United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

Patrick Kennedy, House of

Representatives

November 1998 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES

C-130 Upgrade Plan Could

Help Fix Electronic

Warfare Deficiencies

GAO/NSIAD-99-1

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278786 

November 13, 1998

The Honorable Patrick Kennedy

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

In response to your concern that threats to the U.S. Special Operations

Command’s (USSOCOM) aircraft are increasing, while funds available for

electronic warfare are decreasing, we are reviewing USSOCOM’s acquisition

strategy for aircraft electronic warfare systems. This report focuses on

fixed-wing C-130 aircraft operated by USSOCOM’s Air Force component, the

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). As you requested, we

determined (1) the soundness of AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition

strategy and (2) the extent to which AFSOC is correcting deficiencies and

maximizing commonality in its electronic warfare systems. We also

identified a funding source that could help AFSOC further implement its

electronic warfare acquisition strategy. We will address USSOCOM’s

rotary-wing aircraft in a separate report.

Background The nation’s special operations forces provide the National Command

Authorities a highly trained, rapidly deployable joint force capable of

conducting special operations anywhere in the world.1

 In November 1986,

Congress enacted section 1311 of Public Law 99-661, which directed the

President to establish USSOCOM, a unified combatant command to ensure

that special operations forces were combat ready and prepared to conduct

specified missions. USSOCOM’s component commands include AFSOC, the

Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command,

and the Joint Special Operations Command. AFSOC, located at Hurlburt

Field, Florida, deploys and supports special operations forces worldwide.

To ensure that special operations were adequately funded, Congress

further provided in section 1311 of Public Law 99-661 that the Department

of Defense create for the special operations forces a major force program

(MFP) category for the Future Years Defense Plan of the Department of

Defense. Known as MFP-11, this is the vehicle to request funding for the

development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment,

materials, supplies, and services. The services remain responsible under

1

Special Operations are operations conducted to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological

objectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

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B-278786 

10 U.S.C. section 165 for providing those items that are not special

operations-peculiar.

Since Operation Desert Storm, AFSOC’s threat environment has become

more complex and potentially more lethal. More sophisticated threat

systems, both naval and land-based, have been fielded, and the systems are

proliferating to more and more countries. Even nations without complex

integrated air defense systems have demonstrated the capability to inflict

casualties on technologically superior opponents. According to threat

documents, worldwide proliferation of relatively inexpensive, heat-seeking

missiles is dramatically increasing the risk associated with providing airlift

support in remote, poorly developed countries. Increased passive

detection system use is also expected throughout lesser developed

countries. Passive detection allows the enemy to detect incoming aircraft

without alerting the crew that they have been detected, thereby

jeopardizing operations. Finally, commercially available,

second-generation night vision devices, when linked with warfighter

portable air defense systems (e.g., shoulder-fired missiles), provide these

countries with a night air defense capability. This night air defense

capability is significant because AFSOC aircrews have historically relied on

darkness to avoid detection.

AFSOC aircraft carry a wide variety of electronic warfare systems to deal

with enemy threat systems. Some of AFSOC’s systems are common with

systems used by the regular Air Force, while others are unique to special

operations. Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) between USSOCOM and the

military services lay out specifically the areas of support the services agree

to undertake in support of the special forces. An MOA, dated 

September 16, 1989, and one of its accompanying annexes, dated

February 22, 1990, entered into between the Air Force and USSOCOM list

those items and services the Air Force agrees to fund in support of AFSOC’s

special operations mission. This list includes modifications common to

both AFSOC and regular Air Force aircraft, and electronics and

telecommunications that are in common usage. Part of AFSOC’s electronic

warfare equipment for fixed-wing aircraft is acquired with USSOCOM MFP-11

funds as special operations-peculiar items because the Air Force

historically has employed very little electronic warfare equipment on its

C-130s.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

Results in Brief AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition strategy is sound because it is based

on eliminating operational and supportability deficiencies confirmed by an

Air Force study, test reports, and maintenance records. This evidence

indicates that AFSOC’s current electronic warfare systems are unable to

defeat many current threat systems and have supportability problems.

AFSOC’s acquisition strategy is to procure a mix of new systems and

upgrades for older ones while maximizing commonality within its fleet of

C-130s.

Amidst budget constraints, USSOCOM is funding only portions of AFSOC’s

acquisition strategy due to other higher budget priorities, thereby

hampering AFSOC’s efforts to correct deficiencies and maximize

commonality in electronic warfare systems. For example, although

USSOCOM is funding an AFSOC effort to make C-130 aircraft less susceptible

to passive detection, enhance aircrews’ situational awareness, and

increase commonality, it has rejected other requests to fund effectiveness

and commonality improvements to systems dealing with radar- and

infrared-guided missiles. As a result, in the foreseeable future, deficiencies

will continue, and AFSOC will have to operate and maintain older and

upgraded electronic warfare systems concurrently.

An opportunity exists, however, to help AFSOC implement its electronic

warfare acquisition strategy. Since AFSOC’s acquisition strategy was

adopted, the Air Force has decided to begin a-$4.3 billion C-130

modernization program (C-130X program) for all C-130s. Some of the

planned elements of this modernization are common with some of the

elements of AFSOC’s acquisition strategy that was to be funded by USSOCOM’s

MFP-11 funds. If, as required by the MOA, the Air Force C-130 avionics

modernization program funds these common elements, USSOCOM could

redirect significant portions of its MFP-11 funding currently budgeted for

AFSOC C-130 passive detection and situational awareness deficiencies to

other unfunded portions of AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition strategy.

AFSOC Has a Sound

Acquisition Strategy

AFSOC’s acquisition strategy for electronic warfare equipment is contained

within AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap. The Technology Roadmap identifies

and ranks operational deficiencies and links the deficiencies to material

solutions. The Roadmap flows out of AFSOC’s mission area plans for

mobility, precision engagement/strike, forward presence and engagement,

and information operations. For C-130s, the Roadmap indicates that AFSOC

has serious electronic warfare operational deficiencies in several areas

and identifies solutions for each of these operational deficiencies. These

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

solutions include introducing a mix of new systems and making upgrades

to older systems (See app. II for descriptions of AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft.)

AFSOC’s acquisition strategy is sound because it is based on eliminating

operational and supportability deficiencies confirmed by an Air Force

study, test reports, and maintenance records.

According to AFSOC officials responsible for electronic warfare acquisition,

AFSOC’s C-130s are most vulnerable to three types of threat systems:

(1) infrared missiles, (2) passive detectors, and (3) radar-guided missiles.2

These deficiencies have become more critical since Operation Desert

Storm in 1991 as more sophisticated threats have been developed and

spread to more areas of the world.

An ongoing Air Force Chief of Staff directed study, the Electronic Warfare

Operational Shortfalls Study, confirms what AFSOC officials maintain. This

study found that there are many electronic warfare-related operational

deficiencies within the overall Air Force, including the C-130 community.

The study identified deficiencies with missile warning system missile

launch indications and warning times, infrared expendables and jamming

effectiveness, signature reduction, passive detection, situational

awareness, and electronic warfare support equipment. Classified test

reports and threat documentation corroborate the study’s findings.

According to Air Force officials, electronic warfare deficiencies within Air

Force components, including AFSOC, are so extensive that the solutions

necessary to correct all of them are not affordable within the framework

of Air Force fiscal year 2000-2005 projected budgets.

AFSOC’s aging electronic warfare systems are also failing more often and

requiring more staff hours to support. According to AFSOC’s Technology

Roadmap and maintenance records, all AFSOC electronic warfare systems

have some supportability problems. AFSOC maintenance personnel told us

that they are working more hours to repair the systems, and maintenance

records show that system failures are becoming more frequent. The

ALQ-172(v)1 high band radar jammer in particular is problematic,

requiring more staff hours for maintenance than any other AFSOC electronic

warfare system. The staff hours charged for maintaining the ALQ-172(v)1

represent 34 percent of the total time charged to maintaining all electronic

warfare systems from 1995 through 1997.

2

Infrared missiles detect aircraft from the heat aircraft emit. Passive detectors detect aircraft by

intercepting electronic signals emitted by onboard systems, such as radar or radios. Radar-guided

missiles actively emit electronic signals and receive reflections that reveal an aircraft’s position.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

Budget-Driven

Funding Decisions

Are Undercutting

AFSOC’s Efforts to

Correct Deficiencies

and Maximize

Commonality

AFSOC has made several efforts to correct deficiencies and maximize

commonality in electronic warfare systems. USSOCOM is funding the

Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program, which is

designed to make AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft less susceptible to passive

detection, enhance the aircrews’ situational awareness, lower support

costs, and improve commonality. AFSOC has sought to begin several other

efforts in the past several years, as well, but USSOCOM has rejected these

requests. In addition to addressing deficiencies identified in the

Technology Roadmap, AFSOC is trying to improve commonality among its

electronic warfare systems by eliminating some of those systems from its

inventory. For example, it is replacing the ALR-56M radar warning receiver

on its AC-130U Gunships with the ALR-69 radar warning receiver already

on the rest of its C-130s. AFSOC also planned to replace ALQ-131 radar

jamming pods on its AC-130H Gunships with a future upgraded

ALQ-172(v)3 radar jammer for its AC-130s and MC-130Hs. Achieving

commonality avoids duplicating costs for system development, lowers unit

production costs through larger quantity buys, and simplifies logistical

support.

According to USSOCOM officials, in selecting what to fund they had to

determine which programs would maximize capability, including

sustainability, while conserving resources. The USSOCOM officials said that

these decisions were difficult because although some systems offer

tremendous improvements in capabilities, they require significant

commitment of resources. For instance, USSOCOM did not have sufficient

resources to fund both the CAAP program and the ALQ-172(v)3 upgrade

program to improve commonality and capability against radar-guided

missiles. Additionally, AFSOC had planned to replace its ALE-40 flare and

chaff dispensers with the newer programmable ALE-47 to improve

protection against infrared-guided missiles. But, because of budget

constraints, AFSOC will have to keep the ALE-40 on two of its C-130 model

aircraft while the other models are upgraded to the ALE-47 configuration.

Furthermore, in prioritizing resources for fiscal year 2000-2005, USSOCOM is

accepting increased operational and sustainment risks for systems it does

not anticipate being key in 2010 or beyond. Under this approach, USSOCOM

is dividing AFSOC’s C-130s into so-called legacy and bridge aircraft. The

older legacy aircraft will receive flight safety modifications but not all

electronic warfare upgrades; newer bridge aircraft will receive both. As a

result, the legacy aircraft will become less common over time with the

newer bridge aircraft, even as they become more vulnerable to threats and

more difficult to maintain. Because, according to AFSOC officials, the legacy

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

aircraft are planned to remain in service for 12 more years, for the

foreseeable future, AFSOC will have to operate and maintain more types of

electronic warfare systems.

Opportunity Exists to

Help Implement

AFSOC’s Acquisition

Strategy

Since AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition strategy was adopted, the Air

Force has decided to fund a $4.3-billion Air Force-wide C-130

modernization program of all C-130s, including the special operations

fleet. This avionics modernization program shares many common

elements with the USSOCOM CAAP program. CAAP includes $247 million of

MFP-11 funds for upgrades/systems to address AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft

situational awareness and passive detection problems. Consistent with the

provisions of title 10, the MOA requires that the Air Force, rather than

USSOCOM, fund common items. Therefore, the overlap between the two

programs creates an opportunity for USSOCOM to direct its MFP-11 funding

from CAAP to other solutions identified in AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap

instead of paying for items that will be common to all Air Force C-130s.

The Air Force is funding its avionics modernization program to lower

C-130 ownership costs by increasing the commonality and survivability of

the C-130 fleet. Because USSOCOM designed CAAP independently of and

earlier than the Air Force modernization program, CAAP provides funding

for a number of items that are now planned to be included in the Air Force

program. These include (1) an open systems architecture, (2) upgraded

displays and display generators, (3) a computer processor to integrate

electronic warfare systems, (4) a digital map system, and (5) a

replacement radar.

USSOCOM and AFSOC officials note that these C-130 modernization program

items have the potential to satisfy CAAP requirements with only minor

modifications. For example, AFSOC’s estimates indicate that the cost to

develop and procure a new low-power navigation radar with a terrain

following/terrain avoidance feature as part of CAAP would be

approximately $133 million. However, if the navigation radar selected for

the avionics modernization program incorporates or has a growth path

that will allow for the addition of a low-power terrain following/terrain

avoidance feature to satisfy CAAP requirements, USSOCOM could avoid the

significant development and procurement costs of the common items.

According to Air Force, USSOCOM and AFSOC officials, coordinating these

two programs would maximize C-130 commonality and could result in

additional MFP-11 funding being available to meet other AFSOC electronic

warfare deficiencies.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

Consistent with the provisions of title 10, and as provided for in the MOA

between the Air Force and USSOCOM, the Air Force has included the AFSOC

C-130 fleet in its draft planning documents to upgrade the C-130 avionics.

However, while the MOA requires the Air Force to pay for common

improvements incorporated into AFSOC’s C-130, the Air Force may not pay

for special operations-peculiar requirements as part of the common

upgrade. Nevertheless, the Air Force is not otherwise precluded from

selecting systems that can satisfy both the Air Force’s and AFSOC’s

requirements or which could be easily and/or inexpensively upgraded by

AFSOC to meet special operations-peculiar requirements.

Conclusion AFSOC has a sound electronic warfare acquisition strategy based on a need

to eliminate operational and supportability deficiencies while maximizing

commonality within its C-130 fleet. Because of budget constraints,

however, USSOCOM funding decisions are undercutting AFSOC’s efforts to

implement its Technology Roadmap. An opportunity now exists, however,

to help free up some MFP-11 funds to permit AFSOC to continue

implementing its electronic warfare strategy as outlined in the Technology

Roadmap.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force in procuring common items for its C-130 avionics modernization,

to select items that, where feasible, address USSOCOM’s CAAP requirements

or could be modified by USSOCOM to meet those requirements. We further

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct USSOCOM to use any

resulting MFP-11 funds budgeted for but not spent on CAAP to address other

electronic warfare deficiencies or to expand the CAAP program to other

special operations forces aircraft.

Agency Comments In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)

partially concurred with both recommendations. With regard to our first

recommendation, DOD stated that Air Force and USSOCOM requirements

require harmonization in order to take advantage of commonality and

economies of scale. DOD agreed to require the Air Force and USSOCOM to

document their common requirements. While this action is a step in the

right direction, Office of the Secretary of Defense-level direction may be

necessary to ensure that appropriate common items for USSOCOM are

procured by the Air Force. As for our second recommendation, DOD

officials stated that any MFP-11 funds originally budgeted for CAAP but

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

saved through commonality should be used to address documented

electronic warfare deficiencies or to deploy CAAP on other special

operations forces aircraft. We agree with DOD that savings to the CAAP

program by using common items should be used to address electronic

warfare deficiencies or for expansion of the CAAP program to other special

operations forces aircraft. We have reworded our recommendation to

reflect that agreement. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the basis for AFSOC’s strategy for acquiring and upgrading

electronic warfare equipment and determine the extent to which it would

address deficiencies and maximize commonality, we analyzed AFSOC

acquisition plans and studies and reviewed classified test reports and

threat documentation. We also discussed AFSOC’s current electronic

warfare systems and aircraft and AFSOC’s planned electronic warfare

upgrades and system acquisition with officials at USSOCOM, MacDill Air

Force Base, Florida; AFSOC, Hurlburt Field, Florida; and Air Force

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Additionally, we discussed AFSOC

electronic warfare system supportability with officials responsible for the

systems at USSOCOM; AFSOC; and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center,

Georgia, and reviewed logistics records for pertinent systems. We

accepted logistics records provided by AFSOC as accurate without further

validation.

To identify alternative sources of funding to implement AFSOC’s strategy,

we examined legislation establishing and affecting USSOCOM and

memoranda of agreement between USSOCOM and the Air Force regarding

research, development, acquisition, and sustainment programs. We

discussed relevant memoranda of agreement with USSOCOM, AFSOC, and Air

Force officials. Furthermore, we reviewed planning documents and

discussed the planned Air Force C-130 avionics modernization program

with Air Force officials at Air Force Headquarters and the Air Mobility

Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

We conducted our work from October 1997 through July 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
B-278786 

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees;

the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Assistant Secretary of

Defense, Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; the

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; the Director, Office of

Management and Budget; and other interested parties.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions.

Major contributors to this assignment were Tana Davis, Charles Ward, and

John Warren.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

12

Appendix II 

AFSOC C-130 Aircraft

14

AC-130H Spectre Gunship 14

AC-130U Spectre Gunship 14

EC-130E Commando Solo 15

MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130H Combat Talon II 15

MC-130P Combat Shadow 16

Abbreviations

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

CAAP Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration

DOD Department of Defense

MFP major force program

MOA memoranda of agreement

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 7.

Now on p. 7.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

AFSOC C-130 Aircraft

The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) uses specially

modified and equipped variants of the C-130 Hercules aircraft to conduct

and support special operations missions worldwide. Following are

descriptions of the C-130 models.

AC-130H Spectre

Gunship

Command: AFSOC

Quantity: 8

Mission: The AC-130H is a gunship with primary missions of close-air

support, air interdiction, and armed reconnaissance. Additional missions

include perimeter and point defense, escort, landing, drop and extraction

zone support, forward air control, limited command and control, and

combat search and rescue.

Special equipment/features: These heavily armed aircraft incorporate

side-firing weapons integrated with sophisticated sensor, navigation, and

fire control systems to provide precision firepower or area saturation

during extended periods, at night, and in adverse weather. The sensor

suite consists of a low-light level television sensor and an infrared sensor.

Radar and electronic sensors also give the gunship a method of positively

identifying friendly ground forces and deliver ordnance effectively during

adverse weather conditions. Navigational devices include an inertial

navigation system and global positioning system.

AC-130U Spectre

Gunship

Command: AFSOC

Quantity: 12

Mission: The AC-130U’s primary missions are nighttime, close-air support

for special operations and conventional ground forces; air interdiction;

armed reconnaissance; air base, perimeter, and point defense; land, water,

and heliborne troop escort; drop, landing, and extraction zone support;

forward air control; limited airborne command and control; and combat

search and rescue support.

Special equipment/features: The AC-130U has one 25-millimeter Gatling

gun, one 40-millimeter cannon, and one 105-millimeter cannon for

armament and is the newest addition to AFSOC’s fleet. This heavily armed

aircraft incorporates side-firing weapons integrated with sophisticated

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

AFSOC C-130 Aircraft

sensor, navigation, and fire control systems to provide firepower or area

saturation at night and in adverse weather. The sensor suite consists of an

all light level television system and an infrared detection set. A multi-mode

strike radar provides extreme long-range target detection and

identification. The fire control system offers a dual target attack capability,

whereby two targets up to 1 kilometer apart can be simultaneously

engaged by two different sensors, using two different guns. Navigational

devices include the inertial navigation system and global positioning

system. The aircraft is pressurized, enabling it to fly at higher altitudes and

allowing for greater range than the AC-130H. The AC-130U is also

refuelable. Defensive systems include a countermeasures dispensing

system that releases chaff and flares to counter radar-guided and

infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles. Also infrared heat shields mounted

underneath the engines disperse and hide engine heat sources from

infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles.

EC-130E Commando

Solo

Command: Air National Guard

Quantity: 5

Mission: EC-130E Commando Solo, the Air Force’s only airborne radio and

television broadcast mission, is assigned to the 193rd Special Operations

Wing, the only Air National Guard unit assigned to AFSOC. Commando Solo

conducts psychological operations and civil affairs broadcasts. The

EC-130E flies during either day or night scenarios and is air refuelable.

Commando Solo provides an airborne broadcast platform for virtually any

contingency, including state or national disasters or other emergencies.

Secondary missions include command and control communications

countermeasures and limited intelligence gathering.

Special equipment/features: Highly specialized modifications include

enhanced navigation systems, self-protection equipment, and the

capability to broadcast color television on a multitude of worldwide

standards.

MC-130E Combat

Talon I and MC-130H

Combat Talon II

Commands: AFSOC, Air Force Reserve, and Air Education and Training

Command

Quantity: 14 Combat Talon Is, 24 Combat Talon IIs

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

AFSOC C-130 Aircraft

Mission: The mission of the Combat Talon I/II is to provide global, day,

night, and adverse weather capability to airdrop and airland personnel and

equipment in support of U.S. and allied special operations forces. The

MC-130E also has a deep penetrating helicopter refueling role during

special operations missions.

Special equipment/features: These aircraft are equipped with in-flight

refueling equipment, terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar, an inertial

and global positioning satellite navigation system, and a high-speed aerial

delivery system. The special navigation and aerial delivery systems are

used to locate small drop zones and deliver people or equipment with

greater accuracy and at higher speeds than possible with a standard C-130.

The aircraft is able to penetrate hostile airspace at low altitudes and crews

are specially trained in night and adverse weather operations.

MC-130P Combat

Shadow

Commands: Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Education and

Training Command, and Air Force Reserve

Quantity: 28

Mission: The MC-130P Combat Shadow flies clandestine or low visibility,

low-level missions into politically sensitive or hostile territory to provide

air refueling for special operations helicopters. The MC-130P primarily

flies its single- or multi-ship missions at night to reduce detection and

intercept by airborne threats. Secondary mission capabilities include

airdrop of small special operations teams, small bundles, and rubber

raiding craft; night-vision goggle takeoffs and landings; and tactical

airborne radar approaches.

Special equipment/features: When modifications are complete in fiscal

year 1999, all MC-130P aircraft will feature improved navigation,

communications, threat detection, and countermeasures systems. When

fully modified, the Combat Shadow will have a fully integrated inertial

navigation and global positioning system, and night-vision

goggle-compatible interior and exterior lighting. It will also have a

forward-looking infrared radar, missile and radar warning receivers, chaff

and flare dispensers, and night-vision goggle-compatible heads-up display.

In addition, it will have satellite and data burst communications, as well as

in-flight refueling capability. The Combat Shadow can fly in the day

against a reduced threat; however, crews normally fly night, low-level, air

refueling and formation operations using night-vision goggles.

(707302) Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-1 Special Operations Forces
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