GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

June 1999 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Achieving B-2A 

Bomber Operational 

Requirements

GAO/NSIAD-99-97

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-97 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280223 Letter

June 10, 1999

Congressional Committees

The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1994 requires us to report to the congressional defense committees at 

regular intervals on the total acquisition costs of the B-2A bomber program 

through completion of the production program. In response, we have 

issued five reports since 1994.1

 Because B-2A production is essentially 

completed, this will be the last of these reports. The present report 

discusses deficiencies in achieving B-2A operational requirements and the 

status of acquisition costs. We have not obtained and evaluated details on 

the effectiveness of the B-2As currently employed in Operation Allied 

Force. Even though B-2As are employed in that operation, concerns remain 

about this aircraft’s ability to achieve the operational requirements 

discussed in this report.

Results in Brief Operational testing indicated that the B-2A met most operational 

requirements, but four significant deficiencies were identified that will 

limit or, under some circumstances, slow its pace in flight operations. 

These deficiencies included (1) incomplete development of the ground 

mission planning system, (2) limited situational awareness for the crew 

because defensive avionics do not provide the planned capability, 

(3) insufficient reliability and maintainability of low observable materials 

and features, and (4) inability to effectively operate B-2As from operational 

sites other than the main operating base in Missouri. A March 1999 Air 

Force assessment of progress on correcting the deficiencies confirmed that 

three of the four had not been remedied, but that one—development of the 

ground mission planning system—was nearly corrected. Although the Air 

Force is taking steps to improve B-2A operational capabilities, it does not 

expect to incorporate all improvements before the next planned 

operational milestone, known as Full Operating Capability, which is 

scheduled to occur by June 30, 1999.

The Congress has appropriated 98 percent of the funds that in March 1999 

the Air Force estimated it would need for the acquisition of 21 block 30 

1

A list of related GAO reports is included at the end of this report.

Letr
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B-2As2 and certain future improvements. This program cost estimate is 

$44.5 billion and, according to Air Force officials, includes costs to 

complete development, production, modification, correction of the major 

deficiencies, and certain improvements to the block 30 configuration. Air 

Force officials told us, however, that funding requirements for future years 

and the total acquisition cost for the program may increase. They indicated 

that certain assumptions used to calculate the March 1999 estimate may no 

longer be valid. These assumptions include the cost to install certain 

improvements to low observable features, the period of time the contractor 

is expected to support the aircraft, and the cost of acquiring shelters for 

B-2A maintenance.

This report contains no recommendations.

Background The 21 B-2As ordered by the Air Force have been delivered, but most were 

delivered in configurations known to need modifications. Production was 

begun and aircraft delivered before developmental and initial operational 

tests were completed. Accordingly, problems and deficiencies noted in the 

tests had to be corrected and some features and equipment had to be added 

after the aircraft were delivered to the Air Force. A comprehensive 

modification program was designed to correct problems and defects and to 

incorporate the needed equipment. This modification program was 

designed to bring each B-2A up to a configuration designated “block 30.” 

Through January 1999, 12 B-2As were still being modified to the block 30 

configuration. On average, they were about 50 percent complete. The B-2A 

acquisition schedule and the overlap of development and production are 

shown in figure 1.

Between the beginning of development and completion of the block 30 

modification program, 21 years will have elapsed. The next milestone for 

the program is Full Operating Capability (FOC), which is defined as the 

capability to meet block 30 operational requirements, operate from a 

forward operating location, support planned sortie rates, and achieve 

mission requirements. The commander of the Air Force Air Combat 

Command is scheduled to determine by June 30, 1999, whether the B-2A 

2The B-2A’s operational configuration is defined as a block 30 aircraft. The Air Force accepted B-2As in 

two other configurations, a block 10 training aircraft and block 20 interim capability aircraft, all of 

which will be upgraded to the block 30 configuration.

Letr
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has achieved FOC based on an assessment of the B-2A system performance 

measured against the operational requirements.

Figure 1: Overview of the B-2A Acquisition Schedule as of January 1999

Source: Air Force B-2A Program Baseline Roadmap.

Deficiencies in 

Achieving Operational 

Requirements 

Initial operational testing and evaluation (completed in June 1997) 

indicated that B-2As in the block 30 configuration met most operational 

requirements, but it highlighted four deficiencies. A March 1999 Air Force 

assessment of the progress being made in meeting the B-2A’s operational 

requirements indicated three of these four deficiencies had not been fully 

remedied, but that one was nearly corrected. The four deficiencies were

• incomplete development of the ground mission planning system,

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Fiscal year

Full operating capability (FOC): Third quarter of fiscal year 1999

Development: Nov. 1981 - Mar. 1998 

Production program: Nov. 1987 - Nov. 1997

Block 30 modification: July 1995 - Sept. 2002

Flight test and evaluation: July 1989 - Mar. 1998
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• limited situational awareness for the crew because defensive avionics 

do not provide the planned capability,

• insufficient reliability and maintainability of low observable materials 

and features, and 

• inability to effectively deploy and operate B-2As from operational sites 

other than the main operating base in Missouri.

The Air Force periodically assesses the extent to which it has 

demonstrated that B-2A operational requirements are achievable. 

Table 1 shows the results of the Air Force’s March 1999 assessment.

Table 1: March 1999 Assessment of Achieving Operational Requirements 

aAir Force Mission Support System.

bGlobal Positioning System.

Note: Requirements italicized were identified as significant deficiencies in operational testing.

Demonstration of terrain-following and avoidance system capability and 

radar capability are listed as incomplete on the table; however, test officials 

Operational requirement Status of demonstration

Ground mission planning (AFMSS)a Incomplete 

Situational awareness (defensive avionics) Incomplete

Reliability/Maintainability (low observables) Incomplete

Deployment (shelters) Incomplete

Terrain following and avoidance system Incomplete

Radar Incomplete

Signature Achievable

Penetration Achievable

GPSb aided targeting system Achievable

Navigation Achievable

Contrail management system Achievable

Fixed target effectiveness Achievable

Command and control Achievable

Air refueling Achievable

All weather Achievable

Flying qualities Achievable

In-flight mission planning Achievable

Training Achievable

Range and payload Achievable
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indicated that both systems have generally satisfied operational 

requirements and need only minor improvements for operating in the rain. 

Testing of new software for these systems should be completed late in 

1999.

In another March 1999 report,3

 the Air Force states that the ground mission 

planning system still has deficiencies but that improvements have been 

demonstrated, situational awareness (defensive avionics) is unsatisfactory, 

low observable reliability and maintainability reduces operational 

capability, and all operational requirements for deployment have not been 

met.

Development of Mission 

Planning System Incomplete

Mission planning is critical to effective B-2A operations. The mission plan 

is intended to provide the crew with the most effective routing to achieve 

mission goals with the highest survivability for the crew and the weapon 

system. Air Force officials emphasized that successful use of AFMSS 

requires mission planners well trained in mission planning and survivability 

techniques for low observable aircraft.

Air Force officials told us the upgraded AFMSS met, as of March 31, 1999, 

the requirements for operational use with one exception: A component that 

is unique to mission planning for low observable aircraft was considered 

unsatisfactory in the March 1999 B-2A follow-on test and evaluation report. 

However, Air Force officials said the upgraded AFMSS was capable of 

planning most B-2A missions within the 8-hour operational requirement.

The upgraded AFMSS includes a new computer with faster speeds and new 

software intended to correct most of the deficiencies identified during 

initial operational testing. Based on development testing of the new system 

by the contractor, Air Force officials stated the upgraded AFMSS could 

complete most B-2A mission plans within the 8-hour requirement. 

However, as of April 20, 1999, Air Force operational testing of AFMSS was 

incomplete, and operational testers had not yet prepared a B-2A mission 

plan in the required 8 hours. Air Force test officials conducting the 

operational testing said that, based on testing completed, it appears AFMSS 

will meet the 8-hour planning requirement for most of the expected B-2A 

3On March 14, 1999, the Air Force issued the B-2A follow-on test and evaluation report, which covers 

operational testing from July 1997 through December 1998. This is the first of two phases of operational 

testing that follows the initial operational testing that was completed in June 1997.
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missions. In addition, test officials said the AFMSS component used to 

generate routes that optimize B-2A low observable features is still 

unsatisfactory. Because of deficiencies in this component—called the 

common low observable auto-router (CLOAR)—some mission planning 

timelines could grow to 10 hours. New CLOAR software is scheduled to be 

tested and delivered to the operational B-2A wing by early 2000. Air Force 

officials stated that even with the CLOAR improvements there would be 

some small percentage of missions that could take longer than 8 hours to 

plan because of the complexity of these missions and their plans.

AFMSS is being developed by the Air Force as a separate acquisition 

program. AFMSS is being integrated with the B-2A weapon system and is 

being incorporated as part of the block 30 modification.

Limited Situational 

Awareness Caused by 

Ineffective Defensive 

Avionics

Situational awareness requirements for the B-2A stipulate that crews be 

provided sufficient information about the threats they encounter on a 

mission, which will allow them to make adjustments to the mission plan to 

ensure survivability of the crew and weapon system. The defensive 

avionics system was intended to provide B-2A aircrews with information 

on the location and identity of threats that may be encountered during a 

B-2A mission.

The Air Force spent over $740 million to develop the defensive avionics, 

which does not provide the planned capability. Developmental and initial

operational testing showed the defensive avionics system failed to provide 

the situational awareness information required. It either incorrectly 

identified threats or did not provide an accurate location of threats, 

significantly reducing the situational awareness to the crew. The March 

1999 B-2A follow-on test and evaluation report states that the defensive 

avionics is unsatisfactory and there has been little improvement to this 

component since initial operational testing was completed in June 1997. 

However, the Air Force believes that the B-2A’s survivability can be 

obtained through effective tactics, mission planning, and low observability 

features, and that failure to provide the crew with all of the intended 

situational awareness information will not prevent the B-2A’s use in combat 

operations.

Air Force officials said the deficiencies in the defensive avionics would be 

too costly to correct. As a result, the Air Force plans to modify the 

defensive avionics system to provide a useful capability, but less capability 

than considered necessary for Air Force operational requirements as 
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defined in the original contract specification. The cost to make this 

modification is included in the March 1999 estimate. The Air Force does 

not expect to complete testing of the reduced capability until November 

1999. 

Inadequate Reliability and 

Maintainability for Low 

Observable Materials 

Reduces Planned Use Rates 

for B-2A

The low observable features and materials on the B-2A are not durable, and 

repairs of these features and materials require time-consuming 

maintenance under environmentally controlled conditions with materials 

that require long cure times. These factors diminish the ability of the Air 

Force to fly the aircraft as frequently as operational requirements 

stipulated, especially when the aircraft is deployed to an operating location 

other than the main operating base in Missouri. Although the Air Force has 

improved maintenance procedures and has developed improved materials, 

these problems remain the primary cause for high maintenance times and a 

reduced pace in flight operations. Further improvements are being pursued 

to reduce maintenance, increase aircraft availability, and achieve the 

required pace of flight operations.

The March 1999 follow-on test and evaluation report concluded that low 

observable reliability and maintainability is still the number one challenge 

for the Air Force because of its impact on B-2A mission capabilities. The 

report states that poor low observable reliability and lengthy maintenance 

times reduce mission capable rates, adversely affect aircraft availability for 

crew training, restrict operations when deployed, and limit sustained 

combat operations.

Total maintenance rates have improved since initial operational testing was 

completed in June 1997, but low observable maintenance remains as a high 

percentage of total maintenance—one third of maintenance man-hours per 

flying-hour.4

 Air Force officials stated that the block 30 aircraft are 

designed to incur an average of 17.7 maintenance man-hours for each 

flying-hour to repair low observable features; thus, following a 12-hour 

mission, a B-2A would require on average about 212 man-hours to repair 

low observable features. This estimate does not include the lengthy times 

required for some low observable materials to cure (72 hours in some 

cases) before the aircraft can return to a flight status. The Air Force 

4Maintenance man-hours per flying-hour is used as a measure of maintenance performance for total 

aircraft maintenance but can be used to identify problem maintenance drivers like low observable 

features.
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estimates that the number of maintenance man-hours per flight hour must 

be reduced to 7.5 or lower to generate the number of flights in a specified 

period (sortie rates) required for wartime. The follow-on test results 

showed low observable maintenance man-hours per flying-hour had 

improved, but still averaged 24.6 maintenance man-hours for the period 

from July 1997 to December 1998.

Low observable maintenance and material cure times are important factors 

in achieving a specific mission capable rate, which is the percentage of 

time B-2As are available to perform assigned missions. For example, if the 

low observable tape on the wing does not meet the radar cross section 

mission requirement, the aircraft cannot fly its mission and the mission 

capable rate is reduced, or the mission is flown with the degraded 

capability. The Air Force threshold requirement for the B-2A mission 

capable rate is 60 percent; however, the long-range requirement is a 

mission capable rate of 77 percent. During calendar year 1997, the average 

mission capable rate was 36 percent. However, as B-2As are upgraded to 

the block 30 configuration, the rate has improved. For the 3-month period 

ending November 1998, the rate was 46.1 percent.

A series of low observable features and materials design improvements are 

being developed or implemented to achieve the maintainability 

requirements. The B-2A has about 150 different low observable materials, 

and the improvements are directed toward those materials creating most of 

the problems, primarily tapes and caulks used to fill gaps and seams in the 

B-2A’s exterior surface. The Air Force is also evaluating materials with 

faster cure times, shorter process times, less dependence on specialized 

support equipment, longer shelf life, and fewer restrictions on storage 

requirements. In addition, the Air Force is developing diagnostic tools 

intended to speed the process of (1) assessing areas with damaged low 

observable materials and (2) verifying the repairs of these deficiencies. 

Not all of the improvements will be completed and installed by the planned 

FOC date. Two improvement projects designed to improve mission capable 

rates and reduce low observable maintenance for the B-2As are scheduled 

to be installed during the next depot maintenance cycle, which will take 

place from late 1999 through early 2006. Not all installation costs for the 

material improvements are included in the March 1999 estimate as 

discussed later in this report.
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Inability to Sustain B-2A 

Operations When Deployed

Initial operational test reports indicated that the block 30 B-2A aircraft 

must be sheltered when deployed to forward operating locations to provide 

a suitable environment in which to maintain and restore low observable 

materials. Currently, adequate shelters do not exist at planned deployment 

locations, and until these are provided, the Air Force will not be able to 

repair low observable features quickly enough to fly B-2As at sortie rates 

required at deployment locations and to sustain these rates over the 

required time frames.

The March 1999 B-2A follow-on test and evaluation report states that, 

based on two deployment exercises to Guam, operational requirements for 

deployed aircraft were not achievable. Requirements include the capability 

to sustain the operations of eight aircraft for 14 days at specified sortie 

generation rates. Problems with low observable maintenance were 

identified as the major obstacles to achieving B-2A operational 

requirements during these exercises. For example, during one of the 

exercises, two of the three B-2As deployed had significant low observable

deficiencies. The report states that the lack of shelters would have 

prevented any major repairs of low observable features, but that some 

repairs were made without the benefit of shelters. The report also states 

that progress had been made, but that improvements in low observable 

features and shelters are required to successfully achieve the deployment 

requirements.

Status of Acquisition 

Costs

Most acquisition efforts for the B-2A program have been completed. The 

March 1999 cost estimate of $44.5 billion includes costs to complete the 

block 30 modifications as well as to develop and incorporate improvements 

beyond the block 30 configuration. Through fiscal year 1999, the Air Force 

has been appropriated $43.7 billion, or 98 percent, of the total estimated 

costs. According to Air Force officials, the estimate includes cost to 

complete development, production, modification, correction of major 

deficiencies, and certain improvements to the block 30 configuration. The 

Air Force stated, however, that the cost estimate is based on certain 

assumptions that are no longer valid. Air Force officials advised us that as 

much as an additional $155 million could be required for improvements to 

the block 30 configuration and interim contractor support. These efforts 

were previously believed to have been fully covered in the cost estimate. 

Further, the cost to acquire aircraft shelters for maintenance may be higher 

than planned.
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Funds Available to 

Complete Major Contracts

Air Force officials said adequate funds are included in the cost estimate to 

complete the major contracts for development, production, and aircraft 

modifications to the block 30 configuration planned through fiscal year 

2002. Finishing block 30 modifications is the major effort remaining in the 

program. Nineteen of the original aircraft delivered to the Air Force needed 

modifications to achieve the block 30 configuration. Through January 1999, 

12 B-2As were still being modified, and they were on average about 

50 percent complete. The block 30 modifications began in 1995 and are 

scheduled to be completed in 2002.

Program office contract management reports and assessments by the Air 

Force indicate adequate funds are available to complete the development 

and the production contracts. For example, the Air Force estimates that 

$455 million is required to complete the modification of five test aircraft to 

the block 30 configuration. The contract performance report shows that 

the current contractor estimate of cost to complete the modification of 

these test aircraft to block 30 is within the amount provided by the current 

contract and budget. The Air Force has also evaluated the status of 

modifying the initial production aircraft to the block 30 configuration, and 

their evaluation shows adequate funds are available.

Potential Increases to the 

Acquisition Costs

The Air Force is assessing some estimating assumptions during its fiscal 

year 2001 budgeting process, which may result in higher estimated costs 

than included in the current B-2A estimate of $44.5 billion. The Air Force 

may require up to an additional $155 million for installing low observable 

material improvements to the block 30 configuration and for interim 

contractor support efforts. Further, Air Force officials indicated that cost 

to acquire aircraft shelters for maintenance may be higher than planned.

The Air Force may need an additional $83 million to install critical 

improvements in the low observable features. The Air Force March 1999 

cost estimate assumed that one of the low observable improvement 

programs needed to meet maintainability requirements for the B-2A would 

be installed as part of the programmed depot maintenance process to begin 

in late 1999. The Air Force did not include installation costs for this 

improvement in the March 1999 cost estimate. The Air Force and 

contractor did not believe a significant amount of additional labor hours 

would be required to install the new materials since all low observable 

coatings are removed and then replaced during depot maintenance. The 

contractor has further studied the efforts required for the installation 

process and now believes it will take a significant amount of additional 
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labor hours to complete the installation. They have estimated the cost for 

this increased labor to be about $83 million. If the Air Force determines this 

estimated increase in labor hours and cost to be accurate, then the 

B-2A program cost estimate will increase.

The Air Force estimates it will need up to an additional $72 million to pay 

for contractor maintenance contracts—referred to as interim contractor 

support—until an in-house capability is available. Interim contractor 

support is typically funded from the procurement appropriation as part of 

the acquisition program until an internal Air Force maintenance capability 

is available; once available, the Air Force maintenance capability is paid for 

largely through the operation and maintenance appropriation. The Air 

Force cost estimate for maintenance contracts is based on use of interim 

contractor support through fiscal year 2003. Because the Air Force delayed 

the purchase of selected depot support equipment needed to achieve the 

internal Air Force maintenance capability, it will require greater reliance on 

the contractor for depot support during fiscal years 2001 through 2003. 

Air Force officials pointed out that operation and maintenance funds that 

would have been used to pay for this support effort will no longer be 

required, but they could not provide an estimate for them.

The Air Force has identified a requirement for 13 portable shelters to 

maintain low observable features of the B-2A at locations other than the 

main operating base. The Air Force does not have a firm price for the 

shelters, and the initial contractor estimates are higher than the Air Force 

expected. If the shelters ultimately cost more than expected, the current 

cost estimate will not be adequate to buy the required number of shelters. 

This would create additional funding requirements for the B-2A program

and cause the March 1999 cost estimate to increase.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on the draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

(DOD)agreed that the four primary areas of deficiency discussed in the 

report—AFMSS, defensive avionics, low observable features, and 

operational capability when deployed—require additional effort to meet 

desired performance levels. DOD commented, however, that more progress 

had been made in some of these areas than was indicated in the draft 

report. We added information concerning test results that were reported 

for AFMSS after the release of our draft report to DOD for comment.

DOD commented that we misinterpreted Air Force cost estimates for work 

required to complete the baseline acquisition program. In particular, DOD 
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said costs of certain improvement efforts should not be counted against the 

baseline goal. Our report discusses the added costs to improve the B-2A. 

We did not attempt to define the amount of costs associated with a baseline 

cost goal because the Congress removed the cost ceiling associated with 

the baseline program.

DOD also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. DOD comments are included in appendix I.

Scope and 

Methodology

To evaluate the status of aircraft deliveries, modifications, and 

achievement of operational requirements, we reviewed program office 

management plans, progress reports, and schedules. We also reviewed 

testing and progress assessment reports by the B-2A program office, the Air 

Combat Command, and the 509th B-2A Operational Wing on the status of 

modifying and correcting deficiencies to bring all B-2As into the planned 

block 30 operational configuration. We also reviewed progress assessments 

by the Air Force in achieving the operational requirements necessary to 

achieve the full operating capability requirement by its scheduled date in 

1999. To obtain more detailed information and discuss matters of concern 

in these review areas, we also interviewed officials in the B-2A Program 

Offices at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and at Tinker Air 

Force Base, Oklahoma; the Global Attack Office, Air Combat Command, 

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force 

Base, Missouri; and Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense in the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

To identify cost issues and the potential for increases in the current B-2A 

program cost estimate, we reviewed B-2A program cost estimates, budgets, 

funding plans, and assessments of the Air Force’s ability to execute the 

current program and contracts within estimated costs. We also reviewed 

contract management reports on the status of contractor performance in 

meeting contract schedules within estimated costs. We interviewed B-2A 

Program and Air Combat Command program and financial managers to 

discuss the adequacy of current cost estimates, estimating assumptions, 

issues of concern, and the need and schedule for additional costs to 

complete the program.

We performed our review from June 1998 to March 1999 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
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We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of 

the Air Force; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of Office of Management 

and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies available to 

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix II.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
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Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

18

Appendix II

Major Contributors to 

This Report

22

Related GAO Products 24

Table Table 1: March 1999 Assessment of Achieving

Operational Requirements 4

Figure Figure 1: Overview of B-2A Acquisition Schedule

as of January 1999 3

Abbreviations

AFMSS Air Force Mission Support System

CLOAR common low observable auto-router

DOD Department of Defense

FOC Full Operating Capability
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Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApIenxdi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end 

of this appendix

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-97 Defense Acquisitions

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

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The following are our comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

letter dated April 28, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. The Air Force completed some testing of an upgraded Air Force Mission 

Support Systems (AFMSS) since our draft report was issued. However, an 

important component of the system, the common low observable autorouter (CLOAR), is still unsatisfactory and improvements are being made 

to system software. This component will in some cases prevent mission 

plans from being completed within the operationally required time. In 

addition, operational testing of AFMSS has not been completed. Our final 

report includes updated information on the AFMSS development.

2. DOD stated our description of the defensive avionics as “insufficient” 

implied an inability of the B-2A to perform its mission, whereas B-2As are 

currently participating in combat operations. DOD stated some situational 

awareness information in current operations was being provided by the 

defensive avionics. We changed our report to state situational awareness 

was “limited” rather than “insufficient.” Although the defensive avionics is 

being used to some extent at this time, improvements are still required to 

meet the operational requirements.

3. DOD indicated that the wording of the draft report implied there was an 

operational requirement for low observable maintenance man-hours per 

flying-hour when the requirement is actually for total B-2 maintenance 

activities. The final report reflects this distinction; however, it should be 

noted that the Air Force uses maintenance man-hours per flying-hour to 

measure maintenance improvements for low observable features. This 

metric was used in both the Air Force initial and follow-on operational test 

reports to show low observable maintenance is the main driver for overall 

B-2 maintenance. 

4. DOD stated that B-2As successfully deployed to Guam during two 

exercises in 1998 and that during these exercises some low observable 

maintenance was accomplished without shelters. The final report 

acknowledges that not all low observable maintenance requires an 

environmentally controlled shelter, but it points out that the Air Force 

follow-on test and evaluation report concluded that operational 

deployment requirements were not achieved during these 1998 exercises 

and that the lack of shelters would have prevented any major repair of low 

observable features had they been needed. The test report states that on 

the second deployment exercise, significant low observable deficiencies 
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-97 Defense Acquisitions

occurred and that one of the three aircraft deployed had to be returned to 

the contractor’s facility in the United States for the repairs. Although the 

Air Force can deploy B-2As, the Air Force cannot sustain operations at the 

level required for eight aircraft over a 14-day period without shelters for 

low observable maintenance. 

5. DOD agreed additional funds would be required to complete efforts 

included in the March 1999 B-2A cost estimate. Their comments stated, 

however, that we misinterpreted the Air Force cost estimate for work to 

complete the baseline acquisition program. As stated in the Agency 

Comments and Our Evaluation section, we discuss the added costs to 

improve the B-2A, but we did not attempt to define the amount of costs 

associated with the baseline cost goal because the Congress removed the 

cost ceiling associated with the baseline program. During the formal exit 

conference, DOD officials also stated that additional funds might be 

needed to buy deployable shelters.
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Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report ApIenxdi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division, Washington, 

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Chicago Field Office Robert D. Murphy

Michael J. Hazard

Marvin E. Bonner
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Related GAO Products

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