ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Enforcement

Washington, DC 20555
OE Annual Report

-iTABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................v

CALENDAR YEAR 2006 HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ............................................. ix

MISSION AND AUTHORITY ................................................. ix

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT ................................................ x

I. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS ................... 1

A. ESCALATED VIOLATIONS WITHOUT CIVIL PENALTIES ....................... 1

B. CIVIL PENALTY ACTIONS ........................................... 1

C. ORDERS ...................................................... 2

D. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WITH OFFICE OF INSPECTION REPORTS ............. 3

E. TIMELINESS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ............................... 3

F. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT TRENDS .................................. 4

G. DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION ...................................... 5

II. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS AND NON-LICENSEES ........ 5

III. CASES INVOLVING DISCRIMINATION ..................................... 6

IV. NOTICES OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NOEDS) ....................... 6

V. NOTICES OF SECTION VII OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY DISCRETION ........ 7

VI. 10 CFR 2.206 PETITIONS ............................................. 7

VII. WITHDRAWN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ................................... 8

VIII. HEARING ACTIVITIES .................................................. 8
OE Annual Report

-iiIX. ENFORCEMENT POLICY CHANGES ...................................... 9

X. AGENCY ALLEGATION REVIEWS ....................................... 10

XI. INITIATIVES, PROGRAM OFFICE SUPPORT, STAFF 

GUIDANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

A. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ................................... 10

B. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS ........................... 12

C. CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITY AGAINST NON-LICENSEES FOR DISCRIMINATION ...... 13

D. SAFETY CULTURE ................................................. 13

E. DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINIONS PROGRAM ........................... 15

F. NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS ....................................... 15

G. REACTOR PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES ............................. 15

H. MATERIALS PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES ............................ 15

I. SECURITY PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES ............................. 16

J. LEGAL PROGRAM SUPPORT ......................................... 16

K. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT .............................................. 16

L. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ........................................... 18

M. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, AND REVIEWS ...................... 18

-TABLESTABLE 1. CIVIL PENALTY INFORMATION ...................................2

TABLE 2. ESCALATED ACTIONS TRENDS ..................................4

TABLE 3. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY REGION 

 AND PROGRAM OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

TABLE 4. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY TYPE OF 

 LICENSEE, NON-LICENSEE, OR INDIVIDUAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

-FIGURESFIGURE 1. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT BY TYPE ............................1

FIGURE 2. ESCALATED ACTIONS TRENDS (CY 2002-CY 2006) ..................5

FIGURE 3. WHEN ADR WAS REQUESTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

FIGURE 4. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY REGION

 AND PROGRAM OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

FIGURE 5. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION BY TYPE OF

 LICENSEE, NON-LICENSEE, OR INDIVIDUAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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-APPENDICESA. SUMMARY OF ESCALATED NOTICES OF VIOLATION WITHOUT CIVIL PENALTIES ..... A1

B. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTIES ............................... B1

C. SUMMARY OF ORDERS AND IMPOSITIONS ................................ C1

D. SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS AND 

UNLICENSED INDIVIDUALS ........................................... D1

E. SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST NON-LICENSEES

(VENDORS, CONTRACTORS AND CERTIFICATE HOLDERS) .................... E1

F. SUMMARY OF HEARING ACTIVITY ...................................... F1
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OE Annual Report

-vABSTRACT

Since 1995, the Enforcement Program Annual Report has provided information addressing the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC or Commission) enforcement activities during a

given fiscal year (FY). Last year’s Annual Report employed a calendar year (CY) reporting

time-frame to align this report with the annual reports of other programs in the Office of

Enforcement such as the “Allegation Program Annual Trends Report.”

This year’s report again provides information about the NRC’s enforcement activities for the

previous calendar year (i.e., CY 2006), including the escalated enforcement actions that the

agency took, civil penalties that the agency imposed, changes that the agency made to the

Enforcement Policy, as well as information regarding new initiatives and revised staff guidance

that the agency added.

Security-related issues involving Notices of Violation, civil penalties, orders, Demands for

Information, etc., are not addressed in this report.
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OE Annual Report

-viiCALENDAR YEAR 2006 HIGHLIGHTS

÷ The Enforcement Policy was revised one time.

÷ The NRC issued 87 escalated enforcement actions, including:

• 57 escalated Notices of Violation without civil penalties

• 15 proposed civil penalties totaling $ 332,350

• 15 orders modifying, suspending, revoking a license, or prohibiting involvement in

NRC-licensed activities. Included in this number are eight orders that were issued

as part of the agency’s use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in enforcement cases 

• No orders imposing civil penalties issued

÷ The performance and administrative metrics for completing cases were met for 100% of

enforcement actions taken against NRC licensees.

÷ On September 28, 2006, the Office of Enforcement completed the fifth full revision of the

NRC Enforcement Manual. Revision 5 is a joint effort that draws on the knowledge and

experience of the enforcement staff in both headquarters and the regions, and includes

multiple changes, e.g., updated and reformatted information and hyperlinks to other NRC

documents.

÷ OE is the lead office for the Safety Culture Initiative. This initiative was developed to

enhance the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to more fully address safety culture. This

activity was completed and the revised process was implemented in July 2006.

÷ OE led an intra-agency task group to develop an agency-wide non-concurrence process. 

The non-concurrence process allows NRC employees to not concur on any part of a

document in which the employee disagrees and to document the employee’s concerns

and attach them to the proposed staff position.

÷ The enforcement Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Process pilot program concluded. 

The results of the pilot indicated that the use of ADR in certain kinds of enforcement

cases was generally successful. Based on the results of the pilot, improvements were

made to the ADR process and the agency will continue to use this process for certain

kinds of enforcement cases.
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OE Annual Report

-ixINTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

MISSION AND AUTHORITY

The NRC regulates the civilian uses of nuclear materials in the United States to protect public

health and safety, the environment and the common defense and security. This mission is

accomplished through: the licensing of nuclear facilities and possession, use, and disposal of

nuclear materials; the development and implementation of requirements governing licensed

activities; and inspection and enforcement activities to assure compliance with these

requirements.

The NRC’s enforcement authority is contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

(AEA) and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA). These statutes provide

the NRC with broad authority. The agency implements its enforcement authority through

Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 2. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. OE develops policies and programs for

enforcement of NRC requirements. Enforcement actions are used as a deterrent to emphasize

the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements and to encourage prompt

identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, because

violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the NRC

Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions.

Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations. OE provides oversight of

the major enforcement actions and assesses the effectiveness and consistency of enforcement

actions that the Regional Offices take. Enforcement authority includes the use of Notices of

Violation (NOVs), civil penalties, Demands for Information (DFIs) and orders to modify,

suspend, or revoke a license.

The following goals underlie NRC enforcement procedures:

1. Consistent responses to enforcement issues

2. Effective and efficient use of agency resources

3. Constant movement of enforcement actions toward resolution

4. Effective tracking of enforcement actions

5. Effective internal communication regarding enforcement actions
OE Annual Report

-xTHE OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT

The Office of Enforcement (OE) exercises oversight of the NRC Enforcement Program, 

providing programmatic and implementation direction to regional and headquarters offices

conducting or involved in enforcement activities, to ensure that the agency’s program is

implemented consistently.

The Director, OE, reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste,

Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is responsible for updating

the DEDMRT regarding escalated actions and consulting with the DEDMRT in any case

involving novel, substantial, legal, policy, or programmatic issues raised during the

enforcement review process, or where the Director, OE, believes it is warranted. The Director’s

responsibilities include:

• Preparation and issuance of enforcement actions

• Approval of direct enforcement actions to be taken by offices in the regions or in

headquarters

• Preparation of letters requesting investigations, confirming actions, or obtaining

information under §§161(c) or 182 of the AEA

• Issuance of subpoenas

• Initiation of the necessary or appropriate action in accordance with the decision of an

Administrative Law Judge, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), or the

Commission after enforcement hearings pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2

• Approval, after consultation with the DEDMRT, as warranted, the decision to

disposition a willful violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)

• Providing recommendations to the EDO, through the DEDMRT, regarding changes

to rules and policies concerning enforcement matters for Commission consideration

The Deputy Director, OE, assists the Director in overseeing, managing and directing the

development of enforcement policies and programs, and in issuing enforcement actions, and

acts for the Director in the Director’s absence.

The Chief of the Enforcement Policy and Program Oversight (EPPO) section is responsible for

supervising the OE staff involved with enforcement activities in the execution of their duties, and

acts for the Deputy Director, OE, in the Deputy Director’s absence.

In 2006, OE was allotted 19 full-time employees (FTE); however, 22 individuals were assigned

to OE headquarters, to carry out the full range of its mission. This included the FTE to provide:

(1) oversight of the Enforcement Program, including the ADR process; (2) the lead for all

agency external discrimination cases; (3) oversight of the NRC external Allegations Program;

(4) management of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) Program; (5) the development

and management of the non-concurrence process; and (6) development and oversight of the

policy on the Safety Culture Initiative. The FTE assigned to regional enforcement activities

report to their respective Regional Administrators.
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I. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Escalated enforcement is defined as:

• NOVs including Severity Level I, II, or III violations

• NOVs associated with Red, Yellow, or White Significance Determination Process

(SDP) findings for operating reactor facilities

• Civil penalty actions

• Orders

Figure 1 provides information

addressing the types of escalated

enforcement actions taken in CY 2006. 

The tables and figures at the conclusion

of this report break this information

down further by identifying the

region/program office which initiated the

action, as well as the licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals that were

involved.

A. ESCALATED VIOLATIONS WITHOUT CIVIL PENALTIES

During CY 2006, the agency issued 57 Notices of Violation (NOVs) without civil penalties. 

Seventeen of these actions were associated with White SDP findings from the Reactor

Oversight Process (ROP). Five of these actions were issued to licensed and unlicensed

individuals; and one was issued to a non-licensee.

Appendix A of this report provides brief summaries of the NOVs and NOVs associated with

SDP findings without civil penalties that were issued to licensees. Appendix D provides brief

summaries of the NOVs without civil penalties that were issued to licensed and unlicensed

individuals. Appendix E provides a summary of the NOV issued to a non-licensee.

(As noted previously, security-related issues involving NOVs, civil penalty actions, orders, etc.,

are not addressed in the Appendices of this report.)

B. CIVIL PENALTY ACTIONS

During CY 2006, the agency issued 15 proposed civil penalty actions of which four involved

willfulness.

Figure 1. Escalated Enforcement by Type

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty)

73%

Civil Penalties

17%

Orders

17%
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Information regarding willful violations is identified because, by definition, willful violations are of

particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees

and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with

candor; therefore, a violation involving willfulness may be considered more egregious than the

underlying violation taken alone would have been and the severity level may be increased.

Table I provides information regarding the civil penalties for CY 2002 through CY 2006. When

reviewing the information in this table, please note that an enforcement action may include

more than one civil penalty. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in one year and

imposed or paid in a subsequent year. Finally, the amount of a civil penalty may be reduced,

e.g., as part of a settlement agreement if an issue is resolved through the ADR process.

* This amount reflects a $5,450,000 civil penalty that was issued on April 21, 2005, to FirstEnergy

Nuclear Operating Company for multiple violations, some willful, that occurred at its Davis-Besse

Nuclear Power Plant.

** The NRC issues an “Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty” when a licensee refuses to pay a

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty.

Appendix B includes a brief description of the CY 2006 proposed civil penalty actions.

C. ORDERS

During CY 2006, the NRC issued 15 orders modifying, suspending, or revoking a license or

prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities, including confirmatory orders that were

CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004 CY 2005 CY 2006

Number of Proposed

Civil Penalties 32 22 26 24 15 

Number of Imposed 

Civil Penalties 2 8 3 3 - 

Number of Civil

Penalties Paid 33 23 22 22 16 

Amount of Proposed

Civil Penalties $553,200 $400,600 $498,700 $6,099,950* $332,350

Amount of Imposed 

Civil Penalties** $112,800 $8,500 $31,200 $112,100 $0

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $505,000 $510,100 $526,900 $5,891,900* $375,500

Table 1. Civil Penalty Information
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issued to confirm commitments associated with ADR settlement agreements. These do not

include security orders, or orders modifying licenses that are not associated with an 

enforcement action. Appendix C includes a brief description of the orders that were issued.

D. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WITH OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

In CY 2006, 38% of the 87 escalated actions that the agency issued were supported by an

Office of Investigation (OI) report. Breaking this number down further:

< 15 of 57 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (26%)

< 4 of 15 proposed civil penalties (27%)

< 14 of the 15 enforcement orders (there were no impositions) (93%)

E. TIMELINESS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The protection of public health and safety remains paramount among the agency’s goals and

drives its decisions; however, the NRC recognizes that it must consider other key issues,

including the effect of its decisions on the public's trust in the NRC’s regulatory process, the

industries the NRC regulates, and its own effectiveness and efficiency. Efficiency includes

recognition that regulatory decisions should be made without undue delay.

The agency’s performance measure goals for issuing escalated enforcement actions (excluding

impositions) are:

< 100% of non-investigation cases are completed within 180 calendar days; and

< 100% of investigation cases are completed within 360 calendar days.

In addition, the Enforcement Program has established administrative goals for completing

cases. These are:

< 100% of non-investigation cases are completed within an average of 120 calendar

days; and

< 100% of investigation cases are completed within an average of 180 calendar days.

The measuring period starts on the latest of the following dates:

< The date of the inspection exit (for non-investigation cases);

< The date of the OI memorandum forwarding the OI investigation to the staff (for

investigation cases);

< The date that the Department of Justice (DOJ) informs the NRC that the NRC may

proceed (for cases referred to DOJ); or

< The date of the Department of Labor (DOL) decision that is the basis for the action.

During CY 2006, performance measures and administrative goals were met with average case

times as follows: (1) with all non-OI cases completed within 180 days and all OI cases 
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completed within 360 calendar days; and (2) an average 84 days of processing time for non-OI

cases and an average 178 days of processing time for OI cases.

F. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION TRENDS

During CY 2006, the agency issued 87 escalated enforcement actions. This number is slightly

lower than the average number of 104.4 escalated enforcement actions issued for the last five

years. Table 2 provides information regarding the total number of escalated enforcement

actions from FY 2002 to CY 2006. Figure 2, provides information regarding the escalated

enforcement trends by type of licensee, non-licensee, and individual.

The lower number of escalated actions taken in CY 2006 is a result of several initiatives that the

agency has taken in the last few years. Specifically, as discussed in Section V of this report,

“Notices of VII.B.6 Enforcement Discretion,” enforcement discretion was applied in 17 cases

involving violations of 10 CFR 30.34(i) based on the criteria for such discretion contained in a

Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 06-01. In these cases, when appropriate corrective

actions were taken, discretion was applied to treat these cases as non-escalated enforcement

actions rather than as Severity Level III violations. In addition, during CY 2006, discretion was

applied in both reactor and materials enforcement cases where it was determined that some

licensees who failed to meet the requirements in newly issued security orders, deserved credit

for their good faith efforts to meet these newly-imposed requirements. Finally, the agency used

the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process for eight enforcement cases. Some of these

cases resulted in a less severe enforcement action and/or a reduced civil penalty or no civil

penalty based on the commitments and corrective actions the licensees agreed to during ADR. 

For example, a civil penalty of $6,500 was proposed in a radiography enforcement case;

however, based on the settlement agreement reached during ADR, the NRC agreed to reduce

this amount to $500 in recognition of the extensive corrective actions the licensee took.

CY2006 CY2005 FY2004 FY2003 FY2002 Average 

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil Penalty) 57 70 58 68 79 66.4

Civil Penalties 15 24 26 32 22 23.8

Orders 15 17 7 6 11 11.2

Orders Imposing Civil Penalties 0 3 3 2 8 3.2

Total Escalated Actions 87 114 94 108 120 104.6

Table 2. Escalated Actions Trends
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G. Demands for Information

A Demand for Information (DFI) is an administrative enforcement tool issued to a licensee or

other person that enables the NRC to determine whether additional enforcement action is

warranted, e.g., an order. During CY 2006, no DFIs were issued.

II. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS AND NON-LICENSEES

During CY 2006, the agency issued 13 actions to licensed and unlicensed individuals. This

number is included in the total number of escalated enforcement actions (NOVs and orders)

that the agency took in CY 2006. Appendix D provides brief summaries of the orders and

NOVs that were issued during CY 2006 to licensed and unlicensed individuals prohibiting or

limiting their participation in NRC-licensed activities. Appendix E provides a brief summary of

the one escalated enforcement action issued to a non-licensee, i.e., an NOV issued to a

vendor.

Figure 2. Escalated Actions Trends (CY 2002 - CY 2006)

79

68

58

70

57

22

32

26 24

15

7

17 15 11 8 6 2 3 3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Escalated NOVs (w/o C ivil Penalty)

C ivil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing C ivil P enalties
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III. CASES INVOLVING DISCRIMINATION

The NRC values the importance of nuclear industry employees feeling unimpeded to raise

potential safety concerns to both licensee management and the NRC. The NRC vigorously

pursues enforcement action against licensees or licensee contractors who discriminate against

their employees for raising such concerns, regardless of the merits of the concern.

Unlawful adverse actions taken against employees for raising safety concerns may create a

“chilling effect” on the employee or other workers who may wish to raise concerns, i.e.,

employees may not believe they can raise concerns without fear of retaliation. Acts of

discrimination include discharge and other adverse actions that relate to an employee’s

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. In addition, one of the goals of

the NRC’s enforcement process is to ensure, through appropriate enforcement action against a

licensee or licensee contractor (and when warranted, against the individual personally

responsible for the act of discrimination), that adverse employment actions shall not be taken

against licensee or contractor employees for raising safety concerns, nor shall employers

create or support a work climate that has a chilling effect on employees or other individuals who

may wish to report safety concerns.

During CY 2006 several cases involving alleged discrimination were referred to OI for

investigation; however, none of these cases resulted in escalated enforcement action.

IV. NOTICES OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NOEDS)

Occasionally, circumstances may arise where a power reactor licensee’s compliance with a

technical specification (TS) or other license condition would involve an unnecessary plant

transient or performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is inappropriate

for the specific plant conditions, or would cause unnecessary delays in plant startup without a

corresponding health and safety benefit. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may choose

not to enforce the applicable requirement(s). This enforcement discretion, designated as a

NOED (Notice of Enforcement Discretion), is exercised only if the staff is clearly satisfied that

the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also issue

NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena, when the determination

is made that safety will not be compromised by exercising this discretion. NOEDs require

justification from a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the request

and provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to issue an NOED. Since

2000, no NOEDS have been issued to gaseous diffusion plants.

In 2006, the NRC issued five NOEDs to operating nuclear power plants:

• NOED 06-01-01 was issued on April 20, 2006, to the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating

Company for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 to allow enforcement discretion

regarding the actions required in TS 3.0.3.

• NOED 06-02-01 was issued on February 22, 2006, to the Florida Power and Light
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Company for St. Lucie Unit 2 to allow enforcement discretion for ACTION “c” in

TS 3.6.1.7.

• NOED 06-03-01 was issued on October 18, 2006, to the Exelon Generation

Company, LLC, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to allow enforcement

discretion regarding the actions required in TS 3.1.7.

• NOED 06-04-01 was issued on December 6, 2006, to the South Texas Project

Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) for the South Texas Project, Unit 2,

granting STPNOC’s request for a NOED to allow STPNOC to extend TS allowed

outage time an additional eight days to support corrective maintenance activities on

the Unit 2 “A” high head safety injection pump without having to shut down Unit 2. 

• NOED 06-04-02 was issued on December 20, 2006 to the South Texas Project

Nuclear Operating Company for the South Texas Project, Unit 1. The NOED

granted STPNOC’s request for enforcement discretion for Unit 1 with regard to TS

3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10, Action Statement 35 and TS 3.7.1.2.b, to allow time to return

the affected equipment functions associated with these TS to an operable status.

V. NOTICES OF VII.B.6 ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Section VII of the Enforcement Policy addresses those cases where, notwithstanding the

normal guidance contained in the Enforcement Policy for assessing the significance of a

violation, the NRC may choose to exercise discretion. In such cases, the NRC may either

escalate or mitigate the enforcement sanctions to ensure that the resulting enforcement action

takes into consideration all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, and is in the

interest of the public health and safety.

As mentioned above, OE applied enforcement discretion to 17 cases involving violations of 

10 CFR 30.34(i), based on the criteria for such discretion contained in EGM 06-001,

“Enforcement of Security Requirements for Portable Gauges,” published on June 12, 2006. 

Discretion was applied for first-time, non-willful violations where the gauge was not lost or

stolen, and one suitable restraint (i.e., the previous requirement that was superceded by the

current requirement to have two independent restraints) existed. In these cases, when

appropriate corrective action was taken, discretion was applied to treat these violations as

Severity Level IV violations (rather than as Severity Level III violations).

VI. 10 CFR 2.206 PETITIONS

Under the regulations in 10 CFR 2.206, any person may file a request with the Executive

Director for Operations (EDO) to institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 to modify,

suspend, or revoke a license, or to request other appropriate enforcement action. The EDO 
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assigns this request to a program office. Upon receipt of the request, the Office Director

assigns a petition manager (PM) who coordinates review of the petition and the agency’s

response, i.e., a Director’s Decision (DD) either granting, partially granting, or denying the

request. This process includes the PM establishing a Petition Review Board (PRB).

OE supports these activities, as requested. In CY 2006, OE was asked to serve as a member

on two PRBs to consider the merits of these requests. 

VII. WITHDRAWN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Enforcement actions can be challenged for several reasons, e.g., a licensee might dispute the

requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s application of the Enforcement Policy, or the

significance of the violation. Routinely, it should be noted, licensees provide clarifying

information that was not available at the time of an inspection and this may affect whether a

noncompliance exists. During CY 2006, the agency did not withdraw any escalated

enforcement actions.

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on the

number of withdrawn non-escalated enforcement actions, i.e., less than 30 non-escalated

enforcement actions are successfully disputed based on interpretation of the requirements, the

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the facts of the case. Violations that are overturned

based on supplemental information being provided that was not available for the inspector to

make an appropriate assessment are not counted in this metric. During CY 2006,

approximately 1,434 non-escalated enforcement actions were issued to reactor and materials

licensees. Of these actions, 12 non-escalated enforcement actions were disputed. Of the

disputed actions, the NRC either withdrew or recharacterized six of these actions. Therefore,

this metric was met.

The following nonescalated enforcement action illustrates when the agency may withdraw or

recharacterize an initial enforcement action: During an inspection, the RSO told the NRC

inspector that he had not conducted the required inventories of three portable nuclear gauges

for the specified periods in CY 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005. By letter, the RSO later stated

that, in fact, he had performed the required inventories. RIV discussed the change in position

with the RSO by telephone. During that call, the RSO stated that after receiving NRC's

inspection report, he recalled that he had performed the inventories by physically observing the

gauges in their storage location. He stated that he failed to document these visual inventories. 

Based on this new information, RIV issued a letter withdrawing the SL IV violation.

VIII. HEARING ACTIVITIES

During CY 2006, several cases involved individuals who worked at the Davis Besse Nuclear

Power Plant. Appendix G provides brief summaries of the hearings involved with these cases.
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IX. ENFORCEMENT POLICY CHANGES

The NRC Enforcement Policy, a living document, is revised to reflect experience and

stakeholder input. Enforcement Policy changes are published in the Federal Register. During

2006, the Enforcement Policy was revised once. “NRC Enforcement Policy: Extension of the

Discretion Period of Interim Enforcement Policy” (71 FR 19905) published on April 18, 2006,

extends the enforcement discretion period in the “Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding

Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues” to three years for those licensees

that commit to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), and to provide clarification and enhancements

predominately in the areas of existing non-compliances and the treatment of non-compliances if

a licensee withdraws from the transition.

In addition to this revision of the Enforcement Policy, several Temporary Enforcement Guidance

Memoranda (EGM) were published in CY 2006. The following EGMs can be found in Appendix

A of the NRC Enforcement Manual:

• EGM 05-003, “Statute of Limitations Tracking Guidance,” published on January 10,

2006.

• EGM 06-001, “Enforcement of Security Requirements for Portable Gauges,”

published on June 6, 2006.

• EGM 06-002, “Dispositioning Non-Willful 10 CFR 50.9 Violations Related to Safety

System Unavailability Performance Indicator Changes,” published on August 18,

2006.

• EGM 98-002, “Disposition of Violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections

III.G and III.L, Regarding Circuit Failures (Revision 2, Supplement 1),” published on

September 6, 2006.

• EGM 06-003, “Guidance for Dispositioning Enforcement Issues Associated with

Orders Imposing Increased Controls for Licensees Authorized to Possess

Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern,” published on September 9, 2006.

• EGM 06-004, “Enforcement Discretion for Violations Associated with Concentrating

Uranium at Community Water Systems,” published on October 10, 2006.

• EGM 06-005, “Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR 70.72, Facility Change and

Change Process Violations Related to NRC Regulatory Issues Summary 2006-14,

Facility Changes Under 10 CFR 70.72(C)(2),” published on October 17, 2006.
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X. AGENCY ALLEGATION REVIEWS

Because the Annual Report for the NRC’s Allegation Program provides information about the

activities within that program, information about the program is limited in this report. It merits

mentioning in this report, however, that in accordance with Management Directive 8.8,

“Management of Allegations,” OE performs a quality assurance review of all agency outgoing

responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that involve allegations. The OE

Allegations Assistant reviews both the bracketed and redacted sets of records in order to verify

thoroughness and accuracy in what the agency releases. The review and concurrence of these

records is used to certify that the information to be disclosed from each record, or portion

thereof, will not cause harm to an open allegation, or disclose the identity of an alleger whose

identity still warrants protection. In CY 2006, OE reviewed approximately 36,497 pages of

material for 45 agency FOIA responses. This included 1,687 pages of records that OE was

responsible for reviewing (during the discovery phase) in preparation for the hearing on the first

Individual Enforcement Actions response from the Davis-Besse case.

XI. INITIATIVES, PROGRAM OFFICE SUPPORT, STAFF GUIDANCE, &

IMPLEMENTATION

A. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The NRC has a general Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Policy which was issued on

August 14, 1992. It supports and encourages the use of ADR in NRC activities. The NRC uses

ADR in a variety of circumstances, including rulemaking and policy development, Equal

Employment Opportunity (EEO) disputes, and to a more limited degree, in enforcement cases.

WHAT IS ADR?

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA) encourages Federal agencies to

use ADR. ADR is a term that refers to a variety of processes that emphasize creative,

cooperative approaches to handling conflicts in lieu of adversarial procedures. ADR is a less

formal (compared to litigation) method of resolving differences between two or more parties.

Numerous forms of ADR exist, with mediation and arbitration being the most widely recognized. 

Mediation contains a spectrum of styles. In mediation, the parties develop a settlement

agreement between themselves with a mediator’s unbiased assistance. While ADR is

frequently perceived as “binding arbitration” which concludes with the arbitrator issuing a

decision, in mediation cases, the mediator cannot “bind” the parties. The NRC’s enforcement

ADR program uses mediation rather than arbitration, i.e., the parties develop mutually

agreeable corrective actions rather than being obligated by an arbitrator’s decision.
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HOW IS ADR USED IN THE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM?

At the beginning of FY 2005, the agency implemented a pilot program to evaluate the use of

ADR in the Allegation and Enforcement Programs. The enforcement portion of the pilot

program was initiated after OI had completed its investigation and based on the results of the

investigation, the enforcement staff had concluded that further consideration of the issues

identified in the OI report was warranted. This portion of the pilot program was typically

referred to as “post-investigation” ADR.

Having decided to pursue enforcement based on the OI investigation report, ADR was offered

at three points in the enforcement process: (1) prior to a predecisional enforcement conference;

(2) when an NOV was issued; and (3) when cases resulted in the issuance of an order

imposing a civil penalty. The post-investigation ADR pilot included an evaluation of the position

that ADR would be less adversarial, less formal, and could promote greater communication

which, in turn, could promote greater cooperation between parties at these points in the

enforcement process. The potential for resource savings and a more timely resolution of issues

was also anticipated.

The pilot program operated through the first quarter of 2006. The staff utilized ADR to resolve

reactor, fuel facility, and materials enforcement cases at all points in the enforcement process

provided by the pilot program (i.e., prior to a predecisional enforcement conference, with the

issuance of an NOV, or with the issuance of an order imposing a civil penalty). Licensees,

organizations subject to NRC jurisdiction, and individuals requested and used ADR. The staff

used a confirmatory order to document the final settlement agreement that was reached in each

case.

On May 5, 2006, SECY-06-0102, “Evaluation of the Pilot Program on the Use of Alternative

Dispute Resolution in the Allegation and Enforcement Programs” was issued. In SECY-06-

0102, the staff concluded that the use of ADR was, in general, a success. Despite limited

resource savings overall in the enforcement portion of the ADR program, the opportunity for the

staff to communicate openly with other parties in mediation with the assistance of a trained

mediator helped the staff reach effective agreements that met NRC’s interests. Corrective

actions were broader and/or more comprehensive than typically achieved through the traditional

enforcement process. Parties commented, both formally and informally, that ADR was a less

confrontational means to resolve issues, due in large part to the improved 

communication.

The staff’s evaluation noted that despite overall success, several opportunities for improvement

existed. To improve the process, during 2006: (1) Regional Administrators were delegated the

authority to issue confirmatory orders in their regions that were negotiated pursuant to the ADR

program; (2) under certain circumstances, regional division directors were designated as lead

negotiators; (3) information that is available on both the internal and external web sites was

improved; and (4) plans to conduct additional mediator orientation were developed.
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During 2006, a total of eight

confirmatory orders were issued (i.e.,

two in reactor-related cases and six in

materials-related cases) and one

materials user licensee withdrew from

the process after initially agreeing to

mediate. 

Figure 3 illustrates where ADR was

requested in the enforcement process.

B. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

During CY 2006, no changes were made to Section VIII of the Enforcement Policy which

addresses enforcement actions against individuals. The most recent revision was proposed by

an internal NRC working group chaired by OE to evaluate and propose recommendations to

this section of the Enforcement Policy. The proposed revision was published in the Federal

Register on March 9, 2001, and sought stakeholder feedback on the proposed revision.

The NRC received comments from several stakeholders including the Union of Concerned

Scientists and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). The staff evaluated these comments;

however, since the Discrimination Task Group (DTG) was considering a related question,

namely whether hearing rights should be granted to individuals who receive NOVs, revision to

Section VIII was placed on hold pending issuance of the DTG Staff Requirements

Memorandum (SRM). Issued on March 26, 2003, the DGT SRM provided the staff with the

Commission’s direction to "fully explore the policy and resource implications of providing

hearing rights (either formal or informal) to individuals subject to an NOV in connection with

violations of the employee protection regulations." 

During the ADR pilot program, the staff engaged in mediation with individuals as well as

licensees. Although it was a challenge to coordinate and honor confidentiality issues, the staff, 

as well as some external stakeholders, believed that ADR offered an opportunity to resolve

these matters in a positive manner. The ADR pilot program offered individuals creative actions

meeting the agency’s interest in deterrence and compliance. In addition, the staff allowed

individuals to gain their employer’s agreement to certain actions prior to finalizing a settlement

agreement. Consequently, the staff concluded in SECY-06-0102, that offering ADR to

individuals accused of wrongdoing provides the alternative process for individuals the

Commission directed the staff to continue considering in the DGT SRM.
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The Enforcement Policy will be revised to incorporate the use of ADR for individuals subject to

an NOV in connection with violations of the employee protection regulations.

C. CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITY AGAINST NON-LICENSEES FOR DISCRIMINATION

OE was the lead office responsible for the proposed rulemaking entitled “Clarification of NRC

Civil Penalty Authority over Contractors and Subcontractors Who Discriminate Against

Employees for Engaging in Protected Activities.” 

In January 2006, the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register (71 FR 5015). This

rule would amend the Commission’s employee protection regulations in Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR) 30.7, 40.7, 50.7, 60.9, 61.9, 63.9, 70.7, 71.9, 72.10, and 76.7, to

allow the Commission to impose civil penalties on contractors and subcontractors for violations

of these regulations. The proposed rule also recommended amending 10 CFR 76.7 to bring it

into conformance with the provisions of the other NRC’s employee protection regulations by

providing that the Commission may impose a civil penalty on the United States Enrichment

Corporation or a contractor or subcontractor of the United States Enrichment Corporation. The

FRN provided the public with the opportunity to comment on the amendments, the draft

environmental assessment, and the draft regulatory analysis. The comment period closed on

April 17, 2006. The staff anticipates that the final rule will be published during CY 2007. At that

time, the Enforcement Policy will also be revised to clarify the Commission’s civil penalty

authority over contractors and subcontractors.

D. SAFETY CULTURE INITIATIVE

Beginning in 2005 and continuing in 2006, OE has been the lead office on an initiative to

develop changes to the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to more fully address safety culture

in response to Commission direction in SRM-SECY-04-0111, “Recommended Staff Actions

Regarding Agency Guidance in the Areas of Safety Conscious Work Environment and Safety

Culture.” The Commission has referenced the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's

(INSAG) definition of safety culture as “ ... that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in

organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant

safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” The Commission provided

further guidance in SRM-SECY-05-0187, “Status of Safety Culture Initiatives and Schedule for

Near-Term Deliverables.” The following significant accomplishments were achieved in CY 2006

to complete this initiative.

Early in 2006, the agency held frequent public meetings with external stakeholders to finalize an

approach to modify selected inspection procedures (IPs) and inspection manual chapters

(IMCs) to incorporate safety culture considerations. During this period, multiple briefings on the

status of the safety culture initiative were provided to the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards (ACRS) and other agency staff.
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The inter-office/region safety culture working group modified the following IPs and IMCs to

incorporate safety culture enhancements, based on the approach developed with external

stakeholder involvement: 

• IP 71152 “Identification and Resolution of Problems”

• IP 71153 “Event Follow-Up”

• IP 93812 “Special Inspection”

• IP 93800 “Augmented Inspection Team”

• IP 95001 “Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic

Performance Area”

• IP 95002 “Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White

Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area”

• IP 95003 “Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple

Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or One Red Input”

• IMC 0305 “Operating Reactor Assessment Program: Licensee Response, Regulatory

Response, Degraded Cornerstone, and Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone”

• IMC 0612 “Power Reactor Inspection Reports”

In May 2006, OE developed and submitted SECY-06-0122, “Safety Culture Initiative Activities 

to Enhance the Reactor Oversight Process and Outcomes of the Initiatives,” to provide

information to the Commissioners on the staff’s activities and current status to enhance the

ROP to more fully address safety culture.

The revised ROP was implemented in July 2006. Prior to the implementation of the revised

ROP, safety culture computer-based training and regional inspector counterpart meeting

training was developed and provided to inspection staff.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-13, “Information on the Changes Made to the

Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully Address Safety Culture,” dated July 31, 2006, was

issued, providing information to addressees and their contractors regarding the safety culture

changes to selected IPs and IMCs.

The chair of the inter-office/region safety culture working group is the vice-chair of the Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation’s newly established Safety Culture Focus Team (SCFT). The

purpose of the SCFT is to promote the implementation of the ROP safety culture changes in an

effective and consistent manner across the regions. The Agency’s Allegation Advisor, located

in OE, chairs the SCFT’s newly established subgroup, the Safety Conscious Work Environment 

Findings Review Group, which reviews and dispositions all potential findings in the safety

conscious work environment (SCWE) cross-cutting area of the ROP, to ensure regulatory

consistency. Additional information on SCWE activities can be found in the “Allegation

Program 2006 Annual Trends Report.”
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E. DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINIONS PROGRAM 

The NRC revised its internal program for addressing differing professional views/opinions on 

May 16, 2004. OE has the program lead for the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO)

program. The DPO program emphasizes that the agency will not tolerate retaliation,

harassment or intimidation of employees who raise DPO concerns.

F. NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS

In CY 2006, OE led an intra-agency task group to develop an agency-wide non-concurrence

process. On November 29, 2006, the EDO issued draft Management Directive and Handbook

10.158, "NRC Non-Concurrence Process," as interim policy to provide agency-wide instructions

and guidance for processing non-concurrences on documents in the concurrence process. The

Non-Concurrence Process (NCP) applies equally to administrative issues, policy issues and

technical concerns, and has been made part of the normal NRC document review and

concurrence process.

The NCP is open to those on document concurrence, and to document reviewers and

contributors provided they were assigned by supervisors to perform these roles. Employees

also may request to be removed from concurrence. However, document sponsors must assure

the adequacy of the concurrence chain and make document signers aware of important

concerns that resulted in the request.

G. REACTOR PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES

FIRE PROTECTION ACTIVITIES

As previously noted, OE revised the Enforcement Policy addressing the “Interim Enforcement

Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues,” on April 18, 2006

(71 FR 19905). The revision extends the current enforcement discretion period to three years

for those licensees that commit to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provides enhancements

predominately in the areas of existing non-compliances and the treatment of non-compliances if

a licensee withdraws from the transition.

In September 2006, the agency extended the six-month time frame for the enforcement

discretion from September 6, 2006, until a proposed generic letter addressing this subject and

an associated EGM is issued.

H. MATERIALS PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES

OE supported the following rulemakings:

< The 10 CFR Parts 40, 72, 74, and 150 rulemaking, “Regulatory Improvements to the

Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System;”
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< The 10 CFR Part 70 rulemaking, “The Facility Change Process Involving Items Relied On

For Safety;”

< The 10 CFR Parts 30, 31, and 32 rulemaking, “Exemptions from Licensing, General

Licenses, and Distribution of Byproduct Material: Licensing and Reporting Requirements;”

< The 10 CFR Part 40 rulemaking, “Groundwater Protection at In Situ Leach Uranium

Processing Facilities;” and

< The 10 CFR Part 40 rulemaking, “Uranium In Drinking Water.”

OE served on working groups involved with:

< The development of the National Source Tracking System; and

< The definition of Byproduct Material related to Naturally Occurring or AcceleratorProduced Radioactive Material (NARM).

I. SECURITY PROGRAM SUPPORT & INITIATIVES

OE supported the following Security Initiatives:

< Security Findings Review Panel meetings for NSIR;

< The 10 CFR 73.55 rulemaking, "Power Reactor Security Requirements;” and

< The 10 CFR Part 26 rulemaking, “Fitness-For-Duty.”

J. LEGAL PROGRAM SUPPORT

OE worked extensively with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to provide support for the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing activities related to enforcement actions

issued during 2006 to former employees at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant (IA-05-021,

IA-05-052, IA-05-052, and IA-05-054). Support activities included enforcement specialists

attending depositions with OGC attorneys and assisting with the written responses to

interrogatories.

K. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

The NRC views building and maintaining public trust and confidence as an important

performance goal for the agency as it carries out its mission. To reach this goal, the NRC must

be an independent, open, efficient, clear and reliable regulator and must find appropriate ways

to convey its message to the public, including providing stakeholders with clear and accurate

information about, and a meaningful role in, the agency’s regulatory programs.
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To further these goals, the NRC’s Enforcement Program has been structured to actively

engage stakeholders by educating them on how the enforcement program is conducted and

how it is changing to support new initiatives in the agency’s oversight programs.

To provide accurate and timely information to all interested stakeholders and enhance the

public’s understanding of the NRC’s Enforcement Program, information about the Enforcement

Program is available on the NRC’s public web site where it can be retrieved and downloaded. 

The NRC’s Enforcement web site includes a variety of information such as the Enforcement

Policy; significant enforcement actions issued to reactor and materials licensees, non-licensees

(vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals; upcoming predecisional

enforcement conferences; and enforcement guidance, e.g., the newly revised Enforcement

Manual and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGMs). Consistent with NRC practices and

policies, most security-related actions and activities are not included on the NRC’s public web

site. OE does include security orders that impose compensatory security requirements on

various licensees in its enforcement documents collection.

The draft inspection procedures (IPs) and inspection manual chapters (IMCs) that were

changed to more fully address safety culture were provided on OE’s public safety culture web

site for stakeholder review and comment. The final IPs and IMCs and the resolution of

stakeholders comments were also placed on the NRC’s public web site as were public meeting

materials and summaries, and other relevant documents.

In an effort to increase stakeholder involvement in the development of enforcement policy and

guidance, OE has also established a public participation page on the Enforcement web site

which allows interested stakeholders to provide input on various enforcement issues, e.g., the

use of ADR in enforcement.

In CY 2006, stakeholder activities included:

< On January 18, February 2, and February 14, 2006, OE chaired public stakeholder

meetings on the safety culture revisions to the ROP.

< On March 1, 2006, OE attended a public meeting addressing fire protection issues.

< On March 3, 2006, OE made a presentation at a public meeting on the discretion policy

for NFPA 805 transition periods.

< During the March 2006 Regulatory Information Conference (RIC), OE sponsored a panel

consisting of stakeholders which discussed the use of ADR in the NRC’s Allegation and

Enforcement Programs. Representatives from the various groups involved in the NRC’s

ADR program provided presentations and answered questions.

< At the March 2006 RIC, OE chaired a panel session on “Safety Culture Initiatives and

Implications.”
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< On May 8 through 10, 2006, OE participated in the Conference of Radiation Control

Program Directors (CRCPD) Annual Meeting and presented the use of ADR in the NRC’s

Enforcement Program.

< In May 2006, OE participated in the Nuclear Energy Agency’s 8th International Workshop

on Inspection Activities in Toronto, Canada, on the topic of Nuclear Regulatory

Inspections and Safety Culture.

< In August 2006, OE attended the annual Fire Protection Information Forum sponsored by

the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and made a presentation on the current enforcement

issues related to fire protection.

< In November 2006, OE participated in a panel on “Regulatory Oversight and Involvement

in Safety Culture” at the American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, Albuquerque, New

Mexico.

L. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

The NRC’s Enforcement Manual was completely revised during CY 2006 and deployed in 

September 2006. The Manual is located on the NRC’s external and internal web sites and in

the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). The revision adds

new information and updates current guidance on enforcement issues. No longer provided in

hard-copy, the electronic version will be updated as needed to ensure that users have access to

the latest enforcement guidance. In addition, the revised Manual is in a more “user-friendly”

format for retrieving information.

The guidance in the Enforcement Manual is intended for internal use by the NRC and contains

the procedures, requirements, and background information used by the staff who review and

process enforcement actions; however, it is also publicly available.

M. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, AND REVIEWS

Successful communications and training for internal stakeholders is vital to ensure that the

agency’s Enforcement Program is both understood and acknowledged. Annually,

headquarters, regional, and program office enforcement staff participate in a counterpart

meeting to discuss enforcement issues and present new enforcement initiatives. Weekly

conference calls are also held at which enforcement issues and questions about enforcement

cases are discussed.

Topic-focused reviews are conducted to provide the enforcement staff with comprehensive

feedback regarding the successes and challenges facing the Enforcement Program and to

assist the staff in identifying when the Enforcement Policy and enforcement guidance is

inconsistently applied to enforcement actions. The following section provides brief summaries

of the reviews that were conducted in CY 2006.
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Headquarters

REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM (EATS)

On January 13, 2006, OE completed a review of the Enforcement Action Tracking System

(EATS) which is used to track the progress of the enforcement actions that OE “opens”. The

review looked at cases that were opened in 2005. The purpose of the review was to identify:

(1) cases where the final enforcement action has been issued, but the case was not “closed” in

EATS; (2) escalated enforcement cases that had been issued, but had not been published on

the Enforcement web page within 10 days of their issuance date; and (3) data that was

incorrectly or inappropriately (e.g., security considerations) entered.

During the review, the review team found that: (1) several cases where the final enforcement

action had been issued were missing final data that would have allowed the case to be closed

in EATS; (2) in a few cases, distribution for escalated enforcement actions did not include OE

WEB, resulting in a delay in adding these cases to the OE web page; and (3) a number of data

entry errors were identified, e.g., a number of cases that either did not have a case open date

or had an incorrect open date, several cases that did not include the inspection date, and two

cases that did not identify the enforcement specialist associated with the case. In one case the

OI Report issue was missing in the OI database.

In response to the review, in CY 2006, OE took the following actions to improve the tracking of

enforcement cases within the office: (1) all the errors that were found were corrected; (2) the

Deputy Office Director spoke to the staff regarding the importance of providing correct data and

maintaining the database at several staff meetings and on the weekly conference call with

regional enforcement staff; and (3) OE will continue to monitor cases in EATS to assure that the

data is correct and that cases are closed appropriately.

REVIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS/ENFORCEMENT ACTION (SDP/EA)

REQUEST & STRATEGY FORMS IN ADAMS:

In December 2006, OE completed a review of the Significance Determination

Process/Enforcement Action (SDP/EA) request & Strategy Forms (SFs) that have been placed

into ADAMS. These forms are used to document enforcement strategies and are required to

be entered into ADAMS after they have been approved by OE management. The purpose of

the review was to determine whether (1) all approved SFs have been placed into ADAMS and

(2) ADAMS Document Processing instructions OE-005 are being correctly implemented.

The review examined 41 SFs that were processed during the two-month period from

September 15, 2006, through November 15, 2006. The results of the review indicated that

approximately 90% of the approved SFs were placed into ADAMS. Of the SFs that were placed

into ADAMS, the document processing instructions were correctly implemented with a few

minor errors, and the ADAMS profiles for the approved SFs included all required document
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fields as indicated in OE-005. Only two SFs did not include the case/document number which

while not a required field, is an applicable field.

Based on the results of the review, the following recommendations were made: (1) ensure that 

each strategy form in ADAMS is profiled correctly by placing a case’s EA number in both the 

“ADAMS Document Manager” field, and the “ADAMS Find” field; (2) explore the possibility of

making the EA number a required field; (3) provide document processing training to staff who

process documents in ADAMS; (4) provide training to staff that addresses how to retrieve the

SFs using different/alternate field searches, such as title, or text, etc., in addition to the use of

the EA number; (5) review the ADAMS folder periodically to verify that SFs have been placed in

ADAMS as required. Corrective actions based on these recommendations have been planned

and are currently being implemented.

REVIEW OF THE 3-WEEK EMAIL PROCESS

In April 2006, the staff completed a review of the “3-week email” process entitled “Audit of the

Significance Determination Process/Enforcement Action(SDP/EA) request & Strategy Forms in

ADAMS.” These emails are used to give responsible offices an opportunity to provide

comments on an Office of Investigations (OI) report which indicates that there does not appear

to be a violation. The responsible office enforcement coordinator normally issues an email

message to affected offices within one week after receiving the OI report indicating that no

enforcement action is being considered. If, after three weeks from the date of the email

message, the responsible office has not received differing views, the matter is considered

closed. The purpose of the review was to verify that 3-week emails were being issued, to

determine the timeliness of their issuance, and to solicit suggestions to improve this process. 

The review covered all unsubstantiated OI reports issued during CY 2005.

The review concluded that: (1) all affected offices issued 3-week emails for all the

unsubstantiated OI reports covered by the review or provided justification for those instances

where it was not issued; (2) although some offices met the Enforcement Manual guidance to

issue the emails within one week, the 1-week issuance guidance, on average, was not being

met; and (3) OE historically has not maintained a formal process to ensure that it reviews at

least 10 percent of all unsubstantiated OI reports.

Based on the results of this review, the following changes were implemented: (1) the

Enforcement Manual timeliness guidance for issuance of 3-week emails was changed from one

week to 60 days; (2) the OE Action Item Tracking System (AITS) was revised to include a box

for “unsubstantiated” in the OI Reports field, followed by other boxes which can be checked to

indicate whether the unsubstantiated report was reviewed by the assigned OE specialist and

the date of the review; and (3) an AITS tracking item was opened to ensure that each OE

specialist reviews a minimum of two unsubstantiated OI reports each fiscal year.
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REVIEW OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX B, CRITERION XVI, GREEN NON-CITED VIOLATIONS

In July 2006, OE and the four regional offices completed a review entitled “10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Green Non-cited Violations.” The purpose of this review was (1) to

determine whether inspectors were correctly implementing the NRC Enforcement Policy NonCited Violation (NCV) criteria and (2) to determine whether 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion

XVI, “Corrective Action,” NCVs are being correctly cited.

A total of 60 Criterion XVI NCVs, out of a population of approximately 124 Criterion XVI NCVs

recorded during CY 2005, were evaluated during this review. The review concluded that

approximately 23% of the Green Criterion XVI NCVs evaluated were not valid violations of

Criterion XVI. Approximately 7% of the NCVs evaluated were determined to be inadequately

supported by the inspection report documentation such that a determination could not be made

regarding the validity of the violation. Approximately 30% of the violations described as

Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality (SCAQs) or as “failed to prevent recurrence” were

determined not to be valid SCAQs. With the exception of Inspection Procedure 88110, “Quality

Assurance: Problem Identification, Resolution and Corrective Action (PIRCA) (Construction,

Pre-Operation and Operation),” neither the NRC Inspection Manual nor inspection procedures

define a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) or SCAQ. Therefore, to a large extent, inspectors

must rely on personal judgment to determine whether an issue represents a CAQ or SCAQ and

often the inspection report does not adequately justify how the inspector made that

determination.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) reviewed the recommendations of this review

and agreed to provide additional clarification in inspection program documents and to provide

training to inspectors on the attributes of a properly cited Criterion XVI violation. NRR is also

working with the industry through the Corrective Action Program Owner’s Group to identify

SCAQ examples across the industry in order to reach an industry consensus on the type of

issues which would result in a SCAQ.

REGIONAL

REGION I

Region I conducted two self-assessments (in June and September 2006) of the Enforcement

and Allegations Programs, entered the findings from the reviews into Region I’s corrective

actions program, and provided training in response to the findings.

< SELF-ASSESSMENT: ALLEGATIONS AND NON-ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The first Allegation and Enforcement Self-Assessment was conducted to determine

Region I’s overall effectiveness in handling allegations in both the reactor and materials

areas, as well as the effectiveness of the region’s handling of non-escalated Criterion XVI

enforcement actions in the reactor area. In the enforcement area, evaluation of 

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI violations was selected as the topic for review
OE Annual Report

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based on a February 2006 OE request. All regions were requested to evaluate this area

because of licensee concerns as to whether the NRC was distinguishing between

conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) and significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQ)

when developing related enforcement actions. Two cases were identified where Criterion

XVI NCVs did not appear to be valid, although violations of other NRC requirements likely

existed. Criterion XVI did not appear to be an appropriate requirement for these issues

because the conditions involved component degradation or concerns that, upon

evaluation, did not adversely affect functionality or operability, or otherwise could be

considered a CAQ or a SCAQ. For the enforcement component of the review, the

following recommendations were made: (1) provide training to regional staff regarding

documentation of concerns involving violations of Criterion XVI; and (2) request additional

guidance from OE and NRR by revising Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, “Power

Reactor Inspection Reports,” regarding the issuance of Criterion XVI violations with

respect to handling repetitive issues and SCAQs.

< SELF-ASSESSMENT: ALLEGATIONS AND NON-ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The second Allegation and Enforcement Self-Assessment was conducted to determine

Region I’s overall effectiveness in handling allegations in both the reactor and materials

areas, as well as the effectiveness of Region I’s handling of non-escalated enforcement

actions in the materials area. In the Enforcement area, 15 materials inspection reports

involving non-escalated enforcement actions from the period March - July, 2006 were

reviewed for quality, timeliness, and to determine if the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria

were correctly applied in terms of the NRC Enforcement Policy and IMC 0610, “Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards Inspection Reports.” The assessment found that

regarding enforcement strengths, inspection report documentation of all 15 reports

sampled during the review was considered appropriate and met the Enforcement Policy

guidance for documenting non-escalated enforcement actions. The assessment noted

that regarding enforcement weaknesses, some administrative documentation weaknesses

exist involving attention to detail; however, none were considered significant. The

following recommendations were made: (1) provide training, based on the results of this

self-assessment, to the Division of Nuclear Materials Safety management and staff

regarding the documentation concerns involving materials non-escalated enforcement; 

(2) complete the recommendation from the first self-assessment to provide technical staff

training on Criterion XVI non-escalated enforcement (completed in CY 2006); and (3)

provide increased attention to detail in the documentation of materials inspection reports

and NOVs to preclude administrative errors.

In addition to reviews, the Region I enforcement staff:

< Typically participated in inspection debriefings for reactors and materials inspections to

assure that violations of requirements were being properly dispositioned; and
OE Annual Report

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< Compiled a monthly count of all reactor non-escalated enforcement actions which were

sent to headquarters for inclusion in the NRC’s monthly report to Congress

(Congressional Report). In addition, the enforcement staff also compiled materials nonescalated enforcement actions and provided the statistics to headquarters. The results of

these compilations were summarized and reviewed by senior regional management.

REGION II

< Region II’s Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS) participated, with

OE, in a review of Criterion XVI violations detailed above. 

< EICS participated, with OE, in a review of the 3-week email process, providing input used

to develop and inform conclusions related to regional consistency in following the process.

< In addition to reviews, the regional enforcement staff typically participated in inspection

debriefings for reactors and materials inspections to assure that violations of requirements

were being properly dispositioned.

< The Region II enforcement also staff compiled a monthly count of all reactor nonescalated enforcement actions which were sent to headquarters for inclusion in the NRC’s

monthly report to Congress. In addition, the enforcement staff also compiled materials

non-escalated enforcement actions and provided the statistics to headquarters. The

results of these compilations were summarized and reviewed by Region II senior

management.

REGION III

< The Region III Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS) also participated

in the review of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI violations, in coordination with

OE, in February 2006. Several examples were identified where the Criterion XVI violation

did not appear to be valid and was inappropriately cited when other violations, such as

Criterion V violations, should have been cited. To address this issue, Region III instituted

a process that requires all potential Criterion XVI violations be reviewed with EICS staff

prior to issuance.

< The Region III EICS conducted reviews of all non-escalated enforcement actions in the

materials area. The reviews examined the actions for accuracy, quality and timeliness to

determine if the non-escalated actions met NRC Enforcement Policy and IMC 0610

guidance. The results of these audits did not identify any significant findings and the

results were discussed, as appropriate, with divisional management.

< In addition to reviews, the Region III EICS frequently participated in inspection debriefings

for reactors and materials inspections to ensure that violations of requirements were being

properly dispositioned in accordance with applicable enforcement guidance.
OE Annual Report

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< The Region III EICS also compiled a monthly count of all reactor non-escalated

enforcement actions which were sent to headquarters for inclusion in the NRC’s monthly

report to Congress and compiled all materials non-escalated enforcement actions and

provided summary statistics to OE for its bi-annual review of non-escalated materials

enforcement actions. The results of these compilations were summarized and reviewed

by Region III senior management.

REGION IV

Each year, all offices in Region IV, including the Allegation Coordination Enforcement Staff

(ACES) provide a self-assessment report to regional management on accomplishments for the

year.

< ACES provided its last self-assessment report on August 22, 2006, at the annual program

management retreat. The ACES report indicated that over the year ACES focused on

improving timeliness and quality of allegation and enforcement activities through

improvement initiatives including: (1) biweekly allegation status meetings and monthly

enforcement status meetings with senior managers and OI; (2) monthly OI status

meetings with the Regional Administrator; (3) weekly OE conference calls; (4) review of

OE status of open OI reports; (5) a DNMS allegation closure documentation pilot; (6)

routine communications with OE, OGC, other regions, and program offices; and (7)

comparing processes with other regions. The report also stated that ACES would look for

opportunities to supplement staff. To this end, ACES had one Nuclear Safety

Professional Development Program (NSPDP) participant rotate for three months with

ACES to assist with allegation and enforcement work in FY 2006. Because this initiative

was so successful, ACES will have a NSPDP participant rotate with the ACES staff each

quarter of FY 2007-2008. ACES also reported that it would update Region IV’s policy

guide on allegations consistent with OE’s update of M.D. 8.8, Management of Allegations

in FY 2007. In that report, ACES emphasized the need for centralized storage space for 

allegation and enforcement files. The Division of Resource Management and

Administration (DRMA) provided ACES with this space in late FY 2006 in close proximity

to the enforcement and allegation offices.

< ACES also reported on its internal (quarterly self-assessment) and external (OE and RIII)

allegation assessments in 2006 and its internal quarterly audits of inspection reports in

2006. The inspection reports reviews examined whether enforcement actions are

documented in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. These reviews provided no

substantive findings, but did find some minor areas for improvement.

With regards to “Openness” in the NRC’s Strategic Plan, ACES’s assessment indicates

that it ensures that regulatory/enforcement conferences are noticed and open, where

appropriate, and that publicly available enforcement information is placed in the public

portion of ADAMS. The report also notes that ACES will continue to work with Public

Affairs to ensure that press releases are issued when appropriate and assist with the

development of Communications Plan to support these efforts. In terms of

“Effectiveness,” ACES found that it ensures that NOVs are provided to OI before
OE Annual Report

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investigations are begun, that ACES promotes and uses ADR, as appropriate, and that

ACES takes steps to ensure that experienced GG-14 staff transfer knowledge and mentor

GG-13 staff.

< The Region IV enforcement staff also compiled a monthly count of all reactor nonescalated enforcement actions. These were sent to headquarters for inclusion in the

NRC’s monthly report to Congress. In addition, the enforcement staff also compiled

materials non-escalated enforcement actions and provided the statistics to headquarters. 

The results of these compilations were summarized and reviewed by Region IV senior

management.
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Program Office

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty)

Civil 

Penalties Orders

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil 

Penalties

Total 

FY 2006

Region I 19 7 6 0 32 

Region II 14 2 0 0 16 

Region III 16 4 0 0 20 

Region IV 7 2 2 0 11 

NRR 0 0 0 0 0 

NMSS 0 0 2 0 2 

NSIR 0 0 0 0 0 

OE 1 0 5 0 6 

Total 57 15 15 0 87 

TABLE 3. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

BY REGION AND PROGRAM OFFICE

FIGURE 4. ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY 

 REGION AND PROGRAM OFFICE

1 

7 

16 

14 

19 

2 

4 

2 

7 

2 

6 

2 

OE 5 

NSIR

NMSS

NRR

Region IV

Region III

Region II

Region I

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil Penalty)

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing Civil Penalties
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Type of Licensee

Escalated 

NOVs

(w/o Civil 

Penalty)

Civil 

Penalties Orders

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil 

Penalties

Total 

CY 2005

Operating Reactor 26 3 2 0 31 

Gauge User 7 5 0 0 12 

Hospital 9 0 0 0 9 

Fuel Facility 5 1 0 0 6 

Radiographer 1 5 1 0 7 

Unlicensed Individual (Reactor) 4 0 7 0 11 

Unlicensed Individual (Materials) 1 0 2 0 3 

Other 1 0 2 0 3 

Irradiator 0 1 0 0 1 

Licensed Individual (Reactor) 1 0 1 0 2 

Materials Distributer 1 0 0 0 1 

Non-Licensee 1 0 0 0 1 

Academic 0 0 0 0 0 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Physician 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiography Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Research Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Well Logger 0 0 0 0 0 

Total 57 15 15 0 87 

TABLE 4. CY 2006 - ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

BY TYPE OF LICENSEE, NON-LICENSEE, OR INDIVIDUAL
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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FIGURE 5. CY 2006 ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

BY TYPE OF LICENSEE, NON-LICENSEE, OR INDIVIDUAL

1

1

1

1

4

1

5

9

7

26

1

5

3

2

2

7

2

1

1

5

Research Reactor

Radiography Fabricator

Physician

Pharmacy

Mill

Academic

Non-Licensee

Materials Distributer

Licensed Individual (Reactor)

Irradiator

Other

Unlicensed Individual (Materials)

Unlicensed Individual (Reactor)

Radiographer

Fuel Facility

Hospital

Gauge User

Operating Reactor

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil Penalty)

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing Civil Penalties

1

1
OE Annual Report

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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Appendix A

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.

-A1-

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ESCALATED NOTICES OF VIOLATION

WITHOUT CIVIL PENALTIES*

Advantage Engineering, LLC EA-06-214

Mechanicsburg, PA

On October 18, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the failure by the authorized gauge operator to control and maintain constant surveillance of a

portable nuclear gauge. Specifically, the gauge, which contained NRC-licensed radioactive

material (two radioactive sources), was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer after the

authorized gauge operator had left it unattended for approximately five minutes at a job site.

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC EA-05-199 

Oyster Creek Generating Station

On January 9, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding involving the licensee's failure to properly

utilize the Emergency Plan emergency action level (EAL) matrix during an actual event. 

Specifically, operators did not recognize that plant parameters met the EAL thresholds for

declaring an Unusual Event and a subsequent Alert. Since an Alert was not declared, licensee

personnel did not activate their emergency response organization to assist operators in

mitigating the event. Additionally, State and local agencies, who rely on information provided by

the facility licensee, might not have been able to take initial offsite response measures in as

timely a manner had the event degraded further. The violation was cited against 

10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and the Oyster Creek Generating Station Emergency

Plan.

Andrews Environmental Engineering, Inc. EA-06-299

Napervillle, IL

On December 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a

controlled or unrestricted area and that is not in storage. Specifically, the gauge user left the

portable gauge unattended at a job site to answer a phone call, thus failing to control access to

the unrestricted area and provide constant surveillance of the gauge.
 Appendix A

-A2-

Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc. EA-06-101

Indianapolis, IN

On July 10, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the

licensee’s failure to develop written procedures to provide high confidence that each

administration is in accordance with a written directive. Specifically, the licensee's written

procedure for high dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy did not describe that the HDR metal

interface connector was to be attached during treatment simulation to determine appropriate

location of the sources within the patient. In addition the licensee did not notify the NRC

Operations Center by the next calendar day following discovery of the medical event.

Constellation Generation Group, LLC EA-06-198

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

On October 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

SDP finding involving inadequate design control during the establishment of the over-current

trip setting for an electrical circuit breaker that supplies power to the support systems for the 1A

emergency diesel generator (EDG). The violation was cited against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

B, Criterion III, "Design Control," because the licensee failed to ensure that design control

measures provided for verifying or checking the adequacy of the design when Calvert Cliffs

modified the on-site electrical distribution design by installing a new 1A EDG in 1996. In

addition, the licensee did not conduct adequate design reviews, alternate calculations, nor did it

conduct suitable testing to identify that the over-current trip setting was incorrect.

Dickinson County Road Commission EA-05-226

Iron Mountain, MI

On January 24, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the failure to secure or maintain constant surveillance of NRC-licensed material contained in a

portable moisture/density gauge. Specifically, during a routine safety inspection, an NRC

inspector entered the licensee’s offices in an unlocked public building and found the gauge

unsecured.

Digirad Imaging Solutions, Inc. EA-05-136

Bemus Point, NY 

On January 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty

and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm commitments made as

part of a settlement agreement concerning submission of inaccurate information to the NRC. 

The settlement agreement was reached as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution session

that was held at the request of the licensee. In addition to the NOV, the licensee has changed

its procedures to ensure that any information it submits to NRC will be complete and accurate,

and the Radiation Safety Officer will submit articles to various medical and health physics

journals describing the incident to provide an opportunity for other licensees in the industry to

learn from the incident. (This case is also summarized in Appendix C.)
 Appendix A

-A3-

Duke Power Company, LLC EA-06-199 

Oconee Nuclear Station

On November 22, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

SDP finding involving the failure to effectively control maintenance activities and the failure to

assess and manage the risk associated with removing an access cover in the south wall of the

standby shutdown facility to facilitate installation of temporary electrical power cables. The

violation was cited against the licensee’s technical specifications based on an inadequate

procedure and against 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based on the licensee’s failure to adequately assess

and manage the increase in risk from maintenance activities.

Eastern Shoshone & Northern Arapaho Tribes EA-06-040

Fort Washakie, WY

On July 14, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the

licensee’s failure to conduct operations so that the total effective dose equivalent to individual

members of the public would not exceed 0.1 rem in a year. Specifically, a member of the

public, working in close proximity to the portable gauge storage area, received a calculated

dose in excess of 0.1 rem during calendar years 2000 and 2001. In addition, from March 2000

through May 2006, the licensee failed to make or cause to be made surveys of radiation levels

in unrestricted and controlled areas to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits for

individual members of the public as required. The NRC has exercised enforcement discretion

to refrain from issuing a civil penalty because the licensee has transferred all NRC-licensed

material to an authorized recipient, and requested termination of its NRC license.

ECS Mid-Atlantic, LLC EA-05-177

Chantilly, VA

On May 22, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to a portable gauge containing

licensed material, while the gauge was in an unrestricted area and not in storage. In addition,

the licensee did not control and maintain constant surveillance of the gauge and while

unattended, the gauge was run over by a front end loader and destroyed.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-06-253

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

On December 20, 2006, a Notice of Violation associated with a White SDP finding was issued

involving the shipment of a package containing radioactive material via an exclusive-use open

transport vehicle. The package did not conform to the applicable Department of Transportation

(DOT) regulatory requirements when it arrived at another facility. The violation was cited

against 10 CFR 71.5, “Transportation of Licensed Material,” and 49 CFR 173.441(a) (a DOT

regulation) because the package containing the radioactive material was not designed and

prepared to assure, under conditions normally incident to transportation, that the radiation level

on any point on the external surface of the package would not exceed 200 millirem per hour.
 Appendix A

-A4-

Exelon Generation Company EA-06-081

Braidwood Nuclear Power Plant

On June 29, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving multiple failures by the licensee to adequately evaluate the radiological

hazards associated with the leaks from the circulating water blowdown line vacuum breakers

and to assess the environmental impact of the resultant onsite and offsite tritium contamination.

Exelon Generation Company EA-06-112

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

On June 29, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving the failure to establish measures to ensure that the Unit 1 electromatic relief

valves remained suitable for operation prior to implementing an extended power uprate (EPU). 

This resulted in multiple ERVs becoming inoperable and unavailable due to being subjected to

significantly higher vibration levels during Unit 1 operation at EPU power levels.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-06-022

La Salle County Station, Unit 2

On March 31, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the failure to comply with the written procedures required by the facility’s Technical

Specifications addressing entry into high radiation areas (HRAs). Specifically, a contractor

pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters entered a properly posted HRA without

reviewing and signing the appropriate radiation work permit and without a briefing from radiation

protection personnel for entry into a HRA.

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-06-215

Beaver Valley Power Station

On December 12, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

SDP finding involving an inadequate emergency preparedness implementing procedure that

would be used during certain emergency conditions to assess the offsite radiological

consequences for the purpose of developing protective action recommendations. The violation

was cited against 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) because the licensee’s emergency plan failed to have an

adequate method for assessing actual and potential offsite consequences of a radiological

emergency.
 Appendix A

-A5-

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-06-152

Beaver Valley Power Station

On December 19, 2006, a Notice of Violation and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order

was issued as a result of an investigation of deliberate wrongdoing by a former contract

mechanical engineer. The NOV includes two violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III, ”Design Control,” and the licensee’s procedures for engineering changes and

design interface reviews and evaluations, which were categorized as one Severity Level III

problem. The licensee requested Alternative Dispute Resolution. As a result, both parties

agreed, among other things, that: (1) the former contract engineer deliberately failed to adhere

to procedural requirements; (2) the licensee took multiple corrective actions to prevent

recurrence; (3) there was a need for additional corrective actions at the licensee’s facilities as

well as an opportunity for other licensees in the industry to learn from this incident; (4) in light of

the corrective actions the licensee has taken and has committed to take, the NRC would issue

a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty; and (5) the NRC would issue a Confirmatory

Order confirming this agreement. (This case is also summarized in Appendix C.)

Florida Power and Light Company EA-06-200

Turkey Point Unit 3

On November 22, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

SDP finding involving the failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk of

performing maintenance on the A-train 480-volt 3C load center while the facility was operating

in decay heat removal mode with one operating A-train residual heat removal pump. The

violation was cited against 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) for failure to adequately assess and

manage the increase in risk before performing maintenance on the A-train 480-volt 3C load

center.

Florida Power and Light Energy, LLC EA-04-053

Duane Arnold Energy Center

On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

failure to complete a Pre Fuel Move Checklist prior to relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in

the Duane Arnold Spent Fuel/Cask Pool. Specifically, a designated fuel handling supervisor

failed to complete the checklist, as required by a Duane Arnold fuel handling procedure, before

moving the irradiated fuel bundles.

Florida Power & Light Energy, LLC EA-06-047

Duane Arnold Energy Center

On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure of a designated fuel handling supervisor to complete a Pre Fuel Move Checklist prior to

relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in the Duane Arnold Spent Fuel/Cask Pool.
 Appendix A

-A6-

Florida Power and Light Company EA-06-027

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

On April 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving the licensee's failure to restore the B auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump to

operable status within 30 days, to place the unit in at least Hot Standby during this time, and to

identify and correct the condition adverse to quality even though pump bearing vibration levels

and oil samples provided indication of the adverse condition. In this case, the B AFW pump

was placed in service on September 10, 2003, in an inoperable condition due to a misaligned

radial bearing, and the inoperable condition was not identified until November 7, 2005. The

violation was cited against the licensee’s failure to implement the requirements in Technical

Specification 3.7.1.2 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.”

Hospital Andres Grillasca, Inc. EA-06-125

Ponce, PR

On July 21, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure to implement written procedures to provide high confidence that each patient treatment

is in accordance with the treatment plan and written directive, and that both manual and

computer generated dose calculations are verified. As a result of the failure to verify that an

HDR treatment was administered in accordance with the written directive, a dose was

calculated and delivered to a depth of one centimeter rather than the prescribed two centimeter

depth, resulting in an underdose of 57%.

IUPUI/Indiana University Medical Center EA-06-095

Indianapolis, IN

On July 10, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

licensee’s failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide high

confidence that each administration of NRC-licensed material is in accordance with the written

directive of an authorized user physician, as required by 10 CFR 35.41, "Procedures for

Administrations Requiring a Written Directive."

Mallinckrodt, Inc. EA-06-280

Maryland Heights, MO

On December 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem

involving the failure to close or check several valves during a planned release of certain

radioactive material into a sanitary sewer system resulting in an inadvertent release of other

radioactive material into the system.
 Appendix A

-A7-

New Jersey Department of Transportation EA-06-287

Trenton, NJ

On December 14, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the failure to use two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to

secure a portable gauge containing NRC-licensed material from unauthorized removal when

the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. 

Specifically, the licensee stored the gauge in a locked transportation case inside a locked

wooden box located inside an unoccupied, unlocked building. The wooden box was not under

the licensee’s control, was not secured, and could be accessed by unauthorized individuals.

Nuclear Management Company, LLC EA-06-162

Prairie Island Generating Plant

On September 28, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation was issued to the Nuclear

Management Company, Inc. (NMC), for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and

Accuracy of Information, ” involving information that NMC provided to the NRC in two

applications for reactor operator licenses at the licensee’s Prairie Island facility. Specifically,

the facility licensee provided information on each application indicating the applicant performed

reactivity control manipulations on the Prairie Island plant simulator and that the simulator had a

current core model that replicated the plant as verified by performance testing. However, the

licensee failed to retain records for simulator performance testing associated with reactivity

control manipulations that was conducted on the plant-referenced simulator.

Quaker Sales Corporation EA-06-194

Johnstown, PA

On September 13, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of a portable nuclear gauge

resulting in damage to the gauge. Specifically, the gauge was left unattended for approximately

five minutes while the gauge user was approximately 150 feet away from the gauge. During the

time the gauge was not within the user’s line of sight, it was run over by a bulldozer.

St. Joseph Health Center EA-06-188

St. Charles, MO

On October 20, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the administration of greater than 30 microcuries of I-131 sodium iodide without a written

directive that was signed and dated by an authorized user. Specifically, a technologist

administered 5.4 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide to a patient that was scheduled to receive 15

microcuries of I-131 sodium iodide, without a written directive that was dated and signed by an

authorized user before administering the I-131 sodium iodide dose.
 Appendix A

-A8-

St. Peter's University Hospital EA-06-228

New Brunswick, NJ

On November 30, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the failure to secure licensed material from unauthorized removal or access, and/or

maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that was stored in a controlled or

unrestricted area. Specifically, an HDR unit containing Iridium-192 was left unsecured and

unattended, contrary to the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 10 CFR 20.1802.

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company EA-06-046

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

On May 5, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving the shipment of radioactive material in a package with radiation levels on an

external surface that exceeded applicable regulatory requirements. The Notice of Violation

cited the licensee’s failure to properly design and prepare for shipment a package containing

radioactive material that was transported from the licensee’s facility to an offsite waste

processing vendor.

Southern California Edison Company EA-06-149

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

On September 13, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem

involving a transportation event in which a shipment of low specific activity liquid radioactive

waste from San Onofre Unit 1 leaked from its transport container in Utah. The violations

involved failures to: (1) ensure by examination or appropriate tests that the top discharge valve

of the tanker was properly closed and sealed; (2) load the tanker to the required fill density; and

(3) maintain, fill, and close the tanker so that, under conditions normally incident to

transportation, there would be no identifiable release of materials to the environment.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-06-132

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

On September 18, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White

SDP finding. The violation cited emergency preparedness planning standards 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) as well as the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.g, because the licensee failed to identify weak or deficient areas

during its formal critique of an emergency preparedness exercise. Specifically, the exercise

critique failed to identify that the Emergency Director’s Site Area Emergency event classification

was an incorrect classification.
 Appendix A

-A9-

South Jersey Healthcare EA-05-214

Vineland, NJ

On January 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to a package containing

licensed material that was stored in a mail room which was an unrestricted area. In addition,

the licensee did not control and maintain constant surveillance of this licensed material while in

the unrestricted area.

Southside Community Hospital EA-06-097

Farmville, VA

On July 12, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure to perform surveys or secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to six vials, at

least two of which contained radioactive material, i.e., iodine-131 sodium iodide. The vials were

subsequently disposed of as non-radioactive waste on December 1, 2005.

Southwest X-Ray Corporation EA-06-014

Glenrock, WY

On May 25, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a

radiographer assistant’s failure to wear a direct reading dosimeter and personnel dosimeter on

the trunk of his body during radiographic operations.

Star-Lite Global, Inc. EA-05-174

Beverly Hills, CA

On February 28, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the failure to obtain an exempt distribution license, as required by 10 CFR 30.15, prior

to transferring specialty light bulbs containing radioactive material (Kr-85). The NRC is

exercising discretion to refrain from issuing a civil penalty in this case because Star-Lite Global:

(1) stopped importing and distributing the Kr-85 bulbs by the fall of 2003; (2) no longer operates

or conducts transactions; and (3) plans to file for bankruptcy. The low safety significance of the

Kr-85 bulbs was also a factor.

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-05-169

Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant

On April 7, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving a challenge to reactor coolant system (RCS) integrity by multiple pressurizer

power-operated relief valve (PORV) actuations and a challenge to RCS inventory control by

loss of RCS coolant via the open PORV, during transition to solid plant operations. The

violation cited the licensee’s failure to slowly raise charging flow to fill the pressure at less than

30 gallons per minute as required by Technical Specification 5.7.1.1 and Procedure GO-6, Unit

Stutdown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.
 Appendix A

-A10-

Thomas Jefferson University Hospital EA-05-237

Philadelphia, PA

On March 3, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure to control the annual occupational shallow dose equivalent to 50 rem, and the failure to

conduct adequate surveys. Specifically, a nuclear medicine technologist (NMT) received an

exposure to the skin of the right thumb when the thumb became contaminated with sodium

iodide (iodine 131) during treatment of a patient. The NMT did not perform adequate surveys

necessary for the timely identification of skin contamination and assessment of dose to the skin

of her right thumb. As a result, the NMT's skin was contaminated for 26 hours before being

detected.

Virginia Electric and Power Company EA-06-071

Surry, Units 1 & 2

On July 25, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP

finding involving the failure of a licensee’s full-scale exercise critique to identify a weakness

associated with a risk-significant planning standard which was determined to be a drill/exercise

performance-performance indicator opportunity failure. The violation was cited against

emergency preparedness planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) as

well as the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.g, because the

licensee failed to identify the above weakness during its emergency exercise critique.

Washington Hospital Center EA-06-029

Washington, DC

On May 4, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the

deliberate failure to secure from unauthorized removal and failure to maintain constant

surveillance over licensed material. Specifically, the lock on the door to the hot lab, a controlled

area which contained licensed material, had been deliberately disabled with tape to allow ease

of access and the hot lab was left unattended with the door lock disabled.

Westinghouse Electric Company EA-06-043

Columbia, SC

A Notice of Violation was issued on May 12, 2006, for a Severity Level III violation involving the

licensee’s failure to have a change to a safety significant control, i.e., the use of a new sponge

blasting media, reviewed and approved by the licensees Environmental Heath and Safety Unit,

prior to implementation.
Appendix B

** Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.

-B1-

APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTIES**

Bayou Inspection Services, Inc. EA-05-137

Amelia, LA

On March 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the

amount of $6,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved two

separate instances of the failure to secure or maintain constant surveillance of licensed material

(radiographic exposure devices) in unrestricted areas. In addition, the NRC determined that

willfulness was associated with one instance of this violation.

Epsilon Products Company EA-06-026

Marcus Hook, PA

On May 3, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of

$16,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem composed of six violations of NRC

requirements involving the licensee’s failure to conduct operations such that the dose in an

unrestriced area from external sources exceeded regulatory limits. The most significant of

these violations involved the radiation exposure of five employees and contractors, who were

not radiation workers (and therefore considered members of the public), who received radiation

doses in excess of the regulatory limit of 100 millirem in a year, i.e., they received estimated

doses ranging from 103 millirem to 197 millirem.

GEO EXPLOR, Inc. EA-06-017

San Juan, PR

On April 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount

of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving three violations. The violations

occurred as a result of the authorized user’s failure to: (1) control and maintain constant

surveillance of a licensed gauge; (2) use two independent physical controls to form a tangible

barrier to secure the gauge against unauthorized removal; and (3) properly block and brace the

gauge during transport. Specifically, the authorized user failed to adequately lock a transport

case onto the bed of his truck and close the tailgate. As a result, the case containing a licensed

gauge fell off the truck and was in the public domain for approximately six days before it was

recovered.
Appendix B

-B2-

GeoMechanics, Inc. EA-06-064

Elizabeth, PA

On May 26,2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount

of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to

maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed a tangible barrier to

secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the gauge was not

under direct control or surveillance. Specifically, the licensee used only one physical control

(i.e., a single chain and lock) to secure the gauge to a vehicle while parked unattended

overnight at the South Charleston, West Virginia location. The nuclear gauge was

subsequently stolen and abandoned on a public highway.

H&G Inspection Company, Inc. EA-06-021

Houston, TX

On October 24, 2006, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to confirm

commitments made as part of a settlement agreement. The licensee requested Alternative

Dispute Resolution following the NRC’s May 1, 2006, Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $6,500 (EA-06-021). The violation involved the

willful failure to block and brace a radiographic exposure device during transport. As part of the

settlement agreement, H&G has agreed to implement a comprehensive management review

and oversight program, and within one year, to write and submit an article for publication by

both the American Society of Non-Destructive Testing and the Non-Destructive Testing

Managers Association addressing the value that the new H&G management oversight program

adds to overall safe and effective operations. In recognition of H&G’s extensive corrective

actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the civil penalty originally proposed to $500.

H&G Inspection Company, Inc. EA-06-021

Houston, TX

On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of

$6,500 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a willful failure to block and brace a

radiographic exposure device during transport to and from a temporary jobsite. Two additional

violations, that were not assessed a civil penalty, were identified. These involved failure to

control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material in an unrestricted area, and

failure to have a second qualified individual observe radiographic operations. Because these

violations were unrelated, each was separately categorized as Severity Level III.
Appendix B

-B3-

Indiana Michigan Power Company EA-06-177

D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant

On October 6, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty in the

amount of $60,000 was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M). The violation

resulted from changes the licensee made to its D.C. Cook Emergency Plan in April 2003. In

accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), a licensee may make changes to emergency plans without

Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and

the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). In April 2003, I&M

made changes, without Commission approval, to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Emergency

Action Level (EAL) in the D.C. Cook Emergency Plan that decreased the effectiveness of the

plan and resulted in use of a non-standard scheme of EALs.

MISTRAS Holdings Group EA-05-238; EA-06-065; and EA-06-066

Carol Stream, IL

On April 6, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount

of $19,500, was issued for three Severity Level III problems associated with violations of NRC

requirements. The 1st Severity Level III problem involved the licensee’s failure, after

performing radiographic operations, to: (1) survey the radiographic exposure device and guide

tube to determine that the sealed source had been returned to its shielded position prior to

dismantling the equipment; and (2) secure the sealed source in the shielded position after the

source was returned to the shielded position. The 2nd Severity Level III problem involved the

licensee’s failure, at a field location, to: (1) have two qualified individuals present when a

radiographic exposure was being performed; and (2) have a qualified individual directly observe

the radiographic assistant perform radiographic operations. The 3rd Severity Level III problem

involved the licensee’s failure to: (1) control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed

material that is in a controlled or unrestricted room and that is not in storage; and (2)

immediately report to the NRC missing licensed material, iridium-2 in a radiographic exposure

device (i.e., licensed material in an aggregate quantity greater than 1,000 times the quantity

specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix C), that could result in an exposure to persons in an

unrestricted area. A base civil penalty in the amount of $6,500 was imposed for each of the

three problems, resulting in a civil penalty of $19, 500.

Pennoni Associates, Inc. EA-06-252

Bethlehem, PA

On December 21, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem composed of three violations. The

violations involved the failure to: (1) use a minimum of two independent physical controls to

secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal when the gauge was not under the control

and constant surveillance of the licensee; (2) control and maintain constant surveillance of

licensed material in an unrestricted area; and (3) immediately report the loss of licensed

material. Specifically, an authorized user loaned a vehicle containing NRC licensed material in

a portable gauge to an unauthorized individual. Although the gauge was secured to the vehicle

in its locked transport container in the rear seat of the vehicle (one barrier), the second barrier
Appendix B

-B4-

(locked door) was compromised when the authorized user gave the vehicle keys to the

unauthorized individual who drove off with the vehicle. As a result, only one independent

physical barrier to secure the portable gauge and prevent its unauthorized removal remained.

The gauge was then left unsupervised in the public domain for approximately four days.

Additionally, the NRC was not notified of the missing gauge as required.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-06-013

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

On December 29, 2006, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty

($104,000) was issued for a Severity Level II violation involving the licensee’s failure to

implement the requirements contained in 10 CFR 74.19(a)(1), (b) and (c). Specifically, since

November 1981, the licensee failed to: (1) keep records showing inventory, transfer, or control

of special nuclear material (SNM); (2) implement procedures which included provisions for

inventorying and accounting for approximately 233 inches of spent fuel rod fragments in their

spent fuel pools; and (3) include spent fuel fragments in their annual physical inventories of

SNM possessed.

Sterigenics International, Inc. EA-06-035

Charlotte, NC

On September 18, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the

amount of $9,600 was issued for a Severity Level II violation involving the failure to properly

control and transmit safeguards information (SGI). Specifically, safeguards information was

transmitted to persons who had not satisfied the need-to-know and background screening

requirements to receive SGI and in addition, incomplete and inaccurate information was

provided to the NRC during the course of an inspections and investigation.

Triad Engineering, Inc. EA-06-150

Morgantown, WV

On September 12, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the

amount of $3,250 was issued. The NOV cites two violations of NRC requirements. The first

violation involved the failure of the authorized gauge user (AU) to properly block and brace the

gauge in the open bed of his pick-up truck, to secure the gauge with two independent physical

controls, and to close the tailgate prior to leaving the field office parking lot. The case

containing the gauge fell off the truck onto a public street resulting in the second violation, i.e.,

the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material in an unrestricted

area. After bystanders notified the AU that his gauge had fallen off his truck, the AU driver

retraced his route and retrieved the gauge. The container and the gauge were not damaged

and there was no radiation dose to members of the public as a result of this event.
Appendix C

*** Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.

-C1-

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF ORDERS***

IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY ORDERS

NONE

CONFIRMATORY, MODIFICATION, SUSPENSION, AND CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS

Alfred C. Burris, Senior, M.D. EA-05-110

On January 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty

and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm commitments made as

part of a settlement agreement concerning the submission of false and/or inaccurate

information. The settlement agreement was reached as a result of an Alternative Dispute

Resolution session, held at the request of the applicant. In addition to the NOV, the applicant

has agreed to correct the inaccurate information, and to submit an article to a cardiology journal

and speak at training sessions for similar cardiology groups describing his experience and

emphasizing the need to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.

Digirad Imaging Solutions, Inc. EA-05-136

Bemus Point, NY 

On January 27, 2006, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty

and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm commitments made as

part of a settlement agreement concerning submission of inaccurate information to the NRC. 

The settlement agreement was reached as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution session

that was held at the request of the licensee. In addition to the NOV, the licensee has changed

its procedures to ensure that any information it submits to NRC will be complete and accurate,

and the Radiation Safety Officer will submit articles to various medical and health physics

journals describing the incident to provide an opportunity for other licensees in the industry to

learn from the incident.

Entergy Nuclear Operation, Inc. EA-05-190

Indian Point Units 2 & 3

On January 31, 2006, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order Modifying License was

issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Units 2 & 3. The licensee consented to

modifying its operating licenses for Indian Point Units 2 & 3 to meet the criteria in section 651(b)

of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that directs the Commission to require that backup power is to
Appendix C

-C2-

be available for the emergency notification system of a power plant, including the emergency

siren warning system, if the alternating current within the 10-mile emergency planning zone of

the power plant is lost.

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-06-152

Beaver Valley Power Station

On December 19, 2006, a Notice of Violation and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order

was issued as a result of an investigation of deliberate wrongdoing by a former contract

mechanical engineer. The NOV includes two violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III, ”Design Control,” and the licensee’s procedures for engineering changes and

design interface reviews and evaluations, which were categorized as one Severity Level III

problem. The licensee requested Alternative Dispute Resolution. As a result, both parties

agreed, among other things, that: (1) the former contract engineer deliberately failed to adhere

to procedural requirements; (2) the licensee took multiple corrective actions to prevent

recurrence; (3) there was a need for additional corrective actions at the licensee’s facilities as

well as an opportunity for other licensees in the industry to learn from this incident; (4) in light of

the corrective actions the licensee has taken and has committed to take, the NRC would issue

a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty; and (5) the NRC would issue a Confirmatory

Order confirming this agreement.

H&G Inspection Company, Inc. EA-06-021

Houston, Texas

On October 24, 2006, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm

commitments made as part of a settlement agreement. The licensee requested Alternative

Dispute Resolution following the NRC’s May 1, 2006, Notice of Violation and proposed

imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $6,500. The violation involved the willful failure to

block and brace a radiographic exposure device during transport. As part of the agreement,

H&G has agreed to implement a comprehensive management review and oversight program,

and within one year, to write and submit an article for publication by both the American Society

of Non-Destructive Testing and the Non-Destructive Testing Managers Association addressing

the value that the new H&G management oversight program adds to overall safe and effective

operations. In recognition of H&G’s extensive corrective actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the

civil penalty originally proposed to $500.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration EA 05-125

Greenbelt, MD

On February 10, 2006, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm

commitments made as part of a settlement agreement involving the failure by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, to report missing licensed material, and to provide

complete and accurate information to the NRC as required. The settlement agreement was

reached as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution session, held at the request of the

applicant.
Appendix D

  Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.

-D1-

APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF ACTIONS AGAINST 

INDIVIDUALS (LICENSED AND UNLICENSED)

** **

ORDERS

NRC-Licensed Individuals

Nicholas A Chaimov IA-06-046

On September 12, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRCLicensed Activities for three years from the date of the Order was issued to the individual based

on his deliberate misconduct while employed at the Reed College Reactor (facility). In violation

of 10 CFR 50.5, "Deliberate Misconduct," Mr. Chaimov, a Senior Reactor Operator, made

changes to the facility knowingly and deliberately causing the licensee to be in violation of 

10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, tests, and experiments.”

Andrew Siemaszko IA-05-021

On October 17, 2006, Amendment of Order was issued which provides notice of additional

examples further substantiating the violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) cited in the April 21, 2005,

order with respect to deliberate submission of incomplete and inaccurate information to FENOC

and the NRC. This Amendment of Order does not otherwise alter the statements or terms of

the April 21, 2005, order which prohibits Mr. Siemaszko’s involvement in NRC-licensed activities

for five years.

Theodore D. Simmons II IA-05-041

On February 10, 2006, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty

and an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm commitments made as

part of a settlement agreement involving the failure by the contract Radiation Safety Officer for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to report missing licensed material, and to

provide complete and accurate information, orally and in writing, to the NRC as required. The

settlement agreement was reached as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution session,

held at the request of the applicant.
Appendix D

-D2-

Unlicensed Individuals

Gary Abel IA-06-036

On September 22, 2006, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order confirming commitments

reached as part of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation was issued. At issue

was the NRC conclusion that the individual, a licensee official, deliberately transmitted (faxed)

safeguards information over an unprotected telecommunications circuit to a person who did not

have a need-to-know and had not been cleared to receive safeguards information. Additionally,

the individual did not provide complete and accurate information to the NRC during the course

of its investigation involving the transmittal of this information. The order stipulates, in part, that

the individual will not engage in NRC-licensed activities for one year from the date of issuance

of the Order.

David Geisen IA-05-052

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). As the Manager of Design Engineering, the individual provided incomplete and

inaccurate information concerning the licensee’s written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin

2001-001, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles.” 

The Order is effective for five years from the date of issuance of the Order.

Prasoon Goyal IA-05-055

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). As a Senior Engineer, the individual provided incomplete and inaccurate information

concerning the licensee’s written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 2001-001,

“Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles.” The Order is

effective for one year from the date of issuance of the Order.

Dale Miller IA-05-053

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). On February 23, 2006, Mr. Miller answered the Order, denied the allegations in the

Order, and requested an expedited hearing. During the hearing process before the Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC staff and Mr. Miller entered into settlement discussions

using alternative dispute resolution. The Staff and Mr. Miller reached an agreement which was

submitted to the Board for approval. Upon review of the Settlement Agreement, the Board was

satisfied that its terms reflected a fair and reasonable settlement of this matter, in keeping with
Appendix D

-D3-

the objectives of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, and that no further adjudication of any matter

was required in the public interest. The Order issued on January 4, 2006, to Mr. Dale Miller

was superceded by the Board's Order dated September 29, 2006, approving the settlement.

Steven Moffitt IA-05-054

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). As the Technical Services Director, the individual provided incomplete and

inaccurate information concerning the licensees written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin

2001-001, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles.”

The Order is effective for five years from the date of issuance of the Order. During the hearing

process before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC staff and Mr. Moffitt entered

into settlement discussions using Alternative Dispute Resolution. The Staff and Mr. Moffitt

reached an agreement which was submitted to the Board for approval. Upon review of the

Settlement Agreement, the Board was satisfied that its terms reflected a fair and reasonable

settlement of this matter, in keeping with the objectives of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, and

that no further adjudication of any matter was required in the public interest. The Order issued

on January 4, 2006, to Mr. Moffitt was superceded by the Board's Order dated December 13,

2006, approving the settlement.

Foster Zeh IA-05-051

On June 20, 2006, an Order was issued confirming certain commitments reached as a result of

an Alternative Dispute Resolution session between Mr. Zeh and the NRC. These commitments

included Mr. Zeh’s statement that he has no intention of working or seeking employment in any

activities or at any facility that is subject to NRC regulations, and that he is willing to not engage

in future NRC licensed activities for a period of three years from the date of this Order. In

addition, Mr. Zeh agreed to not disclose Safeguards Information regarding the Indian Point

security program to any unauthorized individuals, consistent with the Wackenhut non-disclosure

agreement that Mr. Zeh signed in 1997. In consideration of the obligations and commitments

as set forth in the Order, the NRC agreed to not take any further enforcement action.

NOTICES OF VIOLATION (NOVS)

NRC-Licensed Individuals

Mr. Michael C. Heins IA-06-037

On August 2, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on

the individual’s failure to comply with NRC requirements governing fitness-for-duty as a senior

reactor operator working at the River Bend Station for Entergy Operations, Inc.
Appendix D

-D4-

Stephen W. Humphries IA-06-007

On May 15, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving an

individual licensed operator who did not participate in the Part 50 licensee drug and alcohol

testing program (i.e., fitness for duty program), in that he refused to provide a specimen for

testing when randomly selected to do so.

Unlicensed Individuals

James Hesler Jr. IA-06-045

On December 19, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving deliberate wrongdoing by a former contract mechanical engineer working at the

Beaver Valley Power Station. The violation was cited against 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate

Misconduct;” 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, ”Design Control;” and the licensee’s

procedures for engineering changes and design interface reviews and evaluations. Specifically,

the former contract engineer, who was responsible for preparation of the replacement reactor

vessel closure head engineering change package (ECP), deliberately failed to adhere to a

procedural requirement when he signed the ECP even though the majority of design interface

evaluations were neither performed nor included in the ECP.

Michael Tepley IA-04-013

On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

failure to complete a Pre Fuel Move Checklist prior to relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in

the Duane Arnold Spent Fuel/Cask Pool. Specifically, Mr. Tepley, a designated fuel handling

supervisor, failed to complete the checklist, as required by a Duane Arnold fuel handling

procedure, before moving the irradiated fuel bundles.

DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION (DFIS)

NRC-Licensed Individuals

NONE

Unlicensed Individuals

NONE
Appendix E

-E1-

APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST 

NON-LICENSEES

(VENDORS, CONTRACTORS AND CERTIFICATE HOLDERS)

Hunt Valve Company, Inc. EA-05-233

Salem, OH

On December 7, 2006, a Notice of Violation containing six violations categorized collectively as

a Severity Level III problem was issued as a result of investigations that determined that Hunt

Valve engaged in deliberate misconduct with respect to applicable quality assurance (QA)

requirements and deliberately failed to provide notifications required by 10 CFR 21.21,

"Notification of the Failure to Comply or Existence of a Defect and its Evaluation," with regard to

the manufacture and distribution of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinder valves and components

procured by U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The NRC Office of Investigation

substantiated that Hunt Valve deliberately violated 10 CFR 21.21 and applicable QA

requirements, i.e., Hunt Valve ultimately delivered UF6 cylinder valves that were not properly

QA tested to a USEC facility (Paducah) and caused USEC to violate its NRC certificate and to

violate 10 CFR 76.93, "Quality Assurance." The NRC is not proposing a civil penalty in this

case because the Department of Justice settled a civil suit against Hunt Valve which included a

sizeable monetary penalty of over $600,000 which significantly exceeds the civil penalty the

NRC would consider for this case. The NRC is not taking additional enforcement action against

Hunt Valve’s former Quality Manager and Hunt Valve’s former Vice President and General

Manager, Military Division, who deliberately committed the violations, based on the results of

their criminal prosecutions and subsequent convictions.
OE ANNUAL REPORT

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
OE ANNUAL REPORT
APPENDIX F

-F1-

APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF HEARING ACTIVITY

Andrew Siemaszko IA-05-021

On April 21, 2005, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities (for five years) from the effective date of the Order was issued to Mr. Siemaszko

based on his deliberate activities while employed at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. As a

former system engineer, Mr. Siemaszko deliberately provided inaccurate and incomplete

information concerning the description of the efforts and results associated with removal of

boric acid deposits from the reactor pressure vessel head.

On April 22, 2005, Mr. Siemaszko requested a hearing on the Order. The NRC staff requested

a stay of the hearing. As of December 31, 2006, the hearing was pending due to stays granted

by the ASLB.

On October 17, 2006, Amendment of Order was issued which provides notice of additional

examples further substantiating the violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) cited in the April 21, 2005,

Order with respect to deliberate submission of incomplete and inaccurate information to

FENOC and the NRC. This Amendment of Order did not otherwise alter the statements or

terms of the April 21, 2005, Order.

David Geisen IA-05-052

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). As the Manager of Design Engineering, the individual provided incomplete and

inaccurate information concerning the licensees written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin

2001-001, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. 

The Order is effective for 5 years from the date of issuance of the Order. On February 23,

2006, Mr. Geisen filed an answer to the Order and requested an expedited hearing. On March

20, 2006, the NRC staff filed a motion requesting a stay of the hearing. The Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board denied the Staff’s request for stay. The Commission accepted interlocutory

review and affirmed the Board’s decision. As of December 31, 2006, the parties were moving

forward with a hearing schedule.

Dale Miller IA-05-053

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). On February 23, 2006, Mr. Miller answered the Order, denied the allegations in the

Order, and requested an expedited hearing. During the hearing process before the Atomic
APPENDIX F

-F2-

Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC staff and Mr. Miller entered into settlement discussions

using alternative dispute resolution. The Staff and Mr. Miller reached an agreement which was

submitted to the Board for approval. Upon review of the Settlement Agreement, the Board was

satisfied that its terms reflected a fair and reasonable settlement of this matter, in keeping with

the objectives of the NRCs Enforcement Policy, and that no further adjudication of any matter

was required in the public interest. The Order issued on January 4, 2006 to Mr. Dale Miller was

superceded by the Board's Order dated September 29, 2006, approving the settlement.

Steven Moffitt IA-05-054

On January 4, 2006, an Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities was issued based on the individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(licensee). As the Technical Services Director, the individual provided incomplete and

inaccurate information concerning the licensees written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin

2001-001, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. 

The Order is effective for 5 years from the date of issuance of the Order. During the hearing

process before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC staff and Mr. Moffitt entered

into settlement discussions using alternative dispute resolution. The Staff and Mr. Moffitt

reached an agreement which was submitted to the Board for approval. Upon review of the

Settlement Agreement, the Board was satisfied that its terms reflected a fair and reasonable

settlement of this matter, in keeping with the objectives of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, and

that no further adjudication of any matter was required in the public interest. The Order issued

on January 4, 2006 to Mr. Moffit. was superceded by the Board's Order dated December 13,

2006, approving the settlement.