United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1999 FOOD SECURITY

Factors That Could

Affect Progress Toward

Meeting World Food

Summit Goals

GAO/NSIAD-99-15

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280276 

March 22, 1999

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on African Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable John Ashcroft

United States Senate

The Honorable Tony P. Hall

House of Representatives

In November 1996, a world summit was held in Rome, Italy, to address a

global commitment to ensure that all people have access to sufficient food

to meet their needs, referred to as “food security.” Participants set a new

interim goal of reducing undernourishment by 50 percent by 2015.

Previous world food conferences and international summits have fallen

considerably short of their targets for reducing or eliminating food

insecurity.1

As you requested, we reviewed the outcome of the summit and identified

key factors that could affect the progress of developing countries toward

achieving the summit’s goal. Appendix XI describes our specific scope and

methodology.

Background The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),2

 the U.S. government, and

others define food security to exist when all people at all times have

physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary

needs for a productive and healthy life. Food insecurity exists when the

availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods, or the ability to

1

Countries that attended the 1974 World Food Conference set a goal of eliminating hunger within

10 years. The 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development agreed to eliminate

severe undernutrition in the quickest possible time and certainly before the end of the century. The

1992 International Conference on Nutrition pledged to make all efforts to eliminate famine and

famine-related deaths and to substantially reduce starvation and widespread hunger before the year

2000.

2

FAO is a specialized agency within the U.N. system. Founded in 1945, FAO has mandates to raise

levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the

conditions of rural populations. It comprises 175 member nations plus the European Community

(member organization).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways, is limited or

uncertain.

Although it is generally agreed that the problem of food insecurity is

widespread in the developing world, the total number of undernourished

people is unknown, and estimates vary widely. For example, estimates for

58 low-income, food-deficit countries range from 576 million people to

1.1 billion people. Appendix I provides further information about these

estimates.

Results in Brief The 1996 World Food Summit brought together officials from 185

countries and the European Community to discuss the problem of food

insecurity and produced a plan3

 to guide participants’ efforts in working

toward a common goal of reducing undernutrition. To reach this goal, they

approved an action plan, the focus of which is to assist developing

countries to become more self-reliant in meeting their food needs by

promoting broad-based economic, political, and social reforms at local,

national, regional, and international levels. The participants endorsed

various actions but did not enter into any binding commitments. They also

agreed to review and revise national plans, programs, and strategies,

where appropriate, so as to achieve food security consistent with the

summit action plan.

Summit participants agreed that achieving food security is largely an

economic development problem, and according to U.S. officials, a

willingness on the part of food-insecure countries to undertake

broad-based policy reforms is a key factor affecting whether such

countries will achieve the summit goal. Other important factors that could

affect progress toward achieving the summit goal are (1) the effects of

trade reform, (2) the prevalence of conflict and its effect on food security,

(3) the sufficiency of agricultural production, and (4) the availability of

food aid and financial resources. Also needed are actions to monitor

progress, such as the ability and willingness of the participant countries to

develop information systems on the status of food security and to

coordinate, monitor, and evaluate progress in implementing the summit’s

plan.

Given the complexity of the problems in each of these areas, summit

participants acknowledged that progress will be slow and difficult. FAO’s

3

Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, World Food

Summit (Rome: FAO, Nov. 13-17, 1996).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

Committee on World Food Security (CFS)4 requested that countries report

to the FAO Secretariat in 1998 on their progress in meeting the summit’s

goals, but many countries did not respond in a timely fashion. In addition,

some reports were more descriptive than analytical, and some reported

only on certain aspects of food security actions. Thus, the Secretariat was

unable to draw general substantive conclusions on progress made to

reduce food insecurity. The U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) said that the level of effort by both donor and developing countries

will probably fall short of achieving the summit’s goal of reducing chronic

global hunger by one-half.

Summit Outcomes The summit resulted in an action plan for reducing undernourishment.

Included in the plan were a variety of measures for promoting economic,

political, and social reforms in developing countries.

Summit Produced a Plan of

Action to Achieve Goal

To reach their goal, summit participants approved an action plan that

included 7 broadly stated commitments, 27 objectives, and 181 specific

actions (see app. II). Among other things, the plan highlighted the need to

reduce poverty and resolve conflicts peacefully. While recognizing that

food aid may be a necessary interim approach, the plan encouraged

developing countries to become more self-reliant by increasing sustainable

agricultural production and their ability to engage in international trade,

and by developing or improving social welfare and public works programs

to help address the needs of food-insecure people. The plan further noted

that governments should work closely with others in their societies, such

as nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector.

Although the summit action plan is not binding,5

 countries also agreed to

(1) review and revise as appropriate national plans, programs, and

strategies with a view to achieving food security; (2) establish or improve

national mechanisms to set priorities and develop and implement the

components of the summit action plan within designated time frames,

based on both national and local needs, and provide the necessary

resources; and (3) cooperate regionally and internationally in order to

4

Among other things, the CFS is responsible for monitoring implementation of the summit’s action

plan, reviewing worldwide demand and supply for foodstuffs, and recommending policy actions

necessary to remedy any difficulty in ensuring adequate cereal supplies. Its membership is open to any

country that is a member of FAO or the United Nations.

5

The plan is a statement of political intent whose implementation depends upon the goodwill of all the

countries and numerous international agencies that expressed support for it when the summit was

held. Each country’s national government will decide how to apply the summit’s objectives within its

borders.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

reach collective solutions to global issues of food insecurity. They also

agreed to monitor implementation of the summit plan, including

periodically reporting on their individual progress in meeting the plan’s

objectives.

Summit Called for

Developing Countries to

Implement Broad-Based

Reforms

The summit placed considerable emphasis on the need for broad-based

political, economic, and social reforms to improve food security. For

example, summit countries called for the pursuit of democracy, poverty

eradication, land reform, gender equality, access to education and health

care for all, and development of well-targeted welfare and nutrition safety

nets. Other international conferences have suggested that major policy

reforms were needed in connection with food security issues. For

example, countries that attended the 1974 World Food Conference and the

1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development said

they would undertake major economic, social, and political reforms.

According to some observers, the most important challenge of food

security today is how to bring about major socio-institutional change in

food-insecure countries, since previous efforts have met with limited

success. According to other observers, there is a growing acceptance on

the part of developing countries that policy reform must be addressed if

food security is to be achieved. However, reports on progress toward

implementing summit objectives that many countries provided to FAO in

early 1998 did not contain much information on the extent to which

countries have incorporated policy reforms into specific plans for

implementing summit objectives.

As defined by the summit and others, achieving improved world food

security by 2015 is largely an economic development problem; however,

the summit did not estimate the total resources needed by developing

countries to achieve the level of development necessary to cut in half their

undernutrition by 2015, much less assess their ability to finance the

process themselves. Many developed countries that attended the summit

agreed to try to strengthen their individual efforts toward fulfilling a

long-standing U.N. target to provide official development assistance

equivalent to 0.7 percent of the gross national product each year.

However, the countries did not make a firm commitment to this goal,6

 and

the United States declined to endorse this target. Assistance from the

6

An agreement to hold the summit included an understanding that the conference would not seek

pledges from donor countries for increased levels of assistance.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)7

Development Assistance Committee members8 has been declining in

recent years—from about $66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in 1997

(measured in 1996 dollars). Total official development assistance from

these countries in 1997 represented 0.22 percent of their combined gross

national product, compared to 0.32 percent during 1990-94.9

Many developed countries believe that the private sector is a key to

resolving the resources problem. Whether the private sector will choose to

become more involved in low-income, food-deficit countries may depend

on the extent to which developing countries embrace policy reform

measures. Private sector resources provided to the developing world have

grown dramatically during the 1990s, and by 1997 the private sector

accounted for about 75 percent of net resource flows to the developing

world, compared to about 34 percent in 1990. However, according to the

OECD, due to a number of factors, most of the poorest countries in the

developing world have not benefited much from the trend and will need to

rely principally on official development assistance for some time to come.

(See app. III for additional analysis on official and private sector resource

flows to the developing countries.)

Factors Affecting

Summit Goal

Among factors that may affect whether the summit’s goal is realized are

trade reforms, conflicts, agricultural production, and safety net programs

and food aid.

Trade Reform Summit participants generally believed that developing countries should

increasingly rely on trade liberalization to promote greater food security,

and in support of this belief, the summit plan called for full

7

The OECD was established in 1961 to promote economic and social welfare in member countries and

to harmonize efforts on behalf of developing countries. OECD members include Australia, Austria,

Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,

the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United

States.

8

The Committee, which includes most OECD countries, deals with development cooperation matters.

It seeks to expand the aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to

improve the effectiveness of the aid.

9

U.S. official development assistance in 1997 was the lowest for all OECD countries, at less than

0.1 percent of gross national product. In terms of actual dollars, the United States was the fourth

largest provider of official development assistance in 1997. The United States has not agreed to the

OECD target on the grounds that the United States provides substantial resources for world security,

whereas the other countries provide relatively lesser amounts.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

implementation of the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements (URA).10 The

participants also recognized that trade liberalization may result in some

price volatility that could adversely affect the food security situation of

poor countries. To help offset these possible adverse effects, the

participants endorsed the full implementation of a Uruguay Round

decision on measures to mitigate possible negative effects.11

The summit participants generally acknowledged that the URAs have the

potential to strengthen global food security by encouraging more efficient

food production and a more market-oriented agricultural trading system.

Reforms that enable farmers in developing countries to grow and sell more

food can help promote increased rural development and improve food

security. Trade reforms that increase the competitiveness of developing

countries in nonagricultural sectors can also lead to increased income and,

in turn, a greater ability to pay for commercial food imports. However,

trade reforms may also adversely affect food security, especially during

the near-term transitional period, if such reforms result in an increase in

the cost of food or a reduced amount of food available to poor and

undernourished people. Reforms may also have adverse impacts if they

are accompanied by low levels of grain stocks and increased price

volatility in world grain markets.12

The summit plan acknowledged that world price and supply fluctuations

were of special concern to vulnerable groups in developing countries. As

part of the plan, food exporting countries said they would (1) act as

reliable sources of supplies to their trading partners and give due

consideration to the food security of importing countries, especially

low-income, food-deficit countries; (2) reduce subsidies on food exports in

conformity with the URA and in the context of an ongoing process of

agricultural reform; and (3) administer all export-related trade policies and

programs responsibly to avoid disruptions in world food agriculture and

export markets.

Also, to mitigate the possible adverse effects of trade reforms on food

security situations, the summit plan called for full implementation of a

Uruguay Round ministerial decision made in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 1994.

Under this decision, signatory nations to the URA agreed to ensure that

10The Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations were finalized in 1994 with a series of agreements

and ministerial decisions and declarations that were annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement, which

established the World Trade Organization (WTO).

11The Uruguay Round Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform

Program on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.

12See also World Food Summit Technical Background Documents, vol. 3 (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

implementing the trade reforms would not adversely affect the availability

of sufficient food aid to assist in meeting the food needs of developing

countries, especially the poorest, net food-importing countries. To date,

however, agreement has not been reached about the criteria that should

be used in evaluating the food aid needs of the countries and whether

trade reforms have adversely affected the ability of the countries to obtain

adequate supplies of food.

While trade liberalization by developing countries was especially

encouraged by summit participants, some observers believe that

developed countries have been slow in removing their trade barriers and

that this may inhibit developing countries from achieving further trade

liberalization. For example, according to reports by the International Food

Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)13 and the World Bank,14 member countries

of the OECD continue to maintain barriers to free trade that are adversely

affecting the means and willingness of developing nations to further

liberalize their own markets and to support additional trade liberalization.

According to the World Bank, without an open trading environment and

access to developed country markets, developing countries cannot benefit

fully from producing those goods for which they have a comparative

advantage. Without improved demand for developing countries’

agricultural products, for example, the agricultural growth needed to

generate employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not be

achieved, the Bank report said. This is critical to food security. If

developing countries are to adopt an open-economy agriculture and food

policy, they must be assured of access to international markets over the

long term, particularly those of the developed nations, according to the

Bank.15 (For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see app. IV.)

Officials of the Department of State and the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA), however, said that the problem of developed countries’

trade barriers against developing countries is not as severe as portrayed by

IFPRI and the World Bank. State acknowledged that there are still some

significant barriers to trade but said most barriers are being progressively

removed because of the Uruguay Round. In addition, it said, the United

States has a number of preferential areas and regimes that favor

developing countries and allow most agricultural imports. State said the

13Per Pinstrup-Andersen, et al., The World Food Situation: Recent Developments, Emerging Issues, and

Long-Term Prospects (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, Dec. 1997).

14Rural Development: From Vision to Action (Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, Oct. 1997).

15Rural Development: From Vision to Action.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

European Union has similar arrangements. USDA officials generally agreed

that it is important for developed countries to remove trade barriers but

said it is equally important for developing countries to eliminate domestic

policies and restrictions on trade that have adversely affected their own

economic growth.

The price volatility of world food commodities, particularly grains, and its

relationship to the level of food reserves, is a key issue related to trade

liberalization and a significant problem for food-insecure countries. Views

differ over the level of global grain reserves needed to safeguard world

food security, the future outlook for price volatility, and the desirability of

holding grain reserves. The summit observed that maintaining grain

reserves was one of several instruments that countries could use to

strengthen food security; however, the summit did not identify a minimum

level of global grain reserves needed to ensure food security nor did it

recommend any action by countries individually or in concert.16 Instead,

the summit participants agreed to monitor the availability and adequacy of

their individual reserve stocks, and FAO agreed to continue its practice of

monitoring and informing member nations of developments in world food

prices and stocks.

FAO, IFPRI, and the World Bank have observed that agricultural markets are

likely to be more volatile as the levels of world grain reserves are reduced,

an outcome expected as trade reforms are implemented. However, they

and other observers have also noted that as a result of trade market

reforms, agricultural producers may respond more quickly to rising prices

in times of tightening markets, the private sector may hold more reserves

than it did when governments were holding large reserves (though not in

an amount that would fully replace government stocks), and the increased

trade in grains among all nations will help offset a lower level of world

grain reserves. Some observers believe that most countries, including

food-insecure developing countries, are better off keeping only enough

reserves to tide them over until they can obtain increased supplies from

international markets,17 since it is costly to hold stocks for emergency

purposes on a regular basis and other methods might be available for

coping with volatile markets. Others support the view that ensuring world

16At the time of the summit, FAO was conducting a study to review whether a stocks-to-use ratio of 17

to 18 percent—previously set by an intergovernmental group on grains—was a reasonable standard for

judging the minimum safe level of global grain stocks in light of changes in national and global food

policies and improved transport and logistics infrastructure. In January 1997, FAO reported that the

standard was still reasonable.

17Luther G. Tweeten, “Food Security,” Promoting Third-World Development and Food Security, eds.

Luther G. Tweeten and Donald G. McClelland (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

food security requires maintaining some minimum level of global grain

reserves18 and that developed countries have a special responsibility to

establish and hold reserves for this purpose. Some have also suggested

examination of the feasibility of establishing an international grain

reserve.19 The U.S. position is that governments should pursue at local and

national levels, as appropriate, adequate, cost-effective food reserve

policies and programs. The United States has opposed creation of

international food reserves because of the difficulties that would arise in

deciding how to finance, hold, and trigger the use of such reserves. (See

app. IV for additional analysis on grain reserves.)

Actions to Reduce Conflict The summit countries concluded that conflict and terrorism contribute

significantly to food insecurity and declared a need to establish a durable,

peaceful environment in which conflicts are prevented or resolved

peacefully. According to FAO, many of the countries that had low food

security 30 years ago and failed to make progress or even experienced

further declines since then have suffered severe disruptions caused by war

and political disturbances. Our analysis of data on civil war, interstate war,

and genocide in 88 countries between 1960 and 1989 shows a relationship

between the incidence of these disturbances and food insecurity at the

national level. A sharp rise in international emergency food aid deliveries

during the early 1990s has been largely attributed to an increasing number

of armed conflicts in different parts of the world.20

Summit countries pledged that they would, in partnership with civil

society21 and in cooperation with the international community, encourage

and reinforce peace by developing conflict prevention mechanisms, by

settling disputes through peaceful means, and by promoting tolerance and

nonviolence. They also pledged to strengthen existing rules and

mechanisms in international and regional organizations, in accordance

18Assessment of the World Food Security Situation (Rome, Italy: Committee on World Food Security,

Apr. 1998).

19See Testimony of Leland H. Swenson, President National Farmers Union, Before the Senate

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, July 29, 1997; Hunger in a Global Economy (Silver

Spring, Md: Bread for the World Institute, 1997); and NGO Recommendations for U.S. Action Plan on

Food Security (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for Food Aid, Nov. 12, 1997).

20Canadian International Development Agency, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norway

Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report (Bergen,

Norway: Chr. Michelesen Institute, Dec. 1993).

21“Civil society” is a term used by U.N. and other international organizations to refer to the

nongovernmental side of society, including both organizations and its citizens more generally.

Distinctions are made between NGOs that are not-for-profit actors and the private (for-profit) sector.

However, the usage of these terms is not always exact. For example, officials and other interested

parties sometimes use NGOs to refer to both. See also appendix X.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

with the U.N. Charter, for preventing and resolving conflicts that cause or

exacerbate food insecurity and for settling disputes by peaceful means.

The FAO Secretariat analyzed progress reports submitted to FAO by member

countries in 1998 and cited several examples of country efforts to support

peaceful resolution of domestic and international conflicts. However, the

analysis did not provide any overall results on the extent to which

countries had made progress in ending already existing violent conflicts

and in peacefully resolving or preventing other conflicts. (See app. VI for

our analysis on the relationship between conflict and food security.)

Increasing Agricultural

Production

One objective of the summit was to increase agricultural production and

rural development in the developing world, especially in low-income,

food-deficit countries. FAO estimates show that achieving the required

production increases will require unusually high growth rates in the more

food-insecure countries and, in turn, greater investments, especially in the

worst-off countries.

World Bank officials have said that the Bank is committed to emphasizing

rural agricultural development in countries that receive its assistance. Its

plan calls for country assistance strategies that treat agriculture

comprehensively and include well-defined, coherent, rural strategy

components. Despite public statements by the World Bank, there are still

differences of opinion within the Bank and among its partners as to the

priority that should be given to the rural sector. These opinions range from

recognizing a positive role for agricultural growth in an overall

development strategy, to benign neglect, to a strong urban bias.

Achieving needed agricultural production increases will also require other

major changes in the rural and agricultural sector and in society more

generally. For example, according to the U.S. mission to FAO, the most

critical factor affecting progress toward achieving the summit goal is the

willingness of food-insecure countries to undertake the kind of economic

policies that encourage rather than discourage domestic production in the

agricultural sector and their willingness to open their borders to

international trade in agricultural products. There must be an “enabling

environment,” the mission said, that favors domestic investment and

production in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the mission said, these

policies are under the control of the food-insecure countries themselves

and can have a far greater impact on domestic food security than

international assistance.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

Another issue involving increased agricultural production concerns

promotion of modern farming methods, such as chemicals to protect

crops, fertilizers, and improved seeds. Agriculture production in

developing countries can be substantially improved if such methods are

adopted and properly implemented. However, some groups strongly

oppose the introduction of such methods because of concerns about the

environment.22 (See app. VII for additional information on this issue.)

Safety Net Programs and

Food Aid

The summit’s long-term focus is on creating conditions where people have

the capability to produce or purchase the food they need, but summit

participants noted that food aid—both emergency and

nonemergency—could be used to help promote food security. The summit

plan called upon governments of all countries to develop within their

available resources well-targeted social welfare and nutrition safety nets

to meet the needs of their food-insecure people and to implement

cost-effective public works programs for the unemployed and

underemployed in regions of food insecurity.

With regard to emergency food aid, the summit plan stated the

international community should maintain an adequate capacity to provide

such assistance. Nevertheless, this goal has been difficult to implement

and, since the summit, some emergency food aid needs have not been met.

For example, according to the World Food Program, which distributes

about 70 percent of global emergency food aid, approximately 6 percent of

its declared emergency needs and 7 percent of its protracted relief

operations23 needs were not satisfied in 1997. Also, donors direct their

contributions to emergency appeals on a case-by-case basis, and some

emergencies are underfunded or not funded at all. In addition, according

to the World Food Program, lengthy delays between appeals and

contributions, as well as donors’ practice of attaching specific restrictions

to contributions, make it difficult for the World Food Program to ensure a

regular supply of food for its operations. In 1998, the program’s emergency

and protracted relief operations were underfunded by 18 percent of total

needs. Other problems affecting the delivery of emergency food aid

include government restrictions on countries to which the food aid can be

sent and civil strife and war within such countries. Notable recent

22See, for example, Norman Borlaug, “Technological and Environmental Dimensions of Rural

Well-Being,” in Rural Well-Being: From Vision to Action, eds. Ismail Serageldin and David Steeds

(Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, 1997).

23As discussed in appendix V, protracted relief operations food aid falls under the broad category of

emergency food aid.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

examples of countries that have not received sufficient assistance,

according to the World Food Program, include North Korea and Sudan,

where both situations involve complex political issues that go well beyond

the food shortage condition itself.24 (See app. V for additional information

on food aid.)

Actions Needed to

Monitor Progress

Summit participants agreed that an improved food security information

system, coordination of efforts, and monitoring and evaluation are actions

needed to make and assess progress toward achieving the summit’s goal.

Need to Develop a Food

Security Information

System

Many countries participating in the summit acknowledged that they do not

have adequate information on the status of their people’s food security.

Consequently, participants agreed that it would be necessary to (1) collect

information on the nutritional status of all members of their communities

(especially the poor, women, children, and members of vulnerable and

disadvantaged groups) to enable monitoring of their situation;

(2) establish a process for developing targets and verifiable indicators of

food security where they do not exist; (3) encourage relevant U.N.

agencies to initiate consultations on how to craft a food insecurity and

vulnerability information and mapping system; and (4) draw on the results

of the system, once established, to report to CFS on their implementation of

the summit’s plan.

According to FAO and U.S. officials, improvement in data collection and

analysis is necessary if countries are to have reasonably accurate data to

design policies and programs to address the problem. However, not much

progress has been made in this regard over the past 20 years, and serious

challenges remain.

A major shortcoming is that agreement has not yet been reached on the

indicators to be used in establishing national food insecurity information

24On June 11, 1998, the World Food Program reported that (1) it lacked sufficient funds and food for

Sudan; (2) it was starting to see the emergence of famine zones in parts of Sudan; and (3) while it

could firmly state that more food aid had to be rapidly delivered to affected areas, it would not be

possible unless it received a quick, massive injection of food and cash. On July 27, the program’s

Executive Director said: “We will need a great deal of help from the donor community if we are to

prevent an all-out famine in Sudan. I ask donors to search for any means to help us save these people.”

In September 1998, the program reported that its operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea had also suffered from resource gaps during the year and, as a result, the program had been

forced to limit its activities there. See “WFP Seeks to Expand Food Aid Operation in Sudan,” World

Food Program Press Release (Rome, Italy: June 11, 1998); “WFP Issues Urgent Appeal for Funds to

Expand Emergency Food Aid to Needy Sudanese,” World Food Program Press Release (Rome, Italy:

July 27, 1998); and 1998 Estimated Food Needs and Shortfalls, World Food Program (Rome, Italy:

September 1998).

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

systems. Following the 1996 summit, an international interagency working

group was created to discuss how to create such a system. As of

November 1998, the working group had not yet decided on or begun to

debate which indicators of food insecurity should be used, and the

working group is not scheduled to meet again before the mid-1999 CFS

meeting. FAO Secretariat officials told us that a proposal will be ready for

the 1999 CFS meeting. Thus far, only a few developed and not many more

developing countries have participated. (See app. VIII for additional

analysis of this issue.)

Coordination Is

Considered Essential

The summit’s action plan incorporates several objectives and actions for

improved coordination among all the relevant players. For example, it

calls upon FAO and other relevant U.N. agencies, international finance and

trade institutions, and other international and regional technical assistance

organizations to facilitate a coherent and coordinated follow-up to the

summit at the field level, through the U.N.’s resident coordinators,25 in full

consultation with governments, and in coordination with international

institutions. In addition, the plan calls on governments, cooperating among

themselves and with international institutions, to encourage relevant

agencies to coordinate within the U.N. system to develop a food-insecurity

monitoring system, and requested the U.N. Secretary General to ensure

appropriate interagency coordination. Since the summit, the United

Nations, FAO, the World Bank, and others have endorsed various actions

designed to promote better coordination.

In April 1997, the United States and others expressed concern to FAO about

problems related to FAO efforts to help developing countries create

strategies for improving their food security. Donor countries noted that

nongovernmental groups had not been involved in the preparation of the

strategies, even though the summit plan stressed the importance of their

active participation. In June 1997, the European Union expressed concern

about the uncoordinated nature of food aid, noting that responsibilities

were scattered among a number of international organizations and other

forums, each with different representatives and agendas. And in

October 1997, the World Bank reported that many agricultural projects

had failed due to inadequate coordination among the donors and

25The principal officer of the U.N. Development Program in each developing country also serves as the

U.N. resident coordinator. The coordinator seeks to ensure effective integration of assistance provided

by the U.N. system of agencies and consistency of the U.N. system’s operational activities with the

plans, priorities, and strategies of the country. For further information, see International

Organizations: U.S. Participation in the United Nations Development Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-8,

Apr. 17, 1997).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

multilateral financial institutions. (See app. IX for additional information

on the coordination issue.)

Need to Monitor and

Evaluate

The summit participants acknowledged the need to actively monitor the

implementation of the summit plan. To this end, governments of the

countries agreed to establish, through CFS, a timetable, procedures, and

standardized reporting formats for monitoring progress on the national,

subregional, and regional implementation of the plan. CFS was directed to

monitor the implementation of the plan, using reports from national

governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other relevant international

institutions, and to provide regular reports on the results to the FAO

Council. As previously noted, as of November 1998, a monitoring and

evaluation system had not yet been developed to provide reasonably

accurate data on the number, location, and extent of undernourished

peoples. In addition, a system had not been created to assess

implementation of the various components of the summit’s action plan

(that is, 7 broad commitments, 27 major supporting objectives, and 181

supporting actions).26 Many of these involve multiple activities and

complex variables that are not easily defined or measured. In addition, CFS

has requested that the information provided allow for analysis of which

actions are or are not successful in promoting summit goals.

In April 1997, CFS decided that the first progress reports should cover

activities through the end of 1997 and be submitted to the FAO Secretariat

by January 31, 1998. Countries and relevant international agencies were to

report on actions taken toward achieving the specific objectives under

each of the seven statements of commitment. As of March 31, 1998, only 68

of 175 country reports had been received. The Secretariat analyzed the

information in the 68 reports and summarized the results in a report to the

CFS for its June 1998 session. The Secretariat reported it was unable to

draw general substantive conclusions because (1) all countries, to varying

degrees, were selective in providing the information they considered of

most relevance for their reporting; (2) varied emphasis was given to

reporting on past plans and programs, ongoing programs, and future plans

to improve food security; and (3) the reports did not always focus on the

issues involved. Furthermore, some countries chose to provide a report

that was more descriptive than analytical, and some countries reported

only on certain aspects of food security action, such as food stocks or

reserve policies.

26CFS’ approach to monitoring and evaluation does not include a review or assessment of individual

country action plans for implementing summit statements of commitment. An FAO official said the

Secretariat does not have sufficient staff to evaluate the action plans of all members.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

CFS had not stipulated or suggested any common standards for measuring

the baseline status and progress with respect to actions, objectives, or

commitments prior to the preparation of the progress reports. In the

absence of common standards, the Secretariat is likely to experience

difficulty in analyzing relationships and drawing conclusions about the

progress of more than 100 countries. In addition, CFS did not ask countries

and agencies to report on planned targets and milestones for achieving

actions, objectives, or commitments or on estimated costs to fulfill summit

commitments and plans for financing such expenditures.

The Secretariat provided the June 1998 CFS session with a proposal for

improving the analytical format for future progress reports. CFS did not

debate the essential points that should be covered in future reports and

instead directed the Secretariat to prepare another proposal for later

consideration. Given the complexity of the action plan and other

difficulties, CFS also decided that countries will not prepare the next

progress report until the year 2000 and will address only half of the plan’s

objectives. A progress report on the remaining objectives will be made in

2002. Thus, the second report will not be completed until 6 years after the

summit. A third set of progress reports is to be prepared in 2004 and 2006.

Under the summit plan, countries also agreed to encourage effective

participation of relevant civil society actors in the monitoring process,

including those at the CFS level.27 In April 1997, CFS decided to examine this

issue in detail in 1998. However, the issue was not included in the

provisional agenda for the June 1998 session. Detailed discussion of

proposals by Canada and the United States on the issue was postponed

until the next CFS session in 1999. The postponement occurred as a result

of opposition by many developing country governments to an increased

role for NGOs in CFS. (See app. X for additional analysis of this issue.)

Agency Comments The Department of State, USDA, FAO, and the World Food Program provided

oral comments and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this

report. They generally agreed with the contents of the report. State

emphasized the important role that broad-based policy reforms play in

helping developing countries address food insecurity and suggested that

our report further highlight this factor. We agree with State on this matter,

and have reemphasized the need for developing countries to initiate

appropriate policy reforms as a prelude to addressing food security issues.

27The U.N. Economic and Social Council has stressed the importance of involving civil society in the

U.N.’s follow-up to all major international conferences and summits more generally.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

State and USDA officials also commented that in their opinion, the World

Bank and IFPRI overstated the effect of developed countries’ trade barriers

on the food insecurity of least-developed countries. We have modified the

report to reflect State’s and USDA’s views on this matter more fully. USAID

said that, although an unfortunate circumstance, it believes the level of

effort by donor and developing countries will probably fall short of

achieving the summit’s goal of reducing chronic global hunger by one-half.

While we cannot quantify the extent to which developing countries may

fall short, we tend to agree with USAID’s observation. USAID’s comments are

reprinted in appendix XII.

FAO officials said the report’s general tone of skepticism was justified

based on the past record and reiterated that reducing by one-half the

number of undernourished people by 2015 requires a change in priorities

by countries along the lines spelled out in the summit action plan. They

also said that work was underway to further investigate the extent to

which the target is feasible at the national level in those countries facing

political instability or with a high proportion of undernourished people.

FAO officials said that our discussion in appendix IX of coordination issues

concerning FAO’s Special Program for Food Security and a Telefood

promotion did not reflect FAO members’ support for these initiatives. We

provided additional information on the initiatives to reflect FAO’s views

(see app. IX). World Food Program officials said food aid for

nonemergency and developmental purposes is more effective than is

suggested by the discussion in our report. However, the officials did not

identify any studies or analysis to support the Program’s position that food

constitutes an efficient use of assistance resources. The World Food

Program said that it has acted on recommendations for improving its

operations, and we modified the report to reflect the World Food

Program’s views. However, it is important to note that a recent USAID study

on the use of food aid in contributing to sustainable development

concluded that while food aid may be effective, it is less efficient than

financial assistance, although the report pointed out that financial aid is

often not available. World Food Program officials acknowledged that

important issues remain unresolved concerning establishment of an

international database on food insecurity.

All of the above agencies and the Department of Health and Human

Services also provided technical comments that were incorporated into

the report where appropriate.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
B-280276 

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Senator

Robert C. Byrd, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Jesse Helms, Senator

Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Senator Joseph I.

Lieberman, Senator Mitch McConnell, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator

Fred Thompson, and to Representative Dan Burton, Representative Sonny

Callahan, Representative Sam Gejdenson, Representative Benjamin A.

Gilman, Representative John R. Kasich, Representative David Obey,

Representative Nancy Pelosi, Representative John M. Spratt,

Representative Henry A. Waxman, and Representative C. W. Bill Young.

We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable Dan Glickman,

Secretary of Agriculture; the Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of

Commerce; the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the

Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services; the

Honorable Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert

E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable J. Brian Atwood,

Administrator, Agency for International Development; the Honorable

Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; the

Honorable George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the

Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; the

Honorable Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser to the President;

and the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative.

Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me

at (202) 512-4128. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix XIII.

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Current Status of

Global Food Security

22

FAO’s Method for Estimating Undernourishment 22

USDA Estimate of Undernutrition 29

World Health Organization Undernourishment Estimates 30

Appendix II 

World Food Summit’s

Commitments,

Objectives, and Select

Actions for Promoting

Food Security

31

Appendix III 

Resources for

Financing Food

Security

35

Private Sector Resource Flows to Developing Countries 40

Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices,

and Grain Reserves

43

Effects of Trade Liberalization on Developing Countries’ Food

Security

43

Implementing the Uruguay Round 47

Trade Liberalization, Food Aid, and the Marrakesh Decision 48

Trade, Price Volatility, and Global Grain Reserves 50

Summit’s Action on Reserves 53

Views About Future Stock Levels and Price Volatility 53

Views on Actions to Increase Stocks and Hold Emergency

Reserves

55

Possible Alternatives to Reserves for Coping With Price Volatility 57

Appendix V 

Emergency and

Nonemergency Food

Aid

59

Trends in Food Aid 59

Costs to Feed the Long-Term Undernourished 63

Effectiveness of Food Aid for Nonemergency Purposes 64

Provision of Emergency Food Aid Since the Summit 66

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents

Appendix VI 

Conflicts’

Contribution to Food

Insecurity

70

Appendix VII 

Increasing

Agricultural

Production in

Developing Countries

73

Production Increases Are Not Likely to Be Easy 74

Appendix VIII 

Establishing an

Information System

for Assessing

Undernutrition and

Food Insecurity

80

Appendix IX 

Coordination in

Implementing Summit

Goals

84

Coordination Since the Summit 84

Appendix X 

Monitoring and

Evaluation of the

Action Plan

90

Progress Reports 90

Participation of Civil Society 92

Appendix XI 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

96

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents

Appendix XII 

Comments From the

U.S. Agency for

International

Development

99

Appendix XIII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

101

Tables Table I.1: FAO Estimates of Chronically Undernourished People

in 93 Developing Countries, 1990-92

26

Table I.2: Distribution of Chronically Undernourished, 1990-92 27

Table I.3: Estimates of Incidence of Chronic Undernourishment

in Developing Countries by Regions of the World, 1969-71 to

1994-96

28

Table II.1: Commitments, Objectives, and Select Examples of

Actions in the World Food Summit’s Plan of Action

31

Table III.1: Relationship Between Income Levels of Developing

Countries and Food Security

36

Table III.2: Total Net Resource Flows from OECD Development

Assistance Committee Countries and Multilateral Agencies to Aid

Recipient Countries, 1990-97

37

Table III.3: ODA Performance of OECD DAC Countries, 1980-97 39

Table III.4: Creditworthiness Ratings and Level of Food Security

in Developing Countries

42

Table IV.1: Estimated Effects of the URAs’ Reforms on Income in

the Developing and Developed World

46

Table IV.2: World Carryover Cereal Stocks, 1971-72 to 1998-99 52

Table V.1: World Grains Food Aid Shipments and Their Use,

1976-97

61

Table V.2: Share of Food Aid Reaching Low-Income, Food-Deficit

Countries, 1976-96

63

Table V.3: 1998 World Food Program Emergency and Protracted

Relief Assistance

67

Table VI.1: Relationship Between Incidence of Conflict and Level

of Food Security in Developing Countries, 1960-89

71

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents

Table VII.1: FAO Analysis of Daily Per Capita Calorie Levels,

Grain Production Growth Rates, and Millions of Undernourished

to 2010 for 93 Developing Countries

74

Abbreviations

ACC Administrative Coordination Committee of the United

Nations

CFS Committee on World Food Security

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DES daily energy supply

ERS Economic Research Service

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute

NGO nongovernmental organization

ODA official development assistance

ODF official development finance

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

UR Uruguay Round

URA Uruguay Round Trade Agreements

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

WTO World Trade Organization

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

Although the problem of food insecurity is widespread in the developing

world, the total number of undernourished people is unknown, and

estimates vary widely. An accurate assessment of the number of people

with inadequate access to food would require data from national sample

surveys designed to measure both the food consumption and the food

requirements of individuals. Such studies may include a dietary survey and

a clinical survey that involves anthropometric, or body, measurements,1

and biochemical analyses. According to the Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO), clinical and anthropometric examinations are the most

practical and sound means of determining the nutritional status of any

particular group of individuals in most developing countries in Africa,

Asia, and Latin America because the countries lack vital statistics,

accurate figures on agricultural production, and laboratories where

biochemical tests can be performed. However, clinical examinations have

often been given a low priority by developing countries, and studies of

anthropometric measurements have been undertaken very infrequently.

National dietary intake surveys are costly and time-consuming and have

also been undertaken in very few countries. As a result, there are no

internationally comparable, comprehensive survey data for tracking

changes in undernutrition for individuals and population groups within

countries, according to FAO.

2

FAO’s Method for

Estimating

Undernourishment

For many years FAO has employed a method to estimate the prevalence of

chronic undernourishment at the country level that is subject to a number

of weaknesses. Nevertheless, FAO estimates are frequently cited in the

absence of better estimates. FAO uses (1) food balance sheets that estimate

the amount of food available to each country over a 3-year period and

(2) estimates of each country’s total population to calculate the average

available per capita daily supply of calories during that period. FAO then

estimates the minimum average per capita dietary requirements for the

country’s population, allowing for only light physical activity. Then, in

combination with an estimate of inequality in the distribution of food

among households in the country, it derives the percentage distribution of

the population by per capita calorie consumption classes. On the basis of

this distribution and a cutoff point for food inadequacy based on the

estimate of the minimum average per capita dietary energy requirements,

1

Measurements of the body, such as height and weight, are made and compared to population norms.

For example, chronic undernourishment in children may result in stunting (low height for age),

underweight (low weight for age), and wasting (low weight for height).

2

See Michael C. Latham, Human Nutrition in the Developing World (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1997) and The

Sixth World Food Survey (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

the proportion of undernourished is estimated. This is then multiplied by

an estimate of the size of the population to obtain the absolute number of

undernourished .

According to FAO, a minimum level of energy requirements is one that

allows for only light physical activity. Depending on the country, FAO says,

the minimum level of energy requirements for the average person ranges

from 1,720 to 1,960 calories per day. Depending on data availability, FAO’s

assessment of equitable food distribution for a country is based on survey

data on household food energy intake, food expenditure, total income or

expenditure, and/or the weighted average of estimates for neighboring

countries.

FAO’s method has a number of weaknesses, and the validity of its estimates

has not been established. For example, FAO’s food supply figures are based

on 3-year averages, and population estimates are for the midpoint of the

reference period used. As a result, FAO’s estimates of the prevalence of

undernutrition do not reflect the short-term, seasonal variations in food

production or availability in countries. In addition, FAO’s method relies on

total calories available from food supplies and ignores dietary deficiencies

that can occur due to the lack of adequate amounts of protein and

essential micronutrients (for example, vitamins essential in minute

amounts for growth and well-being). FAO’s method for measuring

inequality in food distribution or access is ideally based on food

consumption data from household surveys, but the number of developing

countries for which such data are available is limited, and the surveys may

not be national in scope or may have been done infrequently. FAO uses

these data to estimate parameters for countries for which data are not

available.

FAO acknowledges that the quality and reliability of data relating to food

production, trade, and population vary from country to country and that

for many developing countries the data are either inaccurate or

incomplete. According to one critic of FAO’s method, FAO’s estimates are

unreliable indicators of the scope of the undernutrition problem and

erroneously find chronic undernutrition to be most prevalent in Africa.

The main reasons for the latter finding are systematic bias in methods

used by African countries to estimate food production and, to a lesser

extent, certain minor food items that are not completely covered in FAO’s

food balance sheets. The author concludes that anthropometric

measurements, based as they are on measurements of individuals, would

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

be a more promising method for future estimates of undernourishment

than estimates based on FAO’s aggregate approach.3

FAO’s method does not provide information on the effects of chronic

undernourishment (for example, the prevalence of growth retardation and

specific nutritional deficiencies), does not specify where the chronically

undernourished live within a country, and does not identify the principal

causes of their undernutrition. According to FAO and other experts, such

information is needed to develop effective policies and programs for

reducing undernourishment. In addition, FAO does not provide estimates

for developed countries and does not provide estimates of chronic

undernutrition of less than 1 percent.

Overall, according to FAO, its estimates of food availability and/or the

prevalence of undernutrition for many countries are subject to errors of

unknown magnitude and direction. Nonetheless, FAO believes that its

estimates permit one to know generally in which countries undernutrition

is most acute. According to FAO, the consensus of a group of experts that it

consulted in March 1997 was that (1) despite the deficiencies of its

method, FAO had no current substitute for assessing chronic

undernutrition than its food balance sheets based on per capita food

availability and distribution; (2) FAO’s approach tends to underestimate

consistently per capita food availability in African countries because of its

inadequate coverage of noncereal crops; (3) attention needs to be given

not just to indications of severe malnutrition but also to mild and

moderate malnutrition; and (4) more subregional information is needed on

malnutrition and on local levels of food stocks and trade, wages and

market conditions, and household perceptions of medium-term food

insecurity. It was also argued that about 67 percent of child deaths are

associated with nonclinically malnourished children.

In analyses for the World Food Summit, FAO estimated that about

840 million people in 93 developing countries were chronically

undernourished during 1990-92.4

 These countries represented about 

98.5 percent of the population in all developing countries. According to the

FAO estimates, a relatively small number of countries account for most of

the chronically undernourished in the 93 countries (see table I.1). For

example, during 1990-92, China and India were estimated to have about

3

Peter Svedberg, “841 Million Undernourished? On the Tyranny of Deriving a Number,” Seminar Paper

No. 656 (Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for International Economic Studies, Oct. 1998).

4

FAO reported a revised number in 1998 but not on an individual country basis. See table I.3 and the

accompanying discussion.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

189 million and 185 million chronically undernourished, respectively;

collectively, they had nearly 45 percent of the total for all 93 countries.

Five countries—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and

Pakistan—accounted for between 20 million and 43 million chronically

undernourished each. The next 13 countries represented between about

6 million and 17 million of the chronically undernourished. Altogether, the

20 countries accounted for about 679 million, or nearly 81 percent, of the

undernourished in the 93 countries.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

Table I.1: FAO Estimates of

Chronically Undernourished People in

93 Developing Countries, 1990-92

Country

Number of

undernourished

(millions)

Number of

undernourished

as percent of total

number of

undernourished

for all countries

Cumulative

percent

China 188.9 22.5 22.5

India 184.5 22.0 44.5

Nigeria 42.9 5.1 49.6

Bangladesh 39.4 4.7 54.3

Ethiopia 33.2 4.0 58.3

Indonesia 22.1 2.6 60.9

Pakistan 20.5 2.4 63.4

Vietnam 17.2 2.1 65.4

Zaire 14.9 1.8 67.2

Thailand 14.4 1.7 68.9

Philippines 13.1 1.6 70.5

Afghanistan 12.9 1.5 72.0

Kenya 11.3 1.3 73.4

Peru 10.7 1.3 74.6

Tanzania 10.3 1.2 75.9

Sudan 9.7 1.2 77.0

Brazil 9.7 1.2 78.2

Mozambique 9.6 1.1 79.3

Mexico 7.2 0.9 80.2

Somalia 6.4 0.8 80.9

Subtotal 678.9 80.9 80.9

Second 20 countriesa 91.0 10.8 91.8

Third 20 countries 49.8 5.9 97.7

Fourth 20 countries 16.6 2.0 99.7

Last 13 countries 2.4 0.3 100.0

Total 838.7 100.0 100.0

Note: Countries are ranked in descending order based on the number of undernourished.

aAggregate number of undernourished people for the next 20 countries with the largest number of

undernourished people.

Source: Our analysis of FAO data.

As table I.2 shows, great variation also characterizes the extent to which

chronic undernutrition is a problem within countries. According to FAO

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

figures, a majority of the countries were estimated to have chronically

undernourished people at a rate ranging between 11 and 40 percent in

1990-92, and 19 had rates ranging between 41 and 73 percent.

Table I.2: Distribution of Chronically

Undernourished, 1990-92

Percent of country’s population

chronically undernourished

Number of

countries

Total number of

chronically

undernourished

(millions)

1 - 10 18 40

11 - 20 17 255

21 - 30 24 267

31 - 40 15 146

41 - 50 9 50

51 - 60 3 9

61 - 70 5 53

71 - 73 2 19

Total 93 839

Source: Our analysis of FAO data.

Table I.3 provides estimates of the number of undernourished people in

developing country regions of the world between 1969-71 and 1994-96.

(The figures include FAO revised estimates for the periods prior to 1994-96.5

As a result, the total for 1990-92 is slightly lower than that shown in 

tables I.1 and I.2.) FAO’s estimates indicate that the developing world as a

whole made considerable progress in reducing the level of chronic

undernourishment between 1969-71 and 1990-92, from an estimated

37 percent of the total population to 20 percent. However, the absolute

number of undernourished was reduced by only 14.3 percent during the

period—from 959 million to about 822 million—because the total

population of the developing world increased by nearly 1.5 billion people

during that time. Also, a large number of states did so poorly that their

chronically undernourished people increased both absolutely and as a

percentage of their total population. Between 1990-92 and 1994-96, the

proportion of undernourished people in the developing world declined

another 1 percent, but the number of undernourished increased by about

6 million people.

5

See footnote in table I.3.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

Table I.3: Estimates of Incidence of

Chronic Undernourishment in

Developing Countries by Regions of

the World, 1969-71 to 1994-96

Undernourished

Region

Year (3-year

averages)

Total

population

(millions)

Percentage of

total population

Persons

(millions)

Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-71 268 40 108

1979-81 352 41 145

1990-92 484 40 196

1994-96 543 39 211

Near East and North

Africa 1969-71 182 28 51

1979-81 239 12 29

1990-92 325 11 34

1994-96 360 12 42

East and Southeast Asia 1969-71 1,166 43 506

1979-81 1,418 29 413

1990-92 1,688 17 289

1994-96 1,773 15 258

South Asia 1969-71 711 33 238

1979-81 892 34 302

1990-92 1,137 21 237

1994-96 1,223 21 254

Latin America and the

Caribbean 1969-71 279 20 55

1979-81 354 14 48

1990-92 440 15 64

1994-96 470 13 63

Totals 1969-71 2,609 37 959

1979-81 3,259 29 938

1990-92 4,078 20 822a

1994-96 4,374 19 828

aIn May 1998, FAO provided revised estimates of the number and percentage of undernourished

people by regions of the world for 1969-71, 1979-81, and 1990-92 and for the first time provided

estimates for 1994-96. According to FAO, the revised numbers reflect the reestimation of

historical population figures by the U.N. Population Division. (As examples of the changes, FAO

previously estimated the number of undernourished people for all developing regions at

917 million in 1969-71, 905 million in 1979-81, and 839 million in 1990-92.) However, FAO did not

release data on a country-by-country basis for either its revised or new estimates. As a result,

other tables in this report that are based on individual country data use FAO’s previous estimates.

Source: FAO.

Although the percentage of chronically undernourished people in the

developing world was considerably reduced between 1969-71 and 1994-96,

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

sub-Saharan Africa’s reduction was very small. According to FAO’s

estimates, in 1994-96 the proportion of sub-Saharan Africa’s population

that was undernourished greatly exceeded that of the other regions of the

world. However, in absolute numbers, the most undernourished persons

were still found in East and Southeast Asia and in South Asia.

USDA Estimate of

Undernutrition

A 1997 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service

(ERS) study employed an alternative indirect method for estimating the

amount of undernutrition at the country level that is similar to FAO’s

method in some respects.6

 Like FAO, ERS estimates food availability within

a country. It also adopts a minimum daily caloric intake standard

necessary to sustain life with minimum food-gathering activities. However,

the standard is higher than that used by FAO (for light physical

activity)—ranging between about 2,000 and 2,200 calories per day,

depending on the country. According to ERS, its standard is comparable to

the activity level for a refugee; it does not allow for play, work, or any

activity other than food gathering. ERS estimates how inequality affects the

distribution of available food supplies based on consumption or income

distribution data for five different groups of the population. Like FAO’s

estimate, ERS’ estimate is highly dependent on the availability and quality

of national-level data.

In 1997, ERS used its method to estimate the number of undernourished in

58 of the 93 developing countries regularly reported on by FAO. ERS

estimated that during 1990-92, about 1.038 billion people could not meet

their nutritional requirements—nearly 200 million more than FAO’s

estimate of 839 million people for 93 countries. FAO’s data for the same 58

countries indicates 574 million chronically undernourished, about

45 percent less than USDA’s estimate. One reason for the much larger

estimates resulting from the USDA approach are the higher standards used

for minimum energy requirements that were previously noted .7

6

Food Security Assessment, USDA/ERS (Washington, D.C.: USDA, November 1997).

7

In estimating per capita food supply availability, ERS limited its analysis to grains and root crops.

These two food commodity groups account for as much as 80 percent of all calories consumed in the

countries. ERS adjusted its minimum caloric requirements to reflect the total share of grains and root

crops in the diet of each country.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I 

Current Status of Global Food Security

World Health

Organization

Undernourishment

Estimates

Another important source of data on the status of food security in the

developing world is the World Health Organization’s global database on

growth in children under age 5. Since 1986, the World Health Organization

has sought to assemble and systematize the results of representative

anthropometric surveys conducted in different parts of the world. The

data indicate that about 2 out of 5 children in the developing world are

stunted (low height for age), 1 out of 3 underweight (low weight for age),

and 1 out of 11 wasted (low weight for height). In absolute numbers, the

estimates for 1990 are 230 million stunted children, 193 million

underweight, and 50 million wasted under the age of 5.8

 According to the

U.N. Children’s Fund, more than 6 million children in developing countries

die each year from causes either directly or indirectly tied to malnutrition.

8

The results were based on nationally representative surveys conducted in 79 developing countries

between 1980 and 1992. The World Health Organization estimated the number of underweight, stunted,

and wasted children for 1990 by applying prevalence estimates to the population of under 5 year olds

in 1990.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix II 

World Food Summit’s Commitments,

Objectives, and Select Actions for

Promoting Food Security

The 185 countries that attended the World Food Summit pledged their

actions and support to implement a plan of action for reducing food

insecurity. The plan includes 7 major commitments, 27 subordinate

objectives, and 181 specific actions. The commitments, subordinate

objectives, and 24 of the specific actions relating to a variety of objectives

are summarized in table II.1.1

Table II.1: Commitments, Objectives, and Select Examples of Actions in the World Food Summit’s Plan of Action

Commitment, objective,

and action Summary

1 Ensure an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to create the best conditions

for the eradication of poverty and for durable peace, based on full and equal participation of men and

women.

1.1 Prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully and create a stable political environment through respect for all

human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, a transparent and effective legal system,

transparent and accountable governance and administration in all public and private national and

international institutions, and effective and equal participation of all people in decisions and actions that

affect their food security.

1.2 Ensure stable economic conditions and implement development strategies that encourage the full

potential of private and public initiatives for sustainable, equitable, economic, and social development

that also integrate population and environmental concerns.

1.2 (b) Establish legal and other mechanisms that advance land reform and promote the sustainable use of

natural resources.

1.3 Ensure gender equality and empowerment of women.

1.3 (b) Promote women’s full and equal participation in the economy.

1.4 Encourage national solidarity and provide equal opportunities for all in social, economic, and political

life, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged people.

1.4 (a) Support investment in human resource development, such as health, education, and other skills

essential to sustainable development.

2 Implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving physical and economic

access by all.

2.1 Pursue poverty eradication and food sustainability for all as a policy priority and promote employment

and equal access to resources, such as land, water, and credit, to maximize incomes of the poor.

2.1 (f) Promote farmers’ access to genetic resources for agriculture.

2.2 Enable the food insecure to meet their food and nutritional requirements and seek to assist those unable

to do so.

2.2 (a) Develop national information and mapping systems to identify localized areas of food insecurity and

vulnerability.

2.2 (b) Implement cost-effective public works programs for the underemployed.

2.2 (c) Develop targeted welfare and nutrition safety nets.

(continued)

1

Commitments are denoted by a whole number, objectives by a decimal number, and actions by a

decimal number and a letter. We selected 24 actions to further illustrate the depth and specificity of

the summit’s plan. Including all of the actions would have considerably expanded the length of the

table.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix II 

World Food Summit’s Commitments,

Objectives, and Select Actions for

Promoting Food Security

Commitment, objective,

and action Summary

2.3 Ensure that food supplies are safe, physically and economically accessible, appropriate, and adequate

to meet the needs of the food insecure.

2.4 Promote access to education and health care for all.

3 Pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and rural development policies

and practices, in areas with low as well as high potential, that are essential for adequate and reliable

food supplies at the household, national, regional, and global levels and combat pests, drought, and

desertification.

3.1 Pursue, through participatory means, sustainable, intensified, and diversified food production, and

increased productivity and efficiency and reduced losses, taking into account the need to sustain

resources.

3.2 Combat environmental threats to food security, in particular droughts and desertification, pests, and

erosion of biological diversity, and restore the natural resource base, including watersheds, to achieve

greater production.

3.3 Promote sound policies and programs on the transfer and use of technologies, skills development, and

training for food security needs.

3.4 Strengthen and broaden research and scientific cooperation on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry to

support policy and international, national, and local actions to increase productive potential and

maintain the natural resource base in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry and in support of efforts to

eradicate poverty and promote food security.

3.5 Formulate and implement integrated rural development strategies, in high and low potential areas, that

promote employment, skills, infrastructure, institutions, and services in support of food security.

3.5 (b) Strengthen local government institutions in rural areas and provide them with adequate resources,

decision-making authority, and mechanisms for grassroots participation.

3.5 (h) Promote the development of rural banking, credit, and savings schemes, including equal access to

credit for men and women, microcredit for the poor, and adequate insurance mechanisms.

4 Strive to ensure that food, trade, and overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all

through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.

4.1 Use the opportunities arising from the international trade framework established in recent global and

regional trade negotiations.

4.1 (a) Establish well-functioning internal marketing and transportation systems to facilitate local, national, and

international trade.

4.2 Meet essential food import needs in all countries, considering world price and supply fluctuations and

taking into account food consumption levels of vulnerable groups in developing countries.

4.2 (b) Food-exporting countries should act as reliable sources of supplies to their trading partners and give

due consideration to the food security of importing countries.

4.2 (c) Reduce subsidies on food exports in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreements.

4.3 Support the continuation of the reform process in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreements.

5 Endeavor to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies and meet

transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, and

development of a capacity to satisfy future needs.

5.1 Reduce demands for emergency food assistance through efforts to prevent and resolve man-made

emergencies, particularly international, national, and local conflicts.

5.2 Establish as quickly as possible prevention and preparedness strategies for low-income, food-deficit

countries and areas vulnerable to emergencies.

(continued)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix II 

World Food Summit’s Commitments,

Objectives, and Select Actions for

Promoting Food Security

Commitment, objective,

and action Summary

5.3 Improve or develop efficient and effective emergency response mechanisms at international, regional,

national, and local levels.

5.4 Strengthen links between relief operations and development programs to facilitate the transition from

relief to development.

6 Promote optimal allocation and use of public and private investments to foster human resources,

sustainable food and agricultural systems, and rural development.

6.1 Create the policy framework and conditions that encourage optimal public and private investments in

the equitable and sustainable development of food systems, rural development, and human resources

necessary to contribute to food security.

6.2 Endeavor to mobilize and optimize the use of technical and financial resources from all sources,

including debt relief, to raise investment in sustainable food production in developing countries.

6.2 (a) Raise sufficient and stable funding from private, public, domestic, and international sources to achieve

and sustain food security.

6.2 (e) Strengthen efforts towards the fulfillment of the agreed official development assistance target of 0.7

percent of the gross national product.

6.2 (f) Focus official development assistance (ODA) toward countries that have a real need for it, especially

low-income countries.

6.2 (g) Explore ways of mobilizing public and private financial resources for food security through the

appropriate reduction of excessive military expenditures.

7 Implement, monitor, and follow up the summit plan of action at all levels in cooperation with the

international community.

7.1 Adopt actions within each country’s national framework to enhance food security and enable

implementation of the commitments of the World Food Summit plan of action.

7.1 (a) Review and revise, as appropriate, national plans, programs, and strategies to achieve food security

consistent with summit commitments.

7.1 (b) Establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities and develop, implement, and monitor the

components of action for food security within designated time frames.

7.1 (c) In collaboration with civil society, formulate and launch national food-for-all campaigns to mobilize all

stakeholders and their resources in support of the summit plan of action.

7.1 (d) Actively encourage a greater role for, and alliance with, civil society.

7.2 Improve subregional, regional, and international cooperation and mobilize and optimize the use of

available resources to support national efforts for the earliest achievement of sustainable food security.

7.2 (d) Continue the coordinated follow-up by the U.N. system to the major U.N. conferences and summits

since 1990; reduce duplication and fill in gaps in coverage, making concrete proposals for

strengthening and improving coordination with governments.

7.2 (i) Relevant international organizations are invited, on request, to assist countries in reviewing and

formulating national plans of action, including targets, goals, and timetables for achieving food security.

7.3 Actively monitor the implementation of the summit plan of action.

7.3 (a) Establish, through FAO’s Committee on Food Security, a timetable, procedures, and standardized

reporting formats, on the national and regional implementation of the summit plan of action.

7.3 (e) Monitor, through the Committee on Food Security, implementation of the summit action.plan.

7.4 Clarify the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, as

stated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and other relevant

international and regional instruments.

(continued)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix II 

World Food Summit’s Commitments,

Objectives, and Select Actions for

Promoting Food Security

Commitment, objective,

and action Summary

7.5 Share responsibilities for achieving food security for all so that implementation of the summit plan of

action takes place at the lowest possible level at which its purpose is best achieved.

Source: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action (Rome,

Italy: FAO, Nov. 13, 1996).

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

As defined by the countries at the summit, achieving improved world food

security by 2015 is largely a development problem, the primary

responsibility for attaining food security rests with individual countries,

ODA1 could be of critical importance to countries and sectors left aside by

other external sources of finance, and developing country governments

should adopt policies that promote foreign and direct investment and

effective use of ODA.

There is a growing body of evidence that foreign financial aid works well

in a good policy environment. For example, according to a recent World

Bank report,2

 financial assistance leads to faster growth, poverty

reduction, and gains in social indicators with sound economic

management. With sound country management, the report said, 1 percent

of gross domestic product in assistance translates into a 1 percent decline

in poverty and a similar decline in infant mortality. The report concluded

that improvements in economic institutions and policies in the developing

world are the key to a quantum leap in poverty reduction and that effective

financial aid complements private investment . Conversely, financial aid

has much less impact in a weak policy environment.

The report’s conclusions are consistent with the approach espoused by the

summit. For example, according to the summit countries, a sound policy

environment in which food-related investment can fulfill its potential is

essential. More specifically, summit participants said governments should

provide an economic and legal framework that promotes efficient markets

that encourage private sector mobilization of savings, investment, and

capital formation. In addition, the participants said that the international

community has a role to play in supporting the adoption of appropriate

national policies and, where necessary and appropriate, in providing

technical and financial assistance to assist developing countries in

fostering food security .

Table III.1 shows, as could be expected, that a majority of the more

food-insecure countries are low-income countries and many of them are

also least developed. Of 93 developing countries reported on in the table,

1

ODA includes grants or loans to developing countries at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having

a grant element of at least 25 percent), with the promotion of economic development and welfare as

the main objective. Technical cooperation is included in aid. Grants, loans, and credits for military

purposes are excluded. Official development finance includes (1) bilateral ODA, (2) grants and

concessional and nonconcessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and

(3) other official financing that is considered developmental (including refinancing loans) but the grant

element is too low to qualify as ODA.

2

David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, Assessing Aid (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

72 had inadequate food supplies in 1990-92. Forty-six of the countries were

low income (that is, they had a gross national product per capita of less

than $766), and 34 of the 46 countries were designated as “least

developed,” meaning they were the poorest countries in the world.

Together, the 46 countries accounted for more than 700 million of the

chronically undernourished people in developing countries in 1990-92.

Table III.1: Relationship Between Income Levels of Developing Countries and Food Security

Income levelb (number of countries)

Average daily calories

per capitaa

Least

developed, low

income

Other low

income

Lower middle

income

Upper middle

income Total

Inadequatec Less than 2,100 16 3 3 0 22

2,100 to 2,400 15 8 9 1 33

2,400 to 2,700 3 1 8 5 17

Subtotal 34 12 20 6 72

Adequatec Greater than

2,700 0 2 11 8 21

Total number of

countries 34 14 31 14 93

Number of chronically

undernourished people (in

millions) 212 508 90 29 839

Notes: Data on average per capita calories and number of chronically undernourished people are

for 1990-92. Data on income levels are for 1995.

aAverage is based on available food supply at the country level.

bThe U.N. General Assembly designates countries as “least developed” on the basis of several

criteria; they are the poorest countries in the world. Other country designations are, according to

the World Bank classification of 1995, gross national product per capita: low income—less than

$766; lower middle income—between $766 and $3,035; upper middle income—between $3,036

and $9,385; high-income—above $9,385.

cWe designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per capita energy supplies

based on an FAO analysis of the relationship between average per capita daily energy supplies

and chronic undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita

undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level

of unequal food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below

the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the

average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the population will be

undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be undernourished. If food

is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is undernourished decreases,

and vice versa.

Source: Our analysis of FAO and U.N. data.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

Table III.2 shows that between 1990 and 1997, Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee

countries’ allocation of ODA averaged $60.9 billion (1996 prices and

exchange rates). However, ODA has been steadily declining, from a high of

$66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in 1997.

Table III.2: Total Net Resource Flows From OECD Development Assistance Committee Countries and Multilateral Agencies

to Aid Recipient Countries, 1990-97

Dollars in billions (1996 prices and exchange rates)

Net resource flows 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a Mean

Official development finance $91.7 $98.2 $85.7 $93.5 $92.3 $87.1 $78.1 $75.4 $87.8

ODAb 60.6 66.5 63.8 62.5 64.5 58.4 57.9 52.7 60.9

Other ODF 31.0 31.7 21.9 31.0 27.8 28.8 20.2 22.6 26.9

Total export credits 11.4 0.7 1.1 –3.3 6.7 5.5 4.0 –4.7 2.7

Private flows 52.4 58.8 84.2 91.4 135.5 164.2 286.3 222.0 136.8

Total $155.4 $157.7 $171.0 $181.5 $234.5 $256.9 $368.4 $292.6 $227.3

Percent of total

Official development finance 59 62 50 52 39 34 21 26 39

ODAb 39 42 37 34 28 23 16 18 27

Other ODF 20 20 13 17 12 11 5 8 12

 Total export credits 7 0 1 –2 3 2 1 –2 1

Private flows 34 37 49 50 58 64 78 76 60

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Note: Official development finance—ODF.

aProvisional.

bExcluding forgiveness of nonofficial development assistance debt for the years 1990-92.

Source: GAO calculation using OECD data.

For many years, OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has

supported a target of providing ODA equivalent to 0.7 percent of the gross

national product.3

 This goal was reaffirmed by most DAC countries at the

World Food Summit. As table III.3 shows, since the early 1980s ODA as a

percent of the gross national product has declined for most DAC countries,

including the five largest providers (France, Germany, Japan, the United

3

The target was established by the United Nations in 1970 as an appropriate level for ODA.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

Kingdom, and the United States).4 Only four countries met the ODA target

in 1997 (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and they

represent a small amount of the ODA provided by the DAC countries. For the

DAC countries in total, ODA represented 0.34 percent of their combined

gross national product during 1980-84 and only 0.22 percent in 1997. Most

countries’ ODA in 1997 ranged between only 0.22 percent and 0.36 percent

of their gross national product. The United States was the lowest,

contributing only 0.08 percent of its gross national product, or about

one-ninth of the DAC target.

4

The OECD’s figures on ODA for the United States do not fully agree with U.S. figures, since OECD

data are reported on a calendar year basis while U.S. figures are reported for fiscal years. In addition,

the OECD’s definition for ODA differs somewhat from the definition the United States uses in its

reports.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

Table III.3: ODA Performance of OECD DAC Countries, 1980-97

ODA as a percent of gross national product

1997 ODA in dollars (billions)

Country

1980/84

average

1985/89

average

1990/94

average

1995/97

average Actual

Target amount

of 0.7 percent

of GNPa

Shortfallb

relative to

target goal

Australia 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.31 $1.08 $2.65 $1.57

Austria 0.29 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.53 1.44 0.91

Belgium 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.76 1.72 0.96

Canada 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.35 2.15 4.19 2.04

Denmark 0.76 0.89 1.00 0.99 1.64 1.18 –0.46

Finland 0.29 0.54 0.57 0.33 0.38 0.81 0.43

France 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.50 6.35 9.80 3.45

Germany 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.31 5.91 14.58 8.67

Ireland 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.42 0.23

Italy 0.20 0.37 0.31 0.15 1.23 8.02 6.79

Japan 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.23 9.36 29.72 20.36

Luxembourg 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.43 0.09 0.12 0.03

Netherlands 1.01 0.97 0.85 0.81 2.95 2.56 –0.39

New Zealand 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.41 0.26

Norway 0.97 1.09 1.10 0.86 1.31 1.06 –0.24

Portugal 0.03 0.16 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.71 0.46

Spain 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.23 1.23 3.72 2.49

Sweden 0.85 0.89 0.96 0.79 1.67 1.53 –0.14

Switzerland 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.84 1.85 1.01

United Kingdom 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.27 3.37 9.16 5.78

United Statesc 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.10 6.17 56.42 50.25

Total DAC 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.25 $47.58 $152.06 $104.48

aActual and shortfall numbers may not exactly total to the target amount due to rounding.

bA negative number means the country’s ODA exceeded the 0.7 percent of gross national

product (GNP) target.

cThe United States has never approved the ODA target. According to U.S. government officials,

the government has no plans to try to meet the target.

Source: Our analysis of OECD data.

Apart from ODA, the United States devotes substantial resources to

promoting global peace through its participation in a variety of strategic

alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and maintenance

of the world’s most sophisticated defense forces. U.S. expenditures on ODA

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

and defense combined in 1995 represented 3.9 percent of the U.S. gross

national product—a higher percentage than that for any other DAC country.

(The average for all other DAC countries was 2.4 percent, with a range from

1.1 percent for Luxembourg to 3.6 percent for France.)

According to the OECD, reasons for the decline include the end of the Cold

War, which removed a traditional and well-understood security rationale

for development assistance, preoccupation with domestic issues and

budgetary pressures in some donor countries, and fiscal restraint policies

that have included disproportionate cuts in development assistance

budgets. In June 1998, the OECD reported that fiscal restraint programs had

succeeded in reducing OECD public deficits from 4.3 percent of combined

gross domestic product in 1993 to 1.3 percent in 1997. The OECD said that

the continuing decline in ODA ran counter to the widespread improvements

in the economic and budgetary situations of the DAC member countries and

to their clearly stated policy goals for increasing ODA.

According to a June 1998 report by FAO (based on information provided by

only some of the DAC countries), Ireland plans to increase its ODA to

0.45 percent of its gross national product by 2002 (compared to

0.31 percent in 1997); Switzerland plans to increase its ODA to 0.45 percent

of its gross national product (from 0.32 percent in 1997 ), but the year for

reaching this level was not cited; and Norway seeks to raise its assistance

to 1 percent of gross national product by the year 2000 (compared to

0.86 percent in 1995).

Private Sector

Resource Flows to

Developing Countries

As table III.2 shows, private sector resource flows applied to the

developing world have grown dramatically during the 1990s, from

$52.4 billion in 1990 to about $286 billion in 1996 (1996 prices and

exchange rates), although private flows declined in 1997 to an estimated

$222 billion. Although the flow of private resources has increased

considerably, the vast majority of the world’s poorest countries continue

to rely heavily on official development financing.5

 According to the OECD

and the World Bank, with some exceptions, these countries are as yet

unable to tap significant, sustainable amounts of private capital; without

official assistance, these countries’ progress toward financial

independence will be slow and difficult.

5

In 1995, the world’s poorest countries attracted almost no foreign direct investment or loans from

international banks. They have very limited access to foreign portfolio debt or equity finance. Many

lack the financial market structures to handle such financing, a gap that also impairs their ability to

mobilize domestic financial resources.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

One measure of the difficulty of attracting private investment to the most

food-insecure countries and peoples is shown in table III.4. The table

relates creditworthiness ratings of the risk of investing in 92 developing

countries to the level of their food security. The ratings are from

Euromoney, a leading international publication, that assigns ratings as a

weighted average of indicators of economic performance, political risk,

debt, credit, and access to bank finance, short-term trade finance, and

capital. Ratings can range between a possible low of 0 points (poorest

rating) to a possible high of 100 points (most favorable rating). As shown

in the table, we grouped countries into four category ranges—0 to 25, 26 to

50, 51 to 75, and 76 to 100 points. The large majority of countries with

inadequate average daily calories per capita had a creditworthiness rating

of less than 51 points.6

 Only 2 of the 71 countries with inadequate food

availability received a creditworthiness rating of more than 75 points. As

the table also shows, 358 million chronically undernourished people lived

in countries that received a creditworthiness rating of less than 51 points,

and another 459 million undernourished people lived in countries that

received ratings between 51 and 75 points.

6

For the rating period shown in the table, Afghanistan received the lowest score, 3.9 points, and South

Korea the highest rating, 84.3 points.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III 

Resources for Financing Food Security

Table III.4: Creditworthiness Ratings and Level of Food Security in Developing Countries

Investor ratings

Number of countries

Average daily

calories per capitaa 0-25 points 26-50 points 51-75 points 76-100 points Total

Inadequateb Less than 2,100 8 13 0 0 21

2,100 to 2,400 4 24 4 1 33

2,400 to 2,700 1 11 4 1 17

Subtotal 13 48 8 2 71

Adequateb Greater than 2,700 3 7 9 2 21

Total number of

countries 16 55 17 4 92c

Number of chronically

undernourished

people (in millions) 75 283 459 19 836c

Notes: Data on average per capita calories are for 1990-92. Data on investor ratings are based on

Euromoney country risk ratings for 1996.

aAverage based on available food supply at the country level.

bWe designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per capita energy supplies

based on an FAO analysis of the relationship between average per capita daily energy supplies

and chronic undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita

undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level

of unequal food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below

the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the

average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the population will be

undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be undernourished. If food

is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is undernourished decreases,

and vice versa.

cBurundi, with an estimated chronically undernourished population of 2.9 million, was not

included in the analysis, since it did not have a credit rating from Euromoney.

Source: Our analysis of FAO food security data and Euromoney creditworthiness data.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

The World Food Summit identified trade as a key element for improving

world food security and urged countries to meet the challenges of and

seize opportunities arising from the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade

Agreements (URA). According to the summit plan of action, the progressive

implementation of the URA as a whole will generate increasing

opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth to the benefit of

all participants. The summit action plan encouraged developing countries

to establish well-functioning internal marketing and transportation

systems to facilitate better links within and between domestic, regional,

and world markets and to further diversify their trade. The ability of

developing countries to do so depends partly on steps taken by developed

countries to further open their domestic markets. Food-insecure countries

have concerns about possible adverse effects of trade reforms on their

food security and about price volatility in global food markets, particularly

in staple commodities such as grains.

Effects of Trade

Liberalization on

Developing Countries’

Food Security

Trade liberalization can positively affect food security in several ways. It

allows food consumption to exceed food production in those countries

where conditions for expanding output are limited. Food trade has an

important role to play in stabilizing domestic supplies and prices; without

trade, domestic production fluctuations would have to be borne by

adjustments in consumption and/or stocks. Trade allows consumption

fluctuations to be reduced and relieves countries of part of the burden of

stockholding. Over time, more liberal trade policies can contribute to

economic growth and broaden the range and variety of foods available

domestically.1

However, during the negotiations leading up to the URAs and since then,

concerns have been raised about possible adverse impacts of trade

liberalization on developing countries’ food security, especially

low-income, food-deficit countries. These concerns relate to impacts on

food prices, the ability of the developing countries to access developed

countries’ markets, food aid levels, and global grain reserves. For example,

FAO said that future levels of food aid might be adversely affected, since

historically food aid volumes had been closely linked to the level of

surplus stocks, and future surplus stocks could be low. FAO also expressed

concern that if grain stocks fell to low levels, trade liberalization measures

might be less effective in stabilizing world cereal market prices.

1

See, for example, Technical background documents 12-15, World Food Summit (Rome, Italy: FAO,

1996).

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

In 1995, FAO estimated that the effects of the URAs would likely cause a

sizable increase in the food import bills of developing countries. For the

low-income, food-deficit countries as a whole, FAO projected the food

import bill would be 14 percent higher in the year 2000 (about $3.6 billion)

as a result of the URAs.2

 However, a World Bank study, issued at about the

same time, estimated very modest price increases for most major traded

commodities and concluded the changes would have a very minor impact

on the welfare of the developing countries.3

 Some more recent studies

have also indicated that the impact of the URAs on international food and

agricultural prices will be very limited.4

 The authors of one study

estimated that grains and livestock product prices will increase by only

about 2 to 5 percent by 2005 and concluded that the small increases are

not expected to offset a long-term declining trend in food prices.5

Table IV.1 reports the results of two models6 that estimated the income

effects resulting from reforms in the agricultural sector alone and

economywide.7

 Despite the delicate nature of modeling complex trade

agreements, both models projected positive economy-wide benefits (from

0.29 percent to 0.38 percent of the base gross domestic product for

developing countries as a whole). For agricultural reform alone, one

model projected negative benefits and the other positive benefits for

developing countries as a whole. Both models projected that Africa and

the Near East would experience negative benefits from agricultural reform

alone. The study that cited the results concluded that further work was

needed to reconcile differences between the various assessments before

firm policy recommendations could be made. Elsewhere, FAO commented

that studies modeling the impact of the URAs typically cover only the parts

of the agreement that are more amenable for quantification. In FAO’s view,

2

According to FAO analyses released at the time of the summit, low-income, food-deficit countries

continued to worry about their losses in trade preferences as a result of the URAs, greater constraints

in taking advantage of new trade opportunities, and the possibility of higher import bills.

3

I. Goldin, O. Knudsen, and D. van der Mensbrugghe, Trade Liberalization: Global Economic

Implications (Washington, D.C.: OECD and the World Bank, 1995).

4

The World Food Situation.

5

See Kym Anderson, et al., “Asia—Pacific Food Markets and Trade in 2005: A Global, Economy-wide

Perspective,” The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, No. 41:1 (1997).

6

See J. Francois, B. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom, “Assessing the Uruguay Round,” The Uruguay

Round and the Developing Economies, eds. W. Martin and L. Winters, World Bank Discussion Paper

No. 307 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995). See also G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr,

“Quantifying the Uruguay Round,” The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies.

7

The analysis included reforms in the agricultural sector, market access reforms in manufactured and

industrial products, and the phasing out of a multifiber arrangement.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

estimates of the URA trade and income gains from the increase in market

access for goods underestimate the full benefits of the agreement on world

trade and income.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

Table IV.1: Estimated Effects of the URAs’ Reforms on Income in the Developing and Developed World

MRT model base scenarioa

FMN model base scenarioa

Estimated effects on 1992 gross domestic product if UR reforms had been in effect

Dollars in millions

Regions and select countries

and trade groups

Agricultural

reform

Economywide reformb

Economy-wide

reform as

percent of base

gross domestic

product

Agricultural

reform

Economywide reform

Economy-wide

reform as

percent of

base gross

domestic

product

Developing countries $9.21 $17.65 0.38 $-0.21 $10.29 0.29

Africa –0.29 –0.42 –0.24 –0.40 1.81 0.24

East Asia 8.04 12.30 0.86 0.17 7.19 0.50

South Asia 0.10 3.29 0.99 –0.22 1.23 0.37

Near East –0.45 –0.39 –0.07 c c c

Latin America 2.07 3.30 0.27 0.24 0.06 0.01

Developed countries $49.10 $75.21 0.41 $4.33 $26.86 0.14

Australia and New Zealand 1.11 1.52 0.45 0.59 0.29 0.09

Japan 15.23 16.69 0.47 –0.50 1.26 0.04

Canada 0.24 1.16 0.22 0.74 0.72 0.13

United States 1.66 12.84 0.22 0.10 10.07 0.17

European Union –12 28.54 38.85 0.58 4.79 14.56 0.22

European Free Trade Associationd 2.41 4.15 0.35 –0.64 0.27 0.03

Eastern Europe and former Soviet

Union –0.25 –0.42 –0.05 –0.75 –0.31 –0.04

Rest of world e e e 0.52 2.49 0.98

Total $58.3 $92.9 0.41% $4.6 $39.6 0.17%

(Table notes on next page)

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

Legend

UR = Uruguay Round

Note: Income effects were estimated relative to 1992 baseline conditions.

aThe Multi-Regional Trade (MRT) model by G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr and the

Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (FMN) model by J. Francois, B. McDonald, and

H. Nordstrom.

bFull reforms simulated agricultural sector reforms plus reforms in nonagricultural sectors and the

phasing out of the multifiber arrangement.

cIn FMN, the Near East region is covered under Africa.

dMembers include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Austria, Finland, and Sweden

left the association in January 1995.

eNot applicable.

Source: Ramesh Sharma, Panos Konandreas, and Jim Greenfield, “An Overview of Assessments

of the Impact of the Uruguay Round on Agricultural Prices and Incomes,” Food Policy, vol. 21, 

No. 4/5 (1996).

Implementing the

Uruguay Round

According to some observers, the most important thing that developed

countries can do to help food-insecure countries is to open their own

markets to developing country exports. Market access is important not

only in primary commodities but also in clothing, textiles, footwear,

processed foods, and other products into which developing countries may

diversify as development progresses.8

 Yet, according to the International

Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank, the way

developed countries are implementing the URAs is adversely affecting the

ability of developing countries to improve their food security and may

jeopardize their support for further trade liberalization. U.S. government

officials state, however, that because of the URAs, most of the relatively

few remaining barriers are being progressively eliminated. A State

Department official further noted that the United States and the European

Union have a number of preferential arrangements that favor developing

countries and allow most agricultural imports.

One study, by IFPRI, concluded that a large number of developing countries

have liberalized foreign trade in food and agricultural commodities in

response to structural adjustment programs and the recent URAs, but OECD

countries have not matched their actions. While specific quantities of

certain commodities from developing countries still receive preferential

treatment, OECD countries have been reluctant to open their domestic

markets to developing countries’ exports of high-value commodities such

8

Tweeten, “Food Security.”

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

as beef, sugar, and dairy products. In IFPRI’s view, this reduces benefits to

developing countries and may make continued market liberalization

unviable for them. IFPRI recommended that the next round of World Trade

Organization (WTO) negotiations emphasize the opening of OECD domestic

markets to commodities from developing countries.

According to a World Bank report, without an open trading environment

and access to OECD country markets, developing countries cannot fully

benefit from the goods they produce that give them a comparative

advantage. Without improved demand for developing countries’

agricultural products, the agricultural growth needed to generate

employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not occur. Under the

Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture, countries generally agreed

to eliminate import restrictions, including quotas. However, according to

the World Bank, the elimination of agricultural import restrictions through

tariffication resulted in tariff levels that in many cases were set much

higher than previously existing tariff levels. If developing countries are to

adopt an open-economy agricultural and food policy, they must be assured

of stable, long-term access to international markets—including those of

the OECD, the Bank said. Yet during 1995-96, when international grain

prices were soaring, the European Union restricted cereal exports from

member countries (by imposing a tax on exports) to protect their

domestic customers. An export tax was also applied during a few weeks in

1997.

Trade Liberalization,

Food Aid, and the

Marrakesh Decision

The 1994 URAs included a ministerial decision reached by trade ministers

in Marrakesh, Morocco, that recognized that implementation of the UR

agricultural trade reforms might adversely affect the least-developed and

net food-importing countries. The concern was that as a result of the

reforms, these countries might not have available to them adequate

supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms

and conditions and might face short-term difficulties in financing normal

levels of commercial imports. To obviate this situation, the decision

included, among others, agreements to

• review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on

Food Aid under the Food Aid Convention of 1986 and to initiate

negotiations in an “appropriate forum” to establish food aid commitments

sufficient to meet the legitimate food aid needs of the developing countries

during the reform program;

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

• adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic

foodstuffs is provided to least-developed countries and net food-importing

countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in

line with the 1986 Food Aid Convention; and

• have the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture monitor, as appropriate,

follow-up actions.

The decision specifically targeted developing countries whose food aid

needs may be adversely affected as a result of the UR agricultural trade

reforms.9

 It did not establish or propose criteria for assessing whether

trade reforms had adversely affected the availability of and terms and

conditions for accessing basic foodstuffs. (Methodologically, it could be

difficult to separate the effects of the URAs’ reforms from other factors

affecting the ability to access food from external sources.) Nor did the

decision establish what criteria would be used in determining the

“legitimate needs” of different developing countries. For example, would

“legitimate needs” be based on a country’s current overall food aid needs,

the amount of food aid it received prior to completion of the URAs, the

amount of food aid adversely affected by the agreements, or something

else? In addition, the decision did not establish any timetable for resolving

these issues. Finally, the decision did not clearly identify what would be

the appropriate forum for establishing a level of sufficient food aid

commitments.

In March 1996, the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture established a list of

eligible countries covered by the decision with an understanding that

being listed did not confer automatic benefits.10 During country

negotiations over the content of the proposed World Food Summit action

plan in the fall of 1996, there was considerable debate about the

ministerial decision. Developing countries attributed recent high world

grain prices to UR agricultural reforms and wanted the plan to commit

countries to prompt and full implementation of the decision. U.S.

negotiators disagreed. They recognized that the high market prices for

grain had adversely affected the least-developed and net food-importing

countries but said that the reforms were just beginning to be implemented

and it was thus too early for the reforms to have had any measurable

adverse effects.

9

Appendix V provides additional information on food aid apart from the issue of trade reforms.

10The list included the least-developed countries as recognized by the U.N. Economic and Social

Council, as well as 15 developing country WTO members that asked to be listed and submitted relevant

statistical data regarding their status as net-importers of basic foodstuffs. The committee reviews the

list annually .

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

The summit plan that was finally approved by all countries, in

November 1996, states that the ministerial decision should be fully

implemented. To date, however, decisions still have not been made about

criteria that should be used for judging and quantifying the legitimate food

aid needs of developing countries. In addition, no decisions have been

made about an appropriate forum or criteria for assessing whether the

Uruguay Round trade reforms have adversely affected the availability of

and terms and conditions for accessing basic foodstuffs. Consequently, no

findings have been made as to whether adverse impacts have already

occurred.

In December 1996, the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore agreed that

the London-based Food Aid Committee, in renegotiating the Food Aid

Convention (scheduled to expire in June 1998), should develop

recommendations for establishing a level of food aid commitments,

covering as wide a range of donors and donatable foodstuffs as possible,

sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during

implementation of the Uruguay Round reform program.11 In January 1997,

Food Aid Committee members indicated they would do so, with an

understanding that the committee would direct its recommendations to

the WTO and reflect its recommendations in the provisions of a new food

aid convention. Agreement on a new convention has not yet been reached.

The existing agreement was re-extended and is scheduled to expire in

June 1999. According to a U.S. official, if ongoing efforts to negotiate a

new agreement are successful, the document should go some distance in

assuring food-deficit, low-income countries that the Uruguay Round trade

liberalization will not drastically reduce food aid. According to the official,

the United States, Australia, Canada, and Japan are pressing hard for

conclusion of the negotiations . In January 1998, the FAO Secretariat

advised the WTO Committee on Agriculture that there was little it could do

in its analyses to isolate the effect of the Uruguay Round from other

factors influencing commodity prices.

Trade, Price Volatility,

and Global Grain

Reserves

As countries rely more on trade to meet their food needs, they become

more vulnerable to possible volatility in world food prices. Price volatility

of basic food commodities, especially grains, can be a significant problem

for food-insecure countries. Many poor people spend more than half their

11Members also agreed to encourage relevant institutions to consider establishing or enhancing

facilities for developing countries experiencing URA-related difficulties in financing normal

commercial imports. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund reported that they were in

a position to meet requests with existing facilities. The Fund reported that in 1997, one purchase was

made through its Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

income on food.12 FAO and others have suggested that sufficient grain

stocks be held to help contain excessive price increases during times of

acute food shortages and thus provide support to the most vulnerable

countries. However, views differ over the level of global reserves needed

to safeguard world food security, the future outlook for price volatility,

and the desirability of governments’ holding grain reserves.

In response to the world grain crisis of the early 1970s, the 1974 World

Food Conference endorsed several principles regarding grain

stock-holding policies: (1) governments should adopt policies that take

into account the policies of other countries and would result in

maintaining a minimum safe level of basic grain stocks for the world as a

whole; (2) governments should take actions to ensure that grain stocks are

replenished as soon as feasible when they drop below minimum levels to

meet food shortages; and (3) in periods of acute food shortages, nations

holding stocks exceeding minimum safe levels to meet domestic needs and

emergencies should make such supplies available for export at reasonable

prices. Subsequently, the Intergovernmental Group on Grains established

a stocks-to-consumption ratio of 17 to 18 percent as an indicator of a

minimum safe global food security situation.

As table IV.2 shows, the world grain stocks-to-use ratio reached and

exceeded the minimum level in 1976-77 and remained at or above that

level for the next 18 years. In the year before the November 1996 World

Food Summit, the ratio fell to 14 percent, the lowest level in the previous

25 years. During 1995-96, world grain prices rose significantly. The price of

wheat increased from $151 per ton in April 1995 and reached a peak of

$258 in May 1996, a rise of 71 percent. Corn prices rose continuously from

$113 in May 1995 to a record $204 in May 1996, an increase of 81 percent.

The world price increases were accompanied by high grain prices in many

developing countries. In some cases, the latter prices exceeded the world

price increases because of simultaneous depreciation of developing

countries’ currencies. According to the World Bank, the price increases

were a result of a poor U.S. grain harvest in 1995, combined with unusually

low world grain stockpiles. Another factor was China’s entry into world

grain markets, with a purchase of 5 million tons in 1995 (after exporting

nearly 11 million tons of grain in 1993-94).

12According to Tweeten, poor people typically spend 60 to 80 percent of their income on food.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

Table IV.2: World Carryover Cereal

Stocks, 1971-72 to 1998-99 Tons in millions

Year

Private

carryover

stocks

Government

carryover

stocks Total

Government

carryover

stocks as

percent of total

stocks

Total carryover

stocks as a

percent of

world grain

consumption

1971-72 a a 217 a 18.1

1972-73 a a 175 a 14.2

1973-74 a a 189 a 15.4

1974-75 a a 176 a 14.4

1975-76 a a 194 a 15.1

1976-77 a a 256 a 19.1

1977-78 a a 251 a 17.7

1978-79 a a 287 a 20.0

1979-80 115 161 276 58 18.9

1980-81 117 137 254 54 17.4

1981-82 122 179 301 59 19.9

1982-83 91 255 346 74 22.3

1983-84 101 186 286 65 17.9

1984-85 118 221 338 65 21.2

1985-86 194 232 426 54 25.8

1986-87 160 296 457 65 27.4

1987-88 162 240 401 60 24.3

1988-89 117 194 311 63 18.3

1989-90 127 181 308 59 17.9

1990-91 155 196 351 56 20.3

1991-92 145 191 336 57 19.3

1992-93 179 201 380 53 21.8

1993-94 143 195 338 58 19.3

1994-95 148 166 314 53 17.8

1995-96 a a 261 a 14.0

1996-97 a a 297 a 15.4

1997-98 a a 322b a 16.9b

1998-99 a a 328c a 17.2c

(Table notes on next page)

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

Note: Stocks include wheat, rice, and coarse grains. Data are based on an aggregate of

carryover levels at the end of national crop years.

aNot available.

bEstimate by FAO in June 1998. In April 1998, FAO estimated total stocks at 302 million tons and

the stocks-to-use ratio at 15.9 percent.

cForecast by FAO in June 1998.

Source: FAO.

Although the high grain prices of 1996 have abated, estimates of the

stocks-to-use ratio remained at a low level through early 1998. As recently

as April 1998, FAO estimated the ratio would be 15.9 percent for 1997-98.

However, FAO revised its figures in June 1998, estimating that the ratio

might reach 16.9 percent for 1997-98 and cross the 17-percent threshold in

1998-99. These revisions reflected the expectation of a record grain crop in

1998 and lower feed demand in China, the United States, and some

countries affected by the Asian financial crisis.

Summit’s Action on

Reserves

World Food Summit participants said that reserves was one factor, in

combination with a number of others, that could be used to strengthen

food security. According to the summit action plan, it is up to national

governments, in partnership with all actors of civil society, to pursue at

local and national levels, as appropriate, adequate and cost-effective

emergency food security reserve policies and programs. Summit countries

agreed that governments should monitor the availability and nutritional

adequacy of their food supplies and reserve stocks, particularly areas at

high risk of food insecurity, nutritionally vulnerable groups, and areas

where seasonal variations have important nutritional implications. In

addition, international organizations and particularly FAO were asked to

continue to monitor closely and inform member nations of developments

in world food prices and stocks. The summit did not identify a minimum

level of global grain reserves needed to ensure food security nor

recommend any action by countries individually or in concert to achieve

or maintain such a level.

Views About Future

Stock Levels and

Price Volatility

In 1996, FAO invited a group of experts to Rome to consider a number of

developments that directly or indirectly influence price stability. These

included, among others, production variability, the URAs, and the role of

cereal stocks. The group agreed that there was little evidence to reach

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

conclusions on whether production variability at the global level would

increase or decrease in the future. Price instability caused by shifts in

production between countries that may occur because of the URAs was

expected to be slight. The group concurred that ongoing market

liberalization initiatives, including those under the URAs, regional trading

arrangements, and other unilateral initiatives, should as a whole

contribute to stability in international markets by inducing greater

adjustments to demand/supply shocks in domestic markets. However,

changes under the URAs were not considered to be drastic enough for

instability to decrease significantly, as many countries, especially some

larger trading countries, still retained instruments and institutions (such as

policies similar to variable levies and state trading) that had impeded price

transmission in the past.

The group agreed that a lack of transparency and consistency in

government stock-holding and trade policies had been a source of

instability in the past and that less involvement of governments in stock

management and a more transparent trade policy should contribute to

stability in the future. At the same time, there was considerable doubt

whether private stocks would increase to the extent required to offset the

shocks that previously were countered by the public sector stocks.13 The

group concluded that increased funds in international commodity markets

were expected to influence only within-year price volatility and were

unlikely to affect annual price levels in the longer run. In addition, there

were uncertainties regarding how fast China and countries of the former

Soviet Union would be fully integrated into the world agricultural trading

system.

Overall, the experts agreed that compared to the situation in the past,

future world commodity markets would likely retain lower levels of

overall stocks but should be less prone to instability due to faster and

more broad-based adjustments to production/demand shocks. However,

the path to a new market environment was seen as uncertain. The group

generally believed that price instability would be greater during the

transitional period than after the system had fully adjusted.

According to an FAO study prepared for the summit, global stocks are

likely to remain relatively low compared with the previous decade, and the

13An FAO simulation of the impact of a 5-percent production shortfall of grains in 1999 indicated the

URAs would have almost no effect in stabilizing grain market prices in the year 2000. One reason is

that global stocks were not expected to be large in the year 2000, at just around 17 percent of

consumption, compared with what was often over 20 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

chance of price spikes occurring is probably greater than in the past.14

According to a World Bank study, grain stocks are not likely to return to

the high levels of the 1980s, given the current focus on reducing

government involvement in agriculture, and with smaller grain stocks,

prices could be more volatile than in the past.15 According to IFPRI, policy

changes in North America and Europe could result in a permanent

lowering of grain stocks and thus increase future price fluctuations

because of a lack of stocks to buffer price variations. IFPRI noted that the

moderating or cushioning impact on world price instability that once was

exercised by varying world grain stocks has been reduced by the

substantial decline in grain stocks in recent years. As a result, IFPRI said,

international price instability, if fully transmitted to domestic markets,

especially to low-income, food-deficit countries, may raise domestic price

instability in these countries.16

Views on Actions to

Increase Stocks and

Hold Emergency

Reserves

Views differ over whether governments should take action to hold and/or

increase grain reserves. Among the views expressed against increasing or

maintaining large government-held reserves are the following:

• Reserves are expensive to accumulate, store, manage, and release.17 An

annual cost of 25 percent to 40 percent of the value of the reserves is not

unusual. Developing countries cannot afford such costs; it is cheaper for

them to deal with periodic price increases. They should hold only enough

stocks to tide them over until replacement supplies can be obtained from

international markets.

• It is much cheaper for most countries to rely on trade, using financial

reserves or international loans to make up shortfalls.

• If reserves are to be held, it is more efficient and cheaper to hold reserves

in money than in physical stock.

• Governments, including the U.S. government, have not been good at

managing stocks.

14Technical Background Documents 12-15.

15Rural Development: From Vision to Action.

16In a more recent study, IFPRI noted that it is not certain that surplus stocks will continue at a low

level. It noted a European Commission study that projected a gradual rebuilding of large European

Union grain stocks between 2001 and 2006. The projected increases could be even greater if the

European Union is enlarged to include East European countries and these countries are permitted to

obtain the benefits of existing common agricultural policies. See The World Food Situation.

17According to the June 1996 experts’ group that advised FAO, the previous use of stocks as an

instrument for price stability often suffered from several problems, including poor management

practices and lack of clear-cut operational rules. However, in cases where such stocks were managed

correctly, they played an important role in stabilizing domestic markets. The group considered that

maintaining moderate levels of food stocks at the national level, with clear food security objectives for

their use, was a desirable option for countries to pursue and consistent with the URA.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

• Stocks are not the only measures available for coping with price volatility.

• As a result of market and trade liberalization measures, markets can

respond more quickly to shocks, which will lead to much briefer price

cycles than those in the past. Free trade permits stocks to be shifted,

thereby reducing the need to maintain large amounts of domestic stocks.

• World food supplies have been adequate since the Second World War.

Good and bad weather conditions for growing crops tend to balance out

across countries. In addition, some crops and food products can be

substituted for others, depending on the weather.

• The problem is not one of supply but of buying power, including when

prices rise to high levels. Other measures are needed, such as policy

reforms, that increase economic development and enable people to buy

the food they need.

Among views advanced for governments’ taking action to increase and

maintain emergency reserve levels (some of the views pertain specifically

to the United States; others apply to countries more generally) are the

following:

• It is good government policy to store grain during prosperous years in

order to survive lean years.

• Private companies will not hold many reserve stocks, since it is expensive

to do so and governments may limit price increases in times of short

supply, thus affecting companies’ ability to recoup the added cost of

holding emergency reserves.

• Even if governments do not excel at managing reserves, the social costs of

their not doing so may be greater.

• The use of emergency food reserves to respond quickly to periodic food

shortages in developing countries is the most unobtrusive way for

governments to intervene in the market.

• Responsible trade requires that wealthier countries establish and maintain

essential grain reserves as a supply safety net (available to other countries

when the need arises) and thus to encourage and compensate poorer

countries for relying on increased trade liberalization.

• If a tight U.S. grains supply situation occurs and export customers

perceive that a unilateral U.S. export embargo is plausible, they will

intensify their food self-sufficiency goals and seek grain commitments

from other exporters.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

Possible Alternatives

to Reserves for

Coping With Price

Volatility

A 1996 FAO study18 identified several possible alternatives for mitigating

price volatility problems, including national and international measures.

However, it is not clear to what extent developing countries, particularly

low-income, food-deficit countries, are capable of establishing such

measures or the costs and benefits of such measures relative to one

another and to grain reserves.

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture limits the use of quotas and

variable levies, two measures traditionally employed to deal with price

instability. According to the FAO study, a country may adopt a sliding scale

of tariffs related inversely to the level of import prices and keep the

maximum rate of duty at a level no higher than its agreed rate of duty in

the WTO. If the agreed rate of tariffs is fairly high, which is commonly the

case, developing countries may offset variations in import prices by

reducing tariffs when prices rise and raising them when prices fall. In

addition, at times of sharply rising world prices or sharply rising demand

from a neighboring country, it may be possible for a country to limit

exports, provided it has taken other countries’ food security into account.

(See URA on Agriculture, Article 12.)

Commodity exchanges, futures contracts, and options could be used to

reduce uncertainty associated with price and income instability. However,

not all countries could make use of existing exchanges because of lack of

knowledge, lack of economies of scale, and/or higher transaction costs. To

ease such constraints, the experts suggested establishing

nongovernmental institutions to allow a large number of small entities to

pool their risks.

Countries with sufficient food reserves or cash to purchase food could

seek to mitigate the effect of price spikes by providing food aid to meet the

unmet food needs of urban and rural poor. Food aid from international

donors could be used to help mitigate the consequences of high increases

in the price of imported food. However, with reduced surpluses and

budgetary constraints in donor countries, it is not clear how much

additional aid would be available when needed.

The International Monetary Fund’s Compensatory and Contingency

Financing Facility can be used by members to obtain credit if they are

experiencing balance of payment difficulties arising from shortfalls in

export receipts (that is, foreign exchange) or increases in the costs of

grain imports—provided these are temporary and largely attributable to

18Report of a Meeting of Experts on Agricultural Price Instability (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV 

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves

conditions outside the control of the countries. However, partly because

of the conditions and interest costs associated with drawings from the

facility and the availability of alternative facilities that are more favorable,

countries have not used the facility very frequently over the past 15 years.

(The International Monetary Fund believes that price spikes have not been

sufficiently frequent since the facility’s inception to warrant its use.) The

European Union also has a financing mechanism for certain countries, but

the financing is limited to covering shortfalls in export earnings (high food

import bills are not covered), and the mechanism lacks the funding and

concessional terms (below-market interest rates) necessary for wider use

by poorer countries.

Finally, according to the FAO report, an international insurance scheme

could be devised for financing food imports by low-income, food-deficit

countries during periods of price instability. Beneficiary countries could

finance the system with premium payments. Ideally, such a scheme would

operate without conditions. However, according to the FAO study, in

practice only a few countries could afford to pay the premiums by

themselves. Thus, for countries requiring assistance from developed

countries, setting conditions for the use of withdrawals from the insurance

facility might be necessary.

Following the large increase in grains prices during 1995-96, FAO surveyed

the governments of 47 developing countries to determine whether their

domestic retail and wholesale prices of grains rose and, if so, how they

responded. FAO found that domestic market prices increased considerably

in most countries but usually not as much as the world price. (In some

countries, prices did not increase or they even fell because of favorable

domestic harvests.) Many countries mitigated the price effects by

annulling or reducing import duties. Some countries mitigated price

effects by further subsidizing already regulated prices of grain products.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

At the World Food Summit, countries said they would try to prevent and

be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies that create

food insecurity and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements

in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development, and a

capacity to satisfy future needs. The summit’s action plan said that food

assistance can also be provided to help ease the plight of the long-term

undernourished, but concluded that food aid is not a long-term solution to

the underlying causes of food insecurity.1

 The plan called upon countries’

governments to implement cost-effective public works programs for the

unemployed and underemployed in regions of food insecurity and to

develop within their available resources well-targeted social welfare and

nutrition safety net programs to meet the needs of their food insecure. The

summit did not recommend an increase in development assistance for the

specific purpose of helping countries to establish or improve such

programs. However, donor countries generally agreed to strengthen their

individual efforts toward providing official development assistance

equivalent to 0.7 percent of gross national product each year.2

Trends in Food Aid Over the past several decades, food aid has helped meet some of the

emergency and nonemergency food needs of many food-insecure

countries. In recent years, food aid has declined significantly. As table V.1

shows, world grain aid shipments increased from 6.8 million tons in

1975-76 to a peak of 15.2 million tons in 1992-93. Shipments in 1997 were

5.9 million tons, about 40 percent of the peak value and about 60 percent

of the former World Food Conference target. FAO estimates that shipments

in 1997-98 were at about the same level as in 1996-97 (that is, at about

5.3 million tons). According to FAO, grain shipments in 1996-97 were at the

lowest level since the start of food aid programs in the 1950s. Table V.1

also shows a substantial decline in the proportion of food aid provided for

program purposes and a steady increase in the proportion of food aid

1

The summit’s position on food aid differed significantly from that adopted by the 1974 World Food

Conference. That conference established a target for donor countries to provide at least 10 million

tons of food aid annually to developing countries in the form of grain (or the cash equivalent) suitable

for human consumption. Under the Food Aid Convention of 1986, signatory nations agreed to

contribute a minimum amount of grains each year toward achieving the World Food Conference

target. Members said that they would provide, in aggregate, at least 7.5 million tons of grains aid

annually—the highest minimum amount ever approved by the convention. Periodically, members meet

to review their commitments and decide whether to extend the agreement. In 1995, the convention’s

commitment was substantially reduced, to 5.4 million tons. The convention is scheduled for renewal in

June 1999.

2

The United States, in an interpretative statement for the record, noted that it has not agreed to an

ODA target.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

allocated for emergency purposes.3 In absolute terms, in 1997 project food

aid equaled about 54 percent of its peak level (1986-87), emergency food

aid was about 55 percent of its peak level (1992), and program aid was

about 17 percent of its peak level (1993). Program and project aid

combined peaked in 1993 at 11.3 million tons. The combined total for 1997

was 3.5 million tons or 31 percent of the peak-year total.

3

Program and project food aid are nonemergency aid, are generally provided to achieve a

developmental purpose, and could be considered a substitute for financial aid. Program food aid does

not target specific beneficiary groups. It is mainly provided on a bilateral basis to support recipient

governments’ budgets (for stabilization, adjustment, and economic reform) or reduce balance of

payments deficits. Project food aid is provided to selected beneficiary groups to support specific

development objectives. Emergency food aid is targeted to victims of natural or man-made disasters.

Emergency and project food aid are always provided to recipient countries on a grant basis, while

program food aid is also provided under concessional terms.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

Table V.1: World Grains Food Aid

Shipments and Their Use, 1976-97

Nonemergency

Type of aid (percent)

Yeara

All donors

(million tons) Program Project Emergency

1975-76 6.8 71 19 10

1976-77 9.0 77 17 6

1977-78 9.2 71 19 10

1978-79 9.5 72 18 10

1979-80 8.9 70 20 10

1980-81 8.9 60 26 14

1981-82 9.1 52 27 21

1982-83 9.2 62 26 12

1983-84 9.8 57 28 15

1984-85 12.5 53 21 25

1985-86 10.9 46 24 30

1986-87 12.6 55 29 17

1987-88 13.5 54 27 19

1988-89 10.2 54 25 21

1989-90 11.3 58 21 20

1990-91 12.4 56 21 23

1991-92 13.1 52 19 29

1992-93 15.2 57 15 28

1993 15.1 60 15 25

1994 10.7 44 22 34

1995 8.4 42 24 34

1996 6.2 41 24 35

1997b 5.9 25 34 41

aThe first series of data reported is for overlapping years; the second series is calendar year data.

bProvisional.

Sources: Our analysis of World Food Program data.

According to a recent FAO forecast,4 cereal food aid shipments are

expected to increase substantially in 1998-99, after 4 years of decline, and

reach 9 million tons. FAO attributed the increase to a greater availability of

grain supplies in donor countries and higher food aid needs, particularly in

Asia. According to FAO, food aid availabilities have been growing in recent

months, triggered by relatively low international grain prices and

accumulating grain stocks, mostly in the European Union and the United

4

FAO, “Food Aid,” Food Outlook (November 1998).

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

States. (The United States announced in July 1998 that it would increase

its wheat donations by up to 2.5 million tons, most of which has been

allocated.) On the demand side, financial and economic turmoil has

affected the economies of many food import-dependent countries, raising

the need for food aid. Although grain prices have declined, countries

experiencing severe food emergencies will not necessarily be able to

increase commercial cereal imports, FAO said. And, the slower growth of

the world economy, combined with falling cash crop prices and export

earnings, could force some developing countries to sharply cut back on

their imports of essential foods.

Table V.2 shows how food aid trends have affected the low-income,

food-deficit countries (for total food aid, not just grains). Food aid

received in 1995-96 was at the lowest level since 1975-76 and represented

about 50-55 percent of previous peak-year deliveries. During the 1990s,

food aid provided to low-income, food-deficit countries has averaged

about 78 percent of food aid deliveries to all developing countries; by way

of comparison, between 1983-84 and 1986-87, low-income, food-deficit

countries averaged more than 92 percent of deliveries. In 1995-96, the

proportion of these countries’ food imports covered by food aid fell to

8 percent, the lowest level in more than 20 years.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

Table V.2: Share of Food Aid Reaching

Low-Income, Food-Deficit Countries,

1976-96

Year

Food aid to

low-income,

food-deficit countries

(million tons)

Food aid as percent

of global food aid

Food aid as percent

of low-income,

food-deficit

countries’ food

imports

1975-76 5.3 78 20

1976-77 7.1 79 27

1977-78 7.1 77 23

1978-79 7.7 81 19

1979-80 7.6 85 18

1980-81 7.3 82 15

1981-82 7.7 85 15

1982-83 8.2 89 15

1983-84 9.3 95 18

1984-85 11.5 92 23

1985-86 10.2 94 22

1986-87 11.4 90 24

1987-88 12.0 89 21

1988-89 8.7 85 15

1989-90 8.2 73 14

1990-91 9.7 78 18

1991-92 11.0 84 15

1992-93 11.1 73 16

1993-94 8.2 65 12

1994-95a 7.4 88 10

1995-96a 6.0 79 8

aEstimate.

Source: Our analysis of World Food Program data.

Costs to Feed the

Long-Term

Undernourished

In 1996, FAO estimated that it would take an additional 30 million tons of

grain and over 20 million tons (grain equivalent) of other foods simply to

bring 800 million chronically undernourished people up to “minimum

nutritional standards” (assuming perfect targeting of food assistance and

local absorptive capacity).5 FAO estimated the value of the additional

required food at about $13 per person per year (in 1994 dollars), or about

$10.4 billion. According to FAO, the world produces enough food to meet

5

According to Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report, a trebling of food aid from the 1993

level of 15 million tons could, if distribution problems were solvable, enable 700 million-800 million

chronically undernourished people to reach minimum dietary standards.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

the needs of all people,6 but hundreds of millions remain chronically

undernourished because they are too poor to afford all the food they need.

In addition, others are undernourished because they are otherwise unable

to provide for themselves (for example, because of humanitarian crises),

because not enough food assistance has been provided, or because the

assistance has not been sufficiently effective.

The provision of food aid costing $10.4 billion would require a large

commitment compared to recent expenditures on foreign assistance more

generally. For example, during 1996 and 1997, net disbursements of ODA by

the Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD averaged

about $55 billion (1996 prices and exchange rates).

Effectiveness of Food

Aid for Nonemergency

Purposes

Several studies have questioned whether food aid is an efficient means of

satisfying nonemergency, chronic food shortage needs. A joint 1991 study

by the World Bank and the World Food Program on food aid for Africa7

reported that food aid may in some cases be a second-best solution and

there are problems in its implementation. The study concluded, however,

that it is unlikely that an equal amount of financial aid would be available

if the food aid is not provided. The study included a number of specific

recommendations for improving the effectiveness of food aid and

concluded that food aid contributes substantially to growth, long-term

food security, and the reduction of poverty and that its use should

continue.

A 1993 evaluation of the World Food Program found that while emergency

food aid was quite effective, food aid for development had a number of

weaknesses.8

 There was little evidence that country strategies seriously

addressed the use of food aid to support national priorities. At the project

level, many weaknesses were found: the targeting of food aid on the

poorest areas and the poorest people was often unsatisfactory, the

technical content of projects often left much to be desired, and the

phasing out of projects was often not planned. The study made several

recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the food

aid development program.

6

FAO estimated world cereals production in 1996 at 1,873 million tons (including rice in milled terms).

The 30-million tons of grain needed for 800 million chronically undernourished people represented less

than 2 percent of the grains production.

7

Food Aid in Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s (Washington, D.C. and Rome, Italy: The World Bank and

the World Food Program, Aug. 1991).

8

Evaluation of the World Food Program.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

In addition, a 1996 study prepared for European Union member states

evaluated food aid commodities that were provided directly to a recipient

government or its agent for sale on local markets.9

 Such aid was intended

to provide some combination of balance of payments support (by

replacing commercial imports) and budgetary support (through

governments’ use of counterpart funds generated from the sale of the

commodities). This study noted the following:

• The impacts of the food aid on food security were marginally positive, but

transaction costs were very high, suggesting the need for radical changes

to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

• Minor, short-term negative impacts on local food production were

common. Food aid was still being used, though to a decreasing extent, to

support subsidized food sales, which in some countries favored

food-insecure and poor households and, in others, urban middle-class and

public sector groups. The little available evidence suggested that the food

aid had modest positive impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable

groups.

• The European Commission and the member states should consider

(1) either phasing out such assistance, especially in the case of donors

with smaller programs or (2) making radical changes in policies and

procedures to increase effectiveness and reduce transaction costs to

acceptable levels.

A group of experts meeting at FAO in June 1996 opposed food aid as a

regular instrument to deal with market instability because of its market

displacement and disincentive effects. A 1997 report prepared for the

Australian government recommended that Australia considerably reduce

its food aid commitment to the Food Aid Convention and in the future use

food aid primarily for emergency relief. 10

In October 1998, USAID reported on the results of a 2-year study that it

conducted to assess the role of U.S. food aid in contributing to sustainable

development during the past 40 years. It examined 6 case studies.11 The

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) concluded that U.S.

9

Edward Clay, Sanjay Dhiri, and Charlotte Benson, Joint Evaluation of European Union Program Food

Aid: Synthesis Report (London: Overseas Development Institute, Oct. 1996).

10Report of the Committee of Review, The Australian Overseas Aid Program (1997).

11The case studies included five countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia)

and the Sahel region of Africa. (The Sahel consists of 9 countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the

Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.) The examination included field work in

the 5 countries and a desk study of the 9 countries in the Sahel. See: Donald G. McClelland, U.S. Food

Aid and Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Oct. 1998).

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

food aid had at times been successfully used to leverage or support a

sound economic policy environment and thus promote sustainable

development. At other times, however, U.S. food aid had hampered

sustainable development by permitting governments to postpone needed

economic policy adjustments and, at still other times, had no discernible

effect on a country’s economic policy environment. USAID found that

providing large quantities of food aid for sale on the open market at the

wrong time has at times been a disincentive to domestic food production.

However, targeting food aid to those who lack purchasing power and are

unable to buy food has at other times increased food consumption and

incomes without adversely affecting domestic food production. In

addition, USAID concluded that it is normally more efficient to transfer

resources as financial aid rather than as food aid, but in practice this is a

moot point because generally the choice is between U.S. food aid or no

aid.12

Provision of

Emergency Food Aid

Since the Summit

According to the World Food Program, which distributes about 70 percent

of global emergency food aid,13 some of its emergency relief projects tend

to be underfunded or not funded at all because donors direct their

contributions to the program’s emergency appeals on a case-by-case basis.

In addition, the program has problems in ensuring a regular supply of food

to its operations more generally because of lengthy delays between its

appeals and donor contributions and donors’ practice of attaching specific

restrictions to their contributions.

In 1997, about 6 percent of the program’s declared emergency needs were

unmet and 7 percent of its protracted relief operations needs were not

satisfied. Table V.3 shows the program’s resource shortfall for emergency

food aid, including emergency operations and protracted relief

operations,14 for 1998. As the table shows, 33 operations were

underfunded and 18 percent of total 1998 needs were not covered.

12For additional results, see U.S. Food Aid and Sustainable Development.

13The program distributes more than 95 percent of global multilateral food aid and about 40 percent of

all food aid.

14An emergency operation provides emergency food aid for victims of sudden disasters or abnormal

droughts and initial assistance for the first 12 months to refugees and displaced persons. Protracted

relief operations provide food aid to refugees and displaced persons beyond an initial 12-month period

when, for reasons beyond the control of the host government, it has not been possible to achieve any

form of durable solution to enable the people to achieve self-sufficiency in their locations of temporary

residence.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

Table V.3: 1998 World Food Program Emergency and Protracted Relief Assistance

Net 1998 needsa

Recipient Project title

Number of

people to be

assisted Metric tons

Dollars

(millions)

Resource

shortfall

(percentb

Asia and Commonwealth of Independent States

Afghanistan Afghan relief rehabilitation 1,140,000 17,497 $8.0 0

Albania Assistance to destitute victims 24,000 1,000 0.4 100

Albania Assistance to victims of Kosovo crisis 42,000 1,991 0.7 0

Armenia Vulnerable groups, refugees, others 220,000 17,643 9.1 47

Azerbiajan Internally displaced persons 215,000 7,227 3.7 16

Bangladesh Assistance to Myanmar refugees 21,000 4,415 1.9 0

Bangladesh Assistance to flood victims 19,121,500 333,313 84.2 36

Cambodia Rehabilitation program 1,710,000 28,000 15.8 0

China Assistance to flood victims 5,786,900 239,721 65.7 25

Former Yugoslavia Refugees, returnees, internally

displaced persons, war victims 650,000 82,371 46.0 49

Georgia Displaced persons and vulnerable

groups 200,000 7,541 3.3 18

Indonesia Displaced persons and vulnerable

groups 4,600,000 354,000 138.4 9

Iran Food assistance for Afghan refugees 88,000 13,790 4.4 0

Korea, Democratic

Peoples Republic

Vulnerable groups

6,700,000 602,000 346.0 0

Kosovo Crisis Food assistance to refugees,

returnees, internally displaced persons 420,000 37,800 19.4 34

Laos Flood victims 210,000 12,999 6.4 23

Nepal Bhutanese refugees 93,500 18,859 7.7 0

Nepal Victims of crop losses 10,500 685 0.1 0

Pakistan Afghan refugees 28,000 4,119 1.9 100

Sri Lanka Displaced persons 50,000 8,667 3.2 1

Tajikistan Vulnerable groups 500,000 24,761 8.8 36

Thailand Assistance to Cambodian refugees 90,000 12,349 1.6 10

Vietnam Assistance to drought victims 35,000 420 0.2 0

Subtotal 41,955,400 1,831,168 776.9 16

Latin America and Caribbean

Central America Victims of Hurricane Mitch 1,125,000 60,000 30.1 60

Cuba Drought victims 615,195 19,853 40.6 70

Dominican Republic Hurricane Georges 225,000 3,662 2.1 0

Ecuador Victims of “El Niño” 112,060 0 0 0

Guatemala Victims of Hurricane Mitch 40,000 283 0.2 0

(continued)

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

Net 1998 needsa

Recipient Project title

Number of

people to be

assisted Metric tons

Dollars

(millions)

Resource

shortfall

(percentb

Honduras Victims of Hurricane Mitch 101,000 450 0.2 0

Nicaragua Central America regional “El Niño” 323,000 18,764 9.0 14

Nicaragua Crop failure caused by drought (“El

Niño”) 65,500 399 0.2 0

Nicaragua Victims of Hurricane Mitch 63,000 401 0.2 0

St. Kitts-Nevis Hurricane Georges 3,000 35 0.2 0

Subtotal 2,672,755 103,847 82.8 51

Middle East and North Africa

Algeria Assistance to Western Sahara refugees 80,000 10,909 5.1 0

Yemen, Rep. of Food assistance for Somali refugees 10,000 2,339 1.2 1

Iraq Assistance to the destitute/vulnerable 943,000 61,896 35.0 91

Subtotal 1,033,000 75,144 41.3 75

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola Displaced & war affected 539,500 46,848 30.7 0

Cameroon Locust infestation 60,000 540 0.2 0

Cameroon Locust infestation and crop losses 210,000 5,518 1.5 31

Chad Sudanese refugees 12,500 845 0.8 0

Chad Crop failure 122,000 473 0.2 0

Democratic

Republic Congo

Flood victims in Kisingani

13,000 168 0.2 0

Democratic

Republic Congo

Angolan refugees

46,000 4,825 3.4 100

Djibouti Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti refugees 22,000 1,134 0.6 0

Ethiopia Somalia, Sudanese, Djibouti, Kenya

refugees 336,000 30,093 15.6 0

Ethiopia Assistance to returnees 96,000 15,804 6.4 0

Ethiopia Victims of Meher crop failure 800,000 60,000 23.7 0

Guinea Sierra Leone refugees 200,000 17,645 9.4 13

Guinea Bissau War victims 330,000 28,370 17.5 30

Guinea Bissau Assistance to displaced/conflict

affected 25,000 392 0.2 0

Kenya Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudanese refugees 178,000 41,700 26.9 0

Kenya Floods 587,400 31,823 18.5 48

Lesotho Feeding for schools affected by unrest 30,727 245 0.2 0

Liberia Internally displaced persons &

returning Sierra Leone refugees 1,717,000 62,312 41.5 0

Madagascar Mitigation of locust invasion 32,527 674 0.2 0

Malawi Targeted safety net 185,000 6,550 2.7 0

Mali Malian returnees/affected persons 112,500 10,025 7.8 0

(continued)

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix V 

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid

Net 1998 needsa

Recipient Project title

Number of

people to be

assisted Metric tons

Dollars

(millions)

Resource

shortfall

(percentb

Mauritania Assistance to drought-affected

populations 95,000 705 0.2 0

Mozambique Food Assistance to flood victims 70,000 4,297 1.5 8

Namibia Drought victims 25,000 926 0.6 100

Rwanda/Burundi Victims of conflict 1,399,817 104,927 64.5 15

Senegal Reg. Early drought response 1,500,000 6,072 3.3 100

Sierra Leone Internally displaced persons &

returning Sierra Leone refugees 97,840 46,019 33.6 0

Somalia Flood victims 657,500 9,847 13.0 0

Somalia Rehabilitation and reconstruction 829,340 16,885 13.0 19

Sudan Eritrean & Ethiopian refugees 138,000 30,000 13.7 0

Sudan War and drought victims 2,600,000 115,426 125.1 12

Sudan Floods 113,000 4,577 2.0 100

Tanzania Drought victims 1,400,000 5,253 1.9 0

Uganda Sudanese, Zaire, Rwanda refugees 165,000 52,000 29.3 0

Uganda Displaced.persons in North Uganda 347,000 28,622 17.4 40

Uganda Drought victims 126,000 4,077 1.6 0

Zambia Angola, Zaire refugees 25,200 1,302 2.2 0

Zambia Flood victims in Luapula Province 22,200 306 0.2 0

Zambia Drought victims 692,035 25,000 8.2 60

Subtotal 15,958,086 822,225 539.6 13

Total 61,619,241 2,832,384 $1,440.6 18%

Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding.

aFood needs for the entire year, as reported in January 1999, excluding carryover stocks from

1997.

bTons needed minus contributions as a percent of needs.

Source: World Food Program.

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VI 

Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity

The countries attending the World Food Summit acknowledged a clear

relationship between conflict and food insecurity and agreed that an

environment in which conflicts are prevented or resolved peacefully is

essential to improving food security. They also noted that conflicts can

cause or exacerbate food insecurity.

Table VI.1 presents the results of an analysis in which we examined the

relationship between four different types of conflict (genocide, civil war,

interstate war, and revolution) and the level of food security in 88

developing countries. In general, the table shows an association between

countries experiencing conflict and food inadequacy. For example,

countries with low levels of average daily calories per capita generally

experienced more involvement in conflict proportionately than did

countries with higher levels of average daily calories per capita. In terms

of types of conflict, for each of the 3 decades shown, all countries that

experienced genocide had an inadequate level of food security. For 2 out

of the 3 decades (that is, the 1960s and the 1980s), countries that

experienced civil war were more likely to have experienced food

inadequacy.1

 Similarly, for 2 out of the 3 decades (the 1960s and the

1970s), countries that experienced interstate war on their own territory

were more likely to have been food insecure. In the case of revolution, the

relationship is more in the other direction; for 2 out of the 3 decades,

food-secure countries were more likely to have experienced revolution

than food-inadequate countries.

1

The percentages reported in the table for countries with adequate average daily calories per capita

(that is, greater then 2,700 calories) should be interpreted cautiously, given the relatively small number

of countries in this category. For example, during the 1960s, only 3 countries were classified as food

secure; 5 countries during the 1970s; and 15 countries during the 1980s.

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VI 

Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity

Table VI.1: Relationship Between Incidence of Conflict and Level of Food Security in Developing Countries, 1960-89

Average daily calories per capitaa

Number of countries involved in

conflict

Proportion of countries in conflict

for each food security levelb

Type of conflict

1960

to

1969

1970 

to

1979

1980

to

1989 Total

1960

to

1969

1970

to

1979

1980

to

1989 Total

Genocide Inadequatec Less than 2,100 5 4 3 12 13% 13% 14% 13%

2,100 to 2,400 3 5 5 13 8 16 14 12

2,400 to 2,700 1 1 0 2 13 5 0 4

Subtotal 9 10 8 27 11 12 11 11

Adequate

Greater than

2,700 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Civil war Inadequatec Less than 2,100 10 8 9 27 26 27 41 30

2,100 to 2,400 5 12 13 30 13 38 37 28

2,400 to 2,700 0 1 7 8 0 5 44 18

Subtotal 15 21 29 65 18 25 40 27

Adequate

Greater than

2,700 0 2 3 5 0 40 20 22

Interstate war on

country’s territory Inadequatec Less than 2,100 4 3 1 8 11 10 5 9

2,100 to 2,400 2 0 2 4 5 0 6 4

2,400 to 2,700 1 1 0 2 13 5 0 4

Subtotal 7 4 3 14 8 5 4 6

Adequate

Greater than

2,700 0 0 2 2 0 0 13 9

Revolution Inadequatec Less than 2,100 1 9 6 16 3 30 27 18

2,100 to 2,400 9 7 6 22 23 22 17 21

2,400 to 2,700 0 5 1 6 0 24 6 13

Subtotal 10 21 13 44 12 25 18 18

Adequate

Greater than

2,700 1 1 4 6 33 20 27 26

(Table notes on next page)

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VI 

Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity

Note: The unit of analysis is countries grouped together by a specific level of food security, time

period, and type of conflict. For each group, countries were classified by whether they were or

were not involved in at least one conflict during the time period. Conflict data were reported by

decade. Data on conflict and food security were obtained for 88 of 93 developing countries that

were analyzed elsewhere in this report. Data were not available for Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea,

and Saudi Arabia.

aAverage is based on available food supply at the country level. Averages were calculated from

annual data for the decades shown.

bWe calculated the proportion of countries in conflict as the ratio of the number of countries that

were involved in an indicated type of conflict to the total number of countries belonging to the

group of countries for an indicated food security level and time period. For example, for the

decade 1960-69, there were 38 countries whose average daily calories per capita were less than

2,100. Of these, 5 countries experienced genocide, 10 experienced civil war, 4 experienced

interstate war, and 1 experienced revolution. For these groups, the rate of incidence of genocide

was 13 percent (5 out of 38), the rate of incidence of civil war was 26 percent (10 out of 38), the

rate of incidence of interstate war on a country’s territory was 11 percent (4 out of 38), the rate of

incidence of revolution was 3 percent (1 out of 38).

cWe designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily calories per capita based on

an FAO analysis of the relationship between average daily calories per capita and chronic

undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita undernutrition

threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level of unequal

food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below the

undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the

average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 percent to 13 percent of the

population will be undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be

undernourished. If food is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is

undernourished decreases and vice versa. See also the discussion in appendix II.

Source: Our analysis of country data on per capita calories as reported by FAO and on conflict

data as reported by William Easterly and Ross Levine in “Africa’s Growth Tragedy,” The Quarterly

Journal of Economics Vol. CXII, No. 4 (Nov. 1997).

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

The summit’s policy declaration and action plan stress the importance of

promoting sustainable agricultural development in developing countries.

In an analysis prepared for the summit, FAO concluded that it was

technically possible for the more food-insecure developing countries to

increase their agricultural production by substantial amounts and in so

doing to contribute significantly to the summit’s goal of halving the

number of their undernourished people by 2015.1

 According to a U.S.

official, the FAO analysis was an important basis underlying the agreement

of summit countries to try to halve undernutrition by 2015. At issue is

whether the developing countries will be able to achieve the kind of

production increases indicated by the FAO study.

Table VII.1 shows the key results of the FAO analysis. FAO differentiated

between three levels of food-insecure countries: (1) countries with an

estimated average per capita daily energy supply (DES) of less than

1,900 calories, (2) countries with an estimated average per capita DES of

2,300 calories, and (3) countries with an estimated average per capita DES

of more than 2,700 calories. As the table shows, the proposed goal for 17

group 1 countries is to raise their DES to at least 2,300 and if possible

2,500 calories by 2010. The normative goal for 38 group 2 countries is to

raise their DES to at least 2,500 calories and, if possible, to 2,700 calories by

2010. The normative goal for 38 group 3 countries is to maintain DES above

2,700 calories and to achieve a more equitable distribution of food supplies

among their citizenry.

1

According to the World Bank, no developing country has had a sustained impact on reducing poverty

without continuing positive economic growth, and for most developing countries, agricultural growth

has been essential to economic growth. Most of the developing countries that grew rapidly during the

1980s had experienced rapid agricultural growth in the preceding years. Such growth stimulates

economic growth in nonagricultural sectors, which results in increased employment and reduced

poverty. Fostering rural growth also helps the urban poor.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

Table VII.1: FAO Analysis of Daily Per Capita Calorie Levels, Grain Production Growth Rates, and Millions of

Undernourished to 2010 for 93 Developing Countries

1990/92-2010 2010

Average per capita

daily calories

Grains production growth rate

(percent per year)

Number of undernourished

(millions)

Country group

Number of

countries 1990-92

2010

summit

goala 1970-1992

FAO 1995

study

estimatea

Summit

goal 1990-92

FAO 1995

study

estimatea

Summit

goal

1

17 1,860

2,300-

2,500 1.7 3.2 3.8 160 188 95

2

38 2,300

2,500-

2,700 3.0 2.3 2.5 384 359 210

3

38 2,780

More

than2,700 3.2 2.0 2.0 295 133 133

Total 93 2,520 b 3.0 2.1 2.3 840 680 438

aWorld Agriculture: Towards 2010, ed. Nikos Alexandratos (New York: FAO and John Wiley &

Sons, 1995). The study sought to assess the future as it is likely to be in 2010 rather than as it

ought to be from a normative or goal perspective.

bNot available.

Source: Technical background documents 12-15.

According to FAO’s analysis, if the normative goals were achieved,

additional production would deliver 60 percent of the developing

countries’ additional needed food for consumption. The balance would

have to be covered by net imports, which would increase from the

24 million tons in 1990-92 to 70 million tons in 2010 (instead of the

50 million tons projected by a 1995 FAO study). FAO estimated that the

additional export supply was within the bounds of possibility for the main

grain exporting countries.

Production Increases

Are Not Likely to Be

Easy

Achieving the production increases previously discussed is not likely to be

easy because it requires unusually high growth rates in the more

food-insecure countries and, in turn, higher amounts of investments,

especially in the worst-off countries. In addition, it requires numerous

major changes in these countries, particularly in the rural and agricultural

sector.

According to FAO, aggregate production must increase rapidly in countries

with too-low daily caloric levels and must also contribute to development

and generate incomes for the poor. As table VII.1 shows, the group 1

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

countries would have to more than double their aggregate agricultural

production growth rate during 1970-92, from 1.7 percent to 3.8 percent per

year. FAO considered 3.2 percent the most likely production increase. For

several group 1 countries, production increases of 4 to 6 percent annually

are implied, according to FAO. For group 2 countries, the goal is to slow an

expected decline in the agricultural production growth rate per year

relative to the 3 percent rate during 1970-92. FAO estimated the most likely

production increase for these countries at 2.3 percent but said the rate

would need to be at least 2.5 percent to achieve the summit goal of halving

the number of food insecure by 2010.

FAO based its normative targets on fairly optimistic assumptions about

expanding domestic production and access to imports, including food aid.2

In fact, FAO said, extraordinary measures would have to be taken to realize

the normative goals. FAO offered the following rationale to justify the

targets. Previously, some of the countries had already achieved average

per capita daily caloric levels above the proposed minimum of 

2,300 calories. For most of the countries, daily caloric levels were at the

minimum or near the minimum recorded for them during the previous

30 years. There was a marked correlation between these low levels and the

prevalence of unsettled political conditions, which suggested that progress

could be made during a recovery period if more peaceful conditions

prevailed. Finally, FAO said, the historical record showed that periods of

10-20 years of fairly fast growth in production and consumption had not

been uncommon—mostly during periods of recovery (usually from

troughs associated with war, drought, or bad policies). Thus, if conditions

were created for the onset of a period of recovery, policies and efforts to

achieve the required high growth rates could bear fruit.

According to one expert, most low-income developing countries and

countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe have

large, unexploited gaps in agricultural yields.3

 He estimated that yields can

be increased by 50-100 percent in most countries of South and Southeast

Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and by

100-200 percent in most of sub-Saharan Africa. According to the expert, it

is technically possible for the world population to meet growing food

demands during the next few decades, but it is becoming increasingly

difficult because of groups that are opposed to technology, whether it be

developed from biotechnology or more conventional methods of

2

FAO did not break down its estimates in terms of what proportion of the increased exports would be

covered by commercial imports and food aid.

3

See Norman Borlaug, “Technological and Environmental Dimensions of Rural Well-Being.”

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

agricultural science.4 The expert has expressed particular concern about

the effect of these groups on the ability of small-scale farmers in

developing countries to obtain access to the improved seeds, fertilizers,

and crop protection chemicals that have allowed affluent nations plentiful

and inexpensive foodstuffs.

Additional Amount of

Needed Investment Not

Clear

Under its scenario of the most likely increase in agricultural production in

developing countries by 2010, FAO roughly estimated, in a presummit

analysis, that gross investment in primary agricultural production5

 in the

developing countries would require an increase from $77 billion annually

in the early 1990s to $86 billion annually during 1997-2010 (constant 1993

dollars). FAO estimated that another $6 billion of investment would be

needed to halve the number of undernourished people in countries with

low daily per capita caloric levels. While the $6 billion increase

represented only a 7-percent rise, FAO noted that all of the additional

investment would be required in the lagging countries. Thus, group 1

countries (table VII.1) would require a 30-percent annual increase in

investment, and group 2 countries a 17-percent increase. However,

according to FAO, the low-income, food-deficit countries will mostly

continue to have very low domestic savings and access to international

credit. As a result, both private and public sectors will have difficulty, at

least in the short and medium term, in raising the investment funds needed

to respond to new production opportunities, even when they have a

comparative economic advantage, and there will be a continuing need for

external assistance on grant or concessionary lending terms.

FAO’s presummit analysis did not address, for countries with low daily per

capita caloric levels, added investment needs for (1) post-production

agriculture and improved rural infrastructure (excluding irrigation),

(2) public services to agriculture, and (3) social support in rural areas.

Consequently, the analysis may understate the amount of additional

investment required in those countries to attain the normative production

4

Borlaug notes that sophisticated molecular genetics and biotechnology hold great promise for

increasing agricultural yields but doubts they will transform agricultural production in low-income,

food-deficit countries in the next 2 decades, since these technologies will be confined primarily to

more affluent nations. Instead, he believes that more widespread and better application of

conventional technology can accomplish the task. He cites experiences over the past 10 years in eight

sub-Saharan countries, indicating that great strides can be made in improving the nutritional and

economic well-being of their desperately poor populations if Africa maintains political stability and

develops effective marketing and seed and fertilizer supply systems.

5

The estimate did not include agricultural investment needed for the post-food production stage or

public investment needed to improve rural infrastructure (excluding irrigation), public services to

agriculture, and social support in rural areas.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

goals.6 In addition, there is no indication that bilateral or multilateral

donors will increase their assistance by the amounts indicated by the FAO

study. In fact, ODA for primary agriculture steadily declined from a peak of

$18.9 billion in 1986 (1990 constant prices) to $9.8 billion in 1994.

According to FAO, external assistance is almost the only source of public

investment in agriculture for many of the poorer developing countries.7

Desired State of Rural

Development May Be

Difficult to Achieve

According to an October 1997 World Bank report,8 several major regions

of the world and many countries that receive the Bank’s assistance are

agricultural underperformers. These regions and countries have

institutions and agricultural policies that discriminate against the rural

sector, underinvest in technology development, maintain inappropriate

agrarian structures, use arable land for low-productivity ranching,

undervalue natural resources and therefore waste them, seriously

underinvest in the health and education of their rural populations,

discriminate against private sector initiatives in food marketing, and fail to

maintain existing or invest in new rural infrastructure. Unless these

policies, institutions, and public expenditure patterns are corrected, the

Bank said, they will not have abundant food supplies.

In the Bank’s view, rural areas have not been developed for three reasons.

First, countries are not politically committed to the broad vision of rural

6

FAO estimated that gross fixed investment in the post-production food chain in the developing

countries would need to increase from $33.5 billion annually in the early 1990s to $43 billion in the

projection period—to achieve the agricultural output reflected in FAO’s 1995 study, World Agriculture:

Toward 2010. Similarly, investment in the public sector and infrastructure (excluding irrigation) was

required to increase from $25 billion to $37 billion. FAO did not estimate additional amounts needed to

reach the normative production goals for 2010 shown in table VII.1. Regarding public sector

investment in the developing countries, FAO projected a needed increase in domestic public

investment, from $19 billion per year during the early 1990s to $26 billion per year in the projected

period; in multilateral investment, from $6.5 billion per year during the early 1990s to more than

$9.5 billion per year during the projection period; and in bilateral ODA, from $3.5 billion during the

early 1990s to more than $5.5 billion during the projection period. FAO did not estimate additional

amounts needed in these categories to reach the normative production goals.

7

About 67 percent of such assistance is on concessional terms.

8

Rural Development: From Vision to Action.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

development.9 Second, for many reasons, international interest in

agricultural and rural matters has waned over the past decade.10 Third, the

Bank has in the past been poorly committed to rural development, and its

performance on rural development projects has been weak. For example,

according to a Bank official, a 1993 review found that Bank expenditures

on agriculture and rural development had declined from $6 billion to about

$3 billion and that less than half of the Bank’s projects in the area were

successful. Following the review, the Bank conducted additional analyses

and developed a vision statement for its future work in the area. In

September 1996, the Bank’s President announced that rural development

would be one of six key Bank objectives.

To tackle the issue of weak commitment at the country level, the Bank is

focusing on improving its strategies for country assistance. According to

the Bank, the strategies define the key issues for development, analyze the

current and future prospects for dealing with the issues, and provide the

overall context within which Bank operations are undertaken. The Bank

believes that the strategies are crucial to renewing the commitment by

countries and the Bank to rural growth.11 The Bank plans to build a

comprehensive rural development strategy into each of its overall country

assistance strategies. According to the Bank, no approach to rural

9

Partner countries of the Bank have frequently given a low priority to agricultural growth and rural

development because they view agriculture as a declining sector. Many developing countries have

focused resources on the urban and industrial sectors, often at the expense of the rural sector. They

have failed to recognize the critical importance of productivity improvements and growth in the rural

sector in the long transition from an agrarian to an urban-industrial society. Falling real food prices

over the last 2 decades led to complacency toward the agricultural sector (some of the decline resulted

from protectionist agricultural policies pursued in OECD countries). The rural poor have little political

power, and urban elites pursue policies that disadvantage the agricultural sector. In many countries,

public institutions have dominated the agricultural sector by controlling input and output markets,

land markets, and access to finance. They have often been highly inefficient and unresponsive to

changes in market conditions and provided privileges and rents to a favored few. Resources have been

concentrated in the hands of a few. Designing and implementing effective community-based systems

for managing common property resources is difficult and only just starting in many countries.

10Reasons include a decline in real grain prices, leading to complacency, and a reduction of 50 percent

in external assistance for agriculture since 1986. During the 1980s, development assistance

increasingly diverted finance to projects in environmental protection and natural resource

management. Poverty alleviation programs were increasingly disconnected from agricultural

production.

11The Bank also recently adopted a sector investment approach to development assistance that differs

from its traditional project approach. (According to the Bank, the project approach has had limited

impact in increasing rural incomes and reducing rural poverty.) The new approach covers the entire

sector or subsector, is prepared by the country’s local stakeholders, is implemented within the

country’s institutional framework (no new project management units are created), is supported by all

of the active donors in the sector, uses common implementation arrangements for all financiers to the

extent possible, and tailors long-term technical assistance to meet demand. Since the sector

investment approach is still new, its success is not yet proved, according to the Bank.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII 

Increasing Agricultural Production in

Developing Countries

development will work for all countries, and developing and implementing

rural strategies will be complex for most countries.12

The Bank believes that if country assistance strategies include

well-defined, coherent rural strategies and treat agriculture

comprehensively, the chances for a sustained and effective rural sector

program will be substantially improved. Even so, in October 1997, a Bank

report acknowledged that there were still wide differences of opinion

within the Bank and among its partners as to the priority that should be

given the rural sector.

12According to the Bank, it is crucial to improve the formulation of rural strategies by improving the

analytical base; identifying the necessary changes in policies, institutions, and expenditure allocations;

clearly stating priorities; determining an appropriate balance between lending and nonlending services;

developing partnership relationships with appropriate government ministries; and involving members

of civil society at all levels. It requires input not only from agricultural experts but also from experts in

education, population, health, nutrition, infrastructure, the environment, and economics at a minimum.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VIII 

Establishing an Information System for

Assessing Undernutrition and Food

Insecurity

Summit countries agreed to set out a process for developing targets and

verifiable indicators of national and global food security where they do not

exist, to establish a food insecurity and vulnerability information and

mapping system, and to report to the Committee on World Food Security

on the results produced by the system. On March 24-25, 1997, FAO

convened a group of experts to discuss ways and means of implementing

such a system. This group recommended a series of initial steps to take

prior to the CFS meeting in June 1998. Subsequently, an interagency

working group was established to promote development of the

information and mapping system. (Membership included 21 international

agencies and organizations, including bilateral donor agencies.) The

working group met in December 1997 and April 1998. The FAO Secretariat

helps staff the work of the group between meetings.

According to FAO, among some of the key tasks identified for establishing

the information and mapping system are the following:

• Designate country focal points for all the information and mapping system

matters.

• Develop an awareness and advocacy strategy for end-users of the system;

where key national policymakers are not fully aware of the need for strong

food insecurity and vulnerability information systems, secure their

commitment to provide adequate and continuing support for the

establishment and maintenance of such systems.

• Inventory available as well as planned data collection systems at both the

international and national levels, and evaluate the quality and coverage of

their data; at the national level, identify and prioritize the information

needs of key food security decisionmakers and determine to what extent

needs are already met; define a priority set of information required by

national decisionmakers and a set of verifiable objectives; set out a

scheduled program of initiatives and activities to meet those objectives.

• Define the conceptual framework and scope of the information and

mapping system, including the indicators to be used at both national and

international levels for identifying (down to at least the household level)

people who are food insecure or at risk of becoming food insecure, the

degree of their undernutrition or vulnerability, and the key factors or

causes for their food insecurity or vulnerability.

• When agreement on system indicators is reached, complete and issue

guidelines for the establishment of the system at the national level.

• Inventory national systems to determine to what extent the information

and mapping system indicator needs are already met; identify significant

gaps and weaknesses; assess the cost and time required to implement the

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VIII 

Establishing an Information System for

Assessing Undernutrition and Food

Insecurity

information and mapping system and to what extent, if any, countries

require technical or financial assistance; and set out a scheduled program

of initiatives and activities for establishing an effective system.

• Identify and prepare a computerized system for compiling and analyzing

multisectoral data and an information system for mapping, posting, and

disseminating information accessible to all users.

• Ensure the exchange of information among international agencies and

organizations on all aspects related to food insecurity and vulnerability

information and mapping. Do the same at the national level.

By the time of the June 1998 CFS meeting, none of these tasks was

complete. Two reports, based on the interagency working group’s work,

were provided to CFS for its June 1998 meeting. The first was a proposed

plan for continuing and future work on the information and mapping

system. The plan included a long list of tasks, but the items were not

prioritized, and no schedule for completing them was suggested. The

second was a report providing background information and principles that

could be followed in establishing national information and mapping

systems. The report could be useful to officials interested in how to go

about developing an awareness and advocacy strategy for end-users of the

system within their countries, including securing the support of national

decisionmakers.

The interagency working group and FAO Secretariat had been taking an

inventory of available information for use in the information and mapping

system at the international level. However, no report on the results was

available for the June 1998 CFS. The Secretariat, interagency working

group, and member countries had not yet begun to debate what indicators

should be used for the system. At the June 1998 CFS meeting, a number of

countries stressed the need for a decision on what indicators to use so that

member countries could take steps toward measuring progress in

achieving the overall summit goal.

A March 1997 technical advisory group and the CFS have stressed the need

to involve FAO countries in the design of the information and mapping

system. However, the interagency working group has not asked member

countries to identify and prioritize their information needs, determine the

extent to which those needs have already been met, and share the results

with the interagency working group. Only a few developing countries sent

representatives to the first interagency working group meeting. Fourteen

developing countries were invited to the second meeting, and 12 countries

sent representatives. The interagency working group met for the third time

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VIII 

Establishing an Information System for

Assessing Undernutrition and Food

Insecurity

in November 1998. No developing countries sent representatives to the

meeting. There was some discussion of indicators that might be used at

the national and international levels for a food insecurity and vulnerability

mapping system and of existing international data systems from which

some indicators could be drawn. However, no proposals were offered and

no attempt was made to reach agreement on a common set of indicators

for use at the national or international level. The group is not scheduled to

meet again before the next CFS meeting, which will be held in June 1999.

Since agreement had not been reached on the information and mapping

system indicators, detailed technical guidance to countries on how to

develop information on the indicators and establish the system at the

national level also had not been developed. Similarly, member countries

had not been able to identify whether their existing systems meet their

needs or assess the time, financial resources, and technical assistance

required to establish national systems.

The interagency working group and the Secretariat have made progress in

identifying a computer system for compiling and analyzing data and an

information system for mapping, posting, and identifying the information.

However, the work is not yet complete.

A cooperative process is underway among U.N. and other international

agencies. For example, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural

Development hosted the first and second meetings of the interagency

working group, respectively, and the World Bank hosted the third meeting.

Agreements have been reached for sharing information among some of the

agencies, for example, between FAO and the World Food Program.

However, FAO officials told us that problems have arisen in the exchange

of information and that the World Food Program and the World Health

Organization had not yet made important data sets available.

As of mid-December 1998, only about 60 countries had identified focal

points.

In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said considerable

progress has been made in addressing the key tasks for establishing an

information and mapping system, and implementation of many of the tasks

requires a longer period of time. In addition, FAO said, many developing

countries have difficulty in mobilizing the required resources. According

to FAO, only about 15 countries are currently engaged in establishing

national food insecurity and vulnerability mapping systems, with or

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VIII 

Establishing an Information System for

Assessing Undernutrition and Food

Insecurity

without international assistance. FAO said that the interagency group is

working on a technical compendium, to be issued in mid-1999, which will

provide more detailed technical guidance to prospective users on

technical issues related to the selection of indicators, the cut-off points,

the analysis of data, and so forth.

World Food Program officials noted that their program is actively involved

in the interagency working group that is promoting development of a food

insecurity and vulnerability information mapping system, cited several

specific areas of cooperation that involve the agency and FAO, and said the

program recently made available a data base on China that includes data

at the provincial and county level. At the same time, program officials said

that the November 1998 meeting of the interagency working group did not

resolve the issue of mechanisms to be used in the development of an

international food insecurity and vulnerability mapping system data base

as well as the possible technical composition of the data base. Several

different systems (FAO, World Bank, and the World Health Organization)

offer possible alternatives, the officials said. They said the meeting

discussed the issue of availability of data sets and data-sharing, and all

participants are aware that many complications relate to data copyrights

issues. Such issues will need to be resolved at the political level, officials

said, before free data-sharing becomes a practical reality.

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

The summit action plan stressed a need to improve coordination among

governments, international agencies, and civil society. Numerous

organizations are involved in food security issues, including FAO, the World

Health Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, the WTO, regional development banks, key

donor countries, for-profit private sector companies, and NGOs. Since the

summit, international groups have taken steps to promote better

coordination, but problems still exist.

Coordination Since

the Summit

In February 1997, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural

Development proposed that the U.N. resident coordinator in each country

facilitate inter-U.N. coordination and that FAO headquarters establish and

manage a network among the U.N. and non-U.N. agencies. The

Administrative Coordination Committee of the United Nations (ACC)1

endorsed this proposal in April 1997 and authorized FAO to consult with

other U.N. agencies on detailed arrangements to establish the network and

a detailed work plan. The United States succeeded in placing the issue of

food security coordination on the agendas of the 1997 Group of Seven

developed countries’2

 economic summit in Denver, Colorado, and the 1997

U.S.-European Union Summit.

Despite these actions, coordination problems continued. For example, at a

June 1997 meeting of the Food Aid Forum, the European Union and 11

other countries attending the meeting expressed concern about the

uncoordinated nature of food aid in contributing to food security goals.3

The European Union and 11 of the other countries attending the meeting

said global food aid policy components were scattered among a number of

international organizations and other forums, each with different

representatives and agendas, and that they lacked effective coordination.

In addition, they said that systemic coordination of food aid at the regional

and national levels was needed. To improve coordination and the

effectiveness of food aid, the European Union is drafting a proposed code

of conduct for food aid. The code of conduct is to include a statement of

1

The Administrative Coordination Committee, composed of the U.N. Secretary-General and heads of

specialized U.N. agencies, is responsible for ensuring full coordination between all branches of the

U.N. system.

2

The Group of Seven consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

United States.

3

The Forum consists of 15 countries (including several European nations, the United States, Japan,

Australia, and Canada), the World Bank, the Club du Sahel, and the European Union.

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

responsibility for both food aid donors and recipients and stress the need

to ensure optimal use of food aid resources.

Another coordination problem concerned rural agricultural development.

In October 1997, the World Bank reported that in virtually all of the

countries it works with, many donors and multilateral financial

institutions are promoting often disjointed projects. According to the

Bank, these projects are launched when the policy environment is not

favorable and a coherent rural strategy is lacking. Consequently, many of

the projects fail to achieve their development objectives and undermine

local commitment and domestic institutional capacity. Other examples of

coordination problems concern FAO’s Special Program on Food Security, a

telefood promotion to raise money, efforts to assist developing countries

develop food security action plans for implementing summit

commitments, FAO coordination with NGOs, and FAO coordination with

other U.N. agencies.

Special Program for Food

Security

The intent of FAO’s Special Program for Food Security, an initiative of FAO’s

Director-General, is to provide technical assistance to help low-income,

food-deficit countries increase their agricultural production. The program

began in 1995 with a pilot phase involving 18 countries. At a spring 1997

meeting of the CFS, many developed countries expressed concern about

the program. For example, the European Union representative said FAO

was not sufficiently emphasizing the need for policy reform, donor

coordination, and rural development, as called for by the summit, and was

not developing the program in a sufficiently participatory manner to allow

recipient countries to take ownership of the program. The United States

and other countries also complained about a lack of information on the

costs and results of the program and expressed concern that the program

was using FAO resources needed for summit implementation and FAO’s

traditional normative work. According to a U.S. official, the United States

was concerned that FAO was using the special program to become a

development agency rather than an agency that sets standards for

countries to follow. The official also said that the FAO Director-General had

not been responsive to donor concerns about the program.

In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said that we did not

adequately reflect the views of developing countries that are the main

beneficiaries of the program, nor did we recognize that the special

program was an initiative of the Director-General that was approved by

the FAO membership. Moreover, FAO said that the special program is now

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

part of its regular Program of Work and Budget. USDA officials advised us

that our discussion of the April 1997 events was correct, but that since

then, the FAO Director-General had been responsive to concerns expressed

about the program. For example, FAO has provided factual data on the

program’s activities, and that while early discussions about the program

had emphasized supporting large capital projects that were questionable,

the focus of the program has since shifted to encourage many small

projects.

Telefood Promotion In 1997, the FAO Director-General announced plans to put on a 48-hour

global television program to mobilize public opinion and financial

resources to pay for the Special Program and other food security activities.

Participating countries were to organize national broadcasts, to be held on

October 18 and 19, 1997, centered on World Food Day, an annual event

designed to raise awareness about food security problems. According to

the Director-General, the telecast was an important way to raise money for

FAO’s Special Program in light of declining aid levels from donor countries.

The main purpose originally was to raise public awareness of food

problems and, only as a secondary suggestion from member countries, to

mobilize resources for micro-projects providing direct support to small

farmers.

In general, donor countries did not initially support the telefood initiative

when it was discussed at the April 1997 CFS meeting. Some key donor

countries, such as the United States, Australia, and Canada, announced

they would not participate in the telecast, because the proposal (1) had

not been reviewed or approved by FAO members; (2) lacked participation

by civil society in each country; (3) was designed to help fund the Special

Program, which was viewed as not fully reflecting World Food Summit

commitments; and (4) would impinge upon national NGO fundraising

activities centered on World Food Day. In November 1997 FAO indicated

the operation was successful, and invited FAO members to take all

measures they deem appropriate to promote Telefood in the future.

According to FAO, 58 countries participated in awareness-raising activities

in the 1997 Telefood, including 5 developed countries (France, Greece,

Italy, Japan, and Turkey). Twenty of the countries also engaged in

fundraising, including one developed country (Japan). For the 1998

Telefood, 45 countries participated in awareness activities and 35 of these

countries also engaged in fund-raising. Five developed countries

participated , including in both sets of activities (Italy, Japan, Portugal,

Spain, and Turkey).

Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

In commenting on this report, FAO officials acknowledged that concerns

had been expressed about supporting events that might be seen as

competing with the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) but

said that most Telefood supporters came from civil society. USDA officials

said that the United States was critical of Telefood in spring 1997 but

expressed support for the program later in the year. They said that the

United States now recognizes that Telefood may be a significant activity

for other countries and that it can help in raising consciousness about

food insecurity.

Country Strategy Papers Shortly before the summit was held, the FAO Director-General ordered that

food security strategy papers be drafted for each member country,

including developed countries. (According to FAO officials, papers for the

developed countries would simply describe the food security situation in

each country and not include recommendations.) The Director-General did

so without advising or securing the approval of at least some member

countries, including the United States. The strategies for the developing

countries reportedly included recommendations for improving food

security that focused on the agricultural sector. FAO officials told us that

each paper cost approximately $2,000 to produce and was drafted over a

2-week period. Sixty strategy papers, prepared before the summit was

held, were reviewed jointly by FAO, the associated member country

governments, and the World Bank. By April 1997, about 90 papers had

been drafted, and parliaments in about 20 countries had approved the

documents as national action plans for implementing World Food Summit

commitments, according to FAO officials.

At the April 1997 CFS session, donor countries expressed concern that civil

societies of the countries had not been involved in preparation of the

strategies, even though the summit action plan stressed the need for civil

society to participate in planning, promoting, and implementing measures

for improving food security. Donors were also concerned that the

presummit strategies would not reflect the full range of commitments and

actions agreed upon by summit participants. Also of concern was the short

amount of time allotted for drafting the papers. Several FAO officials

indicated that 2 weeks was not sufficient time to prepare sound country

strategy papers. They noted that prior FAO preparation of country

strategies typically took about 6 months. FAO officials also acknowledged

that FAO lacked expertise in several key areas related to food security,

such as macroeconomic and political policy reform, that were emphasized

by the summit. In general, the donors were also displeased about FAO’s

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

funding of country briefs for the developed countries. Countries had

written position papers on their individual approaches to food security

during preparations for the summit. Representatives from several

developed countries noted that neither FAO nor FAO contractors had

contacted their governments to obtain key data and information on the

status of country efforts to develop country action plans. The European

Union representative instructed FAO to stop preparing briefs on the

European Union’s member states unless one of its countries specifically

requested that FAO do so.

FAO staff told us that the country strategies had been well received by the

developing countries, were not meant to substitute for action plans

developed by the civil society of each country, and were only a starting

point to stimulate discussion and debate. However, donor country

governments and other key groups were not invited to critique the drafts.

Moreover, completed strategy papers and briefs have not been made

available to other FAO members. According to FAO, as of June 1998, FAO had

provided assistance to 150 countries in preparing strategy briefs.

FAO Coordination With

Other U.N. Agencies

The summit action plan said coordination and cooperation within the U.N.

system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,

are vital to the summit follow-up. Governments agreed to cooperate

among themselves and with international agencies to encourage relevant

agencies within the U.N. system to initiate consultations on the further

elaboration and definition of a food insecurity and vulnerability

information and mapping system. As part of an already existing effort by

U.N. agencies to coordinate follow-up with major U.N. conferences and

summits since 1990, these governments also agreed to seek to reduce

duplications and fill gaps in coverage, defining the tasks of each

organization within its mandate, making concrete proposals for their

strengthening, for improved coordination with governments, and for

avoiding duplication of work among relevant organizations.

The summit plan also requested that the ACC ensure appropriate

interagency coordination and, when considering who should chair any

mechanisms for interagency follow-up to the summit, recognize the major

role of FAO in the field of food security. In April 1997, the ACC approved a

proposal to establish a network on rural development and food security as

the mechanism for providing interagency follow-up to the summit. At the

country level, the network consists of thematic groups established under

the U.N. Resident Coordinator System. According to FAO, these groups

Page 88 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX 

Coordination in Implementing Summit

Goals

typically include U.N. agencies, national institutions, bilateral donors, and

civil society representatives. At the headquarters level, the network

includes 20 U.N. organizations that participate in and support the

country-level groups. The network is jointly coordinated and backstopped

by FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in close

cooperation with the World Food Program.

Despite these efforts, FAO, other U.N. agency officials, and U.S. officials

advised us that coordination problems continue. For example, an FAO

official said that in May 1998, the U.N. Economic and Social Council4 met

to review a set of indicators for measuring follow-up to the various U.N.

conferences and summits. According to the official, FAO had not been

involved in the exercise to create the indicators, and the proposed

indicators did not adequately represent food security issues. As discussed

in appendix VIII, FAO officials told us that although the World Food

Program and World Health Organization have been cooperating in

establishing an information and mapping system, FAO was still waiting to

receive previously promised data from the organizations. According to

both FAO and U.N. Children’s Fund officials, their two agencies have had

problems coordinating with each other.

In commenting on a draft of our report, FAO officials noted that

coordination problems exist even at the national level among ministries

and agencies, and said that such problems cannot be absent in the U.N.

system of agencies. However, FAO said great efforts had been made,

particularly in the framework of the Administrative Committee on

Coordination, to improve the cooperation and synergy among the different

institutions. According to officials, the network on rural development and

food security is growing rapidly and proceeding satisfactorily.

4

The Council is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the economic and social work of the

United Nations, including that of U.N. specialized agencies. (As previously noted, FAO is one of the

specialized agencies.) The ACC reports to the Council on coordination issues. The Council is seeking

to strengthen its interaction with the specialized agencies. According to the Council, the need to

establish institutional ties between the specialized agencies, and between them and the Council, is a

major issue. Since the specialized agencies have their own governing structures and mandate, the

Council believes it also needs to improve its interaction with the specialized agencies’ governing

bodies.

Page 89 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

The summit directed FAO’s Committee on Food Security to monitor and

evaluate progress toward national, subregional, regional, and international

implementation of the action plan, using reports from national

governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other relevant international

institutions. Governments are to provide regular reports on progress made

to the FAO Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council. The summit

also directed that NGOs and other interested parties should play an active

role in this process, at the national level and within CFS itself. Since the

summit, countries have provided their first progress report to CFS and the

FAO Secretariat, and planning has begun for a revised format for future

reports. NGOs have made some progress in increasing their involvement in

food security efforts, but not as much as they would like.

Progress Reports In April 1997, CFS decided that the first report would cover progress

through the end of 1997 and the reporting procedure would be provisional.

Reports would be prepared by national governments, U.N. agencies, and

other relevant international institutions and were to be received by the FAO

Secretariat by January 31, 1998. Countries agreed to report on actions

taken toward achieving the specific objectives under each of the seven

statements of commitment (following the format of the summit plan of

action) and include information on the actors and, if available, results,

including quantitative assessments, under each of the objectives. CFS

allowed each country to decide whether to report on the specific actions

included in the summit’s action plan. CFS emphasized that the information

should include some analysis on how national policies and actions were

geared toward, and effective in, achieving the food security objective of

reducing the number of undernourished. A more detailed reporting format,

proposed to CFS by the Secretariat, was not approved.

CFS did not set any other requirements concerning the information to be

provided. A proposal by some delegates that countries provide baseline

information on actions taken to implement each of the seven

commitments was noted but not endorsed as a requirement. Countries

were not asked to provide baseline information on the number of their

undernourished, the extent of undernourishment, or the principal causes

of undernourishment. Nor were they asked to provide baseline

information regarding actions already underway or planned or information

on targets and milestone dates for implementing actions. They were not

asked to provide information on actual or planned expenditures for

implementing actions.

Page 90 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

Although CFS did not ask for baseline or target information, in a July 1997

letter to countries, FAO’s Director-General said that the first report after the

World Food Summit was of the utmost importance and would be of

critical value in setting baselines and the orientations that governments

intend to pursue. He also said it was expected that governments’ reports

would cover the contributions of all relevant partners at the national level,

including governmental institutions, as well as nongovernmental and

private sector actors. In addition, he asked for a one-page summary of the

major food security issues that each country was facing and the priority

targets being addressed through implementation of the plan.

By the January 31, 1998, due date, only 5 countries had provided progress

reports to the Secretariat; as late as March 31, 1998, only 68 of 175 country

reports had been received.1

 The Secretariat analyzed and summarized the

results in a report for the CFS’ June meeting but drew no overall

substantive conclusions because (1) information on policies and programs

predominantly covered continuing actions already taking place at the time

of the summit, (2) the Secretariat’s analysis of country actions was limited

to 68 reports, (3) the countries only provided selective information rather

than focusing on all the issues involved, (4) some countries provided

descriptive rather than analytical information, and (5) some countries

reported only on certain aspects of food security action such as food

stocks or food reserve policies. The Secretariat said future reports need to

be oriented more toward providing a precise analysis of selected

situations, actions conducted over time to address them, results obtained,

and reasons for such results.

To date, CFS’ approach to monitoring and evaluation of country

performance has focused on encouraging countries to report on actions

taken and the impact of the actions on food security. Under this approach,

the FAO Secretariat seeks to summarize the results across all countries. CFS

has not considered directly assessing the quality of a country’s overall

action plan—including strategy, programs, resources, targets, and

milestones for achieving the summit commitments, objectives, and

actions.2

 Secretariat officials told us that they lack sufficient staff to

evaluate action plans for all CFS members.

1

According to FAO, the total number of reports that eventually reached the Secretariat was 101 from

member countries, 33 from international organizations, and 3 from NGOs .

2

As part of the summit’s action plan, countries agreed to review and revise, as appropriate, their

national plans, programs, and strategies to promote achievement of the summit’s commitments. They

also agreed to establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities, develop, implement, and

monitor their food security actions within designated time frames, based on national and local needs,

and to provide the necessary resources for their planning.

Page 91 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

The Secretariat prepared a report for the June 1998 CFS session that

included a proposed standard format for reporting future progress in

implementing the plan. The proposal was considerably more structured

than that which CFS asked members to use for the provisional report

provided in 1998. The proposal included suggestions regarding essential

substantive points to be addressed in future reports. Prior to convening on

June 2, CFS held a 1-day working group meeting on June 1 to examine the

Secretariat’s proposals and report on them to CFS. However, the working

group did not debate and CFS did not reach any decisions on the essential

points to be included in future progress reports . CFS directed the

Secretariat to collaborate with member states and other concerned

partners in the continuing preparation of a set of indicators for measuring

progress in implementing the plan and said the work should be completed

sufficiently in advance to be used by CFS in preparing for its session in the

year 2000. CFS also directed the Secretariat to further develop an analytical

framework for preparing future reports and assessing progress in

implementing the summit action plan.

Participation of Civil

Society

The summit action plan directed that civil society be involved in CFS’

monitoring and that governments, in partnership with civil society, report

to CFS on national implementation of the plan. The plan’s directive is

consistent with a growing interest in involving civil society to help

promote the objectives and work of international agencies during the past

decade in response to various transformations within and across

countries. For example, the globalization of the economy has reduced the

ability of individual governments to control the direction of development.

Structural adjustment reforms have led to a redefinition of the role of the

state in many countries, reducing its function as a doer and provider and

leaving it to the private sector and citizen initiatives to take on

responsibilities for services it no longer provides. The demise of

authoritarian regimes in many countries has created opportunities for

groups and collective initiatives of many kinds to spring up and make their

voices heard.

Increasing the role of civil society in CFS is not easily accomplished since

FAO was created as an intergovernmental forum and operates by consensus

of all the members. Unless the members of CFS agree to allow for NGO

participation, this cannot occur. According to several U.N. officials with

whom we spoke, developing countries are generally opposed to greater

involvement by NGOs in U.N. agencies, including FAO.

Page 92 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

According to FAO and other participants, if CFS member countries agree

that civil society should have a greater role, a variety of practical questions

must be addressed. For example, how can FAO deal effectively and

equitably with the large number of civil society organizations that would

like to be heard, the variety and number of conflicting views and interests

that they express, the disparities in their legitimacy and

representativeness, and the difficulties many NGOs in developing countries

have in gaining access to information and policy forums? In addition, given

limited resources, where should priorities lie in promoting policy dialogue,

and how can links between national and global levels be promoted? Some

NGOs believe that some of these issues could be addressed if NGOs were

allowed to hold separate meetings for developing consensus positions and

selecting a few NGOs to represent them in CFS meetings.

At the April 1997 CFS session, several delegates suggested that ways be

considered for strengthening or widening the participation of civil society

organizations in the work and deliberations of CFS. CFS asked the

Secretariat to take interim measures to broaden NGO participation at the

1998 session of CFS and agreed to examine the issue in greater detail at that

time. In responding to the April 1997 CFS session, the Secretariat took

several positive actions prior to June 1998. It increased the number of NGOs

invited to the June 1998 CFS meeting, made documents available on the FAO

website about 1 month prior to the meeting, and provided FAO countries

with a copy of a proposal by a group of NGOs for enhanced civil society

participation. The proposal identified a number of specific actions that

could be taken to increase NGO opportunities for participation before and

around CFS meetings. NGOs expressed particular disappointment about not

being allowed to make prepared statements in CFS meetings until after

government delegates have spoken and said if they were to make the effort

of participation, they needed to be assured of a say in decision-making and

to know that NGO positions could at least be reflected in CFS reports.3

In addition to the actions by the Secretariat, the FAO Director-General

invited seven NGOs to a 2-day meeting at the end of January 1998 to provide

advice on redefining FAO’s role during the next decade. NGO representatives

were asked to address what role FAO should play in fostering an enabling

3

Other NGO suggestions for increased involvement were to (1) allow NGOs to collaborate with the

Secretariat in the drafting of CFS papers, (2) allow civil society representatives to meet separately just

prior to CFS meetings, (3) allow NGO discussions with the CFS Bureau (a small executive committee)

the day before the start of CFS meetings to identify NGO concerns, (4) include two NGO

representatives in committees that draft CFS reports, (5) encourage governments to invite NGOs to

nominate one or two representatives to join their national delegations, (6) increase the use of FAO

trust funds to facilitate participation of developing country NGOs in CFS meetings, and (7) ensure

NGO gender- and geographically balanced representation.

Page 93 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

environment for civil society organizations and building dialogue with

governments and how civil society’s views could be better taken into

account given the intergovernmental nature of FAO. The seven NGOs

provided their views in an information paper that was made available for

the CFS June meeting. In addition, the Secretariat drafted its own paper on

how the NGOs’ role could be enhanced in CFS and invited the CFS Bureau to

approve the paper for use at the June 1998 meeting.

Notwithstanding the positive steps taken by the Secretariat and CFS’

April 1997 decision, CFS did not seriously consider the issue in 1998. For

example, the CFS Bureau, a small executive committee, did not approve the

Secretariat’s paper for use at the June 1998 CFS session, and the issue was

not included in the provisional agenda for the meeting.

At the opening of the session, Canada, with support from the United

States, proposed that the provisional agenda be amended to include a

discussion of the role of civil society. However, rather than permitting

debate on the proposal, the CFS Chairman announced that he had decided

to seek to satisfy NGOs’ interests by holding informal discussions with

them. Subsequently, the Chairman advised the NGOs4

 that he and the CFS

Bureau would meet with representatives of five NGOs. During the morning

of the second day of the CFS meeting, the United States again proposed

that civil society participation be added to the agenda and asked that it be

addressed without further delay. The Chairman agreed to add the item to

the agenda but postponed discussion until the end of the third day’s

meeting. During the abbreviated discussion, various ideas for broadening

civil society participation were noted. However, some delegates, including

China, stressed that CFS is an intergovernmental forum and that any

measures taken to broaden participation would need to respect that

principle.

At the conclusion of the June session, CFS countries agreed to make the

issue of increased civil society participation in its activities a main agenda

item for the 1999 meeting. It asked the Secretariat to prepare and circulate

a discussion paper at least 6 months prior to the next meeting to allow

ample time for consultations between governments and national civil

society organizations. The Secretariat was also asked to analyze the pros

and cons of proposals, including their legal, procedural, and financial

implications.

4

About 20 NGOs attended the CFS session. An FAO official advised us that although it had broadened

the list of NGOs invited to the meeting, many NGOs did not send representatives—probably because

there was no assurance that they would be allowed to participate meaningfully in the session.

Page 94 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X 

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action

Plan

According to a statement presented on behalf of NGOs that attended the

June 1998 CFS session, the involvement of civil society organizations in

preparing national reports on progress in implementing the summit’s

action plan was varied. In some cases, NGOs had written inputs; in other

cases, NGOs gave their views orally in meetings with government officials;

and in numerous other cases, civil society was not invited to participate in

the drafting of the national report.

Page 95 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XI 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

At the request of Senator Russell D. Feingold, Ranking Minority Member of

the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator John Ashcroft, and

Congressman Tony P. Hall, we reviewed the outcome of the 1996 World

Food Summit and key factors that could affect progress toward achieving

the summit’s goal. Our overall objective was to comment on key issues

and challenges related to developing countries’ achieving the summit’s

goal of reducing undernourishment by half by 2015. Our overall approach

was to analyze and synthesize information from a wide variety of primary

and secondary sources. To address the current status of global food

security, the summit’s approach to reducing food insecurity, and the

summit’s possible contribution to reducing hunger and undernutrition, we

did the following:

• reviewed documents and studies by the FAO, the U.N. Children’s Fund, the

World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the World Food Program;

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research; IFPRI; USDA,

USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Health and Human

Services; and various academics, NGOs, and private sector entities

concerned with past and possible future efforts to reduce poverty and

undernutrition;

• discussed issues concerning the extent and causes of undernutrition with

national and international experts in food security, including experts at

FAO, the World Food Program, the World Bank, IFPRI, USDA, USAID, the

Department of State, various NGOs, and universities and international food

companies;

• observed presummit negotiations over the text to be included in the World

Food Summit’s policy declaration and plan of action, the World Food

Summit, and subsequent FAO follow-up meetings to the summit (the latter

include the April 1997 CFS meeting, the November 1997 FAO Conference

meeting, and the June 1998 CFS meeting;

• attended various other conferences and seminars where food security and

related issues were discussed; and

• developed a database on country-level estimates of undernutrition and

various economic, political, and social variables possibly associated with

food insecurity.

We relied heavily on secondary sources of information, including data on

estimated past and future projections of the number of chronically

undernourished people in developing countries, world cereal stocks, and

world food aid deliveries. We used country and regional data on the effects

of the URA, conflicts, agricultural production, income levels, official and

Page 96 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XI 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

private sector resource flows, and investors’ ratings of the risk associated

with investing in countries. We did not validate the reliability of these data.

To address the current status of global food security, more specifically, we

• reviewed methodological issues associated with efforts to accurately

identify and measure the extent of undernutrition;

• reviewed FAO, USDA, and World Health Organization estimates of the

number of undernourished people or children in up to 93 developing

countries that collectively account for about 98 percent of the population

in the developing world;

• used FAO estimates of the number of undernourished people in 93

developing countries to calculate and describe (1) the distribution of the

total number of undernourished people across countries and (2) the

variation across countries in the proportion of population that is

undernourished; and

• compared FAO and USDA estimates of the number of undernourished people

in 58 low-income, food-deficit countries to show to what extent the

estimates differ.

To describe the summit’s policy declaration and action plan for reducing

food insecurity, we reviewed both and prepared a table summarizing the 7

major commitments, 27 supporting objectives, and 24 of the 181

supporting actions. The latter were selected to further illustrate the depth

and specificity of the summit’s plan.

To provide perspective on the summit’s goal of halving the number of

undernourished people by 2015, we reviewed and compared FAO and USDA

estimates on the number of undernourished people in developing

countries. In addition, we analyzed a variety of key issues associated with

the summit’s proposed commitments, objectives, and actions for halving

undernutrition by no later than 2015. These issues concern the ability and

willingness of countries to reasonably measure the prevalence of

undernourishment and the possible effects of trade liberalization, grain

reserves, food aid, conflict, increased agricultural production, policy

reforms, resources, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of

progress in reducing food insecurity.

We related FAO country-level data on the number of undernourished

people to FAO estimates of the capability of the same countries to reduce

undernourishment by redistribution of available food supplies. We

reviewed and analyzed summary FAO data on past and projected cereals

Page 97 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XI 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

production growth rates relative to food insecurity levels and the

aggregate number of undernourished people of the countries.

To assess the impact of trade liberalization on food security, we reviewed

various analyses of the subject, including two detailed estimates of the

projected income impacts of the URAs on major regions of the world and

several major trading countries. To provide perspective on trends and

issues associated with grain reserves and food aid, we analyzed data on

(1) world private and government grain reserves and the ratio of total

grain reserves to world cereal consumption; (2) world and U.S. cereals

shipments of food aid in terms of total quantities and the proportion

provided as program, project, and emergency aid; and (3) total food aid

deliveries to low-income, food-deficit countries and as a percent of total

global food aid deliveries. We also

• analyzed country-level data on average per capita caloric levels and

related this measure of food security to other country-level variables,

including (1) the incidence of civil war, war, revolution and genocide

during 1960-89; (2) the level of income; and (3) creditworthiness ratings of

the risk associated with investing in these countries;

• related country-level data on the number of undernourished people to

(1) income levels of developing countries, (2) total official and private

resources provided to these countries, and (3) creditworthiness ratings of

the risk associated with investing in the countries; and

• analyzed data on the role of official development assistance and private

sector investment in developing countries during 1990-97.

To comment on the issues of (1) improving coordination among

governments, international agencies, and civil society and (2) monitoring

and evaluating their progress in implementing the summit action plan, we

considered information that became available to us in some of our

previously discussed actions. For example, we relied heavily on the FAO

Secretariat’s assessment of individual developing and developed country

progress reports that were provided to the Secretariat during early 1998.

We did not undertake a comprehensive study of actions taken by

governments, international agencies, and civil society to improve

coordination and monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving summit

commitments.

We conducted our review from February 1997 to September 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 98 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XII 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Page 99 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XII 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Page 100 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XIII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Phillip J. Thomas

Wayne H. Ferris

Gezahegne Bekele

Edward George

(711350) Page 101 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100