United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1998 DRUG CONTROL

U.S.-Mexican

Counternarcotics

Efforts Face Difficult

Challenges

GAO/NSIAD-98-154

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280166 

June 30, 1998

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International

 Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

In 1996, we reported that Mexican efforts to combat drug-trafficking

activities were limited by various legal and operational impediments and

extensive corruption. We also noted that the United States and Mexico had

taken a number of steps that could greatly affect future drug control

efforts. These included elevating the importance of drug control issues at

the U.S. embassy, developing a mutual counternarcotics program,

initiating law enforcement and money laundering legislation, and creating

a framework for increased cooperation.1

The United States is concerned that Mexico continues to be a major transit

point for illegal drugs entering the United States. Because of this concern,

the United States has provided the Mexican government with

counternarcotics assistance to support Mexico’s efforts to combat

drug-trafficking activities. At your request, we are providing an update on

the status of counternarcotics activities in Mexico. Specifically, we

examined (1) the nature of the drug threat from Mexico; (2) the progress

that Mexico has made in improving its counternarcotics efforts; (3) issues

related to the provision of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican

military; and (4) the plans that the U.S. government has to assess the

effectiveness of U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts. (A list of

related GAO products on drug control issues in Mexico is at the end of this

report.)

Background According to the State Department, no country poses a more immediate

narcotics threat to the United States than Mexico. For over 20 years, the

United States has supported the Mexican government in its

counternarcotics efforts and has provided assistance to develop and

1

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

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strengthen the Mexican government in its law enforcement efforts to stop

the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States.2

 However,

from 1993 to 1995, the government of Mexico decided to combat

drug-trafficking activities with reduced assistance from the United States.

This policy remained in effect until 1995 when the Mexican government

recognized the increased threat being posed by drug traffickers and again

agreed to accept U.S. counternarcotics assistance for both law

enforcement and military organizations involved in counternarcotics

activities.

In October 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited Mexico in an effort

to strengthen military-to-military relationships between the two countries.

As a result of this visit, the Mexican military agreed to accept U.S.

counternarcotics assistance as part of the Mexican President’s decision to

expand the role of the military in counternarcotics activities. During fiscal

years 1996 and 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided the

Mexican military with $76 million worth of equipment and training from its

inventories. Table 1 summarizes the types of counternarcotics assistance

provided to or planned for delivery to the Mexican military for

counternarcotics purposes during fiscal years 1996 and 1997.

2

Since 1973, the United States has provided the Mexican government with about $350 million worth of

equipment and training to support counternarcotics efforts.

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Table 1: DOD Counternarcotics

Assistance Provided to or Planned for

the Mexican Military, Fiscal Years

1996-97

Dollars in millions

Source of assistance

Value of

assistance Type of assistance

Excess defense articlesa $ 5 20 UH-1H helicopters

Section 506(a)(2) drawdownb

37

53 UH-1H helicopters, 4 C-26

aircraft, 2-year UH-1H spare

parts package

Section 1004c

26

About 70 percent is planned to

be used for training and the

remainder for the purchase of

equipment

Section 1031d 8 UH-1H spare parts

aSection 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k), authorizes

DOD to provide excess equipment to the governments of major drug-producing countries.

bSection 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(2),

authorizes the President to approve the provision of U.S. military goods and services to a foreign

country for counternarcotics assistance when it is in the U.S. national interest.

cSection 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended 

(P.L. 101-510), authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide counternarcotics training and other

types of assistance to drug-producing countries.

dSection 1031 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

(P.L. 104-201) authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide an additional $8 million in

counternarcotics assistance to Mexico during fiscal year 1997.

Sources: U.S. embassy in Mexico and Defense Security Assistance Agency.

All of the helicopters and the C-26 aircraft were delivered to the Mexican

military during 1996 and 1997. Mexico has also received some logistics and

training support; however, DOD officials were unable to provide us with the

exact level of support given because the data was not readily available. In

fiscal year 1998, DOD plans to provide about $13 million worth of

counternarcotics training assistance under section 1004 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, to Mexico’s

military.

In addition to the counternarcotics assistance provided by DOD, the

Mexican military used its own funds to purchase two Knox-class frigates

from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales program.3

 These

frigates were valued at about $7 million and were delivered to Mexico in

August 1997. According to U.S. embassy officials, the Mexican Navy plans

3

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2751 - 2796), authorizes DOD to sell U.S.

defense articles and services to eligible countries. The countries may procure items using their own

funds, U.S. grant funds, or U.S. loan funds.

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to use these frigates for performing various missions, including

counternarcotics activities.

Finally, during the same period, the State Department provided about

$11 million to support Mexican law enforcement efforts. It plans to

provide another $5 million in fiscal year 1998. The State Department,

through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs, is responsible for formulating and implementing the international

narcotics control policy, as well as coordinating the narcotics control

assistance of all U.S. agencies overseas, including DOD.

U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics objectives include (1) reducing the

flow of drugs into the United States, (2) disrupting and dismantling

narco-trafficking organizations, (3) bringing fugitives to justice, (4) making

progress in criminal justice and anticorruption reform, (5) improving

money-laundering and chemical diversion control, and (6) increasing

mutual cooperation between the governments. In February 1998, the

United States and Mexico issued a joint U.S.-Mexican drug strategy that

addressed these objectives. In February 1998, the President certified that

Mexico was fully cooperating with the United States in its

counternarcotics efforts.4

Results in Brief Mexico continues to be the primary transit country for cocaine entering

the United States from South America, as well as a major source country

for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines. Moreover, according to the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), drug-trafficking organizations are

increasing their activities, posing a threat to citizens in the United States

and Mexico.

Mexico, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to improve its capacity to

reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by

• increasing the eradication of marijuana and opium poppy and seizing

significant amounts of cocaine;

• enhancing its counternarcotics cooperation with the United States;

• initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States;

4

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291j), requires the

President to certify by March 1 of each year which major drug-producing and transit countries

cooperated fully with the United States or took adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance

during the previous year with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

• passing new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical

control; and

• instituting reforms in law enforcement agencies and expanding the role of

the military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption.

However, the results of these actions have yet to be realized because many

of them are in the early stages of implementation and some are limited in

scope. For example, no Mexican national has actually been surrendered to

the United States on drug charges, some new laws have not been fully

implemented, and developing competent law enforcement and judicial

institutions has continued to present challenges. Also, the Mexican

government faces a shortage of trained personnel, a lack of adequate

funding to support operations, and extensive corruption.

U.S. counternarcotics assistance has enhanced the ability of the Mexican

military to conduct counternarcotics missions by allowing it to perform

reconnaissance, increase eradication missions, and bolster the air mobility

of its ground troops. However, key elements of DOD’s counternarcotics

assistance were of limited usefulness or could have been better planned

and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican military officials. For example, the

73 U.S.-provided UH-1H helicopters are of limited usefulness in meeting

some counternarcotics missions, and their operational capabilities have

been limited because of the lack of adequate spare parts. The four C-26

aircraft were provided to the Mexican military even though there is no

clearly identified requirement for this type of aircraft. According to U.S.

embassy military officials, the Mexican military is not using the C-26

aircraft. In addition, inadequate coordination between the U.S. Navy and

other DOD agencies resulted in the transfer of two Knox-class frigates to

the Mexican Navy that were not properly outfitted and are currently

inoperable, and in the training of Mexican Navy personnel that may not be

fully utilized until the two frigates are activated.

Although the Mexican government has agreed to a series of actions to

enhance its counternarcotics capacity and the United States has begun to

provide a larger level of assistance, no performance measures have been

established to assess the effectiveness of these efforts. Even though the

United States and Mexico issued a binational drug control strategy in

February 1998, it does not include performance measures. The Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has recognized the need to develop

such measures and has indicated that it plans to devise methods for

evaluating U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics performance by the end of

1998 as part of the binational drug control strategy.

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Nature of the

Drug-Trafficking

Threat

Mexico is the principal transit country for cocaine entering the United

States and, despite the Mexican government’s attempts to eradicate

marijuana and opium poppy, Mexico remains a major source country for

marijuana and heroin used in the United States. According to the State

Department’s March 1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,

about 650 metric tons of cocaine were produced in South America in 1997.

Of this amount, Mexico serves as the transshipment point for between 

50 and 60 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine. Furthermore, DEA estimates that

the majority of the methamphetamine available in the United States is

either produced in Mexico and transported to the United States or

manufactured in the United States by Mexican drug traffickers.

In recent years, drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico have expanded

their cocaine and methamphetamine operations. According to DEA,

Mexican trafficking groups were once solely transporters for Colombian

groups. However, in the early 1990s, major Mexican groups began

receiving payment in product for their services. Thus, major Mexican

organizations emerged as wholesale distributors of cocaine within the

United States, significantly increasing their profit margin.

According to DEA, Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are becoming

stronger. DEA reports indicate that Mexican organizations have billions of

dollars in assets and have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar,

communications equipment, and weapons that rival the capabilities of

some legitimate governments. One such Mexican organization generates

tens of millions of dollars in profits per week. Profits of such magnitude

enable the drug traffickers to pay enormous bribes—estimated for one

organization to be as much as $1 million per week—to Mexican law

enforcement officials at the federal, state, and local levels. DEA has

reported that, because of the traffickers’ willingness to murder and

intimidate witnesses and public officials, they are a growing threat to

citizens within the United States and Mexico. According to the Justice

Department, there has also been an increase in the number of threats to

U.S. law enforcement officials in Mexico.

Progress of Mexico’s

Counternarcotics

Efforts

Since our 1996 report, Mexico has undertaken actions intended to enhance

its counternarcotics efforts and improve law enforcement and other

capabilities. Some of the actions include (1) eradicating and seizing illegal

drugs; (2) increasing counternarcotics cooperation with the United States;

(3) initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States;

(4) passing an organized crime law, as well as other legislation to enhance

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Mexico’s authority to prevent money laundering and the illegal use and

diversion of precursor and essential chemicals; and (5) implementing

measures aimed at reducing corruption within law enforcement

organizations and increasing the role of Mexico’s military forces in law

enforcement activities. Although these are positive efforts, the results of

these actions are yet to be realized because (1) many of them have just

been put in place and (2) some have not been broadly applied. The

government of Mexico faces continuing challenges in trying to implement

these efforts. These challenges include dealing with the lack of adequately

trained and trustworthy law enforcement and judicial personnel,

overcoming the lack of support for operations, coping with the inability of

U.S. agents stationed in the United States to cross the border with

firearms, and combating extensive corruption.

Mexican Efforts to

Eradicate and Seize Illegal

Drugs

During this decade, Mexico has eradicated large amounts of marijuana and

opium poppy and has seized significant amounts of cocaine. Since 1990,

Mexico has eradicated about 82,600 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47

acres) of marijuana. As figure 1 shows, there has also been a substantial

decline in the amount of marijuana under cultivation—from a high of

41,800 hectares in 1990 to a low of 15,300 hectares in 1997.

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B-280166 

Figure 1: Mexican Marijuana Eradicated and Available for Harvest, 1990-97

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

41,800

28,710 28,520

21,190

19,045 18,650 18,700

15,300

Hectares

Eradicated Available

for harvest

Source: State Department.

Despite Mexico’s success at reducing the amount of marijuana under

cultivation, Mexico has not been as successful in reducing the amount of

opium poppy cultivation. During 1990 through 1997, Mexico eradicated

about 56,800 hectares of opium poppy. However, as figure 2 shows, the

amount of opium poppy under cultivation in 1997 was almost 2,000

hectares greater than in the early 1990s.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Figure 2: Mexican Opium Poppy Eradicated and Available for Harvest, 1990-97

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

10,100 10,310 10,170

11,780

12,415

13,500

13,000

12,000

Hectares

Eradicated Available

for harvest

Source: State Department.

Mexico has also increased the amount of cocaine seized from 1994 to

1997—from 22.1 metric tons to 34.9 metric tons. However, as figure 3

shows, despite this increase, cocaine seizures are still substantially below

the levels of 1990-93.

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Figure 3: Mexican Cocaine Seizures 1990-97

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

48.5 50.3

38.8

46.2

22.1 22.2 23.6

34.9

Metric tons

Source: State Department.

Despite these eradication and seizure efforts, U.S. embassy documents

indicate and U.S. law enforcement and U.S. embassy officials in Mexico

stated that the amount of drugs flowing into the United States from

Mexico remains essentially unchanged, and no major drug-trafficking

organization has been dismantled. U.S. embassy officials estimated that

Mexican cocaine seizures represent less than 10 percent of the total

amount of cocaine flowing through Mexico.

U.S.-Mexico Cooperation In 1996, we reported that cooperation between the United States and

Mexico on counternarcotics activities was beginning to occur.

Cooperation was taking place through actions such as the establishment

of a high-level contact group to review drug control policies, enhance

cooperation, develop new strategies, and devise a new action plan. Since

then, a number of activities have been underway. For example, the

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high-level contact group on drug control, comprised of senior officials

from both governments responsible for drug control, has met five times.

Results of these meetings include the following:

• A U.S.-Mexico Binational Drug Threat Assessment was issued in May 1997

that addressed illegal drug demand and production, drug trafficking,

money laundering, and other drug-related issues.

• A joint U.S.-Mexico Declaration of the Alliance Against Drugs was issued

in May 1997 that included pledges from both governments to work toward

reducing demand, production, and distribution; improving interdiction

capacity; and controlling essential and precursor chemicals, among other

issues.

• A joint U.S.-Mexican binational drug strategy was issued in February 1998

that identified 16 objectives that both countries seek to achieve in their

efforts to reduce illegal drug-trafficking activities.

In September 1997, ONDCP reported that the progress made by the

high-level contact group is largely attributable to cooperative efforts that

frequently occur within lower-level working groups. One such effort is the

senior law-enforcement plenary group that meets about three times

annually and is composed of senior law enforcement personnel from each

country. These groups have addressed a variety of issues. For example,

senior-level U.S. law enforcement agency officials worked closely with

Mexican officials in providing technical assistance during the drafting of

Mexico’s anti-money-laundering and chemical control laws.

Executive and Legislative

Counternarcotics Actions

The Mexican government has taken a number of legislative and executive

actions to strengthen Mexican counternarcotics activities. These involve

starting extradition initiatives, passing various laws designed to strengthen

Mexico’s ability to reduce various illegal drug-related activities, and

instituting several anticorruption activities such as reorganizing law

enforcement agencies and instituting a screening process for law

enforcement personnel. However, the government of Mexico faces

numerous challenges in implementing these actions.

Extradition The United States and Mexico have had a mutual extradition treaty since

1980. Although no Mexican national has ever been surrendered to the

United States on drug-related charges, since 1996 Mexico has approved the

extradition of 4 of 27 Mexican nationals charged with drug-related

offenses to the United States. Two of these are currently serving criminal

sentences in Mexico, and the other two are appealing their convictions in

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Mexico. The remaining drug-related extradition requests include 5 persons

currently under prosecution in Mexico, 14 persons still at large, and 

4 others.5

 According to U.S. embassy officials, it is not clear whether any

Mexican national will be surrendered on such charges before the end of

1998 because of Mexico’s lengthy legal processes.

Another example of bilateral extradition efforts is the November 1997

signing of a U.S.-Mexico “temporary extradition protocol.” This protocol

will allow suspected criminals who are charged in both countries to be

temporarily surrendered for trial in either country while evidence is

current and witnesses are available. The protocol is not yet in effect

because it requires legislative approval in both the United States and

Mexico. U.S. officials from the Departments of State and Justice stated

that they do not know when this protocol will be sent to the countries’

Congresses for ratification.

Organized Crime Law In November 1996, Mexico passed an organized crime law that represents

a major step in Mexico’s law enforcement capabilities by providing legal

authority for Mexican law enforcement organizations to employ modern

techniques to combat crime. These include provisions to use sentencing

concessions that equate to plea bargaining to obtain information on other

suspects, provide rewards and protection to persons who give information

to law enforcement officials, establish witness secrecy and protection,

allow undercover operations, and permit court-authorized wiretaps. The

law also has some provisions for asset seizures and forfeitures.

Although the law provides the law enforcement community with the tools

necessary to fight organized crime, including drug trafficking, it has no

provisions allowing the seizure of assets of a suspected criminal who has

either died or fled Mexico. Thus, in some instances, Mexican law

enforcement agencies are limited in their ability to fully pursue suspected

drug traffickers.

Furthermore, according to U.S. and Mexican officials, Mexico needs to

develop a cadre of competent and trustworthy judges and prosecutors that

law enforcement organizations can rely on to effectively carry out the

provisions of the organized crime law. For example, DEA reported that the

lack of judicial support has frustrated implementation of the wire-tapping

aspect of the law.

5

Of the four, one request was denied, two are pending, and one was deferred.

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The impact of the organized crime law is not likely to be fully evident for

some time. Mexican and U.S. officials told us that the process of

conducting investigations is inherently lengthy and that the capabilities of

many Mexican personnel who are implementing and enforcing the law are

currently inadequate. At present, agencies within the Mexican government

are in the early stages of carrying out and enforcing the law. Mexican

agencies have initiated some cases and are currently conducting a number

of investigations under the new law. In addition, the Department of Justice

reported that, by using Mexico’s organized crime law in conjunction with

the U.S.-Mexico Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, cooperating witnesses

have been transferred from prisons in Mexico to the United States to

testify in U.S. criminal proceedings. Although some guidelines and policies

have been established, additional ones still need to be developed. For

example, some units of the Mexican Attorney General’s Office are unable

to use important investigative tools such as plea bargaining and

court-authorized wiretaps because guidelines and policies have not yet

been established.

Several U.S. agencies are assisting Mexico with training and technical

assistance to implement the law and improve institutional capabilities. For

example, the Justice Department is providing assistance designed to

strengthen the investigative capabilities of Mexican police and

prosecutors. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development

has judicial exchange programs and conducts seminars and training

courses for Mexican federal and state judges. Also, the State Department

plans to spend a total of about $3 million during fiscal years 1997 and 1998

to train judges and other law enforcement personnel and to procure

computers and other equipment for law enforcement and judicial

institutions.

Money Laundering According to the State Department, Mexico has become a major

money-laundering center. Drug cartels launder the proceeds of crime in

legitimate businesses in both the United States and Mexico, favoring

transportation and other industries that can be used to facilitate drug,

cash, and arms smuggling and other illegal activities.

Mexico has taken actions to enhance its capacity to combat money

laundering. In May 1996, money laundering was made a criminal offense

that provides penalties of up to 22 years in prison. Prior to May 1996,

money laundering was a tax offense—a civil violation—punishable by only

a fine. In March 1997, Mexico issued regulations requiring reporting of

transactions over $10,000 U.S. dollars and of suspicious voluntary

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transactions, and obtaining and retaining information about customers’

financial institution accounts.

However, U.S. and Mexican officials are concerned that the law lacks

some important provisions. For example, financial institutions are not

required to obtain and retain account holders’ information for transactions

below the $10,000 level, thus providing no protection against “structuring.”6

In addition, there is no requirement for reporting outbound currency

leaving the country.

As of December 1997, the Mexican government had initiated 

27 money-laundering cases since the new requirements went into effect.

One of these cases was prosecuted under the organized crime law, and the

remaining 26 cases are still under investigation. In the one case that was

prosecuted, the charges were dismissed because a federal judge ruled that

there was inadequate evidence of a link between an illegal activity and

how the money was obtained. The Mexican government has appealed the

judge’s decision.

The United States is assisting Mexico’s money-laundering control efforts.

For example, the State Department will spend a total of about $500,000

during fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to provide computer systems and

training for personnel responsible for enforcing the money-laundering

control requirements.

Chemical Controls Mexico established trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals as a

criminal offense in May 1996. These chemicals can be used in the

production of heroin, cocaine, or synthetic drugs of abuse. Although some

chemicals that the United Nations recommends be controlled were not

included in the May 1996 law, Mexico passed additional legislation in

December 1997 to cover them. The new legislation brought Mexico into

compliance with the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic

in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. (See app. I for a list of

these chemicals.) In addition, Mexico has taken further action to control

chemicals by limiting their legal importation into eight ports of entry and

by imposing regulatory controls over the machinery used to manufacture

tablets or capsules.

The impact of the December 1997 chemical control law is not yet evident

because of its recent passage. Currently, the implementation of the law,

the drafting of implementing regulations, and the development of an

6

Structuring is intentionally making transactions just below the $10,000 reporting threshold.

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B-280166 

administrative infrastructure for enforcing it are under way. The United

States has provided technical assistance and training to Mexico for

establishing and carrying out the law. In addition, the State Department

plans to spend about $400,000 during fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to train

government personnel in the safe handling and disposal of seized

chemicals.

Actions Taken to Reduce

Corruption

In September 1996, the President of Mexico publicly acknowledged that

corruption is deeply rooted in Mexican institutions and in the general

social conduct of the nation. He added that the creation of a new culture

of respect for law must start with public officials. Then he affirmed his

administration’s intent to gradually eliminate official corruption by

temporarily increasing the role of the military in civilian law enforcement

matters and by implementing anticorruption reforms in law enforcement.

Mexico has initiated several actions intended to reduce corruption and

reform civilian law enforcement agencies.

In 1996, Mexico’s Office of the Attorney General began a reorganization to

reduce corruption in Mexican law enforcement agencies. As part of this

action, the State Department reported that over 1,250 officials had been

dismissed for incompetence and/or corruption.

In February 1997, the Mexican general who headed the National Institute

for Combat Against Drugs, the Mexican equivalent of DEA, was arrested for

corruption. Subsequently, in April 1997, Mexico’s Attorney General

dissolved the National Institute for Combat Against Drugs, dismissed a

number of its employees, and established a new organization known as the

Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health to replace the Institute.

Within the Special Prosecutor’s Office, there are two special units: the

Organized Crime Unit and the Bilateral Task Forces.7

• The Organized Crime Unit, with an authorized strength of 300, was

established under the organized crime law to conduct investigations and

prosecutions aimed at criminal organizations, including drug-trafficking

activities.

• The Bilateral Task Forces, with an authorized strength of 70, are

responsible for investigating and dismantling the most significant

drug-trafficking organizations along the U.S.-Mexican border. The Bilateral

Task Forces have offices in Tijuana, Cuidad Juarez, and Monterrey, with

suboffices in several other locations within Mexico.

7

These units were carried over from the Institute upon its dissolution.

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Also beginning in 1997, Mexico’s Attorney General instituted a screening

process that is supposed to cover all Attorney General personnel,

including those who work for the Special Prosecutor, the Organized Crime

Unit, and the Bilateral Task Forces. This process consists of conducting

personal background and financial checks, performing medical and

psychological screening, requiring urinalysis, and conducting regular

polygraph testing. U.S. agencies are supporting this initiative by providing

equipment, training, and technical assistance. However, U.S. embassy

officials stated that the screening requirements do not apply to judges,

most units of the military, and other key law enforcement organizations in

counternarcotics-related activities.

Finally, the Mexican President expanded the role of the Mexican military

in undertaking some counternarcotics activities. The Mexican military, in

addition to eradicating marijuana and opium poppy, has also taken over

some law enforcement functions. For example, in 1997, airmobile special

forces units became operational to assist and enhance the Mexican

government’s counternarcotics capabilities. These units have been used to

patrol streets in certain Mexican cities and search for drug kingpins.

Operational and Resource

Issues

Although officials from the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S.

embassy believe these actions show Mexico’s commitment to disrupting

and dismantling drug-related activities in Mexico, there remain unresolved

operational and resource issues that hamper counternarcotics efforts.

These include the following:

• U.S. embassy and Mexican officials stated that the Special Prosecutor’s

Office and the special units suffer from a shortage of trained and

appropriately screened personnel. In December 1997, DEA reported that

796, or 27 percent of the Special Prosecutor’s Office’s authorized strength

of 3,000, had passed the screening process and 84, or 23 percent, of the

special units’ authorized strength of 370 personnel had passed this

process. Mexican officials stated that some personnel who failed the

screening process are still working in the Special Prosecutor’s Office but

have been placed in nonsensitive positions. U.S. embassy officials

expressed concern about having such personnel in the office. In addition,

according to the State Department, personnel who have passed the

screening process often lack law enforcement experience.

• Special units face operational and support problems. These problems

include inadequate Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel, and

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salary supplements for personnel assigned to the special units and a lack

of standard operating procedures.

• The Bilateral Task Forces have yet to complete any successful

investigation of a major trafficking group. DEA has reported that the

operations of the Bilateral Task Forces have been hampered because

U.S.-based law enforcement agents assigned to the Task Forces cannot

carry firearms into Mexico. According to the Justice Department, this

exposes DEA agents to a higher level of danger because of the significant

threat by Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

• Attracting and retaining competent and trustworthy law enforcement

personnel is difficult. Low salaries of law enforcement officers increase

their susceptibility to corruption.

• Many Mexican law enforcement officers have little job security. According

to U.S. embassy officials, most officers are essentially political appointees

who are replaced after each election because Mexico has no career “civil

service” within law enforcement organizations.

• Mexico lacks a cadre of judges and prosecutors that law enforcement

organizations can rely on to effectively carry out the provisions of the

organized crime law.

The establishment of screening procedures or the involvement of the

military cannot ensure that corruption will not continue to be a significant

impediment to U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts. For example, in

February 1998, the U.S. embassy reported that three officials who had

passed the screening process had been arrested for illegal drug-related

activities. This report also noted that five Mexican generals have been

arrested during the past year on illegal drug-related activities. One of these

generals was arrested for offering another general about $1.5 million per

month on behalf of a major drug-trafficking organization, according to DEA.

Issues Concerning the

Provision of

Counternarcotics

Assistance to the

Mexican Military

Between 1996 and 1997, the United States provided the Mexican military

with $76 million worth of assistance, including 73 UH-1H helicopters,

spare parts, 4 C-26 aircraft, and Navy training, to enhance the

counternarcotics capabilities of Mexico’s military. In addition, the

Mexican Navy purchased two Knox-class frigates under the U.S. Foreign

Military Sales Program. The usefulness of the 73 UH-1H helicopters is

limited because they cannot perform some counternarcotics missions and

lack adequate logistical support. Available evidence also suggests that

there was inadequate planning and coordination associated with the C-26

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

aircraft and Knox-class frigates. Neither the aircraft nor the frigates are

currently being used.8

Helicopters Are of Limited

Usefulness for Some

Missions

In September 1996, the President approved the transfer of 73 UH-1H

helicopters and 2 years’ worth of spare parts under the 

section 506(a)(2) drawdown to enhance the mobility of 12 special Mexican

Army units involved in interdicting drug-trafficking activities. However,

the extent to which the helicopters can assist the Mexican government in

their counternarcotics efforts is not clear. No information was available on

the extent to which the helicopters were being used to support the special

Army units.

We also found that the UH-1Hs have limited capability to conduct certain

types of operations. The U.S. embassy reported in August 1997 that the

UH-1Hs are of limited utility because the helicopters’ operational

capability is significantly reduced at altitudes above 5,000 feet. Except for

the coastal areas of Mexico, almost all of the Mexican land area and

altitudes at which most drug-trafficking activities take place, including the

cultivation of most opium poppy, are above this level. Available

information indicates that the Mexican military has used the helicopters

primarily for other counternarcotics missions such as troop transport for

interdiction and manual eradication forces, logistics support, and aerial

reconnaissance.

Logistics Support Issues DOD included supplies valued at $12 million under the 506(a)(2) drawdown

authority to provide logistical support for the helicopters. This package

was based on a U.S. Army assumption that the Mexican military would

follow the U.S. Army flight standard of 14.5 hours per month. DOD and U.S.

embassy officials stated that their goal is to achieve an operational rate for

the 73 helicopters of 70 percent. Since being delivered to Mexico, the

operational rates for the 73 helicopters has been low due to overuse of

those available and maintenance problems. According to U.S. embassy

reports, the Mexican military’s operational rates for the UH-1H helicopters

have varied between 35 percent and 58 percent from February 1997

through January 1998.

8

Our reviews of U.S. international narcotics efforts over the years have noted the issue of poor

planning and coordination, the most recent being our review of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in

Colombia: Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges

(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Key elements of the logistical support package were not provided on a

timely basis. According to the U.S. embassy, the U.S. Army delivered six

aviation tool kits in January 1997.9

 However, in April 1997, the U.S.

embassy reported that the kits and their contents were incomplete and

useless. In December 1997, we visited the Mexican air base where the kits

are located and found that they still lacked a number of the tools needed

to make them useful to maintaining the UH-1H helicopters. According to

U.S. embassy military officials, many of the spare parts contained in the

support packages are now being delivered.

Moreover, end-use monitoring reports from the U.S. embassy and

information supplied by the Defense Security Assistance Agency showed

that, of the helicopters which were operational, the Mexican military was

flying them at an average of 50 hours per month. This resulted in the

Mexican military using up the spare parts that have been provided more

rapidly than intended. In 1997, the Mexican military requested, and DOD

subsequently approved, $8 million in additional counternarcotics

assistance authorized under section 1031 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 for additional spare parts because

of the UH-1Hs’ heavy use. Even with this additional support, U.S. embassy

officials stated that the amount of spare parts is not adequate to maintain

the fleet of helicopters for any significant length of time.

DOD and U.S. embassy officials are concerned that once U.S. logistical

assistance is used, the Mexican military will be unable to provide any

additional support because of budgetary constraints. A Mexican Air Force

official also stated that the Mexican military does not have any plans to

provide large sums of funding needed to support the helicopters and is

counting on the United States to do so. The U.S. embassy has estimated

that it will take about $25 million annually to support the UH-1H fleet and

that the Mexican military has no plans to provide this level of support. In

June 1998, U.S. embassy military officials told us that, due to the costly

operational expenses and Mexican funding constraints, the UH-1H

program has a high potential for complete mission failure.

Planning and Coordination

Problems With the

Provision of C-26 Aircraft

and Knox-Class Frigates

DOD policy is to ensure that countries receiving assistance are made aware

of and given the opportunity to plan for and obtain all support items,

services, and training needed to operate, maintain, and sustain any

equipment. This approach is aimed at ensuring that all material, training,

9

Each tool kit consists of a shelter and contents, including a variety of special tools, needed to perform

maintenance for the helicopters.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

and services offered to a recipient country are scheduled and delivered in

a logical sequence.

We found that DOD’s policy was not followed in providing the C-26 aircraft.

Moreover, DOD fell short in planning and coordinating the delivery and

training support for two Knox-class frigates with the U.S. embassy and the

Mexican Navy.

C-26 Aircraft Are Not Being

Utilized

The four C-26 aircraft were originally included as part of the

September 1996 506(a)(2) drawdown package to enhance Mexico’s

surveillance capabilities. The C-26 aircraft were added to the package for

Mexico by the National Security Council only 3 days before this package

was provided to the U.S. President for his approval. The aircraft were

delivered to Mexico in September and October 1997.

As a result of this short time frame, DOD and the U.S. embassy did not have

adequate time to plan and coordinate for the provision of the C-26 aircraft.

DOD officials stated that they had no input into the decision to provide

these aircraft prior to their inclusion by the National Security Council.

They indicated that, at the time, the Mexican military had not identified a

need for the C-26 aircraft. These officials also stated that they did not

identify the level of operation and support needed to use the aircraft.

Although the C-26 aircraft were originally intended to provide Mexico with

a surveillance-capable aircraft, no C-26 aircraft with this capability were

available under the drawdown. DOD noted that the Mexican military was

aware that they would receive the C-26 aircraft without the sophisticated

surveillance equipment. DOD and the State Department estimate that it will

cost the Mexican military about $3 million to reconfigure each aircraft and

as much as $2 million annually to operate and maintain the aircraft.

According to DOD, the Mexican military has indicated that it has no plans

to invest in U.S. surveillance equipment. Further, U.S. embassy military

officials stated that, as of June 1998, the Mexican Air Force has not used

these aircraft for any purposes, including counternarcotics, because the

Mexican military has not obtained contractor support needed to maintain

the aircraft.

Inoperable Ships Were

Provided to Mexican Navy

The United States provided the Mexican Navy with two Knox-class frigates

that arrived in Mexico in August 1997. The Mexican Navy procured these

ships, using its own funds, through the Foreign Military Sales program.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

The value of these ships was about $7 million. According to U.S. embassy

officials, the Mexican Navy plans to use these ships to perform a variety of

missions, including counternarcotics operations.

We found that there was limited understanding between the U.S. Navy,

DOD, the U.S. embassy, and the Mexican Navy regarding the condition that

the two frigates would be in when they were delivered. U.S. Navy policy

states that ships are to be transferred to foreign countries through the

Foreign Military Sales program in “as-is, where-is” condition. U.S. Navy

officials said that the two ships purchased by the Mexican Navy had been

deactivated and were in dry dock for 6 years before the Mexican Navy

inspected the ships and sought their subsequent transfer. DOD said that the

Mexican Navy was aware that certain equipment would not be provided

and that they would not be operational when delivered. However, our

review of U.S. embassy reports and discussions with U.S. embassy military

officials indicate that the Mexican Navy believed that certain types of

equipment would be provided when the ships were delivered. These

reports indicate that the frigates could not be activated when they were

delivered because they lacked the test kits needed to ensure safe

operations of the propulsion systems.

U.S. Navy officials estimate that the Mexican Navy will have to pay about

$400,000 to procure these kits and that it will take the Mexican Navy about

2 years to obtain the kits once a procurement action is initiated. These

officials also stated that other parts of the ships will have to be refurbished

before the ships can be reactivated.

According to DOD, on April 6, 1998, DOD was informed by the Mexican Navy

that it plans to reactivate the two ships during the summer of 1998. Part of

the Mexican plan includes the purchase of a third Knox-class frigate,

which the Mexican Navy intends to use as a source of parts and spares for

the first two ships. On June 3, 1998, a U.S. embassy military official told us

that the reactivation date for the two Knox-class frigates has slipped until

at least the fall of 1998.

Value of Frigate-Related

Training May Be Limited

We also found that the training was not well coordinated between the U.S.

Navy and DOD. In 1997, DOD provided the Mexican Navy with about

$1.3 million worth of training to about 110 Mexican Navy personnel on

how to operate and maintain the Knox-class frigates. These personnel will

be used to train additional Mexican Navy personnel who will be assigned

to the vessels. According to U.S. embassy military and DOD officials, the

training occurred between February 1997 and March 1998.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD acknowledged that the

training was scheduled even though there was no clear commitment on

the part of the Mexican Navy as to when the ships would be activated.

Furthermore, DOD officials told us that they agreed to provide the training

without knowing that the U.S. Navy had delivered ships that were not

operational. U.S. embassy military officials stated that the Mexican Navy

will reassign these personnel, thus making them potentially unavailable if

and when the ships finally are activated. DOD noted that, in their view, the

training was not a wasted effort because it provided the Mexican Navy

with a cadre of trained naval personnel and expanded the cooperation

with their U.S. counterparts.

Performance

Measures for U.S. and

Mexican Drug Control

Efforts

Without performance measures of effectiveness, it is difficult for

decisionmakers to evaluate the progress that the United States and Mexico

are making to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. We

have previously noted the need for ONDCP to develop drug control plans

that include measures to allow it to assess the effectiveness of antidrug

programs.10

While the United States and Mexico issued a joint antidrug strategy in

February 1998, it does not contain performance measures. It does have 

16 general objectives, such as reducing the production and distribution of

illegal drugs in both countries and focusing law enforcement efforts

against criminal organizations. However, although this strategy is

indicative of increased U.S.-Mexican cooperation, it lacks specific,

quantifiable performance measures and milestones for assessing progress

toward achieving these objectives. State Department officials said that the

bilateral process of establishing performance measures and milestones is

incremental and will be addressed during 1998. ONDCP officials said that

they plan to issue specific performance measures and milestones for the

binational strategy by the end of this year.

Conclusions and

Recommendation

The effectiveness of some U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican

military was limited because of inadequate planning and coordination, an

issue that we have reported on in the past. We continue to believe that

counternarcotics assistance, particularly that provided under

506(a)(2) should be better planned and coordinated. Thus, we recommend

that the Secretary of State, in close coordination with the Secretary of

10Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27,

1997).

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Defense and the National Security Council, take steps to ensure that future

counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico, to the maximum extent

possible, meets the needs of the Mexican military and that adequate

support resources are available to maximize the benefits of the assistance.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II), DOD generally

concurred with the report and our recommendation. However, DOD stated

that the report’s representation of DOD’s counternarcotics assistance

provided to the Mexican military required clarification. Where appropriate,

we have added information on DOD roles and the circumstances

surrounding the provision of the helicopters, aircraft, and frigates.

DOD noted that these initiatives and all other DOD-provided counterdrug

activities are the result of careful planning and coordination between DOD,

its federal counterparts, the U.S. embassy in Mexico, and Mexican

government and military officials. It further stated that while each case has

some aspects that could have been better coordinated, the overall results

of the transactions and the broader U.S.-Mexican military-to-military

coordination are very beneficial to building trust and confidence between

two countries engaged in the fight against drugs.

We agree that U.S.-Mexico cooperation and U.S. counterdrug assistance

have been beneficial as the two countries strive to combat drug-trafficking

activities. However, our analysis shows that weaknesses in planning and

coordination adversely affected the usefulness of certain key items of the

specific assistance transactions we examined. The equipment provided did

not meet a specific counternarcotics need, could not perform required

missions, were inoperable, or lacked adequate logistical support.

Moreover, DOD’s position is not supported by events surrounding the

provision of training to the Mexican Navy. While this training may be

valuable in improving the military-to-military relationships between the

United States and Mexico, the value to improving the counternarcotics

capabilities of the Mexican Navy is clearly limited. We continue to believe

that improvements in planning and coordination are necessary to ensure

the Mexican military realizes the full benefits of this assistance.

The Departments of Justice and State provided oral comments to clarify

information contained in the report. We have incorporated these as

appropriate.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Scope and

Methodology

To examine the nature of Mexico’s drug threat, we received briefings from

U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military officials, and reviewed and

analyzed documentation in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassy in

Mexico.

To address Mexico’s progress in improving its counternarcotics efforts, we

met with officials from U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S.

embassy in Mexico. Specifically in Washington, D.C., we reviewed and

analyzed strategic and operational planning documents, cables, and

correspondence at the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice; the

U.S. Customs Service; DEA; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the U.S.

Coast Guard; and ONDCP. In addition, at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City,

we interviewed U.S. embassy officials, including the Chargé d’Affaires, and

personnel from the Narcotics Affairs Section, DEA, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Department of the

Treasury. We reviewed and analyzed planning documents, cables, and

correspondence regarding the progress that Mexico was making in

improving its counternarcotics efforts.

To assess the issues related to the provision of U.S. counternarcotics

assistance to the Mexican military, we met with DOD officials from the

Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support; the

Defense Security Assistance Agency; and the Departments of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force. At the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, we interviewed

U.S. military personnel from the Military Liaison Office and the Office of

the Defense Attaché. We reviewed and analyzed all reports, cables, and

correspondence provided by the U.S. embassy and DOD regarding how

U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance was being used and problems

associated with maintaining this assistance.

To determine how the U.S. government plans to assess the effectiveness of

U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts, we interviewed officials from

ONDCP and the Department of State. We reviewed and analyzed documents

and correspondence related to the status of developing performance

measures for evaluating the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts with

Mexico.

While in Mexico, we also interviewed Mexican officials from the Ministries

of Treasury, Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the Attorney General to

obtain their views on the issues discussed in this report. We also visited

with Mexican police officials at their maintenance facility in Mexico City

and with Mexican Air Force personnel at their maintenance facility in

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
B-280166 

Culiacan, Mexico to determine how the police and Air Force were

maintaining UH-1H helicopters. Finally, we analyzed Mexican reports and

other documents relating to the progress that Mexico was making to

reduce the flow of drugs into the United States and Mexican military

reports addressing operational readiness and issues relating to the delivery

of U.S.-provided assistance.

We conducted our review between September 1997 and April 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees;

the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury; the U.S. Attorney General;

the Administrator, DEA; and the Directors of ONDCP and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation. Copies will also be made available to other interested

parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call

me at (202) 512-4128. This report was done under the direction of Jess

Ford. The major contributors to this report were Ronald Kushner, Allen

Fleener, Ronald Hughes, José Peña, and George Taylor.

Benjamin F. Nelson, Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Precursor and

Essential Chemicals

Controlled in Mexico

28

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

29

Related GAO Products 36

Table Table 1: DOD Counternarcotics Assistance Provided to or

Planned for the Mexican Military, Fiscal Years 1996-97

3

Figures Figure 1: Mexican Marijuana Eradicated and Available for

Harvest, 1990-97

8

Figure 2: Mexican Opium Poppy Eradicated and Available for

Harvest, 1990-97

9

Figure 3: Mexican Cocaine Seizures 1990-97 10

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Precursor and Essential Chemicals

Controlled in Mexico

Numerous precursor and essential chemicals are used in the illicit

production of illegal drugs. Under the chemical control legislation enacted

in December 1997, Mexico controls the following precursor and essential

chemicals.

Precursor Chemicals Benzyl chloride

Ephedrine

Ergometrine

Ergotamine

Isosafrole

Lysergic acid

N-Acetylanthranilic acid

1-Phenyl-2-propanone

Phenylpropanolamine

Piperonal

Pseudoephedrine

Safrole

3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone

Essential Chemicals Acetic anhydride

Acetone

Anthranilic acid

Ethyl ether

Hydrochloric acid

Methyl ethyl ketone

Phenylacetic acid

Piperidine

Potassium permanganate

Sulfuric acid

Toluene

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 22-23.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Status of Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-129, Mar. 18, 1998).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Activities in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-239, Sept. 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163,

June 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-182, June 12, 1996).

Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico

(GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial

Eradication Program (GAO/NSIAD-88-73, Jan. 11, 1988).

Gains Made in Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourished

(GAO/GGD-80-8, Oct. 25, 1979).

Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico (GAO/GGD-77-6, Feb. 18, 1977).

(711345) Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-154 Drug Control
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