ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Historical Collections Division of the Central Intelligence Agency 

gratefully acknowledges the following persons and organizations for their 

courtesy and assistance in providing material for this collection:

J. David Goldin for his permission to use the Mutual Broadcasting System 

audio files of speeches by President Truman and President Eisenhower.

SPPN - Sarnoff, Paramount, Pathé Newsreels, Inc for use of selected newsreel 

clips from their collections. 

The Staff and Archivists of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 

Independence, Missouri, for their assistance and support in locating

and copying additional materials for this project.

The Staff and Archivists of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, 

Abilene, Kansas, for their assistance and support in locating and copying 

additional materials for this project.

The Declassification Services staff of the National Security Agency

for their assistance in this project.
I. Sponsors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-19

IV. Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

 Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950

 A Personal Perspective

 The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950

 American Cryptology During the Korean War

V. Selected Intelligence Documents . . . . . . . . . . .36

 The USSR and the Korean Invasion

 Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military

 Conquest of All of Korea

VI. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

 Electronic Reading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS
2

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information Management 

Services is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. 

This program seeks to identify, collect, and review for possible release to the 

public documents of significant historical importance. The mission of HCD is to:

• Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the 

information and intelligence that has helped shape the 

foundation of major US policy decisions. 

• Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical 

material to emphasize the scope and context of past actions.

• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating 

reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past decisions.

• Uphold Agency leadership commitments to openness, while 

protecting the national security interests of the US.

• Provide the American public with valuable insight into the 

workings of the Government.

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters 

understanding of the Agency's history and its relationship to today's intelligence 

challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, 

other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians research topics 

on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through 

publications, courses, briefings, and Web-based products. They also work with 

other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that 

highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History 

Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for 

preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.
3

C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum was established to preserve and make 

available the papers, books, artifacts and other historical materials of the 33rd 

President of the United States for purposes of research, education, and exhibition. 

The Truman Library, the nation’s second Presidential Library, was dedicated on 

July 6, 1957. Its archives have 15,000,000 pages of manuscript materials, of 

which about half are President Truman’s papers. The Library contains an extensive 

audiovisual collection of still pictures, audio recordings, motion pictures and video 

tape recordings. The Library has available for research hundreds of transcripts 

of oral history interviews with President Truman’s family, friends, and associates. 

The museum’s collection consists of approximately 30,000 objects, including 

hundreds of Truman family possessions, political memorabilia, and diplomatic gifts. 

Through its public programs, the Library reaches a diverse audience of people and 

organizations by sponsoring conferences and research seminars, by conducting 

special tours of the Library's museum for school classes and educational groups, 

and through a wide range of other activities. The Library’s education department 

sponsors teacher workshops, and prepares activities and lesson plans for 

elementary and secondary students. The White House Decision Center gives 

students a first-hand look at President Truman’s decisions concerning civil rights, 

the Korean War, the Berlin Airlift, and the ending of the war against Japan.

The Truman Library is supported, in part, by the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, 

its not-for-profit partner. The Institute promotes, through educational and community 

programs, a greater appreciation and understanding of American politics and 

government, history and culture, and public service, as exemplified by Harry Truman.

The Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum is an international institution where 

visitors can learn about the only five-star general to become President of the United 

States. The 22-acre site features five buildings, which are open daily from 9:00 

a.m.-4:45 p.m., except Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years Day. By exploring 

all there is to see on our campus, visitors will have the opportunity to understand the 

life of the man, the hero, and the leader of the Free World – Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Our mission is the preservation of the historical papers, audiovisual materials, 

and artifacts relating to Eisenhower and his times. We strive to make this history 

accessible to the general public, students and teachers, scholars, and interested 

visitors through public programs, exhibits, educational materials, and online resources.
4

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E
5

C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R
6

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

The Korean War erupted less than three years after President Harry 

S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, establishing the 

Central Intelligence Agency. Before North Korean forces invaded the 

South on 25 June 1950, the CIA had only a few offi cers in Korea, and 

none reported to the Agency’s analytic arm, the Offi ce of Research and 

Estimates (ORE). Analytical production relating to Korea refl ected the 

generally low priority given the region by the Truman Administration’s 

State Department and the military services. Indeed, most ORE current 

intelligence products, such as the Daily Summary, Weekly Summary, 

and Review of the World Situation, contained information derived 

from State Department and military reporting, usually supplemented 

with open source media material from domestic and foreign sources. 

New information or unique CIA contributions only rarely entered the 

mix. The Daily Summary, for example, which was intended primarily 

for President Truman, consisted of a highly selective digest of all 

dispatches and reports received on any given day from government 

sources. From 1947 on, in response to customer demands, the Daily 

began to include CIA interpretive comments, although they were not 

extensive. All members of the National Security Council, plus principal 

offi cers in the State Department and Pentagon, received the Daily, as 

they did the later Weekly Summary. The Review of the World Situation, 

which fi rst appeared one week before the founding of the CIA, differed 

from the summaries as it was somewhere between current intelligence 

— published uncoordinated each month and brought up to date as 

of publication — and estimative intelligence. Written primarily for the 

NSC, the Review did not initially circulate beyond that small group. 

Truman did not attend NSC meetings until after the North Korean 

invasion, and he favored the smaller Daily and Weekly Summary, so it 

is doubtful the Review routinely came to his attention. By May 1948, 

however, copies of the Review did reach a minimum of 24 military 

and government offi ces, including the White House. Wider distribution, 

however, did not necessarily indicate the Review or the summaries had 

a wider readership or that government and military decision makers 

responded to the intelligence they contained by changing policies or 

formulating new courses of action. 

The Korean War and the 

Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Clayton Laurie, Center for

the Study of Intelligence 

CIA Reporting on Korea, 1948-1950
7

C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

Critics of ORE analysis before and after 1950 have noted the lack of 

any predictive estimates or other “actionable” indications and warning 

intelligence that would have allowed US policymakers to act on Korean 

events before they reached the crisis stage. Yet CIA analysts did report 

frequently on Korea in the prewar years, although from a perspective 

that highlighted the Soviet Union’s involvement and saw Far Eastern 

events as the result of Soviet machinations and grand designs for world 

domination. Given the American adherence to the concept of a monolithic 

world communist movement controlled from the Kremlin, it is perhaps 

understandable that CIA viewed Korean events as just one of many 

fronts in the Cold War, closely interrelated with other Soviet-induced 

crises but not of any greater importance. While analysts accurately 

and consistently reported current intelligence, the reports did not 

emphasize that the Korean situation represented anything extraordinary 

beyond routine Soviet mischief-making and proxy-sponsored “tests” of 

American resolve. ORE reporting from 1947 through 1950 did provide 

many ominous predictions and indicated possibilities of future crises, 

yet in a world menaced by communists everywhere, its reporting on 

Korea did not stand out:

• As early as the 18 September 1947 edition of the Review 

of the World Situation, ORE reported the Soviet military 

threat in Korea as part of general Kremlin-orchestrated 

subversion worldwide.

• In December of that year, the Review noted Soviet efforts 

to establish a communist regime in North Korea, attempts 

to force a US withdrawal from the south, the emergence of 

a rightwing political party under Syngman Rhee, and UN 

efforts to bring about elections. 

• On 12 February 1948, the Review covered the run-up 

to elections and cited Korean nationalist frustration with 

UN and US delays in arranging prompt polling, while 

also stating that given the general instability it “seems 

improbable that any South Korean Government can 

maintain its independence after a US withdrawal.” 

• The next month, CIA reported the likelihood that two 

mutually hostile regimes would appear in Korea, with the 

southern one unlikely to survive. 

In addition, reporting from this period foretold that after the US and 

Soviet Union withdrew their military forces from the peninsula, the USSR 

would “permit the Korean People’s Army to overrun the peninsula.” 

After the 1948 elections, ORE reported bitter political rivalries in the 

south and continued Soviet interference. The CIA consistently reported 

the need for a continued US military presence until the southern regime 

created an adequate security force. Throughout 1948 and into 1949, 

ORE warned of potential negative consequences for Korea from the civil 

war in China, particularly as Communist military successes began to 

foreshadow a Nationalist defeat and possible ramifi cations of a cut in 

US military and fi nancial aid.
8

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

Starting in 1949, CIA reporting on the potential for war in Korea 

became more explicit, especially as proposals for withdrawing 

American forces came closer to reality. The 28 February Review of 

the World Situation stated, “. . . it is doubtful if the Republic could 

survive a withdrawal of US troops in the immediate future.” In the 

absence of a US military presence, “it is highly probable that northern 

Korean alone, or northern Koreans assisted by other Communists, 

would invade southern Korea and subsequently call upon the USSR 

for assistance. Soviet control or occupation of Southern Korea would 

be the result.” The Review continued:

Withdrawal of US forces from Korea in the spring of 1949 would 

probably in time be followed by an invasion, timed to coincide 

with Communist-led South Korean revolts, by the North Korean 

People’s Army possibly assisted by small battle-trained units 

from Communist Manchuria.... In contrast, continued presence 

in Korea of a moderate US force would not only discourage the 

threatened invasion but would assist in sustaining the will and 

ability of the Koreans themselves to resist any future invasion 

once they had the military force to do so and, by sustaining the 

new Republic, maintain US prestige in the Far East.

While the Departments of State, Navy, and Air Force concurred with this 

assessment, the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army, 

refl ecting the long held goal of the service favoring the withdrawal of its 

forces from Korea, dissented from the majority view. The Army stated 

that it considered an invasion a possibility rather than a probability 

with any remaining US military presence being “only a relatively minor 

psychological contribution to the stability of the Republic of Korea.” 

When the ORE assessment appeared, the US military force already had 

decreased from 40,000 to a mere 8,000 men, who returned to Japan 

in June 1949.

In the spring and summer of 1950, ORE reports reaching American 

military headquarters in Japan and top policymaking circles in 

Washington indicated the possibility of trouble ahead in Korea, although 

these assessments were based on vague military and State Department 

information. On 13 January 1950, CIA noted a “continuing southward 

movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirtyeighth parallel,” and their acquisition of heavy equipment and armor, 

but like others, ORE did not see an invasion as imminent. Throughout 

June, the Review contained little information that could be termed 

indications and warning of a pending North Korean attack.

ORE also produced occasional estimates that were coordinated with 

the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in the three years before the 

Korean War. Yet between the appearance of ORE 5/1, entitled “The 

Situation in Korea,” on 3 January 1947, and ORE 3-49, entitled 

“Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring 1949,” 

on 28 February 1949, the CIA produced only four other estimates 

related to Korean events before the June 1950 invasion. While Korea 

did receive mention in other estimates, such as ORE 45-49 of 16 

June 1949, entitled “Probable Developments in China,” which said 

Communist Chinese successes would likely result in increased military 
C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

and economic aid to the North Korea regime, the focus of the estimate 

still remained on Chinese activities and Soviet infl uence in the region. 

It was not until the spring of 1950 that ORE produced another estimate 

specifi cally on Korea, appearing one week prior to the invasion. ORE 

18-50, entitled “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime,” 

and dated 19 June, contained information available to the Agency as 

of 15 May. The estimate declared North Korea a “fi rmly controlled 

Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative,” possessing a 

military superiority over the south, and being fully capable of pursuing 

“its main external aim of extending control over southern Korea.” 

While recognizing the “the present program of propaganda, infi ltration, 

sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla operations against southern Korea,” 

war did not appear imminent. “The ultimate local objective of the Soviet 

Union and of the northern Korean regime,” the estimate noted, “is the 

elimination of the southern Republic of Korea and the unifi cation of the 

Korean peninsula under Communist domination.” Yet beyond noting 

a massing of North Korean forces, including tanks and heavy artillery, 

along the 38th parallel and the evacuation of civilians from these areas, 

the situation on the peninsula had not signifi cantly changed from that 

described in earlier estimates or current intelligence reporting.

THE WAR BEGINS

At 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, 25 June 1950 (Saturday, 24 June in the 

United States), North Korean troops, supported by tanks, heavy artillery 

and aircraft, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. 

Notifi ed at his home in Independence, Missouri, by Secretary of State 

Acheson, who had received a communication from the US Ambassador 

in Seoul, President Truman instructed the secretary of state to contact 

the United Nations and returned to Washington. In the days following 

the outbreak of war, ORE’s Far Eastern/Pacifi c Division Intelligence 

Highlights noted, “all other Far Eastern developments . . . paled in 

comparison to the unexpected Communist invasion of southern Korea,” 

and predicted on 27 June that “it is doubtful whether cohesive southern 

Korean resistance will continue beyond the next 24 hours.” Intelligence 

Memorandum No. 300 issued on 28 June for DCI Hillenkoetter asserted 

that the invasion “was undoubtedly undertaken at Soviet direction” 

and with Soviet material support with the objective of the “elimination 

of the last remaining anti-Communist bridgehead on the mainland of 

northern Asia. At President Truman’s request, ORE began preparing a 

Daily Korean Summary that reported military developments and related 

international diplomatic and political events. The fi rst issue appeared 

on 26 June 1950. Soon after, a special staff within ORE was created to 

monitor and report on Korean events.

Seeing the invasion as a Soviet orchestrated move heralding possible 

aggressions elsewhere, President Truman authorized US naval and air 

operations against North Korea within forty-eight hours of the invasion, 

as US personnel evacuated Seoul and Inchon for the safety of Japan. 

Truman then activated military reserve components in the United States 

The War Begins

9

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10

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

and called on the UN to proclaim the North Korean attack a breach of 

world peace and assist the beleaguered Republic of Korea (ROK). Two 

days later the president committed US ground forces to the Korean 

peninsula under General MacArthur, who assumed command of all UN 

forces on 7 July. Within 24 hours of the presidential order, the fi rst US 

troops arrived in Korea, joined during the next month by the fi rst multinational contingents from an eventual 21 countries.

The force of the North Korea onslaught and the relative lack of 

preparedness of the 95,000 members of the ROK armed forces prompted 

a quick retreat south. Seoul fell on 30 June, followed by Inchon on 3 

July, Suwon on 4 July, and Taejon on 20 July. On 30 July, Communist 

forces had pushed the remnants of the ROK army and the remaining US 

forces to the toe of the peninsula around the port city of Pusan, where 

they prepared for a last stand. Reinforcements were heading for Korea 

from around the globe, but the prevailing attitude among many in the 

American public, in the Truman White House, and in the CIA was that a 

catastrophic and humiliating defeat may be just days away. 

Change of Command at CIA — DCI Walter B. Smith

When the NSC met in the days following the Korean invasion to decide 

on a response, neither DCI Hillenkoetter nor any other high CIA offi cial 

was in attendance. The Korean invasion was widely regarded as an 

intelligence failure, and because of its role as the nation’s intelligence 

service, the CIA bore the blame. Although Hillenkoetter claimed that the 

Agency had warned the president, the NSC, the secretaries of state and 

defense and others, as late as 20 June “that preparations for invasion 

were in high tempo,” the lack of a defi nitive prediction and clear 

warning prompted President Truman to change the Agency’s leadership 

as a necessary fi rst step toward reform. Even though Hillenkoetter had 

indicated his desire to retire in May, it took until 21 August 1950 for 

Truman to announce the appointment of Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith 

as the next DCI. Smith was a career staff offi cer who had served as 

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of staff at the Supreme Allied 

Headquarters (SHAEF) during World War II. He was a proven manager, 

known for getting results, who immediately saw the need to implement 

a far-reaching reorganization of CIA offi ces as well as reforms of its 

processes and procedures.

Although he received overwhelming Senate confi rmation on 28 August, 

Smith was recovering from surgery to treat chronic ulcers and did not 

take offi ce as DCI until 7 October. During the transition period, the 

analytical offi ces of the CIA continued to operate as before, providing 

a daily summary of events in Korea, to include both a military situation 

report as well as a brief summary of world events. Even before his arrival, 

Smith took the opportunity to read the various internal reports on CIA’s 

alleged weaknesses as well as to refl ect on the Agency’s larger role 

as the nation’s primary intelligence organization. Smith saw the CIA’s 

allegedly poor performance as related to both growing pains, a lack of 

budget and personnel, and equally poor organization and coordination. 

Change of Command at CIA—DCI 

Walter B. Smith
11

C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

At his fi rst meeting with the NSC on 12 October, he announced 

intentions to implement reforms including realigning intelligence 

production, reforming the IAC, integrating collection responsibilities, 

regrouping support staffs, and strengthening coordination mechanisms. 

Smith immediately restored the IAC to its intended place as the 

principal forum for discussing interagency problems, and jurisdictional 

confl icts, and as the fi nal review committee for national intelligence 

estimates. The new DCI became an early and vocal proponent of the 

CIA on Capitol Hill and at the White House. Smith pushed for massive 

budget increases to fi nance the rebuilding of the organization, for hiring 

thousands more intelligence offi cers, and for funding more operations, 

not just in support of war in Korea but worldwide. Yet the recommended 

reforms Smith sought, which promised to transform CIA from a small 

organization into a large and effective intelligence agency, required 

time, and events in Korea would give all concerned an increased sense 

of urgency.

Anticipating Victory

The CIA’s change in leadership and announcement of organizational 

restructuring came amid growing optimism within the Truman 

Administration and among military commanders in Korea that the 

United Nations was on the cusp of victory. During August and September 

1950, growing numbers of UN forces defended the Pusan perimeter 

against North Korean attempts to push them from the peninsula. Yet 

during this time as well, the Pusan perimeter transformed from what 

had been a position of a probable desperate last stand into a mightily 

reinforced bridgehead where UN forces stood poised by mid-September 

to take the offensive against what were now exhausted North Korean 

troops. Then, on 15 September, in a brilliant tactical maneuver, UN 

forces launched an amphibious assault far behind North Korean lines 

at the port city of Inchon, north of Seoul. Meanwhile, on 16 September, 

the long-awaited United Nations offensive out of Pusan began. In days, 

resistance collapsed, and Communist forces began a hasty retreat north. 

UN forces liberated Seoul on 28 September, and by 1 October, North 

Koreans were retreating across the 38th parallel. On 27 September, 

MacArthur received authorization to cross the parallel to destroy all 

Communist forces and to continue his advance so long as no signs 

existed of actual or impending Chinese or Soviet intervention, and with 

the understanding that only ROK troops should fi ght in the provinces 

bordering Manchuria and Siberia (an instruction he ignored). On 2 

October, the CIA reported that ROK forces crossed the 38th parallel; 

US forces followed one week later. In a meeting with President Truman 

on Wake Island on 15 October, MacArthur assured the president the 

North Korean regime faced imminent defeat and the war would be over 

by Christmas. 

Anticipating Victory
B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

The Chinese Intervention and CIA Reporting

The belief within the Truman Administration that the USSR orchestrated 

both the Korean War and communist movements worldwide prompted 

early concern at the CIA that the North Korean invasion would soon 

lead Moscow to order Beijing to intervene. While China received direct 

ORE attention during the years of the civil war in all political, military, 

and economic respects, the initial reports concerning possible Chinese 

intervention in the fi rst month of the Korean war remained ambiguous. 

Yet between July and November 1950, CIA produced several hundred 

reports from various sources bearing on a possible Chinese intervention. 

ORE alone produced ten Intelligence Memorandums for DCIs 

Hillenkoetter and Smith between 10 July and 9 November speaking of 

Chinese intentions. In addition, human intelligence reporting, as well as 

radio broadcasts from the USSR, China, and other Far East locations, 

monitored by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service from early 

October onward, indicated an increased likelihood that China may become 

involved militarily. Press reports appearing in Hong Kong, Shanghai, 

Tokyo, Bangkok, and Hanoi told of Chinese troop movements, material 

and medical acquisitions, and public and private pronouncements of 

PRC leaders indicating possible moves towards direct participation. The 

Far East Command and Washington policymakers received these reports 

within days of their arrival through IAC channels. Indeed, one later CIA 

History Staff assessment reported that:

Among OSO’s [Offi ce of Special Operations] intelligence reports 

were some 554 reports disseminated during the critical period 

July – November 1950. According to the OSO’s summary in 

April 1951 ‘a considerable number of reports derived from 

Chinese sources . . . trace the movement of Chinese Communist 

military forces northwards into Manchuria and towards the 

Korean border, indicating units, equipment, and other order 

of battle details’. Also included in OSO’s listing of reports are 

seven ‘indications based on Chinese Communist commercial 

activities in Hong Kong . . . and thirteen indications of CHICOM 

or CHICOM-USSR conferences and policy statement relating to 

war preparations.’

The fi rst ORE Intelligence Memorandum raising the possibility of 

Chinese intervention appeared on 8 July. It stated that the USSR may 

order Chinese overt or covert participation in the war. Again on 19 July, 

ORE’s Review of the World Situation gave special notice to Chinese 

capabilities to intervene but indicated that China would not enter unless 

the USSR ordered it. On 16 August, ORE repeated the warning that 

China had the military capability to intervene in Korea, while a situation 

summary of 1 September predicted that “the stage has been set for some 

form of Chinese Communist intervention or participation in the Korean 

War” and that “some form or armed assistance to the North Koreans 

appears imminent.” The following week, an Intelligence Memorandum 

of 8 September entitled “Probability of Direct Chinese Communist 

Intervention in Korea” reported that while no direct evidence existed 

to indicate that China would enter the confl ict, “limited covert Chinese 

The Chinese Intervention and 

CIA Reporting

12

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of 8 September entitled

Intervention inKorea” re

to indicatethat China wo
13

C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

Communist assistance to the North Korean invaders, including the 

provision of individual soldiers, is assumed to be in progress at present.” 

This memorandum reported an “increasing Chinese Communist buildup of military strength in Manchuria, coupled with the known potential 

in that area, make it clear that intervention in Korea is well within 

immediate Chinese Communist capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese 

Communist accusations regarding US ‘aggression’ and ‘violation of the 

Manchurian border’ may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move.” 

The report detailed that potentially 400,000 Communist soldiers had 

already massed in Manchuria or would soon arrive there.

In the week after the Inchon landing, and as North Korean armies 

crumbled, the Chinese leadership gave no indication that events on the 

peninsula would prompt a military reaction. Indeed, the lack of Chinese 

activity lulled many into a false sense of security. If China hoped to 

intervene decisively to prevent a North Korean collapse, the reasoning 

went, they had missed the opportunity to do so. Nonetheless, the CIA 

continued to address Chinese capabilities and the possibility of some 

outside communist intervention in the war. The ORE Review on 20 

September expressed the idea that while both the USSR and Chinese 

had the capability to intervene, their likely covert response would involve 

the provision of Chinese Communist “volunteers” for integration into 

North Korean combat units. The Communist forces currently massed 

on the Manchurian border, ORE warned, “could enter the battle and 

materially change its course at any time.” As late as 12 October 1950, 

however, ORE 58-50 “Threat of full Chinese Communist Intervention 

in Korea” stated the contrary. “Despite statements by Chou-En-Lai, 

troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities 

and border violations . . . there are no convincing indications of an 

actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention 

in Korea,” and “such action is not probable in 1950.” “From a military 

standpoint, the most favorable time for intervention in Korea had 

passed.” ORE 58-50, with a cover memorandum from DCI Smith, went 

directly to President Truman, then preparing for his fi rst meeting faceto-face with General MacArthur at Wake Island. An 18 October Review 

of the World Situation repeated the assertion passed a week earlier to 

the president.

A week before Pyongyang fell on 19 October, more than 30,000 Chinese 

Communist troops crossed the Yalu River into Korea, followed by another 

150,000 by the end of the month. These troops fi rst engaged ROK and 

US forces on 25 October during the start of their “First Phase Offensive” 

that lasted for one week until ending abruptly on 2 November. During 

this opening phase, and over the course of several days through late 

October, both ROK and US forces captured and interrogated some 25 

soldiers identifi ed as being Chinese. In a memorandum for the president 

on 1 November, DCI Smith reported to Truman that in addition to fresh 

North Korean troops, “it has been clearly established that Chinese 

Communist troops are also opposing UN forces. Present fi eld estimates 

are that between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese Communist troops 

organized into task force units are operating in North Korea while their 

parent units remain in Manchuria.” While Smith remained unclear 

as to whether Chinese forces were intervening directly in combat or 

were simply protecting hydroelectric plants along the Yalu River as he 
14

B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

had indicated to the president a week earlier, the fact remained that 

Chinese forces had entered Korea. NIE 2, published only one week 

later on 8 November, upped the estimated number of Chinese troops 

in Korea to some 40,000, who were now engaging UN troops at various 

points from 30 to 100 miles south of the Yalu River. The “present 

Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria,” the report stated, 

“is estimated at 700,000” of which “as many as 350,000 troops” 

could be made available “within 30 to 60 days for sustained ground 

operations in Korea.” The immediate cause of the Chinese intervention, 

the report maintained, “appears to have been the crossing of the 38th 

parallel by US forces and the consequent swift collapse of North Korean 

resistance.” By mid-month, as refl ected in the 15 November Review 

of the World Situation, the fact that Chinese Communist forces were 

engaged in Korea seemed to have gained acceptance within the CIA, if 

not in the entire US government.

During the fi rst weeks of November 1950, the Chinese infi ltrated an 

additional 300,000 troops into North Korea to support the remaining 

65,000 soldiers of the North Korea army. Although CIA and US Army 

intelligence offi cers in Korea and at Far East Command headquarters 

in Tokyo uncovered increased evidence that Chinese troops had already 

entered and engaged in Korea, and that Chinese rhetoric concerning 

intervention may not be just propaganda, MacArthur renewed his 

offensive towards the Yalu on 24 November, predicting it as the war’s 

last offensive. On that same day, NIE 2/1 entitled “Chinese Communist 

Intervention in Korea” appeared, a coordinated estimate with CIA, State, 

Army, Navy, and Air Force concurrence based on intelligence gathered 

as of 15 November. Refl ecting the lack of consensus about the nature 

of the Chinese Communist involvement, the NIE concluded, “available 

evidence is not conclusive whether or not the Chinese Communists are 

as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort.” The next day, 25 

November, however, upwards of 300,000 Communist Chinese forces 

counterattacked in their “Second Phase Offensive,” sending UN troops 

reeling under the massive assault. Communist China had fully entered 

the war. On 28 November, President Truman remarked, “The Chinese 

have come in with both feet.” In a cable to the President, MacArthur 

described the dire tactical situation as US and ROK troops retreated 

toward the eastern North Korean coast and south, stating, “We now face 

an entirely different war.” 

CIA’s Reorganization under Smith

In the wake of the now-much wider Korean War, the CIA continued to 

reorganize. Although Smith’s reforms and reorganizations affected all 

parts of the Agency, perhaps nowhere did they have as much impact 

as in the Agency’s analytical offi ces. Smith identifi ed three major areas 

for improvement in the execution of CIA’s mission: the need to insure 

consistent, systematic production of estimates; the need to strengthen 

the position of the DCI relative to the departmental intelligence 

components; and the need to defi ne CIA’s research and analysis 

CIA’s Reorganization under Smith
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function. At his fi rst meeting with the IAC on 20 October, Smith noted 

that the CIA had the primary responsibility for insuring that surprise or 

intelligence failure did not jeopardize national security—as happened 

at Pearl Harbor or with the outbreak of the Korean War. In addition, the 

CIA had to consolidate and coordinate the best intelligence opinion in 

the country based on all available information. Smith stated that the 

national intelligence estimates produced by the CIA should command 

respect throughout the government, and to make sure this came to past, 

he announced the formation of the Offi ce of National Estimates (ONE). 

He appointed as its chief former OSS Research and Analysis Branch 

veteran Walter Langer, who took offi ce on 13 November 1950, fi ve days 

after the appearance of NIE 2, and two weeks before NIE 2/1 addressed 

prospects for Chinese intervention. While Smith envisioned an operation 

of 1,000 people, Langer prevailed in his proposal for a smaller offi ce to 

consist of a group of senior offi cers, never more than 50 in number, who 

came from a variety of academic and scholarly backgrounds. ONE would 

have two parts, one composed of analysts who would draft the estimate, 

and a board of seniors who would review and coordinate the fi nished 

estimate with other departments. The process change insured that the 

ONE fi nal product benefi ted from coordination with all interested parties. 

After November 1950, ONE could approach other intelligence agencies 

and government departments directly, reaching out to counterparts for 

an interchange of ideas and information. Smith also insured that the IAC 

would perform a fi nal review process with each NIE before it advanced to 

the policymaker. ONE would also create a list of intelligence issues for 

collection and frequent analytical reporting to guarantee that standing 

requirements always received the Agency’s attention and policymakers 

never lacked up-to-date assessments. Between 1950 and 1952, ONE’s 

major effort was dominated by production of estimates related to the 

Korean War, particularly those involving analyses of Soviet intentions.

The formation of ONE signaled the fi nal demise of ORE. A new offi ce 

created on 13 November 1950, named the Offi ce of Research and 

Reports (ORR), picked up older ORE functions while redefi ning the 

CIA’s intelligence production mission. As originally confi gured, ORR 

consisted of the Basic, Geographic, and Strategic Divisions brought 

over from ORE, and new Economic Services, Materials, Industrial, 

and Economic Analysis Divisions. Basic Intelligence had no research 

function and served as a coordinating and editing staff in charge of the 

National Intelligence Surveys or country surveys. The Maps Division 

consisted of geographers and cartographers, unique to the federal 

government since the days of OSS, who provided a service of common 

concern, while the Economic Research Area became the focus of the 

CIA’s analytical effort primarily examining the USSR. ORR products, 

unlike those of ONE, served the needs of senior and mid-level offi cials. 

The fact that ORR came into existence at the height of the Korean War 

when all federal departments needed intelligence services insured that 

the offi ce would grow in size and infl uence, a trend that did not end with 

the Korean Armistice in 1953.
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Under Smith, ONE took on a current intelligence reporting function on 

15 November 1950 by forming a Current Intelligence Staff responsible 

for all-source coverage in a Daily Summary, with a 24-hour watch 

service, provisions for handling “hot information,” and the creation and 

maintenance of a situation room. On 12 January 1951, the Current 

Intelligence Staff combined with the much smaller Offi ce of Special 

Services to form the Offi ce of Current Intelligence. The new OCI 

continued to produce the Daily Summary and Daily Digest, as well as 

the Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Review. 

During the war, OCI turned out two daily publications on events in 

Korea. Divided into four regional offi ces, OCI included a Far Eastern 

offi ce that promised better current reporting on Korean War events. 

Although controversy over the intelligence “failures” in Korea continued 

through the spring of 1951, involving General MacArthur among many 

other top US government military, diplomatic, and intelligence offi cials 

who were called to testify before Congress, the CIA continued refi ning 

its collection and analytical processes as the war itself stalemated.

The wholesale reorganization of CIA analytical activities, both within the 

Agency itself and within the wider intelligence and defense community, 

prompted DCI Smith to create the Deputy Directorate of Intelligence 

(DI). The DI would serve as the overall organization for analytical 

activities within the CIA. Veteran analyst Loftus Becker became the 

fi rst Deputy Director for Intelligence on 2 January 1952. The new 

directorate contained six offi ces — all overt — the Offi ce of Collection 

and Dissemination, the Offi ce of Scientifi c Intelligence, the Offi ce of 

National Estimates, the Offi ce of Research and Reports, the Offi ce of 

Current Intelligence, and the Offi ce of Intelligence Coordination. The 

addition of another group, the Offi ce of Operations, completed the CIA’s 

analytical overhaul in late February 1952. The analytical capabilities 

of CIA continued to grow in quality, respect, budget and personnel 

through the remainder of the Korean War and by December 1953, the 

Directorate of Intelligence contained some ten times the number of 

trained analysts as had existed in June 1950.

To read this article in its entirety, please refer to the “Estimates 

and Misc.” folder, “CSI Articles” subfolder, on the DVD.
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To read this article in its entirety, please refer to the “Estimates 

and Misc.” folder, “CSI Articles” subfolder, on the DVD.
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C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

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C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

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To read this article in its entirety, please refer to the “Estimates 

and Misc.” folder, “CSI Articles” subfolder, on the DVD.
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C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

To read this article in its entirety, please refer to the “Estimates 

and Misc.” folder, “CSI Articles” subfolder, on the DVD.
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B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

The CIA has established this site, available through the “Library” menu on www.cia.gov, to provide 

the public with an overview of access to CIA information, including electronic access to previously 

released documents. Because of CIA’s need to comply with the national security laws of the United 

States, some documents or parts of documents cannot be released to the public. In particular, the 

CIA, like other U.S. intelligence agencies, has the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and 

methods from disclosure. However, a substantial amount of CIA information has been and/or can be 

released following review. See “Your Rights” for further details on the various methods of obtaining 

this information.

Special Collections

Additional document collections released by the Historical Collections Division can be found on the 

FOIA Electronic Reading Room and include:

Strategic Warning and the Role of Intelligence: Lessons Learned From the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

This collection consists of DI intelligence memorandums, various estimates and memos written by 

the Office of National Estimates (ONE), articles from the Central Intelligence Bulletin (a current 

intelligence daily publication), Weekly Summaries, Intelligence Information Cables, and Situation 

Reports, which were published up to three times a day during the crisis when tensions flared.

The Warsaw Pact: Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

A collection of sensitive Soviet and Warsaw Pact military journals from 1961 to 1984 that provide a 

view into Warsaw Pact military strategy. New information was added to this site in January 2010.

Air America: Upholding the Airmen’s Bond

A fascinating assembly of documents revealing the role that Air America, the Agency’s proprietary 

airline, played in the search and rescue of pilots and personnel during the Vietnam War. The collection 

has personal accounts by the rescued pilots and thank you letters as well as commendations from 

various officials. 

Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski

A captivating collection of over 75 documents concerning the planning and implementation of martial 

law in Poland from mid-1980 to late 1981. Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the Polish Army 

General Staff and the source of the documents, provided information and personal commentary that 

gave intelligence analysts and US policy makers invaluable insight into the crisis.

Creating Global Intelligence

Discover the back story of the US intelligence community by exploring this collection of more than 

800 documents from the late 1940s to the early 1950s that pertain to the establishment of the 

Central Intelligence Agency. The collection provides perspective on the complex issues that senior 

US government officials grappled with as they considered how to establish an enduring national 

intelligence capability. 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

Electronic Reading Room
C I A A N A LY S I S O F T H E K O R E A N W A R

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The Original Wizards of Langley: Overview of the Office of Scientific Intelligence

This overview and collection of documents and other material related to the Office of Scientific 

Intelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIA’s contribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities in science 

and technology during the Cold War. 

A Life in Intelligence - The Richard Helms Collection

This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and 

Ambassador to Iran comprises the largest single release of Helms-related information to date. The 

documents, historical works and essays offer an unprecedented, wide-ranging look at the man and his 

career as the United States’ top intelligence official and one of its most important diplomats during 

a crucial decade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left 

Iran, Helms dealt directly with numerous events whose impact remains evident today and which are 

covered in the release.

A-12 OXCART Reconnaissance Aircraft Documentation (With the Center for the Study of Intelligence)

This release, containing approximately 1,500 pages of material, consisting of about 350 documents, 

maps, diagrams, and photographs will provide researchers on aviation and intelligence with significant 

additional detail about the design and development of the A-12. 
B A P T I S M B Y F I R E

CIA information review and release officers reviewed, redacted, and 

released hundreds of documents related to the Korean war for this 

event. The accompanying DVD contains over 1,300 documents and 

more than 5,000 pages of material.

The material is organized into the following categories.

The Korean War document collection—featuring CIA memorandums 

and daily intelligence reports, National Intelligence Estimates and 

dpecial memos, summaries of foreign media, and other reporting 

related to the Korean conflict.

The multimedia collection—photos, audio, and video material 

from the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 

Libraries, as well as from other sources, providing background 

context to the document collection. 

This DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in 

.PDF format.

DISCLAIMER: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed 

in this booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily 

reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency 

or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the 

contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government 

endorsement of an article’s statements or interpretations.

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