FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

C. L., an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEL AMO HOSPITAL, INC., a 

California corporation; DOES, 1–10, 

inclusive,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-56074

D.C. No.

8:18-cv-00475-

DOC-DFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed March 30, 2021

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit 

Judges, and Brian M. Cogan,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

* The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel vacated the district court’s judgment, after a 

bench trial, in favor of the defendant in an action seeking 

injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits discrimination in 

“places of public accommodations,” including hospitals.

Plaintiff C.L., who has been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and other conditions, obtained a 

dog named Aspen, intending it to be her service dog. 

Because enrolling in a full training course to provide Aspen 

with formal certification was not a viable option for C.L., 

she began self-training the dog. C.L. sought inpatient 

treatment at Del Amo Hospital’s National Treatment Center. 

When she asked the Center if she could bring Aspen with her 

as a service dog, Del Amo denied the dog admission. The 

district court entered judgment in favor of Del Amo on the 

ground that Aspen did not qualify as a service animal under 

the ADA.

The panel held that the district court erred as a matter of 

law by effectively imposing a certification requirement for 

C.L.’s dog to be qualified as a service animal. The panel 

held that the ADA prohibits certification requirements for 

qualifying service dogs for three reasons: (1) the ADA 

defines a service dog functionally, without reference to 

specific training requirements; (2) Department of Justice 

regulations, rulemaking commentary, and guidance have 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 3

consistently rejected a formal certification requirement; and 

(3) allowing a person with a disability to self-train a service 

animal furthers the stated goals of the ADA, for other 

training could be prohibitively expensive.

The panel remanded for the district court to consider 

whether C.L.’s testimony regarding her self-training of 

Aspen, coupled with expert testimony, was sufficient to 

show that Aspen was more likely than not a qualified service 

dog at the time of trial.

COUNSEL

Christopher H. Knauf (argued) and Alexandra M. 

Robertson, Disability Rights Legal Center, Los Angeles, 

California; Jennifer E. Mathis, Bazelon Center for Mental 

Health Law, Washington, D.C.; Celia McGuinness and 

Anthony E. Goldsmith, Derby McGuinness & Goldsmith 

LLP, Oakland, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Raul L. Martinez (argued), Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith 

LLP, Los Angeles, California; Scott D. Buchholz and Moira 

S. Brennan, San Diego, California; for DefendantsAppellees.

Gina F. Elliott (argued), Adam R. Lawton, and Brian J. 

Springer, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, 

California, for Amici Curiae National Disability Rights 

Network, American Association of People With Disabilities, 

Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Disability Rights 

California, Mental Health America, National Council on 

Independent Living, and Psychiatric Service Dog Partners.
4 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to eliminate the discrimination 

that persons with disabilities faced in essential facets of 

everyday life. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Title III of the ADA 

prohibits discrimination in “places of public 

accommodations,” including hospitals. Id. §§ 12181–

12182. Plaintiff-Appellant C.L. (“C.L.”), who survived 

years of abuse at the hands of her family and a romantic 

partner, has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”), dissociative identity disorder (“DID”), 

anxiety, and depression. As a result of these conditions, C.L. 

experiences hypervigilance, PTSD-related nightmares and 

flashbacks, severe anxiety in public spaces and while 

bathing, and has difficulty remaining focused and engaged 

in daily tasks. To mitigate the symptoms of her disability, 

C.L. obtained Aspen, a 16-pound bichon-poodle mix, 

intending Aspen to be her service dog. Because enrolling in 

a full training course to provide Aspen with formal 

certification was not a viable option for C.L., she began selftraining Aspen to perform specific tasks she thought would 

ameliorate her disability and decrease her isolation.

Before and after obtaining Aspen, C.L. sought inpatient 

treatment at Defendant-Appellee Del Amo Hospital’s (“Del 

Amo”) National Treatment Center. When C.L. asked the 

Center if she could bring Aspen with her as her service dog, 

Del Amo denied Aspen admission, concluding that the dog’s 

presence would interfere with C.L.’s therapy. In the 

underlying suit, C.L. challenged Del Amo’s practice of 

denying admission to Aspen as a violation of Title III of the 

ADA and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. C.L. is 

undisputedly a person with a disability, and Del Amo is a 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 5

place of public accommodation. After a bench trial, the 

district court determined that Aspen does not qualify as a 

service dog under the ADA. In this appeal, C.L. challenges 

the district court’s judgment in favor of Del Amo. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and 

remand.

We hold that the district court erred by effectively 

imposing a certification requirement for C.L.’s dog to be 

qualified as a service animal under the ADA. We vacate and 

remand for the district court to reconsider whether Aspen 

was a qualified service dog at the time of trial, and if Aspen 

is a service dog, whether Del Amo has proved its affirmative 

defense of fundamental alteration.

I

C.L. is a speech-language pathologist with a master’s 

degree in Speech and Language Pathology and a Ph.D. in 

Education. As a child, C.L. endured years of physical, 

psychological, and sexual abuse. She escaped her family’s 

abuse at age 17, but then experienced a 10-year abusive 

relationship before escaping and starting therapy in 1995. 

By 1996, she had been diagnosed with PTSD and DID, and 

started taking medication. Since then, C.L. has been 

diagnosed with anxiety and depression.

C.L.’s psychiatric condition limits major life activities, 

such as interacting with others, self-care, and sleeping. As a 

result of her PTSD, C.L. has a heightened startle response 

and hypervigilance—she continually checks whether things 

in her environment are dangerous and finds it difficult to 

remain focused and engaged in daily tasks. Additionally, 

having people unexpectedly in her presence induces anxiety. 

Taking a shower is particularly challenging due to her 

history of abuse while bathing. C.L. has PTSD-related 
6 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

nightmares and flashbacks that are sometimes so severe that 

she tries not to sleep at all to avoid them.

In 2011, after an event triggered a traumatic memory, 

C.L.’s mental health deteriorated and her flashbacks, 

anxiety, and depression increased. C.L. felt suicidal. 

Dr. Michael Foust, C.L.’s therapist, encouraged C.L. to 

obtain a service dog to manage her symptoms of PTSD and 

decrease her isolation.

C.L. began researching the possibility of obtaining a 

service dog. First, she purchased a book called Training 

Your Own Psychiatric Service Dog, by a service dog trainer 

named Katie Gonzalez, to help her understand the tasks 

performed by psychiatric service dogs and whether one 

could meet her needs. Katie Gonzalez is the director of Little 

Angels Service Dogs (“Little Angels”), a nonprofit service 

dog training organization. Gonzalez has trained service 

dogs, including psychiatric service dogs, for twenty years, 

and has published several books on training service dogs. 

Through her research, C.L. learned that because she was 

living on Supplemental Security Income, she could not 

afford to pay for a trained dog. A trained dog would cost at 

least $15,000.1 C.L. conducted further research and 

conferred with a service dog training agency about what dog 

breed might best meet her needs.

In August 2013, C.L. obtained Aspen—a 16-pound 

bichon-poodle mix that was then 8 weeks old—to be her 

1 Little Angels fundraises $38,000 to cover the cost to train each 

service dog and then provides the trained service animal to an approved 

applicant with a disability on its waiting list for a comparatively minimal 

deposit of at least $500. At the time of trial, the waiting list was 

approximately 180–200 approved applicants, and the estimated time for 

an approved applicant to receive a trained service dog was ten years.
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 7

service dog. At that time, she did not yet know what tasks 

she would want Aspen to perform. She took several dogtraining classes at a general dog-training facility, Wags & 

Wiggles, where she learned how to train Aspen for general 

socialization and good behavior in public.2

 C.L. used the 

methods she learned at the dog-training facility and Katie 

Gonzalez’s service dog-training book to begin training 

Aspen to perform specific tasks. C.L.’s method, as taught 

by the classes, included positive reinforcement and verbal 

acknowledgement of successfully performed tasks, while 

extinguishing inaccurate or inappropriate behavior. C.L. 

also used a clicker as a positive reinforcement tool.

In 2013, C.L. trained Aspen to perform specific tasks to 

mitigate symptoms of her disability:

1. Waking from Nightmares: C.L. trained Aspen to 

wake her from nightmares by standing on her or 

licking her face. This task interrupted the 

nightmares, thereby improving her sleep and 

reducing the amount of distress she experienced 

following a nightmare. C.L. testified that by the 

end of 2013, Aspen was consistently performing 

the task of waking C.L. from nightmares and not 

waking her for any other purpose.

2. Grounding: C.L. experiences flashbacks and 

anxiety. C.L. trained Aspen to place herself in a 

particular position on C.L.’s lap and apply deep 

pressure while facing forward. This “grounds” 

C.L. in the present. C.L. testified that Aspen was 

2 C.L. continued to attend classes periodically at Wags & Wiggles 

through the spring of 2019. Wags & Wiggles is certified in dog training, 

but not service dog training.
8 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

performing this task consistently by the end of 

2013.

3. Alert for People Approaching: C.L. trained 

Aspen to alert her that someone is approaching 

outside her sightline, alleviating C.L.’s 

symptoms of hypervigilance and improving her 

ability to focus on tasks at hand.

In 2014, C.L. attended a two-day seminar at Little 

Angels Service Dogs’ facility in San Diego. The seminar 

was the first course in a three-seminar series, where C.L. 

learned about how to select an appropriate service dog, the 

laws and regulations related to having a service dog, and 

basic training concepts. Specifically, C.L. learned additional 

techniques for using positive reinforcement and correcting 

unwanted behaviors such as the “leash tug” and an approach 

that involved tapping the dog in the hind area. Later that 

year, Little Angels offered two additional seminars for 

training one’s own service dog. C.L. says she did not attend 

them because they offered training in tasks that she did not 

need her dog to perform, such as turning on a light or 

opening a door. Moreover, she could not afford the tuition 

or the cost of traveling from her home in Santa Ana to San 

Diego. Nevertheless, she continued to communicate with 

Little Angels trainers via email and telephone to discuss 

Aspen’s progress, receive feedback, and get her training 

questions answered as she continued training.

C.L. testified to training Aspen to accomplish the 

following additional tasks in 2014 and 2015:

1. Interrupt Self-Injurious Behavior: C.L. trained 

Aspen to interrupt behaviors such as cutting and 

banging her head against a wall. For example, 

when C.L. is banging her head against a wall, 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 9

Aspen places herself between C.L. and the wall. 

Although C.L.’s therapist also proposed 

strategies for interrupting self-injurious behavior, 

including use of ice or a rubber band to safely 

provide a sensory distraction, C.L. testified that 

Aspen is much more effective than these 

strategies.

2. Cornering: C.L. trained Aspen to go around a 

corner ahead of C.L. and alert her if someone is 

approaching. Being alerted to the presence of 

people before she sees them alleviates C.L.’s 

anxiety and hypervigilance.

3. Boundary Control: C.L. trained Aspen to create 

a boundary with her body between C.L. and other 

people, enabling her to spend more time in 

public.

4. Alert for Medication: C.L. trained Aspen to alert 

her when her anxiety is increasing, even before 

C.L. becomes conscious of it herself.

5. Standing Guard by the Shower: C.L. has 

difficulty showering due to past sexual abuse, so 

she trained Aspen to sit in a specific location 

outside the bathroom door and to come get her if 

someone approaches.

On thirteen separate occasions, C.L. sought inpatient 

treatment at Del Amo’s National Treatment Center. Only 

seven of those admissions, which took place between 

September 2015 and August 2017, were the subject of C.L.’s 

claims in her initial complaint. The National Treatment 

Center program specializes in treatment of patients who have 

experienced trauma. During those seven admissions, Del 
10 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

Amo denied C.L.’s request to bring Aspen with her. The 

hospital denied C.L.’s request because Del Amo clinicians 

determined that Aspen’s presence in the Center would 

interfere with C.L.’s therapy by allowing her to rely on 

Aspen rather than learn coping skills.

On March 23, 2018, C.L. filed a complaint in the Central 

District of California challenging Del Amo’s practice of 

denying admission to Aspen on the seven previous occasions 

as well as the ongoing denials of admission to Aspen. C.L. 

filed suit under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), 

and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 51(b). The parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment.

In its order on summary judgment, the district court 

found that Del Amo did not dispute that C.L. is a “person 

with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA. The court 

denied Del Amo’s motion in its entirety and granted C.L.’s 

motion in part, holding that Del Amo is a “place of public 

accommodation” under Title III of the ADA. The court 

denied C.L.’s pre-trial motion in limine requesting 

adjudication of whether Aspen was, in fact, a service dog. 

The district court initially rejected C.L.’s request for a bench 

trial, but it then acquiesced when C.L. waived any claim for 

damages and stated that she would be pursuing only 

injunctive relief at trial.

A bench trial took place from July 23 to 26, 2019. Two 

issues were presented at trial: (1) whether Aspen was a 

service dog, and (2) whether allowing Aspen to participate 

in C.L.’s hospitalization would “fundamentally alter” the 

psychiatric services that were being offered to C.L. during 

those hospitalizations under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 11

At trial, C.L. testified to training Aspen to perform the 

specific tasks outlined above. Because C.L. trained Aspen 

in these tasks herself, there was no other witness to testify to 

the details of her training and how Aspen helped her manage 

her disability from 2015 to 2017.

Katie Gonzalez testified as an expert in the training of 

service dogs, the use of service dogs for psychiatric 

disabilities, and the laws and regulations for service dogs as 

applied to the work service dogs perform. Gonzalez testified 

that interrupting nightmares, alerting for people 

approaching, grounding, interrupting self-harm, cornering, 

boundary control, alerting for medication, and standing 

guard in particular places are typical tasks for psychiatric 

service dogs.

Gonzalez also testified to observing Aspen and C.L. as a 

dog-handler unit in June 2019. Gonzalez testified that Aspen 

was a fully trained service dog at the time she observed C.L. 

and Aspen in June 2019. Gonzalez observed C.L. with 

Aspen at multiple locations, a restaurant and a shopping 

center, and the meeting lasted one to one-and-a-half hours. 

She instructed C.L. to demonstrate some of Aspen’s trained 

tasks and examined how the dog reacted to people and its 

disposition. She also considered Aspen’s breed and size to 

evaluate appropriateness for the tasks Aspen was trained to 

perform. Gonzalez also considered the methods by which 

C.L. trained Aspen. She testified that the techniques C.L. 

described using to train Aspen are the same techniques that 

she and Little Angels’ trainers teach in the seminars, and as 

described in the Training Your Own Psychiatric Service Dog 

book and the Little Angels Seminar Booklet. Gonzalez 

interviewed C.L. regarding how C.L. trained Aspen and 

concluded that Aspen’s tasks were trained tasks, rather than 

mere behaviors.
12 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

Relevant to this appeal, Gonzalez testified that Little 

Angels offers a “certification” for service dogs, based in part 

on protocols developed by Assistance Dogs International 

(“ADI”). ADI is a private, nonprofit organization of 

professional service dog trainers. ADI developed the 

protocols for service dog training as best practices by its 

members. Gonzalez emphasized, however, that the legal 

standard for determining whether a dog is a service dog 

under the ADA is different and more basic than the Little 

Angels certification or the ADI protocols. A company like 

Little Angels can of course set its standards for certifying a 

service dog at a level that is more rigorous than that required 

by the ADA.

Gonzalez testified that she could not certify Aspen under 

ADI’s protocols because further steps would be required for 

her to do so, e.g., submitting the dog’s veterinary records, 

remaining in contact with Gonzalez every month, and 

completing all of Little Angels’ seminars and assessments. 

Gonzalez observed C.L. and Aspen working together and 

concluded that the unit exhibited both classical and operant 

conditioning—forms of training that are common in the 

industry and used by Little Angels’ trainers. Based on the 

foregoing, Gonzalez testified that even though C.L. did not 

complete the steps required for Little Angels certification, 

C.L. had successfully trained Aspen as a service dog.

On Del Amo’s fundamental alteration defense, Del 

Amo’s psychiatrist expert, Dr. Anna Solt, testified that 

having the dog present during hospitalization would make it 

“too tempting for her to try to utilize the service dog instead 

of implementing tools that are taught within the program.” 

Dr. Solt also testified that there is “no scientific way to know 

that someone is having a nightmare.”
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 13

After the four-day bench trial, the district court entered 

judgment in favor of Del Amo on the grounds that C.L. had 

not shown Aspen was or is a service dog. The court did not 

reach the question of whether Del Amo had proved its 

affirmative defense of “fundamental alteration.” C.L. timely 

appealed.

While this appeal was pending, on February 7, 2020, 

several organizations moved pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 29(a) for leave to file an amicus curiae

brief in support of C.L. The organizations are recognized 

authorities in the field of disability rights. We granted the 

motion, and the amicus brief was filed on November 6, 

2020.3

II

We first address the proper standard of review for C.L.’s 

claims. We review de novo questions of law or mixed 

questions of law and fact. See OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Has 

Inds., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011); Lim v. City 

of Long Beach, 217 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000). We 

review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Fed. 

R. Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 

564, 566 (1985).

C.L. frames the issues on appeal as two legal errors by 

the district court: (1) imposing a service dog “certification” 

requirement that the ADA prohibits, and (2) concluding 

incorrectly that C.L.’s uncontroverted and unimpeached 

testimony requires corroboration to satisfy the ADA. C.L. 

contends that these erroneous legal rulings were the sole 

bases for the district court’s finding that Aspen does not 

3 The court thanks the amicus parties for their views.
14 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

qualify as a service dog. Del Amo disputes this 

characterization, contending that the issue before us is 

“whether Aspen was a trained service dog and whether 

Aspen could perform tasks directly related to C.L.’s 

disability,” a factual finding resting exclusively on the 

district court’s “Findings of Fact.” According to Del Amo, 

the district court based its factual conclusion that Aspen is 

not a service dog on credibility grounds.

Based on our reading of the district court’s Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law, we frame the certification 

issue as presented by C.L. and review the claim de novo. The 

plain language of the district court’s decision suggests that it 

relied on Katie Gonzalez’s inability to “certify” Aspen under 

Little Angels’ standards to reject C.L.’s claim that Aspen is 

a service dog.

Del Amo contends that even though the district court 

relied on the fact that Aspen was not and could not have been 

certified under Little Angels standards, the court also relied 

on proper grounds, i.e., credibility. This contention is belied 

by the district court order. First, the court repeatedly 

emphasized certification standards in its judgment. Second, 

in laying out its conclusions of law, the court stated: 

“Gonzalez testified that she believes Aspen is a service 

animal as of June 2019,” but that testimony was 

“contradicted” because Gonzalez “is still not willing to 

certify C.L. and Aspen as a service dog and handler team.” 

The court then concluded: “Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has not met her burden to show . . . that Aspen is 

currently a trained service dog.” In other words, Gonzalez’s 

expert testimony that Aspen was a trained service dog as of 

June 2019—the only expert testimony implicating service 

dog training—was not accepted by the court because 

Gonzalez’s inability to certify Aspen necessarily 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 15

contradicted that claim. If the inability to certify Aspen 

“contradicts” an opinion that Aspen is a trained service dog, 

as the district court opined, then the court improperly 

considered certification to be a legally necessary standard for 

assessing whether Aspen was a trained service dog. Because 

the court declined to give weight to C.L.’s testimony on its 

own and considered her testimony uncorroborated, the 

court’s conclusion that Aspen was not a trained service dog 

hinged on the supposed contradiction in Gonzalez’s 

testimony.

Contrary to Del Amo’s contentions, the court did not 

challenge or raise questions about C.L.’s credibility, and it 

made no findings of fact whatsoever on the substance of 

C.L.’s testimony, her demeanor at trial, or any impeaching 

evidence. Nor did the court make credibility findings as to 

Gonzalez, other than noting—apparently based on the 

court’s conflation of the standard for a service dog under the 

ADA and Little Angels’ certification standards—that her 

testimony contradicted itself. Del Amo points to portions of 

C.L.’s testimony it believes are inconsistent or not credible, 

but because these contentions are post-hoc rationalizations 

of the district court decision—rather than an accurate 

representation of the district court’s express findings and 

conclusions—we decline to affirm on credibility grounds 

and review C.L.’s claim as legal error. See Alpha Distrib. 

Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 452–53 (9th Cir. 

1972) (declining to decide contested factual claim where the 

district court’s findings of fact were unclear); Fed. R. Civ. 

Proc. 52(a)(6).4

4 Rule 52(a) requires: “In an action tried on the facts without a jury 

or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state 

its conclusions of law separately.” The Rule “requires the district court’s 
16 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

We next address the scope of C.L.’s requested relief. 

Because she requests only injunctive relief,5 the relevant 

question is whether Aspen was a trained service dog at the 

time of trial: 2019.

III

We next address what appears to be a question of first 

impression for our Circuit6—whether it is a 

misinterpretation of the ADA to effectively require a service 

dog to meet formal certification requirements. We hold that 

the ADA prohibits certification requirements for qualifying 

service dogs for three reasons: (1) the ADA defines a service 

dog functionally, without reference to specific training 

requirements, (2) Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 

regulations, rulemaking commentary, and guidance have 

consistently rejected a formal certification requirement, and 

(3) allowing a person with a disability to self-train a service 

animal furthers the stated goals of the ADA, for other 

training could be prohibitively expensive. Thus, the district 

findings to ‘be explicit enough to give the appellate court a clear 

understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision, and to enable it to 

determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision.’” 

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Alpha Distrib., 454 F.2d at 453).

5 C.L.’s initial complaint requested damages, but at the time of trial, 

C.L. had waived any claim for damages and was pursuing only injunctive 

relief. Though Del Amo devotes much of its answering brief to Aspen’s 

status as a service dog from 2014 to 2018, that evidence is not dispositive 

as to whether Aspen is currently a trained service dog that should be 

allowed to accompany C.L. to Del Amo during future admissions.

6 Even outside of our Circuit, the case law in this area is sparse and 

primarily exists at the district court level. 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 17

court erred by imposing a heightened requirement on Aspen 

that is inconsistent with the ADA.

A

The ADA’s implementing regulations define a service 

animal as “any dog that is individually trained to do work or 

perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a 

disability,” including a psychiatric disability, where the 

work or tasks are “directly related to the individual’s 

disability.” 28 CFR § 36.104. The regulations do not 

specify by whom the dog must be trained. Rather, the statute 

defines a service dog by the outcome of training—what the 

dog is capable of doing to ameliorate an individual’s 

disability. The language also makes clear that the dog’s 

capabilities must be trained for that purpose; a well-trained 

companion animal that happens to alleviate a person’s 

anxiety would not suffice, see id., but a dog trained by the 

individual to perform certain tasks to alleviate that anxiety 

would. Our view is consistent with district courts that have 

considered the question and found that the ADA does not 

require a service dog to perform a particular number of 

trained tasks or amount of work. See, e.g., Green v. Hous. 

Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D. Or. 

1998) (“[T]here is no requirement as to the amount or type 

of work a service animal must provide for the benefit of the 

[person with a disability].”). There must be some evidence 

of individual training to distinguish the service animal from 

the ordinary pet. For example, a dog may naturally jump up 

in its owner’s lap, which would constitute a behavior—

however, if the owner trains the dog to sit in her lap in a 

particular position and only in response to certain triggers 

related to the owner’s disability, then the dog has been 

trained and has ceased to merely behave in a way that dogs 

naturally do. Here, Gonzalez, an expert in service dog 
18 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

training, explained that the process of training a dog to 

mitigate symptoms of disability may involve reinforcing 

some natural behaviors and extinguishing other behaviors 

until the dog is consistently performing the desired task. 

And Aspen had been trained to perform several tasks well 

beyond the normal behavior of a pet, such as licking C.L.’s 

face to wake her from a nightmare, interrupting selfinjurious behavior, cornering, boundary control and other 

specific trained tasks.

B

The DOJ has consistently stated—in regulations, 

rulemaking commentary, and official department 

guidance—that a service animal within the meaning of the 

ADA must be individually trained to perform tasks related 

to an individual’s disability, but the animal need not be 

formally certified. The test is a functional one: can the dog 

consistently help the person with a disability meet the 

challenges of life by assisting in the person’s activities of 

daily living?

In enacting the ADA, Congress explained that one 

purpose is “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a 

central role in enforcing the standards established in this 

chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3). To that end, Congress 

gave the Attorney General the responsibility to promulgate 

regulations implementing the provisions of Title III of the 

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). “To flesh out the details of 

[Title III’s] general rule, Congress charged the Attorney 

General with the task of promulgating regulations clarifying 

how public accommodations must meet these statutory 

obligations.” United States v. AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 

763 (9th Cir. 2008).
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 19

DOJ regulations and commentary make clear that 

individuals may self-train service animals without obtaining 

formal certification. The DOJ’s administrative guidance 

regarding the “public accommodations” provision is 

“entitled to deference.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 

646 (1998) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The current 

regulations were made final after the DOJ published a notice 

of proposed rulemaking in June 2008. See 

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public 

Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 73 Fed. 

Reg. 34508, 34515 (proposed June 17, 2008). With regard 

to qualifying service animals, the DOJ wished to amend the 

definition of “service animal” to exclude some species (such 

as rabbits) and to exclude emotional support animals, but it 

also sought to formalize the agency’s longstanding position 

that people with psychiatric and mental disabilities can use 

service animals. Id. at 34515–16, 34521. After receiving 

comments, the DOJ issued its final regulations in September 

2010, and the regulations took effect in March 2011. See

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public 

Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities (“Final 

Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 56236, 56237 (Sept. 15, 2010); 76 Fed. 

Reg. 13286, 13288 (Mar. 11, 2011) (making technical 

corrections).

The district court’s ruling that Aspen was not a service 

animal in part because she could not be certified under ADI 

standards is contrary to multiple aspects of the 2010 

regulations. First, the regulations state that a person with a 

“psychiatric . . . or other mental disability” may benefit from 

the use of service animals. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Trained 

tasks can include “preventing or interrupting impulsive or 

destructive behaviors.” Id. As other courts have noted, a 

dog can be trained to aid a person with a disability without 
20 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

formal schooling. See Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 430–

31 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court erred as a 

matter of law by providing a jury instruction from which the 

“jury could logically infer . . . that without school training, a 

dog cannot be a reasonable accommodation,” where a 

reasonable accommodation is defined by statute as 

“facilitat[ing] a [person with a disability’s] ability to 

function”); Green, 994 F. Supp. at 1256.

The DOJ’s commentary accompanying its rulemaking 

confirms that persons with disabilities need not secure 

formal training and may self-train their animals. In fact, the 

DOJ considered but specifically rejected a recommendation 

submitted by multiple commenters to adopt “formal training 

requirements for service animals.” Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 

at 56272 (rejecting this approach and concluding that DOJ 

“will not impose any type of formal training requirements or 

certification process”). The DOJ justified its decision by 

noting that a certification requirement would increase the 

cost of acquiring a service animal, thus limiting access to 

such animals for individuals with limited financial 

resources, and that suggested training standards were too 

“lengthy and detailed.” Id. The DOJ also expressed an 

intention not to “unnecessarily impede individual choice” in 

light of “the diverse needs and preferences of individuals 

with disabilities.” Id. at 56266. Declining to impose any 

kind of rigid training requirement, the DOJ emphasized that 

“individuals with disabilities may be capable of training, and 

some have trained, their service animal to perform tasks or 

do work to accommodate their disability.” Id. Thus, the 

district court’s conclusion that Aspen’s failure to receive 

certification weighed against her claim for relief cannot be 

reconciled with the permissive approach adopted by the 

DOJ. It is enough if a service dog had been trained to 

perform specific tasks that will consistently aid a person with 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 21

a disability by making them more able to perform necessary 

tasks and enjoy activities of daily living.

The district court’s decision also creates tension with a 

related regulation. Section 36.302 specifies the 

arrangements that public accommodations must make for 

service animals. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302. Subsection (c)(6) 

permits public accommodations to ask only two questions to 

determine whether an animal is a service animal: (1) whether 

“the animal is required because of a disability,” and 

(2) “what work or task the animal has been trained to 

perform.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6). The public 

accommodation is expressly prohibited from “requir[ing] 

documentation, such as proof that the animal has been 

certified, trained, or licensed as a service animal.” Id.7 The 

DOJ observed that requiring individuals with disabilities to 

carry around documentation “would be unnecessary, 

burdensome, and contrary to the spirit, intent, and mandates 

of the ADA.” See Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56272. We 

conclude that the district court’s implicit rule creates a 

mismatch between the information a public accommodation 

may request and the conditions that a service animal must 

satisfy to be qualified.

Consistent with the clear language of the regulations and 

commentary, many district court decisions both within and 

outside our Circuit have declined to apply a certification 

obligation. See Green, 994 F. Supp. at 1255–56; Riley v. Bd. 

of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cnty., No. 14-CV-00063, 2017 

7 Del Amo contends that this provision of the regulations is a 

“different question” from the one presented here, because the issue here 

is not that C.L. did not have proper documentation for Aspen. True 

enough, but as C.L. points out, it would be nonsensical for the ADA to 

effectively require certification when public accommodations are 

prohibited from asking for proof of it.
22 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

WL 4181143, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 21, 2017); Cordoves v. 

Miami-Dade County, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1230 (S.D. Fla. 

2015); Rose v. Springfield–Greene Cnty. Health Dep’t, 

668 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214–15 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (“There 

are no requirements as to the amount or type of training that 

a service animal must undergo, nor the type of work or 

assistance that a service animal must provide, but the animal 

be trained to perform tasks or do work for the benefit of a 

[person with a disability].”); see also Prindable v. Ass’n of 

Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.Supp.2d 1245, 

1256 (D. Haw. 2003) (noting that “there are no federallymandated animal training standards”).

The DOJ has conveyed the same views in its technical 

assistance manual and other guidance documents. Such 

materials may properly serve as authoritative sources of 

interpretive guidance. See, e.g., Bay Area Addiction Rsch. 

& Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 732 n.11 

(9th Cir. 1999) (stating that DOJ’s ADA Technical 

Assistance Manual “must also be given substantial deference 

and will be disregarded only if ‘plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation’” (citation omitted)). The 

DOJ Technical Assistance Manual on the ADA defines 

service animals by the tasks they are able to perform, and not 

by reference to a particular training protocol. See U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, Technical Assistance Manual on the ADA (1994), 

available at https://www.ada.gov/taman3.html. Though the 

manual identifies that “[a] number of States have programs 

to certify service animals,” it instructs that private entities 

“may not insist on proof of State certification before 

permitting the entry of a service animal to a place of public 

accommodation.” Id. Similarly, the DOJ’s document titled 

“Frequently Asked Questions about Service Animals and the 

ADA,” which provides guidance on the service animal 

provisions, makes clear that the ADA considers self-training 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 23

to be a viable option. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Frequently 

Asked Questions about Service Animals and the ADA” 

(2015), available at https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_

animal_qa.pdf.

C

Finally, we conclude that the district court erred because 

effectively requiring certification would hinder the goals of 

the ADA.

The ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990. 

Congress sought to eliminate the discrimination faced by 

people with disabilities in essential facets of everyday life, 

including at public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101(a)(2)–(3). Accordingly, one of the ADA’s goals 

was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 

for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities.” Id. at § 12101(b)(1). The flexibility to selftrain a service animal for an individual’s specific needs 

furthers the ADA’s goal of helping people with disabilities 

live with “equality of opportunity, full participation, 

independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.” Id.

at § 12101(a)(7).

A certification requirement would have negative 

consequences for persons with psychiatric disabilities who 

rely on service animals. Research shows the significant 

impact service animals can have on the quality of life of 

persons with such disabilities. See Anne Ruff & Adriana 

Fortune, Emerging Duties Under Unsettled Disability Law: 

Web Access and Service Animals in Health Care, 11 J. 

Health & Life Sci. L. 80, 100 (2017) (recognizing that 

service animals are increasingly being used to assist persons 

with psychiatric disabilities rather than physical disabilities). 

Specifically, service animals have been shown to help 
24 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

“individuals with autism, post-traumatic stress disorder, and 

anxiety.” Id. Service dogs in particular have been 

“associated with clinically significant reductions in [PTSD] 

symptoms” compared to usual care alone. See Marguerite 

E. O’Haire & Kerri E. Rodriguez, Preliminary Efficacy of 

Service Dogs as a Complementary Treatment for 

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military Members and 

Veterans, 86 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 179, 184 

(2018); see also Terry K. Crowe et al., Veterans 

Transitioning from Isolation to Integration: A Look at 

Veteran/Service Dog Partnerships, 40 Disability & 

Rehabilitation 2953, 2956 (2018) (finding that service dogs 

decrease isolation because they “were alerted to the 

veterans’ anxiety,” and the animals would “nudge[] or alert[] 

(cue[]) the veterans to leave the store”).

C.L.’s case illustrates the benefits a trained service dog 

can provide to an individual with PTSD. C.L. testified that 

she is able to go into public “much, much more” because of 

Aspen’s training in alerting her to the presence of other 

people. She also feels comfortable going grocery shopping 

with Aspen’s assistance, which she was not able to do 

before. Enrolling in a training course to obtain a certification 

is not always a viable option for persons like C.L., who had 

not been able to work before obtaining Aspen. The district 

court placed great weight on the fact that Gonzalez would 

not certify Aspen as a service dog under standards set by 

Assistance Dogs International, a private trade association, 

but Gonzalez explained that she could not certify Aspen 

under this standard unless C.L. attended three seminars and 

provided proof of disability from a medical provider. Those 

burdens were in addition to the $900 tuition, plus any travel 

or other expenses that may be required to attend multipleday sessions. Moreover, C.L. testified that she did not attend 

all three sessions of Little Angels’ seminar in part because 
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 25

they were focused on tasks she did not require Aspen to 

perform. Importantly, the DOJ declined to adopt formal 

training requirements precisely because the needs of each 

individual with a disability vary greatly. See 73 Fed. Reg. 

at 34524.

Thus, a ruling that service animals cannot be qualified 

under the ADA if an expert is not able to certify the animal 

based on the standards of a private organization would have 

the effect of denying legally protected access to public 

accommodations for persons who—like C.L.—need service 

animals to mitigate the effects of their disabilities in these 

spaces. And from a pragmatic standpoint, there is no 

industry-wide consensus on the proper certification 

standards. For example, Gonzalez testified that her 

organization starts with the general certification framework 

of another organization, but then adds additional standards. 

It is unclear how a person like C.L. could reliably choose 

between these various standards, none of which the DOJ 

endorses, to ensure the “certification” will be judicially 

recognized. Importing a certification requirement would not 

create certainty for whether a dog is truly a service animal. 

Instead, it would multiply litigation over which certifications 

are judicially valid. Under the ADA, the proper focus is on 

whether a service animal will consistently and reliably help 

a person with a disability in performing activities of daily 

living.

IV

Because we hold that the district court erred as a matter 

of law by imposing a certification requirement, we need not 

delve deeply into C.L.’s second claim of legal error—

whether corroboration is required if a person self-training 

their service dog gives unrebutted testimony. According to 

C.L., the district court discounted C.L.’s testimony 
26 C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL

regarding Aspen’s training without giving explicit reasons 

for doing so. The court stated: “Other than C.L.’s assertions, 

there is no evidence in the record as accepted by the Court 

that Aspen was trained to perform, and could perform, the 

outlined [service dog] tasks”; and “The sole evidence

Plaintiff put forth that Aspen was a service animal during 

this time period is her own testimony that she trained Aspen 

to perform tasks.” (emphasis added). Read plainly, these 

statements imply that the court had accepted C.L.’s 

testimony, but without additional accepted testimony, C.L.’s 

own assertions were insufficient to show that Aspen was a 

trained service dog.

But because the district court erred by improperly 

discounting Gonzalez’s testimony on certification grounds, 

and Gonzalez’s expert testimony that Aspen was a “service 

dog” corroborated C.L.’s testimony and thus provided 

“additional accepted testimony,” we need not decide 

whether unimpeached testimony is necessarily insufficient 

to prove that a dog is a service animal. We remand for the 

district court to consider whether C.L.’s testimony regarding 

her self-training of Aspen, coupled with Katie Gonzalez’s 

expert testimony, was sufficient to show that Aspen was 

“more likely than not” a qualified service dog at the time of 

trial. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 

398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing the preponderance 

standard for establishing a fact as “more likely than not”).

V

For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred by 

requiring Aspen to meet formal certification standards to 

qualify as a service dog, because such a requirement is 

inconsistent with the ADA. We remand for the district court

to reconsider C.L.’s claims consistent with what we have 

said in this opinion.
C. L. V. DEL AMO HOSPITAL 27

VACATED AND REMANDED.8

8 Pursuant to General Order 4.5(e), Del Amo Hospital shall bear the 

costs of this appeal.