ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT

 Calendar Year 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555
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ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

-iCONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 1 

OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES .............................................................. 3 

Allegations of Inattentive Security Officers .......................................................................... 3 

Safety Conscious Work Environment .................................................................................. 4 

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................... 6 

National Trends ................................................................................................................... 6 

Reactor Licensee Trends ........................................................................................ 7 

Materials Licensee Trends ...................................................................................... 9 

Source Trends ....................................................................................................... 10 

Agreement State Trends ....................................................................................... 11 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites ................................................................... 12 

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 .................................................................................. 13 

Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 ........................................................................................ 15 

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 .................................................................................... 16 

San Onofre Units 2 and 3 ...................................................................................... 17 

Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 .............................................................................. 19 

Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 .................................................................................. 20 

Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 ................................................................................. 21 

Salem/Hope Creek ................................................................................................ 22 

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees ......................................................... 23 

Allegation Trends for Selected Vendors ............................................................................ 24 

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 25 

APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................... 27 

FIGURES

1 Allegations Received by Calendar Year ............................................................................. 6 

2 Reactor Issues Nationwide 2008 ........................................................................................ 8 

3 Materials Licensee Types Nationwide 2008 ....................................................................... 9 

4 Allegations by Source Category 2008 .............................................................................. 10 

5 Agreement States ............................................................................................................. 12 

6 Susquehanna Allegations ................................................................................................. 13

7 Sequoyah Allegations .......................................................................................................15 

8 Turkey Point Allegations ...................................................................................................16 

9 San Onofre Allegations ..................................................................................................... 17 

10 Browns Ferry Allegations ..................................................................................................19 

11 Palo Verde Allegations ..................................................................................................... 20 

12 Diablo Canyon Allegations ............................................................................................... 21 

13 Salem/Hope Creek Allegations ........................................................................................22 

14 National Enrichment Facility Allegations .......................................................................... 23
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

ii 

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ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

1 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Management Directive 8.8, “Management of 

Allegations,” dated February 4, 1999, requires that the Agency Allegation Advisor prepare an 

annual report for the Executive Director for Operations that analyzes allegation trends. This 

annual report fulfills that commitment by providing national, regional, and site-specific trend 

analyses. 

In addition, significant staff activity in calendar year (CY) 2008 involving the Allegation Program 

and related policies warrants mention in this report. The agency conducted internal lessonslearned reviews regarding the handling of allegations in CY 2007 of inattentive security officers 

at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. These reviews resulted in enhancements to the 

allegation process. In addition, the allegation staff continues to implement the agencysponsored alternative dispute resolution process (Early-ADR) for discrimination allegations. 

Twenty-four percent of the discrimination cases raised in CY 2008 that were offered Early-ADR 

reached settlement. 

With regard to allegation trends, after declining slightly since CY 2005, the total number of 

allegations received increased by about 10% over the total received in CY 2007. The increase 

is primarily due to substantive increases in allegations received at several reactor facilities and 

one fuel cycle facility, and does not appear to be the result of a general industry issue or other 

external factor. Each allegation can include multiple concerns and in CY 2008, coinciding with 

the overall increase in allegations received, the total volume of allegation concerns received 

increased in all four regional offices, the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 

(NMSS) and the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR). Region IV 

experienced a substantial increase in the number of concerns received (28% increase). Twenty 

percent of the allegations received in Region IV in CY 2008 included four or more concerns and 

10 percent included six or more concerns. However, there were no apparent trends with regard 

to Region IV allegations in terms of allegation concerns coming from particular facilities or types 

of facilities or as a result of an event. The largest percentage of concerns received nationwide 

continues to be related to security. 

In CY 2008, the NRC reviewed the effectiveness of 11 Agreement State programs’ responses to 

allegations and concluded that, in general, the Agreement States continue to promptly address 

concerns raised, thoroughly document their investigations and closeout actions, inform the 

allegers of the outcomes, and protect the identity of allegers. 

For some reactor licensees, the NRC received allegations in numbers that warranted additional 

analysis. In preparing this report, the staff reviewed a 5-year history of allegations for reactor 

and materials licensees and vendors to identify adverse trends. The analysis focused on 

allegations that originated from onsite sources to help inform the NRC’s review of the Safety 

Conscious Work Environment (SCWE).1

 The staff selected eight reactor sites and one fuel 

cycle facility for a more in-depth review: Susquehanna Units 1 and 2; Sequoyah Units 1 and 2; 

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4; San Onofre Units 2 and 3; Browns Ferry Unit 1, 2, and 3; Palo Verde 

Units 1, 2, and 3, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2; Salem/Hope Creek; and the National Enrichment 

Facility. 

 

1 The total number of allegations received concerning reactor licensees from all sources, as well as other 

information concerning the Allegation Program, appears on the NRC=s public Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/statistics.html.
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

2 

The report discusses allegation trends at each of these sites. In summary, the trends in most 

cases did not suggest a concern about the environment for raising concerns. In one case, the 

trends are indicative of a weakening SCWE and the NRC has engaged the licensee because of 

this concern and is monitoring the licensee’s activities to address it. No vendors were the 

subject of allegations at a level that warranted additional analysis.
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

3 

OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

In calendar year (CY) 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) undertook certain 

significant activities that affected the Allegation Program and related policies. The agency 

conducted internal lessons-learned reviews regarding the handling of allegations in CY 2007 of 

inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. These reviews have 

resulted in enhancements to the allegation process. In addition, the allegation staff continues to 

implement the agency-sponsored alternative dispute resolution (Early-ADR) process for 

discrimination allegations. Twenty-four percent of the discrimination cases offered Early-ADR 

reached settlement in CY 2008. These areas are discussed in more detail below. 

Allegations of Inattentive Security Officers

In March 2007, the NRC received an allegation from a former contract security manager that 

security officers at Peach Bottom were sleeping on duty as a result of fatigue caused by 

excessive overtime. The alleger requested that the NRC not contact him about the concerns. 

The NRC staff, respecting this request, did not contact the alleger to inquire further about other 

potential locations or to discuss other aspects of the concerns and the agency’s proposed 

handling of them. 

It is the agency’s policy to request a written evaluation of allegation concerns from the licensee 

as often as is appropriate and when the alleger has no objection. When conditions do not inhibit 

the NRC from requesting such information from the licensee, this is considered an effective 

approach to allegation evaluation because the licensee has the primary responsibility for 

ensuring the safe operation of the facility and can promptly address issues through ready access 

to site personnel, equipment, and documentation related to the concerns. Historically, the 

agency has made such requests for approximately 40 percent of the allegations received. 

Employing the agency’s policy, the staff notified the licensee of the Peach Bottom allegation and 

requested an evaluation of the specific concerns raised and a written response to the NRC, 

including documentation of any corrective actions taken in response to the evaluation. The 

licensee concluded that the concerns were unsubstantiated. The NRC reviewed the licensee’s 

response and gathered some additional information but was also unable to substantiate the 

alleger’s specific concerns. 

Notwithstanding that assessment, in September 2007, the NRC received video evidence from a 

reporter that showed a number of inattentive security officers at Peach Bottom. The agency 

promptly conducted an investigation and multiple inspections which resulted in a confirmatory 

action letter being issued to the licensee in October 2007 (Agencywide Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML072920283) and ultimately, on January 6, 

2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 for 

a Severity Level III problem involving inattentive security officers at the site (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML083530084). The investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations 

determined that multiple security officers at Peach Bottom were deliberately inattentive on 

multiple occasions. In addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report 

observations of inattentiveness to their supervision. These security officers put the licensee in 

violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 73.55, “Requirements 

for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors against Radiological 

Sabotage” which requires armed responders to maintain continuous communication with each 

alarm station and be available to immediately respond to threats, and Peach Bottom License 

Condition 2.C(3), which requires, in part, reporting of aberrant behavior. Besides the 

enforcement action taken against the licensee, the NRC also issued a Severity Level III Notice of 
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

4 

Violation to the security contractor, Wackenhut Nuclear Services (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML083530605). 

Since the September 2007 video evidence demonstrated that the March 2007 allegation was, in 

part, valid, the agency also conducted several internal reviews in an effort to determine how the 

agency could have improved its response to the March 2007 allegation and the clarifications 

and/or modifications that could be made to the NRC allegation process to provide the staff with 

better opportunities to discover such inappropriate activity earlier. In addition to the staff’s 

internal reviews, the Office of the Inspector General investigated this matter. The NRC 

developed enhanced guidance for the staff responsible for handling allegations in a number of 

program areas, including communicating with allegers; the process for requesting from a 

licensee information related to an allegation; informing the NRC inspectors of allegation activity, 

as appropriate; expectations for review and documentation of allegation closure information 

involving a licensee response to a request for information (RFI); and, handling alleger feedback 

after the allegation is closed. The staff engaged external stakeholders regarding aspects of the 

process enhancements in early 2009. The Agency issued interim guidance to the staff 

implementing these enhancements (ADAMS Accession No. ML083640272) and will document 

the final outcome of these efforts in Commission and Allegation Program policy and guidance 

documents. 

Safety Conscious Work Environment

The 1996 NRC Policy Statement, “Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry To Raise 

Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation,” outlines the agency’s expectations that licensees 

and other employers subject to NRC authority will establish and maintain a Safety Conscious 

Work Environment (SCWE). The NRC defines a SCWE as an environment in which 

(1) employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns to their employers or the NRC without 

fear of retaliation, (2) concerns are promptly reviewed, given the proper priority, and 

appropriately resolved, and (3) timely feedback is provided. 

The staff gathers insights into the SCWE at a particular site in several ways, including reviewing 

the number and nature of allegations concerning that site and documenting its observations 

concerning a site’s SCWE based on interviews with licensee employees and reviews of pertinent 

documents during the baseline problem identification and resolution (PI&R) inspection. Should 

the staff discern that a work environment is “chilled,” (i.e., not conducive to raising safety 

concerns internally), the NRC management can request, in writing, information concerning the 

licensee’s SCWE. Such correspondence is called a chilling effect letter (CEL). The agency also 

initiates chilling effect letters after a finding of discrimination related to raising safety concerns by 

the U.S. Department of Labor under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as 

amended, or by the NRC under the following employee protection regulations: 

• Title 10 CFR Part 19, “Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers: Inspection and 

Investigations,” (10 CFR Part 19) 

• 10 CFR Part 30, “Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct 

Material” 

• 10 CFR Part 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material” 

• 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities” 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

5 

• 10 CFR Part 60, “Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories” 

• 10 CFR Part 61, “Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste” 

• 10 CFR Part 63, “Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada” 

• 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material” 

• 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste” 

• 10 CFR Part 76, “Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants” 

• 10 CFR Part 150, “Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States 

and in Offshore Waters under Section 274” 

In CY 2008, the agency issued two CELs both to materials licensees reflecting either a merit 

finding by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or an isolated event. Another CEL 

was issued to a reactor facility in early 2009, which is discussed later in this report. 

In October 2004, the staff implemented the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program which 

included the opportunity for using ADR early in the allegation process for cases of alleged 

discrimination before the NRC investigates the allegation. This allows additional opportunities 

for the parties to resolve their differences outside of the normal regulatory framework. EarlyADR involves the use of a neutral third-party to facilitate discussion and the timely settlement of 

the discrimination concern. The NRC believes that voluntary dispute resolution by the parties 

using the communication opportunities afforded in the Early-ADR process can stem the inherent 

damage such disputes can inflict on the SCWE more quickly than an investigation can. At any 

time, either party can exit the ADR process and, if the alleger still wants to pursue the 

discrimination matter, the option of an NRC investigation remains. If a settlement is reached, 

however, the staff will not pursue an investigation or subsequent enforcement of discrimination 

findings. The NRC also considers settlements resulting from licensee-initiated mediation as 

equivalent to settlements reached under the Early-ADR Program. 

The NRC made 45 Early-ADR offers in association with discrimination allegations raised in CY 

2008, of which 19 (42 percent) resulted in agreements to mediate. Of those 19 cases, 11 

(58 percent) mediated discrimination concerns resulted in the parties reaching a mutually 

agreeable settlement. 
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

6 

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS

The NRC monitors allegations to discern trends or marked increases that might prompt the 

agency to question a licensee about the causes of such changes or trends. In preparing this 

report, the staff reviewed a 5-year history of allegations received for reactor and materials 

licensees and vendors. The staff focused on those allegations that have the potential to provide 

insights into the SCWE at a given facility. Such allegations include those submitted by current or 

former licensee or contractor employees or by anonymous sources that indicate an 

unwillingness to raise safety concerns internally. For power reactor facilities, the staff analyzes 

recent allegation activity twice a year in support of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) midcycle and end-of-cycle assessments. In addition, the staff may perform an analysis for a 

particular site or licensee whenever allegations or inspection findings indicate that such an 

analysis is warranted. 

The staff also conducts reviews to identify national trends for reactor and materials allegations 

received, shifts in users of the Allegation Program, and the effect of Allegation Program 

implementation on the workload in the regions and program offices. The following section 

discusses these trends. 

National Trends

National trends are of interest because they provide general information to the staff about the 

effect of external factors, plant events, and industry efforts to improve the SCWE at 

NRC-licensed facilities. In 

addition, they can be useful in 

developing budget and planning 

assumptions to support future 

agency and Allegation Program 

needs. Figure 1 shows that 

there was a slight declining trend 

in the total number of allegations 

received by NRC from CY 2004 

through CY 2007. In CY 2008 

however, the total number of 

allegations received increased 

by about 10 percent over the 

total received in CY 2007, 

primarily due to substantive 

increases in allegations received 

at several reactor facilities and 

one fuel cycle facility. The increases do not appear to be the result of a general industry issue or 

other external factor as the reasons for the increases in allegations at these facilities were plantspecific and varied (e.g., significant outage activity, construction activity, security issues, work 

environment issues, work planning or corrective action program changes). 

The number of allegations processed by the NRC that involve Agreement State matters 

continues to decline to a minimal level as additional states achieve Agreement State status (the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania became an Agreement State in CY 2008). The reason for this 

is that most individuals who contact the NRC with concerns about Agreement State licensees 

indicate a willingness to contact and be contacted directly by Agreement State personnel about 

the evaluation of their concern(s), once the Agreement State program is explained to them. 

Such matters are forwarded to the Agreement State and are not processed by the NRC as 

0

200

400

600

800

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FIGURE 1 - ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY 

CALENDAR YEAR

Reactor Materials Agreement State
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

7 

allegations. Generally, the NRC employs the Allegation Program only to track the evaluation of 

concerns about Agreement State licensees when the concerned individual does not want his or 

her identity to be revealed to the Agreement State. 

Because each allegation can include multiple concerns, the number of concerns received can 

provide more specific information on the staff effort needed for an appropriate response. The 

trend in the total number of concerns has paralleled the trend in total allegations over the last 

several years. For example, the number of concerns about operating power reactor facilities 

increased from CY 2004 to CY 2005, as did the number of allegations in all regions except 

Region III, while all regions experienced a decrease in the number of reactor concerns received 

in CY 2006. In CY 2007, although the total number of allegations decreased, the number of 

concerns actually increased for reactor facilities in almost every region and program office. 

In CY 2008, coinciding with the overall increase in allegations received, the total volume of 

allegation concerns received increased in all four regional offices, NMSS and NSIR. Region IV 

experienced a substantial increase in the number of concerns received (28% increase). Twenty 

percent of the allegations received in Region IV in CY 2008 included four or more concerns and 

10 percent included six or more concerns. However, no trends were apparent in terms of 

allegation concerns coming from particular facilities or types of facilities or resulting from an 

event as the allegations containing higher numbers of concerns involved multiple individual 

reactor and materials facilities. 

Reactor Licensee Trends

To provide further insight into areas in which the NRC is allocating resources on reactor-related 

allegation follow-up, Figure 2 depicts the 14 functional areas that represent approximately 

80 percent of the issues received nationwide in CY 2008.2

As indicated in Figure 2, security issues comprised the largest percentage of allegation concerns 

received in CY 2008. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, security-related 

concerns have continued to represent the greatest percentage of allegation concerns received in 

each subsequent calendar year. Increases noted in CY 2004 were attributable to issues related 

to the effectiveness with which reactor licensees implemented changes to the facility and the 

physical security plan based upon NRC security orders issued and implemented before that time 

frame. In CY 2005 the number of security-related concerns sharply increased in association with 

a national broadcast in October 2005 regarding security at research and test reactors. Since CY 

2005, the overall percentage of reactor security concerns has steadily decreased, indicating that 

concerns in this area will remain prominent, but possibly at a lower level than the substantial 

numbers of security concerns that were received in the three to four year period following 2001. 

Possibly improvements in the training and qualification of the security officers and increased 

familiarity with post 9/11 security requirements are causing a reduction in the number of 

concerns raised. It is also possible that actions to improve security force working conditions and 

to treat the security force as a more integral part of facility activities, particularly in the aftermath 

of the 2007 event involving inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power 

Station, have helped improve the SCWE among the Nation’s commercial reactor security forces. 

 One notable exception in CY 2008 involved a particular reactor facility where almost all the 

 

2 The agency received few concerns in the areas not depicted in Figure 2, which represent the remaining 20 

percent of the issues received. These areas include Chemistry; Civil/Structural; Construction; Electrical; 

Employee Concerns Programs; Environmental; Falsification; Fatigue/Overtime; Fire Protection; Heating, 

Ventilation, and Air Conditioning; In-service Testing; Instrumentation and Control; Licensing; Mechanical; 

Other; Radwaste; Safeguards; Training/Qualifications; and Transportation.
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

8 

allegation concerns involved the security area. In fact, 15 percent of all the reactor-related 

security concerns received in CY 2008 involved a focused issue at this facility. 

 

Since CY 2000, the percentage of chilling effect or chilled work environment concerns in which 

individuals fear retaliation or are discouraged from raising safety concerns has fluctuated (from 6 

percent to 12 percent of the total number of reactor allegation concerns received) as individual 

reactor facilities have experienced, and eventually resolved, SCWE problems. From CY 2004 

through CY 2007, the NRC received a sustained percentage of concerns in this area (8-9 

percent). The receipt of chilling effect concerns at this consistent rate may reflect the nuclear 

workforce’s increasing awareness of SCWE concepts as a result of increased industry focus in 

this area, local and media interest in increased NRC attention to this area at specific sites 

experiencing SCWE problems, and guidance made publicly available by the NRC (i.e., 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-018, AGuidance for Establishing and Maintaining a Safety 

Conscious Work Environment,@ issued in August 2005). The overall percentage of reactorrelated chilling effect concerns in CY 2008 increased to about 10 percent of all reactor 

allegations concerns received, largely due to a sharp increase in SCWE-related concerns at one 

reactor facility. 

In CY 2005, the NRC modified its allegation tracking database to allow concerns to be attributed 

to the concept of Asafety culture.@ That is, a concern regarding a component of safety culture 

broader than a chilling effect (such as a concern about a licensee taking a production-oversafety approach) is now placed in a separate category. Concerns may now be applied to safety 

culture that in the past might have been applied to other options in the absence of a more 

descriptive category. The percentage of concerns attributed to safety culture has increased from 

approximately 4 percent of reactor concerns received in CY 2005 and CY 2006, to approximately 

5 percent in CY 2007 and CY 2008. Reasons for the slight rise in safety culture concerns in CY 

2007 and CY 2008 may be increased industry and worker awareness of safety culture in 

reaction to the mid-2006 change to the ROP’s incorporation of safety culture components into 

FIGURE 2 - REACTOR ISSUES NATIONWIDE 2008

Safety Culture

5%

Security

18%

Access 

Authorization

4%

Engineering

4%

Operations

8%

Emergency 

Preparedness

4%

Quality Assurance

4%

Wrongdoing

5%

Fitness for Duty

6%

Corrective Action

7%

Health Physics

10%

Discrimination

10%

Maintenance

5%

Chilling Effect

10%

Security Chilling Effect Discrimination Health Physics

Operations Corrective Action Fitness for Duty Wrongdoing

Maintenance Safety Culture Quality Assurance Emergency Preparednes

Engineering Access Authorization
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

9 

the ROP cross-cutting areas of human performance, PI&R, and SCWE, as well as to NRC 

efforts initiated in CY 2008 to explore the possible development of an agency policy statement 

regarding safety culture. 

The percentage of discrimination concerns raised in the reactor area during the CY 2004 to CY 

2008 review period has remained consistent at approximately 10 percent per year. More than 

two-thirds of the discrimination concerns raised in the reactor area in CY 2008 came from 

workers in the functional areas of maintenance, security, operations, and health physics. 

Materials Licensee Trends

Because of the many different types of materials licensees and because the activities performed 

by these licensees are not as homogeneous as those performed by reactor licensees, a 

comparison of the types of issues received does not produce meaningful results. For insights 

into the areas where the NRC focused its attention regarding materials-related allegations, 

Figure 3 depicts the eight types of materials licensees that accounted for approximately 80 

percent of allegation concerns received by the NRC nationwide.3

 

Since CY 2004, the number of allegations related to fuel cycle facilities constituted the highest 

percentage (30-40 percent) of the allegation concerns received by the NRC in the materials 

area. A notable increase in the receipt of concerns related to fuel cycle facilities occurred in CY 

2005, but lower numbers of concerns were received in CY 2006 and CY 2007. 

 

3 The agency received few concerns about the materials licensee types not depicted in Figure 3, which 

represent the remaining 20 percent of the issues received. These licensee types include Academic, Casks, 

Decommissioning – Reactor, General Licensee, Irradiators, Other, Nuclear Laundries, Test/Research 

Reactor, Tritium Sources, Transportation, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Disposal.

FIGURE 3 - MATERIALS LICENSEE TYPES NATIONWIDE 2008

Fuel Facililty

42%

Medical

19%

Nuclear Gauges

13%

Research and 

Development

7%

Nuclear 

Pharmacies

4%

Decommissioning - 

Materials

4% Exempt Distribution

4%

Radiography

7%

Fuel Facililty Medical Nuclear Gauges

Research and Development Radiography Nuclear Pharmacies

Decommissioning - Materials Exempt Distribution
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

10 

In CY 2008, the number of fuel facility-related concerns increased to a level higher than in any of 

the prior four years. The substantive increase was due to a sharp increase in allegations related 

to a fuel facility that is transitioning from construction to operating status. 

The number of allegation concerns received regarding decommissioning materials facilities was 

significantly larger in CY 2006 and CY 2007 than in CY 2004 and CY 2005. The increase was 

attributed primarily to activities at four facilities, two in Region I and two in Region IV. The 

number of concerns received in this area decreased significantly in CY 2008 as 

decommissioning activities have progressed. 

Allegation concerns received regarding decommissioning reactors have steadily decreased 

since CY 2004 to minimal levels as facility activities and staffing have decreased over time. As 

an example, a sharp decrease in the number of decommissioning reactor allegations in Region I 

from CY 2004 to CY 2005 coincided with the cessation of decommissioning activities at two 

sites. 

The medical area has consistently comprised the second highest percentage of materialsrelated allegation concerns at about 20 percent per year between CY 2004 and CY 2008. The 

number of allegation concerns regarding radiographers, nuclear gauges, nuclear pharmacies, 

exempt distribution, and research and development has fluctuated during the CY 2004 to CY 

2008 timeframe, with most increases caused by events at specific facilities. 

Source Trends

Figure 4 provides a breakdown of 99 percent of the sources for reactors and materials 

allegations received in CY 2008.4

 The data indicate that the distribution of source categories 

remained consistent between CY 2004 and CY 2008. That is, the primary sources of allegations 

 

4 The NRC received few concerns from the 1 percent of sources not depicted in Figure 4. These sources 

include State Agencies and the News Media.

FIGURE 4 - ALLEGATIONS BY SOURCE CATEGORY 2008

Licensee 

Employee

35%

Contractor 

Employee

22% Anonymous

15%

Private Citizen

10%

Licensee

7%

Special Interest 

Group

2%

NRC

9%

Licensee Employee Contractor Employee Anonymous

Private Citizen NRC Licensee

Special Interest Group
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

11 

continue to be employees of licensees (or former employees) and contractors (or former 

contractors). It follows that the percentage of reactors and materials allegations from other 

sources has also remained largely unchanged over the review period. The only notable change 

in the data resulted from the role of the news media becoming a more prominent source of 

allegations in CY 2005. The October 2005 national broadcast about security at research and 

test reactors, discussed previously, was the primary cause of the increase in allegations. 

In considering those allegation sources previously mentioned as having the potential to provide 

insights into the SCWE at a given facility (i.e., allegations submitted by current or former 

licensee or contractor employees or by anonymous sources), it is notable that the percentage of 

allegations from these sources since CY 2004 has remained consistently in the range of 72 to 

77 percent. 

In comparing the sources of materials allegations to those of reactor allegations over the past 

five years, the largest source for both is consistently licensee (or former licensee) employees. 

For reactor allegations, the next largest sources are contractor (or former contractor) employees, 

anonymous allegers, and private citizens, in that order. Private citizens are the second most 

frequent source of materials-related allegations, followed by anonymous allegers and contractor 

(or former contractor) employees. This is understandable since materials licensees employ 

fewer contract personnel and their activities involve more direct interaction with the public. 

Two of the source categories deserve some explanation. The source category ANRC@

designates an NRC staff member who suspects that a regulatory requirement has been violated 

deliberately or as a result of careless disregard, prompting the initiation of an investigation by the 

NRC Office of Investigations. The source category ALicensee@ denotes that a licensee 

representative, acting in his or her official capacity, has reported a potential wrongdoing to the 

NRC. The agency staff assigns an allegation process tracking number to such items to allow it 

to track the progress of a review of the potential wrongdoing issue. 

Agreement State Trends

Under the authority granted in Section 274b of the Atomic Energy Act (the Act), as amended, the 

NRC may relinquish its authority to regulate certain byproduct, source, and limited quantities of 

special nuclear material to a State Government through a mutual agreement. A State that has 

entered into this agreement with the NRC is called an Agreement State. Before entering into 

this agreement, States must first demonstrate that their regulatory programs are adequate to 

protect public health and safety and appropriately compatible with the NRC’s program. There 

were 35 Agreement States in CY 2008. In early 2009, Virginia became an Agreement State. 

Figure 5 depicts the current 36 Agreement States. 

To ensure that Agreement States maintain a program that is adequate to protect public health 

and safety and appropriately compatible with the NRC’s program, the NRC has a statutory 

responsibility to periodically review the actions of the Agreement States. This authority is 

granted under Section 274j of the Act. The NRC uses the Integrated Materials Performance 

Evaluation Program (IMPEP) to satisfy its statutory responsibility. For more information on the 

NRC’s Agreement State Program or IMPEP, please visit the NRC’s Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental Management Programs website at http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/. 
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

12 

FIGURE 5 - AGREEMENT STATES 

In CY 2008, the NRC conducted routine IMPEP reviews of nine Agreement State programs and 

follow-up IMPEP reviews of two Agreement State programs. The review teams evaluated the 

effectiveness of the Agreement State programs’ responses to allegations by reviewing casework 

and documentation for 63 allegations cumulatively received by all of the programs reviewed. Of 

the 63 allegations reviewed, the NRC referred 26 to the Agreement State programs; the States 

received the other allegations directly from concerned individuals. In all but two cases, the 

review teams concluded that the States consistently responded promptly and appropriately to 

the concerns raised. In two exceptions, prompt action was not taken because of 

miscommunications between the NRC and the State. The issues involved were of minimal 

public health and safety significance, nonetheless, the NRC staff acted to resolve the 

communication issue to prevent its recurrence. In all cases, the review teams noted that the 

States thoroughly documented the investigations and closeout actions, including notifications to 

the allegers of the outcomes of the investigations when the allegers’ identities were known. The 

review team determined that the States that were reviewed in CY 2008 have appropriate means 

to adequately protect the identity of any allegers who request anonymity. In general, the results 

of the CY 2008 IMPEP reviews demonstrate that the Agreement States continue to rank 

response to allegations as a high priority in protecting public health and safety. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites

Trending the number and nature of allegations concerning individual reactor sites is one method 

the NRC staff uses to monitor the SCWE at reactor sites. The appendix to this report provides 

statistics on allegations concerning all operating reactor sites. The NRC reviewed the listed 

allegations during the 5-year period between January 2004 and December 2008 and included 

only allegations received from onsite sources (i.e., those that may be indicative of the health of 

the SCWE). Onsite sources include current or former licensee employees, current or former 

contractor employees, or anonymous allegers. For the purpose of this analysis, the NRC 

assumes that anonymous allegations are submitted by onsite personnel. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

13 

In determining which reactor sites should receive a more in-depth review, the staff applied the 

following criterion: 

• The number of onsite allegations exceeds 3 times the median value. 

For CY 2008, the median number of onsite allegations per reactor site was 3.5. The eight 

reactor sites that met this criterion are Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 (32); Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 

(19); Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (19); San Onofre Units 2 and 3 (18); Browns Ferry Unit 1, 2, and 

3 (18); Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 (17), Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 (13) and Salem/Hope 

Creek (11). Each of these facilities is discussed below. 

[Note: In previous Annual Allegation Trends Reports, the NRC used an additional criterion in 

determining which reactor facilities would receive a more in-depth review. Specifically, reviews 

were also performed for sites receiving a number of allegations from onsite sources that 

exceeded 2 times the median and also experienced more than a 50 percent increase in the 

number of allegations concerning the site over the previous year. A review of the evaluations 

performed for the 6-year period prior to CY 2008 found that none of the facilities evaluated under 

this criterion had an existing or developing SCWE problem. For this reason the Agency 

Allegation Advisor did not analyze the allegations related to these facilities.] 

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2

The number of allegations received from 

onsite sources at Susquehanna has been 

consistently high since CY 2004 (Figure 

6), although a downward trend was 

evident from CY 2005 through CY 2007, 

likely in response to licensee efforts to 

address SCWE issues identified by 

previous site-wide safety culture survey 

results in CY 2006. The downward trend 

in allegation receipt and positive 

movement in SCWE reversed itself early 

in 2008. Since February 2008, there 

have been indications of a weakening 

SCWE at Susquehanna as evidenced by 

the large volume of SCWE and safety 

culture-related allegation concerns received by the NRC, feedback provided by site employees 

to the NRC inspectors and investigators about the site SCWE, and the results of a recent 

independent third-party safety culture survey conducted at Susquehanna in October 2008. 

Apparent contributors to the substantive increase in negative employee feedback about the work 

environment were company policy changes as well as a more formalized human performance 

review program (Event Review Board) implemented in early 2008. Less than effective 

communication of these changes to site workers before implementation appeared to enhance 

negative employee reactions. 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

20

40

FIGURE 6 - SUSQUEHANNA 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

14 

In response to the volume of allegations received and other negative feedback about the SCWE 

and safety culture at Susquehanna, the NRC engaged the licensee in mid-2008 through 

requests for information regarding the licensee’s action plans for addressing concerns with the 

SCWE and feedback on corrective action implementation and effectiveness. The NRC 

continued to review and monitor the licensee’s activities throughout the remainder of CY 2008 

and noted that progress on some corrective actions from the CY 2008 culture survey was 

lacking and that there were some follow-up activities for which corrective actions had yet to be 

developed. Follow-up interviews with site employees conducted by the NRC in late-2008 found 

continuing negative perceptions of the SCWE, the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), and 

other work environment issues involving personnel and work policies. Additionally, follow-up 

NRC interviews with first-line and mid-level supervisors found that not all were fully supportive 

and aligned with the site’s efforts to improve the SCWE. 

The results of the October 2008 independent safety culture survey indicated declining trends in 

the SCWE with broader organizational impacts when compared to previous survey results in CY 

2006. The most negative trends were noted in the health physics and operations areas. 

Numerous write-in comments provided by the survey participants cited problems in the 

management-workforce interface, low morale, management actions and decisions inconsistent 

with maintaining the SCWE, a lack of confidence in management’s ability to maintain facility 

performance and effect improvements under the worsening SCWE, and an overall view that the 

SCWE at the facility was declining. 

Because of continuing concerns about the progress and effectiveness of the licensee’s actions 

in response to the SCWE issue at Susquehanna, the NRC issued a CEL to the licensee on 

January 28, 2009, (ADAMS Accession No. ML090280115). The letter requested (1) a 

description of the licensee’s actions to address the existing SCWE concerns to preclude a 

chilled worked environment, (2) the licensee’s plans for evaluating the health of the SCWE at 

Susquehanna, and (3) the metrics through which the licensee intends to monitor the 

effectiveness of related corrective actions. The licensee responded to the CEL on February 27, 

2009, (ADAMS Accession No. ML090710864) and March 13, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML090760146) outlining its intended actions in response. 

The NRC received six discrimination concerns regarding Susquehanna in CY 2008, an increase 

over prior years. While two remain open, the other discrimination concerns were closed 

because two were withdrawn, one concern involved a vague assertion that discrimination could 

occur sometime in the non-imminent future, and one alleger did not articulate a prima-facie 

showing of potential discrimination. For clarification, to consider a matter of potential 

discrimination pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7, “Employee Protection,” an alleger must present a 

certain pattern of facts, called a prima facie showing. Specifically, the allegation must initially 

establish that an employee has engaged in a protected activity, that an adverse personnel action 

was taken against the employee, that management knew that the employee had engaged in the 

protect activity, and that the protected activity was, in part, a reason for the adverse personnel 

action. In the four year period prior to CY 2008, seventeen discrimination concerns were 

submitted regarding Susquehanna. Of these, nine were investigated by the NRC and not 

substantiated, five did not involve a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination, two allegers 

did not wish to pursue the concern, and one concern involved a third-party assertion of 

discrimination. Regarding third-party complaints of discrimination, the NRC does not pursue 

these because it is necessary to have the cooperation of the individual allegedly retaliated 

against in order to effectively investigate the issue. 

In summary, the volume of SCWE and safety culture-related allegation concerns received by the 

NRC in CY 2008, feedback provided by site employees to NRC inspectors and investigators 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

15 

about the site SCWE, and the results of a recent independent third-party safety culture survey 

conducted at Susquehanna in October 2008 have provided indication of a weakening SCWE at 

Susquehanna. Because of continuing concerns with the progress and effectiveness of the 

licensee’s actions in response to this matter, the NRC issued a chilling effect letter to the 

licensee on January 28, 2009. The NRC is evaluating the licensee’s response to the CEL and 

will continue to monitor the licensee’s actions. The NRC will interface with the licensee 

periodically to discuss progress on and outcomes of SCWE improvement activities, and will 

monitor progress through the ROP baseline inspection program. 

Sequoyah Units 1 and 2

The volume of allegations received 

concerning the Sequoyah site has 

increased in each of the last five years 

(Figure 7), with a clear trend of concerns in 

the security area. While the volume of 

allegations received in CY 2008 remained 

comparatively high, the allegations were 

almost exclusively in the security area, 

with many of those security allegations 

relating to a focused issue. Consequently, 

the allegations from onsite sources 

regarding Sequoyah in CY 2008 were 

received, almost exclusively, from contract 

personnel. 

Discussions with the licensee revealed 

that concerns received by the licensee’s Concerns Resolution Program (CRP) in CY 2008 

mirrored those seen in the allegations received by the NRC in some aspects, specifically with 

regard to security-related concerns. However, more concerns were received by the CRP 

regarding other disciplines onsite. Lastly, a smaller number of anonymous concerns were 

received by the CRP than in prior years. In mid-2007, the licensee interviewed personnel about 

the work environment in security and other organizations that had been identified by an earlier 

survey as having lower SCWE ratings. The results were generally positive; nonetheless, the 

licensee concluded that further review of the security organization was warranted. A focused 

review of the work environment in the security organization was conducted by the licensee in the 

fourth quarter of CY 2007. Among other subsequent actions initiated by the licensee to maintain 

the SCWE, the licensee also determined that the entire Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) fleet 

will return to the use of proprietary security forces at all of its plants. 

The licensee also indicated that in mid-2008, in reaction to increasing numbers of allegations 

received by the NRC regarding all of TVA’s operating power reactors, they initiated an internal 

review in an effort to preclude a decline in the SCWE. A number of efforts were undertaken by 

the licensee in response. Computer based SCWE training was initiated in late-2008 and will be 

included as part of site access General Employee Training and annual refresher training. Efforts 

are being made to increase the visibility of the CRP and CRP personnel onsite. CRP personnel 

are now tasked with providing SCWE presentations to site work groups throughout the year. 

Also in late-2008, efforts were initiated to increase the visibility of CRP through the use of 

posters, drop boxes, and brochures. The licensee recently completed a fleet-wide company 

electronic survey looking at organizational culture, which included an assessment of the 

willingness of personnel to raise concerns and to use available avenues to submit safety issues. 

The results of the survey were somewhat improved compared to a similar survey conducted a 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

FIGURE 7 - SEQUOYAH 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

16 

year earlier, but continued to show a level of employee concern about raising issues to the 

corrective action program or the CRP. A third-party safety culture survey was completed in 

mid-March 2009 and the results are being evaluated. Lastly, the licensee intends to conduct a 

self-assessment of the CRP in late-2009. 

The NRC received three allegations of discrimination in CY 2008. One was settled via EarlyADR, one was not evaluated by because it was a third-party assertion of discrimination, and the 

other remains open at this time. The NRC received four allegations of discrimination in CY 

2007. One was investigated by the NRC but not substantiated, one resulted in a settlement with 

the licensee, one was not investigated because the alleger did not want to pursue the issue, and 

the other is still open. From CY 2004 through CY 2006, four discrimination allegations were 

raised, all in CY 2005. Of these, three were investigated, but not substantiated, while one was 

withdrawn at the request of the alleger. 

Overall, the number and nature of allegations regarding Sequoyah do not appear to indicate an 

SCWE problem at the facility at this time. In response to the findings generated by SCWE 

maintenance activities and efforts taken to assess potential reasons for increasing numbers of 

allegations being submitted to the NRC, the licensee has recognized areas for improvement and 

is taking actions to address them. The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE at 

Sequoyah through normal inspection activities. 

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

The number of allegations received 

concerning the Turkey Point site in CY 

2008 increased significantly. The NRC 

received concerns at a steady rate 

throughout the year. The 5-year trend is 

also increasing (Figure 8). An analysis 

of the subject matter of the allegations 

indicates a trend related to SCWE in the 

area of operations, with a number of 

concerns involving claims of 

discrimination and a “chilling effect” 

challenging the SCWE. Discussions 

with the licensee revealed that the ECP 

saw a slight decline in the number of 

concerns raised by employees through 

that avenue in CY 2008. The majority of concerns were received in the first four months of the 

year and, similar to concerns received by the NRC, primarily involved the Operations 

department. 

In the first half of CY 2008, prompted by an NRC concern regarding a number of allegations 

received, the licensee commissioned an independent, third-party evaluation of the SCWE in the 

Operations Department. The evaluation concluded that some individuals may have been chilled 

with regard to their interactions with specific licensee managers, but there did not appear to be a 

broad chilled environment within the Operations Department, and no personnel feared retaliation 

for raising safety concerns. The NRC also evaluated the licensee’s SCWE during routine and 

focused inspections. NRC inspectors interviewed several licensed operators and found no 

instances where an employee indicated they would be hesitant to raise safety concerns. These 

inspection observations are documented in Inspection Reports (IR) 05000250/2008007, 

05000251/2008007, 05000250/2008008, and 05000251/2008008. The licensee committed to 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

5

10

15

20

FIGURE 8 - TURKEY POINT 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

17 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

FIGURE 9 - SAN ONOFRE 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received

enhance communications between plant operators and senior management to ensure 

constructive interactions. 

In late 2007, and continuing into early 2008, the licensee conducted a self-assessment of the 

ECP. The report identified a number of weaknesses, including the program’s low visibility and a 

lack of confidence in the program’s ability to maintain confidentiality. The NRC’s inspections 

mentioned above found similar concerns. In response to these findings, the licensee appointed 

a new ECP Manager in May 2008 and, according to the licensee, began a number of initiatives 

to address documented weaknesses. These initiatives include improved program advertising 

and outreach efforts, required periodic SCWE training for supervisors, and initial training for new 

employees. A survey was administered in the fall of CY 2008 to assess the SCWE and safety 

culture. According to discussions with the licensee the survey results were provided to the site 

in early 2009 and show steady or improved ratings on a number of questions. The licensee had 

not yet shared the results with the whole management team or with the workforce and it is not 

clear whether corrective actions will be necessary to address the survey findings. 

The NRC received five allegations of discrimination in CY 2008. Three remain open, one was 

not investigated because the alleger did not wish to participate in an investigation or in ADR, and 

one was not eligible for investigation by the NRC because the alleger did not articulate a prima 

facie showing of potential discrimination. 

The NRC will monitor the licensee’s efforts to enhance communications between plant operators 

and senior management, as well as progress on ECP improvement initiatives through normal 

inspection activities. 

San Onofre Units 2 and 3

The number of allegations received at San 

Onofre from onsite sources in CY 2008 (18) 

represents an increasing trend in allegation 

receipt at the facility over the past five years. 

Almost half of the allegations received in CY 

2008 involved the maintenance and work 

planning areas and were focused on 

transition issues related to the 

implementation of new work process 

management tools (including implementation 

of a new corrective action program tracking 

system). Several allegation concerns were 

submitted in CY 2008 about the site work 

environment and safety culture, with most 

involving concerns about the implementation 

of changes to the work planning/control 

processes and the corrective action program. 

The latest PI&R inspection reports (IR 05000361/2008012 and 05000362/20080012, and 

Confirmatory Order EA-07-232 Follow-Up Inspection dated 12/3/2008) highlighted that human 

performance errors continue to occur and that the effectiveness of problem evaluation remains a 

continuing problem at San Onofre. Notwithstanding the identification of persistent problems in 

these areas, it is noted that interviews with site workers during the NRC PI&R inspection 

demonstrated that the workers feel free to report problems to management and to the Nuclear 

Safety Concerns Program (NSCP). For the third consecutive year, the ROP 2008 annual 
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

18 

assessment of facility performance at San Onofre identified continuing substantive crosscutting 

issues in human performance related to the adequacy of procedures or work instructions and in 

PI&R related to the effectiveness of problem evaluation. This has resulted in a request for 

additional licensee follow-up action, including the performance of an independent safety culture 

assessment. Additional NRC inspection activity is also planned. 

Early in CY 2008, the San Onofre NSCP was receiving concerns at a rate similar to that of prior 

years. A substantive increase was seen with the transition to the new work planning and control 

and corrective action program tracking systems. Similar to trends seen in the NRC allegation 

data, concerns to NSCP were submitted most frequently by maintenance and craft personnel in 

CY 2008. 

The licensee indicated in discussions with the NRC that its most recent independent third-party 

safety culture survey was conducted in the first quarter of CY 2008. The survey resulted in 

positive feedback related to general culture and work environment and highlighted that NSCP 

provided an effective alternate path for problem resolution. The overall survey results noted 

slight improvement from previous results, but indicated that expectations were not met in some 

areas, such as in the areas of corrective action program effectiveness and change 

management. 

For the three discrimination concerns received by the NRC regarding San Onofre in CY 2008, 

one was settled via Early-ADR and the other two were not investigated by the NRC because the 

alleger did not articulate a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination. The number of 

discrimination concerns submitted in CY 2008 was notably lower than the number received in 

CY 2007 (6). Regarding the CY 2007 discrimination concerns, the NRC investigated two that 

were not substantiated, and another is still under investigation. The NRC did not investigate one 

2007 discrimination concern because it was provided by a third-party source, and in another 

instance, a discrimination concern was not investigated because the alleger did not wish to 

participate in an NRC investigation. The remaining discrimination concern in CY 2007 was 

settled via Early-ADR. The discrimination allegations received in CY 2007 were all from either 

the maintenance or engineering department. The NRC received nine allegations of 

discrimination regarding San Onofre between CY 2003 and CY 2006. Seven of these were 

investigated and not substantiated. The remaining two were not investigated because one 

alleger did not articulate a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination, and another alleger 

would not provide his or her identity. 

The nature of allegations received by the NRC from onsite sources in CY 2008 regarding San 

Onofre, coupled with SCWE-related feedback from both the NRC PI&R inspection in late-2008 

and the licensee’s most recent independent safety culture survey conducted in early 2008, do 

not appear to indicate a specific SCWE problem at the facility at this time. However, both the 

NRC 2008 PI&R inspection and the licensee’s 2008 independent safety culture survey noted 

issues with corrective action program effectiveness, amplified by problems in transitioning to 

new work planning and control and corrective action program tracking systems. In addition, for 

the third consecutive year, the ROP annual assessment of facility performance at San Onofre 

identified continuing substantive crosscutting issues in human performance related to the 

adequacy of procedures or work instructions and in problem identification and resolution related 

to the effectiveness of problem evaluation. Continuing problems in these areas could have a 

deleterious effect on the safety culture at San Onofre, including the SCWE, if consistent 

improvement is not realized. As a result, the licensee was requested to provide a written 

response to the NRC describing their plans for addressing these substantive crosscutting areas, 

to support a public meeting discussing these issues, and to perform an independent safety 

culture assessment. The licensee has scheduled an independent safety culture assessment for 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

19 

mid-2009. A focused NRC PI&R inspection is also planned for mid-2009 to assess the 

licensee’s improvement efforts. 

Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3

Following the restart of Browns Ferry Unit 

1 in May 2007, in CY 2008, the NRC 

evaluated allegations received from onsite 

sources at Browns Ferry on a site-wide 

basis, i.e., by considering the combined 

total of allegations received at Browns 

Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3. Although the 

number of allegations received at Browns 

Ferry from onsite sources in CY 2008 (18) 

is comparatively high, the nature of the 

allegations received do not appear to 

indicate a SCWE problem at the facility at 

this time. The NRC received allegations at 

an even pace throughout the year and 

there were no distinct issue or discipline 

trends evident from the CY 2008 allegation 

data. For each of the five years in the CY 

2004-2008 time period, a large percentage 

(75 percent or greater) of the total number of allegations received about the Browns Ferry site 

were related exclusively to Browns Ferry Unit 1. The NRC conducted a PI&R inspection in 

August 2007 (IR 05000259/2007008, 05000260/2007008, and 05000296/2007008) that 

included a review of the SCWE. The staff observed that licensee management routinely 

emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems and that employees were 

not hesitant to do so. 

 

Discussions with the licensee revealed that the number of concerns received by the Browns 

Ferry CRP was lower in CY 2008 than the number received in CY 2007. The onsite workforce at 

Browns Ferry 1 decreased significantly after its transition to operating status in mid-2007, and 

the licensee believes that caused a significant drop in the number of concerns received by the 

site CRP. However, the number of allegations received by the NRC increased in CY 2008. 

In mid-2008, in reaction to increasing numbers of allegations received by the NRC involving all 

of TVA’s operating power reactors, the licensee initiated an internal review in an effort to prevent 

a decline in the SCWE. In discussions with the NRC, the licensee indicated that, based on an 

assessment of concerns provided to the licensee in NRC allegation RFI compared to concerns 

raised internally, the review surmised that there may be some concern related to employee 

confidence in management, the corrective action program, and the CRP to resolve issues. At 

Browns Ferry specifically, the licensee identified concerns related to recent personnel policy and 

management changes. A number of efforts were undertaken by the licensee in response. 

Computer based SCWE training was initiated in late-2008 and will be included as part of site 

access General Employee Training and annual refresher training. Efforts are being made to 

increase the visibility of CRP and CRP personnel onsite. CRP personnel are now tasked with 

providing SCWE presentations to site work groups throughout the year. Also in late-2008, the 

licensee indicated that efforts were initiated to increase the visibility of CRP through the use of 

posters, drop boxes, and brochures. The licensee recently completed a fleet-wide company 

electronic survey looking at organizational culture, which included an assessment of the 

willingness of personnel to raise concerns and to use available avenues to submit safety issues. 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

30

FIGURE 10 - BROWNS FERRY 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

20 

 The results of the survey were somewhat improved compared to a similar survey conducted a 

year earlier, but continued to show a level of employee concern about raising issues to the 

corrective action program or the CRP. A third-party safety culture survey was completed in 

mid-March 2008 and the results are being evaluated. Lastly, the licensee intends to conduct a 

self-assessment of the CRP in late-2009. 

The number of discrimination concerns received in CY 2008 (2) and CY 2007 (3) represent a 

substantive decline in such issues compared to the three prior years. Two of the discrimination 

concerns in CY 2007 resulted in settlements, one was not investigated because it was a third 

party claim of discrimination, and the CY 2008 discrimination concerns remain under evaluation. 

 Of the 12 discrimination concerns received in the 2004-2006 timeframe, one (submitted in 

2005) was substantiated. In this instance, the discriminatory act was taken by a licensee 

contractor and because the licensee conducted an immediate investigation and took prompt 

corrective action to address the specific issue and protect the SCWE, the NRC exercised 

discretion in this case. Of the remaining 11 discrimination concerns in the CY 2004-2006 time 

frame, one is still open, four were investigated by the Office of Investigations (OI) and not 

substantiated, one was not investigated because it was a third-party assertion of discrimination, 

and the remaining five were not investigated because the alleger either withdrew the complaint, 

did not want to participate in an investigation, or was unable to be re-contacted. 

The nature of the allegations received in CY 2008 does not indicate a significant concern with 

the SCWE at the Browns Ferry site. The NRC will continue to monitor the site’s work 

environment through normal inspection activities. 

Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3

The number of allegations regarding 

Palo Verde was again high in CY 2008 

as the site continued to address 

“performance areas for improvement” 

identified by the licensee’s and the 

NRC’s safety culture assessments 

(Figure 11). 

 

In CY 2007, the NRC placed Unit 3 in 

Column IV of the NRC’s action matrix 

after identifying two separate significant 

inspection findings. As a result, the 

NRC increased regulatory oversight and 

conducted a special inspection, 

Inspection Procedure 95003, 

“Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive 

Degraded Cornerstone,” at the end of 

the year. The inspection report issued 

February 1, 2008 concluded that, “as an 

overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues had not always received the attention warranted by 

their significance” (IR 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, and 05000530/2007012). The 

NRC inspection team identified weaknesses in organizational characteristics and attitudes 

associated with ten of the NRC’s thirteen safety culture components. However, the two 

SCWE-related components (environment for raising concerns, and preventing, detecting, and 

mitigating perceptions of retaliation) were found to be adequate. None of the 400 individuals 

interviewed by the NRC indicated they were hesitant to raise nuclear safety concerns. Of the 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

30

FIGURE 11 - PALO VERDE 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

21 

interviewees, twenty-five percent had demonstrated a willingness to raise issues multiple times if 

dissatisfied with the original resolution, and almost all said they would escalate a concern. A 

large majority of those interviewed perceived their managers as receptive to concerns and willing 

to address them. In early 2008, the licensee identified 12 key performance areas for 

improvement and the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL) to track the improvement 

initiative. NRC inspections in CY 2008 focused on evaluating the effectiveness of the licensee’s 

actions to improve performance as documented in the CAL. Throughout the assessment period, 

NRC inspections determined that the licensee implemented some corrective actions, however, 

the actions were not completely effective. 

The 17 allegations received by the NRC from onsite sources in CY 2008, came at a steady rate 

throughout the calendar year. The issues raised were generally varied, with small pockets noted 

in engineering, security, and radiation protection, but they did not indicate that the workforce was 

chilled. 

Two discrimination allegations were raised in CY 2008. One is still open and the other was not 

investigated because it was provided by a third-party source. Four were received in CY 2007, of 

which one was withdrawn by the alleger, one was investigated by the NRC and not 

substantiated, and two were settled via a licensee-initiated ADR process and credited under the 

NRC’s Early-ADR process. Between CY 2004 and CY 2006, the NRC recieved seven 

discrimination allegations. Of those, four were investigated by the NRC and not substantiated, 

one was withdrawn, and one was settled under the NRC’s Early-ADR process. 

The licensee had a number of contractors on site in CY 2008. Discussion with the licensee’s 

Employee Concern Program (ECP) staff indicated a significant number of issues were raised 

through that program over the last two years, including issues in areas similar to allegations 

raised to the NRC. In late CY 2008, the licensee began conducting refresher training in the area 

of SCWE. Also in late 2008, the licensee conducted another safety culture assessment, which 

showed rating improvements in a number of areas. The ECP initiated efforts to improve 

visibility, including increasing briefings and new employee orientation. 

In early 2009, the NRC determined that the licensee had made substantial and sustainable 

improvements in their safety culture. The allegation trends do not indicate a weakening of the 

SCWE. The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE at Palo Verde through normal 

inspection activities. 

Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

Although the number of allegations 

received from onsite sources at Diablo 

Canyon increased significantly in CY 2008 

as compared to the last several years, 

there were no significant discipline, 

source, or SCWE-related trends indicated 

in the concerns received (Figure 12). 

Diablo Canyon Unit 2 was down for an 

extended refueling outage between 

February and April 2008 which included 

the replacement of all four steam 

generators. The timing, sources, and 

nature of the concerns raised in the first 

two quarters correspond to this period of 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 12 - DIABLO CANYON 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

22 

significant site activity. It is not unusual to see increased allegation traffic during significant site 

activities given the additional number of workers on site and new and different challenges. 

The most recent NRC PI&R inspection team at Diablo Canyon in November 2008 observed that 

all employees interviewed were willing to raise safety concerns through at least one of the 

avenues available to them (IR 05000275/2008008 and 05000323/2008008). The inspection 

team also found, however, that some were hesitant to raise concerns via one or more of those 

avenues. Some stated examples of both new and older instances of management behavior that 

could discourage raising safety concerns in the Operations Department. Some personnel 

expressed concern that the corrective action program was not effective; specifically with 

prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions. And finally, with regard to the ECP, some 

expressed concerns about its ability to maintain the confidentiality of its customers. A review of 

ECP files indicated that the program has received no nuclear safety or quality issues, other than 

those allegations for which the NRC requested an evaluation, in the last two years. 

Regarding allegations of discrimination, only one was received in CY 2008 and was settled 

between the employee and licensee under the NRC’s Early-ADR process. No other claims of 

discrimination were made during the 5-year review period. 

The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE at Diablo Canyon through normal inspection 

activities. The NRC will monitor areas observed during the PI&R inspection that may challenge 

the SCWE. 

Salem/Hope Creek

The number of allegations received 

from onsite sources decreased 

between CY 2007 and CY 2008, 

and, as seen in Figure 13, the trend 

over the past four years is declining 

as well. The NRC received 

allegations in each of the four 

quarters of the year, with a modest 

increase in the second quarter. The 

timing, source, and nature of the 

concerns raised, corresponded to 

the licensee’s spring outage of 

Salem Unit 2 and the steam 

generator replacement work on site. 

 

Discussions with the licensee’s ECP personnel about general trends in that program’s CY 2008 

activities reveal that similar concerns were also raised internally. Early in CY 2008, the NRC 

engaged the licensee with regard to a chilling effect allegedly impacting a particular department. 

 The licensee conducted an evaluation which resulted in it taking several corrective actions. The 

NRC’s assessment determined that the corrective actions were appropriate and responsive to 

the alleger’s concerns. There does not appear to be any trend in the allegation data that would 

indicate a concern with any other department’s environment for raising concerns. 

 

Allegations of discrimination also declined in CY 2008. The NRC received two; one of which 

was settled prior to an NRC investigation using an ADR process. The other did not meet the 

NRC’s requirements for investigation because it did not articulate a prima facie case. 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

30

FIGURE 13 - SALEM/HOPE CREEK 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

23 

The licensee conducted an assessment of their safety culture in July 2008, including the SCWE. 

 Based on conversations with the licensee, results indicate an improvement in SCWE-related 

ratings at Hope Creek, but slightly declining ratings in certain departments at the Salem facility. 

The licensee has developed action plans to address these areas. The NRC will maintain its 

oversight of SCWE at Salem/Hope Creek through normal inspection activities. Review efforts 

will focus on corrective actions developed in response to the safety culture assessment, 

particularly in the departments identified as needing management attention due to SCWE 

concerns. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees

The NRC website posts allegation statistics for certain fuel cycle facilities (see the appendix to 

this report). Because of the small number of allegations involving other smaller materials 

licensees and because of the potential for a licensee or contractor to identify an alleger, 

allegation statistics for materials licensees other than fuel cycle facilities have not been provided 

publicly or included in this report. 

Allegations were received at greater than 

three times the industry median in 

CY 2008 from onsite sources at one large 

fuel cycle facility, the National Enrichment 

Facility operated by Louisiana Energy 

Services in Eunice, New Mexico. As 

seen in Figure 14, there was a significant 

increase in allegations received from 

onsite sources from CY 2007 (1) to 

CY 2008 (11). The facility is currently 

transitioning toward operation from its 

construction phase which commenced in 

August 2006. It is not unusual to see a 

substantive increase in allegations as a 

large facility transitions from construction 

to operation, i.e., as contractor activities 

are completed and as the oversight of 

facility systems, structures and 

components is transitioned from the contractor to the licensee. The number of personnel onsite 

was decreased by almost 40 percent in CY 2008 and will continue to decrease as the 

construction phase winds down. The allegation sources for CY 2008 were about evenly split 

between contractor employees and licensee employees. In the allegations submitted to the 

NRC, some concerns were raised about incidents that purportedly chilled the work environment 

stemming from the perception of a few individuals that senior management exhibited productionover-safety behaviors. 

The licensee’s ECP is receiving concerns similar to those received by the NRC and saw a 

similar increase in the number of concerns raised from CY 2007 to CY 2008 as the facility 

staffing level has been reduced. The site is currently taking actions in response to some issues 

that were identified during its evaluation of allegations submitted for evaluation via an NRC 

allegation RFI and is also taking actions in response to a recent independent safety culture 

assessment which found overall the licensee’s safety culture to be satisfactory, but noted some 

areas needing improvement (e.g., work control, operating experience, organizational change 

management, and the corrective action program). 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 14 - NATIONAL 

ENRICHMENT FACILITY 

ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

24 

The NRC will continue to monitor allegation activity involving the National Enrichment Facility 

through normal inspection activities as the facility continues to downsize in its approach to 

operational status. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Vendors 

Because none of the vendors received a sufficient number of allegations to discern a trend or 

pattern or to provide insights into the work environment, this report does not include more in 

depth reviews of specific vendors. The report also does not provide statistics by contractor or 

vendor because publishing the number of allegations could identify an alleger. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

25 

CONCLUSIONS

From CY 2004 through 2007 the trend in the total number of allegations received by the NRC 

declined slightly. In CY 2008 however, the total number of allegations received increased by 

about 10 percent, primarily due to substantive increases in allegations received at several 

reactor facilities and one fuel cycle facility. The increases do not appear to be the result of a 

general industry issue or other external factor. The number of allegations processed by the 

NRC involving Agreement State matters continues to decline to a minimal level as additional 

States achieve Agreement State status. Most individuals who contact the NRC with concerns 

about Agreement State licensees agree to have their concerns forwarded to the Agreement 

State for resolution and the NRC does not process these concerns as allegations. To ensure 

that Agreement States maintain a program that is adequate to protect public health and safety 

and appropriately compatible with the NRC’s program, the Agency periodically reviews the 

actions of the Agreement States. The results of these reviews in CY 2008 demonstrate that the 

Agreement States continue to rank response to allegations as a high priority in protecting public 

health and safety. 

The analyses of allegations have provided insights into the SCWE at several facilities. The staff 

has taken action to engage licensees concerning their work environment when warranted and 

will continue to monitor these sites with interest. 

The agency’s Early-ADR process resulted in 11 cases in which discrimination allegations were 

successfully settled between the parties before the start of an NRC investigation. The staff 

believes that voluntary dispute resolution by the parties using the communication opportunities 

afforded in Early-ADR can stem the inherent damage such disputes have on the SCWE more 

quickly than an investigation can. 

Finally, the NRC developed enhanced guidance for the staff responsible for handling allegations 

in a number of program areas based on an internal review of the lessons learned in CY 2007 in 

handling allegations of inattentive security officers. The areas enhanced include communicating 

with allegers; the process for requesting from a licensee information related to an allegation; 

informing the NRC inspectors of allegation activity, as appropriate; expectations for review and 

documentation of allegation closure information involving a licensee response to a RFI; and, 

handling alleger feedback after the allegation is closed. The staff engaged external 

stakeholders regarding aspects of the process enhancements in early 2009. The NRC will 

document the outcome of these efforts in Commission and Allegation Program policy and 

guidance documents.
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

26 

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ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

27 

APPENDIX 

ALLEGATION STATISTICS 

OPERATING REACTORS AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES 
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

28 

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ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

A-1

OPERATING REACTOR ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED FROM ONSITE SOURCES 

Site 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

ARKANSAS 1 & 2 6 4 4 8 6

BEAVER VALLEY 1 & 2 9 7 3 2 3

BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 3 4 6 5 3

BROWNS FERRY 1, 2 & 3 19 24 17 11 18

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 2 3 1 3 2

BYRON 1 & 2 6 12 3 9 8

CALLAWAY 1 11 3 17 2

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 5 1 2 1

CATAWBA 1 & 2 2 2 3

CLINTON 4 1 3 1 1

COLUMBIA PLANT 6 7 3 3 1

COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 2 9 3 4 5

COOK 1 & 2 12 7 7 3 5

COOPER 10 1 3 2 3

CRYSTAL RIVER 4 2 5 4 2

DAVIS-BESSE 12 9 4 1

DIABLO CANYON 1 & 2 2 2 2 2 13

DRESDEN 2 & 3 3 9 7 8

DUANE ARNOLD 8 1 1 1 2

FARLEY 1 & 2 1 4 4 5 5

FERMI 2 2 3 10 3

FITZPATRICK 3 3 1 2

FORT CALHOUN 2 2 6 1

GINNA 2 2 2 4

GRAND GULF 6 7 4 8 4

HARRIS 9 14 14 1

HATCH 1 & 2 1 3 1 6 7

INDIAN POINT 2 & 3 19 9 15 19 3

KEWAUNEE 3 3 4 1

LASALLE 1 & 2 2 1 5 1

LIMERICK 1 & 2 4 8 4 1 3

MCGUIRE 1 & 2 2 2 2

MILLSTONE 2 & 3 1 10 9 5 8

MONTICELLO 2 2 1 2

NINE MILE POINT 1 & 2 4 4 5 6 1

NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 4 2 1 3 1

OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 11 3 2 2 1

OYSTER CREEK 8 14 4 2 6

PALISADES 10 3 6 5 6

PALO VERDE 1, 2, & 3 8 22 16 18 17

PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 1 5 6 8 3

PERRY 12 4 1 1 6
2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

A-2

Site 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

PILGRIM 14 9 6 7 8

POINT BEACH 1 & 2 11 13 2 1 5

PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 4 5 6 6 5

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 1 2 1 4 4

RIVER BEND 3 2 3 2 8

ROBINSON 1 1 1

SALEM/HOPE CREEK 18 23 14 16 11

SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 13 10 15 12 18

SEABROOK 3 10 4 4 9

SEQUOYAH 1 & 2 4 10 11 13 19

SOUTH TEXAS 1 & 2 6 4 8 6 8

ST LUCIE 1 & 2 4 16 15 11 6

SUMMER 3 3 2

SURRY 1 & 2 1 2 1 2

SUSQUEHANNA 1 & 2 13 20 19 13 32

THREE MILE ISLAND 6 4 1 1 2

TURKEY POINT 3 & 4 9 10 18 4 19

VERMONT YANKEE 3 1 4 3 1

VOGTLE 1 & 2 1 5 5 7 1

WATERFORD 1 2 2 2 4

WATTS BAR 1 4 2 6 3 9

WOLF CREEK 3 1 1 7
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2008 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

A-3

FUEL CYCLE FACILITY ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED FROM ONSITE SOURCES 

Site 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

AMERICAN CENTRIFUGE PLANT 1

BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 3 1

FRAMATONE-LYNCHBURG 1

FRAMATONE-RICHLAND 1 1

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL 1 2 1 1

HONEYWELL 2 7 1 4

LOUISIANA ENERGY SERVICES 1 1 11

NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC. 10 6 1 3 3

PADUCAH 10 7 3 6 3
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