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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/384NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 02-2126
CL AR EN CE P. R OB ER TS , Ap pellan t
v. THE MAYOR AND BUR GESS ES OF THE LONDO N BOROUGH OF BRENT
ON APPE AL FROM THE UNIT ED STA TES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DISTRI CT OF NEW JERSEY (Dist. Court No. 02-cv- 01064) District Cou rt Judge: Faith S . Hoch berg Argued on June 2, 2003 Be for e: A LIT O, R OT H a nd S TA PL ET ON , Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: J uly 9, 2003) ANDREW M. MOSKOW ITZ (argued) 76 South Orange Ave., Suite 205 South Orange, NJ 07079 Counsel for

Appellant2 OPINI ON OF THE COURT

PE R C URI AM: Clarence P. Roberts ( “Roberts”) appeals a n order of t he United States Dist

rict Court for t

he District of New Jersey (“District Court”) dismissi ng his complaint against the Mayor a nd Burgesses of t he London Borough of Brent (“Brent”) with pr ejudic e for lack of subj ect matter jurisdi ction. For the r easons st ated bel ow, we affirm the j udgment of the Distric t Cou rt. Because we write onl y for the part ies, we need not disc uss the f actualbackground of this case. Roberts makes t hree cont entions on appeal. First , Robert s argues t hat the Distri ct Court was not

authori zed to di smiss hi s complaint before he coul d serve Brent with proces s. Second, Roberts maint ains t hat even i f the Dist

rict Court could di smiss t

he
com plaint p rior to se rvice o f pro cess, the Distric t Cou rt wa s requ ired to a llow Ro berts leave t o amend his complai nt. Fi nally , Robert s avers t hat the Distri ct Court e rred by determining that it

lacked subject matter j urisdicti on over Robe rts’s sui t. We address Roberts’ s contentions i n turn bel ow. Because the pr esent ca se invol ves onlydisput es of law , our rev iew is ple nar y. In re Shar on Steel Corp. , 871 F.2d 1217, 12 23 (3d C ir. 1989). I. Roberts cl aims that

a District Court

cannot di smiss a compl aint on i ts own motion before the plai ntiff

serves pr ocess on the defendant. In support of this proposit

ion,3

Roberts cites Urbano v. Calissi , 353 F.2d 196 ( 3d Cir. 1965) , and Mayberry v. Prasse , 449 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir . 1971). In Urbano , the Distri ct Court dismissed the plai ntiffs’ comp laint prior to service of p rocess on th e defen dants. W e vacated the District Cou rt’s judg men t and re man ded f or fu rther p rocee ding s. In a b rief op inion, w e stated that sinc e it “appear[ed] that none of the defendant s ha[d] been s erved with t he complaint ,” i t was “desir able that the acti on be permitted to pr oceed in the customary manner.” Urbano , 353 F.2d at 197. In Ma yberry , the Distri ct Court di smissed t he plai ntiff

s’ action pre- servi ce “without a ny cons iderat ion of the merits .” Ma yberry , 449 F.2d at 1266. We vacated and remanded, s tati ng simply that “ the dis tri ct court

should have fol lowed here the advice given in t

he Urbano case.” Id. at 1267. We agree with Ro berts th at Urbano establ ished t he supervi soryrule t

hat a Dist

rict Court may not

dismis s a suit

prior to service of pr ocess. This rul e rest s on thre e sound prudenti al grounds . Fir st, the dis missal of a complaint prior to service of pr ocess can
com pro mis e the Dis trict C our t’s ap pea ran ce o f im par tiality. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch , 914 F.2d 428, 431 ( 3d Cir. 1990) (citing thi s conside rati on in favor of t he proposi tion t

hat a Di stri ctCourt ma y not di smi ss a co mpl ai ntpr io r t o se rv ic e of pr oce ss und erFed . R. Civ. P. 12( b)(6)) . Second, “[w]hile [a] dis tri ct court may ai m” by dis missi ng a complaint prior to service of pr ocess “t o clear its docket of what appears to be a meritless c ase and reli eve the defenda nts of the time and expe nse needed t o respond, if an appealis t aken the case shuttles between the di stri ct and appel late courts .” Id. Finall y, in such1 Our recognition of the possibi lit y of harmless er

ror i n this context

aligns our juri sprudence i n this area with that of severalother circuit s that have concluded t

hat dismissal of a c omp laint for lack of su bject matter jurisdiction is app ropriate even whe re suc h di sm issal occ urs p rior to serv ice o f pr oce ss. See Joyc e v. Joy ce , 975 F.2d 379, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the di smissalof a complaint for lac k of subject

matter jurisdictio n prio r to serv ice of proc ess); Zernialv. Unite d States , 714 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir . 1983) ( affirmi ng a dismis sal prior t o servi ce of process on the ground t hat “[s] ua 4 circumst ances “the appell ate court . . . willlikel y be wit hout the aid of opposi ng counsel to clarifythe is sues. ” Id. We do not, however, read Urbano to forec lose t he possibi lit

y that dis missal for lack of subj ect matter jurisdi ction prior t o servi ce of process may be harmless er ror. Such a readi ng would be inconsi stent with the gr ounds on which Urbano was de ci ded. To support our

conclusi on in Urbano , we cited a N inth Cir cuit d ecis ion , Harmon v. Superior Cou rt , 307 F.2d 796 ( 9th Cir. 1962), i n which that court r eversed a Dis tri ct Court de cisi on dism issin g a c om plain t prio r to se rvic e of pro ces s. Im por tantl y, Harmon was not decide d on the ground t

hat dis missal before service of pr ocess i s alway s improper . Ins tead, Harmon emphasized t

hat a “Dist

rict Court alway s has power to di smiss for lack of juri sdiction . . . . at anytime that such l ack appears .” Harmon , 307 F.2d at 797. It was the Harmon cour t’s determ ination that the Distric t Cou rt had juri sdiction pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, not a bla nket rul e prohibi ting di smissalprior to service of pr ocess for lack of ju risdi ction , that f orm ed th e ba sis fo r its co nclu sion
. Id. at 797-98. We would not likel y have relie d on Harmon in Urbano if we held the view that dismis sal prior t o servi ce of proce ss always cons titutes reversible error. 1 Moreover, pres erving t he possibi lit

y ofsponte di smissalfor lac k of subject -matte r jurisdi ction i s, of cour se, pr oper at a ny st age of

the pro ceed ings” ); Frankli n v. Oregon , 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (“In contrast to dism issals fo r failure to state a claim , if the co urt lack s sub ject m atter jurisd iction, it is not requi red to i ssue a summons or fol low the othe r procedur al requirements. ”) (ci ting Loux v. Rhay , 375 F.2d 55, 58 (9th C ir. 1967)). 5 harmless error

in thes e circ umstances comport s with Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, which rec ognizes that “ any ru ling or o rde r” b y a D istrict Co urt m ay co nstitu te ha rmle ss er ror. See Fed . R. Civ . P. 6 1 (“ No erro r in . . . a ny rulin g or ord er . . . b y the c our t . . . is gr oun d fo r . . . disturbing a jud gmen t or order, unless refu sal to take such action app ears to the cou rt inconsi stent

with subst antia l jus tice .”). Accordingly , we hold that while it cons tit utes error f or a D istrict Co urt to dis miss a n actio n prio r to serv ice of proc ess on the de fend ant, that error may be harmless under certain circumstances. Although we need not enumerate al l of the possibl e circ umstances under which the di smi ss al of

a c omp la in t p ri orto se rv ic e o f p ro ce ss mayamo unt to ha rml es s e rr or , w e believ e that o ne su ch situa tion ob tains w here it is a ppar ent, on the fa ce of the co mp laint, that the Distric t Cou rt lacks s ubjec t matter jurisdictio n. Th is determ ination com ports w ith Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3), which categorical ly stat es that “[w]henever i t appear s by suggesti on of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks j urisdi ction of

the subj ect matte r, the co urt sha ll dismis s the ac tion.” F ed. R . Civ. P . 12(h )(3); see also Ruh rg as AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“ [S]ubject -matte r deli neati ons must be police d by the c ourts o n their o wn initiative e ven a t the hig hest lev el.”). A s we expla in below , we believe that the District Cou rt in the instant case erred b y dismissing Ro berts’s6

com plaint p rior to se rvice o f pro cess o n B rent, bu t that suc h erro r wa s harm less be caus e it was clear fr om the face of Robert s’s complaint t hat the Distri ct Court l acked subje ct matter juri sdiction. For a District Court

to posses s subjec t matt er jurisdi ction ove r a plai ntiff ’s action und er A rticle III of the C ons titutio n, th e pla intif f m ust h ave stan din g to sue . ACLU -NJ v. Tw p. of W all , 246 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). A “plai ntiff only has Arti cle II I sta nding if,” inter alia , “‘i t is likel y, as opposed t o merelyspeculat ive, that t

he injur y wil l be redres sed by a favorabl e decisi on.’” Pitt News v. Fisher , 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidl aw Envtl. Serv., I nc. , 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). When the questi on whether a pl ainti ff’s “‘ clai ms of economic inj ury would be redres sed by a favorabl e decisi on . . . depends on the unf ette red choic es made by indep ende nt acto rs not b efore the co urt[] an d w hose exerc ise of b road and le gitima te discr etion t

he court[ ] cannot presume either to cont rol or to predi ct, ’” US Ecology, I nc. v. Uni te d St at es DOI , 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting ASA RCO , Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U.S. 605, 615 ( 1989)), the pla inti ff must “adduce fa cts showing t hat thos e choices have been or wil l be made in s uch manner as t o . . . permit redressabili ty of injury, ” Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildli fe , 504 U .S. 555, 562 (1992). In the in stant ca se, Ro berts’s a lleged injury con sists of th e takin g of his pro perty by Brent pursu ant to the judgm ent of the C hancery D ivision of the B ritish High C ourt (“Cha ncery Division”). R oberts argue s that if the District Cou rt issued a declaratory7

judgment st ating t

hat he had not

been served i n compliance wit h the Hague Convention on the Servi ce Abroad of Judici al and Extr ajudic ial Documents in Civilor Commercial Matters (the “Convention”), that declar ation “would likely cause the court in the English action to vaca te its order.” Brief for A ppellant at 13. T he redressab ilityof Ro berts’s injury therefore de pends on the fut ure actions of the Chancery Divisi on, an “i ndependent actor not before the court. ” Roberts was thus requi red to pl ead facts suggesti ng that t he Chan cery Division w ould vac ate its order if the D istrict Court issued a de claratory judgm ent in Ro berts’s favor. Rob erts’s comp laint, howev er, contains no in dication of w hy the Chan cery Divisi on would vacate i ts j udgment if t he District Court

issued t he declar atoryjudgment Roberts se eks. Accordi ngly , Robert s’s complaint fa iled to alle ge that his i njurywas redres sable bya favorabl e decisi on. The District Court therefore correctl y determined that i t lac ked subject

matter juri sdiction over Robert s’s act ion. Since it wa s apparen t from the f ace of R oberts’s com plaint that the District Co urt did not have subject

matter juri sdiction over Robert s’s sui t, we hol d that, although t he Distri ct Court e rred bydismis sing Robert s’s complaint prior t o servi ce of process , the District Court’s error was harmless. II. Ro berts n ext co ntend s that the Distric t Cou rt erred b y failing to a fford him le ave to
amen d his com plaint. In support of this proposition, R oberts cites Fed . R. Civ. P. 15 (a),8

which states that

“[a] part y mayamend the party’ s pleadi ng once as a matter of cours e at any time before a responsive pleadi ng is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Since no responsive pleading h ad yet been serve d on R oberts at the time the District Cou rt dism issed h is suit, Ro berts a rgue s, Ro berts sh ould have been allow ed to a men d his
com plaint. It is w ell es tabli she d th at ev en b efo re a r esp ons ive p lead ing has bee n file d, a Distri ct Court maydismis s a plai ntiff ’s cl aim without leave t o amend where “any amendment would be futi le. ” Shane v. Fauver , 213 F .3d 11 3, 116 (3d C ir. 2000 ); see also Grayson v. Mayview Stat e Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plai ntiff does not se ek lea ve to a men d a de ficien t com plaint a fter a d efen dant m oves to dism iss it, the court must inform the plai ntiff that he has leave to amend withi n a set period of ti me, unles s am endm ent w ould be ine quitab le or fu tile.”); Sch reiber D istrib. Co . v. Serv -W ell Furniture Co. , 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir . 1986) ( “If a complai nt is dismis sed for fail ure to s tate a clai m, leave to amend should be gra nted unle ss the c ourt determines t hat the alleg ation o f othe r facts c onsiste nt w ith the c hallen ged p leadin g cou ld no t possib ly cure the de ficiency.”). We have held that

where the abse nce of subje ct matt er jurisdi ction i s apparent from the face of

a complaint , anyamendment would be futi le, and hence dis missal wit hou t leav e to a me nd i s pro per . See M iklavic v. U SA ir , 21 F.3d 5 51, 557-5 8 (3d C ir. 199 4) (“ [W ]e fi nd t hat g ran ting leav e to a me nd w oul d ha ve b een futil e on [the ] gro und
. .2 At oral argu ment, R oberts ackn owled ged that he is not currently suffering injury

as a res ult of t

hreats by Brent

to execut e the Chancery Divisi on’s judgment

in the United States. 9 9 . . [of] lack of su bject matter jurisdiction.”). As n oted abo ve, it was clear fro m R oberts’s
com plaint th at the D istrict Co urt lack ed su bject m atter jurisd iction o ver h is suit. 2 Accordingly , the Distri ct Court was not requir ed to grant

Roberts l eave to amend. III. For th e fore goin g reas ons, w e aff irm the judg men t of the Distric t Cou rt.