STEAM GENERATOR ACTION PLAN

Date Updated: 12/31/2009 FINAL 

Lead Division: DPR 

Supporting Divisions: DCI, DRA, & DSS 

Supporting Office: RES 

Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

1.21 

(MC2470) 

Staff issues a Generic Letter requesting PWR 

licensees to address adequacy of their 

technical specifications to ensure tube integrity 

between inspections. 

01/20/06 (C) 

ML060200385 

DCI 

K. Karwoski 

3.1 

(MD7256) 

In order to address ACRS comments on 

current risk assessments, develop a better 

understanding of the potential for damage 

progression of multiple steam generator (SG) 

tubes due to depressurization of the SGs (e.g., 

during a main steam line break (MSLB) or 

other type of secondary side design basis 

accident). 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 46, 8-12) 

Specific tasks include: 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.1 is Closed 

05/21/04 ML041420237 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

 a. Perform thermal-hydraulic (T-H) 

calculations and sensitivity studies using 

the 3-D hydraulic component of TRAC-M to 

assess the loads on the tube support plate 

and SG tubes during main steam line break 

(MSLB). Perform sensitivity studies on 

code and model parameters including 

numerics. Develop conservative estimate 

of loads and evaluate against similar 

analyses. 

12/30/02 (C) 

ML023650132 

RES 

W. Krotiuk 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

 b. Perform T-H assessment of flow-induced 

vibrations during MSLB. Using the T-H 

conditions calculated during the transient, 

generate a conservative estimate of flowinduced vibration displacement and 

frequency assuming steady state behavior.

12/30/02 (C) 

ML023650132 

RES 

W. Krotiuk 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

 c. Perform additional sensitivity studies as 

needed. 

06/30/03 (C) RES 

W. Krotiuk 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

 d. Obtain information from existing analyses 

related to loads and displacements (axial, 

bending, cyclic) experienced by SG 

structures under MSLB conditions. 

12/26/02 (C) 

ML030230822 

RES 

J. Muscara 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.1 

(cont’d) 

e. Using information from tasks 3.1a, 3.1b, 

and 3.1d, estimate upper bound loads and 

displacements. 

12/26/02 (C) 

ML030230822 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 f. Estimate crack growth, if any, for a range of 

crack types and sizes using bounding loads 

from task 3.1e in addition to the pressure 

stresses. Include the effects of TSP 

movement in these evaluations and any 

effects from cyclic loads. 

12/26/02 (C) 

ML030230822 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 g. Estimate the margins to crack propagation 

for a range of crack sizes for MSLB types 

loads and displacements in addition to the 

pressure stress. 

12/26/02 (C) 

ML030230822 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 h. Based on the margins calculated in task 

3.1.g over and above the bounding loads, 

decide if more refined T-H analyses need 

to be conducted to obtain forces and 

displacements of structures under MSLB 

conditions. 

12/26/02 (C) 

ML030230822 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 i. Conduct tests of degraded tubes under 

pressure and with axial and bending loads 

to validate the analytical results from above 

tasks. 

07/14/03 (C) 

ML032080002 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 j. Conduct analyses similar to above with 

refined load estimates if necessary. 

08/09/04 (C) 

ML042720174 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 k. Use information developed in tasks 3.1a 

through 3.1.j to evaluate the conditional 

probabilities of multiple tube failures for 

appropriate scenarios in risk assessments 

for SG tube alternate repair criteria (ARC). 

06/18/09 (C) 

ML091120480 

DRA 

R. Palla 

DCI 

E. Murphy 

3.2 Confirm that damage progression via jet 

cutting of adjacent tubes is of low enough 

probability that it can be neglected in accident 

analyses. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 10-11) 

Specific tasks include: 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.2 is Closed 

05/21/04 ML041420237 

 a. Complete tests of jet impingement under 

MSB conditions. 

12/31/01 (C) 

ML021910311 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 b. Conduct long duration tests of jet 

impingement under severe accident 

conditions. 

12/31/01 (C) 

ML021910311 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.2 

(cont’d) 

c. Document results from tasks 3.2.a and 

3.2.b. 

12/31/01 (C) 

ML021910311 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

3.3 

(MB7216) 

When available, use data from the ARTIST 

program (planned in Switzerland) to develop a 

better model of the natural mitigation of the 

radionuclide release that could occur in the 

secondary side of the SGs. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 12-13) 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.3 is Closed 

06/13/08 ML081620324 

 a. RES will continue to follow results of 

ARTIST program, especially the results of 

integrated testing of particulate removal 

during passage through the full secondary 

flow path. From the integral results, 

determine whether the decontamination 

factor should be revised for radionuclides 

transport in the secondary side of the SGs 

during a SGTR. Based on this, provide a 

report to closeout SGAP item 3.3.a. 

09/30/05 (C) 

ML052440175 

11/08/07 (C) 

ML073040481 

RES 

R. Lee 

3.4 

(MD7256) 

In order to address ACRS criticism of current 

risk assessments, develop a better 

understanding of RCS conditions and the 

corresponding component behavior (including 

tubes) under severe accident conditions in 

which the RCS remains pressurized. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 46-47, 12-15) 

Specific tasks include: 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.4 is Closed 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

 a. Perform system level analyses to assess 

the impact of plant sequence variations 

(e.g., pump seal leakage and SG tube 

leakage). 

09/28/01 (C) 

ML012720004 

08/12/09 (C) 

ML091660110 

RES 

C. Tinkler 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 b.1 Re-evaluate existing system level code 

assumptions and simplifications. 

08/12/09 (C) 

ML091660110 

RES 

D. Bessett 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 b.2 Following the results from 3.4.a and 

3.4.b.1, perform additional analysis to 

include modeling of heat transfer 

enhancement from radiation heat transfer 

in the hot leg and steam generator; 

suppress unphysical numerically driven 

flows in the calculations; and investigate 

the sensitivity of calculated results to 

bypass flows and other key parameters. 

04/01/04 (C) 

ML040910022 

08/12/09 (C) 

ML091660110 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.4 

(cont’d) 

c. Examine 1/7 scale data to assess tube to 

tube temperature variations and estimate 

variations for plant scale. 

10/31/03 (C) 

ML033140399 

RES 

D. Bessett 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 d. Perform more rigorous uncertainty 

analyses with system level code to address 

the uncertainty caused by key governing 

parameters. Distribution functions will be 

developed for key parameters. Peer 

review. 

06/21/06 (C) 

ML061450055 

05/30/06 (C) 

ML061510011 

08/12/09 (C) 

ML091660110 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 e. Examine SG tube severe accident T-H 

conditions using computational fluid 

dynamics (CFD) methods. This includes 

the following: 

 e.1 Benchmark CFD methods against 1/7 

scale test data. 

10/31/03 (C) 

ML033140399 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 e.2 Perform full scale plant calculations (hot 

leg and SG) for a 4 loop Westinghouse 

design. Evaluate scale effects. 

05/31/04 (C) 

ML041820239 

06/24/04 (C) 

ML041820075 

08/11/09 (C) 

ML093070048 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 e.3 Perform plant analysis to address the 

effects on inlet plenum mixing resulting 

from tube leakage and hot leg orientation 

(CE design impact). 

05/31/04 (C) 

ML041820239 

06/24/04 (C) 

ML041820075 

08/11/09 (C) 

ML093070048 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 f. Examine the uncertainty in the T-H 

conditions associated with core melt 

progression. 

01/24/05 (C) 

ML050120025 

03/31/04 (C) 

ML050250006 

08/12/09 (C) 

ML091660110 

RES 

C. Boyd 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 

 g. Perform experiments to develop data on 

inlet plenum mixing impacts due to SG tube 

leakage and hot leg/ inlet plenum 

configuration. 

03/31/03 (C) 

Note 6 

RES 

D. Bessett 

DSS 

W. Jensen 

DRA 

S. Long 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.4 

(cont’d) 

h. Perform a systematic examination of the 

alternate vulnerable locations in the RCS 

that are subject to failure due to severe 

accident conditions. 

 This includes the following 

 

 h.1 Evaluate the creep failure of primary 

system passive components such as 

pressurizer surge line and the hot leg 

taking into account the material properties 

of the base metal, welds, and heat 

affected zones in the presence of residual 

and applied stresses, in addition to the 

pressure stress, and the presence of 

flaws. 

12/02/08 (C) 

ML082900611 

ML082900620 

RES 

J. Page 

 h.2 Evaluate the failure of active components 

such as PORVs, safety valves, and bolted 

seals based on operability and “weakest 

link” considerations for these components.

12/02/08 (C) 

ML082900611 

ML082900620 

RES 

J. Page 

 h.3 Determine the feasibility of extending the 

Rhodes RCP seals leakage/failure model 

to severe accident conditions. 

12/02/08 (C) 

ML082900611 

ML082900620 

RES 

J. Page 

 h.4 Conduct large scale tests if needed. 12/02/08 (C) 

ML082900611 

ML082900620 

RES 

J. Page 

 i. Use existing international data and develop 

analyses for predicting leak rates of 

degraded tubes in restricted areas under 

design basis and severe accident 

conditions. 

08/09/04 (C) 

ML042720174 

07/31/09 (C) 

ML092260349 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DRA 

S. Long 

DE 

E. Murphy 

 j. Put the information developed in task 3.4.i 

into a probability distribution for the rate of 

tube leakage during severe accident 

sequences, based on the measured and 

regulated parameters for ARCs applied to 

flaws in restricted places (e.g., drilled-hole 

TSPs and the unexpanded sections of 

tubes in tube sheets). 

07/13/09 (C) 

ML091620041 

DRA 

R. Palla 

DCI 

E. Murphy 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.4 

(cont’d) 

k. Integrate information provided by tasks 

3.4.a through 3.4.j and 3.5 to address 

ACRS criticisms of risk assessments for 

ARCs that go beyond the scope and criteria 

of GL 95-05 (e.g., ARCs that credit 

“indications restricted against burst”) as 

well as dealing with other SG tube integrity 

and licensing issues (e.g., relaxation of SG 

tube inspection requirements). 

07/13/09 (C) 

ML091620138 

DRA 

R. Palla 

DCI 

E. Murphy 

3.5 

(MD7256) 

Develop improved methods for assessing the 

risk associated with SG tubes under accident 

conditions. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 47, 16-20) 

Specific tasks include: 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.5 is Closed 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

 a. Development of an integrated framework 

for assessing the risk for the hightemperature/high-pressure accident 

scenarios of interest. 

04/01/02 (C) 

ML020910624 

RES 

H. Woods 

DRA 

S. Long 

 b. Issue report describing improved methods 

and appropriate treatment of uncertainty for 

identifying severe accident scenarios that 

lead to challenges of the reactor coolant 

pressure boundary. 

06/30/03 (C) 

ML031810753 

ML031810787 

RES 

H. Woods 

DRA 

S. Long 

 c. Develop logic framework for improved PRA 

models of the scenarios identified above, 

including the impact of operator actions. 

06/30/03 (C) 

ML031810753 

ML031810787 

04/12/04 (C) 

ML041400416 

05/19/04 (C) 

ML041400394 

RES 

H. Woods 

DRA 

S. Long 

 d. Using the 3.5.b methods and (c) logic 

framework, identify scenarios, calculate the 

frequency of containment bypass events at 

an example plant, make indicated method 

improvements, and document the improved 

methods and results. 

05/27/05 (C) 

ML051470187 

ML051470179 

03/20/09 (C) 

ML083540412 

08/21/09 (C) 

ML092150157 

ML092150382 

RES 

Sancaktar 

 e. Extend the 3.5.b methods and (c) model 

logic to include CE plants, and document 

them. 

03/20/09 (C) 

ML083540412 

08/21/09 (C) 

ML092150157 

ML092150382 

RES 

Sancaktar 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.5 

(cont’d) 

f. Extend the 3.5.b methods and (c) model 

logic to include consideration of external 

events as initiators, and low power and 

shutdown as initial conditions, and 

document them. 

03/20/09 (C) 

ML083540412 

08/21/09 (C) 

ML092150157 

ML092150382 

RES 

Sancaktar 

 g. Extend the 3.5.d, e, and f improved 

methods and logic to include consideration 

of core damage sequences initiated by 

secondary depressurization events (such 

as MSLB design basis accident scenarios) 

that induce tube rupture. 

03/20/09 (C) 

ML083540412 

RES 

Sancaktar 

3.6 To address an ACRS report conclusion that 

improvements can be made over the current 

use of a constant probability of detection 

(POD) for flaws in SG tubes, RES has recently 

completed an eddy current round robin 

inspection exercise on a SG mock-up as part 

of NRC’s research to independently evaluate 

and quantify the inservice inspection reliability 

for SG tubes. This research has produced 

results that relate the POD to crack size, 

voltage, and other flaw severity parameters for 

stress corrosion cracks at different tube 

locations using industry qualified teams and 

procedures. Complete analysis of research 

results and prepare topical report to document 

the results. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 47, 33) 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.6 is Closed 

05/21/04 ML041420237 

12/31/01 (C) 

ML021910311 

RES 

J. Muscara 

DE 

E. Murphy 

3.7 

(MB7216) 

Assess the need for better leakage 

correlations as a function of voltage for 7/8" 

SG tubes. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 48, 28-29) 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.7 is Closed 

05/21/04 ML041420237 

04/26/03 (C) 

ML031150674 

DE 

J. Tsao 

RES 

J. Muscara 

3.8 

(MB0258) 

Develop a program to monitor the prediction of 

flaw growth for systematic deviations from 

expectations. 

(NUREG-1740, Pg. 48) 

ACRS Reviewed and EDO Decides Item 3.8 

is Closed 08/25/24 ML042190267 

01/03/02 (C) 

ML020070081 

DE 

J. Tsao 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.9 

(MB7216) 

Develop a more technically defensible position 

on the treatment of radionuclide release to be 

used in the safety analyses of design basis 

events. 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 48, 38-44) 

Specific tasks include: 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.9 is Closed 

06/21/06 ML061740413 

 a. Assess the Adams and Atwood, and the 

Adams and Sattison spiking data with 

respect to the ACRS comments. 

06/21/06 (C) 

ML061100331 

DRA 

M. Hart 

 b. Based upon the assessment performed in 

task 3.9.a, and the outcome of the 

screening of candidate generic safety issue 

GSI-197, develop a response to the ACRS 

comments. 

06/21/06 (C) 

ML061100331 

See Note 5 

DRA 

M. Hart 

3.10 

(MD7256) 

To address concerns in the ACRS report 

regarding our current level of understanding of 

stress corrosion cracking, the limitations of 

current laboratory data, the difficulties with 

using the current laboratory data for predicting 

field experience (crack initiation, crack growth 

rates), and the notion that crack growth should 

not be linear with time while voltage growth is, 

the following tasks will be performed: 

(NUREG-1740, Pgs. 20-29) 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.10 is Closed 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

 a. Conduct tests to evaluate crack initiation, 

evolution, and growth. Tests to be 

conducted under prototypic field conditions 

with respect to stresses, temperatures and 

environments. Some tests will be 

conducted using tubular specimens. 

05/20/08 (C) 

ML081200180 

RES 

Carpenter 

 b. Using the extensive experience on stress 

corrosion cracking in operating SGs, and 

results from laboratory testing under 

prototypic conditions, develop models for 

predicting the cracking behavior of SG 

tubing in the operating environment. 

05/20/08 (C) 

ML081200180 

RES 

Carpenter 

 c. Based on the knowledge accumulated on 

stress corrosion cracking behavior and the 

properties of eddy current testing, attempt 

to explain the observed relationship 

between changes in eddy current signal 

voltage response and crack growth. 

05/20/08 (C) 

ML081200180 

RES 

Carpenter 
Item No. 

(TAC No.) 

Milestone Date

(T=Target) 

(C=Complete)

Lead Support

3.11 

(MD7256) 

In order to resolve GSI 163, it is necessary to 

complete the work associated with tasks 3.1, 

3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. Upon completion of this 

task, develop detailed milestones associated 

with preparing a GSI resolution document and 

obtaining the necessary approvals for closing 

the GSI, including ACRS acceptance of the 

resolution. 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.11 is Closed 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

07/16/09 (C) 

ML091540192 

DCI 

E. Murphy 

DRA 

R. Palla 

3.12 

(MD7256) 

Review the risk insights developed under Task 

3.5 and assess the need for completing DG 

1073, “Plant Specific Risk-Informed Decision 

Making: Induced SG Tube Rupture.” 

ACRS Agrees Item 3.12 is Closed 

10/22/09 ML092890375 

08/21/09 (C) 

ML092300556 

DRA 

R. Palla 

DCI 

E. Murphy 

Notes: 

1. Steam Generator Action Plan milestones 3.1 through 3.11 were developed from Attachment 1 of 

a memorandum from S. Collins and A. Thadani to W. Travers dated May 11, 2001 (Accession 

No. ML011300073). That memorandum provided a revision to the Steam Generator Action Plan 

as requested by a memorandum from W. Travers to S. Collins and A. Thadani dated 

March 5, 2001 (Accession No. ML010670217). SG Action Plan milestones 3.1 through 3.11 are 

associated with the SG DPO. The page numbers referenced in the milestone description indicate 

the source of the milestone as described in ACRS Report NUREG-1740, “Voltage-Based 

Alternative Repair Criteria.” The ACRS report was included as an enclosure to a memorandum 

from D. Powers to W. Travers dated February 1, 2001 (Accession No. ML010780125). 

 The S. Collins and A. Thadani memorandum dated May 11, 2001 states that the final product for 

each major milestone for which NRR has lead responsibility will be a memorandum provided by 

the lead NRR division to the Associate Directors in NRR. For those major milestones for which 

RES has the lead responsibility, documentation will be by a memorandum provided by the lead 

RES division to the Deputy Director of RES. 

2. Steam Generator Action Plan items 1.1 through 2.8 have been completed and except for item 

1.21, they no longer appear in the above table. Items 1.1 through 2.8 were developed from 

Attachment 1 of a memorandum from J. Zwolinski, J. Strosnider, B. Boger, and G. Holahan to 

B. Sheron and R. Borchardt dated March 23, 2001 (Accession No. ML010820457). That 

memorandum provided a revision to the Steam Generator Action Plan that was originally issued 

via a memorandum from B. Sheron and J. Johnson to S. Collins dated November 16, 2000 

(Accession No. ML003770259). 

3. The work described in milestones 3.1 through 3.5 and 3.7 through 3.9 is related, in part, to 

previously planned work associated with GSI 163, “Multiple Steam Generator Tube Leakage.” 

The work described in milestone 3.1 is related, in part, to previously planned work associated with 

GSI 188, “Steam Generator Tube Leaks/Ruptures Concurrent with Containment Bypass.” 

4. The work described in milestones 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 is related, in part, to previously planned work 

associated with an NRR User Need request dated February 8, 2000 (Accession No. 

ML003682135), and the associated RES response to the request dated September 7, 2000 

(Accession No. ML003714399). Although the research in milestone 3.10 was approved by the 

EDO to resolve the SG DPO, this work was undertaken by RES on an anticipatory basis and 

there is no associated NRR User Need request. 
5. In SECY-04-0156, dated August 27, 2004, Iodine Spiking Phenomena was identified as 

candidate generic safety issue (GSI) 197 with the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) 

listed as the lead organization. Initial screening of candidate GSI-197 is complete, and the issue 

was recommended to be dropped from further consideration per memo dated May 8, 2006, from 

the GSI-197 review panel to the director of RES, as approved by the director (Accession No. 

ML061100331). During the 533rd meeting of the ACRS, the committee considered the results of 

the GSI-197 initial screening and had no objection to the staff’s proposal to drop the issue from 

further consideration. The ACRS decision was sent by memo to the EDO by memo dated 

June 21, 2006 (Accession No. ML061740413). Therefore, the ACRS review of the closure of SG 

Action Plan item 3.9 is considered complete. 

6. Milestone 3.4.g was not performed as evaluation of the cost to perform experiments that would 

improve upon the Westinghouse experiments showed the cost to be prohibitive. CFD analysis 

provided better information than possible experiments at a very small fraction of the cost. Hence, 

the objective was satisfied by the completion of milestone 3.4.e.2. 

Description: 

The Steam Generator Action Plan consolidates numerous activities related to steam generators including: 

(1) The NRC’s review of the industry initiative related to steam generator tube integrity (i.e., NEI 97-06); 

(2) GSI-163 (Multiple Steam Generator Tube Leakage); 

(3) The NRC’s Indian Point 2 (IP2) Lessons Learned Task Group recommendations; 

(4) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report on the IP2 steam generator tube failure event; and 

(5) The differing professional opinion (DPO) on steam generator issues. 

The plan does not address plant-specific reviews or industry proposed modifications to the Generic Letter 

95-05 (voltage-based tube repair criteria) methodology. The plan also includes non-steam generator 

related issues that arose out of recent steam generator related activities (e.g., Emergency Preparedness 

issues from the OIG report). The milestone table shown above is organized as follows: 

• Item Nos. 1.1 through 1.21: SG-related issues (not including the DPO-related issues); 

• Item Nos. 2.1 through 2.8: Non-SG related issues; and 

• Item Nos. 3.1 through 3.11: DPO-related issues. 

Historical Background: The NRC originally planned to develop a rule pertaining to steam generator tube 

integrity. The proposed rule was to implement a more flexible regulatory framework for steam generator 

surveillance and maintenance activities that allows a degradation specific management approach. The 

results of the regulatory analysis suggested that the more optimal regulatory approach was to utilize a 

generic letter. The NRC staff suggested, and the Commission subsequently approved, a revision to the 

regulatory approach to utilize a generic letter. In SECY-98-248, the staff recommended to the 

Commission that the proposed GL be put on hold for 3 months while the staff works with NEI on their 

NEI 97-06 initiative. In the staff requirements memorandum dated December 21, 1998, the Commission 

did not object to the staff’s recommendation. In late 1998 and 1999, the NRC and industry addressed 

NRC technical and regulatory concerns with the NEI 97-06 initiative, and on February 4, 2000, NEI 

submitted the generic licensing change package for NRC review. The generic licensing change package 

included NEI 97-06, Revision 1, proposed generic technical specifications, and a model technical 

requirements manual section. SECY-00-0078 outlines the staff’s proposed review process associated 

with the revised steam generator tube integrity regulatory framework described in NEI 97-06. This review 

process was subsequently revised as described in SECY-03-0080. 

Originating Document: Memorandum from B. Sheron/J. Johnson to S. Collins dated November 16, 2000, 

“Steam Generator Action Plan” (Accession No. ML003770259). 
Current Status: 

Closed. All SG Action Plan items are complete and the SG Action Plan is closed. [Memorandum from 

W. Borchardt to M. Bonaca dated December 3, 2009, “Response to the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards Letter on “Closure Of Steam Generator Action Plan Items 3.1k, 3.4, 3.5, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12” 

and Staff Closeout of Steam Generator Action Plan” (Accession No. ML093200502)] 

Contact: David Beaulieu, NRR/DPR/PGCB, 301-415-3243