Enclosure 6: STP Nuclear Operating 

Company Presentation

Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 

Public Meeting with NEI

Dated August 4, 2010
S

STP Nuclear Operating Company

Nuclear Safety Culture Pilot

Tim Bowman, 

General Manager, Oversight

David Rencurrel

Site Vice President

July 28, 2010

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Overview

S Incorporated NEI 09-07 process into a station specific procedure

S Binned quantitative and qualitative data against the INPO Nuclear 

Safety Culture Principles and Attributes

S NRC cross-cutting aspect findings are one of the data inputs 

S Actions are tracked in the Corrective Action Program

S Independent oversight built into the process

S NRC observed meetings from first two panel and SMT assessments

S Completed three (3) quarterly panel and SMT assessments
Nuclear Safety Culture 

Assessment

S Survey performed in December 2009

S Site assessment in January 2010

S Survey had 73 questions, completed by 981 site personnel

S 77 site interviews

S One strength, 11 positive comments, 4 negative comments 

and 4 general comments

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The Process

Regulatory Oversight

STP Station Leadership Team Policies Program Modifications Training Assessments Benchmarking

IMC 71152 Problem Identification and Resolution

STP Senior Management Team Communication Internal Regulator External Management Review Meeting

Other Input Sources

Subjective Summary Reports / INPO Principles Indicator Results NRC Inspection Results Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Industry Evaluations Operating Experience QA/Self Assessment/ Benchmarking Employee Concerns Program Performance Trends

Site Nuclear Safety Culture Process

Process Inputs STP Executive Oversight Board

STP Senior Executive Team

Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel

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T T T T T T T 
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Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP)

S Consists of department-level managers plus leaders in leadership 

development and human resources

S An independent organizational development consultant either 

participated or provided feedback

S Met each quarter to review data

S Made recommendations to the Senior Management Team (SMT) 

regarding the health of each Principle

S Developed proposed actions to address areas of concern

S Reviewed progress of previously identified actions 
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Senior Management Team

S Led by the Site Vice President

S Reviewed and dialogued on the NSCMP recommendations

S Provided additional insight and clarification

S Agreed to or modified NSCMP recommended actions

S Created additional actions as necessary

S Assigned ownership of actions
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Process Improvements 

S Binned process inputs directly to an INPO Nuclear Safety Culture 

Principle and Attribute.

S Improved the definitions of observation types.

S Added members to Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel 

including member from new build organization.

S Ensured “positive” process inputs were included and communicated 

to learn from successes.

S Development of a communications plan for the process and results.
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Results

Improvement Opportunity identified against Principle 3, 

Trust Permeates the Organization.

S Personnel in some organizations lacked confidence that some concerns 

would be fully addressed by their supervisors.

S This issue did not deter individuals from expressing nuclear safety 

concerns in each organization.

S Actions were put in place to improve supervisory behaviors that build 

trust.

S This issue had the potential to impact the safety culture if not addressed 

at a low threshold.
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Results

S Communicate more clearly to station personnel the relationship 

between the STP Incentive Compensation Plan and nuclear safety

S Improve manager and supervisor visibility in the field

S Improve strategic benchmarking

S Resolve relationship issues between organizations that are hindering 

station performance
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Conclusions

S The Nuclear Safety Culture process:

S Provides a method to identify nuclear safety culture issues and 

take action

S Provides a forum for perception issues (i.e., faint signals) to be 

addressed

S Is transparent

S Is well-defined and repeatable

S Promotes management accountability for nuclear safety culture