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. It 

should address both international and domestic terrorism. The distinction between 

terrorism outside the borders of the United States and domestic terrorist threats is 

eroding. International terrorism crosses borders easily and may directly affect the 

American homeland. This was evident in the New York World Trade Center bombing in 

1993, and more recently in the activities around the turn of the century, especially with 

the arrests of Ahmed Ressam in Washington State, and Lucia Garofalo and Bouabide 

Chamchi in Vermont. The terrorist bombings of the U.S. garrison at Khobar Towers, 

Saudi Arabia, the two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the recent USS Cole incident, 

also illustrate the reach of terrorists against U.S. interests and the profound domestic 

implications they pose. 

To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum 

of the nation’s efforts against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention, 

investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence 

management. As the Advisory Panel recognized in its first report, our nation’s highest 

goal must be the deterrence and prevention of terrorism. The United States cannot, 

however, prevent all terrorist attacks. When deterrence and prevention fail, the nation 

must respond effectively to terrorism, whether to resolve an ongoing incident, mitigate its 

consequences, identify the perpetrators, and prosecute or retaliate as appropriate. The 

Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive Functional Strategy for Combating Terrorism

NATIONAL IN SCOPE, NOT JUST FEDERAL

APPROPRIATELY RESOURCED AND BASED ON MEASURABLE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

FOCUSED ON THE FULL RANGE OF DETERRENCE, PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE 

ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THREATS—DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUILT UPON REQUIREMENTS FROM AND FULLY COORDINATED 

WITH RELEVANT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 5

national strategy should deal with all aspects of combating terrorism and must carefully 

weigh their relative importance for the purpose of allocating resources among them. 

The national strategy should apply to the nation as a whole, not just the Federal Executive 

Branch. The Federal government should lead a strategic planning process that involves 

States and communities as essential and equal partners.4

The national strategy must be appropriately resourced, by all levels of government, to 

provide a reasonable opportunity to achieve its successful implementation. At the 

Federal level, that will require a closer relationship between the Executive and 

Legislative Branches. Nationally, that will require better coordination with State and 

local governments. 

Identifying the Ends of Strategy: National Goals 

The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the Executive Branch to 

define some meaningful, measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in 

combating terrorism. The Federal government’s goals are currently expressed primarily 

in terms of program execution. Administrative measurements alone do not foster 

effective management of a national program. 

The national strategy must express preparedness goals in terms of an “end state” toward 

which the program strives. Since there exists no ready-made measurement of a country’s 

preparedness for terrorism, especially domestically, the Executive Branch must develop 

objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its progress, to 

determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired “end 

state” has been achieved. 

The nation’s strategy for combating terrorism requires results-based goals for three 

reasons. First, the programs need an end-state goal. Elected and appointed officials from 

Federal, State, and local governments must be able to allocate resources to specific 

geographic regions according to requirements of that region. Resources should be 

allocated to achieve that broadest application for all emergency and disaster needs, 

consistent with preparedness goals. That approach is fundamental to the principles of 

building on existing systems and to achieving the maximum possible multipurpose 

capability. 

Second, programs for combating terrorism need accountability. Legislators and public 

officials, especially elected ones, must have some reliable, systematic way of assessing 

the extent to which their efforts and taxpayers’ money are producing effective results. 

 

4

 One of the most effective processes for identifying the issues most important to State and local entities 

has been the joint effort of the National Governors Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices and the 

National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in conducting “States’ Regional Terrorism Policy 

Forums.” The entire compilation of “States’ Recommendations” from the NGA/NEMA Policy Forums is 

contained in Appendix J. Future references in this report will be to “States’ Recommendations” by 

recommendation number. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 6

The performance and results of programs for combating terrorism are currently assessed 

almost solely according to anecdote. The only concrete measure available at the moment 

is the dispersal of Federal funds—a process measurement that does not achieve effective 

strategic management. 

Third, programs for combating terrorism need clear priorities. It is impossible to set 

priorities without first defining results-based objectives. The essence of any coherent 

strategy is a clear statement of priorities that can be translated into specific policy and 

programmatic initiatives. Priorities are the transmission mechanism that connects ends to 

means. 

Developing the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities 

Setting priorities is essential in any strategy, but priorities require clear, results-based 

objectives. With some meaningful sense of objectives, it will be possible to develop 

coherent priorities and an appropriate set of policy prescriptions. For instance, should the 

nation seek a different level of preparedness for large urban centers than for rural areas? 

What should be the relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, 

radiological incidents, chemical weapons, biological weapons, or cyber attacks? Should 

the nation seek to improve its preparedness more against the types of attacks that are 

most likely to occur, such as conventional terrorist bombings or the use of industrial 

chemicals, or for those that are most damaging but less likely to occur, such as nuclear 

weapons or military-grade chemical or biological weapons? With respect to biological 

weapons, which pathogens deserve priority? Should the emphasis be on small-scale 

contamination attacks as opposed to large-scale aerosol releases of the worst pathogen 

types, such as anthrax, plague, and smallpox? What is the relative priority for allocating 

resources to protect critical infrastructure, especially from cyber attacks? 

The answers to these and other questions have important implications for the allocation 

of Federal resources for training, equipment acquisition, exercises, research and 

development, pharmaceutical stockpiles, vaccination programs, and response plans. 

A coherent national strategy would provide clarity to the allocation of Federal resources 

across the full range of possible activities to combat terrorism. To date, these critical 

resource allocation decisions have been made in an ad hoc manner and without reference 

to meaningful national goals. 

The Executive Branch has not articulated a broad functional national strategy for 

combating terrorism. It is, therefore, not possible for the Advisory Panel to evaluate the 

extent to which the current panoply of preparedness programs contributes to the 

achievement of strategic goals. The next Administration should address the issue as a top 

priority, and certainly no later than one year after taking office. The country is now at a 

disadvantage in that a large number of programs have already been established and may 

have to be reconfigured—an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 7

Chapter Two 

Getting the Federal House in Order

IMPROVING FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION

To many at the State and local levels, the structure and process at the Federal level for 

combating terrorism appear uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. Our first report 

included a graphical depiction of the numerous Federal agencies and offices within those 

agencies that have responsibilities for combating terrorism.5 Attempts to create a Federal 

focal point for coordination with State and local officials—such as the National Domestic 

Preparedness Office—have met with little success. Moreover, many State and local 

officials believe that Federal programs intended to assist at their levels are often created 

and implemented without consulting them.6 Confusion often exists even within the 

Federal bureaucracy. The current coordination structure does not possess the requisite 

authority or accountability to make policy changes and to impose the discipline necessary 

among the numerous Federal agencies involved. 

“THE NATIONAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM” 

We recommend the establishment of a senior level coordination entity in the 

Executive Office of the President, entitled the “National Office for Combating 

Terrorism,” with the responsibility for developing domestic and international policy 

and for coordinating the program and budget of the Federal government’s activities 

for combating terrorism.7

 

5

 First Report, Appendix A. 6

 The implementation of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici “120 Cities” training program and the initial structure 

of the equipment grant program are two examples. 

7

 Several of the concepts contained in our recommendation were included in H.R. 4210 (the “Fowler Bill”), 

as it was introduced or as it passed the House of Representatives. The most obvious difference in our 

recommendations and those contained in H.R. 4210 involve the scope of responsibilities of the office. H.R. 

4210 was only for domestic preparedness and response; our proposal covers both domestic and 

international and therefore includes specific provisions related to foreign programs and intelligence 

collection. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Principal Tasks 

National Strategy. The National Office for 

Combating Terrorism will have several principal 

tasks. Foremost will be the responsibility to develop 

a comprehensive national strategy. That strategy 

must be approved by the President and updated 

annually. It must address the full range of domestic 

and international terrorism deterrence, prevention, 

preparedness, and response. The approach to the 

domestic part of the strategy should be “bottom up,” 

developed in close coordination with local, State, and 

other Federal entities.8

The strategy must contain a detailed implementation plan, with specific milestones for its 

accomplishment. Most important, the strategy must articulate a methodology for 

continually measuring and monitoring domestic preparedness. That methodology must 

be accomplished in close coordination with the States. Preparedness efforts will vary 

from State to State and even among jurisdictions within States. Nevertheless, some 

rational system to rate our preparedness as a nation will be required, if making the most 

effective use of limited resources—at all levels of government—is a worthwhile goal. 

We do not suggest that all jurisdictions “look the same” in terms of a specific minimum 

number, for example, of pieces of certain personal protective equipment (PPE) per 

thousand population. 

A simple “scorecard” for preparedness is not the answer. One city in the Los Angeles 

metropolitan area, for example, may not have any “Level A” chemical protective suits, 

but may possess the latest state-of-the-art communications equipment. A neighboring 

jurisdiction may recently have invested in “Level A” gear. Taking the best of each and of 

other nearby jurisdictions as part of a cooperative effort for mutual aid will yield 

dramatically different preparedness indicators than a “city-by-city” rating scheme. 

Cooperative efforts among jurisdictions will foster preparedness on an area basis. 

That recognition suggests to us that a preparedness measurement process should be 

developed along regional lines. Such an approach might start with the 10 Federal 

Emergency Management Agency regions as a base with further subdivisions into area 

groupings. 

Program and Budget Controls. A concurrent responsibility of the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism will be to work within the Executive Branch and with the Congress 

to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to support the execution of the national 

strategy. The U.S. strategy for deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response for 

terrorists acts outside the United States, developed under the leadership of the 

 

8

 See “States’ Recommendations,” Nos. 11 and 23, Appendix J. 

 TASKS 

National Strategy 

Program/Budget Controls 

Intelligence 

Plans Review 

Proposals for Change 

Domestic Programs 

Health and Medical 

RDT&E and Standards 

Clearinghouse 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Department of State, is comprehensive and, for the most part, appropriately resourced. It 

is on the domestic front that much additional effort and coordination will be required. 

We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism be given the 

authority to exercise specific limited program and budget control over activities for 

combating terrorism within the relevant Federal departments and agencies. That 

authority should include the responsibility to conduct a full review of Federal agency 

programs and budgets, to ensure compliance with the programmatic and funding 

priorities established in the approved national strategy and to eliminate conflicts and 

unnecessary duplication among agencies. We recommend that an Assistant Director 

direct the program and budget functions for Management and Budget.

The Office of Management and Budget and the responsible element of the National 

Security Council staff—the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Counterterrorism, and Infrastructure Protection—have developed a process for submitting a 

composite “roll-up” of the programs for combating terrorism of the various Federal 

agencies. The latest submission to the Congress9

 is the most comprehensive to date. 

That is an important step in the right direction—a macro-level inventory of agency 

spending to combat terrorism. To be truly effective, however, such a process must 

contain specific authority to hold agencies accountable for their spending and for 

compliance with the national strategy. Moreover, OMB’s “Annual Report” provides only 

general program descriptions. The Executive should provide comprehensive information 

to the Congress to consider in the deliberative authorization and appropriations processes. 

In addition to a comprehensive strategy document, supporting budget information should 

include a complete description and justification for each program, coupled with current 

and proposed out-year expenditures. 

Intelligence Coordination and Analysis. We recommend that the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism provide coordination and advocacy for both foreign and 

domestic terrorism-related intelligence activities, including the development of 

national net assessments of terrorist threats. A critical task will be to develop, in 

concert with the Intelligence Community,10 policies and plans for the dissemination of 

intelligence and other pertinent information on terrorist threats to designated entities at all 

levels of government—local, State, and Federal.11 

We recommend that an Assistant Director for Intelligence in the National Office 

direct the intelligence function for Combating Terrorism, who should be “dualhatted” as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Combating Terrorism at the 

 

9 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against Weapons of Mass 

Destruction/ Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 18, 2000. The 

requirement for the submission to the Congress of an annual report of funding efforts in the Executive 

Branch to combat terrorism is contained in Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1998 (Pub. L. 105–85), as amended by Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1999 (Pub. L. 105–261). 

10 Including its Federal law enforcement components. 

11 For more detailed recommendations in this subject area, see the section entitled “Collecting Intelligence, 

Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information” in Chapter Three. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 10

National Intelligence Council. That Assistant Director/NIO and staff would be 

responsible for compiling terrorism intelligence products from the various agencies, for 

providing national-level threat assessments for inclusion in the national strategy, and for 

producing composite or “fused” products for dissemination to designated Federal, State, 

and local entities, as appropriate. The Assistant Director/NIO should be delegated, by 

Executive Order or in enabling legislation, tasking authority for terrorism-related 

intelligence collection and analysis. That person will serve as focal point for developing 

policy for combating terrorism intelligence matters, keeping the policymaking and 

operational aspects of intelligence collection and analysis separate. The Assistant 

Director will also be the logical interface with the intelligence oversight committees of 

the Congress. It is, in our view, important to have a senior-level position created for this 

purpose, and we recommend that the person initially chosen to fill the position be a 

current or former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That position can then be 

filled in rotation by appropriately qualified persons from law enforcement and the 

Intelligence Community. The intelligence office should be staffed with a small, select 

staff of knowledgeable and experienced personnel, who understand collection, analysis, 

and assessment processes, from the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 

There is sound rationale for the legal and regulatory requirements governing the 

“domestic collection” of intelligence by the Intelligence Community.12 It will be the 

responsibility of the Assistant Director for Intelligence and the intelligence staff to ensure 

strict adherence to applicable law and regulations in the administration of these activities. 

To assist in this intelligence function, we recommend the establishment of a “Council 

to Coordinate Intelligence for Combating Terrorism,” to provide strategic direction 

for intelligence collection and analysis, as well as a clearance mechanism for product 

dissemination and other related activities. It should consist of the heads of the various 

Intelligence Community entities and State and local representatives who have been 

granted appropriate security clearance. The Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and the Director of Central Intelligence should chair it in annual rotation. 

Plans Review. We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism 

be given authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans, and at the 

request of State entities, review local plans or programs for combating terrorism, 

for consistency with the national strategy. That review will allow the National Office 

to identify gaps and deficiencies in Federal programs. At the completion of that review, 

the National Office should provide an analysis of the plan or program, including any 

recommendations for modification, to the submitting jurisdiction. 

Proposals for Change. We recommend that the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism have authority to propose new Federal programs or changes to existing 

programs, including Federal statutory or regulatory authority.

 

12 For further discussion on this point, see the section entitled “Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, 

and Sharing Information” in Chapter Three. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 11

Domestic Preparedness Programs. We recommend an Assistant Director for 

Domestic Preparedness Programs in the National Office to direct the coordination 

of Federal programs designed to assist response entities at the local and State levels, 

especially in the areas of “crisis” and “consequence” planning, training, exercises, 

and equipment programs for combating terrorism.13 The national strategy that the 

National Office should develop—in coordination with State and local stakeholders—

must provide strategic direction and priorities for programs and activities in each of these 

areas. 

Health and Medical Programs. Much remains to be done in the coordination and 

enhancement of Federal health and medical programs for combating terrorism and for 

coordination among public health officials, public and private hospitals, pre-hospital 

emergency medical service (EMS) entities, and the emergency management 

communities. We recommend that the responsibility for coordinating programs to 

address health and medical issues be vested in an Assistant Director for Health and 

Medical Programs in the National Office for Combating Terrorism. The national 

strategy should provide direction for the establishment of national education programs for 

the health and medical disciplines, for the development of national standards for health 

and medical response to terrorism, and for clarifying various legal and regulatory 

authority for health and medical response. 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National Standards. 

We recommend that the responsibility for coordinating programs in these two areas 

be assigned to an Assistant Director for Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation, and National Standards in the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism.14 The national strategy should provide direction and priorities for RDT&E 

for combating terrorism. We believe that the Federal government has primary 

responsibility for combating terrorism RDT&E. Local jurisdictions and most states will 

not have the resources to engage in the research and development required in the 

sophisticated environment that may be a part of the nation’s response to terrorism. 

Moreover, we have essentially no nationally recognized standards in such areas as 

personal protective equipment, detection equipment, and laboratory protocols and 

techniques. 

 

Clearinghouse Function. We recommend that the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism should serve as the information clearinghouse and central Federal point 

of contact for State and local entities. We heard many comments about how difficult it 

is for local jurisdictions and State agencies, even those with experience in complex 

Federal programs, to navigate the maze of the Federal structure. The National Office for 

Combating Terrorism should assume that role and serve as the “one-stop shop” for 

 

13 For more detailed recommendations in this subject area, see the sections entitled “Training, Equipping, 

and Exercising” and “Planning, Coordinating, and Operating Cooperatively” in Chapter Three. 

14 For more detailed recommendations on RDT&E, see the section entitled “Promoting Better Research and 

Development, and Developing National Standards” in Chapter Three. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 12

providing advice and assistance on Federal programs for training, planning, exercises, 

equipment, reporting, and other information of value to local and State entities. 

 

 Structure and Characteristics 

The National Office for Combating Terrorism 

should possess certain essential attributes, as 

follows: 

Political Accountability and Responsibility. 

The person designated as the focal point for 

developing a national strategy and for 

coordinating Federal programs for combating terrorism must have political accountability 

and responsibility. That person should be vested with sufficient authority to accomplish 

the purposes for which the office is created and should be the senior point of contact of 

the Executive Branch with the Congress. In that way, the Congress will have the 

opportunity to discuss the government’s overall policy and programs for combating 

terrorism with the senior official responsible. For these reasons, we recommend that 

the President appoint and the Senate confirm the Director of the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism, who should serve in a “cabinet-level” position. 

Program and Budget Authority. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should 

have sufficient budget authority and programmatic oversight to influence the resource 

allocation process and ensure program compatibility. That process should include a 

structured certification/decertification process to formally “decertify” all or part of an 

agency’s budget as noncompliant with the national strategy. A decertification would 

require the agency to revise its budget to make it compliant or, alternatively, to allow the 

agency head to appeal the decertification decision to the President. This recommendation 

does not give the Director of the National Office authority to “veto” all or part of any 

agency’s budget, or the authority to redirect funds within an agency or among agencies 

Multidisciplinary Staffing. We recommend that the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism have full-time multidisciplinary expertise, with representation from each 

of the Federal agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism, and with 

resident State and local expertise. The National Office can ensure Federal agency 

representation by directly hiring personnel from the various agencies. A better approach 

would be the directed detail of various Federal agency personnel on a term basis. That 

would allow for the rotation of incoming personnel who bring current perspectives from 

their respective agencies and the return to those agencies of personnel who will have a 

national-level perspective. Moreover, the personnel and the agencies involved must view 

such assignments as “career enhancing.” 

For programs with a domestic focus, the National Office for Combating Terrorism must 

have sufficient resources to employ persons with State and local expertise and from each 

of the response disciplines. The National Office should enter into agreement with State 

and local jurisdictions for a leave of absence for certain personnel, to be employed by the 

 ATTRIBUTES 

Political Accountability 

Program/Budget Authority 

Multidisciplinary Staffing 

No Operational Control 

Advisory Board 

Relationships 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 13

National Office for a specified term. With that approach, there would be a constant flow 

of personnel with perspectives “fresh from the street.” 

 

No Operational Control. While the National Office for Combating Terrorism should be 

vested with specific program coordination and budget authority, it is not our intention 

that it have “operational” control over various Federal agency activities. 

We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism not be “in 

charge” of response operations in the event of a terrorist attack. The National Office 

should provide a coordinating function and disseminate intelligence and other critical 

information. The word “czar” is inappropriate to describe this office. The Director 

should not be empowered to order any Federal agency to undertake any specific activity. 

Lead Federal Agency responsibility will normally fall to the Department of Justice for 

“crisis management” and to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for 

“consequence management.” Other than its continuing responsibility in facilitating the 

flow of information and intelligence, this recommendation does not envision any 

operational role for the National Office for Combating Terrorism during an actual 

response. 

“Lead Federal Agency” and “Lead Agency” are defined as follows: 

“2. Several of these plans designate a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) to coordinate the 

Federal response. The LFA is determined by the type of emergency. In general, an 

LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with 

agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to obtain an initial assessment of 

the situation, develop an action plan, and monitor and update operational priorities. 

The LFA ensures that each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities 

and supports the LFA in carrying out relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of an 

LFA vary according to the agency’s unique statutory authorities.”15 

. . . . . . 

“G. Lead Agency. The FBI defines lead agency, as used in PDD-39, as the Federal 

department or agency assigned lead responsibility to manage and coordinate a 

specific function—either crisis management or consequence management. Lead 

agencies are designated on the basis of their having the most authorities, resources, 

capabilities, or expertise relative to accomplishment of the specific function. Lead 

agencies support the overall Lead Federal Agency during all phases of the terrorism 

response.”16

With few exceptions, we recommend that existing programs remain in the agencies in 

which they currently reside. One notable exception will be the functions of the National 

Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), currently housed in the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. The new office should subsume all of the intended functions of the 

 

15 Federal Response Plan, Basic Plan, Chapter IV. Concept of Operations, Section B, Concurrent 

Implementation of Other Federal Emergency Plans, paragraph 2. 

16 Federal Response Plan, Terrorism Incident Annex, Section VIII, Terms and Definitions, paragraph G. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 14

NDPO—coordination, information clearinghouse, advice and assistance to State and 

local entities. 

The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also assume many of the 

interagency coordination functions currently managed by the National Security Council 

office of the National Coordinator for Security, Counter-terrorism, and Infrastructure 

Protection. For example, the responsibility for coordination of certain functions related 

to combating terrorism—Assistance to State and Local Authorities, Research and 

Development, Contingency Planning and Exercises, and Legislative and Legal Issues, 

among others—will devolve to the National Office for Combating Terrorism.17 We also 

recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism absorb certain entities as 

adjuncts to its office, such as the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and 

InterOperability. 

Advisory Board for Domestic Programs. To assist in providing broad strategic 

guidance and to serve as part of the approval process for the domestic portion of 

strategy, plans, and programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, we 

recommend the establishment of a national “Advisory Board for Domestic 

Programs.” That Board should include one or more sitting State governors, mayors of 

several U.S. cities, the heads of several major professional organizations,18 and a few 

nationally recognized terrorism subject matter experts, as well as senior officials from 

relevant Federal agencies. The President and the Congress should each appoint members 

to this board. 

- Program/ - Coordination/ - Planning - Education/Training - Short/long 

 Budget Review Advocacy - Training - Certifications range R&D 

 - Certification/ - Net Assessments - Exercises - Standards/ - National 

 Decertification - Dual-hatted NIO - Equipment Protocols Standards 

 - Budget submission - Authorities 

Figure 1. National Office for Combating Terrorism

 

17 To avoid confusion, we recommend the removal of the “counter-terrorism” element of the 

“coordinator’s” title. The “coordinator” will continue to be Special Assistant to the President and Senior 

Director for Transnational Threats. That office should coordinate with the new National Office on 

terrorism issues. 

18 Potential organizations would include the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International 

Association of Fire Fighters, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National Association of 

Emergency Medical Technicians, the National Emergency Management Association, the Council of State 

and Territorial Epidemiologists, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, and 

the International City/County Management Association. 

Director 

Assistant Director

for 

 Intelligence 

Assistant Director 

for Management 

And Budget 

Assistant Director

for Domestic 

Programs 

Assistant Director 

for Health and 

Medical Programs 

Assistant Director

for RDT&E and 

Standards 

Intelligence 

Coordinating Council 

Advisory Board for 

Domestic Programs 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 15

Relationship with Other Federal Entities and Agencies. The nature of the relationship 

of the National Office for Combating Terrorism with other Federal entities and the lines 

of authority for all involved must be clear. 

♦ National Security Council (NSC)—The Director of the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism should attend meetings of the National Security Council 

when terrorism is a topic for consideration. Appropriate elements of the National 

Security Council structure will provide direct input into the national strategy 

development and program and budget activities for combating terrorism for 

national security issues.19

 

♦ Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—The program and authorities of the 

National Office for Combating Terrorism are not intended to supplant or usurp the 

authorities of OMB. Agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism will 

continue to submit complete budgets, including those parts of the budget related 

to programs for combating terrorism, to OMB. In parallel, the portions of agency 

budgets related to programs for combating terrorism will also be submitted to the 

National Office for Combating Terrorism. 

♦ Federal Cabinet Departments and Other Federal Agencies—“Lead Federal 

Agency” and “Lead Agency” designations and roles related to Federal programs 

and activities for combating terrorism will continue to apply. 

Alternative Structures Considered 

During the course of our deliberations on the issue of improving Federal Executive 

Branch coordination, we considered and rejected other alternatives to the creation of an 

entity in the Executive Office of the President. We set forth those various alternatives in 

Appendix E and explain why each was rejected. 

 

 

19 An analogy is the current relationship between the National Security Council staff and the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. The director of that office likewise attends NSC meetings pertaining to drug 

control matters. There are other similarities as well. The current statutory provisions for the structure and 

authority of the Office of National Drug Control Policy are contained in 21 U.S. Code, Chapter 22 (22 U.S. 

Code, Sections 1701–1712). 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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IMPROVING COORDINATION IN THE CONGRESS 

In our first report, we were critical of the Congress for its propensity to make “decisions 

for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and response issues [for 

combating terrorism] with little or no coordination.” We noted that the “various 

committees of the Congress continue to provide authority and money within the confines 

of each committee’s jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and 

programs.”20 Those observations still pertain. 

The Congress has been active in proposing legislative “fixes” to the problem of 

Interagency coordination. Two recent examples are the unanimous passage by the House 

of Representatives of a bill to create the “Office of Terrorism Preparedness” in the 

Executive Office of the President,21 and of a provision to create a new “Deputy Attorney 

General for Combating Domestic Terrorism.”22 Numerous Congressional panels on both 

sides of Capitol Hill have held hearings on the subject of terrorism. The Congress has 

also commissioned various studies and reports on combating terrorism by the General 

Accounting Office (GAO).23 One Act noted that Members “continue to be concerned 

about the threat of domestic terrorism, particularly involving the use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and the ability of the Federal Government to counter this threat.” As 

a consequence, the Congress directed a comprehensive report from the GAO: 

The conferees agree to a provision that would require the Comptroller 

General to provide an updated report to Congress, not later than 180 

days after enactment of this Act, on federal strategy, policy and 

programs to combat domestic terrorism. The conferees direct the 

Comptroller General to include in the report on combating domestic 

terrorism a discussion of the following issues: lead agency responsibility 

for crisis and consequence management; adequacy of existing plans 

formulated by the various federal agencies; threat and risk assessments; 

command and control structures; exercises, including a thorough 

assessment of the recent Top Official Exercise 2000; cyberterrorism; and 

research and development efforts of new technologies.24

 

20 First Report, Chapter IV, Conclusions and Recommendations, section on Congressional Responsibilities, 

p. 57. 

21 H.R. 4210 passed on voice vote under suspension of the rules of the U.S. House Representatives on July 

25, 2000. The bill was transmitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, where no further action has been scheduled. 

22 Contained in the U.S. Senate version of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, 

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (H.R. 4690). The provision was not 

contained in the version that emerged from the conference between the House and Senate. H. Rept. 106– 

1005. That version, which has now passed both houses, is awaiting Presidential signature or a threatened 

veto for other reasons. 

23 The GAO combating terrorism reports may be accessed at: http://www.gao.gov 

24 Section 1035, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (NDAA FY01)(H.R. 4205, Pub. 

L. 106–398). See discussion in Conference Report to accompany NDAA FY01, p. 849. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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The Congress continues to direct the creation and funding of specific programs with little 

coordination among the various committees. Some programs are funded with little 

apparent consideration for the impact of those decisions on a comprehensive national 

effort. 

Moreover, appropriations committees, through their various agency appropriations bills, 

occasionally create and fund programs that were not subject to the normal authorization 

processes. The result of such action is often lack of detail and clarity in the structure and 

execution of programs, as well as a lack of continuity and sustainability, as most such 

programs are only funded year by year. Examples of major programs created and funded 

in appropriations bills, which have no parallel authorizing language, include most of the 

programs for combating terrorism administered by the Office of State and Local 

Domestic Preparedness Support in the Department of Justice: equipment grant programs 

totaling $75 million; and training programs, including grants to the national training 

consortium25 and the Center for Domestic Preparedness totaling $37 million; and 

earmarks to two institutes totaling $30 million.26

The Congress may, however, be foundering on the issue in large measure because of the 

absence of a comprehensive “national strategy” for combating terrorism. We do not 

suggest that Congress has or should have the responsibility for creating such a national 

strategy. That is, in our view, clearly the responsibility of the Executive Branch. 

Special Committee for Combating Terrorism 

We recommend the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating 

Terrorism—either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in 

each House27—to address authority and funding, and to provide Congressional 

oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating terrorism. 

We do not make this proposal lightly, and do so with the full recognition that such 

change may be difficult but is no less meritorious. 

 

Committee Functions and Structure 

The joint or separate committee of each House should consist of bipartisan representation 

from Members of all relevant authorization, oversight, budget, and appropriations 

committees and subcommittees that currently have cognizance over Federal programs 

and activities to combat terrorism. It should have a full-time staff either detailed from 

 

25 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; Texas A&M; Nevada Test Site (NTS); and Louisiana 

State University. 

26 For FY 2000 programs. Funds for FY 2001 programs will likely be higher. 

27 Similar to the processes of permanent select committees on intelligence—the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 
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those relevant committees and subcommittees or new employees who have the requisite 

experience and expertise.28

The joint or separate panel should perform several critical functions. First, it would 

constitute a forum for reviewing all aspects of a national strategy and supporting 

implementation plans for combating terrorism, developed and submitted by the National 

Office for Combating Terrorism. As part of that process, the joint or each separate 

committee should develop a consolidated legislative plan, including authorizing language 

and corresponding budget and appropriations “benchmarks” in response to the national 

strategy to combat terrorism and accompanying program and budget proposals. 

Second, it would serve as the “clearinghouse” for all legislative proposals for combating 

terrorism. For separate bills (unrelated to the omnibus package related to the strategy), 

the committee should have first referral of such legislation, prior to the referral to the 

appropriate standing committee. 

Such a structure, with the direct testimony from Executive Branch representatives, State 

and local officials, private industry, and terrorism experts, could help to eliminate 

duplication in programs and funding, and to promote an effective national program. 

 

 

28 The “relevant committees and subcommittees” would include as a minimum: 

Agriculture Committee (House and Senate) 

Appropriations Committee (House and Senate) 

 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary 

 Subcommittee on Defense 

 Subcommittee on Transportation 

 Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 

 Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 

 Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 

 Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

 Subcommittee on Agriculture and Rural Development 

Armed Services Committee (House and Senate) 

Budget Committee (House and Senate) 

Commerce Committee (House and Senate) 

Energy And Natural Resources Committee (Senate) 

Resources Committee (House) 

Foreign Relations Committee (Senate) 

International Relations Committee (House) 

Governmental Affairs Committee (Senate) 

Government Reform Committee (House) 

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (Senate) 

Science Committee (House) 

Judiciary Committee (House and Senate) 

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (House) 

Ways and Means Committee (House) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Chapter Three 

Improving Functional Capabilities 

In Chapter Two, we addressed improving coordination within the Executive Branch and 

the Congress. We now turn to improving selected functional capabilities. Our focus, in 

keeping with our Congressional mandate, continues to be on the needs of local and State 

response entities. We assess how well the Federal government is doing in those areas and 

recommend specific priorities for focus and allocation of resources. 

Building on existing emergency and disaster response capabilities, structures, and 

systems is the foundation of our approach. The nation has developed a reasonably 

effective system for responses to natural disasters, naturally occurring disease outbreaks, 

accidents, and for most criminal acts. It is not necessary, in our view, to create a 

completely separate set of capabilities for combating terrorism. Moreover, we based our 

recommendations on the premise that pursuing capabilities that have at least dual-purpose 

applications is the better approach. 

The National Office for Combating Terrorism, described in Chapter Two, will play the 

key role in planning and synchronizing these initiatives. 

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING THREATS, AND SHARING INFORMATION

From the inception of our deliberations, we have said that “more can and must be done to 

provide timely information—up, down, and laterally, at all levels of government—to 

those who need the information to provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection, 

or response to potential threats.”29 

The potential connection between terrorism originating outside the United States and 

terrorist acts perpetrated inside the United States, means that “foreign” terrorism and 

“domestic” terrorism may not be easily distinguished. The need for lawful, timely 

collection and analysis of intelligence on foreign terrorist plots, outside or inside our 

borders, is accordingly one of the most critical functional capabilities needed by this 

nation. Moreover, any improvement in our ability to detect terrorist activity will provide 

added capability in detecting similar activities by adversarial nation-states. 

 

29 First Report, p. 57. 
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Based on classified briefings as well as “open-source” information, it is clear that the 

U.S. Intelligence Community’s foreign intelligence collection and analysis against 

terrorism has been excellent. There is, however, room for improvement. 

Improve Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 

Recent events worldwide emphasize the need for the best possible intelligence. 

Moreover, reliance on sophisticated “National Technical Means” or other hightechnology systems is not always sufficient to provide the necessary and timely 

“indication and warning” to forestall or to defend against a terrorist attack. 

 

Certain procedures, well intentioned when implemented, are now hampering the nation’s 

ability to collect the most useful intelligence. For that reason, we agree with the 

conclusion of a parallel commission—the National Commission on Terrorism30—and 

recommend the rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the 

Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign 

intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights 

violations. We should return to the restrictions in place prior to the 1995 guidelines, 

which afforded sufficient protections, oversight, and an approval mechanism that will 

prevent abuse. 

Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)31

As the potential grows for terrorists to use more unconventional and sophisticated 

weapons, especially with chemical or biological agents, our capability to detect such 

agents assumes greater urgency and requires new technology to provide needed 

capability. 

To meet that challenge, we recommend an expansion and improvement in research, 

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout 

capability, and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology 

based on enhanced RDT&E efforts. Our goal for sensors and rapid readout technology 

for chemical and biological agents should be no less than our current capability for 

nuclear and radiological agents. 

Review Statutory and Regulatory Authorities 

The following observations and recommendations do not diminish those rights and 

liberties but are intended to allow the nation to be more effective in combating terrorism 

while fully protecting those rights and liberties. 

 

30 Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International 

Terrorism, p. 8. 31 This recommendation is directed to national technical means, not capabilities for response entities. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 21

We recommend a thorough review, by a panel of Department of Justice (DOJ) officials 

and knowledgeable citizens outside the Federal government, of the terrorism portion of 

the Attorney General’s “Domestic Guidelines.” We examined the guidelines, which 

establish conditions under which an FBI agent can open an inquiry into possible terrorist 

activity inside the United States. The guidelines appear to us to be adequate in scope but 

have been rendered confusing and ambiguous by successive redrafting over the years, 

leading to misunderstanding and uneven application among law enforcement agents. We 

do not suggest that the guidelines be rescinded or that the underlying requirement for 

them is not sound. We recommend that the panel review the domestic guidelines for 

clarity, in the interests of strengthening them, while providing for the protection of 

civil rights and liberties. We also recommend that the guidelines provide examples of 

permissible and impermissible activity as further information for agents’ decisions. 

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) governs domestic national security 

investigations.32 The procedures of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) 

in the Department of Justice, required to present a matter to the special Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court established under FISA, require far more justification 

than the Act does. We recommend that the Attorney General direct OIPR to modify 

its procedures to conform to the FISA statutory requirements. 

Moreover, controls inside our borders that can hamper efforts of potential terrorists—be 

they foreign or domestic—by denying them their “tools of the trade,” can be established 

or strengthened without additional authority. We recommend that the Department of 

Justice, in consultation with appropriate committees of the Congress as well as 

knowledgeable members of the scientific, health, and medical communities, and 

State and local government, continually review existing statutory authorities and 

regulations. The purpose would be to propose specific prohibitions, or at least 

mandatory reporting procedures, on the domestic sale and purchase of precursors 

and special equipment that pose a direct, significant risk of being used to make and 

deliver CBRN weapons or agents.

33

Improve Forensics Capabilities to Identify Terrorist Unconventional Weapons 

We have today effective forensic capabilities to detect and identify conventional 

weapons, including high-explosive devices and associated mechanisms, as well as 

sophisticated techniques for identifying perpetrators.34

Given the potential for terrorists to resort to chemical and biological weapons, developing 

a comparable forensics capability for such weapons is a clear priority. We recommend 

that the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster research and development 

in forensics technology and analysis. Those steps will involve either the development 

 

32 50 U.S. Code, Sections 1801–1863. 

33 An identification of such precursors and equipment should be made in an Executive Order or regulations, 

coordinated with all relevant Federal health and law enforcement agencies. 

34 The FBI’s internal laboratory and others available to it collectively are, without question, the best in the 

world. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 22

of a new program in a specific agency, or the consolidation of several existing programs. 

We also recommend that the National Office implement an Indications and 

Warning System for the rapid dissemination of information developed by enhanced 

forensics. 

These efforts should include Federal assistance to State and local forensics capabilities. 

Some terrorist threats or actual attacks may initially appear to be some other form of 

criminal conduct, and Federal involvement may not be implicated. Enhancements at 

State and local agencies will not only facilitate early identification, but will also support 

subsequent criminal investigations. 

If terrorists know that the nation has the capability to detect and identify devices and 

perpetrators—so that the “return address” can be determined—deterrence is enhanced 

accordingly. 

Expand Information Sharing and Improve Threat Assessments 

Several agencies have made strides in enhancing information sharing. Notable examples 

include efforts by the FBI to implement fully its Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

program and to provide information on combating terrorism to response entities through 

its web-based system, Law Enforcement Online (“LEO”). 

An even more comprehensive dissemination system must be developed to provide 

information through expanded law enforcement channels, and through regional FEMA 

offices into State emergency management channels, for further dissemination to local 

response entities. As part of that process, the National Office should promote a 

system for providing some form of security clearance to selected State and Local 

officials nationwide, and methods for disseminating classified information to those 

officials in near real time. One product of that process will be timely threat 

assessments, in which the FBI must be an integral part. The FBI has undergone a 

reorganization that consolidated several related entities into a new Counterterrorism 

Division, with an Assistant Director at its head. That division needs more internal 

analytic capability. We recommend that the FBI consider implementing a “Reports 

Officer” or similar system, analogous to the process used by the Central Intelligence 

Agency, for tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warnings. 

To promote the broadest dissemination of information to the largest audience of response 

entities, we recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster the 

development of a protected, Internet-based, single-source web page system, linking 

appropriate combating terrorism information and databases across all applicable 

functional disciplines. The FBI’s LEO system is one example of many single-function 

capabilities that should be part of an integrated system. The Department of Defense is 

also developing related capabilities that would be valuable components of such a system. 

The system will entail a multi-agency intergovernmental and private sector cooperative 

arrangement. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 23

PLANNING, COORDINATING, AND OPERATING COOPERATIVELY

For all of the advantages of our “federal” system of government, coordination among its 

levels for major undertakings presents challenges beyond those inherent in the 

undertaking itself.35

 

Prior to an attack, the Federal government must provide national leadership, guidance, 

and assistance to response entities at all levels. Federal entities can facilitate nationwide 

preparedness by helping to develop national standards for training, exercising, and 

equipment programs. The Federal role is preeminent, perhaps exclusive, in the areas of 

research, development, test, and evaluation. Moreover, the Federal government must 

have the lead in collecting and analyzing intelligence and in fostering sharing intelligence 

and information. 

When a terrorist attack occurs, the Federal role for criminal investigation and prosecution 

is already very specific. The FBI has responsibility for investigations of terrorist threats 

and attacks. The U.S. Department of Justice then has responsibility for prosecution under 

various Federal criminal statutes on terrorism. Terrorist threats or attacks may also be 

violations of State or local law, so jurisdiction over investigations and prosecutions can 

be concurrent. State and local officials recognize that the FBI and DOJ have paramount 

though not exclusive jurisdiction in both terrorism investigation and prosecution. 

Otherwise, the Federal role in a response to an actual attack should be to assist when 

requested and to meet response requirements that exceed local and State capabilities. 

Response to an attack must be layered and sequential: Local entities will respond first, 

supplemented as necessary by State capabilities. When local capabilities are exceeded, 

the response shifts to the State (perhaps multi-state) level. The Federal response should 

come only after local and State capabilities are exceeded. The Federal response should 

not be a major one—with the Federal entities “in the lead” for operations—except in the 

most extreme situation. For such cases, detailed planning and close coordination will 

lessen the prospect for overreaction that could infringe civil liberties. Moreover, relying 

on assets at the Federal level that are many hours—perhaps days—from deployment in an 

actual response is problematic. 

We recommend that the senior emergency management entity in each State function 

as the prime Focal Point for that State for domestic preparedness for terrorism. 

The focal point should solicit input and representation from local jurisdictions and 

agencies. The State emergency management entity should oversee the lines of 

communications between the Federal government and local response entities. State 

entities are more likely to have the total picture of preparedness and requirements 

throughout the State and can better establish priorities for the allocation of resources and 

for other requirements. This arrangement will reduce potentially counterproductive 

direct communication between the Federal government and local jurisdictions. 

 

35 For comparison purposes, support staff conducted a case study of the way the nation of Israel is 

organized for and coordinates responses to terrorism. That case study is set forth in Appendix F. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 24

Improve Collective Planning Among Federal, State, and Local Entities 

Many Federal entities plan for a variety of emergency responses, including terrorism. 

The Federal Response Plan (FRP)36 is intended to be the single source for “all-hazards” 

responses but does not necessarily contain all plans for terrorism. The bifurcation 

between “crisis” and “consequence” management further complicates the problem.37 

State and local entities find it difficult to keep track of all the plans, and are often not 

consulted in the plan development process. 

We recommend that the Federal Response Plan (FRP) be the single source Federal 

document for “all-hazards” response planning.38 All applicable Federal 

departments and agencies should include their plans to respond to terrorist attacks 

as annexes to the FRP, in accordance with a specific FRP template. The FRP and 

the relevant Federal agency plans should include input from State and local entities. 

For clarity, we recommend renaming the FRP the “Federal Support Plan.” 

Several States have developed excellent plans and processes for combating terrorism.39 

Any of these would serve as a useful model for other States. Because States may have to 

assist each other in response to a terrorist attack, coordination would obviously be 

enhanced if State plans followed a standard format. We recommend that the National 

Emergency Management Association, in conjunction with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, develop a “model” State plan, flexible enough to fit any 

State’s specific circumstances, but with certain standard features.40 In this regard, 

the National Office for Combating Terrorism should play a lead role. 

Enhance Coordination of Programs and Activities 

The complexities of the Federal structure for combating terrorism create daunting 

challenges for a State entity, e.g., to know whom to call at the Federal level for 

 

36 The Federal Response Plan (FRP) “establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, 

and effective delivery of Federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency 

declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 

U.S.C. 5121, et seq.).” FRP, Chapter 1, Introduction. Our recommendation would expand its scope to 

include responses to terrorism under the Stafford Act and other Federal authority. 

37 For example, the FBI’s “U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Contingency Plan ” 

(CONPLAN) is not designed to be part of the FRP. The FBI is in the final stages of publishing the 

CONPLAN, its operational plan for “crisis management,” separate from the FRP, despite the fact that it 

says that it was “developed consistent with . . . the Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident 

Annex," among other documents and directives. CONPLAN, p. iii. It should be included as a part of a 

total plan. And see “States’ Recommendations,” Nos. 7, 11, and 19, Appendix J. 

38 We considered recommending that the National Office promulgate a “Federal Terrorism Response Plan” 

for Combating Terrorism. We did not favorably consider that approach for two reasons: (1) The response 

plan should be operationally oriented, and the National Office for Combating Terrorism is not an 

operational entity; and (2) A fundamental principle in our approach is building on existing emergency 

response systems. Creating an entirely separate plan for response to terrorism could result in 

ineffectiveness and potentially conflicting plans. By the same token, the FRP should not be a strategic 

policy document, and the National Office should therefore, formulate policy for combating terrorism. 

39 California, Iowa, New Hampshire, and New Mexico, to mention a few. 

40 See “States’ Recommendations,” No. 15, Appendix J. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 25

assistance. The National Office should foster clear lines of coordination must be 

established, vertically and horizontally across disciplines, and promote “best practices” to 

eliminate unnecessary redundancies. Creating the National Office for Combating 

Terrorism and designating State emergency management entities as the “focal point” for 

State and local coordination will help. Each Federal agency should also designate a 

“single point of contact” for State and local entities to obtain assistance from that Federal 

agency.

41 

While well intended, the Federal government has in some cases created new programs to 

assist State and local response entities, such as training and exercises, without a full 

understanding of similar programs that already exist and that could be leveraged more 

effectively with resources already available.42 We recommend that the National Office 

for Combating Terrorism conduct inventories of State and local programs for 

capabilities that can be utilized in a national context, especially training and exercise 

programs.

43

We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism promote multijurisdictional mutual assistance compacts, using the FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces as one model, and facilitate the implementation of interstate mutual 

assistance compacts among states, through FEMA Regional Offices.44 Such 

compacts should encompass Federal, State, and local public health entities in all aspects 

of planning, coordination, and operations, especially for multi-jurisdictional and multistate operations. 

A terrorist attack may require a response lasting days, and possibly weeks. Many local 

entities have some capability for “shift changes” to allow personnel to rest and return to 

work, but that capability is likely to be taxed quickly. As a result, we recommend more 

intense tactical and operational planning to facilitate “second wave” capabilities 

from outside entities after the depletion of local resources. 

In our first report, we cited the multi-jurisdictional organizational structure that exists in 

the Los Angeles metropolitan area, called the “LA Operational Area.” More than 80 

municipal and county jurisdictions participate in the LA Operational Area Terrorism 

Working Group (TWG) and a related structure, the Terrorism Early Warning Group 

(TEWG). Our support staff has conducted a case study of the LA Operational area to 

provide “lessons learned.”45 We recommend that States utilize one of the 

standardized multi-state compacts, either the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact or the States Compact.46 

 

41 In keeping with our earlier reasoning and recommendations, local jurisdictions are encouraged to 

coordinate assistance from Federal agencies through the designated State agency. 

42 See “States’ Recommendations,” No. 7, Appendix J. 

43 See further discussions on training and exercise programs below. 

44 See “States’ Recommendations,” Nos. 11 and 30, Appendix J. 

45 That case study is included in Appendix G. 46 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate mutual aid agreement that 

provides a mechanism for States to assist each other in response to natural or man-made disasters. EMAC 

is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and is recognized by the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 26

Improve Operational Command and Control of Domestic Responses 

In response to an attack, lines of authority and responsibilities among the entities 

involved must be clear. The responder community has made progress in establishing 

command structures for response, but more is needed. 

We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism identify and 

promote a standardized Incident Command System (ICS) model for tactical 

operations for response to terrorist incidents that is part of an all-hazards approach. 

The model should capture the best elements and “best practices” of the ICS already in 

place in a number of jurisdictions but should always have two essential characteristics: 

flexibility for adaptation to local circumstances and a configuration that includes State 

and Federal liaison functions. As we noted in Chapter One, every local jurisdiction 

(either individually or as part of a multi-jurisdictional agreement) should adopt a standard 

ICS, and all levels of government above the local level should recognize that system.47

The terms “Incident Command System” and “Unified Command System” are often used 

synonymously. We distinguish the two terms and recommend the identification and 

promotion, by the National Office for Combating Terrorism, of a standardized 

Unified Command System (UCS) model for operations and multi-agency, multijurisdictional coordination above the tactical operations level. The UCS that we 

envision would be required when Federal resources are involved in more than an 

advisory or liaison capacity and when significant State assets are brought to bear. 

 

When significant Federal resources are employed that involve two or more Federal 

agencies, we recommend a single Federal Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be 

established as part of the UCS.

48 We recognize that certain Federal agencies will need 

to conduct operations that cannot be open to all response entities. A standardized UCS 

can be designed with flexibility for “compartmented” operations within the EOC to 

protect classified or law enforcement sensitive information. The Federal EOC should 

include the FBI, FEMA, and any other Federal agency that has a significant role, 

geographically co-located to the extent feasible. Ideally, the State EOC should be located 

in geographical proximity to the Federal EOC. 

The ultimate goal for the implementation of ICS and UCS, and the co-location of EOCs, 

is to delineate clear lines of authority for the conduct of operations at tactical and higher 

levels and to provide maximum coordination. To enhance that process, we recommend 

that each jurisdiction with an ICS and UCS develop operational templates to 

 Congress (Pub. L. 104–312). According to NEMA, 34 states and Puerto Rico have adopted EMAC. The 

"States Compact” refers to the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact, promulgated by the "Federal 

Civil Defense Act of 1950," Jan. 12, 1951, ch. 1228, 64 Stat. 1245 (Title 50 App., Sec. 2251 et seq.), and 

carried forward into the Stafford Act, 42 U.S. Code, Section 5196(h). We also append to this report the 

framework of the New England Multi-State Compact, as an additional model for consideration. 

Appendix I.

47 See “States’ Recommendations,” Nos. 7 and 8, Appendix J. 

48 This concept was used during TOPOFF 2000 and worked reasonably well. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 27

provide for alignment of decision-making structures based on the weapon, means of 

delivery, and severity of the attack.49 

 

Use of U.S. Armed Forces for Response to a Terrorist Attack 

Inside the Borders of the United States50

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety 

deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin, 1759.

The civil rights and liberties of Americans must be paramount in all of the nation’s 

efforts to combat terrorism. That fundamental precept is critical in any contemplation of 

the use of U.S. Armed Forces domestically; most traditional military operations are not 

planned with such considerations in mind, and most military personnel are not trained to 

deal with such issues. 

A major attack by terrorists using unconventional weapons resulting in casualties in the 

tens of thousands is far less likely than a smaller-scale attack. Such an attack is, 

however, possible and must not be ignored. In such an extraordinary and catastrophic 

circumstance, the President may feel compelled, as a result of urgent requests from one or 

more Governors following the exhaustion of local and State capabilities, to resort to the 

use of military assets. In any such case, use of our armed forces must be made with the 

expressed condition that the military will always be strictly under civilian control. 

Clear Constitutional and statutory authority exists for using the U.S. Armed Forces in a 

support role to provide significant assistance to civilian agencies.51 The American people 

 

49 See “States’ Recommendations,” Nos. 8, 15, and 26, Appendix J. 

50 Advisory Panel Member L. Paul Bremer provided the following dissent: 

“This section of the report contains much with which I agree. In almost all foreseeable circumstances, 

a Federal civilian agency should be the ‘Lead Federal Agency’ in responding to catastrophic terrorist 

attacks in the U.S. More must be done to improve those agencies’ capabilities and the ability of the U.S. 

military to act in support of the ‘Lead Federal Agency.’ The U.S. military must always be under civilian 

leadership. And respect for civil liberties should be a primary goal of the Federal response to a terrorist 

incident. 

“The question is how best to deal with the remote, but nonetheless imaginable, circumstance that a 

terrorist attack causes so much damage that it outruns the existing capabilities of Federal, State and local 

civilian entities. It is possible in such circumstances that the President may want to consider identifying, on 

an exceptional and temporary basis, the Department of Defense (DoD) as the ‘Lead Federal Agency’ under 

civilian leadership. 

“Inserting DoD into such a role without preparation could have potentially serious implications for the 

protection of Americans’ civil liberties. Effective crisis management depends on anticipating and planning 

for even the worst-case scenario and requires training and regular exercises to allow responders to practice 

and understand their appropriate roles. 

“At present, the Federal government has no plans for DoD to be the ‘Lead Federal Agency’ under any 

circumstances, so that role is never exercised. This increases the possibility that, if called on by the 

President to be the ‘Lead Federal Agency,’ DoD will not be sensitive to protecting civil liberties. 

“These vital liberties are more likely to be respected if our government ‘thinks about the unthinkable’ 

ahead of time and is not forced to deal with these crucial issues for the first time in the emotional wake of a 

national trauma. That is why I believe that the Federal government should plan for and exercise the 

possibility that the President may want to designate DoD as ‘Lead Federal Agency’ in such circumstances.” 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 28

must be assured that civilian leaders will always direct and oversee the employment of 

military capability and will limit it to restoration of order, mitigation of consequences, 

and apprehension or interdiction of the perpetrators. Whether for “crisis management” or 

for “consequence management,” military activities must, therefore, always be in support 

of the “Lead Federal Agency,” as designated by the President.52 In almost any 

conceivable scenario, the Lead Federal Agency will be either the Department of Justice 

(DOJ)(the lead for “crisis” management) or the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA)(the lead for “consequence” management). No component of the U.S. Armed 

Forces should ever be the lead agency. 

We recommend that the President always designate a Federal civilian agency other 

than the Department of Defense (DoD) as the Lead Federal Agency. Many 

Americans will not draw the technical distinction between the Department of Defense—

the civilian entity—and the U.S. Armed Forces—the military entity. Although the 

Department of Defense and every major component of that department have civilian 

leaders, the perception will likely be that “the military” is in the lead. This 

recommendation does not ignore the fact that the DoD, through all of its various 

agencies—not just the Armed Forces—has enormous resources and significant 

capabilities for command, control, communications, intelligence, logistics, engineer, and 

medical support and may play a major role in response to a terrorist attack, especially one 

with potentially catastrophic consequences. Those resources can still be brought to bear 

but should always be subordinated to another civilian agency. 

Our national civilians leader must ensure that plans for any use of the U.S. Armed Forces 

in a domestic terrorism context are thoughtfully developed and include a comprehensive 

description of the relationships with all levels of government. Military leaders at all 

levels must clearly understand those plans. Sufficient training and exercises must be 

conducted prior to the application of military capabilities in response to a domestic 

attack. This is especially important for the most catastrophic attack and in the event that 

the military provides significant support to a Federal civilian lead agency. In that case, 

the best way to ensure protection of our civil rights and liberties is not by reacting after 

the incident has occurred, but through comprehensive advance planning, rigorous 

training, and realistic exercises.53

In the event of a concerted effort by our adversaries both internationally and 

domestically, our armed forces will be committed elsewhere and not available at home. 

The more the nation enhances preparedness and capabilities to respond to terrorist acts 

with civilian assets—especially local and State response entities—the less likely the 

necessity to employ military assets in any situation. 

 51 A full discussion of the various Constitutional and legal authorities is contained in Appendix R to the 

report. 

52 See page 13, above, for definitions of “Lead Federal Agency” and “Lead Agency.” 

53 We are not yet satisfied that the requisite plans are in place to employ the military in a “crisis” response. 

We will delve into that issue in detail and provide our conclusions and recommendations in our third report. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 29

TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND EXERCISING

One of our fundamental assumptions has been that no single jurisdiction can handle a 

major terrorist attack. That assumption reinforces the importance of mutual assistance 

agreements and highlights the necessity for directly applicable training, equipment, and 

exercises. Proponents of such programs must coordinate with the intended recipients and 

meet national standards. 

In Chapter Two, as part of the recommendation for the creation of the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism, we proposed that an Assistant Director of that office oversee 

Domestic Preparedness Programs, especially those designed to provide training, exercise, 

and equipment assistance to State and local entities. That Assistant Director should rely 

on the “Advisory Board for Domestic Programs”54 for input to the national strategy and 

for continuing advice on training, exercises, and equipment programs.

Training 

With respect to training, one of the first tasks for that Assistant Director will be to design 

a national training plan to address, at a minimum, the following fundamental questions: 

Training to do what? 

To what standards? 

Who is to provide the training and to whom? 

What is the goal of such training? 

How is the necessary level of training maintained? 

The training directed in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Act—the so-called “120 

Cities” training—has been valuable but could have been even more effective. It was 

implemented with little input from the proposed training recipients. Many cities that 

received NLD training did not necessarily require the training provided. Additionally, 

planners assumed that the 120 most populous cities in the country all needed the same 

level and type of training as all others. That determination left some states completely 

out of the training plan. Moreover, the program initially targeted specific municipalities. 

In the early stages, recipient municipalities were not allowed to include representatives of 

surrounding communities, even though mutual assistance agreements among jurisdictions 

had predated the commencement of the training. Some of those problems were resolved 

as the program matured. One important lesson here is that future training programs must 

be responsive to the needs identified by those to be trained. 

Another lesson further reinforces the need for a comprehensive national strategy, one that 

establishes goals and sets priorities across a broad array of functions. In the absence of 

an overarching Executive Branch plan, the Congress directed the Department of Defense 

to conduct the “120 Cities” training,” a task from which senior leaders in the Pentagon 

sought relief. 

 

54 Recommended in Chapter Two. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 30

A Presidential directive of May 2000 transferred the responsibility for most of the NLD 

training (the “Domestic Preparedness Program”) to the Department of Justice. Funding 

for the program did not follow the transfer, however, and DOJ had not budgeted for it. 

Despite attempts to obtain funding for DOJ to complete most of the balance of the 

training,55 as of this writing, the FY 2001 funding for DOJ has not been enacted.56 

To compound matters, the DoD entity that conducted the NLD Domestic Preparedness 

Program—the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command—had established a 

“24-Hour Hotline” and a “First Responders Chemical-Biological Helpline.” As of 

October 31, those services have been terminated.57 Many response entities had used 

those services and had included that capability in their response plans. This is one more 

example of the direct impact on first responders of disorganization at the Federal level. 

State and local entities have developed protocols and response doctrine based on DoD 

Domestic Preparedness Program guidance and education programs. Eliminating this 

service creates a void in rapid access to essential information for emergency service 

entities and will require numerous changes to plans nationwide. 

In the fire services and emergency medical services disciplines, the vast majority of the 

personnel involved—especially those in rural areas—are volunteers. The same holds true 

for reserve law enforcement personnel, who will undoubtedly assist in the response to 

any major terrorist attack. Many training programs for local responders follow a 

“Monday through Friday, 9-to-5” schedule. That time constraint may prevent many 

volunteer responders from participating in important training. We recommend 

restructuring education and training opportunities to account for the high number 

of volunteer personnel in these “first responder” disciplines. Distance learning 

applications would be very useful in this regard. 

Exercising 

Similar coordination and standardization problems exist with exercise programs. Many 

Federal entities58 conduct or facilitate various exercises and offer State and local response 

entities opportunities to participate. Most agencies develop their own scenarios for such 

exercises, and in many cases, they are of the “worst case,” mass-casualty variety. We 

recommend that the Assistant Director for Domestic Programs in the National 

Office for Combating Terrorism develop exercise scenarios that are realistic and 

 

55 DoD will continue to have responsibility for certain courses but not the full program. 

56 Neither the DoD nor DOJ had included funds for the completion of the program in its FY 2001 budget 

submission. Disagreements between the Senate and the House were only resolved in the final compromise 

of conferees on the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Act (CJS), which provides almost $21 million 

“for the NLD Domestic Preparedness Program authorized under the National Defense Authorization Act, 

1997, and previously funded by the Department of Defense, to provide training and other assistance to the 

120 largest U.S. cities.” CJS, Conference Report to accompany H.R 4942. For a complete breakdown of 

DOJ funding for combating terrorism, see Appendix N. 

57 See the notice at http://dp.sbccom.army.mil/fr/dp_technical.html. 

58 Including numerous agencies in the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, and the Department of Justice. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 31

meet the needs of the State and local response entities. Exercises should be a logical 

extension of realistic training to aid in identifying weaknesses for which additional 

training may be indicated. Training and exercises should also include as scenarios the 

more likely, but less catastrophic, smaller scale CBRN attacks, and exercises must 

include all disciplines and all levels of response. 

Members of the Advisory Panel observed significant portions of the national exercise 

called “Top Officials 2000,”59 and based on those observations, we recommend that all 

major exercises include an independent evaluation. 

Equipping 

We support the decision to provide Department of Justice grants to States and localities 

based on equipment requirements identified at the State level. Prior to that change, DOJ 

provided grants directly to cities, a procedure with two disadvantages. First, it gave cities 

with greater expertise and capability for writing grant applications a significant 

advantage, and second, it did not take into consideration possible statewide deficiencies. 

No standard should require any jurisdiction to possess specific types and numbers of 

equipment—sensors, personal protection equipment, communications, etc. With the 

growth of multi-jurisdictional mutual assistance compacts, and State-level oversight of 

sub-state jurisdictions, programs should provide maximum flexibility for State and local 

jurisdictions to address deficiencies. 

Federal programs to assist State and local entities must have three core elements. First, 

programs should be based on the “best practices” of programs at any level of 

government. Second, plans must contain a requirement for evaluation, including 

feedback from the “end user” that will support certification of Federally supported 

programs by the National Office for Combating Terrorism. Finally, plans must identify 

deficiencies and proposals to correct them. 

In April of this year, the Department of Justice Office for State and Local Domestic 

Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) published and distributed to the States an “Assessment 

and Strategy Development Tool Kit,” in connection with the Fiscal Year 1999 State 

Domestic Preparedness Program. That document makes the “[r]eceipt of additional 

[Federal] funds under the [equipment] program60 . . . contingent on the State’s 

development of two separate, but related, documents . . . A State-wide Needs 

Assessment, and. . . a Three-Year Statewide [sic] Domestic Preparedness Strategy.” 

Such tools as this, which provide for States to articulate their needs in accordance with a 

standard set of criteria, will be valuable in designing and implementing training, exercise, 

and equipment programs. 

 

59 A more thorough discussion of the observations is contained in Appendix L. 

60 FY 1999, FY 2000, and presumably “out-year” program funds. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 32

IMPROVING HEALTH AND MEDICAL CAPABILITIES

Complete coordination among public health officials, public and private hospitals, prehospital emergency medical service (EMS) entities, law enforcement, fire services, and 

the emergency management communities is lacking. While coordination in some States 

and localities has improved dramatically, in others coordination is either nonexistent or in 

its infancy. State and local efforts to improve those relationships should continue. 

Debate continues about how prepared the nation is to deal, from a medical and health 

standpoint, with a terrorist attack involving CBRN devices. In some medical institutions, 

especially those well funded in major metropolitan areas, there is significant capability to 

deal with disease outbreaks. That capability is not, however, consistent nationwide. The 

level of expertise in recognizing and dealing with a terrorist attack involving a chemical 

or biological agent is even more problematic. 

Fundamental to our consideration is the premise that the nation must have a robust public 

health system. But that system, and additional resources required to improve it, should 

follow the multi-purpose approach that we have previously stressed. Combating 

terrorism is a compelling reason for such efforts but should not be the exclusive impetus. 

Strengthening the public health infrastructure to deal with accidental chemical injuries, 

emerging infectious diseases, and a pandemic outbreak of any kind should be the 

fundamental goal. Such efforts will expand the capability for decontamination, mass 

trauma cases, and other surge requirements to deal with terrorism mass casualty 

incidents. 

Dual- and multi-purpose applications must be the goal. The nation should not expend 

vast additional resources only to a discrete issue, such as clinical research into biological 

terrorism. Conversely, improvements in prevention and in treatment of “all hazards” 

victims correspondingly enhance the capability to treat victims of terrorism and to 

prevent the spread of terrorists’ agents. 

We do not intend that our recommendations involving public health and medical care 

increase the burden on that system. Our goal is to include the elements of our 

recommendations into existing processes and to urge financial support where it is needed. 

As part of our work next year, we will examine health and medical issues in greater 

detail. 

We recommend that the Assistant Director for Health and Medical Programs seek 

advice and input from Federal, State, and local public health officials, and from 

representatives of public and private medical care providers, to ensure that such 

issues are an important part of the national strategy. 

Improve Education Programs 

For hospitals, programs for domestic preparedness must include initial and continuing 

education in essential disciplines for the public health and medical response to terrorist 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 33

attacks, especially for chemical and biological devices. Training recipients should 

include emergency room doctors, nurses, and staff; other hospital personnel who may 

interact with pre-hospital EMS care providers; disease specialists; and pathologists. 

Medical examiners should also be included in this directed training. It will not be 

necessary to create major separate training programs on terrorism; special terrorism 

considerations can be imbedded in multi-purpose training in infectious diseases and for 

hazardous materials injuries. 

One way to ensure the implementation of such training is to include terrorism-related 

subjects as part of professional licensing and certification processes, e.g., certification of 

designated medical personnel by such entities as the American Board of Emergency 

Medicine, the American Board of Internal Medicine, and the American Board of 

Pathologists. 

We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism consult with 

professional organizations, especially those with licensing or certification 

requirements, to find acceptable methods to implement such programs, including 

the prospect of providing Federal resources to support certified training programs.

Establish Standards and Protocols 

Timely dissemination of accurate information on a terrorist attack is obviously crucial, 

especially for an attack involving a chemical or biological device. Most States require 

some mandatory reporting for diseases and for certain criminal conduct, but they are not 

well coordinated and the criteria are inconsistent. Medical and health authorities 

should establish critical information gathering and dissemination, especially for 

CBRN attacks. They should simplify and standardize mandatory reporting. Several 

major metropolitan areas, including New York City, Baltimore, and Los Angeles, have 

developed communications systems that, along with the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) and the 

emerging CDC EPI-X system,61 can collectively serve as a national standard. Those 

procedures should also include exacting protocols for surveillance, identification, 

palliation, and follow-up. 

Medical laboratories do not have consistent, nationally recognized standard protocols for 

the collection, identification, and referral of terrorists' CBRN agents, which increases the 

probability for incorrect identification and false positives. Medical and public health 

authorities must establish rapid, reliable methods (such as DNA fingerprinting) to 

determine whether an organism might be naturally occurring or the result of an 

intentional act. Explicit and uniform laboratory protocols must be designed and 

implemented at the Federal,62 State,63 and local64 levels to facilitate such determinations. 

 

61 For descriptions of NEDSS and EPI-X, see Appendix H. 

62 For example, CDC, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) laboratories. 

63 State laboratories. 

64 Hospital and reference laboratories. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 34

In any terrorist attack, some conflict will inevitably occur between the special 

requirements of law enforcement and those of public health. The standard procedures 

should set forth the essential protocols to be followed to accommodate these competing 

interests, by providing for more complete sharing of information. 

For almost every terrorist attack, pre-hospital emergency medical services (EMS) will be 

one of the “first responders,” perhaps before an event has been identified as terrorism. 

EMS providers will need decisions early about where to transport victims, and what 

additional precautions may be needed. Standard procedures must include explicit 

decision-making protocols for medical, public health, and EMS providers. 

In the same way that medical personnel should be held to certain standards for 

certification, medical authorities must establish standards for hospital facilities that 

include minimum capabilities in every hospital to treat victims of a terrorist attack. 

An attainable near-term goal should be the requirement that each hospital have at least 

one chemical decontamination facility; that requirement should be included as part of the 

periodic certifications by such entities as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 

Healthcare Organizations and the National Commission on Quality Assurance. 

The nexus between foreign terrorist threats and domestic vulnerabilities is particularly 

noteworthy in the context of infectious diseases. The more that the U.S. health 

community can be aware of infectious diseases anywhere in the world and from whatever 

source, the more likely it can prevent or respond to the intentional introduction of a 

disease domestically. CDC works with the World Health Organization (WHO) to 

identify, track, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks of international significance. 

The Department of Defense also contributes to what the WHO calls its “networks of 

networks” throughout the global health community.65 Although not specifically designed 

for combating terrorism, these efforts provide the U.S health community with a 

foundation for heightened awareness of and response to biological terrorist threats. 

Clarify Authorities and Procedures for Health and Medical Response 

State public health entities have the primary role in the control of disease outbreaks, 

including those intentionally inflicted. The Federal role is almost exclusively one of 

support to States upon request.66 The corollary is that public health entities will have a 

primary role in response to a terrorist attack with a biological agent. 

Virtually all States have some statutory basis for undertaking extraordinary measures, 

such as quarantine, in the event of a major attack. In several cases, however, the statutes 

are ambiguous, because of the broad authority given to State public health officials to 

take whatever steps necessary to respond to such an incident. 

 

65 For more information, see Global Health: Framework for Infectious Disease Surveillance, 

GAO/NSIAD–00–205R. 

66 There is, however, authority for Federal quarantine in exceptional circumstances. See 42 U.S. Code, 

Section 264 and related regulations, 42 CFR Chapter 1, Part 70. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 35

The National Office for Combating Terrorism should review existing Federal and State 

authorities for mandatory or prescriptive activities, such as vaccinations, quarantine, 

containment, and observation. As a result of that review, “model” legislation and 

regulations should be promulgated for the consideration of the States. The National 

Office for Combating Terrorism should also provide, as part of its information 

“clearinghouse” function, reports that will ensure that Federal, State, and local response 

entities have a mutual understanding of the authorities and procedures at all levels of 

government.67

Improve Stockpiles 

Adequate stockpiles of vaccines should be created and made accessible for rapid response 

to a terrorist biological attack. Such stockpiles include 40 million doses of effective 

smallpox vaccine68 and officials should make provisions for improved storage and 

dissemination69 of these and other vaccines, including new ones as they are developed 

and perfected. Much remains to be done to ensure effective distribution of vaccines, 

including better coordination with State and local agencies, improving the technical 

infrastructure for the actual distribution, developing technical protocols for mass 

distribution, and informing the public about vaccines and other medication. 

Evaluate and Test Response Capabilities 

As part of a broader program for evaluating preparedness, medical entities such as 

the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations should conduct 

periodic assessments of medical facilities and capabilities. Evaluation criteria 

should include a comprehensive, clear, coordinated, and testable response plan. 

Given the fact that multiple hospitals and other treatment facilities may be involved in 

treating the victims of a terrorist attack, such facilities should jointly develop hospital 

networking processes (using, for example, a “lead hospital” concept, with other hospitals 

in support). 

Once established, medical facilities should test their plans, preferably annually, and 

ideally through a multi-disciplinary exercise with all response disciplines—law 

enforcement, fire services, pre-hospital emergency medical services, emergency 

managers, medical care providers, and public health. 

 

67 We have learned that a number of State and local public health agencies do not realize that there is 

Federal quarantine authority in 42 U.S. Code, Section 264. 

68 CDC recently contracted for the 40 million doses. 

69 The recent TOPOFF exercise highlighted existing problems in the delivery and distribution of vaccines, 

antidotes, and prophylaxes. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 36

PROMOTING BETTER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPING NATIONAL 

STANDARDS

The sophistication of CBRN weapons and the ambiguity of terrorists’ motives and 

capabilities highlight the need for better coordination in research, development, testing, 

and evaluation (RDT&E). The costly nature of in-depth RDT&E and the need for rigid 

protocols and consistency make it unlikely that individual States can undertake this task. 

Federal agencies conduct or fund RDT&E that has some application in combating 

terrorism—the Department of Justice; numerous entities in the Department of Defense;70

the Department of Health and Human Services, especially several entities of the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and the Food and 

Drug Administration; the Department of Energy, including most of the National 

Laboratories; the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Transportation; the 

Department of the Treasury; the Environmental Protection Agency; and major national 

not-for-profit entities such as the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of 

Medicine. The Congress has also provided major RDT&E funding directly to 

educational or other not-for-profit institutions, including the Dartmouth College Institute 

for Security Technology Studies and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for 

the Prevention of Terrorism. In addition, private commercial and industrial sectors 

conduct significant related research, some of it Federally funded.71

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), an interagency body with oversight 

from the Department of State and program management and support from the Department 

of Defense, is accomplishing significant technical work in research and development for 

combating terrorism. Its “technical co-chairs” are the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has members from 

numerous Federal agencies. Its stated mission is to “Conduct the national interagency 

research and development program for combating terrorism through rapid research, 

development, and prototyping.”72 It serves as an adjunct of the “Interagency Working 

Group on Counterterrorism”73 under the NSC structure. It does not, however, conduct or 

coordinate all R&D for combating terrorism, but only those projects that member 

agencies choose to have it coordinate. The TSWG represents an important activity. We 

recommend that the TSWG become an adjunct to the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism in the same manner that it now serves in the NSC process 

 

70 Including special programs in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict; the Defense Research and Engineering Directorate; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense; the U.S. Army 

Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical 

Defense; the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command; the U.S. Air Force; the U.S. Navy 

Force Protection Division; and the U.S. Marine Corps. 

71 It is not apparent that the OMB/NSC budget submission includes combating terrorism RDT&E funding 

in all Federal agencies. 

72 TSWG Mission Statement from www.tswg.net 

73 Presumably the NSC Counter-Terrorism Security Group. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 37

and that it expand its coordination role for technical aspects of RDT&E for 

combating terrorism.

There is, however, no comprehensive national plan—one that establishes clear priorities 

and precludes unnecessary duplication—for RDT&E for combating terrorism. The 

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has spent many months 

simply taking inventory of the various Federal RDT&E programs that have application 

for combating terrorism. 

Improve Plans for Research, Development, 

Test and Evaluation for Combating Terrorism 

The national strategy developed by the National Office for Combating Terrorism must 

contain a clear set of priorities for RDT&E. The program and budget authority of that 

office must be exerted to ensure effective application of Federal funds devoted to this 

purpose. 

The White House Office of Science & Technology Policy should play a major role in the 

effort. We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National 

Standards of the National Office for Combating Terrorism either enter into a 

formal relationship with OSTP or have appropriate members of the OSTP staff 

detailed to the National Office for Combating Terrorism on a rotational basis. 

Wide varieties of equipment that have potential application for combating terrorism74 are 

available from commercial vendors. Nevertheless, many local responders have told us 

that some equipment they purchased does not meet the specifications described by the 

vendor. At present, no viable program is in place for testing and evaluating the 

effectiveness of equipment for combating terrorism. We recommend that the Assistant 

Director for RDT&E and National Standards develop equipment testing protocols 

and continue to explore the prospect of financial support from vendors for 

equipment live agent test and evaluation, leading to Federal certification. 

We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards 

develop, as part of the national strategy, a comprehensive plan for long-range 

research for combating terrorism; this should include better coordination among the 

National Laboratories. The focus of those efforts by National Laboratories should be 

dual- or multi-purpose applications. 

The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also integrate other indirect, yet 

applicable, research and development projects into its information-dissemination process. 

For example, the Deputy Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism) within the 

Joint Staff provides executive seminars on its Best Practices Study for anti-terrorism and 

force protection. This program also collects information on “commercial off the shelf” 

resources and equipment to support its anti-terrorism mission. These studies and 

 

74 According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, at least 2,000 different pieces of 

respiratory equipment have potential use in chemical environments. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 38

resources may not directly relate to policy and standards for combating terrorism at the 

State and local level but may well contribute to State and local preparedness. 

The top priorities for targeted research should be responder personnel protective 

equipment (PPE); medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; improved sensor 

and rapid-readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications 

interoperability. 

Develop National Standards for Equipment, 

Training, and Laboratory Processes

One of our basic assumptions is that no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of 

responding to a major terrorist attack without outside assistance. That leads to the 

inescapable conclusion that the development of national standards is a critical element of 

any national plan. Firefighters or EMS technicians in the jurisdiction where an attack 

takes place must not be concerned that responders from other jurisdictions, providing 

“mutual assistance,” will arrive with equipment of a different standard than local 

responders, even at risk of becoming casualties themselves. 

We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards in 

the National Office for Combating Terrorism establish a national standards 

program for combating terrorism, focusing on equipment, training,75 and 

laboratory processes. The fundamental objectives for equipment standards will be 

nationwide compatibility, and dual-/ multi-purpose applications. For training, they will 

be interdisciplinary curricula, and training exercises based on realistic scenarios. For 

laboratories, the focus should be clear, strict protocols for identification, forensics, and 

reporting. The ultimate goal of the national standards program should be certification of 

the specific equipment, training, or laboratory and a recapitulation of certifications in a 

“Consumers Digest,” for use by response entities nationwide. 

We recommend that the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 

and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) be 

designated as Federal “co-lead agencies” for the technical aspects of standards 

development. The Executive Branch and the Congress should provide resources for the 

development of national standards, and Congress should be presented with a detailed 

budget request for that purpose at the earliest opportunity. In addition, the Interagency 

Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability should be subordinated to the 

National Office for Combating Terrorism. 

The Federal co-lead agencies should develop certification standards in coordination with 

appropriate Federal agencies and with advice from State and local response entities, 

professional organizations that represent response disciplines, and private and quasipublic certifying entities.

 

75 In this context, we intend “training” to include initial and continuing training and education, as well as 

training exercises. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 39

ENHANCING EFFORTS TO COUNTER AGRICULTURAL TERRORISM

In our first report, we noted that terrorists could cause economic and social damage by 

targeting a State or regional agricultural sector. There we said: 

[A] concerted biological attack against an agricultural target offers 

terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high 

probability of success and which also has the prospect of obtaining 

political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the ability of 

government or giving the terrorists an improved bargaining position. 

This may be especially true if the agricultural bioterrorism attack is 

part of a carefully planned escalation . . . to attain the terrorists’ 

ultimate objectives . . . with minimal risk to the terrorists themselves.76 

A successful attack on a sector of U.S. agriculture could cause economic destabilization 

at home and disrupt overseas commerce, as well as create fear and panic. The U.S. 

agricultural sector continues to be vulnerable to agroterrorism, given the vertical 

integration of livestock breeding, transportation, and marketing, and the high degree of 

genetic homogeneity and concentration found in the nation’s main crop-growing regions. 

In the coming year, the Advisory Panel will consider the adequacy of efforts to counter 

such threats, through a continuing examination of programs of the various entities of the 

U.S. Departments of Agriculture77 and of Health and Human Services78 for prevention, 

preparedness, response, and recovery for agricultural bioterrorist attacks. That review 

will include capabilities for surveillance and response for plant and animal diseases, 

laboratory protocols and standards, and information sharing. The Advisory Panel will 

consult with veterinarian and other professional organizations as part of that process. 

 

76 First Report, pp. 13–14. 

77 Including the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Food Safety Inspection Service, and the 

Agricultural Research Service. 

78 For example, the Food and Drug Administration for food safety issues. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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PROVIDING CYBER SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM

The cyber attacks incident to the current conflict in the Middle East emphasize the 

potentially disastrous effects that such concentrated attacks can have on information and 

other critical government and private sector electronic systems. In addition, several 

Distributed Denial of Service attacks79 in early 2000 against high profile Web-based 

businesses (e.g., Yahoo, Amazon, Ebay, and CNN) demonstrated the vulnerabilities of 

the “e-commerce” infrastructure. Law enforcement responses to such attacks similarly 

illustrate the great difficulty of quickly identifying the perpetrators. 

In a terrorism context, cyber attacks inside the United States could have “mass 

disruptive,” if not “mass destructive” or “mass casualty” consequences. It is easy to 

envision a coordinated attack by terrorists, using a conventional or small-scale chemical 

device, with cyber attacks against law enforcement communications, emergency medical 

facilities, and other systems critical to a response. Moreover, it is conceivable that 

terrorists could mount a cyber attack against power or water facilities or industrial 

plants—for example, a commercial chemical plant that produces a highly toxic 

substance—to produce casualties in the hundreds or thousands. The most likely 

perpetrators of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures are terrorists and criminal groups 

rather than nation-states. That view has led to an assumption that detection of such 

attacks might fall to law enforcement agencies rather than to traditional national security 

authorities or, more probably, to the private sector. 

Beginning with the report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (PCCIP) in October of 1997, the Federal government has sought to mitigate 

critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and potential disruptions to critical services. 

Government officials recognized immediately that the vulnerabilities in cyber-dependent 

critical infrastructures80—those deemed vital to the economic and national security of the 

United States—require unprecedented collaboration with the private sector, because most 

critical infrastructures are under private ownership. A crucial dimension is the extent to 

which the defense establishment is becoming more dependent on private infrastructures.

 

79 A distributed denial of service attack (DDOS) is one in which a cyber attacker first compromises a 

number of electronic “host” networks, and installs a “daemon” on those hosts. A “daemon” is a computer 

process that runs in the background and performs a specified operation at predefined times or in response to 

certain events. Later, the attacker sends a request to the daemon on the compromised hosts asking it to 

begin flooding a target host with various types of electronic packets. The ensuing massive stream of data 

overwhelms the victim's hosts or routers, rendering them unable to provide service. For further 

information, see http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/elias.txt; 

http://www.sans.org/ddos_roadmap.htm; and http://packetstorm.securify.com/distributed/TFN2k_Analysis1.3.txt

80 Non-defense critical information infrastructures include the banking and financial services infrastructure, 

the electric power generation and distribution system, the oil and natural gas pipeline and storage system, 

the air and rail transportation systems, water supply systems, vital human services, and continuity of 

government. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Two documents serve as a foundation for a national framework. The first, released in 

May of 1998, is Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63). That document 

established specific Federal agency responsibilities, response timelines, and milestones 

for Federal government planning for critical infrastructure protection (CIP). A key 

milestone was the publication of a national plan for the defense of U.S. critical 

infrastructures by the beginning of calendar year 2000. In January 2000, a plan was 

released: Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems 

Protection Version 1.0–An Invitation to Dialogue (the “National Plan”). 

PDD-63 called for the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 

(ISACs) to facilitate information sharing between government and industry on 

infrastructure vulnerabilities and threats. To date, the electric power, 

telecommunications, banking and financial services, and oil and gas storage and 

distribution sectors have established such entities. While still embryonic, ISACs have the 

potential to increase greatly the effectiveness of Federal government responses to critical 

infrastructure threats, including terrorism. 

The Congress has not funded many of the initiatives proposed by the Executive Branch in 

the last two fiscal years to implement elements of the “National Plan.” The Congress has 

recognized that critical infrastructure protection is a vital area for governmental activity 

but has withheld certain funding pending the receipt of information from the Executive 

Branch and further debate.81 

Much more needs to be done to establish effective partnerships with the private sector 

and to improve planning and coordination with State and local government entities. 

Private sector collaboration is vital to an effective longer-term response to all aspects of 

CIP—deterrence, detection, identification, prevention, response, recovery, and 

restoration. The private sector remains skeptical of the Federal government’s intentions 

in CIP. Mistrust and a fear that CIP may provide a rationale for re-regulating recently 

deregulated industries have slowed industry responses to Federal government 

coordination and problem-solving initiatives. 

As the Y2K remediation process clearly indicated, many of the critical infrastructures 

requiring protection are owned or in some way regulated by State and local governments. 

In almost every case, those governmental entities provide some measure of physical 

protection for facilities and for people who work there. In any attack, they will play 

important roles in response, recovery, and restoration. We urge all Federal entities with 

CIP responsibilities to include State and local representatives in the planning and 

implementation of CIP programs. 

 

81 A bill requiring a comprehensive report from the President to the Congress on the implementation of the 

requirements of PDD-63, presumably including the status of the various activities directed in the “National 

Plan” (originally introduced as S. 2702—the “Bennett-Schumer Bill”) was added as Section 1032 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (H.R. 4205), which was signed into law on 

October 30, 2000 (Pub L. 106–398). 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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During the coming year, the Advisory Panel will focus on specific aspects of CIP, as they 

relate to the potential for terrorist attacks. We have identified several areas for further 

deliberation. We will make specific policy recommendations in our next report. 

CIP Policy Coordination at the Federal Level 

With Sufficient Authority to Oversee CIP Programs

Currently, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and CounterTerrorism, has certain CIP policy oversight responsibilities, among many others. Those 

various responsibilities are very broad, and may prevent the Coordinator from giving 

sufficient attention to the CIP challenge. Moreover, the person with policy oversight of 

CIP programs needs program and budget authority, perhaps similar to the authority that 

we have recommended for programs to combat terrorism generally. We have chosen not 

to include CIP within the purview of direct responsibilities in the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism. The nature of the threats to our critical infrastructure and the 

processes required to defend against and mitigate attacks are much broader than 

terrorism. 

Standards 

The nation lacks an overarching framework for coordinating with industry and various 

entities in Federal, State, and local government on the development of cyber and 

information technology standards. This includes, in particular, security standards for 

emerging technologies (e.g., wireless) and for significant Internet applications, such as 

business-to-business transactions for critical infrastructure services. 

Currently, the responsibility to coordinate cyber standards development rests, both 

directly and indirectly, in three offices in the Executive Office of the President: 

Office of Management and Budget—Coordinates development of minimum computer 

security guidelines and standards for the Federal government, in concert with the 

National Institute for Standards and Technology, pursuant to multiple statutes and 

authorities; and with the Department of Defense, through the National Security Agency, 

for the development of security standards for national security systems.

82 

National Security Council—Coordinates national and economic security policy issues 

associated with cyber security. 

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy—Coordinates research and 

development associated with cyber security standards. 

 

82 See, e.g., Computer Security Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100–235), Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–

106), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 (Pub. L. 106–65). 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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The Advisory Panel will consider the extent to which those entities and appropriate 

standards-setting bodies within the Executive Branch83 should develop a single 

framework to coordinate efforts with similar industry-led efforts. 

CIP Alert, Warning, and Response 

The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) has certain responsibilities for critical infrastructure alert, warning, 

and response coordination, including cyber attacks by terrorists. The NIPC has been told 

that many of the intended activities will present insurmountable legal issues. Moreover, 

there are inherent difficulties in achieving a close trust relationship between elements of 

the private sector and any governmental agency. That problem is magnified when it is 

essentially a law enforcement agency such as the NIPC. 

There have been discussions in the Executive Branch and in the Congress about shifting 

the forensic and technical support functions of the NIPC to other centers—perhaps to an 

expanded Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERTCC) 

(currently housed at Carnegie Mellon University)84 or to the General Services 

Administration Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC)85—with the 

suggestion that such a move could leverage cyber-investigative expertise already present 

and would lower barriers to acceptance of a more central Federal role in CIP 

preparedness. Nevertheless, it is not obvious that either of those entities currently 

possesses the requisite capabilities, in personnel, equipment, expertise, or authority, to 

perform the functions. It has also been suggested that another non-law-enforcement 

component of the Treasury Department or an entity in the Commerce Department or in 

the Defense Department could be given the mission. The Advisory Panel will consider 

these and other potential solutions in its future deliberations. 

Liability and Other Legal Issues 

A number of entities have identified legal and practical impediments to cyber security 

cooperation. The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the 

Defense Science Board, and, most recently, the “National Plan,” each identified a range 

of legal authorities and policies that may undermine CIP collaboration. Private sector 

institutions focusing on CIP, such as the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security86

and the Financial Services ISAC,87 similarly argue that Federal and State governments 

should identify and remove significant legal impediments to greater cyber security 

 

83 For example, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, for minimum computer security 

standards, and the National Communications Systems, for public telephone network standards. 

84 CERTCC coordinates the nationwide CERT community, an ad hoc collection of CERTs from 

universities, the private sector, and governments agencies. 

85 FedCIRC is the government-wide computer emergency response facility housed at GSA. It is charged 

with coordinating federal agency computer virus outbreak and intrusion detection announcements and 

responses. FedCIRC concentrates on U.S. government computer systems outside of DoD. 

86 See http://www.pcis-forum.org/. 87 See http://www.fsisac.com/. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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cooperation.88 Issues frequently identified include tort liability, antitrust implications, 

patent and copyright protection, Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act issues, and 

the lack of insurance to cover these and other cyber-related matters. 

In its deliberations in the coming year, the Advisory Panel will consider legal 

implications that may be raised in the context of cyber terrorism. 

Additional Research into 

Terrorist Threats to Critical Infrastructure 

The Advisory Panel will also consider whether significant additional research is needed 

for terrorism aspects of CIP. Areas to be considered include threat analytical capabilities 

(with a focus on tracking technical capabilities of terrorist organizations, along with their 

propensity to utilize such tools) and emerging technologies for defensive, recovery, and 

restoration operations. We will also consider the advisability of independent research 

and development initiatives for CIP, where the private sector could, for example, receive 

tax credits or grants to conduct research in critical infrastructure assurance and 

protection. 

 

88 See, for example, Critical Foundations: Protecting American’s Infrastructures, The Report of the 

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection at Chapters 4–7 (October 1997) 

(emphasizing the significance of fostering private sector information-sharing processes and, ultimately, 

greater information sharing between industry and government at all levels.); and Information Warfare 

Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (November 21, 1996) 

(recommendations to the Department of Defense on supporting the Defense Information Infrastructure; 

information-sharing was identified as a significant issue). 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Conclusion

The work of the Advisory Panel will continue in 2001, and will culminate with the 

submission of our third and final annual report to the President and the Congress on 

December 15, 2001. 

The Advisory Panel will proceed with its review and analyses of existing Federal 

programs that are designed to support or enhance domestic preparedness programs for 

terrorist incidents, with emphasis on those specifically mentioned in the enabling 

legislation: training, communications, equipment, planning requirements, the needs of 

maritime regions, and coordination among the various levels of government. 

We will devote considerable attention to issues involving the use of the military, cyber 

terrorism aspects of critical infrastructure protection, and health and medical programs, 

especially those of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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APPENDICES 

 A–Enabling Legislation.........................................................................................................A-1 

 B–Panel Chair and Members ................................................................................................ B-1 

 C–Research Methodology and Strategy Development ........................................................ C-1 

 D–Persons Interviewed .........................................................................................................D-1 

 E–Alternative Structures Considered.................................................................................... E-1 

F–Israel Case Study................................................................................................................F-1 

G–Los Angeles Area Case Study..........................................................................................G-1 

 H–CDC NEDSS and EPI-X ..................................................................................................H-1 

 I–New England-Eastern Canadian Mutual Assistance Compact ............................................I-1 

 J–“States Recommendations” ................................................................................................ J-1 

 K–National Survey Methodology .........................................................................................K-1 

 L–TOPOFF Observations ..................................................................................................... L-1 

M–Department of Defense Program Information ................................................................ M-1 

N–Department of Justice Program Information....................................................................N-1 

O–Panel Activities.................................................................................................................O-1 

P–Glossary of Terms..............................................................................................................P-1 

Q–Working Definitions.........................................................................................................Q-1 

R–Constitutional and Legal Authorities for the Use of the Military Domestically .............. R-1 

 Tab 1–Minor Statutes Authorizing Military Support.............................................R-1-1 

 Tab 2–Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 374.................................................................R-2-1 

 Tab 3–Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 382.................................................................R-3-1 

 Tab 4–Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 831.................................................................R-4-1 

S–Interagency Comments ......................................................................................................S-1

T–Transmittal Letters............................................................................................................ T-1 

U–Rand Staff Providing Support to the Advisory Panel.......................................................U-1 
 

APPENDICES 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

A-1

APPENDIX A—ENABLING LEGISLATION 

Following is an extract of the legislation that created the Advisory Panel and provided its 

mandate. The provision originated in the U.S. House of Representatives and was 

sponsored by Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

An Extract of 

PUBLIC LAW 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 

1998) 

An Act 

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for military activities of the Department 

of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of 

Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and 

for other purposes. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS. 

a. SHORT TITLE- This Act may be cited as the “Strom Thurmond National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.” 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

SEC. 1405. ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE 

CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION. 

a. REQUIREMENT FOR PANEL- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and 

development center to establish a panel to assess the capabilities for domestic 

response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. 

b. COMPOSITION OF PANEL; SELECTION- (1) The panel shall be composed 

of members who shall be private citizens of the United States with knowledge and 

expertise in emergency response matters. (2) Members of the panel shall be 

selected by the federally funded research and development center in accordance 

with the terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a). 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

A-2

c. PROCEDURES FOR PANEL- The federally funded research and development 

center shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, 

including procedures for selection of a panel chairman. 

d. DUTIES OF PANEL- The panel shall-- 

1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for 

incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 

2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency 

responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 

3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving 

weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded 

communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of 

maritime regions; 

4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to 

Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for 

ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass 

destruction incidents; and 

5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding 

effective local response capabilities. 

e. DEADLINE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT- The Secretary of Defense shall 

enter into the contract required under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act. 

f. DEADLINE FOR SELECTION OF PANEL MEMBERS- Selection of panel 

members shall be made not later than 30 days after the date on which the 

Secretary enters into the contract required by subsection (a). 

g. INITIAL MEETING OF THE PANEL- The panel shall conduct its first 

meeting not later than 30 days after the date that all the selections to the panel 

have been made. 

h. REPORTS- (1) Not later than 6 months after the date of the first meeting of the 

panel, the panel shall submit to the President and to Congress an initial report 

setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving 

Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction. (2) Not later than December 15 of each 

year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall submit to the 

President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency 

preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. 

i. COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES- (1) The panel may secure directly 

from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of 

Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, or any other Federal department or agency 

information that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out its duties. 

(2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, and any other official of the United States shall provide the 

panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying out its duties under this section. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 B-1

APPENDIX B—PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS 

Name and Affiliation Name and Affiliation Affiliation Expertise Expertise Expertise 

The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Chair

State perspective

James Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, 

Retired), Corporate Executive, and Former Director, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Chair

Intelligence

L. Paul Bremer, Corporate Executive, and Former 

Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, U.S. 

Department of State

Terrorism, counter terrorism

Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, City 

of New York Fire Department

Emergency response—local

Richard Falkenrath, Associate Professor, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University

Terrorism threats

George Foresman, Deputy State Coordinator, Department 

of Emergency Management, Commonwealth of Virginia

Emergency response—state

William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Army, Retired), 

Private Consultant, and Former Commander, U.S. Army 

Special Operations Command's Delta Force

Special operations

Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency Management 

Division, Department of Public Defense, State of Iowa, 

and President, National Emergency Management 

Association 

Emergency response—state

James Greenleaf, Independent Consultant, and Former 

Associate Deputy for Administration, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Law enforcement—federal

Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate Executive, and Chief of 

Fire and Rescue Services, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Emergency response—local

William Dallas Jones, Director, Office of Emergency 

Services, State of California

Emergency Response—State

Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association 

of Emergency Medical Technicians, and Deputy 

Chief/Paramedic, City of New York Fire Department, 

EMSC

Emergency response—local

John O. Marsh, Jr., Attorney at Law, former Secretary of 

the Army, and former Member of Congress

Interagency coordination, 

cyber, and legal aspects
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 B-2

Kathleen O'Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, 

Minnesota

Local perspective

M. Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., Medical Director/State 

Epidemiologist, Department of Public Health, State of 

Iowa

Health—state

Patrick Ralston, Executive Director, Indiana State 

Emergency Management Agency; Executive Director, 

Department of Fire and Building Services; and Executive 

Director, Public Safety Training Institute, State of Indiana

Emergency response—state

William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired), 

former Senior Vice President of Operations, American 

Red Cross

Non-Governmental 

Organizations

Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of Police, Richmond, 

California, and Third Vice President, International 

Association of Chief of Police

Law Enforcement—local, 

Terrorism

Kenneth Shine, M.D., President, Institute of Medicine, 

National Academy of Sciences

Health—federal

Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation Law Enforcement/Civil 

Liberties

********************************************** 

Ellen Embrey, U.S. Department of Defense Representative

 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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APPENDIX C—RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 

This is the second annual report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter the 

“Advisory Panel”). The mandate to the Advisory Panel, contained in its enabling 

legislation,89 requires it to: 

• assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction; 

• assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to 

incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 

• assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of 

mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, 

and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions; 

• recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal 

agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully 

effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; 

and 

• assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding effective 

local response capabilities. 

The Advisory Panel is a Federal Advisory Committee,90 and has no directive authority 

over any government entity. 

The enabling legislation also directed that a Federally-Funded Research and 

Development Center provide research, analytical, and other support to the Advisory 

Panel during the course of its activities and deliberations. RAND has been providing that 

support, under contract from the Department of Defense,91 since the Advisory Panel’s 

inception. 

This Appendix provides a full description of the Advisory Panel’s deliberative process, 

research methods, as well as information on the structure and foundation of this report. 

Research and Analytical Methodology 

This report is based on a number of research and analytical efforts, including: 

 

89 Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 

(H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). The full text of the statutory enabling 

provisions is contained in Appendix A. 

90 The Advisory Panel is subject to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., 

Pub L. 92–463, October 6, 1972, as amended. 

91 Awarded by the Secretary of Defense, following consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 

Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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• The assessment of a variety of relevant programs of various Federal agencies 

through direct interviews with agency representatives and exhaustive analysis of 

written program and budget documents 

• Interviews with numerous government officials at the local, state, and federal 

levels 

• Consultations with subject matter experts 

• Oral and written presentations and other submissions to the Advisory Panel 

• Case studies addressing specific issues 

• Facilitated discussions among panel members 

• Other quantitative and qualitative research 

Some of the research is contained, either in its entirety or in synopsis form, in other 

appendices to this report, including Federal agency program information, case studies, 

and other documentation. 

The Advisory Panel has also commissioned a nation-wide survey of almost 2000 

response entities at the State and local levels. The results of that survey and a 

comprehensive analysis of the results will be contained in the third and final Advisory 

Panel report to the President and the Congress. For a description of the survey and a 

categorization of the target audience, see Appendix K. 

Advisory Panel Activities 

During the period since its last report, the Advisory Panel has maintained a robust 

meeting schedule (as detailed in Appendix O). Members and support staff have also 

conducted numerous additional activities, including the presentation of Congressional 

testimony, attending numerous Congressional hearings and Federal interagency meetings, 

and participation in a variety of related conferences, symposia, and workshops, all of 

which have assisted in informing and guiding the deliberative process. 

Scope of the Report 

The conclusions of the Advisory Panel, and its related recommendations, are made in the 

belief that the instant report, its first report, and the final report that it will submit in 

December 2001, will contribute to the public debate about how the nation can most 

effectively combat the threat of terrorism. 

This report does not contain specific budgetary recommendations. It outlines, rather, 

several priorities for focusing limited resources. In its third and final report, the Advisory 

Panel will address fiscal issues at the Federal, State, and local levels. 

Except for a portion of the case study on the Los Angeles Operational Area (see 

Appendix G), this report also does not address comprehensively one specific legislative 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

C-3 

mandate – the consideration of the “needs of maritime regions.”92 That issue will 

likewise be addressed in the final report. 

Preliminary Considerations 

The potential for terrorist attacks inside the borders of the United States represents is an 

emerging threat. Effectively preparing the United States for the consequences of such 

attacks will require changes in the relationships among and between all levels of 

government. Key to these changes will be the realization that our ability to respond 

cannot be dependent upon a single level or agency of government. Rather we need a 

national approach, one that recognizes the unique skills that a community, state and the 

federal government possess and that, collectively, will give us the "total package" needed 

to address the consequences of terrorism. 

In its first report,93 the Advisory Panel concluded that, despite a number of Federal 

programs and a significant increase in Federal funding over a six-year period, “a national 

strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents 

involving CBRN and other types of weapons is urgently needed.” Having recognized 

that such a strategy was not likely to be produced in the near term, the Advisory Panel 

decided in March of this year to put forward its proposals with the hope that they will 

serve as a basic framework for that strategy. We have noted the growing frustration of 

local, State and Federal officials over the absence of a clear national vision and 

corresponding strategies, particularly in the area of domestic response capabilities. The 

need is clear, it is time for action, and we intend to help to build momentum toward 

resolution of these issues. 

This Advisory Panel is unique, if for no other reason than its composition. It reflects, 

through the backgrounds of its members, the larger universe of local, State and Federal 

response disciplines that will work together to respond to the next terrorist attack on our 

home soil. With the addition of other members who have policy experience at the 

national level, its perspectives, therefore, reflect a broad strategic vision dealing with 

structure, programmatic, operational and policy issues. The panel is a microcosm of the 

larger process ultimately needed to develop fully a viable national strategy. As 

previously noted, a national strategy does not equate to a Federal strategy; a Federal 

component is only part of a national strategy. In developing a true national strategy, the 

role of the Federal government should be to facilitate and participate in a strategic 

planning process that involves States and communities as equal partners. 

The conclusions and recommendations contained in this report have been informed from 

a variety of sources, including the vast knowledge and experience of panel members, 

discussions with numerous officials at all levels of government, participation in numerous 

 

92 Section 1405d.3. of the enabling legislative. 

93 The First Annual Report to the President and the Congress: I. Assessing the Threat (the “First Report”) 

was delivered on December 15, 1999. See http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/ to download a 

complete copy of the report. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

C-4 

activities where the issue is discussed, and written reports from various entities, both 

public and private. One of the most effective processes for identifying the issues most 

important to State and local entities has been the joint effort of the National Governors 

Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices and the National Emergency Management 

Association (NEMA) in conducting “States’ Regional Terrorism Policy Forums.” 

Emanating from those forums is a consolidated list of fifty-four “States’ 

Recommendations,” compiled in eight functional categories, in which are reflected many 

of the themes contained in this report.94

It has been suggested that several officials documents that have been published in recent 

years – Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the Attorney General’s 1999 FiveYear Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, and the most recent 

Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against 

Weapons of Mass Destruction/ Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (dated May 18, 2000) – taken as a whole, provide a national strategy. We 

disagree. The Presidential Decision directives, for the most part, only direct assign 

certain responsibilities to Federal entities. The Attorney General’s “Five-Year Plan,” 

while salutary, falls short of a fully-coordinated strategy, one that is promulgated by the 

President; and it does not in our view have the requisite “bottom up” approach – having 

as its underpinnings the needs of the local and State response entities. While that 

document contains many significant goals and objectives, it is not apparent that there is 

any enforcement or other tracking mechanism to ensure that the specific objectives are 

tied to milestone dates, or other measures to effect its full implementation. 

These documents describe plans, the description of a compilation of various programs 

already under way, and some objectives; but they do not either individually or 

collectively constitute a national strategy. 

Many of the current programs have resulted from specific Congressional earmarks in 

various appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch budget requests: 

They are the initiatives of concerned and proactive Senators and Representatives. 

The panel recognizes that this instant report addresses only part of a comprehensive 

national strategy for combating terrorism. That focus is the necessary result of the 

panel’s legislative mandate and, consequently, the structure of the panel project being 

limited to the fundamental elements of a “domestic preparedness and response” portion 

of a much broader strategy. We must avoid placing too much emphasis on preparedness 

for response, if it unnecessarily detracts from other necessary efforts. 

The panel is also fully aware of the interdependencies among all aspects of deterrence, 

prevention, and response. That point cannot be overstated. States and communities have 

emerged as critical partners in the formulation of polices on national security, as they 

may have critical roles to fill in the execution of many of those policies. This concept 

 

94 The entire compilation of “States’ Recommendations” from the NGA/NEMA States’ Regional Terrorism 

Policy Forums is contained in Appendix J. 
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will require a change of culture, a new way of thinking, and more dialogue between our 

three levels of government. Our approach as a nation must be one of integration, focus, 

flexibility, and priority allocation of limited resources. We must, therefore, do a better 

job as a nation of planning, coordinating, and providing resources to our domestic 

response capabilities. It will help us achieve a better level of preparedness not only for 

terrorism, but all emergencies and disasters. 

International and Domestic Considerations 

The national strategy should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. It 

should address both international and domestic terrorism. The distinction between 

terrorism outside the borders of the United States and domestic terrorist threats is 

eroding. International terrorism crosses borders easily and may directly affect the 

American homeland. This was evident in the New York World Trade Center bombing in 

1993, and more recently in the activities around the turn of the century, especially with 

the arrests of Ahmed Ressam in Washington State, and Lucia Garofalo and Bouabide 

Chamchi in Vermont. The terrorist bombings of the U.S. garrison at Khobar Towers, 

Saudi Arabia, the two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the recent USS Cole incident, 

also illustrate the reach of terrorists against U.S. interests and the profound domestic 

implications they pose. 

A complete strategy will articulate the various policy and diplomatic reasons for a robust 

U.S. program to combat terrorism directed against U.S. persons and interests around the 

world, and the advantages to engaging our allies in mutual efforts in that regard. It will 

likewise include the necessary linkage between international threats and their potential 

for domestic incidents, as well as terrorism that may have its source inside the United 

States. 

The Relationship of Deterrence, Prevention, and Response 

“The cornerstone of our recommendations for improving our efforts 

to combat terrorism is that we build on existing systems, 

not create entirely new ones.” 

To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum 

of the nation’s efforts against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention, 

investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence 

management. As the Advisory Panel recognized in its first report, our nation’s highest 

goal must be the deterrence and prevention of terrorism. The United States cannot, 

however, prevent all terrorist attacks. When deterrence and prevention fail, the nation 

must respond effectively to terrorism, whether to resolve an ongoing incident, mitigate its 

consequences, identify the perpetrators, and prosecute or retaliate as appropriate. The 

national strategy should deal with all aspects of combating terrorism and must carefully 

weigh their relative importance for the purpose of allocating resources among them. 
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The timely identification of potential terrorist adversaries carries significant strategic 

implications for deterrence, prevention, and response considerations. Our ability to 

detect the potential sources of terrorist activity through a variety of sources and methods 

is, perhaps, the most critical element in all of the activities that we as a nation may 

undertake to combat terrorism.95 While it is unlikely that we will ever be able to identify 

in advance all specific threats with certainty as to time and location of an attack, the 

better we perform that identification function, the more effective we will be in our total 

effort. 

It likewise logically follows that we must maintain overwhelming capability to preempt 

and interdict intended terrorist activity before the act occurs, as well as the capability and 

national will – as noted above -- to retaliate against the actual perpetrators and their direct 

or indirect supporters, and to prosecute perpetrators to the full extent of the law. 

In developing effective response capability, adequate advance preparations obviously are 

key. But the question may remain: “How much is enough?” We have been fortunate as a 

nation that we have suffered relatively few domestic terrorist incidents, the experience 

from which could help to provide answers to such a question. Notwithstanding the fact 

that natural disasters have proven tragic in countless ways, the nation has never been 

faced with the consequences of a man-made attack so devastating that it could threaten 

the very fabric of our society. As a consequence, the answer to that question for any 

actual attack may have to wait for the day-after analysis. 

 

Historical Considerations 

 

While history may not always be the best teacher, there are perhaps any number of 

historical events in the last century, including some in the last decade, that may 

appropriately help to shape our thinking about designing, implementing, and executing an 

effective system for response to domestic terrorist acts. 

 

For example, the tragic 1918 worldwide influenza epidemic, which took the lives of at 

least 500,000 people in the United States, and at least 20 million world wide,96 carries 

with it important lessons about the need for robust medical surveillance, rapid 

identification, and prompt warning capabilities that will be essential in mitigating the 

consequences of certain terrorist attacks, especially biological ones. 

U.S. civil defense efforts during the Cold War era, regardless of how well intentioned, 

eventually failed because they were perceived as unlikely to accomplish their stated 

 

95 It is, at least, arguable that it was unlikely that any reasonable detection capability or processes in 

existence at the time could have recognized the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of Timothy 

MacVeigh before his bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in April 1995. 

Nevertheless, and as described in further detail elsewhere in this report, efforts must be directed at finding 

ways, within our constitutional and legal framework, to discern to the extent possible such conduct before 

an actual terrorist attack. 

96 Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, October 1998, p. 4. 
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purpose. If public support is to be achieved and maintained, Americans must believe that 

any national program for domestic response is realistic and credible. 

 

While there are a number of anecdotes, most Americans will likely agree with the 

premise that we have a reasonably effective system and robust capabilities to respond to a 

wide spectrum of natural disasters, as well as to criminal acts of various types and 

magnitude. Those capabilities have evolved and improved, and are continuing to 

improve, at all levels of government, including cooperation and coordination vertically 

and horizontally. 

In those situations where wartime exigencies and internal strife have caused 

extraordinary steps to be taken—rationing of food and other commodities, the integration 

of public schools in the 1960s, and responses to riots in certain cities, as examples—the 

actions taken by government entities at all levels have, by and large, been measured and 

appropriate, when considered in the context of our Federal form of government, our 

Constitutional protections, and our legal systems.97

 

In those fortunately few cases where terrorism has struck us at home—most notably the 

New York World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building 

bombing, and the Atlanta bombing during the 1996 Olympics—the day-after analysis of 

each response undoubtedly merits relatively high marks. Lessons learned from each of 

those events, however, suggest that there are a number of improvements that can be 

made—in local capabilities, in coordination among governmental entities at various 

levels, in forensics, in mitigation and recovery operations, and other critical functions. 

The reaction to those recent incidents, coupled with the anxiety following the Aum 

Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, has sparked continuing debate about the 

question posed earlier: “How much (preparation) is enough?” The public perceptions of 

terrorism in the last decade have, in large measure, been driven by entertainment and 

news media descriptions of the most catastrophic consequences from terrorist attacks. 

Some senior governments officials and terrorism “experts” have contributed to those 

perceptions. As a result, the evolution of terrorism domestic preparedness and response 

processes has, to date, been influenced by such perception. 

The key point here is that both the anxiety and the level of public expectation for an 

effective response to a major terrorist incident may have been unrealistically heightened. 

Threat Analyses 

Early in our deliberations, the Panel determined that we could not adequately fulfill our 

legislative mandate without a current, comprehensive assessment of the potential threats 

 

97 Examples that could be used to challenge this thesis are relatively few, but would likely include the 

internment during World War II of Americans of Japanese descent, the Kent State University shootings, the 

treatment of certain civil rights and Vietnam War protesters, the Ruby Ridge standoff, and the Waco 

Branch Davidians incident. 
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from terrorists seeking to strike Americans where we live – inside the borders of the 

United States. The threat assessment commissioned by the Advisory Panel is contained 

in its first report.98

The Panel fundamentally reaffirms the threat analysis contained in the first report. In 

recent months, other entities have arrived at essentially the same point of departure in 

terms of potential terrorist threats in the near term,99 namely that conventional weapons 

are more likely to continue to be the “weapon of choice;” that some terrorist may decide, 

for any number of reasons, to attempt to use a CBRN device, but that such an attack is 

likely to be lower on a relative scale of consequences; and that the catastrophic event 

using an unconventional device—while possible and consequential enough to merit 

continuing vigilance and appropriate preparations—is lower on the relative scale of 

probabilities. We also take note of the increasing likelihood that the use of cyber attacks, 

to create or compound disruption, or to interfere with our response capabilities. While 

not a “Weapon of Mass Destruction” in the legal or technical sense, the direct or indirect 

consequences of cyber terrorism are nevertheless potentially devastating. It is not 

implausible that nation-state adversaries may turn to terrorism or other asymmetric 

activity as their only means to compete effectively against the overwhelming military and 

economic superiority of the United States. 

Without comprehensive and current threat and risk assessments, the Panel believes it 

unlikely that public officials—at any level of government—can make informed decisions 

about the allocation of resources to respond to such threats. 

Basic Assumptions 

The conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Panel are based on several key 

assumptions. 

First, the threats from terrorists, whether foreign or domestic, seeking to carry out an 

attack inside the borders of the United States, will continue to evolve and could expand 

dramatically with some unexpected advance in capability. 

Second, “local” response entities—law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical 

technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency 

managers, in any of several combinations depending on the nature of the attack—will 

always be the “first ”—and conceivably only—response. “Local” entities in this context 

 

98 First Report, chapter 2. 

99 See, for examples, the report from the National Commission on Terrorism, “Countering The Changing 

Threat of International Terrorism,” June 5, 2000, which is available on the World Wide Web at several 

sites, including our home page http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/; and several reports and 

testimony of the General Accounting Office, including “Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive 

Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks” (GAO/NSIAD–99–163), September 7, 

1999, and “Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorism Programs (GAO/T–NSIAD–00–

145), April 6, 2000. The entire series of the comprehensive GAO Combating Terrorism reports and 

testimony can be accessed at: http://www.gao/gov. 
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can include elements of incorporated and unincorporated municipalities, counties, and 

State organizations. In every case, some combination of those entities will inevitably be 

involved. 

Third, in the event of a major terrorist attack, however defined—number of fatalities or 

total casualties, the point at which local and State capabilities are overwhelmed, or some 

other measure—no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to such an 

attack without outside assistance. This assumption is critical to understanding the need 

for mutual aid agreements and coordinated operations. 

Fourth—and perhaps most important—there are existing emergency response and 

management capabilities, developed over many years, for responses to natural disasters, 

disease outbreaks, and accidents. Those capabilities can and should be used as a base for 

enhancing our domestic capability for response to a terrorist attack. We are not, as some 

have asserted, “totally unprepared” for a major terrorist attack, even with a biological 

weapon. We can strengthen existing capabilities, without buying duplicative, costprohibitive capabilities exclusively dedicated to terrorism. Similarly, our capabilities to 

deter, prevent, or respond to a terrorist attack correspondingly enhance capabilities 

against similar attacks from nation-states. 

The Cyber Dimension 

The focus in our First Report was on the more unconventional weapons that terrorist 

might choose to employ – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN). 

Nevertheless, we acknowledged “that the issues of cyber terrorism and the (CBRN) 

forms of terrorist activities . . . are so inter-related that the Panel cannot ignore”100 the 

potentially significant consequences of cyber terrorism. For that reason, we have 

included in Chapter Three issues related to cyber-terrorism currently under consideration 

by the Advisory Panel 

Societal Implications 

We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents in this country—however 

tragic—have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or our form of 

government have not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist attacks 

inside the borders of the United States is a serious emerging threat. There is no 

guarantee that our comparatively secure domestic sanctuary will always remain so. 

Because the stakes are so high, our nation’s leaders must take seriously the possibility of 

an escalation of terrorist violence against the homeland. 

Some have suggested that a truly catastrophic event may sorely test us in that arena—that 

public panic, government over-reaction, the use of the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct 

major military activities on American soil,101 or other factors may do long-term damage 

 

100 First Report, p. 67. 101 See further discussion on this topic in Chapter 3. 
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or change the unique nature of American society. Such an unfortunate outcome will be 

much less likely if we conduct more thoughtful advance planning, coordination, and 

cooperation. In that vein, there are several factors that must be taken into consideration 

to prepare for an effective response capability. 

Others have postulated that a major attack will prompt a loss, at least temporarily, of 

certain civil rights or liberties. We take the view that addressing such hard issues in 

advance, and head on, will lessen—perhaps negate—any such outcome. For that reason, 

the members of this panel have kept the issue of the protection of civil rights and liberties 

squarely in the forefront of all their deliberations. 

Panel members also believe that our leadership can and must do a better job of raising the 

level of public awareness on this issue. In recent years, as we have noted previously, the 

public has for the most part been informed by depictions in the entertainment and news 

media, and from some others with public platforms, of mostly catastrophic terrorists 

attacks, leading one to the conclusion that such attacks are the most likely. American 

citizens can and should be given better information about the potential for terrorist 

attacks without heightening—perhaps even lessening—public fear. 

Without better public awareness, it is less likely that government officials at all levels 

will be able to make fully-informed decisions about the appropriate levels of public 

expenditure to address domestic preparedness before the next attack. Moreover, public 

support in the aftermath of an actual attack will be critical. The more that American 

citizens can be educated about what may happen and what will be expected of them, the 

less likely that an incident will be exacerbated by uninformed public reaction. 

 

Roles of Government 

Fundamental to a good understanding of the Advisory Panel’s approach to strategy 

development is an insight into the Panel’s view of the appropriate role of each level of 

government, especially the Federal role. 

Prior to an attack, the Federal government must provide national leadership, guidance, 

and assistance to response entities at all levels. Federal entities can facilitate nationwide 

preparedness by helping to develop national standards for training, exercising, and 

equipment programs. The Federal role is preeminent, perhaps exclusive, in the areas of 

research, development, test, and evaluation. Moreover, the Federal government must 

have the lead in collecting and analyzing intelligence and in fostering sharing intelligence 

and information. 

When a terrorist attack is threatened or occurs, the Federal role for criminal investigation 

and prosecution is already very specific. The FBI has responsibility for investigations of 

terrorist threats and attacks. The U.S. Department of Justice then has responsibility for 

prosecution under various Federal criminal statutes on terrorism. Terrorist threats or 

attacks may also be violations of State or local law, so jurisdiction over investigations 

and prosecutions can be concurrent. It is, nevertheless, widely recognized at State and 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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local levels that the FBI and DOJ have “paramount” though not exclusive jurisdiction in 

both terrorism investigation and prosecution. 

Otherwise, the Federal role in a response to an actual attack should be limited to 

assistance when requested and to meeting response requirements that exceed local and 

State capabilities. Response to an attack must be layered and sequential: Local entities 

will respond first, supplemented as necessary by State capabilities. When local 

capabilities are limited or exhausted, the response shifts to the State (perhaps multi-state) 

level. The Federal response should come only after local and State elements are so taxed 

that such assistance is requested or required. The Federal response should not be a major 

response—with the Federal response entities “in charge” of operations—except in the 

most extreme, the most catastrophic, situation. For such cases, detailed planning and 

close coordination will lessen the prospect for overreaction that could infringe civil 

liberties. Moreover, there are inherent problems in relying on assets at the Federal level 

that are many hours—perhaps days—from deployment in an actual response. 

Strategic Objectives 

The Advisory Panel was constrained in the development of a complete strategy for 

combating terrorism—one that would address all aspects of foreign and domestic issues, 

all elements of deterrence and prevention, and all dimensions of preparedness and 

response capabilities for attacks outside the United States. First, as noted previously, its 

enabling legislation restricts the panel’s scope of consideration to domestic response 

capabilities, and in that context, to Federal programs. Second, the panel members are 

part-time “volunteers” who have other obligations. Finally, the fiscal resources allocated 

to the project are insufficient to do full justice to such a comprehensive strategy. 

It is our intent that the strategic recommendations contained in this report be goal 

oriented. Only through the expression of some strategic goals can a sense of direction be 

given that will shape the development of priorities (especially for resource allocation) and 

indicate the types and level of activities that need to be undertaken. We seek to 

contribute to the development of well-reasoned plans before an attack, not reaction after 

one occurs. 

The domestic preparedness strategy contained in this report is predicated on a “bottomup” approach. The Panel has been careful to consider the needs of local response entities 

as the cornerstone for its recommendations. It has sought and obtained that “local 

stakeholder” input from a variety of sources. Nevertheless, the Advisory Panel 

recognizes the substantial role that the Federal government can and must play in the 

implementation of a complete national strategy. 

States and localities are not looking to the Federal government as the panacea for all 

aspects of domestic terrorism response. The Federal government does, however, have 

several important responsibilities that it must discharge. 
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The Panel emphasizes building on existing response capabilities, structures, and systems. 

The nation has developed a reasonably effective system for responses to natural disasters, 

naturally occurring disease outbreaks, accidents, and for most criminal acts. It is not 

necessary, in our view, to create a completely separate set of capabilities for responses to 

terrorist attacks. Under that same philosophy, many recommendations in this report are 

based on the advantages that accrue in the development of new or enhancement of 

existing capabilities that can have dual-, even multi-purpose applications. 

Timing of the Submission of this Report 

This panel has been critical of certain policies and programs of the current Executive and 

Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The date of the submission of this 

report, although coincidental, is fortuitous. The report has, therefore, been designed to 

provide a set of recommendations to be considered by the new Administration and the 

107th Congress. This document does not purport to provide all the answers. The Panel 

hopes that it will contribute to public debate and stimulate action. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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APPENDIX D—PERSONS INTERVIEWED* 

Cheri Abdelnour 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Lawrence Adams, Critical Incident Analysis 

Group 

University of Virginia 

Graham Allison, Ph.D. 

John F. Kennedy School of Government, 

Harvard University 

Alane Andreozzi-Beckman, 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Anne A. Armstrong 

Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology 

Charles R. Bell 

Marine Corps Systems Command 

Timothy Beres 

Office for State and Local Domestic 

 Preparedness Support 

Department of Justice 

Richard Andrews 

EQE International 

Dr. Rick Babarsky 

National Ground Intelligence Center 

Ann Beauchesne 

National Governors Association 

Richard Behrenhausen 

McCormick Tribune Foundation 

Anthony S. Beverina 

Digital Sandbox 

Pamela Berkowsky 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense-Civil 

 Support 

D. Douglas Bodrero 

Institute for Intergovernmental Research 

Major Adrian Bogart 

InterAgency Board for Equipment 

 Standardization and Interoperability 

Sam Brinkley, 

Department of State 

Aaron B. Budgor 

SAIC 

Michael L. Brown 

Office of Emergency Preparedness 

State of Louisiana 

Brigadier General Eddie Cain 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

Stephen L. Caldwell 

General Accounting Office 

Kwai-Cheung Chan 

General Accounting Office 

Lewis M. Chapman 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Jayanto N. Choudhury 

Embassy of India 

John Cellantano, M.D. 

Office of Emergency Services 

City of Los Angeles 

Frank Cilluffo 

Center for Strategic and International 

 Studies 

Richard Clarke 

National Security Council 

Jim Cline, PH.D 

SAIC 

Deborah Colantonio 

General Accounting Office 

Joseph J. Collins, Ph.D. 

Center for Strategic and International 

 Studies 

Robert J. Coullahan 

SAIC 

Martha Crenshaw, Ph.D. 

Wesleyan University 
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Cabell Cropper 

National Criminal Justice Association 

David Cullin, Ph.D. 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

Michael Dalich 

Department of Justice 

Brian David, 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

Ruth David, Ph.D. 

ANSER Corporation 

Frederick S. Davidson 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

Armand DeKeyser 

Office of Senator Jeff Sessions 

Mark DeMier 

ANSER Corporation 

Rick DeWater 

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Edward P. Djerejian 

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy 

Rice University 

Dan Donohue 

National Guard Bureau 

Stephen M. Duncan 

Southeastern Computer Consultants, Inc. 

N. Dale Dunham 

San Francisco International Airport 

Edward Edens 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

William W. Ellis 

Congressional Research Service 

Thomas Emsley 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

Gerald Epstein 

Office of Science and Technology Policy 

The White House 

Glenn Fiedelholtz 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Richard Fieldhouse 

Armed Services Committee 

United States Senate 

Jonathan Fielding 

University of California at Los Angeles 

Woodbury P. Fogg 

New Hampshire Office of Emergency 

 Management 

John M. Fowler, Jr. 

Gold Creek Technology, LLC 

John Frank 

InterAgency Board for Equipment 

 Standardization and Interoperability 

 

Robert R. Friedman, Ph.D. 

Georgia State University 

Neal Fudge 

Office of Emergency Preparedness 

State of Louisiana 

Archie Galloway 

Office of Senator Jeff Sessions 

Jorge Garcia 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Benjamin Garrett 

Battelle 

Michael J. Gilbreath, Ph.D. 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

George Goodwin, 

National Ground Intelligence Center 

Lisa Gordon-Hagerty 

National Security Council 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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John Hamre 

Center for Strategic and International 

 Studies 

Daniel I. Gluckman 

ISEA Safety Equipment Association 

Michael Guerin 

California Office of Emergency Services 

John E. Guido 

Texas A&M University 

Don Hamilton 

National Commission on Terrorism 

William L. Hamilton, III 

Research Planning, Inc. 

Jerome Hauer 

SAIC 

Jane Hindmarsh 

California Office of Emergency Services 

Frank Hoffman 

National Security Study Group 

Robert V. Homsy, Ph.D. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories 

Jeffrey Hunker 

National Security Council 

Kenneth H. Huffer 

United States Secret Service 

Christopher Jehn 

Congressional Budget Office 

Lieutenant Colonel William Johnson 

7th Civil Support Team 

Vernon M. Keenan 

Georgia Bureau of Investigation 

Barry Kellman, J.D. 

DePaul University 

Terrence K. Kelly, Ph.D. 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

W.O. King 

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy 

Rice University 

Stephanie Kopelousos 

Office of Congresswoman Tillie K. Fowler 

Phil Kosnett 

National Commission on Terrorism 

Robert T. Kroutil, Ph.D. 

U.S. Army Edgewood Research 

 Development and Engineering Center 

Thomas Kuker 

National Domestic Preparedness Office 

Paul B. Kurtz 

National Security Council 

Phil Lacombe 

VERIDIAN 

John Landry 

National Intelligence Council 

Colonel Timothy Lampe 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Peter LaPorte 

Emergency Management Agency 

District of Columbia 

Randall Larsen 

ANSER Corporation 

Major General Bruce M. Lawlor 

Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

Scott Layne, M.D. 

University of California at Los Angeles 

Mary Lou Leary 

Department of Justice 

Howard Levitin, M.D. 

Ted Macklin 

Office for State and Local Domestic 

 Preparedness Support 

Department of Justice 

Anne Martin 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

John A. McCarthy 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
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Alan McCurry 

Office of Senator Pat Roberts 

Craig A. McDowell 

City of Houston 

Leeanne McInnis 

University of Texas 

Gary McConnell 

Emergency Management Agency 

State of Georgia 

Stanley M. McKinney 

Emergency Preparedness Division 

State of South Carolina 

Barbara Martinez 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Timothy Miles 

California Office of Emergency Services 

Andy Mitchell 

Office for State and Local Domestic 

 Preparedness Support 

Department of Justice 

V. Alan Mode, Ph.D. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lisa Moreno-Hix 

Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute 

 for the Prevention of Terrorism 

Richard J. Morgan 

Consolidated Edison 

James Morhard 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, 

 and the Judiciary Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Joe Muckerman 

Association of National Defense Emergency 

 Resources 

Randall Murch, 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

J. Howard Murphy, 

SAIC 

William Navas 

John T. Neuhaus 

Confidential Advisory Services, Inc. 

Robert Newberry 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Commander Mark E. Newcomb 

United States Navy 

Kyle Olsen 

Research Planning, Inc. 

Gerould W. Pangburn 

James Madison University 

R. Nicholas Palarino, 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Veterans Affairs, and International 

 Relations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

John V. Parachini, 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies 

Monterey Institute of International Studies 

Marcus Peacock, P.E. 

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations 

 and Emergency Management 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Tony D. Perez, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Raphael F. Perl 

Congressional Research Service 

Ann Petersen, J.D. 

Joseph Pilat 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Ed Plaugher 

Arlington County Fire Department 

William Pollack 

Department of Energy 

Peter S. Probst 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Ranhofer 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Dennis Reimer 

Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute 

 for the Prevention of Terrorism 

Sue Reingold 

Center for Strategic and International 

 Studies 

Gary Richter 

Sandia National Laboratory 

David J. Rigby 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

The Honorable Laurie Robinson 

Department of Justice 

Gary Rowen 

National Domestic Preparedness Office 

Dwight D. Rowland 

General Accounting Office 

Richard L. Rumpf 

Rumpf Associates International 

Richard Scribner, 

Institute for Security Technology Studies 

Dartmouth College 

The Honorable Jeff Session 

United States Senate 

John A. Shannon 

SAIC 

The Honorable Michael Sheehan, 

Department of State 

Brendan Shields 

Office of Congressman J.C. Watts 

Henry J. Siegelson, MD, FACEP 

Emory University School of Medicine 

Roman W. Sloniewsky 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

Suzanne Spaulding, J.D. 

National Commission on Terrorism 

Ellis Stanley 

Office of Emergency Services 

City of Los Angeles 

James R. Stanton, M.S.W. 

Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical 

 Services Systems 

University of Maryland 

Leslee Stein-Spencer 

Illinois Department of Public Health 

C.H. Straub II 

Office for State and Local Domestic 

 Preparedness Support 

Department of Justice 

John Sullivan 

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department 

Patrick J. Sullivan 

Arapahoe County (CO) Sheriff’s Department 

Chuck Swan 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, 

Department of Defense 

Thomas W. Taylor, J.D. 

Department of the Army 

James W. Tape 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

David Trachtenberg 

Committee on Armed Service 

U.S. House of Representatives 

John Tritak 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

Joel Tsiumis 

National Domestic Preparedness Office 

Barry Turner 

Australian Federal Police 

Victor Utgoff 

Institute for Defense Analysis 

Michelle Van Cleave 

National Security Concepts, Inc. 

Eileen S. Vergino 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

A.D. Vickery 

Seattle Fire Department 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Charles Ward, Ph.D. 

National Ground Intelligence Center 

Bryan S. Ware 

Digital Sandbox 

Ron Watson 

Los Angeles County Fire Department 

Samuel J. Watson 

BioMedical Security Institute 

University of Pittsburgh 

William H. Webster 

Attorney at Law 

Captain Robert West, USN 

Joint Task Force-Computer Network 

 Defense 

Shaundra Westley 

California Firefighters Association 

Richard M. Wheeler, Ph.D. 

Department of Energy 

Michelle E. White 

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations 

 and Emergency Management 

U.S. House of Representatives 

John Allen Williams, Ph.D. 

Loyola University Chicago 

Michael A. Williams 

Department of State 

Leslie Wiser 

National Infrastructure Protection Center 

Lee Zeichner 

LegalNetWorks 

________________________________________________________________________ 

* An “interview,” for the purpose of this list, includes a formal presentation to members of the 

Advisory Panel, a formal interview by a panel member or support staff, the written submission or 

exchange of information, or informal discussions about the issues addressed in this report with 

panel members or support staff. 
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APPENDIX E—ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES CONSIDERED

During the course of our deliberations on the issue improving Federal Executive Branch 

coordination for combating terrorism, the Advisory Panel considered and rejected other 

alternatives to the creation of an entity in the Executive Office of the President.102 We set 

forth those various alternatives below, and explain the reasons why each was rejected. 

Status Quo. We discussed extensively the current structure for coordination of Federal 

programs and activities for combating terrorism, including modification of the current 

processes to make them more effective. We acknowledge the improvements that have 

been made in Federal Interagency coordination but we adjudged the current structure and 

processes inadequate, for the following reasons. 

♦ Lack of Political Accountability—The senior person with day-to-day 

responsibility for Federal programs for combating terrorism—the National 

Coordinator for Security, Counter-terrorism, and Infrastructure Protection—is not 

Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed. A career employee of the 

Executive Branch holds the position. It is essential that the person responsible 

for these processes must be a senior-level Presidential appointee, confirmed by 

the Senate. 

♦ Insufficient Program and Budget Authority—The current structure relies on a 

very involved process of interagency “coordinating groups” which depends 

heavily on meetings to get things done. While there is opportunity for discussion 

and for suggestions to improve programs, there is no real authority to enforce 

program or budget changes. Moreover, that the current format for budget 

submissions is insufficient in detail to prove useful in the budget deliberative 

process. 

♦ Lack of Adequate Resources—The current NSC structure lacks sufficient staff 

even to oversee the Federal coordination structure—there is no inherent directive 

authority to require Federal agencies to detail support personnel—much less to 

engage State and local entities in the process of developing national strategies and 

implementation plans. 

♦ Lack of State and Local Expertise—The current structure lacks the resources to 

accommodate the resident State and local staff expertise that is required to build 

strategies and plans with a true “bottom up” approach. 

“Enhanced” FEMA. We considered the prospect of providing additional authority and 

responsibility to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The “FEMA Option” was 

appealing because of its designation as the Lead Federal Agency for “consequence 

management,” and its existing statutory and regulatory authority for disaster response.103 

But we likewise discounted that option for three reasons: 

 

102 See Chapter Two. 103 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended. 42 U.S. Code, Chapter 

68 (42 U.S. Code, Sections 5121–5204). 
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♦ Domestic Only Responsibility—FEMA has a domestic-only focus. Once we 

made the determination that the Federal coordinating entity should have both 

foreign and domestic responsibility, this is not a viable option. 

♦ Autonomy and Neutrality Issues—Even if FEMA were given additional authority 

to oversee the programs and budgets of other Federal agencies for combating 

terrorism (including the authority to direct other agencies to detail personnel to 

FEMA), it is likely be the case that the exercise of that authority would be viewed 

by other agencies as parochial, creating the type of interagency “turf” issues that 

have arisen in other contexts. By the same token, the person in FEMA with the 

responsibility for this coordination104 would be answerable to an internal 

hierarchy and not likely, therefore, to have the requisite autonomy. 

♦ Lack of Visibility and Access—Injecting the responsibility for coordinating 

programs to combat terrorism into an existing agency with other programs was an 

issue. FEMA’s responsibilities are much broader than simply consequence 

management for domestic terrorist attacks. Terrorism issues might be 

subordinated to FEMA’s other programs. Moreover, the “director” of this activity 

in FEMA would not have the same measure of direct access to the President, as 

would the director of an entity in the Executive Office. 

 

Department of Justice (DOJ). There has been at least one proposal105 for the creation 

of a new senior official in DOJ. We considered that option, but discarded it for many of 

the same flaws that we found in an “enhanced FEMA.” 

♦ Domestic Only Responsibility—It is unlikely that any entity in the Department of 

Justice could be configured to transcend a domestic-only focus. Once we made 

the determination that the Federal coordinating entity should have both foreign 

and domestic responsibility, this would not be a viable option. 

♦ Law Enforcement/Prosecutorial Focus—The DOJ generally, and the FBI in its 

“Lead Agency” role for “crisis management” specifically,106 have often been 

criticized for having too much of a law enforcement and prosecutorial focus in 

their approach to combating terrorism, which detracts from their ability to 

coordinate non-law enforcement activities. That same criticism applies to the 

decision to place the National Domestic Preparedness Office inside the FBI, and 

to have it headed by an FBI Special Agent. Even with a structure organized 

around a Deputy Attorney General, perhaps even with personnel detailed from 

other Federal agencies, it is difficult to envision a DOJ structure that could 

overcome this perception. 

 

104 It is unlikely that the Director of FEMA could have this responsibility personally and directly, because 

of the other significant requirements that FEMA has by statute and regulation 

105 Contained in the U.S. Senate version of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, 

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (H.R. 4690). The provision was not 

contained in the version that emerged from the conference between the House and Senate. H. Rept. 106–

1005. That version, which has now passed both houses, is awaiting Presidential signature or a threatened 

veto for other reasons. 

106 Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 39. 
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♦ Autonomy and Neutrality Issues—For the same reasons that we stated for FEMA, 

a DOJ entity would likely be viewed as parochial. Although DOJ has a number of 

Federal programs designed to assist in the efforts to improve domestic response 

capabilities for terrorism,107 that may be more of a negative than a positive 

consideration. Any modification to those programs, approved by a Deputy AG, 

would likely be interpreted as the “Department taking care of its own.” By the 

same token, even a Deputy AG, vested with the responsibility for coordinating 

programs for combating terrorism, would be answerable to the Attorney General, 

and not likely, therefore, to be viewed as having the requisite autonomy. 

 

♦ Lack of Visibility and Access—Having the responsibility for coordinating 

programs to combat terrorism inserted into an existing agency with other 

programs was also an issue that we considered for the “DOJ option.” DOJ’s 

responsibilities cover everything from the responsibility for overseeing the entire 

Federal criminal prosecutorial system, to major civil litigation, to immigration and 

naturalization, to running Federal prisons. It is not likely that combating terrorism 

would be high on the Department’s priority list. Moreover, a Deputy AG would 

not have the same measure of direct access to the President, as would the director 

of an entity in the Executive Office. 

Other Federal Departments. Other cabinet-level departments, most notably the 

Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense, were 

considered but discounted for many of the same reasons cited for other agencies. In 

addition, the Department of Defense would not be appropriate, politically palatable, or 

publicly acceptable to assume the role of “lead agency.” 

Stand-Alone Presidential Advisory Council. We considered the merits and demerits of 

having a council or commission to advise the President on national strategy and policy 

for combating terrorism. There is much day-to-day work to be done in the coordination 

of programs that span many Federal agencies, and that requires regular coordination with 

State and local response entities. There are, nevertheless, considerable advantages to the 

concept of having knowledgeable individuals providing such advice and assistance. For 

that reason, we have included such a structure in our proposal for the National Office for 

Combating Terrorism, through our recommendation for the establishment of a national 

“Advisory Board for Domestic Programs.” 

 

107 Major combating terrorism programs are resident in the Office of Justice Programs, especially in the 

National Institute of Justice and the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. 
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APPENDIX F—ISRAEL CASE STUDY

The author of this report visited Israel in August-September 1999, to study that 

country’s understanding of the CBRN terrorism threat and the measures that have 

been taken there for both prevention and preparation. 

Introduction 

Two major factors color the potential for learning from Israeli counter-terrorism (CT) 

experience. On the one hand, Israel has an unfortunately rich history of dealing with 

terrorism, and has accumulated more than fifty years of strategic, tactical and technical 

CT experience. On the other, Israel is an extremely small country, many of its CT 

institutions are national and unified (as opposed to local and independent), and thus 

relatively easy to manage, and its legal system is far more permissive towards law 

enforcement vis-à-vis the country’s citizens than is its American counterpart. While 

these latter must give American policymakers pause when considering implementation of 

Israeli CT lessons in the United States, the fact remains that Israel has a wealth of 

technological and practical experience that is currently lacking in the United States, and 

there is much to be learned from its institutions and individuals. 

Israel’s concerns with CBRN weapons date to the mid-1960s, when Egypt used chemical 

weapons during its involvement in the Yemeni civil war. At that time, Israel’s 

parliament, the Knesset, passed a law mandating the procurement of protective gear 

(masks and atropine injectors) for each and every Israeli citizen. Until the run-up to the 

Gulf War, the protective gear was stored in warehouses. Since then, civilians have kept 

their individual protective kits in their homes. What is important to note here is that 

Israel has amassed more than 30 years’ worth of experience in developing the means to 

protect civilians from the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). This 

experience has manifested itself in the development of several generations of personal 

protective equipment (PPE) as well as strategy. 

While the main CBRN threat is still seen to come from neighboring states at wartime 

(indeed, it is now assumed that CBW will be used against both soldiers and civilians in 

any future war),108 it is has been suggested that Palestinian terrorists may seek employ 

chemical agents against Israeli civilian and military targets.109 That said, a number of 

experts suggest that the massive and often alarmist attention given to the CBRN terrorism 

issue by American officials and the American media in recent years in fact helps to build 

the atmosphere of fear that terrorists seek to create. Further, they posit that continued 

widespread, overt discussion of the issue in these terms might make CBRN terrorism a 

self-fulfilling prophecy. One Israeli professor has even begun to include Secretary of 

 

108 Amos Harel, “Non-Conventional Warfare Becomes Conventional,” Ha’aretz, July 20, 1999. 

109 While impossible to verify using open-source materials, one of the leaders of the Egyptian terrorist 

group, “Gama‘at al-Jihad,” told the London daily, al-Hayat, that his group and Osama bin Laden’s “alQa‘idah” had biological and chemical weapons and had plans for 100 attacks against American and Israeli 

targets around the world. Salah, Muhammad, “Musa‘id al-Zuahari l-“al-Hayat”: lidayna aslahah 

biolojiya wakimawiya (Assistant to al-Zuahari to “al-Hayat”: “We Have Biological and Chemical 

Weapons”), Al-Hayat, Monday, April 19, 1999. 
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Defense Cohen’s July 1999 Washington Post op-ed piece, “Preparing for a Grave New 

World” in his terrorism courses’ reading lists as an example of what he sees as 

counterproductive hysteria. This is not to say that these officials and experts want to 

hush all discussion of the subject. Rather, they prefer a more organized and deliberate 

information campaign that would inform the public about ongoing mitigation and 

prevention efforts (e.g., telling the public that anthrax is treatable). Israeli officials 

believe that terrorists would find CBRN weapons less attractive if the government took 

measures to reduce public panic and by making it known that the country is prepared to 

deal with the CBRN threat. 

American-Israeli CT cooperation in general, and CBRN CT cooperation in particular, is 

not new. A number of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) govern an already 

prosperous relationship between the two countries’ defense establishments. The Ministry 

of Defense (MOD) on the Israeli side and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

(defense issues) and National Security Council (NSC) (CT issues) in the United States 

manage the coordination of this relationship, which includes joint research and 

development (R&D), operations and development of doctrine. Following their July 1998 

meeting in Washington, DC, President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak indicated that a 

new MOU would be signed to widen cooperation in the field of CBRN CT. 

Another area of mutual concern that was discussed between the two leaders was the 

growing threat of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] terrorism. This was 

acknowledged to be an area in which both countries stood much to gain from each other’s 

knowledge and experience. In order to enhance their capability to deal effectively with 

this threat, it was agreed to sign a new MOU between their respective national security 

institutions. It would facilitate broad cooperation between the various government 

agencies in both countries in all areas associated with preparing and responding to WMD 

terrorism.110

A senior Israeli defense official pointed out, however, that this new MOU would, in fact, 

only be formalizing a relationship that has already been functioning for some time. 

This essay, the fruit of an August-September 1999 fact-finding trip to Israel, presents 

some of the fields in which the United States can benefit from Israeli know-how and/or in 

which future cooperation can benefit both countries’ efforts to combat CBRN terrorism. 

Ministry of Defense NBC Protection Division 

A 1995 MOU has fostered a technical R&D relationship between the United States and 

Israel. A bilateral steering committee meets every six months to discuss current and 

planned projects. Representing the United States is the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD [SO/LIC]). 

Representing Israel is the Ministry of Defense NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) 

Protection Division. 

 

110 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime 

Minister Ehud Barak,” Washington, DC, July 19, 1999. 
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• Mission of the NBC Protection Division 

The NBC Protection Division was established following the Gulf War of 1991 and is the 

organization responsible for R&D in the field of chemical and biological (CB) defense 

for all branches of the armed forces and the Home Front Command (HFC).111

The NBC Protection Division has numerous responsibilities, ranging from directing basic 

research and managing the infrastructure in CB defense, to developing and maintaining 

laboratories, research centers, and installations for analysis, initiating research and 

feasibility studies, through the full scale development of protective equipment. 

The NBC Protection Division covers all aspects of CB protection, including individual 

and collective protection, the development of tools and methods for detection and 

identification, decontamination and medical treatment, as well as threat analysis, risk 

assessment, and modeling the behavior and dispersion of pollutants. 

Finally, the NBC Protection Division acts as a senior advisory body to the MOD and the 

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff for issues of CBRN doctrine and threat 

analysis. The broad nature of the division’s many activities means that its staff deals with 

everything from respirator system batteries to policy decisions regarding the stockpiling 

of medication, and was reflected in the number of topics raised by division staff. 

The main focus of the NBC Protection Division’s activities is the wartime CBRN threat. 

While there are important, recognized differences between the preparations needed for 

wartime CBRN attack and a terrorist CBRN attack, the former are seen as a base for the 

latter. 

• Research and Development 

In the late 1970s, the MOD began to study how the Israeli public reacted to the gas masks 

that the government was then stockpiling. The results of this research led to domestic 

development of protective kits for children, for whom standard gas masks were found to 

be inappropriate for a variety of reasons (e.g., the varied sizes and shapes of children’s 

heads and their impatience for wearing uncomfortable masks). Further experience was 

gained during the Gulf War, when 300-400 thousand children used domestically 

produced protective equipment. Recently, the U.S. Army bought approximately 3,500 

Israeli kits for dependent women and children of personnel in South Korea. 

Further R&D is ongoing for adult civilian as well as first responder PPE. Israeli 

experience has demonstrated that hood-based systems are more comfortable, easier to 

don and allow for greater user activity (e.g., search and rescue operations under CBW 

conditions) than traditional mask systems. A new hood-based system, known as the First 

Responders Mask (FIRM) has been developed as part of the technical cooperation 

 

111 Descriptive information taken from the NBC Protection Division’s information packet. 
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program with OSD, and according to the specifications of a number of American 

agencies. The system has undergone physiological testing in cooperation with the Army 

Research Lab at Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 

FIRM has run into a problem that is frequently mentioned by American officials dealing 

with CBRN terrorism – the lack of clear standards for non-military CBRN PPE. 

According to National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) rules, 

products such as FIRM must be approved before their employment by first responders. 

At the time of this writing (late 1998), FIRM had been held up in the NIOSH review 

process for more than six months. 

The NBC Protection Division has also made progress in the development of computerbased, real time models that use current meteorological data to simulate the dispersion of 

biological and chemical agents.112 Such models for battlefield dispersion are not new. 

However, in response to the terrorist threat, the NBC Protection Division has expanded 

these models to include chemical and biological agent behavior in urban areas as well as 

in enclosed spaces (e.g., malls, tunnels, etc.). The Division is also developing a number 

of CBW detectors. 

• Response to the Biological Threat 

Historically, most Israeli efforts for protecting the population from CBRN weapons have 

focused on chemical weapons. However, following the Iraq crisis of January/February 

1998, at which time Scott Butler told the New York Times that Iraq had enough 

biological weapons to “blow away Tel-Aviv,”113 Israel began to direct significantly more 

attention to the biological threat. Israel now stockpiles anthrax vaccine, in addition to the 

stocks of atropine and antibiotics already in place.114 Currently there are enough doses of 

antibiotics in storage to supply the entire country. 

Ministry of Defense, Office of Strategic Dialogue and Cooperation, Directorate for 

Foreign Affairs, Arms Control & Regional Security 

This office is the main point of contact for cooperation between the MOD and both OSD 

and NSC. 

• General 

The office’s representative reiterates that both states and terrorist groups threaten Israel 

with CBRN weapons. He contrasts these threats with those of the United States, where 

 

112 Ahi Raz, “Tokhnat mahshev tahazeh kivun hitpashtut halakh ba’avir” (Computer Program Will Predict 

the Direction of Chemical Agent Dispersal in the Air), Bamahaneh, October 23, 1998. 113 “Security Council Members Criticize Butler for Comments,” Associated Press, February 5, 1998, at 

http://cnn.com/WORLD/9802/05/iraq.butler.ap/index.html. 114 According to media reports, a locally developed anthrax vaccine is currently being tested on an 

unspecified number of Israeli soldiers. “Report: Israeli Army Conducting Trials with Anthrax Vaccine,” 

Associated Press, September 26, 1999. 
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there is no threat to the home front from foreign states (except for that of strategic nuclear 

weapons), but the terrorist threat may come from individuals as well as groups. He 

accepts the “when, not if” premise of CBRN terrorism. He also points out that unlike 

traditional counter-terrorism measures, which have come in response to attacks (e.g., the 

increased security measures employed by El Al after the 1968 hijacking of an aircraft 

from Rome to Algeria), measures to counter CBRN terrorism must be researched, 

developed and deployed in advance of such an attack. 

• The Biological Threat 

A medical surveillance system is being developed featuring mapping software for 

determining geographic morbidity patterns. As mentioned above, Israeli equipment and 

doctrine are being developed in large part in conjunction with OSD. 

• Refining the Response to CBW Terrorism 

Since its founding in 1992, the HFC has been training to deal with chemical and 

biological attacks in Israel’s towns and cities, and it was considered the most natural 

force of first responders to CBW terrorist attacks as well. However, the HFC is made up 

primarily of reservists who typically would be mobilized in advance of Israel being 

attacked. Mobilization takes time (up to 48 hours for full national mobilization). By its 

very nature, terrorism often comes as a surprise and is likely at peacetime as well as 

during war. It has become clear that a more appropriate role for HFC responders is to 

support and supplement the true first responders to any security incident – the national 

Israel Police, the Fire Service, Israel’s emergency medical service, Magen David Adom

(MDA), and the Ministry of the Environment (MOE). 

The Israel Police is in command of emergency services at peacetime, and has formulated 

its CBRN terrorism response doctrine for all relevant bodies with the assistance of the 

HFC. 

• Treatment of Victims 

Israeli treatment doctrine has responders bring victims to the hospital as soon as possible 

(i.e., before being decontaminated), while in the United States, decontamination typically 

takes place near the scene of the incident. The reasoning behind the Israeli doctrine has 

two elements. First, it will be difficult to control the population following a CBRN 

incident and many ambulatory victims will arrive at the hospital on their own before 

being decontaminated. Second, the Israelis do not share the apparent American concern 

for contaminating rescue vehicles. A study by the IDF Medical Corps indicates that 

victims with light and moderate chemical exposure are likely to have low concentrations 

of CW material in their clothing. Stripping, covering and transporting the victim in a 

vehicle with its windows open is believed to be safe and effective. For more heavily 

exposed victims, special vehicles probably will be required. This system is in the process 

of being examined, and it is likely that experiments using chemical and biological 

simulants will be performed. 
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• Exercises 

Israel runs periodic large-scale disaster exercises, including simulated CBW missile and 

terrorist attacks. One unique feature of the Israeli exercises that is often impossible to 

implement in the United States for various legal and other considerations, is the use of 

chemical and biological simulants to gain experience with and measure the effectiveness 

of protective gear (both in terms of design and employment) and modeling software. 

American officials have shown particular interest in this aspect of Israeli exercises. A 

number of American officials from the military and the first responder communities have 

observed Israeli exercises in the past and have been invited to future exercises as well. 

Brigadier General (Res.) Yehiam Sasson, Office of the Prime Minister, 

Counter-Terrorism Bureau 

• Threat 

General Sasson emphasizes the psychological impact of the CBRN terrorism threat, 

pointing to the panic among the Israeli population before and during the Gulf War and 

during the above-mentioned 1998 Iraq crisis. He points out that a large-scale attack is not 

necessary in order to achieve the psychological effects desired by terrorist groups, which 

already have crude CBW at their disposal (e.g., off-the-shelf chemicals, insecticides). 

Further, the acquisition of materials (as opposed to their production), whether by 

purchase or theft, or the blowing up of a production facility would give terrorist groups 

CBRN capabilities while demanding no special technical expertise. Moreover, without 

strict global supervision of military CBW, the general believes that these weapons will 

eventually fall into the hands of terrorist groups. 

Despite all of this, General Sasson points out that most terrorist groups are rational actors, 

and as such are concerned about such things as public opinion, possible exposure of 

nearby non-target populations and Israeli retaliation. He believes this latter largely 

explains why CBRN weapons have not been used on a large scale to date. 

• Preparation 

According to General Sasson, the CBRN terrorism threat makes worst-case analysis 

impossible. The magnitude of worst-case scenarios is so large that policymakers are 

virtually paralyzed into inaction and do not know how to properly evaluate the true 

extortive capability of the terrorists. This puts a premium on preparation, which 

improves the authorities’ abilities to cope and make sound decisions during crises, and on 

prevention, which will require worldwide cooperation. 

• United States-Israel Cooperation 

General Sasson points to a number of fields where American-Israeli cooperation would 

be most productive, including intelligence (to include technical intelligence), detection 
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and identification equipment development for before, during and after CBRN weapon use 

and continued R&D in first responder PPE. 

• Public Awareness 

(This topic will be addressed at greater length in the HFC section below.) 

The CT Bureau supports limited public discussion of the CBRN terrorism issue for two 

main reasons. First, if done wisely, prior familiarity with the issue and the government’s 

preparations will mitigate panic. Second, not only does the public want to be told what to 

do in times of crisis, doing so will make the job of responders far easier as well. 

Major General Gabi Ofir, Commanding Officer, IDF Home Front Command (HFC) 

The HFC was established on February 17, 1992 in the wake of the Gulf War, the first war 

in which the Israeli home front was the main theater of operations for the IDF. At 

wartime, the HFC is in command of all emergency services in the country. The HFC is 

responsible for providing Israel’s citizens with a complete protection package. The 

responsibilities that go along with providing this package include the setting of building 

standards to withstand conventional and unconventional attacks, the distribution and 

maintenance of personal protective kits (the main components of which are a mask and 

an atropine injector), the administration of vaccines and other large-scale medical 

services, the operation of the national early warning alert/siren system and a “lookout” 

system to quickly identify bomb and missile strike sites, and the decontamination of areas 

hit with CBW. 

The HFC has devoted considerable efforts into developing a reliable and efficient public 

information system, which is used during war- and peacetime. This system will be 

reviewed in greater detail below. 

While the HFC is, by design, geared toward wartime response to foreign missile and 

bombing threats, the terrorism issue has been receiving attention for about one year. The 

HFC has been working continuously with the Israel Police to develop the latter’s 

response doctrine for CBRN terrorism. 

Colonel Avi,115 Head, Doctrine, Development & Rescue Department, HFC 

One of the main ideas guiding Colonel Avi’s work is the importance of speed. 

Responders to a CBW incident must understand exactly what has happened as quickly as 

possible. This information must then be passed on to decision makers and other 

responders so that appropriate policy and emergency decisions can be made in a timely 

fashion. 

 

115 In accordance with standard practice, IDF officers who are not public figures are identified here only by 

first name. 
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In addition to the development of HFC response doctrine, Colonel Avi has been involved 

in the preparation of other bodies for CBRN response. Some points on preparation: 

As part of the Israel Police’s preparations for CBW attack, police mobile units have 

been equipped with PPE. 

In line with the Israeli approach that has patients decontaminated at hospitals rather 

than in the field, MDA’s job in the field is almost purely for transportation. 

The HFC, though primarily based on reservists, is ready to support the civilian 

rescue services as needed. The HFC maintains active duty, rapid response medical 

teams throughout the country. Additionally, there are rescue teams and an NBC 

team that can quickly respond anywhere in the country.116

• Information 

Colonel Avi reiterates that information forms a critical part of HFC response doctrine. In 

the meantime, however, a political decision has been taken not to discuss the CBRN 

terror issue publicly at great length, so as “not to make it stand out too much.” In any 

case, the threat is not seen to be as great as is, for example, the Iraqi surface-to-surface 

missile threat. 

The focus on information is part-and-parcel of the importance that the HFC attributes to 

psychological issues. This is also reflected in the fact that every HFC rescue battalion 

includes a Civilian Behavior Officer (CBO). The CBO acts as a population barometer, 

finding out what people know and feel, and what they don’t. They provide immediate, 

on-site psychological support services to the traumatized population and policy advice to 

commanders and officials dealing with that population. The CBO also provides 

psychological support to the rescuers themselves, who are typically exhausted and 

worried about their loved ones at home, in addition to the fact that they have been 

exposed to the victims of a disaster in their most grotesque states. 

Lieutenant Colonel Revital, Head, Civilian Information and Training Branch, HFC 

The Gulf War demonstrated the intense psychological forces at work among a population 

under the threat of both conventional and unconventional weapons. The HFC has 

devoted a great deal of effort to familiarizing the public with various civil defense topics 

in the belief that these efforts will lead to 1) greater public cooperation in times of 

emergency; 2) a reduced level of panic; 3) improved ability of a traumatized public to 

return to life as usual after danger passes; and 4) a reduction in the attractiveness of 

CBRN weapons in the eyes of the enemy due to well publicized, effective Israeli 

consequence management. The goal is to have a calm yet alert public. 

Israel, like the United States, has a large number of foreign language-speaking 

immigrants among the population. As such, the HFC’s public information materials are 

produced in Hebrew, Arabic, English, Russian, Amharic (an Ethiopian dialect), and in 

sign language. 

 

116 See also Harel, “Non-Conventional Warfare Becomes Conventional.” 
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There are five primary topics covered by HFC information campaigns: 1) preparedness; 

2) behavior during times of crisis; 3) personal protection kits; 4) sealed/security rooms in 

the home; and 5) evacuation. 

The Civilian Information and Training Branch, in conjunction with the IDF 

Spokesperson’s Unit, annually briefs the nation’s broadcasters on relevant civil defense 

topics as well as on how they should behave during times of emergency. Television and 

radio stations are provided with pre-recorded HFC informational video- and audiotapes 

for use during specific crises (e.g., chemical weapons attack) as well as a file of prewritten official announcements. The Civilian Information and Training Branch with the 

help of psychologists from the Civilian Behavior Branch write these announcements, 

which also address specific civil defense issues. The motivation behind these briefings 

and prepared statements is the perceived importance of uniformity in information coming 

from official channels in order to reinforce the authority and reliability of such 

information. 

The HFC has soldier-instructors (all females) who provide instruction to fifth- and sixthgraders across the country on civil defense matters. Thus, by age 11 all Israeli students 

have been introduced to the threats that the Israeli home front faces, what is being done to 

deal with these threats and what their responsibilities are as civilians. 

The HFC also runs a national information center. The center has a limited staff at 

peacetime, but in times of crisis the staff can be augmented to meet increased demand for 

services. Here, too, language issues are important and are addressed by multilingual 

operators. Fax service is available for hearing impaired citizens. 

During peacetime, the Civilian Information and Training Branch takes advantage of and 

creates opportunities to reach the public. The Branch places notices in newspapers 

(again, in various languages), publishes a special section in the telephone directory and 

has informational brochures available at municipalities around the country. These notices 

and publications deal with a variety of civil defense topics, including proper techniques 

for preparing a sealed room or shelter, how to wear a mask, how to behave when a siren 

is heard, earthquakes, fires, hazardous materials and important telephone numbers. 

Newspaper notices often have to do with the opening and closing of protective kit 

distribution centers. 

The HFC has a number of other methods for reaching the public. Media coverage of 

HFC exercises is invited, including an annual CBW drill in educational institutions. The 

IDF Internet site (http://www.idf.il/ – Hebrew/English), features an HFC section that 

provides information answers to frequently asked questions, in addition to covering most 

of the topics addressed in the telephone directory pages. The soldier-instructors visit 

companies and other organizations, in addition to the above-mentioned schools. Finally, 

there is an annual “Home Front Week”—in fact, an intensive awareness campaign. 

During wartime, the HFC will run a “telemesser,” which is a dial-up automated 

information system. The manned national information center will shift to 24-hour/seven-
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day staffing and regional centers will be opened as well. HFC representatives will be 

assigned to municipal hotline centers around the country. IDF Radio will have a mobile 

team broadcast from the center so that frequently asked questions can reach as broad an 

audience as possible. Prepared HFC circulars will be carried by the newspapers and 

topic-specific brochures will be distributed locally. The HFC will provide officials to be 

interviewed by the media. Additionally, the HFC maintains a list of specialists who can 

address relevant issues in times of crisis. These specialists receive briefings from the 

HFC about how to work with the various media outlets. The number of operating 

distribution stations for protective kits and information can jump from 16 (normally 

operating) up to over 100. Finally, the HFC Behavior Branch will operate its “Population 

Center,” a kind of war room for dealing with civilian issues before and as they arise. The 

HFC has trained a cadre of Emergency Population Instructors (again, all females) for 

assisting in local crisis management. 

The Civilian Information and Instruction Branch is currently working with the Israel 

Police to address the latter’s information needs for dealing with CBRN terrorism. 

Yitzhak Goren, Deputy Director General, Ministry of the Environment (MOE) 

The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for dealing with all types of chemical 

dangers in Israel, including CW terrorism. The CW terrorism threat has been included in 

ministry procedures and exercises since about 1994. From the standpoint of the MOE, 

the only differences between an accidental spill and a terrorist attack are the probable 

location (i.e., in an urban area as opposed to an industrial zone) and, thus, the number of 

victims. These differences make response time more important. 

The MOE has been working with the Israel Police and the Fire Service to help them 

prepare for the possibility of CW terrorism. To date, thousands of police officers have 

already taken courses dealing with event identification, management and assessment. 

The MOE’s Chemical Materials Treatment School runs a number of incident 

management courses annually for local authorities, Fire Service and IDF personnel, and 

additional courses for emergency dispatchers. 

The MOE runs a national HAZMAT information center 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week in cooperation with the HFC. The information center is notified by the Israel Police 

and Fire Service in the event of a chemical incident, collects information and guides 

those in the field. Further, the center has a detailed, continuously updated record, 

including mapping software, of the location of all concentrations of hazardous materials 

in the country. 

There are MOE HAZMAT treatment units throughout Israel, in addition to units run by 

local authorities (in full accordance with MOE standards). The units can rapidly respond 

anywhere in the country and are staffed by trained chemists. The units are now trained 

and equipped to detect and neutralize commercial as well as military chemical agents. 
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Mr. Goren and other officials from Israel attended an exercise in Wichita, Kansas in 

August 1998, and expressed interest in continued and expanded information and training 

cooperation with relevant American agencies. 

Lieutenant Colonel Boaz, MD, Head, NBC Branch, IDF Medical Corps 

Major Amnon, MD, NBC Branch, IDF Medical Corps 

Boaz I. Lev, MD, Associate Director General, Ministry of Health (MOH) 

These health professionals are working together to prepare the nation’s medical system to 

deal with various CBRN threats, both from terrorism and warfare. 

The medical surveillance system described above is being developed by the MOH with 

the IDF Medical Corps acting as a “professional advisor.” 

IDF Medical Corps and MOH personnel have given lectures at each of Israel’s 24 

hospitals. All doctors at these hospitals have received training for dealing with CBW 

victims. Hospitals have the necessary procedures, equipment and supplies in place to 

rapidly set up decontamination lines. These procedures are regularly drilled by hospital 

personnel in conjunction with other responder agencies, often as part of a larger regional 

disaster exercise. 

Since the Iraq crisis, Drs. Boaz and Lev have been in constant contact with a number of 

American bodies, including the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and other DoD and local agencies. 

Professor Ehud Sprinzak, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 

Professor Sprinzak, perhaps Israel’s most prominent academic expert on terrorism, wrote 

an article, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” in the Fall 1998 edition of Foreign Policy. 

Sprinzak defines superterrorism as “the strategic use of chemical or biological agents to 

bring about a major disaster with death tolls ranging in the tens or hundreds of 

thousands.”117 In that article, Sprinzak, posits that “...as horrifying as [CBW terrorism] 

may be, the relatively low risks of such an event do not justify the high costs now being 

contemplated to defend against it,”118 a position he still maintains. 

An important point made by Sprinzak and others is that because of the political nature of 

terrorism, and the poor political returns that would likely result from a CBRN terrorist 

attack for most political movements, CBRN attacks may be more likely to be attempted 

by groups that are on the verge of extinction (e.g., groups that have suffered major 

leadership blows due to arrest or death). With little to gain or lose, such groups may 

want to “go out with a bang.” 

 

117 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy 112 (1998): 116. 118 Sprinzak, 111. 
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Sprinzak explains the widespread worry in the United States as being the result of three 

major factors: 1) sloppy thinking (i.e., the failure of most “to distinguish among the four 

different types of terrorism: mass-casualty terrorism, state-sponsored chemical- or 

biological-weapons (CBW) terrorism, small-scale chemical or biological terrorist attacks, 

and superterrorism.”); 119 2) vested interests (i.e., by those who make PPE, detection 

equipment, etc.); and 3) morbid fascination (“People love to be horrified.”). 120 While 

believing that there are relatively few prospects for superterrorism in the near future, 

Sprinzak does agree that on the small-scale, tactical level, “there will be an increase in 

CBW use – if only because it stirs the imagination.” 

In policy terms, Sprinzak recommends a low-cost (i.e., in proportion to his understanding 

of the threat) package that includes improved international and domestic deterrence, 

better intelligence,121 “smart and compact consequence management teams,” 

psychopolitical research to gain better insight into the “psychological mechanisms that 

may compel terrorists to contemplate seriously the use of weapons of mass 

destruction,”122 and finally, reduction of unnecessary superterrorism rhetoric.123

Colonel (Res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, Bar-Ilan University, Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center 

for Strategic Studies 

Dr. Shoham is a medical microbiologist, and served as a senior analyst in the IDF’s 

Intelligence Corps, specializing in chemical and biological warfare. In 1998, Dr. Shoham 

published Chemical and Biological Terrorism: An Intensifying Profile of a NonConventional Threat through the Ariel Center for Policy Research, in which he provides 

a detailed and well-documented chronology of Middle East and global CBW terrorismrelated events, the former dating to 1964 and the latter to 1978.124

Dr. Shoham believes that bioterrorism is likely to be the preferred mode of CBRN 

terrorism due to its potential efficiency, it being indistinguishable (at least at first) from a 

natural event125 and the difficulties involved in tracing its source. That said, he estimates 

that it is about 11⁄2 times more difficult to acquire a BW capability than a CW capability. 

He makes it clear that acquiring capability does not necessarily mean that terrorists will 

be able to produce chemical and biological agents. Rather, these agents could be bought, 

stolen or transferred from a CBW-producing state. This latter is interesting in that while 

most analysts believe that the fear of such weapons being turned on the donor states make 

 

119 Sprinzak, 116. 120 Sprinzak, 118. 121 Perhaps indicative of the less restrictive environment in which Israeli law enforcement officials operate, 

Sprinzak asserts that “[p]roper CBW intelligence must be freed from the burden of proving criminal 

intent.” Sprinzak, 121. While this would certainly make preemptive intelligence work easier, it is not clear 

that such an idea would fly in the United States among legislators and civil rights advocates. 

122 This call for more psychological research is echoed in Jerrold Post, M.D. and Dr. Ehud Sprinzak, 

“Searching for Answers: Why Haven’t Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?” Armed Forces 

Journal International 135.9 (April 1998): 16-7. 123 Sprinzak, 118-22. 124 Dany Shoham, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: An Intensifying Profile of a Non-Conventional 

Threat (Tel-Aviv: Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), 1998), 17-28. 125 Shoham, 10. 
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their transfer unlikely, Dr. Shoham suggests that terrorists could provide “a state with a 

cheap way to test the effectiveness and dispersal techniques of such products...” and 

thus, “cannot be wholly ruled out.”126 

Dr. Shoham divides the CBRN terrorism threat into three elements: 1) technical 

feasibility, 2) probability and 3) impact. He believes that CBRN terrorism is highly 

feasible (8 on a scale of 10) and would have a great impact (9/10). He believes that such 

an attack today is rather unlikely (3/10), though this probability is slowly “crawling” 

upwards. He goes beyond General Sasson’s assessment regarding impact, saying that 

there is no correlation between dispersability/effectiveness and [psychological] impact. 

As for public information, he suggests finding an “information balance” that will 

moderate or prevent public panic. 

Conclusion 

The Israelis have clearly dedicated a great deal of time, thought and resources to 

preparing for both general and specific CBRN threats. 

Israeli responders will continue to engage in large-scale, complex exercises involving 

CBW simulants and new PPE and detection equipment in a variety of urban and rural 

settings. American officials from all levels of government have taken advantage of these 

exercise opportunities to learn from Israeli experience and should continue to do so. It 

should be pointed out, however, that perhaps the most important lesson to be learned 

from Israeli exercises is that the exercises themselves are a vital part of the Israeli 

response plan. The Israelis can provide valuable assistance in the formulation and 

execution of a broad spectrum of exercises in the United States. The Israelis consulted for 

this study without exception welcomed the prospect of enhanced bilateral cooperation. 

American mental health and consequence management professionals stand to benefit 

from the extensive work done to date by HFC psychologists, the HFC Civilian 

Information and Training Branch and the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit. To be sure, each 

society’s psychological needs are different, however the Israeli work in message 

formulation for a diverse, multilingual population, development of relationships with the 

mass media and integration of mental health specialists in the disaster management 

process is worthy of future study. 

In terms of CBRN CT technology, the Israelis have much to gain from American knowhow and economies of scale. The small Israeli market makes it relatively easy to 

stockpile antibiotics and manage crises, but it also makes R&D costs per capita quite 

expensive. Producing for the 270 million people that make up the U.S. market certainly 

holds economic advantages when compared to doing so for the six million people in 

Israel alone. The United States, for its part, stands to benefit from 30 years of Israeli 

technical and operational experience and the lessons learned from Israeli studies that are 

not likely to be feasible in the United States. It appears that both sides stand to gain from 

continued and enhanced cooperation in the CBRN CT field. 

 

126 Shoham, 7-8. 
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Abbreviations

BSD Biosensor Systems Design, Inc. 

BW Biological Weapons 

CB Chemical and Biological 

CBO Civilian Behavior Officer 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

CBW Chemical and Biological Weapons 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CT Counter-Terrorism 

CW Chemical Weapons 

DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

DoD United States Department of Defense 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

FIRM First Responders Mask 

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 

HFC IDF Home Front Command 

ICT International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 

IDF Israel Defense Forces 

MDA Magen David Adom (Red Star of David); Israeli national 

emergency medical service 

MOD Israel Ministry of Defense 

MOE Israel Ministry of the Environment 

MOH Israel Ministry of Health 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

R&D Research and Development 

USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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Bibliography 

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1999: A19. 

DeGiovanni, Cleto, Jr. “Domestic Terrorism With Chemical or Biological Agents: 

Psychiatric Aspects.” American Journal of Psychiatry 156 (1999): 1500-5. 

Ganor, Boaz. “Nonconventional Terrorism: Nuclear-Chemical-Biological.” Survey of 

Arab Affairs, 15 August 1995. 

Harel, Amos. “Non-conventional Warfare Becomes Conventional” (English). Also 

published as “Hakhanah l’khimiah v’biologiah” (Hebrew). Ha’aretz, July 20, 

1999: 43. 

Israel Defense Forces. IDF Official Web Site. Internet: http://www.idf.il/. 

Israel Defense Forces, Home Front Command. “Meida‘ shehashuv l’da‘at b’nosei 

hitgonenut ezrahit (Important Information to Know about Civil Defense 

Matters).” Dapei Zahav (Golden Pages) North 06. Ramat Gan: Dapei Zahav 

Publishers, 1998: 56-9. 

Israel Ministry of Defense NBC Protection Division. Israel CB Defense Equipment. TelAviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, n.d. 

“Israel Tries to Calm Nervous Public over Attack Threat.” CNN Interactive, February 3, 

1998, http://cnn.com/WORLD/9802/03/israel.iraq/index.html. 

Krasner, LTC Esther. Analysis of the Failure Mechanisms as Criterion for Development 

of Respiratory Protective Systems. Tel-Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, n.d. 

Post, Jerrold, M.D. and Dr. Ehud Sprinzak. “Searching for Answers: Why Haven’t 

Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?” Armed Forces Journal 

International 135.9 (April 1998): 16-7. 

Raz, Ahi. “Tokhnat mahshev tahazeh kivun hitpashtut halakh ba’avir (Computer 

Program Will Predict the Direction of Chemical Agent Dispersal in the Air).” 

Bamahaneh, October 23, 1998. 

“Report: Israeli Army Conducting Trials with Anthrax Vaccine.” Associated 

Press, September 26, 1999. 

Salah, Muhammad. “Musa‘id al-Zuahari l-“al-Hayat”: lidayna aslahah biolojiya 

wakimawiya (Assistant to al-Zuahari to “al-Hayat”: We Have Biological and 

Chemical Weapons).” Al-Hayat, Monday, April 19, 1999. 

“Security Council Members Criticize Butler for Comments.” Associated Press, 

February 5, 1998, http://cnn.com/WORLD/9802/05/iraq.butler.ap/index.html. 

Shoham, Dany. Chemical and Biological Terrorism: An Intensifying Profile of a NonConventional Threat. Tel Aviv: Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), 1998. 

Sprinzak, Ehud. “The Great Superterrorism Scare.” Foreign Policy 112 (1998). Fall 

1998: 110-24. 

Steinberg, Gerald M. “Israeli Responses to the Threat of Chemical Warfare.” Armed 

Forces and Society 20.1 (1993). Fall, 1993: 85-101. 

Susser, Leslie and Yael Haran. “A Silent Terror.” Jerusalem Report, March 29, 1999: 

20-2. 
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“Weapons Officials Arrive in Baghdad for Fresh Round of Talks.” CNN Interactive, 

January 31, 1998, http://cnn.com/WORLD/9801/31/iraq.mood/index.html. 

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement by President Clinton 

and Prime Minister Ehud Barak July 19, 1999.” Washington, DC, July 19, 1999. 

Acknowledgements 

The author is grateful to Mr. Moshe Fox, director of the North American Division of the 

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to Major General Zeev Livne (Israel Defense 

Forces), currently the Israeli Defense and Armed Forces Attaché to the United States, for 

their generous assistance, without which this study would not have been possible.
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APPENDIX G—LOS ANGELES AREA CASE STUDY

This case study, conducted in Los Angeles in early 2000 by RAND at the request of the 

“Gilmore Commission,” examines CBRN counter-terrorism policies and organization, 

the state of responder training, the status of federal assistance and other relevant factors 

in Los Angeles. The study also details the rash of anthrax hoaxes that occurred in Los 

Angeles starting in December 1998, and the local response to them. The Gilmore 

Commission believes that the lessons learned in Los Angeles are relevant to jurisdictions 

nationwide and that the federal government can 1) aid in the dissemination of the lessons 

learned in Los Angeles in the course of developing its CBRN preparedness program; and 

2) participate in educating agencies at all levels of government in the effective use of the 

methodologies employed in Los Angeles to draw relevant conclusions from experience 

and turn them into practice. 

While Los Angeles is unique among large metropolitan areas in the United States in 

terms of population, area, jurisdictional structure and other factors, there is much to be 

learned from the experience of Los Angeles’s local responders in preparing for terrorism. 

This case study, requested by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter the 

“Gilmore Commission”), and conducted in Los Angeles in early 2000, examines the 

response structure, policies, state of responder training and other relevant aspects of, as 

well as the role the federal government has played in, terrorism preparation in Los 

Angeles.127 The Gilmore Commission, having examined the state of preparedness in 

cities across the United States, observed that Los Angeles responders were further along 

in the planning and training than most other metropolitan areas. Further, the Commission 

believes that the lessons learned in Los Angeles are relevant to jurisdictions nationwide 

and that the federal government can 1) aid in the dissemination of the lessons learned in 

Los Angeles; and 2) participate in educating agencies at all levels of government in the 

effective use of the methodologies employed in Los Angeles to draw relevant conclusions 

and turn them into practice. 

Specifically, this case study focuses on two elements of Los Angeles County terrorism 

preparation that are of particular interest to jurisdictions nationwide. First of these is the 

Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), a collaborative, 

coordinating mechanism by and for local responders in the county. Second are the 

lessons learned from the rich experience gained in dealing with a rash of anthrax hoaxes 

since late 1998. Before presenting these two elements, the case study provides the reader 

with further background on the state and structure of terrorism preparedness as well as on 

local responder training in Los Angeles. Responder observations on preparing for 

terrorism response and a section detailing policy recommendations conclude the study. 

BACKGROUND 

Los Angeles County is a particularly complex operational area, with 88 different cities 

and 42 separate law enforcement agencies. The county has its own fire department, as do 

 

127 Throughout this study, “Los Angeles” refers generally to the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. 
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many of the individual cities. This structure necessitates frequent and complex multijurisdictional emergency responses. By state law, California emergency responders 

follow the State Emergency Management System (SEMS), a state-specific version of the 

Incident Command System (ICS).128

In the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack, 

some or all of the following agencies could be expected to respond (ordered 

alphabetically):129

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Los Angeles Field Office 

• Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD)130

• Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS) 

• Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD)131

• Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) 

• Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 

LOCAL RESPONDING AGENCIES: 

A SNAPSHOT OF ROLES AND PROGRESS TO DATE 

LASD Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) 

The EOB has a full-time Terrorism Sergeant who is responsible for coordinating the 

Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW, discussed below), co-developing inter-agency 

terrorism response and administering a counter-terrorism technology test bed. The 

Sergeant provides counter-terrorism analysis for the LASD. 

The EOB has headed the development of standardized training for local responders in the 

county. It was felt that federal training materials did not sufficiently address the specific 

structural and training needs of Los Angeles County. As a result, the EOB applied for, 

and received a $250,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for the 

development of the courses and the suite of training videos mentioned above. 

 

128 The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standard management system for command, control and 

coordination of emergency responders used nationwide. For more information on ICS, see Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Institute, Basic Incident Command System 

(ICS) Independent Study IS-195, January 1998. For more information on SEMS, see 

http://www.fema.gov/pte/exp_06.htm. 129 This list is not intended to be exhaustive. Depending on the nature, scale and location of the incident, 

various local responding agencies might be involved (e.g., Los Angeles World Airports have their own, 

separate police force). 

130 Including the department’s Hazardous Materials Unit (HAZMAT). 131 This includes HAZMAT and Health/HAZMAT. The Health/HAZMAT Division of the Los Angeles 

County Fire Department oversees HAZMAT units and is the county authority for determining when a 

contaminated area is sufficiently clear of contaminants. 
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LAPD 

The LAPD Emergency Operations Section is responsible for the development of policies 

and procedures relating to LAPD response to “unusual events.” In this capacity, the EOS 

authors and distributes the LAPD Emergency Operations Guide and the Supervisor’s 

Field Operations Guide, which feature sections on terrorism awareness and response. 

Since 1998, these sections have addressed the possibility of CBRN as well as 

conventional attacks. 

The LAPD Anti-Terrorist Division’s primary objective is “the prevention of significant 

disruptions of public order in the City of Los Angeles.” The ATD investigates 

individuals or groups that “plan, threaten, finance, aid, abet, attempt or perform unlawful 

acts that threaten public safety.”132 Both the EOS and ATD are represented in the TEW. 

Fire Departments—Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD) & Los Angeles 

City Fire Department (LAFD) 

As there are many law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles area, so too for fire 

departments. LACoFD and LAFD each maintain a three-unit HAZMAT task force and 

has a terrorism coordinator. Battalion Chiefs from both LACoFD and LAFD co-chair the 

Inter-Agency Board’s (IAB) Subgroup on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).133 The 

equipment list used by the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) and later 

adopted by the IAB was largely formulated in Los Angeles. LAFD played a dominant 

role in the anthrax hoaxes that took place in the city in late 1998. As of August 2000 all 

LAFD and LACoFD personnel have been trained to conduct mass casualty 

decontamination and are equipped to do so as well. 

LACoFD Health/HAZMAT Division 

The Health/HAZMAT Division is responsible for the enforcement of HAZMAT-related 

federal, state and local environmental laws in Los Angeles County. In the event of a 

HAZMAT incident, CBRN or otherwise, this office is the only authority in the county 

that can certify a contaminated area as clean. As such, Health/HAZMAT technicians fill 

a supervisory role over the HAZMAT units within the county that are charged with the 

actual cleanup of contaminants. This function puts a premium on identification of 

hazardous material. Thus, Health/HAZMAT plays a lead role in the early identification 

of CBRN agents. 

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS) 

 

132 Official Website of the Los Angeles Police Department, http://www.lapdonline.org/. 133 The IAB consists of leading subject matter experts from local, state and national response organizations 

and is co-chaired by DoD and DOJ. The IAB has developed a standardized equipment list for WMD 

response operations, which ensures equipment standardization and interoperability at the local, state and 

federal levels. See Combined Statement of Department of Defense Witnesses: Preparedness for a 

Biological Weapons Attack, http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/document1.htm. 
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DHS is actively involved in a number of aspects of CBRN terrorism preparation. Among 

these are TEW participation, the expansion of the disease surveillance system to include 

symptoms caused by potential biological agents, the establishment of the Metropolitan 

Medical Response System,134 the stockpiling of CBRN treatments and the training of 

medical and paramedical personnel. 

Caches of medical supplies are maintained at several sites throughout the county, and can 

be transported by ground or air. 

All paramedics in Los Angeles County – public and private – receive their training 

through DHS. The five-month course now includes three hours of CBRN response 

training. DHS has trained personnel at over 50 county hospitals in CBRN treatment. 

Notably, this latter training has come completely from the DHS budget, with no financial 

assistance from any federal programs. 

Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) 

Los Angeles World Airports is the one of two financially self-sufficient departments in 

the city, funded entirely from takeoff, landing, and other airport fees. The department 

operates its own police force, which is separate from LAPD. By virtue of the size and 

importance of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), it was felt that the airport was a 

particularly attractive target for terrorists. LAWA owns several mobile mass 

decontamination units, which it operates in cooperation with LAFD. Via mutual aid 

agreements, these units contribute to the overall preparedness of the Los Angeles area, a 

fact demonstrated during the DNC when they were pre-positioned for use. 

COORDINATING TERRORISM RESPONSE 

In 1996, in an effort to coordinate the terrorism response efforts of the various relevant 

agencies operating there, Los Angeles County formulated its first terrorism response 

plan. As a result of this effort, two coordinating bodies emerged (see Figure 1). First is 

the Terrorism Working Group. In 1996, the Los Angeles operational area established the 

TWG, to be chaired by the inter-agency Los Angeles County Office of Emergency 

Management (OEM). The key members are the FBI, the LASD, the city and county fire 

departments, DHS, as well as the California Office of Emergency Services. The TWG 

guides broad policy and facilitates most of the county’s counter-terrorism planning, 

training and grant application efforts. The TWG convenes regularly, and has no 

operational role during a terrorist event. It is overseen by the county’s Emergency 

Management Council, which is comprised of the county’s Chief Administrative Officer, 

Sheriff, Fire Chief and the heads of other key county departments. The TWG tasks some 

specific policy-related oversight to three subcommittees: the Bioterrorism Working 

Group, the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) Management Committee, 

and the Grant Steering Committee. 

 

134 Los Angeles is also the home of the Western National Medical Response Team. 
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The second terrorism response coordinating body in Los Angeles County, which does 

have an operational role, and informs the policy decisions of the TWG, is the Terrorism 

Early Warning Group. Because of this operational role in coordinating the county’s 

response to a terrorist event, it is of particular interest to this analysis. 

Terrorism Working Group

Bioterrorism Working Group

MMRS Health Advisory Committee MMRS Technical Advisory Committee

Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)

Management Committee

Training Committee

Video Task Force

Grant Steering Committee

Emergency Management Council

Terrorism Early Warning Group

Net Assessment Group

Playbook Committee

Directed Energy Subcommittee

Sheriff

Figure 1. TWG Organizational Structure. Courtesy of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB).

TERRORISM EARLY WARNING GROUP (TEW) 

TEW Mission 

The role of the TEW is to monitor trends and potentialities that may result in terrorist 

threats or attack within Los Angeles County. Because of poor information flow between 

the national intelligence community and local responding agencies,135 the TEW was 

founded as an indications and warning/net assessment element to evaluate open source 

data and research threat information in order to inform incident commanders and guide 

TWG training and planning efforts. The TEW works to identify precursor events when 

assessing trends and potential threats with an eye toward prevention and mitigation. 

TEW Participants 

TEW participants include core and cooperating agencies. The core agencies are the 

LASD, LAPD, LAFD, LACoFD, DHS and the FBI. Cooperating agencies include: 

California Office of Emergency Services Law Enforcement Branch, Federal Aviation 

Administration Security, Long Beach Emergency Management, Long Beach Fire 

Department, Long Beach Health Department, Long Beach Police Department, Los 

Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles World Airports (Los Angeles 

International and Ontario Airports), Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the National 

 

135 There are numerous problems in the dissemination of intelligence from federal to local agencies. Aside 

from classic agency-proprietary “hoarding” of information, the free flow of potentially relevant information 

to local responders is hindered by the sensitivity of the information, much of which is classified for reasons 

of national security. 
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Security Studies Program at California State University, San Bernardino, RAND, the 

California Highway Patrol, the United States Secret Service, United States Customs and 

others. 

The TEW is constituted as a committee, with its work facilitated by a Sergeant from the 

LASD Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) who serves as the group's coordinator. The 

EOB disaster intelligence and threat assessment staff serves as group secretariat and 

designated interagency point of contact. 

Additional members are drawn from the law enforcement, fire, and medical communities. 

Researchers working in national security participate to strengthen the group's ability to 

assess future threats. Various federal agencies also participate as ex officio observers. 

TEW MEMBERSHIP

 

Public sector representatives Roles 

LASD Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) TEW Coordinator and Secretariat

LASD Special Investigations Section (SIS) LASD Crisis Management Liaison

LAPD Emergency Operations Section (EOS) LAPD Crisis and Consequence Management 

Liaison 

LAPD Anti-Terrorist Division (ATD) LAPD Crisis Management Liaison

L.A. City Fire Department (LAFD) Fire Service Liaison

L.A. County Fire Department (LACoFD) Fire Service Liaison

L.A. County Department of Health Services (DHS) Disease Surveillance/Medical Liaison

California Office of Emergency Services—Law State/Law Enforcement Liaison

California Office of Emergency Services—Fire State/Fire-Rescue Liaison

Los Angeles Airport Police Bureau LAX Police Liaison

Federal Bureau of Investigation L.A. Division Liaison

 

Non-governmental representatives 

RAND representatives Policy Studies & Trends Identification

National Security Studies Program, CSUSB Policy Studies & Trends Identification

National Law Enforcement and Corrections 

 Technology Center – West 

Technology Integration 

 

Primary “As-Needed” Members 

United States Coast Guard Maritime Liaison

L. A. County Office of Emergency Management County Agency Liaison

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ATF/ Bombing Liaison

Immigration and Naturalization Service Immigration Liaison

U.S. Customs Service (Criminal) High-tech (WMD) Proliferation Liaison

LASD Arson/Explosives Bomb Squad

LAPD Bomb Squad Bomb Squad

LASD Computer Crimes Information Warfare Issues

Metropolitan Transportation Authority Transit System Liaison

Long Beach Police Department Crisis Management Liaison 

 

Table 1. TEW Membership (Courtesy of EOB) 
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A listing of member agencies and their roles is provided in Table 1, above. Additional 

agencies are incorporated into the TEW on an as-needed basis, depending upon the 

particular threat faced and its probable venue. 

TEW secretariat personnel also act as liaison to the Sheriff's Special Investigations 

Section (SIS) and the LAPD's Anti-Terrorist Division (ATD). When an incident occurs, 

members of the TEW may augment the Plans/Intelligence Section of the County 

Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) or the incident’s Unified Command Structure 

(UCS). 

Monitoring Trends and Potential Threats 

Since its inaugural meeting in April 1996, the TEW has been a focal point for analyzing 

the strategic and operational information needed to respond to and prevent terrorism and 

protect critical infrastructure. Special emphasis is placed on the early detection of 

emerging threats, including acts employing CBRN weapons and information warfare (IW 

or cyber-terrorism). The TEW supports the CEOC, the TWG and the Los Angeles 

County Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). The TEW cooperates with 

criminal intelligence groups (such as the FBI-headed Los Angeles Task Force on 

Terrorism) to provide the Unified Command at a terrorist incident with a net assessment 

of response capabilities and the projected event horizon. To develop the analytic skills 

necessary to assess trends and potentials and conduct a net assessment, the group 

conducts regular briefings and training exercises. 

TEW Monthly Meetings 

Monthly TEW meetings typically start with the introduction of all participants and a brief 

review of the minutes from the previous month’s meeting. A guest speaker, or a regular 

TEW participant with special knowledge then presents a briefing on a specific, relevant 

topic. The goal of the briefings is to educate TEW participants on emerging or changing 

terrorism-related issues. Recent TEW briefings have included topics as diverse as CBRN 

Terrorism, Advanced Terrorism Concepts and the Non-State Soldier, Future War and 

Terrorism (Terrorism in Strategic Context), Recent Trends: Gangs, Mercenaries and 

Drugs, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Preparing for Information Age Conflict, and 

Technology for Cyber-terrorism. 

The EOB staff then gives a review of open source intelligence (OSINT). This includes 

local, national and international media reports and trends and milestones that have a 

potential local impact. Finally, each of the participants is given an opportunity to raise 

relevant issues that have come up or are foreseen in the coming months. The TEW 

meetings are beginning to include short group exercises based on hypothetical terrorism 

scenarios. 
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Playbook Subcommittee

Playbooks

Target Folders

Net Assessment Group

Threat/Consequence Assessment

Course of Action Development

Mission Folders

Emerging Threats Subcommittee

Directed Energy

(Radio Frequency Weapons/Lasers)

Emerging Weapons

Terrorism Early Warning Group

(TEW)

OSINT Indications & Warning

Consequence Assessment

Figure 2. TEW Organizational Structure (Courtesy of EOB)

TEW Organizational Structure 

In addition to the TEW’s monthly general meetings to discuss indications and warnings, 

there are three subcommittees, whose members address specific counter-terrorism topics 

and tasks. The TEW’s organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2. 

The Playbook Subcommittee develops general guidance for responding to specific classes 

of threat. Biological and chemical terrorism as well as water distribution attack response 

playbooks already have been completed. The subcommittee is currently building food 

surety and radio frequency weapons (RFWs) playbooks. Future plans include work on a 

radiological and nuclear playbook as well as playbooks to address several other types of 

threats. Also in development are standardized response information folders (also known 

as “target folders”) for key venues that might be subject to attack in Los Angeles County. 

The Emerging Threats Subcommittee, previously known as the Directed Energy 

Subcommittee, has examined emerging weapons such as RFWs, transient electronic 

devices, and laser strikes against civil aircraft. These threats, while not fully mature, are 

evolving. 

The Net Assessment Group is a subcommittee that operates when a threat emerges or an 

incident occurs. The Net Assessment Group develops incident-driven, task-oriented 

advice for the Unified Command Structure. Specifically, the group will provide the UCS 

with an assessment of the impact of an actual attack on the operational area, gauge 

resource needs and shortfalls, continuously monitor and assess situational awareness and 

status, and act as the point of contact for inter-agency liaison in order to develop options 

for courses of action toward incident resolution. In the process, the group develops an 

intelligence collection plan toward the development of available courses of action 

specific to the given threat or scenario. The courses of action are packaged with target 

folders and other intelligence products to create a mission folder to be delivered to the 

incident commander and/or other relevant players. The group is currently standardizing 

the mission folder format. 

Figure 3 details the directions of information flow in and out of the Net Assessment 

Group. Using virtual “reachback” tools, the Net Assessment Group, the incident 

commander and/or other off-site specialists could discuss the mission folder and response 

parameters while they are en route to the incident scene. Five cells make up the group. 
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The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Cell represents the commander's intent, and interacts with 

the various agencies that participate in the field response. The real hub of the group, 

however, is the Analysis and Synthesis Cell. This cell is comprised of analysts that 

coordinate intelligence tasking for the other group cells as part of the overall collection 

plan in order to estimate the scope and impact of the event. The cell will synthesize 

gathered information and generate a clear product for the Unified Command Structure 

and others via the OIC Cell. Attachment II details the dissemination paths for the various 

TEW products. 

The remaining three cells support the OIC and Analysis and Synthesis cells. The 

Consequence Management Assessment Cell includes representatives of the law 

enforcement side of consequence management, the fire service, HAZMAT specialists, 

and health practitioners. These specialists bring their respective expertise to bear on the 

net assessment. The Public Health/Epidemiological Intelligence Cell, like the 

Consequence Management Cell, includes relevant specialists, in this case coming from 

the public health sector. In order to generate more informed medical analysis, this cell 

also makes use of real-time disease surveillance. Finally, the Crisis 

Management/Investigative Liaison Cell draws on the expertise of criminal intelligence 

groups, such as the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism, the FBI, LAPD Anti-Terrorist 

Division and the local bomb squads. If needed, this cell can send information directly to 

the officer in charge. 

The last component of the group is the “Intelligence Toolbox,” which includes forensic 

intelligence support and all other resources that can assist in the assessment. Forensic 

intelligence offers traditional forensic support as well as CBRN-specific applications 

such as plume modeling, detection, etc. Among the other “tools” at the county’s disposal 

are the national laboratories, the Centers for Disease Control, police agencies around the 

United States and overseas, as well as universities and other research institutions. 
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Figure 3. Net Assessment Group Information Flow-Chart. (Courtesy EOB) 

LOCAL RESPONDER TRAINING IN LOS ANGELES 

In 1997, officials and technical specialists from Los Angeles area local responder 

agencies began training in CBRN response. In September 1997, approximately 50 

representatives of six local agencies attended the National Interagency Civil-Military 

Institute (NICI) five-day course, “Preparing For and Managing the Consequences of 

Terrorism.” This was followed in November 1997 by participation in a Department of 

Defense (DoD)-sponsored “train the trainer” course that was funded by the Nunn-LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program (NLD). At the same time, and also in the 

NLD framework, Los Angeles was scheduled to conduct a large-scale CBRN exercise 

(“Westwind”), for which Los Angeles City and County Fire Departments, in cooperation 

with the Western National Medical Response Team (NMRT), began training. This latter 

training included bimonthly mass decontamination exercises involving the respective 

departments’ hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams. Of particular significance is that 

this initial training focused almost exclusively on operators, rather than on commanders 

or policymakers. 

OIC/Command 

Group 

Public Health/ 

Epidemiological 

Intelligence 

Consequence 

Management 

Crisis Management/ 

Investigative

Liaison 

Analysis/Synthesis

Intel Toolbox/ 

Forensic Intelligence 

Support

Intel Toolbox 

Foreign Intelligence 

Support 
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Reflecting the state of training and the perceived threat, the LAPD Emergency 

Operations Section (EOS) and the LASD EOB released operational advisories addressing 

the CBRN threat starting in the second half of 1998. 

Additional training has been motivated by a combination of federal initiatives (e.g., 

NLD) and preparation for large-scale local events (e.g., the 2000 Democratic National 

Convention [DNC]). In the months leading up to the DNC, for example, DHS provided 

decontamination training to personnel at the hospitals closest to the Staples Center, where 

the DNC was held. This training supplemented a DoD-designed course, which 1,100 

hospital personnel from 50 facilities had received starting in 1998. 

Six locally produced videos, which collectively run approximately two hours, and an 

accompanying workbook are employed to introduce local responders to the CBRN threat, 

specific issues relating to each of the types of CBRN weapons, mass casualty 

decontamination, scene management and other topics. Viewing of the video series is 

considered a prerequisite for participation in local CBRN preparedness courses. 

Four courses have been modularly developed to address the varying needs of local 

responders. At the most basic level for all responders is a four-hour responder awareness 

course. Next is an eight-hour responder operations course. There is a 16-hour medical 

operations course, the last half of which is aimed at hospital personnel. Finally, LACoFD 

has developed an eight-hour mass casualty mass decontamination course. There are 

plans for an additional eight-hour course on force protection for law enforcement 

personnel. 

The goal, through the use of the courses and video suite, is to have all local responders 

trained by the end of 2001. The initial training that responders receive at their respective 

academies will ultimately include the CBRN material that today is being given to veteran 

responders, depending upon the availability of fiscal support. 

ANTHRAX HOAXES IN LOS ANGELES 

Since December 1998, Los Angeles has witnessed more than four dozen threats of the 

intentional dissemination of anthrax, all of which have proven to be hoaxes. As such, 

Los Angeles has the dubious distinction of being the nation’s anthrax hoax capital. The 

upside of this title is that the local responder community rapidly has learned valuable 

lessons in dealing with this phenomenon and its analogues. Additionally, these lessons 

were translated quickly from ideas to policies to actions. 

As noted above, for over a year prior to the December 1998 local outbreak of anthrax 

hoaxes, officials and technical specialists from Los Angeles area local responder agencies 

began training in CBRN response. 

Reflecting the state of training, and the perceived threat, the LAPD EOS released an 

Emergency Preparedness Bulletin, entitled “Terrorism Awareness,” in August 1998. The 

Bulletin, which functions as a supplement to the LAPD Supervisor’s Field Operations 

Guide, included LAPD guidelines for response to terrorist attacks, including those 
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involving CBRN weapons. Anthrax was mentioned as a specific example of a biological 

agent. 

 

Anthrax hoaxes in the United States started with an incident in Wichita, Kansas on 

August 18, 1998, four months before the first one in Los Angeles. The media took hold 

of this event, and through the “copycat syndrome” other hoaxes began to slowly 

proliferate across the country. The significance of this proliferation of anthrax hoaxes 

was quickly identified by the Los Angeles TEW, which saw fit to discuss the Wichita 

incident during its August 27 meeting. Additional anthrax hoaxes were reported during 

the TEW’s October, November and December meetings.136 By the November TEW 

meeting, it was felt that “anthrax hoaxes are coming to L.A.” As a result of this early 

assessment, the EOB formulated a preliminary policy advisory, entitled Responding to 

Potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Anthrax Threat Incidents, which 

was released on December 12, 1998 to all LASD field operations units. 

Anthrax Hoaxes Arrive in Los Angeles 

Four incidents in the latter half of December 1998 were formative for the Los Angeles 

local responders’ procedures for addressing CBRN weapon threats. 

December 17, 1998 – Executive Parking Company 

An employee of the company received an anonymous letter, which informed its recipient 

that she had been exposed to anthrax. LAPD, LAFD, LACoFD Health/HAZMAT 

Division, DHS and the FBI’s Los Angeles field office all responded to the 911 call placed 

by company employees. 

Serendipitously, among the host of responders were at least four who had attended the 

1997 “Preparing For and Managing the Consequences of Terrorism” course at NICI. 

Despite the presence of these qualified personnel, the incident commander, as well as 

other on-site senior officials, had little or no exposure to or training for CBRN terrorism 

response. As such, these officials chose to err on the side of caution, and followed the 

existing paradigm for dealing with hazardous materials. The hazardous materials 

approach is governed by strict Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 

regulations and procedures regarding unknown substances that forced the responders into 

their most aggressive possible response. The result was that HAZMAT technicians had 

to don maximum protective gear and set up decontamination facilities for themselves and 

the 25 employees who were decontaminated on-site, in the building’s parking structure. 

The victims’ decontamination process entailed their being stripped and scrubbed down 

with a diluted hypochlorite (bleach) solution. Their personal effects (e.g., clothing, 

wallets, keys, etc.), considered both contaminated and evidence, were confiscated and 

sealed. These items could not be unsealed and/or released until their safety had been 

confirmed. These individuals were subsequently transferred to UCLA Medical Center. 

 

136 Specifically, the following incidents were mentioned: Colorado Springs (October 15, 1998), 

Jacksonville, FL (November 3, 1998), Miami (November 20, 1998) and multiple incidents in Indiana that 

occurred throughout November. 
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Hospital officials, as unfamiliar with anthrax as many of the other senior responders, 

elected to decontaminate the 25 patients a second time at the hospital. Each patient was 

discharged with a week’s supply of antibiotics and a prescription for more, if need was 

determined, as well as a health and safety (medical exposure) advisory letter from 

DHS/UCLA. At the time of their release, an important logistical oversight became 

apparent in that the by-now tired and traumatized victims were wearing only hospital 

clothing while their wallets and car keys, along with their street clothes, were still being 

held as potentially contaminated evidence. 

The office in which the envelope was opened and all adjoining offices were ordered 

closed until lab results confirmed that no anthrax spores were present, a process that took 

approximately 48 hours. The response to this incident was estimated to cost between 

$500,000 and $600,000. 

December 18, 1998 – U.S. Bankruptcy Court 

An anonymous caller to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court advised, “You should check the air 

conditioning system for possible anthrax.” The building was evacuated, and 105 people 

were identified as possibly having been exposed, and consequently isolated for the eight 

hours it took to search and sample the building.137 The same agencies responded as had 

done so the day before. Consultation with experts at the U.S. Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and DHS, combined with the realization 

that the previous day’s decontamination probably had been unnecessary, led to the 

decision not to similarly decontaminate the victims at the courthouse. Two physicians 

from DHS wrote prescriptions for antibiotics that accompanied a health and safety 

(medical exposure) advisory letter given to all 105 victims upon their release. The letter, 

issued jointly by LAFD, LAPD, LACoFD-Health/HAZMAT and DHS, instructed the 

individuals to self-decontaminate at home by showering for at least ten minutes. Further 

instructions were given regarding the decontamination of personal articles. Notably, it 

was pointed out in the letter that the authorities believed that the incident was likely a 

hoax. 

The targeted courthouse also was ordered closed while samples were analyzed, which 

again took around 48 hours. The cost for the December 18 response was $600,521.87, 

the sum being repaid to the LAFD and LAPD by the now-convicted perpetrator.138

December 21, 1998 – Van Nuys Superior and Municipal Courthouses 

As on the 18th, an anonymous caller to 911 initiated this incident, claiming that “anthrax 

has been released in the Van Nuys courthouse.” While the same agencies responded as 

 

137 There is an important legal distinction between isolation and quarantine. Only the State Health Officer 

can order the latter, while the former is essentially a voluntary separation. In none of the incidents under 

review was a quarantine ordered. 

138 This odd figure, calculated to the penny, is what was ordered repaid by the United States District Court 

in restitution to the emergency response services. For more information, see 

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr/147.htm. This sum is being repaid at a rate of $200 per month, meaning 

that it will be paid in full in just over 250 years. 
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on the previous two occasions, the response itself was markedly more reserved. In this 

case, approximately 1,200 people were evacuated from the building and isolated until the 

building was fully searched and sampled, a process that took around five hours. The 

entire building was closed for the 48 hours required to process the collected samples. No 

prescriptions were issued. A health and safety (medical exposure) advisory letter 

detailing self-decontamination procedures and informing recipients that antibiotics would 

be issued if need was so determined. Again, it was emphasized that health and law 

enforcement authorities believed the incident to be a hoax. 

December 23, 1998 – Time-Warner Cable 

Time-Warner Cable was threatened by yet another anonymous call to 911. Response to 

this incident was more limited than to any of its predecessors. The approximately 70 

evacuees were isolated for about six hours, during the search and sampling phase. Unlike 

the previous incidents, the building was reopened for normal business operations upon 

completion of the search and sampling. No prescriptions were issued, but a similar health 

and safety (medical exposure) advisory letter to that of the 21st was given to company 

employees. 

Other December Incidents 

There were a handful of other threat incidents in late December, all of which were met 

with responses of equal or lesser magnitude than that of the Time-Warner Cable incident. 

With at least seven incidents in ten days, it was clear that local authorities were faced 

with a prohibitively expensive, media-fed, copycat epidemic. Local responders learned 

valuable lessons from each costly incident, and by the 28th, had “finally had it” with the 

overwhelmingly large reaction to what had turned out to be a string of hoaxes. The time 

had come to formalize the policies that heretofore had been conceptual and unwritten. 

Revamping Anthrax Threat Response Policy 

On December 28, representatives of the six major local responding agencies (LAFD, 

LACoFD, LAPD, LASD, DHS and the FBI’s Los Angeles field office) convened a “big6 summit” at the LACoFD headquarters. Participants decided that a more practical, 

measured response was needed, in light of the previous ten days’ experience. 

Participants agreed that continuing with the same response model, costing the community 

approximately half a million dollars for each deployment, would quickly drain local 

resources and budgets as well as damage response capability to other, real emergencies. 

Additionally, the local responders now had gleaned valuable insight from their responses 

and from the collective wisdom of federal, state and local experts from across the nation, 

all of which suggested that such large-scale responses to every threat were both 

impractical and unnecessary. 

Experience in Los Angeles and elsewhere led authorities to develop a dynamic yet 

structured set of indicators by which to assess the credibility of an anthrax threat. As a 

result, the summit participants decided that major components of prior responses now 
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would be employed if and only if credible evidence were present that contradicted 

perhaps less tangible indicators that the event was a hoax. Due to the sensitive nature of 

the subject, interviewed responders have requested that these indicators not be published 

as part of this unclassified report. 

Within days (and in one case, hours) of the summit meeting, LAPD, LASD, LAFD and 

LACoFD all released intradepartmental bulletins outlining these newly formulated 

policies and procedures. These bulletins had department-wide distribution and 

implementation. It is believed that within a week of its release, the contents of the LAPD 

bulletin were in the hands of all field personnel. 

Two points are especially noteworthy in the context of these newly authored policies. 

First, the turnaround time from field experience to written policies was remarkably short; 

the time from the Westwood incident to the summit meeting was just 11 days. Second, 

these written policies have remained virtually unchanged since their initial compilation 

almost 18 months ago. That is, not only were conclusions drawn quickly, so far they also 

appear to have withstood the test of time. 

COMMENTS BY THE LOCAL RESPONDERS 

In recent interviews conducted for the Gilmore Commission, a number of common 

themes emerged regarding the state of preparedness and the role the federal government 

has played in getting there. The most important of these themes are as follows: 

• The Need for Fiscal Sustainment 

All of those interviewed expressed profound concern about the perceived “one-shot” 

nature of federal assistance. To be sure, preparedness entails large up-front costs for 

training and especially for equipment. However, both of these are perishable, and 

local responders worry that in the long run, without continued federal assistance, their 

communities might not be able to maintain the desired level of readiness envisioned 

by policymakers. Some responders wondered aloud whether, without ongoing 

support, the entire CBRN preparedness enterprise would end up an ephemeral waste 

of a great deal of resources and effort. This issue was the most emphatically and 

most often voiced in all meetings with Los Angeles responders. 

• Bearing the Burden of Training Costs 

The Domestic Preparedness Program has provided “train the trainer” courses for 

responders throughout the United States. Interviewees were quick to point out that 

even a four-hour course, when multiplied by the thousands of responders in a large 

metropolitan area like Los Angeles, adds up to significant manpower costs. For 

example, every LASD deputy should optimally undergo 14-40 hours of training (as 

determined by the EOB), which is the equivalent of 1.75-5 workdays. This adds up to 

between approximately 3.75 and 10.73 million dollars for LASD alone.139 No federal 

 

139 This is based on the top-step deputy’s overtime pay of $33.52 per hour multiplied by 8,000 deputies 

multiplied by the 14-40 training hours needed. Most LASD deputies are top-step, and all internal fiscal 

calculations are based on this rank. 
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funding is provided for these training days. Responders almost unanimously believe 

that this training is beneficial and important, yet are worried that – given constrained 

training budgets – CBRN response training will come at the expense of other, perhaps 

no less vital, competencies. 

• The Need for Coordinated Procurement 

Initially, NLD funds were granted to cities, with little or no consideration of the 

operational structure of the individual recipient metropolitan areas of which cities are 

but a part. For example, three cities within the Los Angeles operational area received 

NLD funding (Los Angeles, Glendale, Long Beach).140 This allocation method was 

problematic because it led to the inefficient and inequitable distribution of NLD 

funds. That is, while multiple cities within a metropolitan area might have received 

more total assistance than was necessary for the area (inefficient), smaller individual 

cities within the same metropolitan area could be left with nothing (inequitable). This 

problem has since been resolved insofar as the federal government now allows 

agencies at other than the city level to apply for assistance. Given the county-asoperational-area structure mandated by California law, this change has been 

welcomed by responders in Los Angeles. Currently the EOB, through the TWG, 

coordinates the application for federal assistance and all CBRN-related purchasing for 

the operational area. All parties interviewed expressed satisfaction with this process. 

In the future, OEM will coordinate funding applications for all cities in the county. 

A positive side effect of the coordinated funding application process is that the focus 

of agency lobbying has moved from Washington, D.C. to the local, professional 

arena. In the past, agencies – often via their unions and other professional 

associations – have lobbied grant-giving federal institutions in direct competition with 

their local colleagues. Since in Los Angeles applications are done jointly, any such 

lobbying takes place at home, among cooperating, rather than competing agencies, 

and in accordance with the mutual understanding of the operational area’s needs. 

• Redundant Training 

There has been a proliferation of government-sponsored training options for local 

responders. A number of those who have taken the lead on the subject of CBRN 

preparation for their respective departments (i.e., those who will serve as agency 

trainers) commented on the redundant nature of the training being offered. While it is 

recognized, and indeed hoped, that receiving training from a variety of sources will 

enrich the response repertoire of local agencies, the individuals interviewed felt that 

in fact, some of the federal funds spent on their courses was wasted since each 

additional course added little or no value to their skill-sets. These responder-trainers 

had hoped that federal coordination and standardization of training would lead to a 

well defined training progression that would allow them to gain the level of expertise 

needed for their jurisdictions and job descriptions so that they can competently and 

effectively instruct others within their departments. This reflects the desire of Los 

Angeles CBRN response designers to maintain a small cadre of highly-trained 

 

140 For more information on the overlap of NLD assistance, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities 

to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, GAO/NSIAD–99–3. 
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professionals whose job it is to 1) function as a skilled group of responders; 2) act as 

technical specialists within the Incident Command System, providing insights and 

relevant resources to an incident commander; and 3) train others within the response 

community to a pre-defined baseline level of capability. This desire, in turn, reflects 

the perceived threat and its scale within the Los Angeles operational area. 

• Who Has VX, Anyway? 

Local responders have complained about the overwhelming emphasis in federal 

training programs on military quality CBRN weapons. For a host of reasons, it is 

widely thought that the likelihood of a CBRN attack is low, and that the likelihood of 

such an attack using weapons grade material is even more remote. Thus, the local 

responders would prefer to train based on realistic scenarios involving agents more 

likely to be seen in the United States today and in the near future (i.e., common 

industrial chemicals, etc.). As one TEW participant put it, “Vic from Ventura ain’t 

got VX.” 

• OSHA Needs to Step Up 

It has been recognized in Los Angeles since the first Anthrax hoax incident in 

December 1998 that the standards set by OSHA, while appropriate for chemical spills 

and undoubtedly reflecting a desire to err on the side of caution, have no provisions 

for emerging terrorist threats, and especially those involving biological weapons. 

Specifically, threat analysis has no part in OSHA regulations. Local responders 

complained that despite their belief that no anthrax was present in the 1998 incidents, 

OSHA regulations “forced their hand” into an over the top, costly HAZMAT 

response. They feel that OSHA needs to be integrated into the policymaking process 

for addressing new and potentially unforeseen threats. 

• Know Your Counterparts

A silver lining to the CBRN threat cloud has been the unprecedented level of 

cooperation among emergency response agencies in Los Angeles, a fact almost 

unanimously recognized by interviewees. At the 1998 anthrax hoax incidents, the 

presence of on-scene experts from multiple agencies, who had routinely met (e.g., at 

the TEW) and trained (e.g., at various federally-funded courses and in joint exercises) 

together, enhanced the cooperative working environment that is essential for 

addressing CBRN threats, real or fake. The ongoing monthly meetings of the TEW 

reinforce the atmosphere of cooperation. 

• Elements of The Incident Command System Are Particularly Useful

As mentioned previously, by California law, all emergency response agencies operate 

according to the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), which is a 

state adaptation of the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS is a standard 

management system for command, control and coordination of emergency 

responders. Two ICS principles are of particular relevance to the CBRN threat. 

First is the concept of Unified Command, “a unified team effort which allows all agencies 

with responsibility for the incident, either geographic or functional, to manage an incident 
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by establishing a common set of incident objectives or strategies.”141 In the context of 

the CBRN threat, Unified Command promises to catalyze an effective, coordinated, onscene decision-making process. 

Second, as mentioned above, ICS calls for the employment of technical specialists

wherever their special skills may be of use within an incident. In the case of the 

December 17, 1998 anthrax hoax incident, while there were numerous technical 

specialists present, their expertise was largely unknown and unappreciated by higher 

level decision makers within the incident command structure. In this light, and under the 

stressful circumstances of this first anthrax threat, the incident commander and the 

unified command chose to err on the side of safety, and thus decided to decontaminate 

the office workers. The Los Angeles area response plan now calls for maintaining a 

small cadre of highly trained local specialists to complement the much larger number of 

baseline-trained responders. ICS will allow the efficient use of expertise quickly and 

where most needed. 

Noting that “all terrorism is local,” local responders mentioned that given the anticipated 

degree of federal and local cooperation that a CBRN attack will entail, it is imperative for 

federal response agencies to become proficient in the use of ICS and familiar with their 

roles in it. Doing so will allow these federal resources to quickly and effectively “plug 

into” the local ICS structure. 

• Train the Commanders

Like lower-level functionaries, commanders also need to have a certain (perhaps 

different) baseline level of CBRN training. Commanders stand to benefit in two ways 

from even basic training regarding CBRN weapons. First, they themselves will have a 

greater understanding of the nature of the CBRN threat, and thus be able to make more 

informed operational decisions, making better use of provided intelligence. Second, they 

will be more aware of technical expertise within their own and other responding agencies, 

and be more likely to bring it to bear on their decisions. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

Based on the interviews conducted for the Gilmore Commission, a number of policy 

recommendations for the federal government made themselves apparent. 

• Threat Analysis Needs a Cooperative Vehicle 

As has been noted elsewhere,142 threat analysis is critical in the determination of 

appropriate response. Because of the complexity of terrorism threats in general, and the 

CBRN threat in particular, threat analysis is most effectively conducted by multiple 

agencies, each of which brings its own special skills and strengths to the table. In Los 

Angeles County, the TEW has filled the previously wanting role of a medium for 

 

141 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Institute, Basic Incident Command 

System (ICS) Independent Study IS–195, January 1998, p. A–12. 142 See, for example, GAO, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and 

Target Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD–98–74. 
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information transfer, joint analysis and incident net assessment and thus has proven to be 

an exceptionally useful mechanism. 

While Los Angeles County is unique in its size, the practice of bringing local, state and 

federal stakeholders together on a regular basis to provide threat analysis would be 

valuable in other jurisdictions around the United States, regardless of their size. Other 

California counties have established their own TEWs, and still others are in various 

stages of development. Cities across the country have turned to LASD for assistance in 

creating their own TEWs. The TEW is sufficiently flexible that it can be easily tailored 

to address the specific needs and concerns of America’s variegated communities. For 

example, in Los Angeles the Emerging Threat Cell has focused on RFWs, but in other 

locales this cell’s analog could concentrate on border concerns, infrastructure protection 

(e.g., ports, nuclear facilities, etc.) and other location-specific topics. 

The federal government could assess the effectiveness of the TEW in Los Angeles and 

elsewhere and then, assuming the results are positive, facilitate its replication. The 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) currently offers courses on the 

establishment and operation of emergency operations centers (EOCs). Incorporating the 

TEW into the EOC curriculum, for example, would provide a smooth, standardized 

means for teaching TEW operation to a broad national audience of emergency managers. 

• One Size Does Not Fit All

While large American cities have a lot in common, no two are exactly alike. Aside from 

geography, demographics, climate, etc., cities vary greatly in terms of the structure of 

their emergency management systems and their jurisdictional and emergency response 

structures as well. The federal policies that provide funding, equipment 

recommendations and training to local responders need to be more flexible vis-à-vis 

inter-city variation. The federal government has improved in this regard, as when it 

allowed Los Angeles County to apply for assistance, in addition to the City of Los 

Angeles. The nation’s diverse communities will welcome additional federal flexibility in 

the structural criteria for assistance application. 

• The Need for Ongoing Bottom-Up and Lateral Information Sharing 

While Los Angeles authorities have learned from field experience, exercises and their 

responses to the anthrax hoaxes, this learning occasionally has come at tremendous 

expense in terms of local resources and tax dollars. All localities that are in the process 

of building their response capabilities face a similar set of challenges – equipment 

procurement, protocol and policy development, training, the need to stay on top of 

current technical and other developments, etc. There is currently no formal mechanism 

for officials in these localities to share lessons learned or gain practical advice from their 

counterparts around the country or around the world. This gap often forces responders to 

start from scratch when confronted with situations that have already been successfully (or 

even unsuccessfully) negotiated by others. In this regard, even after Los Angeles had 

established and implemented its new set of anthrax threat response policies, other 

jurisdictions across the United States, when faced with similar threats, reinvented the 

wheel, again at great cost in terms of dollars and unnecessary stress. Likewise, Los 
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Angeles could have learned from those communities that experienced anthrax hoaxes 

prior to December 1998. In the future, this problem could be avoided if the federal 

government facilitated the creation of a bottom-up and horizontal communication system, 

which would allow local agencies to share lessons learned with each other, and with the 

federally sponsored training programs that will further educate responders from across 

the country. 

The federal government should provide this communication system for two main reasons. 

First, the CBRN threat transcends state boundaries and the federal government is legally 

responsible for such issues of national security. Second, because the federal government 

has taken it upon itself to act as the national training authority for this subject, it follows 

that it should facilitate the transfer of information from the field to its own trainers as 

well as to other field locations. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The authors are grateful to the representatives of the following agencies for their 

generous assistance, without which this study would not have been possible: 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles Field Office 

Los Angeles City Fire Department 

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services 

Los Angeles County Fire Department 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

Los Angeles Police Department 

The authors would like to give special thanks to the participants in the Los Angeles 

County Terrorism Early Warning Group, and particularly Sheriff’s Sergeant John 

Sullivan who was extraordinarily generous with his time and expertise. 

Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. 
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ATTACHMENT I. GLOSSARY 

ATD Los Angeles Police Department Anti-Terrorist Division 

CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear 

CEOC County Emergency Operations Center 

DHS Los Angeles County Department of Health Services 

DNC Democratic National Convention 

DoD U.S. Department of Defense 

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice 

EMS Emergency Medical Service 

EOB Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Emergency 

Operations Bureau 

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

EOS Los Angeles Police Department Emergency Operations Section

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GAO United States General Accounting Office 

HAZMAT Hazardous materials 

IAB Inter-Agency Board 

ICS Incident Command System 

IW Information Warfare 

LACoFD Los Angeles County Fire Department 

LAFD Los Angeles City Fire Department 

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department 

LASD Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

LAWA Los Angeles World Airports 

LAX Los Angeles International Airport 

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System 

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office 

NICI National Interagency Civil-Military Institute 

NLD Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program 

NMRT National Medical Response Team 

OEM Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management 

OIC Officer in Charge 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

OSINT Open source intelligence 

PPE Personal protective equipment 

RFW Radio Frequency Weapons 

SEMS Standardized Emergency Management System 

SIS Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Special Investigations Section 

TEW Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group 

TWG Los Angeles County Terrorism Working Group 

UCS Unified Command Structure 

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 

Diseases 
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ATTACHMENT II. TEW PRODUCT DISSEMINATION143

Law Fire EMS Hospital Impacted Elected 

Advisory All 

Alert Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 

Warning Group 1 

plus Watch 

Commander 

and Area 

Command 

Teams 

Group 2 

plus Station 

Captains 

Group 3 

plus 

trauma 

centers 

Group 4 

Net 

Assessment 

Group 1 

plus 

incident 

commander, 

others as 

needed 

Group 2 

plus 

incident 

commander, 

others as 

needed 

Group 

3 

Group 3 

plus 

others 

receiving 

casualties

Group 4 

plus 

management 

as needed 

Group 5 

Issue 

Specific 

White 

Papers 

Command level officers, 

other affected units 

Group 5, 

particularly 

as 

regarding 

law/funding 

impacts 

Group 1: All Command Officers (above Station Commanders), Unit Commanders, 

specialized units (Special Weapons Teams, Bomb Squads, Emergency Operations/tactical 

planning, MMRS members) 

Group 2: All Chief Officers, HAZMAT teams, urban search and rescue teams, CounterTerrorism Coordinators, MMRS members 

Group 3: DHS EMS Section, Medical Alert Center, Epidemiological Surveillance 

Section, National Disaster Medical System Coordinator 

Group 4: Directors, OIC’s, Security Chief(s) of impacted entities 

Group 5: As needed, based upon circumstances of situation and jurisdiction

 

143 Courtesy of EOB. 
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APPENDIX H—CDC NEDSS and EPI-X 

Supporting Public Health Surveillance through the National Electronic Disease 

Surveillance System (NEDSS)144

Methods for conducting public health surveillance may often differ considerably by 

program and disease. Regardless of these differences, however, all surveillance activities 

share many common practices in the way data are collected, managed, transmitted, 

analyzed, accessed and disseminated. The National Electronic Disease Surveillance 

System (NEDSS) will, primarily through the creation of standards, facilitate the handling 

of data through each of these steps. As described below, different interrelated activities 

supporting NEDSS will offer significant improvements in the way public health 

surveillance is conducted at the Federal, State, and local level. The long-term vision for 

NEDSS is that of complementary electronic information systems that automatically 

gather health data from a variety of sources on a real-time basis; facilitate the monitoring 

of the health of communities; assist in the ongoing analysis of trends and detection of 

emerging public health problems; and provide information for setting public health 

policy. 

 

Data Collection

Cases of a disease or other condition of interest are primarily identified in the medical 

care system. Once identified, these cases are typically reported to a local health 

department, often using paper-based data collection forms. At the local health 

department, forms may be entered into a computerized electronic data management 

system and transmitted to the State, or they may be copied, filed at the local level and 

then sent directly to the State where they are manually entered into the State health 

department’s electronic system. These reporting processes are generally the same, 

regardless of the disease or condition that is being reported. There are a number of 

problems that can arise during the reporting process. These problems, in turn, often place 

a large burden on medical care staff who have responsibility for disease reporting. For 

example, cases may be reported from a variety of sources from within the health care 

setting, such as clinical laboratories and private physicians. Physicians and laboratory 

supervisors and their office staff are already overworked. Nevertheless, it is often left up 

to health care providers to determine if a case meets public health surveillance case 

definitions and to figure out how to fill out the wide variety of forms produced by CDC 

and health departments. They may also spend significant time tracking down patient 

records in response to requests for more information from the health department. NEDSS 

will facilitate the collection of case report forms from providers in two important ways. 

First, standards are being developed to assure uniform data collection practices across the 

nation. The public health data model and the CIPHER (Common Information for Public 

 

144 Http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/otheract/phdsc/presenters/nedss.pdf. NEDSS is a program of the Health 

Information and Surveillance System Board, in the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For more information, see 

http://www.cdc.gov/od/hissb/index.htm.
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Health Electronic Reporting) guidelines will recommend, for example, a minimum set of 

demographic data that should be collected as part of the routine surveillance. In addition, 

the CIPHER guidelines will provide a consistent method for coding data on the data 

collection forms. It is expected that standardizing data collection forms should ease the 

burden on physicians and their staff by providing forms that are similar in appearance and 

that do not require that someone figure out for each specific form where information is 

located and how it should be coded. 

Second, NEDSS will include recommended standards that can be used for the electronic 

reporting of surveillance data. Specifically, NEDSS will recommend a standard data 

architecture and electronic data interchange format to allow computer systems to generate 

automatically electronic case reports that can be sent to local or State health departments. 

These types of standards would both ease the burden on large organizations that already 

have computerized data systems (such as regional laboratories, hospitals, managed care 

organizations) and would ensure that all cases that are in the provider’s data systems are 

being reported to public health. 

Data management issues: a) multiple case reports

To whom cases should be and are reported is often unclear. For example, a physician 

reporting a case would likely send the form to the county health department. A State or 

regional laboratory may also report the same case to the State health department. Given 

the number of potential sources of information regarding a single patient, the possibility 

exists that persons may be entered into the system more than once or may have discrepant 

data reported about them on the multiple reports. In addition, undoing these duplicate 

records after the reports have been received at the health department (often weeks or 

months later) is more cumbersome than detecting those duplicate records and 

consolidating them prior to entry into the system database. For example, the original 

paper records needed to resolve discrepant data may not be easily retrievable or may be 

lost. To address this problem, NEDSS will identify standard software components/tools 

that may be used at the local and State health department levels to detect duplicate reports 

based on a person’s demographic data (e.g., name, address, date of birth, sex). This 

process is known as registry matching (also referred to as “record matching”). As paper 

forms are entered into the electronic system, the database of prior records would be 

scanned and potential duplicates identified. Next, data entry operators could decide 

whether to enter the particular case as a new report or to update the record already 

present. The need for an automated system of registry matching is even more important 

as we move toward increasing reliance on automated electronic case reporting. While 

paper forms are generally handled one at time for entry and processing, electronic records 

are usually received in bulk and are processed together. The record matching software 

must be able to reliably determine which records are new and which should update 

existing reports. In addition, the software must also be capable of detecting instances of 

discrepant data, and, as deemed appropriate by the programs, it must be able to resolve 

those discrepancies. Finally, the tool must provide a mechanism for saving enough 

information on the individual reports in electronic archives if necessary, so that if at a 
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later date two records were found to be merged inappropriately, the original records can 

be restored. 

Data Management Issues: b) Data Entry at the Health Departments

The multiple data entry systems that CDC has created for local and State health 

department use have led to many complaints. Chief among these is that that data for an 

individual person must be entered into multiple, disparate systems. Given recent 

advances in technology, this is an unnecessary and burdensome step. A second common 

complaint is that each of the CDC-provided systems works differently, so that using more 

than one of them is onerous and time-consuming. An analogous situation that most 

office workers could relate to would be having to use three different word processors in 

an average day. Image if you had to be trained on and familiar with all the subtleties of 

Microsoft Word, Corel WordPerfect and Lotus WordPro! These problems created by 

different surveillance systems are being addressed through the definition of standards for 

system development activities. As previously mentioned, creation of data architecture 

standards will ensure, just as it did for the data collection forms, that information is 

entered and stored in a consistent and uniform way. Having data stored in a uniform way 

also means that they can more easily be transferred from one system to another so that 

duplicate data entry is reduced. Another relevant set of standards has to do with the user 

interface of CDC-developed surveillance systems. A person trained on any one system, 

for example, should be able to move to another without changing the way they interact 

with the software. A set of standards for a common user interface will guarantee that all 

systems look and work similarly. It is expected that the same set of user interface 

standards will be applied both to Windows-based applications and to Internet-browser 

based data collection systems. This type of integration through interface of the web and 

the stand-alone PC is the same approach that Microsoft is taking with its operating 

systems and application interfaces. 

Data Transmission from Local to State Health Department and to CDC 

Once surveillance data are entered into computerized data management systems, they are 

not only analyzed within the organization to which they were reported, but are also 

transmitted for analysis at other levels. Simply speaking, electronic reporting may occur 

as data are sent from the health care setting to local (city or county) health departments, 

then on to State health departments, and finally to CDC. With the current myriad of 

systems in place, there are many different methods for reporting data. For example, 

diskettes may be mailed, dial-up modems may be used to connect over public telephone 

lines, leased telephone lines may provide wide area network used for reporting, or the 

public Internet may be used. Currently, just for reporting to CDC, all of these methods 

are in place. There are also different levels of security in terms of electronic encryption 

methods that are applied. For example, in a recent inventory, over 73 different 

surveillance systems developed at CDC sent or received surveillance data electronically. 

Only 19, however, reported encrypting the data for transmission. While virtually all 

programs do not consider the encryption of their data an issue because individual person 

or site identifiers are removed before reporting to the next level, there is at least a small 
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risk that a person could be indirectly identified based on data in these individual records. 

There are two coordinated efforts that are addressing this problem. The first is the 

creation of the “Health Alert Network (HAN)” that will use the Internet as a backbone for 

communicating surveillance data (as well as a host of other information such as 

surveillance reports, training materials, policy documents, etc.) between health 

departments and CDC. This system is expected one day to connect the myriad of local 

health departments with State and territorial health departments and federal agencies, 

including CDC, nationwide. The second part is the Secure Data Network (SDN – 

sometimes called the “secure Internet pipeline”). This pipeline will provide CDC 

program areas with a secure method for encrypting and transferring files from a health 

department to a CDC program application across the Internet. (As an Internet-based 

system, the SDN may be considered to be part of HAN, not independent of it.) It will also 

allow CDC to eliminate the multiple methods of receiving data. In addition, using digital 

certificates and the MD5 message digest, the SDN will provide a consistent, transparent 

method for authenticating the source and ensuring the integrity of those data. This 

network will raise the standard on security for most of the surveillance activities now 

supported by CDC. Eventually the combination of the HAN and the standards that are 

used for the Secure Data Network can be extended to support standardized security 

beyond just reporting to CDC. They will allow any two or more partners in public health, 

whether they are heath care providers, clinical labs or local and State health departments, 

to exchange information without risk of eavesdropping by unauthorized parties. 

Data Analysis

Individual program areas at CDC and State and local health departments have, over the 

years, developed many innovative methods for the analysis of data. For example, recent 

efforts have led to development of techniques that accurately detect some changing or 

unusual patterns of trends or outbreaks of diseases. In addition, statistical methods have 

been developed to account for the delays in reporting of data from providers to health 

departments to CDC and, where appropriate, to estimate the true incidence of a disease or 

condition even when not all cases have been reported. 

The tools for implementing these methods have been provided to local and State health 

departments as part of individual surveillance systems, but in general they are not widely 

available. The closest thing that CDC has to the universal distribution of analysis tools 

are those contained in the DOS-based EpiInfo software package, however the DOS 

version of the application does not include some of the more sophisticated techniques 

described above. 

The issue of how to provide standardized data analysis tools will be addressed by NEDSS 

through the identification, adoption and promotion of statistical component standards. 

Software written to these standards will be able to be used and incorporated into a variety 

of surveillance systems – not only those developed by the CDC but also those that are 

being used by local and State health departments. As an example of the application of 

components, state-of-the-art analytic software would be able to be dropped into other 

software applications in the same way that spreadsheets, presentation graphics and e-mail 

components are now a standard part of many systems. 
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Data Analysis: Linkage

Another common problem is the need to link data collected in different surveillance and 

information systems. For example, persons responsible for notifiable diseases are 

interested both in the cases reported by providers and also, whether those cases might be 

linked to those reported in a laboratory-based system, where there is available species or 

serotype information that indicates that these cases may be part of an outbreak. Or, 

persons investigating an increase in the number of cases of a vaccine-preventable disease 

would be interested in determining whether persons with these illness received a certain 

type or lot of vaccine, information increasingly available, but in a separate location such 

as an immunization registry. And persons responsible for maternal and child health 

programs at the State level have noted that how they define and count cases of infectious 

disease among children does not match the Case Definitions for Infectious Conditions 

under Public Health Surveillance developed by CDC and the Council of State and 

Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) for notifiable disease surveillance. This issue is also 

being addressed by the surveillance data standards. The data standards will promote the 

linkage of data, as appropriate to public health needs, either at the individual patient or 

record level, or more broadly by place and time. Having standardized definitions for data 

elements will help ensure the correct interpretation of data elements. Having data stored 

using the same sets of codes will mean that epidemiologists and others needing merged 

data sets will not need to spend as much time understanding the peculiarities of any one 

system. Finally, these standards, by ensuring consistent definitions of data and coding of 

variables, will also facilitate the development of State data warehouses and the virtual 

State data centers envisioned by the National Association for Public Health Statistics and 

Information Systems (NAPHSIS). 

Data Access and Dissemination

The ability to access and disseminate appropriate public health data and information in a 

timely fashion to targeted audiences is key to making an impact on the population’s 

health. Often, however, there are significant delays in providing access. For example, 

program areas at CDC often complain that they spend much of their time generating data 

sets and responses to requests for information by State health departments, other Federal 

and State agencies, non-profit organizations, the news media, the public, etc. In addition, 

providing this information typically requires that staff redirect their activities away from 

other responsibilities. States also point to the same level of resources required to respond 

to the myriad of organizations within their own area that frequently request public health 

data and information. 

While providing easy access to appropriate public health data and information has been 

difficult in the past, program areas have also struggled with how to disseminate and/or 

present data and information results to interested parties. For example, one program area 

may use the 1990 population census as the denominator for generating rates, while 

another program area in the same State uses the projected 1998 rates. In addition, 

program areas may present rates by age in five-year intervals for one disease while 
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disseminating results for another disease using different age ranges, leading to an 

inability to compare the data (when indicated). Finally, no central location at CDC or in 

many State health departments exists where people can go to locate these data. This lack 

of a standardized approach to disseminating data and information at CDC, and often in 

State and local health departments as well, impedes the ability of public health 

professionals to have a direct impact on public health policy and decision-making. 

To address these challenges, NEDSS will include the development of best-practice 

specifications for a method to analyze and disseminate data and information, primarily 

using data warehouses. Through collaboration with people within CDC and State health 

departments currently developing data warehouses, a method will be developed to solicit 

specification requirements from potential users, to review available COTS (commercial 

off-the-shelf) products based on these functionalities, and to provide logical justification 

for choices, with empirical justification when available and appropriate. Through this 

process, a form of a standard off-the- shelf or internally developed software application 

will be identified to provide data access capacity to a variety of users with various needs. 

Conclusion

As this document illustrates, CDC staff working on NEDSS are focusing on the 

development, testing, and implementation of standards. These standards will serve as the 

framework that will support more complete and comprehensive integration of systems in 

the future. The standards focus on five important areas: data architecture (data model and 

data standards), user interface, information systems software architecture , tools for 

interpretation, analysis, and dissemination of data, and secure data transfer. While the 

various systems developed by CDC and State and local health departments will remain 

distinct from one another, the use of standards will assure that surveillance data may be 

easily shared, that users familiar with one system can easily use another, and that 

software can be easily shared across programs. In addition this approach will ensure that 

State-of-the-art statistical methods are readily available to epidemiologists, and that a 

single secure method is in place for reporting data to CDC. 

These standards are just the first step to achieving the desired level of integration among 

CDC-developed, as well as State- and locally-developed, surveillance systems. However, 

they will provide an important degree of integration for the collection, management, 

transmission, analysis, and dissemination of data that does not currently exist. It is 

expected that this integration will better support public health professionals in their 

efforts to improve the health of the populations they serve. 
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Epidemic Information Exchange (EPI-X): A Rapid Communication System 

to Notify Public Health Officials of Emerging Health Events 

Background

With the capacity for local outbreaks to develop into pandemics in a matter of days, the 

emergence of previously unidentified diseases, the potential for contaminated food or 

products to be widely disseminated, and the increased threat of bio-terrorism, the need for 

rapid communication, research and response has become an essential element of the 

public health profession. To keep pace with these emerging challenges, the CDC recently 

launched Epi-X, the Epidemic Information Exchange. Epi-X is a secure, Web-based 

communications network for public health officials that will both simplify and expedite 

the exchange of routine and emergency public health information between CDC and state 

health departments. This information will prompt investigative and prevention efforts, 

and help bioterrorism preparedness efforts by helping officials share preliminary 

information about outbreaks and other health events across jurisdictions, and gain every 

day experience in the use of a secure communication system. Examples of postings 

include disease outbreaks, newly recognized environmental, product and occupational or 

recreational hazards, vaccine recalls, bioterrorism threats, and disaster response. EPI-X

is guided by an editorial board, and has been endorsed by the Council of State and 

Territorial Epidemiologists. Epi-X became operational in November 2000. 

System Description: Developed using a user centered design process, the construction of 

Epi-X was facilitated by the input of over one hundred health officials and scientists. EpiX enables state and local epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, and other members of 

the public health community to: 

• Instantly notify colleagues and experts of urgent public health events; 

• Receive a daily email of information in their area of interest 

• Create reports and track information; 

• Research outbreaks and unusual health events through an easily searchable database; 

• Rapidly communicate with colleagues through e-mail, Web and telecommunications 

capabilities; 

• Quickly find people and information; 

• Customize their home page, information and options based upon specific needs; and 

• Request assistance from CDC online. 

Future needs: Epi-X is an initial effort to build secure public health communications 

capacity at the national level and as such will have to grow to fully link officials across 
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jurisdictions and disciplines into a responsive public health work force. Future needs 

identified in discussions with health officials include technical changes to provide secure 

communications for multi-state outbreak response teams, links to disease surveillance 

systems to merge disease reporting with health alerting, and improved software to 

automate the recognition of similar disease outbreaks across jurisdictions. 

 

Project Contacts 

Carol Pertowski, M.D., Medical Director, Epi-X

John W. Ward, M.D., Editor, MMWR, Director OSHC, EPO (404) 639-3636 
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APPENDIX I—NEW ENGLAND AND EASTERN CANADIAN MUTUAL 

ASSISTANCE COMPACT 

INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE MEMORANDUM 

OF UNDERSTANDING

This document follows from Resolution 23-5 resolved at the 23rd Annual 

Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers and is 

compliant with Article II (j) of the Agreement between the Government of the 

United States and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive 

Emergency Planning and Management renewed on December 2, 1998. 

Purpose and Authorities - Article I 

The International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of Understanding, 

hereinafter referred to as the "compact," is made and entered into by and among such of the 

jurisdictions as shall enact or adopt this compact, hereinafter referred to as "party jurisdictions." 

For the purposes of this agreement, the term "jurisdictions" may include any or all of the States 

of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut and the 

Provinces of Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 

and such other states and provinces as may hereafter become a party to this compact. 

The purpose of this compact is to provide for the possibility of mutual assistance among the 

jurisdictions entering into this compact in managing any emergency or disaster when the affected 

jurisdiction or jurisdictions ask for assistance, whether arising from natural disaster, 

technological hazard, man-made disaster or civil emergency aspects of resources shortages. 

This compact also provides for the process of planning mechanisms among the agencies 

responsible and for mutual cooperation, including, if need be, emergency-related exercises, 

testing, or other training activities using equipment and personnel simulating performance of any 

aspect of the giving and receiving of aid by party jurisdictions or subdivisions of party 

jurisdictions during emergencies, with such actions occurring outside actual declared emergency 

periods. Mutual assistance in this compact may include the use of emergency forces by mutual 

agreement among party jurisdictions. 

General Implementation - Article II 

Each party jurisdiction entering into this compact recognizes that many emergencies may exceed 

the capabilities of a party jurisdiction and that intergovernmental cooperation is essential in such 

circumstances. Each jurisdiction further recognizes that there will be emergencies that may 

require immediate access and present procedures to apply outside resources to make a prompt 

and effective response to such an emergency because few, if any, individual jurisdictions have all 

the resources they need in all types of emergencies or the capability of delivering resources to 

areas where emergencies exist. 
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The prompt, full and effective utilization of resources of the participating jurisdictions, including 

any resources on hand or available from any other source that are essential to the safety, care and 

welfare of the people in the event of any emergency or disaster, shall be the underlying principle 

on which all articles of this compact are understood. 

On behalf of the party jurisdictions participating in the compact, the legally designated official 

who is assigned responsibility for emergency management is responsible for formulation of the 

appropriate inter-jurisdictional mutual aid plans and procedures necessary to implement this 

compact, and for recommendations to the jurisdiction concerned with respect to the amendment 

of any statutes, regulations or ordinances required for that purpose. 

Party Jurisdiction Responsibilities - Article III 

1. Formulate plans and programs. It is the responsibility of each party jurisdiction to 

formulate procedural plans and programs for inter-jurisdictional cooperation in the 

performance of the responsibilities listed in this section. In formulating and implementing 

such plans and programs the party jurisdictions, to the extent practical, shall: 

A. Review individual jurisdiction hazards analyses that are available and, to the 

extent reasonably possible, determine all those potential emergencies the party 

jurisdictions might jointly suffer, whether due to natural disaster, technological 

hazard, man-made disaster or emergency aspects of resource shortages; 

B. Initiate a process to review party jurisdictions' individual emergency plans and 

develop a plan that will determine the mechanism for the inter-jurisdictional 

cooperation; 

C. Develop inter-jurisdictional procedures to fill any identified gaps and to resolve 

any identified inconsistencies or overlaps in existing or developed plans; 

D. Assist in warning communities adjacent to or crossing jurisdictional boundaries; 

E. Protect and ensure delivery of services, medicines, water, food, energy and fuel, 

search and rescue and critical lifeline equipment, services and resources, both 

human and material to the extent authorized by law; 

F. Inventory and agree upon procedures for the inter-jurisdictional loan and delivery 

of human and material resources, together with procedures for reimbursement or 

forgiveness; and 

G. Provide, to the extent authorized by law, for temporary suspension of any statutes 

or ordinances, over which the province or state has jurisdiction, that impede the 

implementation of the responsibilities described in this subsection. 

2. Request assistance. The authorized representative of a party jurisdiction may request 

assistance of another party jurisdiction by contacting the authorized representative of that 

jurisdiction. These provisions only apply to requests for assistance made by and to 

authorized representatives. Requests may be verbal or in writing. If verbal, the request must 

be confirmed in writing within 15 days of the verbal request. Requests must provide the 

following information: 

A. A description of the emergency service function for which assistance is needed 

and of the mission or missions, including but not limited to fire services, 

emergency medical, transportation, communications, public works and 

engineering, building inspection, planning and information assistance, mass 

care, resource support, health and medical services and search and rescue; 

B. The amount and type of personnel, equipment, materials and supplies needed 

and a reasonable estimate of the length of time they will be needed; and 
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C. The specific place and time for staging of the assisting party's response and a 

point of contact at the location. 

3. Consultation among party jurisdiction officials. There shall be frequent consultation 

among the party jurisdiction officials who have assigned emergency management 

responsibilities, such officials collectively known hereinafter as the International 

Emergency Management Group, and other appropriate representatives of the party 

jurisdictions with free exchange of information, plans and resource records relating to 

emergency capabilities to the extent authorized by law. 

Limitation - Article IV 

Any party jurisdiction requested to render mutual aid or conduct exercises and training for 

mutual aid shall undertake to respond as soon as possible, except that it is understood that the 

jurisdiction rendering aid may withhold or recall resources to the extent necessary to provide 

reasonable protection for that jurisdiction. Each party jurisdiction shall afford to the personnel of 

the emergency forces of any party jurisdiction, while operating within its jurisdictional limits 

under the terms and conditions of this compact and under the operational control of an officer of 

the requesting party, the same powers, duties, rights, privileges and immunities as are afforded 

similar or like forces of the jurisdiction in which they are performing emergency services. 

Emergency forces continue under the command and control of their regular leaders, but the 

organizational units come under the operational control of the emergency services authorities of 

the jurisdiction receiving assistance. These conditions may be activated, as needed, by the 

jurisdiction that is to receive assistance or upon commencement of exercises or training for 

mutual aid and continue as long as the exercises or training for mutual aid are in progress, the 

emergency or disaster remains in effect or loaned resources remain in the receiving jurisdiction 

or jurisdictions, whichever is longer. The receiving jurisdiction is responsible for informing the 

assisting jurisdictions of the specific moment when services will no longer be required. 

Licenses and Permits - Article V 

Whenever a person holds a license, certificate or other permit issued by any jurisdiction party to 

the compact evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical or other skills, 

and when such assistance is requested by the receiving party jurisdiction, such person is deemed 

to be licensed, certified or permitted by the jurisdiction requesting assistance to render aid 

involving such skill to meet an emergency or disaster, subject to such limitations and conditions 

as the requesting jurisdiction prescribes by executive order or otherwise. 

Liability - Article VI 

Any person or entity of a party jurisdiction rendering aid in another jurisdiction pursuant to this 

compact are considered agents of the requesting jurisdiction for tort liability and immunity 

purposes. Any person or entity rendering aid in another jurisdiction pursuant to this compact are 

not liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so 

engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection 

therewith. Good faith in this article does not include willful misconduct, gross negligence or 

recklessness. 
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Supplementary Agreements - Article VII 

Because it is probable that the pattern and detail of the machinery for mutual aid among two or 

more jurisdictions may differ from that among the jurisdictions that are party to this compact, 

this compact contains elements of a broad base common to all jurisdictions, and nothing in this 

compact precludes any jurisdiction from entering into supplementary agreements with another 

jurisdiction or affects any other agreements already in force among jurisdictions. Supplementary 

agreements may include, but are not limited to, provisions for evacuation and reception of injured 

and other persons and the exchange of medical, fire, public utility, reconnaissance, welfare, 

transportation and communications personnel, equipment and supplies. 

Workers' Compensation and Death Benefits - Article VIII 

Each party jurisdiction shall provide, in accordance with its own laws, for the payment of 

workers' compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that 

jurisdiction and to representatives of deceased members of those forces if the members sustain 

injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the 

same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own jurisdiction. 

Reimbursement - Article IX 

Any party jurisdiction rendering aid in another jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall, if 

requested, be reimbursed by the party jurisdiction receiving such aid for any loss or damage to or 

expense incurred in the operation of any equipment and the provision of any service in answering 

a request for aid and for the costs incurred in connection with those requests. An aiding party 

jurisdiction may assume in whole or in part any such loss, damage, expense or other cost or may 

loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party jurisdiction without charge or 

cost. Any two or more party jurisdictions may enter into supplementary agreements establishing 

a different allocation of costs among those jurisdictions. Expenses under article VIII are not 

reimbursable under this section. 

Evacuation - Article X 

Each party jurisdiction shall initiate a process to prepare and maintain plans to facilitate the 

movement of and reception of evacuees into its territory or across its territory, according to its 

capabilities and powers. The party jurisdiction from which the evacuees came shall assume the 

ultimate responsibility for the support of the evacuees, and after the termination of the emergency 

or disaster, for the repatriation of such evacuees. 

Implementation - Article XI 

1. This compact is effective upon its execution or adoption by any two jurisdictions, and is 

effective as to any other jurisdiction upon its execution or adoption thereby: subject to 

approval or authorization by the U.S. Congress, if required, and subject to enactment of 

provincial or state legislation that may be required for the effectiveness of the 

Memorandum of Understanding. 

2. Any party jurisdiction may withdraw from this compact, but the withdrawal does not 

take effect until 30 days after the governor or premier of the withdrawing jurisdiction 

has given notice in writing of such withdrawal to the governors or premiers of all other 
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party jurisdictions. The action does not relieve the withdrawing jurisdiction from 

obligations assumed under this compact prior to the effective date of withdrawal. 

3. Duly authenticated copies of this compact in the French and English languages and of 

such supplementary agreements as may be entered into shall, at the time of their 

approval, be deposited with each of the party jurisdictions. 

Severability - Article XII 

This compact is construed to effectuate the purposes stated in Article I. If any provision of this 

compact is declared unconstitutional or the applicability of the compact to any person or 

circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability 

of the compact to other persons and circumstances are not affected. 

Inconsistency of Language - Article XIII 

The validity of the arrangements and agreements consented to in this compact shall not be 

affected by any insubstantial difference in form or language as may be adopted by the various 

states and provinces. 

Amendment - Article XIV 

This compact may be amended by agreement of the party jurisdictions. 

Signed this 18th day of July, 2000 at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. 
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APPENDIX J– STATES’ RECOMMENDATIONS 

States’ Regional Terrorism Policy Forums 

“Protecting States’ Critical Infrastructures”

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION

CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES AND

THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

In February 1999, the National Governors' Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices and the 

National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) co-sponsored the States’ Terrorism Policy 

Summit in Williamsburg, Virginia. One of the many significant outcomes arising from that summit, 

which was hosted by Governor James S. Gilmore, was the concept that states needed to work 

together in partnership with the federal government to develop a coordinated national strategy to 

prepare for and deal with the consequences of domestic terrorism. As such, NGA and NEMA 

have again combined efforts to co-sponsor a series of regional forums to address domestic 

terrorism preparedness by bringing together state145, local, and federal officials to share 

information and explore emerging issues about state and federal efforts. These regional 

meetings have been conducted throughout 2000, with meetings in Atlanta, Georgia, and Des 

Moines, Iowa that were hosted by Governor Roy Barnes and Governor Tom Vilsack, respectively. 

Another forum was held in Salt Lake City, Utah, and an additional regional meeting is planned for 

December in Boston, Massachusetts. In May, 2001 NGA and NEMA anticipate hosting a second 

national summit to discuss progress since February 1999, and to define the next steps in 

finalizing a national preparedness strategy. 

STATES’ RECOMMENDATIONS

At each of the policy forms, state officials were asked to make recommendations for improving 

the nation’s ability to more effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from the 

consequences of terrorism. The following is a compilation of these recommendations from the 

first three forums: 

Threat/Awareness 

1. Credible threat information on WMD is needed that is based on solid research, analysis and 

sound science rather than worst-case scenarios based on fiction. 

2. States should put more emphasis on the awareness of vulnerabilities and threats concerning 

bioterrorism. 

3. States should develop an effective strategy for communicating the potential threat to the 

public and the media. 

4. States need additional training and technical assistance with conducting vulnerability 

assessments. 

5. States should put more emphasis on the awareness of vulnerabilities and threats concerning 

cyberterrorism. 

 

145 The following states attended various regional meetings: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 

Hawaii, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 

Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 

Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the District of 

Columbia. 
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6. States need to take action to ensure that awareness of the possibility of WMD incident at the 

executive level and to ensure continuity between Administrations. 

Preparedness/Response 

7. All levels of government should utilize and improve upon the existing emergency 

management and response systems and should not seek to “reinvent the wheel.” 

8. The federal government must develop an overall terrorism preparedness strategy that 

includes program consolidation between all agencies, funding consolidation, integration of 

goals and objectives, and a federal single point of contact. The strategy must address 

sustainability issues and also identify ways to engage the private sector in domestic 

preparedness. Further, this strategy should provide general guidelines and 

recommendations for state preparedness in order to tie the nation together in a united 

planning effort. 

9. Long-term sustainability of federal funding and focus is a major concern for states. The 

answer is to integrate domestic preparedness into an all-hazards response capability, utilize 

available resources to enhance overall capabilities of state and local response systems. 

7. All levels of government should adopt the Incident Command System. 

8. All levels of government should formalize interagency relationships through operational 

protocols. 

9. States should develop mutual aid agreements across multiple jurisdictions and consider 

developing a regional WMD response capability. 

10. States should mandate WMD specific planning, training, and exercises beyond natural 

hazard approach and take advantage of all training opportunities. 

11. All levels of government should ensure that crisis management and consequence 

management occur in coordination and in parallel. 

12. States need to consider a statewide interoperable communications system. 

13. States should develop teams (and consider using existing Y2K teams) to deal with 

cyberterrorism. 

14. A WMD Overhead Management Team should be established to rapidly deploy and establish 

a Joint Operations Center (JOC). This team would be activated during a credible or actual 

terrorist event involving a weapon of mass destruction. It could be modeled after the National 

Incident Management Teams of the National Interagency Coordinating Group. They provide 

an overhead management system in response to major wildfires around the nation. They 

have also been used during other significant national events. A DOJ/FEMA component and 

training could be added to the National Interagency Coordinating Group for this purpose. 

15. States need recommended templates, model legislation, and recognized “best practices” to 

assist them in WMD preparedness planning and response. NGA and NEMA were identified 

as the appropriate organizations to collect and disseminate these resources to the states. 

16. A national interoperable Exercise Design and Planning System with an efficient After Action 

Reporting (AAR) mechanism is needed to design plan and conduct WMD exercises. The 
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Exercise Design and Planning System, EDAPSTM being developed for the New Mexico WMD 

program provides this type of application. It is a platform to greatly improve exercises and, it 

also provides a measure of standardization and interface without dictating a policy of 

standardization. http://demo.edaps.net. 

17. States need to develop procedures to access National Pharmaceutical Stockpile including 

how to formally request resources and how local governments will receive it. 

18. Agricultural terrorism needs to be addressed by states and the federal government. 

Coordination/Information Sharing 

19. Increased federal coordination is critical to the nations’ overall capability to respond to a 

terrorist event. 

20. States should require the establishment of joint terrorism working groups for coordination. 

21. All levels of government should mandate a formal communication network between the 

intelligence community and medical community. 

22. States should identify what intelligence information is needed at the state level and who can 

receive it and assess security clearances with the FBI. 

23. Effective relationships should be built and maintained to enhance information sharing among 

agencies and levels of government. 

24. With regard to the Joint Information Center (JIC), there must be a coordinated message from 

all three levels of government. 

25. The NDPO, NGA or NEMA should serve as a clearinghouse for “best practices” and share 

model plans, effective programs, policy determinations, conference and training information, 

etc. 

26. A national policy is needed for threat-based information sharing. States recommend that a 

national task force be established, with state and local representation, to develop new 

protocols for information sharing. 

27. A national interoperable communications system with secure access is needed for 

responders. This system should utilize the newest available technology. States further 

recommend that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) become engaged in 

communications interoperability issues. 

Legal Authority/Constitutional Issues 

28. Every state should examine state laws and authorities that relate to search and seizure, 

invasion of privacy, quarantine, evacuation, relocation or restricting access. States should 

develop comprehensive preparedness strategies that utilize all legally available assets. 

29. Each Governor must have the appropriate authority to address the above issues as soon as 

the situation occurs and have these authorities in place before a WMD incident. 

30. States should coordinate with each other regarding restricted access across state lines in a 

WMD incident. 
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31. The federal government and states may need to consider legislation to protect WMD 

intelligence information from Freedom of Information Act Requests. 

Medical Issues 

32. State public health capabilities must be enhanced nationwide. States recommend that the 

medical community be included as first responders in order to place increased emphasis on 

life-saving efforts. 

33. States should plan, train, and exercise on a regular basis with the medical community 

including: HMOs; PPOs; and private hospitals. 

34. States should develop a system that mandates information sharing with medical facilities and 

state epidemiological offices regarding actual, suspected, and potential terrorist activity. 

35. All levels of government should identify ways to provide needed resources to hospitals such 

as equipment, training programs, pharmaceuticals, etc. 

36. The Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation should have a standard for hospital 

preparedness for terrorism. 

37. There should be legal requirements for private hospitals to work cooperatively with the state 

on preparedness, particularly with regard to bio-terrorism surveillance and reporting. 

Military Issues 

38. States should integrate the WMD Civil Support Teams (formerly known as RAID Teams) into 

state planning, training, and exercises. 

39. States and the military require specific funding to train and exercise together. 

Funding 

40. States must determine appropriate funding levels (state and federal contributions) for longterm sustainability such as multi-year funding to match multi-year planning goals and 

objectives. One-year funding does not allow long range planning and implementation for 

domestic preparedness. Federal funding levels are also not adequate when divided between 

all states and thousands of local communities. 

41. States need to examine and address the funding needs of hospitals. 

42. Congress and the federal government should consider threat and risk as a component of the 

criteria for state funding. 

43. Congress and federal agencies should develop an expedited funding mechanism for grants 

to states. 

44. Congress and federal agencies should consider setting aside a percentage of funds within 

grants to states for discretionary use based on the needs assessment and strategic plan of 

the state. 

Training 

45. All levels of government should seek to standardize training and exercises. 
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46. States should train with all agencies and volunteer organizations. 

47. States should be aware of and take advantage of all federal training opportunities. 

48. Many states have developed excellent WMD training courses. Increased federal support is 

needed for these state training programs so that they can be sustained and shared between 

states. A comprehensive compendium of all available federal training programs and funding 

would facilitate this process. 

49. More training opportunities and forums are needed regarding vulnerability assessments. 

Cross discipline training is also needed to develop a common terminology. 

Political 

50. Given that a new Administration will be in place soon, Congress, the federal government, and 

states need to codify the funding authorizations and WMD preparedness programs that are in 

place now to ensure continuity and consistency in the future. 

51. Much progress has been made with regard to WMD preparedness within a short period of 

time. All levels of government need to set baselines for where we are now and establish 

measurable goals and objectives for the future. 
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APPENDIX K—NATIONAL SURVEY METHODOLOGY 

A Survey of Local Responder Organizations 

to Assess Federal Government Programs for 

CBRN Incident Preparation 

Purpose of the Survey 

The survey will elicit State and local response organizations’ assessments of Federal 

programs intended to improve preparedness to respond to a CBRN terrorism incident. In 

addition to soliciting local responders’ assessments of Federal programs, the survey will 

evaluate local awareness of CBRN issues and self-assessed local preparedness to respond 

to a CBRN incident, in order to put the assessments in context. 

The survey differs from past surveys in that it is not a capability assessment, nor is it a 

readiness assessment. Rather, it is a vehicle for responder organizations to provide the 

Panel with a local responder assessment of Federal programs. The information collected 

will be used to inform and validate the Panel’s deliberations, and the results will be 

presented as part of the final Panel report. 

Assessment questions will fall into two major categories: (1) Questions pertaining to a 

subjective assessment of existing Federal government programs aimed at improving local 

responder CBRN preparedness, and (2) local responder desires and needs for Federal 

Government programs, both those programs that exist but have not yet been provided or 

made available to certain local responder organizations and those that are desired or 

required but do not exist. A general description of the survey follows. 

Survey Outline 

Survey questions will be tailored to the individual local responder organization—e.g., 

police department, EMS organization, and public health department—but designed with a 

significant amount of similarity and commonality between organizations. This design 

will allow evaluation within individual responder organizations and comparisons between 

types of responder organizations. The survey will ask questions in several categories: 

Organizational Descriptive Information. These questions will characterize the 

organization in terms of function, size, location, and other characteristics. 

Organizational Threat Perceptions and Experience. These questions will capture how 

credible the organizations consider the various types of CBRN threats and whether the 

organization has had experience with actual or threatened incidents. 

Readiness Assessment, Using Both Subjective and Objective Measures. These questions 

will provide some information about current organizational readiness for CBRN 

incidents. 
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Local Responder Assessment of Their Support Needs and of Current Federal Programs. 

Assessment will include existing Federal Government programs aimed at improving local 

responder CBRN preparedness and local responder desires and needs for support and for 

Federal Government programs. Queries will include awareness of and participation in 

key Federal programs intended to support and improve preparedness efforts at the local 

and State-levels, as well as barriers encountered in terms of participation such as cost, 

availability, time constraints, and others. Examples include grant programs for 

equipment purchasing, funding for training and joint exercise opportunities, information 

sources and threat assessment updates, technical assistance programs. 

Survey Methodology 

The survey will be fielded in March of 2001. The survey will be conducted by mail and 

will be approximately 1/2 hour in length in order to maximize the response rate. 

Questions will primarily be scenario-based and closed ended for specificity, with some 

open-ended final questions to allow for unstructured input. Respondent and 

organizational anonymity will be promised. 

The survey will employ a two-stage sampling strategy in which 200 counties will first be 

randomly chosen146 throughout the United States and then one of each of the following 

types of local responder organizations will be chosen within each county: 

• Law enforcement 

• Fire departments, both professional and volunteer 

• HAZMAT organizations (separate from fire departments) 

• Hospitals 

• Emergency medical services (separate from hospitals and fire departments) 

• County coroners 

• Public health departments 

• Offices of emergency management and/or local CBRN/terrorism working groups 

The sample will be chosen so that it is statistically representative of each responder 

organization population and of local responders in general. In addition, public health 

departments and offices of emergency management of every State will be surveyed. 

For the county organizations, we will sample 200 organizations. An 80 percent response 

rate, yielding 160 completed surveys per type of organization, will result in a confidence 

interval half-width of 10 percent at the organizational level, meaning that a 95 percent 

confidence interval around the percentage of organizations agreeing with a binary 

response question will be plus or minus 10 percent. For questions and analyses that span 

all the organizations, the confidence intervals will be significantly smaller. 

 

146 The probability of selection into the sample will be a function of county population. The probabilities 

will be set so that counties with larger populations have a higher probability of selection; however, small 

and rural counties will also be included in the sample. This sampling scheme was specifically chosen so 

that the maximum amount of information can be obtained. 
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APPENDIX L—TOPOFF OBSERVATIONS 

Several members of the Advisory Panel147 and its support staff observed the conduct of 

the national exercise, directed by Congress, called “Top Officials 2000” or TOPOFF, 

during the period May 20-24, 2000. Members and staff also observed two of the “afteraction” reviews following the exercise. 

The major purpose of the exercise was to engage “top” or senior officials at the Federal 

level, especially the heads of agencies with significant responsibilities for combating 

terrorism. The exercise was conducted under the joint direction of the Department of 

Justice Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. 

There were two “field venues” for the exercise148—Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and 

Denver, Colorado—in addition to the Federal agency exercise locations in the National 

Capital area. There was each field venue had a its own terrorist “attack” scenario. In 

Portsmouth, the attack involved a mustard gas chemical device; in Denver, there was a 

biological attack involving a release of “plague.” 

General Observations 

The exercise was only partially successful in engaging the heads of Federal agencies. 

Observers made special note of the direct and intense involvement of the Attorney 

General of the United States, who participated in many of the pre-exercise orientations, 

and was in the national emergency operations center (the FBI’s Strategic Information and 

Operations Center) for much of the exercise itself. The Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency also devoted considerable personal time prior to and 

during the exercise. Beyond that, many agency “heads” were designated stand-ins for 

actual agency heads. 

There is significant value in exercises like TOPOFF, that are more than “table-top” paper 

shuffles. With its two major “field” events and separate scenarios, the exercise provided 

a degree of realism on issues such as the potential stress on health and medical treatment 

activities, as well as the identification of numerous coordination problems among various 

governmental agencies at all levels. We encourage additional exercises, and have 

recommended more coordination and structure to a national plan for that purpose. 

Realism 

TOPOFF was intended to be a “no-notice” exercise, with the realistic objective of little or 

no advance warning of a terrorist attack. In large measure, the exercise failed to achieve 

 

147 Vice Chairman Jim Clapper, and members Richard Falkenrath, George Foresman, Jim Greenleaf, and 

Paul Maniscalco. 

148 A third field venue—the National Capital area—was originally designed as part of the total TOPOFF 

exercise. For reasons not fully explained to observers, that part of the exercise—a radiological release—

was removed from TOPOFF and run as a “concurrent” exercise, National Capital Region 2000. 
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that objective. Almost everyone directly involved knew the general exercise time frame 

weeks in advance and were able to pinpoint the actual start several days in advance. 

Some of the reasons advanced for that result include the requirement to arrange logistics 

and other administrative details well in advance, ensuring that certain key officials were 

actually available, scheduling response personnel in order not to disrupt real-life 

activities, potential problems with overtime pay for response personnel, and others. All 

of those factors will, however, pertain if an actual attack occurs. It is our view that a true 

test of the ability of various systems and processes, with virtually no notice, is better for 

learning lessons than a carefully structured one. 

The unfortunate result was a substantial loss of realism. Equipment and personnel assets 

were “pre-positioned,” normal leaves were cancelled; certain advance coordination that 

might not ordinarily be accomplished in advance had already been undertaken. 

Recognizing that such reaction may be hard to replicate in an exercise, one observer 

noted that there was generally no simulated “panic” or the intense sense of urgency that 

would attend an actual event. 

Moreover, the perception among State and local officials at the Portsmouth venue was 

that, given the specific scenario, the level of Federal response provided was much greater 

than would be required if it had been an actual attack of the same magnitude, one senior 

official musing that State and local entities could have handled the attack without any 

Federal assistance. 

Cost of the Exercise 

Observers were critical at the apparently excessive cost of the exercise. It is our view 

that exercises of this nature can and should be conducted “internally.” We believe that 

there is no need to “contract out” most of the exercise design and execution. Several 

agencies of the Federal government, notably numerous elements of the Department of 

Defense, the Federal Emergency Management, various Federal law enforcement 

agencies, and other entities have significant expertise in the design and conduct of 

exercises. Contractors are not likely to be readily available when an event occurs; actual 

systems need to be tested. 

In addition, panel observers came away with the impression that too much money was 

spent unnecessarily, on such items as T-shirts, pins, caps, other “commemorative” items, 

and costly facilities. 

“Consequence” and “Crisis” Management 

The exercise reinforced our concern with the attempt to draw a bright line between 

“crisis” and “consequence” management responsibilities and authority. 

One panel observer noted that the FBI does not focus on anything other than “crisis 

management.” The FBI agents in Portsmouth did not appear to be sensitive to 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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“consequence management” issues or coordination. While it is true that the FBI has the 

Federal lead for “crisis management,” it is clear that the two overlap to such an extent 

that coordination of all response activities must have a central, not bifurcated, focus. 

Use of the Military 

The exercise highlighted both advantages in using the obviously robust capability of the 

military, and problems in its coordination and execution. The FBI learned that, for “crisis 

management” activities, there are potentially major differences in their understanding of 

the military mission, and they way the military structure itself views their roles and 

missions. 

Who’s in Charge? 

This question was not resolved in TOPOFF. Coordination issues arose that can, 

nevertheless, be fixed; and we are confident that some will. 

There were clearly problems with the organization and location of various “operations” 

centers. Part of the problem had to do with available facilities, but part is cultural or 

parochial or both. We address the issue with specific recommendations in Chapter Three. 

As late a 4:00 PM on the day that the attacks actually took place, no Federal agency had 

stepped forward and announced its “lead agency” role. That designation should not be 

assumed. It must be clear, preferably in advance of an incident. (See more discussion on 

operational relationships in Chapter 3.) 

Even as late as the after-action review four weeks after the exercise, relationships were 

not clear. A state official asked the senior FEMA representative if FEMA is “in charge” 

of all consequence management or only the Federal piece. After some thought, the 

answer was, “Only the Federal piece.” 

During the exercise, FEMA representatives were not able to list the full range of support 

available at the Federal level to assist State and local responders. 

Independent Exercise Evaluation 

For valuable lessons to be captured for future reference, it is essential in our view that 

there be a thorough and independent evaluation of such exercises. Other than the fact 

that the General Accounting Office also observed the exercise and has prepared a briefing 

on its observation, there was not structured evaluation of TOPOFF. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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APPENDIX M—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM INFORMATION149

Civilian Oversight and Accountability 

A large number of DoD entities (including elements of the military departments and 

defense agencies, and the combatant Commanders-in-Chief) have varying responsibilities 

for parts of DoD activities for combating terrorism.150 The Assistant Secretary of 

Defense-Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict is responsible for most “antiterrorism” programs—primarily the engagement, outside of the United States, of special 

purpose forces, equipment, and other capabilities. The Secretary has designated another 

civilian as Assistant to the Secretary for Civil Support,151 who has principal responsibility 

for policy development for “consequence management” activities, including direct 

coordination. Other Assistant Secretaries and senior agency officials have responsibility 

for other aspects of the Department’s total effort. The Congress is now requiring the 

DoD to designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense as the senior civilian “with the 

overall supervision of the Department’s combating terrorism activities,”152 apparently for 

the purpose of vesting political accountability and responsibility in a person appointed by 

the President and confirmed by the Senate. 

In addition, the Congress has directed the Secretary to provide to the Congress a detailed 

report on activities to protect military installations from terrorist attack, and to provide 

adequate response capability on those installations to respond to such attacks.153

Command and Control 

In 1999, DoD established a new headquarters for the planning efforts, and command and 

control of subordinate military elements, for providing “consequence management” 

support to domestic civil authorities. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a 

 

149 This is an on-going assessment of several aspects of DoD combating terrorism programs and activities. 

It is not an exhaustive review of all such DoD programs. Such an undertaking would require considerable 

time and significant resources. The Advisory Panel will, nevertheless, continue to analyze, assess, and 

comment on certain DoD activities. 

150 See chart attached. 151 This is not an Assistant Secretary position, i.e., appointed by the President, subject to Senate 

confirmation. 

152 Section 901, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (NDAA FY01)(HR 4205, Pub. L. 

106–398). See discussion in Conference Report to accompany NDAA FY01, p. 833. 

153 Section 1031, NDAA FY01 requires the Secretary of Defense “to submit to Congress a report 

on the program of the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure the preparedness of DOD first responders 

for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction on military installations.” The provision 

directs the Secretary “to include within the report the following: (1) a detailed description of the program; 

(2) the schedule and costs associated with the implementation of the program; (3) how the program is being 

coordinated with first responders in the communities in the localities of the installations; and (4) the plan 

for promoting the interoperability of the equipment used by first responders on DOD installations with the 

equipment used by the first responders in the local communities. . .” as well as “a description of 

deficiencies in the preparedness of DOD installations to respond to a weapon of mass destruction incident 

and the plans of the Department to correct those deficiencies.” Conference Report to accompany NDAA 

FY01, p. 848. 
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major subordinate command of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (previously U.S. Atlantic 

Command), headquartered at Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia. On the surface, this new 

structure seems to provide an appropriate focus for activities for combating terrorism. 

Nevertheless, it now creates two separate systems for providing military assistance to 

civil authorities. 

Military activities to support civil authorities in emergency response had previously been 

coordinated through the U.S. Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS).154 JTF-CS 

will now direct consequence management support for terrorism, while DOMS will be 

responsible for similar support in other emergencies, especially any military assistance 

for response to a natural disaster under provisions of the Stafford Act. The commander 

of JTF-CS has made it clear that his organization will only engage in “consequence 

management” support activities, and events during TOPOFF 2000 substantiated that 

position. While the JTF-CS and staff were present at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to 

respond to requests for “consequence management” support, special purpose forces 

deployed to the same venue, under different command structure, to provide direct support 

to the FBI. Other structures, including additional JTFs under various combatant 

commands, could be used for such “crisis” purposes, but such structures are not well 

defined. 

National Guard Activities and Structure 

Congress and DoD have considered a number of missions and structures for the National 

Guard to provide additional combating terrorism support to civilian authorities. There 

have been numerous studies and analyses on the subject, including an exhaustive study in 

1998-1999.155 

National Guard units and personnel have been thought to be an especially attractive asset 

for several reasons, including: 

Guard elements are normally under the authority of State Governors, under 

provisions of U.S. Code, Title 32. It is only when Guard personnel conduct 

overseas training or when they have been mobilized and deployed under 

provisions of Title 10 or other statutes that they become “Federal” forces. In that 

Title 32 status, the Governor can direct their employment anywhere in the state 

that they may be needed. Moreover, Governors of several States may agree to use 

Guard elements for mutual support. 

Guard personnel in a Title 32 or “state” status are not automatically subject to the 

restrictions of 18 U. S. Code, Section 1385—the so-called Posse Comitatus Act—

and other statutory restrictions on the use of the military domestically.156

Guard units and personnel are “local.” They are viewed as integral parts of 

communities; many are employed in their civilian capacity in law enforcement, 

fire services, and other “response” occupations. Being local, they are likely to be 

 

154 The Department of the Army had been serving as “Executive Agent” of the DoD for such purposes. 155National Guard Support for Terrorism Response, SAIC, March 1999. 156 See Appendix R for a discussion of those statutory restrictions. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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able to respond more quickly than an active duty military element from 

somewhere else in the country. 

In 1998, Congress directed the creation of certain National Guard detachments or teams, 

designed specifically to assist State and local response entities in “consequence 

management” activities. Those units, originally designated Rapid Assessment and Initial 

Detection (RAID) teams, are now known as Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 

Teams or WMDCSTs. Starting with ten teams, composed of 22 full-time National Guard 

active duty personnel, in 1999, Congress directed an additional 17 teams in fiscal year 

2000, and recently added five more,157 for a total of 32.158

Training 

In Chapter Three, there is a discussion of the Domestic Preparedness Program (the “120 

Cities” training program established under the provisions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Act). Even with the transfer of most aspects of that program to the Department of 

Justice, DoD continues to have a number of other training and exercise programs, several 

of which involve direct participation by State and local responders.159 Nevertheless, there 

apparently is no comprehensive DoD plan or standard for the conduct of such training 

activities, nor a senior official designated for the oversight of terrorism-related training 

programs. 

Domestic Preparedness Programs for Combating Terrorism 

DoD had a total budget for combating terrorism of approximately $4.5 billion for FY 

2000. A significant portion of that budget goes to support DoD anti-terrorism programs. 

What follows is programmatic description that is limited to major research, development, 

training, and equipment programs within DoD deemed relevant to domestic preparedness 

and response for terrorist incidents. Some programs may only be indirectly related to 

State and local terrorism preparedness. The spending on such programs totaled $766.5 

million in FY2000, about 18% of the total DoD budget of $4.5 billion for programs to 

combat terrorism. 

In its 18 May 2000 Annual Report to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget 

records only $476 million in FY2000 WMD preparedness spending for the entire 

“national security community”—a further indication that it is difficult to discern what 

programs are included in the OMB report. 

The information contained in this analysis is derived from a 200-page DoD Combating 

Terrorism budget document, one that is primarily informational. It appears to be a 

compilation of programs, rather than an attempt to establish spending priorities or 

 

157 Section 1032, NDAA FY01. 158 WMDCSTs are being allocated on the basis of one per State, with the exception of California, which has 

two. 

159 The U.S. Marine Corps Chem-Bio exercise program is one example. 
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provide direction to the numerous DoD agencies involved. That is especially true with 

research and development programs. 

Having said that, the DoD budget document, which provides a description of each 

program, is much more comprehensive and inclusive than any that we have found in any 

other agency. Individual program descriptions are grouped according to the entity in 

DoD with which each is associated. 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

1. Physical Security Equipment Program, $25.4 million (FY00) 

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) is 

responsible for the execution of the PSE Program. This program utilizes an ongoing DoDcoordinated Joint Action Group, including the three Services and the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. Other representatives may include DoE, DoJ and NIJ. The Joint Action Group’s 

primary functions include monitoring, directing and prioritizing potential and existing PSE 

programs. Each of the Services or CINC users can nominate products for Force Protection 

commercial off the shelf evaluation and testing. 

2. Chemical/Biological Defense Program, $15.4 million (FY00) 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is responsible for the Chemical/Biological 

Defense Program. Among its projects, this program assesses military installations' vulnerabilities 

to chemical and biological threats. In addition, FY2000 plans included providing technical 

support and upgrades to the CD-ROM planning tools for Joint Staff Anti-Terrorism/Force 

Protection initiatives. 

JSIVA Teams (Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment) became indigenous to DTRA in 

FY2000, giving installation commanders and First Responders the training and tools necessary to 

limit their vulnerability to the threat of WMD terrorism and react in a manner that will save lives. 

The Chemical/Biological Program also provided equipment and training for 5 WMD Civil 

Support Teams in FY2000 and will provide funds for improved Chemical Agent Monitors and 

Chemical Agent Monitor simulators in FY2001. 

3. Biological Warfare Defense Program, $131.7 million (FY00) 

The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency manages and directs this program, which 

develops and tests medical response, detection, defensive/protective systems, genetic sequencing, 

and consequence management to protect against the possible use of biological warfare agents 

(including bacterial, viral and bio-engineered organisms and toxins) by both military and terrorist 

opponents. DARPA coordinates its activities with DTRA, the Food and Drug Administration, the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence 

community. 

Some examples of the technologies that this program will explore in FY2001 are included below: 

Build and test a prototype air purification system for collective protection 
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Test, in model systems, one or more of the most promising candidate strategies for rapid 

detection based on bodily responses or other biomarkers to provide early indicators of 

infection or exposure 

Develop neutralization technologies for aerosolized agents 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

4. Combating Terrorism Technology Support (CTTS) Program, $43.6 million (FY00) 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, OASD 

(SO/LIC), administers the CTTS Program. This program helps fund research and development 

efforts as part of DoD’s Technical Support Working Group, which is the R&D component of the 

Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism. The program also works with the White 

House Office of Science and Technology to determine current government-wide deficiencies that 

could be addressed with non-medical research and development. Examples of CTTS Program 

projects for FY01 are as follows: 

Detection and defeat of improvised explosive devices, 

Protection and assurance of critical government, public and private infrastructure systems 

required to maintain the national and economic security of the U.S, 

Investigative and forensic support to terrorist related cases, 

Improvements in personnel protective equipment for escaping the immediate vicinity of a 

terrorist attack, and 

Development of systems to support the treatment of mass casualties, as well as WMD 

threat remediation in urban areas. 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

5. Deputy Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism), $2.1 million (FY00) 

In 1999 this office coordinated the JSIVAs program that managed and allocated 96 JSIVAs that 

assessed DoD installations in the area of physical security, counter-operations, intelligence and 

counterintelligence, operational readiness, structural engineering, and infrastructure engineering. 

These teams provided commanders with expert assessments of their vulnerability to terrorist 

attacks. 

Funding also includes a Force Protection Equipment Demonstration that will showcase 

commercial off-the-shelf force protection equipment. The funding for FY2001 includes 

Executive Seminars on antiterrorism and implementation of the Best Practices Study. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

6. Domestic Preparedness Program, $32.1 million (FY00) 

With the transition of the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice, overall 

FY01 program funding will be significantly reduced from FY00 (by $10 million). The U.S. 

Army will still maintain the following programs in FY01: 

Expert Assistance Program: The Chem-Bio Database is one of three components that 

comprise the Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) being developed and maintained 
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by FEMA with interagency members for use by State and local authorities; its maintenance 

will continue to be a U.S. Army responsibility. 

Equipment Testing Program: The Equipment Testing Program evaluates and tests 

commercial protective equipment using live agents. 

Chemical and Biological Improved Response Program: This program relates to DoD 

activities with the chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) and the 

WMD Civil Support Teams. As a result, the funding projects for these programs assume that 

DoD will bear half of the estimated total program cost, while DoJ assumes the other half. 

Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team: DoD is required to maintain at least one 

domestic rapid response team per Section 1414 of Pub. L. 104-201. This requirement does 

not include the WMD Civil Support Teams since they are under the direction of State 

governors. 

7. Security, Force Protection and Law Enforcement Division, $136.6 million (FY00) 

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army provides for anti-terrorism 

functional courses in the Army's Service School System and the Military Police School. Mobile 

Training Teams also conduct training at various locations. This training is not part of the 

Domestic Preparedness Program nor other programs for training State and local law enforcement 

and first responders. 

8. Consequence Management Program (CoMPIO), $107.2 million (FY00) 

The Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities, 

established a Consequence Management Program and Integration Office. The CoMPIO program 

responsibilities include: management of the operational training exercises for the WMD Civil 

Support Teams and Military Support Detachment, and existing Reserve Component domestic 

response, casualty decontamination, NBC reconnaissance, medical, engineering, security, 

information, communications, logistics, and transportation organizations supporting civil 

authorities in preparing for and responding to the consequences of terrorist attacks using weapons 

of mass destruction within the United States. 

9. Additional U.S. Army Programs, specific combating terrorism funding unknown. 

In addition to the three programs listed above, the U.S. Army is involved in various research, 

development, training, and exercising programs that may relate indirectly to WMD response and 

yet are not included in the overall DoD combating terrorism FY2001 budget. These programs 

include: US Army 52nd Ordnance Group, US Army Technical Support Unit, US Army Response 

Task Forces, US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, US Army Medical 

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, US Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic 

Analytical Center Modular On-Site Laboratory, US Army Radiological Control Team, and the 

US Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

10. Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Atlantic Command, $5.6 million (FY00) 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Costs associated with the headquarters and for coordination and planning activities of the joint 

task force. 

11. Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, $1.4 million (FY00) 

The Marine Corps System Command’s CBIRF research and development programs work towards 

the development of key technologies that will benefit CBIRF and the armed forces as a whole. 

These improvements are in the areas of reconnaissance, decontamination, emergency medical 

support, communications and general support and force protection. 

12. Navy Force Protection Division, $152.0 million (FY00) 

Like the U.S. Army force protection programs, these training efforts do not directly apply to 

domestic response capabilities. However it is important to note that the U.S. Navy is also 

conducting anti-terrorism awareness and training program and a cross-agency dialogue may 

inform each organization’s “best practices.” The funding noted above includes material, supplies, 

equipment and travel costs to conduct criminal investigative services and antiterrorism awareness 

training program ashore and afloat, as well as domestic terrorism coordination and investigation 

of theft of navy ordnance. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

13. First Responder -- WMD Threat Response Program, $73.0 million (FY00) 

This program provides first responder (fire, EOD, security forces, medical personnel, and CE 

readiness) WMD planning, training, exercising and equipment capabilities for Air Force 

installations. The training is modeled after the WMD Civil Support Teams and the Texas A&M 

Training Academy programs and is intended to provide direct support for CBIRF deployment. In 

FY2000 the Air Force spent $73 million on Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) aircraft, 

but nothing on first responder training. The FY2001 budget proposal ($2.7 million) does not 

reflect any additional procurement. 

 

14. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, FY 40.5 million (FY00) 

The Air Force also has its own antiterrorism training program. The FY 01 program funding 

includes: 9,748 antiterrorism training sessions and 6 interactive courses for senior Air Force 

leaders and their drivers. 
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MILITARY PERSONNEL SPENDING FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 

The budget numbers attached to the brief program descriptions listed above do not 

include spending for military personnel. Not all spending for domestic preparedness for 

terrorism has been, nor perhaps can be, captured. Spending for such personnel costs that 

has been included in the DoD budget document is summarized below. 

The first chart provides personnel costs for the Consequence Management and Domestic 

Preparedness Programs. The Consequence Management program personnel funding for 

FY2000 is primarily for the National Guard WMDCSTs. For FY2001, according to the 

DoD budget submission, costs also include the “local Department of Defense installation 

commander’s training for first responders.” The Domestic Preparedness program costs 

for FY2000 reflect DoD’s exclusive responsibility for its implementation. Most of that 

program transferred to DOJ on October 1, 2000. 

Consequence Management and Domestic Preparedness Programs 

Agency Category FY2000 FY2001

Army AC Military personnel $ 600,000 $ 100,000 

 National Guard 20,000,000 27,500,000

 Reserve 2,100,000 100,000

Navy * * *

Marine Corps * * *

Air Force National Guard 5,400,000 6,700,000

Consequence Management Totals $ 28,100,000 $ 34,400,000 

*Note: The Navy and the Marine Corps did not provide a breakdown of spending on personnel. The Navy 

 had 26 personnel (primarily for JTF-CS) and the Marine Corps had 373 personnel dedicated to consequence 

 management in FY2000. (primarily for CBIRF). In neither case were personnel costs provided. 

Personnel costs reflected in the following chart represent spending for all terrorism 

programs—anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, “crisis management,” and “consequence 

management,” domestic preparedness, force protection, and installation defense—

worldwide. Personnel costs in the preceding chart are included in the totals below. 

Total Military Personnel Spending for Combating Terrorism 

Agency Category FY2000 FY2001

Army AC Military personnel $ 676,500,000 $ 698,200,000 

 National Guard 85,100,000 94,100,000

 Reserve 46,800,000 45,200,000

Navy AC Military personnel 155,190,000 167,240,000

 Reserve 11,959,000 12,678,000

Marine Corps AC Military personnel 308,809,000 322,418,000

 Reserve 4,290,000 4,540,000

Air Force AC Military personnel 901,000,000 938,500,000

 National Guard 95,900,000 100,900,000

 Reserve 34,800,000 35,500,000

SOCOM AC Military personnel 92,596,000 99,025,000

Totals $2,320,440,596 $ 2,518,301,000 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving W

Federal Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism 

Federal Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism 

15 Dec 99

Department of Defense

Secretary, Deputy Secretary 

Assistant Secretary 

for H ealth Affairs

The Army S

U.S. Army 

Medical 

Research an

Materiel 

Command

Soldier & 

Biologica

Chemical 

Command

Arsenals

Rapid 

Response 

Teams

U.S.Army 

Medical Research 

Institute of 

Chemical Defense

U.S.Army Medical 

Research Institute 

of Infectious 

Diseases

U.S.

Me

Mat

Com

U.S. Army 

Materiel 

Command

Defense 

Research and 

Engineering

Defense Threat 

Reduction 

Agency

Ballistic 

M issile Defense 

O rganization

Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency

Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense - Nuclear, Chemical 

and Biological Defense 

Programs

Assistant Secretary 

for Reserve Affairs

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Manpower & 

Reserve 

Affairs

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Installations 

& 

Environment

Director of 

Military Support

UnderSecretary

for Policy

UnderSecretary for 

Personnel and 

Readiness

UnderSecretary Secretary of the Army

for Acquisition 

and Technology

Defense Intelligence 

Agency

Defense Information 

Systems Agency

National Imagery and 

Mapping Agency

National Security 

Agency

National 

Reconnaissance Office

Assistant Secretary for 

Command, Control, 

Communications, and 

Intelligence

Chief of Sta

Army

Defense Security 

Service

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Acquisition, 

Logistics & 

Technology

Assistant 

Secretary for International 

Security 

Affairs

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Special 

Operations 

and Low 

Intensity 

Conflict

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Strategy and 

Threat 

Reduction

Joint Task Force -

Civil Support

U.S. Joint Forces 

Command

Other Unified 

Commanders-inChief

Special Assistant for 

Civil Support

Defense 

Logistics 

Agency

Joint Program Office for 

Biological Defense

M-9 

De

partment of Defense Or

ganizational Structure for Combatin

g Te
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APPENDIX N—DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROGRAM INFORMATION 

The Department of Justice has not produced a document that provides program 

description for all combating terrorism programs in DOJ. Most such programs are 

administered either through the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), and its subordinate 

entities, especially the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, or 

through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As the following charts indicate, the OMB 

budget document for the DOJ portion of “WMD Preparedness” also provides limited 

details. 

OMB Summary of DOJ's Combating Terrorism Spending 

Dollars in Millions FY99 Actual FY00 Enacted FY01 Request

WMD Preparedness $201.20 $217.20 $254.70 

CIP 54.10 44.00 45.50 

Totals (Dollars in Millions) $255.30 $261.20 $300.20 

Within the main body of the report (Chapter 3), we have commented favorably on 

specific aspects of the DOJ programs, particularly the equipment grant program, and the 

“assessment” tool developed by OSLDPS as part of that process; we have also expressed 

our concern about the potential impact of the transfer of the Domestic Preparedness 

Program from the DoD to DOJ. In Appendix L, we have included specific comments on 

the observation of the TOPOFF exercise by members of the Advisory Panel. 

As noted elsewhere in this report, the vast majority of the programs under OJP have 

never been authorized. They only exist through a funding stream provided in a 

succession of appropriations bills. That will continue to be the case in FY2001, assuming 

that applicable provisions of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 

Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2001 is eventually signed into 

law in substantially the form passed by the Congress. 

OJP FY2000 Program Plan Summary 

Office Program FY00 Enacted

Bureau of Justice Assistance State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training $ 2.00 

National Institute of Justice Counterterrorism Technology 37.20 

Office for Victims of Crime N/A 0.70 

Office for State and Local Domestic 

Preparedness Support 

See OSLDPS chart below 94.80 

Totals (Dollars in Millions) $134.70 
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Provisions contained in the FY2001 Conference Report to accompany that appropriations 

act are descriptive of the problems with programs not properly authorized and the impact 

of special funding earmarks:160

“Counterterrorism Assistance. A total of $220,980,000 to continue the initiative to 

prepare, equip, and train State and local entities to respond to incidents of chemical, 

biological, radiological, and other types of domestic terrorism. Funding is provided as 

follows: 

“Equipment. $109,400,000 is provided for grants to equip State and local first 

responders, including, but not limited to, firefighters and emergency services personnel, 

as follows: 

“$97,000,000 for Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grants to be used to procure 

specialized equipment required by State and local first responders to respond to terrorist 

incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). The conference agreement continues the direction included in the 

fiscal year 2000 Appropriations Act, allowing funds to be allocated only in accordance 

with an approved State plan, and adopts the direction included in the Senate report 

requiring 80 percent of each State's funding to be provided to local communities with the 

greatest need. 

“Within the total amount provided for these grants, up to $2,000,000 shall be made 

available for continued support of the Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical 

Assistance program at the Pine Bluff Arsenal; $5,000,000 is for equipment grants for 

State and local bomb technicians; and$7,400,000 is for pre-positioned equipment. 

“Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program (NLD). $20,980,000 is for the NLD Domestic 

Preparedness Program authorized under the National Defense Authorization Act, 1997, 

and previously funded by the Department of Defense, to provide training and other 

assistance to the 120 largest U.S. cities. On April 6, 2000, the President proposed the 

transfer of responsibility for completion of the NLD program to the Department of 

Justice. The conference agreement provides the full amount necessary to complete the 

NLD program, of which $8,100,000 is for training and $6,880,000 is for exercises for the 

remainder of the 120 cities; $3,000,000 is for Improved Response Plans; and $3,000,000 

is for management and administrative costs associated with this program. Within the 

amounts provided for Domestic Preparedness Equipment grants, the Office of Justice 

Programs may provide equipment to NLD cities if such equipment is necessary to fulfill 

the requirements of the program. The conference agreement includes a series of new 

programs to address training and exercise requirements on a national basis, and expects 

the Office of Justice Programs to provide any future training and exercises assistance 

through these programs. 

 

 

160 Conference Report 106 –1005, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, Title I extract. 
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“Training. $45,500,000 is for training programs for State and local first responders, to be 

distributed as follows: 

 

“$33,500,000 is for the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, of which 

$15,500,000 is for the Center for Domestic Preparedness at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, 

including $500,000 for management and administration of the Center; $5,250,000 is for 

the Texas Engineering Extension Service at Texas A&M; and $12,750,000 is to be 

equally divided among the three other Consortium members; $8,000,000 is for additional 

training programs to address emerging training needs not provided for by the Consortium 

or elsewhere. In distributing these funds, OJP is expected to consider the needs of 

firefighters and emergency services personnel, and State and local law enforcement; 

$3,000,000 is for continuation of distance learning training programs at the National 

Terrorism Preparedness Institute at the Southeastern Public Safety Institute to provide 

training through advanced distributive learning technology and other mechanisms; and 

$1,000,000 is for continuation of the State and Local Antiterrorism Training Program. 

 

“Exercises. $7,000,000 is for exercise programs, of which $4,000,000 is for grants to 

assist State and local jurisdictions in planning and conducting exercises to enhance their 

response capabilities, and $3,000,000 is for planning, execution, and analysis of TOPOFF 

II. 

 

“Technical Assistance. $2,000,000 is for technical assistance to States and localities. 

 

“Counterterrorism Research and Development. $36,100,000 is for counterterrorism 

research and development, of which $18,000,000 is for the Dartmouth Institute for 

Security Technology Studies (ISTS),$18,000,000 is for the Oklahoma City National 

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), and $100,000 is for a pilot 

project to develop an RDT&E system similar to the Department of Defense System, as 

proposed in the Senate report. Within the amount provided for MIPT, up to $4,000,000 is 

to be used to support the development of performance standards in a biological and 

chemical environment for respirators and personal protective garments. The MIPT and 

the ISTS are directed to work with the Technical Support Working Group and the 

National Domestic Preparedness Office to develop and implement a process whereby 

WMD equipment is standardized.” 

Broad programmatic descriptions of the application of similar funds for FY2000 are 

shown in the following table. 
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Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support 

Program/Grant FY00 Enacted

National Domestic Preparedness Consortium $10.50 

Center for Domestic Preparedness 13.00 

Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services 

Training Program 

 1.50 

WMD Awareness for Sheriffs 0.60 

Personal Scene Safety Training 0.50 

State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program 64.50 

State and Local Domestic Preparedness Exercise Program 1.20 

State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical 

Assistance Program 

 1.50 

Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness 0.75 

Terrorism Policy Workshops 0.75 

Totals (Dollars in Millions) $94.80 

* Note: In FY01, the Domestic Preparedness Training Program, formerly at DoD will shift to DOJ, 

costing approximately $31 million. 
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APPENDIX O—PANEL ACTIVITIES 

Calendar Year 2000 

During the past year, the panel held four formal meetings: 

 March 29, 2000 at the Pentagon, Washington, DC 

 July 17-18, RAND Washington Office, Arlington, VA 

 September 28-29, Library of Virginia, Richmond, VA 

 November 27-28, RAND Washington Office, Arlington, VA 

During the course of those meetings, panel members received formal presentations from 

the following: 

Barry Kelman, DePaul University School of Law, and Michael Wermuth, RAND 

Project Director, on International and Domestic Law regarding Terrorism 

Pam Berkowsky, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense-Civil Support, and BG 

Bruce Lawlor, Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support, on DoD Terrorism 

Policy and Force Structure Issues 

Ed Plaugher, Chief, Arlington County (VA) Fire Department, Dr. Henry 

Siegelson, Emory University Medical Center, and Panel Members Dr. Patricia 

Quinlisk and Dr. Ken Shine, on Critical Health and Medical Issues 

Richard Clarke, Special Assistant to the President for Transnational Threats and 

National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism, and 

Lisa Gordon Hagerty, NSC Director for Transnational Threats, with NSC 

Terrorism Updates 

Ted Macklin, Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (DOJ), 

and Anne Martin, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Exercise CoDirectors for TOPOFF 2000 

George Goodwin and Richard Babarsky, Ph.D., Joint Assessment of Catastrophic 

Events, National Ground Intelligence Center; Major Adrian Bogart and Special 

Agent John Frank, InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and 

InterOperability (IAB); Andy Mitchell, Office of State and Local Domestic 

Preparedness Support, Department of Justice; and LTC Don Buley, Joint Program 

Office for Biological Defense, Department of Defense, on Technology, 

Equipment and Standards 

Panel Member L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer, on the Report of the National Commission 

on Terrorism 

Panel Members Jim Clapper, Jim Greenleaf, Richard Falkenrath, George 

Foresman, and Paul Maniscalco, and RAND Project Director Mike Wermuth, on 

Observations from the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 

Ambassador Michael Sheehan, and Sam Brinkley, U.S. Department of State, on 

the U.S. International Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
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Bruce Morris, Chief Deputy Secretary, Virginia Department of Public Safety, on 

the Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Assistance to State and Local 

Authorities 

The Honorable William Webster, former Director of the FBI, and former Director 

of Central Intelligence on Coordination of Terrorism Intelligence and 

Investigative Activities 

Jeffrey Hunker, NSC Director for Critical Infrastructure Protection; John Tritak, 

Critical Information Assurance Office (CIAO); Leslie Wiser, National 

Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC); Captain Robert West, Joint Task ForceComputer Network Defense (US Space Command) (JTFCND); and Lee Zeichner, 

LegalNetWorks, on Providing Cyber Security and Defending Other Critical 

Infrastructure 

At the March 2000 meeting, panel members determined that one-day meetings were 

insufficient for the amount of information that needed to be presented and adequate time 

to discuss the issues involved. As a result, starting with the July 2000 meeting, the panel 

now conducts two-day sessions. 

Under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, meetings of the panel are 

generally open to the public, except when national security classified information is being 

presented or discussed, or for one of the other exceptions stated in the Act. Notices of 

meetings are published in the Federal Register and posted on the panel’s web page on the 

RAND web site, http://www.rand.org. Unclassified minutes of panel meetings are posted 

to the same web page as soon as the panel has approved them. 

In addition to its regular meetings, panel members and support staff attended and 

participated directly in numerous conferences, workshops ands symposia on the subject 

of terrorism. In addition panel members and staff attended several Congressional 

hearings on terrorism. Panel Vice Chairman Jim Clapper presented testimony on the 

work of the panel before the Subcommittee on Investigations, Oversight, and Emergency 

Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 

Representatives; and Project Director Michael Wermuth presented testimony on the work 

of the panel before the Subcommittee on National Security and Veteran’s Affairs, 

Committee on Governmental Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. 

Calendar Year 2001 Planned 

Continuing Review and Analysis of Federal Programs 

The panel, in conjunction with its supporting FFRDC, will continue its review and 

analysis of existing Federal programs that are designed, in whole or in part, to support or 

enhance domestic preparedness programs for terrorist incidents. 

The review and analysis will place particular emphasis on those areas specifically 

mentioned in the enabling legislation: training, communications, equipment, planning 
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requirements, the needs of maritime regions, and coordination among the various levels 

of government. 

The review and analysis of equipment issues will continue to focus on research, 

development, testing, and evaluation of equipment currently available, as well as 

emerging technologies, communications interoperability, and the development and timely 

dissemination of various categories of critical information between and among entities at 

the Federal, State, and local level. 

Most significantly, the review and analysis with concentrate on several issues: 

Use of the military to respond domestically 

Policies and programs for dealing with the threat of cyber terrorism 

Health and medical issues 

Combating Terrorism fiscal strategies at the Federal, State and local levels 

Survey of Local Responders and State Emergency Management and Response 

Organizations 

During the coming months, the panel will complete its nationwide survey of State and 

local entities. The survey will be designed to elicit the views of those surveyed with 

respect to the efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in the areas of training, 

equipment, planning, communications, and Federal agency coordination among the 

various levels of government. The survey will be conducted with a targeted survey 

audience that will include all geographic regions of the country, and in states and 

localities with a broad range of population densities.161 

Interviews with Federal, State, and Local Officials 

 The panel members and support staff will continue to conduct interviews with 

selected senior and mid-level officials at the Federal, State, and local level—including, at 

the local level, law enforcement, fire services, emergency and other medical providers, 

public health personnel, and other emergency service officials. The purpose of the 

interviews will be to obtain more detailed information on programs and activities 

currently being conducted in certain jurisdictions, as well as specific proposals or 

recommendations that any of those persons interviewed may have to improve or enhance 

Federal efforts designed to strengthen local emergency responses to any such incident. 

 

161 For a complete description of the survey, see Appendix K. 
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APPENDIX P—Glossary of Terms 

ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 

ACPR Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tel Aviv 

ATD Anti-Terrorist Division, Los Angeles Police Department 

BSD Biosensor Systems Design, Inc. 

BW Biological Weapons 

CB Chemical and Biological 

CBO Civilian Behavior Officer 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

CBW Chemical and Biological Weapons 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CEOC County Emergency Operations Center 

CERTCC Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center, 

Carnegie Mellon University 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIAO Critical Information Assurance Office, Department of Commerce 

CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 

CIPHER Common Information for Public Health Electronic Reporting 

CJS Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary and 

 Related Agencies Appropriations Act 

CoMPIO Consequence Management Program, Secretary of the Army 

CONPLAN U.S. Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan 

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 

CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, 

Department of the Army 

CSTE Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 

CT Counter-Terrorism 

CTTS Combating Terrorism Technical Support Program, 

Department of Defense 

CW Chemical Weapons 

DCI Director of Central Intelligence 

DDOS Distributed Denial of Service 

DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Health Services, Los Angeles County 

DNC Democratic National Convention 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOMS Director of Military Support, U.S. Army 

DPP Domestic Preparedness Program, 

Department of Defense/Department of Justice 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
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EMS Emergency Medical Service 

EOB Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Emergency Operations Bureau 

EOC Federal Emergency Operations Center 

EOS Los Angeles Police Department Emergency Operations Section 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPI-X Epi-X, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

Department of Health and Human Services 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FDA Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human 

 Services 

FedCIRC Federal Computer Incident Response Center, 

General Services Administration 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FEST Foreign Emergency Support Teams, Department of State 

FIRM First Responders Mask 

FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

FRP Federal Response Plan 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO General Accounting Office 

HAN Health Alert Network (CDC) 

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 

HFC Home Front Command, Israel Defense Forces 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

IAB Inter-Agency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability 

ICS Incident Command System 

ICT International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 

IDF Israel Defense Forces 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

ISTS Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth 

IW Information Warfare 

JAMA Journal of the American Medical Association 

JIC Joint Information Center 

JOC Joint Operation Center 

JSIVA Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams 

JTFCND Joint Task Force Command 

JTF-CS joint Task Force-Civil Support, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

LACoFD Los Angeles County Fire Department 

LAFD Los Angeles City Fire Department 

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department 

LASD Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

LAWA Los Angeles World Airports 

LAX Los Angeles International Airport 
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LEO Law Enforcement Online 

LFA Lead Federal Agency 

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence 

MDA Magen David Adom, Israeli EMS 

MIPT Memorial Institute for Preventing Terrorism, Oklahoma City 

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System 

MOD Israel Ministry of Defense 

MOE Israel Ministry of the Environment 

MOH Israel Ministry of Health 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NAPHSIS National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems 

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

NEMA National Emergency Management Association 

NGA National Governors Association 

NICI National Interagency Civil-Military Institute 

NIH National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services 

NIJ National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 

Department of Justice 

NIO National Intelligence Officer 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 

Department of Health and Human Services 

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology, 

Department of Commerce 

NLD Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act 

NMRT National Medical Response Team 

NSC National Security Council 

NTS Nevada Test Site 

OEM Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management 

OIC Officer in Charge 

OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice 

OJP Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 

Department of Health and Human Services 

OSINT Open source intelligence 

OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, 

Office of Justice Programs 

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 

PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

PDD Presidential Decision Directive 
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PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

PUB L Public Law 

R&D Research and Development 

RAID Rapid Assessment Initial Detection teams 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

RFW Radio Frequency Weapons 

RRIS Rapid Response Information System, Department of the Army 

SDN Secure Date Network (CDC) 

SEMS Standardized Emergency Management System 

SIS Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Special Investigations Section 

SO/LIC Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense 

TEWG Terrorism Early Warning Group, Los Angeles Operational Area 

TSWG Technical Support Working Group 

TWG Terrorism Working Group, Los Angeles Operational Area 

UCS Unified Command System 

USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 

WHO World Health Organization 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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APPENDIX Q—WORKING DEFINITIONS 

“Weapons of Mass Destruction” 

For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term CBRN (chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in preference to the more commonly used, yet 

potentially misleading term, “weapons of mass destruction” or WMD, to describe the 

unconventional types of weapons that terrorists may use. As recognized in at least one 

Federal statute, moreover, even small amounts of conventional explosives could 

potentially have “mass destructive” effects. 162 Indeed, few Americans would likely 

conclude that the device used in the attack by Timothy McVeigh and his cohorts on the 

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was anything other than a “weapon of mass 

destruction,” despite the more limited definition in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act. It is 

intended that the term CBRN within the construct of this report include, as an example, 

potential terrorist attacks on industrial chemical facilities that do not necessarily involve 

an actual CBRN weapon, where the purpose is to engineer the hazardous release of a 

toxic gas or other substance intended to kill and injure surrounding populations. 

“Mass Casualties” 

With the exception of nuclear weapons, none of the unconventional weapons by itself is, 

in fact, capable of wreaking mass destruction, at least not in structural terms. Indeed, the 

terminology “weapons of mass casualties” may be a more accurate depiction of the 

potentially lethal power that could be unleashed by chemical, biological, or nonexplosive 

radiological weapons. The distinction is more than rhetorical and is critical to 

understanding the vastly different levels of technological skills and capabilities, weapons 

expertise, production requirements, and dissemination or delivery methods needed to 

 

162The NLD (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) Act defines a “weapon of mass destruction” as “any weapon or 

device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number 

of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of—(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their 

precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity.” Nevertheless, 18 U.S.C, Section 

2332a, which makes it a Federal crime—carrying a maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment—to 

use “certain weapons of mass destruction,” includes in its definition of such weapons not only definitional 

elements substantially similar to those contained in NLD, but also “any destructive device as defined in 

section 921” of that title, which includes (A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (i) bomb, (ii) 

grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive 

or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices 

described in the preceding clauses; (B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which. . 

.is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever name known which 

will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other 

propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter; and (C) any 

combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive 

device described in subparagraph (A) or (B) and from any combination of parts either designed or intended 

for use in converting any which a destructive device may be readily assembled.” 
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undertake an effective attack using either chemical or biological weapons in particular.163 

Nevertheless, there continues to be no universally accepted definition of “mass 

casualties.” The panel has, instead, chosen to describe casualties in a range: 

Terrorist acts of that fall into the category of “higher probability” (e.g., with the use of 

conventional high explosives) will produce casualties of “lower consequences” in the 

dozens, compared to a “lower probability” attack (the mass release of an infectious 

biologic), that can cause “higher consequence” casualties in the thousands or tens of 

thousands. 

Terrorism 

There continues to be no universally accepted definition of terrorism. The definition of 

terrorism employed in this report, and used as the framework for its first report and the 

Panel’s deliberations to date, is essentially one used by RAND for more than a quarter of 

a century: 

Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear 

and alarm, through acts designed to coerce others into actions they otherwise would not 

undertake or into refraining from actions that they desired to take. All terrorist acts are 

crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a state of war existed. This 

violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives 

of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that 

will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized 

group, although increasingly lone actors or individuals who may have separated from a 

group can have both the motivation and potentially the capability to perpetrate a terrorist 

attack. Unlike other criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, 

terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage that 

they cause.164

Terrorist Group 

For the purposes of this report, a terrorist group is defined as a collection of individuals 

belonging to an autonomous nonstate or subnational revolutionary or antigovernment 

movement who are dedicated to the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Such an 

entity is seen as having at least some structure and command and control apparatus that, 

no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an overall organizational 

 

163Although biological agents “are often described as ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ it does not follow that 

the ability to inflict mass casualties is an intrinsic property. Key variables in determining the impact of a 

[biological] terrorist attack are the quantity of agent employed and the means of dissemination.” See 

Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 

(July/August 1999), which can be accessed at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ 

ja99tucker.html 

164From Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1986

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3890-RC, 1990), p. 1 (with slight modifications), which in turn is taken 

from Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND , P-5261, 1974). 
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framework and general strategic direction. This definition is meant to include 

contemporary religion-motivated and apocalyptic groups, and other movements that seek 

theological justification or divine sanction for their acts of violence. 

State-Sponsored Terrorism 

State-sponsored terrorism is defined here as the active involvement of a foreign 

government in training, arming, and providing other logistical and intelligence assistance 

as well as sanctuary to an otherwise autonomous terrorist group for the purpose of 

carrying out violent acts on behalf of that government against its enemies. Statesponsored terrorism is, therefore, regarded as a form of surrogate warfare. 
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APPENDIX R—CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE USE 

OF THE MILITARY DOMESTICALLY 

There are several constitutional bases for the use of the military domestically in support 

of civil authorities. Article One gives Congress the power to create military forces, and 

provide for their regulation, and contains explicit language for “calling forth the militia” 

to enforce laws, and suppress rebellions and insurrections.165

Article Two designates the President as commander in chief not only of regular Federal 

forces, but also of the state militias, when in Federal service—“militia” in each of these 

cases being what we now know as the National Guard of the various States.166

Article Four says that the United States shall protect each of the states not only against 

invasion, but also against “domestic violence.” Note the use of the word of the 

obligatory “shall” and not the permissive “may.”167

In the first century of the Republic, there were a number of instances in which the 

military was used to enforce laws, which gave rise to some criticism of those activities, 

most particularly, military actions in the reconstruction and post-reconstruction periods in 

the South. It was the latter circumstances that caused Congress, in June of 1878, to pass 

what has come to be called the “Posse Comitatus Act.”168 Posse Comitatus translated 

from Latin means “the power or force of the county.”169 

The Congress did not proscribe the use of the military in Title 10—the code title for 

military activities generally—as a “posse comitatus,” or otherwise as a means of 

enforcing the laws, it made it a crime under Title 18 to do so. Moreover, the statute does 

not refer to the laws “of the United States,” it refers to “the laws” generally, which can 

include the laws of the various States. 

 

165 “ARTICLE I, Section 8. The Congress shall have power. . .; 

“To raise and support Armies . . .; 

“To provide and maintain a Navy; 

“To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; 

“To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 

Invasions; . . . .” 

166 “ARTICLE II, Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 

United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 

States . . . .” 

167 “ARTICLE IV, Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 

Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the 

Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence. “ 

168 “18 U. S. Code, Section 1385 — Use of Army and Air Force as a posse comitatus. Whoever, except in 

cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 

any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 

169 Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, MN, citing case references. See also The 

American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition, special print for the Virginia Polytechnic Institute 

and State University, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1985. 
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But the Congress created an exception for those cases authorized in the Constitution or 

other Acts of Congress. As noted above, there is at least one specific and preexisting 

Constitutional mandate. 

In the years following the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Congress has 

created a number of statutory exceptions to that Act, which fall into four major 

categories: 

♦ Insurrections/Civil Disturbances 

♦ Counterdrug Operations 

♦ Disaster Relief 

♦ Counter-terrorism/Weapons of Mass Destruction 

There are also a number of “minor” exceptions, covering a wide range of activities.170 

In 1956, Congress created broad authority for use of the military to suppress 

insurrections, rebellions, and unlawful combinations and conspiracies in the various 

states – an extension of the Constitutional mandate to protect the states against domestic 

violence.171 

Beginning in 1981, and as amended in the intervening years, Congress has created a 

number of authorized activities for use of the military in counterdrug operations, both 

inside the United States, and extraterritorially.172 Those activities include intelligence 

and information sharing; the use of military equipment and facilities; training and advice 

to law enforcement agencies; the maintenance and operations of a vast array of 

equipment—owned at the Federal, state and local level. There is also specific authority 

in these provisions for air, sea, and ground detection and monitoring of the illegal transit 

of drugs into the United States—which includes some authority for “hot pursuit” inside 

U.S. borders, as well as some interception authority for vessels and aircraft detected 

outside of our borders for purposes of identifying and communicating with the vessel or 

aircraft, and directing them to a location specified by civilian law enforcement. That 

authority also includes the transportation of domestic and foreign law enforcement and 

military personnel engaged in counterdrug operations; the operation of bases of operation 

inside the u.s. and extraterritorially; aerial and ground reconnaissance—but not 

surveillance—operations inside and outside the U.S.; and the implementation of 

procedures for civilian law enforcement agencies to procure certain military equipment 

for counterdrug activities. 

The military, as has been the case a number of times in recent years, may also be used for 

disaster relief operations, both domestically, pursuant to provisions of the Stafford Act in 

Title 42;173 and internationally, under the provisions of section 404 of Title 10. 

 

170 See list attached at Tab 1. 171 10 U.S. Code, Section 331, et seq. 172 10 U.S. Code, Section 124, and Sections 371, et seq. 173 42 U.S. Code 5121, et seq. 
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In 1988, Congress added to this series of provisions the authority to operate equipment in 

the conduct of counter-terrorism operations both foreign and domestically, including 

transporting suspected terrorists to the U.S. for trial.174

Most significantly in the specific terrorism context, Congress has also provided the 

authority to assist in biological and chemical incident responses, which may, under 

certain exceptional circumstances, include direct involvement in arrests, searches, 

seizures, and the collection of specific intelligence;175 and authority in Title 18, to 

provide assistance in nuclear terrorism cases, which may also include participation in 

arrest, search and seizure activities.176 

Some of the specific authority, and the conduct of activities pursuant to that authority, 

have not of course been without their detractors. From both within and outside of 

military circles, there have been concerns about the use of the military in this fashion, as 

being outside of the scope of normal military operations. And military leaders have often 

expressed concern about the effect of such activities on military preparedness for war and 

other contingencies. 

Some in Congress and elsewhere also express concern that, in times of reduced force 

structure and other limitations on defense spending, the military should focus on 

preparing for and participating in purely military operations. 

Others raise the specter of the military engaging in widespread violations of civil rights. 

As examples, in connection with anti-terrorism legislation in 1995, a group of law 

professors suggested that soldiers had no grounding in the Constitution, and knew 

nothing about minimum force; and the ACLU and others made vague reference to 

Constitutional issues, citing the Posse Comitatus Act (which is not, of course, a 

Constitutional protection). 

There are, however, a number of protections against abuse that are built directly into 

some of the statutes and contained in a number of Federal regulations and policy 

documents. In several statutes, there are conditions precedent, which must occur or exist, 

for the use of the military. Examples include: 

• A Presidential Declaration of Disaster for support under the Stafford Act177

• A proclamation to persons engaged in civil disorders to disperse and retire, contained 

in the Insurrections Statutes178 

 

174 10 U.S. Code, Section 374. See statutory text at Tab 2. 175 10 U.S. Code, Section 382. See statutory text at Tab 3. 176 18 U.S. Code, Section 831. See statutory text at Tab 4. 177 See 42 U.S. Code, Section 5170, 5170b, and 5191. 178 10 U.S. Code, Section 374. There have been nine times that such proclamations have been issued, 

primarily for integration of schools in the South and for the various riots in major U.S. cities in the1960s: 

- Arkansas, 1957 (Little Rock public schools) 

- Mississippi, 1962 (Mississippi public schools) 

- Alabama, 1963 (University of Alabama) 

- Alabama, 1963 (Alabama public schools) 
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• A specific order from the President in cases of suppressing insurrections and other 

civil disobedience;179 for foreign disaster relief; and in the case of many of the 

“minor” statutes that are listed in Tab1 

• Either a specific request from a State governor or legislature for assistance to 

suppress an insurrection,180or a determination that others have refused, failed, or are 

not capable of enforcing the laws to suppress insurrection and other civil disorder181

In a number of cases, senior Federal officials must request or approve, either individually 

or jointly with others, the use of military support: 

• For several activities in the counterdrug arena, a specific support request must come 

from the head of a Federal law enforcement agency—the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, U.S. Customs Service, U.S Coast Guard, U.S. Marshals, U.S. Border 

Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation—even if the support is ultimately intended for 

a State or local government.182

• The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General (and for foreign operations, the 

Secretary of State as well) must approve the transportation of law enforcement and 

military personnel, and the operation of bases of operation for counterdrug 

activities.183

• For response to biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorist incidents, as well as for 

many of the minor statutes, the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General must 

approve the specific activity.184

There are also numerous statutory, regulatory, and other policy limitations on military 

activities in support of civil authorities: 

• There are provisions in several sections that require a determination that the activity 

will not have an adverse impact on military preparedness.185

• Several sections also require reimbursement from the supported agency under 

provisions of the Economy Act, although there is an exception where the activity is 

conducted in the course of training or provides equivalent training.186

• Although the Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice at one point opined that 

many of these statutes do not, unless stated explicitly, apply outside of the border of 

the United States, the Department of Defense has consistently done so, and the key 

 - Alabama, 1965 (Selma to Montgomery march) 

- Michigan, 1967 (Detroit riot) 

- Washington, DC, 1968 (DC riot) 

- Illinois, 1968 (Chicago riot) 

- Maryland, 1968 (Baltimore riot) 

179 10 U.S. Code, Sections 331 and 334. 180 10 U.S. Code, Section 331. 181 10 U.S. Code, Section 334. 182 10 U.S. Code, Section 374. 183 10 U.S. Code, Section 374. 184 10 U.S. Code, Section 382, and 18 U.S. Code, Section 831. 185 E.g., 10 U.S. Code, Sections 376 and 382; and 18 U.S. Code, Section 831. 186 See 10 U.S. Code, Sections 374 and 381. 
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DoD Directive for such support states that exceptions to such extraterritorial 

application will be considered on a case-by-case basis, and then only in “compelling 

and extraordinary circumstances.”187

• There is an overarching provision in the counterdrug statutes that prohibits military 

involvement in search, seizure, arrest or similar activity188 (but cf 10 U.S. Code, 

Section 382, and 18 U.S. Code, Section 831). 

• Although the specific provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act do not apply to the U.S. 

Navy and the U.S. Marines, they have been included in the provisions of the 

counterdrug statute that prevents direct involvement in law enforcement; the Navy 

and Marines are also covered under Posse Comitatus Act provisions by regulation;189

and other provisions require the presence on naval vessels of U.S. Coast Guard law 

enforcement personnel during counterdrug operations.190

• The DoD Directive covering “military assistance to civil authorities” requires that 

each such request be evaluated against the six criteria, most of which are a regulatory 

expression of statutory requirements, as are many other provisions in regulatory and 

policy guidance.191

The rulings and interpretations of the Federal courts, in construing the specific statutory 

language and the legal implications of domestic activities conducted by the military, are 

relatively few and they have been remarkably consistent. Two are notable: 

In Laird v. Tatum,

192 the U.S. Supreme Court very succinctly noted that the 

Constitutionality of the Insurrection Statutes was not an issue; nor was the Posse 

Comitatus Act a limiting factor. In Gilligan, the Supreme Court noted both 

Constitutional and Federal statutory authority for the use of the National Guard for 

executing the Insurrection Statutes (although the Guard was actually not Federalized at 

Kent State).193

While the terrorism-specific statutes have not been tested in Federal court, there is no 

reason to believe that courts would find a Constitutional deficiency in them. 

 

187 DoD Directive 5525.5. 188 10 U.S. Code, Section 375. 

189 10 U.S. Code, Section 375; 32 CFR 213.2. 

190 10 U.S. Code, Section 379. 

191 Legality (compliance with laws); lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces); risk 

(safety of DoD forces); cost (who pays, impact on DoD budget); appropriateness (whether the requested 

mission is in the interest of the Department to conduct); and readiness (impact on the DoD's ability to 

perform its primary mission). DoD Directive 3025.15. 

192 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971) (1967 Detroit riots), ruling on 10 U.S. Code, Section 333, citing Art. 

IV, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

193 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1(1972) (1970 Kent State shootings), citing Congressional authority 

under Art. I, Sec. 8, and Presidential authority under the Constitution, and the use of the National Guard (10 

U.S. Code, Section 331, et seq.) to assist in controlling civil disorders.
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TAB 1 TO APPENDIX R—MINOR STATUTES AUTHORIZING MILITARY 

SUPPORT 

• Protect national parks, other Federal lands (16 USC23, 78, and 593) 

• Assist in case of crimes against members of Congress (18 USC 351) 

• Protect the President, Vice President, other dignitaries (18 USC 1751) 

• Enforce the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 USC 1861) 

• Support the neutrality laws (22 USC 408 and 461-462) 

• Execute quarantine and certain health laws (42 USC 97) 

• Support certain customs laws (50 USC 220) 

• Remove persons unlawfully present on Indian lands (25 USC 180) 

• Execute warrants for enforcement of civil rights laws (42 USC 1989) 

• Remove unlawful inclosures from public lands (43 USC 1065) 

• Protect the rights of a discoverer of a guano island (48 USC 1418) 

• Support territorial governors in civil disorders (48 USC 1422 and 1591) 

• Assist in case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests, other internationally 

protected persons (18 USC 112 and 1116) 
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TAB 2 TO APPENDIX R—TITLE 10, U.S. CODE, SECTION 374 

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 

Subtitle A - General Military Law 

PART I - ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS 

CHAPTER 18 - MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 

 Sec. 374. Maintenance and operation of equipment 

 (a) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make Department 

of Defense personnel available for the maintenance of equipment for Federal, State, and local 

civilian law enforcement officials, including equipment made available under 

section 372 of this title. 

 (b)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and in accordance with other applicable law, the Secretary of 

Defense may, upon request from the head of a Federal law enforcement agency, make 

Department of Defense personnel available to operate equipment (including equipment made 

available under section 372 of this title) with respect to - 

(A) a criminal violation of a provision of law specified in paragraph (4)(A); 

(B) assistance that such agency is authorized to furnish to a State, local, or foreign government 

which is involved in the enforcement of similar laws; 

(C) a foreign or domestic counter-terrorism operation; or 

(D) a rendition of a suspected terrorist from a foreign country to the United States to stand trial. 

 (2) Department of Defense personnel made available to a civilian law enforcement agency 

under this subsection may operate equipment for the following purposes: 

(A) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic. 

(B) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of surface traffic outside of the 

geographic boundary of the United States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of 

the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the boundary. 

(C) Aerial reconnaissance. 

(D) Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the 

purposes of communicating with such vessels and aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go 

to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. 

(E) Operation of equipment to facilitate communications in connection with law enforcement 

programs specified in paragraph (4)(A). 

(F) Subject to joint approval by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General (and the 

Secretary of State in the case of a law enforcement operation outside of the land area of the 

United States) - 
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 (i) the transportation of civilian law enforcement personnel along with any other civilian or 

military personnel who are supporting, or conducting, a joint operation with civilian law 

enforcement personnel; 

 (ii) the operation of a base of operations for civilian law enforcement and supporting 

personnel; and 

 (iii) the transportation of suspected terrorists from foreign countries to the United States for 

trial (so long as the requesting Federal law enforcement agency provides all security for such 

transportation and maintains custody over the suspect through the duration of the transportation). 

 (3) Department of Defense personnel made available to operate equipment for the purpose 

stated in paragraph (2)(D) may continue to operate such equipment into the land area of the 

United States in cases involving the pursuit of vessels or aircraft where the detection began 

outside such land area. 

 (4) In this subsection: 

(A) The term ''Federal law enforcement agency'' means a Federal agency with jurisdiction to 

enforce any of the following: 

(i) The Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or the Controlled Substances 

Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.). 

 (ii) Any of sections 274 through 278 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1324-1328). 

 (iii) A law relating to the arrival or departure of merchandise (as defined in section 401 of 

the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401) into or out of the customs territory of the United States 

(as defined in general note 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States) or any other 

territory or possession of the United States. 

 (iv) The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.). 

 (v) Any law, foreign or domestic, prohibiting terrorist activities. 

 (B) The term ''land area of the United States'' includes the land area of any territory, 

commonwealth, or possession of the United States. 

 (c) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make Department 

of Defense personnel available to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement agency to 

operate equipment for purposes other than described in subsection (b)(2) only to the extent that 

such support does not involve direct participation by such personnel in a civilian law enforcement 

operation unless such direct participation is otherwise authorized by law. 

 (Added Pub. L. 97-86, title IX, Sec. 905(a)(1), Dec. 1, 1981, 95 Stat. 1115; amended Pub. L. 98-525, title XIV, Sec. 

1405(9), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2622; Pub. L. 99-570, title III, Sec. 3056, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-77; Pub. L. 99-

661, div. A, title XIII, Sec. 1373(c), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 4007; Pub. L. 100-418, title I, Sec. 1214(a)(1), Aug. 23, 

1988, 102 Stat. 1155; Pub. L. 100-456, div. A, title XI, Sec. 1104(a), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2043; Pub. L. 101-189, 

div. A, title XII, Sec. 1210, 1216(b), (c), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1566, 1569; Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title X, Sec. 

1042, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2492; Pub. L. 105-277, div. B, title II, Sec. 201, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-567; Pub. 

L. 106-65, div. A, title X, Sec. 1066(a)(4), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 770.) 
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TAB 3 TO APPENDIX R—TITLE 10, U.S. CODE, SECTION 382 

TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES 

Subtitle A--General Military Law 

PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS 

CHAPTER 18--MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 

 

Sec. 382. Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction 

 

 (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense, upon the request of the Attorney General, may 

provide assistance in support of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of 

section 175 or 2332c of title 18 during an emergency situation involving a biological or 

chemical weapon of mass destruction. Department of Defense resources, including personnel of 

the Department of Defense, may be used to provide such assistance if-- 

 (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General jointly determine that an emergency 

situation exists; and 

 (2) the Secretary of Defense determines that the provision of such assistance will not 

adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. 

 (b) Emergency Situations Covered.--In this section, the term ``emergency situation involving a 

biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction'' means a circumstance involving a biological 

or chemical weapon of mass destruction-- 

 (1) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United 

 States; and 

 (2) in which-- 

 (A) civilian expertise and capabilities are not readily available to provide the required 

assistance to counter the threat immediately posed by the weapon involved; 

 (B) special capabilities and expertise of the Department of Defense are necessary and 

critical to counter the threat posed by the weapon involved; and 

 (C) enforcement of section 175 or 2332c of title 18 would be seriously impaired if the 

Department of Defense assistance were not provided. 

 (c) Forms of Assistance.--The assistance referred to in subsection (a) includes the operation of 

equipment (including equipment made available under section 372 of this title) to monitor, 

contain, disable, or dispose of the weapon involved or elements of the weapon. 

 (d) Regulations.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General shall jointly prescribe 

regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided under this section. Such 

regulations shall also describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in 

circumstances incident to the provision of assistance under this section. 

 (2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the regulations may not authorize the following 

actions: 

 (i) Arrest. 

 (ii) Any direct participation in conducting a search for or seizure of evidence related to a 

violation of section 175 or 2332c of title 18. 

 (iii) Any direct participation in the collection of intelligence for law enforcement purposes. 

 (B) The regulations may authorize an action described in subparagraph (A) to be taken under 

the following conditions: 
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 (i) The action is considered necessary for the immediate protection of human life, and 

civilian law enforcement officials are not capable of taking the action. 

 (ii) The action is otherwise authorized under subsection (c) or under otherwise applicable 

law. 

 (e) Reimbursements.--The Secretary of Defense shall require reimbursement as a condition for 

providing assistance under this section to the extent required under section 377 of this title. 

 (f) Delegations of Authority.--(1) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Secretary of 

Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense 

under this section. The Secretary of Defense may delegate the Secretary's authority 

under this section only to an Under Secretary of Defense or an Assistant Secretary of Defense and 

only if the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to whom delegated has been designated by the 

Secretary to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the Secretary. 

 (2) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney 

General may exercise the authority of the Attorney General under this section. The Attorney 

General may delegate that authority only to the Associate Attorney General or an Assistant 

Attorney General and only if the Associate Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General to 

whom delegated has been designated by the Attorney General to act for, and to exercise the 

general powers of, the Attorney General. 

 (g) Relationship to Other Authority.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict any 

executive branch authority regarding use of members of the armed forces or equipment of the 

Department of Defense that was in effect before September 23, 1996. 

(Added Pub. L. 104-201, div. A, title XIV, Sec. 1416(a)(1), Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2721; amended Pub. L. 105-85, 

div. A, title X, Sec. 1073(a)(6), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1900.) 

 
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TAB 4 TO APPENDIX R—TITLE 18, U.S. CODE, SECTION 831 

TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 

PART I--CRIMES 

CHAPTER 39--EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER DANGEROUS ARTICLES 

 

Sec. 831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials 

 (a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section occurs- 

 (1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes 

of, or disperses any nuclear material and-- 

 (A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person or 

substantial damage to property; or 

 (B) knows that circumstances exist which are likely to cause the death of or serious bodily 

injury to any person or substantial damage to property; 

 (2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear material, knowingly-- 

 (A) takes and carries away nuclear material of another without authority; 

 (B) makes an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer, of nuclear material belonging to 

another; or 

 (C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear material belonging to another; 

 (3) knowingly-- 

 (A) uses force; or 

 (B) threatens or places another in fear that any person other than the actor will imminently 

be subject to bodily injury; 

and thereby takes nuclear material belonging to another from the person or presence of any other; 

 (4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby obtains nuclear material belonging to 

another; 

 (5) with intent to compel any person, international organization, or governmental entity to do 

or refrain from doing any act, knowingly threatens to engage in conduct described in paragraph 

(2)(A) or (3) of this subsection; 

 (6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material to cause death or serious bodily injury to any 

person or substantial damage to property under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably 

be understood as an expression of serious purposes; 

 (7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; or 

 (8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to commit an offense under paragraph 

(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection, if any of the parties intentionally engages in any conduct in 

furtherance of such offense; 

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 

 (b) The punishment for an offense under-- 

 (1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section is-- 

 (A) a fine under this title; and 

 (B) imprisonment-- 

 (i) for any term of years or for life (I) if, while committing the offense, the offender 

knowingly causes the death of any person; or (II) if, while committing an offense under paragraph 

(1) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, the offender, under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the life of an individual, knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby recklessly 

causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person; and 
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 (ii) for not more than 20 years in any other case; and 

 (2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section is-- 

 (A) a fine under this title; and 

 (B) imprisonment-- 

 (i) for not more than 20 years if the offense which is the object of the conspiracy is 

punishable under paragraph (1)(B)(i); and 

 (ii) for not more than 10 years in any other case. 

 (c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section are that-- 

 (1) the offense is committed in the United States or the special maritime and territorial 

jurisdiction of the United States, or the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (as 

defined in section 46501 of title 49); 

 (2) the defendant is a national of the United States, as defined in section 101 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101); 

 (3) at the time of the offense the nuclear material is in use, storage, or transport, for peaceful 

purposes, and after the conduct required for the offense occurs the defendant is found in the 

United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States; or 

 (4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with respect to the carriage of a consignment 

of nuclear material for peaceful purposes by any means of transportation intended to go beyond 

the territory of the state where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a 

facility of the shipper in that state and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within 

the state of ultimate destination and either of such states is the United States. 

 (d) The Attorney General may request assistance from the Secretary of Defense under chapter 

18 of title 10 in the enforcement of this section and the Secretary of Defense may provide such 

assistance in accordance with chapter 18 of title 10, except that the Secretary of Defense may 

provide such assistance through any Department of Defense personnel. 

 (e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance from the Secretary of Defense under 

this subsection in the enforcement of this section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of this title, the 

Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, provide such assistance to the 

Attorney General if-- 

 (A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly determined by the Attorney General and the 

Secretary of Defense in their discretion); and 

 (B) the provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the 

United States (as determined by the Secretary of Defense in such Secretary's discretion). 

 (2) As used in this subsection, the term ``emergency situation'' means a circumstance-- 

 (A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; and 

 (B) in which-- 

 (i) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if the assistance were not 

provided; and 

 (ii) civilian law enforcement personnel are not capable of enforcing the law. 

 (3) Assistance under this section may include-- 

 (A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to arrest persons and conduct searches 

and seizures with respect to violations of this section; and 

 (B) such other activity as is incidental to the enforcement of this section, or to the protection 

of persons or property from conduct that violates this section. 
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 (4) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a condition of assistance under this 

section. 

 (5) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's function under this subsection 

only to a Deputy, Associate, or Assistant Attorney General. 

 (f) As used in this section-- 

 (1) the term ``nuclear material'' means material containing any-- 

 (A) plutonium with an isotopic concentration not in excess of 80 percent plutonium 238; 

 (B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore residue that contains the mixture of isotopes as 

occurring in nature; 

 (C) uranium that contains the isotope 233 or 235 or both in such amount that the 

abundance ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the 

isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature; or 

 (D) uranium 233; 

 (2) the term ``international organization'' means a public international organization 

designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 

U.S.C. 288) or a public organization created pursuant to treaty or other agreement under 

international law as an instrument through or by which two or more foreign governments engage 

in some aspect of their conduct of international affairs; 

 (3) the term ``serious bodily injury'' means bodily injury which involves-- 

 (A) a substantial risk of death; 

 (B) extreme physical pain; 

 (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or 

 (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 

faculty; and 

 (4) the term ``bodily injury'' means-- 

 (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; 

 (B) physical pain; 

 (C) illness; 

 (D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or 

 (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary. 

(Added Pub. L. 97-351, Sec. 2(a), Oct. 18, 1982, 96 Stat. 1663; amended Pub. L. 100-690, title VII, Sec. 7022, Nov. 

18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4397; Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 5(e)(6), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1374; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, 

Sec. 330016(2)(C), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2148.) 
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APPENDIX S—Interagency Comments 

Copies of the report were provided to the Federal Interagency on December 13, 2000, for 

review and comments. The agencies have until January 12, 2000, to provide comments. 

Subsequent to that date, the Advisory Panel will submit to the President and the Congress 

a supplement to this report containing agency comments and Advisory Panel responses. 
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APPENDIX T—Transmittal Letters 

Attached are facsimiles of the letters transmitting the report. 

A copy of the report under similar covering letter was delivered to each of the following: 

The President 

The President-Elect 

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert 

Speaker of the House 

The Honorable Al Gore, Jr. 

President of the Senate 

The Honorable Strom Thurmond 

President Pro Tempore 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Richard K. Armey 

Majority Leader 

U.S. House of Representatives 

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt 

Minority Leader 

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Trent Lott 

Majority Leader 

United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas Daschle 

Minority Leader 

United States Senate
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James S. Gilmore, III 

Chairman 

James Clapper, Jr. 

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer 

Raymond Downey 

Richard Falkenrath 

George Foresman 

William Garrison 

Ellen M. Gordon 

James Greenleaf 

William Jenaway 

William Dallas Jones 

Paul M. Maniscalco 

John O. Marsh, Jr. 

Kathleen O'Brien 

M. Patricia Quinlisk 

Patrick Ralston 

William Reno 

Joseph Samuels, Jr. 

Kenneth Shine 

Hubert Williams 

Ellen Embrey* 

* U.S. Department of 

Defense Representative

 December 14, 2000 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

 On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit 

to the Congress the second of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The 

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 

(H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). 

The report provides several policy recommendations for consideration by 

the President and the Congress, including matters involving the development of a 

national strategy for combating terrorism, Federal coordinating structure, 

improvements in Congressional coordination, and specific functional areas. 

The report is being simultaneously provided to the Federal Interagency for 

comment. After comments are received, the advisory panel will submit a 

supplement to this report, forwarding the comments and any responses to them that 

we may have. 

 Very respectfully, 

 /s/ 

 

 James S. Gilmore, III 

 Chairman 

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to: 

RAND 

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone: 703-413-1100 FAX: 703-413-8111 

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

T-3 

James S. Gilmore, III 

Chairman 

James Clapper, Jr. 

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer 

Raymond Downey 

Richard Falkenrath 

George Foresman 

William Garrison 

Ellen M. Gordon 

James Greenleaf 

William Jenaway 

William Dallas Jones 

Paul M. Maniscalco 

John O. Marsh, Jr. 

Kathleen O'Brien 

M. Patricia Quinlisk 

Patrick Ralston 

William Reno 

Joseph Samuels, Jr. 

Kenneth Shine 

Hubert Williams 

Ellen Embrey* 

* U.S. Department of 

Defense Representative

 December 14, 2000 

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert 

Speaker of the House 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

 On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit 

to you the second of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The advisory panel 

is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 

105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). 

The report provides several policy recommendations for consideration by 

the President and the Congress, including matters involving the development of a 

national strategy for combating terrorism, Federal coordinating structure, 

improvements in Congressional coordination, and specific functional areas. 

The report is being simultaneously provided to the Federal Interagency for 

comment. After comments are received, the advisory panel will submit a 

supplement to this report, forwarding the comments and any responses to them that 

we may have. 

 Very respectfully, 

 /s/ 

 

 James S. Gilmore, III 

 Chairman 

Please address comments or questions to: 

RAND 

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone: 703-413-1100 FAX: 703-413-8111 

 The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel 

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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APPENDIX U—RAND STAFF PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE ADVISORY 

PANEL 

Project Director

Michael Wermuth 

Research Staff for the Report

Janice Blanchard 

David Brannan 

Jennifer Brower 

Peter Chalk 

Kim Cragin 

Lois Davis 

Paul Davis 

Margaret Harrell 

Marvin Heinze 

Bruce Hoffman 

Brian Houghton 

Gerald Jacobsen 

Sarah Cotton Nelson 

Jennifer Pace 

William Rosenau 

Jonathan Schachter 

Michael Wermuth 

Traci Williams 

Ron Fricker 

Administrative Support

Nancy Rizor Priscilla Schlegel

Other RAND Staff Providing Support

Nykolle Brooks 

Roger Brown 

Shirley Burch 

Mary Evans 

David Feliciano 

Tyrone Greene 

Kenneth Myers 

Christel Osborn 

Carolyn Rogers 

John Schrader 

Deanna Webber 

RAND Corporate Leadership on the Project

Jeffrey Isaacson, Vice President, National Security Research Division, and Director, National 

Defense Research Institute (NDRI) 

Susan Hosek, Director (Until 1 March 2000), and Susan Everingham, Director (1 March 2000-

Present), Forces and Resources Policy Center (NDRI) 

Stuart Johnson, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center (NDRI) 
 

LIST OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 

Executive Branch: 

♦ Develop national strategy approved by the President 

♦ Create a “National Office for Combating Terrorism”

- Director appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate 

- Located in the Executive Office of the President 

- Point of contact for the Congress 

- Strategy formulation 

- Plans Review 

- Multidisciplinary staffing 

- No operational control 

- Specified control of Federal programs/budgets 

- Supported by Advisory Board for Domestic Programs

- Assistants for Domestic Preparedness, Intelligence, Health and Medical, RDT&E/National Standards, and 

Management and Budget 

Congress: 

♦ Create a “Special Committee for Combating Terrorism” 

- Bipartisan membership with full-time staff from relevant committees 

- Direct link to the new “National Office for Combating Terrorism” 

- Develops consolidated legislative plan for authorization, budget, and appropriations 

- Clearinghouse and first referral for relevant legislation 

Functional Recommendations: 

♦ Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing 

- Improve human intelligence by rescinding CIA guidelines on certain foreign informants (DCI) 

- Improve measurement and signature intelligence through enhanced RDT&E (Intelligence Community) 

- Review/modify guidelines and procedures for domestic investigations (Review Panel/Attorney General) 

- Review/modify authorities on certain CBRN precursors and equipment (Executive and Congress) 

- Improve forensics technology/analysis, and enhance indications and warnings systems (National Office) 

- Provide security clearances and more information to designated State and local entities (National Office) 

- Develop single-source, protected, web-based, integrated information system (National Office)

♦ Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations 

 - Designate Federal Response Plan as single-source “all hazards” planning document (National Office) 

- Develop “model” State plan (NEMA and FEMA) 

- Conduct inventories of State and local programs for nationwide application (National Office) 

- Promote/facilitate the adoption of multi-jurisdiction/multi-state mutual aid compacts (National Office) 

- Promote/facilitate adoption of standard ICS, UCS, and EOC (National Office) 

- Designate agency other than DoD as “Lead Federal Agency” (President) 

♦ Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising 

- Develop input to strategy and plans in close coordination with State and local entities (National Office) 

- Restructure education and training opportunities to account for volunteers in critical response disciplines 

- Develop realistic exercise scenarios that meet State and local needs (National Office) 

♦ Improve Health and Medical Capabilities

- Obtain strategy input/ program advice from public health/medical care representatives (National Office) 

- Promote certification programs for training and facilities (National Office) 

- Clarify authorities and procedures for health and medical response (All jurisdictions) 

- Improve surge capacity and stockpiles (All jurisdictions) 

- Evaluate and test response capabilities (All public health and medical entities) 

- Establish standards for communications/mandatory reporting (All public health/medical entities) 

- Establish laboratory standards and protocols (All public health/medical entities) 

♦ Promote Better Research and Development and Developing National Standards

- Develop, with OSTP, equipment testing protocols and long-range research plan (National Office) 

- Establish national standards program with NIST and NIOSH as co-leads (National Office)

♦ Enhance Efforts to Counter Agroterrorism

♦ Improve Cyber Security Against Terrorism 

Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive 

Functional Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

NATIONAL IN SCOPE, NOT JUST FEDERAL

APPROPRIATELY RESOURCED AND BASED ON 

MEASURABLE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 

FOCUSED ON THE FULL RANGE OF DETERRENCE, 

PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE 

ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THREATS—DOMESTIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL

FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUILT ON REQUIREMENTS 

FROM AND FULLY COORDINATED WITH RELEVANT 

LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES