Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 1 - 82301

NRC INSPECTION MANUAL PERB

INSPECTION PROCEDURE 82301

EVALUATION OF EXERCISES FOR POWER REACTORS

PROGRAM APPLICABILITY: 2513, 2514, 2515

SALP FUNCTIONAL AREA: PLANT SUPPORT (PLTSUP)

82301-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVE

To assess the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response

program, the implementation of the emergency plan, the emergency

plan implementing procedures, and the training program for

emergency response.

82301-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

02.01 Verify that the emergency preparedness exercise or drill

meets the licensee's (or applicant's) commitments and regulatory

requirements.

02.02 Control Room. Observe and evaluate the performance of

licensee (or applicant) emergency response personnel in the control

room, as they perform the following activities during a drill or

exercise: 

a. Facility management and control.

b. Analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions.

c. Detection and classification of emergency events.

d. Protective action decision making.

e. Notifications and communications.

f. Implementation of onsite protective actions.

g. Dose assessment.

h. Evaluation of post-accident sampling results.

i. Dispatch and coordination of monitoring teams

02.03 Technical Support Center (TSC). Observe and evaluate the
82301 - 2 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

performance of licensee (or applicant) emergency response personnel

in the Technical Support Center, as they perform the following

activities during a drill or exercise:

a. Staffing and activation of the TSC.
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 3 - 82301

b. Facility management and control.

c. Accident assessment and classification.

d. Dose assessment.

e. Protective action decision making.

f. Notifications and communications.

g. Implementation of protective actions.

h. Assistance and support to control room.

i. Evaluation of post-accident sampling results.

j. Dispatch and coordination of monitoring teams.

02.04 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Observe and evaluate

the performance of licensee (or applicant) emergency response

personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility, as they perform the

following activities during a drill or exercise:

a. Staffing and activation of the EOF.

b. Facility management and control.

c. Accident assessment and classification.

d. Offsite dose assessment.

e. Protective action decision making.

f. Notifications and communications.

g. Implementation of protective actions.

h. Interaction with offsite officials, NRC, and other organizations.

02.05 Operational Support Center (OSC). Observe and evaluate the

performance of licensee (or applicant) emergency response personnel

in the Operational Support Center, as they perform the following

activities during a drill or exercise:

a. Staffing and activation of the OSC.

b. Facility management and control.

c. Performance of support functions.

02.06 Corporate Command Center (CCC). Observe and evaluate the

performance of licensee (or applicant) emergency response personnel

in the Corporate Command Center, as they perform the following

activities during a drill or exercise:
82301 - 4 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

a. Staffing and activation of the CCC.

b. Performance of support functions.

02.07 Offsite Monitoring. Observe and evaluate the performance of

licensee (or applicant) offsite monitoring teams as they perform

the following activities during a drill or exercise:

a. Activation and deployment of the monitoring teams.

b. Surveys, sampling and analysis.

02.08 Corrective Action Or Rescue Teams. Observe and evaluate the

performance of licensee (or applicant) corrective action and rescue

teams as they perform the following activities during a drill or

exercise:

a. In-plant repair actions.

b. Rescue operations.

02.09 Security and Accountability. Observe and evaluate the

licensee's (or applicant's) security practices during a drill or

exercise:

a. Security.

b. Accountability.

02.10 Emergency News Center (Joint Public Information Center).

Observe and evaluate the performance of licensee (or

applicant) emergency response personnel in the Emergency

News Center (Joint Public Information Center), as they

perform the following activities during a drill or

exercise:

a. Staffing, activation, and facility control as applicable.

b. Processing and dissemination of information to the media.

02.11 Onsite Emergency Medical Services. Observe and evaluate the

performance of the licensee's (or applicant's) onsite medical

response team during a drill or exercise.

02.12 Post-Accident Sampling Team (PASS). Observe and assess the

performance of the PASS team during a drill or exercise.

02.13 Critique. Assess the licensee's (or applicant's) critique.

2 02.14 Public Meeting. Participate in a public meeting 2 following the exit meeting with the licensee if the staff has 2 determined that a significant break-down of the emergency 2 preparedness program has occurred or there is strong public 2 interest. 2

82301-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 5 - 82301

General Guidance

This procedure is a part of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) CORE

Inspection Program and is to be used to inspect the licensee's

biennial, FEMA-observed exercise. Under the Plant Support

Procedure for resident inspectors, this procedure is also to be

used to observe selected exercises and drills. The region may

decide to inspect a Utility-Only exercise because of concerns about

declining utility performance in the area of EP. If this procedure

is used for 

Utility-Only exercises, or any other purposes, the time expended is

required to be recorded as Regional Initiative. 

Evaluations conducted in accordance with this procedure are limited

to the staff, activities, records, and facilities of the licensee

(or applicant). Where necessary to verify licensee (or applicant)

performance, concerning interactions with organizations and persons

involved in offsite emergency preparedness, inspectors are to limit

their activities to reviews of pertinent records available through

the licensee (or applicant). If additional information is needed

about offsite emergency preparedness, it can be obtained from FEMA.

The general practices for a team inspection are to be used for the

planning and conduct of this inspection and for the preparation of

the inspection report. During an exercise or drill, observation

and evaluation of licensee (or applicant) performance in the

control room, the TSC, OSC and the EOF, as appropriate, is

required. However, consistent with Paragraph C. of Appendix I to

Inspection Manual Chapter 2500, the regions may adjust the extent

of observation in each area, as needed, to concentrate on areas

where past licensee (or applicant) performance was considered

marginal or in need of observation.

An exercise or drill is a training tool to prepare for an

emergency. It is important to remember that there are three

aspects to a successful exercise or drill. The first is the

development of a technically accurate and challenging scenario to

test the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the

licensee's (or applicant's) emergency response capabilities. The

second part is the implementation of the plans, procedures, and

equipment. The last aspect is the critique following the exercise

or drill in which the licensee (or applicant) makes a candid

self-evaluation in terms of (1) the scenario, (2) the adequacy of

the emergency equipment, facilities, and procedures, (4) the

players' responses, and (5) the effective use of evaluators and

controllers, where applicable.

It is important that interference with the players or the

controllers by observers or NRC evaluators not occur, nor should

the controllers prompt, coach, or otherwise interfere with the

performance of the players. NRC evaluators may query or seek

clarifications or information from the controllers regarding the

exercise, drill and/or the scenario.

In assessing the licensee's (or applicant's) performance,

scenario-related problems are to be noted in the inspection report.
82301 - 6 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

For exercises, these are to be discussed at the exit meeting.

Specific Guidance

03.01 The requirement for Emergency Preparedness exercises are

found in 10 CFR 50.47(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Part

IV.F.

03.02 Control Room

a. Facility Management and Control. Does the shift supervisor

coordinate and oversee control room response, redirecting the

response as necessary? Are actions performed in accordance

with applicable procedures and instructions?

b. Analysis of Plant Conditions and Corrective Actions. Are

control room operators able to correctly interpret control

room instrument displays? From these and other sources of

available information, are operators able to recognize that

events are progressing abnormally, determine plant status and

develop appropriate strategies to bring the plant to a safe

shutdown condition if necessary?

c. Detection and Classification of Emergency Events. Are

control room operators able to classify an emergency using

emergency action levels (EALs) on the basis of plant

conditions and confirm (where possible) the emergency

classification by dose calculations or monitoring? After

recognizing and classifying the emergency, do control room

operators correctly implement the immediate actions of the

emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs)?

d. Protective Action Decision Making. After classifying an

event, are control room operators able to determine

protective actions for onsite and offsite personnel without

waiting for a dose assessment? Do they recommend protective

actions on site and off site, on a timely basis, that are

consistent with those in the approved onsite emergency plan

and the EPIPs? Guidance on protective actions is provided in

NUREG-0654. To the extent that time permits, the licensee

(or applicant) should consider the following in promptly

deciding appropriate offsite protective actions: 

1. Current plant status.

2. Current dose assessment and dose projection.

3. Expected duration of release.

4. Evacuation time estimates.

5. Local sheltering efficiencies.

6. Current meteorological parameters (wind speed, wind

directions, and stability class) and projected weather

conditions.
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 7 - 82301

7. Local geography.

8. Time of day.

e. Notifications and Communications

1. Are onsite personnel promptly notified of the following:

(a) Emergency conditions.

(b) Emergency classifications

(c) Activation of the emergency organization and

facilities.

(d) Protective actions.

(e) Radioactivity release status.

(f) Any changes in these conditions.

2. Are offsite officials, including NRC, promptly notified

of the following:

(a) Emergency conditions.

(b) Emergency classifications.

(c) Activation of the emergency organization and

facility.

(d) Radioactivity release status.

(e) Potentially affected population.

(f) Projected population doses.

(g) Recommended protective actions.

(h) Any changes in these conditions.

3. A communications link is to be maintained between the

control room, the TSC, the OSC, and the NRC, if

requested. A knowledgeable staff member is to be

available to notify licensee (or applicant) personnel and

State and local authorities of an emergency and to

maintain communications within 15 minutes after the

emergency is declared. Federal authorities are to be

notified within 1 hour of emergency declaration and the

Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is to be activated

within 1 hour of event declaration for Alert and above.

f. Implementation of Onsite Protective Actions. The control

room initiates onsite protective actions until the TSC or the

EOF is activated.

1. For a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency,
82301 - 8 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

nonessential personnel are evacuated (may be simulated)

from the site to the offsite locations(s) specified in

the emergency plan. Appropriate protective measures are

initiated for those personnel remaining on site (e.g.,

accountability, protective clothing, KI).

2. For a General Emergency with imminent major releases

projected, evacuation of nonessential onsite staff should

be directed without monitoring or decontaminating them.

For General Emergencies in which major releases are not

imminent, evacuation should be initiated following

monitoring and decontamination. Is the licensee (or

applicant) able to accomplish the initial accountability

within 30 minutes of the order for the assembly of all

nonessential personnel and able to account for all

remaining personnel continuously thereafter?

Habitability of the control room and assembly areas is to

be assessed periodically by the licensee.

g. Dose Assessment. Are approved procedures for dose assessment

available and do personnel know how to use them? If a

release is anticipated or in progress, are control room

personnel able to correctly and rapidly assess and integrate

information from the reactor system's status and trends,

source-term assumptions, post-accident sampling system (PASS)

samples, and meteorological information to define the

magnitude and location of the onsite and offsite impact?

These assessments need not be as sophisticated or as accurate

as dose projections made by the TSC or the EOF but are to be

sufficiently accurate to determine onsite protective actions

and offsite protective recommendations as necessary. If a

release is under way, do personnel promptly initiate onsite

sampling and monitoring to confirm the composition of the

releases (i.e., iodine fraction), to better define the source

term and to confirm projected doses? Is dose assessment

performed in the TSC or the EOF once these facilities are

activated?

h. Evaluation of Post-Accident Sampling Results. If

appropriate, the control room may request that a post-accident containment air or primary water sample be obtained to

confirm the composition of any release (i.e., iodine

fraction). The results of the samples would be used to

redefine or confirm the condition of the reactor, the

emergency classification, the source term, and projected

doses. Post-accident sampling may be directed from the TSC

after this facility has been activated.

i. Dispatch and Coordination of Monitoring Teams. If a release

is anticipated or in progress, the Emergency Director may

deploy teams to perform environmental sampling at appropriate

locations to characterize the size, location, and intensity

of the plume. The teams could be asked to take measurements

of radiation levels, radioiodine or gross beta levels in the

air, or to collect samples of water, vegetation and milk to

determine the concentrations of radionuclides in these

samples. Onsite and offsite monitoring may be directed from
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 9 - 82301

the TSC or the EOF after these facilities have been

activated.

03.03 Technical Support Center (TSC). Are approved plant

procedures current, readily available and used in the TSC? Is the

EOF kept informed of the status of the emergency? Are proper

functions transferred to the EOF when that facility becomes

operational? Are all concerned parties notified of such a

transfer? Is the TSC equipped to perform intended functions? Are

job aids, such as status boards, accurate and kept current?

a. Staffing and Activation of the TSC. Guidance on the staffing

of the TSC can be found in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0737. The licensee's or (applicant's) staffing of the

TSC can be found in site emergency plans or implementing

procedures. Are relief personnel properly and adequately

briefed?

b. Facility Management and Control. Are congestion and noise

levels kept to a minimum? Are bound or other permanent-type

logs kept and all important data, calculations, notifications, and decisions recorded as they occur? For Alerts,

Site Area Emergencies and General Emergencies, the TSC,

through procedure, is designed to be activated and prepared

to perform the following functions within about 1 hour after

an emergency is declared:

1. Manage site activities.

2. Provide technical support to reactor operations.

3. Manage corporate emergency resources (These functions

are normally transferred to the EOF after it is

activated).

4. Manage radiological effluent and environs monitoring and

dose projections (Monitoring and dose projections are

normally transferred to the emergency operations facility

(EOF) after it is activated). 

c. Accident Assessment and Classification. The following tasks

are normally performed by the staff in the TSC:

1. Use EALs, as appropriate, to classify the emergency.

2. Initially assess and continuously reassess reactor

conditions.

3. Confirm the emergency classification or reclassify the

emergency.

4. Maintain an overview of the reactor and plant conditions

using the expertise of technical staff and the

information provided by them or from other sources. 

5. Use the results of post-accident sampling or monitoring,

as appropriate, to redefine reactor conditions and the
82301 - 10 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

emergency classification.

6. Provide this information to proper personnel (control

room, EOF, NRC, offsite authorities, corporate

management, etc.).

d. Dose Assessment. If a release is in progress, do TSC

personnel promptly initiate onsite and offsite sampling and

monitoring to confirm the composition of the release (i.e.,

iodine fraction), and to define the source term and projected

doses? If a release is anticipated or in progress, do TSC

personnel correctly assess and integrate information from the

reactor system's status and trends, radiological monitoring,

source-term assumptions, and meteorological information to

define the magnitude and location of the onsite and offsite

impact? Do TSC personnel use the results of post-accident

sampling and radiological monitoring to redefine projected

doses, as appropriate? Are approved procedures for dose

assessment available and do personnel know how to use the

procedures?

e. Protective Action Decision Making. As appropriate, do TSC

personnel use plant conditions to decide on protective

actions for onsite and offsite personnel without waiting for

a dose assessment? Do TSC personnel promptly recommend

protective actions onsite and offsite consistent with the

criteria in the approved onsite emergency plan? It is

expected that within 15 minutes of the classification of

General Emergency conditions, TSC personnel (or control room

personnel if the TSC is not staffed and functional) recommend

appropriate protective actions to offsite officials.

Guidance is provided in NUREG-0654. To the extent that time

permits, the licensee (or applicant) should use the following

parameters for determining appropriate protective actions:

1. Current plant status.

2. Current dose assessment and dose projection.

3. Expected duration of release.

4. Evacuation time estimates.

5. Local sheltering efficiencies.

6. Current meteorological conditions (wind speed, wind

direction, and stability classification) and projected

weather conditions.

7. Local geography.

8. Time of day.

f. Notifications and Communications 
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 11 - 82301

1. Are all communications systems functioning properly?

(a) Does the TSC establish and maintain a primary

communications link with the control room?

(b) Do TSC personnel communicate frequently with each

other and with other centers, especially with the

control room?

2. It is expected that the licensee promptly notifies onsite

personnel of the following:

(a) Emergency conditions.

(b) Emergency classification.

(c) Activation of the emergency organization and

facility.

(e) Protective actions.

(f) Radioactivity release status.

(g) Any changes in these conditions.

3. Are follow-up notifications of the emergency to Federal,

State, and local emergency response organizations and

recommendations for public protective actions made as

required? (This function is normally transferred to the

EOF after it is activated).

g. Implementation of Protective Actions. It is expected that

responsible TSC staff perform the following tasks:

1. Confirm that the onsite protective actions above have

been implemented.

2. Direct that all onsite personnel are accounted for.

3. Confirm that all personnel are accounted for and, if not

accounted for, begin search and rescue for missing

personnel (initial accountability is normally completed

within about 30 minutes of the declaration of the

emergency). The licensee (or applicant) is to be able to

account for onsite personnel continuously thereafter.

4. Confirm and periodically assess the habitability of the

TSC, the OSC, and assembly areas. Functions of the TSC

are to be transferred to habitable areas if necessary.

5. Confirm that offsite authorities are aware of the licensee's recommendations for protective actions.

6. Determine from the offsite authorities what, if any,

protective actions are being taken.

7. Inform management and NRC of these actions.
82301 - 12 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

h. Assistance and Support to the Control Room. Does the TSC

coordinator (the person in charge) oversee the analysis and

corrective action response? Are actions performed in

accordance with approved procedures? Performance of other

functions should not interfere with direction or

determination of corrective action. Are corrective actions

implemented in an effective and timely manner? Are potential

offsite consequences of corrective actions considered and

discussed with offsite officials? Are the resources

necessary to perform the required analyses available? Are

those performing the analyses and making decisions aware of

important trends or changes of status. Are job aids, such as

status boards, used effectively and in a manner not to

interfere with the performance of corrective actions? Do

those in charge of operations, maintenance, and radiation

protection consult frequently and as necessary with each

other and with offsite members of licensee's (or applicant's)

emergency response support organizations (e.g., consultants,

corporate personnel, and contractor personnel) about

corrective actions?

i. Evaluation of Post-Accident Sampling Results. If

appropriate, does the licensee (or applicant) request that

post-accident containment air or primary water samples be

obtained to confirm the composition of any release (i.e.,

iodine fraction) and use the results of the post-accident

sampling to redefine or confirm the condition of the reactor,

the emergency classification, the source term, and projected

doses, as appropriate?

j. Dispatch and Coordination of Environmental Monitoring Teams.

If a release is anticipated or is in progress, does the

licensee or applicant deploy an initial environmental

sampling team(s) to appropriate locations to (1) intercept

the plume, (2) direct the team(s) regarding geographical

movement (e.g., remain at predesignated locations, go to the

approximate center, begin a traverse from location to

location), (3) direct the teams regarding measurements or

samples to be taken (e.g., gross beta (B), air, water,

vegetation, milk, TLDs), and (4) use results of monitoring to

redefine the source term and projected doses, as appropriate?

03.04 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Are the correct

functions transferred to the EOF in a timely manner, when this

facility becomes operational? Are all concerned parties notified

of such a transfer? Are plant procedures used in the EOF current,

readily available and reviewed and approved as required? Is the

EOF properly equipped to perform intended functions? Are job aids,

such as status boards, accurate and kept current? For Site Area

Emergencies and General Emergencies, the EOF should be activated

and prepared to perform the following functions within about 1 hour

after an emergency is declared:

a. Staffing and Activation of the EOF. Guidance for staffing of

the EOF is specified in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 13 - 82301

and the licensee's staffing is listed in the site emergency

plans or implementing procedures. Personnel should not be

prepositioned before commencement of the exercise. Are the

personnel performing key functions knowledgeable in their

duties and responsibilities? Are relief personnel properly

and adequately briefed?

b. Facility Management and Control 

1. Are congestion and noise levels kept to minimum?

2. Are bound or other permanent-type logs kept and all

important data, calculations, notifications, and

decisions recorded chronologically?

3. At the request of personnel in the TSC, the control room,

or in other locations, are outside resources are obtained

in a timely manner and managed from the EOF (before

activation of the EOF, this function may have been

initiated at the TSC)?

4. Overall radiological effluent and environs monitoring and

dose projections are normally managed from the EOF.

(Before activation of the EOF, this function may have

been performed at the TSC.)

c. Accident Assessment and Classification. Are personnel

activating the EOF able to adequately and accurately perform

the following tasks:

1. Use EALs, as appropriate, to classify an emergency.

2. Initially assess and continuously reassess reactor

conditions.

3. Confirm the emergency classification or reclassify the

emergency.

4. Maintain an overview of the reactor and plant conditions

using the expertise of the staff and the information

provided by them or other sources.

5. Use the results of post-accident sampling or monitoring,

as appropriate, to redefine reactor conditions and the

emergency classification.

d. Offsite Dose Assessment. If a release is anticipated or is

in progress, does the licensee (or applicant) correctly

assess and integrate information from the reactor system's

status and trends, radiological monitoring, source-term

assumptions, and meteorological information to define the

magnitude and location of the offsite impact? If a release

is anticipated or in progress, does the licensee (or

applicant) deploy an initial environmental sampling team(s)

to appropriate locations to (1) intercept the plume, (2)

direct the team(s) regarding geographical movement (e.g.,
82301 - 14 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

remain at a predesignated location, go to the approximate

center, begin a traverse from location to location), and (3)

direct the team(s) regarding measurements or samples to be

taken (e.g., gross beta, air, water, vegetation, milk, TLDs?

Are the results of monitoring used to redefine the source

term and projected doses as appropriate? Is the licensee (or

applicant) able to promptly and correctly project the

direction and maximum dose within the plume EPZ and the

distance to which the EPA's PAGs are projected to be

exceeded? Does licensee (or applicant) staff, responsible

for protective action recommendations, communicate with the

reactor systems' status personnel to comprehend plant status

and trends and anticipate radiological consequences as events

progress? Does the licensee (or applicant) obtain necessary

current and forecasted meteorological information from onsite

systems and appropriate offsite sources (e.g., supplemental

systems, the National Weather Service)? Does the licensee

(or applicant) assure that assessments are updated as

tangible changes in plant status, release, or meteorological

conditions become evident, are forecasted, or are refined

from confirmatory measurements? Are current approved

procedures used for dose assessment and do personnel know how

to use them? Is a backup dose assessment system available if

the primary system fails? Is the staff trained in using the

alternate system?

e. Protective Action Decision Making. As appropriate, the

licensee (or applicant) is to assess the status of the

reactor core, reactor systems and containment to recommend

offsite protective actions without waiting for a dose

assessment. (Before activation of the EOF, this function may

have been initiated at the TSC.) Does the licensee (or

applicant) promptly recommend offsite protective actions that

are consistent with those in the approved offsite emergency

plan? Guidance on protective measures are found in Appendix

I of NUREG-0654. To the extent that time permits, the

licensee (or applicant) should consider the following in

determining what protective actions are appropriate:

1. Current reactor and plant status.

2. Prognosis of accident.

3. Expected duration of release.

4. Evacuation time estimates.

5. Local sheltering efficiencies.

6. Current and projected weather conditions.

7. Local geography.

8. Time of day.

d. Notifications and Communications 
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 15 - 82301

1. Do EOF personnel communicate frequently with each other

and with other centers (especially with corporate

headquarters and with offsite authorities)? Is a primary

communications link with the TSC established and

maintained? Do personnel in the EOF also communicate

with the NRC Site Team? Do all primary communications

systems function properly and, if they do not, are backup

systems available? Does the licensee (or applicant)

establish and maintain a communications channel to

offsite authorities, including the NRC?

2. If not already accomplished by TSC or control room

personnel, it is expected that offsite officials,

including NRC, are promptly informed of the following:

(a) Emergency conditions.

(b) Emergency classification.

(c) Radioactivity release status.

(d) Potentially affected population.

(e) Projected population doses.

(f) Recommended protective actions.

(g) Any changes in these conditions.

3. Do responsible personnel in the EOF notify Federal, State

and local emergency response organizations of the

emergency, and make recommendations for public protective

action (before activation of the EOF, this function may

have been initiated at the TSC)?

g. Implementation of Protective Actions. Does the licensee (or

applicant) confirm and periodically assess the habitability

of the EOF? If the EOF has to be evacuated, its functions

are to be transferred to alternate facilities without

disruption of offsite interaction, command and control, dose

projections, or protective action decisionmaking. Does the

licensee (or applicant) confirm that offsite authorities are

aware of the licensee's (or applicant's) recommendations for

protective actions? Does the licensee determine from the

offsite authorities what, if any, protective actions are

being taken? Is licensee (or applicant) management and the

NRC informed of these actions? Is the licensee (or

applicant) aware or informed of the status of offsite

protective actions?

h. Interaction with Offsite Officials. Are the offsite

representatives at the EOF and the site briefed upon arrival

and kept informed of changing conditions without interfering

with the onsite response? Are offsite monitoring and

sampling results coordinated with offsite officials?

03.05 Operational Support Center (OSC). Is the OSC properly
82301 - 16 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

equipped to perform intended functions? Is reliable voice

communication established with the control room, the TSC, and the

EOF? Is habitability of the OSC confirmed and periodically

assessed? If need be, are the functions of the OSC transferred to

a more habitable area? Do all primary communications systems to

the TSC, the EOF and the repair teams function properly and if they

do not, are backup systems available?

a. Staffing and Activation of the OSC. The OSC is to be quickly

staffed, activated, and fully functional. Are licensee (or

applicant) personnel assigned to the OSC identified in the

Emergency Plan and/or the implementing procedures? Guidance

on staffing is presented in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0737. Are relief personnel properly and adequately

briefed?

b. Facility Management and Control. Are operations at the OSC

supervised by licensee (or applicant) officials predesignated

in the emergency plan and procedures? Is the

manager-in-charge knowledgeable of his or her duties and

responsibilities. Are congestion and noise levels kept to a

minimum. Is the OSC staff periodically briefed on plant and

radiological conditions? Are personnel who will perform

specific tasks as requested by management, the TSC, or the

control room assigned in a timely manner and given clear

instructions? Are teams dispatched from the OSC briefed,

tracked, and debriefed upon return to the OSC? Is a

pre-implementation planning meeting involving operations,

maintenance, and health physics held to reduce exposure by

means of appropriate tool selections, routes of travel,

development of temporary procedures, etc.? (These actions

may be performed in the TSC or the control room.) Exposure

and exposure limits of personnel are to be considered in

planning activities. (These actions may be performed in the

TSC or the control room.)

c. Performance of Support Functions. Is communication with the

teams dispatched from the OSC maintained? For conditions

requiring iodine protection, do personnel promptly implement

appropriate iodine-protective measures (use appropriate

respiratory protection or take KI)? Normal plant

configuration and activity controls should be in effect

whenever practicable. Are in-plant teams fully aware of

procedural provisions for performing activities? Procedure

adherence is required unless authorization to deviate is

specifically provided. If normal use of procedures is

impracticable, or if assigned activities cannot be

accomplished using existing/available procedures, the extent

of authorized and implemented deviation from procedures is to

be clearly identified to and clearly reported by the activity

performers. Also, to the maximum practicable extent, are

deviations from prescribed system/component line-ups or

alignments documented, and identified to the responsible

control room, TSC, and EOF staffs?

03.06 Corporate Command Center (CCC). If called for in the

emergency plan or procedures, is the Corporate Command Center
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 17 - 82301

activated and prepared to perform its functions in a timely manner?

Are congestion and noise levels kept to a minimum? Is the CCC

properly equipped to perform intended functions? Are reliable

voice communications established with the site (primarily the EOF)?

a. Staffing and Activation of the CCC. Are licensee (or

applicant) officials predesignated in the emergency plan or

related procedures to manage operations? Is the senior

manager knowledgeable of his or her duties and

responsibilities and able to perform intended functions?

b. Performance of Support Functions. When called upon for

assistance, does the CCC provide timely support in such areas

as Government liaison, logistics, and finance?

03.07 Offsite Monitoring

a. Activation and Deployment of Monitoring Teams. Licensee (or

applicant) staff capable of performing offsite surveys are to

be prepared to implement their functions in a timely manner.

Are vehicles available and readily accessible to transport

the teams and capable of functioning under adverse weather

conditions? Are calibrated instrumentation and equipment

available for monitoring and for taking samples? Is instrumentation to detect radioiodine at levels as low as 10-7

uCi/cc under field conditions available? Are teams equipped

with an adequate communications system (e.g., a radio that

permits unimpeded transmission and reception of data and

instructions over the entire plume emergency planning zone

(EPZ))? Are teams adequately briefed on radiological

conditions, their mission and plant conditions before they

are dispatched? Are monitoring teams dispatched in a timely

manner? Personnel should not be prepositioned before

commencement of the exercise.

b. Surveys, Sampling and Analysis. Are team members able to

demonstrate proficient use of protective equipment such as

protective clothing and respirators? Are teams able to

quickly locate sampling and monitoring locations (for

example, predetermined sample sites)? Do team members

exhibit proficiency in collecting, bagging, and marking

samples, and in reading monitoring results in accordance with

procedures (e.g., open and closed G.M. window readings, where

appropriate)? Are teams kept informed of changing conditions

in the field? Do team members keep track of their individual

radiological exposures? Are monitoring results promptly and

correctly reported to the TSC and/or the EOF?

03.08 Corrective Action or Rescue Teams. Are team actions

initiated and performed promptly following the decision to conduct

an operation? Before entry, does the team consult and coordinate

with the control room and receive a briefing on potential hazards.

Is the team provided with adequate protective equipment such as

self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA) with sufficient stay

times, and monitoring equipment with sufficient ranges (e.g., up to

1000 R/hour)? Team exposure is to be monitored constantly and not

exceed accepted guidelines or preestablished values. Is
82301 - 18 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

communication with the team maintained by the control room, the

TSC, or the OSC? Are team personnel qualified by training or

experience to perform the job specified, in a high radiation

environment, and are they trained in the use of the appropriate

protective equipment? Are team personnel able to demonstrate

proficiency in the use of protective equipment?

03.09 Security and Accountability

a. Is access control maintained at the site in a manner not to

interfere with the response to an emergency (e.g., response

of offsite assistance is not hindered)? Are security

practices or procedures such that they do not impede movement

and access of site operating and response personnel to plant

areas during an emergency situation (e.g., computer-controlled doors to vital areas fail in the open position upon

loss of electrical power, essential personnel have keys to

locked doors or can easily obtain keys, anti-passback

features do not hinder reentry)? Any practice or procedure

to allow easy access during emergencies must be compatible

with the licensee's (or applicant's) Physical Security and

Contingency Plans developed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73

and 10 CFR 73, Appendix C. Is access control maintained at

the control room, the OSC, the TSC, and the EOF? Are security personnel monitored for exposure and appropriate

protective actions taken as appropriate?

b. Are all onsite personnel accounted for and the names of

missing individuals achieved within about 30 minutes of the

declaration of a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency?

Is a search-and-rescue operation initiated promptly for

missing people? Are all onsite personnel continuously

accounted for during the emergency response?

03.10 Emergency News Center (Joint Public Information Center)

a. Is information disseminated to the media/press by the

licensee (or applicant) accurate and timely? Are news releases properly coordinated with the NRC and other offsite

officials? Are media personnel prohibited from interfering

with the emergency response? Is corrected or supplemental

information promptly released in the event of error or

misinformation in news stories (e.g., rumor control)? Is

information given to the public by the licensee (or

applicant) prepared to the technical level that the public

can understand? Is news updated periodically whether or not

the status has changed?

b. Are adequate numbers of telephones available for press use?

Are licensee (or applicant) personnel giving the briefings

technically qualified and able to answer media questions

accurately and quickly?

03.11 Onsite Emergency Medical Services

a. Is appropriate consideration given to first aid treatment of

the victim(s) and associated radiological hazards? Are first
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 19 - 82301

aid treatment and decontamination efforts commensurate with

the extent of the injuries? To the extent possible, are

radiological control efforts onsite and during transport to

offsite medical facilities utilized?

b. Are offsite medical facilities informed, in advance of a

victim's arrival, of both medical and radiological

conditions? Is pertinent medical and radiological

information provided to offsite responders and/or medical

facility staff?

c. Does a qualified radiological control technician accompany

the injured person to the hospital? Are hospital personnel

adequately briefed by the radiological control technician on

the extent of the injury and on any contamination levels?

03.12 Post-Accident Sampling Team. When the licensee (or

applicant) analyzes the post-accident primary coolant and containment atmosphere samples, required exposure limits for the in-plant

team operations are to be maintained. The team is to be qualified

and capable to take and analyze coolant and containment atmosphere

samples under emergency conditions. The team is to be able to proficiently implement the post-accident sampling procedure, wear, or

simulate the wearing of, the appropriate protective clothing and

equipment (e.g., SCBA), and follow the appropriate radiation

protection procedures. Are appropriate tools used, and samples

properly transported? Are samples analyzed using the appropriate

precautions to prevent personnel exposure and contamination of the

lab? Are samples analyzed for noble gases, radioiodine, cesium,

nonvolatile isotopes, hydrogen, chlorides, and boron? Are the 2

results of these analyses available in the TSC within a time frame 2

consistent with the commitments in the emergency plan (This is 2

generally three hours after the samples are requested, but 2

individual licensee commitments should be verified)? 2

03.13 Critique. At the end of an exercise or drill, each facility

is to hold a critique with the controllers and players while the

details are fresh. For exercises, this preliminary critique is

followed by a formal critique that evaluates the overall

performance of the exercise and the interaction of facility

representatives and players with one another. During the critique,

do the evaluators provide an unbiased and candid evaluation of the

exercise, identifying the areas of strength as well as weakness and

areas needing improvement? Are corrective actions defined and

scheduled?

03.14 Public Meeting. The Region should conduct a public 2

meeting if: (1) the preliminary results of the inspection indicate 2

that a significant breakdown of the licensee's onsite emergency 2

preparedness program has occurred or (2) there is strong public 2

interest as demonstrated by past and present communications with 2

members of the public. The identification of three or more 2

exercise weaknesses may be indicative of a significant programmatic 2

breakdown; consideration should be given to the root cause of the 2

weaknesses and the performance record of the licensee to the EP 2

area. The public meeting should follow the formal exit meeting 2

with the licensee, complying with the ten-day notification 2
82301 - 20 - Issue Date: 12/31/96

2 requirement discussed in IMC 1100. 2

82301-04 RESOURCES

For planning purposes, the total estimated time to complete this 2 procedure is 90 hours of direct onsite inspection effort (When 2 conducting public meetings, add an additional 10 hours).

82301-05 REFERENCES

2 Memorandum to Office Directors and Regional Administrators from 2 James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, dated February 2 12, 1996, "Meetings Between NRC Staff and the Public." (NUDOCS 2 72852/356-357) 2

Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled

Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During

and Following an Accident," Revision 3, May 1983 (Microfiche

Address: 04393/323-326).

Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for

Nuclear Power 

Reactors," Revision 3, August 1992. 

NUREG-0396, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local

Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of

Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978 (Microfiche

Address: 00567/260 - 00568/40).

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and

Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and

Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980

(Microfiche Address: 01997/314 - 01998/71).

NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response

Facilities," February 1981 (Microfiche Address: 08158/270-313).

NUREG-0731, "Guidelines for Utility Management Structure and

Technical Resources," September 1980 (Microfiche Address:

06910/234-265.)

NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980. (Microfiche Address: 07003/27-284) and Supplement

1, January 1983 (Microfiche Address: 17301/342-363).

EPA-520/1-75-001-A, "Manual of Protective Actions for Nuclear

Incidents," January 1990. 

ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981, "Selection, Qualification and Training of

Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants," (Supersedes ANSI

N18.1-1971-77) (Microfiche Address: 65959/199-225.)

END
Issue Date: 12/31/96 - 21 - 82301