Audit

Report 

Administration of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund Contract Files 

Report Number 05-007 April 30, 2005 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

April 30, 2005 

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND - IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, PROJECT AND CONTRACTING OFFICE - IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Administration of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contract Files 

(Report No. 05-007) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed 

the audit in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as 

amended, which mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the 

programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available 

to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires 

that we provide for the independent and objective leadership and coordination of and 

recommendations on policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

in the administration of such programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, 

fraud, and abuse. 

We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing 

the final report. Comments on the draft of this report conformed to requirements and left 

no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on 

this report, please contact Mr. James P. Mitchell at jim.mitchell@sigir.mil or at (703) 

428-1100. For the report distribution, see Appendix F. 

 Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

Sincerely, 
i 

Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

Report Number 05-007 April 30, 2005 

(Project No. D2004-DCPAAF-0037) 

Administration of 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contract Files

Executive Summary 

Introduction. This audit report discusses contract administration provided by the 

Project and Contracting Office (PCO) for contracts awarded for security, relief, 

rehabilitation and reconstruction projects that are funded with the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). 

Title II of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” authorized 

$18.4 billion for security, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Iraq funded 

through the IRRF. 

Objective. The audit objective was to evaluate whether contracts awarded by the PCO 

for Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts contain adequately prepared statements of work, 

clearly negotiated contract terms, and specific contract deliverables. The audit included 

an evaluation of the administrative processes and controls related to contract execution, 

distribution, reporting, and disposition of files by the PCO for reconstruction projects in 

Iraq. 

Results. The 37 contracts and associated contract files we reviewed at PCO, valued at 

more than $184 million, were not being adequately maintained to fully support 

transactions relating to the performance of contract administration processes. Further, the 

PCO could not produce 21 percent, or 10 of the 48 randomly selected contract files for 

review. The PCO generally awarded contracts that contained adequately prepared 

statements of work, specific contract deliverables, and clearly negotiated contract terms. 

However, the audit identified significant deficiencies in contract administration processes 

and controls. Consequently, there was no assurance that the contract file data was 

available, complete, consistent, and reliable or that it could be used to effectively monitor 

and report the status of contracted project activity for the IRRF. 

Material Management Control Weaknesses. The audit identified material management 

control weaknesses in the administration of contract files. Consequently, there was no 

assurance that fraud, waste, and abuse did not occur in the management and 

administration of IRRF contracts. 

Management Actions. During our review, PCO officials directed all contracting 

personnel to search for all contract files and properly label and file them. Because 

management actions were still ongoing when our audit work concluded, we could not 

assess the effectiveness of those actions. 
ii 

Recommendations. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command - 

Iraq, or Director, Project and Contracting Office, respectively: 

• Ensure that hardcopy and electronic contract files are properly maintained. 

• Develop and implement transitional operating procedures between departing and 

successor contracting officers. 

• Establish a public email account to electronically access contract solicitation 

information. 

• Ensure a reliable network server. 

• Implement the Standard Procurement System. 

• Correct duplicate contract award numbers. 

• Verify and correct all reported deficiencies. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. The original recommendations in the 

draft of this report were directed to the Director, PCO. However, the Commander, Joint 

Contracting Command - Iraq (JJC-I) and the Director, PCO have each responded to the 

draft of this report. This occurred because of organizational changes that have redefined 

IRRF contracting responsibilities since the performance of this audit, including moving 

the Head of Contracting Activity function from the PCO to the JCC-I. As such, the 

recommendations were redirected to include both officials. Suggestions made in the 

management comments to clarify findings regarding support provided by other 

organizations were considered and made. See the Finding section of the report for a 

discussion of management comments and the Management Comments section of the 

report for the complete text of the Commander, JCC-I and the Director, PCO comments. 

The Director, PCO concurred with the audit finding and recommendations relating to the 

public email account and network server and took actions to correct the reported 

deficiencies. The Commander, JCC-I concurred with the audit finding and 

recommendations not addressed by the Director, PCO. The Commander, JCC-I states 

that actions are underway to address the recommendations of our report. The 

management comments from both organizations are fully responsive. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objective 2

Finding 

Contract File Administration 3 

Appendixes 

A. Scope and Methodology 15 

B. Other Matters of Interest 18 

C. Project and Contracting Office 19 

D. Contract Files Reviewed 20 

E. Acronyms 21 

F. Report Distribution 22 

G. Audit Team Members 24 

 

Management Comments 

Commander, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq 25 

Director, Project and Contracting Office - Iraq 33 
1 

Introduction 

Background 

This audit report discusses contract administration provided by the Project and 

Contracting Office (PCO) for contracts awarded for security, relief, rehabilitation and 

reconstruction projects that are funded with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

(IRRF). 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, required the maintenance of records on the use of 

IRRF to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such funds. This report is 

one in a series to determine whether U.S. organizations have established adequate 

requirements, systems, and processes to manage and maintain records to facilitate future 

audits and investigations of the identification and use of IRRF funds. 

Reconstruction Program. Title II of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 

2004,” authorized $18.4 billion for security, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction 

projects in Iraq funded through the IRRF. The Project Management Office was 

established to execute the Iraq infrastructure reconstruction program. The Project 

Management Office initially identified over 5,000 Iraq infrastructure reconstruction 

projects. Of those, 2,311 projects were funded through the IRRF. 

Project Management Office. The Coalition Provisional Authority was the authority 

responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq through June 28, 2004. Thereafter, the 

Iraqi Interim Government was the authority responsible for the governance of Iraq. The 

Project Management Office, as part of the Coalition Provisional Authority, ceased to 

exist on June 28, 2004, and the PCO was established to replace the Project Management 

Office. For a description of the establishment of the PCO and the Head of the Project and 

Contracting Office Contracting Activity (PCO CA) structure, see Appendix C. 

Federal Acquisition Regulation. Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 4, Administrative 

Matters, sets specific requirements for executive agencies to establish, maintain, and 

report unclassified records and procurements in excess of $25,000. Every contract, 

purchase order, basic ordering agreement, basic agreement, and blanket purchase 

agreement is required to have a unique Procurement Instrument Identifier in the system. 

Further, the Federal Acquisition Regulation provides guidelines for the type of 

documentation that should be evident in the government contract files, to ensure a 

complete history of each transaction. 

Standard Operating Procedures–Contracting Activity 2004. The PCO CA Standard 

Operating Procedures–Contracting Activity 2004 (SOP-CA 2004) establishes standard 

procedures and policies that apply to all contracting personnel assigned to the Contracting 

Activity. It identifies the organization structure and defines responsibilities. The 

SOP-CA 2004 stresses the importance of proper contract file management and 

maintenance to justify the contracting officer’s actions regarding procurement activities. 

The SOP-CA 2004 establishes the minimum documentation requirements for contract 

files. 
2 

Objective 

The audit objective was to evaluate whether contracts awarded by the PCO for Iraq relief 

and reconstruction efforts contain adequately prepared statements of work, clearly 

negotiated contract terms, and specific contract deliverables. The audit included an 

evaluation of the administrative processes and controls related to contract execution, 

distribution, reporting, and disposition of files by the PCO for reconstruction projects in 

Iraq. 

For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For other matters of interest, see Appendix B. For definitions of the 

acronyms used in this report, see Appendix E. For a list of the audit team members, see 

Appendix G. 
3 

Contract File Administration 

The 37 contracts and associated contract files we reviewed at PCO CA, valued at more 

than $184 million, were not being adequately maintained to fully support transactions 

relating to the performance of contract administration processes. Further, the PCO CA 

could not produce 21 percent, or 10 of the 48 randomly selected contract files for review. 

These conditions occurred because the PCO CA did not establish adequate administrative 

processes, controls, or capabilities to properly maintain contract files, as specified in 

SOP-CA 2004. Specifically: 

• The PCO CA did not properly maintain hardcopy or electronic contract files in a 

standard or business manner in accordance with the requirements of SOP-CA 

2004. Consequently, files were unavailable, incomplete, inconsistent, and 

unreliable.

• There were no transition processes or procedures in place to ensure that departing 

contracting personnel transitioned workload to successor personnel. As a result, 

this prevented the effective continuity of contract administration when each tourof-duty expired.

• A public email account was not established. As such, successor contracting 

officers could not access proposal submissions directed to the previous 

contracting officer when staffing rotations occurred.

• A reliable network server was not provided. Therefore, the requirements for 

electronic storage and communications for contract administration were not fully 

supported.

• The Standard Procurement System (SPS) was not implemented. Consequently, 

contracting officers were unable to perform their contract administration duties in 

a streamlined, integrated, and automated manner. 

• Records identification controls were inadequate. As a result, we could not rely on 

the accuracy of data contained in the PCO CA contracting actions database.

The PCO CA generally awarded contracts that contained adequately prepared statements 

of work (SOWs), specific contract deliverables, and clearly negotiated contract terms. 

However, the audit identified significant deficiencies in contract administration processes 

and controls. Consequently, there was no assurance that the contract file data was 

available, complete, consistent, and reliable or that it could be used to effectively monitor 

and report the status of contracted project activity for the IRRF. 
4 

Maintenance of Contract Files 

The 37 contracts and associated contract files we reviewed at PCO CA, valued at more 

than $184 million, were not being adequately maintained to fully support transactions 

relating to the performance of contract administration processes. This condition occurred 

because the PCO CA did not establish adequate administrative processes, controls, or 

capabilities to properly maintain contract files, as specified in SOP-CA 2004. 

Specifically, the PCO CA did not properly maintain hardcopy or electronic contract files 

in a standard or business manner in accordance with the requirements of SOP-CA 2004. 

Contract File Completeness. Hardcopy and electronic contract files were not being 

adequately maintained to ensure the reliability or completeness of contract 

documentation. We found the contract files to be sparse, missing and incomplete. Our 

review of 37 contract files disclosed that 18 lacked adequate documentation (some 

contract files had two or more instances of inadequate documentation).1 For our 

evaluation, we used 7 of 13 file content documents that were listed as minimum 

requirements for inclusion in contract files by SOP-CA 2004. For a list of the contract 

files reviewed, see Appendix D. 

We identified seven contract files that did not include a signed copy of the contract 

award. For example, in one case, the contract file contained a September 9, 2004, 

memorandum for the record, stating that a customer had come to the PCO CA asking 

questions about the preparation of forms required for payment. Contracting personnel 

discovered that they had no hard or electronic copy of the contract in their files. 

According to the memorandum, the PCO CA had to obtain a copy of the contract from 

the customer, so that payment could be made in a timely manner. However, because the 

customer did not provide a complete copy of the contract to the PCO CA, the file 

remained incomplete, containing only 2 pages of the contract, 3 copies of contractorsubmitted invoices, and a material inspection and receiving report. 

During our review, we were unable to determine whether 6 of the 37 sampled files 

required justification and approval documents, in accordance with SOP-CA 2004 because 

the contract files lacked sufficient documentation to determine whether a contract was 

competitively awarded or sole source. 

The following table shows the documentation we selected in determining file 

completeness and the results of our review of the contract file completeness. 

 

1

 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 4, Administrative Matters, states that files must be maintained at 

organizational levels that ensure effective documentation of contract actions, and SOP-CA 2004 

stipulates, at a minimum, 13 requirements of a contract file. 
5 

Results of Document Completeness Evaluations 

for 37 Contract Files 

 Documentation 

SOP-CA 2004 

File Content 

Requirement 

Adequate Inadequate Not 

Applicable 

One signed copy of the 

contract 30 7 0 

 

Performance Evaluation 

criteria 28 8 1 

 

Source selection plan 

(if appropriate) 14 2 21 

 

Purchase request or other 

certifying document. 24 13 0 

 

Justification and approval, if 

not competitive award * 1 0 30 

 

Evidence of 

Competition 27 9 1 

 

Solicitation and all 

amendments 29 7 1 

*Note: Applicability of requirement could not be determined for 6 files. 

Hardcopy File Maintenance. The PCO CA did not properly maintain hardcopy contract 

files in a standard or business manner in accordance with the requirements of SOP-CA 

2004 to ensure the availability, completeness, consistency, or reliability of contract 

documentation. We found the contract files to be in disarray. 

Although the files were arranged by various PCO sectors2, our examination of the files 

during September 12 through 18, 2004, disclosed a disorganized filing system. 

Specifically, contract files were: 

• placed randomly in the file drawers

• not in numerical order 

• co-mingled with open, closed, and cancelled contract folders in the same file 

drawers 

In one case, two different contracts were co-mingled in the same contract folder. Also, 

files found within the file cabinets were not always the files that were indicated on the 

label affixed to the outside of the file drawer. As a result, the unorganized files 

contributed directly to a lack of assurance that contract files can be located or retrieved 

on a consistent or recurring basis. 

 

2

 For description of sectors, see Appendix C. 
6 

Electronic File Folder Maintenance. The PCO CA did not properly maintain electronic 

contract files in a standard or business manner in accordance with the requirements of 

SOP-CA 2004 to ensure the availability, completeness, consistency, or reliability of 

contract documentation. We found the files to be haphazardly arranged and incomplete. 

In addition, the files contained documents unrelated to the contract identified for the 

folder. The PCO CA contracting officers did not properly maintain electronic contract 

documents in the appropriate PCO sector-based file folders to ensure the consistency, 

completeness, or availability of required electronic contract records. The PCO CA 

contracting officers were required to maintain standard electronic file folders for each of 

the six PCO sectors. These folders should have contained subfolders for filing 

documents in accordance with the specifications of the SOP-CA 2004.3

During our search for the missing contract files, we found some of those documents filed 

in electronic folders other than those set up for the sectors. The extraneous folders were 

labeled as Contracting Officer, Construction, and Non-Construction. The SOP-CA 2004 

does not identify these non-standard folders, and therefore, provides no filing 

expectations relating to the use of these folders by the contracting officers. 

However, we found examples of contracting officers filing the same type of contract 

document in any combination of contracting officer folders, construction subfolders, nonconstruction subfolders, or wrong sector folders or subfolders. 

Specifically, our review of the content of electronic contract file folders and subfolders 

identified these instances of noncompliance: 

• A contract folder labeled for the procurement of railroad-related articles also

contained an acquisition plan document for weapons and ammunition. 

• Some contract folders did not contain subfolders as required. Instead, pre-award 

and post-award documents were co-mingled with task order and delivery order 

documents. 

• Some folders and subfolders contained incomplete documentation, such as 

missing solicitations, purchase requests and commitment, and availability of 

funds documents. These start-up contract documents should have been filed to 

support the subsequent disbursement documentation that was filed in the folders.

As a result of this non-standardized filing practice, locating specific contract file 

documents was made extremely time-consuming and difficult. 

Administrative Processes 

The PCO CA could not produce 10 of the 48 (21 percent) randomly selected contract 

files that we requested on September 13, 2004. The PCO CA assigned one of its 

contracting personnel to search and retrieve the listed contracts from the electronic files. 

On October 5, 2004, after obtaining less than half of the 48 requested files, we met with 

the PCO CA Director, Program Support Division, and provided a list of the files that had 

not been produced. One file was subsequently located with PCO legal counsel due to a 

 

3

 SOP-CA 2004 requires contracting officers to file electronic files in a folder entitled Contract Files, with 

the following schematic: Subfolder Sector/Fund Source/Contract No., located on the Contracting Activity 

shared drive. SOP-CA 2004 explains that the contract folder should contain these subfolders: Pre-Award 

File, Post Award, Correspondence, and Task Order / Delivery Order. 
7 

contract protest, and was removed from our list of sample files to review. After 

searching further, the PCO CA provided 37 of the 47 remaining requested files, but was 

unable to locate the 10 outstanding contract files by the end of our audit fieldwork on 

October 30, 2004. As a result, it took approximately 6 weeks to obtain the 37 files.4

This condition occurred because the PCO CA did not establish adequate administrative 

processes, controls, or capabilities to properly maintain contract files, as specified in 

SOP-CA 2004. Specifically: 

• transition procedures to ensure that contracting personnel provided a complete 

accounting and transfer of their workload and contract files to their successors 

upon the end of their rotating tour-of-duty 

• a public email account that would allow multiple users to access responses to 

contract solicitations

• reliable network server capability for electronic file storage and email 

communications 

• implementation of the SPS

Transition Procedures. The PCO CA did not have exit procedures in place to ensure 

efficient continuity of its contract administration operations. Military personnel assigned 

by the various services were deployed in rotations to support the PCO CA as contracting 

officers. At the time of our audit, the PCO CA had 46 contracting personnel who were 

assigned on a temporary basis. Tours-of-duty varied from 4 to 12 months. 

Based on our observations, Air Force personnel comprised the majority of the contracting 

officers who were on-board during our audit. Those Air Force contracting officers were

deployed for 4-month tours. Prior to September 2004, the Air Force assigned contracting 

personnel to support the former Coalition Provisional Authority for 3-month tours-ofduty. Personnel on 12-month assignments were usually contractors hired as contract 

specialists to aid the shorter-termed government contracting officers. As such, contract 

administration assignments to the PCO CA changed frequently under this staffing 

practice. 

For example, one contracting officer stated that the contracting officer he replaced had 

already departed the PCO CA before he had arrived, leaving him to resolve the status of 

various contracts assigned to him. Another contracting officer stated that she, and three 

other new contracting officers, reported to the PCO CA to replace officers who had 

departed approximately a month earlier. An outstanding solicitation had been left 

without anyone assigned to complete the award process. Through discussions with 

PCO CA contracting personnel and our observations of the condition of the contract files, 

these deficiencies occurred because there were no written transition processes or 

procedures in place to ensure that departing contracting personnel transitioned workload 

to successor personnel. This prevented the effective continuity of contract administration 

when each tour-of-duty expired.

 4 In its 2004 Annual Statement of Assurance, the PCO CA stated that it had established a central filing 

system both for hardcopy and electronic files to reduce time finding documents, increase response time, 

increase access, increase accuracy in reporting, and lead to better control. 
8 

Public Email Account. The PCO CA did not establish a public email account that 

would allow multiple contracting officers with proper permissions to access contractor 

proposals submitted in response to contract solicitations. Instead, responses were sent to 

and maintained in the individual email account of the contracting officer who issued the 

solicitation. If these documents were not electronically transferred by the issuing 

contracting officer, to a shared drive on the network server or to other personnel, the 

documents could not be accessed by the successor contracting officer when staffing 

rotations occurred. 

For example, according to one contracting officer, his tour-of-duty began after the 

response period for a previously issued contract solicitation had closed, and the issuing 

contracting officer had departed. The contractor proposals had been received and were 

awaiting evaluation. However, the solicitation instructions directed contractors to submit 

their proposals to the email address of the issuing contracting officer. The successor 

contracting officer was unable to access this email account, and was told that access 

could not be provided because of Privacy Act issues. As a result, the successor 

contracting officer was unable to retrieve and review the previously submitted proposals, 

thereby causing the contract award to be delayed until the solicitation could be reissued 

and the resubmitted proposals were received in his email account for evaluation.

Network Server Reliability. The PCO CA was not assured that the network server 

would provide reliable access to email for transmitting contractor-related discussions or 

correspondence, or access to electronically-filed contract documents for retrieval. 

Information technology services were provided by the U.S. Central Command, MultiNational Force-Iraq, Communications Directorate. Some PCO CA contracting personnel 

stated that they maintained their files on their computer hard drives or external storage 

devices rather than the network server, citing network reliability problems. These 

problems prevented access to contract file folders stored in shared drives, or in some 

cases, caused the loss of contract-related documentation. 

During our audit, we observed several instances of network problems preventing the 

transmittal of email correspondence to and from the contracting officer and contractor. In 

other cases, network problems prevented the contracting officers from accessing 

electronic contract files to perform their contract administration duties. We experienced 

the same types of reliability problems while conducting on-site field work at the PCO CA 

offices in Baghdad. Further, when we attempted to determine whether the contract files 

missing from our initial request had been stored on the external devices or hard drives of 

individual contracting officers, we were told that some contract files may have been 

permanently lost because of the accidental formatting of a contracting officer’s hard 

drive. As a result of these network problems that were ongoing at the conclusion of our 

field work, the electronic storage and communications capabilities in support of SOP-CA 

2004 contract administration requirements remained unreliable.

Standard Procurement System. Due to pending implementation decisions by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), 

the PCO CA could not implement the Department of Defense SPS acquisition product 

suite, including the Procurement Desktop Defense contract management module, in 

accordance with requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 4 and the 

SOP-CA 2004.

Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 4 requires each executive agency to establish and 

maintain, for a period of 5 years, a computer file, by fiscal year, containing unclassified 

records of all procurements exceeding $25,000, and to make it accessible to the public 

using Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) Next Generation. When operational, the 
9 

SPS will provide the PCO CA with an automated interface to the FPDS. Until then, the

PCO CA included these FPDS reporting requirements in SOP-CA 2004: 

DD Form 350 – Contracting Officers must complete the Individual Contract 

Action Report, required for every contract action funded with appropriated 

dollars, greater than $25,000 ($200K in a declared contingency operation). 

Until such time as the SPS/PD2 [Procurement Desktop Defense] system is 

operational all forms will be submitted to [PCO] policy compliance for 

forwarding IAW [In Accordance With] DFARS [Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulations] 253.204-70 

DD Form 1057 – Monthly contracting Summary of Actions, is required for 

every contract action funded with appropriated dollars, less than $25k ($200K in 

a declared contingency operation). Until such time as the SPS/PD2 

[Procurement Desktop Defense] system is operational all forms will be 

submitted to [PCO] policy and compliance for forwarding IAW [In Accordance 

With] DFARS [Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations] 253.204-71 

With SPS, contracting officers would have had the capability to perform contract 

administration in an automated, streamlined, integrated, and efficient manner. SPS is an 

integrated desktop environment that supports the complete end-to-end procurement cycle 

from requirements definition/initiation through solicitation, offer evaluation, and award, 

to contract administration and closeout. It provides improved capabilities for managing 

funds and supporting all types of contract actions. 

As a result of not implementing the SPS, contracting officers are unable to perform their 

contract administration duties in a streamlined, integrated, and automated manner. 

Lacking SPS, they had to perform their duties in a manually-intensive, time-consuming 

manner. According to one contracting specialist, not having the automated SPS 

capability adds to the time it takes to issue solicitations and award contracts. At the 

conclusion of our audit, PCO CA officials stated that they were trying to work out 

arrangements with the Army Corps of Engineers to possibly use their SPS product.

Reliability of Data. The controls over the identification of records were inadequate. We 

identified systemic weaknesses in the reliability of the data in the PCO CA contracting 

actions database. The PCO CA used this database as a means to calculate the status of 

contractual obligations and payments, and to provide reports to PCO headquarters. This 

database was also the source of the information provided for our Quarterly Report5

 and 

Semiannual Report to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2004. 

For this audit, we used a report generated from the contracting actions database as a 

means of identifying contracts awarded with IRRF and our sample was selected from this 

database. However, our review of the contract files selected in our sample identified 

discrepancies in the data contained in the PCO CA database. Specifically, our initial 

review of the report identified three contracts that were awarded with fund types other 

than IRRF. As a result, we had to modify our randomly selected sample, by eliminating 

contracts that were awarded using other than IRRF funds and those contracts being 

administered by contracting offices other than the PCO CA, and replacing them with 

additional contracts to reach our random sample size of 48 contract files. 

 

5

 Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we report to Congress each quarter, among other 

information, a detailed summary of all obligation and expenditure ... associated with reconstruction and 

rehabilitation activities in Iraq. 
10 

Further, contract W911S0-04-A-0004 was recorded incorrectly as W91180-04-A-0004, 

as indicated, making it difficult to locate the correct contract file. As a result, we could 

not rely on the accuracy of data contained in the PCO CA contracting actions database.

Contract Language 

Of the 37 available contract files we reviewed, 5 files lacked complete contracts. Of the 

32 remaining contracts, with 3 exceptions, 29 contracts contained language that 

adequately support SOWs, specified contract deliverables, and clearly stated negotiated 

contract terms. The 3 exceptions had the following deficiencies:

• one contract lacked an adequate SOW

• one contract lacked specific contract deliverables

• one lacked clearly negotiated terms

We used Military Handbook 245D, which provides guidance for Department of Defense 

personnel in creating a SOW. We used our judgment in determining whether each 

contract met standards in accordance with the guidance. Of the 32 contracts reviewed, 

24 were for the purchase of supplies and equipment. Those contracts typically listed item 

numbers from catalogs, or a particular model, and did not require an elaborate SOW. 

We concluded that the PCO CA generally awarded contracts that contained adequately 

prepared SOWs, specific contract deliverables, and clearly negotiated contract terms. 

Subsequent Events 

At the conclusion of our audit field work in October 2004, PCO CA officials 

acknowledged the problems concerning the initial missing contract files and those 

missing from our audit sample, stating that the files may never be completely accounted 

for, but vowed to make every effort to track them down. 

Subsequently, the PCO CA was able to locate some of the missing contract files from the 

listing that caused the initiation of this audit, as well as from our audit sample. 

Initial Missing Contract Files. At the time of this audit, the PCO CA also attempted to 

locate the 14 previously unaccounted for contracts that were included in the contract 

status listing provided to us for inclusion in our Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report 

to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2004. The PCO located and provided 7 of the 14 contracts 

prior to completion of our fieldwork on October 30, 2004. The PCO CA continued to 

search for the seven remaining missing contract files and was able to provide six 

additional contract files – four in December 2004 and two in January 2005. 

The PCO CA determined that an invalid contract number recorded in the PCO CA 

database was the cause of one missing file and that the number of missing contracts 

should have only been 13. According to PCO CA officials, the seven contracts located 

were on external storage devices, referred to as memory sticks, which were left behind by 

previous contracting officers. However, when we reviewed these seven contract files, we 

identified one instance of the PCO CA awarding two separate contracts under the same 
11 

contract award number. 6 This duplication occurred because an administrative 

modification to correct the contract numbering was not made. 

Resolution of Missing Files from the Audit Sample. The PCO CA provided 9 of the 

10 missing requested contract files subsequent to the completion of our field work – 6 in 

December 2004 and 3 in January 2005. Our review of these files disclosed that all 9 files 

lacked adequate supporting documentation required by the SOP-CA 2004. Specifically, 

7 of the 9 files contained only a signed copy of the contract; 1 file contained only 2 pages 

of the contract; and the remaining file contained some, but not all of the supporting 

documentation, including only 2 pages of the contract. 

Management Actions

During our review, the PCO CA appointed a new Principle Assistant Responsible for 

Contracting. We provided an initial briefing to the Principle Assistant Responsible for 

Contracting, on October 5, 2004, to discuss our preliminary findings. Subsequently, the 

Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting instituted a file clean-up day and required 

all contracting personnel to search desk drawers and surrounding areas for all contract 

files. Files found were then labeled and filed numerically in the appropriate file drawer. 

Although files found were properly labeled and organized numerically, the Principle 

Assistant Responsible for Contracting could not assure us that all files had been located.

Because management actions were still ongoing at the time our audit work was 

concluded, we could not assess the effectiveness of those actions. In our opinion, the 

results of these actions may aid in the elimination of the conditions identified in this 

report. 

Conclusion 

The PCO CA generally awarded contracts that contained adequately prepared SOWs, 

specific contract deliverables, and clearly negotiated contract terms. However, the audit 

identified significant deficiencies in contract administration processes and controls. 

Consequently, there was no assurance that the contract file data was available, complete, 

consistent, and reliable or that it could be used to effectively monitor and report the status 

of contracted project activity for the IRRF. 

Potential Legal Ramifications. The lack of dependable information may also adversely 

affect the U.S. Government’s ability to properly administer contracts, enforce contractor 

compliance, and defend its interests in disputes involving: 

• contractor noncompliance or nonperformance 

• false claims 

• recoupment of overpayments 

• underpayment claims 

 

6

 The FPDS requires that each reporting agency assign a unique identifier for every contract, purchase 

order, basic ordering agreement, basic agreement, and blanket purchase agreement that is reported to the 

FPDS. Agencies are also required to have in place, no later than October 1, 2003, a process that would 

ensure that each Procurement Instrument Identifier reported to the FPDS is unique, Government-wide, 

and will remain so for at least 20 years from the date of contract award. 
12 

These significant deficiencies could result in the loss by the U.S. Government of a 

historical accounting of the efforts conducted to provide relief and reconstruction to the 

people of Iraq. 

Material Management Control Weaknesses. The audit identified material management 

control weaknesses in the administration of contract files. Consequently, there was no 

assurance that fraud, waste, and abuse did not occur in the management and 

administration of IRRF contracts. 

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit 

Response 

Although the original recommendations in a draft of this report were directed to the 

Director, Project and Contracting Office (PCO), the Commander, Joint Contracting 

Command - Iraq (JCC-I), and the Director, PCO have each responded to this report. This 

occurred because of organizational changes that have redefined IRRF contracting 

responsibilities since the performance of this audit, including moving the Head of 

Contracting Activity function from the PCO to the JCC-I. As such, the recommendations 

were redirected to include both officials.

We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq, or 

Director, Project and Contracting Office, respectively: 

1. Ensure that hardcopy and electronic contract files are properly maintained to 

attain availability, completeness, consistency, and reliability of the files. 

Management Comments. The Director, PCO, deferred the response to the Commander, 

JCC-I. The Commander, JCC-I, concurred and is taking corrective action. With the 

support of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), JCC-I is scanning all 

hardcopy files and storing them electronically so that they may be found. DCMA is 

auditing all non-construction contract files prior to closure, while the Gulf Region 

Division of the Army Corps of Engineers is auditing all construction contract files. The 

Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting has augmented the staff of DCMA with 

five Iraqi Nationals to assist in cataloging and ensuring storage of electronic and 

hardcopy files. The Commander, JCC-I, estimated the completion date to be mid fiscal 

year 2006. 

2. Develop and implement transitional operating procedures to ensure the efficient 

transition of contract files between departing and successor contracting officers. 

Management Comments. The Director, PCO, deferred the response to the Commander, 

JCC-I. The Commander, JCC-I, concurred and took corrective actions. The 

Commander, JCC-I, is currently training Iraqi Nationals to perform contract 

administration functions. In addition, the JCC-I personnel officer is engaging with 

service assignment officers to try to overlap arrival dates of incoming and outgoing 

contracting officers, and to attempt to provide a timeframe to hand-off open contract 

actions prior to a contracting officer’s departure. The Commander, JCC-I, stated that the 

corrective actions were completed as of April 29, 2005. 
13 

3. Establish a public email account to enable multiple contracting officers to 

electronically access contract solicitation information. 

Management Comments. The Commander, JCC-I, deferred the response to the 

Director, PCO. The Director, PCO, concurred and took corrective action. On February 

10, 2005, as part of the PCO and JCC-I migration from the Centcom.mil network to the 

pco-iraq.net network, a joint JCC-I/DCMA public email box was established to support 

the electronic submittal and retrieval of contractor proposals by multiple contracting 

officers with proper permissions. The Director, PCO, stated that the corrective actions 

were completed as of April 27, 2005. 

4. Ensure that a reliable network server provides access to electronically filed 

contract documentation, and for transmitting and receiving email communications. 

Management Comments. The Commander, JCC-I, deferred the response to the 

Director, PCO. The Director, PCO, concurred and took corrective action. On 

February 10, 2005, PCO and JCC-I were migrated from the Centcom.mil network to a 

more robust PCO information technology infrastructure. While there will continue to be 

incidents of electronic failure, the overall reliability and capacity of the new system will 

rectify the lack of capability and/or performance issues identified in the finding. The 

Director, PCO, stated that the corrective actions were completed as of April 27, 2005. 

5. Implement the Standard Procurement System for automated contract 

administration capability. 

Management Comments. The Director, PCO, deferred the response to the Commander, 

JCC-I. The Commander, JCC-I, concurred and is taking corrective actions. The JCC-I is 

currently setting up a Standard Procurement System in one sector, Security and Justice, to 

begin utilizing the system on a small scale. The Principle Assistant Responsible for 

Contracting Reconstruction at JCC-I is utilizing the “crawl-walk-run” concept of start-up 

to ensure the system works and people are trained before full execution. Delays in 

deploying a Standard Procurement System have been related to decisions pending from 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology) as to the preferred (workable) architecture of the Standard Procurement 

System in Iraq. The Commander, JCC-I, estimated the completion date for implementing 

the initial scale Standard Procurement System to be between June and July 2005. 

6. Prepare administrative contract modifications to correct duplicate contract 

award numbers. 

Management Comments. The Director, PCO, deferred the response to the Commander, 

JCC-I. The Commander, JCC-I, concurred and took corrective actions. DCMA was 

tasked in October 2004 with contract administration but did not effectively arrive in 

theatre until December 2004. As a result of ongoing DCMA efforts, there are now no 

duplicate contract numbers. The Commander, JCC-I, stated that the corrective actions 

were completed as of April 29, 2005. 
14 

7. Verify and correct all instances of deficiencies detected as a result of the audit 

paying specific attention to database errors such as the identification of Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund and non-Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funded 

contracts. 

Management Comments. The Director, PCO, deferred the response to the Commander, 

JCC-I. The Commander, JCC-I concurred and is taking corrective actions. DCMA is 

auditing all non-construction contracts, and as a part of its reconciliation and contract 

closeout process, it is ensuring that compliance and payment actions are completed and 

that contract files are complete. The Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of 

Engineers is managing the construction contracts in the same manner. The Commander, 

JCC-I, estimated the completion date to be mid fiscal year 2006. 

Audit Response. The Commander, JCC-I, and the Director, PCO, comments to all 

recommendations are fully responsive. During the course of the audit, the audit team 

informed the former PCO Head of Contracting Activity of the deficiencies being 

detected. As a result, the PCO initiated corrective actions as noted in the management 

comments. The JCC-I is heading corrective actions underway. 
15 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We initiated this audit because the Coalition Provisional Authority Project Management 

Office7 could not produce documentation for 14 contracts, valued at more than 

$211 million, as identified in information provided for inclusion in our Quarterly Report 

and Semiannual Report to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2004. This documentation should 

have been maintained by the Project Management Office, and subsequently the Project 

Contracting Office (PCO), in accordance with their roles and responsibilities to oversee 

and manage funds provided by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 

We conducted an on-site review at the Project and Contracting Office Contracting 

Activity (PCO CA), located in Baghdad, Iraq, between September 2 and October 30, 

2004. In addition, as the PCO CA located and provided missing contracts to our 

headquarters office, we continued our evaluation of those documents through March 15, 

2005, subsequent to the conclusion of our fieldwork. 

We evaluated documents, procedures, and processes at the PCO CA. We conducted 

interviews with PCO managers and staff to discuss the procedures and processes used by 

the PCO CA to administer contracts funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 

As a basis for our review and evaluation, we used: 

• provisions of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004” 

• Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 4, “Administrative Matters” 

• Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement Part 204 

• Military Handbook 245D 

• PCO CA Standard Operating Procedures-Contracting Activity 2004 

• PCO CA organizational charts, as of September and November 2004 

• contracting officer authorizations and warrants 

We conducted interviews with the PCO Head of the Contracting Activity and the 

Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, a Sector Chief, five contracting officers, 

and two contract specialists. In addition, we examined the general processes and 

procedures used by the PCO CA to maintain hardcopy and electronic contract files. Our 

review included contracts with effective dates from February 2004 through August 2004.

Using Ranuni, a statistician provided a sample of 48 contract files, in simple random 

order with September 13, 2004 as the random number seed, from a universe of 168 

contract files. The universe was a list of 168 contract files provided to us by the 

PCO CA. That technique used is in accordance with SAS v9.1, an acceptable 

methodology. 

We reviewed 37 of 48 randomly selected contract files requested from the PCO CA 

between September 2 and October 30, 2004. The 37 contract files were valued at more 

than $184 million. The PCO CA could not locate 10 of the 48 files, and 1 file was 

 

7

 Now the Project and Contracting Office. 
16 

removed from our sample because it was under review with legal counsel. For a 

description of 37 contract files that were reviewed during this audit, see Appendix D. 

For our assessment of contract language, we evaluated documentation in 32 of 

37 contract files to judgmentally assess the adequacy of the preparation of the statements 

of work, the clarity of contract terms, and the specificity of contract deliverables. The 

remaining five contract files lacked a complete copy of the contract, preventing their 

evaluation. To access the completeness of the contract files, we used the PCO CA 

Standard Operating Procedures-Contracting Activity 2004 to identify 7 of 13 file content 

documents that were listed as minimum requirements for inclusion in contract files. We 

based our selection of these seven attributes on what we judged to be most important in 

providing a clear history of the procurement cycle from solicitation to contract closeout. 

We used our sample of 37 contract files to test for file completeness by determining 

whether the minimally required documents were contained in each file.

For our assessment of administrative processes, we evaluated the PCO CA processes and 

controls related to contract execution, distribution, reporting, and disposition of files. 

Specifically, we reviewed and observed the effectiveness of processes, procedures, and 

technical capabilities in place to address rotational contracting officer staffing; email 

usage; network reliability; and automated contract administration support. 

We performed this performance audit from September 2004 through March 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Scope Limitation. Of the 48 contract files we randomly selected, the PCO CA was 

unable to locate 10 contract files prior to the completion of our audit fieldwork on 

October 30, 2004. One file was removed from our sample when it was determined to be 

under review with PCO legal counsel. Also, 5 of the 37 files we reviewed lacked 

complete contracts; limiting our ability to determine if the contract language for those 

contracts issued by the PCO CA contained adequately prepared statements of work, 

clearly negotiated contract terms, and specific contract deliverables. The PCO CA 

management control program was not reviewed, due to restricted audit resources and 

associated time constraints while auditing in a war zone. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. The PCO CA used an Access database to record its 

contracting actions. We did not perform tests to verify the validity or reliability of the 

database. We relied on the information contained in that database in selecting our sample 

of contract files for review. However, our review of the contract files selected in our 

sample identified discrepancies in the data contained in the PCO CA database. As a 

result, we had to modify our randomly selected sample, by eliminating contracts that 

were awarded using funds provided by other than the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund and those contracts being administered by contracting offices other than the PCO 

CA, and replacing them with additional contracts to reach our random sample size of 

48 contract files. 

Prior Coverage 

During 2003 and 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of 

Inspector General Department of Defense (OIG DoD), and the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction (formerly the Office of the Inspector General, Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA-IG)) issued five reports discussing the award of contracts for 

Iraq reconstruction. The GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at 
17 

http://www.gao.gov. The OIG DoD reports can be assessed at 

http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports. Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction reports can be located over the internet at http://www.sigir.mil. 

GAO-04-605, “Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 

Challenges,” June 1, 2004 

IG DoD Report No. D-2004-057, “Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional 

Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004 

CPA-IG Report No. 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for 

Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” 

July 28, 2004 

CPA-IG Report No. 04-005, “Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts,” 

July 23, 2004. 

CPA-IG Report No. 04-013, “Coalition Provisional Authority’s Contracting Processes 

Leading Up To and Including Contract Award.” July 27, 2004 
18 

Appendix B. Other Matters of Interest 

Other matters of interest identified by our audit work are discussed below.

Personnel Management. The Project and Contracting Office Contracting Activity 

(PCO CA) was understaffed by 23 contracting personnel according to its organization 

chart dated September 2004. Although the PCO CA was authorized to staff 

69 contracting personnel (26 civilian, 24 contractors, and 19 military), the on-board staff 

was comprised of 46 personnel (8 civilian, 19 contractors, and 19 military). During the 

audit, we observed that the PCO CA contracting personnel worked 7 days per week. 

PCO CA personnel also told us that they worked 13 to 15 hours each day, 6 days a week; 

with a shortened shift of 6 to 11 hours on the 7th day. 

As one contracting officer stated to us, a contracting officer in the United States would 

normally have a team of contracting specialists to assist in the procurement process. 

However, in Iraq, contracting officers work the majority of contract actions from start to 

finish without assistance.

The Center for Disease Control issued a report, “Overtime and Extended Work Shifts: 

Recent Findings on Illnesses, Injuries and Health Behaviors”, April 2004, that 

summarized 52 published research reports and 4 studies focused on the effects of long 

workdays. According to the report, those individuals working extended shifts reported 

that the 9th to 12th hours of work were associated with feelings of decreased alertness 

and increased fatigue, lower cognitive function, and declines in vigilance on task 

measures. When 12-hour shifts were combined with other work-related demands, a 

pattern of more adverse findings were detected across studies. 

We are planning to commence an audit to determine whether U.S. Government 

organizations’ recruitment and deployment processes for qualified personnel supporting 

Iraq reconstruction is effective. We will concentrate our efforts on the effectiveness of 

legislative and regulatory guidance and processes used to identify personnel 

requirements, the methods to recruit and retain the personnel, and the procedures to 

measure recruitment and retention success. 

Records Management. The conditions noted in this report concerning the maintenance, 

completeness, and accuracy of records pertaining to contracts awarded for reconstruction 

activities in Iraq are a cause for concern. 

Accordingly, we are planning to commence an audit to determine whether U.S. 

organizations have established adequate requirements, systems, and processes to manage 

and maintain records to facilitate future audits and investigations of the identification and 

use of funds provided by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 
19 

Appendix C. Project and Contracting Office 

National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in 

Iraq,” May 11, 2004, established the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). 

Project and Contracting Office Mission. National Security Presidential Directive 36 

directed the PCO to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to 

activities in Iraq and to the Chief of Mission, as requested by the Secretary of State and 

heads of other departments and agencies. On June 22, 2004, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense established the PCO within the Department of the Army and directed the PCO to 

provide support related to the close-out of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The PCO 

was made responsible for all activities associated with asset, financial, program, and 

project management and for managing both construction and non-construction activities 

across six major sectors: 

• buildings, education, and health care 

• electricity 

• oil 

• public works and water 

• security and justice 

• transportation and communications 

Project and Contracting Office Contracting Activity Structure. The Head of the 

Project and Contracting Office Contracting Activity (PCO CA) is appointed by the 

Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). The PCO CA is 

responsible for providing acquisition and project management support for contracts 

awarded for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities, including those funded by the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other 

departments and agencies. 

The PCO CA Head appoints the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, who 

establishes policy and procedures for the contracting office. The Principal Assistant 

Responsible for Contracting is responsible for authorizing the issuance of letters of 

appointment and warrants that delegate contracting authority to the contracting officers. 

The PCO CA has established the Director, Regional Contracting Office, as the official 

responsible for the daily operations of the forward-deployed Regional Contracting Office 

in Iraq. The contracting officers have the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate 

contracts and are the only officials authorized to bind the U.S. Government. Military and 

civilian personnel serve as contracting officers. They are supported by contract 

specialists in preparing solicitations and other contracting documents leading up to 

contract award. 
20 

Appendix D. Contract Files Reviewed

A sample of 37 contract files was reviewed during this audit, and is listed below. 

*Description of scope of work may not be all inclusive.

Contract Number 

Contract 

Effective 

Date General Scope of Work* Contract Value 

W9126G-04-D-0002 TO 1 02/04/2004 Transition planning $600,000.00 

W914NS-04-D-0005 DO1 03/23/2004 Mobilization $2,487,603.00 

W914NS-04-D-0022 TO 2 04/21/2004 Water Supply System Design, Site Survey $42,806,604.00 

W914NS-04-M-0108 04/26/2004 Airport Signs $42,967.50 

W914NS-04-M-0102 04/27/2004 Valves & Hoses $2,297,520.00 

W914NS-04-M-0110 05/01/2004 Top Loading Container Handlers $1,498,000.00 

W914NS-04-D-0006 TO5 05/12/2004 Site Assessment $5,000,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-0120 05/20/2004 Digital Plotter $18,540.00 

W914NS-04-D-0126 05/20/2004 Fire Fighting Flash Hood and Gloves $484,652.80 

W914NS-04-M-2348 05/26/2004 Chainette Suspension $5,023,214.90 

W914NS-04-D-0142 06/08/2004 Not Available $4,355,700.00 

W914NS-04-M-0115 06/09/2004 Locomotive Spare Parts $6,083,621.02 

W914NS-04- M-0103 06/01/2004 Franking Machine $368,142.00 

W914NS-04-D-0145 06/15/2004 Operations/Logistics Movement Control Center $1,750,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-0112 06/16/2004 Heavy Duty Container Trailers $636,368.00 

W914NS-04-M-0111 06/16/2004 100 Ton Mobile Harbor Cranes $6,492,376.00 

W914NS-04-D-0139 06/18/2004 Thermal Imager Camera & Bolt Cutter $1,304,402.00 

W914NS-04-M-2362 06/29/2004 Electrical Workers Overhead Line Tools $37,789.50 

W914NS-04-M-2363 06/29/2004 Electric Worker Overhead Tool $194,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-9000 07/02/2004 Ear plugs, AK-47 sight adj. tool, Target pasties $16,750.00 

W914NS-04-M-9002 07/02/2004 CLP (50 Gallons) $2,200.00 

W914NS-04-D-0119 TO 12 07/05/2004 Ear Plugs and First Aid Kits $31,223.00 

W914NS-04-M-2364 07/06/2004 Electrical Test Cable Conversion Van $2,145,330.00 

W914NS-04-M-0134 07/11/2004 Intermodal Container Handler $1,718,000.00 

W914NS-04-C-9010 07/12/2004 Air Conditioners and Folding Tables $14,710.00 

W914NS-04-D-0010 TO 9 07/18/2004 Electrical Lines $39,021,180.00 

W914NS-04-M-0123 07/20/2004 Fire Rescue Boat $945,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-0109 07/22/2004 Locomotive Spare Parts $1,459,284.97 

W9126G-04-D-0001 TO 26 07/22/2004 Repair and upgrade oil products pipelines $35,287,472.00 

W914NS-04-M-0116 07/23/2004 Railroad Turnout $21,180,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-0151 07/25/2004 Armored Car 1997 Mercedes-Benz S-Class $150,650.00 

W914NS-04-M-0141 07/28/2004 Armored Vehicle $1,702,454.00 

W914NS-04-M-0154 08/12/2004 Dodge Vehicles $82,000.00 

W914NS-04-M-0158 08/12/2004 6 Chevy Astro Cargo Van $161,946.00 

W914NS-04-M-2376 08/16/2004 Portable Computers $29,988.00 

W914NS-04-M-0153 08/25/2004 Fire Trucks/Pumper $2,870,840.00 

W914NS-04-M-0156 08/26/2004 Toyota Camry Vehicles $70,380.00 

TOTAL $184,015,208.69 
21 

Appendix E. Acronyms 

CPA-IG Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

FPDS Federal Procurement Data System 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

JCC-I Joint Contracting Command - Iraq 

OIG DoD Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PCO CA Project and Contracting Office Contracting Activity 

SOP-CA 2004 Standard Operating Procedures Contracting Activity 2004 

SOW Statement of Work 

SPS Standard Procurement System 
22 

Appendix F. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Support Office-Iraq 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group - Central 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 
23 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management 

Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 
24 

Appendix G. Audit Team Members 

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The staff members who 

contributed to the report include: 

Brian M. Flynn 

Karen D. Bell 

William J. Whitehead 

Lynne M. Champion 

Leslie M. Barnes 
Management Comments, Commander, Joint 

Contracting Command - Iraq

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Management Comments, Director, Project and 

Contracting Office - Iraq
34
35
36
37
38