## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

People v . Rin ehart, 2012 IL 111719

Caption in S upreme Court: THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Appellant, v. THOMAS S. RI NEHART, Appe llee.

Docke t No. 111719

Filed J anuar y 20, 2012

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The 2005 statutory amendment stating that, for the offe nse of crimi n al sexual assault, “the term of mandatory supervi s ed rele ase shall rang e from a minimum of 3 y ear s to a maxi mum of the natura l lif e of the defe ndant” is properly

construed to provide for an indeterminate parole
term which is under the control of the Depa rtment of Correc tio n s and which a se ntencingcourt ne ed not spec ify in its j udg ment.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Four th Di s t ri ct; hear d in that
court on appea l from the Circuit Court of C o l es C o u nty , the Hon. Gar y W. J acobs, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med in part a

nd vacated in part.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and C. Steve Fe rguson, State’s Attorney
, of Charleston (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Ge n era l, and Michae l M. Gli ck an d Kather ine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral, of Chicag o, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman and Luke McNe ill, of the Offic e of the State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor, of Springf ield, of counse l), for the People.

Kar en Munoz, Deputy Def ender
, and Colleen M. Morg an, Assistant Appell at e Defender
, of the Offic e of the State Appellate Def ender
, of Springf ield, for a ppellee.

J ustices J USTI CE THEI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Ch ie f Ju s ti c e Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Thomas, Gar

man , K a r me ie r , and B urke c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In 2007, defe ndant T h o m as R i n eh ar t was convicted of criminal sexual assault and

s en t en ced to 28 y ear s’ imprisonment. The defe ndant appea led, and the appellate co u rt aff irmed his conviction and sentenc e, but rema nded with instructions for the circ uit court of Coles County to selec t a term of mandatory supervised rele ase (MSR) within the range of three y ear s to natura l life contained in section 5-8-1( d)(4) of the Unified Code of Correc tions (730 I L CS 5/ 5-8-1( d)(4) (West 2006)). 406 I ll. App. 3d 272. The State appe aled. ¶ 2 The centr al issue befo re u s , t h en , i s whether the appellate court err ed in holding that section 5-8-1( d)(4) require s the trial court to set a deter minate MSR term within the statutory rang e. In his reque st for cross-r elief, the defe ndant raises the issue of whether the trial court

err ed in allowing the State to pose various questions during voir d i r e

. We aff irm the defe ndant’s convic tion and sentenc e, and va cate the appe llate cour t’s order on MSR.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 In 2006, th e d ef en dant lived with his g irlfriend, Hope Scott, and her children, one of

wh ic h w a s A

. A

. , a th e n

- 1 7

- ye a r

- o ld g irl with developmenta l disabiliti es. Sometime in August of that y ear , the defe ndant borrowe d Scott’s minivan to help her friends move to Mattoon from Charleston, I llinois

. A.A. rode alone with the defe ndant on one trip. S everal wee ks later, she told Scott’s friends’ daughters that the defe ndant had forc ed her to have sex in the back of the minivan on the day they moved. Subsequently
, the police arr ested the defe ndant, and cha rg ed him with criminal sexual assault. ¶ 5 The case proce eded to a j u ry t ri al

. During jury selec tion, the parties wer e permitted to

-2-question venire me mbers pursua nt to Supre me Court Rule 431 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 431 (ef f. May 1, 2007)). The State asked 5 of the 25 po t en t i al j u ro rs who wer e questioned why a sexual assault victim might delay in reportingan incident. The exchang es betwe en the pr osecutor and the juror s were short.

“MS. KI GER [Assi stant State’s Attorney]: Can you think of some rea sons why a sexual assault victim might not immediately repor t an incident?
MR. W HI TE [P rospec tive J uror]: W hy they would not report a

n incident?
MS. KI GER: Right awa

y

. MR. W HI TE: The victim?
MS. KI GER: Correc t. MR. WHI TE: Well, they probably may say it r eally didn’t happen, and then the falling out with the pare nts. May b e t h er e wa s a relationship, you know, ag e differ enc e re lationship. Then the pare nts found out about i t, convince d, you know. Children are children.
MS. KI GER: Can you think of a rea son why a victim who had had some things happen to them mig ht not imm ediately g o to an adult or re port it?
MR. W HI TE: Scare d.
* * *
MS. KI GER: Can you think of some rea sons why a victim of sexual assault might not immediately

repor t it to s omeone?
MS. FUL L ER [ Prospective Juror]: Fear , shame.
* * *
MS. KI GER: Can you think of a rea son why a victim mi gh t d el ay i n repor ting beingrape d or beinga victim of sexual assault? MS. HANFT [Prospective Juror]: S hame, e mbarra ssment, fea r. * * *
MS. KI GER: Ca

n you think of some rea sons why a sexual a ssault vic tim mig ht not automatically

come f orwa rd?
MR. RAL STON [P rospec tive J uror] : Oh, I think may be fea r, and think you would be a le sser pe rson if somethinglike that happene d to y ou. * * *
MS. KI GER: Ca

n you think of some rea sons why a sexual a ssault vic tim mig ht not immediately

repor t that? MR. AYERS [ Prospective Juror]: Yeah.
MS. KI GER: Can you tell me what some of those rea sons would be?
MR. AYERS: S ame, f

ear and sca red to c ome forw ard.” Def ense coun sel did not object to any of these questions. The State and the defe nse eac h excused one of these jurors, so only three of those five venire members ultimately serve d on the jury

.

-3-¶ 6 At trial, A.A. testified for the State, and rec ounted the details of the attack. Acc ordingto

A.A., while she and the defe ndant wer e betwee n towns, he pulled the minivan off a familiar state hig hway

and onto an unf

amiliar rur al side road. He stopped the van and turned off its
eng ine. A.A. could see tree s and a fe nce, a nd a distant house. She stated that the defe ndant order ed her to g et into the back of the van, wher e the rea r seats had been remove d, and take off her clothes. She was scar ed and complied. She further stated that the defe ndant joined her there and took off his clothes, then forc ed her to have sex. After war ds, they g ot dresse d, and he ins tructed her not to tell anyone before resuming the t rip to Charleston. A.A. identified the def endant a s the man who attacked he r. ¶ 7 Detec tive J ames Hite of the Coles County sheriff ’s depar tment also testified for the State. He stated that he rece ived a call on August 27, 2006, to investigate a sexual assault by the defe ndant ag ainst A.A. Dete ct ive Hite contac ted the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s, who arrang ed an interview betwee n a child advoca cy cente r st aff er an d A. A. He watche d the interview and observe d A.A.’s demea nor. Detec tive Hite also took photogr aphs of the site of the attack, which wer e submitted into evidence by the State. ¶ 8 The de fenda

nt presente d no evidenc e on his behalf . The jury found him guilty , and the trial court sentenc ed him to 28 y ear s’ imprisonment, but not to a specific MSR term. Instead, the cour t stated:
“I further order that the defe ndant will serve a period of [MS R] afte r serving his
sentenc e as ma

ndated by statute. Counsel, [i t is] a littl e bit unclea r to me what that period would be. There ’s been

some rec ent l eg islation that would sug ges t t o m e t hat t he applicable ti me upon the defe ndant for this offe nse is not less than three and could be up to natura l life, as the statute indicates, r eg ardingthe mandator y supervised rele ase period. I don’t think I have to make that as part of my finding

. It’s what the Depa rtment of Correc tions will impose upon him, but t here is a minimum three -year mandatory

supervised r elea se period. As I

understand the statute, it could be beyond that period.” The wri t t en sentenc ing judgme nt also did not mention MSR. There afte r, the I llinois Depa rtment of Correc tions calc ulated the defe ndant’s sentenc e to include an indeterminate MSR t erm of thr ee year s to natural life. The defe ndant appe aled. ¶ 9 T h e ap p ell ate court aff irmed the defe ndant’s conviction, vacated his MSR term, an d

rema nded with direc tions t o s et an MSR term within the statutory rang e. 406 I ll. App. 3d 272. The appellate court first addre ssed the defe ndant’s arg ument that the State’s questions fo r prospec tive jurors asked them to prejudg e A.A.’s cre dibilit y and predisposed them t o believe her testimony
, thus d en y i n g h i m a fair trial. The appellate court noted that the defe ndant had forf

eited review of that issue, but considere d whether i t wa s p l ain error. Id.
at 276. The court conclude d that allowing the questions was, indeed, err or. Acc ording to the appellate court, “[The questions wer e] desig ned to expose whether a juror would automatically
perc eive a delay in re p o rt i n g to mean the victim was lying about the incident. A
neg ative response to the State’s question could have indicated potential bias ag ainst the vera city of the victim’s testimony

. Whil e questions desig ned to discover bias are

-4-proper , these questions to prospec tive jurors asked juror s to speculate a s to r easons why a victim might not come forwa rd. Whil e the subject could be raised in voir dire throug h artful questions, the questions asked by the prosec utor crosse d the boundary of ac cepta

ble voir dire .” Id. ¶ 10 The appellate court, howeve r, ref used to excuse the defe ndant’s proce dural defa ult. F irst, the court held that the evidenc e in this case was not c losely balanc ed. Id. at 277. The State, thro u gh A.A.’s testimony
, prese nted evidenc e of the attack and its location, while the defe ndant prese nted no evidenc e. Id. Second, the court held that the err or did not aff ect the fairne ss of the trial. Id. The a ppellate c ourt stated: “[W ]hi le the voir dire question s cr o ssed the line of propriety
, they did not indoctrinate t h e jury and deny defe ndant a fair trial. The State’s questions, though imp ro per, were not perva sive. In addition, the j urors, during the same questioning,

rec og nized defe ndant’s innocenc e until p ro v ed guilty and asser ted they would be impartial. During trial, the jurors hear d the victim testify she was afr aid to tell her mother, who was defe ndant’s live-in para mour, beca

use she fea

red her mother would
not believe her and would punish her. The jurors did not have to rely on speculation for de terminingthe re ason for A.A.’s de lay

in reportingthe offe nse.” Id. The a ppellate c ourt furthe r held that the defe ndant did not rec eive inef fec tive assistance of

counse l beca

use he could not show prejudice from his attorney ’s failure to object to the State’s questions. Id. at 278. ¶ 11 The appellate court then addre ssed the defe ndant’s argument that the trial court err ed in
not sentenc ing him to an MSR term within the statutory rang e. The appellate court conclude d that the Unified Code of Correc tions contains a deter minate sentenc e st ru cture, and an indeterminate MSR term is inconsistent with that structure

. Id. at 280-81. Additionally
, the
court noted that the Code grants the trial court, not the Prisoner Review Boa rd, the power to impose an MSR term. Id. at 2 8 1. Acc ording to the appellate court, “B eca use section 5-8- 1(d)( 4) contains an MSR term rang e for criminal sexual assault, the court also possesses the duty to exercise i t s d i s cr etion and impose MSR within that rang e. The trial court, and not DOC, is in the best position to assess and weigh the fac tors rele vant t o deter mine whether

a defe ndant should serve three y ear s’ MSR, natura l life, or a term i n b et we en .” Id. The appellate court acknow ledg ed that People v. Schneide r , 403 I ll. App. 3d 301 (2010), rea ched the opposite result, but dec lined to follow that case

. Id. at 281-82. ¶ 12 This c ourt g rante d the State’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (ef f. F eb. 26, 2010). In his response brief, the defe ndant reque sted cross-r elief, contending that the trial
court e rre d in allowing the State’s voir dire questions.

¶ 13 ANALYSI S ¶ 14 I f the defe ndant succe eds on the issue raised in his reque st for cross-r elief, he would be entitled to a new trial. Thus, we will addre ss that issue first. Be cause defe nse counsel did not object to the State’s que stions, our discussion begins with plain er ror. ¶ 15 The plain-er

ror doctrine offe rs criminal defe ndants a narr ow path to appellate revie w of
proce durally forf

eited trial err ors. People v. W alker
, 232 I ll. 2d 113, 124 (2009). As a matter

-5-of convention, a prer equisite–or as we have previously termed it, an initial or first step (see

People v. Hudson
, 228 I ll. 2d 181
, 1 9 1 (2008); People v. Kitch
, 239 I ll. 2d 452, 462 (2011)) –toward applying that doctrine is the exis tence of an err or. People v. Sargent
, 239 I ll. 2d 166, 189 (2010). Thus, we must deter mine whether the t rial cour t erre d in allowing the State to ask cer

tain venire members about their views on sexual assault alleg ations in which there was a

delay betwee n an incident a

nd the re portingof it. ¶ 16 The constitutional rig ht to a jury trial encompa sses the rig ht to an impartial jury

. See Irvin

v. Dowd
, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961). The trial court is primarily responsible for initiating and conducting voir dire (

People v. Strain
, 194 I ll. 2d 467, 476 (2000)), though i t must permit the parties to supplement its examination “by such direc t inquiry as the court deems proper ,” pursuant to Rule 431 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 431 (ef f. May 1, 2007)). Be cause there is no prec ise test for deter mining which questions will filter out partial jurors (see People v. W ashington
, 104 I ll. App. 3d 386, 390 (1982))
, the manner and scope of the examination rests wi t h i n the di s cr et i o n o f the trial court, and we revie w such decisions for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occur s when the conduct of the trial court thwarts the purpose of voir dire examination–namely
, the selec tion of a jury fre e from bias or prejudice

. People v. W illiams
, 164 I ll. 2d 1, 16 (1994); People v . Clouti er , 156 I ll. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993) (“ [t ]he purpose of voir dire is to asce rtain sufficie nt information about prospec t i v e j u rors’ beliefs and opinions so as to allow remova l of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot ap ply the l aw as instructed in acc ordanc e with their oath”) ; see also People v. Clark
, 278 I ll. App. 3d 996, 1003 (1 9 9 6 ) (“ T h e purpose of voir dire is to enable the trial court to selec t an impartial jury and to ensure that the attorney s have

an informed and intelligent basis on wh i ch to exercise pere mptory challeng es.”)

. Stated differ ently
, a trial court does not abuse its discretion during voir dire if the questions cre ate “a rea sonable assura

nce that any prejudice or bias would be discovere d.” People v. Dow
, 240 I ll. App. 3d 392, 397 (1992). ¶ 17 Acc ording ly
, voir dire questions, whether asked by the trial court or by the parties with the sanction of the court, must not be “a means of indoctrinating a jury
, or impaneling a jury with a par ticular pre dispositi on.” People v . Bowel , 111 I ll. 2d 58, 64 (1986). Rather t han a brig ht-line rule, this is a continuum. Br oad questions are g ener ally permissible. For example, the State may ask potential jurors whether they would be disinclined to convict a defe ndant based on circ umstantial evidenc e. S ee People v. Freem an , 60 I ll. App. 3d 794, 799-800 (1978). Specific questions tailored to the fac ts of the case and i ntended to serve as “pre liminary final argument” ( People v. Mapp
, 283 I ll. App. 3d 979, 989-90 (1996)) are g ener ally impermissible. But see People v. Faulkner
, 186 I ll. App. 3d 1013 (1989) (holding that the State may inquire whet h er v enire members have deep- seate d beliefs that preve nt them from returning a guilty verdic t in a murder case wher e the State cannot produce direc t evidenc e of the victim’s body). ¶ 18 T h e d ef

en d an t argue s, trac king the appellate court’s analy sis below, that the State’s questions did not seek to uncover bias but, rather
, soug ht to pree ducate potential jurors on

an aspec t of A.A.’s expected testimony
, and there by bolster her cre dibilit y

. Acc ording to the defe ndant, the State encoura g ed potential jurors t o imag ine why A.A. would not have told

an y o n e about the incident when it happene d, and thus empathize with her. The defe ndant

-6-direc ts our attention to People v . Bell , 152 I ll. App. 3d 1007 (1987), a nd People v . Boston
, 383 I ll. App. 3d 352 (2008). ¶ 19 In Bell
, the defe ndant was char g ed with the murders of his pare nts. During voir dire
, the State asked a majority of the potential jurors whether they believed that people have a natura l impulse to confess their wrong doings, a nd whether

they believed that a person c ould car ry out a pl an to murder a family member as a solution to problems in that relationship. The defe ndant did not object to these questions. He was convicted. On appea l, the appellate court chose to addre ss the issue on the merits, and held that the questions wer e improper “bec ause they serve d primarily to indoctrinate the jurors as to the State’s theory at trial and asked them to prejudg e the f

acts of the case .” Bell , 152 I ll. App. 3d at 1017. ¶ 20 In Boston
, the defe ndant was char g ed with criminal sexua l as s au l t o f h i s gi rl friend. Du ri n g vo i r dire
, the State asked all of the potential jurors whether they believed that t h e g overnme nt should not be come involved in dome stic incidents; whether they believed that

a woman who obtains an order of protec tion ag ainst a man, and then invites that man to her home, has g iven implied consent to a subsequent sex act with the man, and has made herse lf responsible for any subsequent violence with the man; and wh et h er t h ey believed that a

woman consents to a sex act if she does not scre am or fig ht while she is being assaulted. The defe ndant did not object to these questions. He was convicted. On appea l, the appellate court did not discuss forf

eiture, and simply noted that the evidenc e was closely balanc ed. Boston
, 383 I ll. App. 3d at 356. The court held that the questions we re i m p ro p er beca use they “hig hlighted fac tual details about the case an d asked prospec tive jurors to prejudg e those fac ts,” and conce rned matters of law or instruction, which are not appropriate are as of inquiry under Rule 431( a). Id. at 355. ¶ 21 The questions in this c ase differ from those in Bell and Boston

. Unlike the questions in those case s, the questions here wer e less fac t-driven, and more focuse d on potential jurors’
prec onceptions about sexual assault case s, in an eff ort to uncover any bias reg arding delayed
repor ting and the cre dibilit y of a victim who informed no one about the alleg ed attack when it happened. An answe r which indicated a juror was less likely to be lieve a victim who did
not immediately repor

t an in cident would have g iven the State g rounds to exercise intelligently its pere mptory challeng es. The questions wer e brief, and t h e S tate did not elabor ate on the subject, but instead acc epted the answe rs it rec eived and fac tored them into the decision on which jurors to excuse. Fur ther, unlike the State in Bell and Boston
, the State here did not ask every

potential juror about this subject, and instea d posed a que stion on it
to only five potential jurors, one-f ift h o f t h e v enire

. Although we agree with the appellate
court t h at t h e s ub

ject could have been raised more artfully (406 I ll. App. 3d at 276), and perha ps phrase d in terms of a venire member’ s bias and ab i l i t y t o put any bias aside in

rea ching a verdic t, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Be cause there was

no err or, the de fenda

nt’s proce dural de fault must stand. Kitch , 239 I ll. 2d at 465. ¶ 22 A d d it io n a lly , b e c a use there was no err or, the defe ndant’s ineffe ctive assista n c e o f c o u n s e l contention must fail. Def

ense counsel’s failure to object to voir dire questions which the trial
court did not abuse i t s d i s cr etion in allowing was not objectively unrea sonable. People v. Manning , 241 I ll. 2d 319, 326 (2011).

-7-¶ 23 We turn to the i ssue raised by the S t at e in its appea l, whether the appellate court erre d

in holding that section 5-8-1( d)(4) of the Unified Code of Correc tions require s the trial court to set a deter

minate MSR term within the statutory rang e. Resolution of this issue is a matter of statutory construction, and our revie w proce eds de novo

. P eo ple v. Cordell
, 223 I ll. 2d 380, 389 (2006). ¶ 24 T h e p rimary objective of statutory interpre tation is to asce rt ai n t h e i n t en t o f t h e leg islature. Brucke r v. Merc ola
, 227 I ll. 2d 502, 513 (2007). The plain languag e of the statute is the best indication of that intent, and if that languag e is clea r and unambiguous, it must be
g iven ef fec t. People v . Christ opherson , 231 I ll. 2d 449, 454-55 (2008). ¶ 25 Section 5-8-1( d) of the Unified Code of Correc tions require s that “eve ry sentenc e shall include as though written there in a term [of MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment.” 730 I L CS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2006). Se ct i o n 5 -8 -1(d)(4) provides that the MSR term for

cer tain sex offe nses, including cr i m i n al sexual assault, “shall rang e from a minimum of 3
y ear s to a maxi mum of the natura l life of the defe ndant.” 730 I L CS 5-8-1( d)(4) (West 2006). That section does not indicate whether the trial court should choose a term within that rang e,

o r whether the term is the rang e itself. The statute may be rea d either way , and i t s p l ai n languag e does not indicate the leg islature’s intent. ¶ 26 I f a statute’s languag e is unclea r or ambiguous, if it is suscept i b l e o f m o re than one

rea sonabl e re ad ing, we must resor t to other source s to aid our inquiry

. See People ex rel. Departme nt of

Professional Regulation v. Manos
, 202 I ll. 2d 563, 571 (2002). Such source s include the maxi m of in pari materia
, under which two statutes, or two parts of one statute,

conce rning the same subject must be considere d toge ther in order to produce a “har monious whole.” Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.
, 1 4 7 I ll. 2d 548, 555 (1992). Words and phrase s should be construed, not in isolation, but in light of other rele vant provisions. People v. Be achem , 229 I ll. 2d 237, 243 (2008). “[W] e conside r the statute in it s entirety , keeping in mind the subject it add resses and the leg islature’s appar ent objective in enac ting it.” People v. Cardamone
, 232 I ll. 2d 504, 512 (2009); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d 264, 280 (2003) ( “in deter mining the intent of t he Genera l Assembly
, we may proper ly consider not only the languag e of the statute, but also the purpose and nece ssity for the law, the evils soug ht to be reme died, and g oals to be ac hieved” ). ¶ 27 Section 5-8-1( d)(4) was part of Public Act 94-165 (ef f. J uly 11, 2005), which ame nded various sections of t he C ode, including sec tion 3-3-2, and added section 3-14-2.5. Section 3-3-2( a)( 3.5) provides that the Prisoner Review Boa rd shall “hea

r *** and *** decide [ ] the conditions of mandatory s up ervised rele ase and the time of discharg e from mandatory supervised rele ase, *** impose sanctions for violations of mandatory supervised rele ase and revoke mandatory supervised rele ase for those serving extended supervised rele as e terms pursuant to para g raph (4 ) o f s ubsection (d) of Section 5-8-1.” 730 I L CS 5/3-3-2(a)(3.5) (West 2006). ¶ 28 Section 3-14-2.5, titled “Extended super vision of sex offe nders,” provides: “(a ) The Depa

rtment shall reta in custody o f al l s ex offe nders place d on mandatory supervised rele ase pursuant to clause (d)( 4) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code and shall supervise such persons during their term of supervised rele as e i n ac cord

-8-with the conditions set by the Prisoner Review Boa rd pursuant to Section 3-3-7 of this Code. (b) A copy of the conditions of mandatory supervised rele ase shall be signe d by the offe nder and g iven t o him or her and to his or her supervising office r. Commencing 180 day s afte r the offe nder’ s rele ase d at e an d continuing ever y 180 day s there afte r for the duration of the supervision term, the supervising office r shall
prepa re a progress repor

t detailing the offe nder’ s adjustment and compliance w it h the conditions of mandatory s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e in cluding the offe nder’ s participation and
progress in sex offe nder tr ea t m en t

. The progress repor t shall be submitt ed to the Prisoner Review Boa

rd and copies provided to the chief of police and sheriff in the municipality

and county

in which the off

ender resides a nd is reg istered. (c) Su p e r v is in g o f f icer s shall rec eive specia liz ed training in the supervision of sex offe nders includingthe impact of se x ual assault on its victims. (d) Release es serving extended mandatory supervised rele ase terms pursuant to subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code may reque st discharg e from supervision

as provided by subsection (b) of Section 3-3-8 of this Code. Requests for discharg e from extended mandatory supervised rele ase sha ll b e s u p p o r te d b y a r e c o mmendation by the releasee ’s s upervising ag ent an d an evalua tion of t he release e completed no longe r than 30 day s prior to the reque st for discharg e from s up ervision. The evaluation shall be conducte d by a Sex Offe nder Ma nag ement B oard a

pproved se x offe nder evaluator and shall be at the rele asee ’s expense.” 7 3 0 I L C S 5/3-14-2.5 (West 2006). ¶ 29 Public Act 94-165 cre ated a compreh en s i v e s ch em e reg arding MSR for cer tain sex offe nses, which marke d a phil osophical and proce dural ch an ge in how parole operates for defe ndants convicted of such offe nses. The appellate court here noted that the Gene ral Assembly “ca

rved out a limit ed exception for the crimes listed in section 5-8-1( d)[(4)]” (406 I ll. App. 3d at 280), but ref used t o g ive t hat decision any weight, and i nstead focused on a purported inconsistency betwee n section 5-8-1( d)(4) and the otherwise deter minate sentenc e structure of section 5-8-1( a). The Schneide r court saw the impetu s behind section 5-8-1( d)(4)

more clea rly : “Presumably the leg islature, in using indeterminate languag e with reg ard to the MSR term long afte r it g ener ally abolished indeterminate sentenc es, s pecif ically intended indeterminate MSR t erms in sexual assault case s.” Schneide r , 403 I ll. App. 3d at 308. The leg islature abandone d the structure of deter minate MSR terms acc ompanying other offe nses and adopted a structure of indeterminate or “extended” MSR terms for sex offe nses prec isely beca use i t viewed sex offe nses di ffe rently
, due to the risk of re cidivism. S ee 94th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, Marc h 10, 2005, at 82-83 (statements of R ep re sentative Gordon) ( this legislation “c reates lifetime supervision for high- risk sex offender s”). ¶ 30 Fur

ther, under section 3-14-2.5(b), a sex offe nder’ s parole office r must p r ep a r e a p r o gr e s s repor t ever y 180 day s, and under s e c ti o n 3-14-2.5( d) the offe nder may reque st discharg e from MSR upon the rec ommendation of the office r. These provisions contemplate indeterminate MSR terms, not deter

minate terms. The appellate court was incorre ct in vacating the d ef endant’s MSR term. We aff irm the defe ndant’s conviction, and vacate the appellat e

-9-court’s order on the issue of MSR. The defe ndant’s MSR term is an indeterminate three y ear s

to natural life.

¶ 31 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 32 For the rea sons that we have stated, the judgme nt of the appellate court is aff irmed in pa

rt and vac ated in par

t.

¶ 33 Affir

med in part a

nd vacated in part.

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