ENGINEER TACTICS 
CLEAR THE WAY 

By Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

The old and stable Army mold is being 

broken. The Army of this decade will be 

smaller, primarily CONUS based, and must be 

trained and ready for contingency operations 

anywhere in the world. 

This will drive changes in the way engineers 

do their jobs. We must be forward-looking and 

design doctrine and equipment that will allow us 

to accomplish future engineer battlefield missions. At the Engineer Center we are doing just 

that. Working together, we will establish a sound 

foundation for Army engineers in the 21st 

century. 

I've talked to many of you in my first two 

months as Commandant, and your feedback has 

helped me outline four priorities for engineers to 

successfully contend with the challenges of a 

complicated, diverse, and resource-constrained 

world. The first is professional development. We 

have done an excellent job in the past to 

prepare our junior engineer leaders, and I want 

that to continue. In this regard, I recommend you 

read TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, dated 1 August 

1991. This pamphlet previews the Army's AirLand Operations concept and helps set the 

doctrinal azimuth we will be following in the 90s. 

It is an extremely important document! 

Second is communication with the field. I 

want the school to do a better job in this area. 

As part of the team, you need to help us 

design and build the future combat engineer 

force. Since you deal with unit problems daily, I 

know you are identifying innovative solutions to 

solve them. A lot of great ideas are out there, 

but if you don't share them, they will only be 

great ideas for a few. In turn, we at the school 

need to stay in touch with you on the full range 

of issues on our plate. I'll do all I can at this 

end to open the communication lines. 

I have already started working my third 

priority: force structure enhancements. Despite 

the successes of the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), we do not yet have the final solution. We must keep ERI on track for the armored and mechanized divisions and watch out 

for "nibbling" on the margins. We still have to 

work out the structure at the corps level and 

above to ensure we can sustain the future contingency fight. This means we will look closely 

at the roles of combat heavy battalions, combat 

support equipment companies, and bridge 

companies. 

Last but not least, we must work on equipment 

modernization. This is broken, and fixing it with 

the sharply reduced resources will not be easy. 

Mobility enhancements are a critical Army 

shortfall. Vern Lowrey's article on engineer observations from Desert Storm (pages 42-48) highlights our inability to breach complex obstacles 

quickly and effectively. We need to aggressively 

field the equipment required to accomplish our 

warfighting missions. The M1 breacher/bridger 

is, consequently, our number one equipment 

priority. 

To meet these enormous challenges, we must 

maintain a sense of balance-a balance that 

places attention on our work and family 

priorities, and doing all that we do with a sense 

of purpose and humor. The teamwork we 

develop will help us speak with one voice for the 

engineer community and greatly enhance the effectiveness we will need in the demanding environment of the 90s. 

We at the Engineer Center are committed to 

helping our Total Army "maintain the edge" 

during the transition to the smaller, quality force 

of the future. With your help, we will ensure engineers "Clear the Way" for this force, as we 

have for every force fielded by this nation since 

the founding of our Republic. Essayons! 
E . P9 cxtober ~glneer Volume 21 PB 5-91-4 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDER/COMMANDANT 

Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Phillip R. Howell, Jr. 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

PATRICIA P. HICKERSON 

Brigadier General, United States Army 

The Adjutant General 

Cover photo: Two armored combat 

earthmovers (ACEs) of the 9th Engineer Battalion move to their next objective during Operation Desert Storm 

(Photo by SFC Bob Crockett, VII 

Corps, Public Affairs Office). 

FEATURES 

2 The Engineer Role In Helping the Kurdish People 

by Colonel Stephen A. Winsor and Major Stephen D. Austin 

10 The Brigade Deliberate Breach 

by Major Greg S. Kuhr and Major John F. Antal 

18 Constructing Iraqi-Style Obstacles at the NTC 

by Captain Thomas E. Sawyer 

26 Engineers as Part of the Combined Arms Reconnaissance 

Team 

by Captain Bob Wray 

35 The Evolution of River Crossing Doctrine, 1918 to 1944 

by Captain Robert Toguchi 

42 Initial Engineer Observations by Engineers In the Gulf 

War 

by Vernon Lowrey 

51 The Quadripartite Working Group: Honing Engineer 

Standardization 

by Captain Kathryn M. Ohmann 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

9 Personal Viewpoint 

22 Engineer Problem 

32 Lessons Learned 

49 Engineer Solution 

55 Engineer Update 

58 Past In Review 

61 Bridge the Gap 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) Is prepared quarterly by the U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATSE-TDM-PB, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. 

Second Class postage Is paid at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and addttlonal mailing 

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reflect official Army or TRADOC positions, nor does the content change or supersede information In other official Army publications. ENGINEER reserves the right 

to edtt malarial. 

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Engineer 1 
The Engineer Role in Helping 

the Kurdish People 

A fter the Desert Storm vic-

...t'1iory, coalition forces provided humanitarian support to 

the Kurdish people of northern 

Iraq through Operation Provide 

Comfort. The operation presented a unique set of challenges 

for participating military unitsand especially for the U.S. 18th 

Engineer Brigade. 

Deployed from Karlsruhe, Germany in April of this year, the 

brigade was part of Joint Task 

Force Bravo (JTF-B}-responsible 

for overseeing operations in northem Iraq. The brigade was given 

responsibility for all engineering 

in the region, and was headquartered in Zakho (see map). 

In tum, the brigade controlled all 

coalition separate engineer units in 

the region. These units included 

the 94th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) (ECB(H)) (US), the 

133rd Naval Mobile Construction 

Battalion (NMCB) (US), the 51st 

Field Squadron (United Kingdom) 

(UK), and the 11th Engineer Relief 

Battalion (Netherlands) (NL). The 

94th and 133rd were deployed from 

Darmstadt, Germany and Rota, 

Spain, respectively. The Dutch unit 

was a composite battalion created 

specifically for Operation Provide 

Comfort, and included an engineer 

company, a medical company, and a 

staff company. 

Elements of the Air Force 564th 

Civil Engineering Squadron 

(Prime Beef), Air Force 39th EOD 

flight, Army 72nd EOD Detachment, 524th Special Team Royal 

Engineers (STRE) (UK), and 6th 

Field Squadron (UK) rounded out 

the tactical organization of the 

brigade. Due to a shortage of lift 

assets, it took about a month from 

the arrival of the brigade headquarters until all units had arrived in Iraq. The brigade task 

force eventually reached a 

strength of about 2,000 personnel 

from three countries. 

Only organic engineer platoons 

remained under the control of 

their parent units. These elements 

were primarily used to provide 

combat engineer support to their 

higher headquarters, but were 

called on from time to time by the 

brigade to augment scarce engineer resources as the mission 

dictated. 

The urgency of the mission at 

hand transcended language barriers and interservice rivalries. 

2 Engineer 

By Colonel Stephen A. Winsor and Major Stephen D. Austin 
The Kurds had to be moved out of 

the mountains on the Turkish border, relocated to transient camps 

and/or their homes, and their 

health and well-being ensured. So, 

despite the diversity of units under 

the brigade's control, cooperation 

and a sense of purpose were the 

rule rather than the exception. 

After setting up operations, the 

brigade prioritized several 

primary engineer missions. The 

first and most difficult was to provide engineer command and control. This would enable the 

brigade to manage the construction of sufficient camps to handle 

the expected flow of displaced 

Kurds. These camps were located 

primarily in the Zakho valley, but 

camps were also planned just east 

of Zakho near Suri, and to the 

south, just outside of Dihok. 

The second mission was to provide sustainment engineering for 

coalition forces in northern Iraq. 

This was a demanding responsibility, considering that troop 

units from six countries had to be 

supported. As JTF-B became a 

division-sized force with a troop 

strength exceeding 15,000 personnel, engineer support became 

critical. 

The third mission was to 

manage real estate allocation and 

use, primarily in the Kakho area, 

where the bulk of JTF-B forces 

were located. With limited space 

and a plethora of units, this was no 

easy task. 

An additional "be prepared" 

mission called for the brigade to 

provide mobility, countermobility, 

and survivability engineering for 

coalition forces should the Iraqi 

Army initiate an attack from the 

south. 

The humanitarian assistance 

mission was dynamic and evolved 

through several stages before the 

final concept emerged. All con-~ 

struction which supported the 

camps had to be adapted to the 

Kurdish lifestyle to ensure the 

facilities were accepted and used. 

From the start of the operation, 

professional relief experts advised 

us on important cultural and 

sanitary considerations for the 

Kurdish people. 

In response, the command 

devised five construction guidelines which were excellent benchmarks throughout the exercise. 

These guidelines directed that all 

infrastructure and construction 

be: adaptable to Kurdish culture, 

easily taken over by civilian relief 

organizations, temporary in nature, economical, and easily constructed. 

Both cultural and religious customs had to be considered. Latrines, 

for instance, were designed to accommodate only one person at a 

time and were positioned to 

preclude the individual from turning 

his or her back to the east. While 

such restrictions made the construction projects less "efficient" from a 

purely engineering standpoint, they 

were well worth the effort when the 

Kurds moved in. 

Originally, ten transient camps 

were planned, each capable of 

handling about 21,000 people. 

They were planned to be built in 

the Zakho valley area east of the 

city. 

Each camp, covering about 1.5 

square kilometers (km) was composed of a city center and five 

Operation Provide Comfort 

Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility 

JTF-A 

Turkey 

Iran 

\0 lfl 

iW5 

citli'r- • Diyarbakir 

:,oo 01 

Syria 

Iraq 

Sirsenk • 

Deralok • 

• Dihok Shiladiza • 

• Suri 

JTF-8 

Engineer3 
Operation Provide Comfort 

18th Engineer Brigade Task Organization 

I 

II 

I 

X 

TF 18 I 

I 

II 

I 

I 

fort, permanent piping 

systems were constructed in two camps. 

Another major contract was the fabrication and erection of 

latrines. While contractors were initially 

194 ECB (H) I NMCB 1331 I 51 FS (UK) I 

responsible for construction of the latrines, 

the heavy influx of disI T I 

• • • • • • 

I I 

I • • • • 

placed Kurds soon outdistanced the number of 

...,1

1

c=:E=o=oc=:::::'.JQ ._I_6_F_s_(u_K_>_,II L-_s2_4_s_T_R_E-'II L-_H_H_c_!_->----'1 Ll_s_64_c_E_s___JJ ~,_l_~-~iw_me_~___J 

latrines. Troops were 

used to expedite construction, averting a 

720 EOD potentially life-threat39TH EODF 

sub-communities of approximately 4,200 people each. The city center handled food warehousing, 

health care, administration, 

security, engineering, and logistics 

services. The sub-communities 

were further divided into villages, 

blocks and "zozans"-or basic 

building blocks of the Kurdish 

community. 

The zozan was designed to hold 

66 people in 12 tents. The tents 

were set in a rough square with 3 

tents to a side. All tents faced inward to a common area. Three of 

the four corners of the zozan 

square contained latrines. The 

tents came from a variety of sources, ranging from American 

military general purpo·se (GP) 

smalls to desert Bedouin tents. 

The progression from zozan to 

sub-community was simple. 

There were four zozans to each 

block and four blocks to each village. Finally, four villages comprised one sub-community. 

Infrastructure 

The brigade's responsibility 

for providing camp infrastructure required considerable coordination of resources 

and effort. The latrines, water 

4 Engineer 

system, and food warehouse 

facilities were contracted through 

TUSEG (The United States 

Army Engineer Group of the 

Europe District of the U . S. 

Army Corps of Engineers). Representatives of TUSEG worked 

with the construction management section of the brigade to 

provide quality assurance of contractor operations. TUSEG also 

assisted in coordinating with the 

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and 

various non-government organizations (NGO). Among these 

was the International Relief 

Commission (IRC), which eventually took over operation of the 

transient camps. 

The contractors used by the 

brigade were Turkish and all their 

materials were brought in from 

Turkey. One of the most important 

of these contracts was for the 

water systems. Each camp system 

had eleven 6,000-gallon tanks 

placed throughout the community 

with tapstands connected to each 

of the tanks. Initially, water was 

hauled from the wells to the tanks 

by military and contract trucks. 

Later, a contract was let for a permanent piping system between 

the wells and the water tanks. By 

the end of Operation Provide Comening health and 

sanitation problem. 

Each camp required 

a minimum of 960 

latrines, and latrines were constructed for three complete camps. 

The latrines generally consisted of 

an augered hole, plywood base, 

concrete baseplate, sheetmetal 

roof, door, walls, and a vent stack. 

Although not visually attractive, 

they served their purpose well. 

Troop Construction 

Many other missions were 

handled solely with troop 

construction. Soldiers surveyed 

the layout of the camp sites, constructed roads, erected tents, and 

put up contractor-procured fencing and lighting. Each camp required a road system of more 

than 9,000 meters. By the end of 

Operation Provide Comfort, complete road systems had been 

built for four camps, and a total 

of seven camps throughout 

northern Iraq had been su~ 

veyed. Fortunately, only three 

camps were ever occupied. 

When the Kurds first started 

coming down from the mountains, 

one of the highest priority missions was the improvement of the 

road from Umzulu, Turkey to Kani 

Masi, Iraq. This was critical to the 

movement of over 130,000 people 

from the Cukurca and Umzulu 
., 

Top: A Kurkish transient camp 

In the Zakho valley area. Each of 

the camps was capable of handling 21 ,000 people (U.S. Army 

photo). 

Right: One of the food 

warehouses set up as an integral 

part of each transient camp's city 

center (U.S. Army photo). 

refugee camps back to their homes 

in Iraq. In fact, it was the only 

road from these two camps back 

into Iraq. The job was accomplished expeditiously by 

Seabees of the 133rd NMCB, who 

worked on more than 25 

kilometers of unimproved roads 

for more than two weeks. 

Humanitarian assistance took 

on many forms other than camp 

construction. These included construction of hospital administration areas, school furniture, construction and erection of 

playground equipment and the 

construction of storage facilities 

for CARE and the IRC. These 

projects were carried out as engineer assets became available. 

Over 300 sets of school furniture, 

including chairs, desks and tables, 

were built by the 18th Engineer 

Brigade. As the word got out that 

the engineers could provide 

quality construction, the nongovernmental organizations kept 

carpenters busy with numerous 

requests. These products were 

destined not only for the transient 

camps, but for villages throughout 

northern Iraq. 

Sustainment 

Engineering 

The second primary mission 

for the brigade was sustainment engineering for all 

coalition forces in northern Iraq. 

This was no easy task, with a 

tactical area of operational 

responsibility exceeding an area 

250km by 80km. While construction standards were austere and 

units used abandoned Iraqi Army 

facilities when possible, the task 

was still monumental. 

Each individual unit required 

latrine and shower facilities. 

Protective berms for aircraft, fuel, 

and ammunition storage areas, 

roads, and logistics storage areas 

also needed to be constructed, 

repaired or maintained. Moreover, 

two large hospitals and multiple 

medical facilities required continual engineer support. As the 

higher priority tasks were accomplished, the brigade was also 

able to improve the quality of life 

for all soldiers by constructing 

Engineer5 
numerous articles of miscellaneous furniture. 

When tallied up, the brigade 

maintained over 225 kilometers of 

main supply routes (MSRs) and 

local highways for more than 45 

days. It constructed over three 

kilometers of 10 to 15-foot-high 

POL and aircraft protective 

berms, and built numerous 

latrines, showers and other 

facilities. The brigade was also in 

the water supply business, as the 

133rd NMCB and 51st Field 

Squadron (UK) contained organic 

water supply units. 

Sirsenk Airfield 

One of the brigade's highprofile sustainment engineering missions was returning 

Sirsenk Airfield to an operational 

status. Sirsenk Airfield was approximately 50 kilometers west 

of Zakho and-until Desert 

Storm-was under construction 

by Saddam Hussein's forces to 

service his palaces in the area. It 

was bombed by the coalition air 

forces and sustained heavy 

crater damage during the war. 

The brigade tasked the Air 

Detachment of 133rd NMCB, augmented by an earthmoving platoon 

from the 94th ECB(H) to create a 

C130-capable airstrip from the 

remains of the airfield. This was 

accomplished in approximately 6 

days. Abandoned Iraqi construction equipment at the airfield, particularly dozers, was used to augment scarce heavy engineer 

equipment. Twelve large craters 

and numerous smaller ones were 

filled and compacted to create an 

80-foot by 5,000-foot airstrip. 

Airfield repair operations also 

included laying geotextile fabric in 

two craters to preclude drainage 

problems. The fabric was flown in 

from existing stocks at Incirlik 

AFB, Turkey. This combat strip 

proved its worth, allowing airlift 

operations for more than 60 days, 

sometimes handling up to eight 

6 Engineer 

flights a day. 

As resources became available, the 

brigade was also able to pursue a 

number of civil affairs assistance 

projects to aid the local Iraqi population. Most of these projects worked 

toward improving the electrical or 

water systems in the area 

Two Corps of Engineers prime 

power experts, called in from 

Saudi Arabia, were instrumental 

in providing power to the Zakho 

hospital. They repaired the hospital generator, which operated 

more than 45 days while domestic 

power was restored. This same 

two-man team, working with 

electrical experts from the 133rd 

NMCB and 524th Special Team 

Royal Engineers (STRE) (UK) 

were solely responsible for reestablishing domestic power to over 

half of the city of Dihok (population: 250,000-plus). Their efforts 

provided power to seven city water 

wells, the Dihok city hospital, and 

the Dihok dam, which provided 

water to many parts of the city. 

Ironically, the Iraqis initially did 

everything they could to stall the 

electrical team's efforts. But after 

seeing the results of their work, 

they did not want the team to 

leave Dihok. 

Dihok 

Engineer operations in the 

city of Dihok proved to be 

one of the most interesting and 

valuable contributions to the entire support mission. Dihok is 

the largest northern city with a 

substantially Kurdish population. As such, it holds great emotional significance for the Kurds. 

Many Kurds who lived in and 

around Dihok waited in camps 

for coalition forces to bring the 

city into the security zone. 

But Dihok also held great political significance for the Iraqi 

government. The government indicated that it would not move 

Iraq military and police forces out 

and allow coalition forces into 

Dihok as it had done in Zakho and 

locations to the east. As negotiations stalled, the lack of a sense of 

security within the city stalled the 

return of displaced Kurds to their 

homes. Coalition negotiators finally convinced the Iraqi government 

that it would be in their best interest to accept a non-threatening assistance team made up of coalition 

soldiers with special skills to 

''help" them restore basic services 

to the city. 

A team of approximately 100 

soldiers, consisting of engineers, 

explosives specialists, medical 

personnel, civil affairs experts, 

and military police was allowed 

into Dihok to begin a very visible 

period of assistance. Seeing the 

co alition soldiers dispersed 

throughout the city convinced the 

Kurds that the city was safe, and 

they began returning to the city by 

the thousands each day. As the city 

came to life, the soldiers were 

replaced with a small UN security 

police force, along with private 

relief organizations. Because of 

the special skills they possessed 

and their very visible presence , 

the engineers and other soldiers 

on the team were able to accomplish what might have taken 

thousands of combat soldiers. 

Water 

Water was a constant problem and much effort was 

addressed to supplying the local 

population with safe and adequate supplies. Toward this end, 

four wells in the Zakho valley 

were put into service to supply 

the transient camps and the 

local population. Th ese wells 

we r e activate d primarily by 

bringing in new pumps and generators. The 133rd NMCB also 

accomplish ed a first for Ira q 

when they successfully drilled a 

250-foot well in Der alok, providing 60 gallons of wate r per 

minute to coalition forces and 

local citizens. 
Kurdish children gather around a water storage tank built by the engineers (U.S. Army photo). 

The wells, along with siting and 

locating fourteen 6,000 gallon tanks 

throughout the sector, made a considerable impact on alleviating 

water problems in Kurdish settlements throughout northern Iraq. 

Munitions 

The unusual unit diversity within the brigade task 

force led to missions not usually 

encountered by the 18th. The 

39th EOD flight, 72nd EOD 

Detachment, and EOD teams 

from the 11th EN BN (NL), 

removed and destroyed over 3 

million pounds of Iraqi munitions while in northern Iraq. 

Confiscated munitions ran the 

gamut from small arms ammunition, rockets, grenades, and 

mines, to mortar rounds and 

large projectiles up to 152 millimeters (mm). 

These munitions, manufactured in 

several countries, were strewn 

everywhere. Many times, coalition 

soldiers had to take items of ammunition from Kurdish children. Am-

. munition of every description was left 

in almost all positions formerly occupied by the Iraqi soldiers. 

Minefields were also prevalent 

throughout the area and were a 

constant danger, but as little as 

possible was done about these 

obstacles to preclude risk to coalition personnel. Coalition forces 

were tasked with marking 

minefields, but mines were not 

removed unless they presented a 

direct hazard to coalition forces. 

Fortunately, mine neutralization 

proved to be necessary in only a 

few cases. 

Combat Engineering 

0 n at least one occasion, the 

brigade served as a combat engineer unit. The JTF-B 

commander was concerned about 

the possibility of an Iraqi attack 

as coalition forces expanded the 

sector south to Dihok. Accordingly, the brigade provided combat 

engineer planning and prepared 

for this contingency by task organizing elements of the 94th 

ECB(H), 133rd NMCB, and 51st 

Field Squadron (UK) into a 

provisional organization under 

the brigade S-3. This organization was prepared to support the 

24th MEU and 3/325 Infantry by 

constructing obstacles and building fighting positions. Engineer 

platoons organic to the 3/325 and 

24th MEU would support their 

own units in conjunction with 

brigade task force elements. 

The construction of obstacles was 

complicated by the lack of munitions 

and the nature of the terrain. An 

obstacle trace was devised, consisting 

of hand-placed point minefields, short 

tank ditches and bridge destruction. 

The obstacles were sited on highspeed avenues of approach. Point 

minefields were necessarily small as 

the only mines available in the area 

were captured Iraqi mines. Because 

of the shortage of dozers, tank 

ditches were designed to be short and 

were sited only in the vicinity of 

roads. Lastly, since there were few 

bridges in the sector, destruction of 

identified bridges did not overtax 

critically short engineer assets and 

available demolitions. Road craters 

would have been ideal in many locations. They were planned but not executed for lack of suitable charges. 

Engineer 7 
Observations 

With all the challenges in Operation Provide Comfort, many valuable observations 

were noted. One that we seem to 

continually relearn is that engineers need to deploy very 

early-and in sufficient strength 

to do the job. Initially, only the 

Air Detachment of the 133rd 

NMCB and B company (minus 

heavy equipment) of the 94th 

ECB(H) were on the ground. 

Even these two companies would 

have made a tremendous difference and been more fully 

employed if they had arrived a 

week or more earlier. Eventually, 

the brigade built up enough 

strength to handle all missions. 

However, during the critical early 

stages of the operation, more engineers were badly needed. In order 

to make this happen, better contingency engineer packages need to be 

developed. These packages must be 

capable of being quickly tailored to 

meet specific needs, be able to 

deploy rapidly by military aircraft, 

and be able to sustain and protect 

themselves for at least 30 days. 

Small dozers, SEEs (small emplacement excavators), graders, and 

forklifts are critical to these packages. The brigade is now in the 

process of developing such packages 

for future missions. 

The mix of engineer forces is important. The organic combat engineer forces that arrived with the 

combat elements were not adequate to satisfy all the combat engineer missions. Although operations in northern Iraq were 

humanitarian in nature, mobility, 

countermobility, and survivability 

missions were very real. The 18th 

Engineer Brigade undertook the 

planning and execution of these 

missions, but lacked mine detection and clearing capability. For 

future contingency missions, a 

mix of engineer capabilities 

should be tailored to respond to 

possible engineer missions. 

8 Engineer 

Our lack of local experience and 

the austere conditions around 

Zakho made the local contracting 

process both difficult and critical. 

The brigade learned very quickly 

that an efficient, on-site contracting capability is almost a necessity. 

We depended on the established 

Corps of Engineers apparatus, but 

the distance from Incirlik to the 

brigade was over 600 miles and 

less-than-desirable communications hindered the process. 

A contracting cell, co-located with 

the brigade headquarters, would 

have greatly enhanced our ability · 

to better tailor the contracts to the 

situation at hand and quickly locate and procure engineer construction materials. It is unrealistic to 

expect a contingency engineer force 

to move in and establish its own 

contracting capability. Locating a 

local expert with the engineer 

headquarters on the ground seems 

to be the answer. 

Engineer materials were a problem. Class IV was slow to arrive 

and even upon arrival, high priority 

humanitarian needs in Iraq competed with low priority needs-such 

as tent floors- farther to the rear 

in the supply system. The brigade 

established a central construction 

material yard in Zakho to control 

all class IV in northern Iraq. Run 

by experts-the 6th Field Squadron 

(UK)-the yard worked flawlessly, 

but was at the whim of a slow and 

non-responsive supply system. Only 

a dedicated crew of contracting "expediters" -scroungers if you willkept the brigade alive in terms of 

real-time mission accomplishment. 

These actions should not have 

been necessary. Local-purchase 

authority is absolutely necessary 

for any engineer organization on a 

contingency mission. Elimination of 

the diversion of engineer material 

in the supply system can only be 

done by bringing it to the attention 

of the tactical commander. 

Other problems encountered by 

the brigade came from splitting 

the brigade headquarters between 

Germany and Iraq. There were 

still four battalions working in 

Germany which could not be left to 

operate independently. This 

necessitated dividing each staff 

section in order to best support 

both operations. The headquarters, of course, is not structured or resourced to operate in 

this manner. 

Difficulties arose from the almost exclusive "European" focus 

and mature-theater mission of the 

brigade. Equipment presumed to 

be adequate in the European environment-especially communications equipment, MHE, 

and haul assets-proved to be inadequate for operations in Iraq. 

The Main Lesson 

But the main lesson to be 

learned was that dedicated, well-trained, spirited engineers-regardless of their 

country or branch of serviceadapt very well to the situation 

at hand and routinely perform 

miracles. If we did not know that 

before Operation Provide Comfort, we know it now. 111 

Colonel Winsor is commander of 

the 18th Engineer Brigade. He previously served as commander of the 

547th Engineer Combat Battalion 

and executive officer of the 54th 

Engineer Combat Battalion. He is 

a graduate of Command and 

General Staff College and the 

Naval War College. He received his 

commission from the U.S. Military 

Academy. He is a registered professional engineer in Virginia. 

Major Austin is S-3 plans officer 

for the 18th Engineer Brigade. He 

previously served as assistant resident engineer for the South Dakota 

District Office of the Corps of Engineers. He has also served as a 

company commander with the 

82nd Engineer Combat Battalion. 

He is a graduate of Command and 

General Staff College. He was commissioned from the U.S. Military 

Academy. He is a registered professional engineer in Virginia. 
Personal Viewpoint 

What Are You Worth? 

A " the Army be~ns to build 

.l"'1down, many 1n my yeargroup ( 1981) are feeling the 

anxiety of waiting two years for 

our promotion board. Many officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) I know, especially 

those who "missed" the Gulf War, 

are wondering if they will survive the coming cuts. While Congress worries about taking a little more time to make the cuts, 

some of us just worry. 

One day you may get the word, 

a quick personal meeting with 

your commander, closed door, somber: You were not selected for 

retention (reduction in force (RIF) 

scenario). Perhaps it's even more 

personal: You were passed over for 

promotion, not selected (very low 

selection rate scenario). A lot of 

good soldiers will hear words like 

those in the next few years. It's a 

shame, but how else can the Army 

cut 25 percent of its force? Somebody has to go. 

So now what? How do you react? 

What is the "right thing" to do? Let 

me offer some suggestions and 

propose a reality check for your 

perspective. 

Assess. During the eight, ten, 

twelve, or more years spent serving your country, you have learned 

a lot. What is in your head is of 

great value. What is in your heart 

is of even greater value. Professional (mid-career) officers and 

noncommissioned officers are 

leaders. They are responsible for 

the lives, training, discipline, care, 

and development of people. 

You may not be a Dale Carnegie 

graduate, but you are a people person. You get things done through 

the direction and leadership you 

provide to others. That skill and 

experience are of enormous value. 

Just because the Army has a 

smaller need does not diminish 

your inherent value. Pick up your 

chin and think for a moment. 

Prior to active duty I was a 

project engineer for a small, heavy 

highway construction firm. Let me 

tell you what most employers really want: capable , flexible, 

trainable, dependable people who 

are honest, hardworking, and willing to accept and bear responsibility. They want mature people 

who are ready to work, prepared to 

deal with life and get the job done. 

They want men and women who 

know and understand people and 

know how to direct, lead, and 

motivate them. And, they want 

people who are at least as interested in the company as they are 

in themselves. Those descriptions 

sound like a good company commander or top-notch NCO to me. 

If you take a close look at your 

experiences with people, getting 

tough jobs done, going the extra 

mile for someone or for the mission, you begin to get the picture. 

You probably are worth much 

more than you thought. 

Accept. The experiences of 

being fired once and laid off once 

taught me a basic lesson: Other 

people do not dictate my personal 

self-esteem. The Army's need to 

drawdown should not dictate your 

self-esteem either. When you go 

job hunting, some places won't 

want you, and others may not 

need you. Life is often that way. 

But remember that the Army gave 

you another important asset: an 

understanding of justice, human 

dignity, and personal rights. 

The work environment in the 

private sector may differ greatly 

from that in the Army. Not every 

business is as color or gender blind 

as the Army. Not every boss rates 

on performance and merit alone, 

and promotions sometimes go to 

less qualified people. The U.S. 

Army holds the unique distinction 

of living out the promises of our 

constitution for every service 

member. Such is not always the 

case on the "outside." 

This is where you can make the 

most difference. Take the lessons 

of personal integrity, honesty, fairness, and justice with you. Of all 

the values you have learned, those 

are the most important. 

Act. Many good soldiers will 

take a multitude ofvaluable skills 

into the private sector in the next 

few years. If you are invited to 

take up another occupation, view 

it as just another opportunity in 

life. By no means view it as a 

measure of your value as a person 

or a soldier. Get ready for it. Deal 

with it, and then get on with your 

life. Take the pride and values of 

the U.S. Army into the private sector and show the people who work 

with you and for you how good you 

really are. 

There is a trade deficit to 

erase, products to improve, services to fine tune, new technologies to develop, and another 

generation of young Americans 

to educate. We have drugs to 

fight, crime to control, people 

who need help. Who can do these 

jobs better than a soldier, than 

an Engineer soldier! 

CPT Brannon is an analyst for the 

U.S . Army Engineer School. Previous assignments include platoon 

leader, DEH operations and executive officer, assistant S-3, and company commander. CPT Brannon is 

a registered professional engineer 

in Texas. 

Engineer 9 
THE BRIGADE DELIBERATE BREACH 

By Major Greg S. Kuhr and Major John F. Antal 

For units undergoing Desert Storm preparation at the National Training Center (NTC), 

the greatest challenge was breaching Iraqi-style 

complex obstacles. 

The obstacle developed at the NTC was about 500 

meters (m) in depth. It consisted of a belt of buried 

anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, supplemented 

by a tank ditch and several wire obstacles. The infantry trench was approximately 200m behind the 

last minefield. The whole obstacle was supported by 

fighting positions for tanks and anti-tank weapon 

systems. Such a formidable defense, when properly 

employed by the enemy, can be penetrated only by a 

well orchestrated deliberate breaching effort. 

This article describes how a brigade, as part of a 

heavy division deliberate attack, can synchronize a 

deliberate breach of a complex obstacle and trench 

line. While the model used in this study is based 

on Iraqi doctrine, the principles apply t o all 

deliberate breaching operations. 

The primary reference for this article is FM 90-

13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 1 This 

manual identifies four fundament als used for 

achieving synchronization during deliberate breaching operations: 

• Detailed reverse planning. 

• Clear sub-unit instructions. 

• Effective command and control. 

• Well rehearsed forces. 

Reverse Planning 

Planning for a deliberate breach begins with a 

thorough mission analysis. The commander 

and his staff must determine the following: 

• Purpose of the higher headquarters' mission. 

• Intent of commanders two echelons up. 

10 Engineer 

• Specified, implied and essential tasks to be performed. 

• Assets available. 

• Constraints and restrictions. 

• Degree of risk involved. 

• Analysis of available time. 

After completing the mission analysis, the commander should give a warning order, and give the 

staff his guidance. The staff then develops courses 

of action, analyzes each one, and presents them t o 

the commander. After he makes his decision, the 

order is pr epared and issued. 

The reverse planning technique assists the staff 

during this process. Reverse planning will "ensure 

that actions at the obstacle support actions on the 

obj ective."2 This technique requires that the com-

. mander and his staff have a full understanding of 

the organizations that are required for breaching 

operations. 

Breaching Organization 

0 nee the brigade commander has determined 

(by analyzing relative force ratios) that the 

breaching operation is beyond the capabilities of a 

single or reinforced battalion task force, he must 

task organize to conduct a brigade deliberate 

breach. The brigade should give specific support, 

breach and assault roles to appropriate subordinate 

task forces. Forces are allocated for each mission 

u sing a force ratio analysis. 

The Support Force. The support force mission 

should be assigned to an armor heavy task force. 

Th e mission of the support force is to destroy the 

enemy's ability to interfere with the obstacle reduction operation. It does this by winning the direct 

fire battle over the breaching area, controlling 
I '' 

An armor unit practices breaching operations at the NTC. Complex obstacles, when properly 

employed by the enemy, can be penetrated only by a well orchestrated effort (U.S. Army photo). 

indirect suppressive fires, and obscuring the breach 

site from enemy observation. The support force also 

secures the area of penetration with fire prior to 

deployment of the breach force. (While securing the 

breach site by infiltrating into the trench is an option, it is generally not feasible because of the 

depth and complexity of such obstacles). 

The support force should deploy into an attackby-fire position that is within the range of its direct 

fire suppressive weapons. For tanks and infantry 

fighting vehicles, this means that the support force 

must be within 1,500m to 1,800m of the trench 

line. To accomplish this, the support force must attack using a "creeping" overwatch from successive 

attack-by-fire positions starting at 3,000m. Once 

the breach force is deployed, the support force must 

continue to isolate the breach site from enemy fires. 

The Breach Force. The breach force mission 

should be assigned to a balanced or infantry-heavy 

task force. The majority of the brigade's breaching 

equipment should be assigned to this force. The 

mission of this task force is to provide secure passage lanes for the brigade assault force and clear 

the enemy trench line. The force must be a combined arms team capable of executing all of the 

breaching fundamentals: suppression, obscuration, 

security and reduction (SOSR). When faced with a 

complex obstacle defended by an infantry trench 

line, the breach force is organized into the following sub-units: 

• A support team to provide local suppression. 

• A breach team to reduce the obstacle. 

• An assault team to secure the breach site by 

attacking the enemy in the trench line, and 

blocking possible enemy armored 

counterattacks. 

Depending on the availability of forces, the task 

force may designate company teams to play more 

than one role in the breaching operation. For example, a portion of the support team may be designated as an assault team once a breach lane is established. (To avoid confusion in terms, refer to all 

of the breach force's subunits as teams.) 

The breach team is built around breaching assets (armor and engineer). Armored breaching assets (mine-roller tanks, mine-plow tanks, combat 

engineer vehicles, armored vehicle launched 

bridges, and armored combat earthmovers) are critical because of their survivability. Explosive breaching using mine clearing line charges (MICLICs), 

and manual breaching done by sappers and designated infantry units, complement the armored 

breach. The assault team should be infantry-heavy 

in order to clear a defended trench line. The support team should be balanced with armor and 

mechanized infantry in order to suppress and 

destroy all of the enemy's direct fire systems. 

The Assault Force. The assault force is either 

Engineer 11 
balanced or infantry heavy. The brigade may designate one task force as the breach/assault force if 

the brigade has only two task forces. The mission 

of the assault force is to pass through the breach 

lanes and seize defensible terrain l,OOOm to 

1,500m on the enemy side of the penetration. The 

assault force then defends against enemy counterattacks, giving the brigade time to pass forward the 

support force or other follow-on forces. These followon forces continue on to seize the brigade objective. 

Other task forces should be designated by 

division headquarters to exploit brigade penetrations of the enemy obstacle belt. These forces 

should have an on-order mission to be the division 

main effort once a brigade breach site is secured. 

These follow-on forces maintain the tempo of the attack by passing through the breach and seizing the 

division objective. 

Reverse Planning Sequence 

D eli berate breach planning should take place 

in the following order: 

(1) Actions on the objective: The "who, what, 

where and when" must be determined for the far 

side of the enemy obstacle and trench line. This 

will focus the size, composition and missions of the 

assault force and the number of breaching lanes required to support it. 

(2) Identify potential enemy vulnerabilities: 

A METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time) analysis, based on the situation 

template, should be conducted to determine where 

the enemy may be vulnerable to attack. Typical opportunities include sites lacking protection of the 

enemy's mobile reserves, enemy positions lacking 

adjacent unit supporting fires, seams between 

units, and defensive positions supported by weak 

obstacle systems. 

(3) Select breach sites: Primary and alternate 

sites are planned, then finalized after considering 

the results of silent breach teams, direct reconnaissance, or the support force commander's observations. The brigade must allocate sufficient company/teams to the breaching task force to clear 

lanes through the obstacle belt, fight and win the 

trench battle, and hold the breach site until the assault force can pass through. The breach force 

should organize its company/teams into breach, support and assault teams. 

(4) Determine support force requirements: 

The support force is balanced with long-range antitank systems and infantry weapons that will 

enable it to win the direct fire battle at the breach 

site. The force should use a combination of tank 

fires and heavy machine gun fire to suppress 

12 Engineer 

enemy infantry in the trench system. The same 

fires will also isolate the breach sites once the 

breach force moves forward to conduct the breach. 

(5) Development of scheme of maneuver: 

Commanders and staffs develop task organizations, 

unit missions, and other plans to support the requirements identified above. 

Clear Subunit Instructions 

Subunit commanders must understand exactly what is expected of their forces. If the support force does not win the direct fire battle over 

the point of penetration, the breach force will be 

jeopardized. Likewise, if the assault force is committed prior to the establishment of secure lanes, it 

could dissipate its combat power by having to fight 

through the obstacle lanes. Each subordinate commander must understand the interdependence of 

the breach, support and assault forces (and teams). 

They must understand each force's mission and 

how each successful mission develops the 

commander's decision making. Clear subunit instructions include the following: 

Pha8e Co-located Command Group• 

1. Movement to the obstacle Brigade command group and 

support force commander colocate in vicinity of support 

force's attack-by-fire position. 

2. Breach of the obstacle 

3. Assault the defending 

enemy 

4. Continue the attack 

Brigade command group and 

breach force commander colocate to observe breach lanes. 

Brigade command group accompanies assault force commander 

through the obstacle. 

Brigade command group accom· 

panies the main effort. 

These instructions must define the measure of success. For example, the support force is successful 

when the enemy can no longer place effective antitank fires on the breach sites because of destruction, 

suppression or obscuration. The breach force is successful when it has at least one secure lane through 

the enemy obstacle belt and has cleared the trench 

line in the near vicinity of the lane. The assault 

force is successful when it has destroyed the enemy's 

ability to place effective anti-tank fires on the intermediate objective on the far side of the obstacle. 

The instructions must limit the responsibility of 

each subunit. The support force's suppression and 

obscuration mission should be limited to a specific 

breaching area. This enables the force to achieve 
sufficient mass to overwhelm the enemy's direct 

fire systems at the breach point. The breach force 

should be limited to clearing two lanes--the 

obstacle belt and the trench line-all within a well 

defined breach objective. The assault force should 

be limited to racing through the cleared lane and 

seizing a defensible terrain feature on the far side 

of the enemy trench line. 

Lastly, the subunit instructions must clearly address the timing of the operation. This timing is 

determined more by events than by designated 

times. The breach operation must be quick, thereby 

limiting the force's exposure to enemy fires. The 

plan must address the timing of obscuration fires to 

preclude interference with suppressive fires. The 

breach and assault forces must be committed as 

early as possible, but not before the enemy's antitank fires are rendered ineffective at the breach site. 

Effective Command and Control 

Command. Effective command is critical to 

successful breaching operations. For a 

deliberate breaching operation, the commander 

must be far enough forward to see the breach sites. 

His command organization can play a vital role in 

this effort. 

Field Manual 71-3, The Armored and 

Mechanized Infantry Brigade, stipulates that "the 

command group moves to a position that allows the 

commander to observe the battlefield, issue appropriate orders at critical times, and influence the 

battle with his personal presence."3 For a brigade 

deliberate breach, that position is clearly one that 

gives him a good view of the planned breach site. 

Additionally, since this operation involves several 

units passing through each other, the co-location of 

command groups is critical. Here is the recommended co-location of command groups for each phase: 

Depending on the location of the task force commander, the task force tactical operations center 

(TOC) may substitute for the task force command 

group. Terrain, communications and security must 

also be considered when deciding the best way to 

co-locate command groups. 

While the brigade command group is co-located 

with the task force command groups, the brigade 

tactical command post (TAC) has four primary 

missions: 

• Assist in the implementation of the 

commander's decisions. 

• Serve as a backup should the brigade command group become ineffective. 

• Control movement of units into the crossing 

area. 

• Continue to synchronize combat operations, 

combat support, and combat service support 

for the close fight. 

Traffic Control. The crossing area should be 

defined by release lines on each side of the 

obstacle. The crossing area is initially limited to 

the friendly side, and is extended as the assault 

force secures the far side. A far side release line 

should be planned to provide sufficient space for 

the assaulting task forces to deploy into attack formations. 

Until the brigade has secured its objective, it 

must manage unit movement into the crossing area 

and across the obstacle. Movement control is 

passed to the brigade main command post prior to 

passage of the battalion task force field trains or 

follow-on brigades. Before the main command post 

can accept control of the crossing area, it must be 

in a position to effectively control the area and communicate with units. 

During the first three phases of the operation, 

brigade main command post missions include executing the deep operation, tracking the close fight, 

coordinating combat support and combat service 

support requirements, and planning future operations. When the objective is secured, control of 

crossing operations for the remainder of the 

brigade should pass from the brigade TAC to the 

main command post. 

A brigade crossing plan must be developed to control this part of the operation. The brigade S-4, assisted by the MP platoon leader, can organize a 

temporary traffic control cell at the brigade TAC to 

control movement through the crossing area. Once 

control is passed to the brigade main, this traffic 

control cell can relocate to the main command post. 

The brigade commander should designate an officer, initially the brigade S-3, then the XO, to control the movement of forces through the crossing 

area. The brigade plan should detail the transfer of 

obstacle lane control from the breach force to the 

crossing area commander. This delegation of responsibility to a crossing area commander frees the 

brigade commander to concentrate on forward battlefield leadership. The crossing area commander 

controls: 

• Movement and positioning of all elements transiting or occupying positions within the crossing area. 

• Security elements (i.e., maneuver, air defense) 

at crossing sites. 

• Support forces such as engineers, military 

police, and chemical units within the crossing 

area. 

If the brigade is supported by an engineer 

Engineer 13 
Three Battalion/Task Forces 

ASNUit Position 

PL California PL Tex .. I tSOOm I PL Georgia PL Florida 

Figure 1 

Two Battalions/Task Forces 

Intermediate Object 

PL California PL Texas 

Assault Position 

PL Georgia 

then, on order. 

Assault Force 

PL Florida 

Figure 2 

battalion, the engineer battalion commander 

should be designated as the crossing area engineer. 

He reports directly to the crossing area commander 

and is responsible for: 

• Developing an engineer support plan, which 

recommends the combined arms battle drills 

needed to reduce the obstacle, allocation of 

armor and engineer breaching equipment, lane 

marking, and plans for improving/increasing 

assault lanes. 

• Tracking the progress of obstacle reduction 

and advising the commander when changes in 

the plan are needed. 

• (On behalf of the crossing area commander), 

assuming control of breach sites from the 

14 Engineer 

breach force commander as soon as possible 

after the sites are secured. Duties include 

keeping the lanes open, improving the lanes, 

and advising the crossing area commander of 

their condition. 

Initially, the breach force is responsible for traffic 

control through the breach sites. The breach force 

must designate a breach site commander for each 

lane to control movement through the lanes. Site 

commanders should be company executive officers or 

platoon leaders whose responsibilities include: 

• Maintaining cleared and well marked lanes. 

• Establishing traffic control posts (TCPs) to 

guide units through the lanes. 

• Reporting any lane closures to the breach 

~~ ="'--- - ---- -- --- . 
Platoon 

Black 

---~~~~~ore~-- --t& 

Crossroads 

'--------------------------

Platoon Black Support Force 

Figure 3 

team commander (who in turn reports to the 

breach force commander). 

The crossing area engineer should assume control of the breach sites as early as possible in order 

to begin lane improvements. Military police should 

quickly assume traffic control responsibilities from 

the breach force to facilitate an increase in the 

number of TCPs and to improve necessary route 

markings. Once relieved of these duties, the breach 

force can consolidate and prepare for follow-on 

missions. 

Graphic Control Measures. Graphic control 

measures are established to facilitate cooperation 

between units without imposing unnecessary 

restrictions on the freedom of subordinate unit 

leaders. The minimum graphic control measures 

can be displayed three ways: the brigade operations overlay showing the overall brigade concept, a 

large-scale sketch to graphically portray actions at 

the obstacle, and a movement control overlay for 

traffic control within the brigade zone. Here are 

some examples of each of these: 

Figures 1 and 2 show the minimum information 

to include on the brigade operations overlay: 

• A direction of attack or axis of advance from 

the assembly area to the obstacle and beyond 

for the support, breach and assault forces. 

• Location of assault positions where the assault 

force or other task forces will locate prior to 

commitment through the obstacle lanes. 

.• Primary planned breach lanes. 

• Location of the support force attack-by-fire 

positions, with arrows extending over the 

r ange and direction of the direct fire systems. 

• Intermediate and final objectives for the assault force and for any follow-on task force s. 

• Phase lines and release lines. 

If the brigade has a contingency plan to attack 

in a different location, the same graphics are required, but are drawn with dashed lines. 

Figure 3 depicts the brigade's plan for actions at 

the obstacle. This is accomplished with a sketch 

map of the obstacle area. It's not possible to show 

this level of detail on a 1:50,000 overlay. At a minimum, the sketch should have the following 

information: 

• Approximate locations of recognizable terrain 

features in the area. 

• Location of enemy platoons in the main defensive belt and any reserve forces which could interfere with the breaching operation. 

• Planned breach lanes. 

• Support force attack-by-fire (ABF) positions, 

with arrows showing the range and direction 

Engineer 15 
of suppressive fires. 

RL 

white 

Figure 4 

• Routes for the support, breach and assault forces, to and through the obstacle. 

• All objectives for the breach elements. 

• Location of planned TCPs. 

• Phase lines and release lines. 

Figure 4 shows a movement control plan through 

the brigade's zone. As a minimum, this 1:50,000 

overlay should have routes, holding and staging 

areas, phase lines and/or release lines, TCPs, and 

initial assembly areas. 

Additionally, the brigade must identify designated routes, near and far signals to guide units to 

the lanes, and lane limits. Initial markings must 

be placed rapidly and should be improved and 

maintained as soon as the situation permits. 

Control measures are also used to maximize the 

effectiveness of direct and indirect fires in support 

of maneuver and to reduce the possibility of 

fratricide. The brigade deliberate breach plan must 

include the following control measures for fires: 

• Priority of fires. Who has it during each 

phase, who will decide to change it, and under 

what criteria? 

16 Engineer 

X 

RL 

Black 

AA = Assembly Area 

RL = Release Line 

SA = Staging Area 

HA = Holding Area 

~ = TCP 

RL 

white 

• Coordinated fire line (CFL). Brigade CFLs will 

be used to protect units conducting forward 

passage of lines. These CFLs should be included on the operations overlay. The plan 

must note when the CFL changes, and who 

makes that decision. 

• Hand-over line. The hand-over line will identify at what point the assault force takes over 

responsibility for the direct fire battle. It will 

be identified on the brigade operations overlay 

as a phase line, and can coincide with the far 

side release line. 

• Target reference point CTRP). The brigade 

should have a standard methodology for designating TRPs. Subordinate unit commanders 

must coordinate the specific placement of 

TRPs to ensure that their fires are supportive. 

• Smoke. Obscuration is a critical component of 

the breach. Too much or too little smoke can 

hinder the breaching effort. Smoke must be 

carefully controlled and coordinated to ensure 

that it supports the breaching effort. The 

chemical officer, fire support officer, brigade S3, and engineer are the key planners. When 

planning smoke, consider the following: 
- designate smoke targets for indirect fire systems, and use smoke generators for smoke 

objectives. 

- identify who controls the smoke. 

- coordinate the delivery systems (artillery, mortars, generators, vehicle engine exhaust smoke 

systems). 

- determine effects of weather. 

Well-Rehearsed Force 

The purpose of a combat rehearsal is to improve agility, ensure synchronization, foster 

initiative, improve the depth of the force, and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and fire plan. 

Rehearsals should "identify problem areas and 

contingency actions, determine movement reaction 

times, enhance coordination and refine the plan. n4 

Rehearsals should be conducted for "actions critical 

to the accomplishment of the mission to ensure the 

unit can accomplish these actions given its state of 

training, the orders issued, and the terrain and 

weather conditions expected. "

5 

When conducting a rehearsal, the commander 

should emphasize key events that trigger friendly 

actions. Rehearse both fire support and maneuver 

actions. The rehearsal becomes a tool that the commander can use to reinforce understanding of the 

plan, and help subordinate commanders visualize 

his intent. This assists subordinates in understanding what they are to do when the battle does 

not go according to plan. 

The two essential ingredients of a brigade rehearsal are training down to the company commander level and carefully reviewing the details of 

the operation. It's recommended that the brigade 

conduct a minimum of two rehearsals. The first is 

a key leader rehearsal with a walk-through on a 

terrain model. The second is a full-scale, drivethrough rehearsal which includes the company commanders. The brigade staff must prepare for the rehearsals by developing a script that describes the 

sequence of actions. An action-reaction format 

should be used, with the S-2 acting in the role of 

the enemy. While rehearsal techniques are beyond 

the scope of this article, engineer leaders should 

pursue combat rehearsals as a means of improving 

synchronization. 

Conclusion 

e Army must be able to bust through com-

~ ~lex obstacle systems. For years, in-stride 

breaching techniques have been emphasized as a 

way of maintaining momentum and the initiative. 

However, when an in-stride breach fails, or 

analysis of the force ratios confirms an enemy situation is beyond the capability of a subordinate unit6 , 

a deliberate breach must be conducted. 

The four fundamentals outlined in this article 

will give the engineer officer a solid foundation for 

successful breaching operations. Detailed reverse 

planning focuses the force on mission accomplishment. Clear subunit instructions and effective command and control are essential to coordinating the 

actions of the support, breach, and assault forcesthus minimizing casualties. Lastly, a wellrehearsed force will have the agility to adapt to unexpected battlefield conditions. 

By following these breaching fundamentals, engineer leaders and maneuver commanders can 

place combat power at the decisive point, and maximize their chances for a successful brigade 

deliberate breach. W 

Major Kuhr is S-3 of the 2nd Engineer Battalion. During 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations, he served as 

Senior Brigade Engineer Trainer for the NTC. He has also 

served as a company commander. He is a graduate of 

Command and General Staff College, and received his 

commission from West Point. 

Major Antal, an armor officer, is XO of the NTC's Operations Group. He previously served as the NTC's brigade 

S-3 trainer. Other assignments include S -3 for for the 

272nd Armor Battalion, S-3 for the 2-8 Cavalry, and company commander for both the 332nd Armor Battalion, and 

the 172nd Armor Battalion. He is a graduate of Command 

and General Staff College, where he earned a master's degree in military science. He received his commission from 

West Point. 

Notes: 

1

Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. (Washington: U.S. 

Army, 28 February 1991). 

2Ihid, pp. 2-7. 

3Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. (Washington: 

U.S. Army, May 1988), p. 2-5. 

4Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-2, The 

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. 

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 1988), p. 2-21, 2-22. 

5

Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-1, The 

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. 

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 1988) p. 2-14. 

6

Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. (Washington: U.S. 

Army, 28 February, 1991), p. 4-1. 

Engineer 17 
Constructing Iraqi-Style Obstacles 

at the NTC 

Before Operation Desert 

Storm, the Iraqi Army possessed a formidable combat engineer force. These engineers had 

performed remarkably well 

during the eight-year Iran-Iraq 

War, emplacing millions of 

mines, diverting rivers to create 

obstacles, constructing hundreds 

of miles of combat roads, and 

building intricate defensive 

obstacles. The Iraqis did just as 

well in Kuwait-at least initially-where they constructed extensive obstacle belts along the 

border with Saudi Arabia. 

Facts: 

The Mission 

To familiarize mobilized 

Reserve Component forces 

with Iraqi-style obstacles, the 

14th Combat Engineer Battalion 

(Corps) at Fort Ord was ordered 

to the National Training Center 

(NTC) at Fort Irwin in late 

November 1990. There, the battalion was given the mission of 

replicating the obstacles being 

built in Kuwait by the Iraqis. 

The 14th served as a supporting 

engineer unit to the NTC's 177th 

Armor Brigade (OPFOR) (Opposing 

6.2 km of anti-tank ditch 

9.6 km of trench systems 

12 km of cattle fence 16 hull down positions 

12 km of triple standard concertina 

Force). During peace-time training 

rotations, the 177th plays the part 

of the mythical ''Krasnovian Army," 

which fights with Soviet equipment 

and tactics. During preparations 

for Desert Storm, however, the 

177th became the "Sarnaran Army," 

which mimicked Iraqi fighting forces. This part of the transition was 

relatively easy, because Iraqi military doctrine and equipment largely paralleled those of the Soviet 

Union and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact. The most difficult part of 

the "Samaran" mission turned out 

to be combat engineering. 

Obstacle 14: Largest obstacle ever constructed at NTC, 5-17 December 1990 

By Captain Thomas E. Sawyer 

18 Engineer 
Iraqi Obstacle System (Typical) 

: /'>.AA./'>. ·/'...·/'>.·/'>.·/'>.·/'>.·/'...·/'...·/'>.>'-> ·,>·,> o_:- 1- 50m 

3. a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a o _o 25m 

1. 18m 

3. a a a a a a a a a a _ a a a a a a a a 25m 

850m 

200m 

1. • 30m 

4. )( )( )( )( )( )( )( -)( )( )( - )( )( )( )(- . )( )( )( )( 

200m 

- j _ 

1 Buned mmes 

2. Anti-rank ditch 

3. Tr~p/9 standard concerrma wtrhout barbeo w11e 

4. Canle f9ncB 

Figure 1 

Samaran Platoon Position 

I· 300m- 350m 

s· 01 

Tee Bunker 

Figure 2 

Iraqi Ob tacle 

The Iraqi obstacles in 

Kuwait consisted largely of 

concertina wire fences, anti-tank 

ditches, minefields, berms, 

barbed wire, flame ditches, and 

trenches. Figure 1 shows a typical obstacle layout. The minefield 

on the enemy side is normally a 

condensed minefield with buried 

anti-tank and anti-personnel 

mines. Most of these were pressure-fuzed and overpressureprotected. The wire obstacles 

were generally triple-strand concertina and four-strand barbed 

wire fences. The anti-tank ditch 

was slightly larger than 

American tank ditches, and did 

not have a berm on the friendly 

side, where the spoil is spread. 

Not all Iraqi trench systems in 

Kuwait were constructed to a 

standard design. Though they 

were generally platoon-sized 

trenches, individual commanders 

apparently had the flexibility to 

modify the trenches to support 

METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, 

troops and time available). There 

is also some evidence to suggest 

that standard designs were not 

followed because of engineer constraints in time or equipment. 

While most of these trenches were 

linear, some were shaped like a 

"lazy W" or a champagne glass. 

Behind these trench systems 

were vehicle fighting and survivability positions. These usually 

consisted of horseshoe-shaped 

berms built up to at least the hull 

defilade level. These positions 

were generally well located to 

allow the vehicles to make full use 

of long-range tank-killing 

weapons systems. 

Samaran Ob tacles 

I n an attempt to replicate the 

Iraqi obstacles in Kuwait, 

without compromising curr ent 

intelligence-gathering activities, 

the NTC developed a "Samaran" 

obstacle system, incorporating 

minefields, wire, tank ditches 

and platoon trenches. 

The minefields in this design 

were notional buried minefields. 

Friendly forces would have to "go 

through the motions" to breach 

the minefield. The anti-tank ditch 

design was similar to our own 

doctrin e, with a berm on the 

friendly side. Wire fences were 

triple-strand concertina, but 

without barbed wire strung on top 

of the concertina. The design of the 

trench system took on the "lazy W'' 

design, with three squad trenches 

connected by two communication 

trenches. (Figure 2). 

Each trench system had a "'I"' 

shaped fighting position, with 

berms and overhead cover across 

the front, and bunkers across the 

back. These systems were 300 to 

350 meters long, and were constructed linearly along the back of 

the obstacle belt. These could also 

have bf:)en constructed in depth. 

This design provided a good 

Engineer 19 
Samaran Construction Rates 

Trench, Anti-tank Ditch and Berm 

Met•• (Thouunda) Sr---------------------------------------------, 

4~----------------------------------,~------4 

...... -- ....... 

3 ----------------------------:: ..... *"' ...... ...... 2 ------------,,--.. "'-'--- .. _ .. _ .. ______________________ -! 

.... .... .... 1-----..~ 

.... 0 .. 

0 20 40 

Time (Hours) 

60 

- 80 

-Trench --- ATD _ Berm 

• Trench dug using teams of three SEEs 

• ATD dug using teams of two 07 dozers 

• Berm dug using two loaders and one dozer 

Figure 3 

Samaran Construction Rates 

Wire Obstacles 

Met•• (Thouunda) 

36 

Time (Hours) 

--- TSCW - 6 Strand NSW - 9 Strand NSW - CF 

e Each obstacle contructed by six to nine man squad 

Figure 4 

approximation of Iraqi obstacles, 

without compromising the extent 

of our knowledge of the obstacle 

systems in Kuwait. 

Ob tacl 14 

Soon after arriving at the 

NTC, the battalion began 

construction of what was to become the largest obstacle ever 

constructed at Fort Irwin. 

20Engineer 

- -

Obstacle 14, as it came to be 

known, was 6.2 kilometers (km) 

long, and included 24 platoon 

trench systems. 

Construction started on December 

5, with the initial planned size to be 

10 km, with 32 platoon trenches. 

However, to ensure completion by 

the time the first Saudi-bound unit 

arrived for training on January 3, 

the obstacle was downsized. The 

obstacle was oriented to the east, 

------·------- - -

beginning in the vicinity of Langford 

Lake, and stretching to the south 

(map, page 18). 

To facilitate construction, the 

battalion consolidated all of its 

SEE (small emplacement excavator) assets under one company commander. This proved to 

be a valuable arrangement, 

providing leadership continuity 

and consistent quality control. 

The battalion used three to seven 

SEEs on each trench system. Up 

to three SEEs would dig the squad 

and communication trenches first, 

then the remaining SEEs would 

begin work on the "Ts" and 

bunkers. Construction of the first 

trench system was completed in 

nine hours using seven SEEs. 

Mter some practice, operators 

using three SEEs were able to construct one complete platoon trench 

in 19 hours. 

Dozers were also placed under 

the control of one company. Teams 

of two dozers began digging along 

the trace of the anti-tank ditch 

which had already been marked. 

Simultaneously, line platoons 

began construction on the wire 

obstacles forward of the trench 

systems. 

Construction of the anti-tank 

ditch and wire obstacles were completed in a matter of days. The 

trenches, however, were not completed until December 17. 

Con truction Rate 

A fter analyzing construction 

ata, the battalion was 

able to determine real-world 

work rates, and compare them to 

American planning rates, and intelligence figures on Iraqi engineers. As suspected, the heavy 

equipment operators were not 

able to maintain the planned 

work rates. 

Several factors contributed to 

the slower work rate, including 

maintenance downtime, refueling, 

crew rest, and-most significantly-the hard soil conditions at 
Obstacle Construction Rates 

U.S. Planning Rates 

73rn!hr (2 dozer team) 

69rn/hr (2 ACE team) 

(11 ' wide x 6' deep) 

NTC Exe_erience_ 

Ditching 

62m/hr (2 dozer team) 

(11 ' wide x 6' deep) 

74m/hr (2 dozer team) 

(4m Wide x 3m deep) 

22m/hr (1 SEE) 

(2.5' wide x 4.5' deep) Tren~hl n_g 

12m/hr ( 1 SEE) 672m/hr 

(2 .5' wide x 4.5' deep) (1m wide x 2m deep) 

Figure 5 

Fort Irwin. Generally speaking, 

companies maintained a 16-hour 

work day, starting at 6 a.m., with 

about 12 hours being productive 

work time. 

The larger pieces of equipment, 

like bulldozers and bucket 

loaders, were staged at the 

obstacle to minimize the loss of 

work due to travel time. Figures 3 

and 4 show some of the work rates 

achieved by the battalion during 

the construction of Obstacle 14. 

Shown are non-stop rates for one 

piece of equipment or team. 

Figure 5 compares the battalion's rates to what Iraqi engineers might have been able to 

achieve. 

Equipment Experiences 

Construction of the Samaran trenches pushed the 

battalion's equipment to the 

limits. The maintenance lessons 

learned center around the rugged 

NTC terrain, and the high operations tempo. 

The SEE was the workhorse for 

the trench system, but it experienced some problems. Initially, operators had to tighten frame 

bolts after every hour of work. 

The battalion motor officer, after 

some field-expedient experimentation, came up with a replacement bolt system that solved the 

loosening problem. 

Problems also surfaced with the 

SEE buckets. During the early 

stage of the operation, the buckets 

failed after about three hours of 

work and had to be repaired. 

Again, an expedient modification-welding an additional plate 

to the bottom of the bucket-saved 

downtime. Maintenance personnel went a step further, and 

replaced the original bucket with a 

stronger bucket purchased locally. 

Both modifications significantly 

reduced the amount of time lost to 

inoperable equipment. 

Other precautions included inspection and as-needed replacement of SEE bucket teeth and 

dozer blade cutting edges, along 

with twice-daily, on-site lubrication. Mechanics also removed 

dozer belly pans once a week for 

inspection. 

Operation Lessons 

The battalion found that 

dozers with rippers were 

valuable digging assets during 

the construction of the anti-tank 

ditch. If only a limited number of 

dozers with rippers were available, then they would dig from 

within the ditch. Non-ripper 

dozers would push the spoil to 

the friendly side. Because of high 

wind conditions during the 

winter, we found that we had to 

push spoil further away from the 

back edge of the ditch to 

decrease the amount of fail-in. 

This lesson was learned the hard 

way, when the battalion returned 

from a Christmas break to find 

much of the tank ditch partially 

or completely filled in with blown 

sand. 

When the SEEs were digging 

the trench systems, the most effective organization was found to be 

SEE teams-as mentioned earlier-with NCOs supervising the 

digging. During limited visibility, 

SEE operators found it difficult to 

judge the depth of the trench, and 

the supervisors proved valuable in 

directing the operators. 

Battalion graders cut a combat 

trail along the front and back of 

the trench systems, so that the 

SEEs could easily move up and 

down the line of trenches. This 

speeded construction because the 

top-heavy SEEs were able to 

travel faster on these trails than 

on the bumpy desert floor. Too, the 

creosote bushes found at the NTC 

can cause tire punctures, and the 

combat trails enabled the SEEs to 

avoid these hazards. 

The Samaran obstacles at the 

NTC were designed and constructed specifically for preparing 

Reserve Component units for combat against Iraq. Though they were 

a departure from the standard 

OPFOR regimen, the obstacles 

were of tremendous training value 

for maneuver units as well as the 

14th battalion. And for the 14th 

Combat Engineer Battalion, that 

value came not only through construction operations, but through 

the first-hand experience of building an IraqVSoviet-style obstacle 

complex. W 

Captain Sawyer is assistant S-3 

for the 14th Combat Engineer 

Battalion. Previous engineer assignments include company executive officer and platoon leader. 

Before transferring to Engineer 

Branch, he served as an infantry 

rifle platoon leader, mortar 

platoon leader, and S-1. He is a 

graduate of West Point and the 

Engineer Officers Advanced 

Course. 

Engineer21 
Engineer Problem 

The following problem will acquaint you with the activity on the node (ADN) method of preparing logic networks and solving resource-constrained problems. 

Students learning project management in the Engineer School are presently introduced to two methods of 

solving logic networks. The first, activity on the arrow (ADA), is the method currently promoted as the Army 

standard. The second is ADN. Both methods are described in FM 5-333, Construction Management (ADA is 

discussed in Chapter 2, and ADN is in Appendix B). 

Beginning in January 1992, the Engineer School's focus of instruction will shift from ADA to ADN. This 

move will have advantages for both students and instructors. Activity on the node has a simplified logic network and a simplified resource constraining procedure. It is easier to learn and requires less time to teach. 

A/so, ADN is the technique taught in most engineer colleges and is the method most widely used in the 

private sector. 

Problem: As a project supervisor, you developed the logic diagram and early start schedule shown 

below. During initial planning, the number of available squads (14) was the only critical resource. Later you 

were tasked to provide three squads to support post clean up during the same time period. This has reduced 

the number of squads available for the project to 11 . You must resource constrain the project to 11 squads 

by completing the following tasks : 

a. Resource constrain the early start schedule. (PART I of procedure) 

b. Update the logic network. (PART II of procedure) 

c. Update the early start schedule. (PART Ill of procedure) 

d. Determine if the reduced number of squads affects the project duration. 

22 Engineer 

------·------ --
Engineer Problem 

Network 

Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

10 (30) 25 lX 

15 (35, 40, <45) 4S 4S [X [X lX 

20 (30) 6S 6S 6S ~ 25 (55) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 

30 (45, 50) 55 55 55 ~ 35 (55) 25 25 25 

40 35 35 35 35 

45 (55) 25 

50 15 15 

55 6S 6S 6S 6S 6S 

Squads (5) 14 12 13 12 12 10 5 3 6 6 6 6 6 

The following step-by-step procedure is one way to solve this problem. Although a procedure to constrain 

resources is not presently included in FM 5-333, this procedure will be used during future instruction at the 

Engineer School. You r comments and recommendations for changes are welcome and should be addressed 

to: U.S. Army Engineer School, ATIN: ATSE-DI-CC, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. 

Procedure To Constrain Resources (AON) 

PART 1: Resource Constrain The Early Start Schedule 

Step 1. Find the first time period where resource requirements exceed the resources allocated. 

Step 2. Choose an activity(s) to delay. Review the activities that begin in the time period identified in 

Step 1 and that provide sufficient resources. Choose the activity that has the largest amount of total float (the 

amount of time an activity can be delayed without delaying the project). Delay that activity one tirr.e unit. 

~ If one activity will not provide enough resources, choose a combination of activities that meets the 

resource requirement. 

~ If more than one activity qualifies as having the most total float, delay the one with the most free float 

(the amount of time an activity can be delayed without delaying any other activity). 

~ If there are no activities with float, choose one on the critical path to delay. 

Step 3. Follow the delay through the schedule. If an activity is delayed into interfering float or past its 

right bracket (late finish), follow the delay through the schedule. (An activity delayed into interfering float will 

delay an activity but not delay project duration.) 

Engineer23 
Engineer Problem 

... To accomplish Step 3, you must identify all activities that logically follow the delayed activity. These activity numbers are shown in parenthesis behind the delayed activity. For example: Activity 25(30,40) indicates that activities 30 and 40 logically follow activity 25 . 

... Check each activity shown in parenthesis (Step 3a) to see if its early start (ES) comes before the early 

finish (EF) of the activity delayed for insufficient resource. If so, delay that activity's start until the first 

time period after the early finish of the activity delayed for insufficient resource. 

... Repeat Steps 3a and 3b for all activities that are delayed into interfering float. 

Step 4. Sum resources. After following the delay through the schedule, determine the total resource requirement for each time period. 

Step 5. Move to the next time period. Go to the next time period where required resburces exceed the 

resources available. Repeat Steps 2 through 4 until the entire schedule has been adjusted to meet the 

resource limitations. 

Step 6. Identify reason for the delays. If insufficient resources caused an activity to be delayed, place an 

"R" at the right of its late finish (LF) bracket (see example). If logic caused an activity to be delayed (it follows 

an activity delayed because of resources or logic), place an "L" at the right of its late finish bracket. 

Step 7. Draw the resource flow arrow(s). Each resource-delayed activity is immediately preceded by an 

activity(s) that uses the same resource and has an early finish one time period before the resource-delayed 

activity begins. If two or more preceding activities use the same resource, you must choose one. Normally 

you will choose the one that provides the least, but sufficient, resources. Find the source of the resource and 

draw a resource flow arrow(s) from the end of the preceding activity(s) to the beginning of the resourcedelayed activity. 

In the following example, activity 30 is resource delayed and will begin on time period 10. Look at the 

preceding time period (9) for activities that end on it and that use the same resource. Activity 20 is the only 

one that ends on time period 9. Therefore, activity 20 must be completed before activity 30 can begin. In this 

example, you would draw the resource flow arrow from the end of activity 20 to the beginning of activity 30. 

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

5(30) 2c 2c 2c 

20(50) 4c 4c 4c 4c I) 

30(50) 3c 3c 

45(50) 6c 6c R 

Note: One activity may require assets from two or more activities, or one activity may provide assets for 

two or more activities. In the following example, activities 5 and 20 provide resources to activity 45. 

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

5(30) 2c 2c 2c ~ 

20(50) 4c 4c 4c f./ 

30(50) ,~ 3c 3c 

45 (50) r--"""'sc 6c R 

24 Engineer 
Engineer Problem 

PART II: Update The Logic Network 

Step 8. Draw the resource dummy arrow. A resource dummy arrow must be added to the logic network 

for every resource flow arrow on the early start schedule. Draw the resource dummy arrow from the 

activity(s) that provide the resource to the activity(s) that receive it. In the following example, activity 20 

provides a resource to activity 30. 

I 

AI 

I 

I 

R/ 

I 

I 

AI 

I 

_I 

Step 9. Conduct a new time analysis. The addition of resource dummy arrows to the network changes 

the time analysis for the network and may change the critical path. 

PART Ill: Update The Early Start Schedule 

Step 10. List activities. Activities that provided resources will gain new follow-on activity numbers (numbers in parenthesis). Adjust the activity numbers on the early start schedule. 

Step 11: Mark time frames. Check the early start (ES) and late finish (LF) times for all activities. If an 

activity's ES or LF changed, adjust the left and right brackets accordingly. 

Step 12: Identify float. Recalculate interfering float for each activity based on the new ES and LF times. 

Update the interfering float "XX" on the early start schedule. 

The node shown below is from Appendix 8 of FM 5-333. 

Activity on the Node Time Analysis 

Early Start (ES) + Duration = Early Finish (EF) 

Activity# 

Duration 

Late Finish (LF) ·Duration = Late Start (LS) 

Reference: FM 5-333, Chapter 2 and Appendix B. 

ENGINEER Solution begins on page 49. 

Engineer25 
Engineers As Part of the Co1nbined 

Ar1ns Reconnaissance Tea1n 

By Captain Bob Wray 

The success of an offensive or defensive operation often depends directly on the success of 

the reconnaissance effort. This effort enables the 

maneuver commander to see the battlefield. 

Likewise, the ability of engineers to support 

maneuver units depends on the success of the engineer reconnaissance effort. This article describes 

two types of reconnaissance, and provides an overview of the combined arms planning process. 

There are two basic types of engineer reconnaissance: technical and tactical. The reconnaissance 

missions are conducted under different threat environments, focus on different engineer-specific information requirements, and are executed and organized differently (Figure 1). 

Technical Reconnaissance 

Technical reconnaissance missions focus on collecting engineer information about a target, 

area or route. This type of reconnaissance gathers 

engineer information about the target without 

regard to the enemy. It is usually conducted under 

a low level of threat and in areas physically controlled by friendly forces. The mission is normally a 

specified task from higher headquarters or is 

derived from mission analysis, and can be conducted by a pure engineer unit. A technical reconnaissance is typically conducted rear of the forward 

line of troops (FLOT). A combat engineer company 

could anticipate the following technical reconnaissance missions: 

• River (unopposed river crossing) 

• Engineer resource 

• Bridge 

• Route and road 

• Landing area 

• Tunnel 

• Ford and ferry (unopposed) 

• Water resource 

26 Engineer 

General Types of Engineer Recon Missions 

Technical Rscon: 

- Collect engineer specific technical data on a point, 

area target, or route 

- Normally a specified task from higher headquarters 

- Conducted in a Level 1 threat environment 

- May involve only engineer forces 

Tactical Rscon: 

- Collect engineer specific information requirements on 

an enemy point, area target, or attack axis/route 

- Implied task to support maneuver plan 

- Conducted in Level 3 threat environment 

- Combined arms effort: Engineer force is just part of 

total intelligence collection effort 

Figure 1 

The basic references for technical reconnais'sance 

are Field Manual (FM) 5-36, Route Reconnaissance 

and Classification, FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, 

FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations, Technical 

Manual (TM) 5-312, Military Fixed Bridges, TM 5-

330, Planning and Design of Roads, Airbases, and 

Heliports in the Theater of Operations, and TM 5-

700, Field Water Supply. 

Tactical Reconnaissance 

Tactical reconnaissance is conducted against a 

target in areas where enemy contact is likely, and the reconnaissance mission is an integral 

part of confirming or denying the intelligence 

preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and developing 

a scheme of maneuver. These missions normally 

are not specified, but fall out as an implied task. 

Engineer forces participate in tactical reconnaissance as part of a combined arms team consisting 

of scouts, infantry or cavalry patrols. Tactical 
reconnaissance is typically performed forward 

of a task force rear boundary. The combat engineer company could anticipate the following 

tactical reconnaissance missions: 

• Enemy obstacle 

• River 

• Landing/pick-up zone (PZILZ) 

• Terrain 

• Choke points 

• Friendly situational obstacle 

• Friendly reserve obstacle (bridge demolitions, road craters, etc .. ) 

• MOUT (building evaluations, utility 

facility recons) 

The basic references for tactical reconnaissance are FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, FM 

20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 90-

13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, 

FM 5-25, Explosives and Demolitions, FM 7-7, 

The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, 

and FM 7-70, Light Infantry Platoon I Squad. 

These two categories of engineer reconnaissance are critical to developing and training 

engineer squads. They provide the baseline for 

the tactics, techniques and procedures for 

each reconnaissance mission, and will help 

focus training and squad reconnaissance 

drills. The new FM 5-36, Engineer Reconnaissance, will reflect the two categories. The 

remainder of this article concentrates on tactical reconnaissance. 

Recon Planning 

Combined arms engineer reconnaissance planning is conducted as an integral part of the 

engineer estimate. Figure 2 shows the reconnaissance planning steps and how they integrate with 

the engineer estimate process. The estimate 

process provides the foundation for developing a 

reconnaissance plan. However, an engineer reconnaissance mission may require engineer forces to 

deploy with scouts prior to completion of the estimate process. When engineer reconnaissance forces deploy early, the task force engineer must consider how he will shift the reconnaissance effort as 

the planning process matures. 

Mission. Knowledge of the mission should automatically start to focus intelligence requirements. 

Deliberate attack, hasty attack, hasty defense, or 

movement to contact missions generally call for 

general intelligence targets. For example, in the offense, obstacle intelligence, mobile obstacle detachEngineer Tactical Recon Planning 

and the Estimate Process 

Engineer Estimate Recon Planning 

Mission Specified region tasks 

Engineer battlefield assessment Identify possible NAis 

Identify recon assets 

available in adjacent recon 

efforts 

Participate in IPB Establish IRs and integrate 

into collection plan 

Commander's guidance Establish PIR 

Mission analysis Identify specified/implied 

recon missions 

Develop scheme of engineer 

operations 

Wargame and compare 

Finalize plan 

Allocate recon assets to 

accomplish recon missions 

and develop tentative recon 

plan 

Deconflict recon plan with 

other staff/manuever 

plans 

Integrate recon plan into 

order, and complete 

coordination 

Note: Recon assets may have to deploy before estimate process is 

complete based on tentative NAis and PIRs. 

Figure 2 

ment location, terrain data, enemy survivability effort, enemy countermobility and mobility asset location, and engineer low density equipment location 

are intelligence requirements which can help confirm or deny the situational template. 

In the subunit instructions, an engineer company 

could receive a specified reconnaissance mission. 

Characteristically, the engineer subunit mission will 

be a technical reconnaissance. The task force engineer needs to be aware of the maneuver unit's 

specified reconnaissance task, and higher 

headquarter's priority intelligence requirements. 

This article uses the deliberate attack as an example. 

Engineer Battlefield Assessment. The engineer battlefield assessment [EBA] is the basis of 

the engineer's input into the IPB and, therefore, becomes the foundation for reconnaissance planning. 

During terrain analyses, the engineer and S-2 identify key and decisive terrain features whose engineer characteristics are important to the 

maneuver plan. The S-2 uses the higher 

headquarter's situational template and refines it 

(Figure 3). The task force engineer uses the 8-2's 

template of the enemy location, along with other 

Engineer27 
Objective 

Figure 3 

Recon Planning and Engineer Battlefield 

Assessment 

Terrain and weather analyses: 

- Identify key terrain features requiring engineer recon 

(technical or tactical) 

- Focus on existing obstacles that impact on maneuver 

forces 

Enemy MICMIS capability and employment 

-Template enemy engineer activities 

- Identify possible NAI's/information requirements 

- Begin to establish priorities 

Friendly MICMIS capability 

- Identify friendly recon assets available 

- Include engineer, maneuver, and intelligence assets 

- Coordinate with adjacent engineer recon efforts 

- Identify necessary recon equipment 

Figure 4 

Recon Planning Input to the IPB 

Provide Input Into 5-2's terrain analysis 

- Determine impact existing obstacles have on avenues 

of approach and mobility corridors 

- Prioritize engineer recon to confirm terrain analysis 

and begin recon early 

Provide input Into the 5-2's doctrinal and situation 

template 

- Base your input on enemy M/CM/S assessment 

- "Identify tentative NAI's and information requirements 

Provide Input Into the 5-2's collection plan 

- S-2 and engineer develop coordinated list of NAI's and 

information requirements 

- Ensure mutual support is planned 

Figure 5 

28 Engineer 

facts and assumptions, in order to template enemy 

mobility/countermobility/survivability capabilities 

(Figure 4). This procedure assists the engineer and 

S-2 in focusing tactical reconnaissance on specific 

named areas of interest (NAis) to collect the information requirements/priority information requirements (IRs/PIRs) (Figure 5). Figure 6 shows a 

refined situation template with NAis annotated. 

Mission-critical NAis and PIRs can now be 

prioritized. 

The S-2 and engineer also look at adjacent reconnaissance efforts which impact on the area of operations. Last, the engineer considers the friendly engineer capability and reviews the combined arms 

assets available for collecting engineer intelligence. 

Those usually include: 

• Scouts - Used to recon areas in close 

proximity to the enemy. Scouts reconnoiter to 

determine enemy locations, orientations, and 

dispositions. Before, during, and after the battle, they report their observations and significant changes in enemy activity. 

• Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs) - A 

GSR can detect moving vehicles and personnel 

in open terrain at long ranges, and it can provide information on the number, location, disposition, and types of targets. Normally, GSRs 

are placed to cover open, high-speed approaches where early detection is critical. 

• Remote Sensor Teams (REMS)- Like 

GSRs, REMS are division assets attached or 

placed in direct support. The REMS should be 

placed as far forward as possible. They are useful in covering dead space and broken terrain 

where observation would require more observation posts COPs) or patrols than are available. 

They can also assist in detecting attempts to 

breach friendly obstacles and in keeping track 

of enemy movements after security force 

withdrawal. 

• Maneuver Listening/Observation Posts 

(LP/OPs) - LP/OPs are used to observe or listen to the front, or in gaps between friendly 

positions. They provide early warning of the 

enemy's advance. 

• Patrols - Patrols are conducted to cover unoccupied gaps between defensive positions. On occasion, patrols also may cover the terrain between OPs to the front. This is normally accomplished by the occupying unit during a 

defensive operation. 

• Engineers - Engineers are used specifically to 

gain intelligence on the enemy's 

mobility/countermobility/ survivability operations and friendly OCOKA requirements. 
Figure 6 

• Aerial Reconnaissance - You must coordinate for these assets-if they are available 

at the battalion task force level. Imagery and 

photography products can compliment your intelligence collection plan. Ensure the requests 

for these products are submitted. On 

numerous occasions, the products are not 

"pushed" through the system. Aviation assets 

can be task organized to the battalion task 

force for specific missions. OH-58s can be requested to cover specific areas, routes or targets (Refer to FM 17-95 Cavalry Operations). 

Be sure to consider SEAD (suppression of 

enemy air defenses) and air superiority when 

planning and requesting these assets. 

Commander's Guidance. The commander's 

guidance is given after the restated mission of the 

command estimate. The restated mission confirms 

the essential tasks expressed in the mission statement. This aids in determining and recommending 

PIRs to the commander. He confirms the PIRs, and 

the staff engineer ensures that intelligence requirements are included in his recommendation. 

Mission Analysis. Recon tasks identified in the 

IPB process and R&S (reconnaissance and surveillance) planning are included in the mission 

analysis. The engineer considers all engineer recon 

missions given by higher headquarters as specified 

tasks. These tasks are usually technical recon missions. The engineer also identifies implied technical 

and tactical recon missions as implied missions. 

Mission-critical technical and tactical engineer 

recon missions are identified as essential tasks and 

----

Recon Planning and Mission 

Analysis/Commander's Guidance 

Identify all specified recon missions 

- Based on higher's basic OPORDER 

- Intelligence annex 

- Engineer annex 

- Higher engineer OPORDER 

Identify Implied engineer recon missions 

- Based on EBA and IPB input 

- Prioritize recon missions 

- Identify recon missions that are essential tasks 

Recon missions and priorities may change as 

maneuver plans are developed 

Establish PIR based on commander's guidance 

Figure 7 

become the main effort in recon planning and force 

allocation. 

A word of caution: engineer recon mission 

priorities may change as maneuver plans are 

developed and refined, or they may change as the 

situation changes (Figure 7). Time analysis of the 

command estimate might drive specific NAis to be 

more important than others. Mission analysis 

provides the framework for a reconnaissance and 

surveillance plan with NAis, targeted areas of interests (TAis) and PIRs. 

Develop Scheme of Engineer Operations. 

The scheme of engineer operations is developed concurrently with the maneuver course of action. Figure 8 shows a generic offensive scheme of 

maneuver. Engineer recon efforts are included in 

the development of a scheme of engineer operations. The engineer analyzes the recon tasks that 

have been identified and looks at where they occur 

on the battlefield. He knows the assets available 

from his EBA analysis, and so allocates the engineer forces necessary to accomplish the recon 

task. Normally, an engineer squad is capable of 

reconnoitering one target at a time. Large targets 

may require an entire platoon. 

In some cases, using non-engineer intelligence 

collection assets is more appropriate. Scouts, 

patrols, GSRs and aviation recon efforts may be 

tasked to collect engineer IRs in coordination with 

the S-2. The engineer will then task organize engineer assets allocated to the recon effort based on 

the type reconnaissance and the type of force commanding and controlling the recon effort. As a rule 

of thumb, engineer forces conducting technical 

recons remain task organized under engineer 

Engineer 29 
PL Tackle PL Guard 

ABF10 

PL Tackle PL Guard 

Figure 8 

headquarters. Engineer forces conducting tactical 

recons are task organized as attached to a 

maneuver headquarters-usually the task force or 

battalion scouts. The engineer integrates engineer 

recon force s, missions, and priorities into the total 

scheme of engineer operations. 

Engineers are trained to conduct obstacle and fortification reconnaissance to evaluate the technical 

nature of these works. Scouts and infantry also conduct obstacle reconnaissance, and are experts in 

Finalize The Engineer Recon Plan 

Assign specific NAis, IRIPIR to subordinate units 

Integrate engineer recon effort Into BDEnF OPORDER (R&S plan) 

Coordinate recon routes with other staff members and unit commanders 

Brief engineer recon effort at the OPORDER 

Develop engineer recon tracking/command and 

control systems 

Specify how hard Intelligence will be disseminated 

- By whom - To whom 

- Where - When 

- Using what means (radio, FAX, courier) 

Figure 9 

30 Engineer 

tactical maneuver and reconnaissance. Maneuver 

unit recon assets are normally better than an engineer squad at collecting information in NAis that 

are close to the enemy location. However, increasing engineer recon training can compensate for 

this. For example, in support of an offense operation, engineers would focus on the NAis covering 

the enemy's tactical obstacles, while the scouts 

would focus on the NAis covering the enemy's 

weapon systems and protective obstacles. 

Wargame and Refine. The engineer always 

participates in the wargaming process. Wargaming 

offers the engineer an excellent opportunity to look 

at his recon effort in the context of the maneuver 

plan and other recon efforts. It helps him identify 

weaknesses in his recon plan. As the maneuver 

plan is wargamed, the engineer should consider 

how well his recon plan has provided the information needed to successfully execute the maneuver 

plan. As a result, the engineer may identify the 

need for additional NAis and IRs. He also looks for 

conflicts such as recon assets that are operating in 

an area of indirect preparatory fires. 

Finalize Plan. In coordination with the TF S3, S-2, and commander, the engineer finalizes his 

recon plan. Engineer forces participating in the 

recon effort are given specific NAis and IRs as sub 

unit instructions in the engineer company OPORD 

(Figure 9). If the reconnaissance assets have already moved out, their plan must be updated and 

the commander's intent given to the recon elements. This critical point is often overlooked. If the 

reconnaissance units know the commander's intent, 
-------" ' 

Primary A 

" '- __. To NAI 7 

.----/ , / - - - From NAI 6 

/ 

~ )'0 

'v..q/ 6 

Figure 10 

they will be better prepared to demonstrate the appropriate initiative to help the commander. 

The staff engineer makes every effort to coordinate with other TF staff members and maneuver 

commanders. He ensures that engineer reconnaissance assets are given the appropriate NAis, command and control, and logistics. It's important that 

the engineer brief his recon plan (as part of the TF 

plan) at the TF operations order (OPORD) to ensure that the plan is disseminated. As the engineer 

recon plan is finalized, the engineer must consider 

how he will track the progress of the recon effort, 

receive reports, and, if necessary, shift the recon 

focus. He must not only focus on his engineers, but 

on the total combined arms reconnaissance effort 

as well. The scout platoon leader integrates the engineers into his movement and develops his own 

movement plan (Figure 10). 

Summary 

, "J"'\is article has been limited to the engineer's 

~ ;lanning process and his responsibilities as 

part of a combined arms staff. Combined arms 

reconnaissance planning should not be viewed as a 

check to block activity-the R&S plan confirms or 

denies the situation template. After the intelligence 

reports are received, the template is updated and 

refined and the S-2 and engineer develop new 

NAis. As for all staff engineer planning, the engineer estimate provides the basic framework for 

engineer reconnaissance operations. Mter staff 

planning, engineer reconnaissance leaders must 

conduct standard troop leading procedures. 

Engineers are a critical part of the combined 

arms reconnaissance effort, and must be proficient 

in recon operations and planning. Engineer leaders 

should take note, and make sure their units are 

trained up to the mission. W 

Captain Wray is an instructor I writer in the Engineer School's Tactics, Training and Doctrine 

Division. He previously served as a company commander and assistant S-3 with the 7th Engineer 

Battalion. He is a graduate of Command and 

General Staff College and the University of 

Louisville. 

Engineer 31 
LESSONS LEARNED 

Basic Rifle Marksmanship Sustainment Training 

By Robert C. Clark 

The following Lessons Learned apply to the unit 

Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) training program. They are based on an evaluation of the BRM 

program conducted by the Engineer School's Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES). For 

more information, write to Commandant, U.S. Army 

Engineer School, ATSE-ESE, Fort Leonard Wood, 

MO, 65473-6630. Or, call (314) 563-5320, Autovon 

676-5320. 

ISSUE: Many soldiers who attend the Noncommissioned Officer's Basic and Advanced Courses 

(BNCOC and ANCOC) or the Engineer Officer's 

Basic Course (EOBC) are not prepared to learn the 

train-the-trainer skills taught in these professional 

development courses. Instead, they require training 

in the basic skills needed to qualify with a weapon. 

Students comment that their unit training programs 

are not designed to sustain BRM skills, as required 

in FM 23-9, M16A1 Rifle and M16A2 Rifle 

Marksmanship. 

DISCUSSION: Analysis of the BRM program 

taught in NCO and officer courses at the Engineer 

Center revealed that the basic officer and NCO courses (EOBC and BNCOC) provided no training in 

BRM skills, and the advanced course (ANCOC) 

32 Engineer 

provided only familiarization training. To correct these 

deficiencies, rifle qualification became a requirement 

to graduate from EOBC, BNCOC, and ANCOC as of 

October 1990. 

Many of the issues identified in this study relate 

directly to unit BRM sustainment skills. Student feedback through surveys and group discussions indicate 

that some soldiers were never assigned MI6AI or 

M16A2 rifles. And many unit BRM programs did not 

include a unit sustainment program, as required FM 

23-9. Other key points-

• Basic rifle marksmanship training for BNCOC, 

ANCOC and EOBC provides instruction to 

leaders on how to plan, conduct, and evaluate 

rifle marksmanship sustainment training. It is not 

designed to train soldiers in basic BRM skills. 

• While the intent of the BRM program in professional development courses is to train-thetrainer, soldiers report to them with skill deficiencies. They must be trained in the basic skills required to qualify with an individual weapon 

before they can learn the advanced tasks. Thus, 

instruction cannot focus on train-the-trainer 

skills. Instead, it focuses on ensuring soldiers 

qualify with the weapon so they can meet 

graduation requirements. 
"A unit can best sustain marksmanship 

proficiency by implementing a quality unit 

training program." 

During the DOES' evaluation, soldiers pointed out 

that: 

• Many soldiers had not fired or qualified with their 

individual weapon since leaving Advanced Individual Training (AIT). 

• Soldiers had not been exposed to pop-up targets (target detection) since AlT. 

• Long periods often elapse between initial and 

sustainment training. 

• Unit sustainment training often is not in accordance with FM 23-9. In many units emphasis is 

on qualification, not on sustaining individual soldier skills. 

What Needs To Happen 

To ensure soldier proficiency in BRM skills, commanders and trainers must first understand the 

Army's training goal and the standards and strategies 

for marksmanship training. 

Training Goal: The Army's goal for training is to 

develop a combat-ready force that is prepared to mobilize and deploy on short notice and to fight and 

defeat enemies. DA Pam 350-38, Standards in 

Weapons Training, can help units attain this goal. It 

provides commanders and unit trainers with: 

• A common set of weapon and weapon qualification standards 

• Suggested weapon training strategies that will 

lead to the attainment and sustainment of 

measurable standards, and a model for resource 

requirements 

Standards and Strategies: Commanders must 

design training strategies that will allow their soldiers 

to attain the BAM standards. DA Pam 350-38 

provides models for training and the resources 

needed to attain the standards. The models provide 

generic, not specific, requirements and are one way 

to attain and sustain the standard. 

Unit commanders can select from the generic 

menu of weapon training programs described in DA 

Pam 350-38 to train for a specific assigned mission 

or unit goal. This flexibility allows trainers to design 

programs that meet their needs. 

For Example 

As an engineer company commander in an engineer battalion, you are tasked to determine 

the requirements for qualifying your company on the 

M16A2 rifle. Using DA PAM 350-38, you determine 

that the soldiers are Category II (not members of a 

rifle or scout squad). Thus, 90 percent of the soldiers 

assigned an M 16 rifle or M203 Grenade Launcher 

must have met the individual requirements for the 

M 16 rifle to standard within the past 6 months. Individual requirements for Category II soldiers include 

qualifying on a day record fire course, firing in mission oriented protection posture (MOPP) 4 protective 

clothing to standard, and firing a night record course 

to standard. 

Table 5-31 (DA PAM 350-38) recommends training 

strategies (firing events) that will enable soldiers to 

maintain and sustain proficiency with the M16 rifle. 

The table also lists ammunition allocation requirements for each weapon per firing event, which makes 

it easy for trainers to order the correct type and 

amount of ammunition. 

Now you know the firing events, standards, and 

ammunition requirements for your unit. The next 

steps are to review the suggested training strategies 

in FM 23-9, plan the training, program the events into 

long-range training calendars, and then conduct the 

training to standard. You should use both DA Pam 

350-38 and FM 23-9 to be sure the training and BRM 

qualification are conducted to standard. 

Year-round Marksmanship Training 

A year-round marksmanship training program 

will help units meet the Army's training goal. 

Engineer33 
An effective unit marksmanship program reflects the 

commander's and trainer's priority of interest and emphasis. Appendix A of FM 23-9 proposes a strategy 

to guide units in establishing and conducting an effective program. It includes a list of tools for individual 

and leader refresher training that can help soldiers 

maintain the basic skills learned during initial entry 

training (lET). 

Unit sustainment training is a critical part of yearround marksmanship training. Studies show that soldier skills and marksmanship fundamentals 

deteriorate within two months, and mechanical skills 

weaken even sooner. Therefore, units should provide 

short periods of training throughout the year to maintain these skills. 

A year-round marksmanship sustainment program 

enables units to attain and maintain their individual 

and collective firing proficiency skills. Many non-firing 

tasks can be accomplished as opportunities develop 

or concurrent with other training. Dry-fire training can 

strengthen marksmanship skills and assess training 

needs. The key is to make marksmanship training an 

on-going event. 

Back To The Study 

The DOES survey of students in BNCOC and 

ANCOC produced the following information: 

• Of students surveyed, 66 percent indicated that 

BAM training in their units did not include target 

detection. This is a key element of BAM training 

and is a major reason why soldiers fail to qualify 

in their professional development courses. Appendix B of FM 23-9 provides tips to improve 

training in this area. 

• Many units do not use training devices such as 

the M15A1 aiming card, riddle sight device, M16 

sighting device, or the weaponeer. Several 

marksmanship training devices can enhance sustainment training when they are used with appropriate training strategies (see Appendix C, 

FM 23-9). These devices are especially useful 

when ammunition is limited. While some are 

complex, costly, and in limited supply, others are 

relatively simple, inexpensive, and in large supply. Devices can be used individually or in 

combinations. 

Individuals or squads should use these devices 

to practice and sustain basic marksmanship 

skills and fundamentals. The old philosophy &hat 

training can't be conducted because bullets and 

a range are lacking is no longer valid. 

34 Engineer 

RECOMMENDATION: The Engineer Center 

recommends that commanders at every level ensure 

their unit sustainment training program conforms with 

FM 23-9, and that soldiers meet BAM standards at 

least semi-annually. 

Soldiers are taught how to detect and hit a target, 

and how to maintain their weapons during lET. They 

must maintain these skills throughout their Army 

careers. Commanders at all levels are responsible for 

developing programs that enable soldiers to sustain 

these skills. 

A year-round program is the best way to maintain 

the basic skills learned in lET. In these days of force 

reductions, only top quality soldiers are selected to attend professional development courses. If a student 

is not prepared to learn the train-the-trainer tasks 

there, his military career may be in jeopardy. 

The following suggestions may help you develop a 

sound BAM program: 

1. Use the training strategy chart (Figure 1-1) on 

page 1-2 of FM 23-9 as a guide when developing a 

sustainment program. 

2. Know the standard. Review Chapter 5 and 

Tables 5-30 and 5-31 in DA PAM 350-38. 

3. Integrate sufficient time for marksmanship training in the unit's mission essential task list (METL). 

4. Assess your soldiers' proficiency. 

5. Train the trainers. 

6. Conduct refresher training. 

7. Use training devices. 

8. Ensure standards are met. 

As we begin a new fiscal year, let me challenge 

you to include BAM in your overall training program. 

Commanders , examine each strategy as it applies 

to your unit's modified table of organization and 

equipment (MTOE), METL, training level, time available, and unique training needs. Implement a yearround marksmanship training program that will allow 

soldiers to sustain BAM skills and contribute to your 

unit's overall proficiency. 

Robert Clark is a training specialist in the Directorate 

of Evaluation and Standardization at the Engineer 

School. Mr. Clark retired from the Army as a master 

sergeant, and has a bachelors degree in management from Columbia College, Missouri. 
The Evolution of River Crossing Doctrine, 

1918 to 1944 

By Captain Robert Toguchi 

I taly's Rapido River was shrouded in heavy fog as 

darkness fell shortly before 6 

p.m. January 20, 1944. The soldiers of the 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th (US) Infantry 

Division, anxiously awaited 

movement to the water's edge for 

an assault river crossing. The 

regiment's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Aaron A Wyatt, 

Jr., moved among his men as 

they made final preparations for 

the crossing.1 

The first group of troops took 

their assault boats from a nearby 

depot, and departed for the river 

at 7 p.m. Pathways thick with 

mud made it a difficult journey. 

Barely 30 minutes later, more 

than sixteen battalions of friendly 

artillery began firing on defending 

German positions of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. German 

batteries replied, raining down 

shells on the Americans trying to 

make their way to the riverbank. 

Within minutes, one company lost 

30 men. 

The situation got worse as engineer guides lost their way in the 

artillery fire, and the advancing 

Americans entered friendly 

minefields. By 8 p.m., 25 percent 

of the boats and footbridges 

needed for the assault were lost. 

Radio and landline communications broke down. Some of the 

troops that managed to reach the 

river found that their boats had 

been pierced by shrapnel and sank 

when placed in the water. Other 

boats were swept away by the 

swift current before they could be 

loaded, and some sank because the 

crews paddled improperly. Of four 

footbridges designated for the 

crossing, one was destroyed in a 

minefield enroute to the riverbank, one was defective, and the 

remaining two were destroyed by 

artillery fire. By salvaging bits 

and pieces from each bridge, engineers managed to construct a 

single footbridge by 4 a.m., nearly 

seven hours after the designated 

crossing time. 2 By 6:30a.m. on the 

21st, only half a battalion of a 

three-battalion force had 

managed to get across the river. 

With the approach of dawn, LTC 

Wyatt tried to put together a 

daylight operation to sustain the 

small force across the river. He 

considered using of smoke to conceal continued crossing operations. But much to his chagrin, 

Wyatt discovered that no smokegenerating equipment was available. Six hundred smoke pots were 

available at a rear depot, but the 

141st was not notified of their 

availability until it was too late. 3 

Without concealment, the small 

foothold on the far shore of the 

Engineer 35 
River crossing failures In the early days of World War TWo cannot be laid entirely at 

the feet of the soldiers on the line. Institutional flaws in doctrine were a significant 

factor (U.S. Army photo). 

Rapido was doomed. Consequently, Wyatt ordered the evacuation of 

the soldiers who had already 

crossed. Subsequent assaults the 

following day by the 141st and an 

adjoining regiment also failed. 

The 36th Division suffered 1,681 

casualties and was forced to cancel 

the river crossing operation.4 

The Rapido operation was one of 

the earliest attempts by the Army 

t o conduct a river crossing in 

World War 11-and it was a fiasco. 

Combat engineers had a critical 

role in support of the crossing, 

and-as a whole-they performed 

poorly. Prior to the operation, the 

regimental engineer had developed a crossing plan without 

consulting the infantry regiments. 

Pre-paratory bridging drills were 

not conducted. Pre-liminary roadwork was not accomplished. 

Bridging equipment was not adequately inspected. Coordination 

measures had not been established with the infantry. And these 

were just a few of the problems 

36 Engineer 

that led to one of the worst 

military disasters in American 

military history.5 

Military doctrine provides the 

foundation and framework for 

commanders to build successful 

operations. The absence of river 

crossing doctrine was a key factor 

in the poor performance of the 

14lst Regiment and the 36th 

Division. In an attempt to analyze 

the state of U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers' doctrine at the start of 

World War II, this article will 

focus on the evolution of river 

crossing doctrine during the prewar period and during the war itself, during the years 1918 to 

1944. 

Traditional histories of the 

Rapido river crossing have placed 

the overwhelming burden of 

responsibility squarely on the 

shoulders of senior commanders. I 

believe the factors influencing the 

operations's failure are far more 

complex than merely pointing the 

finger of culpability at local battle 

---

captains. To a certain degree, operational historians 

have a penchant for emphasizing the obvious while 

ignoring that Army systems 

can affect individual battles. This has resulted in 

traditional studies that 

have not always revealed 

the institutional flaws that 

doom certain battles before 

the first shot is fired. I contend that the Rapido river 

crossing operation was just 

such a battle, and that fundamental flaws existed in 

th e Army's ability to 

produce viable crossing 

doctrine before World War 

II. 

Doctrine, in military 

usage, is a word of fairly 

recent origin.6 During the 

14th century, the word 

"doctrin e" was used to 

describe fundamental 

truths concerning a special 

field of knowledge. The 

term "military doctrine" does not 

appear to have entered American 

military jargon until the early 

20th century. The Dictionary of 

United States Army Terms defines 

it as the: "compilation of principles and policies, applicable to a 

subject, which have been 

developed through experience or 

by theory, that represent the best 

available thought, and indicate 

and guide but do not bind in 

t

. ..7 

prac Ice ... 

Official doctrine for the Corps of 

Engineers was provided primarily 

in the form of published field 

manuals or field service regulations that instructed soldiers and 

leaders on how to fight on the battlefield.8 Subjects were diverse, 

ranging from basic survival techniques, to unit logistics, to combined arms operations. The field 

manual was the normal authority 

on the specific techniques or tactics to be used in a given battlefield situation.9 So, to understand doctrine development 

------------------------
during this period, we 

must look at the 

progressive changes 

made in those 

manuals. 

Despite the advent of highly mechanized maneuver forces, river crossing doctrine did not 

The Corps first addressed the subject of 

river crossing doctrine in the 1862 

Manual for Engineer 

Troops, a compilation 

of doctrinal instructions adopted from 

British, Austrian, 

and French manuals.10 Since the 

Army had not developed such related 

doctrinal instructions 

prior to this time, the 

Corps translated and 

adopted the procedures then in use by 

foreign armies. This 

t

. f . keep pae&-Often limiting the usefulness of those forces (U.S. Army photo). prac ICe o copymg 

the doctrinal instructions of the 

mf\ior European powers was quite 

common for developing military 

establishments of the period. 

Only one of the five chapters 

within the manual was devoted to 

river crossings. This chapter 

provided 27 pages of instruction 

that focused primarily on the technical aspects of pontoon bridge 

construction. It discussed construction materials, river conditions, bank preparations, fording, 

ferrying operations, and basic 

pontoon drills. While the manual 

provided valuable advice on 

methods of streamlining speed of 

construction, it did not provide instruction on tactics or coordination with the infantry.11 

A revised version, Tit€ Engineer 

Field Manual, was published in 

1904. This manual provided river 

crossing doctrine under a section 

devoted to floating bridges.12 

Again, instruction focused largely 

on the technical aspects of construction, and dealt only briefly 

with military tactics. The manual 

provided technical details on 

American bridging equipment, incorporating changes in bridge 

design since the 1862 manual. 

This basic manual was popular, 

under1oing four revisions by 

1917.1 Interestingly, the floating 

bridge portion of the manual 

remained virtually the same . 

Basic pontoon bridge design did 

not experience significant change 

between the Civil War and World 

War I. As a result of the satisfactory results experienced during 

the Civil War, the Engineer Corps 

decided in 1869 to retain the Civil 

War pontoon bridge designs. 14 

In the years between the wars, 

engineer offices that played a key 

role in the development of river 

crossing doctrine included the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the 

Engineer Board, and the Engineer 

School. The Chief of Engineers 

was the primary authority for the 

formulation of engineer policy, and 

was responsible for the technical 

performance of all officers and enlisted men within the Corps. 15 The 

office was divided into two 

divisions, Civil Works and 

Military. The Military Division 

was responsible for personnel, intelligence, operations and training, construction, railways, and 

supply. The division also directed 

the activities of the two field agencies, the Engineer Board and Engineer School.16 

The Engineer Board served as 

the Corps' proponent agency for 

research and development on all 

Army engineer equipment. The 

board also developed procedures 

that covered the technical aspects 

of construction, maintenance, 

handling, and storage of engineer 

equipment. The Engineer School, 

on the other hand, was responsible 

for the training of Army engineers, 

and for the development of engineer tactical doctrine. Both 

agencies submitted their concepts 

of doctrine and equipment to the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers for 

review.17 

A contributing factor to the slow 

development of river crossing 

doctrine was the Engineer 

School's concentration on individual training for soldiers. 

Concerns other than engineer instruction received limited attention, and suffered considerably. 

Engineer 37 
The school simply did not provide 

any formal provisions or institutional structure to ensure the consistent review and generation of 

river crossing doctrine. Similarly, 

the Office ofthe ChiefofEngineers 

failed to ensure that the school updated and formulated the Army's 

river crossing doctrine. 

Interestingly enough, many of 

the doctrinal concepts during the 

interwar period were developed by 

individual soldiers-independent 

of any support from the engineer 

hierarchy. Following World I, a 

number of after-action reports 

were written about the Army's 

European river crossing experiences. A young engineer, Captain 

William M. Hoge, completed a 

book in 1918 that provided frank 

after-action comments about the 

5th Infantry Division's crossing of 

the Meuse River. 

Despite the success of the operation, the soldiers of the 7th Engineer Regiment had to overcome 

several difficulties. The Meuse 

valley, about 600 meters in width, 

consisted of marshy flats that 

made ingress and egress difficult 

on both sides of the river. The hills 

overlooking the valley provided 

commanding fields of observation 

and fire for enemy artillery. The 

necessary use of French bridging 

equipment, which the Americans 

were not familiar with, compounded the regiment's 

problems. 18 

The engineers were able to overcome these obstacles through 

meticulous planning. Prior to the 

crossing, one engineer company 

received the dedicated mission for 

road preparation, infantry guides 

were designated, fascines were 

constructed to facilitate passage 

over mud, ramps were constructed 

over high banks, wagon loads were 

prioritized, and assault engineers 

were attached to the infantry 

brigades.19 All of these measures 

were planned and executed prior 

to the crossing. While Hoge's book 

covered seemingly simple tactical 

38 Engineer 

procedures, it was the combination of all these techniques that 

paved the way for the success of 

the Meuse crossing. 

From his review of the operation, it is evident that Captain 

Hoge captured valuable insights 

into the difficulties of organizing 

engineer assets for river crossing 

operations. He presented these 

ideas in a well-written book entitled Engineers in the Crossing of 

the Meuse. Unfortunately for the 

Army, none of this material was 

incorporated as approved doctrine 

into the engineer manual. The 

next revised version of the manual, 

which was published in 1932, did 

not include Captain Hoge's wellreasoned and coherent thoughts on 

river crossing.20 

Other veterans of the war 

provided similar grass roots 

doctrinal material based on practical experience. In early 1920, 

Colonel R.R. Ralston, the Fourth 

Corps Engineer of the American 

Expeditionary Force, published an 

article in The Military Engineer 

that included discussions on 

World War I river crossings. The 

work titled "Engineers' Duties in 

the Field of War" was a compilation of senior officer comments on 

engineer doctrine.

21 While the article presented several perceptive 

insights from highly experienced 

senior officers, none were used for 

the formulation of crossing 

doctrine during that period. 

In the article, Colonel John C. 

Lee, chief of staff for the 89th 

Division, stressed the importance 

of traffic control. He recommended 

prioritizing traffic, controlling 

local traffic with engineers, and 

having military police provide 

general traffic control.22 

Colonel John Kingman, chief of 

staff for the 90th Division, recommended a three-phase approach 

for river crossings: (1) an infantry 

footbridge, (2) standard pontoon 

bridge, and (3) a timber trestle 

structure.

23 Kingman believed 

that a phased approach would 

preclude increasing the load 

capacity of the standard pontoon 

bridge. 

During the period between the 

wars, traditional concepts of war 

slowed development of the Army's 

mechanized forces, further delaying the development of river crossing doctrine and equipment. The 

attitude among some Army planners was "the next war should be 

fought like the last one."24 For example, the infantry branch was initially given responsibility for the 

organization and development of 

the tank corps. As perhaps an expected consequence, their concept 

of tank employment called for 

armor to play an infantry support 

role-rather than take its place as 

a large, mechanized maneuver 

force. This attitude, though not 

pervasive, limited the development of a mechanized force which 

would have forced planners to 

rethink river crossing operations. 

Despite a reduced interest in 

warfighting concerns, the Corps 

updated the Engineer Field 

Manual in 1932, incorporating 

new material on modernized 

bridging equipment. The manual 

added technical details on the 

M19261ight bridge and the M1869 

heavy bridge. The new instructions focused primarily on bridge 

construction techniques, bridge 

specifications, transportation, 

maintenance, and load capacities. 

Some tactical instruction was 

provided, with a recommendation 

that bridging operations be 

divided into four phases: 

• pontoons to ferry infantry 

• light pontoons to cross combat 

wagons 

• heavy pontoons to cross heavy 

trains 

• fixed bridging 

While the manual was an improvement over earlier versions in 

many respects, tactical procedures 

filled no more than one page of 

instruction. 25 
While many valuable field reports were available from experienced combat engineers, doctrine 

writers often failed to use the Information (U.S. Army photo). 

As early as January 1941, the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers 

was aware of the extreme complexi~ of river crossing operations. 6 German crossing operations in May 1940 were reported in 

German publications and translated by Captain Paul W. 

Thompson, an American military 

observer stationed in Germany 

prior to our entry into World War 

II. Complete accounts of step-bystep crossing sequences, timetables, operational diagrams, fire 

support, equipment characteristics, bridge sites, and orders 

issued by the participating German units were available to the 

American engineers.28 These 

materials were published in 1941 

in several articles appearing in 

The Military Engineer. Later that 

year, Captain Thompson published a book, Modern Battles, that 

depicted modern German doctrine 

for assault river crossings.29 In 

1942, now-Lieutenant Colonel 

Thompson published two more 

books, the Army Engineer and Engineers in Battle, which provided 

material superior to doctrinal 

literature then available on river . 30 

crossmg. 

While detailed reports on successful river crossing operations 

were flowing out of Europe, where 

were the doctrinal writers in the 

Engineer Corps? Thompson's publications were a valuable and costfree opportunity for the Corps to 

update existing crossing doctrine. 

Engineers in the field needed 

more definitive guidance than the 

general overview of crossing 

operations officially available at 

the time. But strangely enough, 

comparable changes to the existing river crossing doctrine did not 

occur until1943. 

In 1941, the river crossing 

doctrine contained in FM 5-5, Engineer Field Manual: Troops and 

Operations, was an improvement 

over previously available literature, but did not provide enough 

detail at the tactical level. The 

manual included general instructions on planning, command and 

control responsibilities, equipment characteristics, reconnaissance, and site selection. However, 

doctrinal writers made no attempt 

to flesh out the problems encountered in the support of tactical river crossings. 

The prescribed doctrine viewed 

a crossing as an end in itself, 

rather than as a means to accomplish a definite wartime 

objective. 

No plans were made to continue 

the attack once the crossing was 

achieved. Was the whole operation 

supposed to grind to a halt once 

the river was crossed, leaving a 

complacent bridgehead vulnerable to counterattack? To the 

detriment of soldiers in the field, 

plans for securing initial, intermediate and final objectives were 

not included in the 1941 

doctrine.31 

Combined arms coordination 

is critical to the success of 

Engineer 39 
military operations, a fact not 

unrecognized in 1941. But the 

1941 manual scarcely addressed 

instructions on how engineers 

should fit into the combined 

arms team. For example, the 

preparation of engineer estimates, the allocation of assembly areas within the division's 

sector, the incorporation of engineer units into the communications net, and the use of a 

deception plan were just a few of 

the techniques that were absent 

from engineer doctrine in 

1941.32 

The same manual also lacked 

detailed instructions for the assault phase of a crossing, whereby 

the infantry secured the far shore 

prior to the construction of rafts 

and bridges. Probably the most 

difficult phase of a crossing operation, the assault is normally conducted under direct enemy fire. 

Timing, speed, and organization 

are critical to the operation's success. Hence, extremely detailed 

engineer planning in shore party 

organization, timetables, boat 

crew breakdowns, far shore objectives, ferry round-trip times, 

marked routes, and other techniques were expected to be addressed in tactical manuals. In 

1941, two pages of general instructions addressed the assault phase, 

whereas ten pages were used in 

the 1943 manual 33 

Further, details on control and 

coordination measures to direct 

the actions of the crossing units 

were practically nonexistent in 

the 1941 text.34 Interestingly, 

these measures were discussed in 

Captain Hoge's after-action 

reports in 1918, but were not incorporated in later texts. Coordination measures are necessary 

to ensure that the maneuver force 

knows the plan for linking up with 

the engineers, the location of key 

crossing assets, assembly areas, 

and routes to and from the crossing sites. Without these procedures, the probability of disorganization and mission failure 

40 Engineer 

increases considerably-even for 

the simplest operation. 

The lack of doctrinal coordination measures was a sure sign that 

both engineer and maneuver units 

were operating with the cards 

stacked against them. In 1941, a 

mere thirteen pages were used to 

describe an extremely complex 

operation that had already been 

described earlier in voluminous 

detail by American and German 

engineers with combat experience. 

In 1943, finally, the Corps of Engineers developed viable river 

crossing doctrine. The new 

manual, FM 5-6, Engineer Field 

Manual: Troops and Operations, 

fully incorporated many of the 

detailed tactical procedures that 

were missing from the 1941 publication. For the first time, the 

manual differentiated between 

conducting hasty and deliberate 

river crossing operations. 35 It also 

outlined initial, intermediate, and 

final objective phases of a crossing. Unfortunately, it was made 

available to the field only after 

American forces had been 

deployed. Had the manual been 

published earlier, units-both engineer and infantry---eould have 

familiarized their soldiers with 

these techniques under training 

conditions. As it was, most had to 

learn the hard way-under enemy 

fire. 

The 1943 manual also provided 

detailed instructions for conducting the assault phase of river 

crossings. Initial assembly areas 

were added to assist in the control 

of traffic movement to the crossing 

sites. Traffic control plans were assigned with specific routes of 

march, a time sequence for group 

assembly areas, and specific 

frontages designated for boat 

groups. Specific boat battle drills 

were added to the doctrine specifying boat crew conduct, boat 

navigation, paddling techniques, 

and loading/unloading procedures. The techniques of successive trips were discussed, and concentrated on the responsibilities of 

engineer fJlides for the return 

boat trips. 6 

In addition to specific tactical 

instructions, the manual also 

provided engineer planning data 

for river crossing operations at the 

division and corps levels. It 

specified the quantity of bridge 

equipment and the number of engineer units required to support 

different types of infantry and 

armor units. It also included construction and crossing times to assist the maneuver commander in 

planning his operation. 37 

The manual was refined in 1944 

with the addition of instructions 

for the use of heavy weapons companies in lead battalions to provide supporting fires at the 

river. 38 It also addressed the use of 

specialized equipment, like bangalore torpedoes, to facilitate the 

passage of obstacles during the assault wave. It also continued to 

update the engineer time tables 

for bridge construction, equipment use, and ferrying operations. 

A historical review of official 

doctrine clearly reveals that the 

Corps of Engineers did not develop 

effective or timely river crossing 

doctrine during the period 1918 to 

1944. While many tactical insights 

were readily available from both 

American and German engineers 

with significant combat experience, none gave birth to badlyneeded initiative or forethought 

among those responsible for such 

doctrine. 

While those insights were available in many informal formsmagazines, after-action-reports, 

and books-this did not ensure 

that the knowledge would be incorporated into the Army 

mainstream. Such experience was 

often gained at a great cost in 

human lives, and the loss of such 

experience weighed heavily on the 

combat readiness of Army 

engineers. 

Have we developed viable river 

crossing doctrine to meet the 
l 

demands of modem tactical operations? Indeed, a hard look at the 

doctrine in FM 90-13, TC 90-13-1, 

and FC 90-13 reveals areas that 

could be addressed in greater 

detail. For example, the current 

concept of conducting the assault 

phase solely with armored personnel carriers (APCs) presents itself 

well on paper, but cannot be the 

rule for all river crossings. Far 

shore bank conditions can often 

preclude or seriously hamper the 

use of APCs. Too, dismounted infantry is often needed to breach 

obstacles and secure difficult terrain prior to the movement of 

APCs. Moreover, in a full 

mobilization, many combat units 

may find themselves short of their 

full complement of APCs. 

So, before we become complacent in our satisfaction with 

current doctrine, let's take a lesson from the past. I submit that we 

need to consistently review a wide 

variety of writings-including 

foreign publications-on engineer 

operations, promptly process experiences from the field, and 

rapidly produce draft doctrinal 

publications for review. In addition, greater institutionalization 

of combined arms tasks can be accomplished by assigning doctrinal 

proponency to specific combat 

units. Only through painstaking 

effort and consistent command 

emphasis can we ensure that 

there will never be another 

Rapido. W 

Captain Toguchi is a history 

instructor at the U.S. Military 

Academy. He previously served 

two successive tours as a company commander with the 

237th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 502nd Engineer 

Company. He has also served 

as a battalion S-4, and assistant division engineer. He is a 

graduate of West Point. 

Notes: 

1

Martin Blumenson, Bloody River: The 

Real Tragedy of the Rapido, (Boston: 

Houghton Miffiin Company, 1970), p.83. 

2

1bid. 82-85. 

3

1bid. 87. 

4

1bid. 110. 

6

1bid. 71-111. 

6

Jay Luvaas, MSome Vagrant Thoughts 

on Doctrine," (March 1986): 56. 

7

Department of the Army, Dictionary of 

United States Army Thrms (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 

p. 78, as quoted in Jay Luvaas, "Some 

Vagrant Thoughts On Doctrine," (March 

1986): 56. 

B.rraining Regulations (TR) 10-5. 

Military Training, War Department. 

(Washington D.C., 10 August 1935), p. 1. 

9

G.B. Troland, "Decade of Progress in 

Military Engineering,• Military Engineer 

20 (November-December 1928): 524-525. 

1

°Captain J.C. Duane, Manual for Engineer Troops (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 

1862), p.l. 

111bid. 7-33. 

120ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual, Part II. Professional 

Papers No. 29. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904). 

130ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual, Parts I-IV. Professional Papers No. 29. 4th revised edition, 

with addenda. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917). 

14Kohloss, "The Status of Pontoon 

Bridge Development,• p. 1. 

1

SWar Department, Corps of Engineers, 

General Provisions. AR 100-5. (Washington 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), 

pp. 1-3. 

1

SWar Department, Report of the Chief 

of Engineers. Office of the Chief of Engineers (Washington D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1921), p. 3-4. 

17Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and 

Herbert H. Rosenthal, Report of the Chief 

of Engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1921), p. 3-4. 

17Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and 

Herbert H. Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment 

(Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, 1958) p. 4. 

18Wi!liam M. Hoge, Engineers in the 

Crossing of the Meuse River (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff 

School, 1918), pp. 1, 5-6. 

191bid. 1-18. 

2

°Colonel R.R. Ralston, "Engineer 

Duties in the Field in War," The Military 

Engineer 12 (January-February 1920): 

67-80. 

21Colonel R.R. Ralston, "Engineer 

Duties in the Field of War," The Military 

Engineer 12 (January-February 1920): 

67-80. 

221bid. 75. 

231bid. 73. 

24Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: 

Prewar Plans and Preparations 

(Washington D.C.: Historical Division, 

1950), pp. 23-25, 35. 

250ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual, Military Engineering, Volume II. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932) 

26Captain Paul W. Thompson, "Engineers in Battle," The Military Engineer 

33 (January-February 1941): 1-5. 

271bid. 1-5. 

281bid. 1-5. 

~ajor Paul W. Thompson, Modern 

Battle (Richmond, Virginia: Infantry Journal, 1941), p. 1-209. 

~ajor Paul W. Thompson, The Army 

Engineers, (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 

1942); Engineers in Battle, (Harrisburg, 

P.A.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942). 

310ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual: Troops and Operations, FM 5-5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 252-261. 

32Ibid. 252-261. 331bid. 252-261. 

341bid. 252-261. 

350ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual: Operations of Engineer Units. FM 5-6 (Washington D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1943). pp. 85-

87. 

361bid. 85-97. 

371bid. 116-124. 

380ffice of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer Field Manual: Operations Of Engineer Units. FM 5-6 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 

1-15. 

Engineer41 
Initial Observations 

By Engineers in the 

Gulf War 

By Vernon Lowrey 

42 Engineer 
The Desert Storm victory 

depended heavily on massive engineer support. Engineers constructed hundreds of 

miles of main supply routes 

(MSRs), logistics facilities and 

base camps, airfields, landing 

pads and aviation maintenance 

facilities, combined arms training facilities for maneuver units, 

and several prisoner-of-war 

camps. 

They also played a critical 

role in general defense planning 

to thwart incursion of Iraqi forces into Saudi Arabia. Engineers dug in maneuver units, 

and provided force protection 

and camouflage. They provided 

updated maps and topographic 

imagery for fighting forces, 

trained units in breaching Iraqi 

defenses, and accomplished 

countless other preparatory 

tasks for both American and allied forces . 

And just before Desert Storm 

forces crossed Iraqi lines, engineers cleared gaps in the 

enemy's complex obstacle belts. 

When the attack began, engineer soldiers were well forward with covering force and 

scout units. 

Engineers fire a MICLIC (mine clearing line charge) during Operation Desert 

Storm. The MICLIC appeared to suffer from several shortfalls during the Gulf 

War (U.S. Army photo). 

Following the allied victory, engineers cleared 

MSRs deep into Iraqi territory, allowing supplies to 

keep up with maneuver units. Sappers cleared wide 

areas of unexploded mines and other ordnance, and 

destroyed vast quantities of captured Iraqi facilities, 

vehicles, weapons and munitions. 

After the cease fire, engineers constructed 

redeployment bases, and assisted in the initial 

reconstruction of Kuwait. Engineer forces continue 

today to assist war refugees, and are working to restore Saudi facilities and roads. 

Ob rv tiona 

The Gulf War clearly showed that certain engineer problems, identified since World War 11 

continue to be a source of concern, including count~r­ mine/counterobstacle operations, and the engineer 

force structure for the heavy divisions. The operation 

also showed that the recent procurement of new engineer equipment, like the M9 armored combat 

earthmover (ACE), the small emplacement excavator 

(SEE), and the full-width combat engineer vehicle 

mine rake (CEV), were wise choices-and invaluable 

to the success of the operation. 

Nothing "new" has really been gleaned from the 

operation, and the engineer community seems to be 

on track with the refinement of current engineer 

doctrine, training, organization, materiel and leader 

development. 

The following are ten major engineer observations 

from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

The commandant of the Engineer School has passed 

them on to the Center for Army Lessons Learned to 

be used for further study and development. These 

are only observations, and will become official "lessons learned" only after they have been analyzed. 

There are many observations currently under study, 

and these are some of the more important ones. 

1. OBSERVATION: Formation of "regimental engineer'' organizations in heavy divisions. 

Engineer43 
~~The regimental engineer organization ... 

allowed the regimental engineer staff to 

be an integral part of the decision cycle, 

rather than just reacting to it." 

DISCUSSION: Regimental engineer force structures were created in four of the five heavy divisions 

deployed to Saudi Arabia. The regimental engineer organization consisted of a headquarters detachment 

and three engineer combat battalions-one associated with each maneuver brigade. Engineer planning took place inside the maneuver commander's 

decision cycle. This allowed the regimental engineer 

staff to be an integral part of the decision cycle, 

rather than just reacting to it. The time freed up by efficient engineer planning and operations allowed maximum use of mobility, countermobility, and survivability 

operating systems. For the first time, maneuver commanders were able to mass engineers at the point of 

application. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to form regimental engineer organizations in each heavy division, as 

approved by the Army chief of staff in April1991. 

J, OBSERVATION: The M9 ACE worked well. 

DISCUSSION: Desert Storm provided the first 

hard evaluation of the M9 ACE. Though not intended 

as an assault breaching vehicle -hence its light 

armor protection-the ACE proved to be a success in 

breaching obstacles that were not covered by fire. 

The ACE remained well forward, and was available 

for task force operations when required. ACE missions included knocking down Iraqi berms, constructing friendly survivability positions, and digging 

trenches for the destruction of captured munitions. Its 

mobility was also a key factor, because it did not require the additional transport vehicles normally associated with bulldozers. Commanders commented 

that the ACE needs an additional crewman and a 

weapons system such as the .50 caliber machine 

gun, or the Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher. 

RECOMMENDATION: The M9 ACE should continue to be fielded in sufficient quantities in all combat 

engineer companies. ACE training needs to be em44 Engineer 

phasized in the future. The concepts of a weapons 

station, blade design, engine improvement, and twoman crew need further study. 

3. OBSERVATION: The overall breaching 

capabilities of engineer forces must be improved in 

order to provide effective mobility support. 

DISCUSSION: Iraq developed formidable, complex obstacle systems to blunt penetrations into 

Kuwait by allied forces. The U.S. Army and its allies 

responded with several existing systems, and quickly 

developed other, mechanical obstacle-reduction 

methods. In addition, a combined arms breaching 

doctrine, described in Field Manual (FM) 90-13-1, 

was implemented, rehearsed, and successfully 

executed. 

On the whole, complex obstacle breaching was not 

conducted under fire. If this had been the case, the 

breaches would have been more difficult because of 

the numerous systems and methods in use. Desert 

Storm revealed that the current (essentially World 

War II vintage) breaching and clearing capabilitiesalong with a lack of demolition expertise-severely 

limited our ability to breach modern mine fields . 

The modem conventional mines now employed by 

Third World countries are more sophisticated than 

our own. They contain magnetic, double impulse, and 

seismic fuses, along with anti-disturbance devices. 

They also contain little or no metal, and most mine 

detectors are ineffective in locating them. 

The sophistication of these mines also makes the 

use of grappling hooks, bangalore torpedoes, and 

mine probes a very hazardous proposition. Other 

mechanical and explosive breaching methods proved 

slightly faster, but were limited in numbers and success. The mechanical systems lacked the mobility 

and protection required to provide responsive support 

to maneuver forces, and only managed a cursory 

obstacle reduction capability. 
An Iraqi minefield on the Kuwaiti coast. While Iraq built formidable obstacles on both the 

southern and coastal borders of Kuwait, Desert Storm engineers successfully breached 

them using current combined arms breaching doctrine (U.S. Army photo). 

Breaching by Air Force bombing was ineffective. 

Bombing patterns did not provide a straight lane, and 

made proofing with plows and rollers difficult and ineffective. Such bombing also left metal fragments 

which interfered with mine detection, and left dud 

bombs which had to be cleared. 

Once a breach was established, breach lane marking was ineffective. There were no standard marking 

systems identified in the theater. The cleared lane 

marking system (CLAMS), and the hand-emplaced 

minefield marking system (HEMMS) proved ineffective for most units, and were seldom used. Both systems proved difficult to see at night. The HEMMS 

could not be easily deployed from the rear of lead 

vehicles in breach lanes, and the CLAMS was often 

covered by sand from passing vehicles. 

Descriptions of several mechanical obstacle reduction systems and comments on their effectiveness 

follow: 

Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC). The MICLIC 

had several shortfalls. Numerous firing failures occurred during live fire training, involving both the 

trailer firing circuits and rocket/line charge circuits. 

Test firings prior to the start of hostilities resulted in a 

50 percent failure rate (primarily due to unfamiliarity 

with the system, inadequate training prior to arrival in 

theater, and production quality control). 

Additionally, the MICLIC only attacks the mine 

fuse-not the mine itself. As a result, it was only effective against single, short-impulse, pressure-fuzed 

mines that were surface-laid, or buried 10 inches or 

less below the surface. The system also left "skip 

zones" (0.75 meter (m) to 1.5m) on both sides of the 

centerline, where mines escaped destruction from 

overpressure blast. Mines with other types of fuzes 

were not affected by ttie MICLIC. 

The unarmored MICLIC trailer, towed by armored 

vehicles, suffers from a lack of survivability and 

mobility that hinder the usefulness of the system. 

Mounting the MICLIC on an armored vehicle 

launched MICLIC (AVLM) provided more survivability, 

but did little to help other operational problems. The 

AVLM is a modified AVLB (armored vehicle launched 

bridge) chassis with two MICLICs on the rear deck. 

Commanders planned for their use as part of 

deliberate breaching operations, but left them behind 

once the initial breach and pursuit were initiated. 

Simply put, the older M48/M60 chassis was unable to 

keep up with the M 1 s and M2s of the maneuver 

forces. 

Engineer45 
An Iraqi mine In southern Kuwait. These mines are much more sophisticated and versatile 

than our own, and contain magnetic, double Impulse, and seismic fuses-along with 

anti-disturbance devices (U.S. Army photo). 

Another logistical limitation was imposed by the 

1OOm length, or effective range of the system. 

Commanders found that several MICLICs were required for breaching complex obstacles. 

The Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV). Engineer 

forces conducting breaching operations with the CEV 

found that the vehicle was unable to keep up with 

maneuver forces-diminishing its value to the operation. The CEV also had maintenance delays because 

it is built on the M48/M60 chassis and spare parts 

were not readily available in a theater where most 

U.S. tanks were M1 s. 

The CEV Full- Width Mine Rake. This rake is a 

non-developmental item developed and fielded specifically for use in Desert Storm. The rake is suited only 

to a dry sand environment, giving it a very narrow 

usefulness. The rake was normally employed after a 

MICLIC firing to proof and clear a lane. Because the 

rake was designed to remove only antitank mines, antipersonnel devices slipped through the tines. Once 

the deliberate breaching operation was completed, 

commanders left them behind. Overall, the rake 

worked well during Desert Storm. 

Countermine Sets (Mine Rollers and Mine Plows). 

Extensive training and rehearsal with mine rollers and 

46 Engineer 

mine plows took place during Desert Storm. Prior to 

this, countermine sets received little more than "lip 

service" from the maneuver community. 

The use of tank-mounted mine plows for lane clearing or breaching proved to be very effective against 

surface-laid and scatterable mines. The plows were 

effective at punching through the Iraqi sand berms 

and clearing minefield lanes for the tanks. 

Mine rollers, however, were judged by armored forces to be ineffective and cumbersome. 

Overall, Desert Storm validated the value of mine 

breaching systems mounted on fast, survivable 

vehicles. The most effective system will depend on 

the tactical situation, but the need for the capability is 

clear. 

Others. Other means of reduction not addressed 

here included the ACE, the AVLB, and manual techniques (grappling hooks, probes, and bangalore 

torpedoes). 

RECOMMENDATION: The mechanical reduction 

methods now in use need to be replaced by a system that will provide the Airland Battlefield maneuver 

commander with a highly mobile and effective 

obstacle reduction capability. That system is the 
combat mobility vehicle (CMV). The CMV is highly 

mobile, survivable, and can be very effective in the 

reduction and clearing of complex obstacles-without 

the aid of other mechanical or manual reduction 

means. 

The CEV should be replaced by the CMV. There 

must be four CMVs per company, supporting a 

maneuver task force (two per breached lane). The 

CMV needs a crew of at least two soldiers in order to 

conduct 24-hour operations. 

Current countermine sets should remain with armored forces as a self-extraction capability. Mine 

rollers should remain in the force for use in terrain 

other than that found in the Persian GuH region. 

Additionally, we need an improved or modified 

MICLIC to correct the identified deficiencies. The 

MICLIC must be mounted on a survivable vehicle 

that can keep up with the supported maneuver units. 

Live fire exercises for the MICLIC must be included 

in the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). Adequate resources must be provided by the Standards 

in Training Commission (STRAC) to support live firing 

by engineer forces. Live fire training sites must be 

identified for the MICLIC and similar systems. 

Standoff minefield detection systems, remotely 

operated breaching devices, and a standardized, 

simple, and durable minefield marking system need 

to be developed. Live mine training must be emphasized in order for soldiers and leaders to gain sufficient skill and confidence. 

4, OBSERVATION: Gap crossing with the AVLBM48/M60 chassis. 

. DISCUSSION: The AVLB continues to be a viable 

means of crossing gaps of 18 meters or less. However, there are major mobility and survivability concerns. The AVLB is mounted on an outdated M48 or 

M60 chassis that cannot keep up with main battle 

tanks or infantry vehicles, and can't offer the same degree of protection. 

RECOMMENDATION: As we continue to rely on 

AVLBs for crossing short gaps, we must begin to 

mount the system on the M1 chassis. This will give 

the AVLB the mobility it needs to support rapidly advancing maneuver units. 

I. OBSERVATION: Combat engineers mounted 

in M113s or 5-ton dump trucks could not keep pace 

with maneuver forces. 

DISCUSSION: Once maneuver forces broke 

through initial Iraqi defenses and advanced rapidly to 

the north, combat engineers in outdated and slow 

vehicles were left lagging behind. Engineer units require mobility and protection commensurate with that 

of supported maneuver forces. They must be agile 

enough to respond to the needs of maneuver units as 

the situation develops-not afterwards. This lack of 

mobility degraded the capability of engineers to 

respond to missions during the attack. The required 

level of engineer protection was not adequately assessed in this operation. 

RECOMMENDATION: The current divisional 

mechanized combat engineer squad M113 should be 

replaced with a modified version of the M2 infantry 

fighting vehicle-making it a "sapper vehicle." Since 

the M2 turret is not required for the engineer mission, 

it should be replaced with a commander's machine 

gun station. Removing the turret also allows increased internal storage for squad equipment and 

munitions. 

M2s and M113s could be transferred from deactivated divisions for use as sapper vehicles. Not all 

mechanized engineers would be able to receive M2s, 

so M113s should be allocated to lower priority units. 

Corps combat engineer squads that support 

mechanized forces should also receive M 113s. 

B. OBSERVATION: The M548 tracked ammunition carrier could not keep up with heavy forces. 

DISCUSSION: The M548 is the prime mover for 

ground emplaced mine scattering systems (GEMSS) 

and the upcoming VOLCANO mine system. Because 

of its relative slowness, the carrier normally moves 

with combat trains instead of maneuver elements. 

RECOMMENDATION: Replace the M548 with a 

vehicle providing enhanced speed and survivability 

for the GEMSS and VOLCANO . 

7. OBSERVATION: Before the start of gulf operations, realistic training on complex obstacle breaching 

was not conducted at the combat training centers 

(CTCs). 

DISCUSSION: When it became apparent that allied forces would have to breach a complex obstacle 

system in order to retake Kuwait, a serious deficiency 

in unit training was discovered. Units traveling to the 

CTCs had not practiced complex obstacle breaching. 

In fact, units at the NTC did not have rollers or plows, 

and MICLIC trainers were not being used. 

This resulted in a last-minute effort to train units in 

the complicated breaching operation, along with the 

organization and equipment necessary to support it. 

If the CTC program had operated as planned, realistic threat training would have been in place. 

RECOMMENDATION: Units training at the CTCs 

should train to standards. The threat should be accurately portrayed and breaching operations should 

Engineer47 
be conducted in accordance with FM 90-13-1. Because breaching, like bridging, is an extremely complex task, units must keep their skills current so they 

will be better prepared to conduct this operation. 

8. OBSERVATION: Current conventional mine 

stocks need to be modernized. Inventories of scatterable mines must be expanded to meet contingency 

requirements. 

DISCUSSION: Foreign conventional mines are 

complex, yet highly effective and versatile, highlighting the obsolete nature of our own mine stocks. Had 

the roles been reversed, it would have been far 

easier for the enemy to breach our obstacles. Overpressure protection, advanced fuzing, and anti-handling features make foreign mines an attractive alternative to our current stock of conventional mines. 

Existing stocks of scatterable mines did not meet 

theater requirements. Europe-based battalions were 

the only units with GEMSS equipment. Artillerydelivered scatterable mines have not been produced 

in sufficient quantities to meet anti-personnel and antitank requirements. Marine requirements also put a 

strain on the limited availability of these mines. Only 

two Air Force scatterable minefields were employed. 

RECOMMENDATION: Replace current conventional mine stocks with modem models. Adopt a common-fuzed mine which has the flexibility of performing any of the current mine functions. Provide a 

capability for remotely arming/disarming/seH-destructing these mines. Increase production and fielding of 

scatterable mines and their delivery systems to meet 

future contingency requirements. 

9. OBSERVATION: Engineers need a hardened 

ambulance for casualty evacuation on the battlefield. 

DISCUSSION: Currently, the mechanized engineer battalion is authorized only one soft-skinned 

ambulance. Mechanized engineer companies must 

have an armored, tracked ambulance in order to 

evacuate casualties from the battlefield. Area evacuation doesn't work because of the size of the battlefield and the number of casualties. Maneuver units 

were forced to give up their own M113 ambulances in 

support of engineers conducting breaching operations. 

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize an M113 ambulance in each mechanized engineer company. 

10. OBSERVATION: Topographic survey support 

and map production failed to meet the requirements 

of units at corps level and below. 

48 Engineer 

DISCUSSION: GuH operations showed the need 

for new and updated topographic capabilities. Existing control points for corps artillery were of questionable accuracy, since they were established from 

local datums or by unknown procedures. The nature 

of the guH region emphasized the need for 

automated, integrated survey instruments (AISI) and 

the global positioning system (GPS) to provide 

positioning and navigation for engineers. 

Rapid, down-sized, and tailored map production 

capabilities are also needed to support tactical commanders at division level and below. This capability is 

currently available with non-developmental items of 

equipment, but these systems are not tactically 

feasible because of special handling and power requirements. 

RECOMMENDATION: Topographic survey 

capabilities should be retained in the force structure 

to allow engineers to map and update potential contingency theaters. Geodetic-quality GPS systems 

should be fielded to topographic units for survey purposes. Compact, rugged equipment needed at the 

division level includes a down-sized digital 

topographic support system (DTSS), digital cartographic integrated information system (DCIIS), and 

quick response multi-color printer (QRMP). This 

equipment should be mounted on a high mobility, 

multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) to provide 

better support to the maneuver commander. W 

Mr. Lowrey is chief of the Engineer School's 

Analysis Division, Directorate of Evaluation and 

Standardization. He previously served as primary action officer for the E-Force and Engineer Restructure 

Initiative for the directorate. As an Army National 

Guard major, he also serves as S-3 of Missouri's 

113Bth Engineer Combat Battalion. Previous military 

assignments include company commander, platoon 

leader and S-1. He holds a bachelors degree from 

Colorado State University. 
Engineer Solution 

PART 1: Resource Constrain The Early Start Schedule 

After constraining the early start schedule, we find there are two resource delays (R) and one logic delay 

(L). Activity 15 cannot start until the resource from activity 20 becomes available. When delayed, activity 15 

moves into interfering float. This causes a logic delay of three days for activities 35 and 40. When time 

period 6 is constrained, we find that activity 40 must be delayed one additional day for insufficient resource. 

The resource needed for activity 40 must come from activity 30. 

NNumllw 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 120 21 

10 (30) 2S [X 15 (35, 40, C5l .4$ 4S R 

20 (30) 6S 6S 6S ~ 25 (55) 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 

30 (45, 50) ss 5S ss tX 35 (55) 2S 2S 2S L 

40 3S 3S 3S 3S R 

45 (55) 2S 

50 1S 1S 

55 6S 6S 6S 6S 6S 

Squads (SJ 6 6 6 

10 8 8 11 11 9 10 8 9 9 

PART II: Update The Logic Network 

We incorporated the two resource flow arrows into the logic network by drawing dashed arrows and a superimposed "R". This established two new paths in the network and changed the time analysis . The updated 

network and time analysis are shown below. Changes in the time analysis are annotated in red . 

EngiMer 49 
n..nn.a 

Engineer Solution 

PART Ill: Update The Early Start Schedule 

The changes made in the logic network must be incorporated into the early start schedule. After updating 

the activity numbers (Step 1 0), time frames (Step 11) and float calculations (Step 12), we prepared the following early start schedule. Activity numbers that changed are shown in red . Time frames (early start and/or late 

finish) changed for activities 15, 20, 35 and 40. Interfering float calculations did not change for the activities 

with float (activities 10, 30, 40, 45, and 55). 

Nelwof1< 

~bw r-.--.-.-.--,-.-.--.~--r-.--.-.-.--r-.-.--.-.--~ 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

10 (30) 2S 

15 (35, <40. 45) d 4S 4S R 

20 11s, 30) ss ss ss D 

25 (55) 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 

30 ( 40, 45, 50) 5S 5S 5S ~ 35 (55) 2S ~s 2S L 

40 ~ 3S 3S 3S 3S R 

45 (55) 2S 

50 1S 1S 

55 6S 6S 6S 6S6S 

Squads (S) 6 6 6 

10 8 8 11 11 9 10 8 9 9 

Summary. At this point we have constrained the resources for the project. Three additional activities (20, 

15 and 35) have become part of the critical path. Critical activities are defined as activities with zero float. 

None of the changes resulted in any activity being delayed beyond its late finish (right bracket). Therefore, 

the project duration will not change. 

Notes: The step-by-step procedure described in this problem will produce a solution to the resource problem. If this technique results in project delays that are unacceptable, there are two variations the manager 

can use to select activities to delay (Step 2). 

The first vari ation is to delay the early start of an activity that is ongoing, but does not begin, during the 

time frame identified in Step 1. In some cases this option provides a better solution to the resource problem. 

The procedure used is the same, except that the first activity delay will be greater than one time period. 

The second variation is to delay part of an activity (splitting an activity). This option requires that you redefine 

the logic network and make two activities out of one. You must add the new activity to the early start schedule. 

A project manager can use these techniques after he or she fully understands the basic technique 

described in Step 2. For any project with insufficient resources, the project manager must ultimately decide 

which activities to delay. An understanding of the intricate interaction between each activity will enable the 

manager to make informed decisions and successfully complete the project. 

This problem was submitted by Captain Earl Hooper, an instructor in the Combat Construction Division, Department of 

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School. 

50 Engineer 
B A 

A c 

The Quadripartite Working Group: 

Honing Engineer Standardization 

By Captain Kathryn M. Ohmann 

Operation Desert Storm engineers are still sifting through the lessons of the Gulf War, but 

one thing they know for sure: The standardization of 

allied engineer equipment, tactics and procedures 

was critical to the swift victory over Iraq. 

That's the word from engineer officers from four 

coalition nations-the United States, United Kingdom, 

Canada and Australia-who recently met at Fort 

Leonard Wood for the 1Oth Quadripartite Working 

Group on Engineers (QWG Engr). 

Background 

The QWG is part of the American-BritishCanadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies Standardization Program, initiated shortly after the end of 

World War II. Its origins can be traced directly to the 

close working relationship of the Allies during World 

War II. Within two years after the war's end, General 

Eisenhower and Field Marshall Montgomery sought 

to maintain the hard-earned interoperability between 

British and American forces by implementing the 

"Plan to Effect Standardization" in 1947. The plan, 

supported by Canada as well, had two basic purposes: minimize materiel or technical obstacles to full 

wartime cooperation among the armies concerned, 

and maximize economy of resources and effort. In 

the following years, equipment began to appear in 

the three armies with the designation ABC preceding 

the model and nomenclature of the item, indicating 

an operational commonality. 

By 1963 Australia joined the effort, and the program was ratified by the current agreement, called 

the Basic Standardization Agreement 1964 (BSA 

1964). New Zealand initiated cooperation with the 

ABCA in 1965 and, though not a signatory to the 

BSA, maintains close ties with the organization. 

Working under the authority of BSA 1964, the aims 

of the ABCA are to: 

• Ensure cooperation and collaboration among the 

ABCA armies 

• Achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability among the signatory armies through 

materiel and nonmaterial standardization 

• Obtain operational economies through the use 

of combined resources and effort 

To achieve those ends, the ABCA strives to: 

• Keep each army fully informed of research and 

development (R&D) taking place in the other 

armies 

• Guide R&D so that it meets the requirements of 

all four armies 

• Record and maintain formal agreements on 

materiel and nonmaterial items or concepts 

Engineer 51 
A team of Canadian Army engineers lifts a section of bridge 

during a training exercise. Commonality of equipment was a 

significant contributing factor to the success of Operation 

Desert Storm . 

meeting the needs of two or more armies 

• Ensure that such formal agreements are not 

modified without consultation 

At the senior level, each army gives direction to 

the program through quadripartite standardization discussions known as TEAL (tactics, equipment and 

logistics). These discussions are held in rotation 

among the four member countries approximately 

every 18 months. They are attended by officers at the 

vice/deputy chief of staff level-or equivalent-and 

their delegations. At the action level, the policymaking body is the Washington Standardization Officers (WSO). This group is composed of senior officers on duty in Washington D.C. They represent 

each of the member armies and collectively provide 

management guidance to the program by discussing 

policies, programs and procedures. 

The WSO is supported by the Primary Standardization Office (PSO), which is composed of 

military representatives from each of the armies. The 

PSO provides the secretariat for the WSO, reviews 

52 Engineer 

the progress of the ABCA Program, and 

monitors the activities of the QWGs. This office 

is led by a director (colonel), provided by each 

of the participating countries on a rotational 

basis, and lieutenant colonels from each 

country. The lieutenant colonels are designated 

as the Primary Standardization Officer (PSO) 

for their country. 

In addition to these ABCA elements, each 

army designates a National Standardization Officer (NSO) and appoints three Standardization 

Representatives (StanReps) to each of the 

other three armies. The Stan Reps' duties include liaison with the staff agencies to which 

they are accredited, and relaying information 

and reports to their own army. 

QWGs 

The key working elements of the program 

are the QWGs. Currently, 18 QWGs exist 

to exchange information, develop concepts, 

recommend areas for cooperation and standardization, develop Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) and assist 

the WSOs to maintain the standardization 

progress. QSTAGs are formal agreements ultimately incorporated into "how to fight" 

manuals. They define the level of standardization to be achieved in materiel and nonmateriel fields. 

The current QWGs are: Engineers, Engineering Standardization, Air Defense, Infantry, 

Armor, Intelligence, Army Operational Research, Logistics ; Aviation, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defense, Combat Developments, Command and 

Control, Proofing, Inspection, and Quality Assurance, 

Communications and Information Systems, Surfaceto-Surface Artillery, Electronic Warfare, Surveillance, 

Target Acquisition, Night Observation, and Health Service Support. 

Most of the detailed work of standardization is conducted in the QWG forum. Experts in the appropriate 

fields represent their army at QWG meetings. Meeting time is used principally to resolve issues that cannot be settled by correspondence, and redirect the 

work of the QWG in accordance with TEAL guidance. 

In the time between such meetings, correspondence 

between national points of contact (NPOCs) carries 

the QWG workload. 

Each QWG has a standing chairman, appointed by 

the WSO, who coordinates QWG business and 

chairs meetings. The QWG Engineer standing chairman is always provided by Australia. 

In general, the role of each QWG is to: 
Australian engineers conduct river crossing training using a British Class 30 aluminum bridge. Crossing the bridge 

Is an Australian cavalry fire support vehicle, a modified version of the American M113 armored personnel carrier. 

• Exchange information 

• Develop concepts 

• Influence requirements 

• Identify areas for cooperation and standardization 

• Develop standardization agreements 

• Participate in the validation of standardization 

agreements 

• Maintain the standardization level that has already been achieved 

• Review appropriate sections of the standardization list (STANLIST) to ensure that it 

remains current in both content and application, 

and recommend additional items for the list 

On a QWG's recommendation, special working parties (SWP) and information exchange groups (lEG) 

may be established to achieve, through correspondence, tasks requiring expert examination beyond the 

OWG's capability, and to explore other areas of 

potential standardization. QWG Engineer has two associate SWPs: Field Electrical Power Systems, and 

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. QWG Engineer also 

has an lEG on Engineer Command, Control and Information Systems. These SWPs perform valuable work 

in their specialist areas of concern, though interoperability in both of these areas is still some way off. 

1Oth QWG Summary 

The 10th QWG Engineer was held 5-11 June 

1991, at the Engineer Center, Fort Leonard 

Wood. Attendees included: 

Standing Chairman · LTCOL K.J. Gillespie (AUS) 

WSO Representative- LTCOL A.W. Ayerbe (AUS) 

NSO Representative- Dr. R. Wiltshire (US) 

StanRep- LTCOL E.W. Challis (AUS) 

US Delegation- COL F.J. Charles Ill, LTC R.J. 

Somerville, Mr. C.F. Wassan, MAJ W.O. Johnson 

(USMC) 

UK Delegation- Col P.B. Page, Lt Col (R) D. 

Silver, Maj J.P.J. O'Sullivan 

CAN Delegation- LCOL D.A. Grice, Maj R. B. 

Nageleisen, Maj J. Hamel 

AUS Delegation- COL P.C. Cooper, LTCOL P. 

Newman, MAJ G.O. Fenton 

NEW ZL Observer- LTCOL A.T. Beaver 

A special working group, composed of the QWG 

NPOCs, met for two days before the meeting began 

to discuss interoperability gaps and a plan of action. 

This meeting identified and prioritized areas for the 

QWG agenda. In many cases, the priorities were 

changed from the original agenda because of recent 

engineer developments. 

Discussions continued to center on low and midintensity conflicts, with particular emphasis on priority 

tasks identified in the QWG Engineer Plan of Action. 

lnteroperability aims were directed toward ensuring 

that an ABCA engineer squadron/company would be 

able to operate effectively as a subunit of any member nation's brigade or engineer regiment. Integration 

of units below squadron/company level was not considered feasible. 

Concentration of work for mid- and low-intensity 

conflicts will probably be centered on general 

Engineer 53 
engineer support and engineer command, control and 

information systems (ECCIS). Work on ECCIS is particularly important because it's a key factor in achieving interoperability. Before the 11th OWG Engineer 

meets, the WSO will probably be asked to approve 

the formation of a Special Working Group ECCIS. 

The reorganization and down-sizing now taking 

place in each army may well have a detrimental effect on the ABCA program. QWG Engineer decided 

that the current program of work should continue 

without amendment. However, dates for the execution of individual tasks, and perhaps the whole program, may have to be slipped as reorganizational 

changes take effect. 

The major achievements of the 1Oth QWG Engineer meeting were: 

• A review of the assessment of interoperability 

gaps and preparation of a revised plan of action 

• A revision of concept papers, reference and 

working papers, and QSTAGs 

• A major discussion of ECCIS and its role as a 

key factor in future interoperability 

• Reconfirmation of ECCIS and general engineer 

The ENGINEER Writer's Guide 

We think engineers take a special pride in their 

profession, and ENGINEER is always looking for 

articles from readers who want to share their expertise, experience and ideas. 

If you're a potential contributing writer, here are 

a few "writer's guide" tips that should help steer 

you in the right direction: 

Articles can cover engineer training, operations 

or doctrine, engineer equipment, history or other 

areas of general interest to an engineer readership. 

We're especially interested in articles that have 

a "how-to-do-it-better" theme. For instance, we're 

not looking for articles telling readers how you conducted a routine field exercise. But if you think you 

have a "new-and-improved" way of conducting a tactical operation, training exercise, or other operational procedure that may prove helpful to other engineers-that's what we need. 

Articles should generally come from contributors 

with first-hand experience with the subject being 

presented. 

Avoid theatrical writing styles like: "It was a 

dark and stormy night ... ," or " ... the soldier blazed 

through the jungle on his lumbering D7, providing 

a trail of freedom for the other vehicles ... " 

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and 

in the active voice. 

Length should range between 2,000 and 4,000 

words, and the text should be typewritten and 

54 Engineer 

support as priority areas for future work 

• Confirmation of the structural changes and 

developments undertaken at previous QWGs 

• An exchange of information and ideas 

The 11th OWG Engineer is scheduled to be held in 

the United Kingdom in October 1992. 

Achieving true interoperability between allied forces is a daunting objective. But the accomplishments 

of the ABCA Program proved their worth in the Gulf 

War, and the QWG Engineer will continue to be a 

vital part of those efforts. W 

Captain Ohmann is the information management 

coordinator for the Engineer School's Directorate of 

Combat Developments. She served as the administrative officer in charge of planning and organizing the 10th QWG Engr meeting. Captain Ohmann's 

previous assignments include platoon leader, adjutant and S-2 for the 29th Engineer Battalion 

(TOPO). She is a graduate of the Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services 

Staff School, and North Dakota State University. 

double-spaced. Generally, each such page will contain from 200 to 250 words. 

Articles containing attributable information or 

quotations not referenced within the story should 

carry appropriate footnotes. 

Manuscripts must be original, unpublished, and 

not under consideration by another publication. 

Normally, you can expect a reply to your submission within two weeks after we receive it. 

All submissions are subject to editing. 

Contributors are encouraged to include blackand-white photos, artwork, and/or line diagrams to 

help illustrate your article. 

Include your full name, rank, current unit and 

job title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience and education, your mailing address, and daytime phone number-preferable 

Autovon. Send your articles to: Editor, ENGINEER 

Professional Bulletin, ATTN: ATSE-TDM-PB, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. 

If you have any questions about an article you're 

working on-or considering writing-give our features editor, Phil Howell, a call at Autovon 676-

7643, or commercial (314) 563-7643. 

We look forward to hearing from you. 

P.S. ENGINEER is planning to start a Letters to the Editor column soon, and correspondence from our readers is welcome. 
I 

1 

n ENGINEER UPDATE 

Autovon numbers are 676-XXXX, and commercial numbers are 

(314) 563-XXXX, unless otherwise noted. 

Directorate of Training 

and Doctrine (DOTD) 

Directorate of Combat 

Developments (DCD) 

Directorate of Evaluation 

and Standardization 

(DOES) 

Topographic Division Welcomed. The Department of Topographic 

Engineering is reorganized as a division under the Directorate of Training 

and Doctrine. Office telephone numbers are the same: -5433/5435. LTC 

Mark Schnable, the chief, came to us from Fort Shafter, Hawaii, where he 

was commander, 29th Engineer Battalion (Topographic). POC is Robert 

Valska, -7505. 

Combined Artns Training Strategy. Proposed training strategies for 

the combined arms training strategy (CATS) will be distributed to the field 

for comments by April1992 . POC is CPT Frank Barry, -7594. 

DA Pam 35D-38 Revision. The review process for DA-PAM 350-38, 

Standards in Weapons Training, has been accelerated due to issues arising from Desert Storm operations. Plans are to review field comments 

and produce an updated DA PAM 350-38 by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 

(FY) 92. POC is Rayburn Toy, -7591 . 

Explosive Malfunctions. Units returning from Saudi Arabia report 

numerous malfunctions with demolitions, particularly with the M180 

Demolition Cratering Charge. If your unit experienced problems with explosives in the Persian Gulf or in normal training, call the Engineer Hotline, AV 676-7324 or (314) 563-7324. When recording your message, include a POC (name, unit, and phone number), and the ammunition type 

and lot number. If possible, do not destroy the evidence. POC is SFC 

Leatherman or Eric McGrath -7337/7256. 

Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI). Implementation of ERI has 

been approved in the FY 92 FORSCOM Command Plan. This conversion 

will affect 11 CONUS installations. The redistribution of engineer assets 

within FORSCOM includes heavy divisional battalions, corps mechanized 

battalions, and separate engineer companies. POC is Pete Malley, -7243. 

Engineer Center Welcome Packets. Students scheduled to attend 

professional development courses at the Engineer Center should receive 

welcome packets before they come to Fort Leonard Wood. Students who 

do not receive a welcome packet 30 days prior to their scheduled report 

date should request one by calling the appropriate office: 

.,.. Engineer Officer Basic or Advanced Course (EOBC/EOAC)- AV 581-

4367, (314) 596-4367 . 

.,.. Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic or Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officer Courses (BNCOC and ANCOC) - AV 581 -

2419/6334, (314) 596-2419/6334. 

POC is Bob Clark, -5320. 

Desert Shield/Storm Oral History Program. Units returning from the 

Persian Gulf area will participate in an oral history program conducted by 

DOES. The program is designed to collect information about soldiers' experiences, opinions of the value and importance of equipment, and solutions to issues. Key unit personnel, recorded on tape, will discuss topics 

Engineer 55 
Department of 

Instruction (DOl) 

56 Engineer 

such as deployment, combat, administration, and logistical operations.lnitial analysis of transcripts and other related documents will be used to 

determine impacts on engineer doctrine, training, organizations, materiel, 

and leader development. 

Every engineer unit that was in the Persian Gulf will participate. If your 

unit participated but has not been contacted by DOES, call Vern Lowrey, 

-5304. 

Obstacle Numbering System. The standard numbering system for 

obstacles described in Appendix 2 of FM 5-102, Countermobility, is obsolete. The new, revised obstacle numbering system shown below will 

consist of 11 characters and an obstacle status symbol. It will show the 

type of obstacle, the belt and zone in which it is located, and the headquarters that established the zone. POC is CPT Bob Wray, -5808. 

Character 

1 through 4 

5 

6 

7 

8 and 9 

10 and 11 

12 

Description 

Alphanumeric descriptions of the headquarters type and 

r1umerical designation that established the obstacle zone. 

Cha~acter 1 designates the unit type with a letter (A, Armor 

Division/Brigade; I, Infantry Division/Brigade; C, Cavalry 

Division; R, Cavalry Regiment; and Z, Corps). 

Letter indicating obstacle zone. 

Number indicating belt number in obstacle zone. 

Letter indicating group in obstacle belt. 

Letters indicating obstacle type. 

Two numbers indicating obstacle number in the group. 

One of four characters indicating obstacle status: 

I (slash planned obstacle. 

-(dash) obstacle being prepared. 

+ (plus) = prepared obstacle. The+ is for reserve demolition targets and may indicate a readiness state of safe or 

armed. 

X ((X) = completed obstacle. 

Unit's name and type 

1st Armor Division 

Obstacle type and number 

Turn minetield/11 th obstacle 

Obstacle zone/belt/group 

Zone Charlie 

Q 

Obstacle status 

Planned Belt 3, Group Delta 
l 

Engineer Personnel 

Proponency Office 

(EPPO) 

Obstacle type abbreviations: 

B - Bridge demolition (demo) 

BA - bridge demo, abutment 

BS - bridge demo, span 

BC - bridge demo, combination 

of abutment and span 

M - Minefields 

MD - minefield, disrupt 

MT - minefield, turn 

MF - minefield, fix 

MB- minefield, block 

MN - minefield, nonstandard 

MP - minefield, protective 

MQ - minefield, nuisance 

MS - minefield, standard pattern 

R - Road crater 

RH - road crater, hasty 

RD - road crater, deliberate 

RM - road crater, mined 

W - Wire obstacles 

WA - wire, double apron 

WB - wire, obstacle with booby 

traps 

WF - wire, tangle foot 

WG - wire, GPBT 

WN - wire, nonstandard 

WR - wire, road block 

WT - wire, triple standard 

S - Scatterable minefields 

SA-FASCAM, ADAMS 

SP - FASCAM, PDM 

SG - FASCAM, GEMSS 

SB-FASCAM,GATOR 

SR- FASCAM, RMMS 

SF - FASCAM, ADAMS and 

RMMS 

SM - FASCAM, MOPMS 

SV - FASCAM,VOLCANO 

SW - FASCAM, WAM 

Miscellaneous 

AD - antitank ditch 

AR - rubble by CEV gun 

AB - rubble by blade 

AT- abatis 

AE - rubble by explosives 

AM - movable MOUT obstacle 

(car, bus, etc) 

AN - expedient nonstandard 

AL - log crib 

AP - post obstacles (hedgehog, 

tetrahedron) 

AH - log hurdles 

Example: Obstacle number 1005-A2A-SM21 / indicates the 5th Infantry 

Division planned the obstacle in zone A. It is the 21st obstacle in group 

A, belt 2, and has not been executed. The obstacle is a MOPMS. 

Civilian Proponency. EPPO has assumed proponency for employees 

in engineer wage grade career fields. The proponent will serve as an 

advocate for personnel management issues and life-cycle activities. An 

article explaining the program will appear in a future issue of ENGINEER. 

POC is Cynthia Matthews, -6341. 

Functional Area Designation Process. The functional area (FA) 

designation process is underway for all year group (YG) 86 officers. By 

now, YG 86 officers should have returned an FA preference marksense 

form to Engineer Branch, PERSCOM. EPPO has provided a desired FA 

designation plan to Department of Army. Nominally, about 50 percent of 

YG 86 engineer officers will receive FA designations; the rest will be 

single-tracked as engineers. Results are expected by January 1992. POC 

is Rita Price, -5351 . 

Engineer 57 
Past in Review 

Rear Guard at Kunu-Ri 

By Dr. James W. Dunn 

T n late November 1950 the 

erican Eighth Army, and the 

2nd Infantry Division in particular, 

suffered a resounding defeat when 

Chinese forces attacked south 

across the Chongchon River in 

North Korea Most accounts of that 

action credit either infantry or artillery elements of the 2nd Infantry 

Division with carrying out the missions of a rear guard during the 

critical November 30 withdrawal 

from Kunu-ri. In reality the rear 

guard at Kunu-ri was the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion. How that 

came to be and what happened to 

the 2nd Engineers is the thrust of 

this article. 

In the fall of 1950, the United 

Nations Command moved north 

across the 38th parallel to complete 

the destruction of the North 

Korean Army and to unify the 

country under the government of 

South Korea. The offensive carried 

the Eighth Army deep into North 

Korea. On October 25, Chinese forces attacked forward elements and 

forced a withdrawal south to positions astride the Chongchon River, 

some 50 miles north of Pyongyang, 

North Korea's capital. After a 

period of recovery, Lieutenant 

General Walton Walker, commander of the Eighth Army, determined they were ready to resume 

the offensive on November 24, the 

day after Thanksgiving. 

The mountainous terrain of 

North Korea made movement and 

coordination difficult for a 

mechanized force such as the 

Eighth Army. Roads were narrow 

and gravel-surfaced, and had 

steep grades. In late November 

the first snows fell, and a brisk 

58 Engineer 

northern wind made it bitterly 

cold. As temperatures dropped, 

vehicles and weapons failed to 

function, and the troops suffered 

from frostbite. 

While the North Korean Army 

had been all but destroyed, the 

Chinese Peoples Liberation Army 

posed an unknown threat to the 

attacking Eighth Army. Estimated 

at about 50,000, the Chinese opSouth end of roadblock T l 

• . ,, 

" ''-,, 

,, 

~~ ... 

• 

-~ ~ 

Suncho~·~ 

posite the Eighth Army actually 

numbered more than 200,000 

men. They were poised to conduct 

a mobile defense geared to invite 

penetration, and then to counterattack with an aim of complete 

destruction. 

The Eighth Army planned to 

conduct a phase-line controlled, 

corps-in-zone advance to the 

northern border, with I Corps on 

,..~.::~ .... 1:: •• :-.;$, f, . 

. • 

~ ......... ~ 

5000 

Yards 

Map of the Kunu-Ri, Sun chon area, Korea 
l 

the left, IX Corps in the center, 

and the Republic of Korea II Corps 

on the right. In the IX Corps zone, 

the 2nd Infantry Division was to 

attack north in the Chongchon 

river valley toward Kunu-ri. This 

kind of methodical advance usually assured close coordination 

among major units. However, the 

mountainous terrain made communications difficult, and the 

campaign developed into a series 

ofbattalion-level actions. 

Kicking off the attack on November 24, the 2nd Division had the 

9th Infantry Regiment on the left, 

the 38th Infantry Regiment on the 

right, and the 23rd Infantry Regiment in reserve. They reached a 

line 20 miles north of Kunu-ri by 

late afternoon on the 25th. The 2nd 

Engineer Combat Battalion had a 

company with each of the two attacking infantry regiments, while 

the rest of the battalion remained 

under division control The engineers were busy keeping roads 

open and constructing fords across 

the Chongchon River. 

In an attack that night, the 

Chinese virtually destroyed a battalion of the 9th Infantry and a 

company of the 38th Infantry. The 

next morning, the division commander attached Company C of 

the 2nd Engineers to the 38th Infantry and the rest of the battalion 

to the 9th Infantry for use as 

infantry. 

As Chinese pressure mounted, 

the 2nd Infantry Division gradually withdrew toward Kunu-ri. In a 

strong attack against the 9th Infantry on November 27, the 

Chinese overran the 2nd Engineers' command post. They 

moved to Company D's position to 

continue the fight. 

By November 29 the Chinese 

had stymied the entire Americanled offensive, and Eighth Army ordered a withdrawal south to 

Sunchon. It detailed the 2nd 

Division as a rear guard to hold at 

Kunu-ri until November 30. In 

preparation for the withdrawal, the 

Combat engineers place satchel charges on a bridge near Pyongyang, Korea, 

during the winter of 1950 (U.S. Army photo). 

division relieved its engineers from 

attachment to the infantry regiments, and the battalion moved to 

a position near the division command post, just south of Kunu-ri. 

That same day the command 

post received reports that Chinese 

were on the road to Sunchon, 

threatening to cut the withdrawal 

route. Attempts by company-sized 

units to clear the road were unsuccessful, so Division Headquarters 

ordered the 9th Infantry to attack 

on the following morning. The 2nd 

Engineers were ordered to occupy 

a ridge just south of the command 

post. They were to hold it until all 

elements of the division, except 

the rear guard of the 23rd Infantry, had cleared south on the 

road to Sunchon. 

The division withdrawal plan for 

November 30 had the attacking 9th 

Infantry in front, followed in tum by 

the 38th Infantry, Division Headquarters, artillery battalions, 2nd Engineers and, finally, the 23rd Infantry 

as rear guard. But when the 9th Infantry attack failed to clear the road 

and the 23rd Infantry reported increasing Chinese pressure, Division 

ordered the 38th Infantry to lead a 

fighting withdrawal and blast open 

the road south to Sunchon. 

At 1300 the 38th Infantry 

started south along the road. It 

passed through the Chinese block 

position, but following units had 

Engineer 59 
trouble. By mid-afternoon the 

Chinese had closed the road again, 

blocking the withdrawal of 

division headquarters and the 

leading artillery battalions. Air 

strikes helped clear the way, and 

as darkness fell the stalled units 

began to move south. 

At 1500 . the Chief of Staff 

authorized the engineer battalion 

to assemble and follow the artillery in the withdrawal column. 

This proved to be Division 

Command's final contact with the 

2nd Engineers. Headquarters personnel began to move off the ridge 

in preparation for the move south, 

but the remainder of the battalion 

stayed in the defensive position. 

At the same time the 23rd Infantry, feeling pressure from the 

Chinese and increasingly concerned about the security of the 

withdrawal route, asked the assistant division commander for permission to begin withdrawing. 

They proposed using an alternate 

route west through Anju. Their 

withdrawal was approved, but 

nobody told the 2nd Engineers. 

When the 23rd Infantry pulled 

60 Engineer 

out, the engineers were the northernmost troops in position between the withdrawing 2nd 

Division and the attacking 

Chinese. As darkness fell, they 

stood alone as the rear guard. 

By the time engineer headquarters personnel got in the 

withdrawal column behind the 

last artillery units, about 1930, all 

three infantry regiments, division 

headquarters, and some of the artillery battalions had successfully 

withdrawn. Darkness and the 

Chinese caught the engineers and 

artillerymen on the road. They 

took to the hills and walked south 

to Sunchon. 

The rest of the 2nd Engineers 

stayed on the ridge to hold it, as 

ordered, until all elements of the 

division had cleared south on the 

road to Sunchon. They were still 

there when the Chinese overran 

the position about 2000. Their story 

is incomplete because all records 

were lost during the withdrawal. 

Division artillery staff officers confirmed that, as the artillery was 

withdrawing, the engineers were 

still there as the rear guard. 

Combat engineers 

serving as Infantry 

In Korea In the 

winter of 1950. 

Snow and bitter 

cold caused vehicles and weapons 

to malfunction (U.S. 

Army photo). 

These engineers paid a heavy 

price, suffering one of the highest 

casualty rates in all of the Eighth 

Army during the Chinese offensive. 

At Sunchon on December 1, the 

2nd Engineers, which had an 

authorized strength of 977, counted 

an actual strength of 266. The S-2 

was in command of the battalion. 

The battalion commander, executive officer, S-1, S-3, S-4, and four 

company commanders had been 

lost in the fighting, as had almost 

all of the battalion's equipment. 

The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalinn merits recognition for the 

sacrifices it made in November 

1950, when it served as the rear 

guard at Kunu-ri. 

Additional Reading: 

Mossman, Billy, Ebb and Flow, 

November 1950-July 1951, U.S. 

Army in the Korean War, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1990. 

Appleman, Roy E., Disaster in 

Korea, Texas A&M University 

Press, College Station, 1989. 

Dr. James Dunn is chief, Studies 

and Analysis Division, Office of 

History, USACE. 
By Command Sergeant Major Richard N. Wilson 

U.S. Anny Engineer School 

-- ----,------ ---=,.---- -=--------

"Training is the Army's top priority. It prepares us to fight. As 

leaders our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever 

dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained." 

This introduction to FM 25-101 by General Vuono, 

our former Chief of Staff, captures the essence 

of noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibility. Our 

first and foremost responsibility is to train soldiers in 

all aspects of their military occupational specialty 

(MOS) skills and to further develop them in the whole 

soldier concept. 

The NCO Corps is responsible for training the individual tasks and most of the collective tasks in unit 

training plans. To do this effectively, NCOs must first 

provide input to their unit's training schedule. After 

the training schedules and plans are developed, 

NCOs in each organization must be allowed time to 

train. A plan that looks good on paper, but which 

doesn't provide enough resources or protected time 

to train, has little chance of succeeding. 

"Sergeant's time" is a great tool when it is properly 

used. In many units, however, sergeant's time is simply placed on the schedule. If left there, it provides little to that organization's training posture. Sergeant's 

time becomes a beneficial tool only when an NCO 

uses the time for planned, quality training needed by 

the squad or section. 

The NCO is the principal person responsible for 

making sergeant's time a success. He or she must 

ensure that training is planned, rehearsed, conducted 

to standard, and retrained as necessary. But he cannot work alone. The chain of command must back 

the program by providing the resources and emphasis that will allow the NCO to perform his principal 

mission as a trainer. 

The fielding of new equipment and organizational 

changes challenge Engineer Corps NCOs to continually revise their training plans. For example, when 

complex equipment like the M9 ACE is fielded, NCOs 

must develop and provide training on how to operate 

and maintain it. Changes in organization, such as the 

development of engineer brigades in heavy divisions 

or the manner in which we will fight in a new organization, require that we teach these unfamiliar concepts at the unit level and in the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System. 

In addition to these changes, several MOS restructuring initiatives now underway will affect how we 

develop and train engineer soldiers. An example is 

the 12-series MOS. Upon implementation of this initiative, we will no longer have 128 (combat engineer) 

and 12C (bridge crewman) as separate MOS. The 

two will be consolidated into a 12A (sapper) MOS, 

and 12A soldiers will become responsible for all 

aspects of the 128 and 12C MOS tasks through all 

skill levels. This consolidation is tentatively set for 

fiscal year (FY) 1994. 

The 12F (engineer tracked vehicle crewman) series 

MOS was restructured when the M9 ACE was 

fielded. ACE operators are now part of the 12F MOS. 

as are operators of the CEV and the AVLB for skill 

levels 1, 2, and 3. At skill level 4, 12F MOS soldiers 

are programmed to merge into the 12A (sapper) MOS. 

This means that, starting in FY 94, a 12A sapper 

platoon sergeant must be knowledgeable in all 

aspects of what are currently 128, 12C, and 12F 

skills. This will be quite a challenge. 

Other MOS are being evaluated for possible consolidation. For example, portions of Career Managment 

Field 51 (general engineering) may be combined. 

Initiatives such as these will require that soldiers in 

the NCO Corps become more knowledgeable and 

better trained over a wider spectrum of engineer 

tasks than they are now. In addition, much of the 

training currently done in one station unit training and 

advanced individual training will shift to the soldier's 

individual unit. Thus, NCOs can expect assignments 

with great diversity. 

As the Army's engineer corps shrinks, we must 

ensure our NCOs are the highest caliber trainers we 

can develop. We must select only the best soldiers 

to become NCOs, and then expend great effort and 

time developing the skills and attitudes they will 

need for retention and advancement in the NCO 

Corps. We must train these soldiers so they are 

prepared to replace us senior NCOs, and can continue to meet Corps' missions with confidence and 

pride. 

Engineer 61 
MINE EFFECTS SIMULATOR 

Miles 11/Radlo Frequency 

Training Mine 

M74 (AP)/M75 (AT) 

GEMMS/FLIPPER mines 

Weight: 3.39 pounds 

To be fielded to the Combat 

Training Centers beginning 

In FY 92