United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace

Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign

Relations; and the Caucus on International Narcotics

Control, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

9:30 a.m., EDT

Wednesday,

September 16, 1998

DRUG CONTROL

Observations on U.S.

Counternarcotics Activities

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller

General, National Security and International Affairs

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittee and Caucus:

I am pleased to be here today to present our observations on the

effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat the movement of drugs into the

United States. My statement discusses the (1) challenges of addressing

international counternarcotics issues and (2) obstacles to implementing

U.S. and host-nation drug control efforts. My testimony is primarily based

on our recent reports concerning U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the

Caribbean, Colombia, and Mexico.1

Summary Our work over the past 10 years indicates that there is no panacea for

resolving all of the problems associated with illegal drug trafficking.

Despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal

drugs still flood the United States. Although U.S. and host-nation

counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrest of major drug

traffickers and the seizure of large amounts of drugs, they have not

materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States. A key

reason for the lack of success of U.S. counternarcotics programs is that

international drug-trafficking organizations have become sophisticated,

multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control

efforts. As success is achieved in one area, the drug-trafficking

organizations quickly change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts.

Other significant, long-standing obstacles also impede U.S. and source and

-transit countries’2

 drug control efforts. In the drug-producing and

-transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by

corruption; limited law enforcement resources and institutional

capabilities; and internal problems such as insurgencies and civil unrest.

Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in corrupting the

countries’ institutions.

Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their

capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Among

other things, these countries have taken action to extradite criminals;

enacted legislation to control organized crime, money laundering, and

1

Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154,

June 30, 1998); Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges

(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998); Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean

and Eastern Pacific (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

2

The major source countries for cocaine are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The major source nations for

heroin in the Western Hemisphere are Colombia and Mexico. The major drug transit areas include

Mexico, the Caribbean, the eastern Pacific, and Central America.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs; and instituted reforms to

reduce corruption. While these actions represent positive steps, it is too

early to determine their impact, and challenges remain.

U.S. counternarcotics efforts have also faced obstacles that limit their

effectiveness. These include (1) organizational and operational limitations,

and (2) planning and management problems. Over the years, we have

reported on problems related to competing foreign policy priorities, poor

operational planning and coordination, and inadequate oversight over U.S.

counternarcotics assistance. We have also criticized the Office of National

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and U.S. agencies for not having good

performance measures to evaluate results. Our work has identified ways

to improve U.S. counternarcotics efforts through better planning, sharing

of intelligence, and the development of measurable performance goals.

Background Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to be a

serious health problem in the United States. According to ONDCP,

drug-related illness, death, and crime cost the nation approximately

$67 billion annually. Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent

over $19 billion on international drug control and interdiction efforts to

reduce the supply of illegal drugs. ONDCP has established goals of reducing

the availability of illicit drugs in the United States by 25 percent by 2002

and by 50 percent by 2007.

ONDCP is responsible for producing an annual National Drug Control

Strategy and coordinating its implementation with other federal agencies.

The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy includes five goals: (1) educate

and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and

tobacco; (2) increase the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially lowering

drug-related crime and violence; (3) reduce health and social costs to the

public of illegal drug use; (4) shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers

from the drug threat; and (5) break foreign and domestic drug supply

sources. The last two goals are the primary emphasis of U.S. interdiction

and international drug control efforts. These are focused on assisting the

source and transiting nations in their efforts to reduce drug cultivation and

trafficking, improve their capabilities and coordination, promote the

development of policies and laws, support research and technology, and

conduct other related initiatives. For fiscal year 1998, ONDCP estimated that

about 13 percent of the $16 billion federal drug control budget would be

devoted to interdiction and international drug control activities—in 1988,

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
these activities represented about 24 percent of the $4.7 billion federal

drug control budget.

ONDCP also has authority to review various agencies’ funding levels to

ensure they are sufficient to meet the goals of the national strategy, but it

has no direct control over how these resources are used. The Departments

of State and Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are

the principal agencies involved in implementing the international portion

of the drug control strategy. Other U.S. agencies involved in

counternarcotics activities overseas include the U.S. Agency for

International Development, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs

Service, various U.S. intelligence organizations, and other U.S. agencies.

Challenges in

Stemming the Flow of

Illegal Drugs Into the

United States

Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs

in the United States through the implementation of successive drug

control strategies. Despite some successes, cocaine, heroin, and other

illegal drugs continue to be readily available in the United States.

According to ONDCP, the cocaine source countries had the potential of

producing about 650 metric tons of cocaine in 1997. Of this amount, U.S.

officials estimate that about 430 metric tons were destined for U.S.

markets, with the remainder going to Europe and elsewhere. According to

current estimates, about 57 percent of the cocaine entering the United

States flows through Mexico and the Eastern Pacific, 33 percent flows

through the Caribbean, and the remainder is moved directly into the

United States from the source countries. According to ONDCP estimates, the

U.S. demand for cocaine is approximately 300 metric tons per year.

According to DEA, Colombia was also the source of 52 percent of all heroin

seized in the United States during 1996. The current U.S. demand for

heroin is estimated to be approximately 10 metric tons per year.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
Drug-Trafficking

Organizations Have

Substantial

Resources,

Capabilities, and

Operational Flexibility

A primary challenge that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics

efforts face is the power, influence, adaptability, and capabilities of

drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their enormous financial

resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics personnel, and operational

flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations are a formidable threat. Despite

some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign government law

enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal drugs,

drug-trafficking organizations have found ways to continue to meet the

demand of U.S. drug consumers.

According to U.S. law enforcement agencies, drug-traffickers’

organizations use their vast wealth to acquire and make use of expensive

modern technology such as global positioning systems, cellular

communications equipment and communications encryption devices.

Through this technology, they can communicate and coordinate

transportation as well as monitor and report on the activities of

government organizations involved in counterdrug efforts. In some

countries, the complexity and sophistication of drug traffickers’ equipment

exceed the capabilities of the foreign governments trying to stop them.

When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking

organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes of

operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of their

illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have proven

successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland

transportation routes.3

 According to recent U.S. government reports, even

after the capture or killing of several drug cartel leaders in Colombia and

Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon filled the void and adjusted

their areas of operations. For example, we reported in February 1998 that,

although the Colombian government had disrupted the activities of two

major drug-trafficking organizations, the disruption had not reduced

drug-trafficking activities, and a new generation of relatively young

traffickers was emerging.4

3

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10,

1993).

4

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
Obstacles in Foreign

Countries Impede

Counternarcotics

Efforts

The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source

of drug production and drug transiting points to reduce the amount of

coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make the drug seizures,

arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the production and movement

of illegal drugs. While the United States can provide assistance and

support for drug control efforts in these countries, the success of those

efforts depends on the countries’ willingness and ability to combat the

drug trade within their borders. Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have

taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of drugs into the

United States.

Drug source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles that

limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These obstacles, many

of which are interrelated, include corruption; limited law enforcement

resources and institutional capabilities; and insurgencies and internal

unrest.

Corruption Permeates

Institutions in Countries

Involved in Drug

Production and Movement

Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem affecting U.S. and

foreign governments’ efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Over the

years, U.S. officials have identified widespread corruption problems in

Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and the countries of Central America and

the Caribbean—among the countries most significantly involved in the

cultivation, production, and transit of illicit narcotics.

Our more recent reports have discussed corruption problems in the

Caribbean, Colombia and Mexico.5

 For example, in October 1997, we

reported that the State Department had identified narcotics-related

corruption in various transit zone countries in the Caribbean, including

Antigua, Aruba, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 

St. Kitts, St. Vincent, and others.6

 We also reported that once the influence

of drug trafficking becomes entrenched, corruption inevitably follows and

democratic governments may be placed in jeopardy. In March 1998, the

State Department reported that narcotics-related corruption problems

continue in many Caribbean countries.

5

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, 

June 27, 1995); Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996);

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997); Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998; and

Drug Control GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).

6

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
In June 1998, we reported that persistent corruption within Mexico

continued to undermine both police and law enforcement operations.7

Charged with corruption, many law enforcement officers had been

arrested and dismissed. One of the most noteworthy arrests involved

General José Gutierrez Rebollo—former head of the Mexican equivalent of

DEA. In February 1997, he was charged with drug trafficking, organized

crime and bribery, illicit enrichment, and association with one of the

leading drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico.

Despite attempts by Mexico’s Attorney General to combat corruption, it

continues to impede counternarcotics efforts. For example, in

February 1998, the U.S. embassy in Mexico City reported that three

Mexican law enforcement officials who had successfully passed screening

procedures were arrested for stealing seized cocaine—illustrating that

corruption continues despite measures designed to root it out.

Inadequate Resources and

Institutional Capabilities

Limit Arrests and

Convictions of Drug

Traffickers

Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative

tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the

source and transiting countries. Although the United States can provide

assistance, these countries must seize the illegal drugs and arrest,

prosecute, and extradite the traffickers, when possible, in order to stop

the production and movement of drugs internationally. However, as we

have reported on several occasions, these countries lack the resources and

capabilities necessary to stop drug-trafficking activities within their

borders.

In 1994, we reported that Central American countries did not have the

resources or institutional capability to combat drug trafficking and

depended heavily on U.S. counternarcotics assistance.8

 Two years later,

we said that equipment shortcomings and inadequately trained personnel

limited the government of Mexico’s ability to detect and interdict drugs

and drug traffickers.9

 These problems still exist. For example, we reported

in June 1998 that the Bilateral Border Task Forces, which were established

to investigate and dismantle the most significant drug-trafficking

organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border, face operational and support

problems, including inadequate Mexican government funding for

7

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).

8

Drug Control: U.S. Counterdrug Activities in Central America (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-251, Aug. 2, 1994).

9

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
equipment, fuel, and salary supplements for personnel assigned to the

units.10

Countries in the Caribbean also have limited drug interdiction capabilities.

For example, we reported in October 1997 that many Caribbean countries

continue to be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities and

have insufficient resources for conducting law enforcement activities in

their coastal waters.11 We reported that St. Martin had the most assets for

antidrug activities, with three cutters, eight patrol boats, and two

fixed-wing aircraft, whereas other Caribbean countries had much less.

Insurgency and Civil

Unrest Limit

Counternarcotics Efforts

Over the years, our reports have indicated that internal strife in Peru and

Colombia have limited counternarcotics efforts in these countries. In 1991,

we reported that counternarcotics efforts in Peru were significantly

hampered because of the threat posed by two insurgent groups.12

Currently, Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts are also hindered by

insurgent and paramilitary activities. In 1998, we reported that several

guerrilla groups made it difficult to conduct effective antidrug operations

in many areas of Colombia.13 Since our report, the situation has worsened.

For example, during this past summer the insurgents overran a major

police base that was used as a staging area for aerial eradication efforts.

Efforts to Improve

Counternarcotics

Capabilities

Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their

capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. For

example, in June 1998, we reported that Mexico had taken efforts to

(1) increase the eradication and seizure of illegal drugs, (2) enhance

counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, (3) initiate efforts to

extradite Mexican criminals to the United States, (4) pass new laws on

organized crime, money laundering, and chemical control, (5) institute

reforms in law enforcement agencies, and (6) expand the role of the

military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption.14 Many of

these initiatives are new, and some have not been fully implemented.

10Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).

11Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

12The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991).

13Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

14Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
Colombia has also made progress in making efforts to improve its

counternarcotics capabilities. In February 1998, we reported that

Colombia had passed various laws to assist counternarcotics activities,

including money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, reinstated

extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States in November 1997,

and signed a maritime agreement.15

Obstacles Inhibit

Success in Fulfilling

U.S. Counternarcotics

Efforts

Our work over the past 10 years has identified obstacles to implementing

U.S. counternarcotics efforts, including (1) organizational and operational

limitations, and (2) planning and management problems. Over the years,

we have criticized ONDCP and U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

activities for not having good performance measures to help evaluate

program results. Efforts to develop such measures are currently

underway.

Organizational and

Operational Limitations

The United States faces several organizational and operational challenges

that limit its ability to implement effective antidrug efforts. Many of these

challenges are long-standing. Several of our reports have identified

problems involving competing priorities, interagency rivalries, lack of

operational coordination, inadequate staffing of joint interagency task

forces, lack of oversight, and lack of knowledge about past

counternarcotics operations and activities.

For example, our 1995 work in Colombia indicated that there was

confusion among U.S. embassy officials about the role of the offices

involved in intelligence analysis and related operational plans for

interdiction.16 In 1996 and 1997, we reported that several agencies,

including the U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, had not provided personnel, as they had agreed, to the Joint

Interagency Task Force in Key West because of budgetary constraints.17

In October 1997, we reported that according to U.S. officials, the small

amount of aircraft and maritime assets hindered U.S. interdiction efforts in

the Eastern Pacific and that their ability to interdict commercial and

15Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

16Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

17Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997) and Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the

Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
noncommercial fishing vessels was limited.18 We also reported in 1993 and

1997 that reduced radar capability was limiting operational successes in

this region.19

We also reported on instances where lessons learned from past

counternarcotics efforts were not known to current planners and

operators, both internally in an agency and within the U.S. antidrug

community.20 For example, in the early 1990’s the United States initiated

an operation to support Colombia and Peru in their efforts to curtail the

air movement of coca products between the two countries. However, U.S.

Southern Command personnel stated in 1996 that while they were

generally aware of the previous operation, they were neither aware of the

problems that had been encountered nor of the solutions developed in the

early 1990s. U.S. Southern Command officials attributed this problem to

the continual turnover of personnel and the requirement to destroy most

classified documents and reports after 5 years. These officials stated that

an after-action reporting system for counternarcotics activities is now in

place at the U.S. Southern Command.

We have also reported that a key component of the U.S. operational

strategy is having reliable and adequate intelligence to help plan

interdiction operations. Having timely intelligence on trafficking activities

is important because traffickers frequently change their operational

patterns and increasingly use more sophisticated communications, making

it more difficult to detect their modes of operations.21 ONDCP is in the

process of reviewing U.S. counternarcotics intelligence efforts.

Planning and Management

Limitations

Over the years, our reviews of U.S. counternarcotics efforts have indicated

planning and management limitations to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Our

recent reports on Colombia and Mexico have shown that the delivery of

U.S. counternarcotics assistance was poorly planned and coordinated.

In February 1998, we reported that the State Department did not take

adequate steps to ensure that equipment included in a 1996 $40-million

Department of Defense assistance package could be integrated into the

18Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

19Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993) and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15,

1997).

20Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27,

1997).

21Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
U.S. embassy’s plans and strategies to support the Colombian police and

military forces.22 As a result, the assistance package contained items that

had limited immediate usefulness to the Colombian police and military

and will require substantial additional funding before the equipment can

become operational.

We reported a similar situation in Mexico. In June 1998, we noted that key

elements of the Defense Department’s counternarcotics assistance

package were of limited usefulness or could have been better planned and

coordinated by U.S. and Mexican officials.23 For example, we reported that

the Mexican military was not using the four C-26 aircraft provided by the

United States because there was no clearly identified requirement for the

aircraft and the Mexican military lacked the funds needed to operate and

maintain the aircraft. In addition, inadequate coordination between the

U.S. Navy and other Defense Department agencies resulted in the transfer

of two Knox-class frigates to the Mexican Navy that were not properly

outfitted and are currently inoperable. Further, Mexican Navy personnel

were trained in the frigates’ operation, but these personnel may not be

fully utilized until the two frigates are activated.

Our work has also shown that, in some cases, the United States did not

adequately control the use of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and was

unable to ensure that it was used as intended. Despite legislative

requirements mandating controls over U.S.-provided assistance, we found

instances of inadequate oversight of counternarcotics funds. For example,

between 1991 and 1994, we issued four reports in which we concluded that

U.S. officials lacked sufficient oversight of aid to ensure that it was being

used effectively and as intended in Peru and Colombia.24 We also reported

that the government of Mexico had misused U.S.-provided

counternarcotics helicopters to transport Mexican military personnel

during the 1994 uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas.25

Our recent work in Mexico indicated that oversight and accountability of

counternarcotics assistance continues to be a problem. We found that

22Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

23Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).

24The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain

(GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993); The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in

Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991);

and Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30,

1991).

25Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
embassy records on UH-1H helicopter usage for the civilian law

enforcement agencies were incomplete. Additionally, we found that the

U.S. military’s ability to provide adequate oversight is limited by the

end-use monitoring agreement signed by the governments of the United

States and Mexico.

Importance of Measuring

Performance

We have been reporting since 1988 that judging U.S. agencies’

performance in reducing the supply of and interdicting illegal drugs is

difficult because the agencies have not established meaningful measures

to evaluate their contribution to achieving the goals contained in the

National Drug Control Strategy.

In February 1998, ONDCP issued its annual National Drug Control Strategy,

establishing a 10-year goal of reducing illicit drug availability and use by

50 percent by 2007. In March 1998, ONDCP established specific performance

effectiveness measures to evaluate progress in meeting the strategy’s goals

and objectives. While we have not reviewed the performance measures in

detail, we believe they represent a positive step to help gauge the progress

in attaining the goals and objectives.

Ways to Improve the

Effectiveness of U.S.

Counternarcotics

Efforts

We recognize that there is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the

obstacles posed by drug-trafficking activities. International drug control

efforts aimed at stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related

activities in the source and transit countries are only one element of an

overall national drug control strategy. Alone, these efforts will not likely

solve the U.S. drug problem. Overcoming many of the long-standing

obstacles to reducing the supply of illegal drugs requires a long-term

commitment. Over the years, we have recommended ways in which the

United States could improve the effectiveness of the planning and

implementation of its current counternarcotics efforts. These

recommendations include (1) developing measurable goals, (2) making

better use of intelligence and technologies and increasing intelligence

efforts, (3) developing a centralized system for recording and

disseminating lessons learned by various agencies while conducting law

enforcement operations, and (4) better planning of counternarcotics

assistance.

Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to

respond to any questions.

(711381) Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249 Drug Conrol
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