United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-2951

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Alfreda Spencer, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Ripley County State Bank; Ronald D. *

Brooks, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

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Submitted: April 17, 1997

Filed: July 21, 1997

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Before LOKEN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In July 1992, Alfreda Spencer began working as a teller at the Ripley County

State Bank in Doniphan, Missouri. In October 1992, the Bank opened a branch office

in Naylor, Missouri. Ronald Brooks, the Bank’s President, asked Spencer to work at

the new branch. When Spencer refused, Brooks fired her. Spencer then brought this

action against the Bank and Brooks individually under Title VII and the Missouri

Human Rights Act, alleging that Brooks’s sexual harassment had subjected her to a

hostile work environment. 
The HONORABLE STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, United States District Judge 1

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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At her deposition, Spencer testified that shortly after she began work, the Bank’s

head teller warned her that Brooks “can’t keep his hands to himself.” Thereafter,

Spencer testified, on at least ten occasions over the course of her employment, Brooks

came to her teller cage, where “[h]e would put his arm around you and pull you to him

and he would pinch you on the back around your bra and he actually even pulled on my

bra at times in the back.” Spencer found this conduct “disgusting” and attempted to

move away when Brooks touched her, but she did not complain to Brooks or anyone

else at the Bank. She refused to transfer to the Naylor branch because it would be

easier for Brooks to “hit on me” at that more isolated location.

One month before trial, the Bank moved for summary judgment, submitting

affidavits by numerous male and female Bank employees averring that: (i) no other

female employee had been harassed by Brooks; (ii) Spencer never complained to

anyone about Brooks’s alleged conduct, and no one had seen any such conduct at

Spencer’s teller cage; (iii) Spencer did not accuse Brooks of harassment or state her

alleged concern about working at the Naylor branch at her termination meeting with

Brooks and Brenda Pigg, vice president of operations, or when she complained

immediately after the termination to Floyd Lynxwiler, a member of the Bank’s Board

of Directors, or when she sought help from Dwayne Hackworth, Chairman of the Board

and the Bank’s majority owner; and (iv) the Bank has a written policy against sexual

harassment and a well understood procedure by which employee sexual harassment

complaints may be reported to the Chairman of the Board.

Spencer did not respond to the Bank’s motion. The district court granted the 1

motion, explaining that by resting on her pleading Spencer failed to establish a prima

facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment in two respects. First, she
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presented no evidence that Brooks’s conduct was so offensive or abusive as to affect

her well-being or her work performance; second, she presented no evidence that the

Bank knew or should have known of the alleged harassment and failed to take

appropriate remedial action. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,

21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Burns v.

McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992). The court dismissed

Spencer’s claims against Brooks on the ground that individual employees are not

personally liable under Title VII. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377,

381 (8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. St. Bernards Regional Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th

Cir. 1994). It dismissed her pendent state law claims without prejudice.

Spencer then moved to alter or amend the court’s judgment, stating that she had

delayed responding to the Bank’s motion in order to complete additional depositions.

The district court granted her time to complete and submit those depositions and a

responsive memorandum. After considering these additional submissions, the court

denied Spencer’s motion to alter or amend because “[n]one of these deponents provide

any factual support to plaintiff’s contention that she was sexually harassed, that her

work environment was hostile, that the defendant Bank was aware of the harassment

and failed to take proper measures to end it, or that she was fired because she would

not submit to defendant Brooks’s sexual advances.” On appeal, Spencer argues that

she presented a triable claim of sexual harassment, that the Bank should be strictly

liable for the actions of supervisor Brooks, and that we should afford her a Title VII

cause of action against Brooks individually. After carefully considering the sparse

record, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See 8th Cir. Rule 47B.

A true copy.

Attest: 

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.