1

Filed 12/27/18 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL JASON THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C083845

(Super. Ct. No. 16FE007658)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND DENYING 

REHEARING 

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 3, 2018, be modified as 

follows:

On page 3, the first full paragraph, the seventh sentence, beginning with “After 

removing the knife”, is deleted and the following sentence is inserted in its place:

After removing the knife from the lining of defendant’s jacket, Burnett 

“observed” an BET card at the bottom of defendant’s pant leg, near his left 

boot, with defendant’s name on it.

On page 4, delete the last full paragraph, beginning with “The magistrate” and 

insert the following paragraph in its place: 

The magistrate, Alan G. Perkins, found there was sufficient 

suspicion to contact defendant, as he was in physical proximity to the 
2

location two and one-half hours after the call, in daylight. Given the minor 

“nature of the crime,” the magistrate reasoned defendant would not have 

felt compelled to get away from the scene quickly. The magistrate also 

found there was sufficient basis to presume the conduct complained of was 

sufficient to be “some kind of criminal offense or some kind of conduct that 

might lead to danger to others or perhaps even to the person doing the 

harassing.” The magistrate then found “the combination of the crime being 

harassing conduct, the person being in the area, the homeless camp nearby, 

the lack of cooperation which by itself is not a crime but combined with 

other factors and the factor that the defendant was dressed in at least what 

might seemingly be overdressed for the occasion in the sense it was a very 

hot day with bulky sweatpants and a wind breaker, I think would barely but 

sufficiently give the officer suspicion that there might well be something 

concealed under there that could be a danger.” Accordingly, the magistrate 

denied the motion to suppress.

On page 8, delete the first full paragraph, beginning with “There are, however” 

and insert the following paragraph in its place: 

There are, however, limitations on the applicability of the probation 

exception. As relevant here, “the exception is inapplicable if police are 

unaware of the probation search condition at the time of a warrantless 

search.” (People v. Hoeninghaus, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1184, 

1194-1195; also In re Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th 128; People v. Sanders

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332-333; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 

797; People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 64; Myers v. Superior 

Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1252.) 
3

On pages 8 and 9, delete last paragraph beginning on page 8 and continuing on 

page 9. The paragraph begins with “Moreover, even if” and ends with “the warrantless 

search.” 

There is no change in the judgment. Defendant’s petition for rehearing is denied. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ 

Blease, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.
1

Filed 12/3/18; Certified for Publication 12/10/18 (order attached); (unmodified version)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL JASON THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C083845

(Super. Ct. No. 16FE007658)

Defendant Daniel Jason Thomas appeals his convictions for possession of a dirk or 

dagger, possession of methamphetamine with prior convictions, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. On appeal, he contends it was error to deny his motion to suppress under 

Penal Code1section 1538.5 as the detention and patsearch were not justified by 

reasonable suspicion. We agree and reverse the judgment.2

 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2

 Because of our resolution on this issue, we do not address defendant’s additional 

claim that his sentence for possessing a methamphetamine pipe should have been stayed 

when he was sentenced for possessing methamphetamine. 
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Based on the evidence discovered during the search of defendant, he was charged 

with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, felony possession of methamphetamine based 

on a prior strike conviction, and misdemeanor possession of a smoking device.3 The 

information also alleged a prior strike conviction. 

After the preliminary examination, defendant filed a motion to suppress under 

section 1538.5. Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate denied the motion. 

Suppression Hearing

In April 2016 at 12:23 p.m., the Sacramento Police Department received a call that 

a “male black adult subject wearing a dark hoody, . . . and black pants” was harassing 

customers in front of a business in the Del Paso Heights area. The description of the 

subject was clarified as a gray hooded sweatshirt and black pants. Additional information 

included that the subject had “set up camp,” “there was some kind of homeless camp set 

up nearby,” and defendant “appeared to have something mental going on,” in that he did 

not seem to understand when people were speaking to him. There was no information in 

the call regarding threats, trespassing, battery, physical assault, or weapons being 

involved. 

The Del Paso Heights area has a high crime rate. There are a high number of 

transients and homeless people in the area. There is also a “fair amount” of foot traffic in 

the area due to the retail shops and restaurants. 

Officer Mark Kimble and his beat partner responded to the area at 2:54 p.m., 

approximately two hours and 20 minutes after the initial call. Defendant was wearing 

“bulky clothing, bulky hooded sweatshirt and bulky pants, as well as a windbreaker 

jacket on top of that.” Kimble indicated it was a “pretty warm . . . afternoon.” He was 

 

3

 Given the claim on appeal, a detailed recitation of the facts underlying the 

substantive offenses is unnecessary.
3

seated on the sidewalk approximately 70 to 80 yards away from the complaining 

business. There was no one else in the immediate vicinity. 

The officers contacted defendant “and he repeatedly would not give his name on 

multiple different requests.” The officers explained why they were in the area and 

speaking to defendant, but he “repeatedly would not give his name.” Based on “what he 

was wearing, the totality of the circumstances,” Kimble asked defendant if he had any 

weapons on him. Defendant said he was not on probation, did not have to speak to the 

officers, and began walking away. Burnett put defendant in a control hold, Kimble 

handcuffed him and performed a patsearch for weapons. In the course of that search, 

Kimble felt an item that felt like a fixed blade knife and what felt like a narcotics pipe. 

After removing the knife from the lining of defendant’s jacket, Burnett “observed” an 

EBT card in defendant’s pocket with defendant’s name on it. Kimble performed a 

records check and it showed defendant was on informal searchable probation. The 

officers continued to search defendant and found methamphetamine in the same pocket 

the pipe had been in. 

The parties stipulated the scope of the suppression hearing was limited, as 

defendant was only contesting the initial detention and Terry4 patsearch. 

Defendant argued that generalized harassment is not a crime; thus, officers 

responding to a general call of harassment, are not responding to a report of a crime. In 

addition, there was more than a two-hour time lapse between the call and the officer’s 

contact with defendant, the description given was vague and general, the area was heavily 

trafficked, and there were a great number of transients in the area. Thus, the officers did 

not have a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed. Moreover, counsel 

argued, defendant was not aggressive or threatening and did not appear under the 

 

4

 Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889].
4

influence of a controlled substance. He noted California does not have an identification

law requiring compliance with a law enforcement officer’s request to identify oneself. 

Defense counsel argued, therefore, there was no basis to justify a Terry search. Defense 

counsel acknowledged it was reasonable for the officers to make a consensual contact 

with defendant, but when they restrained and detained him, “they went a step too far.” 

The People argued that the 911 call, coupled with defendant’s attire, behavior, 

lying, refusing to identify himself, and starting to walk away gave the officers reasonable 

suspicion. The People also argued discovery of the knife and drug paraphernalia was 

inevitable, because if defendant had “been forthcoming with his identity from the 

beginning, the officers would have learned of [his] probation condition sooner and would 

have inevitably searched [him] and discovered the evidence.” 

The magistrate found there was sufficient suspicion to contact defendant, as he 

was in physical proximity to the location two and one-half hours after the call, in 

daylight. Given the minor “nature of the crime,” the trial court reasoned defendant would 

not have felt compelled to get away from the scene quickly. The trial court also found 

there was sufficient basis to presume the conduct complained of was sufficient to be 

“some kind of criminal offense or some kind of conduct that might lead to danger to 

others or perhaps even to the person doing the harassing.” The trial court then found “the 

combination of the crime being harassing conduct, the person being in the area, the 

homeless camp nearby, the lack of cooperation which by itself is not a crime but 

combined with other factors and the factor that the defendant was dressed in at least what 

might seemingly be overdressed for the occasion in the sense it was a very hot day with 

bulky sweatpants and a wind breaker, I think would barely but sufficiently give the 

officer suspicion that there might well be something concealed under there that could be a 

danger.” Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 
5

Trial

After the denial of the motion to suppress, the matter proceeded to jury trial. A 

jury found defendant guilty of all three charges. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court 

found the prior conviction allegation true. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term 

of two years on possessing a dirk or dagger, doubled pursuant to the strike, a concurrent 

two-year term on felony possession of methamphetamine, doubled pursuant to the strike, 

and time served on the misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, for an aggregate 

term of four years in prison. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends it was error to deny his motion to suppress. He contends the 

investigative detention and patsearch were not justified by reasonable suspicion, as the 

report was stale, overly general in its physical description of him, and vague in its 

assertion of any criminal activity. The People argue defendant is estopped from arguing 

the search was unlawful because he lied to the officers when he told them he was not on 

probation when he was, and in any event, there was reasonable suspicion to support the 

stop and patsearch search. 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

(U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 20 [20 L.Ed.2d. at 

p. 905].) “A seizure of the person occurs ‘ “whenever a police officer ‘by means of 

physical force or show of authority’ restrains the liberty of a person to walk away.” ’ ” 

(People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, quoting People v. Ceils (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 667, 673; see People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 976-977.) Warrantless 

searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable, “ ‘subject only to a few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” (People v. Diaz (2011) 

51 Cal.4th 84, 90.) “There are two different bases for detaining an individual short of 

having probable cause to arrest: (1) reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is 

involved in criminal activity [citation]; and (2) advance knowledge that the individual is 
6

on searchable probation or parole.” (Douglas, at p. 860; see People v. Schmitz (2012) 

55 Cal.4th 909, 916.) “[A] search founded on neither reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity nor advance knowledge of a probation search condition can aptly be 

characterized as arbitrary.” (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 138; see People v. 

Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188.) In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on 

a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s express or implied factual findings if 

supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719; People v. 

Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674.) “However, if the undisputed facts establish that 

the search or seizure was constitutionally unreasonable as a matter of law,” we are not 

bound by the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Middleton (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732, 738 

quoting People v. Medina (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 809, 815.) We independently determine 

whether the facts found amount to a reasonable search or seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. (Redd, at p. 719; Woods, at pp. 673-674.) 

The People claim defendant cannot challenge the validity of the “search and 

seizure as a probation search” because he was on informal searchable probation and lied 

when he told officers he was not on probation. In making this claim, they rely on our 

decision in People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403. In Watkins, we held that a 

defendant who intentionally misrepresented his identity to prevent law officers from 

discovering his probation or parole status and search conditions was equitably estopped 

from challenging the search as a probation search. (Id. at pp. 1408-1409.) 

The People are raising this claim for the first time on appeal.5 “[F]or a 

suppression ruling to be reviewable, the underlying objection, contention or theory must 

 

5

 The People did cite Watkins in their opposition to defendant’s motion, in the 

context of arguing the search of defendant was inevitable because he was on searchable 

probation. The People argued that while defendant denied he was on probation, once the 

officers learned his name from his EBT card and that he was subject to search, the 

discovery of the knife and drug paraphernalia was inevitable. They went on to argue had 
7

have been urged and determined in the trial court.” (People v. Manning (1973) 

33 Cal.App.3d 586, 600.) “[T]he scope of issues upon review must be limited to those 

raised during argument, whether that argument has been oral or in writing. This is an 

elemental matter of fairness in giving each of the parties an opportunity adequately to 

litigate the facts and inferences relating to the adverse party’s contentions.” (Manning, at 

p. 601.) It was the People’s burden to raise the issue of equitable estoppel at the 

suppression hearing. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 [At the suppression 

hearing, once defendant has made the prima facie showing that the police acted without a 

warrant, the prosecution “has the burden of proving some justification for the warrantless 

search or seizure, after which, defendants can respond by pointing out any inadequacies 

in that justification”]; LaRue v. Swoap (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 543, 551 [“The burden of 

pleading facts which raises the issue of estoppel lies with the party who would estop the 

other party [citation], and for estoppel to be available it must be specially pleaded”].) 

“Failure to plead estoppel constitutes a waiver and we need not consider the issue for the 

first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) Because the People did not raise and argue the issue of 

equitable estoppel, defendant was not permitted to litigate the issue, and the trial court 

was not required to rule on it. Accordingly, the claim of equitable estoppel is forfeited on 

appeal.

When a defendant challenges the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the 

People must establish that the search fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the 

warrant requirement. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939; People v. 

 

he been forthcoming with his identity from the beginning, they would have learned of his 

probation condition earlier and inevitably searched him and discovered the evidence. At 

no point did the People argue or put forward evidence supporting a claim of equitable 

estoppel. That is, they did not offer evidence that defendant intentionally misrepresented 

his probation status and did so with the purpose of preventing officers from discovering 

the search condition.
8

Hoeninghaus, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) “A probation search is one of those 

exceptions. (People v. Schmitz[, supra,] 55 Cal.4th . . . [at p.] 916 . . . ; People v. 

Woods[, supra,] 21 Cal.4th . . . [at pp.] 674-675 . . . [probation exception based on 

advance consent].)” (Romeo, at pp. 939; see Hoeninghaus, at p. 1184.) 

There are, however, limitations on the applicability of the probation exception. 

First, “the exception is inapplicable if police are unaware of the probation search 

condition at the time of a warrantless search.” (People v. Hoeninghaus, supra, 

120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1184, 1194-1195; also In re Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th 128; 

People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332-333; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 

789, 797; People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 64; Myers v. Superior Court

(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1252.) Second, because the exception is based on consent, 

the search is limited to the terms articulated in the search condition. (People v. Bravo

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 605; People v. Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.) “[A] 

probation condition is the written manifestation of the probationer’s consent, and it both 

defines the scope of consent and sets the parameters of a proper consent search.” 

(Hoeninghaus, at p. 1195.) Thus, to determine if a probation search is reasonable, we 

must evaluate the terms of the operative search clause objectively. (Romeo, at p. 950.) 

In this case, the record is clear, the officers were unaware defendant was on 

searchable informal probation until after they placed him in a control hold, handcuffed 

him, and conducted a patsearch for weapons. Because the officers were unaware of the 

probation search condition at the time they detained and searched defendant, they cannot 

rely on the existence of this probation condition to now justify the search and seizure. 

Moreover, even if the People could rely on the existence of a probation condition 

based on their claim of equitable estoppel, it would remain their burden to justify the 

probation search was reasonable. (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 919.) 

Where a probation search is challenged, an officer’s knowledge that the defendant was on 

probation and subject to search alone may be insufficient to determine the search was 
9

reasonable because “probation search clauses are not worded uniformly” and “judges 

may limit the scope of the defendant’s consent to searches for particular contraband, such 

as drugs or stolen property, or place spatial limits on where searches may take place.” 

(People v. Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.) Here, “there is nothing in the 

record to aid an objective evaluation of the scope of advance consent that was given.” 

(Id. at p. 950.) In the absence of any evidence as to the terms of the probation condition 

or the scope of defendant’s consent, there is no way for the trial court, or this court, to 

consider the reasonableness of the probation search. In the absence of such evidence, the 

People did not meet their burden to justify the warrantless search. 

“[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or 

apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect 

that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, 

and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C.

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; Terry v. Ohio,

supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 911].) “The corollary to this rule, of course, is 

that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is 

unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (In re Tony C., 

at p. 839.) It remains the prosecution’s burden to prove “that the warrantless search or 

seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th 

at p. 130.)

Here, the facts are undisputed. In the middle of the day, a person contacted law 

enforcement officers to report an adult black male wearing a sweatshirt and dark pants 

was “harassing” customers. The subject appeared to have some mental health problems 

and had “set up camp.” The area was a high-crime area, with a high number of transients 

and homeless people. The area also has a “fair amount” of foot traffic due to numerous 

retail shops and restaurants. Two and one-half hours after they received the call, law 

enforcement officers arrived to the area. They saw defendant sitting on the sidewalk, 
10

approximately 80 yards away from the business. He was wearing a Windbreaker, 

sweatshirt, and dark pants. There was no one else in the area. 

A vague description does not provide reasonable suspicion to stop every person 

falling within that vague description. (In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 381-

382.) A more detailed description, including such characteristics as age, hair or eye 

color, attire, height and build combined with additional suspicious circumstances, might 

reasonably justify a detention. (People v. Fields (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 555, 564 

[detention lawful where the defendant matched victim’s description of suspect’s race, 

gender, height, general age, and attire]; People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 387 

[“male Caucasian, dark hair, moustache, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, about 150 pounds, 

wearing a light cardigan sweater and dark trousers”]; People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 

85, 89 [“Mexican-Americans, wearing dark clothing and wide-brimmed hats, each being

5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall, and weighing 160 to 165 pounds” and driving a 

dark-colored General Motors “fastback” sedan of mid-1940’s vintage].) Here, the caller 

provided an extremely vague and very general physical description of the person 

“harassing” customers. The description did not include any reference to the person’s 

height, weight, or age. Even the clothing was nondescript, a sweatshirt and black pants. 

There was nothing distinguishing in the description of the person or his clothing. The 

most potentially distinctive information provided was that the subject appeared to have 

mental health problems, did not understand what people were saying, and had “set up 

camp.” There was no indication in the record defendant displayed any behavior 

suggesting a mental health problem or lack of understanding when the officers 

approached and spoke with him. Nor was there any indication he had “set up camp.” 

Such a vague description does not provide reasonable grounds to stop every person 

falling within that vague description. (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 898; In re 

Carlos M., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 381-382.) 
11

A general description combined with a close temporal and geographical 

connection between the crime and the suspects, may justify a detention. (People v. 

Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 390 [detention lawful where stop occurred within 

two minutes of receiving report of a burglary]; People v. Lazanis (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 

49, 54 [detention lawful stop occurred within moments of burglary report]; People v. 

McCluskey (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 220, 223 [lawful detention description included 

height, race, facial hair, approximate age and general clothing, stop conducted within five 

minutes of report of robbery].) Here, although there was geographic proximity to the 

business, the officers were at the scene two and one-half hours after the call was made. 

In addition, this was not a secluded or remote area. It was a business area, with 

significant foot traffic, in the middle of the day. Two and one-half hours in a busy area is 

a significant lapse of time, and that lapse of time combined with the general physical 

description did not provide reasonable suspicion.

In addition, in the authorities cited above, an actual crime was reported -- the 

threshold requirement in a Terry stop. Those reports of crimes gave rise to an indication 

that “some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur.” 

Mere presence in a high-crime area cannot supply the necessary reasonable suspicion. 

(In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893.) Here, the complaint was of otherwise 

undescribed “harassing” conduct. There was no information indicting threats, 

trespassing, battery, physical assault, or weapons. There was no information the person 

had been asked and refused to leave the business. This was not a description of criminal 

conduct, and at the hearing, the People made no assertion that this “harassment” was 

criminal, nor did they suggest what criminal offense this conduct might have constituted.6 

 

6

 At the trial court, the People did not offer any suggestion as to what criminal 

activity was occurring or about to occur that would have justified the detention. On 

appeal, the People contend law enforcement officers received a complaint someone was 

violating section 602.1, subdivision (a) (“Any person who intentionally interferes with 
12

Nothing about defendant’s conduct, sitting on the sidewalk, wearing a jacket, sweatshirt, 

and pants suggested he was engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. 

A person approached by police for questioning “need not answer any question put 

to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. 

[Citations.] He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective 

grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish 

those grounds.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498 [75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236]; see 

also Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 125 [145 L.Ed.2d 570, 577].) Thus, the 

fact that defendant refused to provide his identification and tried to walk away from the 

officers did not provide them with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify his detention.

“[A] frisk for weapons is not justified unless the officer can point to specific and 

articulable facts which, considered in conjunction with rational inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” 

(People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176-177.) A claim of “harassing” 

customers of a business, with no reports of violence, battery, assault, threats or weapons 

does not reasonably suggest the presence of weapons. Nor did defendant’s conduct, or 

wearing a jacket and sweatshirt on a “pretty warm” day provide reasonable grounds to 

believe he was armed and/or dangerous and might gain immediate control of a weapon. 

(People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 927.) Thus, there was not reasonable 

suspicion to patsearch defendant once he was detained.

In this case the officers did not have sufficient information that a crime had been 

committed or was about to be committed and defendant was the person who had 

 

any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner or agent of a business 

establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry 

on business, or their customers, and who refuses to leave the premises of the business 

establishment.”) No reference was made to that Penal Code section in the call, and there 

was no indication in the call that person had refused to leave the premises or that he was 

obstructing or intimidating customers. 
13

committed that crime. There was no reasonable suspicion for them to detain defendant or 

patsearch him. The motion to suppress should have been granted. Because the motion to 

suppress was erroneously denied, the judgment must be reversed. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with instructions 

to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress, enter a new order granting the motion 

to suppress and conduct further proceedings in accordance with the law. 

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Blease, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.
1

Filed 12/10/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL JASON THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C083845

(Super. Ct. No. 16FE007658)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION FOR 

PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion of this court filed December 3, 2018, was not certified for publication 

in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears the opinion should be published in 

its entirety in the Official Reports and it is so ordered. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ 

Blease, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.
2

EDITORIAL LISTING

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Steve 

White, Judge. Reversed.

Richard M. Oberto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Jesse 

Witt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.