REPORT OF THE

INTERAGENCY COMMISSION

ON CRIME AND SECURITY IN

U.S. SEAPORTS

FALL 2000
Table of Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Chapter 7: Intelligence and Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Chapter 8: International Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Chapter 9: The State of Security in U.S. Seaports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Appendix A: Executive Memorandum Establishing the Commission. . . . . . . . . . 175

Appendix B: Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Appendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders . . . . . . 207

Appendix E: Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Appendix F: Model Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

i
Crime at U.S. Seaports

The Commission was not able to determine the full extent of serious crime at

seaports. No national data collection and

reporting systems are now in place that

cover serious crime in seaports. Federal

agency databases do not adequately collect

and report crime data by seaports, and

state and local law enforcement agencies

do not specifically collect and report crime

data by seaports. For these reasons, the

crime data summarized in this report,

while significant, do not offer a fully comprehensive picture. Serious crime at seaports is probably more extensive than what

is detected, reported, and retrievable from

federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies.

Criminal activity with a nexus to U.S.

seaports encompasses a broad range of

crimes, including the importation of illicit

drugs, contraband, and prohibited or

restricted merchandise; stowaways and

alien smuggling; trade fraud and commercial smuggling; environmental crimes;

cargo theft; and the unlawful exportation

of controlled commodities and munitions,

stolen property, and drug proceeds. 

While it is difficult to develop a complete picture of all crimes extant in seaports

because of venue, reporting definitions, and

collection issues, it is possible to look at

available reports as indicators to make

diagnostic conclusions. Significant criminal

activity is taking place at most of the 12

seaports surveyed by the Commission and

was not limited to a few specific seaports.

The primary criminal activity at seaports is

in violation of federal laws, much of it

directly related to the importation and

On April 27, 1999, President Clinton

signed an Executive Memorandum directing the establishment of the Interagency

Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.

Seaports. Citing both the importance of

seaports to the nation’s commerce and the

presence at seaports of crime and conspiracies associated with those crimes that

“pose threats to the people and critical

infrastructures of seaport cities,” the President called for “a comprehensive review of

the nature and extent of seaport crime and

the overall state of security in seaports, as

well as the ways in which governments at

all levels are responding to the problem.” 

The Executive Memorandum directed

that the Commission’s report include the

following:

■ An analysis of the nature and extent of

serious crime and an assessment of the

overall state of security in U.S. seaports.

■ An overview of the specific missions

and authorities of federal agencies with

relevant responsibilities, together with a

description in general terms of the typical roles played by state and local agencies as well as by the private sector.

■ An assessment of the nature and effectiveness of the ongoing coordination

among the federal, state, and local government agencies.

■ Recommendations for improving the

response of the federal, state, and local

governments to the problem of seaport

crime.

This executive summary presents the

Commission’s key findings and all of its

recommendations in response to the President’s mandate.

Executive Summary

iii
iv ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

half of fiscal year 2000, there were more

apprehensions of smuggled aliens than for

the three years for which the Commission

gathered crime data.

Trade fraud offenses were reported at 9 of

the 12 seaports surveyed. Most nondrug

import crimes go undetected at seaports

because less than 2 percent of the cargo is

inspected. Trade fraud includes diversion

of imported or in-bond merchandise into

the commerce of the United States; textile

transshipments to avoid quotas; undervaluation, double invoicing, or false description

of merchandise imported into the United

States; importation, transportation, and distribution of counterfeit goods subject to

trademark and copyrights; and importation,

transportation, and transshipment of items

that pose a threat to U.S. consumers or the

environment, including tainted or prohibited foodstuffs, medicines, unapproved

drugs, and chlorofluorocarbons. Environmental offenses were reported in 8 of the

12 seaports surveyed.

Cargo theft offenses or recoveries were

reported at 7 of the 12 seaports surveyed.

The vast majority of cargo thefts occur

outside of the seaports in the metropolitan

areas. Neither industry nor the law

enforcement community has been able to

provide a valid estimate of the severity of

the cargo theft problem for two reasons.

The first is that cargo crime is not a specific reportable offense in the Uniform Crime

Reporting Program. Adding it to a national

reporting system, such as the Uniform

Crime Reporting Program or the National

Incident-Based Reporting System, would

help law enforcement authorities assess the

extent of losses and develop appropriate

responses to the problem, and would also

increase state and local law enforcement

authorities’ awareness of the crime. The

second reason is the reluctance of the private sector to report cargo theft to law

enforcement authorities. The private sector

is chiefly concerned with rising insurance

premiums, competitiveness within the

industry, and reputation for reliability. The

exportation of goods and contraband. Federal agencies are primarily responsible for

contraband and alien interdiction. State and

local law enforcement agencies support

federal anti-smuggling efforts, but focus

primarily on violent and property crimes on

seaport premises.

Drug smuggling is the prevalent crime

problem reported at seaports. Cocaine is

the principal illicit drug smuggled into the

United States through seaports, but significant quantities of marijuana are also smuggled. Most illicit drugs enter through commercial traffic, particularly in containers,

but some also enter on commercial vessels

and passenger cruise ships, concealed by

crewmembers and passengers. Smuggling

by crewmembers is a particular problem at

seaports where bulk cargo is imported. 

Internal conspiracies present the most

serious challenge to drug interdiction

efforts at seaports because they can thwart

traditional Customs Service targeting and

examination processes. These conspiracies

are criminal activities committed by smugglers or other organized criminal groups

aided by corrupt individuals employed in

seaports or within the transportation industry. They were reported at 9 of the 12 seaports the Commission surveyed. Drug

smuggling organizations use transportation

industry employees with access to seaport

areas, and/or with specific knowledge of

Customs procedures, to facilitate their drug

smuggling operations at seaports by controlling and monitoring drug shipments

concealed inside cargo shipments of legitimate importers. These internal conspiracies

play a substantial role in facilitating drug

smuggling and present a major investigative challenge to interdiction efforts.

Stowaways and alien smuggling are the

largest problems facing the Immigration

and Naturalization Service in seaports. At

10 of the 12 seaports surveyed it is stowaways. However, organized alien smuggling has also surfaced as a major concern,

particularly on the West Coast. In the first
Threat Posed by Terrorism

Although seaports represent an important

component of the nation’s transportation

infrastructure, there is no indication that

U.S. seaports are currently being targeted

by terrorists. The FBI considers the present

threat of terrorism directed at any U.S. seaports to be low, even though their vulnerability to attack is high. The Commission

believes that such an attack has the potential to cause significant damage. Some port

organizations expressed frustration with

not being made aware of specific threat

information on an ongoing basis.

Combating terrorism can be divided into

three fundamental activities: crisis management, consequence management, and

protective measures. National-level responsibilities for crisis and consequence management are clearly delineated in Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62.

Responding to terrorism is a multidisciplinary effort that involves prevention of

potential acts, investigation of acts that do

occur, and crisis and consequence management. Therefore, a comprehensive response

to terrorism involves the efforts of law

enforcement and intelligence agencies,

emergency response agencies, and, when

necessary, even the military. A full assessment of the threat of terrorism in U.S. seaports appears in Chapter 4 of the complete

report.

The State of Security of U.S.

Seaports

The state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair, and, in a

few cases, good.

There are no widely accepted standards

or guidelines for physical, procedural, and

personnel security for seaports, although

some ports are making outstanding efforts

to improve security. Control of access to

the seaport or sensitive areas within the

seaports is often lacking. Practices to

most effective law enforcement efforts to

combat cargo thefts are task forces comprised of state, local, and federal agencies,

which are specifically trained and dedicated to attacking cargo theft.

Export crime is perpetrated to avoid the

United States’ controls on the export of

strategic and sensitive items including

munitions and firearms, weapons of mass

destruction-related materials and components (such as chemical precursors and

biological agents), missiles, critical technologies, military hardware and equipment,

critical dual-use items, and monetary

instruments. Outbound currency seizures

were reported at 6 of the 12 seaports surveyed. The three largest outbound currency

seizures ever made by Customs have been

in seaports. A shipper’s export declaration

is required for most goods. But many filings are vague and incomplete, only half

are filed electronically, and most are filed

after the vessel has departed. Data are not

available to assess the extent of export

crime at U.S. seaports. However, export

crime statistics for the 12 seaports surveyed covering the period 1996-1998 suggest that the export of stolen vehicles is the

most detected export crime at the seaports,

followed by export crime involving controlled commodities and munitions.

Stolen vehicle exports were reported at 10

of the 12 seaports surveyed. The National

Insurance Crime Bureau reports that more

than 200,000 stolen automobiles, totaling

$4 billion in value, are illegally shipped

out of the United States each year. 

Other serious crime, covering offenses

such as bribery, public corruption, extortion, and racketeering, was reported at 5 of

the 12 seaports surveyed. The extent of

these crimes is hard to determine because

they are difficult to identify and expose,

but most law enforcement officials agree

that they do occur at seaports. 

A full assessment of crime in U.S. seaports is addressed in Chapter 3 of the complete report.

Executive Summary ■ v
vi ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

bility/threat assessments for those seaports,

and a lack of specific security standards.

The Commission developed a methodology to evaluate the various ports. This

became the basis for the Model Port

included in Appendix F, which could

become the framework for discussions on

general guidelines for security at seaports.

BORDER CONTROL AT U.S.

SEAPORTS

Effective controls on the arrivals of passengers, crew, and cargo can substantially

reduce terrorist and other criminal threats

at seaports.

Cruise ship passenger controls. The level

of passenger security in place at terminals

that serve cruise lines indicates a commitment to security. Terminals uniformly

employ private security forces, who appear

to know which police unit should be notified when there is a problem. Security procedures are, for the most part, well coordinated between terminal and vessel

personnel in the case of passengers boarding to depart the United States. However,

the arrival of international passengers is

marked by facilities that allow direct

access to uncontrolled areas where disembarking passengers and their baggage

intermingle with visitors, baggage handlers, truck drivers delivering stores to

ships, and dock workers—many of whom

may not have been cleared by anyone for

access to those areas. Separation of arriving passengers and baggage could be

accomplished by facilities dedicated to

passenger control and examination following Federal Inspection Services guidelines.

Import control. More than 600 laws and

500 trade agreements must be checked for

applicability on each import. Sixty separate federal agencies have an interest in

inspecting merchandise. Customs is the

agency with the largest presence for cargo

restrict or control the access of vehicles to

vessels, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations

at seaports are either not present or not

consistently enforced, increasing the risk

that violators could quickly remove cargo

or contraband. Many ports do not have

identification cards issued to personnel to

restrict access to vessels, cargo receipt and

delivery operations, and passenger processing operations. 

At many seaports, the carrying of

firearms is not restricted, and thus internal

conspirators and other criminals are

allowed armed access to cargo vessels and

cruise line terminals. In addition, many

seaports rely on private security personnel

who lack the crime prevention and law

enforcement training and capability of regular police officers.

Frequently, federal, state and local law

enforcement agencies do cooperate with

each other in regard to security matters,

including the sharing of intelligence. However, there were locations surveyed where

private sector representatives said they

were unclear which federal agency

required reports of possible cargo thefts

and other violations. No regular securityrelated local meetings are being held

between law enforcement organizations

(federal, state, and local), the trade, and

port authorities, with the exception of

those relatively few Strategic Seaports

where Port Readiness Committees are

active. 

Visits to 4 of the nation’s 13 commercial

Strategic Seaports, which are critical

chokepoints for future military mobilizations, found that the National Port Readiness Network/local Port Readiness Committee concept is fundamentally sound, but

in need of increased emphasis and support.

Specific problems included inadequate

proactive local planning for military mobilization security, a lack of actual port

readiness exercises, an absence of vulnera-
Location of federal inspection facilities.

Federal inspection facilities should be

located at the docks rather than in remote

private sector locations. And federal

inspection agencies should be co-located in

joint facilities so that they can share equipment, reduce costs, and coordinate

enforcement and compliance examinations.

Export control. The law and regulations for

exports are different from those for

imports. Recent advances in the Automated

Export System have increased filing of

shipper’s export declarations via automation to almost 50 percent, but the delayed

filing privilege allows most goods to

depart the country before information is

available to control agencies. The inspection and criminal investigation personnel

resources devoted to export transactions

are only a small fraction of those devoted

to imports. Customs and the Commerce

Department are the agencies with preeminent roles.

Seaports are vulnerable to those trying

to acquire or sell U.S. goods illegally.

Some of these goods, such as weapons,

munitions, and critical technology, affect

the national security. Other crimes, such as

diversion into the U.S. economy of foodstuffs that had been denied entry into the

country, affect public health.

A full assessment of the state of security

in U.S. seaports appears in Chapters 5 and

9 of the complete report.

Roles and Authorities in

Seaports

The 361 U.S. seaports range widely in size

and characteristics. The most basic economic activity at seaports is effecting the

transportation of cargo. The regulatory

framework of U.S. seaports, which began

their existence in this country before there

was a national government, evolved very

differently from that of other entities such

as airports. The United States has no

inspection in seaports; Agriculture is second. 

Given the immense volume of cargo,

without automated assistance, a difficult

task would certainly be impossible. In

1982, Customs implemented the Automated Commercial System, which allows

importers to file import documentation and

pay duties electronically. The collection,

analysis, and dissemination of usable cargo

information are essential to protecting U.S.

border ports. However, the Automated

Commercial System is now outdated and

relies on inadequate or inaccurate information. Criminals can bypass the federal

clearance and inspection process through

underreporting, misreporting, or not

reporting at all. Information on ships’ manifests is often wrong or incomplete. Import

entry documentation contains more information than the manifest, but it is not

required for at least five days after arrival.

Violators have exploited the in-bond system for moving imported cargo across the

country for export from a different port;

they divert or substitute cargo, evade

duties, or smuggle unlawful merchandise.

These issues need to be addressed. 

Violations of regulations on imports of

foreign food and the introduction of foreign insect species raise concerns about

imports that can affect the nation’s food

supply. U.S. agricultural interests have suffered major losses as a result of infusions

of foreign insects and plant species. Concerns have also been raised about the safety of food imported through seaports.

An unintended consequence of increasing automation is that federal inspectors

are more often behind computers than on

the docks. This creates opportunities for

criminal enterprises to take hold. Many

stakeholders told the Commission that

more federal inspectors were needed at the

docks. An alternative would be mobile

computer systems that provide inspectors

with timely information and free them

from their office computer terminals. 

Executive Summary ■ vii
viii ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

security forces, labor groups and dock

workers, and trade associations. 

A more detailed overview of missions

and authorities appears in Chapter 2 of the

complete report.

Nature and Effectiveness of

Coordination

The threat warning systems designed to

relay specific information from the federal

sector to the private sector appear to be

satisfactory and operating as intended.

Partnership programs have been very successful and are a force multiplier for federal agencies. However, policing and security

functions are fragmented at many seaports,

and coordination is lacking among the various police and security personnel. There is

a disparity in substantive knowledge, training, and capability in port security and law

enforcement matters between the local

police (including port police) and contract

security personnel at many ports that were

surveyed. At some seaports there is an

apparent mistrust of, and lack of cooperation between, labor and law enforcement

agencies. 

Cooperation among law enforcement

agencies. The Commission found that

coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is good at the 12 seaports surveyed.

The nature and extent of coordination

efforts encompasses a wide variety of

criminal activities, among a range of law

enforcement agencies. The varied coordination efforts included drug smuggling,

health and safety crimes, stolen vehicles

and cargo theft, environmental crimes, and

export control crimes. Some of the coordination efforts were solely among federal

law enforcement agencies; other efforts

included federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies.

Although much of the crime at seaports

involves violations of federal laws relating

national port authority. The federal, state,

and local governments share jurisdiction

over ports and harbors. The primary

responsibility rests with the states, which

charter seaports within their territories. A

port authority is an instrumentality of state

or local governments. Some marine terminals are operated by public port authorities,

others by private sector tenants of the port

authority. Other facilities are wholly independent of the state. The Commission found

that it is very different in each seaport. 

The Second Act of Congress in 1789

established the Customs Service and its

ports of entry, with a mission of being

present at every unlading of a vessel in

order to conduct a complete inventory of

the cargo, appraise the value, and collect

the applicable duty as well as tonnage

taxes and fees. The Coast Guard was established in 1790 as the Revenue Cutter Service to enforce the nation’s customs laws

on the seas. The roles of both agencies

have expanded greatly through the years.

Among many other federal agencies that

play important roles at seaports are the

Department of Agriculture, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Food and

Drug Administration, the Environmental

Protection Agency, and the Department of

Commerce. The Department of Defense,

through the Maritime Administration, has

port planning orders in place at 13 commercial seaports (designated as Strategic

Seaports), which identify tentative arrangements for the use of facilities and services

needed for military deployments.

State and local governments, as well as

all levels of law enforcement, have important roles. Among the major stakeholders

of seaports are the port authorities, vessel

operators/carriers, terminal operators,

trucking companies, warehouse or container freight station operators, railroads,

importers and exporters, freight forwarders, cruise line operators, contract
Commission found that three important

enablers—technology, intelligence and

information management, and international

cooperation—warrant specific focus.

Technology

While using technology is only one means

to an end and not the end itself, adding the

right technology at U.S. seaports can: (1)

increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and

safety of port operations and the enforcement of applicable laws and regulations;

(2) decrease vulnerabilities to criminal

activities; (3) serve as a force multiplier for

port operators and enforcement agencies;

(4) provide new capabilities for port security and control; and (5) facilitate quick

responses for military mobilization, terrorist threats, and new requirements. 

An extensive review of technology

already available and under development

for use in the next five years finds that

viable technology exists for purposes of

security, investigation, and contraband

detection. Some of this technology is

already in place; some is being developed;

much could be adapted to meet the needs

that the Commission has identified at seaports. A joint effort by federal inspection

agencies to develop a five-year plan identifying technology needs, priorities for

deployment, and funding sources is essential. The application of technology needs to

be addressed across the agencies in seaports on a continual basis.

A more detailed list of available technology is included in Appendix E, and further discussion is in Chapter 5 of the complete report as well.

Intelligence and Information

Management

The Commission heard concerns from law

enforcement agency personnel and maritime industry focus groups that informato the importation and exportation of

goods, most of the state and local law

enforcement agencies support anti-smuggling efforts. Some of the most successful

law enforcement efforts were at seaports

where multiagency task forces of federal,

state, and local agencies addressed specific

crime problems. Few seaports, however,

have stand-alone task forces where agencies routinely meet to discuss approaches

to all types of crime, rather than a specific

crime, and to assess threats to the seaport.

Additional resources allocated by law

enforcement agencies might increase participation in task forces and other effective

interagency partnerships and initiatives

involving federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies and might also

enhance cooperation, coordination, and

responses to seaport crime.

Role of port officials. Some commercial

port officials either were unaware of the

nature and extent of crime being committed

at their seaports or considered most of the

criminal activity related to the importation

and exportation of goods, where there was

no immediate victim in the port, to be the

responsibility of the federal government.

Role of security. Inadequate security at seaports contributes to criminal activity. Many

law enforcement officials believe that security enhancements are essential in the long

run to combat internal conspiracies, smuggling by crewmembers, alien smuggling,

and cargo theft, while reducing the vulnerability of critical seaport infrastructure, and

increasing the effectiveness of the federal

government’s border control functions. 

A full assessment of the nature and

effectiveness of ongoing cooperation

among federal, state, and local agencies

appears in Chapter 6 of the complete

report.

ADDITIONAL MATTERS

In addition to addressing the tasks contained in the Executive Memorandum, the

Executive Summary ■ ix
x ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

threats among port facilities and vessel

operators, and expanding the availability of

threat information from government

sources through training, outreach, and

public/private interagency forums, such as

local port security committees, would do

much to alleviate this problem.

Finally, the information systems that

support decision-making need attention.

The Customs information management and

processing systems are of critical importance. These underlying systems process

the electronic equivalent of millions of

documents and forms that are associated

with the importation, movement, and clearance of hundreds of billions of dollars of

commercial cargo. They must be strengthened to accommodate the ever-increasing

demands of international trade. It is important not only that robust electronic data

processing systems are maintained, but that

such systems continue to evolve and develop to reflect the changing trade environment and interagency enforcement and

compliance priorities. The Automated

Commercial Environment plan of the Customs Service is a step in that direction.

The issues of intelligence and information management are more fully addressed

in Chapter 7 of the full report.

International Cooperation

International commerce has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.

Globalization and the liberalization of trade

practices have resulted in fewer impediments to trade and an increase in the flow

of goods, most of which are transported by

sea. Advances in technology and communications have changed the way companies

conduct business. More companies have

become global in nature. International competition, open markets, and the dropping of

trade barriers contribute to the selection of

goods available to U.S. consumers and producers. Developed nations like the United

States are increasingly dependent on fortion needed for seaport security was lacking in three principal areas: (1) availability

to law enforcement agencies of relevant,

actionable intelligence on seaport crime;

(2) awareness of terrorist threats and availability of threat information to the private

sector as well as to inspection personnel at

seaports; and (3) integrated information on

the movement of vessels, people, and cargo

within seaports and ready availability of

that information to government agencies

and private sector security organizations. 

Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating

intelligence is central to effective efforts to

counter seaport crime. Predictive, operational intelligence of a quality that provides explicit information that is usable at

the tactical level can increase the probability that certain threats can be identified and,

if appropriate, interdicted before arrival in

U.S. ports and container or other inspections will result in contraband seizures and

arrests. Development of intelligence

sources, overseas and at home, is critical.

Exchange of information on terrorist

threats, criminal activities, and port security among law enforcement agencies and

the private sector is also critical. Multiple

federal agencies distribute terrorist threat

information to a variety of end users, each

targeting different customers. These

processes appear to be working well, with

end users gaining access to terrorist threat

information through the most appropriate

channels. Therefore, it does not appear necessary to centralize the distribution of this

information within a single federal agency,

or to incorporate terrorist threat dissemination procedures for seaports into regulation.

Problems persist, though, with getting

more general information on crime and

security trends into the hands of the security personnel at the ports who must implement enhanced security measures. In many

cases this is a lack of internal communication between the private sector and law

enforcement agencies at the ports. Increasing the awareness of security-related
complete report. The key findings that

drive the recommendations are summated

here. The recommendations are numbered

in the sequence that they appear in the

report.

Finding 1. Notwithstanding the existence

of a series of Presidential Decision Directives, as well as various national strategies

and other directives with application to

security in seaports, there exists a need for

a more comprehensive and definitive statement of the specific federal responsibilities

in this context. Moreover, this statement

should be disseminated broadly, particularly to the local levels at which most security

activities and operations are undertaken.

Recommendation 1. Strengthen interagency, intergovernmental, and public/private sector efforts to address the threats of

seaport crime (including terrorism), and to

enhance control of imports and exports

through seaports. Unless otherwise specified in Presidential Decision Directives

and other policy documents, lead agencies

to initiate action and promote increased

cooperation should be as follows: Customs, for international cargo and related

contraband smuggling; Immigration, for

admissibility of international

passengers/crew and alien smuggling;

Coast Guard, for seaport security; and FBI,

for counter-terrorism.

Finding 2. Most persons who consider the

significance of seaports within the larger

community see them as vehicles to promote economic growth. Attention to seaport security is insufficient in part because

dissemination to the local levels of what

national efforts are underway, and how

security can reduce crime and terrorism

vulnerabilities, is lacking.

Recommendation 2. Strengthen the efforts

of the Marine Transportation System

national organizations to enhance the

awareness of state and local governments

eign markets to produce goods through

cheaper manufacturing costs.

The security of foreign seaports has a

direct influence on the security of U.S. seaports. Shipping and cargo originating in or

transiting foreign ports provide an avenue

for the introduction of transnational threats

to the United States. Increased involvement

overseas by U.S. law enforcement agencies

engaged cooperatively with their foreign

counterparts is essential to proactive policing of international cargo crime and to

improving the results of law enforcement

efforts. 

International cooperation can be critical

in addressing many of the issues that are

the focus of this report. The susceptibility

of U.S. ports to the repercussions of lax

security in foreign ports, for instance,

makes international port security engagement a priority.

The issue of international cooperation is

more fully addressed in Chapter 8 of the

complete report.

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommendations set

forth below have significant crime control

and other national security implications.

Substantial resources will be required to

implement many of them. These resources

may be reprogrammed from within a

department’s base funding, or new

resources in addition to base funding. The

Commission urges that the findings and

recommendations of this report be accorded prominence for agency policy, program,

budget, and regulatory purposes. To the

extent that the recommendations have

resource implications, the Commission

recognizes that they must be weighed

against other priorities in the context of the

overall budget process. 

There are many more specific findings

contained in Chapters 2 through 8 of the

Executive Summary ■ xi
xii ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Based Reporting System. The Criminal

Justice Information Services Advisory Policy Board should take the lead in the

development, management, and continued

evaluation of cargo theft to facilitate the

data collection required to assess the

nature and extent of cargo theft reporting

and facilitate databasing. This will ensure

that such information provides the maximum utility to its intended users.

Finding 5. Coordination and cooperation

among federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies could be improved at

seaports by more joint efforts with a seaport focus. Comprehensive interagency

crime threat assessments, which currently

are not conducted at seaports, offer one

such opportunity. By preparing annual

crime threat assessments, federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies would

develop a better understanding of the overall crime threat at each seaport and also lay

the groundwork for enhanced communication, cooperation, and coordination.

Recommendation 5. Prepare, on an annual

basis, comprehensive interagency crime

threat assessments for seaports with international trade to support coordinated operational planning and enforcement activities

as appropriate. All federal, state, and local

law enforcement agencies with significant

regulatory and enforcement missions,

including Customs, Immigration, the Food

and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the FBI, the

Coast Guard, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, should participate on a joint basis. The Intelligence

Community should, to the extent allowed

by law, support these threat assessments.

Customs should coordinate this initiative,

and should consider providing a sanitized

version of the crime threat assessment to

the private sector.

and private sector interests (including

labor) of the vital role that seaports play in

national security that extends beyond their

indispensable contribution to the nation’s

economy.

Finding 3. The Commission was not able

to determine the full extent of serious

crime at seaports. No national data collection and reporting systems now in place

cover serious crime in seaports. Federal

agency databases do not adequately collect

and report crime data by seaports, and

state and local law enforcement agencies

do not specifically collect and report crime

data by seaports. While significant, the

crime data summarized in this report do

not reflect the full extent of the problem;

serious crime at seaports is probably more

extensive than what is detected, reported,

and retrievable from federal, state, and

local law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation 3. Modify, to the extent

feasible, the existing databases of federal

agencies with significant regulatory and

enforcement missions at seaports to ensure

the collection and retrievability of data

relating to crime with a nexus to seaports.

Finding 4. Cargo theft is a major concern

to the private sector entities that operate at

seaports. Although the vast majority of the

reported cargo thefts take place while shipments are outside of the seaports in the

metropolitan areas, seaports provide central locations where organized crime

groups can locate and easily target a wide

variety of high value goods. The lack of a

national collection and reporting system

for cargo theft data and the underreporting

of cargo theft losses by the private sector

hinder the assessment of the problem and

the development of appropriate solutions.

Recommendation 4. Evaluate the feasibility of capturing data on cargo theft offenses

(including cargo thefts taking place outside

of seaports) through the National Incident-
■ On an expedited basis, the Coast Guard

and the FBI (including the National

Infrastructure Protection Center), in

coordination with other relevant agencies and the private sector, should develop a system for categorizing seaport

physical and information infrastructure

based on both vulnerability and threat

(e.g., low, medium, and high risk).

The federal government should establish

baseline vulnerability and threat assessments for terrorism at U.S. seaports as

soon as possible. Priority should be given

to the Strategic Seaports, Presidential

Decision Directive 40 “Controlled Ports,”

and economically strategic seaports, the

criteria for which should be developed by

the Interagency Committee on the Marine

Transportation System/Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council.

Thereafter, threat and vulnerability assessments should be conducted every three

years. The FBI should ensure that seaports

are included within its field offices’

domestic terrorism surveys to assess the

potential threat. The Coast Guard should

conduct port vulnerability assessments.

Both the FBI and the Coast Guard should

coordinate their efforts with other agencies, particularly the Department of

Defense for the seaports designated as

Strategic Seaports for large-scale military

mobilizations, and those designated as

Controlled Ports under PDD 40. Results

should be made available, as appropriate,

to all relevant agencies and local port security committees.

■ Coast Guard Captains of the Port and

the FBI should ensure that their respective Maritime Counterterrorism Plans

and Incident Contingency Plans are

updated and coordinated annually, and

exercised regularly with other concerned

federal, state, local, and private entities.

Finding 8. Passenger processing facilities

for cruise ships do not provide the security

needed for federal officials to undertake

their inspections and related efforts associFinding 6. Certain existing statutes, regulations, and sentencing guidelines do not

provide sufficient sanctions to deter criminal or civil violations related to the import

and export of goods and contraband, fraud,

cargo theft, and other non-drug-related

crimes.

Recommendation 6. Promote enactment as

soon as possible of the 21st Century Law

Enforcement and Public Safety Act, which

includes proposals for the creation of new

criminal violations and enhanced penalties

related to seaport crime. Additionally, federal agencies—including Customs, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and

others—should work with the Department

of Justice to identify needs for new statutes

and forfeiture provisions, including stiffer

civil and criminal penalties for import- and

export-related seaport crime. Justice

should take the lead in this initiative.

Finding 7. Coordination among law

enforcement agencies at all levels of government is generally good where FBI Joint

Terrorism Task Forces are located to coordinate the exchange of information and

joint investigations. However, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces did not typically focus

on activity in seaports. The extent of coordination (among non-law enforcement

agencies and key private sector entities)

related to counter-terrorism security measures was inconsistent at the 12 seaports

surveyed.

Recommendation 7. Intensify the federal

government efforts to assist seaports in

preparing for the possibility of terrorist

acts directed at critical infrastructure.

Specifically, the Department of Transportation, as Lead Sector Agency for Transportation in accordance with Presidential

Decision Directive 63, should be responsible for coordinating implementation of the

following recommendations:

Executive Summary ■ xiii
xiv ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Finding 11. Vessel manifest information,

import and export, is sometimes deficient

for the purposes of import risk assessment

and export cargo control. Vessel manifest

information is more easily utilized for drug

enforcement and commercial compliance

efforts if it is received in electronic data

formats before the arrival of the vessel.

Recommendation 11. Undertake a comprehensive initiative to improve cargo

import procedures and related efforts to

target seaport crime. Customs, in consultation with other relevant federal agencies,

should:

■ Proceed with the development of the

Automated Commercial Environment

(ACE) and Automated Export System

(AES) to ensure the adequacy of underlying Federal automated systems

required to process commercial

data/information.

■ Propose revisions to its regulations to

require that all ocean manifests be transmitted electronically to Customs sufficiently in advance of the arrival of the

vessel to allow manifest information to

be used effectively.

■ Propose regulations, and, if necessary,

legislation, requiring for all entries,

including in-bond entries, the same level

of information required for entries

released into the commerce of the United States.

■ Propose requiring that the above information be transmitted to Customs electronically before release of shipments

for movement, including in-bond movement, from the port at which goods covered by the entry first arrive.

■ Work closely with all other agencies

having enforcement or regulatory

responsibilities at the border to arrange

for the above information to be distributed on a real-time basis to all agencies

having an interest in the goods covered

by a particular entry.

ated with international travelers and crew

members.

Recommendation 8. Develop and propose

new regulations to create a secure area

(Federal Inspection Stations) in seaports

where international passengers or passengers from foreign countries disembark.

Customs, Immigration, and other relevant

agencies should undertake this initiative on

a joint basis.

Finding 9. The continuing increases in

international passenger and crew arrivals

have placed increasing strains on the current inspection processes of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. With these

increases have also come increases in

stowaways and alien smuggling.

Recommendation 9. Proceed with the

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Seaport Reengineering System Pilot Program for managing risk with respect to the

admissibility of passengers and crew at the

nation’s seaports consistent with the President’s 2001 budget request.

Finding 10. The federal agency automated

systems are not easily accessible from

waterfront cargo facilities or remote container examination stations. Lack of ready

access impedes service level efficiencies,

enforcement activities, and commercial

compliance initiatives.

Recommendation 10. Establish, to the

maximum extent possible, shared dockside

inspection facilities (Federal Inspection

Stations) at seaports for use by relevant

agencies. Customs should take the lead

with this initiative and coordinate it with

implementation of the five-year technology

plan (see Recommendation 15). Other relevant inspection agencies (e.g., Coast

Guard, Food and Drug Administration,

Agriculture) should conduct coordinated

inspections and staff the Stations appropriately.
■ Commerce should develop a dedicated

team at each Commerce/Export

Enforcement field office to work with

Customs to target export control crimes

and provide training to Customs on

export control documentation as needed.

Stakeholders, such as freight forwarders,

should be targeted for compliance education and outreach by joint Customs

and Commerce enforcement teams as

needed.

Finding 13. The federal government has

established formal structures for coordinating government efforts and developed

national strategies to address drug trafficking, terrorism, and other domestic and

international crime; military mobilization

at seaports; and airport security. Seaport

security per se, however, has not been adequately addressed. Stronger and more

focused interagency and public/private sector efforts to enhance seaport security are

needed to address the threats of crime and

terrorism, and to enhance control of

imports and exports, in order to meet

national security and economic mobility

requirements.

Recommendation 13. Create, under the

Marine Transportation System initiative,

national-level security subcommittees of

the Interagency Committee on the Marine

Transportation System (made up of representatives from the federal government

including Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Maritime Administration, Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and others as appropriate)

and the Marine Transportation System

National Advisory Council (made up of

representatives from the private sector

including port authorities, ocean carriers,

terminal operators, organized labor, truckers, warehouse proprietors, and railroads)

to discuss, evaluate, and propose solutions

related to seaport security and to address

research and development, with emphasis

on emerging technologies.

Finding 12. Inadequate security, particularly existing cargo control measures, renders

U.S. seaports vulnerable to those seeking

to acquire or sell U.S. goods illegally. 

Recommendation 12. Strengthen the

export enforcement programs, while preserving export facilitation, by proceeding

as follows:

■ The Department of Commerce should

engage in rulemaking to require the

electronic filing of export documentation for ocean shipping one day before a

shipment’s departure to facilitate targeting of illegal/illicit shipments and other

criminal activity by law enforcement

agencies. The proposed rule should provide for waiver authority for exigent circumstances. This information should be

made available on a real-time basis to

agencies with law enforcement responsibilities related to the seaports.

■ The agencies with export enforcement

responsibilities should update relevant

regulatory authorities to increase fines

and penalties (both administrative and

civil) for export documentation violations, including provisions for enforcement personnel at all relevant federal

agencies to issue on-the-spot fines for

export documentation violations.

■ All relevant agencies should strengthen

government export document review

programs aimed at enforcement of

export control laws to increase export

document review and identification of

potential violations, and to increase

export control-related investigations and

enforcement activity, including legal

support.

■ Customs and the Office of Export

Enforcement in the Department of Commerce should work jointly to improve

effectiveness of existing resources by

setting appropriate standards for seaports for export documentation compliance checks and by strengthening interagency cooperation.

Executive Summary ■ xv
xvi ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Restricting the access of vehicles to seaports and facilities in seaports and

requiring port authorities and the principal private sector businesses that use

seaports to implement procedures that

achieve appropriate control and accountability.

■ Restricting the carrying of firearms in

seaports.

■ Developing a private security officer

certification program to improve the

professionalism of port security officers.

Finding 15. Security-enhancing technology

and equipment that could assist law

enforcement personnel in accomplishing

their missions is not available at most seaports.

Recommendation 15. Develop, on a joint

basis with all relevant federal agencies, a

five-year crime and security technology

deployment plan that addresses examination and investigative technology that can

be deployed to seaports. Customs should

take the lead in establishing a task force to

develop a plan that considers utilizing current mechanisms and programs, such as the

Customs Border Integrity Project. This

plan should address joint acquisition/use of

equipment. Upon completion of the plan,

appropriate funding should be sought

through the regular budgetary process.

Finding 16. The National Port Readiness

Network/local Port Readiness Committee

concept in the designated Strategic Seaports is fundamentally sound but in need

of increased emphasis.

Recommendation 16. Strengthen, through

the National Port Readiness Network, with

Transportation and Defense as the lead

agencies, the planning and coordination for

military mobilization security at each

Strategic Seaport. These efforts should

include the following:

Finding 14. No minimum security standards or guidelines exist for seaports and

their facilities.

Recommendation 14. Develop, through

the proposed national-level security subcommittee: (a) voluntary minimum security guidelines for U.S. seaports and their

users that are linked to existing Coast

Guard Captain of the Port controls of maritime trade; and (b) a model port concept,

to include a list of risk-based best practices

for use by terminal operators. The voluntary guidelines and the model port concept

should take into account the differing risk

levels and other security factors among

ports and should be reviewed and updated

at least every five years. To the extent that

this approach does not promote significant

and generally uniform security improvements at seaports within the next five

years, alternative approaches should be

considered, including making such guidelines mandatory. Consistent with Presidential Decision Directive 63, Transportation

should be responsible for coordinating

implementation, and the security guidelines should address, among other topics,

the following:

■ Uniform practices for physical security

(fences, lighting, gates, etc.); for controlling the delivery, receipt, and movement of cargo, passengers, and crew;

and for identifying high-risk individuals

who seek access to sensitive areas within the seaport.

■ A private sector credentialing process

that limits access to sensitive seaport

areas. States, unions, port authorities,

and/or port terminal operators should

administer this process. The national

security committee should also assess

the desirability and feasibility of utilizing criminal background checks to assist

in determining access to restricted or

sensitive areas at the seaports, including

the advisability of port-specific

approaches.
tion, and dissemination at seaports by proceeding as follows:

■ The Coast Guard should work with relevant agencies to coordinate development

of an integrated, real-time information

system for tracking the movement of

vessels (including cargo and personnel)

within the seaport environment. This

system would be available for use by

relevant law enforcement and inspection

agencies in crime prevention and security efforts.

■ Law enforcement agencies should develop specific collection requirements for

foreign intelligence collection efforts

concerning the illicit movement of merchandise and contraband in commercial

cargo through seaports.

■ The Central Intelligence Agency and

other national intelligence agencies

should increase foreign intelligence collection efforts aimed at providing specific, actionable information about those

international criminal activities affecting

seaports that have been identified as

national security threats to the United

States (e.g., drug trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).

■ Law enforcement agencies should work

together to ensure that they have an

effective mechanism to process and

share intelligence at the seaport level as

appropriate. 

Finding 19. The security of foreign seaports has a direct impact on the security of

U.S. seaports. Shipping and cargo originating in or transiting foreign ports provide an

avenue for the introduction of transnational

threats to the United States.

Recommendation 19. Work internationally

to strengthen global seaport security by:

■ Continuing implementation of the President’s International Crime Control Strategy and other related strategies.

■ Local Port Readiness Committees

should actively participate in Department of Defense-sponsored combatant

commander and Service mobilization

exercises/cargo movements (in addition

to their own biennial port readiness

tabletop exercises) to ensure realism and

efficient use of Department of Defense

assets.

■ The Department of Defense should

assist the Coast Guard in establishing

additional security guidelines for commercial facilities handling military

cargo at the Strategic Seaports and for

those seaports designated as Controlled

Ports under Presidential Decision Directive 40.

Finding 17. Seaport security is a complex

issue that involves federal, state, and local

governments, port authorities, and hundreds of businesses; coordination related to

seaport security measures is generally

inadequate, in part because security-related

meetings are not held in most seaports.

Recommendation 17. Establish local Port

Security Committees-or possibly a subcommittee of an existing Harbor Safety

Committee or Port Readiness Committeeat seaports, including representatives from

the port authority, federal, state, and local

governments, and the private sector

(including organized labor), to discuss and

develop solutions for port-specific security

issues. The responsible Coast Guard Captain of the Port should chair the local Port

Security Committee.

Finding 18. Information about the movement of vessels, people, and cargo within

seaports is not integrated, nor is it always

readily available to government and private

sector security organizations responsible

for detecting, intercepting, and preventing

terrorism and other criminal activity.

Recommendation 18. Improve information

(including intelligence) collection, integraExecutive Summary ■ xvii
xviii ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Finding 20. Assessing the adequacy of personnel resources contributing to seaport

security is complicated by a combination

of many factors. Any such assessment

would need to address the following

points, among others: (a) all relevant personnel, including criminal investigators,

inspectors, analysts and support staff; (b)

the interdependency of the federal agency

personnel who comprise the “federal team”

at seaports; (c) possible application of current and planned approaches to personnel

issues associated with air and land ports of

entry; and (d) the optimal overall mix of

federal/state/ local/private sector personnel

and other assets needed to provide an

appropriate level of security, including border control, at seaports. 

Recommendation 20.Consider initiation,

through the new proposed national-level

security subcommittee, of a comprehensive, interagency study to analyze the

impact of current projections related to

seaport crime, trade volumes, technology,

and other key factors on future personnel

requirements for federal agencies having

border control responsibilities at seaports. 

■ Promoting, through federal agency initiatives and diplomatic channels, the

development by cognizant international

organizations of appropriate international guidelines for addressing seaport

crime and security issues. These organizations include the International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, the

Organization of American States, the

World Bank, the International Monetary

Fund, and other relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

■ Increasing cooperation and information

sharing with foreign law enforcement

and customs agencies.

■ Expanding training in seaport security

for less-developed countries that are

trading partners. Such training should be

targeted toward countries where there

are serious problems and/or special law

enforcement concerns. Topics should

include anti-corruption, export control,

and handling of transit goods.
■ Recommendations for improving the

response of the federal, state, and local

governments to the problem of seaport

crime.

A copy of the Executive Memorandum

establishing the Interagency Commission

on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

can be found in Appendix A.

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Attorney

General were directed to establish the

Interagency Commission on Crime and

Security in U.S. Seaports. Each appointed

a co-chair of the Commission to lead the

effort. Fifteen additional Commissioners

were appointed from departments and

agencies throughout the government that

had an interest in seaport crime and security. The Commissioners appointed full-time

staff members to carry out the day-to-day

work of the Commission.

Related Initiatives

About Seaport Security

Throughout this report, the Commission

has made regular reference to other related

initiatives. After its establishment, the

Commission’s first step was to review

already existing initiatives. The White

House, for example, has been active in

preparing and implementing national strategies when the issues are critical to the

country as a whole and successful response

requires the integrated efforts of many

agencies. The White House has also published numerous Presidential Decision

Directives providing guidance on key issues

relevant to seaport crime and security.

There is a National Security Strategy, an

On April 27, 1999, President William J.

Clinton signed an Executive Memorandum

directing the establishment of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security

in U.S. Seaports. The memorandum stated:

United States seaports are an integral part

of our Nation’s commerce. Too often,

however, they tend to be a major locus of

crime, including drug trafficking, cargo

theft, and smuggling of contraband and

aliens. Moreover, the criminal conspiracies often associated with these crimes

can pose threats to the people and critical

infrastructures of seaport cities.

Many government agencies at the Federal, State and local level are addressing

this significant problem, at times in partnership with the private sector. I have

determined that the Nation needs a comprehensive review of the nature and

extent of seaport crime and the overall

state of security in seaports, as well as

the ways in which government at all levels are responding to the problem.

The Executive Memorandum directed

that the Commission’s report include the

following:

■ An analysis of the nature and extent of

serious crime and an assessment of the

overall state of security in U.S. seaports.

■ An overview of the specific missions

and authorities of federal agencies with

relevant responsibilities, together with a

description in general terms of the typical roles played by state and local agencies as well as by the private sector.

■ An assessment of the nature and effectiveness of the ongoing coordination

among the federal, state, and local government agencies.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1
2 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

who had worked for many years in and

around the seaport environment had differing opinions on what constitutes a seaport,

what is serious crime, and what should be

included in security.

This report defines seaports as harbors

for seagoing vessels with facilities to lade

and unlade cargo and/or passengers and

with easy access to the sea (from the 24

nautical mile contiguous zone to the terminal, inclusively). Smaller seaports may

simply service vessels. According to the

Maritime Administration, there are 361

public seaports in the United States.

Many seaports are small and have limited commerce; only 144 have more than a

million tons of cargo. In the larger seaports, the activities can stretch along a

coast for many miles, including public

roads within their geographic boundaries.

The facilities used to support arriving and

departing cargo are sometimes miles from

the coast. The inland ports accept mostly

bulk products such as grain, petroleum,

coal, and steel. The seaports that accept

international cargo have a higher risk of

international crimes such as smuggling of

drugs and aliens.

The top 50 ports in the United States

account for about 90 percent of all the

cargo tonnage. In terms of container shipments, 25 U.S. seaports handle 98 percent

of the cargo. Cruise ships visiting foreign

destinations embark from 16 ports.

This report defines crime as unlawful

activity. It can take many forms. For example, there is profit-driven crime, and political-driven crime. There are violent crimes,

and there are white-collar crimes. The purpose of this report is to discuss crime as it

applies to U.S. seaports, so the report

divides its consideration of crime into two

forms—terrorism, which generally has

political motivations, and all other forms

of crime, which are more typically profitdriven.

International Crime Control Strategy, and

The National Drug Control Strategy. Congress and the President have worked closely

in commissioning important studies,

including Critical Foundations—Protecting

America’s Infrastructure, Aviation and

Safety at U.S. Airports, The Maritime

Transportation System, International Organized Crime and Cargo Theft, and the

Ocean Policy Study. Several other efforts

are either ongoing or recently completed.

It is important to understand each of the

other efforts and their relationship to the

efforts that are the focus of this report.

The Commission’s study and this report

are related to these other efforts in a number of ways. The Commissioners overseeing this report decided that this effort

would be consistent with current policy

and that it would not duplicate or reresearch areas that other study groups had

already covered.

A few of the more significant efforts

of other groups are summarized in

Appendix C.

The Commission’s

Conceptual Approach

With so much work completed or under

way at the national and systems levels, the

Commission wanted to take on our established mission by focusing on seaports at

the micro-level. We wanted to address

issues such as: How do seaports operate?

What kind of security is present now and

who funds it? What are the roles of the

various levels of government? What role

does the private sector play? How do seaports prepare for the terrorist threats? How

serious is crime at seaports, and what are

law enforcement agencies doing about it?

In our research on existing studies and

reports, the Commission was unable to

find any recent efforts that specifically

addressed these questions. In developing

our approach, we found that even people
ships at berth or in the harbor are

important requirements. Procedures to

identify workers who are arriving, and

for deterring and preventing internal

conspiracies (when smugglers or other

criminal groups have their activities

aided by employees in the transportation

industry), are also becoming increasingly important.

■ Cargo security: measures ensuring that

cargo is protected from theft or unauthorized access. This includes the physical

security measures and procedural security of how information and documentation is controlled and used to facilitate

movement of cargo. The integrity of

import or export shipments during their

transit through seaports is fundamental

to ensuring that border control agencies

are able to accomplish their mission.

Unconstrained by jurisdictional requirements or national borders, criminal

organizations are exploiting weak security in seaports and their intermodal

connections to commit a wide range of

cargo crimes. Levels of containerized

cargo volumes are forecast to increase

significantly, which will create more

opportunities for crime while lowering

the statistical risk of detection and interdiction.

■ Passenger and crew security: protection

of persons on board vessels, including

protection against terrorist attacks and

prevention of unauthorized entry of

alien migrants or stowaways. The large

numbers of U.S. citizens sailing on

international cruises pose a special risk

from a security perspective, making it

much more akin to the air transport

environment. Approximately 80 percent

of cruise line passengers are U.S. citizens and 20 percent are aliens. Approximately 92 percent of crewmembers are

aliens. The worldwide cruise ship fleet

will carry nearly 10 million passengers

this year. Cruise ship terminals must be

secure to prevent unauthorized people

from gaining access to the area. Coast

This report recognizes that seaport

crime often has a nexus outside the seaport. In seaports where security is

improved, the industry has found that cargo

thefts occur after the cargo leaves the seaport. There is a wide variation between

examining crimes that occur within the

strict confines of a seaport and crimes

related to cargo that is imported or exported. And there is a lot of middle ground.

Generally, seaport geographic boundaries are defined. But criminal activity

associated with the cargo that comes into

the seaport does not always occur on the

seaport grounds, or it is not detected until

after the cargo leaves the port. Frequently

cargo arrives in U.S. ports and the importer

files in-bond documents to move that

cargo to another city, perhaps thousands of

miles away. Technically the cargo is still

under federal supervision until importers

file their final entry in another location

and it is released by Customs.

This report defines security as protective measures taken to prevent crime and

maintain a state of freedom from danger,

harm, or risk of loss to person or property,

including measures undertaken by federal

border control agencies to interdict goods

posing a health or safety threat to the public at large and to prevent the unlawful

export of controlled items. Security in this

context focuses on the following:

■ Physical security and access control:

measures ensuring that seaport operations and users are protected from unauthorized intrusions into their facilities

and systems. Effective physical security

and access control in seaports is fundamental to deterring and preventing

potential threats to seaport operations,

cargo shipments for smuggling or theft,

or other cargo crimes. Securing entry

points, open storage areas, and warehouses throughout the seaport, controlling the movements of trucks transporting cargo through the port, and

searching containers, warehouses, and

Chapter 1: Introduction ■ 3
4 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

98 percent of all international cruise ship

passengers. Based on these figures, the

Commission deemed it appropriate to limit

the scope of on-site surveys. Consequently,

the Commission conducted detailed on-site

surveys in the following 12 seaports:

Charleston New Orleans

Detroit New York/New Jersey

Gulfport Philadelphia

Long Beach Port Everglades

Los Angeles San Juan

Miami Tacoma

These seaports were selected based on

their size and disparate threat level for

crime. An effort was made to identify

large-, medium-, and smaller-sized seaports with varying levels of threats. An

effort was also made to ensure that the full

range of seaport activities was covered in

the on-site surveys, including cargo processing, bulk and container vessel arrivals,

cruise ship operations, and Strategic Seaports used in military operations. In addition to the 12 seaports listed above, the

Commission conducted more limited field

surveys at Baltimore and Jacksonville. It

also made on-site surveys of two major

foreign ports—Felixstowe, United Kingdom, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands—

to observe “best practices.”

■ The Commission collected data at each

location it surveyed. It toured ocean and

land facilities and reviewed security

practices. It examined port and terminal

facilities, warehouses, and federal

inspection stations, along with other

port facilities. Many seaport officials

were interviewed. The entire methodology and criteria for this collection are

provided in Appendix B.

In addition to the focus group interviews conducted during the on-site port

surveys, the Commission published a

notice in the Federal Register to give the

private sector an opportunity to comment

Guard regulations specify minimum

security standards to which cruise ship

lines must adhere in order to protect

passengers adequately from terrorist

attacks.

These Coast Guard regulations apply

only to large cruise ships on international voyages. They do not cover ships on

domestic voyages (not transiting the

high seas), such as sightseeing, gambling, and fishing vessels, nor do they

cover commuter and car ferries. Security programs in these sectors are voluntary. Cost considerations often prevent

these business sectors from pursuing a

solid security program.

■ Military mobilization security: port

readiness measures in the event of war

or situations when the federal government requires the use of seaport assets.

If U.S. troops and equipment are needed

in other parts of the world, they are generally deployed through U.S. commercial seaports. In the event of a contingency, U.S. military and logistical

support for overseas operations must

now extend greater distances over shorter time lines in order to reach the military theater of operation. Consequently,

U.S. seaports have become critical

choke points of future military mobilizations. The security of our commercial ports during times of military mobilization ensures that such movements

are not disrupted; it is therefore essential to our national defense.

The Seaports Studied and the

Commission’s Methodology

The Commission surveyed the list of 361

commercial seaports to determine which

should be the prime focus of our study.

A select list of some 50 seaports represent 90 percent of all U.S. cargo by tons;

25 of these ports represent 98 percent of

the container traffic; and 16 ports represent
in public sessions. These sessions were set

in Hampton Roads, Virginia; Houston,

Texas; and San Francisco, California. The

comments elicited at all of these sessions

are detailed in Appendix D. A Web site was

established on the Internet to provide information about the study to the general public and to solicit comments from those who

could not contact the Commission in person. The Commission also attended conferences of relevant national organizations

and solicited comments from many private

organizations.

Organization of This Report

The chapters that follow were organized to

correspond with the Executive Memorandum that set out the issues to be addressed

by the Commission. Chapter 2 addresses

the nature of seaports, the various entities

operating in a seaport, and the roles of all

levels of government. Chapter 3 addresses

the nature and extent of crime in seaports.

Chapter 4 addresses the terrorist threats;

we elected to discuss this issue as a separate topic from other crime because of its

importance. Chapter 5 assesses security in

seaports and the federal process of examining imported and exported international

cargo, passengers, and crewmembers at the

seaports. Chapter 6 addresses coordination

and cooperation of the diverse levels of

government and industry players on the

wide array of issues identified in Chapters

3, 4, and 5. Chapter 7 addresses intelligence and information management issues.

Chapter 8 discusses international cooperative efforts and best practices in other

countries. Chapter 9 summates the evaluation of the Commission’s findings and

details the main comments and conclusions. Recommendations appear at the end

of each chapter where they are discussed in

conjunction with findings. Six appendices

complement the content of the various

chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction

■

5
induced economic impact of the U.S. port

industry in 1996 was:

■ 13 million jobs.

■ $494 billion in personal income.

■ $1.5 trillion in business sales.

■ $743 billion to the nation’s gross

domestic product.

■ $200 billion in federal, state, and

local taxes.

These statistics provide a clear picture

of the importance of seaports in the economic well-being of the nation. It is also

important to remember that the military

now depends on commercial facilities to

support its forward presence. Also, the border inspection and control agencies of the

federal government view seaports as a

cost-efficient place to verify the admissibility of people and goods entering the

United States, and to allow departures of

regulated commodities.

The Structure and Operation

of U.S. Seaports

The structures and operations of seaports

vary significantly. States have responsibility for chartering seaports within their territories. These charters generally include

specific geographic boundaries. Some are

as large as 30 or 40 square miles, including

territory that is on the waterfront as well as

surrounding areas. Port authorities in the

United States are instrumentalities of state

or local governments, established by enactment or grants of authority by the state legislature. With respect to port development

The 361 U.S. seaports range widely in size

and characteristics. Some are multibilliondollar enterprises. Others just have occasional vessel arrivals. Cargo operations

range from container traffic, to liquid bulk

such as petroleum, to dry bulk such as

grain, to barge traffic carrying iron ore or

steel. Some cargo arrives or departs from

foreign locations; some travels from one

domestic port to another. In this chapter we

review the structure of seaports, their regulatory framework, and the interests of their

so-called stakeholders. We also discuss the

role of the federal agencies that have an

interest in seaports, and introduce coordination and cooperation at the seaport level.

Background on seaports. The first seaports in America were built in colonial

days, long before there was a U.S. government. The regulatory framework of our

nation’s seaports evolved very differently

from that of other entities such as airports,

which were established after the national

government was firmly in place.

According to the Maritime Administration, public ports generate significant local

and regional economic growth, including job

creation. Commercial port activities in 1996

provided employment for 1.4 million Americans. Port activity contributed $74.8 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product, and

personal income of $52.7 billion in 1996.

Port activities in 1996 accounted for federal

taxes of $14.7 billion, and state and local

tax revenues amounting to $5.5 billion.

The American Association of Port

Authorities reports that direct, indirect, and

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in

Seaports

7
8 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

police powers, at least to the extent of

maintaining security and enforcing boardapproved ordinances on properties that they

own. A few also exercise regulatory powers, such as licensing stevedores, enforcing

local or state environmental and land-use

regulations, and managing submerged or

tidal lands within the port’s jurisdiction.

A recent survey by the American Association of Port Authorities of its U.S. port

members identifies 32 “operating,” 33

“nonoperating” (or “landlord”), and 9

“limited” operating port agencies. Operating ports are those in which cargo-handling inland from the pier is performed by

port authority employees. At landlord

ports, these functions are performed by

port authority tenants. Limited operating

ports combine characteristics of the first

two categories, leasing some facilities and

operating others.

Private sector operations. Private sector

terminal operations are also widespread in

virtually every U.S. port. They include private sector tenants of public port agencies,

as well as facilities that are both privately

owned and privately managed. In addition,

many port services, such as railroads,

trucking, towage, pilotage, and bunkers,

are typically private rather than public sector functions. Many ports, such as Searsport, Maine, and New Haven, Connecticut, are entirely private in the sense that

the facilities are all privately owned and

have no governing port agency at all.

The beneficiaries, or users, of the seaport are principally the private sector and

all those that support seaport operations.

The most basic economic activity at seaports is the transportation of merchandise.

Importers and exporters, as well as domestic business, use seaports extensively.

About 95 percent of the cargo that does not

arrive in the United States through contiguous countries travels by ocean. Ocean, rail,

and truck carriers all support arriving and

departing cargo. Freight forwarders, wareand investment, the federal function has

historically included construction and

maintenance of navigation channels.

Shoreside development has been left to the

nonfederal public and private sectors.

Public seaport operations. Public seaport

agencies in the United States vary widely in

structure and operation, not only between

states but also within the states themselves.

Some are, in fact, “port authorities” in the

sense of being autonomous or semiautonomous, self-sustaining public corporations.

Others are integral administrative divisions

of state, county, or municipal government.

Independent port or navigation districts constituted as “special-purpose” political subdivisions of state government exist in California, Florida, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and

Washington. Bi-state agencies include the

Delaware River Port Authority and the Port

Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Port governing boards may be elected

or appointed. Some port agencies have the

power to levy taxes; others do not. Port

authorities are typically empowered to exercise the powers of eminent domain, to conduct studies and develop plans, to levy facility charges, to issue bonds, to sue and be

sued, to apply for federal grants, to act as the

local sponsor for federal navigation projects, to enter into contracts and agreements,

and, frequently, as the Massachusetts Port

Authority statute states, “to do all acts and

things necessary or convenient to carry out

the powers expressly granted in this act.”

The jurisdiction of most is limited to a single

port; some, however, such as the North Carolina and South Carolina state ports authorities, may extend to two or more ports.

The range of port authority activity may

also be extended to include airports,

bridges, tunnels, commuter rail systems,

inland river or shallow draft terminals,

industrial parks, foreign trade zones, world

trade centers, terminal or shoreline railroads, shipyards, commercial vessels,

dredges, marinas, and public recreational

facilities. Many port authorities are given
neers. Under the Constitution, the federal

government also retains jurisdiction over

the nation’s interstate and foreign commerce. Following from that is the national

interest in regulating key operational and

functional activities that occur in seaport

(i.e., administering tariffs, trade agreements, immigration, prohibited material,

and safety of commerce). Thus, there is a

significant extent of federal activity in

state and privately administered seaports.

Customs Service

The Tariff Act of July 4, 1789 authorized

the collection of duties on imported goods.

In 1789, the Fifth Act of the First Congress

established the Customs Service and its

ports of entry. At the time, the Customs

mission was to supervise the unlading of

vessels, ensure a complete inventory of

imported cargo, appraise the value, and

collect the applicable duty. For nearly 125

years, Customs duties funded virtually the

entire government.

As the nation’s principal statutorily

established border agency, Customs performs dual missions, one of law enforcement and one of regulating commercial

activities. Within its mission, Customs has

significant responsibilities for ensuring

that all goods and persons entering and

exiting the United States do so in accordance with all U.S. laws and regulations.

The mission is based primarily on statutory

authority contained in Title 19, Customs

Duties, and Title 18, Crimes and Criminal

Procedures, of the U.S. Code, which grants

statutory and regulatory authority to

enforce smuggling laws and to conduct

warrantless searches and seizures at the

border or the functional equivalent (airports or seaports). Customs also has

authority to enforce all violations of U.S.

export control laws and economic sanctions and embargoes. In addition, Customs

enforces hundreds of provisions contained

in more than 600 other laws.

houses, customs brokers, and a host of

other businesses also support trade.

Cruise ships and other passenger ships

such as ferries and gambling ships increase

the number of public users of the seaports.

This business and all the businesses that

support cruise ship operations are expanding dramatically. The number of businesses

and suppliers that are required to support a

cruise ship of more than 1,500 passengers

on a voyage of a week or more is extensive. A cruise vessel the size of the Empire

State Building being serviced as if it were

a hotel doing all of its cleaning, stocking,

checkout, and check-in within 9 to 12

hours creates a very difficult logistic effort

for the operators. There is the same impact

on the agencies charged with allowing

appropriate people and things on and off.

Crews of cruise ships and cargo vessels

also arrive regularly at seaports and need

service. Those arriving on foreign-owned

cruise ships and cargo vessels who are not

American citizens require attention from

federal officials.

The Federal Role in

U.S. Seaports

Unlike many countries, the United States has

no national port authority. Instead, jurisdiction over U.S. ports and harbors is shared

by the federal, state, and local governments.

The Constitution does not establish the regulation of seaports as a federal responsibility, so under the 10th Amendment (“The

powers not delegated to the United States

by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to

the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”), the primary

responsibility rests with the states.

The Constitution, however, does grant

the federal government jurisdiction over

the navigable waters of the United States,

including its deep draft channels and harbors—authority delegated primarily to the

Coast Guard and the Army Corps of EngiChapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 9
10 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

may focus on the diversion of in-bond

merchandise, textile transshipments,

antidumping, intellectual property rights,

and public health and safety.

Although states grant authority to establish ports in their geographic areas, in

order for a port to receive foreign ships,

cargo, and passengers it must be specifically designated as a port of entry by the

federal government. This designation

places the port under Customs jurisdiction.

Implicit in the authority of Customs over

border search and inspection and its right

to designate ports of entry is the right to

maintain a controlled and secure Customs

area that facilitates and ensures the integrity of the authorized search and inspection.

Not only does Customs have implicit

authority to institute a seaport security program to maintain the integrity of the border area, but various provisions in Customs

law provide statutory authorization for

such a program. Previously existing Customs programs, however, have been eliminated and curtailed through the years as

resources were dedicated to growth in priority areas. For example, until the mid1980s, Customs had a patrol force operating in seaports. It consisted of uniformed

officers in marked vehicles, patrolling seaport environs. They were charged with

interdiction of contraband and anti-smuggling activities. They usually conducted

surveillance of vessels at rest in terminals,

and rolling gate checks of dockworkers,

crewmembers, visitors, and vendors, as

well as trucks and truck drivers. They

coordinated their activities with the control

force that examined and permitted unlading and release of cargo, as well as the

security and local police authorities. This

function was eliminated and the resources

absorbed into the Customs Service.

Coast Guard

The Revenue Cutter Service, the predecessor to the Coast Guard, was created by an

Act of Congress in 1790 to enforce the

nation’s customs laws on the seas. At that

Customs responsibilities include assessing and collecting duties, excise taxes,

fees, and penalties due on imported merchandise; ensuring that imports and

exports meet legal entry and exit requirements; regulating Customs bonded warehouses and container stations, Customs

brokers, bonded carriers, centralized examination stations, and foreign trade zones;

processing conveyances, persons, baggage,

cargo, and mail; detecting and apprehending persons engaged in smuggling, including illegal drugs, and in fraudulent practices designed to circumvent Customs and

related laws; protecting U.S. business,

labor, and intellectual property rights by

preventing illegal trade practices, including

provisions related to quotas and the marking of imported merchandise, and the AntiDumping Act; enforcing export restrictions

and prohibitions, including the export of

strategic dual-use goods and technology

and defense articles and services, and economic sanctions and embargoes; and collecting accurate import and export data for

compilation of international trade statistics.

The investigative mission of Customs is

to identify, disrupt, and dismantle activities

of individuals and organizations that are in

violation of U.S. laws enforced by Customs. Customs investigative responsibilities encompass a multitude of illegal activities pertaining to the importation and

exportation of merchandise and contraband. The majority of the investigations

related to seaports are conducted in four

major program areas: smuggling, financial,

strategic, and fraud. Smuggling investigations may include smuggling drugs and

commercial quantities of merchandise, and

cargo theft. Financial investigations center

on narcotics-related and non-narcoticsrelated money laundering activities. Strategic investigations may consist of the export

of strategic and controlled commodities

such as defense articles and services,

weapons of mass destruction, dual-use

goods and technology, economic sanctions,

and stolen property. Fraud investigations
The Coast Guard has the legal authority

for enforcing security requirements at all

U.S. seaports and waterways. The Coast

Guard also has a wide range of legal

authority pertaining to its other missions of

marine safety, environmental protection,

navigational aids, vessel traffic, maritime

law enforcement, and national security.

Although the Coast Guard does not have

an officer physically located at each of the

361 seaports, a Coast Guard “Captain of

the Port” structure covers all 361 seaports.

The Captain of the Port is usually a senior

officer who is also the commanding officer

of the Marine Safety Office that covers

that geographic area. The Coast Guard’s

once active port security program (i.e.,

dedicated headquarters and field unit port

security specialists to do contingency planning, conduct vulnerability assessments,

and carry out security-related liaison with

other agencies) has been curtailed because

its resources have been redirected into

other mission areas as workloads grew and

missions changed.

Immigration and Naturalization Service

At the end of the 18th century, in The Act

of March 26, 1790, Congress established a

uniform rule for naturalization by setting

the residence requirement at two years.

This Act represents the first federal activity in an area previously under the control

of the individual states. The authority for

this Act is an enumerated power in Article

1, Section 8, of the Constitution.

The Act of July 4, 1864, represents the

first congressional attempt to centralize

control of immigration. Under that Act, a

Commissioner of Immigration was

appointed by the President to serve under

the authority of the Secretary of State.

On March 3, 1891, Congress enacted

the first comprehensive law for national

control of immigration. The law established the Bureau of Immigration within

the Treasury Department to administer all

immigration laws. The law further restricttime, the primary concern was to protect

the revenue of the United States by interdicting ships that were attempting to evade

Customs officials. Congress has consistently expanded the role of the Coast

Guard, so that today it includes maritime

law enforcement, marine safety, hazardous

cargo control, protection of natural

resources, maritime security, national

defense, waterway navigational aids, vessel

traffic management, and icebreaking.

The Coast Guard’s legislated authority

for port security began with the Espionage

Act of 1917, which gave the Coast Guard

that responsibility during times of war. The

Magnuson Act of 1950 gave the President

authority to “govern the anchorage and

movement of any foreign-flag vessels in

territorial water, inspect such vessels at any

time, safeguard against destruction, loss, or

injury from sabotage or other subversive

acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar

nature, vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities...” whenever the President

found the security of the United States

endangered by “war; invasion; potential

subversive acts; and/or disturbances of

international relations.”

Under this authority, President Truman

signed Executive Order 10173 in 1950, giving the Coast Guard the authority to prevent both intentional and accidental loss or

destruction of vessels and waterfront facilities. The order further directed all agencies

and authorities of the U.S. government and

state and local authorities to support, conform to, and assist in the enforcement of

these regulations. The Ports and Waterways

Safety Act of 1972 provided a broad permanent statutory basis for the exercise of

nondefense safety and security for protecting vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront

facilities from intentional destruction, loss,

or injury due to subversive or terrorist acts.

The Coast Guard also has a major responsibility to check and monitor hazardous

cargo that is transported by vessel. Hazardous cargo poses a risk to shipping, ports,

land transportation, and individuals.

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 11
12 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

The Food and Drug Administration is

responsible for a wide bandwidth of product categories that the American consumer

comes in contact with. These items can

range from the expected (pharmaceuticals)

to the surprising (television screens that

emit radiation or dinner plates that might

contain lead in the glaze) and everything in

between that in some manner may come

into contact with or be ingested by or

expose the American consumer to potential

risk if the product were not compliant with

the Food and Drug Administration regulations. Although not represented on the

waterfront in the same numbers as Customs

or Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration has a vital role in the monitoring

of import cargo on the nation’s waterfront.

The Department of Commerce is

responsible for a number of activities

affecting U.S. seaports both directly and

indirectly. Its Census Bureau is responsible

for (among other things) compiling data on

imports, exports, and shipping. To meet

these data gathering responsibilities, Census is responsible for the shipper’s export

declaration (SED), one of the principal

documents that must be filed with the government. The SED is used for all exports

over $2,500. Law enforcement officials use

the SEDs to assist in targeting and in investigating export control violations (discussed

further in Chapters 3 and 5).

In addition, the Department of Commerce contains the Bureau of Export

Administration, which is responsible for

issuing licenses for items contained on the

Commerce Control List, a list of dual-use

items controlled for national security or

foreign policy reasons. The export licenses

are also key documents that must be available for inspection before shipment of a

U.S. export. Export Enforcement, the federal law enforcement agency dedicated

solely to preventing and investigating dualuse export control violations, also resides

in the Bureau of Export Administration.

ed immigration by adding to the inadmissible classes persons likely to become public

charges, persons suffering from contagious

disease, felons, persons convicted of

crimes or misdemeanors, and aliens assisted by others by payment of passage.

Besides its headquarters in Washington,

D.C., the Bureau opened 24 inspections

stations at land and sea ports-of-entry

(including Ellis Island) in January 1892.

In June 1940 the Bureau of Immigration

became the Immigration and Naturalization Service and moved to the Department

of Justice in a reorganization meant to provide more prevention and correction of

illegal immigration. This is an important

function of Immigration, because even

while the U.S. economy encourages immigration, the overall economy and infrastructure cannot support all who might

wish to come to this country.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of

June 27, 1952, brought into one comprehensive statute the multiple laws that had

governed immigration and naturalization in

the United States.

Immigration is responsible for the

examination and inspection of all crews

and passengers arriving on ships from

ports outside the United States. Those

found inadmissible may be detained,

removed, or deported. Immigration is also

responsible for the apprehension of aliens

seeking entry outside designated ports-ofentry along the nation’s sea boundaries.

The Department of Agriculture oversees both import and export cargo transactions through various divisions such as the

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,

Agriculture Marketing Service, and Food

Safety and Inspection Service. Agriculture

has the second largest presence among the

federal inspection agencies represented on

the waterfront, and it performs a missioncritical function of protecting both the

American consumer and American agriculture (farms, fields, and forests) from harmful pests, diseases, and unfit foodstuffs.
crime. Cooperative international seaport

security partnerships among government

and private sectors is used to facilitate collaboration with multinational entities such

as the Organization of American States, the

American Association of Port Authorities,

the Maritime Security Council and the

International Association of Airport and

Seaport Police. The program focuses on the

Western Hemisphere. The activities are

intended to decrease drug smuggling and

cargo crimes through commercial maritime

conveyances. The Maritime Administration

supports improved seaport security measures as a means of constricting access to

commercial cargoes by drug smugglers.

The Department of Defense also has a

major interest in seaports in the event of

military mobilization. The Department of

Defense, through the Maritime Administration, has port planning orders in place in

13 commercial seaports (designated as

Strategic Seaports), which identify tentative arrangements for the use of facilities

and services needed for military deployments. Both the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration work with Defense

during times of war.

The Federal Maritime Commission is

an independent agency that regulates waterborne foreign commerce rates, ensures

equal treatment, and protects against unauthorized activity. It also regulates and

licenses freight forwarders and consolidators. Its regulatory authority extends

beyond U.S. boundaries to foreign companies that do business in international cargo

destined for the United States. It is essentially the regulatory agency of the shipping

industry. Before 1961, the Maritime

Administration and the Federal Maritime

Commission were part of the same agency.

In 1961 a decision was made to separate

the regulatory and the promotional activities of the shipping industry.

The following table summarizes the

federal agencies involved or interested in

seaport operations.

Export Enforcement’s primary mission is

to identify and investigate export control

violations before an item can be shipped out

of the country. From eight field offices, and

as one of several priorities, Export Enforcement is involved in enforcing export controls at the seaports, in conjunction with

Customs. It works on an as needed basis

with Customs to inspect export licenses and

export containers. Enforcement also conducts joint investigations with Customs

when the investigation involves a potential

export control violation at seaports.

The Maritime Administration in the

Department of Transportation facilitates the

efficient and secure movement of people

and cargo in domestic and international

waterborne commerce to promote America’s

economic growth and international competitiveness in a safe and healthy environment.

It leads and assists the U.S. maritime industry in achieving and improving competitiveness by ship operators and shipbuilders,

improving ports and harbors, fostering an

efficient intermodal transportation system,

and providing sealift for national security

and the national defense. Some of the programs the Maritime Administration is

responsible for are the operation of the Merchant Marine Academy; maintenance of the

Ready Reserve Force vessels for use during

military contingencies and other Department of Defense-sponsored operations;

administration of the Maritime Security

Program, which provides financial support

to U.S.-flag vessels that are committed to

meet military requirements during war or

national emergency; and administration of a

loan guarantee program that provides assistance for construction or reconstruction of

vessels as well as shipyard modernization.

The Maritime Administration conducts

studies on issues relating to shipping and

publishes a wealth of data on seaport activities, including a guidebook on port security.

The Port and Cargo Security Program aims

to reduce criminal exploitation of commercial maritime cargo, particularly drug smuggling, cargo theft, and other forms of cargo

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 13
14 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Federal Agencies That Have an Interest in Seaports

Department of Transportation

Office of Intelligence and Security: Oversees and coordinates the Department’s

intelligence and security programs and develops long-range plans and policy on domestic

and international transportation security matters.

Maritime Administration: Administers programs to aid in the operation of the U.S. flag

merchant fleet, supports port and cargo security programs, operates the U.S. Merchant

Marine Academy, maintains Ready Reserve Force vessels, and assists military

mobilization efforts in the event of war.

Coast Guard: Administers a range of programs, including maritime law enforcement, port

safety and security, waterways management, marine environmental response, aids to

navigation, and marine inspection and licensing.

Federal Maritime Commission

An independent agency that regulates waterborne commerce of the United States,

ensures that U.S. international trade is open to all nations on equitable terms, and

protects against unauthorized activity.

Department of the Treasury

Customs Service: Administers 600 laws for 60 agencies to ensure that all goods and

persons entering and exiting the United States do so in accordance with all U.S. laws,

by inspecting cargo and conducting criminal investigations relating to drug smuggling,

fraud, money laundering, and the export of controlled commodities.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: Enforces laws for alcohol, tobacco, firearms,

explosives, and nationwide arson. Its mission is to reduce violent crime, collect revenue,

and protect the public through criminal law enforcement, regulatory enforcement, and

tax collection.

Internal Revenue Service: Administers the tax code and investigates tax evasion arising

from criminal activity, among other things.

Office of Foreign Assets Control: Administers laws, regulations, and economic sanctions

and embargoes against “targeted countries” and their nationals, and licenses certain

transactions, including importations and exportations, before dealing with “targeted

countries” and their nationals.

Department of Justice

Criminal Division: Oversees criminal matters for more than 900 criminal statutes and

sets priorities for criminal prosecution.

Federal Bureau of Investigation: Investigates all violations of criminal statutes, unless

assigned to another federal agency, with priority to organized crime, drugs,

counterterrorism, white-collar crime, and violent crime.

Drug Enforcement Administration: Enforces controlled substances and chemical diversion

laws and regulations, and conducts investigations targeting violators at the interstate and

international levels.

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Enforces immigration laws, including the

inspection of passengers and crew at ports of entry, and the removal, investigation,

detainment, or deportation of aliens who have violated immigration or other laws.
Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 15

Department of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President,

the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council including advice on

military mobilization issues such as public seaports readiness for mobilization.

Department of the Navy: In addition to military mobilization issues, the Navy has an extensive

maritime intelligence capability that is critical to assessing threats to commercial seaports.

Department of the Army: In addition to military mobilization issues, the Army Corps

of Engineers has numerous waterway and port functions, and the National Guard

assists with drug interdiction in many seaports.

Transportation Command: Through its transportation component command, the Military

Traffic Management Command, operates military ocean terminals; maintains military units

at commercial ports in the United States and overseas; and coordinates defense

transportation interest in the planning, construction, and maintenance of the national

infrastructure of highways, railroads, ports, waterways, aviation facilities, and pipelines.

Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: Regulates animal and plant health,

including prohibiting the entry of dangerous insects and diseases and certifying

domestic products for export.

Food Safety Inspection Service: Regulates meat and poultry, including imports,

to ensure that they are safe, unadulterated, and properly labeled.

Department of Health and Human Services

Food and Drug Administration: In part through inspecting imports, ensures that food

is safe; that human and animal drugs, biological products, and medical devices are

safe and effective; and that electronic products that emit radiation are safe.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Administers national programs for the

prevention and control of communicable diseases and enforces foreign quarantine

activities and regulations.

Department of the Interior

Fish and Wildlife Service: In part through monitoring of imports and exports, conserves,

protects, and enhances the habitat of fish and wildlife, including the protection of

endangered species.

Department of Commerce

Bureau of the Census: Among other things, compiles statistics on U.S. foreign trade,

including data on imports, exports, and shipping.

Bureau of Export Administration: Directs export control policy, including export licensing,

and oversees Export Enforcement (see below).

International Trade Administration: Coordinates trade promotion, international commercial

policy, market access, and trade law enforcement.

Export Enforcement: Investigates violations of U.S. export control laws relating to dual-use

strategic goods and technology and analyzes export intelligence to assess risks of diversion.

Federal Agencies That Have an Interest in Seaports (cont.)
16 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Department of Labor

Fosters, promotes, and improves the welfare of wage earners in the United States. Labor

unions such as the longshoremen and the teamsters have significant presence in seaports.

Department of State

Conducts U.S. foreign policy and coordinates international activities of other U.S.

government agencies, directs U.S. export control policy of defense articles and services,

and oversees the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

Office of Defense Trade Controls: Promulgates the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations, which contain the U.S. Munitions List of controlled defense articles and

services that require licensing, and issues licenses. Requires persons engaged in the

business of exporting defense articles and services to register with the State Department.

National Security Council

Advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy as

it affects the United States—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic.

Central Intelligence Agency

Collects, produces, and disseminates foreign intelligence on national security issues,

including international drug trafficking, and conducts foreign counterintelligence activities.

Office of National Drug Control Policy

Establishes policies, objectives, and priorities for the national drug control program.

Environmental Protection Agency

Implements federal laws designed to promote human health by protecting the Nation’s air,

water, and soil from harmful pollution. Coordinates effective action for the environment

including monitoring damage done to marine life as a result of the shipping industry.

U.S. Trade Representative

Coordinates trade policy for the United States and negotiates and controls international

trade agreements.

Federal Agencies That Have an Interest in Seaports (cont.)
tion if a state or local law is violated.

Sometimes, the state and local governments provide on-site security through law

enforcement officers. For example, in the

Port of Baltimore, the state police provide

on-site security and patrol the area. In Los

Angeles, Miami, and Port Everglades,

local law enforcement is actively involved

in security. In other cases, local law

enforcement responds when a crime is

committed. The main concern state and

local government representatives expressed

to the Commission was that the federal

government might give them some federal

mandate but not the resources they would

need to respond.

Public seaport authorities vary significantly in structure and operation, not only

between states but also within the states, as

discussed earlier in this chapter. It was our

view that port authorities would have a significant interest in identifying and addressing security-related concerns within ports

because if they did not they might be perceived as fostering environments that allow

crime to exist, and an individual port’s reputation might suffer as a result. We found

that some of the port authorities take an

active role in enhancing physical security

by installing fences, lights, gatehouses,

and other measures. Some ports had made

major efforts and spent considerable

resources in improving security. Some port

authorities have police divisions consisting

of sworn law enforcement officers.

Other port authorities did not appear

concerned about security issues and

seemed to resist spending their resources

on security. Some seaports saw their mission as totally economic and were concerned that any expenditure on security

would affect their bottom line. Some port

officials, especially where the port authority serves as primarily a lessor, believed

that terminal operators or carriers should

fund any security enhancements.

Many ports do assist the federal government in dealing with crimes such as drug

Other Federal Agencies

The federal role at U.S. seaports is broad,

particularly at seaports designated as ports

of entry. Federal agencies have jurisdiction

for a large variety of offenses committed at

seaports. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration has jurisdiction over

the controlled substances laws and regulations and conducts investigations of violators operating at the interstate and international levels. The Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms has jurisdiction

involving the importation of munitions.

The Environmental Protection Agency has

jurisdiction involving environmental

offenses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in addition to being the lead agency

in terrorism matters, has jurisdiction in

numerous violations that may occur at seaports, including public corruption, organized crime, labor racketeering, interstate

transportation of stolen motor vehicles,

and theft from interstate shipment and

interstate transportation of stolen property.

Seaport Stakeholders and

Their Crime and Security

Interests

Another way to look at the structure and

operations of seaports, and in particular at

security issues at seaports, is from the

standpoint of all the public and private

entities that hold a stake in the seaports.

A major part of the Commission’s study

involved identifying these stakeholders and

obtaining testimony and comments from

them as a means of understanding how the

pieces fit together. What follows is a rundown of the major categories of stakeholders (other than federal agencies) and what

we found their interests and concerns to be

with respect to security.

State and local governments are the

regulators of seaports, as discussed earlier

in this chapter. When crime occurs at the

seaports, state and local governments have

a major role in investigation and prosecuChapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 17
18 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Terminal operators can be carriers,

independent firms, or port authorities. Frequently the terminal operator within the

port will oversee the unlading of the cargo

or passengers from the vessel and the

movement of the cargo or passengers to a

secure area under the terminal operator’s

control. If passengers are involved, the terminal operator will oversee the transfer of

the passengers from the vessel to federal

inspection areas (in the case of international voyages) or shoreside facilities (in the

case of domestic voyages). If cargo is

involved, the terminal operator will oversee

the delivery of the cargo that has been

unladed from the vessel to facilities such

as warehouses, container freight stations,

freight forwarders, importers, and railroads

within the immediate area. Most terminal

operators provide security services, usually

from private security firms. Terminal operators seem to recognize the importance of

security, but the cost of providing security

is a major issue for them.

Trucking companies in most instances

move cargo from the port authority’s or terminal operator’s facility to warehouses or

importers’ facilities. Trucking companies

are usually common carriers that are

engaged in the business of transporting

goods for hire. Trucking companies can

own the vehicles that transport merchandise, lease vehicles, or hire independent

drivers (who own their own trucks) to haul

cargo within, or through, the port. While

the cargo is being transported from the

port authority or terminal operator’s facility to the facilities described above, the

company transporting the cargo is responsible for its security. The American Trucking Associations has taken a strong stand

on cargo security. It has even developed its

own national database that is responsive to

its needs and is shared with law enforcement agencies. It has been working with

law enforcement at all levels to increase

security. It is often difficult to determine

where cargo was stolen and in whose jurisdiction the crime occurred. In legislative

and alien smuggling. Other port officials

said that was totally a federal responsibility

and saw no reason to fund security

enhancements that might deal with these

crime problems.

Some port authorities, particularly those

that had worked hard to improve security,

favored the idea of government-enforced

security standards universal to all ports.

They stated that port authorities that take

security measures place themselves at a

competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those

that ignore security.

Vessel operators, or carriers, are individuals, partnerships, or corporations

engaged in the business of transporting

goods or persons for hire. They may own

the vessels that transport merchandise from

port to port, or they may lease a vessel for

a voyage or for an extended period. Vessel

operators, or carriers, are responsible for

the security of cargo and passengers as

they are transported from port to port.

However, once the vessel docks and

unlades its cargo or passengers, the security of the cargo often becomes the responsibility of the port authority, or a terminal

operator. Carriers are legally responsible

for any losses of cargo. With regard to

international cargo, the federal government

holds the carriers responsible for numerous

requirements and can issue large fines for

noncompliance. For example, Customs has

the authority to penalize a carrier millions

of dollars if unmanifested illegal drugs are

found aboard a vessel.

Many carriers that operate in high-risk

environments have developed extensive

security programs and work cooperatively

with law enforcement officials at all levels.

Cargo theft has been a major issue for carriers, and they often opined to the Commission that law enforcement officials do

not devote sufficient resources to cargo

theft. Piracy on the high seas is also an

area that concerns carriers, although it is

rare off U.S. ports.
will send shipments to be assembled or

disassembled (depending on whether cargo

is being imported or exported) to breakbulk stations (where containers are

unpacked and smaller, less-than-full loads

of cargo deliveries are made), or container

freight stations that service the seaport,

before they are shipped out to their final

destination.

Cruise line operators are engaged in

the business of transporting persons for

hire between ports. Their operations in the

United States are governed by regulations

administered by the Coast Guard. In addition to ensuring the safe passage of their

passengers between ports, they must

ensure that their operations and procedures

conform to Customs and Immigration regulations and that passengers arriving from

foreign countries are conveyed to federal

agencies. For the most part, cruise ship

operators have taken a strong stand on

security and have worked cooperatively

with the Coast Guard in implementing the

spirit and intent of the regulations. Some

of the cruise lines that have implemented

the most sophisticated security systems

believe the standards should be more

aggressively enforced and made more

stringent. An important issue for them is

the cost of implementing security requirements, and the related issue of whether or

not a competitor might be relaxing security

to reduce its operating costs.

Contract security plays a significant

role in most ports. Most ports do not have

dedicated security forces (public or private) that oversee security for the port and

for the entities in the port. Instead, most

port authorities, carriers, terminal operators, cruise line operators, trucking companies, and facility operators rely upon contact security personnel to provide security

at gates, cargo receipt and delivery areas,

passenger embarkation and debarkation

areas, and other sensitive areas. The personnel who perform security work for contractors may or may not receive securityrelated training. Some security providers

proposals this year, the American Trucking

Associations recommended criminal record

checks for truck drivers.

The warehouse or facility operator is

responsible for the security of the cargo

once it is transported to a warehouse or a

container freight station. While under the

custody of the facility operator, the cargo

may be subject to a variety of operations

such as unpacking containers, manipulation, storage, and repackaging. Once these

operations have been completed, the cargo

is normally moved from the facility to the

owner or importer via a transportation

company’s conveyances (such as the facility operator’s trucks, an independent trucking company, or the cargo owner’s trucks).

The trucking company moving the cargo is

responsible for its security until the owner

or importer takes final delivery of the

cargo.

Railroads that service ports can be privately owned, or a port authority can operate them. They are primarily responsible

for transporting cargo on railcars from outside the port to shoreside facilities, piers,

or terminals within seaports (or vice

versa). Some ports even have railyards that

permit different railroads to service many

carriers and terminal operators. The railyards enable railcars and containers transported via rail to be brought adjacent to

vessel operations. The responsibility for

the security of the cargo carried via rail

begins when the railroad receives the cargo

from a trucking company or terminal operator, and ends when the railroad releases

the cargo to a trucking company or terminal operator at destination. By federal law,

railroads have their own sworn law

enforcement to assist in security. The railroads have been aggressive in pursuing

security issues.

Importers and exporters cause the

transport of merchandise through seaports.

Freight forwarders assemble small shipments from various shippers into larger

shipments. Frequently, freight forwarders

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 19
20 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

notified. Longshoremen, freight forwarders, importers, exporters, brokers,

truckers, rail carriers, and other business

entities are also notified so that they can

respond to the arriving vessels. Tugboats

are often involved in channeling vessel

arrivals, and various systems for controlling vessel arrivals are set up in each port.

In some of the larger ports, the Coast

Guard operates vessel traffic services to

eliminate vessel collisions and groundings.

A typical scenario describing a container vessel arriving from a foreign port may

be instructive on how interrelated all the

necessary transactions are. As the vessel

approaches the seaport, the first physical

contact usually is taking on board the harbor pilot. Often there is support from tugs

to move alongside a container berth where

crane operators will offlade the cargo containers. A bunker barge may come alongside the vessel to lade fuel.

The vessel is boarded and cleared by

Customs, Immigration, and Agriculture.

More frequently, Customs and Agriculture

do not go aboard but perform these formalities remotely, or in a central administrative office. Immigration generally goes

aboard to muster the crew. Any inspector

for a federal agency is dispatched from an

administrative office away from the waterfront terminal. Longshoremen go aboard

and prepare vessel equipment to discharge

containers. Chandlers, suppliers, and repair

companies provide service to the vessel at

the berth. A controlled gate should review

all these persons doing business with or

visiting the vessel.

As containers are discharged, the immediate transfer loads are placed directly on

rail cars and a unit train is marshaled and

dispatched to the trunk railroad carrier.

Containers for local delivery are loaded on

wheeled chassis and “spotted” in the yard

for pickup. High value cargo containers

often go to a single location in the yard.

Local drivers are dispatched to the

terminal when the vessel operator sends

stated that they were not permitted to supply enough personnel to cover security

needs adequately because of the costs.

Labor groups and dockworkers are

also significant stakeholders within U.S.

seaports. Organized labor performs the

lading and unlading of cargo at many U.S.

seaports, and performs tasks related to the

movement of goods within ports. The

Commission received extensive comments

from the various labor groups. Some

feared for their personal security in seaports and said that security efforts needed

to be increased to protect labor. On the

West Coast, the longshoremen’s union had

recently negotiated an agreement with port

authorities for the union to provide security. There are variances in how the exclusive bargaining units view access controls

being applied to their members. Wearing

identification cards and being subject to

criminal history checks are opposed by

some, while others are more amenable to

such controls when equitably exercised.

Trade associations represent carriers,

importers/exporters, insurance companies,

and others who have an interest in reducing the vulnerability of their members.

Coordination and

Cooperation in U.S. Seaports

So many thousands of actions arise every

day in the seaport environment that it is

difficult to generalize about cooperation

and coordination. Once a seaport is chartered by the state, is designated a port of

entry by the Secretary of the Treasury, and

is able to receive foreign vessels, the port

authority or owner/operator is empowered

to make business decisions about operations. However, the Coast Guard may deny

entry to vessels because of safety or security issues. Customs, Immigration, and

Agriculture must be notified of incoming

vessels from foreign countries and,

depending on the nature of the cargo, any

of a host of other federal agencies must be
This sort of operational scenario happens more than 200,000 times a year and

involves more than 10 million loaded

container movements into and out of the

United States.

There are two things to note in this

narrative: (1) the amount of interplay and

communication of information required

to execute these transactions quickly and

smoothly; and (2) the lack of specific

verification of all of these transactions by

federal entities that could establish better

accountability and security in each

instance.

The table below lays out the responsibilities for each of the sectors present.

As the table shows, the private sector

and the port authorities share several

responsibilities with federal, state, or local

government entities. Several other responsibilities rest solely with the federal government. Although organized labor has no

notice of arrival to consignees. The stevedore verifies that delivery is authorized to

the truck driver by the carrier and that

there are no federal holds or instructions.

In most cases when there is an identified

need for examination, containers of interest

to a federal agency are transferred to a

local container examination station, and

released from there. These stations are private enterprises. Customs establishes

requirements, and the local industry

importers and brokers and truck drivers

can select which one to do business with.

While the vessel is in port, the Coast

Guard will board and perform a safety

inspection for Safety of Life at Sea

requirements, load line standards to determine seaworthiness, and verify compliance

with pollution controls. The Coast Guard

will also review how hazardous cargo is

labeled, stored on the terminal, stowed

onboard the vessel, and manifested.

Chapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 21

Roles and Responsibilities at U.S. Seaports

Private Port Local State Federal

sector authority gov’t gov’t gov’t

Protect cargo X X X

Protect facilities X X X X

Port security X X X X X

Marine/environment X X X X

Secure waterways X

Prevent crime X X X X X

Investigate crime* X X X X

Prevent terrorism X X X X X

Control border X

Military mobilization** X X

Regulate or inspect imports X

Regulate or inspect exports X

Regulate interstate trade X

* port authorities with police departments **strategic ports only
22 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

be discussed and decided when the issue of

cooperation and coordination on crime prevention and suppression are being

addressed. This is because a combination

of responses are needed among the federal,

state, local, and private sectors. These

issues are discussed in Chapter 3.

Terrorism

On terrorism issues, the federal government has the clear lead in coordinating the

nation’s ongoing response. Clear guidance

has been issued to the Executive Branch

through Presidential Decision Directives,

which assign roles and responsibilities to

appropriate federal agencies and set forth

policy and procedures. While these federal

roles are clear, what is less clear is who at

the local seaport level is responsible for

specific actions on the preventive side.

Positive steps to reduce the vulnerability of

seaports to terrorism, and who has the

responsibility for action, need to be clearly

stated and shared with those responsible.

These issues are discussed in Chapter 4.

Security

Seaport security could be considered to be

under the purview of the terminal owner/

operators. Some take this responsibility

more serious than others do. Although

security requirements could be directed by

the states, they generally have not been.

The federal government has several

strong interests in this area. Pursuant to

Presidential Decision Directive 63, the

Secretary of Transportation has the lead

responsibility to coordinate both public

and private sector efforts to protect critical

infrastructure within the transportation sector, including seaports, against terrorism

and other threats. The federal government

also plays a role through the National Port

Security Committee to control embargoes

and monitor vessels of certain foreign

states while they are in U.S. waters. The

Coast Guard has the lead responsibility

among the federal agencies for waterway

specific responsibilities for these major

functions relating to crime and security at

seaports, it is a strong and active player

at seaports. Because of labor unions’ large

membership, constant presence on the

piers, and integral involvement in many

critical activities, a cooperative relationship

with labor is important. The Commission

found excellent cooperation in some seaports and mistrust or unproductive relationships in others. Coordination and cooperation is more fully discussed in

Chapter 6.

Crime

Seaports are an entry point and exit point

for people, goods, and waterborne conveyances in international trade. The movement of the cargo is an opportunity to perpetrate the crime, or to be integral to the

crime. For federal law enforcement, seaports provide a critical opportunity to

detect and interdict illegal flows of contraband, cargo, and persons, through the use

of warrantless searches that may be conducted at the border. Also, because the seaports are an important link in the logistical

supply chain for goods consumed or products going to international markets, they

are important infrastructures for the security of the United States, both militarily and

economically.

Because of the wide variety of federal

agencies concerned with admissibility of

goods, and the wide variety of jurisdictions

and control by federal, state, and local

entities, there are necessarily a wide variety of responses. These responses make

allowances for the different geographical

makeup of ports and for the expansive

variety of specialization of infrastructure

investment—for example, the different

equipment required by a petroleum refinery, the wood pulp and forestry export

industry, and general cargo on board massive container carriers. These industries all

require different landside capabilities and

necessarily different applications to similar

security needs. All of these factors need to
ly to the local levels at which most security

activities and operations are undertaken.

Finding 2.b. Most persons who consider

the significance of seaports within the

larger community see them as vehicles to

promote economic growth. Attention to

seaport security is insufficient in part

because dissemination to the local levels of

what national efforts are underway, and

how security can reduce crime and terrorism vulnerabilities, is lacking.

Recommendation 1. Strengthen interagency, intergovernmental, and public/

private sector efforts to address the threats

of seaport crime (including terrorism), and

to enhance control of imports and exports

through seaports. Unless otherwise specified in Presidential Decision Directives

and other policy documents, lead agencies

to initiate action and promote increased

cooperation should be as follows: Customs, for international cargo and related

contraband smuggling; Immigration, for

admissibility of international passengers/

crew and alien smuggling; Coast Guard,

for seaport security; and FBI, for counterterrorism.

Recommendation 2. Strengthen the

efforts of the Marine Transportation System national organizations to enhance the

awareness of state and local governments

and private sector interests (including

labor) of the vital role that seaports play

in national security that extends beyond

their indispensable contribution to the

nation’s economy.

safety and security and for waterfront

facilities, while Customs and Immigration

are concerned about security of passengers, and the Coast Guard and Customs are

concerned about international cargo.

Security also serves to prevent crime,

and for that reason it should be of interest

to all seaport stakeholders. For example,

law enforcement officials at all levels

could view crime prevention as a way to

reduce needs for additional resources. The

private sector also has a major interest in

reducing losses due to theft: a decrease in

crime may make the private sector’s operations more profitable.

Unlike some of the other areas covered

in this report, security responsibilities are

not clearly laid out. In some seaports, there

may be an active interest in security and in

others there may not be much. Most often,

security programs are downplayed because

of perceived costs. Neither the federal government nor the state governments have

taken the lead in this area. These issues

are discussed in Chapter 5.

Findings and

Recommendations

Finding 2.a. Notwithstanding the existence

of a series of Presidential Decision Directives, as well as various national strategies

and other directives with application to

security in seaports, there exists a need for

a more comprehensive and definitive statement of the specific federal responsibilities

in this context. Moreover, this statement

should be disseminated broadly, particularChapter 2: Roles and Authorities in Seaports ■ 23
cuss their assessment and views of criminal activity, their response to crime, and

their recommendations to improve anticrime efforts at seaports. A number of private sector interests, primarily concerning

cargo theft and related issues, were also

interviewed.

The Commission collected data on criminal activity relating to the importation of

weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs,

currency, firearms and munitions, tainted

foodstuffs, pharmaceutical drugs, chlorofluorocarbons, pesticides, child pornography,

art and artifacts, endangered species, counterfeit and trademark merchandise, and

alien smuggling and stowaways. Information was also collected on cargo theft both

in the seaports and in the metropolitan

areas, extortion, racketeering, money laundering, bribery, corruption, and environmental crimes relating to Clean Water and

Clean Air Act violations. Finally, data were

collected on the unlawful export of weapons

of mass destruction technology and components, ballistic delivery systems, controlled

commodities, firearms and munitions, currency, and stolen vehicles, property, and

securities. The type of data collected covered known offenses, arrests, seizures, and

recoveries, and information about internal

conspiracies. Recognizing the extensive collection, reporting, and analytical programs

currently in place to analyze Part I and Part

II offenses (defined below) in the Uniform

Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the Commission did not include these offenses in its

study of crime at seaports.

Note: Given that terrorism poses a direct

threat to our national security, the Commission chose to address this criminal

activity as a separate topic in Chapter 4.

One of the key objectives of the Commission was to analyze the nature and extent

of serious crime in U.S. seaports. No

recent studies have addressed crime at seaports in a comprehensive manner. Frequently, news reports point to large

seizures of drugs found in shipping containers arriving from foreign countries, or

to illegal export of weapons and munitions,

or even to cargo that violates intellectual

property rights laws. But without a comprehensive view of the nature and extent of

crime at seaports, it is difficult to determine the comparative degree of seriousness of the problem.

Method of Data Collection

The Commission’s crime data collection

effort occurred in two main areas. First, the

Commission collected data from all relevant federal agencies for fiscal years 1996

through 1998. Crime data were collected

from the Customs Service, the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the

Department of Commerce, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast

Guard, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms (ATF), the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS), the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Second, the Commission collected crime

data from state and local law enforcement

agencies for 1996 through 1998, and also

conducted on-site studies at the 12 seaports

surveyed. More than 200 officials were

interviewed from appropriate federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies to disChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports

25
26 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

used to facilitate specific criminal activity. But because these investigations are

conducted under a number of different

case classifications or programs, there is

no way to determine with any precision

which of them are related to seaports. In

addition, criminal activity committed in

or facilitated through seaports may be

discovered only after the commission of

the crime outside of the seaport or in a

different city or state. The data from

these incidents are nearly impossible to

capture and attribute to specific seaports

with current law enforcement databases.

4. Inadequate information databases and

data collection requirements limit the

ability of agencies to collect certain

types of information or to capture data

specifically by seaports. With the exception of state or local agencies, most

agencies do not collect data on the number of “known offenses” committed, and

therefore their databases cannot capture

this information. (Known offenses were

defined as the actual number of offenses

based on all reports of criminal activity

received from all sources or discovered

by officers, regardless of whether anyone is arrested, seizures are made,

or prosecution is undertaken.) Known

offenses are important because they represent the best depiction of crime and

the most meaningful data to determine

the actual extent of crime at seaports.

Furthermore, certain agencies collect

data on seizures, arrests, or investigations by program areas, but these programs are too broad for analysis, and

the appropriate data could not be captured by specific seaport.

5. The vast majority of the crime data

available from the state and local law

enforcement agencies that were responsible for law enforcement at the 12 seaports surveyed related to offenses that

were outside the scope of the Commission’s study. Agencies at these seaports

generally collected and reported only

data involving Part I and Part II offenses

Determining the Nature and

Extent of Serious Crime at

Seaports

In conducting an analysis of the nature and

extent of serious crime at seaports, the

Commission found that its assessment was

dependent on two factors: the availability

and collection of crime data by law enforcement agencies and the crime detection

capabilities of law enforcement agencies.

Both of these factors are discussed below.

Availability and Collection of

Seaport Crime Data

The Commission found that the collection

of crime data at the seaports was difficult

because of five major factors:

1. No nationwide crime data collection

and reporting system exists for seaports.

For example, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, a component of the Office of

Justice Programs in the Department of

Justice, is the country’s primary source

for criminal justice statistics. But none

of its programs collect and report crime

data by seaports. The UCR Program and

the National Incident-Based Reporting

System are also nationwide crime data

collection and reporting systems, administered by the FBI, but these programs

do not collect and report crime data by

seaports.

2. Not all law enforcement agencies were

able to provide crime data because most

federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies do not collect and report crime

data by seaports. Many federal law

enforcement agencies collect data only

by regions, divisions, or districts, which

may include metropolitan areas or an

entire state or several states, and agencies were unable to extract the data by

specific seaports.

3. Many agencies initiate investigations

outside of seaports for a number of

crimes in which seaports may have been
cies would gain a better understanding of

each other’s crime problems, thereby

enhancing communication, cooperation,

and coordination. This could also facilitate

joint operations and assist in better allocation of limited resources.

Crime Detection Capabilities of

Law Enforcement Agencies

The limited crime detection capabilities of

federal law enforcement agencies also hindered the Commission’s ability to determine the full extent of crime in seaports.

The ability of agencies to identify and

detect criminal activity at seaports is

directly related to both resource allocations

and agency priorities. Federal agencies can

improve coordination among themselves

and with state and local governments and

the private sector and improve efficiency

through information management and

increased technology. However, with the

tremendous growth in trade and the projections that it will double every decade, and

with resource increases not assured, federal

agencies make resource allocation decisions based upon agency priorities.

Because agencies cannot allocate resources

at the same level to address all serious

crimes at seaports, they decide which

crimes will be addressed proactively and

which crimes will be addressed reactively.

For example, because of the significant

drug smuggling threat at many seaports,

substantial portions of Customs resources

are devoted to counter the drug threat,

while other criminal activities such as

commercial smuggling, trade fraud, cargo

theft, and the export of drug proceeds and

controlled commodities and munitions are

allocated fewer resources. Therefore, Customs is in a reactive rather than a proactive

posture in addressing certain types of

crime, and this affects how well Customs

can detect or discover certain crimes that

have fewer assigned resources.

In fact, in many locations, for a variety

of crimes, we found that Customs criminal

in the UCR Program. Part I offenses are

homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny—theft,

motor vehicle theft, and arson—the

so-called Crime Index. Part II offenses,

in which only arrest data are reported,

are all other offenses, including other

assaults, forgery and counterfeiting,

fraud, embezzlement, stolen property,

vandalism, weapons, prostitution, sex,

drug abuse, gambling, offenses against

the family and children, driving under

the influence, liquor laws, drunkenness,

disorderly conduct, vagrancy, suspicion,

curfew and loitering laws, and runaways.

Adequate information databases would

have significantly improved our ability to

assess the nature and extent of serious crime

at seaports. Adequate information databases

can also assist in detecting emerging crime

trends sooner so that appropriate resource

allocations and responses can be made in a

more timely manner. Finally, adequate information systems would permit departments

and agencies to make rational budgetary

and resource decisions based upon empirical data, and could better assist in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of agencies and programs.

Although nationwide strategies such as

the International Crime Control Strategy

and the National Drug Control Strategy

serve to coordinate federal efforts at the

national level, there are no comprehensive

local strategies or threat assessments at the

12 seaports surveyed. Task forces at the

local level to address specific threats have

worked well and should continue. But

coordination and cooperation would be

facilitated if federal, state, and local law

enforcement officials had a common

understanding of the crime threat.

An annual crime threat assessment at

the local seaport level could summarize

known criminal activity at the seaport from

all law enforcement entities, including all

intelligence and other information that can

be collected. Through this process, agenChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 27
28 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

or the export of stolen vehicles, and only

one had anticrime equipment, such as surveillance equipment to assist combating

internal conspiracies or crewmember drug

smuggling.

In the area of export control crimes,

which is discussed further in Chapter 5, the

minimal level of computer technology to

track controlled commodities and the lack

of timely and accurate export reporting

prevented effective targeting and detection

of export crime at seaports.

Full Extent of Serious Crime

at Seaports Unknown

As a result of the problems noted above,

the Commission believes that the crime

data in this report are probably underreported. The data, while significant, represent only detected or known criminal

activity, and the full extent of crime at

seaports is not fully known, but serious

crime at seaports is probably more extensive then what is detected, reported, and

retrievable from the law enforcement

agencies. Most of the agencies could not

query their databases for criminal activity

at specific seaports. Most attempted to

gather their data by manually reviewing

files, but not all agencies were able to

provide data. The final results are a compilation of database queries and manual

file review. This method has limitations

in terms of accuracy and completeness,

and the resulting statistics should be

viewed with these limitations in mind.

The data do not provide a complete

picture of the crime problem or law

enforcement’s response to crime, but

rather an overview of detected, reported,

and retrievable criminal activity.

investigators conduct investigations only

after they receive substantial information

about criminal activity or after inspection

personnel detect violations or make

seizures. In most cases, the proactive, complex investigations, such as undercover and

financial investigations, that are necessary

to identify and dismantle criminal organizations operating at or facilitating criminal

activity through seaports, are not being

conducted. This limitation is important

because not all crimes readily come to the

attention of law enforcement agencies. The

limitation is particularly problematic

because the law enforcement officials

interviewed and the data collected by the

Commission at the 12 seaports surveyed

indicate that the most extensive and significant criminal activity involve violations of

federal laws. Generally these crimes do not

have direct victims reporting offenses or

incidents to federal authorities. Therefore,

federal agencies must expend a significant

amount of time and effort targeting and

screening cargo to detect violations and to

identify violators. Because resource allocation varies among the different types of

criminal activity at seaports, it probably

affects how well agencies can detect or discover crimes that have fewer assigned

resources. This, in turn, distorts their

knowledge of the full extent of those criminal activities, which may ultimately result

in the assignment of the limited resources.

Federal agencies indicate that without a

proactive approach to serious crime, determining the full extent of criminal activity

at seaports will be difficult, at best.

The limited amount of contraband technology and surveillance equipment affects

the ability of agencies to detect certain

criminal activity like drug smuggling,

internal conspiracies, cargo theft, and the

export of stolen vehicles. Just two of the

12 seaports surveyed had contraband

detection technology such as non-intrusive

X-ray systems to combat drug smuggling
tainer of otherwise legitimate and properly manifested products. An export

control example may involve misclassifying or incorrectly describing a riot

control vehicle with a pepper spray

system as a “truck” in order to export

it from the United States without the

required export license.

■ The second category involves criminal

activity committed by smugglers or

other organized criminal groups whose

criminal activity is aided by corrupt

individuals employed in seaports or

within the transportation industry. For

example, a dockworker employed in a

seaport may be paid by a drug smuggling organization to remove shipments

of drugs from imported shipping containers. These conspiracies are commonly referred to as “internal conspiracies.”

■ The third category involves crimes that

comprise the Part I and Part II offenses

in the UCR Program as noted above.

These crimes may be committed against

seaport employees, visitors, passengers,

crewmembers, and property. These

crimes are reported to and pursued by

the state or local law enforcement agencies with jurisdictions that include seaports. As noted above, the Commission

did not include Part I and Part II offenses in its analysis of the nature and extent

of crime in seaports. Nonetheless, the

Commission found little evidence that

there was a serious problem with these

crimes at the 12 seaports surveyed.

The table below depicts broad categories of criminal activity with a nexus to

seaports and the government agencies

with some degree of jurisdiction. Although

the table does not represent a complete

list of all criminal activity, it does include

the majority of significant criminal activity, which was included in this analysis.

The criminal activity in the table is not

organized in any particular order of importance or based upon any agency priorities.

U.S. Seaports as Major

Conduits for Serious Crime

Seaports with international cargo and passengers represent the sea borders of the

United States and are increasingly the

first and last place that federal authorities

are able to exert physical control and

authority over international cargo and

passengers. Seaports are important “choke

points” that make it convenient, efficient,

and cost-effective to exercise federal

responsibility.

Criminal activity with a nexus to U.S.

seaports encompasses a broad range of

crimes, including but not limited to the

importation of illicit drugs, contraband,

and prohibited or restricted merchandise;

alien smuggling; trade fraud; bribery;

extortion; racketeering; environmental

crime; cargo theft; and the unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and

munitions, stolen property, currency, and

precursor chemicals. Frequently, criminal

organizations are well-funded regional,

national, and international conspiracies

that are as knowledgeable as legitimate

traders in their use of the intermodal system, commercial shipping and documentation, and computer technology.

Criminal activity at seaports can generally be viewed in three broad categories.

■ The first category involves criminal

activity that exploits legitimate international trade or otherwise utilizes the

transportation industry in facilitating

crime. For example, a drug smuggler

may import drugs into the United States

concealed in a shipping container

aboard a commercial vessel, using a

“front company” and without the assistance of industry personnel. This drug

smuggling method is commonly

referred to as a “consignee load.”

Another example may be an importer

who imports counterfeit merchandise

concealed deep inside a shipping conChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 29
30 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Jurisdiction over Criminal Activity at U.S. Seaports

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AGENCY

Terrorism FBI, Coast Guard, Customs, 

Immigration, Treasury, Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, S/L

Crime against shipping, piracy FBI, Coast Guard, Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms, S/L

Smuggling (importation) strategic/sensitive: Customs, FBI, Drug Enforcement 

Weapons of mass destruction and components Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, 

Controlled substances Tobacco, and Firearms, Coast Guard, 

Arms and munitions Secret Service, S/L

Monetary Instruments

Child pornography

Counterfeit U.S. currency

Precursor and essential chemicals

Alien smuggling Immigration, Coast Guard, FBI

Unlawful entry

Stowaways

General smuggling (importation): Customs, FBI, Fish and Wildlife, 

Art and artifacts Environmental Protection Agency,

Endangered species and wildlife Food and Drug Administration, 

Chlorofluorocarbons Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Prohibited or restricted merchandise Firearms, Coast Guard, S/L

Commercial merchandise and alcohol

Cargo theft: Customs, FBI, S/L

Inside seaport

Customs custody

Outside seaport

Outside customs custody

Cargo control: Customs, Food and Drug 

False manifesting Administration, Environmental 

Diversion Protection Agency, Drug 

Substitution Enforcement Administration, 

Agriculture, Commerce

Trade crime: Customs, Commerce, FBI

Revenue fraud

Intellectual property rights

Textile transshipment

Antidumping/countervailing duties

Child, forced, or indentured labor

Trade agreements

Country of origin marking
Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 31

Jurisdiction over Criminal Activity at U.S. Seaports (cont.)

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AGENCY

Other serious criminal activity: FBI, Customs, Drug Enforcement 

Extortion Administration, Internal Revenue 

Bribery Service, Bureau of Alcohol, 

Racketeering Tobacco, and Firearms, S/L

Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations

Money laundering

Tax evasion

Alcohol and tobacco diversion

Health and safety: Customs, Food and Drug 

Tainted foodstuffs and alcohol Administration, Environmental 

Pharmaceutical drugs Protection Agency, Agriculture, FBI, 

Insects Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Dangerous organisms Coast Guard, Fish and Wildlife

Environmental: Coast Guard, Environmental 

Hazardous cargo Protection Agency, FBI, Customs, 

Nonindigenous species Agriculture

Ballast water exchange

Deliberate discharge (pollution)

Smuggling (exportation) strategic/sensitive: Customs, Commerce, State, Drug 

WMD and components Enforcement Administration, 

Ballistic delivery systems Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

State-of-the-art critical technology and Firearms, FBI, Coast Guard, 

Military hardware and equipment Internal Revenue Service

Dual-use equipment

Monetary instruments

Arms and munitions

Precursor and essential chemicals

Smuggling (exportation): Customs, FBI, Coast Guard, S/L

Stolen vehicles

Stolen property

Stolen securities

U.S. trade secrets

Economic espionage

Economic sanctions and embargoes: Customs, Treasury, Commerce

Trading with the Enemy Act; 

Other

Bribery (government officials) The official’s agency, FBI

Assault on federal officer The officer’s agency, FBI
32 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

agencies stress that criminal organizations,

particularly drug smuggling organizations,

are extremely resilient and mobile, and

will shift their modes and methods and

entire smuggling operations within a seaport or to different seaports after law

enforcement efforts are intensified in any

particular seaport. For example, they may

shift their drug smuggling from commercial cargo shipments to crewmember or to

passenger ships, or to an entirely different

seaport.

Drug Smuggling Most

Prevalent and Reported

Crime Problem

Drug smuggling is a problem at a number

of the seaports the Commission surveyed.

Cocaine is the principal illicit drug smuggled into the United States through seaports, but significant quantities of marijuana are also smuggled, according to seizure

data. The bulk of illicit drugs enter through

commercial traffic, particularly in containerized shipments. Containerized shipments permit drug traffickers to avoid the

high fees charged by noncommercial

smugglers and insulate smugglers from the

drug loads detected by law enforcement

authorities. Drugs are also concealed

aboard commercial vessels and passenger

cruise ships, and are also smuggled by

crewmembers and passengers. Drug smuggling by crewmembers is a particular problem at seaports where bulk cargo is

imported, according to Customs. Dry or

liquid bulk shipments, such as steel, fruits,

or oil shipments, by their very nature, are

less conducive than containerized cargo

shipments to conceal drugs and require

smugglers to have more control in order to

retrieve the concealed drugs. Therefore,

drug smuggling organizations appear to

prefer crewmember and vessel concealment methods when bulk vessels are used

to facilitate drug smuggling operations at

seaports.

As the table indicates, there are a variety

of federal and state and local (S/L) law

enforcement agencies with joint jurisdiction depending on the crime.

From the law enforcement officials

interviewed and the data collected, the

Commission found that the primary criminal activity occurring at the 12 seaports

surveyed is violations of federal laws, not

violations of state or local laws. Much of it

is directly related to the importation and

exportation of goods and contraband.

International criminal organizations and

individuals exploit the tremendous volume

of international trade transported through

U.S. seaports. Federal agencies are primarily responsible for contraband and alien

interdiction, regulating the importation and

exportation of cargo, vessels and international passengers, and other border control

issues. Most of the state and local law

enforcement agencies support federal government anti-smuggling efforts, but focus

primarily on violent and property crimes

committed on seaport property, and to

some extent on security of the seaports.

Some seaports with dedicated law enforcement agencies are more proactive with

respect to certain types of crimes, such as

the export of stolen vehicles or cargo theft,

but generally consider most of the criminal

activity related to the importation and

exportation of goods to be the responsibility of the federal government.

Although the type of criminal activity

varies among seaports and regions, the

Commission found that drug smuggling

was the most prevalent and reported crime

problem at the 12 seaports surveyed. However, trade fraud and intellectual property

rights violations, stowaways and alien

smuggling, cargo theft, the smuggling of

chlorofluorocarbons, and the unlawful

export of controlled commodities and

munitions, stolen vehicles, and currency

were consistently problems too. Criminal

activity occurs at most of the 12 seaports

the Commission surveyed and was not limited to a few specific seaports. Federal
Narcotics Seizures in Commercial

Cargo Shipments and Vessels at

12 Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

Number of Weight 

Narcotic Seizures (in pounds)

Cocaine 335 130,084

Marijuana 107 169,402

Heroin 21 37

A large portion of the seizures and

offenses reported involved commercial

cargo shipments and vessels—335 of the

seizures of cocaine, totaling 130,084

pounds; 107 of the seizures of marijuana,

totaling 169,402 pounds; and 21 heroin

seizures, totaling 37 pounds, were reported. Although the total weight of marijuana

seized in commercial cargo shipments and

vessels was greater than the total weight of

cocaine seized, the total amount of marijuana seized trended downward significantly, while the total amount of cocaine

seized remained consistent. For marijuana

seizures, 105,314 pounds in fiscal year

1996, 34,721 pounds in fiscal year 1997,

and 29,367 pounds in fiscal year 1998. For

cocaine seizures, 48,067 pounds in fiscal

year 1996, 36,852 pounds in fiscal year

1997, and 45,165 pounds in fiscal year

1998. The total weight of heroin seizures

also trended downward, from 22 pounds in

fiscal year 1996 to 5 pounds in fiscal year

1998.

To put the drug smuggling problem at

the 12 seaports in perspective, it is useful

to compare these seizures with those made

nationally and along the Southwest border

during the same period.

Total Narcotics Seizures

and Offenses at 12 Seaports

Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

Number of Weight

Narcotic Seizures (in pounds)

Cocaine 429 130,521

Marijuana 752 169,724

Heroin 36 75

Number of Number of

Offenses Arrests

Narcotic Offenses 2,730 959

Internal Conspiracy

Offenses 818 219

From fiscal years 1996 through 1998,

there were 429 seizures of cocaine totaling

130,521 pounds, 752 seizures of marijuana

totaling 169,724 pounds, and 36 seizures

of heroin totaling 75 pounds in commercial

cargo shipments and vessels and cruise

ships reported at the 12 seaports that the

Commission surveyed. During this same

time period, there were 2,730 narcotic

offenses and 959 arrests reported, including 818 internal conspiracy offenses and

219 arrests.

Commercial cargo shipments and vessel

drug seizures involved more significant

weights, while cruise ship seizures tended

to be small amounts and involved less

organized smuggling efforts. For example,

there were 94 cocaine seizures totaling 437

pounds, 645 marijuana seizures totaling

322 pounds, and 15 heroin seizures totaling 38 pounds reported from cruise ships.

Customs indicated that it does monitor

cruise ship drug smuggling activity for

potential internal conspiracy operations

and to determine shifts in smuggling patterns from commercial cargo shipments

and vessels.

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 33
34 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Comparison of Narcotics Seizures

by Weight in Commercial Cargo

Shipments and Vessels at 12

Seaports Surveyed and Southwest

Border, FY 1996–1998

12 Southwest 

Seaports Border

(% of lbs. (% of lbs. 

seized seized 

Narcotic nationwide) nationwide)

Cocaine 69% 13%

Marijuana 55% 36%

Heroin 12% <1%

The 12 seaports surveyed accounted

for 69 percent of all cocaine by weight, 55

percent of all marijuana, and 12 percent

of all heroin seized in commercial cargo

shipments and vessels at all ports of entry

nationwide. In contrast, all of the ports of

entry along the Southwest border accounted for 13 percent of all cocaine by weight,

36 percent of all marijuana, and less than 1

percent of all heroin seized in commercial

cargo shipments and vehicles nationwide.

Comparison of Number of

Narcotics Seizures in Commercial

Cargo Shipments and Vessels at

12 Seaports Surveyed and

Southwest Border, FY 1996–1998

12 Southwest 

Seaports Border

(% of # (% of # 

of seizures of seizures 

Narcotic nationwide) nationwide)

Cocaine 56% 4%

Marijuana 32% 45%

Heroin 65% 3%

Narcotics Seizures in Commercial

Cargo Shipments and Vessels,

Nationwide, FY 1996–1998

Number of Weight 

Narcotic Seizures (in pounds)

Cocaine 597 188,336

Marijuana 331 304,094

Heroin 32 307

In fiscal years 1996 though 1998, in

commercial cargo shipments and vessels

at all ports of entry nationwide, there

were 597 seizures of cocaine totaling

188,336 pounds, 331 seizures of marijuana

totaling 304,094 pounds, and 32 heroin

seizures totaling 307 pounds, according

to Customs.

Narcotics Seizures in Commercial

Cargo Shipments and Vehicles,

Southwest Border, FY 1996-1998

Number of Weight

Narcotic Seizures (in pounds)

Cocaine 26 25,160

Marijuana 149 111,216

Heroin 1 1

In commercial cargo shipments and

vehicles at all ports of entry along the

Southwest border, there were 26 seizures

of cocaine totaling 25,160 pounds, 149

seizures of marijuana totaling 111,216

pounds, and 1 seizure of heroin totaling

1 pound.
phia, and Port Everglades. Small quantities

of marijuana were seized in Gulfport, New

Orleans, and San Juan, and no marijuana

was seized at Charleston, Detroit, and

Tacoma.

In addition to the severity of the problem, the method of drug smuggling may

vary among seaports. For example, in

Miami, a large number of drug seizures are

made in containerized cargo shipments and

vessels, including internal conspiracies and

cruise ships, but numerous seizures are also

made from vessels on the Miami River.

Although part of the Port of Miami, it is

not in the strict confines of seaport boundaries. Investigations indicate that the vessel

operators involved in drug smuggling are

being paid in cocaine by drug trafficking

organizations for smuggling drugs into the

United States. Illegal drugs are concealed

in deep compartments and in fuel and water

tanks. In two seizures, nearly 1,500 pounds

of cocaine was discovered in welded compartments inside water and fuel tanks and

crew quarters, and recently, during a 10-day

period, nearly 3,000 pounds of cocaine was

seized concealed inside the keels and hulls

of four Haitian cargo vessels. It can cost

law enforcement authorities between

$1,000 and $3,000 to pump out the tanks to

search for illegal drugs.

Although there have been significant

internal conspiracies reported at New York/

New Jersey, consignee loads appeared to

be favored by drug smuggling organizations. A seizure of 1,332 pounds of

cocaine concealed in commercial paper

rolls demonstrates the great lengths to

which smugglers go in getting drugs into

the country. In this case the smugglers

concealed the cocaine deeper within

commercial paper rolls after comparing

the depth of drill holes made by Customs

during an examination of a previous dry

run (an empty shipment imported by

smugglers to test Customs detection

efforts).

The 12 seaports surveyed accounted

for 56 percent of the number of cocaine

seizures, 32 percent of the number of

marijuana seizures, and 65 percent of the

number of heroin seizures in commercial

cargo shipments and vessels at all ports of

entry nationwide. In contrast, all of the

ports of entry along the Southwest border

accounted for 4 percent of the number

of cocaine seizures, 45 percent of the

number of marijuana seizures, and 3 percent of the number of heroin seizures

in commercial cargo shipments and vehicles nationwide.

Drug seizures were reported at 9 of the

12 seaports surveyed (Los Angeles and

Long Beach were counted as one seaport),

and large amounts of drugs were seized at

8 of the 12. The leaders in drug seizures in

commercial cargo and vessels among the

12 seaports were Charleston, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Miami, New Orleans,

New York/New Jersey, Philadelphia, Port

Everglades, and San Juan. These figures

represent only known drug smuggling

activity; the full extent of undetected drug

smuggling at seaports is unknown.

While significant amounts of narcotics

are being smuggled through the seaports,

the problem does appear to vary considerably among ports. For pounds of drugs

seized from fiscal year 1996 through 1998,

the Port of Miami ranked number 1 and

Port Everglades ranked number 2 among

the 12 seaports the Commission surveyed.

During those years, 63,662 pounds of

cocaine were seized at the Port of Miami

and 30,283 pounds at Port Everglades.

Large quantities of cocaine were also

seized at Charleston, Los Angeles/Long

Beach, New Orleans, New York/New Jersey, Philadelphia, and San Juan. Small

quantities of cocaine were seized at Gulfport, and no cocaine was seized at Detroit

and Tacoma. Large quantities of marijuana

were seized at Los Angeles/Long Beach,

Miami, New York/New Jersey, PhiladelChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 35
36 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Internal Conspiracies Present

Most Serious Challenge to

Drug Interdiction Efforts at

Seaports

Internal conspiracies were reported at 9

of the 12 seaports surveyed—Charleston,

Gulfport, Los Angeles, Miami, New

Orleans, New York/New Jersey, Port

Everglades, Philadelphia, and San Juan.

Again, the full extent of undetected internal conspiracies at seaports is unknown.

Internal conspiracies involve criminal

activity committed by smugglers or other

organized criminal groups whose criminal

activity is aided by corrupt individuals

employed in seaports or within the transportation industry. The internal conspiracies detected at the seaports the Commission surveyed were primarily involved

with drug trafficking organizations smuggling illicit drugs into the United States.

Because the counter-drug effort is a high

priority, with more resources allocated to

it than are allocated to commercial smuggling or trade fraud, Customs reports that

drug smuggling organizations counter

these efforts by utilizing internal conspiracies to ensure a safe and dependable

method to smuggle drugs into the United

States. Customs officials do caution that

internal conspiracies may be involved

with commercial smuggling, trade fraud,

cargo theft, or other criminal activity

as well, but to date they have not been

detected.

Seaports face several drug smuggling

threats, but the most serious challenge to

drug interdiction efforts at seaports is the

operation of internal conspiracies. Drug

trafficking organizations use industry

employees to facilitate their drug smuggling operations at seaports. Industry

employees include dockworkers, employees of ocean carriers, security firms,

freight forwarders, brokers, and other

Parasitic devices are used to smuggle

narcotics aboard commercial vessels. For

example, at the Philadelphia seaport 335

pounds of cocaine and 3 pounds of heroin

were found concealed in the rudder compartment of an oil tanker while it was at

anchorage. Divers, using a small pleasure

craft, were involved in removing the narcotics from the vessel once it reached the

seaport.

Drug smuggling by crewmembers is a

problem at some seaports. For example,

in New Orleans, 1,445 pounds of cocaine

was seized aboard a vessel arriving from

Colombia, and cocaine seizures in the

hundreds of pounds are common. In

Philadelphia, three crewmembers were

arrested for smuggling nearly 15 pounds

of heroin into the United States.

Drug smuggling organizations also

ship drugs to other countries via the

United States. For example, at Charleston

862 pounds of cocaine was seized concealed in five containers of asphalt from

Colombia for shipment to Italy. Another

container had already been shipped and it

was located in Spain and found to contain

an additional 160 pounds of cocaine. A

controlled delivery to Milan, Italy, was

conducted, and Italian authorities arrested

three individuals.

Finally, a case in Los Angeles/Long

Beach demonstrates that internal conspiracies also operate in foreign seaports—

587 pounds of cocaine was seized in nine

duffel bags in the tail end of a container

from Colombia intended for Vancouver,

Canada. After the cocaine was seized,

a controlled delivery of the cocaine to

Canada was conducted. The investigation

by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

revealed an extensive internal conspiracy

involving dockworkers at the seaport in

Vancouver.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the increasing pressure to enforce the laws and regulations while rapidly moving containers

through seaports has diminished the

amount of time Customs has to examine

cargo. To carry out its responsibilities in

this environment, Customs relies on selective targeting and automation to process

imported cargo. In order for this process to

be effective, Customs must be assured that

the shipments it selects for inspection are

intact, undisturbed, and in the same condition as when they arrived in the United

States. This is important because Customs

physically inspects less than 2 percent of

cargo before its released, and therefore all

of its inspections must be effective. Selective targeting and automation has generally

been effective against consignee drug shipments (those not involving internal conspiracies), primarily because the shipments

are intact and undisturbed before Customs

inspection. However, no matter how

sophisticated or state-of-the-art automated

targeting systems become, international

shipments will continue to remain vulnerable to internal conspiracies if ocean carriers cannot ensure the integrity of imported

shipments.

The components of seaport internal

conspiracies include overseas conspirators

with access to containers or vessels to

conceal drugs, the use of common commodities and importers with unsuspicious

importation records, access to containers

or vessels in U.S. seaports, knowledge of

Customs examination techniques and routines, the ability to remove contraband and

reseal containers to maintain the integrity

of the smuggling method, and the ability

to transport smuggled drugs out of the

U.S. seaports without detection.

Internal conspiracies employ numerous

methods to smuggle drugs through seaports. Among the common methods is

concealment of contraband on vessels or

in underwater hull attachments (parasitic

devices). Often, duplicate container seals

are attached to drug shipments inside the

companies involved in the importation or

transportation of goods. Internal conspiracies involve individuals with knowledge of

Customs procedures and activity, including

methods and patterns of targeting, inspection, examination, surveillance, and investigations. These individuals have unrestricted access at seaports, including vessels,

vehicles, piers, warehouses, containers,

baggage, passengers, crewmembers, longshoremen, and employees.

Industry employees—although the

majority of the individuals prosecuted for

their participation in internal conspiracies

have been dockworkers and security personnel, others may be involved—may be

paid by drug smuggling organizations to

remove drugs from containers or vessels at

seaports before the containers or vessels

can be examined and the drugs detected by

Customs. Industry employees may also be

paid to provide information about specific

imported shipments or details about law

enforcement activities and vulnerabilities

at seaports.

Internal conspiracies pose the greatest

challenge not because of the amount of

drugs they import into the United States

but because they often utilize the shipments of large-volume, nationally known

importers (without the importers’ knowledge or participation) to conceal drugs,

and Customs is less likely to examine

what appears to be legitimate freight. The

use of legitimate importers and the ability

to remove the drugs before shipments can

be examined effectively thwart traditional

Customs efforts to target and examine.

This may be the most significant vulnerability for Customs. For example, in one

case internal conspirators were able to

open a container and remove a shipment

of cocaine in seven seconds. Without

advance information about this smuggling

attempt, even if Customs did examine this

shipment after the drugs were removed,

Customs probably would not detect it as

an internal conspiracy.

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 37
38 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

niques, and they are easily aware of law

enforcement successes. This makes it

extremely difficult for law enforcement

officers to conduct their work. In some

cases, Customs has actually had to remove

containers in the middle of the night to

shield the examination from individuals

involved in internal conspiracies.

Internal Conspiracies and

Security at Seaports

Inadequate security does contribute to certain serious crimes at seaports. A relevant

example occurred at the Port of Miami,

when, during the unloading of a rollon/roll-off vessel, a van drove onto the vessel’s deck. The crane operator moved a

shipping container from the top stack of

the vessel and placed it on the deck near

the van. The driver of a mule (a small

truck to move containers around the port)

placed a different container on the deck in

front of the van to block any dockside view

of the activity. Individuals from the van

broke the seal on the container and

climbed inside the container and removed

an estimated 20 to 30 boxes. Ten individuals were involved, and when the third mate

confronted the individuals, they threatened

his life. The boxes were loaded into the van

and it departed. When Customs arrived, no

dockworkers were present; only the

crewmembers were at the scene. Customs

suspects that 1,000 kilograms of contraband was removed and that many of the

individuals involved were dockworkers.

This example demonstrates how poor

security failed to prevent or even hinder a

serious crime in progress. The Port of

Miami is located on Dodge Island, which is

accessed by one road. The port has a security force and system with physical security

and access control measures to control visitors, passengers, seaport personnel, truck

drivers, and others, and includes identification cards and criminal records checks for

seaport employees with access to restricted

rear of containers. After removal of the

drugs by conspirators, the duplicate is

attached to the container, thus concealing

the illegal activity from Customs and the

ultimate recipient of the cargo. Internal

conspirators may load drug shipments in

company equipment or in their personal

vehicles (some seaports permit employees

to park their personal vehicles at dockside)

and subsequently depart the seaport with

no security screening or accountability.

Security guards, shipping office personnel,

and security gates may be compromised to

facilitate drug smuggling. Deeper concealment inside containers, concealment in the

structure of containers, removal of drugs

concealed in containers that are in transit

to a different seaport after Customs inspection at the first port of arrival, or diversion

and removal of suitcases concealing drugs

from cruise ships may be employed.

Customs must take steps to ensure that

these conspiracies do not remove drugs

before it can examine the containers. These

steps may include inspecting containers

when they are unladed from vessels at

dockside or moving them under direct

supervision or observation to container

enforcement examination stations. Even

cargo shipments destined for inspection

may have been tampered with before they

reached Customs inspection. In many cases

Customs must rely on the private sector,

including dockworkers (due to labor agreements), to move or unload containers or

operate container examination stations,

which often are miles away from the seaports, and which themselves are also vulnerable to internal conspiracies. The fact

that customhouse brokers know which

shipments Customs has selected for examination and when those examinations may

take place is a vulnerability.

Internal conspiracies are successful

because the individuals involved have

unrestricted access and are not subject to

security screening and inspection and

accountability. Their countersurveillance

efforts can defeat law enforcement tech-
them to notify the principal smugglers and

other conspirators of the Customs activities.

The effect was to effectively defeat the

attempts to conduct controlled deliveries of

the drug-laded containers to the recipients

or to further develop the seizure. During

the course of the investigation 6 tons of

cocaine and 10 tons of marijuana was

seized.

Similar to the Port of Miami, Port Everglades also permitted seaport employees

to park their personally owned vehicles

near arriving and departing vessels and

sensitive cargo operations, and port security did not conduct routine security screening and inspection and accountability of

personally owned vehicles or seaport

equipment. This was one of the methods

most frequently used by the employees

involved in the internal conspiracies to

remove imported drugs from the seaport,

according to Customs. Effective security

screening and inspection and accountability of seaport employees and vehicles

entering and leaving the seaport probably

would have prevented or severely hindered

the internal conspirators from removing

drug shipments from the seaport in their

personal vehicles. Subsequent to these

investigations, Port Everglades implemented effective physical, access control, and

operational security measures designed

to improve security and to specifically

counter internal conspiracies.

The combination of the successful

investigations noted above and the

enhanced security countermeasures are

paying off, according to Customs. Port

Everglades and the Port of Miami are

very similar with respect to their container

traffic and countries of origin for imported

goods. But the levels of security at the

two ports are very different. In fiscal

year 1998, Port Everglades’ internal conspiracy drug seizures represented 40 percent of its total drug seizures, down from

74 percent in fiscal 1997, and consignee

drug seizures have been increasing. In contrast, at the Port of Miami, drug seizures

cargo operations. A significant weakness,

however, is that dockworkers are permitted

to park their personally owned vehicles at

dockside or near vessels lading or unlading.

Internal conspirators frequently use their

personally owned vehicles to remove drugs

shipments from the Port of Miami, according to Customs. Moreover, port security

personnel do not conduct routine security

screening and inspection and accountability

of personally owned vehicles or seaport

equipment. Effective security screening and

inspection of vehicles entering and leaving

the seaport in this case probably would

have prevented or severely hindered the

opportunity to commit this crime. The port

security personnel had no records to identify the van or any of the individuals inside

that were involved in this crime. Improved

accountability would have provided records

to identify the vehicle and individuals so

that investigators could conduct an appropriate investigation.

An example of the relationship between

security and internal conspiracies is two

significant internal conspiracy investigations conducted by Customs and DEA at

Port Everglades that subsequently resulted

in the arrest of 45 individuals, including 35

dockworkers and contract security personnel, on drug smuggling and related offenses. The internal conspirators arrested were

well-organized and were knowledgeable of

the enforcement activities of the federal

agencies, according to Customs. For example, in most seaports, dockworkers move

and unlade containers for ocean carriers

and Customs, so when Customs needs to

move, examine, or unload a container, this

work is normally performed by dockworkers. During these cases there were several

instances when Customs needed to X-ray a

container. The dockworkers involved in the

internal conspiracy drove the containers to

the X-ray station and to the examination

area, where Customs conducted in-depth

examinations. This allowed the dockworkers to know exactly what Customs was

doing with the containers and permitted

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 39
40 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

tion station on seaport property would also

have prevented the theft of the container.

Furthermore, effective security screening

and inspection and accountability of seaport employees and vehicles entering and

leaving the seaport probably would have

prevented or severely hindered the ability

of the dockworker to remove drug shipments from the seaport.

Another example of lax security is two

significant internal conspiracy investigations conducted by Customs, DEA, and

the Waterfront Commission of New York

Harbor at New York/New Jersey that

resulted in the arrest of 42 individuals,

including 13 dockworkers involved in

drug smuggling. These investigations

resulted in the seizure of approximately

3,100 pounds of cocaine and 35,000

pounds of marijuana. Perhaps more important, however, was that these cases established an extensive alliance between traditional organized crime groups and

dockworkers under their control, and

Colombian trafficking organizations. The

Colombian drug smuggling organizations

used corrupt dockworkers to assist in the

removal of cocaine from the seaport. In

addition, at the time, these investigations

revealed a never-before-seen tactic used by

internal conspiracies—so-called “Colombian break-in groups”—to remove illegal

drugs from waterfront facilities. Dockworkers either located shipping containers

or positioned containers near holes in

fences protecting terminals or at remote

locations inside the terminals for the

smugglers. The dockworkers then would

advise the Colombian smugglers, who in

turn would dispatch Colombian break-in

groups to enter the terminal, locate the

containers, and remove the drugs. In one

case, the group climbed the third tier of a

container stack to remove a cocaine shipment. According to Customs, these groups

operated in Brooklyn, New York; Port

Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore; Norfolk; San Francisco; and Seattle.

involving internal conspiracies represented

71 percent in fiscal 1998, up from 45

percent in fiscal 1997.

Another example of the relationship

between security and internal conspiracies

is an internal conspiracy case at

Charleston. After a Customs dockside tailgate examination, a container was ordered

to an examination site for further examination. The container was resealed and delivered to the examination site and a locking

device was placed on the container, but

sometime during that evening dockworkers broke the locking device and removed

the container from the examination site.

The port authority owns the examination

site and uses it to lade and unlade containers. The port authority also allows Customs to use a portion of the building to

conduct its examinations at the seaport

rather than move containers to a centralized examination station that is off seaport

property. The container was found 10 days

later in an empty container storage area.

When Customs examined the container,

the seal had been broken and merchandise

had been removed. A hole, tunneled

approximately 8 feet into the merchandise,

revealed a large void. Not far from this

container, a truck driver found several duffel bags containing 291 pounds of cocaine

in an empty container. The arrest of an

individual and the seizure of cocaine were

linked to the 291-pound cocaine seizure.

Investigation by Customs, DEA, and the

FBI identified a dockworker involved in

the drug smuggling conspiracy and resulted in the seizure of 3,086 pounds of

cocaine, and 22 arrests, indictments, and

convictions, including a dockworker who

was responsible for removing the drugs

from shipping containers.

Although the examination site was

located within the Charleston seaport

property, a fence did not protect the examination site where the container was

stolen. A fence probably would have prevented the removal of the container by

dockworkers. A secure Customs examina-
consuming and manpower-intensive, and

when nonconsensual interceptions are utilized, they may require significant funding

for related equipment and expenses. Security countermeasures reduce or eliminate

vulnerabilities and opportunities for certain criminal activity. This is particularly

applicable with respect to internal conspiracies, crewmember drug smuggling, alien

smuggling, and cargo theft. In fact, many

law enforcement officials believe that

security enhancements are the best longterm measures to combat internal conspiracies. Without enhanced security countermeasures, increasingly more federal, state,

and local staffing and resources may be

needed to identify, arrest, and prosecute

individuals and organizations involved,

and other industry employees will continue to be vulnerable to drug smuggling

organizations.

Immigration Crime:

Stowaways and Alien

Smuggling

Stowaways were the largest Immigration

problem at 10 of the 12 seaports surveyed.

From fiscal 1996 through 1998, Immigration intercepted a total of 1,187 stowaways

and 247 individuals with fraudulent documents arriving aboard vessels. Immigration

intercepted 108 criminal aliens, another

108 aliens who were found to be smuggling narcotics, and 83 aliens who were

smuggled into the United States. Miami

and New Orleans reported the largest

number of stowaways, 405 and 232,

respectively, while Detroit and Tacoma

did not report any stowaways.

The impact of stowaways includes

disruption of service and direct costs and

revenue losses for vessel operators. Stowaways also have posed a physical threat

to crew and to the safe operation of ships

because of their fear of apprehension.

This case clearly demonstrates how

inadequate security even failed to prevent

outside intruders from entering the seaport

and committing a serious crime. Effective

physical security and access control measures probably would have prevented or

severely hindered these Colombian breakin groups. Repairing downed perimeter

fences and holes or breaks in the fencing,

proper perimeter lighting, and security

screening and inspection and accountability of individuals and vehicles entering and

leaving the terminals would have been

effective deterrents as well.

An example of how effective security

prevented a serious crime is a case involving 806 pounds of cocaine concealed in a

container in a warehouse in New Jersey,

which was the intended target of a Colombian break-in group. The container had

been at a terminal in Staten Island before it

was moved to the warehouse. While the

container was at a terminal, several individuals were arrested for trespassing by the

Port Authority Police Department. The

individuals had ladders in their possession

to gain access to the terminal and bolt cutters to open containers. At the time of their

arrest, they were thought to be cargo

thieves, but a subsequent investigation

revealed that they were in fact a Colombian break-in group.

These investigations clearly demonstrate

the importance of implementing and maintaining effective security measures to prevent unauthorized access to international

shipments by internal conspiracies and

other criminals.

In spite of the successes in attacking

internal conspiracies noted above, the

fact remains that internal conspiracies

are difficult to detect. Once they are

detected it is more difficult to identify

the individuals involved, and once the

individuals involved are identified it is

extremely difficult to gather sufficient

evidence for prosecution. Internal conspiracy investigations are tremendously timeChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 41
42 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

arrested 32 illegal aliens in soft-top containers at the Port of Los Angeles. Thirty illegal

immigrants from China who crossed the

Pacific in specially outfitted cargo containers were arrested at the Ports of Long Beach

and Los Angeles. The containers were

equipped with food, water, battery-powered

lights, portable potties, cell phones, and

ladders. Each alien was charged $50,000 by

smugglers and had paid $5,000 in advance

for the voyage, according to Immigration.

Immigration arrested 18 illegal aliens from

China after they were found inside a cargo

container at the Port of Long Beach. Twelve

other illegal aliens from China were arrested after they were found inside a soft-top

container at the Port of Seattle. Also, Immigration found three Chinese aliens dead and

15 others in another soft-top cargo container

in the Port of Seattle. In addition, and what

is most disturbing, is the marked increase

over the last several months of Chinese

nationals being smuggled into West Coast

seaports in hard top containers.

This latest activity is disturbing for two

reasons. First, the lives of the illegal aliens

are put at serious risk (containers arriving

with dead aliens inside are not an uncommon occurrence). Second, finding a container with illegal aliens inside when the

containers may be stacked 10 high and 10

across is a daunting, often impossible task.

The current Immigration strategy

involves overseas districts and domestic

district and sector offices engaging in an

integrated enforcement effort across the

entire Immigration Service to identify,

dismantle, or disrupt alien smuggling

organizations. Immigration special agents

focus enforcement efforts on targeting

complex, sophisticated alien smuggling

organizations that are international in scope.

These smuggling organizations, based in

source countries, in transit countries, or in

the United States, may use multiple organizations, or smuggling “subcontractors,” to

further insulate them from identification

and prosecution by law enforcement agencies. Immigration’s anti-smuggling strategy

Immigration Offenses at 12 Seaports

Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

# of Known 

Type of Offense Offenses

Fraudulent documents intercepted 247

False claims of U.S. citizenship 10

Aliens smuggling narcotics 108

Aliens smuggled into U.S. 83

Cases accepted by U.S. Attorney 30

Stowaways intercepted 1,187

Criminal aliens 108

Another problem that Immigration must

deal with is vessel crews. Crewmembers

easily obtain visas, and once Immigration

processes the arrival of a vessel, the captain

is responsible for ensuring that crewmembers without appropriate visas remain on

board during the vessel’s stay in port. Often

the captains do not enforce these restrictions, and no head count or exit inspection

of the crew is performed. Immigration

does not currently compare the departure

manifest with actual departing crew on

board at the time of departure. So Immigration has no way of knowing whether

manifested crews actually leave on the

ship they arrived on, leave on another ship,

or remain illegally in the United States.

Smuggling of illegal aliens is also a

problem. In the 12 seaports surveyed,

from fiscal 1996 through 1998, a total of

83 smuggled aliens were intercepted.

However, in the five months beginning

fiscal year 2000, 114 smuggled aliens have

been intercepted. It is important to realize

that the bulk of alien smuggling does not

take place within the confines of a seaport

of entry, but rather at points contiguous to

the port-of-entry.

Maritime smuggling from the Caribbean

into South Florida is increasing, and Immigration has recently noticed the reemergence of Chinese boat smuggling on both

the East and West Coasts. Immigration
rights restrictions, and health and safety

standards. Textile transshipments involve

schemes to illegally import, transport, and

transship falsely declared textiles and wearing apparel into the United States to avoid

quotas. Undervaluation, double invoicing,

or false description of merchandise generally involves schemes to avoid or reduce the

amount of duty on merchandise imported

into the United States. Intellectual property

rights schemes involve the illegal importation, transportation, and distribution of

counterfeit goods subject to trademark and

copyrights registered with Customs. Public

health and safety schemes involve the illegal importation, transportation, and transshipment of items that pose a threat to U.S.

consumers and/or the environment, including, but not limited to, tainted or prohibited

foodstuffs, medicines, unapproved drugs,

and chlorofluorocarbons.

Trade fraud offenses were reported at 9

of the 12 seaports surveyed. At the Ports of

Los Angeles and Long Beach, trade fraud

is a major problem. From fiscal years 1996

through 1998, these seaports accounted for

98 percent of the nearly $103 million in

trade fraud goods seized by Customs. A

large number of trade offenses were reported in New York/New Jersey, San Juan, and

New Orleans. Most import crimes go

involves all enforcement components of

Immigration, and is designed to disrupt

alien smuggling activities at all levels of

operation. The strategy is crafted to be

flexible and seeks the best mix of enforcement responses to changing situations.

Import Crimes Other

Than Drugs at Seaports

Except for illicit drugs, this group of

import crimes involves numerous types of

commodities and goods, but the vast

majority of the crimes reported involved

trade fraud or commercial smuggling and

importations of counterfeit and trademark

merchandise.

Trade fraud relates to the protection of

revenue and to unfair, predatory trade practices. Trade fraud includes violations involving diversion of imported or in-bond merchandise into the commerce of the United

States, textile transshipments, and undervaluation and double invoicing of merchandise,

as well as false description of merchandise.

Diversion schemes involve circumventing or manipulating the Customs entry or

in-bond systems to avoid paying duty

and/or to circumvent trade agreements,

import restrictions, intellectual property

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 43

Import Crime Other Than Drugs at 12 Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

# of Known # of # of Value of 

Type of Offense Offenses Arrests Seizures Seizures

Trade fraud 411 90 175 $102,994,627

Counterfeit/trademark 336 58 797 $61,167,785

Child pornography 21 6 8 N/A

Alcohol diversion 17 2 17 0

Precursor chemicals 0 0 0 0

WMD 0 0 0 0

Pesticides 1 0 1 $53,696

Art and artifacts 0 0 0 0

Endangered species 0 0 0 0

FDA-regulated products 7 4 1 $75,000
44 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Philadelphia reported a large number of

intellectual property rights offenses. As a

whole, the 12 seaports had 797 seizures,

valued at $61.1 million. Nationally for the

same period, this type of crime resulted in

7,746 seizures, valued at $198 million. The

12 seaports accounted for 10 percent of the

total number of intellectual property rights

seizures and 30 percent of the total value

of all intellectual property rights seized

nationwide.

In a recent investigation, the largest

seizure ever of imported counterfeit merchandise, valued at $20 million, occurred

in New York. The counterfeit merchandise

filled 20 40-foot containers. The importer

had evaded Custom’s automated targeting

four previous times by changing the name

of the company.

Cargo Theft Outside Seaports

in Metropolitan Areas

The effective operation of the U.S. economy depends, in large part, on the efficient

and organized movement of goods between

and among all modes (maritime waterways,

highways, railways) of the U.S. transportation infrastructure. More than $400 billion

is spent annually in the United States on

the movement of cargo.

In recognizing that seaports are an

important component of the larger transportation system, and that significant portions of international cargo remain under

federal custody after departure from seaports, the Commission expanded the scope

of crimes in its analysis to include cargo

theft in the metropolitan areas.

Cargo theft disrupts the reliable and

efficient flow of goods. Cargo theft goes

unnoticed by most people outside the transportation industry or the law enforcement

community, but it is a serious problem

affecting the entire transportation network.

According to the transportation and

insurance industry, cargo theft results in

undetected at seaports because less than 2

percent of the cargo is inspected, according

to Customs.

One investigation conducted by Customs in Los Angeles revealed that over a

five-year period, 360 shipping containers

of wearing apparel and counterfeit

Microsoft software were imported into the

United States. They were falsely described

on import documentation as knockdown

furniture headboards. The investigation

disclosed that typically the last three rows

of the containers were loaded with cartons

of headboards and the remainder of the

container was loaded with counterfeit software and wearing apparel subject to quota

restrictions and high duty rates. The investigation determined that this scheme

involved $12 million in counterfeit software and $64 million in wearing apparel.

The loss of revenue to the U.S. government

was $6.5 million.

In a similar scheme, wearing apparel

valued at $80 million, with a loss of revenue to the U.S. government of $7.5 million, was concealed inside 500 containers

behind several rows of lawn furniture. The

principal had several weeks’ advance

notice that this investigation had been initiated because the containers were flagged

for inspection in the Customs Automated

Commercial System. This allowed the principal time to destroy all documentary evidence in the United States before the execution of search warrants and to move his

illegal proceeds to offshore locations.

Also related to trade fraud is the illegal

importation of counterfeit and trademark

material (intellectual property rights).

Intellectual property rights offenses were

reported at 8 of the 12 seaports surveyed.

Intellectual property rights violations were

a significant problem in the Ports of Los

Angeles and Long Beach. From fiscal

years 1996 through 1998, 386 seizures,

valued at $28.6 million, came from these

two ports. New York/New Jersey reported a

large number of seizures, and Miami and
burglary and robbery under the UCR Program. However, inconsistent reporting by

law enforcement agencies makes it difficult

to retrieve reliable cargo theft data, according to many law enforcement officials.

For example, when a container of goods is

stolen, it could be recorded as a theft of a

motor vehicle, theft from a motor vehicle,

or theft of motor vehicle parts or accessories, or even a robbery if force or the

threat of force was used during the theft.

The value of stolen goods may not be

reported at all, when in reality the value of

the stolen cargo far exceeds the value of

the conveyance.

In addition to the lack of a specific

cargo theft offense in the UCR Program,

underreporting by the private sector

severely hampers the collection of cargo

theft data, according to law enforcement

authorities. Many cargo theft losses are

unreported by the private sector because of

high insurance deductibles, rising insurance premiums, self-insurance, fear of negative publicity, between-party settlements,

competitiveness within the industry, and

their reputation for reliability, according to

the AIMU. Law enforcement officials also

point out that not only is there underreporting by the private sector, but in many cases

when the private sector does report cargo

theft incidents, the reports are not timely.

This untimely reporting has had a negative

impact on the ability of law enforcement

authorities to respond and investigate these

cargo theft losses. The untimely reporting

by the private sector is particularly a problem in cases involving cargo losses

heavy costs to industries and consumers.

However, the transportation industry as a

whole has not been able to provide data

indicating the extent and cost of cargo

theft nationwide. The American Institute

of Marine Underwriters (AIMU) is an

association representing more than 100

ocean marine insurance companies. The

aggregate premium volume of marine and

inland cargo represents about 2 percent

and between 5 and 6 percent, respectively,

of the total insurance business nationwide,

according to the AIMU. The AIMU also

could not provide any loss data on the

extent of cargo theft nationwide.

The theft of high technology products

and components from U.S. manufacturers

and their customers could exceed $5 billion annually in direct and indirect costs,

according to a study published in 1999 by

the Rand Institute. The study estimated

that direct losses amounted to $250 million

per year and indirect costs, such as lost

business, security, and insurance, increased

the total in excess of $1 billion. Moreover,

the theft of products from the industry’s

customers could cost another $4 billion.

The law enforcement community has

not been able to provide such data. The data

cannot be extracted with precision from the

Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program

because cargo theft is not a specific offense

for which data are collected. Cargo theft is

not a specific statutory crime (rather, it is

larceny, burglary, or robbery depending

upon the circumstances); therefore, cargo

theft data is included as a larceny-theft,

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 45

Cargo Theft at 12 Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

Value of 

# of Reported # of Reported Property

Type of Offense Incidences Arrests Value of Cargo Recovered

Cargo theft at seaport 138 47 $11,777,984 $2,057,805

Cargo theft in 

metropolitan area 1153 859 $192,604,983 $100,506,964
46 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

particularly evident when these estimates

are viewed alongside the UCR, which

reported that the total value of stolen property in connection with all property crimes

exceeded $15.4 billion in 1998. This total

includes $3.1 billion for burglary offenses,

$4.8 billion for larceny-theft offenses, and

$7.5 billion for motor vehicle theft. It is

particularly striking, in relation to these

figures, that the value of stolen goods in

cargo thefts far exceeds the value of the

stolen conveyances alone—in this case,

$7.5 billion in 1998.

The Commission found that cargo theft

is a major concern to the private sector at

all 12 seaports surveyed. Most of the cargo

theft committed inside the 12 seaports

resulted from documentation fraud or leakage. Hijackings or “driver give-ups” (when

a truck driver is paid to turn over cargo to

thieves) were more common in the metropolitan areas. In fact, the greatest vulnerability in the transportation system appears

to be the truck driver, according to law

enforcement officials. This is important

because 85 percent of all the freight transported in the United States is moved by

truck. Drivers are susceptible to hijacking

and payments by criminal organizations to

give up the cargo and to falsely report the

loss as a theft.

Thieves, street gangs, traditional organized crime groups, and emerging organized

crime groups all target cargo, but the

majority of cargo theft today is committed

by organized criminal groups acting with

advance information about cargo shipments, according to law enforcement

authorities. International organized crime

groups could be responsible for nearly half

of the estimated $30 billion to $50 billion

in cargo stolen worldwide annually, according to some estimates. Former drug traffickers are becoming more involved in

cargo theft because of the high profit that

can be made and because the criminal sentences are much lower than those for drug

offenses, according to law enforcement

officials. These individuals and groups are

through “leakage” (a term used when the

parties are unable to determine the actual

point of loss). Many times in cases where

disputes are finally resolved, too much

time has elapsed for law enforcement

agencies to properly investigate those losses. Underreporting of cargo theft not only

hinders the collection and analysis of cargo

theft data, but may also hinder law

enforcement efforts and may limit law

enforcement resources that might otherwise be assigned to address cargo theft,

according to law enforcement authorities.

Furthermore, the private sector is reluctant to report cargo thefts to Customs in

cases where imported goods are still in

Customs custody, according to Customs

and industry officials. Current law requires

Customs to levy penalties on businesses in

cases of theft of goods in Customs custody,

even in cases where the businesses are not

responsible for the thefts. Current law does

permit Customs to mitigate the penalties

subsequently in cases where business is not

responsible, but the law prevents Customs

from mitigating the U.S. government duties

owed on the stolen imported goods. This

disincentive appears to have the unintended

consequence of deterring private sector

reporting of thefts from Customs custody.

As a result, industry and the law

enforcement community have not been

able to provide a valid estimate of the

severity of the cargo theft problem. Some

law enforcement authorities estimate the

direct loss of cargo theft to be about $6 billion annually, while many in the transportation industry believe the direct loss

exceeds $10 billion annually. The American Trucking Associations estimates the

direct loss of cargo theft to be about $6 billion annually, based on its own data collection. Some industry analysts believe the

indirect costs, such as lost business and

increasing insurance needs, related to

cargo theft range from $20 billion to $60

billion each year. If these estimates are

close to the actual losses, then cargo theft

is indeed a significant problem. This is
address cargo theft in the Los Angeles

metropolitan area. The task force consists

of state, county, and local law enforcement

agencies. The success of Cargo CATS has

proven that the surveillance and investigative abilities of a multijurisdictional team

exceed those of any single agency. Cargo

CATS reported a total of 1,153 grand

thefts and robberies valued at $192.6 million, $34.5 million in recovered property,

and 238 arrests in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

The FBI in Los Angeles established a

multi-agency Safe Streets Task Force with

the California Highway Patrol, the Long

Beach Police Department, the Internal

Revenue Service, and Immigration to

specifically target cargo theft activities in

the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area

to include the Ports of Los Angeles and

Long Beach. This task force recovered

more than $2.5 million and made 34

arrests in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. This

task force works closely with other Southern California law enforcement agencies

and employs sensitive investigative techniques such as undercover operations to

address major theft violations.

The Tactical Operations Multi-Agency

Cargo Anti-Theft Squad (TOMCATS) was

created by the Miami-Dade Police Department to address cargo theft in the Miami

metropolitan area. The task force consists

of the Miami-Dade Police Department, the

FBI, Customs, the Florida Highway Patrol,

and the Florida Departments of Law

Enforcement and Transportation. TOMCATS reported 393 arrests and recovered

property valued at almost $46.5 million.

Because there is no formal system to

specifically collect cargo theft data, TOMCATS only reports full container recoveries and does not collect data on the number

of theft incidents.

New York/New Jersey has fewer than a

dozen incidents of cargo theft reported

each year, according to the Port Authority

Police Department. In contrast, the Waterwell-organized and frequently steal goods

based upon specific orders placed in

advance by “fences,” brokers, or others.

Thefts occur from warehouses, terminals,

truck stops, or any other area where cargo

is located. Some organizations are capable

of committing cargo thefts that span the

jurisdictional boundaries of cities, counties,

states, and countries. Once stolen, the

goods are quickly disposed of in-state or

transported to out-of-state fencing locations

or even out of the country. Law enforcement authorities estimate that most stolen

goods are disposed of in less than 24 hours.

Exported stolen goods may reenter the

United States and be sold at a discount,

effectively legitimizing illegal profits.

Cargo theft offenses or recoveries were

reported at 7 of the 12 seaports surveyed.

The largest number of offenses occurred in

the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles,

Miami, and New York/New Jersey. But the

vast majority of the reported thefts take

place outside of the seaports in the metropolitan areas. Law enforcement authorities

at the 12 seaports, the AIMU, and the

study conducted by the Rand Institute all

support this finding. Many cargo thefts are

committed against trucks coming to and

from the seaports, not inside the seaports

themselves. Seaports provide central locations where organized crime groups can

locate and easily target a wide variety of

high-value goods. There were 137 thefts

valued at $11.7 million and more than

$2 million in recovered property from

the seaports in Charleston, Los Angeles/

Long Beach, Miami, New Orleans, New

York/New Jersey, and Port Everglades.

Forty-seven arrests were reported. In

contrast, there were 1,153 reported thefts

valued at more than $192 million, 859

arrests, and nearly $101 million in recovered property in the metropolitan areas

of the Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans,

and Philadelphia.

The Cargo Criminal Apprehension Team

(Cargo CATS) was formed by the Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 47
48 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

theft data and it would not be restricted to

any one mode of transportation.

Some in the transportation industry

advocate the creation of a cargo theft

offense for the UCR Program. The FBI,

which administers the UCR Program and

the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), does not support adding a

cargo theft offense to the UCR Program

because the program is in the process of

being phased out and eventually will be

replaced by NIBRS. A major obstacle to

creating a cargo theft category in the UCR

Program is establishing a comprehensive

definition of cargo theft. Because of the

variations in defining similar crimes that

occur in different states, it is important that

the UCR Program adopt a single definition

for each of the chosen offenses to ensure

meaningful crime data, according to the

FBI. As noted above, cargo thefts can occur

from warehouses and other real property

and conveyances, and sometimes the use of

force may be used. To some extent, these

factors influence how a crime is categorized under the UCR Program. Furthermore, separating cargo theft would dilute

the almost 70 years of data used for comparison purposes. Another consideration is

the major programmatic change that would

be required, which would place undue hardship and expense on the cooperative statistical effort of approximately 17,000 city,

county, and state law enforcement agencies

voluntarily reporting data on crimes.

Instead of using the UCR Program, the

FBI supports the use of NIBRS to collect

cargo theft data. Cargo theft data can be

extracted from NIBRS by querying location and/or cost analysis because most

cargo thefts are of higher dollar value than

typical larceny-thefts. NIBRS allows for

more detailed collection of crime data, to

include location of a particular incident,

the relationships between victim and

offender, and a comprehensive description

of the property involved in a larceny-theft

or other crime. NIBRS is in fact more

comprehensive and provides more detailed

front Commission of New York Harbor

reported that from fiscal years 1996

through 1998, it received 120 reports of

thefts, with a total property value of $9.9

million, and it recovered $2 million in

stolen property and made 47 arrests. The

difference in reporting probably occurs

because the Waterfront Commission

requires a quarterly cargo theft report from

all businesses that it licenses.

The American Trucking Associations

(ATA) created a Cargo Theft Information

Processing System (Cargo TIPS) in

response to the need for a national cargo

theft database. Reports are sent to Cargo

TIPS through the Internet or by facsimile.

Cargo TIPS has three primary components.

The first is the cargo theft reports which

provides the core of the database. The second is a method for analyzing and reporting

the data. The third is a bulletin board,

which permits communication between law

enforcement authorities and the transportation industry. Cargo TIPS has 300 contributors. One-third are ATA members and others, and two-thirds are law enforcement

agencies. The carriers participating in the

Cargo TIPS represent about 50 percent of

freight moving by truck in the United

States. All state or local law enforcement

agencies with cargo theft task forces and

the FBI’s interstate theft task force units

utilize the system, according to the ATA.

With the implementation of the Cargo TIPS

III in the near future, the public will also be

able to access and input data on cargo theft.

Many people in the transportation and

insurance industry and in the law enforcement community believe it is essential that

any national cargo theft database be managed and operated by law enforcement in

order to protect the integrity of the information and the proprietary interests of all

the reporting parties. A database managed

and operated by law enforcement would

ensure the most comprehensive collection

and reporting data available nationwide

because nearly all state and local law

enforcement agencies would report cargo
carbons seized nationwide. Miami led the

country, with 11 chlorofluorocarbons

smuggling cases during this period, but

San Juan seized the most pounds of chlorofluorocarbons, 82,896, for the same period. Miami was second, with 52,072 pounds

seized, and New York/New Jersey was

third, with 45,750 pounds.

In Philadelphia, there have been several

cases of chlorofluorocarbons smuggling,

including one seizure of 10,000 units of

Halon, an ozone-depleting chemical used

in fire extinguishers. In San Juan, Customs

seized 60,000 pounds of chlorofluorocarbons and arrested and convicted four individuals for smuggling the chlorofluorocarbons concealed in containers of toilet

paper and beverages.

The profit margin on smuggled chlorofluorocarbons can approach that of the narcotics trade, according to some law

enforcement officials. A 30-pound canister

of chlorofluorocarbons can be purchased in

Europe for approximately $60 and resold

in the U.S. market for $600. One Customs

special agent is assigned to target and

investigate the importation of chlorofluorocarbons in South Florida. This task is made

even more difficult because Customs targeting is predominantly directed toward

high-risk drug source countries that are not

source countries for chlorofluorocarbons.

Thus, one individual’s manual targeting

effort to pinpoint chlorofluorocarbons

importation in Miami has resulted in more

chlorofluorocarbons seizures there than

anywhere else in the nation. This effort is

information than the summary data of the

UCR Program. While only 10 percent of

the nation’s population is currently under

NIBRS, the percentage is continuing to

increase, according to the FBI. NIBRS will

permit the collection, analysis, and reporting of data that would enable law enforcement authorities to assess the extent of

losses and develop appropriate responses

to the problem.

Environmental Crimes

at Seaports

Environmental offenses were reported at 8

of the 12 seaports surveyed. Smuggling of

chlorofluorocarbons was a problem at a

few of the seaports, particularly Miami and

Puerto Rico. Chlorofluorocarbons are commonly used as refrigerant in cooling systems, and are known to contribute to the

depletion of the ozone layer. In 1996, the

United States and other developed nations

agreed to phase out chlorofluorocarbon

production and to ban most chlorofluorocarbon imports. Since then, a black market

has developed in chlorofluorocarbons,

which are still legally produced abroad, for

use in older machines not adaptable to

other coolants. From fiscal years 1996

through 1998, there were 52 chlorofluorocarbon seizures totaling 184,673 pounds at

the 12 seaports. Nationwide for the same

period, there were 1,651 seizures totaling

579,682 pounds of chlorofluorocarbons.

The 12 seaports accounted for nearly 32

percent of the total pounds of chlorofluoroChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 49

Environmental Crime at 12 Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

# of Known # of Pounds 

Type of Offense Offenses # of Arrests # of Seizures Seized

CFCs 27 0 52 184,673

Clean Air Act violations 12 8 0 N/A

Clean Water Act violations 11 0 0 N/A

Other 30 2 3 N/A
50 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

contracted to dispose of sewage at sea

properly by using approved practices. In

fact, however, it would dump the sludge

in New York Harbor and lease the same

vessels out to another vendor. Employees

of the company were indicted for these

criminal violations.

In Puerto Rico, the EPA/CID undertook

a successful investigation in partnership

with the Coast Guard and the FBI. While

a vessel was towing a barge, the towline

broke, causing the barge to drift and rupture on a coral reef. The result was the discharge of 750,000 gallons of bunker oil

onto the beaches and into San Juan Harbor. The towrope had been repaired only

hours before. The corporation was fined

$75 million.

Export Crimes at Seaports

Export crimes include the unlawful exportation of controlled commodities such as

strategic dual-use goods and technologies

(goods and technologies that have both

military and commercial applications),

defense articles and services, monetary

instruments, and stolen vehicles, and violations of economic sanctions and embargoes.

Unlawful Export of Strategic

and Controlled Commodities

In furtherance of national security and

foreign policy objectives, and to combat

international terrorism, the United States

controls the export of strategic and sensitive commodities. These items may include

sensitive goods and technology, dual-use

technologies, defense articles like missiles,

munitions, and firearms, weapons of mass

destruction material, precursor chemicals

for ballistic weapons systems, or chemical

and biological material and agents.

Generally, all goods in excess of $2,500

exported from the United States require

not replicated elsewhere, and because this

kind of international crime is mobile, violators may shift to other seaports with less

intense enforcement efforts. The more

chlorofluorocarbons Customs seizes in

Miami, the more chlorofluorocarbons may

be smuggled through other seaports.

Other serious environmental crimes also

occur at the seaports. The Environmental

Protection Agency’s Criminal Investigation

Division (EPA/CID) operates a standing

environmental task force encompassing the

FBI, the Coast Guard, and all state, local,

and federal law enforcement agencies that

have jurisdiction at the seaports in South

Florida. A recent investigation of a major

cruise line is an example of how well this

task force has operated. The Coast Guard

initially sighted a discharge from one of

the cruise line vessels. The task force

undertook the investigation, and subsequent cases on the cruise line were opened

in Alaska, New York, Miami, Los Angeles,

the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.

The investigation resulted in a plea agreement in which the cruise line pleaded

guilty to 21 felony counts of dumping

waste oil and hazardous chemicals and

making false statements and agreed to an

$18 million fine, the largest ever to be

paid by a cruise line.

Ships that fail to follow the marine

environmental standards established by the

International Maritime Organization have

recently been recognized as a significant

source of pollution. Discharges of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances

carried in packaged forms, sewage, and

garbage are frequently undetected.

In New York, the EPA/CID investigated

the dumping of sewage sludge by a barge

leasing company. The company has been

involved in environmental violations in

New York and New Jersey for more than

a decade. The company was indicted in

New Jersey for 25 felony counts of sewage

sludge dumping in New Jersey seaports.

More recently, the company purportedly
not required to be filed in advance of

export. Without appropriate and detailed

information in these documents, filed in

a reasonable amount of time in advance

of the ship’s departure, it is virtually

impossible for law enforcement agencies

to screen, target, and inspect export cargo.

Most of the successful export interdictions

have been accomplished through investigations, including undercover operations,

and intelligence or information received

or developed from sources, according to

federal agencies.

These limitations and the resources

allocated to export inspections and investigations may weaken U.S. efforts to maintain an effective defense against those

seeking sensitive American technology

and munitions for the development of

weapons of mass destruction or terrorism,

and may affect national security interests,

particularly U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, the illegal export of

sensitive technology, munitions, and other

controlled items can result in increased

risk for U.S. military personnel stationed

around the world.

Given the resource allocations targeting

the problem, federal agencies are probably

detecting only a small portion of the controlled commodities that are being exported illegally. Investigative work by Customs

and Export Enforcement in the Department of Commerce indicates that a

favored technique among persons unlawfully seeking to export sensitive dual-use

shippers to file a shipper’s export declaration (SED) at the time the goods are delivered to carriers for lading. Ocean carriers

are required to file SEDs and carrier export

manifests with Customs up to four days

after ships depart the United States. Moreover, the export of specific controlled commodities also requires an approved license

from the appropriate department responsible for controlling the specific item to be

exported. The Department of Commerce

licenses specific items on the Commerce

Control List, the Department of State

licenses specific items on the U.S. Munitions List, and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control

(OFAC) administers economic sanctions

and regulates certain transactions involving

targeted countries or its nationals. Specific

controlled commodities require that SEDs

be filed with Customs in advance of ship’s

departure, and exporters and others may be

required to obtain OFAC licenses before

dealing with a targeted country or its

nationals.

SEDs and the carrier export manifests

have problems similar to those associated

with import manifests. These are described

in greater detail in the Chapter 5, but, in

short, the vast majority of SEDs and carrier export manifests are extremely vague,

lack specific details, and do not provide

an accurate inventory of the merchandise

onboard vessels. Furthermore, these documents are scrutinized far less frequently

than the import documents because of

resource allocations, and because they are

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 51

Export Crime at 12 Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

# of Known # of # of Value of

Type of Offense Offenses Arrests Seizures Seizures

Controlled commodities

and munitions 296 26 323 $33,426,794

Currency 33 21 16 $25,085,180

Stolen property 29 10 82 $3,388,675

Stolen vehicles 1732 365 1,861 $48,327,692
52 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

prison, and received a criminal fine of

$125,000.

A Customs investigation discovered that

a Japanese man purchased 350 handguns

and unlawfully exported them to Japan

from the seaport in Los Angeles. One of

the exported handguns was subsequently

used to kill a Japanese police officer. The

man who exported the handguns was linked

to the group responsible for the sarin gas

release in the Tokyo subway system.

In another case, law enforcement officials seized six containers of sodium sulfide, a munitions list item and a component

of mustard gas, which were intended for

export to the government of Syria. Two

additional containers had been shipped

before the discovery and were subsequently

seized by Italian authorities en route to

Syria. The investigation indicated that

similar shipments had been exported previously from other seaports.

Unlawful Export of Currency

To facilitate criminal, tax, and regulatory

investigations and proceedings, the United

States monitors the transportation of currency and monetary instruments through financial reporting requirements. These reporting

requirements assist the U.S. government in

tracking the movement of crime proceeds,

which are used to promote criminal activity;

in uncovering the nature, location, source,

ownership, and control of criminal proceeds; or in pinpointing avoidance of

domestic financial reporting requirements.

Outbound currency seizures were reported at 6 of the 12 seaports surveyed. From

fiscal years 1996 through 1998, 2,756 outbound currency seizures valued at $173.5

million were made nationwide, according

to Customs. The Southwest border accounted for 590 outbound currency seizures

valued at $28.3 million, while the 12 seaports accounted for 16 outbound currency

seizures valued at nearly $25.1 million.

The Southwest border accounted for 16

goods is to circumvent the export license

process by falsifying export license information. Another method is to ship without

a license, using a false SED. With considerably less than 1 percent of export cargo

inspected at seaports, there are limited

obstacles in the way of criminals who

unlawfully export controlled items.

Export control violations were reported

at 7 of the 12 seaports surveyed. The 12

seaports accounted for 11 percent of the

total seizures of controlled commodities

and munitions nationwide and 20 percent

of the total value. The statistics that are

available on export crime between fiscal

years 1996 and 1998 show that 296 known

offenses and 323 seizures of controlled

commodities and munitions were reported.

Not surprisingly, because of its high volume of export container cargo, the largest

number of reported offenses, 211 out of

296, occurred at Los Angeles/Long Beach.

Miami, Port Everglades and Los Angeles/

Long Beach also reported a number of

seizures. During the same period, export

crimes involving controlled commodities

and munitions accounted for about 14 percent of reported export offenses—in sharp

contrast to stolen vehicles, which are subject to 72-hour advance reporting requirements, and which accounted for about

82 percent.

A joint investigation between Export

Enforcement in the Department of Commerce and Customs revealed that a multinational aerospace corporation unlawfully exported more than $3 million in

aircraft parts to Iran. The company

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay

a criminal fine of $2.5 million and a

civil fine of $500,000. In another joint

Office of Export Enforcement/Customs

investigation, a shipment of controlled

computer equipment destined for Libya,

via Cyprus, was detained at the seaport.

A Scottish national was subsequently

indicted for violations of various export

laws. He was found guilty of all charges,

was sentenced to 51 months in federal
1 percent of U.S. stolen vehicles smuggled

overseas are repatriated.

Exports of stolen vehicles were reported at 10 of the 12 seaports surveyed. Several of the seaports reported significant

problems with vehicle smuggling. Miami,

Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/New

Jersey, and Port Everglades led the country in this crime, accounting for 1,551 of

the recoveries. The 12 seaports accounted

for 62 percent of all export recoveries and

66 percent of the total value at all seaports

nationwide. Of the 3,018 export recoveries, the 12 seaports accounted for 1,861

export recoveries valued at more than

$48 million.

California’s Foreign Export and Recovery Team, which was created by state law

and consists of the California Highway

Patrol, Customs, and the NICB, was formed

to combat the export of stolen vehicles

from all seaports in the state. The Foreign

Export and Recovery Team is funded by

surcharges on insurance premiums and

vehicle registrations. In the last three fiscal

years, this task force recovered 288 stolen

vehicles valued at nearly $7 million.

The Miami-Dade County Auto Theft

Task Force was formed by the Miami-Dade

Police Department, the FBI, Customs, the

Florida Highway Patrol, the Florida State

Attorney, the Miami City Police Department, the Miami Beach Police Department,

NICB, and the Hialeah Gardens Police

Department. The task force was created to

address the problem of stolen vehicles in

the metropolitan area, including the export

of stolen vehicles through the port of

Miami. In the last three fiscal years, this

task force recovered 851 stolen vehicles

valued at more than $19 million.

The Miami-Dade Auto Theft Task Force

discovered an emerging trend in organized

auto thefts. It found that an organization

was established as a subgroup of major

narcotics operations and South American

organized crime groups. The organization’s

activities were financed with drug propercent and the 12 seaports accounted for

14 percent of the total value of outbound

currency seized nationwide. While the

numbers of outbound currency seizures

at seaports are a relatively small portion

of the numbers nationwide, the three

largest outbound currency seizures ever

made by Customs have been in seaports:

$11.1 million, $9.5 million, and $7 million.

Drug distribution in the New York metropolitan area brings in between $6 billion

and $12 billion annually, according to law

enforcement authorities. The exportation of

bulk drug proceeds is a serious problem,

but resource allocations hamper Customs

efforts at targeting outbound currency

shipments. In a recent case, more than

$11 million was seized in transmission

parts being exported to Venezuela. This

was the ninth shipment to be exported, and

shipments of similar size were exported

every six weeks. In a year’s time, the drug

trafficking organization exported between

$50 million and $100 million.

In another case, $895,450 in currency

concealed inside acetylene cylinders destined for Cali, Colombia, was seized in

Charleston, South Carolina. This shipment

originated in Newark, New Jersey.

Export of Stolen Vehicles

Congress has enacted laws to combat the

exportation of stolen vehicles. This crime

is a particular concern to many American

citizens and law enforcement officials; it

results not only in the loss of personal

vehicles but also in higher insurance rates.

In 1998, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports

estimated that nearly 1.2 million automobiles valued at $7.5 billion were stolen in

the United States. The recovery rate was

about 65 percent. According to estimates

by the National Insurance Crime Bureau

(NICB), of the total number of automobiles stolen in the United States, some

200,000, totaling $4 billion in value, are

smuggled out of the country. Fewer than

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 53
54 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

In one undercover operation conducted

by the FBI and the New York City Police

Department Joint Auto Larceny Task force,

20 convictions were obtained, including

that of a corrupt Department of Motor

vehicles employee, pursuant to a scheme

which involved the re-tagging (tampering

with vehicle identification numbers) of

hundreds of motor vehicles, many of which

were illegally exported to the Dominican

Republic via fraudulent certificates of origin for subsequent sale by corrupt car dealerships in Santo Domingo. Retagged vehicles worth $5.5 million were seized in

connection with this undercover operation.

Uncovering Other Serious

Crime at Seaports

Other serious criminal offenses such as

bribery, public corruption, extortion, and

racketeering related to seaports are difficult to identify and expose. The extent of

these crimes is hard to determine, but most

law enforcement officials agree that they

do occur at seaports. The most difficult

aspect of these offenses is in uncovering

the various schemes and the individuals

involved because without inside information or sources, it is almost impossible to

investigate and prosecute these cases. In

some cases, witnesses or victims may be

reluctant to come forward and provide the

information necessary to initiate an investigation because of the threat of violence or

intimidation. In other cases, victims may

have committed criminal acts themselves,

and coming forward and providing information might subject them to prosecution

as well. In still other cases, acts of extortion and racketeering may just be seen as

the cost of doing business.

Other serious crime offenses were

reported at 5 of the 12 seaports surveyed.

From fiscal years 1996 through 1998, a

total of 113 offenses involving organized

crime activity were reported at these seaports. The primary offense reported was

money laundering, which accounted for

ceeds, and the stolen vehicles were used as

partial payment for drugs. (The organization was structured into three tiers. The

first level was the financiers and brokers;

the second level was the warehousing and

shipment of the stolen vehicles; and the

third level was the disposition of the vehicles overseas and the financial infrastructure.) The organization rented warehouses,

using fraudulent front companies, to

receive the stolen vehicles and equipment

and to provide a delivery site to receive

rented construction equipment, which was

also obtained through fraudulent means,

and was subsequently stolen too. The warehouse was used to containerize the stolen

vehicles and equipment, and then the warehouse was abandoned. The containers were

picked up by legitimate shipping companies for export to Venezuela and Colombia.

The violators provided the shipping companies with false information for the bills

of lading and manifests. In one case, 12

containers were intercepted, resulting in

the seizure and recovery of 20 stolen vehicles valued in excess of $850,000. Another

22 high-value stolen vehicles and 20 pieces

of stolen off-highway mobile construction

equipment valued in excess of $1 million

were also recovered.

Stolen vehicles are also a large problem in the New York metropolitan area.

Vehicles are being stolen for export to

the Dominican Republic, the Middle East,

Africa, Russia, and other former Eastern

Bloc countries. In one joint New York City

Police Department and Customs investigation, 26 persons were arrested, including

New York City Department of Sanitation

employees. The scheme involved the

Sanitation Department’s derelict vehicle

operation, which administers the removal of

junk vehicles on city streets. The arrestees

targeted and stole high-value vehicles for

theft, and in some cases for export, and the

titles and paperwork were tampered with to

show that the vehicles were salvaged.
band and other goods from the United

States is already included the Administration’s proposed 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act.

The present criminal sanctions for illegal fraud schemes have not kept pace with

the millions of dollars in illegal proceeds

made by violators who devise elaborate

schemes involving commercial products

that endanger the health and safety of

Americans and the competitiveness of the

U.S. economy. The existing criminal sanctions provide no deterrent value. Therefore,

an increase in the penalty from two years

to five years for violations of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 542 should be

enacted. This recommendation, too, is

already included in the proposed 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety

Act. After the sanctions are increased, a

commensurate increase in the sentencing

guidelines should also be sought.

The present criminal sanctions for

removing goods from Customs custody

do not take into account the large sums

in illegal proceeds made by cargo theft

organizations, nor do they take into

account how well these groups are organized or how extensive an impact they have

on the American economy. The current

sanctions provide no deterrent value.

Existing law requires Customs to levy

mandatory fines against carriers and businesses in cases of theft from Customs cus98 of the 113 offenses, 102 of the 118

arrests, and all of the seizures reported. The

money laundering offenses were primarily

related to drug smuggling activities. New

Orleans led the 12 seaports, with 82 reported offenses, 63 arrests, and 49 seizures

with a value of $3.7 million. In second

place was Philadelphia, which reported

7 offenses, 36 arrests, and 11 seizures with

a value in excess of $1 million.

Legislative and

Regulatory Issues

Many federal prosecutors and agencies,

and some private sector stakeholders,

advised the Commission that new statutes

are needed and that certain existing

statutes, regulations, and sentence guidelines are inadequate to deter criminal activity and thus need to be amended.

A number of the recommendations

made by federal prosecutors were already

included in the Administration’s crime bill,

the 21st Century Law Enforcement and

Public Safety Act. The bill has been introduced in Congress.

Laws should be strengthened to increase

the cost of smuggling contraband out of

the United States. While there is a general

criminal statute for illegal importation

activity, there is no equivalent general

statute for illegal exports. Our recommendation for a statute for smuggling contraChapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 55

Other Serious Crime at 12 U.S. Seaports Surveyed, FY 1996–1998

# of Known # of # of Value of

Type of Offense Offenses Arrests Seizures Seizures

Bribery 2 9 0 0

Public corruption 3 4 0 0

Extortion 1 1 0 0

Money laundering 98 102 63 $4,855,876

Racketeering 4 2 0 0

Tobacco diversion 1 0 1 0

Other 4 0 5 $89,765
56 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Penalties for export control violations,

including documentation violations, also

do not serve as an effective deterrent. Civil

penalties can be as little as $10,000 per

violation, essentially, the cost of doing

business. Failure to present the required

documentation on a timely basis may be

sanctioned with civil penalties accruing at

the rate of $50.00 a day.

Currently, there is no “attempt” provision

that would permit the EPA to be proactive

in preventing environmental crime and

damage. An “attempt” provision would

allow for the arrest of individuals before

they can take an action that will cause significant harm to the environment. By making an arrest, the EPA can stop someone

who is about to commit a crime that puts

human health at risk or causes damage to

the environment. At present, the EPA can

only stop such harmful activity by taking

the perpetrator into custody, and that is now

possible only after the act is consummated

and the damage is done. An “attempt” provision would allow a person who acts

alone, and therefore would not be guilty of

conspiracy, to be charged. Finally, it would

allow prosecution in cases in which business owners and operators walk away from

a business location and abandon chemicals

on site, leaving to local authorities and to

the EPA either to wait for a disaster to

occur or to spend money on a cleanup.

At present, when containers intended for

export are interdicted with stolen property,

such as vehicles, the container or the goods

in the container used to conceal the stolen

property are not subject to forfeiture. This

has created a significant problem in that

Customs cannot dispose of the containers or

goods used to conceal the stolen property.

A trend may be emerging in counterfeit

and trademark schemes. Organizations are

lawfully importing products into the United States and then affixing counterfeit or

trademark labels on the products and distributing products in the U.S. market.

“Works in progress” and instrumentalities,

tody, even if businesses are not responsible

for the thefts. In these cases, Customs may

mitigate the fine but not the duty. An unintended consequence is that businesses are

reluctant to report these thefts to Customs.

Current sentencing guidelines for violations of intellectual property rights are

based on the value of the infringed property and not on the value of lost property.

As a result, the current sanctions provide

no deterrent value and it is not commensurate with the damage inflicted on copyright

and trademark holders.

The present sentencing guidelines for

smuggling violations are related to tax or

duty loss, and do not adequately address

the smuggling of prohibited or nondutiable

merchandise. Nor do they address the millions of dollars in illegal proceeds made by

violators involved in commercial smuggling activities. The current criminal sanctions provide no substantive deterrent

value. The guidelines are not commensurate with the level of illegal proceeds and

do not take into account cases where there

is no tax loss. Violators view the sentences

as minor roadblocks and a cost of doing

business. In fact, several violators were

back in business shortly after they completed their sentences.

Specific sentencing guidelines for

smuggling munitions into the United States

must be created. In a case in the Southern

District of Florida, a defendant was sentenced under smuggling guidelines for

attempting to smuggle surface-to-air missiles into the country. These guidelines are

the same as those used for sentencing individuals who smuggle wearing apparel or

other goods. Obviously, this level of sentence is inadequate, given the emerging

threat of terrorism and especially in cases

where individuals may be apprehended

before a terrorist act is committed and

insufficient evidence exists to prove a terrorism charge, and only a lesser charge of

smuggling munitions may be proved.
thwart traditional Customs Service targeting and examination processes. Drug smuggling organizations use transportation

industry employees to facilitate their drug

smuggling operations at seaports by controlling and monitoring drug shipments

concealed inside cargo shipments of legitimate importers.

Finding 3.d. The Commission was not

able to determine the full extent of serious

crime at seaports. No national data collection and reporting systems now in place

cover serious crime in seaports. Federal

agency databases do not adequately collect

and report crime data by seaports, and

state and local law enforcement agencies

do not specifically collect and report crime

data by seaports. While significant, the

crime data summarized in this report do

not reflect the full extent of the problem;

serious crime at seaports is probably more

extensive than what is detected, reported,

and retrievable from federal, state, and

local law enforcement agencies.

Finding 3.e. Resource allocations, agency

priorities, and contraband detection technology and surveillance equipment affect

the crime detection capabilities of federal

law enforcement agencies at seaports.

Resource allocations are based upon

agency priorities, and high priority threats

like drug smuggling receive substantial

portions of resources, while other crimes

such as commercial smuggling and trade

fraud receive fewer resources. This affects

how well agencies detect these other types

of crimes, and without a proactive approach

to crime, determining the full extent of

criminal activity at seaports is difficult.

Only two of the 12 seaports surveyed had

contraband detection technology such as

non-intrusive X-ray systems, and only one

seaport had surveillance equipment. The

limited amount of contraband technology

and surveillance equipment affects the ability of agencies to detect certain criminal

activity like drug smuggling, internal conspiracies, and the export of stolen vehicles.

such as equipment used to finish counterfeit or trademark goods in the United

States, are not subject to forfeiture because

the goods were not in violation at the time

of importation. These products can only be

seized as evidence and must be returned

after prosecution. This may become a common method used by intellectual property

rights traffickers.

Findings and

Recommendations

Finding 3.a. U.S. seaports are major conduits for serious crime. A wide range of

significant criminal activity is being committed at seaports. Drug smuggling is the

most prevalent and reported crime problem, but smuggling of contraband and

prohibited or restricted merchandise,

stowaways and alien smuggling, trade

fraud and commercial smuggling, environmental crimes, and the unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and munitions, stolen property, and drug proceeds

are consistent problems too.

Finding 3.b. The primary criminal activity

at seaports is violations of federal laws,

much of it directly related to the importation and exportation of goods and contraband. Federal agencies are primarily responsible for contraband and alien smuggling,

regulating the importation and exportation

of cargo, vessels and international passengers, and other border control issues. Most

state and local law enforcement agencies

support anti-smuggling efforts, but focus

primarily on violent and property crimes

committed on seaport property. Seaports

with dedicated law enforcement agencies

are more proactive with respect to certain

crimes such as cargo theft and the export of

stolen vehicles, but consider most of the

import- and export-related crime to be the

responsibility of the federal government.

Finding 3.c. Internal conspiracies present

the most serious challenge to drug interdiction efforts at seaports because they can

Chapter 3: Crime at U.S. Seaports ■ 57
58 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

lead in the development, management, and

continued evaluation of cargo theft to

facilitate the data collection required to

assess the nature and extent of cargo theft

reporting and facilitate databasing. This

will ensure that such information provides

the maximum utility to its intended users.

Recommendation 5. Prepare, on an annual

basis, comprehensive interagency crime

threat assessments for seaports with international trade to support coordinated operational planning and enforcement activities

as appropriate. All federal, state, and local

law enforcement agencies with significant

regulatory and enforcement missions at seaports with international trade, including

Customs, Immigration, the Food and Drug

Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement

Administration, the FBI, the Coast Guard,

and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, should participate on a

joint basis. The Intelligence Community

should, to the extent allowed by law, support

these threat assessments. Customs should

coordinate this initiative, and should consider providing a sanitized version of the crime

threat assessment to the private sector.

Recommendation 6. Promote enactment

as soon as possible of the 21st Century Law

Enforcement and Public Safety Act, which

includes proposals for the creation of new

criminal violations and enhanced penalties

related to seaport crime. Additionally, federal agencies—including Customs, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and others—

should work with the Department of Justice

to identify needs for new statutes and forfeiture provisions, including stiffer civil and

criminal penalties for import- and exportrelated seaport crime. Justice should take

the lead in this initiative.

Finding 3.f. Cargo theft is a major concern to the private sector entities that operate at seaports. Although the vast majority

of the reported cargo thefts take place

while shipments are outside of the seaports

in the metropolitan areas, seaports provide

central locations where organized crime

groups can locate and easily target a wide

variety of high value goods. The lack of a

national collection and reporting system

for cargo theft data and the underreporting

of cargo theft losses by the private sector

hinder the assessment of the problem and

the development of appropriate solutions.

Finding 3.g. Coordination and cooperation

among federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies could be improved at

seaports by more joint efforts with a seaport focus. Comprehensive interagency

crime threat assessments, which are currently not conducted at seaports, offer one

such opportunity. By preparing annual

crime threat assessments, federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies would

develop a better understanding of the overall crime threat at each seaport and also lay

the groundwork for enhanced communication, cooperation, and coordination.

Finding 3.h. Certain existing statutes,

regulations, and sentencing guidelines do

not provide sufficient sanctions to deter

criminal or civil violations related to the

import and export of goods and contraband, fraud, cargo theft, and other nondrug-related crimes.

Recommendation 3. Modify, to the extent

feasible, the existing databases of federal

agencies with significant regulatory and

enforcement missions at seaports to ensure

the collection and retrievability of data

relating to crime with a nexus to seaports.

Recommendation 4. Evaluate the feasibility of capturing data on cargo theft

offenses (including cargo theft taking place

outside of seaports) through the National

Incident-Based Reporting System. The

Criminal Justice Information Services

Advisory Policy Board should take the
subject, an Algerian-born man named

Ahmed Ressam who was attempting to

enter the country at Port Angeles, Washington, was stopped by U.S. Customs

inspectors as he disembarked a commuter

ferry from Vancouver, British Columbia.

The inspectors found more than 100

pounds of urea sulfate in his rented vehicle, as well as approximately eight ounces

of a highly volatile nitroglycerine mixture

and fusing components. The FBI is currently investigating possible accomplices

as well as possible links between these

individuals and international groups.

The FBI divides the U.S. terrorism threat

into two broad categories—domestic and

international. Each of the five terrorist

incidents recorded in the United States in

1998 was attributed to domestic terrorists.

These incidents were bombings at a superaqueduct and two separate bank offices in

Puerto Rico, a bombing at a women’s

health clinic in Birmingham, Alabama,

and arson at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado,

that resulted in $12 million in damages.

There have been no successful incidents

of international terrorism in the United

States since the bombing of the World

Trade Center in 1993.

The National Response

to Terrorism

President Clinton has taken a strong leadership role in establishing a comprehensive

and formal structure to deal with the terrorist threat. As a result of several important studies related to terrorism, strong

direction has been provided to the Executive Branch through Presidential Decision

Directives (PDDs).

There is no single, universally accepted

definition of terrorism. The Code of Federal Regulations defines it as “...the unlawful

use of force and violence against persons or

property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or

social objectives” (28 CFR, Section 0.85).

Both within the United States and

worldwide, the numbers of terrorist attacks

are decreasing, but the numbers of casualties and the levels of property damage are

on the rise. Within the United States, for

example, the FBI recorded 5 terrorist incidents and 12 preventions of terrorist acts in

1998, down from 13 terrorist incidents or

suspected incidents and 23 preventions in

1985. Worldwide, the State Department

recorded a drop in the number of terrorist

attacks from 302 in 1997 to 273 in 1998.

But during both periods there was a dramatic rise in the numbers of casualties and

the levels of destruction.

The most dramatic examples of these

trends, and of the potential threats that

international and domestic terrorists pose

within the United States, are the bombings

of the World Trade Center in New York

City in February 1993 and of the Alfred P.

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma

City in April 1995. Prime examples outside

U.S. borders are the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,

Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,

which involved highly destructive terrorist

attacks that maximized property damage

and casualties.

A more recent example of the potential

threat in the United States was the arrest,

in December 1999, of individuals attempting to enter the country from Canada. One

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism

59
60 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ The FBI, as head of the investigative

agency for terrorism, shall reduce vulnerabilities by an expanded program of

counterterrorism.

■ The Secretary of State shall reduce

vulnerabilities affecting the security of

all personnel and nonmilitary facilities

abroad.

■ The Secretary of Defense shall reduce

vulnerabilities affecting the security of

all U.S. military personnel.

■ The Secretary of Transportation shall

reduce the vulnerabilities affecting security of all airports in the United States

and all aircraft and passengers and all

maritime shipping under U.S. flag or

registration or operating within U.S.

territory and shall coordinate security

measures for rail, highway, mass transit,

and pipeline facilities.

■ The Secretary of State and the Attorney

General shall use all legal means available to exclude aliens who pose a terrorist threat.

■ The Secretary of the Treasury shall

reduce vulnerabilities by preventing

unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, by protecting the President and

other officials against terrorist attack,

and through the enforcement of laws

controlling the movements of assets,

and the export from or import into the

United States of goods and services.

■ The Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency shall lead the intelligence community to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities

to international terrorism through an

aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.

PDD 62 designates a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection in the National Security

Council staff. The National Coordinator is

tasked with coordinating the responsibilities of the federal agencies involved with

Combating terrorism can be divided into

three fundamental activities: crisis management, consequence management, and

protective measures. National-level responsibilities for crisis and consequence management are clearly delineated in PDDs 39

and 62. PDD 63 addresses critical infrastructure protection to develop plans coordinated through the lead federal agencies

for crisis and consequence management,

eliminate vulnerabilities, prevent terrorist

attacks, and, as necessary, respond to terrorist incidents. Specific security recommendations are addressed in Chapter 5.

PDD 39 designates the Department of

Justice (acting through the FBI) as the lead

agency in responding to terrorism in the

United States. The Department of State is

the lead agency in responding to acts of

terrorism outside the United States involving American citizens or interests. The

Federal Aviation Administration is the lead

federal agency for coordinating the law

enforcement response involving aircraft

piracy (including terrorist hijackings)

while an aircraft is in flight. PDD 39

divides the federal response to terrorism

into two categories—crisis management

and consequence management. Crisis management involves dealing with the causes

of a terrorist attack; consequence management involves the aftermath of an attack.

According to PDD 39, the FBI will lead

the crisis management phase of a terrorist

attack, and the Federal Emergency and

Management Agency will lead the consequence management phase, utilizing the

Federal Response Plan.

PPD 39 specifies that steps be taken to

reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorism.

Major responsibilities among federal agencies for reducing vulnerabilities are delineated as follows:

■ The Attorney General shall chair a Cabinet committee to review the vulnerability to terrorism of government facilities

in the United States and critical national

infrastructure.
National Infrastructure Protection Center

monitors both cyber threats and, to a certain extent, physical threats. Physical

threats are referred to the FBI’s counterterrorism program, in view of the FBI’s lead

in countering terrorism in the United

States. The National Infrastructure Protection Center is divided into three sections:

■ The Computer Investigations and Operations Section performs three basic

functions. It program-manages computer intrusion investigations conducted by

FBI field offices; provides subject matter experts, equipment, and technical

support to cyber investigators in federal, state, and local government agencies; and provides a cyber emergency

response capability to help resolve

cyber incidents.

■ The Analysis and Warning Section provides analytical support during computer intrusion investigations and performs

long-term analysis of threats and trends.

This section provides warning of potential vulnerabilities and threats to government, state, local, and private sector

entities.

■ The Training, Outreach, and Strategy

Section coordinates the training and

education of cyber investigators within

FBI field offices and other federal,

state, and local agencies. It also coordinates outreach efforts to private sector

companies, state and local governments,

other government agencies, and FBI

field offices, and it provides National

Infrastructure Protection Center input

into national planning processes.

Threat Assessment for

U.S. Seaports

Although seaports represent an important

component of the nation’s transportation

infrastructure, there is no indication that

they are currently being targeted by terrorists. The FBI considers the present threat

combating terrorism, estimated to be 47 in

a recent General Accounting Office report.

PDD 63 outlines the federal government

policy and responsibilities in Critical Infrastructure Protection. Based on the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

PDD 63 divides the nation’s infrastructure

into 7 sectors, including transportation, and

assigns lead agency responsibilities. While

not specifically addressing the prevention

of terrorism and focusing on cyber threats,

PDD 63 includes protective measures as

part of its menu of ways in which to protect the critical infrastructure.

While PDDs 39 and 62 clearly identify

the FBI as the lead federal agency for

responding to terrorism, they do not clearly

designate a lead agency on developing

security policy and procedures to protect

seaports from acts of terrorism. In seaports, several federal agencies have existing authorities and responsibilities that

lend themselves to filling that role: the

Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration.

Of these agencies, the Coast Guard has,

through its Captains of the Port, the broadest port security authority. Although Customs also has broad authority for security,

its authority rests only in ports with international trade and/or passengers; the Coast

Guard’s authority also covers ports that

handle only domestic vessels (see Chapter

2). Findings and recommendations regarding lead agency designations for port security are in Chapter 5.

The National Infrastructure Protection

Center combines the involvement and

expertise of numerous agencies in an effort

to detect, assess, warn of, and respond to

unlawful acts that threaten the nation’s

infrastructure. The Center was established

in 1998 and is located at the headquarters

building of the FBI. It employs representatives from the Department of Energy, the

Department of State, the Secret Service,

the Postal Service, and other federal and

state law enforcement agencies. The

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 61
62 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

ment, training, and expertise needed for a

response. This is a long-term process that

continues to evolve under the direction of

existing inter- and intra-agency programs.

In addition, an overarching crisis management structure is in place to meet the

unique demands of a chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear event.

Today’s terrorists have potential access

to weapons and technologies that pose a

serious threat to the U.S. population. The

1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, which killed 12 people and

forced more than 5,000 to seek medical

treatment, marked the first large-scale use

of a chemical agent by a terrorist organization. In 1985, an obscure religious cult in

the American Pacific Northwest placed a

biological agent in the salad bar of a local

restaurant, causing dozens of people to

become ill. The cult was attempting to

influence a local election by affecting voter

turnout. As these cases demonstrate, chemical and biological agents offer terrorists

alternatives to conventional weapons such

as bombs and firearms.

Another area of growing concern to the

intelligence and law enforcement communities is the potential for widespread

destruction and disruption resulting from

attacks on vital infrastructure. A broadbased terrorist attack on targets such as

power grids, water facilities, or transportation systems could temporarily paralyze a

metropolitan area. In recent years, Algerian

extremists have detonated bombs on the

Paris subways, the Irish Republican Army

has waged a campaign against Britain’s

passenger trains and subways, and Palestinian terrorists have carried out suicide

bombings on Israel’s buses. In the United

States, unknown subjects derailed a passenger train in Arizona in 1995, and

domestic extremist groups have attempted

to attack military facilities and other critical infrastructures. In addition, as discussed previously, three of the five terrorist

incidents recorded by the FBI in 1998

stemmed from terrorist attacks on critical

of terrorism directed at any U.S. seaports

to be low, even though their vulnerability

to attack is high. The Commission believes

that such an attack has the potential to

cause significant damage.

Each year, thousands of ships, and millions of passengers, enter and leave the

United States through seaports. It is estimated that 95 percent of the cargo that

enters the country from noncontiguous

countries does so through its seaports. In

addition, many U.S. seaports are located

adjacent to, or in, major metropolitan

areas. A terrorist act involving chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear

weapons at one of these seaports could

result in extensive loss of lives, property,

and business, affect the operations of harbors and the transportation infrastructure

(bridges, railroads, and highways) within

the port limits, and cause extensive environmental damage.

In 1995 and 1996, Congress held hearings on the threat posed by the international proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). The findings of those

hearings indicated that chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons,

materials, and know-how are more widely

available to terrorists now than at any other

time in history. There are indications that

some nations and rogue terrorist elements

(of both domestic and international orientations) are actively pursuing the capability

(or access to the capability) to use weapons

of mass destruction in future attacks. These

hearings also identified shortcomings in

U.S. preparations for responding to

weapons of mass destruction-related

attacks on U.S. soil.

The FBI recognizes the risks and dangers posed by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons and international organizations seeking to procure

such weapons. However, it should be noted

that the FBI and other federal, state, and

local agencies have expended significant

time and resources to obtain the equip-
seaports, and would be consistent with a

recent nationwide increase in the number of hoaxes involving threatened use

of weapons of mass destruction. In

1997, the FBI investigated 74 cases

involving use or threatened use of

weapons of mass destruction. In 1998,

it investigated 181 such cases. The vast

majority (but not all) of these cases

were found to be hoaxes. Hoax threats

involving weapons of mass destruction

continue to plague communities and to

tax law enforcement resources.

Improved Response to

Terrorism at the

Seaport Level

Responding to terrorism is a multidisciplinary effort that involves prevention of

potential acts, investigation of acts that do

occur, and crisis and consequence management. Therefore, a comprehensive response

to terrorism involves the efforts of law

enforcement and intelligence agencies,

emergency response agencies, and, when

necessary, even the military. While Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62, and 63

provide overarching guidance to the federal

government for crisis management, consequence management, and infrastructure

protection, guidance for preventative measures is not so clearly laid out.

Further, the operational and jurisdictional challenges that are unique to the maritime and port environment add complexity

to coordination and training efforts. These

include the public/private interface; the

intermodal nature of ports; the critical role

of commercial ports in national security in

terms of both military utility and economic

vitality; foreign-flag shipping; multiple

jurisdictions at all levels of government;

and border control issues. Adding to the

complexity of combating terrorism in U.S.

ports is the variety of management arrangements at the ports—some have a robust

port authority, some have strong local or

infrastructure targets (a superaqueduct

project and two separate bank branch

offices) in Puerto Rico.

While there is no evidence of an

increased threat of terrorist attacks in

America’s seaports, the vulnerability of

those ports is high. The influx of goods

through U.S. ports provides a venue for the

introduction of a host of transnational

threats into the nation’s infrastructure. Further, the nexus of transportation modes as

well as the concentration of passengers,

high-value cargoes, and hazardous materials make our ports potential targets for terrorist attacks. A chart reflecting a vulnerability analysis of the 12 seaports surveyed

by the Commission appears at the end of

this discussion in this chapter.

The current threat assessment of terrorism at U.S. seaports can be summarized

as follows:

■ The threat of terrorism on U.S. soil,

including U.S. seaports, is low but

should not be discounted. The United

States has recorded several important

successes against terrorism in recent

years, but it remains a target of domestic

and international terrorists. The August

7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies

in East Africa, and the subsequent

August 20 U.S. missile attacks on suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan

and Sudan, have heightened risks to

U.S. interests worldwide. Generalized

threats to U.S. interests have been issued

by terrorist groups since the August 20

airstrikes. On June 7, 1999, international

terrorist Usama Bin Laden, alleged mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings,

was placed on the FBI’s Top Ten Most

Wanted Fugitives list. Although there is

no specific, corroborated threat information, the addition of Bin Laden to

the “Top Ten” list heightens the potential for an act of terrorism.

■ Threats of chemical or biological assault

could represent an emerging issue for

national infrastructure systems such as

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 63
64 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Cruise line security managers routinely

receive threat warning information through

the FBI’s National Threat Warning System

via the Coast Guard and directly through

the Awareness of National Security Issues

and Response system for commercial

enterprises. In addition, state and local law

enforcement agencies throughout the

nation receive unclassified threat information from the FBI via the National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System.

Further, the maritime industry, including

port authorities, routinely receives threat

advisories issued by Coast Guard headquarters and disseminated by the local Coast

Guard Captain of the Port. These advisories

are based on information received from the

Department of Transportation’s Office of

Intelligence and Security.

Communication of critical threat and

intelligence information is largely a function of federal agencies (notably the FBI or

the Coast Guard), which receive the information and then relay a sanitized version

on a need-to-know basis. Communication

is especially effective where Joint Terrorism Task Forces exist and state and local

members hold security clearance.

In general, the threat warning systems

(National Threat Warning System, Awareness of National Security Issues and

Response System, and National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System)

appear to be satisfactory and operating as

intended. However, where these avenues of

communication exist, much of the critical

information is classified and therefore not

readily releasable to civilian entities within

the port. Some port organizations, from

port authority law enforcement personnel

to terminal operators, expressed frustration

with not being aware of threat information

on an ongoing basis.

Currently, Coast Guard Captains of the

Port maintain Maritime Counterterrorism

Plans that outline Coast Guard responsibilities and actions to be taken in the event of a

terrorist incident or threat. These plans also

state oversight, and some are managed by

private entities. Given these complexities

and variations among ports, it is particularly challenging to identify issues and solutions that are applicable to all ports.

In some cases, U.S. seaports and their

adjacent territorial waters are near the territorial waters of other countries. Operations in an interterritorial environment

present additional challenges, such as coordinating enforcement activities and monitoring shipments through free-trade zones.

Many officials with whom Commission

members spoke stated that law enforcement coordination and counterterrorism

training at their seaports is satisfactory.

Officials at other ports are not as confident

in the level of coordination and training.

Overall, there appears to be a need for an

overall assessment of the training needs for

seaport personnel to raise their awareness

of terrorism issues.

Currently, 26 Joint Terrorism Task

Forces are in place in communities around

the country, including Philadelphia, New

York City, Newark, Los Angeles, and

South Florida. These Joint Terrorism Task

Forces—headed by the FBI and made up

of veteran investigators from federal, state,

and local agencies—provide an integrated

approach to counterterrorism efforts in

their communities. In some locations that

lack a Joint Terrorism Task Force, officials

have established liaison efforts through

which unclassified terrorist threat advisories and alerts are shared.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces contact port

authorities, along with officials connected

with other critical infrastructures, for the

purpose, among other things, of conducting a terrorism threat assessment. An

assessment is then made for the area covered by the Joint Terrorism Task Force,

including seaports. This process, however,

does not appear to take into consideration

the unique environment of the seaport.

Specific threat assessments for seaports are

not conducted.
The Coast Guard manages the National

Security Council-directed Special Interest

Vessel program, in which ships of countries known to sponsor terrorism are prohibited from entering U.S. waters. Ships

of other selected countries are required to

obtain prior permission (seven days in

advance) to enter U.S. ports or are

required to provide advance notices of

arrival (up to three days) beyond the 24-

hour standard requirement. The program

also applies to citizens of targeted countries sailing on nontargeted ships.

While the potential was present at all

ports surveyed, the probability that a terrorist subject would enter through a seaport

varied among the ports. In South Florida,

law enforcement officials speculated that as

security tightens at U.S. airports, terrorists

might use seaports as a point of entry. Seaports are particularly vulnerable to illegal

entry because good screening processes are

not in place. This issue is discussed in more

detail in Chapter 5.

The smuggling of contraband and illegal

aliens may be connected with terrorism

issues. Many of the seaports the Commission surveyed did not employ any standardized background screening of seaport personnel. With the exception of the cruise ship

industry, there are no attempts to screen

personnel who have access to restricted

areas of ship terminals. This situation could

increase the risk that terrorists or other

criminals are working in sensitive areas at

the seaports. These and other security issues

are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

The following chart reflects the findings of a vulnerability analysis of the

12 seaports surveyed by the Commission.

detail the roles and responsibilities of other

key agencies, including the FBI, and summarize the existing memorandum of understanding between the Coast Guard and the

FBI in matters concerning maritime terrorism as well as the interagency agreement

between the Coast Guard and the FBI on

maritime law enforcement. However, no

requirement now exists for the Captains of

the Port to coordinate or exercise the Maritime Counterterrorism Plans with other

federal, state, or local agencies.

The proceeds from smuggling operations may be used to fund other terrorist

activities. In South Florida, terrorist organizations have used seaports to smuggle

narcotics and other contraband into the

United States. The same organizations

have exported stolen property, currency,

and small arms. In the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, groups of Middle

Eastern origin have exported weapons and

high tech equipment to the Middle East.

In Detroit, terrorist groups have used proceeds from stolen vehicles and from counterfeit videos as a source of funds. While

the opportunity for smuggling by terrorist

groups exists in Gulfport, New Orleans,

and San Juan, no cases of such smuggling

via those ports have been confirmed.

At present, there is minimal use of

container screening technology (used primarily to detect cargo theft/smuggling) at

U.S. seaports. In addition, the procedures/

logistics employed to get the containers to

the inspection sites do not provide adequate assurances that the cargo has not

been tampered with, enabling potential

smugglers to access contraband, weapons

of mass destruction, and precursor material

before it is inspected. In addition, federal

inspectors inspect only a minimal amount

of cargo.

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 65
66 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Port Facility Characteristics

Current threat analysis availability X X X X X X X

Port accessibility:

Uncontrolled access X

Limited access XX XXXX X X

Controlled access XX X

Passenger terminal volume:

High (over 100,000) XXX X XX

Medium (10,000-100,000) X

Low (10,000) X XX X

DoD assets within port X X X X X

Port Security Force Characteristics

No security guard force

Security manager, no guard force

Security manager, security force 

with little/no training X X X X

Security manager with trained 

security force, but not fully equipped X

Security manager with trained and 

fully equipped security personnel X X X

Security manager with trained, 

fully equipped security personnel 

and security exercises conducted

on a regular basis X X X X

Physical Security Characteristics

Landside

No landside physical security measures

Perimeter fencing, 

landside lighting only X X

Fencing, lighting and live 

surveillance/patrol system XX XX X XX

Seaport

Vulnerabilities A B C D E F G H I J K L
Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 67

Fencing, lighting and electronic 

surveillance system

Fencing, lighting, electronic and 

live surveillance system XX X

Waterside

No waterside security measures XX XXX XXXX

Waterside lighting only X

Live surveillance only X X

Single electronic surveillance system

Multiple electronic surveillance 

systems

Physical Characteristics of the Port

Terrain

Built-up, commercial XXXXXXXXXXXX

Mountainous, forested, undeveloped

Open clear area/underdeveloped 

farm land

Routes of access/egress

Expressways XXXX X X

Major highways X X XX

City streets X X

Rail accessibility

Rail gates open at all times X X

Rail gates open only when in use XXXXXXX X X

Unused rail access

No rail access X

Water channels

More than 3 choke points XX X

1-3 choke points XXXX XX XXX

No choke points

Seaport

Vulnerabilities (cont.) A B C D E F G H I J K L
68 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Communications at Port Facility

No communications readily available X

Communication interoperability between 

port & local law enforcement

Non-secure XXXX X X

Secure X

Communication interoperability 

between port, federal, state & 

local law enforcement

Non-secure XXXXXX X

Secure

Sustainability of Additional Port Resources

High threat

1 day XXX X

3 days X

7 days XX X X X

Indefinite X X

Medium threat

1 day X X

3 days XXX

7 days X X XXX

Indefinite X X

Low threat

1 day

3 days

7 days

Indefinite XXXXXXXXXXXX

Seaport

Vulnerabilities (cont.) A B C D E F G H I J K L
Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 69

Response Time for Specialized Security 

Personnel

Police patrol

30 minutes or less XXXXXXXXXX X

30-60 minutes X

60 minutes or more

Bomb squad

30 minutes or less XX XX X

30-60 minutes XX X

60 minutes or more XX X X

SWAT

30 minutes or less XX X X XX

30-60 minutes XX XXX

60 minutes or more X

Response Time for Specialized 

Emergency Personnel

Fire department

15 minutes or less XXXXXXXXXXXX

15-45 minutes

45 minutes or more

Pollution response team

15 minutes or less X X XX XX

15-45 minutes XXX X

45 minutes or more X X

Proximity to Urban Areas

Population over 100,000 X X X X X X X X X X X

50,000-100,000 X

Seaport

Vulnerabilities (cont.) A B C D E F G H I J K L
70 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Geographical Location

OCONUS X

East/west coast X X X X X X

Gulf coast X X

Alaska, Hawaii, Northwest, 

Central or New England X X

Proximity to International Borders

High threat

Medium threat

0-100 miles

101-500 miles

+500 miles X

Islands X

Low threat

0-100 miles XXXX X

101-500 miles X

+500 miles XX X

Islands

Seaport

Vulnerabilities (cont.) A B C D E F G H I J K L

Note: “X” indicates “yes.”
Finding 4.i. U.S. seaports are vulnerable

to terrorist attacks, and such attacks have

the potential to create substantial damage

to seaport infrastructure, with significant

national security consequences.

Finding 4.j. Threats of chemical or biological assault could represent an emerging

issue for national infrastructure systems

such as seaports.

Recommendation 7. Intensify the federal

government efforts to assist seaports in

preparing for the possibility of terrorist

acts directed at critical infrastructure.

Specifically, the Department of Transportation, as Lead Sector Agency for Transportation in accordance with Presidential

Decision Directive 63, should be responsible for coordinating implementation of the

following recommendations:

■ On an expedited basis, the Coast Guard

and the FBI (including the National

Infrastructure Protection Center), in

coordination with other relevant agencies and the private sector, should develop a system for categorizing seaport

physical and information infrastructure

based on both vulnerability and threat

(e.g., low, medium, and high risk).

■ The federal government should establish baseline vulnerability and threat

assessments for terrorism at U.S. seaports as soon as possible. Priority

should be given to the Strategic Seaports, Presidential Decision Directive

40’s “Controlled Ports,” and economically strategic seaports, the criteria for

which should be developed by the Interagency Committee on the Marine Transportation System/Marine Transportation

System National Advisory Council.

Thereafter, threat and vulnerability

assessments should be conducted every

three years. The FBI should ensure that

seaports are included within its field

offices’ domestic terrorism surveys to

Findings and

Recommendation

Finding 4.a. There is a formal structure at

the national level to deal with the terrorist

threat that clearly delineates responsibilities among federal agencies.

Finding 4.b. Coordination among law

enforcement agencies at all levels of government is generally good where FBI Joint

Terrorism Task Forces are located to coordinate the exchange of information and

joint investigations. However, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces do not typically focus

on activity in seaports. The extent of coordination (among non-law enforcement

agencies and key private sector entities)

related to counterterrorism security measures is inconsistent at the 12 seaports surveyed.

Finding 4.c. Federal officials do not

conduct annual, seaport-specific terrorism

vulnerability and threat assessments that

might assist seaports in preparing for

terrorist threats.

Finding 4.d. Risk management for individual seaports can be effectively carried

out only by federal agencies in conjunction

with local officials.

Finding 4.e. Many Coast Guard Captains

of the Port have existing Maritime Counterterrorism Plans. But these plans are

developed with insufficient coordination

and input from other agencies, and there

is no requirement that they be exercised.

Finding 4.f. In general, most seaport personnel are not aware of, or sensitized to,

terrorism issues. Most have not received

training and therefore are not aware of the

appropriate initial response to terrorism.

Finding 4.g. Improved security and cargo

detection technology could assist in identifying high risk shipments.

Finding 4.h. The threat of terrorism on

U.S. soil, including U.S. seaports, is low

but should not be discounted.

Chapter 4: Threat Posed by Terrorism ■ 71
72 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

assess the potential threat. The Coast

Guard should conduct port vulnerability

assessments. Both the FBI and the Coast

Guard should coordinate their efforts

with other agencies, particularly the

Department of Defense, for the Strategic

Seaports for large-scale military mobilization, and for those designated as

Controlled Ports under PDD 40. Results

should be made available, as appropriate, to all relevant agencies and local

port security committees.

■ Coast Guard Captains of the Port and

the FBI should ensure that their respective Maritime Counterterrorism Plans

and Incident Contingency Plans are

updated and coordinated annually, and

exercised regularly with other concerned

federal, state, local, and private entities.
for assessing the degree of the security

risk present at U.S. seaports.

Management of Risk

Before assessing security at the 12 seaports surveyed in this report, a review of

the nature of risk, threat and vulnerability

may be helpful. Although the model below

was developed primarily to address the

threat of terrorism, it is applicable to all

threats to seaport security. According to

the Coast Guard, risk management should

take into account the vulnerability of a

facility, the level of threat against it, and

the impact if an attack were successful.

A simple formula is:

Risk = Vulnerability x Threat x Consequence

Threat is the intent to inflict injury or

damage. It is an important concept because

whether one is dealing with a wartime scenario, a civil disturbance, terrorism, or

other intentional acts, threat assessments

can indicate how likely it is that an act will

be carried out against a vessel or a port

facility. Security planning and resource

management must consider potential

threats to ports and assess how a port’s

destruction or damage might have military,

economic, political, or publicity value to

an attacker. While the numbers of domestic

maritime terrorist or subversive acts have

been few, the vulnerability of many U.S.

seaports is quite high.

Vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility of an asset or group of assets to an

adverse action or potential action through

which the effectiveness of the asset is

A primary objective of the Commission

was to assess the overall state of security

in U.S. seaports. Chapter 2 discussed the

nature of seaports and the interactions of

federal, state, and local government officials and private sector entities. Chapter 3

covered the nature and extent of crime at

seaports and Chapter 4 addressed the specific crime of terrorism. Crime is a serious

threat at the seaports. The threat of terrorism is low, but the vulnerability of seaports to terrorism is high. Security is a

key to providing some level of deterrence.

Chapters 3 and 4 examined the relationship between lack of seaport security and

exploitation of the seaport by the criminal

element.

This chapter focuses on the current

state of security in our seaports and the

associated issues of custodial and informational control over the cargo, passengers,

and vessel crew members that enter and

leave through the nation’s ocean gateways.

This focus is based on observations made

by the Commission during its on-site

assessments at the 12 seaports surveyed.

It also includes information gathered

through a series of focus group meetings

with federal agency representatives, port

authorities, law enforcement and private

security personnel, and representatives of

key sectors of the maritime industry. This

chapter analyzes port security by looking

at physical security and access control;

security of cargo, passengers, and crew;

and security for military mobilization

operations in commercial seaports. It

begins with a discussion of threat and

vulnerability as the primary components

Chapter 5: Security Practices in

U.S. Seaports

73
74 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Transfer, loading, or storage facilities

such as rail and truck terminals, cargo

container yards, airports, vessel docking

facilities, and loading facilities.

■ Transportation modes, such as trains,

trucks, aircraft, vessels, conveyors, and

pipelines and their consolidation (choke)

points.

■ Transportation support systems such as

bridges, tunnels, runways, roads, locks,

piers, channels, anchorages, and aids to

navigation.

Much of what the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

considered was the relationship between

vulnerability and consequences and conceptual ways to approach risk management

using the formula above.

Presidential Decision Directive 63 notes

the findings of the President’s Commission

on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

including the vulnerability of the nation’s

infrastructure, of which maritime ports are

a part. The President’s Commission on

Critical Infrastructure Protection specifically notes:

We know our infrastructures have substantial vulnerabilities to domestic and

international threats....Although we know

these new vulnerabilities place our infrastructures at risk, we also recognize that

this is a new kind of risk that requires

new thinking to develop effective countermeasures....The Commission has not

discovered an immediate threat sufficient

to warrant a fear of imminent national

crisis. However, we are convinced that

our vulnerabilities are increasing steadily,

that the means to exploit those weaknesses are readily available, and that the costs

associated with an effective attack continue to drop.

The National Security Strategy echoes

the findings of the President’s Commission

on Critical Infrastructure Protection by

stating that “...advances in information

technology and competitive pressure to

improve efficiency and productivity have

reduced or eliminated. While no measure

exists that can determine absolute vulnerability, tools and methods are available for

determining relative vulnerability of various port facilities, and these can aid in setting priorities for employment of limited

security resources. Factors to be considered

in determining vulnerability include, but

are not limited to, the following:

■ Geographical location and avenues of

ingress and egress.

■ Accessibility of the vessel or facility to

disruptive, criminal, subversive, or terrorist elements.

■ Adequacy of storage facilities and ease

of access to valuable or sensitive items

such as hazardous materials, arms,

ammunition, and explosives.

■ Availability and adequacy of security

forces and adequacy of physical security

measures.

■ Adequacy of coordinated planning and

operations among responsible agencies

and private port entities.

Consequence is the adverse effect from

the loss of an asset, and assessing its

important in security planning. An asset

with low threat and vulnerability but

whose loss would result in extremely serious consequences may deserve more attention than another where the threat and vulnerability may be high but the negative

impact of its loss or damage would be low.

In evaluating the risk to an asset, consideration must be given to its mission sensitivity, its importance to the continuity of

essential port operations, and the military

or economic impact of its loss or damage.

While no attempt has been made to develop a relative scale of consequence, highvalue assets may include:

■ Production, supply, and repair facilities

such as power generating stations, oil

and chemical storage facilities, and

shipyards.
be discounted. It also concluded that the

vulnerability of seaports is high for the

reasons stated above. Finally, it concluded

that threats of chemical or biological

assault could represent an emerging issue

for national infrastructure systems such

as seaports.

Security is measures taken to prevent

terrorism and other criminal activity.

Threats—particularly terrorist threats—

are often unpredictable; security should

be considered from a vulnerability-driven

perspective rather than a threat-driven

perspective. Recommendations that minimum port security guidelines should be

developed are in line with this position.

Guidelines, however, should be developed

for varying threat levels, because threat

warnings are applicable in some, but not

all, situations.

Considering infrastructure protection

from a vulnerability-driven perspective is

appropriate and is in keeping with national

guidance. This creates a powerful argument

for minimum-security guidelines and lays

the foundation for guidelines to be developed for varying degrees of threat.

Maritime Vulnerabilities

In 1998, the Department of Transportation

initiated a Surface Transportation Vulnerability Assessment. The assessment found

that the United States possesses an effective and efficient surface transportation

infrastructure that promotes the well-being

of its citizens as well as important economic and national security goals. The

level of security afforded this infrastructure

is relatively low compared with the security enhancements recently implemented in

the commercial aviation sector. However,

there is sufficient reason to believe that the

security levels of the surface transportation

modes need to be raised as the vulnerabilities of the current infrastructure become

apparent.

created new vulnerabilities to both physical

and information attacks as these infrastructures have become increasingly automated

and interlinked.” It further “makes it U.S.

policy to take all necessary measures to

swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to physical or information attacks

on our critical infrastructures....”

The National Security Strategy and the

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection clearly recognize the

vulnerability-based risk management

required in preventing asymmetric or terrorist attacks on our infrastructure. Contributing to this finding is the difficulty in

assessing threats from unconventional, ad

hoc terrorist groups with no state sponsor

and the associated threat-warning problem

inherent in addressing those threats.

Threat-driven risk management is inherently dependent on indicators that are part

of a robust warning system. The challenge

of combating terrorism, particularly with

the rise of non-state-sponsored groups and

ad hoc groups, is complicated by the difficulty of establishing indicators and warning thresholds for such nebulous groups

Terrorist threats to U.S. interests are traditionally evaluated using several broad

criteria regarding terrorist groups—their

existence, history, intent, targeting, and

security environment. In other words,

groups that may conduct attacks are analyzed to gauge the threat of terrorism. For

existing, state-sponsored groups, these criteria are valid and have proven successful.

But the indications and warning process

using existing indicators and evaluation

tools collapses in the face of less-organized, ad hoc terrorist groups with shadowy

connections and a loose or nonexistent

base of support, such as the group of terrorists that bombed the World Trade Center. Therefore, threat-based risk management alone is not fully adequate.

In Chapter 4, the Commission concluded that the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil,

including seaports, is low but should not

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 75
76 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

could result in serious economic and

strategic consequences regionally, nationally, and internationally. The criticality of

shipping to support our armed forces

abroad has become more apparent. As

commercial users continually require faster

and more extensive service, the maritime

transportation network’s efficiency, complexity, and inter-connectivity have grown.

Maritime transportation providers, along

with port and waterway facility operators,

are implementing new information technologies and logistics practices responsive

to changing business environments in

which timely parts delivery plays an integral role. Greater nationwide sensitivity

to on-time performance heightens the

consequences of both delays and major

disruptions.

Setting Standards of

‘Adequate Security’ for

Seaports

The Commission found many publications

that promoted security and provided guidelines. Some were published by the federal

government, some by private sector firms,

and some by trade associations. However,

there were no generally accepted standards

or guidelines to assist seaports in improving security. Without standards or guidelines, seaports have no benchmark to use if

they choose to make a concerted effort to

improve security. They also have no basis

to measure the effectiveness of existing

security measures. The absence of standards and guidelines also provided a

dilemma for the Commission in carrying

out its mission to assess security in seaports.

Before the Commission could assess

seaport security, an “adequate security”

baseline had to be established to compare

against existing seaport security measures.

Researching existing publications turned

up four basic categories of measures: physical security and access control; passenger

The maritime mode does not exhibit a

substantial security or anti-terrorism profile, particularly when compared with the

emphasis commercial aviation places on

these activities. The primary reason for this

situation is historical. In the U.S. experience, aviation, particularly in an overseas

environment, has been by far the most visible and dramatic transportation target for

terrorism and violent criminal incidents.

Few similar actual incidents involving

domestic surface transportation assets have

occurred. Thus, each mode has responded

to its own specific security and terrorist

history, and has developed and implemented security practices that are consistent

with its actual and assessed vulnerabilities.

Additionally, the open nature of the maritime environment makes it difficult, if not

impractical, to apply security measures that

would hinder the movements of individuals. However, the increase in the potential

threat to these facilities in recent years is

reason to review this situation.

An efficient and secure maritime transportation network is an integral part of

U.S. national security. Both the military

and the civilian economies depend on

effective and secure marine transportation

networks. Today’s marine transportation

system has adapted to a global-based economy and the demands of “just-in-time”

delivery of cargo (scheduled arrival of

spare parts timed to assembly line requirements), and in doing so is predominantly

reliant on electronic data exchange for

documentation of the many transactions

associated with interstate and international

transportation. As the pace and volume of

global transportation changes, new opportunities are introduced that can be exploited by a broad scope of antagonists from

pilferers to terrorists.

The operation of the U.S. economy

depends on the effective movement of

freight, the stability of intermodal connections, and the reliability of the transportation network. Any long-term disruption to

the maritime transportation infrastructure
maritime cargo tonnage. In terms of container shipments, 25 U.S. seaports account

for 98 percent of the cargo. Cruise ships

visiting foreign destinations embark from

16 U.S. ports.

Given these difficulties, and taking into

account the criteria discussed above, the

Commission’s assessment is that the state

of security in U.S. seaports is generally

poor to fair. This assessment of all U.S. seaports is an extrapolation of the state of

security observed during our summer 1999

on-site surveys of the 12 domestic seaports,

which constitute a representative crosssection of U.S. seaports. This assessment of

U.S. seaport security is a result of comparing the Commission’s on-site observations

with the criteria for good and enhanced

security discussed in Appendix B. Summary data supporting this assessment of seaport security are found in the table below.

The following table demonstrates that

the level of security does not even meet

the Commission’s definition of minimum

standards or guidelines. Some ports have

been working diligently to improve security, but most have not. Several key issues

are discussed below.

Minimum Security Standards

Although the Commission found during

its port visits that there were no uniform

minimum security standards (physical,

procedural, and personnel) for seaports,

some ports are making outstanding efforts

to improve security. In Port Everglades,

for example, the port authority, federal

and local law enforcement agencies, and

carriers are adopting standards (for fences,

lighting, gates, etc.) in an effort to restrict

access to the port and its operations.

By contrast, some ports do not even

have fences around areas where cargo

was loaded and unloaded. Other ports

have put in security on a piecemeal basis

as problems arose. The port officials we

talked to from seaports that import automobiles have all put up sturdy fences with

and crew security; cargo security; and military mobilization security. In the Commission’s efforts to develop its framework, it

recognized one set of guidelines for seaport security that could be deemed “minimum guidelines” and a more complete set

that could be described as “enhanced

guidelines.” Then the Commission developed criteria for each category. The two

categories were developed in recognition

of the fact that not all seaports require the

same level of security. Seaports with a

higher risk may need to consider additional

security measures. Appendix B (Methodology) contains the criteria used in each of

the categories.

Additionally, Appendix F is a conceptual framework for developing a “model

port.” It contains suggested attributes and

potential best practices of a model port in

the areas of physical security and access

control, passenger and crew security, cargo

security, and military mobilization security.

Assessment of Security

at 12 Seaports

Assessing the state of seaport security is

difficult. Unlike airports, seaports cannot

be easily categorized. No two of the 361

public seaports in the United States are

exactly alike. They have a broad range of

characteristics. Many seaports are small

and have limited commerce; only 144

process more than a million tons of cargo

per year. In the larger seaports, the activities can stretch along a coast for many

miles, including public roads within their

geographic boundaries. The facilities used

to support arriving and departing cargo are

sometimes miles from the coast. The

inland ports accept mostly bulk products

such as grain, petroleum, coal, or steel.

The seaports that accept international

cargo have a higher risk of international

crimes such as drug and alien smuggling.

The top 50 ports in the United States

account for about 90 percent of all the

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 77
78 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Overall Assessment of Current Security Measures

Do security measures within the port meet the minimum port security criteria? 0

Do security measures within the port meet the enhanced port security criteria? 0

Vulnerability and Threat Assessments

Has a vulnerability assessment been performed for the port? 17

Has a threat assessment been performed for the port? 0

Physical Security and Access Control

Is adequate perimeter fencing (chain-link with barbed-wire top-guards) in place? 50

Is perimeter fencing surrounding vehicle storage areas reinforced with guard rails, concrete 

barriers, earth berms, or other means to prevent vehicles from being driven through the fence? 33

Are access points to marine terminals gated? 92

Are gates either locked or monitored by security personnel? 83

Are marine terminal security personnel uniformed for easy identification? 75

Do security personnel conduct patrols of the port or marine terminals? 67

Do security personnel receive specialized security training? 67

Is lighting for the port/terminal sufficient? 83

Is the carrying of firearms restricted within the port? 0

Is the access of personal vehicles to piers, terminals, etc., restricted/controlled? 50

Are employee parking lots separated from vessel loading or cargo storage yards? 42

Enhanced Measures

Is a port-wide identification card system in place to control or restrict access? 8

Are criminal records checks performed on employees and dockworkers who have access 

to the port? 17

Are closed-circuit television cameras or other intrusion detection systems widely in use 

within the port? 0

Cargo Security

Are cargo control and reconciliation procedures in place? 92

Are sound sealing practices followed? 75

% of Ports in 

Port Security Assessments Affirmative
Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 79

Is access to equipment controlled? 42

Are sound cargo receipt/delivery/transfer procedures in place? 92

Is “loose” cargo properly stored? 83

Are shipping documents reviewed for accuracy? 92

Are measures taken to secure high-value merchandise? 83

Are sound personnel security practices followed? 67

Are procedures in place to audit irregularities and correct vulnerabilities? 33

Enhanced Measures

Separate Federal Inspection Station for foreign cargo? 0

CCTV to record lading/unlading procedures? 0

Have installed automated access control systems to monitor access to restricted areas? 0

Employ non-intrusive technology to identify contraband and/or verify cargo shipments? 25

Trucking companies use automated system such as GPS to track trucks and shipments? 42

Firms implemented “Integrated Security Concepts” to deter internal conspiracies? 8

Passenger and Crew Security (7 Cruise Ship Ports Only)

Are passenger and cargo operations segregated within the port? 100

Is there a dedicated passenger terminal for cruise ship operations? 100

Is the terminal operating company employed directly by the cruise lines? 43

Is passenger terminal security provided by a uniformed, private security force? 100

Is additional security available from port authority police? 71

Are embarking and disembarking passengers separated within the terminal? 86

Is appropriate passenger and baggage screening technology (x-ray and metal detector) 

employed at the passenger terminal? 100

Are gangways properly secured to prevent unauthorized access to vessels? 86

Do crew have up-to-date knowledge of passenger documentary requirements and check 

documents as passengers enter the terminal area? 86

Do terminal security personnel receive training in the performance of their duties? 71

Does the terminal security force receive terrorist threat information from federal, state, 

or local law enforcement agencies, or from the port authority? 43

Are security procedures coordinated between terminal and vessel personnel? 86

% of Ports in 

Port Security Assessments (cont.) Affirmative
80 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Enhanced Measures

Is there a separate Federal Inspection Station where international passengers arrive? 0

Are automated access control cards used instead of keys to enter terminal facilities? 0

Are carriers using the Advance Passenger Information System and submitting information 

in timely fashion to Customs and INS so law enforcement checks can be done prior to vessel’s 

arrival? 0

Military Mobilization (Applies to Only 4 of the 12 Seaports Surveyed)

Is the port readiness committee active? 100

Are all applicable federal, state, local, and private sector entities included in the port readiness 

committee’s membership? 75

Is there a written local memorandum of understanding on the port readiness committee? 50

Has a port readiness exercise been held in the past two years? 100

Enhanced Measures

Have the “lessons learned”/problems from the last port readiness exercise been resolved? 50

Has a Defense Department vulnerability assessment been done? 25

Are there enough resources to coordinate the local port readiness committee process 

adequately? 50

Coordination and Cooperation

Is there coordination between the port, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector or 

trade community regarding security issues? 17

Does labor cooperate with the port, the trade community, and law enforcement agencies 

regarding security issues within the port? 42

Is there cooperation between the federal agencies regarding security issues within the port 

or terminal? 42

Is intelligence being shared between law enforcement agencies within the port? 25

Technology

Is any technology (e.g., X-rays, closed circuit TV) available in the port for the use of 

law enforcement agencies? 42

Is the port installing or implementing any special equipment (e.g., automated access systems, 

closed circuit TV) within the port? 8

% of Ports in 

Port Security Assessments (cont.) Affirmative
Access Control to Seaports and Terminals

The Coast Guard has legislative authority

for regulating waterway security and security for waterfront facilities, but may not

have authority for other areas not located

on the water. Customs can regulate any

area where international cargo, passengers,

or vessels arrive or are processed. It is not

clear whether a federal agency has authority for regulating overall access to a seaport

if the port handles only domestic cargo.

Either agency could probably make a case

for being able to regulate access control,

however.

Common sense and generally accepted

industry security standards dictate that personnel access to vessels, cargo receipt and

delivery operations, and passenger processing operations be restricted or tightly controlled to reduce unauthorized access to

sensitive areas and operations. Firms usually control or regulate employee and visitor access to operational areas through the

use of identification cards. The absence of

port-issued identification cards can permit

unauthorized personnel to access vessels,

cargo receipt and delivery operations, and

passenger processing operations and facilities within seaports. The result can be an

increase in crimes, such as drug smuggling

and pilferage, in the port. The lack of identification cards can also affect the ability

of businesses and law enforcement personnel to identify, and restrict the access of,

employees with criminal records to sensitive areas in the port.

There are currently no established standards or regulations that require ports to

issue identification cards to personnel as

there are at other facilities such as airports.

Also, there are no requirements that background checks be performed on personnel

applying for access to sensitive areas.

Union officials have vigorously opposed

any effort to require that criminal record

checks be conducted on their members.

Particularly on the West Coast, they state

that no union member has been convicted

guardrails and lighting because in their

assessment auto theft was a serious problem and if the fences did not have

guardrails, thieves would simply drive the

cars right through the fences.

Some ports believe they do not have a

theft problem and thus they do not need

security. One port official repeatedly stated

that there must be an economic justification for every cent he spends and because

he did not perceive crime as a high threat,

there was no justification for enhancing

security. Another port official repeatedly

said that federal crimes are the federal government’s responsibility and if security is

needed, then the federal government

should provide it.

Some ports that have made major

expenditures for security to support federal

crime efforts, such as drug smuggling,

believe they have been put at an economic

disadvantage. They are of the opinion that

spending millions on security to support

federal crime issues increases their cost of

doing business, which could have a longterm negative impact on business if other

ports chose to ignore these issues.

Many officials we talked to recommended minimum security standards for seaports. Base-level uniform guidelines could

include physical security (e.g., fences,

lighting, gates), procedural security practices (for controlling the delivery, receipt,

and movement of cargo), and personnel

security standards (for identifying highrisk individuals who want access to sensitive areas within the seaport).

The absence of uniform minimum physical, procedural, and personnel security

standards for seaports can result in security

deficiencies or gaps, within and between

seaports, that the criminal element can easily exploit. Where different standards are

implemented at different seaports that share

the same risk assessment or are in geographic proximity to each other, the results

can invite “port shopping” by criminals.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 81
82 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

tions also increases the risk that violators

could quickly remove large amounts of pilfered cargo or contraband. This has been a

serious problem for some local authorities.

Although a number of ports have the

appearance of physical access control, in

many cases, access is freely granted to

anyone seeking entry into the port. At a

number of ports we were told that anyone

arriving at a port entrance with a tractor

was automatically waved through without

being questioned. At other ports a simple

statement of intent to go to a particular

location was sufficient to gain access. In

another port pedestrians could freely walk

through access control points without

being questioned.

The same appearance of control exists

at terminal and container yards. Some are

relatively secure. Others have controls in

place that are easily overcome. For example, some container yards in San Juan have

a “sticker system” which requires that a

tractor have a designated letter sticker (A,

B, etc.) to enter a particular yard. However,

a driver without the appropriate sticker can

have a confederate with the correct sticker

enter the yard and haul the chassis outside

the fence for later pickup.

A serious issue the Commission identified during its field visits related to

firearms. At some seaports, such as New

Orleans, local policy and/or agreements

with the local labor force restricted the

presence of firearms. At other ports, such

as Miami, the carrying of firearms was not

restricted or controlled. In airports, the

presence of firearms is prohibited by federal regulations and local laws, which are

enforced by federal, state, and local government agencies. In addition, the private

sector, usually the airlines or airport

authorities, hire contract security personnel

to screen baggage, passengers, employees,

and the public who require access to the

“secure” side of the airport for weapons.

The lack of laws restricting the carrying of

firearms on seaports means that criminals,

of drug trafficking or other felony offense.

They believe these checks would violate

their members’ privacy.

These union officials are also against

wearing identification badges. The union

says that this issue has been under negotiation with management and the union officials do not want the federal government to

interfere with the bargaining process.

During visits to the Port of Miami and

Port Everglades, the Commission found

that access to the seaport and its facilities

(piers, terminals, warehouses, etc.) was

controlled or restricted by the issuance of

port-issued identification cards. These

cards were issued to all regular workers

(dockworkers, truck drivers, warehouse

personnel, etc.). At these two ports, the

company employing the workers submitted

a letter advising the port that its employees

regularly require access to the port or its

operations. Upon receipt of the letter and

payment of a processing fee (and contingent upon the completion of a successful

criminal history check on the employee),

the employee is issued a port-specific identification card. None of the other ports visited had identification card schemes in

place, although the New York Waterfront

Commission does perform criminal background checks on all waterfront workers.

During its visits the Commission also

found that at many seaports (e.g., New

Orleans, Gulfport, and Miami), the access

of privately owned vehicles and commercial vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and

delivery operations, and passenger processing operations was not controlled. The lack

of control permits individuals to park vehicles adjacent to vessel lading and unlading

operations, cargo operations, and passenger arrival and departure areas.

The absence or lack of enforcement of

security standards to restrict or control

vehicle access increases the risk that criminals can easily gain access to sensitive

areas. The proximity of uncontrolled vehicles to vessel, cargo, and passenger opera-
The Coast Guard, after much consultation with the private sector, aligned its new

regulations as closely as possible with the

International Maritime Organization measures. These measure contain the basic elements needed to develop a sound security

program while giving industry the flexibility to adapt security measures to different

ports, passenger terminals, and vessels.

These regulations, which were finalized in

October 1998, required the development

of security procedures ranging from hand

searches to screening with X-ray equipment and metal detectors. The measures

were designed to prevent the introduction

of weapons, incendiaries, or explosives

on board passenger vessels by persons,

within personal articles or baggage, in

stowed baggage, or among ships’ stores.

The regulations were made applicable to

all passenger vessels over 100 gross tons,

carrying more than 12 passengers for hire,

and making voyages lasting more than

24 hours, any part of which is on the high

seas (international waters). They apply to

vessels for which passengers are embarked

or disembarked in the United States or its

territories, and to the passenger terminals

that receive them.

The regulations, however, do not apply

to ferries that operate on lakes, bays, and

sounds, and that transit international waters

for only short periods of time, on frequent

schedules. Thus, many ferries or gambling

ships that carry hundreds of passengers are

not subject to these security regulations,

but may be an attractive target to terrorists.

In its port visits and meetings with

industry groups, the Commission found

that security in place for passenger vessels

and terminals is generally in compliance

with the regulations. Today, passenger vessels and terminals are subject to the highest security requirements of all maritime

transportation facilities. Passenger security

plans prepared by private sector owners

and operators are submitted to and examined by the Coast Guard, which routinely

verifies that vessels and terminals are

including terrorists, can freely transport

firearms onto seaports and can access

cargo vessel and cruise line operations

armed. The potential presence of armed

criminals poses a serious threat to law

enforcement personnel, workers,

crewmembers, and passengers.

Cruise Ship Security

The vulnerability of passenger vessels and

associated passenger terminals to terrorist

attack has been a major national and international concern since the death of a U.S.

citizen during the hijacking of the Italian

cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985.

To address this threat, the President signed

into law the Omnibus Diplomatic Security

and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Title IX of

which constitutes the Maritime and Port

Security Act. That act amended the Ports

and Waterways Safety Act (33 USC 1221)

and authorized the Coast Guard to “carry

out or require measures, including inspections, port and harbor patrols, the establishment of security and safety zones, and

the development of contingency plans and

procedures, to prevent or respond to acts

of terrorism.”

Also in 1986, the International Maritime

Organization adopted and published its

Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against

Passengers and Crews on Board Ships,

guidelines that apply to passenger ships

engaged on international voyages of 24

hours or more and to the port facilities that

serve them. Initially, the Coast Guard relied

on voluntary compliance with these guidelines to ensure that passenger vessels and

terminals were prepared to prevent and

respond to acts of terrorism. However, voluntary compliance did not produce the

industrywide level of security necessary to

protect passengers and crews. Witnessing an

increase in domestic terrorism, and in the

threat of international terrorism, the Coast

Guard in July 1996 published an interim

rule requiring the development of security

plans by passenger vessels and terminals.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 83
84 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

facilities such as warehouses, container

freight stations, freight forwarders,

importers, and railroads within the immediate area. Trucking companies usually

move the cargo from the port authority or

terminal operator’s facility to warehouses

or importers.

While the cargo is being transported

from the port authority or terminal operator’s facility to the other facilities, the

trucking company is responsible for its

security. Once the cargo is transported to a

warehouse or a container freight station,

the facility operator is responsible for its

security.

While under the custody of the facility

operator, the cargo may be subject to a

variety of operations such as devanning,

manipulation, storage, and repackaging.

The cargo is then normally moved from the

facility to the owner or importer by a transportation company (such as the facility

operator, an independent trucking company, or the cargo owner). The transportation

company is responsible for the security of

the cargo until the owner or importer takes

final delivery.

If security practices are lax at any of the

cargo-handling facilities described above,

or when cargo is being transported

between facilities within a seaport, the

cargo is vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and

unauthorized access.

The Commission found that the several

trade entities that operate in seaports (such

as terminal operators, carriers, trucking

companies, warehouses, and importers)

were doing an excellent job at controlling

cargo, while others were not. The members

of the working group also found that few

of the seaports or facilities employed

measures or technology that enhanced

cargo security.

During our reviews, the Commission

working group found that seaports did not

have separate and restricted areas where

vessels, cargo, and passengers arriving

operating in accordance with their specified security procedures and with applicable federal security regulations.

The cruise industry, whether operating

overseas or from U.S. ports, is almost

entirely foreign owned and operated, with

ships registered in countries other than the

United States. The International Maritime

Organization’s security measures for passengers and crews, strongly supported by

the U.S. government, were a highly successful formulation of internationally

agreed-upon technical measures to improve

security and reduce the risk to passengers

and crews. It was to maintain consistency

with these international standards that the

Coast Guard limited the scope of its security regulations to larger passenger vessels

engaged in international voyages.

In this case, the use of regulated minimum standards was found to be necessary

to protect cruise ship passengers. It should

be noted that the regulations apply only to

certain passenger vessels. There are a host

of passenger vessels and ferries that are

not subject to these rules and have not chosen to comply voluntarily.

Cargo Security

The private sector, including vessel carriers, terminal operators, trucking companies, warehouses, railroads, and importers

and exporters, has a strong interest in

maintaining security for cargo. However,

the responsibility for the security of cargo

changes as cargo moves through most seaports. Typically, vessel operators, or carriers, are responsible for the security of

cargo as it is transported via the water

from port to port. Once the vessel docks

and unloads its cargo, though, the security

of the cargo becomes the responsibility of

the port authority or a terminal operator,

which oversees the unlading of the cargo

from the vessel and the movement of the

cargo to a secure area under its control.

The port authority or terminal operator

then oversees the delivery of the cargo to
exporters and others involved in international trade. Under the name of America’s

Anti-Smuggling Coalition Initiative, Customs also included businesses from Latin

American countries that were considered

high risk for drug smuggling. This voluntary program has served to improve the

practices of those businesses that chose to

participate.

Import Cargo Control

As clearly stated in the previous section,

good cargo security guidelines and vigorous terminal security and inventory control

procedures at access points to a port facility (driver documentation check, pick-up

and delivery order validation, shipment

discrepancy recordation, closed circuit television, scales. etc.), in conjunction with

well maintained perimeter barriers (fences,

walls, railings, etc.), will mitigate against

cargo crimes and the illegal entry of contraband merchandise or unauthorized persons into the United States.

Physical security of ports and terminals

is essential to protect the integrity of the

seaports. But there is another aspect of

seaport security that is of critical importance to the security of the nation, and that

is the custodial and informational control

over the cargo, passengers, and crewmembers that enter and leave the country

through its seaports.

The U.S. volume of trade in imports and

exports represents 20 percent of the

world’s economy. Against this unending

flood of manufactured goods, raw materials, and agricultural products are arrayed

the various federal regulatory and inspection agencies that are tasked with protecting the country from harmful imports and

our national interest from the export of

restricted goods. Further complicating that

responsibility are criminal enterprises and

terrorist organizations that exploit the complexities of international trade and transportation for their illicit activities. In fact,

from foreign locations were processed.

Frequently, cargo, vessels, and passengers

arriving from outside the United States

were processed adjacent to, or in the same

areas as, those arriving domestically.

In contrast, airports are required to provide sterile, restricted areas for performing

federal inspection activities (of aircraft,

cargo, and passengers arriving from foreign countries) that are separate and distinct from domestic activities, and that

comply with nationally accepted standards.

The lack of separate and distinct foreign

and domestic operations processes within

seaports can permit dock workers and

other individuals with access to ports, such

as truck drivers and vendors, to mix freely

with operations involving foreign vessels,

cargo, or passengers which they are not

officially authorized to participate in. This

unapproved access can increase the risk of

illegal activities such as drug smuggling,

cargo theft, pilferage, and alien smuggling.

During the port surveys, federal officials

also expressed concern about the lack of

security for international cargo at the seaports and said that international cargo

should not be mingled with domestic

cargo, or tampered with, before federal

inspection and release procedures. Areas

where international cargo arrives and

departs need to be controlled to prevent

unauthorized access to the cargo.

Cargo control is an area that has been

consistently emphasized by the Customs

Service over the last decade. Because of

the increased threat of drug smuggling in

the 1980s, Customs developed several

cooperative programs with the private sector. The first was the Carrier Initiative. In

this program, Customs developed detailed

cargo security standards for vessels and

signed agreements with more than 1,000

carriers who agreed to abide by the rules in

exchange for favorable consideration in the

event that penalties were assessed against

them. Customs later expanded the program

for freight forwarders, brokers, importers,

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 85
86 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

in Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the complexity of this process

should not be understated. There are 60

federal agencies that have an interest in

international cargo. A few examples of

the diversified agency interests are listed

below:

■ Dairy products, fresh fruit, vegetables,

plants, nuts, live animals, meat products,

poultry, bees, and honey are some of

the imports that are of interest to the

Agriculture Department (Food Safety

Inspection Service, Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine), Food and Drug

Administration, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Arms, ammunition, and

radiological materials are subject

to restrictions by the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms, the Office of

Defense Trade Controls, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

■ Consumer goods, electronic products,

and energy conservation products are

subject to restrictions by the Department of Energy and the Federal Trade

Commission.

■ Foods, drugs (including narcotic derivatives), cosmetics, and medical devices

are subject to requirements of the Food

and Drug Administration, the Drug

Enforcement Agency, the Department

of Agriculture, and the Public Health

Service.

■ Textiles are subject to requirements of

the Federal Trade Commission, the

Department of Agriculture, the Customs

Service and the Commerce Department.

■ Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products are subject to requirements of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms, the Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service, the Food and Drug

Administration, the Customs Service,

and the Internal Revenue Service.

terrorism, serious crime and inadequate

cargo control are the most obvious threat

vectors in seaports today.

Customs was created in 1789 with the

mission of examining every vessel and all

merchandise entering the United States to

ensure that applicable duty was paid and

that the import transaction was in compliance with all laws. Customs still has this

function today, in conjunction with other

agencies and departments, but the law does

not require, nor can it be expected, that

Customs will inspect each piece of merchandise entering the country. Today, much

of the routine work is accomplished

through electronic data processing, and the

inspectional activity is governed through

risk management systems. To provide some

perspective, a profile of the international

trade environment is provided below:

■ More than 600 laws and 500 trade

agreements are enforced on import

transactions.

■ All import cargo has to be classified

in one of the 20,000 categories of the

international Harmonized Tariff Schedule. This classification is the key to

determining admissibility, duty rates,

and other import requirements.

■ More than $22 billion in duties is

collected annually on imports.

■ The United States has 301 ports of

entry where merchandise can legally

enter or exit.

■ Revisions to provisions of the trade

system occur frequently.

■ Cargo is processed 24 hours a day,

7 days a week.

■ Some 100 million trade transactions

take place every year, ranging in size

from merchandise carried by passengers to shipments worth hundreds of

millions of dollars.

The requirements for admitting international cargo into the country are set forth
arriving from foreign countries. The monitoring of all imports and exports to ensure

their compliance with U.S. laws and regulations is difficult when the multitude of

requirements and the rapid service that

business expects are factored together.

The convergence of threat vectors noted

above can best be addressed through better

coordination among the multiple federal

agencies that have jurisdictional and/or

regulatory interest in the seaport environment. In ports where there are shared facilities, interagency coordination is advanced,

and if the shared inspection facility is situated directly on the ocean terminal property, cargo control is enhanced.

Federal officials must also accomplish

their mission objectives without creating

undue delays in the movement of legitimate cargo. One of the keys to managing

this challenging environment is the use of

automated information processing systems

and applied technology such as high energy X-ray container scanners and mobile

computer systems to bring on-line access

into the most remote cargo or passenger

examination stations.

Electronic System for Processing Imports

and Detecting Violations

In 1984, Customs implemented the Automated Commercial System, which allows

importers to file import documentation

and pay duties electronically. Although

99 percent of the formal entry documentation is filed through this system, this

represents only a portion of the information that federal officials need to carry out

their responsibilities. For example, formal

entries represent but a portion of the cargo

that actually arrives on a vessel. In this

section we describe how the formal entry

system works and identify the cargo that

arrives and is not immediately covered by

this system.

The Automated Commercial System

was designed to process import entry data,

calculate duty, use tariff classifications to

These are only a representative sample

of the tens of thousands of product categories that are imported into or exported

from the United States every day.

Of all the federal agencies sharing an

interest in cargo control, Customs is the

one agency that is staffed at every port

where imports or exports occur. Customs

has the responsibility to enforce all of the

laws and trade agreements that pertain to

cargo, in addition to mission fulfillment

when other agencies are not present. Of

the inspection agencies, Customs has the

largest presence at seaports; the Department of Agriculture, through its Animal

Plant Health Inspection Service and Food

Safety Inspection Service, is the second

largest force. The Food and Drug Administration also has inspectors near some seaports, although in lesser numbers.

In conducting their inspection efforts,

federal inspectors are under increasing

pressure to expedite their work. For example, one ocean container is landed in the

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

every 20 seconds. In other words, upwards

of 240,000 pounds of cargo landed every

minute in 1999 just in Los Angeles and

Long Beach.

The pressure to meet commercial sector

just-in-time inventory requirements and the

necessity to move the containers to prevent

seaport terminal congestion, have created

an environment in which there is little time

or ability to examine international cargo.

Less than 2 percent of import and 1 percent of export cargo is physically inspected

before release. That is why the federal

inspection agencies increasingly rely on

selective targeting techniques and electronic data processing

In addition to the commercial pressure

to clear import cargo, serious crime threats

and the potential for terrorism are associated with international commerce. There is

also an entire array of health, safety, fraud

and environmental threats, including drug

trafficking and other smuggling in cargo

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 87
88 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

cargo was loaded, and the ports where the

cargo is slated for unlading. The manifest

also provides fundamental shipment information consisting of the commercial parties (shipper, consignee, and notify party),

cargo description, marks and numbers

appearing on the cargo, the serial number

of the ocean container that it is stowed

within, special handling information,

stowage locations in the vessel, and hazardous cargo data. Literally since the

beginning of recorded history, a manifest

of goods has been deemed essential in the

regulation of trade and the control of

cargo.

Only about 50 percent of the cargo that

arrives by vessel in the United States

becomes an official import, with the

detailed information required, at the first

port of arrival. For example, some cargo

arrives in the United States on the West

Coast and travels by land to Mexico or

Canada, or to an East Coast port for export

by vessel to Europe. Other import cargo is

immediately sent to a foreign trade zone, a

bonded warehouse, or a container freight

station before entry requirements are satisfied.

Another provision of the Customs regulations, called “in-bond,” allows cargo to

be transported from the port of arrival to

another U.S. port for formal entry into the

commerce or for loading onto a vessel for

export to a foreign country, without the

payment of duty or taxes. For example,

cargo may arrive by vessel in Tacoma and

be transported by truck to Cincinnati. The

transportation to Cincinnati would be

authorized after the importer, its agent, or

the importing carrier filed only minimal

information about what the cargo contained and pledged to be liable for any

duty and taxes that might accrue if the

cargo were misdelivered. Formal entry

requirements would be satisfied in Cincinnati.

Another concern relates to “consolidated shipments.” When shipments are not

identify shipments of interest to federal

agencies, receive manifest data (bills of

lading), and find routine errors in import

data. The violation histories compiled provide excellent data not only on the shipper,

importer, and consignee, but also on the

commodity. With this information, federal

officials can identify frequent violators and

the commodities that are most likely to

incur cargo and entry violations.

Random sampling was added to the

Customs network several years ago to

ensure that routine, low-risk shipments

were not automatically bypassed. The random sample selections are computer-generated and are also useful to assay the flow

of imports for overall regulatory compliance. Predicated upon the compliance rate,

revenue implications such as duty and tax

losses may be derived. Overall, this profiling provides a more focused view of the

import cargo picture and where resources

are best spent.

The Customs Service coupled the complex criteria screening with routine entry

and manifest data processing in a way

that frees officials from rote document

handling so that they may concentrate

on detecting violations and apprehending

violators. Systems that use artificial intelligence and more complex screening systems are under development.

It is the detecting of any discrepancy

that can lead to identifying violations,

serious or not. To the extent that this

process can be performed electronically,

it is generally quicker and more reliable.

About 90 percent of the ocean manifests

are filed electronically via the automated

manifest system (AMS) and 98 percent of

all import entry transactions are filed electronically via the automated broker interface module of the Automated Commercial

System network.

The vessel manifest is an important tool

for monitoring international trade. A manifest is a list of all cargo that has been taken

aboard the vessel, the ports where the
robust electronic data processing systems

are maintained, but that such systems continue to evolve and develop to reflect the

changing trade environment and interagency enforcement and compliance priorities. The Automated Commercial Environment plan of the Customs Service is a step

in that direction, and if the initiative proceeds, its development should be coordinated with other federal inspection agencies to

ensure that their informational needs are

accommodated within the $2 billion that

the new system is estimated to cost.

Coordination is also needed in the operational environment to produce greater

service level efficiencies and coordination

is absolutely essential in the realm of electronic data processing to avoid mistakes

that could cost tens of millions of dollars

in misdirected development efforts.

Better Information Via Electronic

Interfaces for Cargo Control

To avoid delaying the movement of legitimate cargo and to ensure regulatory compliance, federal inspection agencies need

timely access to shipment information and

the ability to analyze the data quickly with

automated processes.

Even with automation, the practices

and procedures used to track merchandise

entering and leaving the country have

eroded over the past decade for a number

of reasons:

■ The volume of trade has increased exponentially over the past 30 years, making

it important that the federal government

use selective targeting techniques in its

inspection processes.

■ The business community demands

immediate release of cargo to maintain

the just-in-time inventory systems and

to reduce congestion at seaports; despite

these demands for immediate clearance

of cargo, business has been unwilling or

unable to consistently provide accurate

and timely information.

large enough to occupy an entire ocean

container, several shipments are combined

to fill one container. Generally, the container contents are manifested as “various”

or “assorted,” by the foreign freight forwarder, providing federal inspectors with

no useful shipment information.

Therefore, the 50 percent of the cargo

that does not become an official import at

the port of arrival poses the largest risk.

The information requirements for these

shipments is less than for the entry documentation. Federal officials do not receive

sufficient information to make admissibility decisions on this cargo.

Bridging the entry and manifest systems

is the cargo selectivity application that performs automated screening of the entry

data against criteria databases for the purpose of admissibility and release.

In the late 1980s, the Office of Management and Budget directed that there not be

a proliferation of electronic systems in the

agencies that deal with international trade.

It decided that all other agencies would

link into the Customs system to ensure that

the private sector has only one point of

contact for electronic submission of trade

information. Coordination between federal

agencies must not be limited to operational

procedures, such as cargo examinations or

vessel inspections, but must be extended to

the arena of information sharing through

electronic data interchange (EDI).

Predicated upon the OMB decision, the

Customs information management and processing systems (Automated Commercial

System, automated manifest system, automated broker interface, etc.) are of critical

importance. Those systems process the

electronic equivalent of millions of documents and forms that are associated with

the importation, movement, and clearance

of hundreds of billions of dollars of commercial cargo. These underlying systems

must be strengthened to accommodate the

ever-increasing demands of international

trade, and it is important not only that

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 89
90 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

could be assessed. That procedure is provided for in the Customs regulations.

In March 1999, Customs initiated a new

vessel manifest compliance audit program.

Under this program, Customs not only

counts the containers on the ship, but also

compares the manifest description with the

contents of the cargo container. Here again,

the carrier can correct inaccurate or misleading manifest descriptions within the

60-day grace period. The results for the

first year are as follows:

■ Of 181 ship manifests reviewed, 96 of

the ships were found to have more or

fewer containers on board than identified on the manifest, for a 53 percent

discrepancy rate.

■ Of 921 containers that were physically

examined, 91, or 9.8 percent, had discrepancies, as follows:

■ 28 containers (3 percent) had incorrect

quantities.

■ 46 containers (4.9 percent) had a

description discrepancy.

17 containers (1.9 percent) lacked sufficient information. These findings are

indicative of systemic problems in the

trade practices, and regulatory changes are

needed to improve them. However, even

existing regulations are not being followed. The automated data systems were

designed to reduce the need for additional

resources, and they have made a major

difference. However, without a way to

ensure that the data supplied by the business community are accurate, the entire

trade system is at risk.

Criminal Abuse of the Federal 

Inspection Control Systems

The lack of effective cargo control allows

goods to be unlawfully manipulated or

diverted into the commerce of the United

States. This has significant negative economic consequences, ranging from lost

duty and tax revenues to the United States,

■ Federal regulations frequently do not

require accurate accounting for incoming or outgoing cargo until days or

weeks after it has left the seaport.

■ Carriers do not believe that they should

be held responsible for an accurate

accounting of the cargo that they bring

into the country, arguing that it is the

shipper’s responsibility; carriers maintain that they have no responsibility to

verify the contents of a container.

■ Even if discrepancies with the carrier

manifests are detected, the carriers have

60 days to correct the manifest before

penalties can be assessed. If the manifest is not corrected after 60 days, the

maximum penalty that inspectors may

issue is $1,000 (19 USC 1584) unless

the agency can prove fraud; carriers

appear to treat the penalties as a cost of

doing business.

■ Consolidated shipments often contain

no information on what is included in

the container, listing cargo as “various”

or “assorted merchandise.”

Although the federal government does

receive alternative and supplemental shipment information, there are timing issues.

For example, the import entry documentation contains more information than the

manifest, but the documentation is not

required for at least 5 days after arrival,

and complete entry summary information

is not required until 10 days after release

of the cargo.

How accurate are manifests? Customs

reviewed 633 carrier arrivals in 38 seaports. The results indicated that 119 of the

manifests, or 19 percent of the sample of

633 vessels, were discrepant. In other

words, the ships carried more or fewer

containers than they listed on their manifests. However, once Customs notified

them of the discrepancy, all they had to do

was make corrections to the manifest within the 60 days after arrival and no penalties
Foreign trade zones are also exploited

by commercial smuggling organizations. In

one scheme presented to the Commission,

200 containers of wearing apparel valued

at $1.6 million were smuggled through a

foreign trade zone. The violator, who was

the importer of record, either sold the

goods without authorization or used fraudulent transportation and exportation bonds

to claim that the goods were exported to

Mexico. The merchandise was never

exported; it was delivered directly to buyers in New York. The loss of revenue to the

U.S. government in this case was

$900,000.

In another investigation, a New Yorkbased importer caused the diversion of

about 325 containers of textiles with a

value in excess of $100 million from the

Port of Miami. The truck driver was paid

$500 for each container delivered to New

York and the broker was paid $13,000 for

false documents per container, adding up

to a total of about $2.3 million over 18

months.

Inadequate cargo control can implicate

concerns beyond duty or tax revenues.

Inadequate cargo control can threaten the

health and safety of the American public.

An example of this type of violation was

the importation of tainted swordfish from

South America.

Generally, the Food and Drug Administration identifies swordfish for automatic

detention because it must be tested for

mercury content. In cases where excess

mercury levels are detected, regulations

require that the products be destroyed or

exported under Customs supervision. To

avoid the automatic detention, importers

either change the country of origin or falsify the description of the shipments. In

some cases, importers simply fail to deliver the swordfish to the Food and Drug

Administration testing site. In cases where

excessive mercury levels are detected,

importers may substitute the shipments,

to failure to enforce international trade

agreements and restrictions on import or

export cargo. In addition to the revenue

implications of inadequate cargo control,

the health and safety of American citizens

may be jeopardized when unapproved and

unsafe products are smuggled into this

country or unlawfully diverted into the

commerce from shipments not intended for

entry into the United States.

The Commission found that inadequate

cargo control facilitates criminal activity.

The most flagrant examples of ineffective

cargo control were found at Los

Angeles/Long Beach, where several investigations revealed that more than 2,000

containers with nearly $260 million of

merchandise were diverted into the commerce of the United States without federal

inspection, the proper payment of duty, or

compliance with international trade restrictions or agreements. The loss of revenue to

the United States was more than $25 million in this one case.

This diversion scheme involved the

transportation of merchandise from the

Port of Los Angeles via truck to Laredo,

Texas, under Customs transportation and

exportation bonds. Once the merchandise

arrived in Laredo and the applicable transportation and exportation bonds were

accepted by Customs for the merchandise

to be exported to Mexico, the merchandise

was immediately and illegally delivered

back to the importer’s warehouse in Los

Angeles or to other distribution locations.

Eventually the violators did not even

attempt to deliver the goods to Laredo;

instead, a decoy shipment was kept in

Laredo. If Customs ever wanted to examine a shipment, the decoy shipment would

be presented. Over time, the decoy shipment aged to the point that the boxes were

falling apart when the operation was

brought to an end by Customs seizure.

Seven individuals were arrested, indicted,

and convicted of smuggling goods into the

United States, and $4.8 million in merchandise was confiscated.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 91
92 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

larger portion of imported cargo is transported from the first port of arrival to an

in-land destination where Customs and

other import formalities will be transacted.

This cargo moves over domestic roads and

through cities to foreign trade zones, bonded warehouses, and containerized freight

stations (CFS) with very little information

required from the importer before arrival

of the cargo at the destination location

when Customs clearance procedures will

be initiated. Some federal law enforcement

officials believe that criminal activity is

facilitated through the loosely controlled

interstate movement of imported cargo

upon which no duty or tax has been collected. Once the in-bond movement begins,

the importer has up to 30 days to complete

the in-bond transportation and then 10

days after arrival to complete the Customs

(entry filing) procedures. As a consequence, the collection of duty and tax payments is deferred. More significantly, federal law enforcement officials frequently

observe that this transportation interval

provides the time and the opportunity to

divert or substitute cargo, evade duties, or

smuggle unlawful merchandise. Customs

has made unsuccessful attempts to eliminate this system.

That the in-bond system may be abused

is highlighted in the following examples

from major ports:

■ As previously described, the in-bond

procedures were used to facilitate the

unauthorized diversion of 2,000 container loads of textiles, which are subject to

import restraints, into the commerce of

the United States without the payment

of duties.

■ The Customs office in a Gulf Coast port

reported that in-bond cargo constituted

its highest-risk category of shipment. It

cited misclassification, transshipment,

quota/visa fraud, and intellectual property rights violations as being present in

in-bond shipments. A Northeast Customs office reported the diversion into

not export them at all, or import them

again through other seaports.

Another vector for dangerous goods to

enter the U.S. commerce is for cargo to be

smuggled through Puerto Rico to the mainland United States. To counter this threat,

the Food and Drug Administration has

formed a partnership with the Puerto Rico

Hacienda Police as a means of generating

referrals because of the high volume of

container cargo that the Hacienda Police

inspect in the process of assessing a local

tax.

To understand the scope of this problem,

consider that an estimated 45 percent of

smuggled unapproved medical devices

manufactured in foreign countries under

unknown conditions travel through Puerto

Rico and ultimately arrive in the United

States.

Exploitation of Current Control Systems

As previously noted, upwards of 50 percent

of imported cargo is not cleared at the first

U.S. port of arrival. The unentered cargo is

moved in-bond to another U.S. port for

consumption entry or export from the

country. Unfortunately, as implemented,

the in-bond procedures of the U.S. Customs Service deny the federal government

detailed information on cargo that is transiting the United States.

A portion of the cargo arrives that at

West Coast ports via ocean carriers from

Asia, travels across the country by truck,

and exits East Coast ports for transport to

Europe. In these instances, the provisions

of in-bond are used as a convenience to

shippers and importers outside the United

States. Metaphorically, that aspect of the

in-bond procedures renders the United

States the doormat of world commerce; we

facilitate international trade and get stuck

with the dirt of illegal diversions, contraband, and revenue loss.

In addition to the export bound foreign

cargo transiting the United States, a far
tification number for enforcement purposes should not be considered as “customs

business” in statutory terms.

The transportation community should be

encouraged to electronically transmit the

vessel cargo information (i.e., manifest

data) into the Customs Automated Commercial System before the arrival of the

vessel at the U.S. port, and under no circumstances should any imported cargo be

permitted to move beyond the first U.S.

port of arrival, via the in-bond procedures,

if the related shipment information had not

been electronically transmitted to Customs.

Resistance to the enhanced informational reporting requirements, particularly if

the desire to capture entry level information before in-bond movement results in

the disenfranchising of the transportation

party from the right to file in-bond transportation entries with Customs, may be

anticipated from some sectors of the trade

community.

Additional resistance to a change in inbond informational requirements may be

expected from the custodial entities such as

port authorities, terminal operators, local

trucking and cartage companies, and long

haul motor and interstate rail carriers if the

enhanced level of information-gathering

leads to slower release of ocean cargo and

the attendant consequence of terminal-port

congestion including adverse impact on

vessel rotations into and out of the port.

Importers, customs brokers, and custodial entities at in-land ports that were the

destination of in-bond traffic may offer

objections to any proposed changes in inbond informational requirements if those

parties perceive an adverse impact on their

local revenue streams that depended on inbond movements.

The fundamental weakness inherent in

the in-bond system is the practice of allowing unexamined cargo to transit the United

States. The raison d’être of in-bond, the

deferral of duty and tax payments, would

the U.S. commerce of millions of dollars

of in-bond merchandise with no payment of duty or compliance with visa

requirements.

In the Ports of Los Angeles and Long

Beach, some container freight stations

(CFS) are more than 30 miles from the

waterfront and are visited by Customs

officials on an as needed basis. The Commission was told that the interval between

dispatch of an uninspected container to the

CFS and the subsequent arrival of Customs inspectors to examine the goods

could be one to two weeks after the container reached the CFS. During that interval, the integrity of the unexamined container could be compromised.

It is also important to note that merchandise that is subject to import restrictions or forbidden entry into the commerce

of the United States is permitted to move

through the United States for export to a

third country. Only the integrity of the

bonded carrier and the absence of criminal

intervention or accidents during transportation prevent the cargo from being released

into the commerce or environment of the

United States with potentially adverse consequences for the economy and health of

the nation.

A vital first step toward regaining control over the movement of unentered cargo

would be to increase the kind and quality

of data that must be in the possession of

the appropriate federal agencies before

imported merchandise was permitted to

move beyond the first U.S. port of arrival.

The level of information required on

imported merchandise should be made

uniform for all entries, including in-bond

transportation entries, and such information should be accepted from any entity in

the trade sector (carriers, importers, customs brokers, etc.). This enhanced reporting requirement should not infringe the

rights granted to carriers in the Customs

regulations (19 CFR 111.3) and the provision of the Harmonized Tariff System idenChapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 93
94 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ In July 1999 an importing firm and a

freight forwarder were fined $650,000

for the mislabeling of $6 million worth

of swordfish over a 12-month period.

Under FDA regulations, unless the foreign seafood processor is exempt, all

importations of swordfish must be tested to verify that mercury residues are

within permissible levels.

■ Since 1990, brined and canned mushrooms from the People’s Republic of

China have not been allowed entry into

the United States because of staphylococcal entertoxin contamination. Shipments may only be released into the

United States on a lot-by-lot basis after

the FDA is satisfied that the product is

compliant. Since the ban was imposed,

12 significant seizures of Chinese mushrooms labeled with misleading country

of origin (Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand)

or falsely invoiced to hide the true

processor in China (the invoiced manufacturer did not match the product code

on the end of can) have been made.

■ Decomposing shrimp (Food and Drug

Administration levels 2 and 3) shipped

from an unapproved foreign packer were

imported into South Florida. The shrimp

were defrosted and then washed in a bath

of chlorine, copper sulfate, and lemon

juice. Repacked and refrozen, the product was sold as “fresh-frozen” in Florida

and Virginia. Five company executives

were indicted in the scheme, which

involved imports from China and India.

Exotic forest pests (insects) or

pathogens (diseases) have been released

into the environment from imported merchandise or from the solid wood packing

material that contained imported merchandise. The recent discovery of the Asian

longhorned beetle has already cost New

York City $5 million for tree removal. The

state of Illinois removed 20 square miles of

forest in an attempt to halt the spread of

the beetle. The Department of Agriculture

estimates that at risk are 279 million acres

not be compromised if examination, for

enforcement or compliance or safety purposes, were conducted before removal

from the first port of arrival.

Effect of Undetected Violations 

on Food Supply

Criminal activity is not limited to theft of

cargo or denial of revenue to the government. Criminal threat vectors also include

the for-profit importation of forbidden or

unapproved foodstuffs or pharmaceuticals

and the introduction of invasive organisms

that harm our agriculture or environment.

U.S. agricultural interests have suffered

major losses as a result of introductions

of foreign insects. The Great Lakes are

plagued with zebra mussels that are damaging public utilities such as power plants.

The states of Florida and New York are

contending with invasive blights, a citrus

canker in Florida and the wood destroying

Asian longhorned beetle in the Northeast.

Public concerns have been raised about

the safety of imported food that may be

processed in countries where the health

laws and sanitation standards may be

far different from U.S. standards. Some

examples of these problems:

■ Infant powdered milk was imported into

a foreign trade zone from Ireland and

Holland without the FDA-required lot

numbers or manufacturing codes. In

addition, the manufacturer was not registered with the FDA as required. While

the milk was in the foreign trade zone,

the importer removed the label with the

lot codes from the cans. The cans were

sold to U.S. companies and relabeled

for U.S. consumption. The FDA sampled

the powdered milk from a dealer’s warehouse and confirmed the cans were produced by foreign manufacturers without

adequate quality control procedures.

On February 26, 2000, the importer

plead guilty to a felony count (18 USC

2320) for trafficking in infant formula

that was packed in counterfeit labels.
The absence of federal inspectors on

the docks opens more opportunity for

criminal activities and for criminal enterprises to take hold. Federal investigators

have noted that a substantial number of

their smuggling cases, especially drugs,

involve internal conspiracies. In the

absence of a highly visible federal presence, such conspiracies can only grow

more brazen. The simple fact of a highly

visible uniformed federal inspectional

presence on the waterfront facilities does

have a deterrent effect much as the return

of uniformed policemen to the streets has

a deterrent effect on street crime.

The utility of returning the federal

inspection presence to the waterfront cargo

environment is self-evident. The return of

the federal presence could be a force multiplier if the representatives of the various

agencies were co-located in shared Federal

Inspection Stations located directly on the

ocean terminal property. If the shared facilities are equipped with non-invasive cargo

examination tools, such as high energy

X-ray container scanners and unloading

platforms, as the Commission members

witnessed at the European Container Terminal in Rotterdam, both the government

and the private sector accrue benefits

from more rapid and efficient cargo control and clearance methodologies.

In every port visited, the consensus

was that more federal inspectors were

needed at the docks. The number of

inspectors and criminal investigators has

simply not kept pace with the trade volumes. Officials believe they are catching

only a small percentage of the violations.

At Commission forums, terminal operators

and others in the custodial cargo community (truck fleet operators, railyard security

personnel, etc.) said they would welcome

the return of the federal presence to the

waterfront.

Additional inspectors and criminal

investigators at seaports would appreciably

assist in handling the increasing trade volof hardwood stands and fruit orchards in

the eastern United States. Potential economic losses (timber, fruit, syrup, tourism)

could reach $41 billion annually if the

beetle is not contained.

Inadequate or missing information on a

vessel manifest could result in a contaminated shipment being overlooked, with the

consequent introduction of an ecologically

or economically harmful pest. The Department of Agriculture identified the following pests and pathogens as having been

introduced into this country from imported

cargo or its packing materials: Asian longhorned beetle, pine shoot beetle, gypsy

moth, chestnut blight, Dutch elm disease,

and Japanese cedar beetle.

Consistently, the federal agencies that

were interviewed complained about the

accuracy and completeness of shipment

information. In ports we visited, import

vessel manifests had been presented with

some of the cargo described simply as

“merchandise,” or “assorted.” Similar findings were reported at the other survey ports.

Need for Inspectors on the Docks

Regardless of agency, the inspector’s work

frequently involves more sitting or standing

behind a computer terminal than actually

doing on-site inspections of cargo or passengers. Collaterally, this has changed the

way business is conducted on the waterfront. Customs, for example, has moved

most of its commercial inspections off the

port grounds, to examination stations that

are often miles away from the seaport.

More than a decade ago, Customs

developed the “central examination stations” that are generally located on private

sector rented premises. Businesses are

permitted to compete for the right to

operate these inspection stations and

charge those whose cargo is being inspected for the service. Again, this means that

the inspectors and the federal deterrent

presence are not on the docks.

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Collectively, this mass of domestic and

foreign goods is the export cargo of the

United States. In 1998, the United States

exported 366,016,833 metric tons of

goods by water.

It is important to note that although

export transactions are conceptually the

same as the import process described

above, exports have an entirely different

legal framework. The regulations and procedures for imports are very different

from those for exports.

In the export arena, two federal agencies

have preeminent roles: Customs and the

Department of Commerce. Customs has

inspectors at the seaports that review documentation and conduct inspections of

export merchandise, and Customs special

agents conduct criminal investigations of

violations of all export control laws,

including strategic dual-use goods and

technologies, defense articles and services,

and economic sanctions and embargoes.

Commerce is the principal recipient of the

information that is collected on exports

after the cargo leaves the port. It contains a

federal law enforcement agency dedicated

solely to export enforcement. In addition to

Customs and the various departments within Commerce that are concerned with

exports, a number of federal agencies have

licensing oversight, including the Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade

Controls and the Department of Defense’s

Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Others,

such as the Food and Drug Administration

and Agriculture, are monitoring the export

of restricted or forbidden imports.

The laws and regulations governing

exports cover a broad scope. They deal

with everything from licensing dual-use

items and munitions to ensuring that only

safe agricultural products are exported to

other countries. Two primary export documents that enforcement agencies use are

the shipper’s export declaration (SED) and

the shipper’s manifest. Except in specific

cases, shipper’s export declarations may be

ume, and there are other things that can be

done. One example is mobile computer

systems that can provide the inspectors and

criminal investigators with more and timely information and free them from being

tied to their office computer terminals.

Many police forces now have computer

technology in their cars, where it can be

secured and the officers can be mobile.

In summary, if the Federal Inspection

Stations were located at the docks (on the

container terminal itself) rather than in

remote private sector locations away from

the ports, the commercial parties (carriers,

importers, brokers) would benefit from

speedier cargo exams. It would also be

possible to coordinate cargo examinations

among the various agencies. The federal

agencies would then be able to share

equipment, reduce costs, and coordinate

enforcement and compliance examinations.

Shared facilities equipped with high energy X-ray devices would benefit all federal

inspection agencies and their partners in

international trade.

Such a redeployment within the port

(not necessarily requiring additional staff)

and a technology upgrade effort could be

done in conjunction with a five year technology development plan (discussed in

Appendix E) that would encompass the

needs of all federal inspection agencies

from the perspective of technology requirements, cargo examination facilities, and

office space for the inspectors and information analysts.

Export Cargo Control

Historically, the export transaction has

drawn less scrutiny from the federal inspection agencies than the import cargo that is a

both source of revenue and a vector for

contraband. The products of our factories

and farms are joined with the mass of international cargo that is flowing through our

intermodal transportation network en route

from one corner of the world to another.
Another current practice, delayed filing

privilege, is at the center of the problem

of export control, and it defines the fundamental difference between the import and

export cargo control environments. Export

reporting is on an exception basis, while

for imports all shipments are reported to

the federal authorities before or at arrival.

Enforcement personnel believe the delayed

filing compromises the mission of export

control for all meaningful purposes.

In addition to its own concerns,

Customs assists a number of agencies to

enforce their export control regulations

along the U.S. borders. Principal among

those are the Department of Commerce,

the State Department, the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the

Department of Energy.

Illicit shipments are more likely to be

concealed within or falsely described

under a non-controlled category. That is

why it is essential that export information

filing before vessel departure be made

mandatory for all merchandise, not just

the sensitive categories noted above. The

control of export cargo effectively ends

when the cargo is laded aboard the vessel.

Although exported cargo, upon demand,

can be redelivered to the United States,

there is no guarantee that what is returned

is in fact the same merchandise or all of the

merchandise that was originally exported.

Information-processing and document

analysis are parts of a risk assessment criteria screen through which suspect shipments can be assessed. However, if the

export shipment information is not available, by established business and regulatory practice, up to 4 days after sailing of

the export cargo, there is no chance of

performing pre-export risk analysis on the

vast majority of export cargo transaction.

The most compelling reason to be concerned about exports is the illegal exportation of sensitive technology and goods.

This is an issue of national security. We

know from intelligence sources that U.S.

filed up to four days after the ship departs

the port. The specific exceptions, in which

documentation must be filed with Customs

in advance of the ship’s departure, include

the following:

■ The currency and foreign transactions

reporting requirements are set forth

within Title 31 of the U.S. Code. For all

currency shipments valued at $10,000

or more, a Customs Form 4790 must be

presented to Customs before or at the

time of export.

■ Munitions and weapons: Department

of State licenses (DSP-1, 5, 73, 83, 85,

94 as appropriate) and/or the Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF Form 9)

must accompany the export shipment

of certain classes of munitions and

other defense articles.

■ Chemicals used in illegal narcotic production (“pre-cursor chemicals”):

■ Critical technology, nuclear nonproliferation items, embargo enforcement and

national security issues: Export of qualifying goods requires that shipments of

such articles or technology be licensed

for export and that the license be verified prior to actual exportation.

■ Used motor vehicles: Customs Regulations (19 CFR 192.2) require the presentation of documentation three days

before the exportation of the vehicle.

Thus, exports that include articles covered in these areas must present documentation before the ship leaves the seaport.

The obvious problem with this framework

is that it is unlikely that someone attempting to smuggle goods out of the country

without proper clearances would stop to

file the appropriate paperwork. Thus, serious enforcement efforts can begin only

after the cargo has already left the seaport.

In addition, after the ship leaves the port,

federal inspectors cannot verify whether

the paperwork was accurate. Federal

enforcement officials are frustrated with

the general process.

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98 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

automation hard copy inventory control

system and must be revised to benefit from

and better manage the electronic commerce

environment of today’s shipping industry.

Although national security ranks on top

of the list for risks, an inadequate export

control system affects other interests, too.

The Food and Drug Administration has

identified export fraud as a major area of

concern with serious economic and health

implications. Legitimate products purchased at steep discounts for export are

secretly diverted into the domestic commerce and false export declarations are

issued to cover the diversion. The American producers are deprived of lawful revenue and the U.S. consumer is put at risk

in the event of a product recall because

there is no legitimate record of these

diverted products in the U.S. marketplace.

(There is also export fraud associated with

the diversion into the U.S. commerce of

rejected foodstuffs and that issue is

addressed later in this section.)

Import restrictions and export promotion methodologies, such as “Customs

drawback” (refunds of previously paid

Customs duties upon export of duty paid

goods) have been compromised via export

fraud associated with violations of the provisions of Chapter 9802 of the U.S. tariff

code. This section provides for duty-free

re-entry of goods that have been “advanced

or improved abroad.” The presentation of

false export documentation is used to

fraudulently enter goods duty-free that do

not qualify for 9802 treatment.

Stolen vehicles have been detected in

export containers in all of the 12 seaports

surveyed by the Commission. In some

ports, stolen vehicles concealed in export

containers are a major source of revenue

for domestic and international criminal

enterprises. The U.S. insurance industry

places great emphasis upon the detection

and reduction in car thefts. Car thefts are

not always victimless crimes. Crimes

against personal property can be traumatic

products are being aggressively sought by

terrorists, rogue states, narco-traffickers,

and others. The law enforcement community informs us that these goods are being

exported through our seaports, in addition

to airports and land borders. Interviews

conducted at the 12 seaports surveyed confirmed this to be the case.

Based on law enforcement investigations

and interviews conducted at the 12 seaports

surveyed, we know that seaports are vulnerable to those trying to acquire or sell U.S.

goods illegally. Another reason criminals

are able to smuggle is that it is relatively

easy to circumvent required export document requirements. Information given by

exporters on paperwork is often vague,

inaccurate, or missing completely. For

example, at one of the ports we visited,

authorities noted that the largest export

commodity from the port is described as

“general cargo.” At another seaport, we

were told that some major shipping lines

are flagrant violators, having manifest

accuracy rates of only 40 percent. Another

official stated that the submitted forms are

often illegible. Customs does conduct postaudits (often months after the ship leaves

the port) of manifests and shipper’s export

declarations at the 12 seaports surveyed,

but at rates that range from less than 1 percent to 10 percent of all manifests.

Customs estimates that less than 1 percent of U.S. exports are inspected. Law

enforcement officials interviewed at ports

believe that illegal shipments are likely to

pass through the system undetected. One

way to improve the federal ability to

inspect and monitor the increasing amounts

of export cargo is to tighten the regulations

governing the information provided by

exporters and their agents. Currently, most

shipper’s export declarations and on-board

bills of lading are prepared by the exporter

or its agent, the freight forwarder. These

documents are received and collated by

the vessel operator at its offices or by its

agent (the receiving clerk) at the terminal

location. These practices reflect a pre-
If the export control regulations of the

United States are to have any real significance, the federal inspection and investigative agencies responsible for the administration and enforcement of the export

regulations must know the true nature of

the export merchandise, and the true identities of the shipper and end user. To

accomplish this would require that the

export information be available to the federal authorities in advance of the departure

of the vessel.

The verification of pre-departure filing

of export documentation (shipper’s export

declarations and the outbound export manifest) and the physical inspection of suspect shipments are the means by which

export violations will be detected and prevented. Law enforcement officials interviewed at the ports believe that additional

personnel devoted to export documentation

review would strengthen efforts to detect

illicit shipments. They also believe that

interdiction efforts would be enhanced

through the use of applied technology such

as X-rays and computer software applications that can screen export data in

advance of the vessel departure.

Benefits and Limitations of

Automated Export System

Customs and Commerce developed an

automated system, the Automated Export

System, for the collection of export information. Until recently, participation in the

Automated Export System was totally voluntary. At the seaports surveyed, participation rates varied between 1 and 6.7 percent

of exports.

Its designers envision that the automated

export system will improve the quality of

the information that is gathered on exports

by requiring that specific information be

submitted for each field. The submission

will not be accepted with missing or insufficient information, as often happens in the

paperbound system. A beneficial consequence of the improved information will be

and even deadly in some cases. The export

of stolen vehicles is a major product of

criminal enterprises to be found at seaports.

Exporters and outbound vessels are

required by law to file accurate export

information, but for decades these laws

have not been enforced. Law enforcement

officials interviewed at the ports believe

that there is a lack of manpower and technology to enforce these regulations. In

addition, efforts to gain compliance by federal officials have not always been warmly

received by the private sector. Although

there are complaints about the practicality

of providing timely and accurate information, the state of technology has improved

dramatically over the last decade. Most

records, today, are automated.

The exporters, freight forwarders, customs brokers, and transportation providers

that are party to an export transaction are

automated within their industry sectors.

Some of these parties exchange shipment

information via electronic data interchange

to facilitate the export transaction. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect them

to satisfy federal reporting requirements

using the Automated Export System of the

Commerce Department and Customs.

However, this has not been the case.

The exporter or its agent, the freight forwarder, has in its possession the shipment

information before export. They should

know who the foreign buyer (importer) is

in order to prepare the export bill of lading. The freight forwarder should know the

identity of the U.S. shipper and the foreign

importer, and the description of the goods,

in order to prepare the shipper’s export

declaration. The export carrier should

know the nature and character of the goods

in order to prepare a stowage plan. This

information is known to the export community and should be provided to the federal inspection agencies responsible for the

administration and enforcement of the

export laws.

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tool for targeting and enforcement purposes. The system should also enhance the

reliability of trade statistics.

Despite the positive potential of having

a fully functioning electronic filing system,

the Automated Export System has several

significant problems. One is that the filing

requirements cover only certain export

goods.

Under the Proliferation Prevention

Enhancement Act of 1999, in the near

future, exporters that are required to file a

shipper’s export declaration will file such

declarations through the Automated Export

System with respect to exports of items on

the U.S. Munitions List or the Commerce

Control List. This requirement is a positive

change, but even more comprehensive

requirements for filing are needed. If only

certain licensable goods are covered, violators could simply file fraudulent paper

documents that they know may receive less

immediate scrutiny than the electronic filings, in order to mask their illegal exports.

For enforcement purposes, it is more

useful to eventually require that all shipper’s export declarations and, when a viable

system is in place, all other export documentation, be filed through an automated

system. The ability to cross-check all electronic submissions for a single export will

allow for better targeting of suspect shipments than could be accomplished with

paper submissions. Instead of slowing commerce, this should in fact speed processing

and release of legitimate exports.

Timeliness is also a problem in the way

the Automated Export System is currently

planned. In fact, the current four-day filing

of shipper’s export declarations in the

paperbound system may actually be better

than the possible 10-day filing—even

though automated—that will shortly be

implemented for licensed goods. The proposed new Automated Export System filing options will hamper the use of this

export information for enforcement purposes. Exporters or their agents will potenmore reliable trade statistics and an

enhanced enforcement and compliance

environment for the federal inspection

agencies. Furthermore, it will replace an

earlier automated initiative of Commerce

that allowed for the monthly filing of

export information on magnetic tapes under

the Automated Export Reporting Program.

The monthly Automated Export Reporting Program filing procedure removed the

administrative burden of hard copy document handling for exporters. However, it

also removed an important enforcement

tool, which was the review and screening

of the hard copy documents by the Customs Service before the transmittal of the

documents to the Commerce Department

(specifically, the Foreign Trade Division of

the Bureau of the Census). Therefore, the

first automated initiative in the export

arena was counterproductive from an

enforcement and compliance perspective.

The advent of the automated export system is a step in the right direction, but it

has some significant drawbacks. Jointly

designed by Customs and Commerce, it

accommodates the informational reporting

requirements of the Census Bureau and the

enforcement concerns of Customs, Commerce, and other federal inspection agencies. When implemented fully, it will contain information on the shipper’s export

declaration, the shipper’s outbound manifest, and the bill of lading for individual

shipments. Currently, only the shipper’s

export declaration portion of Automated

Export System is fully functioning.

The ability to file the shipper’s outbound manifest is expected to be available

in the near future. It is now being tested on

a limited basis. The final segment envisioned is submission of the bill of lading

for all shipments electronically. It is in the

early stages of development and will

require time and funding to become fully

operational. When all three segments are

finally implemented, the Automated Export

System has the potential to be a powerful
appear regularly. In Charleston, manifest

penalties averaged 87 per month. In New

York/New Jersey, we were told that 2,086

shipper’s export declaration discrepancies

were found between January 1997 and

June 1998. Some federal inspectors at various ports said they often did not pursue

these violations, or if they did pursue them

they preferred to issue verbal warnings.

The fines are too low to be an incentive

to exporters to submit their documentation

on time. Present regulations and operational policy allow for the presentation of

the shipper’s export declaration to federal

authorities up to four days after departure

of the vessel. Failure to present the

required documentation on a timely basis

may be sanctioned with civil penalties

accruing at the rate of $50 on the first

delinquent day and increasing to $100 after

3 days for a possible maximum fine of

$1,000 at 12 days. However, it is the practice in many ports to wait an additional six

days beyond the four-day delayed filing

period before any penalty action is initiated. Obviously, this permissive environment

does not promote compliance. However,

because of the low level of the penalty,

costs to process the penalty are more than

is collected, if the violator pays.

Because the shipping industry is a very

competitive environment, and the speed of

delivery is a hallmark of service, the possibility of a $500 fine for late filing of

export declarations may actually be viewed

as an acceptable cost of doing business.

As noted earlier, the Automated Export

System has the potential to make the

export information available for review by

the federal inspection agencies even before

the loading of the vessel, if current filing

requirements are changed. That would be a

quantum improvement over the current

practice of waiting until the hard copy document shuffle is completed among the forwarders, terminal operators, and steamship

company agents, which can take up to 10

days after the export event.

tially have three options for electronically

filing shipper’s export declarations for

licensed commodities. The individual

licensing agency will determine which

option or options will be available to the

exporter. The first option is the pre-departure submission of all Automated Export

System data. This is the only option that

has positive benefits for inspection and

enforcement activities. The second option

is the partial predeparture submission of

some specified data, with the rest of the

information due 10 days after export. The

third option is that no shipper’s export declaration information is due until 10 days

after export. Some licensing agencies have

already said they are in favor of an

“exporter-friendly” policy of allowing the

third option—for the majority of exports,

submissions will not be due for 10 days

after export.

Thus, while the Automated Export System may improve the accuracy of the

export information, if the shipper’s export

declaration information is not received

until 10 days after the vessel has sailed, the

chance of retrieving a forbidden or restricted export is severely diminished. In fact,

vessels sailing to Central or South America, where the restricted cargoes could be

transferred to other carriers for reshipment

to forbidden destinations in third countries,

would have arrived at its destination before

the documentation was even presented to

U.S. authorities. Although Customs has the

authority to demand redelivery of a cargo

whose legitimacy is in question, if it has

reached its destination there is no guarantee that what is returned is actually what

was initially exported from the United

States. Enforcement will lose one of the

greatest potential benefits of an automated

system if filing of all export documentation is not required before vessel departure.

Insufficient Export Penalties

Noncompliance with export cargo documentation requirements carries minimal

consequences. Documentation violations

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 101
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community and federal agencies. Various

intelligence reports indicate that U.S. products are being aggressively sought by

WMD proliferators, arms dealers, narcotraffickers, and others outside of the country. Highly sought-after items include dualuse goods such as high-performance

computers and advanced electronic components that can be used to manufacture

weapons of mass destruction, as well as

goods that can generate income on “black”

and “gray” markets, such as guns, alcohol,

and tobacco.

Recent criminal cases also demonstrate

that seaports are being used in these illegal

efforts. One investigation by the Commerce

Department’s Office of Export Enforcement revealed that an American company

exported potassium fluoride and sodium

fluoride to Jamaica and Suriname on 50

separate occasions without obtaining the

required export licenses. Potassium fluoride

and sodium fluoride are controlled because

they can be used to make chemical

weapons. The company made false statements on export control documents in the

case of each shipment. A civil penalty of

$750,000 was assessed on the company.

This case is particularly interesting because

it was a shipper’s export declaration review

program in the Office of Export Analysis

that led to the investigation. It demonstrates

how important export documentation

review is to enforcement, and how timely

and complete submissions of information

by exporters aids this enforcement effort.

Government export document review

(export control) programs that are enforcement-oriented should be encouraged.

Food Safety Concerns Affecting Exports

Cases that involve the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction stand

out among export cases. But there are

other issues of concern, such as public

health and safety. In conjunction with the

export transaction, federal agencies such

as Agriculture and the Food and Drug

For the reasons articulated above, the

agencies with export enforcement tasks

should review and update the appropriate

sections of the Code of Federal Regulations

or if required, the U.S. Code (statutory

law), so that the assessment levels of fines

and penalties (administrative and civil) for

export documentation violations are substantially increased. To promote compliance with export regulations, consideration

should be given to authorization of “onthe-spot” assessments of financial penalties for export documentation violations.

Lack of Historical or Current

Statistics on Export Violations

As discussed in Chapter 3, crime statistics

are not effectively collected. It is difficult

to evaluate the extent of the problem or the

cost to the United States of goods being

illegally exported through our seaports.

Few statistics capture export crime because

there are no statistical reporting requirements on export-related violations or

crimes involving the seaports.

Even the export-related information that

is collected is difficult to retrieve from

agency databases, as Chapter 3 documents.

Nine of the 12 seaports surveyed do not

track the accuracy rates of the Automated

Export System. Only four of the 12 were

able even to provide information on the

volume of licensable commodities traveling through their ports.

Officials who were interviewed did

express concern about illegal exports. The

concerns mentioned included currency

smuggling, arms trafficking, and the illegal

export of high-technology military equipment, precursor chemicals, and weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) technology. For

example, New York/New Jersey said it had

found significant illegal activity during

inspections of outbound cargo. In one case,

it found $11 million in currency concealed

in truck inner tubes.

These concerns are corroborated by

information available from the intelligence
■ In another FDA case, 170 cartons of

dried mushrooms were refused entry.

Again, only the intervention by a Customs outbound inspection team resulted

in an inspection, which revealed that the

cargo being exported had, in fact, been

substituted for the nonconforming and

forbidden product. Physical inspection

of the cargo revealed that the bag

weights differed from the import documentation, that the descriptions on the

cartons had been altered, and that the

actual product was larger in dimension

than the original import lot. The shipment was seized, and a fine of $22,066

was assessed.

■ Export fraud can also involve American

products. A U.S.-based exporter devised

a complicated scheme that ultimately

defrauded 39 companies. These violations eventually led to a prison sentence

and a $1.9 million fine in 1995. The

New Jersey U.S. Attorney’s Office

revealed that the scheme involving the

legitimately discounted purchase of

U.S.-manufactured products for export.

Some of these products were exported

and then immediately reimported under

the Customs “American goods returned”

provisions, which allow for the duty-free

entry of American-origin goods. These

reimported goods were then illegally

sold into the U.S. market, without the

knowledge or permission of the manufacturer, and undercutting the manufacturer’s own domestic product line.

■ In other cases involving U.S. goods,

there was no physical exportation,

but fraudulent shipping documents,

including bills of lading, were produced

to make it appear that the goods had

been shipped overseas. The difference

between the domestic and discounted

export prices, which could range

upwards of 50 percent, provided the

profit motive for these export diversion

schemes. In addition to monetary loss,

the export diversion schemes caused

some U.S. manufacturers to violate the

Administration are required to provide

inspections and issue certificates attesting

to the fact that the export-bound cargo

meets the import requirements of the country of destination. Some federal agencies

also allow for the export of goods that have

been refused admission into the United

States. Interestingly, most agencies reported that they did not conduct inspections to

verify whether the same material that was

certified for export or refused entry into

the United States was actually exported

from the United States. In some cases, the

verification of export task was deferred to

Customs, which did not finally learn of

the nature of the exported goods until four

days after vessel departure.

Customs and the Food and Drug Administration reported significant numbers of

violations involving the diversion of foodstuffs that had been denied entry into the

country. Noncompliant products that were

refused entry, including seafood, fruit

juices, mushrooms, and products intended

for specific ethnic markets, were frequently diverted into U.S. commerce. The diversion of dangerous, poisonous, or noncompliant foodstuffs into the U.S. marketplace

threatens both public health and the business of the legitimate importer. These are

some typical examples of these lowvisibility violations that carry high-risk

health and safety consequences:

■ A shipment of more than 100 cartons

of dried grouper fish was refused entry

into the country, and the importer was

granted permission to export the fish.

During a spot check by a Customs

inspector before export, samples of

the export-bound fish were drawn and

sent to the Food and Drug Administration. Analysis revealed that the product

was not the original grouper, but a

less expensive fish (croaker). The

importer had willfully diverted the

rejected grouper into the U.S. marketplace. The importer was fined $32,484.

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and the number of laws affecting imports

has risen to more than 600. Export controls

play a much different role. They are a protective device involving U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns as well as

the protection of U.S. business, knowledge,

and service. The need for increased attention on export enforcement has risen with

concerns about controlling the spread of

weapons of mass destruction and dual-use

items used for their development; smuggling of U.S. firearms to revolutionary

groups and other extremists; sales of U.S.

commodities to fund terrorist operations;

and other activity counter to U.S. interests.

Providing more scrutiny and control on

exports, in contrast, has been more controversial. Some have viewed export controls

as anti-business. Still, national security

concerns are raised frequently about U.S.

weapons, munitions, and critical technology being provided to our enemies. And a

variety of laws and regulations are in place

to control such exports. Enforcement of

these laws is problematic.

■ At Los Angeles and Long Beach, the

two busiest ports in the country, only

9 Customs inspectors and 1 supervisor

were assigned to export, compared with

a total of more than 100 inspectors on

the inbound side. To understand the task

they face, consider that 150,000 containers a month leave from those two

ports. Traditionally, the inspectors working outbound have been looking for

stolen vehicles because Customs inspectors are required by law to check the

paperwork for each used vehicle being

exported. This leaves only three inspectors for targeting munitions list and

dual-use goods—and this number actually reflects a recent increase.

■ At Customs, few criminal investigators

are devoted solely to working export

cases. For this reason, there is no exact

number of agents doing export investigations nationwide. It is estimated that

in 1998, out of a total of 2,789 criminal

Food and Drug Administration recordkeeping requirements, which could have

led to serious health and safety consequences if any of the products had been

subject to a recall. Also, some manufacturers received rebates from Customs

(under its drawback program) and Agriculture (which subsidized sugar at

below-U.S.-market price) predicated on

the fact that these companies believed

their goods had been exported. Among

the U.S. companies or domestic affiliates that were defrauded were Alpo Pet

Foods, American Cyanamid-Lederle,

CIBA Pharmaceuticals, Elder Pharmaceuticals, Fissions Pharmaceuticals,

Forest Pharmaceuticals, Fujisawa Pharmaceuticals, General Mills, Golden

Grains, Hunt & Wesson Foods, ICN

Pharmaceuticals, Nestle, Procter &

Gamble, Ralston-Purina, Redmond,

Schwartz Pharmaceutical, Tsumora

Medical, and Van Camp-Hormel.

These examples underscore the fact that

product substitution and export diversions

can be detected only through examination

of cargo. Furthermore, the practices are

widespread, they pose significant risks for

the health and safety of the U.S. public,

and they can have serious economic consequences for U.S.-based industries.

Falsification of export documents and

physical substitution of forbidden products

hurts the American polity and impugns the

integrity of American business practices.

The promotion of cargo control in the

export environment needs to become a

national priority.

Export Control Enforcement

As stated earlier, the legal frameworks for

imports and exports evolved differently.

Import duties funded practically the entire

federal government for nearly 150 years,

so import transactions have always been

the subject of concerted effort. As trade

has increased, concern over the smuggling

of many commodities has also increased,
they do not address issues relating to processing of passengers and crew through

Customs, Immigration, and Agriculture.

Seaport passenger volumes have climbed

steadily over the past decade, principally

because of the increased popularity of

cruise ship vacations as opposed to a resurgence in transoceanic passage. The cruise

market is particularly vibrant in the South

Florida region, where passenger capacity is

so tight that new and bigger ships are constantly being constructed. The passenger

cruise industry is also expanding in northern waters with Alaskan itineraries and

almost every east and west coast port of

any size has some cruise activity, whether

daily like Miami or seasonally like New

Orleans, Boston, New York, Philadelphia,

Baltimore, San Francisco, and Seattle.

The fact is that the burgeoning cruise

ship industry is reversing a decades long

decline in waterborne passenger traffic that

began with the availability of jet aircraft

travel in the last 1950s. Unfortunately, the

swelling numbers of cruise ship passengers

provide opportunities for domestic and

international criminal enterprises. Narcotic

smuggling by passengers or vessel crew,

commercial contraband (merchandise

smuggling), illegal aliens (either secreted

aboard or crewmembers jumping ship),

terrorist operations, and public health

menaces from communicable diseases

or infested agricultural goods can all be

carried on-board a cruise vessel.

Each individual arriving from a foreign

country must be checked by Immigration

to ensure that he or she is a U.S. citizen or

has the right to be in the United States. All

of these individuals are also checked to

determine if they are criminal aliens, if

there is an outstanding warrant for their

arrest, or if other information makes them

suspect as having terrorist or criminal connections. If an individual appears to have a

serious health condition, Immigration is

required to call the Public Health Service

investigator positions, the equivalent of

126 investigators, or 4.2 percent of the

total, were working export cases.

■ Export Enforcement at the Department

of Commerce is the only agency that

investigates solely export violations.

It covers the nation with 105 criminal

investigators. If export enforcement is a

vital national interest, staffing increases

for both inspection and investigation

should be considered.

With such constraints, operational coordination and shared facilities in Federal

Inspection Stations at waterfront locations

would serve as force multipliers in an environment now functioning with limited

resources.

As a first step in this direction, the

Department of Commerce should develop

a dedicated team at each Commerce/

Export Enforcement field office to work

with Customs to target export control

crimes and provide training to Customs on

export control documentation as needed.

Stakeholders, such as freight forwarders,

should be targeted for compliance education and outreach by joint Customs and

Commerce enforcement teams as needed.

Cruise Ship

Passenger Control

Seaports are also the venue for cruise ship

passenger activity, and every arriving commercial vessel has non-resident crew members who represent a potential threat for

illegal entry into this country. This section

of the chapter will examine the issues surrounding passenger and international crew

control at seaports.

The Coast Guard regulations on cruise

ships are meant to deter acts of terrorism.

They are aimed strictly at preventing

weapons and explosives from being

brought aboard passenger vessels. The regulations require screening of embarking

passengers, baggage, and ships’ stores, but

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Seaport automation will allow ports of

entry to focus resources on areas with the

highest immigration risks instead of the

highest volume. More time can be spent

on inspection activities related to people

who pose a higher risk in the seaport

environment.

Passenger control extends beyond immigration concerns to encompass additional

threat vectors from cruise ships. In addition to Immigration, each returning cruise

ship is met by representatives of Customs

and Agriculture. For example, during the

period of the Commission’s seaport review,

Customs made 754 seizures of illegal

drugs from cruise ship passengers. Threats

include passenger health, crew member

smuggling, illegal aliens concealed aboard

the ship, contraband carried by passengers,

in their baggage or secreted within the vessel itself, prohibited agricultural products,

and duty evasion. The many areas underscore the need for coordination between

the various federal agencies.

The cruise industry is expanding dramatically, and the expansion is expected to

continue. Yet, unlike airports and land borders, commercial seaports have no clearly

delineated sterile areas for federal inspection stations. At airports, the federal inspection agencies have secure sterile areas for

conducting their inspections where domestic passengers, visitors, and airport workers

are segregated from arriving passengers. At

seaports, there is also generally a lack of

suitable space to detain suspects while further checking is being done.

A review of passenger security at terminals that serve cruise lines indicates a commitment to passenger control. Passenger

and cargo operations are generally segregated, at least in the home ports of cruise

ships, and separate terminals are designated for cruise passengers. Terminals uniformly employ private security forces, and

those personnel appear to be clear as to

which police unit should be notified when

there is a problem. Security procedures

to ensure that no communicable diseases

are involved.

The Immigration and Naturalization

Service has recognized the need to

improve border control and streamline

inspection processes in the seaport environment. Seaport operations have not

changed substantially in decades and are

overdue for streamlining and modernization. At present, the Immigration inspection processes are paper-driven and laborintensive. For similar reasons, the maritime

industry desires changes in the Immigration inspection process to decrease the

paperwork burden and to more efficiently

process passengers. This is especially evident in the cruise line environment where

passengers may undergo multiple Immigration inspections in one voyage after short

visits to foreign ports of call.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

placed far-reaching alien control and

reporting responsibilities on the Immigration and Naturalization Service. These

responsibilities include the development of

an automated system to collect and match

the arrival and departure records for all

non-U.S. citizens entering and departing

the United States via air, land, and sea.

This is a particular challenge in the seaport

environment, which does not currently

have an automated method to collect

crewmember arrival and departure records.

The lack of an automated seaport system

makes the ready access of records at a

national level impossible. Furthermore,

intelligence information is not routinely

shared among ports of entry.

The Immigration and Naturalization

Service, in an attempt to meet these challenges, seeks to design a seaport system

whose purpose is to focus existing inspection resources more appropriately. The initiative also seeks to develop alternative

types of inspection procedures for crew of

cargo vessels that have histories of compliance with Immigration regulations.
availability of a designated federal inspection site at seaports, like the sterile area in

an airline terminal, would reduce risk to

federal law enforcement officers by providing an area where a suspected terrorist or

criminal can be detained and adequately

supervised, and it would limit jurisdictional

issues related to the apprehension of aliens

after they disembark the vessel.

The issues are especially problematic

in light of the short time frame involved.

Cruise ships are generally in port less than

12 hours. Within that short time, all passengers and their baggage must be unloaded;

cleaning and trash removal must take place;

new supplies must be taken on; and new

passengers must be boarded with their

luggage. Any repairs to the vessel must

also take place at this time. Some of the

larger ships hold more than 2,000 passengers, and the crew-to-passenger ratio is

about 1:3, which results in additional

movement on and off the ship. It is logistically difficult for the federal inspectors to

control who and what goes on and off the

vessels under the current arrangements.

Crew Processing Control

Foreign vessels have become an emerging

avenue for aliens to enter the United States

illegally through organized efforts, as stowaways or as crew “jumping” (unauthorized

departure with intent to remain illegally in

the United States) the vessel.

On cruise ships, where the number of

crewmembers is generally about one-third

the number of passengers, the clearance of

crew is a substantial effort. Cargo and other

commercial vessels often have large numbers of crew as well. Because most vessels

calling at U.S. seaports are foreign-flag vessels, most of the crew are foreign citizens.

In some cases the crews are undocumented

and are not allowed to enter the United

States.

Although many vessel captains cooperate fully with federal authorities, occasionare, for the most part, well coordinated

between terminal and vessel personnel.

One aspect of passenger control that is

of concern is the system for identifying

passengers reembarking at foreign ports.

While cruise ships operating from U.S.

ports are required by regulation to employ

procedures to prevent unauthorized access,

no standards are in place for identifying

bona fide passengers who seek to reboard

a cruise ship after spending some time

ashore in a foreign port. This provides an

opportunity for stowaways or others who

are not registered passengers to board.

Some cruise lines issue identification

cards; others simply check off passenger

names on the manifest. A more secure

system should be encouraged.

But the security of federal inspection

space is an outstanding concern. In a typical

seaport, one can observe a mix of arriving

and departing cruise ship passengers, vendors servicing cruise ships, and workers

employed on behalf of cargo vessels

engaged in foreign and domestic activities

in the port. Because distinct processes within seaports are not formally separated, dockworkers and other individuals with access to

ports, such as truck drivers and vendors, can

mix freely in the federal clearance environment. This negates the entire federal inspection process. For example, a drug smuggler

could easily pass his contraband to someone waiting at the dock. A crew member or

stowaway with a communicable disease or

even a suspected terrorist could bypass the

federal inspection process completely.

Because areas at seaports in which federal inspections take place are not well

controlled, opportunities for illegal activities increase. Because passenger terminals

are not owned or administered by the federal government, passengers disembark and

enter a terminal area controlled by a private

security service after immigration examination or inspection is completed aboard the

vessel. The area where further federal

inspections take place is not sterile. The

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Military Mobilization Security

at Strategic Seaports

In this post-Cold War era, forward deployment of U.S. troops and equipment overseas is a less frequently utilized strategy.

Consequently, in the event of a contingency, military equipment will have to

travel farther in less time to the theater of

operation. Because the ongoing base

realignment and closure initiatives include

closing several military-owned and -operated ports, U.S. commercial ports have

become critical choke points of future

military mobilizations. The security of

commercial ports during times of military

mobilization is therefore essential to the

national defense.

At the request of the Military Traffic

Management Command, the Maritime

Administration has issued port planning

orders to 13 U.S. commercial ports. The

orders define the tentative arrangements

to make port facilities and services available to meet anticipated defense agency

requirements during a mobilization. Military mobilizations through commercial

ports would occur in the midst of all regular cargo activities. Not only would this

situation increase the demand for facilities, equipment and labor, it would

increase the demand for security. The

designated Strategic Seaports are:

Beaumont, Texas

Charleston, South Carolina

Corpus Christi, Texas

Jacksonville, Florida

Long Beach, California

Morehead City, North Carolina

New York/New Jersey

Norfolk/Newport News, Virginia

Oakland, California

San Diego, California

Savannah, Georgia

Tacoma, Washington

Wilmington, North Carolina

ally Immigration has difficulty obtaining

an accurate list of crew. Crew frequently

change as vessels travel from port to port,

and some captains do not appear to maintain adequate control of their crew. The

size of fines levied against cruise lines for

the boarding of improperly documented

crew has risen, in turn brought on by an

increase in mala fide (bad faith) crew

seeking entry into the United States.

Ships’ officers often are inadequately

trained to identify bogus documents.

If Immigration forbids crew members to

enter the United States, the ship’s captain

has the responsibility to detain them aboard

the vessel. Loose security often results in

detained crewmembers leaving their vessel.

Immigration does not have the resources to

check departing crew against manifests,

thus leaving an avenue for crew jumping.

Some of the biggest concerns of federal

officials are stowaways on private vessels,

passengers on day cruises, and crewmembers’ visas (which are issued by the Department of State). Officials commented that

such visas could easily be obtained at the

last port of call before the ship reaches the

United States.

Stowaways present a significant problem for law enforcement agencies in

Gulfport and New Orleans, and crewmembers are often involved in alien smuggling. Another problem for law enforcement agencies is document forgery. In

Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, stowaways from

the Dominican Republic present a significant challenge for law enforcement agencies. Immigration contacts the FBI when

it believes it has a stowaway or an alien

in custody who is suspected of having

ties to a terrorist organization. The FBI

then interviews the subject and shares

information on a need-to-know basis,

which will include Immigration and the

Joint Terrorism Task Force.
which might represent the port authority,

Customs, the FBI, Immigration, the local

police department, local government agencies, and so forth.

The key federal agency mobilization

responsibilities for Strategic Seaports are

as follows:

■ The Coast Guard is responsible for

enforcement of federal laws and international treaties and the security of

U.S. ports and waterways. This includes

but is not limited to establishment and

enforcement of security zones, supervision over the loading of explosives,

control of all vessel traffic within the

port, harbor defense, cargo segregation

at facilities and aboard vessels, enforcement of all navigational safety regulations and law enforcement aboard vessels and waterfront facilities, vessel

escorts, enforcement of limited access

areas, aids to navigation and port safety,

and administration of all bridges over

navigable waterways. In addition, the

Coast Guard provides search and rescue,

responds to releases of oil, chemicals

(including chemical weapons of mass

destruction), and hazardous materials,

conducts boardings and inspection of

vessels, and investigates casualties.

■ The Maritime Administration provides

U.S.-flag ships and, as necessary, U.S.-

owned foreign-flag ships by requisition

to meet Department of Defense requirements in time of war and non-North

Atlantic Treaty Organization contingencies, and acts for the United States in

North Atlantic Treaty Organization shipping affairs. For use in national emergencies, it maintains the National

Defense Reserve Fleet and the Ready

Reserve Force. During emergencies, the

Maritime Administration becomes the

operating arm of the National Shipping

Authority. It is responsible for coordinating the use of ships and nonmilitary

ports, and it administers a program that

assures allocation and priority use of

A key memorandum of understanding

on port readiness guides the overall outload of military equipment from these

Strategic Seaports. The purpose of the

memorandum of understanding is to ensure

the readiness of military and commercial

seaports to support deployment of military

personnel and cargo in the event of mobilization or national defense contingency

through enhanced coordination and cooperation among the following U.S. entities:

■ Maritime Administration

■ Joint Forces Command

■ Headquarters Forces Command

■ Transportation Command

■ Military Sealift Command

■ Military Traffic Management Command

■ Army Corps of Engineers

■ Coast Guard

■ Maritime Defense Zone

The memorandum of understanding on

port readiness established a National Port

Readiness Network Steering Group and a

subordinate working group of designated

representatives from the agencies listed

above. The working group is tasked to:

■ Coordinate contingency planning concerning military requirements for and

use of strategic seaports.

■ Develop initiatives supporting military

preparedness at commercial seaports.

■ Coordinate operational procedures and

information exchange.

■ Conduct joint exercises, conferences,

workshops, and training to evaluate

plans and procedures.

The memorandum of understanding

on port readiness also directed the signatory agencies to form local port readiness

committees at Strategic Seaports to develop specific geographical and functional

agreements. The activities of the port determine the composition of each committee,

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assessments are lacking in the Strategic

Seaports, although the Coast Guard has

done some local threat assessments.

No specific security standards have

been established for facilities used by the

military during mobilizations. The Army

is tasked with landside security for strategic outport operations. This security, however, is centered on protection of personnel and specific cargo within allocated

terminal confines and is defined in memorandums of understanding (both joint and

between Military Traffic Management

Command and Joint Forces Command).

The overall level of landside security

for the entire port is a function of local

memorandums of understanding between

the Army and the port authority. Depending on the strength of the local memorandum of understanding, the level of port

security provided could potentially be inadequate, especially if the threat increases

dramatically.

The American Association of Port

Authorities expressed concern about security for military mobilization. In written

comments to the Commission, it recommended that the Departments of Defense,

Transportation, and Justice support and

participate in the ongoing efforts to review

wartime vulnerability and peacetime security needs of U.S. ports. The Association

asked that this be coordinated with all

relevant federal (military and civilian),

state, and local law enforcement and

security-related agencies, including port

authorities.

The impact of maintaining the status

quo probably would not be evident until

an actual military mobilization occurred,

but potential problems include increased

vulnerability to terrorist attack, a slowdown in the outload of military equipment,

and ultimately a degradation in the country’s national defense capability.

commercial port facilities. The Maritime

Administration also appoints a federal

port controller, who serves as the director of the local port, to act as its agent

in national emergencies.

■ The Military Traffic Management

Command, an Army command that is

a component of the Transportation Command, is responsible for coordinating

the movement of military traffic, cargo

equipment, and personnel. During mobilization, its reserve units are activated

to direct the outloading of military cargo

at commercial ports. The security cell

of the transportation terminal battalions

supervises terminal security at the port,

while the port security detachment, if

available, provides access control and

security for military cargo. Joint Forces

Command’s port support activity and

deploying units assist in the security

operations.

Visits by the Commission to four of the

13 commercial Strategic Seaports revealed

that the “National Port Readiness Network

and local Port Readiness Committee” concept is fundamentally sound but in need

of increased emphasis. In particular, local

memorandums of understanding need to

be updated, local Port Readiness Committees need to meet more often, nontabletop

exercises need to be held more frequently,

and resolution of unsolved issues and

problems need to be escalated.

With many competing operational

demands, no dedicated resources, and

little guidance from the National Port

Readiness Network, the local Coast Guard

Captain of the Port is often forced to place

this collateral duty on the back burner

until an actual military mobilization arises. Adding to the problem is the fact that

the national port readiness network has

not made it a priority to provide for actual

port readiness exercises, and therefore

only tabletop exercises are held on a yearly basis. Finally, vulnerability and threat
Monitoring/surveillance equipment

can be used to collect and record evidence

of illegal actions and to record events

occurring within the port. Examples are

audio intercept, electronic surveillance, and

tracking devices. Also included in this category are technologies appropriate for a first

response to warnings of terrorist threats,

hazardous incidents, and other special security concerns. Surveillance technology

encompasses the broad set of electronic,

audio, video, forensic, and other devices

and systems used by criminal investigators

to prevent crime, to enable the recovery of

stolen goods and the seizure of contraband,

and to bring criminals to justice. In this

report, surveillance is cited as a key means

of addressing the Commission’s issues of

preventing and detecting terrorism and

crime, cargo control, and passenger and

crew control at seaports.

Contraband detection technology is

used to examine cargo, containers, conveyances, and persons for the presence of

illegal or controlled materials entering or

leaving the seaport. Examples are sensors

to detect traces of explosives, drugs, or

nuclear radiation; systems using gamma

and X-ray imaging or neutron interrogation

techniques to detect specific or anomalous

concealed materials; and devices to detect

concealed compartments.

Less than 10 years ago, the technology

available to detect concealed materials in

cargo or conveyances consisted primarily

of small, low-powered X-ray units to

examine baggage and small parcels, and

hand-held devices such as fiber optic

scopes, steel probes and needles, gamma

backscatter units, and electric drills, which

were generally limited to examining small

sections of the suspect item. Using this

equipment to thoroughly examine a truck

and its cargo was time-consuming, laborintensive, and frequently destructive.

Today, as a result of greatly increased

congressional support and funding in the

past decade for the development of new

The Role of Technology

in Seaports

The use of technology can be a critical

building block in the effort by both the

private and public sectors to reduce crime

and increase security in U.S. seaports. The

increased use of technology should be part

of the response to each of the major issues

identified by the Commission: the prevention and investigation of terrorism and

crime; military mobilization; and border

control of passengers, cargo, and crew.

While it is important to recognize that

using technology is only one means to an

end and not the end objective itself, adding

the right technology at U.S. seaports can:

■ Increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and

safety of port operations and the enforcement of applicable laws and regulations.

■ Decrease vulnerabilities to criminal

activities.

■ Serve as a force multiplier for port

operators and enforcement agencies.

■ Enable new capabilities for port security and control.

■ Facilitate quick responses for military

mobilization, terrorist threats, and new

requirements.

Technology can assist federal agencies,

ports, and the private sector in the following areas:

Security equipment and technology

is useful for establishing and controlling

physical boundaries around and within

the seaport. Examples of this type of technology/equipment are fencing and gates,

access control systems, surveillance cameras, and communications equipment.

Increased security technology at U.S. seaports can deter and defeat potential threats

to seaport operations, minimize cargo

theft and the illicit movement of materials

into and out of the country, protect passengers and crews against criminal attacks,

and protect vital national defense assets

during military mobilizations.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 111
112 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

dock in seaports. This is a labor-intensive

process requiring many hours. Because

appropriate technology for examining containers and shipments is limited at seaports, shipments may go unexamined.

Non-intrusive examination technology

does exist that would allow federal inspectors to examine shipments quickly without

opening containers. This technology is

described in detail in Appendix E. During

the seaport visits, the Commission found

that the gamma ray system (at Port Everglades), a mobile truck X-ray system (in

Miami), and weapon detection devices

were being used to examine shipments

entering or exiting the United States. The

shipments were targeted because officials

considered them high-risk for contraband,

weapons, or explosives.

The identification and deployment of

examination technology at many of the

major ports along the southern land border,

and at a limited number of seaports, has

greatly enhanced the ability of Customs to

examine high-risk shipments and containers entering the United States and to detect

contraband and narcotics entering and exiting the country. The use of weapon detection devices at airports (by airline security

personnel) and seaports (by the cruise line

industry) has also resulted in the effective

and efficient screening of passenger and

baggage for weapons and explosive

devices.

The Commission also found during its

seaport visits that equipment such as cameras, carbon dioxide detectors, small boats,

and vessel tracking devices that could

assist law enforcement personnel in

accomplishing their missions was available

to field personnel in very few seaports.

Immigration in Miami, for example, has a

small boat to patrol the Miami River area,

and Customs has, or is in the process of

installing, cameras in the Ports of Jacksonville, Gulfport, Miami, and Port Everglades to assist in monitoring activities

within the ports. The Coast Guard uses

drug detection technologies, new inspection systems now becoming available can

examine entire trucks or containers in just

minutes and provide a very high probability of detection of drugs, currency, explosives, and radioactive materials.

The technology categories are not necessarily exclusive. For example, closedcircuit television cameras around a seaport

perimeter are part of security, but if a theft

occurs they also can be used in the investigative activity that follows. Similarly,

radiation detectors at a truck gate support

both security and contraband detection.

A complete description of security,

surveillance, and contraband detection

technology is available in Appendix E of

this report.

Technology and Equipment at Seaports

Federal inspection agencies, including Customs, the Food and Drug Administration,

the Animal Plant and Health Inspection

Service, the Food Safety Inspection Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Administration, have an interest in maintaining the

integrity of cargo arriving from foreign

countries. If cargo is stolen, not properly

manifested, or improperly secured, it affects

the ability of the federal agencies to carry

out their functions of ensuring that cargo

complies with U.S. laws and regulations.

Each year millions of shipments (many

of them containerized) enter and exit the

United States through the seaports. Federal

agencies such as Customs, the Coast

Guard, Immigration, and Agriculture that

are charged with targeting and detecting

contraband (e.g., drugs, illegal merchandise, organized alien smuggling, and stowaways), as well as weapons or explosives,

in these shipments can examine only a

small number of these targeted shipments

through conventional means. Conventional

means include surveillance, stripping containers and opening boxes, searching

vessels, performing selective document

checks, and patrolling areas where vessels
means of communication between them.

However, it should be realized that depending on the type of cargo at the port, the

physical security in place may be sufficient. For example, most of the cargo on

site at the Port of Detroit is steel for the

automobile industry, which is not a highly

desired target for theft because of its

weight and bulk.

Although few seaports had X-ray technology, there were a few like Miami and

Port Everglades that had basic non-intrusive detection technology. For the most

part, seaport technology has lagged substantially behind that available in the

nation’s airports and on the Southwest

border of the United States.

During its on-site surveys at the 12 seaports, the Commission found that the following technology (which was described

in this chapter) was prevalent, or available

for the use of law enforcement personnel:

pallet/mobile X-ray systems, personal radiation detectors, contraband detection kits,

covert surveillance equipment (including

tagging and tracking devices), cameras,

and sonar devices.

The Commission also found that the

private sector has deployed the following

technology at some of the12 seaports (or

private terminals/facilities within seaports

and the environs): vehicle tagging/tracking

devices (for access control and accountability), closed circuit television cameras,

trace detectors (for identifying the presence of drugs, explosives, or other contraband), infrared sensors, magnetometers,

vessel tracking systems, and baggage/

parcel X-ray systems.

Technology at the foreign ports visited

(Felixstowe and Rotterdam) included large

scale non-intrusive technology and closed

circuit television cameras. The equipment

deployed by both the government and the

private sector in ports visited in the United

States and overseas has proven beneficial

in detecting both contraband and criminal

activity at the seaports.

vessel tracking systems in the Ports of

New Orleans and Los Angeles to track

vessels within the limits of the ports.

The identification and deployment of

equipment that can assist law enforcement

personnel in accomplishing their missions

is critical. Devices such as cameras and

vessel tracking devices that are useful in

monitoring vessels and activities at piers,

and carbon dioxide detectors and small

boats that can be used to detect aliens and

monitor “seaside activities” at seaports,

can enable law enforcement personnel to

work more effectively and efficiently.

Both the technology that is in use and

the rudimentary forms of security vary

from port to port. The majority of oil terminals and refineries that the Commission

visited provide the benchmark for the use

of technology and equipment. Most have

more than adequate perimeter fencing

(chain-link with barbed-wire top-guards in

place). Lighting is designed to minimize

shadows. Closed-circuit television is used

to complement, not substitute for, manned

security. Continuous vehicle patrols are

made of the perimeter areas where possible, as well as in the interior. Berms are

often in place along perimeter areas. Security vehicles have a radio link to each other

and to a central command site. Employee

parking is limited to a designated area.

Firearms are prohibited for the most part.

The use of technology and equipment at

other types of terminals, as well as at the

ports themselves, is less substantial. Where

perimeter fencing exists, it is in good

repair, but there are ports and terminals

where fencing is simply not in place. Commission members did not visit the ports or

terminals at night, but it is clear from the

placement of lighting that some facilities

are not well lit, even though lighting for the

most part is adequate. Closed-circuit television equipment is very limited, and many

terminals do not have regular perimeter or

internal vehicle patrols. Where a port has

more than one entrance, there is often no

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 113
114 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Responsibility for Improving

Security at Seaports

During its reviews, the Commission found

that the primary federal agencies having a

primary interest in seaport security (Coast

Guard, Customs, and Immigration) were

not routinely performing security surveys

and vulnerability assessments, nor were

they participating in initiatives with the

private sector to identify and address security-related deficiencies within seaports.

In the airport environment, the Federal

Aviation Administration has dedicated

staffs who work closely with airport

authorities, carriers, vendors, and federal

agencies at airports to identify and address

security-related issues. Once the issues are

identified, action plans can be developed

and implemented to address the specific

deficiencies or threats. Similarly, in the

seaport environment, the Coast Guard,

Customs, and Immigration and Naturalization Service should all have a strong interest in seeing that issues related to port

security in seaports are identified and that

these issues are addressed.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6,

everyone involved at the seaport should

have an interest in security. The private

sector should be interested in preventing its

cargo and facilities from attracting criminals. The port authority should be interested in preventing the port from being a

haven for criminals. Law enforcement

agencies at all levels should be interested

in deterring crime, and entities that fund

law enforcement should be interested in

prevention, thereby reducing the need for

expensive investigations and prosecutions.

As mentioned above, several federal

agencies have a direct or indirect interest

in security activities at the nation’s seaports. What is needed is a mechanism to

ensure that security interests in the seaports are carried out in a coordinated,

cooperative manner. The overarching

issue is who should take the lead.

Even the most basic technology has

shown results where it has been used. For

example, in Miami, federal, state, and local

law enforcement joined efforts to X-ray

containers that were scheduled to be

exported in an effort to identify stolen

vehicles that were being illegally exported.

Stolen cars are a major problem in South

Florida, and law enforcement officials

believed they were being smuggled in

ocean containers. Using very low-resolution equipment that processed very rapidly,

law enforcement officials were able to

X-ray every container entering the yard to

check for stolen vehicles. The process

required only about 3 seconds, and cargo

was not slowed down at the gates.

During the first month of the special

operation, law enforcement officials were

able to identify scores of stolen vehicles

and return them to their owners. However,

once the culprits were apprehended, the

smuggling through the Port of Miami

virtually stopped. Interestingly, the stolen

car rate in Miami-Dade County declined

substantially. The rate did increase,

though, in Broward County, immediately

north of the Miami seaport. Law enforcement officials were able to determine that

the smugglers had shifted and were using

Port Everglades to export stolen vehicles.

The equipment that had been purchased

by the state of Florida was then moved to

another port.

Several of the agencies with work at

the seaports could benefit from technology. Rather than each agency pursuing its

own needs, it would be more cost-effective

to develop shared technology at shared

facilities, avoiding duplication of effort.

Federal agencies could share facilities at

seaports to share costs and also improve

enforcement coordination and cargo

inspection. The stakeholders at the seaports the Commission visited and in the

MarineTransportation System report also

recommended this course of action.
issues. However, Coast Guard landside

authority may be limited to waterfront

facilities.

Customs has broader landside authorities for ports with international cargo.

Its jurisdiction for security includes port

authorities, carriers, brokers, truckers, railroads, foreign trade zones, and bonded

warehouses. Customs jurisdiction extends

to any place where international cargo

has not cleared federal import or export

requirements, even if it is 1,000 miles

away from the port of entry.

The FBI is the lead agency for combating and responding to acts of terrorism. It

has both investigatory and operational lead

federal agency authorities when the issue

involves terrorist incidents occurring within U.S. territory or in international waters.

In addition, the FBI has Joint Terrorism

Task Forces in major cities, and it actively

manages terrorism programs in each of its

56 field offices and 400 resident agencies.

Port security is a broader issue than

any one agency. The Coast Guard covers

all seaports, but only on the water and at

waterfront facilities. The Department of

Defense has major security interests in

13 Strategic Seaports in times of military

mobilization. The FBI has jurisdiction

over numerous federal violations, including

terrorism—this jurisdiction is not specific

to the seaports. Customs has broad authorities for all passengers, cargo, and crew,

and their movements until they clear Customs—but this jurisdiction covers only

international seaports.

While everyone (federal, state, and

local) is responsible for some aspect of

seaport security, we believe the Coast

Guard should be appointed the lead federal

agency for coordinating seaport security.

Further, we believe that national and local

port security coordinating committees

should be established that would include

not only all the interested federal agencies

but also other governmental and private

sector interests.

According to Presidential Decision

Directives (specifically PDD 63), it is

the policy of the United States to ensure

the continuity and viability of critical

infrastructure, and to take all necessary

measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerabilities to both physical and

cyber attacks on critical U.S. infrastructures. Because the targets of attacks

would likely include both facilities in the

economy and those in government, the

elimination of potential vulnerability

requires closely coordinated efforts of

both the public and the private sectors.

To the extent feasible, the federal government should seek to avoid outcomes that

increase governmental regulation or

expand government mandates to the

private sector.

Applying this policy to seaports is a

difficult task. Seaport terminals are a

mix of government-owned and privately

owned. The larger seaports are generally

owned by the state or local government

or a port authority that is part of some

level of government. Many privately

owned terminals may deal with only one

or two commodities. Even ports that are

publicly held may be operated, in whole

or in part, by the private sector, so private

sector cooperation is necessary.

Clearly, protecting seaports as described

in the President’s guidance on critical

infrastructure will require a lead federal

agency. The directive also designates the

Secretary of Transportation as the lead for

critical infrastructure that is transportation-related. The Coast Guard has a longstanding overall mission to foster seaport

security, it has many specific missions

related to this function, and it has experience in port security. The Coast Guard

also has in place a Captain of the Port

structure, which means that every port in

the United States already has a designated

Coast Guard officer with existing responsibilities. The Coast Guard clearly has

the lead responsibility among the federal

agencies for waterway security and safety

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 115
116 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

to undertake a comprehensive study of the

nature and extent of the crime problem and

state of security in U.S. seaports. The recommendations of the Task Force addressed

areas for action that included facilitating

collective action; developing coordinated

interagency approaches; and evaluating

existing programs or encouraging new programs that will produce the qualified, welltrained government and private sector personnel needed for implementing seaport

security plans and operations. The Commission agrees that these are crucial issues

and that deficiencies in these areas present

significant problems to countering crime

and improving security in U.S. seaports.

During its work, the Commission found

deficiencies in the state of security in seaports that led to the following effects:

■ Enabled criminals to generally exploit

vulnerabilities within the marine transportation system.

■ Encumbered efforts against the types

of organized criminal enterprises that

target seaport commerce.

■ Enabled internal conspiracies involving

the acquisition of cargo transaction

data and other forms of facilitation.

■ Enabled criminals to operate fictitious

or front firms for exploiting seaport

commerce.

■ Enabled criminals to operate extraregional and transnational alliances

for trading stolen goods and illicit

services, and for facilitating other

illegal transactions.

■ Impaired sharing of federal, state, and

local law enforcement intelligence

and information with port authority

security personnel.

■ Focused attention on the limited presence of law enforcement and private

sector countermeasures deployed in

seaports, and the lack of integrated

coordination between crime prevention

and police efforts.

One Size Doesn’t Fit All

Throughout the Commission’s review, it

was evident that the threats faced by U.S.

seaports varied for each seaport as a whole

and for locations within the seaport.

Because there are 361 seaports of many

sizes and characteristics, it is reasonable to

expect security requirements to vary from

location to location. A rational scheme for

the largest seaports like New York, Los

Angeles, and Long Beach, which are dealing with large volumes of cargo, would be

very different from a scheme appropriate

to a port that has just a few vessels a

month. Seaports with cruise ship passengers have special requirements. Requirements for security at seaports with major

criminal activity such as New York, Miami,

and Port Everglades will be different from

the requirements at ports like Tacoma and

Charleston that do not appear to have as

large a crime threat. Within seaports, the

security requirements for petroleum and

other hazardous cargo will be different

from those for iron ore or sawdust.

Another issue is response to incidentspecific threats. It is not realistic to expect

a security system at seaports that could

accommodate a worst case scenario at all

times, but a flexible system, involving a

minimum level of security that can be

raised during serious threats, is a reasonable expectation. For example, if the United

States receives information that terrorists

have planned a major assault on U.S. seaports and action is imminent, a system

should be in place that could be augmented

as needed to deal with that particular threat.

Governance and Delivery

of Security Services in

Seaports

In light of the recognition of seaport crime

and security as a national security issue,

the Marine Transportation System Task

Force deferred to the Seaport Commission
security departments that lack law enforcement powers are limited in their capacity

to coordinate with police agencies and are

seldom included in the exchange of law

enforcement intelligence used to counter

organized criminal activity in seaports.

Observations of Current Practices

During its survey of U.S. seaports, the

Commission found that port authorities

were typically state or local governmental

agencies that provided security services, if

at all, through a variety of different organizational arrangements. The crime prevention approach was predominant and was

carried out primarily through staffs of nonpolice personnel. In several seaports, most

notably the Port of New York/New Jersey

and the Port of Los Angeles, both crime

prevention programs and law enforcement

operations were delivered through port

authority police departments. In those port

authorities, security services were effected

through comprehensive and coordinated

crime prevention and police enforcement

operations that were routinely integrated

with other relevant federal, state, or local

law enforcement operations (and on occasion with foreign police agencies), as well

as with the security programs of private

sector tenants.

Within other port authorities, less robust

security services were provided through an

arrangement consisting of an in-house security division staffed with non-police personnel, augmented by the operational presence

of the local law enforcement agency of the

jurisdiction in which the seaport is located.

Within these port authorities the resources

committed to the delivery of security services varied considerably. The following

examples—Port Everglades and the Port of

Miami—are seaports that do not have port

authority police departments. They are

instead attempting to combine an in-house

security division conducting crime prevention with the law enforcement resources of

the county police agency from the jurisdiction in which the seaport is located.

Blending Crime Prevention and

Police Enforcement

The Commission observed that the most

effective seaport security services consist

of a blend of crime prevention and

enforcement components, each of which

have proactive and responsive aspects.

Thus, quality of security in a seaport jurisdiction is the product of the combined

effect of both crime preventive and police

enforcement approaches.

The integration of crime prevention

countermeasures and police enforcement

operations, therefore, offers the best

prospect for delivery of the most effective

security services in seaport jurisdictions.

Crime prevention in seaports may

include security surveys and vulnerability

assessments, installation and monitoring of

surveillance equipment, patrol and firstresponse to indications of detected crime,

and communicating alerts for summoning

a coordinated law enforcement community

response. Crime preventive approaches do

not require arrest authority and are typically carried out in U.S. seaports by nonpolice personnel, who may be employed by

port authorities or private security firms.

Large private sector firms operating within

the port authority jurisdiction typically

exercise crime prevention security practices in some form, either through their

own staffs or contract personnel, although

small independent tenants of seaports seldom employ such capabilities.

Conversely, enforcement action is primarily characteristic of seaport police

departments empowered with the arrest

authorities typically vested in state or local

law enforcement agencies. Such enforcement activities involve the full range of

operations characteristic of police agencies, including crime prevention patrol,

developing and managing informants,

coordination of multijurisdictional investigations, undercover operations and electronic surveillance, execution of search

warrants, and arrest of criminals. Port

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 117
118 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

tent policy framework for governing the

planning and implementation of seaport

security strategies and operations, at the

national, state, and local levels, is of paramount importance to achieving successful

results. Cohesive governance is also a key

factor in successfully developing U.S.

operating guidelines and minimum security

standards, along with a strategy and

process to enable their advancement on an

international basis. Recognition of those

advantages gives rise to the reasonable

expectation that governmental port authorities would decide, at a minimum, to retain

enforceable oversight of the security plans

executed by private sector tenants within

their port facilities.

Advancing further the concept of state

and local government responsibility, it

would again seem reasonable that the

government jurisdiction in which a seaport is located would decide to take lead

responsibility as the primary provider of

police enforcement operations and oversight of crime prevention programs. Without a policy framework that facilitates

unity of purpose, it seems unlikely the

United States will develop integrated coordination of federal, state, and local security and law enforcement resources for

achieving high quality crime prevention

and police responsiveness to an organized

criminal threat in seaports.

Professionalization of

Private Security Providers

The Commission has received several suggestions about the private security guards

frequently used at seaports. Many respondents stated that the employees did not

have the training or expertise to do an adequate job. The view was frequently

expressed that as long as the front line of

security did not have the requisite skills,

security would not be adequate.

At Port Everglades, the port authority

security staff seemed adequate in numbers

compared with the size of the complex.

The staff has received specialized training

in seaport security and conducts crime preventive operations under the management

of a public safety director who is guided

by a written port security master plan. This

security operation is augmented by a unit

of the county’s police agency consisting of

officers and administrative staff totaling

more than 60 personnel, the commander of

which coordinates closely with the port

authority public safety director. The county

police personnel had not, however, undergone any specialized training in seaport

policing, nor had they necessarily been

selected for duty because of their relevant

professional experience.

At the Port of Miami, the security staff

seemed fewer in numbers compared with

the size of the complex. They had received

little in-house training, but operated under

the guidance of a port security plan. The

staff operations were augmented by a small

cadre of the metropolitan police, the commander of which has direct supervisory

control over the port authority security

division. However, the port authority and

metropolitan police are each independent

departments of Miami-Dade County. It

seems inevitable that separating the reporting lines of authority within a seaport

jurisdiction would not provide the most

effective arrangement in the long term

for delivery of high quality security and

police services.

The Policy Framework for

Effective Seaport Security

The quality of seaport security is a matter

of public interest, and the engagement of

all levels of government is necessary to

support seaport security requirements and

minimize jurisdictional fragmentation of

responsibilities. The Commission believes

that in order to accomplish requisite objectives, a well-defined, coherent, and consis-
Findings

Finding 5.a. Presidential Decision Directives state that the federal government

should play the lead role in bringing

together the private sector interests in protecting critical infrastructure. Applicable

PDDs do not call out seaports or responsibilities specifically.

Finding 5.b. The federal government has

established formal structures for coordinating government efforts and developed

national strategies to address drug trafficking, terrorism, and other domestic and

international crime, military mobilization

at seaports, and airport security. Seaport

security per se, however, has not been

adequately addressed. Stronger and more

focused interagency and public/private

sector efforts to enhance seaport security

are needed to address the threats of crime

and terrorism, and to enhance control of

imports and exports, in order to meet

national security and economic mobility

requirements.

Finding 5.c. Although there are national

efforts, many of them have not yet reached

the level of individual seaports. Seaport

authorities are often unaware of terrorism

and crime threats and how security could

lessen vulnerabilities.

Finding 5.d. Seaport security is a complex issue that involves federal, state, and

local governments, port authorities, and

hundreds of businesses; coordination related to seaport security measures is generally inadequate, in part because securityrelated meetings are not held in most

seaports.

Finding 5.e. Federal, state, and local

governments; port authorities; and private

sector operators have not given adequate

attention to seaport security issues.

Finding 5.f. Security measures and limits

to access to seaports and terminals vary

from port to port but are generally fair to

poor. In a few cases, they are good.

During December 1999, the Commission traveled to the Netherlands to observe

cargo control and port security practices

and to learn more about that country’s

program for professionalizing and accrediting security personnel. In the Netherlands,

no one may work as a security guard without a General Security Officer diploma

issued by the national government. To

obtain the diploma, all private security

officers must be graduates of governmentapproved security courses and must pass

national exams. In 1937, the Netherlands

government, under authorization of the

Militias and Private Security Organizations

Act, established standards and performance

levels in core competencies for security

officers.

For the managerial and supervisory

levels, training is provided in risk management, fire, social risks (labor disputes,

police referrals, entry into property, etc.),

burglary prevention, access control, fraud,

embezzlement, internal corruption, sabotage, vandalism, industrial espionage,

terrorism, and crisis management. This

level of training is targeted at the company

employee eligible for advancement. A

collateral set of training classes is offered

for those responsible for health and safety

concerns. This training covers life-saving,

fire prevention, first aid, wound bandaging,

hazardous materials handling, and workplace safety.

The result of having a national standard

has been the professionalization of the

private security industry with nationally

established job performance standards and

a transportable credential (General Security Officer certificate) from the Dutch

Government that provides employment

opportunities and is a source of pride for

the holder. Port security guards in the

Netherlands are competent professionals

and full partners with local and national

law enforcement entities.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 119
120 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

vessel tracking devices) that could assist

law enforcement personnel in accomplishing their missions is not always available

to field personnel.

Finding 5.s. Facilities (terminal operators,

trucking companies, railroads, oil facilities,

warehouses, etc.) surveyed did not meet all

of the minimum standards established by

the Commission for effective cargo security.

Finding 5.t. Seaports do not have separate

and restricted areas where vessels, cargo,

and passengers arriving from foreign locations are processed.

Finding 5.u. Areas in which federal

inspection (Customs, Immigration, and

Agriculture) takes place are not wellcontrolled, which poses a security risk

to federal inspection personnel.

Finding 5.v. Passenger processing facilities for cruise ships do not provide the

security needed for federal officials to

undertake their inspections and related

efforts associated with international travelers and crew members.

Finding 5.w. Cruise ships have worked

cooperatively with federal officials to provide electronic passenger manifests, but

officials still need detailed and accurate

crew manifests.

Finding 5.x. The continuing increases in

international passenger and crew arrivals

have placed increasing strains on the current inspection processes of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. With

these increases have also come increases

in stowaways and alien smuggling.

Finding 5.y. The process of clearing and,

where necessary, targeting cargo is complex, and highly dependent on robust Federal automated data systems and information provided by the importing and

transportation communities in the private

sector.

Finding 5.z. Vessel manifest information,

import and export, is sometimes deficient

for the purposes of import risk assessment

Finding 5.g. No minimum security standards or guidelines exist for seaports and

their facilities.

Finding 5.h. Responsibility for seaport

security is fragmented.

Finding 5.i. Intelligence and information

on seaport security matters is not consistently shared with all who need it.

Finding 5.j. There are few vulnerability

or threat assessments of seaports and their

facilities.

Finding 5.k. Current staffing allocations

within federal agencies (such as the Coast

Guard, Immigration, Customs, and Agriculture) do not permit them to dedicate

resources to perform security surveys and

vulnerability assessments, and to work

with the trade to improve/enhance security

within the seaports.

Finding 5.l. Procedures for restricting

access to sensitive areas at terminals are

inadequate.

Finding 5.m. At many seaports, the access

of privately owned vehicles and commercial vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and

delivery operations, and passenger processing operations is not controlled.

Finding 5.n. At some seaports, local policy

and/or agreements with the local labor force

restrict the presence of firearms, but at most

ports, the carrying of firearms onto the seaport is neither restricted nor controlled.

Finding 5.o. In some ports, there is

mistrust and a lack of cooperation and

communication between labor and federal

law enforcement agencies.

Finding 5.p. Technology is available that

can substantially improve the detection of

criminal acts within seaports and contribute to overall security.

Finding 5.q. Security-enhancing technology is not available at most seaports.

Finding 5.r. Equipment (such as cameras,

carbon dioxide detectors, small boats, and
would promote interagency efficiencies in

cargo processing and provide economies

for the importing and exporting public.

Finding 5.ee. Inadequate security, particularly existing cargo control measures,

renders U.S. seaports vulnerable to those

seeking to acquire or sell U.S. goods

illegally.

Finding 5.ff. The shipper’s export declaration—a key source of information used

by law enforcement officials to identify

illegal exports—is usually filed up to four

days after the actual sailing of the vessel

carrying the goods. This delayed filing

privilege effectively removes any real controls from the administration of export

regulations.

Finding 5.gg. Export enforcement efforts

are hampered by inadequate electronic

data systems and a compliance regime

(fines and penalties) that may be inadequate to guarantee compliance with the

export regulations.

Finding 5.hh. Differences appear to exist

in the levels of resources devoted to export

inspections and investigations as compared

with import activity.

Finding 5.ii. Export control and compliance would be enhanced with better interagency coordination and improved educational outreach to the private sector

exporting community.

Finding 5.jj. The fundamental weakness

inherent in the in-bond system is the practice of allowing unexamined cargo to transit the United States. The raison d’être of

in-bond, the deferral of duty and tax payments, would not be compromised if examination, for enforcement or compliance or

safety purposes, were conducted before

removal from the first port of arrival.

Finding 5.kk. The National Port Readiness Network/local Port Readiness Committee concept in the designated Strategic

Seaports is fundamentally sound but in

need of increased emphasis.

and export cargo control. Vessel manifest

information is more easily utilized for drug

enforcement and commercial compliance

efforts if it is received in electronic data

formats before the arrival of the vessel.

Finding 5.aa. The Customs in-bond

system for the movement of foreign or

restricted merchandise through the United

States has been abused by violators, who

have succeeded in denying revenue to the

government, endangering American consumers, and compromising international

trade agreements. Internal controls in the

in-bond system would be improved if the

level of information required for in-bond

authorization were enhanced and received

in an electronic format.

Finding 5.bb. Inadequacies in the cargo

control processes used by federal inspection agencies provide opportunities for

violators to exploit the system. Better

information received in advance of shipment arrival via electronic data systems

would promote improved cargo control

processes.

Finding 5.cc. The federal agency automated systems are not easily accessible

from waterfront cargo facilities or remote

container examination stations. Lack of

ready access impedes service level efficiencies, enforcement activities, and commercial compliance initiatives.

Finding 5.dd. The numbers of uniformed

inspection personnel on the waterfront

have been reduced over the past two

decades, and the federal personnel

involved in cargo processing usually do not

coordinate their inspection efforts, nor do

the various agencies share waterfront

inspection facilities. Such discordant practices are inefficient for the government and

burdensome for the trade and transportation communities. Shared federal inspection facilities, equipped with state-of-theart high energy (X-ray or gamma ray)

non-invasive inspection devices, and container devanning platforms located directly

on the waterfront container terminals,

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 121
122 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

expect one standard security regime to be

applicable to all ports.

Recommendations

Recommendation 8. Develop and propose

new regulations to create a secure area

(Federal Inspection Stations) in seaports

where international passengers or passengers from foreign countries disembark.

Customs, Immigration, and other relevant

agencies should undertake this initiative

on a joint basis.

Recommendation 9. Proceed with the

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Seaport Reengineering System Pilot Program for managing risk with respect to

the admissibility of passengers and crew

at the nation’s seaports consistent with the

President’s 2001 budget request.

Recommendation 10. Establish, to the

maximum extent possible, shared dockside inspection facilities (Federal Inspection Stations) at seaports for use by relevant agencies. Customs should take the

lead with this initiative and coordinate

it with implementation of the five-year

technology plan (see Recommendation

15). Other relevant inspection agencies

(e.g., Coast Guard, Food and Drug Administration, Agriculture) should conduct

coordinated inspections and staff the

Stations appropriately.

Recommendation 11. Undertake a comprehensive initiative to improve cargo

import procedures and related efforts to

target seaport crime. Customs, in consultation with other relevant federal agencies,

should:

■ Proceed with the development of the

Automated Commercial Environment

(ACE) and Automated Export System

(AES) to ensure the adequacy of underlying Federal automated systems

required to process commercial

data/information. 

Finding 5.ll. Private security guards are

a vital component of overall port security

and cargo control. However, competencies

in mission-critical tasks and service performance vary widely by security companies. The federal mission objectives of

safe and secure ports are compromised if

private security is unreliable.

Finding 5.mm. There is no existing system for testing the effectiveness of seaport

security.

Finding 5.nn. The integrated coordination

of crime prevention countermeasures and

police enforcement operations led by the

local jurisdictions offers the best prospect

for delivery of the most effective security

services in seaport jurisdictions.

Finding 5.oo. Separate lines of management between crime prevention security

and police enforcement functions within

a seaport authority jurisdiction encumber

the delivery of high quality security and

police services.

Finding 5.pp. The assertion of lead

responsibility by the government jurisdiction in which a seaport is located, as the

primary provider of police enforcement

operations and oversight of crime prevention programs, will improve the integration, coordination, and effectiveness of

federal, state, and local law enforcement

resources with non-police seaport security

staffs.

Finding 5.qq. Inadequate security hampers law enforcement efforts. Effective

security measures are important tools for

crime prevention and deterrence. Security

countermeasures must be specifically

designed to address internal conspiracies.

In the majority of the seaports visited,

there were no adequate security measures

specifically designed to counter internal

conspiracies, crewmembers drug smuggling, or alien smuggling.

Finding 5rr. Ports vary significantly in

size and scope of operations throughout

the United States. It is unrealistic to
civil) for export documentation violations, including provisions for enforcement personnel at all relevant federal

agencies to issue on-the-spot fines for

export documentation violations.

■ All relevant agencies should strengthen

government export document review

programs aimed at enforcement of

export control laws to increase export

document review and identification

of potential violations, and to increase

export control-related investigations

and enforcement activity, including

legal support.

■ Customs and the Office of Export

Enforcement in the Department of Commerce should work jointly to improve

effectiveness of existing resources by

setting appropriate standards for seaports for export documentation compliance checks and by strengthening

interagency cooperation.

■ Commerce should develop a dedicated

team at each Export Enforcement field

office to work with Customs to target

export control crimes and provide training to Customs on export control documentation as needed. Stakeholders, such

as freight forwarders, should be targeted

for compliance education and outreach

by joint Customs and Commerce

enforcement teams as needed.

Recommendation 13. Create, under the

Marine Transportation System initiative,

national-level security subcommittees

of the Interagency Committee on the

Marine Transportation System (made

up of representatives from the federal

government including Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Maritime Administration, Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others as

appropriate), and the Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council

(made up of representatives from the private sector including port authorities,

ocean carriers, terminal operators, organized labor, truckers, warehouse propri-

■ Propose revisions to its regulations to

require that all ocean manifests be transmitted electronically to Customs sufficiently in advance of the arrival of the

vessel to allow manifest information to

be used effectively.

■ Propose regulations, and, if necessary,

legislation, requiring for all entries,

including in-bond entries, the same

level of information required for

entries released into the commerce of

the United States.

■ Propose requiring that the above

information be transmitted to Customs

electronically before release of shipments for movement, including inbond movement, from the port at

which goods covered by the entry

first arrive.

■ Work closely with all other agencies

having enforcement or regulatory

responsibilities at the border to arrange

for the above information to be distributed on a real-time basis to all agencies

having an interest in the goods covered

by a particular entry.

Recommendation 12. Strengthen the

export enforcement programs, while preserving export facilitation, by proceeding

as follows:

■ The Department of Commerce should

engage in rulemaking to require the

electronic filing of export documentation for ocean shipping one day before a

shipment’s departure to facilitate targeting of illegal/illicit shipments and other

criminal activity by law enforcement

agencies. The proposed rule should provide for waiver authority for exigent

circumstances. This information should

be made available on a real-time basis

to agencies with law enforcement

responsibilities related to the seaports.

■ The agencies with export enforcement

responsibilities should update relevant

regulatory authorities to increase fines

and penalties (both administrative and

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 123
124 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

seaports, including the advisability of

port-specific approaches.

■ Restricting the access of vehicles to

seaports and facilities in seaports

and requiring port authorities and the

principal private sector businesses that

use seaports to implement procedures

that achieve appropriate control and

accountability.

■ Restricting the carrying of firearms in

seaports.

■ Developing a private security officer

certification program to improve the

professionalism of port security

officers.

Recommendation 15. Develop, on a joint

basis with all relevant federal agencies, a

five-year crime and security technology

deployment plan that addresses examination and investigative technology that can

be deployed to seaports. Customs should

take the lead in establishing a task force

to develop a plan that considers utilizing

existing mechanisms and programs, such

as the Customs Border Integrity Project.

This plan should address joint acquisition/use of equipment. Upon completion

of the plan, appropriate funding should be

sought through the regular budgetary

process.

Recommendation 16. Strengthen, through

the National Port Readiness Network, with

Transportation and Defense as the lead

agencies, the planning and coordination for

military mobilization security at each

Strategic Seaport. These efforts should

include the following:

■ Local Port Readiness Committees

should actively participate in Department of Defense-sponsored combatant

commander and Service mobilization

exercises/cargo movements (in addition

to their own biennial port readiness

tabletop exercises) to ensure realism

and efficient use of Department of

Defense assets.

etors, and railroads) to discuss, evaluate,

and propose solutions related to seaport

security and to address research and

development, with emphasis on emerging technologies.

Recommendation 14. Develop, through

the proposed national-level security subcommittee: (a) voluntary minimum security guidelines for U.S. seaports and their

users that are linked to existing Coast

Guard Captain of the Port controls of

maritime trade; and (b) a model port concept, to include a list of risk-based best

practices for use by terminal operators.

The voluntary guidelines and the model

port concept should take into account the

differing risk levels and other security

factors among ports and should be

reviewed and updated at least every five

years. To the extent that this approach

does not promote significant and generally

uniform security improvements at seaports within the next five years, alternative

approaches should be considered, including making such guidelines mandatory.

Consistent with Presidential Decision

Directive 63, Transportation should be

responsible for coordinating implementation, and the security guidelines

should address, among other topics, the

following:

■ Uniform practices for physical security

(fences, lighting, gates, etc.); for controlling the delivery, receipt, and movement of cargo, passengers, and crew;

and for identifying high-risk individuals

who seek access to sensitive areas within the seaport.

■ A private sector credentialing process

that limits access to sensitive seaport

areas. This process should be administered by states, unions, port authorities,

and/or port terminal operators. The

national security committee should

also assess the desirability and feasibility of utilizing criminal background

checks to assist in determining access

to restricted or sensitive areas at the
■ The Department of Defense should

assist the Coast Guard in establishing

additional security guidelines for

commercial facilities handling military

cargo at the Strategic Seaports and for

those seaports designated as Controlled

Ports under Presidential Decision

Directive 40.

Chapter 5: Security Practices in U.S. Seaports ■ 125
only domestic cargo is involved could be

pursued by the FBI or the Drug Enforcement Administration, or by state or local

agencies. If federal agencies became

involved, they generally would view the

seaport not as a special entity but as just

part of the city or jurisdiction in which the

federal law enforcement officer operates.

Cargo theft is a crime of major concern

to the private sector. It strikes directly at

private entities’ economic interests, and

the Commission recorded dissatisfaction

at the perceived lack of federal response to

cargo crime at several seaports that we

surveyed. Cargo theft is usually reported

to the local law enforcement authorities

and insurance companies. The FBI has

long been active in responding to interstate cargo theft, working with local officials when possible. Customs and other

federal inspection agencies also have a

major interest in preventing cargo theft

from the seaports. Combating crime on the

waterways is primarily the Coast Guard’s

responsibility when federal statutes are

involved. Coast Guard Captains of the Port

commands are at all large ports and number several hundred people. The Environmental Protection Agency also has a major

interest in environmental crimes on the

waterways.

Exercise of state and local responsibility

varies by jurisdiction. Many state and local

governments have laws relating to ports

and waterways in their jurisdiction and, in

some cases, employ large law enforcement

units for marine law enforcement. In many

other ports, there is no local law enforcement presence in seaports or patrolling the

waterways.

One of the key objectives of the Interagency Commission was to assess the

nature and effectiveness of the ongoing

coordination among the federal, state, and

local government agencies. As described in

Chapter 2, a wide variety of entities exist

in most seaports. The interests and missions of these entities are very frequently

diverse and, in the case of law enforcement

personnel, they often overlap. This chapter

will look at how well the federal, state,

and local government agencies and, to

some extent, the private sector, coordinate

and cooperate on matters concerning

crime, terrorism, security, and federal

inspection procedures.

Coordination and

Cooperation Regarding

Crime in Seaports

International trade at seaports makes

them highly vulnerable to a wide range of

criminal activity, and combating crime at

seaports involves a wide variety of players.

The distinction between federal or local

responsibility for combating crime is

generally based on what statute is being

violated. If it is a federal statute, the federal government is responsible. If it is a state

or local statute, the state or locality is

responsible. If statutes of more than one

jurisdiction are involved, any of those

jurisdictions may prosecute.

For example, murder, assault, embezzlement, and theft at a seaport would generally be handled by the local jurisdictions

unless it was related to organized crime or

triggered some other federal statute. Drug

trafficking that occurred at a seaport where

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation

127
128 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

ernmental, need to plan and coordinate

their anti-crime efforts. We noted many

successful examples of joint task forces or

special operations that were interagency,

intergovernmental, or both.

Coordination and

Cooperation Among Law

Enforcement Agencies

The Commission found that coordination

and cooperation among federal, state, and

local law enforcement agencies was good at

the 12 seaports surveyed. The nature and

extent of coordination efforts encompasses

a wide variety of criminal activities, among

a range of law enforcement agencies. The

varied coordination efforts included drug

smuggling, health and safety crimes, stolen

vehicles and cargo theft, environmental

crimes, and export control crimes. Some of

the coordination efforts were solely among

federal law enforcement agencies; other

efforts included federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies.

A number of federal agencies and

departments have memorandums of understanding that govern coordination and

cooperation on law enforcement matters.

For example, the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) and Customs coordinate and cooperate in drug smuggling

investigations. Customs and Export

Enforcement in the Department of Commerce coordinate and cooperate on certain

export control investigations. The relevant

law enforcement agencies in the Departments of Justice and Treasury also coordinate and cooperate on money laundering

investigations. 

Although much of the crime at seaports

involves violations of federal laws relating

to the importation and exportation of

goods, most of the state and local law

enforcement agencies support anti-smuggling efforts. In fact, some of the most successful law enforcement efforts were

As explained in Appendix C, President

Clinton approved two important strategies

that relate to crime at seaports. The 1998

International Crime Control Strategy recognizes that international criminals engage

in a wide range of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, terrorism, smuggling

of aliens and contraband, fraud, extortion,

money laundering, bribery, economic

espionage, intellectual property theft, and

counterfeiting. Most of these crimes occur

at seaports. Because of the special border

search authorities of agencies like Customs, Immigration, and the Coast Guard,

seaports are a convenient and cost-effective

location for combating these international

crimes.

The 1999 National Drug Control Strategy established the framework for federal

efforts directed toward drug trafficking.

Drug trafficking has consistently been a

major part of the role of Customs, the

Coast Guard, and the Drug Enforcement

Administration in and around the ports and

on the water. Again, the special border

search authority makes efforts at the seaport and on the high seas a productive and

fruitful location to combat drug trafficking. In addition, interdicting drugs at their

source or transit points is cost-effective.

The private sector has a responsibility to

protect their property and facilities and to

deter crime. Some take this responsibility

more seriously than others. Some develop

elaborate security systems; others do not

choose to spend the money and instead

rely on insurance to compensate them for

the cost of crime and losses. Private sector

entities have a wide variety of reasons for

deciding what levels of security they will

employ. However, once a crime is committed, it becomes the responsibility of the

government at some level.

Although much of the information

regarding crime is considered sensitive

information and should not be released

without a “need to know,” law enforcement

agencies, both interagency and intergov-
The following are some examples, from

the 12 seaports the Commission surveyed,

of how law enforcement is responding to

various aspects of seaport crime. These

efforts are in addition to the task force

efforts previously reported in Chapter 3.

It should be noted, however, that many

federal, state, and local agencies routinely

work together in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Task Forces, in Organized

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, and

on a daily basis to address criminal activity

relating to seaports.

Operation Winternight is a DEA and

Customs partnership in which the DEA

provides Customs with foreign drug intelligence about drug smuggling in containerized cargo. Customs obtains information

on smuggling and smuggling organizations, which provides real-time investigative and interdiction information and leads.

From fiscal years 1996 through 1998, 24

drug seizures totaling 11,162 pounds of

cocaine were made at U.S. seaports based

upon information provided by Operation

Winternight.

A special project conducted by Customs, the Department of Transportation,

and the Consumer Product Safety Commission targeted prohibited importation

of cigarette lighters. The project targeted

the smuggling of cigarette lighters without

child-resistant safety devices into the United States. The project netted 30 seizures

of nearly 4 million unapproved and unsafe

cigarette lighters.

In January 1997, the Miami-Dade Auto

Theft Task Force began electronic reporting at the Port of Miami. All vehicle identification numbers of vehicles presented

for export were entered into a file that was

sent to the National Insurance Crime

Bureau (NICB) to run against the NICB

database. If vehicles were stolen, if they

had been exported before, if they had been

salvaged, if the vehicle identification number did not conform, or if they were

rentals, a message would be sent back to

accomplished at seaports where multiagency task forces of state, local, and federal agencies addressed specific crime

problems. Some of these task forces were

funded through specific mechanisms, such

as surcharges on insurance premiums to

combat the export of stolen vehicles, or the

Department of Justice Safe Streets Program to attack cargo theft. A number of

task forces take advantage of the reimbursement of state and local overtime costs

through federal law enforcement forfeiture

funds, while others are encouraged by

asset-sharing programs. Still other task

forces were conducted under auspices of

the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

or the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement

Program.

The Commission found few stand-alone

seaport task forces where agencies routinely met to discuss approaches to all types of

crime at a given seaport. Rather, the task

forces were focused on a particular crime,

and the members consisted of the agencies

with statutory authority in that crime. This

kind of task force could be a formal standing task force, meaning that it met regularly and never disbanded, such as an environmental task force operating in Miami,

Florida, or it could be informal and set up

only for a specific duration, operation, or

one-time initiative. By pooling resources

and sharing intelligence, many agencies

have found they can be more effective.

Some federal agencies do not routinely

join a task force because they lack the staff

needed for full-time or even part-time participation, or because the major focus of

their mission may not be seaport-related.

Coordination and cooperation among

law enforcement agencies may be further

improved by increased joint planning

efforts and cross training. Increased participation in task forces and other effective

interagency partnerships and initiatives

between federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies may enhance coordination, cooperation, and responses to seaport crime.

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 129
130 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

transshipment points for stolen U.S. motor

vehicles located in foreign territories.

Recent Customs regulations implemented for the export of used vehicles appear to

be sufficient to detect stolen vehicles, previously exported vehicles, salvaged vehicles, and vehicles with problem vehicle

identification numbers. The regulations

will be effective against criminals presenting vehicles for export, but they will not

necessarily be effective against criminals

concealing stolen vehicles inside containers for export.

However, the regulations, plus the

Stolen Automobile Recovery System, an

X-ray system, have proven very effective

in combating the export of stolen vehicles

at the Port of Miami. These X-ray systems

can examine a container in an extremely

short time, and hidden vehicles are easily

detected. The Stolen Automobile Recovery

System does not slow the incoming truck

traffic. In a 90-day test period, more than

8,000 containers were examined with no

false indications. The Port of Miami and

Port Everglades both plan on purchasing

these units.

The Environmental Protection Agency’s

Criminal Investigation Division, via a partnership with Customs, has addressed the

importation of chlorofluorocarbons

through Florida. The Criminal Investigation Division operates a standing environmental task force encompassing all state,

local, and federal law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction at the Port of

Miami. It also has been very active in

New York and has conducted a number of

successful investigations in Puerto Rico.

The Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) has developed an initiative to familiarize Customs officials and brokers with

the notification requirements and other

compliance aspects of importing pesticides into the country. The effort has dramatically increased the number of import

notifications received and has significantly strengthened the relationships between

the task force the following morning. The

vehicles on this list would be checked

before the exportation date.

The vehicles that were presented for

export were checked against the National

Insurance Crime Bureau database, but they

only hit on the mirror image (stolen vehicles) of the National Crime Information

Center database. In 1998, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information System created

Project VINNY to allow checking also

against silent hits and felonies. The data

collected at the port would be sent to

VINNY and the vehicle identification

numbers would be run in the National

Crime Information Center database to

check for straight hits (stolen vehicles),

silent hits, and felony messages. Each

check would also leave a footprint for

future reference. In addition, the Criminal

Justice Information System would send the

information to the NICB database for its

checks. The NICB would send its messages back to the Criminal Justice Information System, and that System would

create a list of vehicles to be checked and

send it back to the task force. Thus, the

information was more complete.

The FBI has implemented the Vehicle

Theft Export database (VTED) to provide

support to task forces targeting exported

stolen U.S. motor vehicles. The primary

goal of the VTED is to generate reports

identifying criminal trends in modus

operandi with shippers and consignees.

The VTED captures the output results

from VINNY via Law Enforcement

Online. The FBI is attempting to identify

patterns of exported stolen U.S. motor

vehicles through date of export and the

identity of the actual shippers. The port

databases are being restructured to include

the consignee field, which will support FBI

efforts to identify patterns and organized

groups or businesses creating and perpetuating the demand for exported stolen U.S.

motor vehicles. As the VTED evolves,

efforts will further be made to identify
the New York and New Jersey Port Authority Police Department. This task force,

which handles major theft investigations

such as cargo and vehicle theft in the Port

of Newark and Port Elizabeth, has a number of significant port-related major theft

cases pending.

New York and New Jersey have been

cooperating on seaport crime-fighting for

close to 50 years through the Waterfront

Commission of New York Harbor. Congress established the Commission in 1953

with a mandate to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity and

influence in the Port of New York/New Jersey, and to ensure fair hiring and employment practices, so the port and the region

can grow and prosper. Two commissioners,

appointed by the governors of the two

states, chair the commission. An executive

director is responsible for day-to-day operations and oversees the six divisions: law;

police; audit and control; executive; licensing and employment centers; and administration and management information systems. The commission has the authority to

issue licenses and grant registrations and to

conduct background investigations on certain employees of the port. The police division has full police powers in both states to

investigate criminal activity relating to the

port. Investigative accountants of the commission have authority to audit books and

records of licensees for evidence of criminal activity and to ensure compliance with

federal and state laws.

The commission conducts investigations

on organized crime activity such as extortion, racketeering, gambling and loansharking, corruption, bribery, drug smuggling,

cargo theft, and vehicle thefts. Many of

these investigations are conducted jointly

with appropriate state and federal agencies

such as the FBI and Customs.

At the Port of New Orleans, Operation

Government Against Theft on the River is

a Customs initiative dedicated to the discovery and seizure of cargo stolen from the

the EPA, Customs, and the brokers and

importers. The EPA hopes that it can gain

routine access to Customs data it needs

for evidence in its enforcement actions

and for targeting companies that are not

providing it with proper notification for

imports of chemicals and pesticides.

The EPA has several civil enforcement

initiatives encompassing seaports. One is

the Voluntary Audit and Disclosure Export

Notifications Initiative, which encourages

companies to voluntarily disclose and correct Toxic Substance Control Act violations. Companies could volunteer by sending a notice of intent to audit their records

for potential Toxic Substance Control Act

violations. By September 1999, participating companies were to have audited and

corrected any required notice violations.

In return for companies’ voluntary participation, the EPA issues a notice of noncompliance instead of a penalty action for

these violations. As of September 9, 1999,

70 companies had registered to audit their

facilities for violations.

In Seattle/Tacoma, EPA inspectors are

accompanying Customs import specialists

on joint inspections of selected chemical

shipments. The EPA will conduct a compliance measures analysis and, as necessary, take follow-up enforcement actions

against potential Toxic Substance Control

Act violators.

Customs is currently cooperating with

the EPA by providing records that will be

used as evidence in an administrative case

against a company for the sale and distribution of six aluminum phosphide fumigant products that it imported from China.

Aluminum phosphide is inherently explosive and acutely toxic. All of the products

the company has imported have been

placed under bond and held by Customs.

An import alert has also been issued to

prevent any more of the products from

entering into U.S. commerce.

The FBI’s Newark Field office has

established a Major Theft Task Force with

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 131
132 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

A number of officials either were unaware

of the nature and extent of federal crime

being committed or held the view that

these crimes were not their problem. Many

of these officials were primarily concerned

with violent crime and property offenses

being committed against seaport customers, employees, businesses, and property. Some officials seemed to use cargo

theft as a benchmark for crime problems.

They appeared to associate the level of

crime in their seaports with their cargo

theft problem. Some port officials stated

that other types of crime, such as drug or

alien smuggling or export crime, were the

responsibility of the federal government

and that if additional security or action

was needed, the federal government was

responsible for addressing those problems.

A contributing factor to these views

may be that many of the law enforcement

operations, initiatives, and investigations

that agencies conduct are sensitive, and

that laws, regulations, and agency policies

limit the dissemination of information to

port authorities. As a result, many port

authorities do not know what types of federal crimes are being committed and the

extent of those crimes. Without a complete

understanding of the crime problems, it

may be difficult for them to take crime

issues seriously. This problem emphasizes

the importance of collecting and reporting

crime statistics by seaports. Crime reports

could provide port authorities with the

data, information, and assessments of the

crime problems that they need to understand the effect of crime on their port

operations.

Coordination and Cooperation

Between Federal Agencies

and Private Sector

Federal agencies have created several cooperative programs with the private sector

to encourage joint efforts to combat crime

at seaports. In many cases, maritime comport. Participants in this initiative include

Customs, the Louisiana State Police, the

New Orleans Harbor Police, and the New

Orleans Police Department. Another Customs initiative in New Orleans, Operation

Noose, is directed toward the detection and

seizure of stolen conveyances and heavy

machinery intended for export.

Agencies that may not have specific

seaport enforcement operations or agency

initiatives are responding to seaport crime

as necessary. For example, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service focuses the

majority of its enforcement efforts at the

land borders and airports rather than seaports, but through its investigations and

anti-smuggling units it continues to develop intelligence to monitor alien smuggling.

In August 1999, for instance, the Immigration and Naturalization Service received

intelligence about alien stowaways on a

vessel scheduled to arrive at Savannah,

Georgia. The first inspection of the vessel

for stowaways produced nothing, but additional intelligence led to the discovery of

about 120 stowaways welded into the actual structure of the vessel. Without the

information gathered by the Immigration

and Naturalization Service, the stowaways

would never have been detected. In the Los

Angeles/Long Beach area, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service has had a working group on alien smuggling and stowaway problems in effect for two years.

These activities have proven instrumental

in dealing with the current rash of alien

smuggling interdictions on the West Coast.

Role of Port Officials in

Identifying and Combating

Crime

Some of the commercial port officials the

Commission met with at the 12 seaports

surveyed did not have a good understanding of the nature and extent of federal

crimes associated with the importation and

exportation of goods within their seaports.
and governments throughout Central and

South America. These programs have also

proven to be successful enforcement tools

for Customs. From fiscal years 1996

through 1998, participants in these programs provided information to Customs

that resulted in 175 seizures totaling 39,326

pounds of narcotics and assisted in 287 foreign interceptions totaling 73,854 pounds

of narcotics destined for the United States.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has a Carrier Affairs Office that manages and designs programs to educate carriers in the screening of passengers at ports

of embarkation and in the examination of

travel documents, including instruction on

detecting fraudulent documents. These

efforts attempt to decrease the incidents of

aliens arriving in the United States without

proper documents in violation of immigration laws. In addition, these training efforts

assist carriers in reducing administrative

fines imposed against them for boarding

improperly documented passengers.

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s

Chemical Diversion Group provides assistance to the regulated private sector which

produce legitimate products used by traffickers to manufacture illegal drugs. This

involves working with associations in

development of enforcement policies and

regulations, sponsoring conferences and

national and working committees, conducting annual seminars on the import/export

application process, providing manual and

customer service pamphlets, establishing

industry points of contact with the Drug

Enforcement Administration, and maintaining information on the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s Internet home page.

The Maritime Administration’s Port and

Cargo Security Program aims to reduce

criminal exploitation of commercial maritime cargo, particularly drug smuggling,

cargo theft, and related forms of transnational cargo crime in the Western Hemisphere. The Maritime Administration

engages in cooperative efforts with governpanies involved in trade logistics have

significant information and can readily

identify suspicious importers or shipments.

Through industry partnership programs,

federal agencies enlist the industry’s support in law enforcement initiatives. The

agencies provide incentives to companies

to establish practices that will prevent violations and reduce industry’s vulnerability to

criminal activities, and to report violations

to law enforcement officials. These reports

can result in the seizure of contraband and

arrests and convictions of violators.

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau

of Export Administration initiated the

Business Executives’ Enforcement Team

program. The program is part of Commerce’s effort to prevent violations by

educating and expanding contacts with

U.S. business. The program, a series of

half-day forums around the United States,

allows corporate officials to learn about

their responsibilities under U.S. export

control laws, and to pose questions to

senior export enforcement officials. The

Business Executives’ Enforcement Team

participants explore ways for businesses

and enforcement personnel to work together to prevent violations and identify projects of concern for proliferation reasons.

Customs has three major industry partnership programs: the Carrier Initiative

Program, the Business Anti-Smuggling

Coalition, and the Americas Counter

Smuggling Initiative. Under the Carrier

Initiative Program, Customs provides

incentives, such as penalty offsets, to carriers to enhance their security practices and

training to prevent carriers’ conveyances

from being used to import drugs into the

country. Under the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, corporate participants

(importers and exporters) and port authorities set self-imposed standards to deter narcotics smuggling and work with Customs

to implement and share best practices.

Under the Americas Counter Smuggling

Initiative, Customs has expanded antinarcotics security programs with industry

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 133
134 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

has been issued to the Executive Branch

through Presidential Decision Directives

(PDDs), which assign roles and responsibilities to appropriate federal agencies and

set forth policy and procedures.

Many officials with whom Commission

members spoke stated that law enforcement coordination and counterterrorism

training at their seaports are satisfactory.

Officials at other ports are not as confident

in the level of coordination and training.

Overall, there appears to be a need for an

overall assessment of the training needs for

seaport personnel to raise their awareness

of terrorism issues.

As noted in Chapter 4, the various threat

warning and response systems appear to

be satisfactory and operating as intended.

Coordination and Cooperation

of Security in Seaports

As mentioned in Chapter 2, seaport security could be considered to be under the

purview of the ports and the entities who

use the ports (carriers, terminal owners,

warehouse operators, etc.). Some ports take

this responsibility more seriously than

others. Although security requirements

could be directed by the states, they generally have not been.

The Secretary of Transportation, under

Presidential Decision Directive 63, has

responsibility for leading efforts to protect

critical infrastructure in the transportation

sector, which includes seaports.

The federal government also plays a

role through the National Port Security

Committee created in 1950 under the

Magnuson Act. The Committee is under

the aegis of the National Security Council

and chaired by the Commandant of the

Coast Guard. The committee deals with

specific incidents such as embargoes and

monitoring the entry of vessels that bear

the flag of, or are under the effective control of, certain states that have been identment and private sectors to develop seaport

security improvements in the Inter-American region. It collaborates with multinational entities such as the Organization of

American States, the American Association

of Port Authorities, and the International

Association of Airport and Seaport Police.

In 1998, the Maritime Administrator

addressed a summit of Western Hemisphere transport ministers and proposed

the cooperative development of a strategic

approach for improving the security of the

Inter-American maritime trade corridors

and reducing cargo crime, and was incorporated into the ministerial declaration.

This directly influenced subsequent port

security developments within the Organization of American States, with particular

bearing on private sector development.

Since 1995, the Maritime Administration

has published the Maritime Security

Report, an open source intelligence product that is disseminated widely to government and the private sector. In collaboration with the Organization of American

States, the Maritime Administration also

organizes and manages the Inter-American

Port Security Training Program.

Coast Guard initiatives include Prevention Through People to exchange information between industry and the Coast Guard

on maritime matters; Multi-Agency Strike

Force Operations to stop illegal incidents

in port areas; and Port State Control to

facilitate foreign vessel inspections.

Partnership programs have been very

successful and are a force multiplier for

federal agencies. They should be continued, and expanded where appropriate.

These issues are addressed more fully in

Chapter 3.

Cooperation and Coordination

Concerning Terrorism

On terrorism issues, the federal government has the clear lead in coordinating the

nation’s ongoing response. Clear guidance
in cooperation with port authorities, the private sector, and other federal agencies.

Enhanced security measures also serve

to prevent crime, and for that reason security should be of interest to all seaport

stakeholders. For example, law enforcement officials at all levels could view

crime prevention as a way to reduce needs

for additional resources. The private sector

also has a major interest in reducing losses

due to theft; a decrease in crime should

make the private sector’s operations more

profitable.

Unlike some of the other areas covered

in this report, security responsibilities are

not clearly laid out. It is not clear who

should do what. In some seaports, there

may be an active interest in security and in

others there may not be much. Most often,

security programs are downplayed because

of the perceived costs. Neither the federal

government nor the state governments have

taken the lead in this area. As described in

Chapter 5, seaports handle day-to-day

security in a variety of ways. The first

responders for nonfederal crimes are generally local law enforcement. Some seaports have sworn law enforcement officers

on-site, but most do not. In all ports and

terminals, private security firms provide

some form of security.

To a certain extent, the quality of coordination and cooperation between law

enforcement agencies regarding securityrelated issues depends directly on two

factors: the quality of training that officers

receive and the clarity of definition of

their roles. The 12 seaports that we surveyed had various types of law enforcement oversight, and the quality of training

and the interrelationship among the various enforcement and security groups

differed. At one extreme were ports such

as New Orleans, Los Angeles, and New

York/New Jersey, which had one police

agency that was responsible for most of

the policing at the port. The police officers

were academy-trained, carried firearms,

ified as threats to national security while

operating in the territorial seas of the

United States. Executive Order 10173

further directs all agencies and authorities

of the United States government and all

state and local authorities to support, conform to, and assist in the enforcement of

this program.

The Coast Guard has the lead responsibility among the federal agencies for waterway security and safety issues. Its landside authority, however, may be limited to

waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard’s

responsibility for port security, and for

fulfilling other missions related to this

function, is of long standing. Through the

Coast Guard’s Captains of the Port structure, every port in the United States

already has a designated Coast Guard

officer with existing responsibilities.

The Captain of the Port participates in

Harbor Safety Committees, many of which

were established by port. These committees

generally include representatives from all

the private sector interests involved in port

activities. A national counterpart has just

been created via the Interagency Committee on Marine Transportation System and

the Marine Transportation Systems National Advisory Committee.

The security of international passengers

and cargo is the concern of the Coast

Guard and Customs. Customs has broad

landside authorities for ports with international cargo. Its jurisdiction for security

includes port authorities, carriers, brokers,

truckers, railroads, foreign trade zones, and

bonded warehouses. Customs jurisdiction

is anywhere there is international cargo that

has not cleared federal import or export

requirements, even if it is 1,000 miles away

from the port of entry. Customs has established voluntary security agreements with

thousands of carriers, brokers, and freight

forwarders and businesses in the United

States and in high-risk countries as part of

its antidrug efforts. Customs also has a

pilot program to install security equipment

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 135
136 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

consists of non-sworn officers with no

police powers and no dedicated harbor

patrol capability. In the Port of Charleston,

moderately trained state employees (port

service officers) staff all entrances to the

port’s five central terminals. Relatively

untrained contract security personnel guard

San Juan and Long Beach’s widely dispersed and numerous individual terminals.

Several ports where a sworn police force is

in place do have periodic meetings with

stakeholders to discuss their concerns about

security and to share intelligence information with them. At the Port of New

York/New Jersey, police officers are

assigned on a permanent basis to maintain

contact and periodically conduct on-site

visits to the tenants in the officer’s area of

responsibility. In addition, monthly meetings are held with tenants to hear their concerns, offer suggestions for improving their

levels of security, and share intelligence.

This community policing effort has been

considered beneficial by the participants.

During the on-site surveys at Miami,

Port Everglades, Los Angeles, Long Beach,

and San Juan, we found an apparent mistrust of, and lack of cooperation between,

labor and law enforcement agencies. In

Miami there was a sense that labor felt that

it was being wrongfully singled out for

investigations into criminal activity. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies appeared to cooperate to a greater

degree in Gulfport, Charleston, and Tacoma. In Tacoma, local law enforcement officials told the Commission the local union

was helpful in combating crime. The most

serious problem at the ports we surveyed is

the failure of federal law enforcement agencies to cooperate with each other in regard

to security matters and to share intelligence

information. This is especially necessary

where federal law enforcement is stretched

extremely thin. The lack of cooperation

appears to result not from a concerted

effort on the part of the federal agencies to

“go it alone,” but simply from a lack of

centralized organizational control in sharand had general arrest authority. At the

other extreme was a port such as San Juan,

where an unarmed port security force with

no general arrest authority was responsible

for security.

Whether or not a particular port had a

well-trained police force in place, all 12 of

the seaports surveyed had multiple security

agencies doing the policing. Container

facilities, oil terminals, and passenger terminals often had private security in place.

In Port Everglades, for example, port

authority security staff, local law enforcement officers, contract security, and federal

agencies all had some responsibility for

security within the port, and in its terminals and facilities.

While a “layered” system for ensuring

security at seaports is viable, what we

found more often than not was that the

policing and security functions were fragmented. Often it was unclear who was

responsible for enforcement tasks. In most

of the ports we found a lack of coordination among the various police and security

personnel and a lack of common standards

for ensuring security. The lack of common

standards creates gaps that criminal elements can and will exploit. It also creates

problems for stakeholders who are not sure

whom to contact and who on occasion are

left with the feeling that nothing is done

when a complaint is filed.

The issue of fragmentation is only part

of the problem inherent in a multiple law

enforcement jurisdiction. The other part is

the disparity in substantive knowledge,

training, and capability in port security and

law enforcement matters between the local

police (including port police) and contract

security personnel. Complicating matters is

the fact that security personnel are often

structured differently in each seaport. For

example, in Los Angeles the port police are

sworn law enforcement officers with full

police powers and a dedicated waterside

harbor patrol. Next door, in Long Beach,

the Harbor Department’s Security Division
Coordination and Cooperation

Among Federal Inspection

Agencies

The clearance of international cargo is

solely a federal government function. It

involves 60 agencies and the enforcement

of 600 laws and more than 500 trade agreements. Customs conducts inspection and

review functions for most of the agencies,

but the following agencies are often on-site

or located near the seaports: the Food and

Drug Administration, the Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service, the Food Safety

Inspection Service, the Fish and Wildlife

Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The Coast Guard, also

located in or near every seaport, conducts

its own inspections, particularly those dealing with hazardous materials.

Customs serves as the unofficial lead

for the clearance of international cargo.

It maintains the nationwide database for

international cargo that is used by all agencies in the federal government. Although

Customs has a five-year plan and an annual plan, the other federal agencies involved

in international cargo clearance are not

officially part of the plan. The agencies

meet in headquarters and the field when

issues arise, but there is no formal coordinating mechanism at either the national or

the local level. There should be.

Despite the vast number of agencies

involved in this border inspection and control function, there is no formal structure

for planning and organizing the process.

Each agency conducts its planning separately. They may consult one another, but

there is no joint plan or process. With the

complexity of the process and the large

number of federal agencies involved, coordination is a necessity at both the national

and local levels.

The co-locating of federal inspectors,

with their electronic equipment, in Federal

Inspection Station facilities at the docks

where the cargo arrives would improve

ing intelligence. Various representatives at

the federal agency focus groups we held at

all the seaports told us repeatedly that their

agency worked very well with other agencies. The problem, however, is that these

relationships tended to be reactive. A number of seaports that we surveyed do have

joint federal agency meetings, but the meetings tend to be occasional, and it is not

clear to the agencies who should take the

lead in establishing the meetings and setting the agendas. Thus, once a crime has

been detected, the agencies may work well

together, but they rarely work together in

planning or taking measures to prevent

crime or other problems.

The on-site seaport surveys revealed

that regular “security-related” local meetings were not being held in seaports

between law enforcement organizations

(federal, state, and local), the trade, and

port authorities, with the exception of

those relatively few Strategic Seaports

(ports that support military mobilization)

where port readiness committees are

active. The meetings could provide the

participants (government and private sector) with the opportunity to exchange

intelligence information, discuss operational issues, and carry out action plans

designed to enhance security in seaports

and address deficient security practices

within seaports. New Orleans is one port

that used to have regularly scheduled

meetings of principals to discuss securityrelated issues, but over time it has discontinued the meetings.

The Marine Transportation System

Report recommended that a National Advisory Council be established to work with

the large numbers of public/private sector

interests in the maritime network. Coordination of the complex network of relationships and interests on security is critically

important. A separate Security Subcommittee should be established as part of the

Marine Transportation System to ensure

that the recommendations in this report are

carried out.

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 137
138 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

greater interagency exchange of data and

sharing of information.

Many of the memorandums of understanding between Customs and other federal inspection agencies on the sharing of

trade information are outdated and do not

reflect the current information needs of

each party. Although each inspection

agency complained about the accuracy and

completeness of the data in the Customs

systems, an underlying issue appears to be

that some agencies do not access or use

the data that are already being collected.

In fact, because many federal inspection

agency employees do not have background

clearances or sufficient procedures to safeguard trade information, Customs is prohibited from giving them complete access

to the information it collects.

If the Customs automated systems are

to remain the central trade-data collection

system for all other federal agencies, Customs needs to enfranchise the other federal

agencies in the developmental dialogue

about new systems. An interagency group

should be convened to develop long- and

short-range plans to meet trade information needs. This group should focus on

both improving the existing systems and

developing criteria for the next-generation

system to ensure that it supports each

agency’s regulatory role and facilitates

information-sharing and user-friendly

access for all participants. If the Customs

automated systems are to remain the

central processor and repository of trade

data, the Customs Service should chair

this committee.

The federal government is funding the

improvement, deployment, and development of automated trade data systems for

the commercial and enforcement needs of

the federal agencies and their private sector

partners in the arena of international trade.

The federal agencies and the trade sector

are dependent on the reliability and utility

of these systems, and unless improvements

are made to existing federal systems, discooperation, avoid duplication of effort,

reduce costs in the long term, and support

coordinated enforcement activities and

promote customer service. The creation of

the Federal Inspection Station is a necessary first step, and a very tangible step, in

the right direction.

Assisting with the mission of interagency coordination and support is the Customs automated commercial system. The

Customs automated system is a critical

link to all the inspection agencies. Customs

has placed criteria in its cargo release system for at least 12 other federal agencies,

and it provides online access, data extracts,

or other interfaces as reported below for a

variety of federal agencies. Some agencies

have access to one or more automated Customs systems; some, such as the Food and

Drug Administration, have their own automated systems that interface with Customs; and others, such as Agriculture’s

Food Safety Inspection Service, do not use

the Customs system at all. Many other

agencies could improve their monitoring of

international trade with real-time use of

this system.

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service (APHIS) of Agriculture has access

to the automated manifest but not the

automated entry system, which has more

detailed information on the merchandise

and the country of origin. Most of the

APHIS offices reviewed still use the paper

manifest to target merchandise for inspection because of the lack of adequate

descriptions and difficulty using the manifest data. The Fish and Wildlife Service

receives data only from the entry system

of Customs. The Food and Drug Administration developed its own system to pull

in Customs entry data to automate its processing, targeting, and tracking activities.

The Environmental Protection Administration is considering broadening data-sharing

and coordination with the Customs Service. We believe it is in the interest of all

federal inspection agencies to consider
health and safety crimes, stolen vehicles

and cargo theft, environmental crimes, and

export control crimes.

Finding 6.b. Some of the most successful

law enforcement efforts are accomplished

at seaports where multi-agency task forces

of state, local, and federal agencies

addressed specific crime problems. However, some federal agencies do not routinely join a task force because they lack the

staff needed for full-time or even part-time

participation, or because the major focus

of their mission may not be seaport-related.

Finding 6.c. Some commercial port officials do not have a good understanding of

the nature and extent of federal crimes

associated with the importation and exportation of goods and contraband within their

seaports. Some port officials are primarily

concerned with violent and property crimes

and consider federal crimes such as alien

smuggling or export crime to be the

responsibility of the federal government.

Finding 6.d. Industry partnership programs between federal agencies and the

private sector are notable and are a force

multiplier for federal agencies. These

programs have not only enhanced the

security practices and training of the

private sector, but they have proven to

be successful enforcement tools in U.S.

drug interdiction efforts.

Finding 6.e. The threat warning systems

(the National Threat Warning System, the

Awareness of National Security Issues and

Response System, and the National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System)

appear to be satisfactory and operating as

intended.

Finding 6.f. Policing and security functions are fragmented at many seaports,

and there is a lack of coordination among

the various law enforcement and security

personnel.

Finding 6.g. There is a disparity in substantive knowledge, training, and capabiliruptions in the import or export of cargo

may occur. As previously noted, technology upgrades should be coordinated among

all relevant federal inspection agencies to

ensure that every agency’s needs are being

addressed and to promote efficiencies in

the design and development of new multiagency cargo control, entry systems, and

enforcement systems.

Border control of international passengers and crewmembers is a federal responsibility. Immigration, Customs, and Agriculture must check all persons arriving

from other countries, including crew of

vessels as well as passengers aboard cruise

ships, to ensure that they meet requirements to enter the United States. Immigration also must address alien smuggling at

seaports. This is solely a federal function,

but cooperation from the state and local

law enforcement agencies and the private

sector can be helpful. A prime finding of

this Commission is the need for coordination and cooperation among the various

federal inspection agencies that share

responsibilities and interest in waterborne

cargo (import and export). In an era of

diminished resources, the creation of

shared Federal Inspection Stations,

equipped with adequate facilities for the

examination of container load shipments,

supported with state-of-the-art high energy

X-ray devices and located directly on the

waterfront (container terminal) properties

is the right course of action if this country

is to reestablish meaningful control over

its seaport gateways.

Findings and

Recommendation

Finding 6.a. Coordination and cooperation

among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is good. The nature and

extent of coordination efforts encompasses

a wide variety of criminal activities, among

a range of law enforcement agencies. Coordination efforts include drug smuggling,

Chapter 6: Coordination and Cooperation ■ 139
140 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Finding 6.j. Many of the memorandums

of understanding between Customs and

other federal inspection agencies on the

sharing of trade information are outdated

and do not reflect the current information

needs of each party.

Finding 6.k. Seaport security is a complex

issue that involves federal, state, and local

governments, port authorities, and hundreds

of businesses; coordination related to seaport security measures is generally inadequate, in part because security-related

meetings are not held in most seaports.

Recommendation 17. Establish local

Port Security Committees—or possibly a

subcommittee of an existing Harbor Safety

Committee or Port Readiness Committee—at seaports, including representatives

from the port authority, federal, state, and

local governments, and the private sector

(including organized labor), to discuss and

develop solutions for port-specific security

issues. The responsible Coast Guard Captain of the Port should chair the local Port

Security Committee.

ty in port security and law enforcement

matters between the local police (including

port police) and contract security personnel

at many ports.

Finding 6.h. At some seaports there is an

apparent mistrust of, and lack of cooperation between, labor and law enforcement

agencies.

Finding 6.i. Regular “security-related”

local meetings are not being held in seaports between law enforcement organizations (federal, state, and local), the trade,

and port authorities, with the exception

of those relatively few Strategic Seaports

(i.e., ports that support military mobilization) where Port Readiness Committees

are active.
The Role of Intelligence

in Combating Crime

Intelligence is the product resulting from

the collection, processing, integration,

analysis and interpretation of available

information. Collecting, analyzing, and

disseminating intelligence is central to

striking international crime at its source.

Intelligence can pay substantial dividends

in identifying trends in international criminal activities and in tracking the structure,

networks, methods of operation, and vulnerabilities of international criminal organizations. Mechanisms must be in place to

ensure that intelligence efforts are directed

toward meeting the highest-priority needs

of policymakers and federal law enforcement agencies. The intelligence community should enhance its efforts to provide

detailed and timely information to U.S. law

enforcement agencies to help them prevent

international crime and dismantle criminal

organizations. According to the President’s

International Crime Control Strategy (May

1998), international crime threatens vital

U.S. interests in three broad categories:

threats to Americans and their communities, threats to American businesses and

financial institutions, and threats to global

security and stability.

■ International terrorism and drug trafficking most directly threaten American

lives and property.

■ Illegal immigration, trafficking of

women and children, and environmental crimes may pose direct threats to

safety, health, stability, values, and other

interests of American communities.

Chapters 2 through 6 discussed the variety

of government agencies and private sector

entities involved in seaport security operations and their needs for intelligence and

information to conduct their mission or

business effectively. This chapter deals

with that intelligence and information—

which agencies are involved in gathering

and providing it, what kinds of information are available, and what processes are

used for disseminating intelligence on

crime, terrorism, and port activities to

those who need it.

The term “intelligence” is used here in a

general sense, to describe the gathering of

information by law enforcement agencies

in support of broad investigative or general

law enforcement initiatives, as well as the

gathering and use of national-level intelligence by agencies of the intelligence community. Interviews with law enforcement

agency personnel and maritime industry

focus groups revealed concerns that information needed for seaport security was

lacking in three principal areas, which will

be the focus of this chapter:

■ Availability to law enforcement agencies

of relevant, actionable intelligence on

seaport crime.

■ Awareness of terrorist threats and availability of threat information to the private sector as well as federal, state, and

local enforcement personnel.

■ Integrated information on the movement

of vessels, people, and cargo within seaports and ready availability of that information to government agencies and private sector security organizations.

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worldwide networks and infrastructures,

including front companies, quasi-legitimate

businesses, and investments in legitimate

firms to support criminal operations.

Targeting Containerized

Shipments

Intelligence is key to interdiction. In particular, it is essential to the aspect of

maritime surveillance that attempts to

identify a particular container being used

to smuggle illegal drugs or other contraband. Intelligence for tipping off and

directing interdiction operations is the only

effective means to segregate most maritime

smuggling targets from normal commerce.

Without predictive intelligence, the detection and monitoring of ships is impossible,

given the thousands of vessels found daily

in the sea lanes. Intelligence collection and

analysis must begin, for targeting purposes,

before the shipment reaches its destination.

To provide this focused targeting information at U.S. seaports, informants need to be

cultivated in foreign countries who provide

information on companies, individuals, and

organizations involved in illicit trade.

Investigations of the use of freight containers for smuggling depend heavily on

explicit intelligence provided by informants. As maritime container traffic volumes

increase, random inspections become statistically less likely to detect concealed

shipments. Review of shipping documentation by customs inspectors, although an

increasingly effective tool, is also somewhat limited by the volume of container

traffic. Labor-intensive searches of containers based on random selection are less

productive than inspections prompted by

explicit intelligence. Predictive, operational

intelligence that provides explicit information usable at the tactical level can increase

the probability that threats can be identified before arrival in U.S. ports, and that

container inspections will result in contraband seizures and arrests. Smugglers will

■ The illicit transfer or trafficking of

products across international borders

may undermine U.S. national security

objectives. The tremendous volume of

international traffic and trade provides

international criminals tremendous

opportunity to smuggle illegal aliens,

drugs, and other contraband into the

United States.

■ Economic trade crimes such as the

smuggling of contraband products, the

violation of intellectual property rights

through product piracy and counterfeiting, industrial theft and economic espionage, and foreign corrupt business

practices may rob U.S. companies of

substantial commercial revenues and

may affect their competitiveness on

world markets.

Many of these threats have a maritime

component. Customs data show that in

1999 more than 200,000 merchant and passenger ships docked at U.S. seaports. They

carried nearly 5 million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo into the

United States. Customs physically inspects

less than 2 percent of the goods transiting

U.S. borders daily. Threats and Challenges

to the Maritime Security 2020, published

by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the

Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination

Center, states that “legal maritime trade,

driven by global economic growth and

flourishing international trade, will triple

by 2020. The most explosive growth will

be in the container shipping industry. The

trend will be toward larger ships carrying

more containers.” Given these trends and

the existing level of resources, it is likely

that even less than 2 percent of arriving

cargo will be inspected in the future.

Criminals have expanded the scope and

range of their activities and have become

more sophisticated in the conduct of their

operations. Criminal organizations take

advantage of growing global maritime trade

to move products more efficiently. Many

criminal organizations have extensive
basis for understanding the scope and

magnitude of international crime. This

approach can offer the government a

mechanism for integrating the maritime

industry into the process of preparing a

comprehensive assessment of the international cargo crime problem. Inclusion of

the private sector would add an indispensable dimension to the cooperative efforts

of all U.S. law enforcement, diplomatic,

and intelligence agencies.

Intelligence Support for

Law Enforcement

Federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies interviewed indicated that intelligence collection and dissemination regarding criminal activity, particularly as it

relates to foreign intelligence collection,

needs to be improved. A common complaint was the lack of actionable international intelligence in the commercial environment. With current staffing and

resource allocations, limited contraband

detection technology, and the tremendous

growth in trade, agencies need to have

significantly more actionable intelligence

to be effective.

Information-sharing and intelligencegathering among federal, state, and local

agencies at the ports is spotty and sporadic. A significant amount of foreign

criminal intelligence is collected in the

areas of drug trafficking, organized crime,

money laundering, alien smuggling, and

other criminal activities. However, specific,

actionable intelligence or information

relating to the importation of illicit merchandise or non-drug contraband in commercial cargo shipments is lacking.

Most existing foreign criminal intelligence and information collection efforts

are aimed at providing actionable information to intercept illegal drug shipments into

the United States. For example, there are

two federal interagency committees consisting of federal law enforcement agencies

likely continue to convert larger percentages of their illicit cargoes to commercial

maritime freight containers. Development

of intelligence sources, particularly human

agents, that can provide information on

specific shipments en route should

improve interdiction results.

Information Exchange with

the Private Sector

Government efforts to combat cargo crime

will be enhanced by the increased awareness resulting from information exchange

programs with the private sector. Information exchange is crucial to enlarging port

and cargo security programs into cooperative alliances that can form an investigative

bridge throughout maritime trade corridors.

Key coordinating processes that can

result from information exchange include

the following:

■ The private sector’s role in supporting

government’s requirements for actionable

intelligence on cargo crime activities.

■ The reciprocal role of government in

providing industry with intelligence

with which to implement effective

countermeasures against cargo crimes.

■ Joint training of seaport police and

private sector security personnel.

Information provided by the maritime

industry has proven indispensable to law

enforcement in effecting multinational

interdiction of alien smuggling, drug

smuggling, and other cargo crimes at their

source or in transit countries. Even if

developed late in the shipping cycle, this

source of intelligence continues to be

instrumental in successful government

interdiction of cargo crimes. In recent

years, information derived from the Customs Service’s private sector carrier initiatives has resulted in more drug seizures

than has intelligence developed by federal

agencies. Information exchange provides a

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While these programs have been effective against drug smuggling activities, they

may not be as effective against smuggling

chlorofluorocarbons, trademarked and

copyrighted products, and other non-drug

contraband because many law enforcement

agencies stationed abroad collect very little

intelligence and information necessary to

interdict contraband in the United States.

Therefore, the activities of U.S. government law enforcement personnel stationed

abroad must be intensified to remedy this

weakness.

Finally, intelligence resources must be

used more effectively to provide focused

targeting on suspect non-drug shipments

and violators, and intelligence collected by

domestic law enforcement must be disseminated more widely. Many federal agencies

maintain data on violators and the types of

violations they have found. Illegal activity

such as smuggling may represent violations of more than one agency’s laws and

regulations, with each agency tracking

those activities independently. With the

exception of interagency task force operations, very little of this information is routinely exchanged. Interagency sharing of

violation histories might help in targeting

inspection activities and in fostering joint

agency operations. Sharing intelligence

would also help agencies identify the

smuggling techniques used to circumvent

U.S. laws.

Federal Intelligence and

Law Enforcement Agencies

The following are brief accounts of a number of current federal agency capabilities

for developing and processing information

related to targeting and interdiction of contraband in commercial cargo and other seaport crime. Discussion of some agencies

and programs has been omitted because

of security classification constraints on

making the information available.

and the intelligence community aimed at

disrupting and dismantling major heroin

and cocaine smuggling organizations operating out of Southeast and Southwest Asia,

South and Central America, Mexico, and

the Caribbean. These committees meet

regularly to disseminate intelligence and

coordinate joint investigations and operational matters.

The Office of Naval Intelligence’s Civil

Maritime Industry Group, Counterdrug

Division, began providing improvised container targeting support, primarily to federal law enforcement agencies, in May 1998.

Most of this effort supports Latin America

drug operations. In 1997, international

business and transportation industry paperwork was analyzed. It demonstrated relationships among people and organizations

buying, selling, distributing, smuggling,

manufacturing, planning, and using containerized cargo. Precursor chemicals

bound for Colombian cocaine laboratories

were profiled, identified, and located. The

analysis of this information was subsequently disseminated to Customs, resulting

in six seizures of more than 105 metric

tons of precursor chemicals.

To help fill the gap in drug-smuggling

intelligence by commercial cargo and

conveyances along the Southwest border,

Customs instituted Intelligence Collection

and Analysis Teams. Based on the Southwest border model, these teams have been

instituted at the Ports of Los Angeles,

New York/New Jersey, Miami, and San

Juan. They are multidiscipline, tactical

intelligence units whose sole responsibility

is to produce actionable, tactical intelligence on the movements of drugs in and

through the ports of entry. In some locations, they are also working on a wide

range of criminal issues including stolen

vehicles, illegal weapons smuggling, and

money laundering. Customs Intelligence

Collection and Analysis Teams produce

intelligence reports for targeting and

investigative leads on a daily basis.
Intelligence Community, counter-crime,

and counter-narcotics law enforcement

and policy agencies.

Defense Intelligence Agency Office

for Counterdrug Analysis

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Office

for Counterdrug Analysis coordinates the

Agency’s intelligence support to the counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement

communities. It also provides strategic and

operational intelligence support to Department of Defense military commands and

law enforcement agencies. Primary areas

of emphasis include coordinating activities

of overseas counterdrug representatives

and supporting overseas country teams,

developing intelligence support packages

for country teams and host nations,

exploiting captured documents, preparing

drug trafficking organization profiles,

managing the Counterdrug Intelligence

Data System, and coordinating the interagency assessment of cocaine movement.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms collects information on commercial seaports to support specific investigations of firearms trafficking patterns and

alcohol and tobacco diversion. The information is disseminated to the Bureau’s

field divisions and field offices for action

with investigative cases. Information is

collected on foreign businesses or persons

that ship goods in cargo containers if they

are believed to be involved in firearms

trafficking or alcohol and tobacco diversion. The Bureau receives national-level

intelligence at the headquarters intelligence

division. A mechanism is in place to task

the intelligence community on specific

collection requirements. It has been used

frequently, and the information received

has been extremely useful in the investigations. In a number of instances, intelligence was used as lead information to

initiate an investigation.

The Intelligence Community

The Director of Central Intelligence serves

simultaneously as Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency and as the leader of

the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community refers in the aggregate

to those Executive Branch agencies and

organizations that conduct the variety of

intelligence activities that make up the

total U.S. national intelligence effort. The

Community includes the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security

Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency;

offices within the Department of Defense

for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance

programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and

Research of the Department of State;

Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence;

the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the

Department of the Treasury; and the

Department of Energy. Members of the

Intelligence Community advise the Director of Central Intelligence through representation on a number of specialized committees that deal with intelligence matters

of common concern. Chief among these

are the National Foreign Intelligence Board

and the Intelligence Community Executive

Committee, chaired by the Director of

Central Intelligence.

Director of Central Intelligence

Crime and Narcotics Center

The Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence houses the Director

of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center, which monitors, assesses,

and disseminates information on international narcotics trafficking and international organized crime to policymakers

and the law enforcement community. The

Counter-Narcotics Center was established

in April 1989, and its mission and name

were expanded to include international

organized crime in 1994. The Center is

staffed with representatives from all

Directorates within the Agency and

includes direct participation of most

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Customs, through Treasury, makes its

requirements for intelligence known

through formal mechanisms such as the

National Human Intelligence Requirement

Collection Process. Customs also directly

tasks the Intelligence Community for assistance through requests for information or

special intelligence collection requirements.

National-level information frequently contributes to ongoing investigations. Investigative leads, consisting of various kinds of

information, are used by all Customs field

investigative units, and they contribute to

further targeting of command-and-control

centers of organized criminal groups. Warehouses, stash sites, crossing points, vehicle

information, and identification of members

of drug groups are examples of information

that is passed on a routine basis and that

enhances investigations. Drug groups and

organizations are frequently targeted based

on this information, and overall the information contributes to both interdiction and

investigations.

Commerce

Export Enforcement collects information

relating to sensitive dual-use exports in

order to enforce U.S. export control laws in

place to protect sensitive American products from being diverted to countries developing weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and others working counter to the

interests of the United States. This information is disseminated to Enforcement’s eight

field offices for action and investigation.

Export Enforcement develops intelligence

from its own investigations and informants.

It also receives national-level intelligence

from a variety of sources, including other

federal law enforcement agencies and the

U.S. intelligence community. This information is specifically related to domestic and

foreign efforts to circumvent U.S. export

control laws. Export Enforcement concentrates on using intelligence to target diverters and identify foreign procurement networks seeking U.S. dual-use goods, front

companies, and brokers.

Customs

Customs collects information on imports

in order to appraise and classify merchandise and ensure compliance with laws and

regulations. Customs also uses advance

manifest information to conduct risk

assessments on cargo. Customs has long

collected intelligence on the movement of

drugs and other contraband via intermodal

containers, and it has been at the forefront

of the effort by the intelligence community

and other federal law enforcement agencies

to encourage the development of more

intelligence related to cross-border smuggling. Customs develops its own intelligence from investigations and informants.

This intelligence is specific to Customs’

drug interdiction mission, and it focuses on

specific intelligence that is needed to target high-risk modes of conveyance, intermodal containers, traffickers, and smuggling methods. Customs has established a

series of multidiscipline Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams at most major

ports of entry, whose core responsibilities

are to collect all-source intelligence, focusing on conveyances, intermodal containers,

traffickers, and smuggling methods.

Customs receives national-level intelligence from a variety of sources, including

other federal law enforcement agencies

and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

This information runs the gamut from narcotics-related intelligence to terrorism and

trade crime information. National-level

intelligence is critical to the mission of

the Customs Service and constitutes a

major component of both its investigative

and interdiction activities. National-level

intelligence is widely disseminated to

Customs field units, including inspection,

investigative, and intelligence groups.

Typically, national-level intelligence is

received in a classified format. This information is usually sanitized and, in some

cases, declassified. Sanitized intelligence

may be entered into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, Customs’

national database.
The Coast Guard has detailed officers

to several major intelligence activities,

including the Central Intelligence Agency,

the El Paso Intelligence Center, the National Drug Intelligence Center, the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the National Security

Agency, the Joint Intelligence Command

Pacific, and the Joint Inter-Agency Task

Forces East and West. Additionally, the

Coast Guard maintains accredited Coast

Guard attachés in Colombia, Mexico, the

Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, and

soon Panama. The Coast Guard also maintains close working relationships with the

respective High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Areas and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces.

The Coast Guard routinely receives

intelligence from throughout the law

enforcement and intelligence community.

This intelligence is essential to accomplishment of the Coast Guard’s mission.

While constrained at present by assigned

resources, the process is capable of expansion to support operations directed at a

variety of emerging maritime threats.

Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s

Intelligence Division runs several Special

Field Intelligence Programs that target

commercial seaports in South America.

These efforts focus on drug smuggling

operations in ports in a number of source

countries, targeting drug shipments concealed in containerized cargo destined for

the United States. Information collected

under these programs is passed to the

El Paso Intelligence Center, or directly

to other law enforcement agencies as

appropriate.

The El Paso Intelligence Center is a

24-hour tactical drug intelligence center

under the Drug Enforcement Administration. Personnel from 14 federal agencies

work together to provide information to

field entities for interdiction and investigative purposes.

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard has many missions. With

the end of the Cold War and the increase in

asymmetric threats that may be moved by

maritime means—such as terrorism, and

smuggling of narcotics, aliens, weapons of

mass destruction, and other materials—the

Coast Guard has seen its own role in the

national security area grow. In this new

environment, Coast Guard intelligence

interaction with the Department of Defense

and the intelligence community has dramatically increased. This relationship recognizes the Coast Guard’s unique status as

both a federal law enforcement agency and

one of the five armed services. Only the

Coast Guard can exploit the national foreign intelligence community as a military

service, while at the same time enforcing

U.S laws. Intelligence supports all of the

Coast Guard’s primary mission areas,

including interdiction of drugs and illegal

aliens, preservation of living marine

resources, and protection of the marine

environment. It also supports expanding

missions such as port security, countering

the entry of weapons of mass destruction,

and homeland security.

The primary goal of Coast Guard intelligence is to leverage, not duplicate, the

work of other intelligence agencies. To

enable this, Coast Guard Intelligence Information Resources Management systems

are connected with law enforcement,

defense, and intelligence community systems. Its secure computer system, the

Coast Guard Intelligence Support System,

is interoperable with the Defense Department’s Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System. The Coast Guard is able to

communicate with the intelligence community via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communication Systems circuit and the

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network.

The Coast Guard also maintains the Law

Enforcement Information System database

on suspect vessels, and it has access to

several marine safety databases that assist

in tracking suspect vessels.

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of human intelligence requirements with

other law enforcement agencies and it can

propose collection requirements, but it

does not task the intelligence community

directly. Some information received on

alien smuggling has been valuable for lead

purposes. The timeliness of information

received has varied greatly from case to

case. However, most of this intelligence is

not specific enough with regard to time,

locations, or involved individuals to

prompt Immigration enforcement action.

In general, actionable intelligence has been

generated internally rather than received

from other sources.

Office of Naval Intelligence

The Office of Naval Intelligence has a

Counterdrug Division that supports

requests for information on high-interest

suspect drug trafficking vessels or maritime-related items from the Department

of Defense and various law enforcement

agencies. The Civil Maritime Analysis

Department has begun a project that analyzes foreign businesses and is capable of

some network profiling. An expansion of

this intelligence model to include communications intelligence, human intelligence,

and document exploitation could provide

useful information for container targeting.

The Small Ships Database contains information on nearly 6,000 vessels under 100

gross tons and more than 28,000 associated vessel movements. The Office of Naval

Intelligence, in conjunction with the Coast

Guard Intelligence Coordination Center,

has loaded more than 5,000 images of

small vessels in the AMIDSHIPS database, which is accessible to the counterdrug community via SEALINK.

National Reconnaissance Office

The Department of Defense’s National

Reconnaissance Office coordinates the

collection of national security-related

information via space-based surveillance

systems. The Office is currently developImmigration and Naturalization Service

The Immigration and Naturalization

Service is a law enforcement agency.

Although it collects intelligence and other

information relating to seaports, shipping,

and other maritime data, this information

collection is collateral to Immigration’s

primary enforcement responsibilities.

Information relating to cargo container

shipments is not collected routinely or

systematically. Immigration collects information on foreign businesses or persons

that ship consumer goods in cargo containers only insofar as it is relevant in the

regulation of aliens and foreign businesses

operating in the United States.

Immigration collects information on

alien smuggling activity that takes place

on commercial shipping vessels. The El

Paso Intelligence Center’s Alien Intelligence Unit collects and analyzes reporting

on alien smuggling organizations that

operate worldwide. This unit has developed more than 2,000 alien smuggler target intelligence files. Immigration maintains intelligence information on alien

smuggling that arrives via commercial

vessels as well as by private vessels or,

in fact, via land or air. As relevant, this

information is shared with the Customs

Service or the Coast Guard. It is shared

with state or local agencies only in the

context of specific ongoing joint operations. Intelligence on alien smuggling

is the only intelligence that is collected

systematically, as narcotics interdiction

is secondary to Immigration’s primary

mission.

The Immigration and Naturalization

Service receives national-level security

information at the headquarters level and

through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces at

the local district office level. Some classified information is sanitized and then

entered into lookout systems, which are

not classified but which operate as limited

official use–law enforcement-sensitive.

Immigration participates in the formation
concern to the law enforcement community, which highlights changes, patterns, and

trends on the domestic drug front.

Joint Maritime Information Element

The Joint Maritime Information Element

(JMIE) originated in the mid-1980s when

a group of federal agencies with important

maritime security, safety, regulatory, and

enforcement responsibilities sought to

improve ways to share information and

data. Today, it is a consortium of agencies

from the intelligence, law enforcement,

and defense communities. It provides

member agency analysts ready access to

multisource maritime data and enables

agile processing and correlation of the

data to meet their information requirements. Pooling maritime-related information into one central database and

developing an automated informationhandling system enable users to query

other agency data sources, correlate

results, and gain timely and improved

information. The database contains information from multiple sources on merchant

ships, cargoes, fishing and research

vessels, and pleasure craft.

The Joint Maritime Information Element mission is to improve the availability

of maritime information to member agencies and to develop synergy among the

members in support of their maritime missions. Members of the consortium are the

Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard,

Customs, Defense Intelligence Agency,

Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Energy, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Maritime Administration,

Military Sealift Command, National Security Agency, Office of National Drug

Control Policy, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Department of State. The Joint

Maritime Information Element is under

joint Coast Guard and Navy management,

and is accessible on the SECRET Internet

Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET).

ing a Law Enforcement Application Program (LEAP) to better support the information needs of law enforcement agencies,

and to develop a legal framework for

administrative and operational processes

for disseminating relevant information to

appropriate agencies. The primary goal is

to develop an organized, systematic

approach to exploring the utility of spacebased reconnaissance systems for responsive support of federal law enforcement

agencies’ operational needs.

National Drug Intelligence Center

The National Drug Intelligence Center is

an independent component of the Department of Justice. It is responsible for providing counterdrug agencies with timely,

multisource assessments on drug trafficking organizations. The information is specific enough to assist law enforcement

agencies with their investigative initiatives,

yet general enough to provide strategic

value to the overall community. The Center

explores open-source materials and keeps

up with the activities of the counterdrug

community in search of emerging trends

and patterns. It uses information from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, coupled with related foreign assessments from the intelligence community, to

accurately reflect the global threat posed

by drug trafficking. The Center produces

the National Drug Threat Assessment, a

timely, predictive intelligence report for

policymakers and counterdrug executives

on the threat of drugs, gangs, and violence.

It synthesizes the views of local, state,

regional, and federal agencies to produce a

comprehensive picture of this national

threat. Based on specific threats identified,

the National Drug Intelligence Center produces additional intelligence reports consisting of predictions, strategic estimates,

organizational assessments, and baseline

studies. It publishes the National Drug

Intelligence Digest, a macro-level assessment of emerging issues and trends of

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The FBI uses several means to disseminate threat information. If the information

warrants broad dissemination, unclassified

messages are quickly transmitted to state

and local law enforcement agencies nationwide over the National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System. Information

that is less urgent is communicated

through the Law Enforcement On-line

system. For the private sector, “Awareness

of National Security Issues and Response

Warnings” are issued to as many as 5,000

companies in the U.S. business community.

These messages are transmitted as assessments, advisories, or alerts. They include

criminal threat information such as product

tampering, extortion, computer crimes, and

criminal hijacking. In addition, the National Threat Warning System provides a

mechanism for public threat notification

when appropriate.

The FBI’s field offices routinely share

information through their ongoing working

relationships with state and local law

enforcement agencies. To strengthen these

existing relationships and improve communication about terrorism issues, the FBI

created Joint Terrorism Task Forces

(described in detail in Chapter 4). Currently

located in 26 metropolitan areas, they are

composed of representatives from the FBI,

federal law enforcement agencies such as

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Immigration, and the Naval Criminal Investigative

Service, and officials from state and local

law enforcement agencies. Members of

the Task Forces work together, usually on

a full-time basis, to gather, analyze, and

disseminate intelligence and investigate

terrorist activity.

In addition to Joint Terrorism Task

Forces, the FBI has established regional

terrorism task forces to serve several rural

states that have common terrorism concerns. These task forces share terrorismrelated intelligence and sponsor regional

terrorism conferences to train local law

enforcement agencies about the terrorism

threat in their region. These working

Threat Dissemination

One of the key concerns in informationsharing is that intelligence on terrorist

threats to port facilities, maritime transportation systems, and other critical port

infrastructure must reach appropriate personnel, both within the law enforcement

agencies that must prevent and respond to

terrorist acts and within the private sector

that owns and operates the vast majority of

that infrastructure. The following section

describes federal agency efforts to disseminate terrorist threat information to appropriate law enforcement agencies, port

authorities, private sector vessel and facility operators, and the traveling public. This

section also compares threat dissemination

procedures at airports and seaports.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the

lead federal law enforcement agency for

combating terrorism within the United

States. In addition, it has jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered,

assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or

when certain U.S. interests are attacked.

The FBI has established the National

Threat Warning System to ensure that vital

information on domestic terrorism reaches

the members of the U.S. counter-terrorism

community and law enforcement community for use in responding to terrorist

threats. The major threat warning system

recipients are the Departments of State,

Defense, Treasury, Energy, and Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency;

National Security Agency; Environmental

Protection Agency; Customs Service;

Secret Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Internal Revenue Service; Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bureau of Prisons; Drug Enforcement

Administration; Federal Aviation Administration; Coast Guard; Naval Criminal

Investigative Service; Air Force Office of

Special Investigations, Army; and White

House Situation Room.
Department of Defense terrorist threat

warnings are accomplished using two

mechanisms. The intelligence community

system issues fully coordinated terrorist

threat alerts and advisories. The services

have the opportunity to comment on proposed warnings, and direct their responses

through the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The executive coordinator of the Community Counterterrorism Board is responsible

for coordinating threat warnings outside

the United States, and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation is responsible for coordinating and issuing intelligence community

warnings for domestic threats. The second

system is the Defense Indications and

Warning System, in which members at any

level may initiate unilateral threat warnings, called terrorism warning reports.

Warnings within the Department generally

stay within the system and are primarily

for use of Defense Department activities.

Before a warning is issued, the Community

Counterterrorism Board is consulted to

determine whether the national community

will issue an advisory or an alert.

Warnings are issued when a specific

target and timing exist or when analysts

have determined that sufficient information

indicates that U.S. personnel, facilities, or

interests, are being targeted for attack. The

purpose is to identify threat information to

prevent the compromise of deployed U.S.

military forces to espionage, foreign intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorism, and

assassination. Commanders in Chief of the

combatant commands (CINCs) are responsible for reviewing the antiterrorism force

protection status of all military activities,

including Department of Defense contracting activities, within their geographic area

of responsibility.

Commanders in Chief and military base

commanders issue Threat Conditions

(THREATCONs). These are based on the

perception of security threat to their facilities, and are not necessarily tied to the terrorist threat level. Threat Conditions

describe the progressive level of a terrorist

arrangements not only improve the flow

of information from federal intelligence

agencies to localities, but they allow federal agencies to obtain intelligence from

local sources.

Department of State

U.S. government policy requires the dissemination of information to the general

public about specific and credible overseas

terrorist threats that cannot be countered.

When the threat applies to the general public, there is no double standard between

information available to government officials and to private citizens. When terrorist

threat information is received, the State

Department’s Office of the Coordinator

for Counterterrorism coordinates the interagency effort to determine if public dissemination is appropriate. Depending on

the nature of the threat, public dissemination will be effected by the issuance of a

travel advisory (or revision of an existing

advisory) or a public statement or press

briefing by the State Department. A public

announcement or travel advisory will

generally include recommended actions

to reduce risk, such as deferring travel to

a particular country.

Department of Defense

The Defense Intelligence Agency provides

terrorist warning and analysis support to

the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of

Defense, and to the unified commands.

It provides prompt dissemination of intelligence information on terrorist threats,

including specific warning of threats

against service personnel and their family

members, facilities, and other Defense

Department assets. The Defense Intelligence Agency is the focal point within the

Department for data and information pertaining to domestic and foreign terrorist

threats to Defense Department personnel.

In addition, it provides support to policymakers and programs, counterterrorism

collection, operations, and the investigation

communities.

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tion security matters. The Office of Intelligence and Security coordinates and disseminates terrorist threat information to

the Department’s operating administrations

for distribution to their regional and field

offices and to law enforcement and transportation industry contacts. This information is distributed in the form of Transportation Security Information Reports.

These reports are intended to advise recipients of emerging security threats, the

potential for near-term terrorist attacks, or

other security-related information of interest to transportation security personnel.

A threat is defined as any indication of

planned violence against U.S. persons,

transportation facilities and infrastructures,

including computer networks. A threat can

originate from individuals, terrorist groups,

or other criminal elements. The reports are

produced in an unclassified format, using

both classified and unclassified information available from a number of sources.

Department of Transportation operating

administrations transmit the reports to

regional and field offices, law enforcement

officials, and industry security contacts,

and encourage law enforcement and security personnel to take measures to enhance

security and to reduce the vulnerability of

the transportation system to the reported

threat.

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard disseminates threat information affecting the marine transportation

industry to a variety of private sector commercial interests. Threat information is

generally received by the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection at Coast Guard headquarters from the Department of

Transportation’s Office of Intelligence and

Security or through the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. This information is forwarded in the form of threat advisories via Coast Guard district offices to

the Coast Guard Captain of the Port. Each

Captain of the Port distributes the informathreat to all U.S. military facilities and personnel. They are recommended security

measures designed to ease interservice

coordination and support of U.S. military

antiterrorism activities. Once a Threat

Condition is declared, the selected security

measures are implemented immediately.

■ THREATCON NORMAL applies when

a general threat of possible terrorist

activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.

■ THREATCON ALPHA applies when

there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and

facilities, the nature and extent of which

is unpredictable, and circumstances do

not justify full implementation of

THREATCON BRAVO.

■ THREATCON BRAVO applies when an

increased and more predictable threat of

terrorist activity exists.

■ THREATCON CHARLIE applies when

an incident occurs or intelligence is

received indicating that some form of

terrorist action against personnel and

facilities is imminent.

■ THREATCON DELTA applies in the

immediate area where a terrorist attack

has occurred or when intelligence has

been received that terrorist action

against a specific location or person is

likely.

Department of Transportation

The Aviation Security Act of 1990 established the Office of Intelligence and Security within the Department of Transportation, and made the Director accountable

for overseeing the development of policies,

strategies, and plans for dealing with

threats to transportation security. The

Director serves as the department’s primary security policy official and liaison

with Transportation’s operating agencies,

other federal agencies, the transportation

industry, and the intelligence and law

enforcement communities on transporta-
personnel. Threat information is gathered

and vetted by the headquarters Office of

Civil Aviation Security. If the information

is determined to represent a valid threat to

security, it is transmitted in one of two

forms, Information Circulars or Security

Directives. Information Circulars provide

threat information to the private sector that

may be acted upon voluntarily, with airport

and airline operators enhancing security

measures at their discretion. Security Directives specify mandatory security measures.

In either form, threat information is passed

from the Office of Civil Aviation Security

to Federal Aviation Administration regional

offices and then to civil aviation security

field offices. The information is then forwarded to individual airport security coordinators directly or, in the case of the

largest (Category X) airports, via the federal security manager assigned there. For airlines, threat information is passed to the air

carrier’s ground security coordinator via the

Federal Aviation Administration’s principal

security inspector at the field office. Procedures for disseminating threat information and responsibilities for implementing

security measures are specified in regulations stemming from the Aviation Security

Act of 1990.

Remaining Threat Dissemination

Questions at Seaports

As the descriptions above indicate, multiple federal agencies, each targeting different customers, distribute terrorist threat

information. These processes appear to be

working well, with end users gaining

access to threat information through the

most appropriate channels. Therefore, there

appears to be no need to centralize the distribution of threat information within a single federal agency, or to incorporate threat

dissemination procedures for seaports into

regulation, as is the case for aviation security. However, some issues persist.

Although management of private sector

companies may receive threat information

directly from federal agencies or indirectly

tion to port authorities, waterfront facility

operators, shipping agents, vessel operators,

and other local port stakeholders. This

information is primarily distributed for private sector security personnel to act on voluntarily. However, the Captain of the Port

may direct operators of vessels and waterfront facilities to implement enhanced security measures before continuing cargo or

passenger operations.

Maritime Administration

The Maritime Administration disseminates

threat information to operators of U.S.-flag

and effective U.S.-controlled vessels (vessels owned by U.S. interests but flagged in

a foreign nation). Maritime Administration

advisories are forwarded from the Office

of National Security Plans to regional

offices, where they are distributed to U.S.

shipping companies and port authorities.

Information is also distributed through the

Office of Ship Operations in the form of

Anti-Shipping Activity Messages. The

Department of Defense’s National Imagery

and Mapping Agency, in carrying out its

mission to produce Notices to Mariners,

has developed an Automated Notice to

Mariners System containing information

on navigation safety. The database provides

for remote queries that the agency makes

available to the entire maritime community

through the Navigation Information Network. The Anti-Shipping Activity Message

file is available from this database as well

as from the Maritime Administration’s

Web site.

Threat Dissemination at Airports

vs. Seaports

It may be useful to compare threat dissemination procedures for airports, which operate with a regulatory scheme, with those in

the seaport environment, which depend primarily on cooperation between the federal

government and the private sector. The Federal Aviation Administration has in place a

systematic process for disseminating threat

information to airport and airline security

Chapter 7: Intelligence and Information Management ■ 153
154 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

travel are reduced and volumes of international cargo and passengers grow, opportunities for criminals to exploit the commercial transportation system also increase.

Pertinent information is needed to detect,

intercept, and prevent terrorism and criminal activity within seaports. Existing information about the movement of vessels,

people, and cargo is not integrated, nor is

it readily available to responsible security

organizations.

Law enforcement and inspection agencies must identify and intercept illegitimate

activities hidden in an environment of similar-looking legitimate activities. Separating the “bad” from a sea of “good”

requires real-time knowledge of vessels,

people, and cargo approaching, moving

through, and departing a seaport. Greater

knowledge of cross-border flows of people

and goods will facilitate detection of criminal and terrorist activity. Improved targeting information made readily available to

all interested inspection and law enforcement agencies will permit them to focus

their efforts on cargo, persons, and vessels

that present the highest risk to security

while reducing random inspections that

increase disruptions to commerce and

result in costly delays.

In addition, the maritime industry needs

to be aware of the location and status of

vessels and cargo, and it must manage a

variety of information desired by its customers and demanded by federal agencies.

A variety of information systems exist, in

both the public and private sectors, for

managing this information. These include

automated systems for processing and

clearing import and export cargo; asset

management systems to locate and track

vehicles and containers; security systems

to monitor vehicles, containers, and cargo

in transit or storage; vessel traffic systems

to track the position and movement of vessels; and real-time weather, oceanographic,

and vessel identification systems for safe

navigation.

through port authorities or local maritime

trade associations, that information may

not always reach the security personnel

who must implement enhanced security

measures. In many cases, this is a failure

of internal communication within the private sector. Increasing the awareness of

terrorist threats among port facilities and

vessel operators, and expanding the availability of threat information from government sources through training, outreach,

and public/private interagency forums,

such as local port security committees,

would do much to alleviate this problem.

Threat information assembled by government agencies is often classified for

reasons of national security. Few persons

among the target audience for this information, especially within the private sector,

possess the requisite security clearances to

receive it. Therefore, threat information

must be sanitized so that it can be presented in an unclassified form while protecting

the sources of that information and methods of collecting it. Sanitized threat warnings, standing alone, may lack sufficient

detail to prompt action by local law

enforcement and private sector security

personnel. Developing good working relationships among port-level federal agency

personnel, local law enforcement personnel, and private sector stakeholders can

help to build confidence in the messenger

and thus the message, and enhance the

credibility of such warnings.

Managing Seaport

Information

Seaports are a key confluence in the transportation system. They present a complex

nexus of vessel movements, passenger

lists, and cargo manifests where significant

information about the nature, volume, and

location of intermodal exchanges resides.

Integrating and managing this information

is crucial to maintaining control of our

maritime borders. As barriers to trade and
■ The Coast Guard should work with relevant agencies to coordinate development

of an integrated, real-time information

system for tracking the movement of

vessels (including cargo and personnel)

within the seaport environment. This

system would be available for use by

relevant law enforcement and inspection

agencies in crime prevention and security efforts.

■ Law enforcement agencies should

develop specific collection requirements for foreign intelligence collection

efforts concerning the illicit movement

of merchandise and contraband in

commercial cargo through seaports.

■ The Central Intelligence Agency and

other national intelligence agencies

should increase foreign intelligence

collection efforts aimed at providing

specific, actionable information about

those international criminal activities

affecting seaports that have been identified as national security threats to the

United States (e.g., drug trafficking

and proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction).

■ Law enforcement agencies should

work together to ensure that they have

an effective mechanism to process and

share intelligence at the seaport level

as appropriate.

An integrated port information system

could satisfy the need for information brokerage for private sector business activities

while supplying critical decision making

support for government agencies. The

value of such a system has previously been

identified in An Assessment of the U.S.

Marine Transportation System, a report to

Congress submitted by the Secretary of

Transportation, and also in Turning to the

Sea: America’s Ocean Future, a report to

the President jointly prepared by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Navy.

Investments in the area of upgrading

and integrating seaport information systems should receive high priority consideration in the budget development process.

A variety of initiatives for upgrading information systems (including automated systems for processing cargo and passengers)

are underway throughout the federal government. Integrating these systems in a

deliberate fashion will enable the nation to

reap current benefits while setting the

stage for future assimilation of vessel and

cargo tracking sensor technology. Integrating this information will provide “one-stop

shopping” for a total operational picture of

port activities and will enable security

agencies to make valid risk-based targeting

decisions for allocating scarce resources.

Findings and

Recommendation

Finding 18. Information about the movement of vessels, people, and cargo within

seaports is not integrated, nor is it always

readily available to government and private

sector security organizations responsible

for detecting, intercepting, and preventing

terrorism and other criminal activity.

Recommendation 18. Improve information (including intelligence) collection,

integration, and dissemination at the seaports by proceeding as follows:

Chapter 7: Intelligence and Information Management ■ 155
selection of goods available to U.S. consumers and producers. Developed nations

like the United States are increasingly

dependent on foreign markets to produce

goods through cheaper manufacturing

costs. In addition, exports are playing a

key role in strengthening the U.S. economy

and national security. Exports are responsible for creating 12 million jobs in the United States. Exports are providing high tech

firms with the disposable capital to invest

in research and development and bring

new products to market, thus ensuring that

the U.S. military has the most advanced

technology to draw upon.

At the same time, the influx of goods

through U.S. ports provides a venue for

the introduction of a host of transnational

threats into the U.S. infrastructure. These

include drugs, weapons (both conventional

and weapons of mass destruction), and illegal migrants. Further, the nexus of transportation modes, as well as the concentration of passengers, high-value cargo, and

hazardous materials in seaports, make

them potential targets for terrorist attacks.

The position of the United States as a

world power and our dependence on foreign trading partners makes this country

vulnerable. Threats can come from an

adversary, a rogue state, an organized

criminal element, or an individual. Instability in regions where governmental

regimes are changing may increase the

threat. The security of domestic ports is

affected by the security of ports at the

originating and transit points of the shipping “logistics chain.”

Despite the status of the United States

as a world leader, the susceptibility of U.S.

ports to the repercussions of lax security

Most of the issues described in previous

chapters have an international component,

be it trade, terrorism, international passengers or crewmembers, or cargo. International cooperation can be critical in

addressing many of these issues.

Issues that confront the United States

in the international arena include the

following:

■ Economic globalization is compressing

reaction time and blurring national

borders.

■ International criminal and terrorist

threats are constantly changing and

adapting to law enforcement capabilities. Today’s communications and integrated intelligence systems lack the

sophistication to support real-time

monitoring of vessels, people, and

cargo movements.

■ The wide-ranging state of development,

differing port operation management

structures, and amount of resources

available to the seaports of the world

present a formidable challenge to developing a coordinated approach to the

detection of crime and establishing

international seaport security standards.

International commerce has changed

dramatically since the end of the Cold War.

Globalization and the liberalization of

trade practices have resulted in fewer

impediments to trade and an increase in

the flow of goods, most of which are transported by sea. Advances in technology and

communications have changed the way

companies conduct business. More companies have become global in nature. International competition, open markets, and the

dropping of trade barriers contribute to the

Chapter 8: International Considerations

157
158 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

criminal activities, adversely affecting

their competitiveness.

Unconstrained by borders or national

sovereignty, international organized crime

groups are operating transnationally and

deriving billions of dollars from a wide

range of cargo crimes. Among the most

lucrative types of cargo crime is cargo theft

itself and the smuggling of drugs, alien

migrants, stolen goods including automobiles, contraband merchandise, and illicit

currency shipments. Levels of containerized cargo volumes are forecasted to

increase significantly. This will create

more opportunities for cargo crime while

lowering the statistical risk of detection

and interdiction.

Ports as Marine Intermodal Choke Points

International maritime trade corridors

consist of three main logistical components—ports, ocean vessels, and the landside modes of transport. Functioning as

pivotal nodes in a system of trade routes,

the seaports provide intermodal interface

to the international maritime shipping

cycle. Among the trade segments engaged

in marine intermodal business transactions

are, for example, ocean and land transporters, shippers, freight consolidators and

forwarders, financial institutions, warehousers, labor unions, and the security

departments of all parties involved.

Consequently, seaports and the

freight movements through their landside

accesses are viewed by cargo crime

groups as marine intermodal choke points

of commerce. Improved port and cargo

security, therefore, is central to all efforts

by government and industry to reduce

criminal exploitation of commerce transported in the international maritime trade

corridors.

International Crime Control Strategy

The Strategy, issued by the White House

in May 1998, was developed through a

coordinated process involving all relevant

in foreign ports makes international port

security engagement a priority. The United

States must seek the cooperation of its

trading partners in eliminating crime, and

it should lead the world in developing

international port security standards and

conducting training to facilitate the implementation of those standards.

The activities of international organized

crime adversely affect the economic competitiveness of legitimate open market

commerce and deter trade and investment.

The billions of dollars derived from illicit

enterprises enable organized crime groups

to compromise and penetrate commercial

markets and acquire legitimate companies.

This further equips them with the instruments to advance their criminal enterprises

and obfuscate their operations in the

process. The effects can discourage the

commercial initiative of U.S. business

interests operating overseas. The most

powerful criminal syndicates may be capable of achieving substantial influence or

even monopolistic control over critical

sectors of the national economy of some

countries. The result may diminish multilateral efforts to promote more cooperative

solutions to global trade problems and may

prevent credible economic systems from

being instituted.

International organized crime groups

are taking full advantage of the growth

in sophisticated global commerce, transportation, communication, and financial

links to perpetrate cargo crimes involving

smuggling, cargo theft, and money laundering. Criminal exploitation of the maritime trade corridors places in jeopardy

the international commerce of the United

States and its global economic alliance.

U.S.-flag ocean carriers call on ports in

nearly every country, and cargoes owned

by U.S. interests may be embarked on

ocean vessels of any flag or in any port

worldwide. U.S. commercial maritime

interests, therefore, can be jeopardized

worldwide by a broad range of organized
Marine Transportation System Task Force

The Marine Transportation System Task

Force—a federal interagency and private

sector assessment of the U.S. marine transportation system—reported to Congress in

1999 that the United States must be able

to detect, intercept, and respond to threats

to the Marine Transportation System as

far offshore as possible. The report also

included findings that overseas ports serve

as primary entry points in the system for

U.S.-bound cargoes and people. Because

the origin of much of the cargo that moves

through the Marine Transportation System

lies well beyond U.S. borders, more effective international cooperation is needed to

establish and police security standards at

overseas ports in our international trade

corridors. Improving foreign seaport security capabilities will reduce the risk that

contraband or terrorists will find their way

into the United States.

The Marine Transportation System Task

Force therefore recommended, for example: (1) the development of a strategy and

process for advancing U.S. operating

guidelines and minimum security standards

on an international basis; (2) providing

intelligence and training to improve international oversight of the global maritime

infrastructure; and (3) support of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.

In addition, the Task Force specified that

efforts should be incorporated into several

ongoing interagency and public/private sector efforts, including the Interdiction Committee and the following Customs Service

initiatives: the Carrier Initiative Program,

the Americas Counter-Smuggling Initiative,

and the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition. The improved capabilities of foreign

seaport police and security personnel developed with—guidelines, standards, strategy,

intelligence, and training—thus create multilateral operational benefits and improvements in the security of the international

maritime trade corridors.

federal agencies intended to improve U.S.

government efforts to combat international organized crime and is based on Presidential Decision Directive 42, which was

issued on October 21, 1995. This directive

aims to improve international anti-crime

efforts by strengthening the rule of law,

and by fostering democracy, free markets,

and human rights. The directive ordered

executive branch agencies of the U.S.

government to: (1) increase the priority

and resources devoted to countering international crime; (2) achieve greater effectiveness and synergy by improving internal coordination; (3) work more closely

with other governments to develop a

global response to this threat; and (4) use

aggressively and creatively all legal

means available to combat international

crime.

The Strategy is a plan of action. It complements other crime control documents,

such as the National Drug Control Strategy

and Presidential Decision Directives on,

for example, alien smuggling (Directive 9)

and counterterrorism (Directive 62). The

Crime Strategy is intended to provide a

framework for integrating all facets of the

federal response to the direct and immediate threat international crime presents to

the national security interests of the United

States. This Strategy is intended to be

dynamic, adaptable, and sufficiently flexible to enable its extrapolation into tailored

applications and subsidiary strategies,

including one specifically tailored to

address international crime’s impact on

port and cargo security.

The Strategy goals and objectives

address many specific issues and provide

broad guidance for many others. This

Strategy also includes numerous programs

and initiatives that serve as a blueprint

for an effective, long-term attack on the

international crime problem. The goals are

listed in Appendix C.

Chapter 8: International Considerations ■ 159
160 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

nation that is both consumer and producer,

the United States can expect that foreign

trade in goods will continue to increase.

The overwhelming bulk of this trade will

flow through the nation’s seaports. Increases in federal assets, including equipment,

facilities, and personnel, at the seaports

have not kept pace with the increases in

trade volume. To accommodate increases

in trade and still maintain an acceptable

level of security and law enforcement at

seaports will require new and innovative

enforcement and security measures.

These measures will require increased

cooperation with our international partners.

As governments remove barriers to trade

and travel, U.S. officials will need more

advanced information on the cross-border

flow of people and goods and on other

maritime activities (such as vessel operations/schedules) in order to identify actual

and potential threats.

U.S. Agencies’ International

Cooperation Programs

Many U.S. agencies, including the Coast

Guard, the Maritime Administration, Customs, the FBI, the Department of State,

the Department of Commerce, and the

Environmental Protection Agency, have

international programs and initiatives in

place that relate to the key issues of cooperation, training, and standards. These

programs may include deployments, foreign liaisons, attaches, advisory groups,

and training for foreign nations.

Customs, the Coast Guard, Immigration,

the Federal Law Enforcement Training

Center, and the Maritime Administration

have international port security training

programs. The Maritime Administration

coordinates with the Organization of

American States to provide an inter-American port security training program funded

through the Organization of American

States. Utilizing instructors from Customs

and personnel from two U.S. port authoriIn its report the Task Force identified

five strategic areas for action related to

security: improving security awareness;

improving transparency; ensuring qualified

operators; forging stronger public/private

partnerships; and strengthening international cooperation. These areas were studied by the Commission and are addressed

in Appendix C of this report.

Presidential Decision Directive 63,

Protecting America’s Critical

Infrastructures

This directive called for an effort to establish international cooperation as a means

of protecting the U.S. infrastructure. The

directive identifies several findings that

are addressed by the Commission in

Appendix C.

As it relates to seaport security, international cooperation has at least three key

components:

■ Cooperation (including the gathering

and sharing of information).

■ Training with respect to seaport operations and security.

■ Standards for seaport security operations.

During the Commission’s port visits, it

became evident that these areas needed to

be addressed on an international level.

Many government agencies, including the

FBI, Customs, and the Coast Guard,

expressed the need for better information

and cooperation from foreign countries

that export to U.S. seaports. The Commission believes that cooperative engagement

with this country’s international trading

partners is essential to effecting meaningful and lasting improvements to seaport

crime and security.

U.S. seaports, as a critical infrastructure

subset of the marine transportation system,

are especially vulnerable to criminal or

terrorist activities because of their scale,

complexity, and pace of activity. As a
auspices of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

Under the auspices of the State Department and through its 38 Legal Attaché

offices with regional responsibilities, the

FBI conducts liaison activities with foreign

law enforcement agencies and other foreign government officials. These Legal

Attaché offices assist not only the FBI, but

also other U.S. law enforcement agencies

at all levels, in making contact with foreign law enforcement agencies in a cooperative fashion. FBI Legal Attaché offices

also assist foreign law enforcement agencies in training matters.

The Environmental Protection Agency

has been involved in coordinating between

domestic and foreign law enforcement

agencies to identify suspect shipments of

waste destined for export. The project,

Exodus Asia, has brought together a network of state and federal law enforcement

agencies to focus on illegal shipments of

waste from the United States to Asian

nations.

The following are examples of recent

international initiatives and programmatic

activities of U.S. agencies in Latin America

and the Caribbean. These international

cooperative best practices contribute directly and collaterally toward substantially

improving port and cargo security in the

international maritime trade corridors of

the Western Hemisphere.

Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative

Commercial transport has become the preferred method of smuggling for sophisticated trafficking organizations. In response,

Customs developed the Americas Counter

Smuggling Initiative as a priority undertaking designed to increase the effectiveness of

countering drug smuggling via commercial

cargo and conveyances. The Initiative is

intended to strengthen cooperative regional

efforts with the international trade community in Latin America. The objectives of the

Initiative include increasing awareness of

ties, the Maritime Administration has

developed a model training program in

port security that provides training to 34

countries in the Western Hemisphere. This

model could be used in other regions,

including Africa, Eastern Europe, and

Asia.

The Coast Guard provides assistance

in many ways, such as training, maritime

legal infrastructure assistance, port assessments, equipment sales or transfers, and

operational cooperation. International

training and technical assistance is coordinated by the Headquarters International

Affairs Staff. Through its International

Training Division, Coast Guard personnel

are deployed worldwide to conduct training

in all mission areas including Maritime

Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue,

Marine Environmental Protection, and

Port Security. Foreign naval, coast guard,

and police personnel are also brought to

the United States for resident training.

The Coast Guard assists nations with the

development of effective maritime legal

infrastructure through the Model Maritime

Service Code project. This project, which

is designed to assist partner nations in

identifying and developing the necessary

laws, regulations and policies to support a

small naval service with roles and missions

similar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard,

provides the model for the legal authority

necessary for the service to function effectively as a military service, a law enforcement organization, and a regulatory

agency. In conjunction with Customs, the

Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments to make recommendations on the

control of cargo shipments and to improve

port security in order to reduce illegal drug

shipments to the United States. Assessments have already been conducted in

Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In order to

protect U.S. travelers from the risk of terrorism, Coast Guard personnel also perform vulnerability assessments for overseas cruise ship ports of call under the

Chapter 8: International Considerations ■ 161
162 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Sea Carrier Initiative Program

Like the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, the Sea Carrier Initiative Program is a

joint effort between commercial carriers

and Customs. When it was established in

1984 to seek problem solving solutions to

recurring problems, the concept was developed as an alternative to substantial fines

and seizures of conveyances. Currently,

approximately 2,870 sea carriers participate

in the program. About 70 percent of these

carriers are foreign-based. The program

encourages the carriers to improve their

port and cargo security practices to prevent

drug smuggling via their conveyances.

Overseas Security Advisory Council

The Department of State, through its Overseas Security Advisory Council, interacts

with industry on overseas security problems

of mutual concern. More than 1,400 private-sector organizations participate in the

Advisory Council’s activities and receive

information and guidance to defend against

security threats such as terrorism, economic

espionage, and organized crime. U.S. firms

voluntarily submit accounts to the Advisory

Council pertaining to security or crime

incidents affecting their own or other U.S.

overseas operations.

Inter-American Port Security

Training Program

This Organization of American States initiative, managed by the Maritime Administration for the Organization of American

States, provides port security training

courses for commercial port authority

police and security personnel. Participants

in the training are from member countries

of the Organization. This program was

developed in cooperation with the Organization of American States Permanent Technical Committee on Ports. Port security is

a major goal of the Organization, as

expressed in its Guidelines for an InterAmerican Port Policy, published in 1997.

contraband trafficking in the commercial

environment and disrupting internal conspiracies. The Initiative focuses on each

aspect of the commercial transportation

process and offers a more comprehensive

approach to dealing with this problem.

Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition

As part of its response to the problem of

smuggling in commercial shipments, Customs established a business-led alliance in

1996, called the Business Anti-Smuggling

Coalition. The Coalition is a response to

Customs identification of commercial containerized cargo at seaports as its primary

narcotics detection requirement. The Coalition is intended to significantly deter the

use of legitimate commercial shipments as

narcotic smuggling conveyances. It does so

by examining the entire process of manufacturing, packaging, and shipping merchandise to the United States from foreign

countries. The Coalition also addresses the

growing problem of internal conspiracies

at cargo handling and intermodal freight

interchange points.

The Coalition assistance includes, for

example, security site surveys, developing

and implementing security programs, conducting post-seizure analysis in drug

smuggling cases, and guidance on application and deployment of security technology. Assistance also includes development

of information exchange relationships.

The Coalition is voluntary and without

Customs-imposed mandates, relying

instead on the international commercial

industry to set standards. The Colombian

government and the country’s trade community have been especially cooperative

with Customs in the Coalition initiatives

overseas. It complements the Customs

long-standing Sea Carrier Initiative Program, which emphasizes deterring narcotic smuggling onboard commercial ocean

carriers.
The following are examples of multilateral cooperative efforts in which U.S.

government agencies have demonstrated

significant roles:

Caribbean/U.S. Summit Joint Committee

on Justice and Security

This Joint Committee convenes annually to

review the justice and security element of

the plan of action agreed to by Caribbean

heads of state, including President Clinton,

at the May 1997 Bridgetown Summit. The

1999 meeting of the Joint Committee discussed progress made since the summit,

which included increased cooperative maritime law enforcement efforts, substantial

progress by the Caribbean Financial Action

Task Force in money laundering investigations, and the ratification of a number of

mutual legal assistance and extradition

treaties. The 1999 meeting of the Joint

Committee was co-chaired by Jamaica’s

Minister of National Security and Justice

and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State

for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs.

The 1997 Caribbean/U.S. Summit

The agenda of the May 10, 1997, summit

meeting between President Clinton and

other Caribbean heads of state committed

the United States to cooperation in formulating a plan of action linking security

issues with the economic performance of

island nations. The summit strategy formulated a new regional approach intended

to integrate trade, economic, and environmental issues, with justice and security

issues such as drug smuggling, money

laundering, weapons trafficking, and

strengthened criminal justice systems.

The agenda recognized the important roles

of trade and regional economic viability

toward Caribbean nations becoming less

exploited as transshipment points for drug

smuggling and by other organized criminal activities.

In 1998, three subregional training

courses were funded and conducted in

Panama, Peru, and Barbados, in order to

accommodate participation from Central

and South America, and the Caribbean.

The training teams consisted of instructors from U.S. commercial port authorities and the U.S. government. In 1995,

training was conducted for Organization

of American States countries, sponsored

and organized by the Maritime Administration and the Organization of American

States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission.

Multilateral Cooperative

Efforts

Several of the national strategies described

in earlier chapters involve engagement by

U.S. entities with international security

efforts. An engagement policy is an

assumption of the National Security Strategy, and is framed by the International

Crime Control Strategy and the National

Military Strategy. Key elements of strategy

address international law enforcement

cooperation, international crime and terrorism, and drug trafficking, all of which find

a nexus in U.S. seaports. In addition, the

National Drug Control Strategy involves

international efforts to foster cooperation,

improve international intelligence-gathering, and provide for interdiction operations

to “shield America’s sea frontiers from the

drug threat.”

To support the fight against drug smuggling, the United States has entered into

several global, multilateral, subregional,

and bilateral drug control accords. These

range from the United Nations Drug Convention of 1988, to the Organization of

American States Anti-Drug Strategy of

1996, to several Western Hemisphere multilateral accords, to bilateral maritime

counterdrug agreements with 19 Caribbean

and Central American nations.

Chapter 8: International Considerations ■ 163
164 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

efforts focus on improving communications, information and intelligence systems, training and development of customs

officers, customs reform and modernization, and promoting continued cooperation

between member customs administrations

and other enforcement agencies.

International Maritime Organization

Resolution on Commercial Maritime

Drug Smuggling

The International Maritime Organization

(a component of the United Nations) Resolution A.872(20), which was adopted by

the Organization in November 1997, establishes guidelines for the prevention of drug

smuggling on ships engaged in international maritime commerce. The resolution, is

titled Guidelines for the Prevention and

Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs,

Psychotropic Substances and Precursor

Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic. Although written

from the vessel operator’s viewpoint, the

resolution is considered a precedent-setting

document containing language that could

serve as a foundation for a companion resolution on port and cargo security from the

landside perspective.

Key International

Organizations on Seaport

Security Issues

Achieving solutions requires a multilateral

partnership among governments, the international commercial maritime industry

and trade community, and constituents of

the world economy. A cooperative international approach depends on the commitment of all states to sustain their participation in multilateral organizations.

Promoting cooperation against transnational organized crime committed against

the maritime industry is more effectively

organized through such organizations.

They include, for example, the International Maritime Organization, United

The United States pledged to provide

advice, technical assistance, and training

in improving the security of manufacturing plants and the shipping cycle, and in

combating customs-related corruption.

The heads of the Caribbean states in turn

agreed to engage transport companies and

the private sector within their jurisdictions

in a cooperative partnership. The intent is

the development and adoption of security

procedures and participation in programs

that deter illegal access to and use of cargoes, commercial conveyances and associated equipment, and seaport and terminal

facilities.

Organization of American States

Technical Advisory Group on Port Security

The Maritime Administration serves as

Chair and Secretariat of the Technical

Advisory Group on Port Security of the

Organization of American States InterAmerican Committee on Ports, which has

among its agenda: (1) developing a hemispheric approach to improving the security

of the Inter-American maritime trade corridors; (2) developing a common port security strategy; (3) devising basic guidelines

and minimum standards of security for

ports of member countries of the Organization; and (4) organizing and conducting

annual courses planned under the InterAmerican Port Security Training Program.

Caribbean Customs 

Law Enforcement Council

Established in the 1970s, the Council has

35 signatory countries including the United

States and other members of the Organization of American States, as well as several

European countries with interests in the

Caribbean Basin. The mission of the Council is to assist member administrations to

fulfill their mandates to (1) collect and

protect revenue, (2) prevent and interdict

illicit drugs and other prohibited and

restricted goods, and (3) facilitate legitimate trade and international travel through

the use of modern business systems. Its
Human Rights.” INTERPOL is designed as

a communications organization and does

not maintain a force of international police

officers or agents. Instead, it serves as a

conduit for a cooperative exchange of

criminal information to help detect and

combat international crime. INTERPOL

provides a forum for discussion, working

group meetings, and symposia to enable

police from the member countries to focus

on specific areas of criminal activity

affecting their countries.

Two organizations that offer monetary

solutions and support to nations are the

International Monetary Fund and the

World Bank. The International Monetary

Fund promotes monetary cooperation

through a permanent forum for consultation and collaboration on international

monetary issues. The World Bank provides

development assistance to client nations.

The World Bank’s purpose is to help people help themselves and their environment

that includes forging partnerships in the

public and private sectors. Both of these

organizations are lending institutions that

expect repayment of their monetary assistance. In developing counties, it is frequently the case that governments lose

substantial revenues because they lack adequate control of their borders, including

seaports, and therefore fail to collect legitimate import duties and taxes associated

with foreign trade. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank may attach

conditions to their loans requiring countries to shore up their port infrastructure,

reduce corruption, and improve border

security in order to stem this loss of revenue. These organizations have significant

leverage over the behavior of foreign governments and could make use of such loan

conditions to promote the objectives of

combating crime and enhancing security in

foreign seaports.

The World Customs Organization, established originally as the Customs Cooperation Council, is an intergovernmental body

composed of 150 customs administrations.

Nations, International Criminal Police

Organization (INTERPOL), International

Association of Airport and Seaport Police,

International Council of Cruise Lines,

American Association of Port Authorities,

International Chamber of Commerce,

Baltic and International Maritime Council,

and World Customs Organization.

The International Maritime Organization, an active and well-respected organization, was created as a convention at an

international conference in Geneva in

1948, which recognized that shipping is

perhaps the most international of the

world’s industries. The International Maritime Organization fosters international

cooperation on maritime issues. Recently

the organization has been addressing issues

specifically related to terrorism and crime,

so it might provide a forum for some of the

issues raised in this report.

The Commission visited the International Maritime Organization headquarters in

London to discuss the status of international security guidelines, recommendations,

or standards and the process for initiating

international port security guidelines or

standards. This visit confirmed that, except

for cruise ship and terminal security guidelines, and guidelines for governments and

ship owners in combating piracy, there are

no international port security guidelines.

The Organization has passed a resolution

establishing guidelines for the prevention

of drug smuggling on ships engaged in

international commerce. The Organization’s representatives indicated that if the

United States or another nation were interested in proposing the development of

international port security guidelines, the

International Maritime Organization would

be the proper international forum.

INTERPOL, established in 1914,

ensures and promotes widespread mutual

assistance between all criminal police

authorities within the limits of the laws

existing in the different countries and in

the spirit of “Universal Declaration of

Chapter 8: International Considerations ■ 165
166 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

perspective of what amounts to a private

law enforcement agency. The perimeter

security (fence), closed-circuit TV system,

and access control procedures at the port

were excellent.

Rotterdam highlighted several important

security practices, including a state-of-the

art container X-ray facility. The most

important practice was its methods for certification of private security officers. In the

Netherlands, as noted earlier in this report,

all private security officers must be graduates of government-approved security

courses and must pass national exams.

This certification process is conducted at

every level of private security, including

management, and it enhances the professional reputation of private security officers as well as increasing their competence. Rotterdam emphasizes seaport

security by designating a Harbor Police

Division within its police department.

Findings and

Recommendation

Finding 8.a. The security of foreign seaports has a direct impact on the security of

U.S. seaports. Shipping and cargo originating in or transiting foreign ports provide an

avenue for the introduction of transnational

threats to the United States.

Finding 8.b. Maritime cargo is increasingly vulnerable to criminal exploitation

during transaction points throughout the

landside shipping cycle.

Finding 8.c. Increased involvement overseas by U.S. law enforcement agencies

engaged cooperatively with their foreign

counterparts is essential to proactive policing of international cargo crime and

improving the results of law enforcement

efforts.

Finding 8.d. Three key international

organizations could serve as a forum to

promote international cooperation and standards in the areas addressed in this report:

The group has been working for decades to

foster cooperation and harmonization

among customs operations throughout the

world. One very significant achievement

was the harmonization of the global tariff

codes, which number more than 20,000—a

project so complex that it required more

than 20 years to complete. The organization in June 1999 adopted a model customs

code that would harmonize all customs

procedures globally.

The International Chamber of Commerce has as its members the major businesses throughout the world that are interested in international trade issues. The

group has committees that are concerned

with shipping and customs issues.

International Best Practices

To gain an appreciation for how U.S. seaports compare with international seaports,

the Commission visited two large seaports

overseas and identified their best practices.

The Commission selected the ports of

Felixstowe, United Kingdom, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands, for visits because of

their significant infrastructure and their

advanced use of technology. The Commission attempted to identify the areas that

make the ports successful.

The Commission also met with representatives of the British government concerned with seaport security: the Department of the Environment, Transport, and

the Regions, the Security Service, and the

Home Office Coordinator for Ports Policing. Of particular note was the existence of

a national-level committee that deals with

port security issues.

Felixstowe showcased a robust in-house

security operation. The port police have

full police powers but are employees of the

port. This relationship, while efficient and

a model of professionalized seaport security, creates a conflict of interest from the
nization, INTERPOL, the Organization

of American States, the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, and other

relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

■ Increasing cooperation and informationsharing with foreign law enforcement

and customs agencies.

■ Expanding training in seaport security

for less-developed countries that are

trading partners. Such training should

be targeted toward countries where there

are serious problems and/or special law

enforcement concerns. Topics should

include anti-corruption, export control,

and handling of transit goods.

the International Maritime Organization,

the World Customs Organization, and the

International Chamber of Commerce.

Finding 8.e. Several U.S. agencies provide international port security training to

our trading partners.

Finding 8.f. The port of Rotterdam, in

the Netherlands, with its state-of-the-art

container X-ray facility, national certification of private security officers, and specialized harbor police division, could provide adoptable best practices and serve as

a model port.

Recommendation 19. Work internationally to strengthen global seaport security by:

■ Continuing implementation of the

President’s International Crime Control

Strategy and other related strategies.

■ Promoting, through federal agency initiatives and diplomatic channels, the development by cognizant international organizations of appropriate international

guidelines for addressing seaport crime

and security issues. These organizations

include the International Maritime OrgaChapter 8: International Considerations ■ 167
but smuggling of contraband, stolen goods,

prohibited or restricted merchandise and

illegal aliens, trade fraud, unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and

munitions, and environmental crimes are

also occurring in seaports. In addition,

while instances of seaport criminal activity

directly linked to terrorism are rare, much

of the criminal activity regularly occurring

in seaports (particularly contraband and

alien smuggling) is by nature susceptible to

exploitation by terrorists in conducting

their operations. Moreover, while the threat

of terrorism against seaports themselves is

currently regarded as low, critical seaport

infrastructure is vulnerable to direct attack.

The Commission was unable, however, to

assess the full extent of serious crime in

seaports, or to conclusively establish relevant trends. There are currently no reporting

systems in place that provide an accurate

and comprehensive picture of serious crime

in seaports. Federal agency databases do not

adequately collect and report crime incidents by seaports, nor are there adequate

state or local government databases to draw

upon. Moreover, there are strong indications

that a high percentage of crime in seaports

goes unreported and often undetected.

Most crimes in seaports are violations

of federal law, typically directly related to

the import or export of goods or contraband. Federal agencies are responsible for

regulating the import and export of cargo,

the movement of vessels, and the entry and

departure of persons, as well as for countering contraband and alien smuggling

through seaports. Most state and local law

enforcement agencies support the overall

anti-smuggling effort, but focus primarily

Introduction

Seaports are critical components of the

nation’s borders that serve as gateways for

the movement of international commerce.

Port security measures are aimed at minimizing the exploitation or disruption of

maritime trade and the underlying infrastructure and processes that support it.

Seaports face threats from criminals and

terrorists. A variety of criminal enterprises

target seaports and their land and waterside

approaches to exploit these intermodal

transfer points for the purpose of perpetrating a range of economic crimes including

trade fraud, cargo theft, and smuggling.

Terrorists and rogue states intent on attacking U.S. interests could target the critical

infrastructure that includes the transportation and information networks that support

U.S. economic power and the peacetime

transportation capabilities depended upon

to support deployment of military forces

for national security contingencies. Seaport

vulnerabilities may stem from inadequate

crime prevention and security measures, as

well as the challenge of monitoring the

vast and rapidly increasing volume of

cargo, persons, and vessels passing through

U.S. ports. To what degree are U.S. seaports at risk?

Key Findings

In assessing crime and security at U.S. seaports, the Commission found substantial

evidence indicating that the problem of

serious crime in seaports is significant.

Drug smuggling is the most prevalent and

most readily documented criminal activity,

Chapter 9: The State of Security in 

U.S. Seaports

169
170 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

band smuggling, commercial fraud and

export crime receiving much less attention.

While trade volumes have grown

tremendously and are expected to double

every 10 years, for the most part agency

staffing at seaports has not kept pace, limiting the ability of the federal government

to detect, respond to, and prevent criminal

activity in seaports. Although there have

been many significant investigative and

law enforcement accomplishments, and

there are additional efficiencies yet to be

gleaned (primarily through increased use

of technology and enhanced information

sharing), the relevant federal enforcement

agencies believe that more personnel and

other resources would help address seaport

crime and security issues. However, they

recognize that increases must be considered in the context of the overall budget

development process.

As reflected in the Commission’s recommendations, potential improvements in

the border control realm may be realized

through broader and more effective use of

technology; changes to the existing statutory and regulatory structure governing the

flow of cargo, vessels, and persons through

seaports; and better coordination and partnership among agencies at all levels of

government and with the private sector.

In terms of both physical security and

safeguarding seaport infrastructure, field

surveys revealed that security measures

(including control of access to marine terminals and other facilities) vary from port

to port, but generally range from fair to

poor. In several cases, security is good. No

widely accepted security standards or

guidelines exist for seaports and their facilities. Responsibility for seaport security is

fragmented, with coordination and cooperation among all levels of government and

the private sector generally not optimal.

The limited intelligence and other information available on seaport security issues is

not consistently shared with all of those

who should have that information. Few

on property and violent crimes committed

in seaport areas.

Seaport security is a complex issue that

encompasses a broad array of threats and

vulnerabilities, and involves numerous key

actors including federal, state, and local law

enforcement and inspection agencies; port

authorities; private sector businesses; and

organized labor and other port employees.

In addressing seaport security, the Commission focused on three primary areas:

■ The routine border control activities of

certain federal agencies, most notably

Customs, the Coast Guard, and the

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

in seeking to ensure that the flow of

cargo, vessels and persons through seaports complies with all applicable U.S.

criminal and civil laws.

■ The nature and extent of physical security at seaport facilities.

■ The ongoing efforts of certain federal

agencies, most notably the Coast Guard,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

the Department of Defense, in seeking

to ensure that critical seaport infrastructure is safeguarded from major terrorist

attack or other catastrophic accident.

In the first area, the Commission found

that each of the responsible federal agencies has inspection and enforcement programs that target seaports in a comprehensive and generally effective manner given

the volume of maritime traffic and the

level of agency resources available for this

task. That said, there were many indications that seaport border control programs

can and should be improved. Current

resource allocations are a primary determinant of the level of federal border enforcement efforts, and agencies too often find

themselves in a reactive mode in addressing the full range of seaport crime. The

significant and high-profile drug smuggling threat typically commands most of

the available resources, with other contra-
while others move low-risk bulk commodities such as grain, or specialize in intermodal freight containers. In certain ports,

unique geography or the proximity of specific high-risk facilities heightens the vulnerability to potential terrorist acts or catastrophic accidents. The recommendations

advanced by the Commission reflect the

widely varying circumstances affecting

seaports and the necessity to tailor security

improvements accordingly.

The major findings upon which the

Commission based its recommendations

may be summarized as follows:

■ Internal conspiracies are one of the

most serious crime problems, particularly with respect to drug smuggling.

Trafficking organizations routinely use

transportation industry employees to

facilitate their smuggling operations at

seaports by controlling or monitoring

the movement of the legitimate cargo

in which drug shipments are concealed.

■ Cargo theft is the crime that is most

important to the private sector business

entities that operate in seaports. While

the majority of cargo thefts occur when

shipments are in transit away from seaports, the seaports provide central locations where organized crime groups can

locate and easily target a wide variety

of high value goods. The absence of a

nationwide system for collecting and

reporting cargo theft data has hampered

both assessment of this problem and the

development of appropriate solutions.

■ The threat of terrorism directed at U.S.

seaports is low, but should not be discounted. Although seaports represent

an important component of the nation’s

transportation infrastructure, there is no

indication that they are currently being

targeted by terrorists.

■ The vulnerability of U.S. seaports to

terrorist attack is high, and the potential

consequences of such attack are significant from a national security standpoint.

threat or vulnerability assessments of seaports and their facilities are conducted.

The Commission found that substantial

work has been done at the national level in

preparing strategies and establishing formal structures for coordinating government

efforts to address seaport security, either

directly or indirectly. This work relates primarily to preventing drug and other contraband smuggling; promoting marine transportation safety; protecting critical

infrastructure; and combating terrorism.

Many of these initiatives, however, have

not yet reached the level of individual seaports. Too many seaport authorities remain

largely unaware of ongoing criminal activity, the potential for terrorism, and the way

in which appropriate security measures can

deter crime and decrease vulnerabilities.

The Commission believes that many seaport entities have not given adequate attention to these security issues and that more

effective interagency and public/private

sector efforts are needed in this regard.

Seaports are critical border control

points that afford law enforcement unique

opportunities to employ warrantless

searches of cargo and persons to intercept

contraband and other goods being transported illegally into the country. The effectiveness of this border control function has

crime and national security implications

for all parts of the United States, not only

the seaports. A key facet of seaport security must be to protect the integrity of the

border control function, and thereby to

help control crime and promote national

security generally.

The Commission recognizes that one

standard security regime will not be appropriate for all seaports. Seaports across the

United States vary significantly in size as

well as the nature and scale of operations.

The major seaports are multi-billion dollar

enterprises, while many others receive only

a few vessels a year. Some seaports handle

large volumes of bulk hazardous cargoes

such as petroleum or liquefied natural gas,

Chapter 9: The State of Security in U.S. Seaports ■ 171
172 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

trol. As one example of current shortfalls, the shipper’s export document—

a key source of information used by

law enforcement officials to identify

illegal exports—is usually filed up to

four days after the actual sailing of the

vessel carrying the goods. This delayed

filing effectively removes any real control from the administration of export

regulations. Another example is that

the Customs “in-bond” system for the

movement of foreign or restricted merchandise through the United States is

susceptible to abuse in ways that deprive

the government of revenue, compromise

international trade agreements, and at

times endanger American consumers.

■ The federal agency automated systems

for tracking cargo and vessels are not

easily accessible from waterfront facilities or are at remote container examination stations. Lack of ready access

undercuts agency efficiencies, enforcement activities, and commercial compliance initiatives.

■ Existing federal statutes, regulations,

and sentencing guidelines do not provide sufficient sanctions for civil and

criminal violations. Civil penalties for

failures to comply with cargo documentation requirements are commercially

inconsequential when compared to

cargo values and shipping fees. While

criminal sentences potentially available

for drug trafficking provide significant

deterrents, other criminal activity (e.g.,

cargo theft) does not entail the same

sentencing risk, yet it is often more

lucrative.

■ Joint task forces of federal, state, and

local law enforcement have proven to be

successful in combating crime in certain

seaports, and cooperation among law

enforcement agencies could be further

improved through increased joint planning efforts and cross training. However,

resource constraints often hampered

agencies’ participation in task forces and

Ports provide a venue for the introduction of a host of transnational threats

into the nation’s infrastructure. Further,

the nexus of transportation modes as

well as the concentration of passengers,

high-value cargoes, and hazardous materials make seaports potential targets for

terrorist attacks.

■ Inadequate physical security at seaport

facilities undercuts law enforcement

efforts. A fundamental cause of this

condition is the absence of uniform

security standards and operating guidelines. The access of persons and, more

importantly, commercial and privately

owned vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt

and delivery operations, and passenger

processing areas should be controlled

in order to more effectively deter and

prevent crime.

■ Unlike airports, seaports do not have

separate and restricted areas where

vessels, cargo, and passengers arriving

from foreign locations are processed.

Areas in which federal inspection

(Customs, Immigration, and Agriculture) takes place are not well controlled,

undercutting the effectiveness of these

inspections and at times posing a security risk to federal inspection personnel.

■ Private security personnel are a vital

component of overall seaport security

and cargo control. However, competencies in critical tasks and service performance vary widely among security

companies, highlighting the potential

for private security to compromise the

federal interest in seaports.

■ The U.S. trade system is vulnerable to

cargo diversion and commercial smuggling. The process of clearing goods is

complex and highly dependent on both

electronic systems and timely inputs

from commercial sources, both of which

need significant improvement. Vessel

manifest information, import and

export, is often inadequate for import

risk assessment and export cargo con-
ports. Shipping and cargo originating

in or transiting foreign ports provide an

avenue for the introduction of transnational threats to the United States. Maritime cargo is highly vulnerable to criminal exploitation at transaction points

throughout the landside shipping cycle.

Increased involvement overseas by U.S.

law enforcement agencies engaged cooperatively with their foreign counterparts is essential to improved international enforcement efforts.

Optimizing Resources

The Commission did not undertake a

resource allocation study. However, many

statements were volunteered in the seaports

surveyed indicating that there are clear perceptions within agencies and the private

sector that changes in trade patterns and

federal agency resources have not kept pace.

Customs has recently developed a resource

allocation model. A number of other agencies have also developed and employed

such planning devices. All agencies

involved in seaport security need to be

certain that they have evaluated their

resource allocation and budget development in accordance with increased trade

volumes, enhanced use of information

management and screening technology,

and other relevant projections affecting

federal agency staffing levels. They should

consider as well the appropriate mix of

federal, state, and local assets needed to

adequately address crime and security

within seaports.

The Commission’s recommendations,

detailed at the end of each chapter and

highlighted in the Executive Summary,

have significant crime control and other

national security implications. Substantial

resources will be required to implement

many of them. These resources may be

reprogrammed from within a department’s

base funding or new resources in addition

to base funding. The Commission urges

that the findings and recommendations

other interagency partnerships among

federal, state, and local law enforcement. Ongoing cooperation between

federal agencies and the private sector

(e.g., the Customs Carrier Initiative)

is impressive and should be expanded

where appropriate.

■ Adequate equipment and securityenhancing technology is not available

at most seaports. Few seaport facilities

employ best practices and available

technology to enhance cargo security.

Equipment (such as cameras, carbon

dioxide detectors, and vessel tracking

devices) that would assist law enforcement personnel in accomplishing their

missions is not always available to field

personnel. The level of inspection and

detection technology available at seaports has generally not kept pace with

that available at other border locations,

such as airports and the Southwest land

border. Acquisition costs for such new

equipment and technology could be kept

to a minimum by co-locating federal

agencies at seaports and initiating a

joint planning process for technology.

■ Information about the movement of vessels, people, and cargo within seaports

is not integrated, nor is it always readily

available to government and private sector security organizations responsible for

detecting, intercepting, and preventing

criminal activity (including terrorism).

In addition, there is inadequate actionable intelligence on seaport crime made

available to law enforcement agencies.

This process of sharing and disseminating information should be monitored by

the local port security committee to

ensure that information of security

awareness, and intelligence information

on criminal activity, port vulnerabilities,

and terrorist threats is shared among

government agencies and with the private sector where appropriate.

■ The security of foreign seaports has a

direct effect on the security of U.S. seaChapter 9: The State of Security in U.S. Seaports ■ 173
174 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

of weapons of mass destruction through

seaports. These factors, coupled with the

increasing dependence upon commercial

seaports for the deployment of U.S. military forces abroad, have national security

implications far beyond reductions in

smuggling and cargo theft. A robust program aimed at improving port security

undertaken by federal inspection and law

enforcement agencies, state and local

governments, port authorities, and the

private sector can generate measurable

reductions in seaport vulnerability that

will enhance national security, reduce

crime, and improve the economic wellbeing of the United States.

Finding 20. Assessing the adequacy of

personnel resources contributing to seaport

security is complicated by a combination

of many factors. Any such assessment

would need to address the following

points, among others: (a) all relevant personnel, including criminal investigators,

inspectors, analysts and support staff; (b)

the interdependency of the federal agency

personnel who comprise the “federal team”

at seaports; (c) possible application of current and planned approaches to personnel

issues associated with air and land ports of

entry; and (d) the optimal overall mix of

federal/state/local/private sector personnel

and other assets needed to provide an

appropriate level of security, including border control, at seaports.

Recommendation 20. Consider initiation,

through the new proposed national-level

security subcommittee, of a comprehensive, interagency study to analyze the

impact of current projections related to

seaport crime, trade volumes, technology,

and other key factors on future personnel

requirements for federal agencies having

border control responsibilities at seaports.

of this report be accorded prominence

for agency policy, program, budget, and

regulatory purposes. To the extent that the

recommendations have resource implications, the Commission recognizes that they

must be weighed against other priorities in

the context of the overall budget process.

Summary

As barriers to trade and travel across international boundaries are reduced and volumes of international cargo and passengers grow, opportunities for criminals to

exploit the commercial transportation system grow as well. In the absence of positive action to identify threats and reduce

vulnerabilities, U.S. seaports will remain

at risk from criminals trafficking in drugs,

illegal migrants, weapons, and other contraband, and engaging in fraud, theft, and

terrorism.

Although much of the investment in

security infrastructure and protection of

port facilities is the responsibility of state

and local governments or private sector

security managers, a lead role for coordinating seaport anti-smuggling and

counterterrorism activities lies with the

federal government. Presidential Decision

Directive 63 clearly states that the federal

government will take the lead in bringing

together private sector interests in protecting critical infrastructure, including

seaports.

While physical, procedural, and personnel security enhancements at seaports will

require added investments in equipment,

personnel, and training, such measures

may significantly reduce the vulnerability

of port infrastructure, vessels, waterfront

facilities, persons, and cargo to terrorist

attack or other criminal activity. Increasing

the difficulty of exploiting the legitimate

commercial cargo system for smuggling

of drugs, illegal migrants, stolen vehicles,

and other contraband can also greatly

limit opportunities for the introduction
Appendix A: Executive Memorandum

Establishing the Commission

175
176 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports
Appendix A: Executive Memorandum ■ 177
178 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports
security is improved, the industry has found

that cargo thefts occur after the cargo

leaves the seaport grounds. There is a wide

variation in examining crimes that occur

within the strict confines of a seaport and

crimes that include those related to the

cargo that is imported or exported. And

there is a lot of middle ground. For this

effort, the Commission addressed security

and crime within the port boundaries and

international cargo remaining under federal

supervision. In addition, the Commission

reviewed existing information on cargo

crime in the seaport’s metropolitan area.

Far from being self-contained entities,

seaports should be viewed as part of an

intermodal and international trade corridor.

Ensuring cargo security and preventing and

reducing crime at U.S. seaports really

starts when the cargo is loaded by manufacturers or when it is loaded onto the vessels at the foreign ports. Starting when the

vessels reach U.S. seaports leaves out critical points in the process where crimes can

be initiated. Although the Commission’s

primary focus is to review security and

crime in U.S. seaports, the Commission

addressed, to a limited extent, vessels

being boarded and loaded in foreign countries and en route to their destination on

the high seas.

In addressing criminal activity in U.S.

seaports, the issue of what crimes should

the Commission study arises. The Presidential Memorandum directing the establishment of the Commission uses terms such as

“seaport crime,” “crime in our seaports,”

and “all serious crime with a nexus to the

maritime context.” Criminal activity involving U.S. seaports can generally be viewed

in three broad categories: (1) criminal

Scope

There are 361 public seaports in the United

States. They have a broad range of characteristics. Many seaports are small and have

limited commerce; only 144 have over a

million tons of cargo. In the larger seaports, the activities can stretch along a

coast for many miles, including public

roads within their geographic boundaries.

The facilities used to support arriving

and departing cargo are sometimes miles

from the coast. The inland seaports accept

mostly bulk products such as grain, petroleum, coal, or steel. The seaports that

accept international cargo have a higher

risk of international crimes such as drug

and alien smuggling. The top 50 ports in

the United States account for about 90

percent of all cargo tonnage. In terms of

container shipments, 25 U.S. seaports

account for 98 percent of the cargo.

Cruise ships visiting foreign destinations

embark from 16 ports.

Generally, seaport geographic boundaries are defined. However, criminal activity associated with the cargo that comes

into the seaport does not always occur on

the seaport grounds, or it is not detected

until after the cargo leaves the port. For

example, crime may be suspected and

federal agents may engage in a surveillance that may not be culminated until

many days or weeks later and hundreds of

miles away. Frequently, cargo arrives in

U.S. ports and the importer files in-bond

documents to move cargo to another city,

maybe thousands of miles away. Technically the cargo is still under federal supervision until importers file their final entry

in another location and it is released by

Customs. Finally, in those seaports where

Appendix B: Methodology

179
180 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

U.S. trade secrets, economic espionage,

etc.).

In addressing security (which we view

as the preventative side) at U.S. seaports,

the following categories have been identified as core issues: physical security and

access control; cargo security; passenger

and crew security; and military mobilization security. Effective physical security

and access control in seaports is fundamental to deterring and preventing potential threats to seaport operations, cargo

shipments for smuggling or theft, or other

cargo crimes. Securing entry points, open

storage areas, and warehouses throughout

the seaport, controlling the movements of

trucks transporting cargo through the port,

and searching containers, warehouses, and

ships at berth or in the harbor are important requirements. Identification procedures for arriving workers, and deterring

and preventing internal conspiracies, are

also becoming increasingly important.

Unconstrained by jurisdictional constraints

or national borders, criminal organizations

are exploiting weak security in seaports

and their intermodal connections to commit a wide range of cargo crimes. Levels

of containerized cargo volumes are forecasted to increase significantly, which will

create more opportunities for crime while

lowering the statistical risk of detection

and interdiction.

The large number of U.S. citizens sailing on international cruises provides an

attractive target to terrorists seeking to

cause mass casualties. Approximately 80

percent of cruise line passengers are U.S.

citizens and 20 percent are aliens. Approximately 92 percent of crewmembers are

aliens. Cruise ships pose a special risk

from a security perspective. The worldwide cruise ship fleet will carry nearly

10 million cruise passengers this year.

Cruise ship terminals must be secure to

prevent unauthorized people from gaining

access to the area. Coast Guard regulations exist that specify minimum security

standards to which cruise ship lines must

activity committed by smugglers, thieves,

or other criminal groups whose criminal

activity is aided and abetted by corrupt

individuals employed within the transportation industry (commonly referred to as

internal conspiracies), (2) criminal activity

that exploits legitimate international trade

or otherwise utilizes the transportation

industry to facilitate crime, and (3) crimes

that comprise the Part I and Part II offenses

in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program.

The list below shows the types of crimes

that the Commission included in its efforts:

■ Terrorism.

■ Internal conspiracies involving all

substantive crime.

■ Smuggling: strategic/sensitive items

(weapons of mass destruction, drugs,

munitions, currency, precursor chemicals, etc.).

■ Smuggling: general (child pornography;

art/artifacts, endangered species, etc.).

■ Alien smuggling; stowaways.

■ Cargo theft (metropolitan area, federal

supervision).

■ Cargo control (false manifesting,

diversion, substitution, etc.).

■ Trade crime (intellectual property rights,

dumping, child labor, etc.).

■ Extortion, racketeering, money laundering, tax evasion, bribery, corruption,

and other serious crimes.

■ Health and safety (tainted foodstuff,

pharmaceutical drugs, chlorofluorocarbons, pesticides, etc.).

■ Environmental crimes (dumping oil,

hazardous waste, toxic substances, etc.).

■ Unlawful export of strategic/sensitive

items (weapons of mass destruction,

ballistic delivery systems, critical technology, military equipment, munitions,

currency, etc.).

■ Unlawful exports of general items

(stolen vehicles, property and securities,
Detroit New York/New Jersey

Gulfport Philadelphia

Los Angeles Port Everglades

Long Beach San Juan

Miami Tacoma

The Commission collected data at each

location it surveyed. It toured ocean and

land facilities and reviewed security practices. It examined port and terminal facilities, warehouses, and federal inspection

stations, along with other port facilities.

Many seaport officials were interviewed,

including the following:

■ Port authorities and terminal operators.

■ State and local law enforcement officials.

■ Other state and local government

officials.

■ Ocean, truck, and rail carriers.

■ Warehouse operators.

■ Foreign trade zone operators.

■ Freight forwarders and customs brokers.

■ Importers and exporters.

■ Private security groups.

■ Labor unions.

■ Officials of federal agencies including

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms, the Animal Plant Health

Inspection Service, the Commerce

Department, the Coast Guard, the

Consumer Product Safety Commission,

the Customs Service, the Department

of Defense, the Drug Enforcement

Administration, the Environmental

Protection Agency, the Federal Bureau

of Investigations, U.S. Attorney’s

Offices, the Food and Drug Administration, the Internal Revenue Service,

the Food Safety Inspection Service, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

and the Maritime Administration.

adhere to in order to adequately protect

passengers from terrorist attacks. These

regulations apply only to large cruise

ships on international voyages. In contrast,

ships with domestic voyages (that do not

dock at a foreign port) such as sightseeing, gambling, and fishing vessels, as

well as commuter and car ferries, are not

covered under the regulations. Security

programs in these sectors are voluntary.

Costs associated with enhancing security

often prevent these business sectors from

pursuing a solid security program.

If U.S. troops and equipment are needed

in other parts of the world, they are generally deployed through U.S. commercial seaports. In the event of a contingency, U.S.

military and logistical support for overseas

operations must now extend greater distances over shorter time lines in order to

reach the military theater of operation.

Consequently, U.S. seaports have become

critical choke points of future military

mobilizations. The security of our commercial ports during times of military mobilization ensures that such movements are

not disrupted and is, therefore, essential to

the national defense.

Ports Under Study by the Commission

The Commission reviewed the listing of

361 commercial seaports to determine

which seaports we should study in depth.

With only 50 seaports representing 90 percent of all cargo by tons, 25 ports representing 98 percent of the container traffic,

and 16 ports representing 98 percent of all

international cruise ship passengers, we

decided to confine the scope of on-site

surveys to 12 seaports.

The Commission performed on-site

surveys at 12 seaports, with the primary

focus on those seaports that receive international cargo. The seaports were selected

based on their size and level of criminal

activity. They are:

Charleston New Orleans

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 181
182 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Work Plan

In order to accomplish its work, the

Commission developed a comprehensive

methodology. The methodology included

the following sections:

I. Describe the specific mission, authorities, and responsibilities of federal

agencies and identify the roles played

in security by federal, state, and local

governments as well as the private

sector.

II. Analyze the nature and extent of

serious crime with a nexus to the

maritime context.

III. Assess the readiness of seaports to

respond to terrorist threats.

IV. Evaluate the state of security at

U.S. seaports.

V. Assess the nature and effectiveness of

ongoing coordination among federal,

state, and local government agencies.

VI. Solicit input from the private sector

and other interests.

Each section and the work efforts undertaken for the Commission’s efforts are

described in more detail below.

The following national and international

organizations provided input to the Commission:

■ American Association of Exporters

and Importers.

■ American Association of Port 

Authorities.

■ American Institute of 

Marine Underwriters.

■ American Trucking Associations.

■ American Waterways Operators.

■ International Council of Cruise Lines.

■ International Longshore and

Warehouse Union.

■ International Longshoreman’s

Association.

■ Maritime Security Council.

■ National Cargo Security Council.

■ American Association of

Waterfront Employers.

■ American Institute of Marine

Underwriters.

■ National Customs Brokers and

Forwarders Association.

■ Technology Asset Protection

Association.

The Commission also published a notice

in the Federal Register to give the private

sector and public an opportunity to comment in public sessions. These sessions

were set in Hampton Roads, Virginia;

Houston, Texas; and San Francisco, California. A Web site was established on the

Internet to provide information about the

study to the general public and to solicit

comments from those who could not contact the Commission in person. Commission members and the staff also attended

conferences of relevant national organizations and solicited comments from many

private organizations.
as a mechanism for undocumented or illegal

aliens to enter the United States. Terrorist

threats and environmental crime involve

even more agencies.

Collecting Federal Agency Information

To describe the authorities, missions, and

responsibilities in each federal agency, the

Commission contacted each to obtain legislation, regulations, executive orders, and

other sources that provide information

about agency authorities regarding crime

and security at seaports. We also surveyed

agencies to determine which agencies have

grant authority. The Commission identified

the specific organizational components that

deal with crime and security at seaports and

their mission-related objectives.

Agency Programs on Crime and 

Security at U.S. Seaports

Several agencies have developed programs

that deal with crime and security at U.S., as

well as foreign seaports. For example, the

Customs Service has a Carrier Initiative Program in which the agency works with carriers to improve their security in U.S. and foreign ports, as well as the Americas Counter

Smuggling Initiative and the Business AntiSmuggling Coalition program, which are

designed to assist foreign businesses and

governments in deterring and preventing

narcotics from being smuggled via legitimate

businesses, and to assist importers, exporters,

and port authorities in deterring smuggling,

respectively. Although these programs were

initially designed to prevent drug smuggling,

the improvements in security assist the businesses for other areas as well. The Maritime

Administration, in conjunction with the

Organization of American States, conducts

a maritime security training program for

ports in foreign countries. The Commission

also briefly looked at some of the key federal

control functions in the seaport and in the

approaches to seaports, focusing on the areas

of maritime security, law enforcement, cargo

inspection and control, and passenger/crew

inspection and control.

Section I: Describe the Specific

Missions, Authorities, and

Responsibilities of Federal

Agencies and Identify the Roles

Played by Federal, State, and

Local Governments as well as

the Private Sector

Seaports are complex entities with hundreds of different organizations conducting business, often with tens of thousands

of employees working for them. The Maritime Administration estimates that the

port industry, nationwide, results in more

than 13 million jobs, about $500 million

in personal income, $1.5 trillion in business sales, about $750 billion in GNP and

about $200 billion in taxes. Public seaports are generally owned and operated by

local governments through a Port Authority; however, large portions of seaport real

estate are often leased to the private sector

with the local government operating as a

landlord. In addition, many privately

owned and operated terminals exist within

seaports, independent of the local Port

Authority. Businesses operating in the seaport include terminal operators, ocean carriers, and trucking companies as well as

warehousemen, freight forwarders, brokers, and food servicing companies.

Crime that occurs in the seaport may be

investigated by a number of agencies. State

or local law enforcement officers combat

much crime at seaports, but the federal

government also has a role. The Customs

Service, Immigration, and other inspection

agencies such as the Food and Drug

Administration and the Agriculture Department are also involved to ensure that cargo

and passengers arriving from foreign countries comply with U.S. laws and regulations. Smuggling merchandise such as

illicit drugs, weapons of mass destruction,

conventional weapons, child pornography,

and counterfeit merchandise also attract

federal agency interest. Seaports also serve

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 183
184 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Administration. The type of crime data

collected consisted of known offenses,

arrests, seizures, recoveries, and information on internal conspiracies (industry

employees).

Second, the Commission conducted onsite studies at the 12 seaports surveyed,

where crime data were collected from

appropriate state and local law enforcement agencies from 1996 through 1998

and where interviews and meetings were

held with appropriate federal, state, and

local law enforcement officials to discuss

crime problems at seaports. During the

on-site study, the team conducted the

following activities:

■ Met with relevant federal, state, or

local law enforcement officers knowledgeable in seaport crime to discuss

their estimates and views, and how

they are responding to seaport crime.

■ Met with appropriate U.S. Attorney

representatives who are knowledgeable

in the prosecution of seaport crime to

determine what prosecution efforts are

underway relative to seaport crime and

their ideas for improvement.

■ Met with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies knowledgeable

in seaport crime to discuss their recommendations to improve anti-crime

efforts at seaports.

■ Met with relevant federal, state, and

law enforcement officers knowledgeable

in seaport crime to discuss intelligence

initiatives, as well as the crime threat

facing their seaports and their recommendations for improvement.

■ Met with relevant federal, state, and

local law enforcement officers knowledgeable in seaport crime to discuss

technology issues and their recommendations for technology improvements.

Section II: Analyze the Nature

and Extent of Serious Crime 

with a Nexus to the Maritime

Context

One of the key objectives of the Commission was to conduct an analysis of the

nature and extent of serious crime in U.S.

seaports. In order to do this, the Commission had to collect as much information as

possible from federal, state and local law

enforcement agencies relating to seaport

crime. This was difficult because most

federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies typically do not collect and report

crime data by seaports.

For example, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, a component of the Office of

Justice Programs in the Department of

Justice, is the primary source for criminal

justice statistics, but none of its programs

collect and report crime data by seaport.

In addition, the Uniform Crime Reporting

Program and the National Incident-Based

Reporting System are nationwide crime

data collection and reporting systems

administered by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, but these programs also

do not collect and report crime data by

seaport.

The Commission’s crime data collection

effort occurred in two main areas. First, the

Commission collected data from all relevant federal agencies for fiscal years 1996

through 1998. Crime data were collected

from the Customs Service, the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Department

of Commerce, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,

the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental

Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug
such as a cargo vessel, port facility, cruise

ship, bridge, or oil storage tanks to attack.

The Commission addressed how well

ports throughout the country have prepared

for terrorist threats and evaluate what the

Federal government is doing to assist them.

The Commission decided to:

■ Work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, Navy,

Department of Transportation, Central

Intelligence Agency, National Security

Council, and other agencies to collect

available information on terrorist threats

to U.S. seaports and maritime commerce, in general.

■ Identify if and how information about

terrorism and terrorist threats is disseminated to the port authorities and carriers

for them to prepare for threats.

■ Review with port authorities and terminal operators their knowledge of terrorist threats and determine what steps they

have taken to prepare.

■ Review with carriers, for both cargo

and passengers vessels, their knowledge

of terrorist threats and determine what

steps they have taken to prepare.

■ Solicit suggestions for improvements.

Section IV: Evaluate the State

of Security at U.S. Seaports

To evaluate the state of security at seaports,

the Commission needed a set of standards

or criteria to use as a benchmark. Unfortunately, there has not been comprehensive

federal rulemaking on security at seaports

as there has been at airports. There are also

no generally accepted international or

industry standards for all components of

seaport security. Therefore, the Commission needed to develop a set of standards

to use for the purpose of this evaluation.

Section III: Assess the

Readiness of Seaports to

Respond to Terrorist Threats

The Commission reviewed the issues related to addressing possible terrorist acts at

seaports. In addressing the issue of possible terrorist attacks at seaports, the Commission examined if seaports are vulnerable to terrorist incidents, and how security

within seaports could contribute to a possible terrorist incident. The Commission also

examined the ways in which government

agencies are responding to the threat of

possible terrorist incidents at seaports and

provide recommendations for reducing vulnerabilities and improving the response of

federal, state, and local governments to

these threats.

Many government agencies have found

that by establishing partnerships with the

maritime industry and trade organizations

that provide incentives for industry to participate in programs, they can enlist the

trade’s support in law enforcement initiatives. Because of the effect that a terrorist

activity could have at a seaport and industry’s interest in preventing or thwarting this

type of activity it was anticipated that carriers, port authorities, and other affected

organizations would want to work closely

with the Commission on this issue.

The Commission also focused on ways to

develop and disseminate actionable intelligence to law enforcement agencies (including state and local) regarding: the identification of illegal trafficking in weapons of

mass destruction, illicit financial transactions involving terrorists, and the identification of possible terrorist targets at seaports.

The Commission also reviewed ways that

the federal agencies are providing the private sector with information. Information

could permit the private sector to target suspicious shipments and individuals who

could be using a U.S. seaport to transport

terrorist-related materials, or who could be

choosing a target within the seaport area

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 185
186 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

terminals or en route to or from the seaport, or smuggling of contraband concealed in containers along with legitimate cargo shipments.

■ Passenger and crew security includes

protecting vessel passengers and crew

from terrorist attack, preventing unauthorized entry into the seaports of illegal

migrants or stowaways on commercial

vessels, and preventing smuggling of

drugs or other contraband by vessel

crewmembers.

■ Security for military mobilization

includes measures to ensure physical,

operational, and information security

for overseas deployment of U.S. military

equipment, ammunition, and supplies

through commercial seaports in order

to prevent sabotage, espionage, and

terrorist attack.

A complete set of criteria is included at

the end of this appendix.

Field Work and Survey Techniques

To further its study and analysis, the Commission conducted on-site surveys at 12

U.S. seaports, including some Strategic

Seaports, where the Commission conducted security surveys of entities within the

ports (vessel operations, pier and terminal

operations, warehouses, trucking terminals,

and rail facilities). The surveys were conducted by using entity-specific surveys

developed and designed to assess the security of passenger, cargo, and military operations within the port, and the overall

physical security of the port. The Commission also reviewed existing plans and threat

assessments and the dissemination of intelligence within seaports. The Commission

surveyed two foreign ports and compared

the security at these foreign facilities to

that at the 12 U.S. seaports surveyed.

Security Criteria

In developing standards for seaport security

to be used by the Commission, many

sources were evaluated including federal

regulations, government handbooks, and

guidelines of private sector groups that

have devoted substantial efforts to improving security. A set of criteria was compiled

which provide a basis for key elements of

seaport security. The criteria, compiled

from commercial industry port security

standards and federal agency guidelines,

represent reasonable and defensible minimum levels of performance. The Commission developed a two-tier approach. The

first tier was a minimum set of standards

that have been accepted as good practice

by the various business and government

groups that have studied these issues.

A second tier was designed enhanced security measures that have been either proposed or are in effect in some seaports.

The seaports were evaluated using the first

set of criteria. However, the Commission

collected information at the seaports on

the enhanced security measures to determine if the level of commitment to security

is higher in some areas and to see how they

are working. The criteria developed by the

Commission for evaluating security pertain

to four functional components as follows:

■ Physical security and access control

refers to perimeter security, for both

port and facility boundaries and internal

restricted areas, and may include fences,

gates, lighting, alarm systems, and security patrols. It should also include identification and access restrictions for

employees, casual labor, visitors, vehicles, and vessels.

■ Cargo security includes screening of

shipments for contraband (drugs, currency, stolen vehicles, prohibited exports,

etc.), as well as implementing measures

to prevent theft of cargo from marine
security and combating crime. Many of the

security procedures are implemented by

the private sector such as ocean carriers,

truckers, and warehousemen. Employees

who work at the seaports are also a critical

link. Businessmen and employees sometimes are willing to serve as informants to

law enforcement agencies. The Commission also reviewed efforts the federal,

state, and local agencies have ongoing

to work with this important sector of the

seaport community.

Section VI: Solicit Input from the

Private Sector and Other Interests

The issues involving port security within

U.S. seaports affect many different entities

in a variety of ways. For example, carriers,

importers/exporters, and freight forwarders

often suffer when security practices in a

port are lax because their operations

become vulnerable to smugglers and

thieves. Also, an individual port’s reputation may suffer because if it fails to correct

deficient security practices, it may be perceived as fostering environments that allow

thieves and smugglers to exist. The lack of

security can therefore relate to increased

business costs for the individual trade entities that use a port, or in the loss of business by ports.

There are trade associations in the private sector whose goals are to reduce cargo

theft and pilferage, such as the National

Cargo Security Council. There are associations with interests in reducing their vulnerability to drug and alien smuggling

and maritime terrorism, such as the Maritime Security Council, the International

Council of Cruise Lines, and the American

Association of Port Authorities. These

associations represent carriers, importers/

exporters, insurance companies, port

authorities, and others who have an interest

in reducing the vulnerability of their members. Many of these entities and associaSection V: Assess the Nature

and Effectiveness of Ongoing

Coordination Among Federal,

State, and Local Government

Agencies

Assessing the effectiveness of coordination

is a complex task because coordination is

difficult to measure and quantify. There are

also no widely accepted standards on

effective coordination. After much consideration, the Commission decided to conduct the assessment in this section by interviewing the various entities and asking a

series of questions about how they work

together. The Commission also saw some

difference in the way coordination might

occur in the area of criminal activity versus

security and prevention. Although law

enforcement authorities do pursue criminal

activity both proactively and reactively, a

significant amount of time and effort is

spent reacting to criminal activity. The purpose of security is to deter and prevent

crime and unauthorized intrusions. Most

frequently, the officials who pursue the

crimes are not the same as those who

pursue security.

The Commission identified current

U.S. interagency and intergovernmental

initiatives and activities that address crime

and security in the seaport environment.

Once these initiatives and activities were

identified, the Commission examined

whether the efforts are sufficient to ensure

safe and crime-free seaports.

Because there are no set measures that

quantify whether cooperation is at an

acceptable level, the Commission identified several areas for review, including

communication and liaison, training, intelligence sharing and results, operational

coordination, and accomplishments.

The Commission is also aware that businesses and other entities involved in seaport operations are critical to improving

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 187
188 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Speaking with all of those from the

private sector or state and local governments who wished to make a presentation to the Commission.

Port Security Criteria

The following details the criteria used to

evaluate seaport security and review possible enhancements as described in Chapter

5. The sources used to compile this information are included in the footnotes.

Physical Security and Access Control1

Perimeter Fence Line

■ Fence line should be intact, taut, well

secured to upright supports anchored

into the ground, topped with barbed

wire on outward facing angle irons,

and stand at least eight feet in height.

■ Reinforcement of the fence line with

a barrier (e.g., ditch or berm) should

be used to enclose wheeled operations

involving containers on chassis or trucks

with consolidated cargoes overnight, to

render certain parts of the fence line

physically impassable for a trailer.

■ Alarms should be installed to complement the security of a reinforced fence

line to form a system capable of monitoring many alarm zones from a central

control room manned by terminal security personnel.

tions are currently involved in partnerships

with government agencies in order to identify and address security-related issues and

to reduce their overall vulnerabilities. The

experience and knowledge that these entities and organizations could offer to the

Commission had the potential to make the

Commission’s evaluations more effective

and accurate, and to ensure that the Commission’s recommendations are realistic

and can be effectively implemented.

It was anticipated that labor groups

would also be a significant stakeholder

regarding the issue of security within U.S.

seaports. Labor organizations perform the

lading and unlading of cargo at many U.S.

seaports, and other organizations perform

tasks related to the movement of goods

within ports. These and other groups have

an interest in security-related issues in

ports.

Identifying and soliciting input from

stakeholders was accomplished by:

■ Interviewing the headquarters of federal

agencies and congressional offices to

determine the organizations and groups

they normally consult with on these

issues.

■ Contacting local federal agency offices

to determine the organizations and

groups they consult with on these issues.

■ Meeting with private sector and labor

groups during the on-site surveys.

■ Publishing a notice in the Federal Register regarding the establishment of the

Commission and soliciting input from

the stakeholders.

■ Creating a Web site to disseminate

information to stakeholders about the

establishment of the Commission and

to outline its objectives.

■ Attending and speaking to the attendees

of industry conferences and law

enforcement conferences.

1 Standards for Marine Cargo Security, Security

Committee, American Association of Port Authorities,

1980; Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against

Passengers and Crews On Board Ships {Assembly

Resolution A.584(14)}, International Maritime Organization (IMO), 1986; Physical Security for Cargo

and Passenger Terminals, Maritime Security Manual,

Seaports and Harbors Subcommittee, Standing

Committee on Transportation Security, American

Society for Industrial Security, 1990; Terminal Security, TT Club; 1997 [TT Club is a European-based

specialist insurer of transport operators equipment

and liabilities operating in 80 countries]; Port Security: Security Force Management, authored by Port

Authority of New York/New Jersey Police and private sector seaport security consultants; published

by U.S. Department of Transportation, 1998.
■ Gatehouses at all vehicle entrances and

exits shall be manned during business

hours by operators of facilities handling

a substantial volume of high value

cargo, should be situated so that exiting

vehicles may be halted and examined on

terminal property, and be equipped with

telephones or other communications

devices.

■ Closed circuit television systems should

be used for control of the interior and

perimeter of the terminal and record

entry and exit through the main gate,

and the images stored for designated

periods.

■ Operational information obtained by

terminals during the entry stage should

be made available to the security department for its purposes to, for example,

ensure and verify that a particular container was released to a specific driver.

Lighting

■ Controlled adequate lighting shall be

provided to enable clear illumination

for all facility areas, including perimeter

fence lines, entrances, exits, and gatehouses, and sufficient to assure proper

visibility of approaching persons and

vehicles.

■ Seaport authority should ensure that all

areas of the terminal are illuminated to

at least the level of twilight, even when

there is no activity. While in port, the

ship deck and hull should be illuminated

in periods of darkness and restricted visibility, but not so as to interfere with the

required navigation lights and safe navigation.

Buildings

■ In areas adjacent to warehouses, sheds,

and passenger terminals a buffer zone of

at least 10 feet should be created around

the entire building and be enforced at all

times.

Parking

■ Parking areas shall be situated outside

of fenced operational areas or a substantial distance from cargo handling and

storage areas and buildings, and passenger embarkation areas.

■ Employees exiting to the parking area

from a cargo or passenger facility shall

be required to pass through a controlled

area under the supervision of security

personnel.

■ Employees visiting their motor vehicle

during work shifts should be required

to notify management or security

personnel.

■ Control of access to employee parking

areas should be supervised, and shall

be restricted by a permit system with

records maintained that include matching personnel with permit number and

motor vehicle identification. Temporary

permits will be issued to vendors and

visitors for parking in designated controlled areas.

Access Points

■ Gates in disuse should be permanently

sealed or removed.

■ Gates considered indispensable and in

daily use should be secured by two sets

of padlocks and case-hardened steel

chains, or deadlocking bolt or an equivalent device, which does not require

use of a chain.

■ Gates should be equipped with a recording system to document inspection

stops by security personnel during

routine patrols.

■ Separate gates shall be constructed for

the use of personnel and vehicular traffic, which will include personnel

screening point.

■ Gate alarms should be installed and

monitored from a central point (e.g.,

main guard house).

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 189
190 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ An employee identification card system

shall be employed by terminals handling

a substantial volume of cargo or passengers to identify personnel authorized to

enter cargo, passenger, and document

processing areas.

■ Display of employee identification card,

visible at all times, shall be required of

each employee.

■ Supervisory personnel should be present

during lunch and breaks if taken in the

work area.

■ Truck drivers, vendors, and other visitors should not be permitted in the general offices of any terminal other than

as required to conduct their business,

and only authorized personnel should

be permitted in warehouses.

■ Computer security formal guidelines

should be in place for each marine

terminal.

■ Computerized information access must

be password controlled, and should be

restricted on a need-to-know basis,

which would include dissemination of

information no sooner than required to

complete transactions involving, for

example, shipping agents.

Security Force Management

■ Security director should establish minimum hiring standards, and ensure their

compliance.

■ Training is imperative for in-house or

contracted security force personnel, all

of whom must receive adequate prework classroom training and certification by a qualified professional that

includes completion of basic security

topics, and should have at least 16 hours

of on-the-job training.

■ Security director’s written job specifications should include the task of maintaining and validating the published

information in the security manual,

should be an assessment element in the

manager’s formal performance review.

■ Remove containers obstructing the view

of building entrances by police and

security guards.

■ All exterior doors and windows should

be equipped with properly installed

locks or locking devices, and incorporated with detection or alarm systems.

■ Area alarm systems should be installed

to secure computer rooms and office

spaces where confidential documents

are stored.

■ Key control system should be implemented with a formal policy governing which

personnel have right of access to specified areas, and include a master ledger

maintained recording the legitimate

holder of each copy of each key, and

issuance for which shall be controlled

by management or security personnel.

■ Locks, locking devices, and key control

systems will be inspected regularly, and

malfunctioning equipment repaired or

replaced.

Standard Operating Procedures

■ Port authority or terminal operator shall

provide current security manual incorporating standard operating procedures,

standards of conduct, and a definitive

statement of what the management

expects of the security force.

■ The security manual should be fully

documented, complete, and accurate,

and be consistently adhered to.

■ Security director should formulate written operating procedures for securityrelated matters, including bomb threats

and alert levels, and should collaborate

with relevant government and law

enforcement agencies to develop an

emergency response plan.

■ Adequate and reliable communications

should be provided to enable contact

between elements of the terminal security force and from the security force to

local law enforcement.
■ Personnel processing delivery orders

should verify the identity of the trucker

and trucking company before releasing

the shipment.

■ Access to areas where documentation

is processed must be limited to only

authorized personnel and shipping

documents need to be safeguarded

from theft.

■ Seal numbers on containers should be

verified against documents, and seals

should be checked for integrity.

■ The insides of conveyances should be

checked for stolen merchandise.

■ Drivers should sign for shipments

legibly and in ink.

Reception of Cargo

■ Drivers entering facilities with

deliveries must obtain gate passes.

■ Drivers should show identification and

the company name of carriers must be

clearly shown on all equipment.

■ Delivery documents (such as bills of

lading) should be closely scrutinized,

seal numbers on containers should be

verified against documents, and seals

should be checked for integrity.

■ Cargo shipments should be verified

upon receipt.

Security of Cargo during Lading and

Unlading from Vessels and Railcars

■ Cargo should be moved directly

from railcars or vessels directly to

storage facilities, and directly from

storage facilities to railcars and 

vessels.

■ Seals should be checked on all

containerized shipments prior to

arrival/departure/transfer.

■ Empty containers should be opened,

examined, and resealed, and stored

door to door in facilities.

■ Security personnel should frequently

patrol terminals to ensure that gates,

fence line, and buildings are secure.

■ Security personnel should be required to

complete a work sheet during each shift,

recording the duties performed by them

and at the times of occurrence.

Enhanced Measures for Physical Security

and Access Control

■ All individuals employed in the seaport

who have access to restricted or secure

areas have been subject to background

and criminal record checks.

■ In addition to port facility employees,

photo ID badges are displayed by vessel

crewmembers, other carrier employees,

vendors, longshoremen, passengers and

visitors to prevent unauthorized access

to restricted areas.

■ Intrusion Detection Systems including

video monitoring, remote sensors and

alarms, and computerized recording

instrumentation are employed to facilitate

real-time evaluation and response and

subsequent investigation and analysis.

Cargo Security2

Delivery of Cargo

■ Gate passes must be issued to truckers

and other carriers to control and identify

those authorized to pick up cargo.

■ The company name of carriers must be

clearly shown on all equipment.

■ Cargo should only be released to the

carrier specified in the delivery order

unless a release authorizing delivery to

another carrier is presented and verified.

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 191

2 Treasury Decision 72-56, dated February 4, 1972;

Sea Carrier Security Manual, Customs Publication

No 546, April, 1989; Terminal Security, published

by the TT Club; Cargo Security and Loss Control,

published by the National Cargo Security Council,

1998; Security Recommendations and Standards for

Cargo Security, compiled by the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police, 1984.
192 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ High value cargo in containers should

also be placed on the upper tiers of

container stacks in order to limit their

accessibility, and the containers should

also be stacked so that the doors of

each container abut each other.

Seals and Sealing Practices

■ Seals must be inspected whenever a

sealed containerized shipment enters or

leaves a facility. If the seals are not

intact, or there is evidence of tampering

or the seals are not correct, security

needs to be notified and the cargo in

the container needs to be tallied.

■ Unsealed containerized shipments need

to be sealed at the point of entry to the

facility and the seal number needs to be

noted on shipping documents.

■ Seals must be stored in a secure place,

access to seals must be restricted, and a

log noting the distribution of seals must

be kept.

■ Seals must also be checked and their

numbers, date, time, and place of examination recorded at each of the following times: arrival at/leaving the terminal

gate, during stacking; relocation within

the terminal; loading/discharge from a

vessel; whenever the container doors

are opened.

Equipment Control

■ Access and keys to equipment such as

yard mule tugmasters, trucks, or high

loaders should be strictly controlled.

■ Equipment should be kept in a secure

and specified area when not in use.

Personnel Security

■ Perspective employees should be

required to provide background information about previous employment history, criminal records, and drug use.

■ All prospective employees should be

fingerprinted as part of the application

process and criminal history records

Storage of Loose Cargo

■ Cargo stored in open areas, and palletized or stacked cargo stored in warehouse facilities must be properly stacked

and placed within, away from, and

parallel to fences and walls, to ensure

unimpeded views for security personnel.

Documentation Review and Control

■ Bills of lading for cargo and containers

should be checked for accuracy prior to

acceptance.

■ Cargo on documentation should be adequately described, and the weights and

piece counts indicated on documentation.

■ Cargo documentation should be closely

guarded to avoid documentation fraud.

Cargo Control, Inventories, and

Cargo Reconciliation

■ Facility operators must maintain, and

continuously update an accurate list

(paper or electronic) of all cargo in

facilities and a location chart of all

cargo, and containers in their facilities.

■ Import cargo, export cargo, and domestic cargo should be segregated.

■ Delivery and receiving operations

should be segregated.

■ Overages and shortages should be

reported immediately.

High Value Merchandise

■ High value commodities must be stored

in cribs or security cages designed to

resist forcible entry from all sides, and

separate logs and procedures for the

release and receipt of these commodities

must be maintained.

■ High value merchandise in mounted

containers must be placed in a secure

holding area where it can be observed

by management or security personnel

at all times and separate logs and procedures for the release and receipt of

these containers must be maintained.
■ Port Authorities, or terminal operators,

employ non-intrusive technology (such

as X-ray, or gamma ray systems) to

identify contraband and/or verify cargo

shipments.

■ Trucking company uses an automated

system such as Global Positioning

Systems or cellular) to track trucks

and shipments.

■ Firms have developed and implement

“Integrated Security Concepts” into

their operations to deter and prevent

internal conspiracies from occurring.

Security of Passengers and Crew3

■ The introduction of prohibited weapons,

incendiaries, or explosives aboard passenger vessels, on persons, within personal articles or baggage, or in stowed

baggage, cargo, or stores should be

prevented or deterred.

■ A high level of gangway security should

be maintained by passenger vessels

throughout a voyage. These security

measures should include some form of

biometric identifier (such as a photograph), to prevent the unauthorized

boarding and re-boarding of persons

after port calls.

■ Timely, accurate, and complete passenger and crew arrival and departure

manifest information should be submitted by carriers to the Immigration and

Naturalization Service.

should be performed on all perspective

employees (to the extent permitted by

law).

■ Employers should have “drug awareness” and “security education” programs in effect for all employees.

■ Employees must wear distinctive identification cards or badges that act as authorization for accessing restricted areas.

Audit Trails, Correcting Vulnerabilities, and

Reviewing Procedures

■ Procedures must be in place that will

permit investigators when reviewing

documentation to determine how and

when any cargo or containers were

removed from an operator’s custody

in an unauthorized manner.

■ When an operator’s system is compromised, and cargo or containers are

removed from an operator’s custody in

an unauthorized manner, procedures

must be in place to identify the deficient

procedures/practices and corrective

action must be taken to ensure a similar

incident does not occur.

■ Managers must review procedures periodically to ensure new threats and procedural vulnerabilities are identified as

they arise.

Enhanced Measures for Cargo Security

■ Seaports where foreign cargo arrives

should have a separate Federal Inspection Station. Access to these areas is

limited only to those that have previously received approval to enter the area.

■ Closed Circuit Television system should

be used to record activities during lading and unlading procedures, and within

cargo processing and trucking facilities.

■ Port Authorities, terminal operators,

warehouse operators, and trucking companies have installed automated access

control systems in order to monitor

access to restricted areas.

Appendix B: Methodology ■ 193

3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex

17: International Standards and Recommended Practices; U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14,

Part 107 (Airport Security), Part 108 (Airplane

Operator Security), Part 109 (Indirect Air Carrier

Security); United Kingdom—Aviation and Maritime

Security Act of 1990; International Maritime Organization (IMO)—Maritime Security Committee

Circular 443: Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts

Against Passengers and Crews on Board Ships;

International Maritime and Port Security Act (46

USC app. 1801)—Title IX of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (PL

99-399); U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 33,

Part 120 (Security of Passenger Vessels), Part 128

(Security of Passenger Terminals).
194 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Military Mobilization Security

■ The local Port Readiness Committee

must actively meet. All applicable federal, state, local, and commercial entities

must be included in its membership.

■ The Port Readiness Committee must

have a written and current memorandum

of understanding.

■ A Port Readiness Exercise must have

been conducted within the last two

years.

Enhanced Measures for Military

Mobilization Security

■ Any “lessons learned”/problems, as

outlined in the latest Port Readiness

Exercise Final Report, must be resolved

or in the process of being actively

resolved.

■ The local Coast Guard Captain of the

Port must address security for military

mobilization in their planning documents.

■ If a Department of Defense vulnerability assessment was done on this port,

the vulnerabilities, if any, must have

been adequately addressed by the Port

Readiness Committee.

■ All members of a passenger vessel’s

crew should be adequately trained to

perform their security-related duties.

■ Physical and operational security measures should be coordinated between

passenger terminals and passenger vessels whenever a vessel is moored at the

terminal.

Enhanced Measures for Passenger and

Crew Security

■ Seaports where international passengers

arrive should have a separate Federal

Inspection Station. Access to these areas

is limited only to those that have previously received approval to enter the area.

■ Visitors/Passengers gain access to a

terminal facility through a designated

screening point that should include a

metal detector and X-ray system.

■ The use of automated access control or

magnetic stripe cards is utilized over the

use of keys to enter terminal facilities.

■ The Advance Passenger Information

System is utilized by carriers and is

submitted in a timely fashion to the

Immigration and Naturalization Service

and Customs so that law enforcement

checks can be performed prior to a

vessel’s arrival in the United States.
■ Responding to threats and crises (transnational threats, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other international crime).

■ Emerging threats at home (national missile defense, countering foreign intelligence collection, preparedness against

weapons of mass destruction, critical

infrastructure protection, and national

security emergency preparedness).

■ Small-scale contingencies (humanitarian

aid, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S.

citizens, and reinforcing allies).

■ Major theater warfare.

■ Promoting prosperity by strengthening

financial coordination, promoting an

open trading system and enhancing

American competitiveness through technological advantage, export advocacy,

enhanced export control, providing for

energy security, and promoting sustainable development.

■ Promoting democracy and human rights

abroad.

■ Integrating regional approaches.

The National Security Strategy is relevant to seaports in three major ways. First,

seaports, because of their multimodal

nature, are a nexus where a number of elements of the nation’s critical infrastructure

meet. The portal effect of a seaport as an

entry point to the United States serves to

heighten its importance to U.S. national

security interests. Further, the seaport is

vulnerable to a host of transnational threats

including terrorism, drug and alien smuggling, and fraudulent activity. Clearly, the

One of the first tasks the Seaport Commission undertook was to survey what had

already been done by the federal sector

that pertained directly to the tasks set forth

in the Presidential Memorandum. The

Commission’s study and this report are

related to these efforts in a number of

ways. It is important to understand each of

the other efforts and their relationship to

the focus of this report. The Commissioners overseeing this report decided that the

work of the Seaport Commission would be

consistent with current policy and that it

would not duplicate or re-research areas

that other study groups had already covered. A few of the more significant efforts

of other groups are summarized below.

A National Security Strategy for a

New Century, December 1999

This strategy, released by the White House

in December 1999, contains three core

objectives: to enhance America’s security,

to bolster America’s economic prosperity,

and to promote democracy and human

rights abroad. The strategy addresses the

following topics:

■ Threats to U.S. interests such as regional

or state-centered threats, transnational

threats, spread of dangerous technologies, failed states, foreign intelligence

collection, and environmental and health

threats.

■ Shaping the international environment

(diplomacy, international assistance,

arms control and nonproliferation initiatives, military activities, international

law enforcement cooperation, and environmental and health initiatives).

Appendix C: Related Initiatives About

Seaport Security

195
196 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Optimize the full range of U.S. efforts,

including coordination, partnership with

the private sector, and measurement of

progress.

Most of the crimes that are described in

the strategy occur at seaports, and because

agencies such as Customs, the Border

Patrol in the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Coast Guard have

authority to conduct border searches on the

water and on the border, seaports are a

convenient and cost-effective location to

pursue such crimes. Fostering international

cooperation and establishing international

standards are also relevant to this effort.

National Drug Control Strategy, 1999

This strategy, published by the Office of

National Drug Policy Control in 1999, sets

five goals:

■ Educate and enable America’s youth to

reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol

and tobacco.

■ Increase the safety of American citizens

by substantially reducing drug-related

crime and violence.

■ Reduce the health and social costs to

the public of illegal drug use.

■ Shield America’s air, land, and sea

frontiers from the drug threat.

■ Break foreign and domestic drug

sources of supply.

Countering drug trafficking has consistently been the role of Customs, the Coast

Guard, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, both in the port and on the water.

Again, the special border search authority

makes the seaport and the high seas productive and fruitful locations to combat

drug trafficking. In addition, it is more

cost-effective to interdict drugs before the

supplies are cut or distributed among

numerous individuals and entities.

nation’s seaports are vitally important elements of the nation’s critical infrastructure.

Second, seaports are a vital link for

energy. Almost half of the cargo tonnage

that enters U.S. seaports is petroleum or

petroleum products.

Finally, with the end of the Cold War

and the resultant military draw-down and

withdrawal from foreign bases, some of our

domestic commercial ports have taken on

increased importance as endpoints of the

Sea Lines of Communication and as Seaports of Embarkation for military forces

being deployed for contingencies worldwide. The importance of our commercial

seaports as venues for deployment of military forces underscores the vital importance

of U.S. seaports to the national interest.

International Crime Control Strategy,

May 1998

This strategy, released by the White House

in May 1998, recognizes that international

criminals engage in a wide range of illegal

activities, including drug trafficking, terrorism, alien and contraband smuggling,

fraud, extortion, money laundering,

bribery, economic espionage, intellectual

property theft, and counterfeiting. The

strategy sets these eight goals:

■ Extend the first line of defense beyond

U.S. borders.

■ Protect U.S. borders by attacking

smugglers and smuggling-related

crimes.

■ Deny safe haven to international

criminals.

■ Counter international financial crime.

■ Prevent criminal exploitation of international trade.

■ Respond to emerging international

crime threats.

■ Foster international cooperation and the

rule of law—for instance, by establishing international standards.
the aviation industry and how the government should adapt to them; and to look at

technological changes coming to air traffic

control and what should be done to take

advantage of them for security purposes.

The report was issued in February 1997,

and the recommendations relevant to

security are these:

■ Consider aviation to be a national security issue, and provide substantive federal funding for capital improvements.

■ Assess the possible use of chemical and

biological weapons as tools of terrorism.

■ Establish consortiums of federal, state,

and local governments and the private

sector at all commercial airports to

implement enhancements to aviation

safety and security.

■ Secure access to airport-controlled

areas, and ensure the physical security

of aircraft.

■ Establish federally mandated standards

for security enhancements.

■ Establish a security system that will

provide a high level of protection for

all aviation information systems.

■ Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.

■ Aggressively test existing security

systems.

■ Require criminal background checks

and Federal Bureau of Investigation

fingerprint checks for all screeners and

employees with access to secure areas.

■ Work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce,

including screening personnel. Certify

screening companies and improve

screener performance.

■ Significantly expand the use of bombsniffing dogs.

■ Use the Customs Service to enhance

security.

International Organized Crime and

Cargo Theft, December 1999

According to the report prepared by the

Central Intelligence Agency, international

organized crime groups could be responsible for as much as half of the estimated

$30-50 billion in cargo stolen worldwide

each year. Key findings include:

■ Russian and other syndicates have infiltrated key transportation hubs—including

air and seaports in Asia and Europe—

and appear to tap information-sharing

networks to identify lucrative cargo.

■ Syndicates look for cargo with high

resale value and pre-sell some of these

to unscrupulous buyers. The groups are

highly mobile and able to elude law

enforcement.

■ Crime groups typically target regions

experiencing economic or social turmoil

to take advantage of burgeoning black

markets for other goods.

■ Law enforcement will be hard pressed

to disrupt cargo theft along key transit

routes because prosecution rates are

poor and regulations governing stolen

cargo are not standardized.

■ Syndicates also will most likely target

commercial shipping systems and Internet Web sites.

This effort is relevant to the Commission’s effort in that it demonstrates that

cargo theft is a global concern. Cargo

theft, or piracy, can occur on the high seas,

near the port, or on the port grounds.

Cargo theft represents an area where international cooperation could serve U.S.

efforts as well as those in other countries.

Report of the White House Commission

on Aviation Safety and Security,

February 1997

President Clinton created the Commission

on Aviation Safety and Security to look at

the changing security threat and determine

how to address it; to examine changes in

Appendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security ■ 197
198 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

Critical Foundations—Protecting

America’s Infrastructure, October 1997

The report of the President’s Commission

on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

Critical Foundations—Protecting America’s Infrastructure, was released in

October 1997. That Commission looked

at elements of the critical infrastructure—

energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications—and found that they

must be viewed in a new context in the

Information Age. Its findings were the

following:

■ Information sharing is the most immediate need.

■ Responsibility for protecting the infrastructure is shared among owners

and operators (the private sector) and

government.

■ Infrastructure protection requires integrated capabilities of diverse federal

agencies and special means for coordinating the federal response to ensure

that these capabilities are melded

together effectively.

■ The challenge is one of adapting to a

changing culture.

■ The federal government has important

roles in the new infrastructure protection

alliance with industry and state and

local governments.

■ The existing legal framework is imperfectly attuned to dealing with cyber

threats.

■ The current level of research and development is not adequate to support

infrastructure protection.

With regard to the transportation sector,

the Commission recommended that the

Department of Transportation take the

lead and:

■ Establish a central office for coordinating intermodal infrastructure assurance

for examining terrorism issues, includ-

■ Give properly cleared airline and airport

security personnel access to classified

information they need to know.

■ Improve passenger manifests.

■ Implement a comprehensive plan to

address the threat of explosives and

other objects in cargo, and work with

industry to develop new initiatives.

■ Significantly increase the number of

FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism

investigations, to improve intelligence

and crisis response.

■ Deploy existing technology.

■ Establish a joint government-industry

research and development program.

■ Create a central clearinghouse within

the government to provide information

on explosives crime.

■ Submit a proposed resolution, through

the U.S. representative, that the International Civil Aviation Organization

begin a program to verify and improve

compliance with international safety

standards.

■ Provide antiterrorism assistance in the

form of airport security training to

countries where there are airports served

by airlines flying to the United States.

■ Provide regular, comprehensive explosive detection training programs for

foreign, federal, state, and local law

enforcement, as well as Federal Aviation

Administration and airline personnel.

It was important for the Commission to

review these recommendations and consider their application to the seaport environment. This effort did not address crime at

airports; it aimed to examine vulnerabilities, especially related to terrorist activities. In some senses our study is broader;

however, the airport effort did place heavy

emphasis on safety issues such as the air

traffic controller system.
Commandant of the Coast Guard to implement a program in coordination with the

Departments of State, Defense, Treasury,

and Justice and the federal intelligence

community. The Coast Guard Captain of

the Port exercises authority under the

Magnuson Act of 1950 and regulations

33 CFR 6 to enforce provisions including

controlling vessel movements and denying

entry to U.S. ports as necessary.

Worldwide Maritime Challenges

The report entitled Worldwide Maritime

Challenges was jointly prepared by the

Department of State, the Coast Guard, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

the Customs Service, and the Department

of the Navy. The report identified the

following 11 categories of challenges to

maritime security:

■ Multinationals-multiflags: The borderless finances of multinational corporations have blurred the focus on who

controls ship and cargo movements.

For protection, support, interdiction,

and monitoring, it is increasingly difficult to know precisely who is being

affected and who may be called for

assistance.

■ Smuggling: Illicit trade at sea includes

smuggling of narcotics and illegal

aliens, transfer of unauthorized technology, or seaborne transfer of other illegal

or untaxed cargoes.

■ Sealift support: Although airlift can

provide short-term support, sealift is

the key to sustaining operations for

whatever time is required to complete

the effort.

■ Sanction violations: Arms or trade sanctions levied by the United States, the

United Nations, or other international

organizations are often violated or circumvented by deceptive trade practices,

false shipping and cargo documentation,

stealth, and other means.

ing prevention, mitigation, contingency

response, recovery, and coordinating

with other federal agencies on those

issues.

■ Develop joint government/industry

response and recovery plans with the

private sector.

■ Establish an improved information

dissemination and sharing process.

■ Test the effectiveness of the dissemination process and of established

security procedures.

■ Work more closely with industry

on research and development and

education.

■ Request funding and positions to

manage these emerging issues.

■ Provide government security

clearances to industry.

■ Develop security and infrastructure

assurance education programs.

■ Perform crosscutting research on

assurance issues.

■ “Red Team” and test critical Department of Transportation systems and

industry systems on a cooperative,

selective basis.

■ Sponsor and conduct industry

symposiums and workshops.

Seaports are part of the nation’s critical

infrastructure. These recommendations

are relevant and needed to be considered

as part of the Commission’s review of

seaports.

Presidential Decision Directive 40:

U.S. Port Security Program,

September 1995

National security interests require that

measures be taken to control the access of

foreign-flag vessels to U.S. ports, internal

waters, and territorial seas. Presidential

control is exercised through the National

Security Council. The NSC directed the

Appendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security ■ 199
200 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Nonstate actors, such as environmental

groups and multinational corporations,

will have more influence.

■ Organized crime will increase in influence and scope.

■ Adversaries of the United States will

be more likely to engage in asymmetric

warfare such as terrorism, sabotage,

information operations, and chemical

or biological attacks.

■ The capabilities of space-based ocean

monitoring systems will increase.

■ Exploitation of nonliving marine

resources (such as oil and minerals)

will increase.

In addition, the report cited the following issues of today that will continue as

pressing issues through 2020:

■ Worldwide demand for fish will

increase.

■ Drug trafficking will continue to

plague the United States.

■ International migration will continue

to increase.

■ Degradation of the marine environment will continue.

An Assessment of the U.S. Marine

Transportation System, A Report to

Congress, September 1999

In November 1998, Congress mandated

that the Coast Guard, the Maritime

Administration, and other interested agencies “assess the adequacy of the nation’s

marine transportation system (including

ports, waterways, harbor approach channels, their intermodal connections) to

operate in a safe, efficient, secure, and

environmentally sound manner.” The

agencies’ effort was essentially an assessment of where the maritime industry was

going during the next 20 years and what

steps were necessary to prepare for its

future. The focus areas included coordination, competitiveness, infrastructure,

■ Mass migration: Economic or political

refugees traveling via the sea can quickly

tax the resources of U.S. maritime forces

and humanitarian organizations.

■ Arms trafficking: Monitoring arms flow

is an essential element in predicting

future instability and in assessing forces

with which the United States and its

allies may have to contend.

■ Crime and violence: Terrorism, piracy,

and other crimes at sea are injurious to

commerce, stability, and freedom of

the sea.

■ Weapons of mass destruction: The

legal and illegal trade in weapons of

mass destruction, components, and

precursors can alter the balance of

power and endanger a population and

the environment.

■ Trade access: The sea is a common

highway; no nation should deny access

to the United States or its allies.

■ Environmental protection: The maritime

environment is increasingly vulnerable,

and the concern goes far beyond the

beaches.

■ Maritime food supply: The sea is a

source of food supply that should be

protected.

Threats and Challenges to Maritime

Security 2020, March 1999

The report entitled Threats and Challenges

to Maritime Security 2020 was published in

March 1999 by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. It was intended to be an

information tool for policymakers, strategic

planners, integrated systems analysts, and

force structure planners. The report identified the following significant changes

affecting the maritime threat by 2020:

■ Legal maritime trade will triple.
ommend using the Marine Transportation System National Port Readiness

Network and local Port Readiness Committees to focus attention on enhancing

seaport security through increased coordination and cooperation between the

public and private sectors. See recommendations 2, 13, and 17.

■ “Improve Security Awareness”: Develop national exercises that measure U.S.

ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, including scenarios in which

attacks are directed at military mobilization or critical infrastructure within U.S.

ports and waterways. The Departments

of Transportation and Defense and the

FBI should assume responsibility for

this recommendation and coordinate

with other agencies and public and

private sector stakeholders.

Comment: As discussed in Chapters 4

and 5 within the context of securing the

nation’s militarily Strategic Seaports, the

Seaport Commission strongly supports

the development of national exercises to

prevent and respond to terrorist attacks

in our nation’s seaports. See recommendation 16.

■ “Identify Vulnerabilities and Improve

Transparency”: Conduct baseline and

periodic reviews of the strategic ports

and waterways of the National Port

Readiness Network to identify vulnerabilities and determine the readiness of

public and private resources to meet

military mobilization requirements.

Comment: As discussed in Chapters 4

and 5, the Seaport Commission strongly

supports baseline and periodic vulnerability and threat assessments for each

major U.S. seaport including the militarily strategic seaports. See recommendations 7 and 16.

■ “Identify Vulnerabilities and Improve

Transparency”: Conduct readiness exercises that test the ability to support continued waterside security and uninterrupted military mobilization operations

environmental, national security, and

safety.

The interests in national security were

to keep the flow of traffic moving and to

safeguard the nation’s waterways, ports,

facilities, vessels, individuals, and property

in the vicinity of the port from accidental

or intentional damage, destruction, loss, or

injury. The Marine Transportation System

(MTS) initiative is closely linked to the

Interagency Seaport Commission via seaport security issues. Of particular importance to the Seaport Commission’s security

assessment of U.S seaports is the MTS

Report’s “Security” strategic area discussion. Within this “Security” strategic area,

the MTS report highlighted five action

areas: improving security awareness,

improving transparency, ensuring qualified

operators, forging stronger public/private

partnerships, and strengthening international cooperation.

Many of the recommendations contained within these five MTS security

action areas defer to the assessment of

seaport security being done by the Seaport

Commission. Specifically, the MTS security recommendations below were extensively studied by the Seaport Commission.

Following each MTS security recommendation below is a brief synopsis of the

Seaport Commission’s position and, where

appropriate, a link to a specific Seaport

Commission recommendation.

■ “Improve Security Awareness”: Support

the Interagency Commission on Crime

and Security in U.S. Seaports to heighten national awareness of the need for

collective action and to develop a coordinated interagency approach to Marine

Transportation System ports and waterways security.

Comment: As extensively discussed in

Chapters 5 and 6, the Seaport Commission strongly supports the development

of a coordinated interagency approach

to improving security awareness in our

nation’s seaports. Specifically, we recAppendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security ■ 201
202 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

should be engaged on this issue. Participants should include the Coast Guard,

Department of Defense, Maritime

Administration, Customs Service, private sector organizations, state and local

authorities, and labor organizations.

Comment: As discussed in Chapters 5

and 6, the development of security

guidelines via public/private sector partnerships is one of the key Seaport Commission recommendations. See recommendations 13, 14, and 17.

■ “Strengthen International Cooperation”:

Develop a strategy and process for

advancing U.S. operating guidelines and

minimum security standards on an international basis; and provide intelligence

and training to improve international

oversight of the global maritime infrastructure.

Comment: As discussed in Chapter 8,

the Seaport Commission strongly supports stronger international cooperation

due to its potentially positive impact on

domestic seaport security. See recommendation 19.

Ocean Policy Study, September 1999

In June 1998, President Clinton directed

the Cabinet to provide him with recommendations for a coordinated, disciplined,

long-term federal ocean policy. Although

the report covered many areas, the two

that are most relevant to this study were

on marine transportation and maritime

enforcement. These are the ongoing

concerns stated in the report:

■ Many federal agencies, state and local

governments, port authorities, private

industries, and labor groups share

responsibility for managing safety,

security, and environmental protection,

which makes coordinated responses

to challenges and opportunities very

difficult to achieve.

■ Innovative U.S. financing, regulatory

changes, and tax mechanisms may be

while responding to (1) terrorist threats

and acts and (2) nontraditional asymmetrical attacks on the Marine Transportation System.

Comment: As discussed in Chapters 4

and 5, the Seaport Commission strongly

supports the development of readiness

exercises to deter terrorist attacks and to

respond to nontraditional asymmetrical

attacks on our nation’s seaports. See recommendations 7 and 16.

■ “Identify Vulnerabilities and Improve

Transparency”: Develop and integrate

real-time intelligent systems for tracking

cargo, personnel, and vessel operations

throughout the Marine Transportation

System.

Comment: As discussed in Chapter 7

(Intelligence and Information Management), the Seaport Commission supports development of an integrated, realtime information system for tracking the

movement of vessels (including cargo

and personnel) within the seaport environment. See recommendation 18.

■ “Forge Stronger Public/Private Partnerships”: Advocate and oversee integration

of public/private sector national security

strategy, policy, and goals to support

Department of Defense mobility plans.

Comment: As discussed in Chapters 5

and 6, the Seaport Commission strongly

supports increased public/private coordination to support Department of

Defense mobility plans. See recommendations 13, 16, and 17.

■ “Forge Stronger Public/Private Partnerships”: Develop public/private sector

Marine Transportation System partnerships to establish security guidelines for

onshore facilities, offshore facilities,

and vessels, and implement incentivebased mechanisms to address Marine

Transportation System security vulnerabilities. The Interagency Committee for

the Marine Transportation System and

regional and local coordinating bodies
tions to protect against security threats

and support military mobilization.

■ Maritime law enforcement: Improve cooperation at the interagency, interservice,

and international levels to address threats

to our maritime interests, including collecting and sharing key information, and

developing and integrating real-time intelligence systems for tracking cargo, personnel, and commercial vessel operations.

■ Maritime law enforcement: Improve U.S.

capability to conduct surveillance, detection, identification, classification, and

interdiction of maritime threats before

they reach U.S. coasts and harbors.

■ Maritime law enforcement: Acknowledge

the low level of current security awareness in the marine transportation system,

and initiate a national education campaign to improve federal, state, and local

awareness of the growing threats.

Roles and Missions of the Coast Guard,

January 2000

In March 1999, President Clinton issued

an Executive Order creating an Interagency

Task Force on the Roles and Missions of

the U.S. Coast Guard, to provide advice and

recommendations on the appropriate roles

and missions of the Coast Guard through

the year 2020. The task force included representatives from the Coast Guard, the Departments of Transportation, State, Defense,

Justice, Commerce, and Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear

Energy Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security

Council, the Domestic Policy Council, the

Council on Environmental Quality, the

Office of National Drug Control Policy,

and the Office of Cabinet Affairs.

The report relevance is its reaffirmation

of the mission of Coast Guard to continue

in national defense, including port security,

and at-sea drug interdiction. The report

required over the long run to spur the

substantial public and private investment

needed to meet growing demands.

■ The marine transportation system infrastructure and supportive information

systems may be stretched to their limits

to cope with projected increases in the

system’s users and the size, speed, and

diversity of vessels.

■ Growth in vessel traffic will increase

risks to sensitive ocean, coastal, and

inland environments.

■ International criminal and terrorist threats

are constantly changing and adapting to

current law enforcement capabilities.

Today’s communications and integrated

intelligence systems lack the sophistication to support real-time monitoring of

vessels, people, and cargo movements.

■ High-level awareness of the emerging

threats to maritime transportation is required, as is interservice, interagency,

and international cooperation to address

them.

The resulting September 2, 1999,

report—entitled Turning to the Sea:

America’s Ocean Future—covered many

areas, but the ones most relevant to seaport security were on marine transportation

and maritime law enforcement. Specifically, the pertinent recommendations from

these two areas are listed below—all of

which are strongly supported by the recommendations found in this Seaport

Commission final report.

■ Marine transportation: Facilitate coordination among all stakeholders by establishing a federal Interagency Committee

for the Marine Transportation System,

a nonfederal Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council, as well

as regional and local committees.

■ Marine transportation: Meet national

security objectives by balancing commercial demands with safeguards and inspecAppendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security ■ 203
204 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

■ Fully identify the airborne and seaborne

assets used to transport drugs to the

United States by maritime means.

■ Determine how drugs are transported to

the United States by maritime means.

■ Describe how the organizations react to

Coast Guard interdiction efforts.

Field visits included in the study cover

Boston, Buffalo, Charleston, Chicago,

Cleveland, Detroit, Duluth, Houston,

Galveston, Jacksonville, Key West, Long

Beach, Miami, Mobile, New Bedford,

New Orleans, New York/New Jersey,

Norfolk, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Port

Everglades, Portland (Oregon), San Diego,

San Francisco, San Juan, Savannah,

Seattle/Tacoma, Tampa Bay, Vancouver,

and Wilmington.

The information responding to this task

is relevant as the Commission makes interagency operational recommendations.

State of Florida, Office of Drug Control

Statewide Security Assessment of

Seaports, Ongoing

The state of Florida’s Office of Drug -

Control is in the process of a broad, comprehensive assessment of security (and

related issues) at the state’s 14 deepwater

ports. This complete, objective assessment

is to develop a viable campaign plan to

implement enhancements that solve drug

interdiction, money laundering, and general port security problems. Currently there

is an on-site data collection for the assessment to address physical security, port

operations, and information security.

The stated focus of the study is:

■ Discovery and interdiction of illegal

drug imports.

■ Discovery and confiscation of illegal

exports of cash.

■ Reduction or elimination of cargo theft.

■ Safety and security of persons working

at ports.

was issued in January 2000 and contained

the following overarching conclusions:

■ The Coast Guard’s roles and missions

support national policies and objectives

that will endure into the 21st century.

■ The U.S. will continue to need a flexible, adaptable, multi-mission, military

Coast Guard to meet national maritime

interests and requirements well into the

next century.

■ In order to hedge against tomorrow’s

uncertainties, the Coast Guard should

be rebuilt so as to make it adaptable to

future realities.

■ In keeping with its well-deserved reputation as one of the federal government’s

most effective and efficient organizations, the Coast Guard should continue

to pursue new methods and technologies

to enhance its ability to perform its

vital missions.

■ The recapitalization of the Coast Guard’s

Deepwater capability is a near-term

national priority.

■ The Deepwater acquisition project is

a sound approach to that end and the

Interagency Task Force strongly endorses its process and timeline.

Maritime Drug Trafficking Project, Ongoing

The Coast Guard requested the National

Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) to conduct a study of the top 10 to 20 maritime

drug trafficking organizations that pose

a threat to the United States, covering the

identities of the vessels used, key transportation personnel, modes of operation,

and the traffickers’ reactions to Coast

Guard interdiction efforts. Among the

critical questions to be studied are:

■ Fully identify the most significant drug

trafficking organizations transporting

drugs to the United States by noncontainerized maritime means, including

only those that control the means of

transportation.
The study topics clearly have relevance

to the work of the Commission. In fact, the

commitment of the State of Florida seems

to offer an opportunity to prototype many

of the items listed in the Model Port Concept in Appendix F.

Appendix C: Related Initiatives About Seaport Security ■ 205
means of setting the full seaport scenario

for readers of this report. Throughout the

report, references are made to specific

concerns and interests that stakeholders

expressed to the Commission and that the

Commission took account of in developing its findings and recommendations. To

complete the record, this chapter adds

summaries of comments heard from the

various stakeholders at focus group sessions, in public hearings, and in written

comments to the Commission.

Focus Group Sessions

The Commission made extensive efforts

to reach out to organizations and entities

by holding a total of 46 focus group sessions with representatives from the trade

during on-site surveys at the ports of

Charleston, Gulfport, Long Beach, Los

Angeles, Miami, New York/Newark, New

Orleans, Philadelphia, Port Everglades,

San Juan, and Tacoma. Focus groups were

held with port authorities and terminal

operators; vessel operators and carriers;

trucking companies and warehouse operators; rail carriers; importers, exporters, and

freight forwarders; customs house brokers;

organized labor; and miscellaneous trade

groups.

When soliciting comments, the Commission specifically asked the stakeholders

to describe problems that need to be solved

concerning crime, terrorism, and security

in seaports; any proposals for new laws or

regulations; suggested methods for ensuring better reporting and more accurate

collection of data; and possible ways to

Chapters of this report have discussed the

full range of issues related to the security

of U.S. seaports. Although this report discussed the views of the seaport stakeholders from time to time, those chapters did

not focus on them. Because the private sector, port authorities, and other levels of

government are so critical in the operations

at seaports, the Commission wanted to use

this appendix to highlight their issues. In

fact, the President’s memorandum initiating this study specifically stated:

In the course of its work, the Commission shall seek input from, and take full

account of, the expertise and views of the

many different state and local government agencies with relevant responsibilities, as well as the involved private sector

interests.

The Commission solicited comments by

talking to hundreds of businesses involved

in seaport operations; surveying 12 seaports and talking with officials and workers in each port; soliciting comments in a

Federal Register notice; holding public

hearings in three locations; meeting with

national industry groups; and attending

and participating in national conferences

whenever and wherever they were held.

The Commission found that stakeholders in seaports have a wide range of interests and views about the issues involving

crime and security, and that the issues

involving port security and/or the lack of

security within U.S. seaports affect stakeholders in a variety of ways.

The various stakeholders and their

interests were described in Chapter 2, as a

Appendix D: Comments from the

Private Sector and Other Stakeholders

207
208 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

and procedural (cargo receipt and delivery

systems) standards in a seaport. The majority of the commenters favored some sort

of national standards, but there were a

variety of opinions on whether these standards should be mandatory or voluntary.

A representative of a labor organization

who worked in one port suggested that

there should be federally mandated security

standards tailored to the needs of individual terminals. A representative of a labor

organization who worked in another port

felt that there should be minimal federal

government involvement in port security.

The standards, or components, that

make up a “model” seaport and a “model”

cargo release system could be jointly

developed by government and the private

sector, and the trade community would be

encouraged to adopt these standards and

components, some commenters suggested.

In addition, the private sector and government could decide to designate one seaport

in the United States as a “model” pilot seaport, and work jointly with personnel in

that seaport to implement the acceptable

standards and components that they have

identified.

At one meeting, the private sector suggested improvements to ports that could

enhance overall security within an individual port or address security issues common

to many ports. The suggestions included

creating “port security” yards within seaports where containers could be stored

adjacent to terminals facilities; segregating

processes such as cargo and passenger

operations within ports; and reconfiguring

traffic patterns in seaports to reduce opportunities for the criminal elements in ports

to gain access to sensitive areas. Truck and

rail firms at two ports expressed their support for establishing “port security yards”

within ports for the safekeeping of containers, and for enhanced “sealing” practices

within the port. Carriers and terminal operators at one port also suggested the need to

segregate processes (cargo and passenger)

in the port as a means of enhancing security

improve coordination and cooperation

among government agencies.

A review of the focus group meetings

revealed that there is no consensus on

how to address most security issues. The

following significant and recurring issues

and recommendations were raised by

stakeholders at these sessions.

Port and Terminal Security

Carriers and terminal operators in one port

were concerned that security improvements

in the port were taking too long. A carrier

in another port expressed his concern

about the lack of security in the port during operation “Desert Storm.” Carriers and

labor, as well as a cruise line operator, felt

that the ports they operated in were vulnerable (to criminal and terrorist activities).

Carriers in some ports and brokers/freight

forwarders in another port also felt that

there was a need for nationwide minimum

standards for ports, that port security practices should be standardized, and that

someone (undetermined) needs to address

non-uniformity between ports. Carriers and

terminal operators in two ports were satisfied with the security in the ports in which

they operated. There was also concern that

the presence of security guards within

some ports was inadequate and that the

“personnel” security practices of some

transportation firms were insufficient to

prevent crime.

There was much discussion about minimum security standards. Some members of

the private sector have suggested developing and publicizing the “standards” and

components that constitute acceptable

security practices in a port and that could

serve as the basis of a “model” port that

seaports around the country could emulate.

These guidelines in the “model” port could

include such elements as adequate physical

security (lights, fences, etc.), access control (gates, identification cards, etc.), personnel (employment and criminal history

checks, polygraphing, and fingerprinting),
of the carriers, terminal operators, cruise

line operators, and trade thought that the

issuance of identification cards was a good

idea and that there should be standardized/universal cards for the trade to use

(especially in Florida). Carriers and terminal operators in another port also

expressed their concern about knowing

who belongs in ports. Some members of

labor unions were in favor of identification

cards, while others were strongly opposed.

Some union officials saw identification

card requirements as an invasion of union

members’ privacy. Others said identification cards were unnecessary because each

union member had a union card in his

pocket that could be produced if necessary.

Others said that the union members were

well-known on the port and identification

was not needed. One union official also

commented that the wearing of identification cards at the seaports was a negotiable

issue between the port authorities and

workers and that the government should

not interfere.

Some members of labor unions, railroads, and trucking firms expressed concern about implementing identification

card programs and the practicality of issuing the cards at the port level, especially to

transient workers, railroad employees, and

truck drivers. A member of one trade

organization thought it would be beneficial

to have a nationwide identification card

program.

The performance of background/criminal history checks on dock workers and

port employees was clearly the most controversial issue raised by the stakeholders.

Most comments we received from labor

groups dealt with their strong opposition to

imposing requirements for background

checks and criminal record checks on

labor. They felt strongly that they were not

the problem with crime at the seaports and

should not be singled out. They considered

any such program to be a violation of their

privacy. Programs with these basic characteristics were implemented in both Port

within the port, and members of a trade

organization in one port also thought the

traffic patterns in the port needed to be

reconfigured.

The trade community in one port and

brokers/freight forwarders in another

expressed concern that security costs

should be reasonable, and that increased

security measures should not negatively

affect the flow of commerce.

Carriers in one port felt that government

agencies that have “partnership-type” programs with the private sector needed to

expand these programs to U.S. seaports.

A labor organization in another port recommended that federal agencies develop

local and national “partnerships” with

labor organizations as a way to foster communication and information-sharing.

A carrier in one port and a cruise ship

operator in another port felt that “labor”

in the ports represented a “risk” to operations. The trade in another port felt that

getting union members to comply with

port procedures was often an issue. Labor

in one port and carriers in another port

felt that “transient” labor (truck drivers or

“day” workers) was a major unresolved

issue in the port.

Carriers and terminal operators in one

port thought that “information” about shipments is sometimes “too available.” They

felt that this availability could facilitate

criminal activities.

A member of the trade also suggested

that seaport users adopt an “integrated

security system” that his firm employs,

which makes internal conspiracies harder

to perform during cargo/container drop-off

and pick-up. The system, which can be

added to a firm’s existing receipt and

delivery procedures, restricts the movement of drivers and rotates employees

assigned to delivery and receipt operations.

The issuance of identification cards to

dock workers and port employees was

found to be a highly sensitive issue. Some

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 209
210 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

are lacking on the piers and terminals at

seaports, and that law enforcement’s

response is often poor, or nonexistent, in

the seaports. In order to address this issue,

the carriers and terminal operators at several ports, labor at one port, and rail and

trucking companies at another port suggested increasing federal resources at the

seaports and increasing the presence of

federal and local police on the piers and

terminals at seaports.

Several of the carriers and terminal

operators in one port saw a need to share

information about cargo theft, at both the

port and national levels, to increase penalties for cargo thefts, and to create and fund

cargo theft task forces as appropriate. Rail

and truck firms in one port recommended

that “cargo crime” should be included as a

category in the FBI’s Uniform Crime

Reporting, and a truck/rail firm in another

port thought that the trade could benefit

from sharing information about cargo losses among each other.

In two ports, carriers and terminal operators expressed their views that violators

were not being punished sufficiently for

criminal activities (especially cargo theft),

and they recommended that penalties and

sentencing guidelines for violators be

increased as possible solutions to these

issues.

Carriers, cruise line operators, and terminal operators at one port and the trade in

another port felt that coordination and

cooperation were lacking between law

enforcement agencies, the ports, and their

tenants and between the trade within the

ports, especially with respect to issues

relating to terrorism and cargo theft. These

stakeholders suggested that law enforcement agencies should cooperate/share

information more in the port, especially

about terrorist and cargo theft issues. The

trade in another port suggested establishing

a “port tenant” committee as a way to help

define security-related roles and responsibilities in the port.

Everglades and Miami over the objections

of the union. In Miami, the labor union

was able to negotiate a role in reviewing

the circumstances that barred a union

member from employment at the port on a

case-by-case basis. In Miami this seemed

to be acceptable to the union.

Other stakeholders (including a Gulf

Coast labor group) saw benefits in having

background checks performed on employees, and wished to see the checks expanded to other workers. At two ports, terminal

operators and carriers were in favor of

background checks for port employees,

and during one focus group session, truck

and rail company personnel voiced their

support for identification card programs

that could control access to the ports and

its terminals.

Carriers and terminal operators in one

port felt that there was a lack of awareness

on the part of some elements of the trade

community regarding security matters, and

a carrier in another port suggested that law

enforcement personnel could benefit from

training on shipping and related industries.

Labor in one port suggested that training

for security guards was inadequate. A

cruise line operator suggested that the

federal government should sponsor a port

security course at least once a year in

South Florida.

Law Enforcement

The “threat” of terrorism was a concern to

cruise line operators, carriers, and terminal

operators in two ports. Importers/exporters

and carriers in one port also felt that there

was a need for more coordination and planning to address possible terrorist threats

and incidents in ports and that there was a

need to increase the trade’s awareness of

terrorism and terrorism-related intelligence.

Carriers, terminal operators,

brokers/freight forwarders, and truck and

rail firms in several ports expressed their

belief that federal resources are lacking at

the seaports, that federal and local police
Customs be funded. Truck and rail carriers

in two ports thought that the trade needed

to acquire and use “smart card” technology

and “scanner” technology to enhance security within their operations. Carriers and

terminal operators in one port also thought

rail cars need to be built to reduce their

vulnerability to theft and pilferage.

In many of the ports the trade endorsed

the use of technology and equipment to

deter/prevent cargo and equipment thefts,

track cargo and conveyances, and detect

contraband. The equipment/technology that

the trade supported using included electronic seals, cargo tagging/tracking systems, antitheft devices, smart card technology, X-ray systems, and cameras. In one

location, the trade also suggested that the

government and private industry underwrite a study of technology to determine

what systems should be employed in seaports and how they can be best used.

Written Comments Received

from Stakeholders

This section of the report summarizes

written comments received in response to

the Commission’s notice, published in the

Federal Register, dated June 16, 1999. The

notice requested comments over a 60-day

period from interested parties on the issues

of crime in seaports, terrorism and environment crimes, security and prevention,

cargo control and technology, and possible

legislative initiatives. In response to the

notice, the Commission received written

comments from 13 organizations and individuals. The following is a synopsis of the

written comments received.

The American Association of Port

Authorities wrote to the Commission on

August 9, 1999, with comments covering

the following four areas: (1) The Customs

Service should join with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI in developing a proactive policy and program that

shares criminal intelligence with state and

Members of the private sector thought

that government and the private sector

should find ways to work together to

improve security within seaports. The ports

of Port Everglades, Jacksonville, and Gulfport currently have government/ private

sector initiatives to enhance security within

their ports.

Private sector commenters cited the

need to develop and maintain partnerships

at the national and local levels between

government agencies and the members of

the private sector (such as ports and labor

unions). The partnerships would serve as

ongoing forums to increase communication

between partners and address securityrelated concerns within the ports.

Members of the private sector also felt

that additional communication between

principals (carriers, terminal operators,

port authorities, etc.) in ports would be

beneficial. Examples of cooperation would

be the establishment of port tenant committees that could meet locally to identify

and address security concerns, sharing of

information with other principals about

losses and incidents through local forums,

and establishment of a local theft-tracking

database for the port.

Federal Inspection

The carriers and terminal operators in one

port and the brokers/freight forwarders in

another port recommended that centralized

facilities be created in ports where all federal agencies can perform their examinations. Labor organizations in two ports felt

that all devanning/stripping of containers

should be performed on the piers. 

Carriers and terminal operators in several ports stated that the acquisition of technology (such as X-rays and closed circuit

television) could assist law enforcement

personnel in processing cargo and detecting violations. The trade representatives at

one port and the carriers in another port

both recommended that information systems like the automated system used by

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 211
212 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

should be expanded to look at terrorism,

cargo theft, narcotics, and internal conspiracies, and to look outside the traditional

port limits. (2) The study should look at

the ports as a major component of a larger

intermodal system and look at the criminal

activity that occurs outside the direct control of ocean carriers/ports. (3) The Commission should issue guidelines for identification standards for the various parties

normally in port areas or handling cargo,

such as port management, labor, truckers,

and carrier personnel. (4) A model should

be developed (acceptable to law enforcement, Customs, and the industry) that

articulates a secure cargo delivery process.

(5) The Commission should increase sentencing guidelines. (6) The Commission

should create seaport crime as a category

in the “Uniform Crime Reports.” (7) The

Commission should establish a national

database for cargo crimes and fund multiagency cargo crime task forces. (8) The

Commission should “partner” with the

private sector in efforts to address seaport

crime, and law enforcement should attend

seminars presented by the industry on

seaport/cargo operations and security to

learn how these businesses work.

The International Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union (Southern

California District Council) wrote to the

Commission on August 8, 1999, that it

believes that petroleum tankers, refineries,

rail operations, containers, vessels, and

trucks all pose threats for possible terrorist

activities. The union also said container

storage, transfer, and marine terminals are

vulnerable to criminal activities. It felt that

white-collar crimes are prevalent in ports

and that security guards used in ports and

for terminals must be sufficient in number

and receive proper training. The union

believes that physical security and lighting

is important for seaports. It expressed

opposition to any propositions to privatize

the port’s work force now protected by

union contracts and to perform background

checks on longshoremen.

local law enforcement agencies. (2) The

Departments of Defense, Transportation,

and Justice should support and participate

in the efforts to review the wartime vulnerability and peacetime security needs of

U.S. ports. This review should be coordinated with all relevant federal (military and

civilian), state, and local law enforcement

and security-related agencies, including

public port authorities. Upon completion

of the assessment, a concerted effort

should be undertaken to remedy any discrepancies and other security deficiencies

identified in the process. (3) The state

and federal governments should provide

appropriate legal and/or legislative support

in assisting the private contract security

guard industry in its efforts to protect the

nation’s cargo commerce with security

personnel of the highest caliber and

integrity. (4) Sentencing for cargo theft

crimes under federal law should be

strengthened, a national database with

information about cargo theft should be

established, and a centralized office should

be created within the federal government

to oversee efforts designed to curb cargo

theft and increase coordination with the

private sector and state and local law

enforcement.

The Commission also received a concept paper from the new Chairman of the

Security Committee from the American

Association of Port Authorities on June

4, 1999. He recommends that a Maritime

Security Institute be established and funded as a joint project between the public

and private sectors. The Institute would

establish a forum where students take

courses of instruction in conducting security surveys, developing security plans,

implementing security measures, and

other security-related programs. He

suggested Miami as the location for this

institute.

The National Cargo Security Council

wrote to the Commission on August 13,

1999, with the following suggestions:

(1) The scope of the Commission’s study
should be refined. (2) Federal agencies

need to look at investigating crimes with

smaller thresholds (less than $100,000).

(3) Electronic delivery orders for the port

of New York/New Jersey should require a

back-up order from trucking companies to

pick up freight. (4) The industry needs to

safeguard information from thieves. It also

commented that cargo theft informants are

often involved in the theft/distribution/

fencing chain.

The American Institute of Marine

Underwriters wrote to the Commission on

August 10, 1999, with four recommendations: (1) A centralized database on cargo

theft information needs to be developed.

(2) Penalties, jail time, and fines need to

be increased for persons convicted of cargo

crimes. (3) Background and security

checks need to be performed on all new

hires directly involved in the transportation

of cargo. (4) An international network of

law enforcement agencies should be established to coordinate efforts to combat

cargo crimes.

The South Carolina Ports Authority

wrote to the Commission on August 23,

1999. It said it wanted to see realistic goals

set for seaport security that neither constrain the flow of commerce nor create

additional costs for ports. It said that background checks (on non-port authority personnel) should not be done without probable cause. It expressed concerns that

establishing a visitor pass or identification

card program for truck drivers entering the

port would be inefficient and costly.

Barry Tarnef wrote the Commission on

August 12, 1999. He said he wanted to see

intermodalism incorporated into the Commission’s study. He suggested that nonfederal law enforcement personnel should

serve on the Commission, because of their

expertise in transportation-related crimes,

and that the Commission should work to

reduce all types and levels of crime. He

also expressed support for the Cargo Theft

Deterrence Act of 1999. He opposed the

The International Longshoremen’s

Association wrote to the Commission on

August 12, 1999. It believes the association has the ability to detect terrorism,

environmental offenses, and breaches of

security, and it recommended that guidelines be developed for use by its members

to assist them in recognizing and reporting

criminal activities involving movements

of drugs and contraband, and potential

acts of terrorism.

The International Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union (San Francisco) wrote to the Commission on September 16, 1999. It said it was opposed to

criminal background checks being performed on its members. It said the wearing

of identification badges is unnecessary,

and any requirement to wear them should

be negotiated between the employer and

the union. It expressed a need for additional guards at the ports, and it supported the

adoption of a law mandating manning and

training requirements for guards.

The International Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union-Local 24

Puget Sound Council wrote to the Commission on August 1, 1999, and expressed

opposition to HR 318, the “Shaw Resolution,” which would require that criminal

history checks be performed on dock

workers in seaports.

The Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO sent a letter to the Commission on August 16, 1999, expressing

opposition to criminal background checks

being performed on port workers and related employees. It encouraged the Commission to create a set of recommendations

that will recognize the role labor can play

in reducing crime and criminal activities at

U.S. seaports.

H&M Terminal Transport wrote to the

Commission on August 16, 1999, with four

recommendations and a comment. (1) The

Sealink card system, which gives authority

in New York/New Jersey for drivers to pick

up loads for specific trucking companies,

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 213
214 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

port authorities, and customhouse brokers

in the Hampton Roads area, and private

consultants from the field of security and

loss prevention.

During the session, the following areas

were discussed: the government’s role in

seaports, the use of identification cards

and background checks to control/restrict

access to ports, crimes in seaports, the lack

of information about shipments, security

enhancements within ports, security standards for seaports, and security for information systems which service seaports.

The trade community believes that the

federal government has a significant role

in seaports, especially concerning the placing of technology in seaports, the investigation of crimes, and the ability to control

entities (carriers, etc.) that use seaports.

Some of the attendees felt that government

needed to make a bigger commitment for

law enforcement agencies within ports and

that the federal law enforcement community needed to work more in partnership with

the trade community within ports and to

share information.

The subjects of identification cards and

background checks for employees who

require access to seaports were discussed

extensively at the session. Many of the

speakers said that the use of an identification card program for our nation’s seaports

was a good idea, and that cards could

increase accountability within a port and

uniformity among ports. There was no

clear consensus, however, about “who”

should have identification cards in ports,

whether there should be “standardized or

universal” port identification cards for all

U.S. ports, and whether there should be

national standards requiring criminal history checks for all employees in seaports.

One presenter stated that the government

should help determine who within a seaport

requires an identification card, and that the

port, not the terminal operator, should

actually issue the cards. Another presenter

also stated that if organized labor is

adoption of the cargo theft database (TIPS)

program, and said a national “cargo theft”

database is necessary. He believed that the

“known shipper” initiative that is used in

the air environment to identify the contents

of a shipment and ensure proper manifesting might have applications in the sea

environment. He said that more emphasis

should be placed on law enforcement training at the local, state, and federal levels,

and that law enforcement personnel need

to be linked electronically.

Representatives from FLIR Systems

wrote to the Commission on August 17,

1999, that the thermal imaging systems it

markets might have applications for law

enforcement agencies that have responsibilities in the seaports.

Public Meetings

The Commissioners held three public

meetings/listening sessions to receive input and feedback from the private sector

on the significant issues involving crime,

security, and terrorism in U.S. seaports.

The sessions were held in the Norfolk/

Hampton Roads area on February 2, 2000;

the San Francisco/Oakland area on February 16, 2000; and the Houston area on

March 1, 2000. During the course of the

meetings the Commissioners provided the

public with some of the observations seen

during their on-site seaport surveys, and

sought private sector solutions and recommendations for addressing issues related

to crime terrorism and security in seaports.

Norfolk/Hampton Roads, Virginia

The first public meeting/listening session

held in the Norfolk/Hampton Roads,

Virginia,, area on February 2, 2000, was

attended by representatives from trade

associations such as the National Cargo

Security Council, the Hampton Roads

Maritime Association, and the Carriers

Container Council, Inc. In addition, there

were representatives from vessel carriers,
enhancements without significantly

increasing costs, and that by adopting these

enhancements they could reduce their

insurance costs. Presenters expressed their

views that more modern inspection techniques by federal agencies in ports and

funding for non-intrusive detection technology (capable of scanning containers and

other large articles) could make seaports

more secure and enable law enforcement

agencies to detect crimes more effectively.

The issue of unreliable manifest information about shipments was discussed

briefly at the meeting. A representative of a

vessel carrier advised the Commission that

shippers, not carriers, need to increase their

compliance about accurately describing

shipments. Two members of the trade also

expressed their support for continued funding for Customs automated data systems.

Concern was expressed at the session

about the possible vulnerability of the

information technology systems that service ports and the need for intelligence and

information-sharing about possible threats

to critical areas in ports such as power,

electrical, and data systems. A presenter

advised the Commission of the benefits of

analyzing a port’s “cyber” systems and

conducting a critical dependency analysis

of ports so that vulnerabilities can be identified and addressed before they are

exploited.

In summation, the members of the trade

community who attended the Norfolk session believe that the federal government

has a significant role in seaports. In general, they supported the use of identification

cards to control access to seaports, but

there was no agreement on who should

be required to have, or issue, the cards.

The trade believes that cargo thefts at seaports, and environs, are a major issue that

can be addressed by funding and creating

more multi-agency task forces, collecting

information and intelligence about crimes,

and updating cargo crimes statutes and

sentencing guidelines. The trade voiced

required, with all workers, to receive identification cards, and the program is uniformly and fairly administered, it will work.

The issue of crime, and especially cargo

thefts, in seaports was widely discussed. A

presenter estimated that $10 billion in losses occurs each year in the United States

because of cargo thefts. While there is the

opinion that most cargo thefts occur outside seaports, but within close proximity of

the ports, there was also an acknowledgement on the part of a presenter that seaports and seaport users are often reluctant

to report crimes because it could be bad

for business. The attendees advised the

Commission that it should be the responsibility of the government, not insurance

companies, to collect and manage data

about cargo losses. The trade also felt that

the federal government should address the

issue of cargo thefts by funding and creating more multi-agency task forces that

address security concerns, collecting information and intelligence about crimes, and

updating cargo crimes statutes and sentencing guidelines. There was a concern on

the part of the trade that alien smuggling,

especially via containers, is significant in

the maritime environment, and seaports are

vulnerable to terrorist-related incidents.

The issue of security “standards” for

seaports and seaport users was a central

topic at the meeting. Presenters advised the

Commission that they would like to see

guidelines about security measures developed and recommended, but that the guidelines should not be mandated by government agencies. An alternate approach that

was discussed was having the government

set the guidelines regarding security that

the industry (including carriers, ports, and

terminals) could follow as part of a partnership program. Once the guidelines are

established, the market forces would then

work to encourage ports, and the ports’

users, to comply with the guidelines.

There was the sentiment at the meeting

that many ports could adopt security

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 215
216 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

tation of counterterrorism techniques at

seaports. She also felt that, to address

cargo theft issues, port authorities should

be responsible for tightening and standardizing security operations within ports, and

she expressed a willingness to work with

the Commission to come up with appropriate legislation and recommendations to

support the work of the Commission.

The issue of crime and especially cargo

thefts, was widely discussed at the session.

The crimes cited by attendees as occurring

at seaports included auto and cargo theft,

as well as alien, drug, and contraband

smuggling. Some in attendance also

believed that seaports were vulnerable to

acts of terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction. In order to address the threat

of terrorism, it was suggested that a systematic approach to improving security at

seaports was required.

Regarding the issue of cargo theft, two

of the presenters felt that thefts occurred

frequently outside, not inside, the ports or

while in transit between businesses. A presenter stated that a criminal’s knowledge

about shipments could facilitate cargo

thefts within a port or its environs, and that

the lack of significant penalties for cargo

theft (as compared with drug smuggling)

makes cargo theft more attractive to organized crime. Two of the presenters also stated that the lack of a uniform database to

collect information about cargo theft losses

makes estimating industry losses difficult

and that law enforcement’s coordination

of cargo theft data needs to be improved.

A centralized database for capturing cargo

theft data, the inclusion of “cargo theft” as

a category in the Uniform Crime Reporting, and increased penalties for cargo theft

crimes were suggested as a means of

addressing these issues. A presenter

offered to assist government agencies in

developing the database.

The issues of the need for reliable and

accurate information about export shipments and the government’s need to raise

support for establishing security guidelines

and enhancing security practices within

seaports, for increasing the trade’s compliance of imported merchandise, and

for supporting Customs’ automated data

systems.

San Francisco, California

The second in the series of three public

meeting/listening sessions was held in San

Francisco, California, on February 16,

2000. The session was attended by representatives from the National Cargo Security Council, the Maritime Security Council,

the National Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association, the American Institute of Marine Underwriters, and the

American Association of Port Authorities.

In addition there were representatives from

the International Longshoremen’s and

Warehousemen’s Union, vessel carriers,

port authorities, stevedoring companies,

various West Coast ports, terminal operators, insurance companies, warehouse

operators, consultants in the field of security, and the general public.

The following significant areas were

discussed: the role and requirements of

government’s agencies in seaports, the vulnerability of seaports to crime and terrorist-related incidents, the need for information and additional legislation for export

shipments, the need for data about cargo

thefts, security standards for seaports, the

use of identification cards and background

checks to control/restrict access to ports,

the lack of information about shipments,

and security enhancements within ports.

Senator Diane Feinstein spoke at length

and advised the Commission that the following is needed at seaports: additional

technology, increased coordination

between federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies, increased federal

oversight of seaports, additional Customs

and Immigration officers, additional Customs and Commerce investigators, partnerships with trade and labor, and implemen-
The issue of security standards for seaports was a central topic at the session.

Some members of the trade believed that

minimum standards were warranted for

seaports, while others felt that “guidelines”

(which would not take regulations to

implement) were more appropriate. Some

presenters expressed concern that if state

or local governments issued standards it

might result in 50 disparate standards. One

presenter advised the Commission that he

was unsure what the role of the federal

government should be in the issuance and

development of standards.

Some members of the trade expressed

their views that security, and anti-crime

initiatives, could be enhanced at seaports

and facilities within seaports through the

use of technology, the increased presence

of uniformed officers (federal and private

security) at seaport facilities, increased

examinations, and through better control of

documentation and cargo.

In summation, the trade and members of

the public who attended the session in San

Francisco were concerned about crime in

U.S. seaports and believe seaports to be

vulnerable. However, they believe that

crime in seaports can be addressed by

enhancing security practices, by placing

additional federal resources and technology in seaports, as well as by increasing

information about shipments and increasing compliance on the part of the trade.

They believe that cargo theft (at seaports

and environs) is a major issue that can be

addressed in part, by better data collection

and increased law enforcement coordination. Although organized labor is opposed

to identification cards and background

checks as a means of controlling access to

seaports, other members of the trade

voiced their support for both identification

cards and background checks. The members of the trade also supported minimum

security guidelines for seaports.

the compliance of the trade regarding

exports were central topics at the meeting.

The presenters suggested the mandatory

use of the Customs Automated Export System, educating the trade about export

requirements, and increased penalties for

violators as ways to increase compliance.

The most discussed issue at the session

concerned the use of identification cards

and background (criminal history) checks

to control/restrict the access of employees

to seaports. Members of organized labor

who spoke were opposed to the concept of

using identification cards and background

checks to control access to seaports. They

stated that crimes were not being committed by dock workers at West Coast ports

and therefore that identification cards were

unwarranted. They said that any recommendations (like identification cards)

could negatively impact the viability of

commerce on the west coast. They

expressed concerns that identification card

programs could delay “transient or casual”

laborers (who are sometimes used in ports

during busy times) from being able to get

to work sites. In addition, they felt that it is

impractical to attempt to identify “sensitive

zones or work areas” in ports where additional security (and therefore identification

cards and a stable work force) could be

used on ports.

Some members of trade organizations

who spoke at the meeting expressed support for the use of identification cards and

background checks, although there was no

clear consensus about who should issue the

cards or if they should be mandated. One

opinion was that the government should

mandate the cards, and the ports should

issue them. Another member of the trade

felt that identification cards, but not background checks, should be required for all

workers who require access to seaports. A

third presenter believed that identification

cards were only effective if combined with

adequate physical barriers such as fences.

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 217
218 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

ports and tenants, between law enforcement agencies and the trade, and between

security people in related industries.

The use of identification cards to control/restrict the access of employees to seaports was raised at the meeting. One presenter stated that identification card

systems needed to be uniform for all ports

and that all employees (drivers, dock workers, etc.) who required access to seaports

should be required to obtain the cards. The

presenter also felt that the use of the cards

could facilitate, not hamper, commerce

within seaports. However, one speaker

expressed concern that the requirement for

prospective employees and workers to have

identification cards could adversely affect

the ability of emergency response teams to

access some seaports.

There was also some discussion about

performing background checks on employees who apply for identification cards and

the drug testing of employees at seaports.

One presenter felt that the performance of

background checks could deter criminal

activity in seaports and another speaker

expressed support for random drug testing

of seaport workers.

The issues of security standards for seaports and controlling access to seaports

were central topics. One presenter was

receptive to identifying security guidelines

for ports, but stated that government

should not mandate strict standards for all

ports. He felt that standards should be

developed with a view to the needs of

commerce in each individual port and the

various industries (oil refineries, bulk merchandise importers, etc.) that make up a

port. The presenter supported the concept

of the trade, in concert with federal agencies such as Customs and the Coast Guard,

defining minimum levels of security that

seaports and seaport users could adopt as

part of a cooperative initiative.

Two presenters felt that controlling the

access of vehicles, and unauthorized personnel, to seaports and vessels was an

Houston, Texas

The third and final in a series of three public meeting/listening sessions was held in

Houston, Texas, on March 1, 2000. The session was attended by representatives from

the oil industry, railroads, carriers, terminal

operators, freight forwarders, stevedoring

companies, maritime associations, congressional staffers, the press, local law enforcement agencies, representatives from the

Ports of Houston, Texas City, and Galveston, and the general public.

The following significant areas were discussed: cargo theft in seaports, the sharing

of information in seaports, identification

card systems, security standards and technology for seaports, partnership between

government agencies and the trade, controlling access to seaports, and the role of the

federal government in seaports.

The issue of crime and especially cargo

thefts was discussed. The main crimes that

occur at seaports were identified as drug

smuggling, cargo thefts, and terrorism.

One of the presenters felt that cargo thefts

occurred most frequently when goods were

in transit or while being shipped, and that

her company’s product line (high-tech

products) was vulnerable to thefts because

the product could be easily disposed of by

criminals, and information about shipments could be easily obtained. She also

stated that losses are increasing each year

in her industry (an estimated $1 billion in

losses last year) and that organized crime

is now involved in thefts. The presenter felt

that a uniform database to collect information about cargo theft losses is needed,

companies need to be adequately compensated (by insurance companies) for losses,

federal guidelines for sentencing criminals

involved in cargo thefts need to be developed, and current penalties for cargo theft

violations are insufficient.

There was also significant discussion

about the need to share information about

losses. Presenters stated that informationsharing needed to be enhanced between
address cargo thefts, enact stricter guidelines for cargo theft convictions, and

develop law enforcement task forces to

address cargo crimes. Another presenter

felt that the federal government needed

to develop “partnerships” with the trade

community to identify and address

issues of related to crime and security

in seaports.

In summation, the trade and members

of the public who attended the session in

Houston were concerned about crime in

U.S. seaports. They believe that the theft of

cargo at seaports is a major issue that can

be addressed by the creation of a uniform

database on losses and by ensuring that

companies are fairly compensated for their

losses. Enacting laws to address cargo

thefts, setting stricter guidelines for cargo

theft convictions, and developing law

enforcement task forces to address cargo

crimes were also identified as solutions to

address the issues of cargo thefts. The

trade also voiced support for restricting

access to seaports through the use of identification cards, developing and adopting

security guidelines that ports could follow,

and identifying and placing technology at

seaports to detect crimes.

important issue. One presenter stated that

the most critical components of security

systems were adequate perimeter fencing

and a means (identification cards for

example) of controlling access to seaports.

Another presenter stated that better controls could be achieved through the use of

enhanced perimeter controls, identification

cards, and the use of lists of personnel who

are approved to be in seaports.

Some members of the trade expressed

their views that security, and anti-crime

initiatives, could be enhanced at seaports

and facilities within seaports through the

use of technology. There was some concern, though, that technology for seaports

could be “over-engineered” (that is, there

is a tendency for law enforcement agencies

and the trade to attempt to develop and

implement systems that will detect all types

of crimes in seaports, although in most

users’ experience, this goal is unrealistic).

The role of the federal government in

seaports was discussed extensively. One

presenter stated that the federal government’s role in addressing cargo thefts

should be to review current regulations

to ensure that companies are fairly compensated for their losses, enact laws to

Appendix D: Comments from the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders ■ 219
lished for selected areas within the port.

Often overlooked is the need for a security

perimeter alongside cargo and cruise ships

and along the water boundaries of the port,

both at the immediate waterside and in the

waterways approaching the port.

Fences can be used to establish and

protect sensitive areas within the port such

as the federal inspection area, the security

office, high-value storage, lading and

unlading areas next to ships, and the holding areas for mobile inspection systems.

Protected zones can be established by a

variety of commercially available electronic fences and physical barriers. Electronic

line and area sensors also can be used to

establish a temporary security perimeter

around high-risk vessels or suspect containers. External intrusion sensors to meet

every need are available from commercial

or military sources.

Interior spaces can be protected by other

types of sensors to detect entry into an

area, movement within the area, or access

to a sensitive item. They could be employed

in office, equipment, and warehouse spaces

as a backup to the perimeter sensors. Interior sensors might be used without external

perimeter sensors only if the security

response would be quick enough to respond

The table at the bottom of the page indicates how technology associated with security, surveillance, and contraband detection

relates to the major issue areas of the

Commission.

The following sections provide a brief

overview and comparison of the types of

devices and systems expected to be commercially available within the next five

years in each of the three technology categories covered in this appendix. The intent

is to provide a realistic indication of the

opportunities and improvements that could

be realized by a focused and significant

investment in seaport technology over the

next several years.

Security Technology

Available Technology

Physical security and access control. The

function of a physical security and access

control system, or perimeter security system, is to deter, detect, document, and

deny or delay any entry of the protected

area. The most obvious seaport boundary

to be protected by a perimeter security system is the external property line. In addition, physical boundaries need to be estabAppendix E: Technology

221

Issues Addressed by Technology Category

Issue Security Surveillance Contraband detection

Prevention and detection of terrorism X X X

Prevention and detection of crime X X X

Military mobilization X X

Cargo control X X X

Passenger and crew control X X X
222 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

devices. As a result, each biometric technology should be individually tested on site.

In addition to ID access controls at

pedestrian and vehicle gates, there are a

number of portal control technologies to

address general or specific threats. These

include:

■ Magnetometers to detect firearms,

knives, or unauthorized tools.

■ Radiation detectors for nuclear weapons

or hazardous materials.

■ Trace detectors to detect drug or explosive residue on clothing, hands, lunchboxes, door handles, steering wheel, car

trunks, and so forth (see Contraband

Detection Technology section below).

■ Document scanners looking for drug or

explosive traces on entry passes and ID

documents; these and the trace detectors

would help to detect not only smugglers

but also drug users who might be a safety risk within the port.

■ X-ray systems to scan packages (Figure

1), small items (Figure 2), or persons.

These security control measures at vehicle entry and exit gates can be enhanced

on either a permanent or a random basis by

employing some of the new mobile or relocatable X-ray and gamma-imaging systems

capable of scanning an entire truck, container, or car for drugs, explosives, and

other contraband. Additional information

on these systems is provided in the Contraband Detection Technology section.

It would be preferable for security purposes that privately owned vehicles not be

allowed within the security boundaries of

the port at any time. Access by commercial

vehicles should be limited to the areas for

which they are authorized. Tire shredders

and pneumatic/hydraulic bollards can be

used to prevent the improper use of vehicle

gates. License plate readers or electronic

tags can be used to control and record the

movement of commercial and private vehito the break-in before the thief could reach

the target and flee the scene.

Gates and access controls must provide

the same level of security as the fences and

intrusion sensors. Personal ID cards or

badges should identify both the person and

the areas to which he/she is authorized

access. Electronic codes embedded in the

ID can be used both to verify authorized

access and to record and track personnel

movements for later analysis as needed.

Electronic IDs or tags also can be applied

to vehicles operating within port boundaries to control access and record movement. The IDs could be permanently associated with a vehicle or they could be

attached to a truck and trailer when it

enters the port and removed by the exit

control guard when it leaves. The increased

use of electric tags on commercial trucks

offers another opportunity for identifying

vehicles when they enter and leave the port

and tracking their movement within the

port. Gates that are dependent on a guard

to control entry/exit must also be equipped

with a means of preventing their use when

the guard is distracted or absent.

A variety of biometric technologies for

access control are already on the market or

under commercial development. They can

be used to control access to a physical area

or to a particular item such as a computer

or vehicle. The specific biometric could be

a person’s fingerprint, handprint, facial

image, iris or retina image, voice, handwriting, or thermal image. Each biometric usually has an associated cost, benefit, and

drawback that must be considered as a specific installation is planned. At present, the

least costly biometric technologies employ

facial image, single fingerprint, and either

voice or signature recognition. Unfortunately, these inexpensive technologies also are

subject to delay or defeat as a result of

external factors such as lighting, cuts, dirt,

background noise, or immature design. The

most accurate and reliable technologies are

the most expensive, possibly as much as

50 times the cost of the less expensive
or to sink to the bottom for later retrieval.

Electronic sensors also can be used to

detect surface and underwater movement

approaching the ships or piers, including

small quiet boats and underwater swimmers. Side-scan sonar can be used to check

vessels for external compartments that

might contain contraband; the Customs

Service has deployed both fixed and towed

sonar arrays for this purpose. Finally, systems such as the Coast Guard’s Vessel

Tracking System can be used to monitor

the movement of ships approaching and

departing the seaport. That system can be

augmented by one or more appropriately

sited marine radars to detect and monitor

small boat traffic around the seaport; the radars can in turn be supported by remotely controlled

closed-circuit television cameras to

provide visual records of suspect

boats and their occupants.

Protected voice and data communications within the port boundaries are another component of

physical security and access control. Federal inspectors and agents

need to communicate suspicious

activity, check databases, access

merchandise processing information systems, and coordinate their activities. Security officers and port operators also need to

communicate their observations, check

databases, and coordinate activities. Reliable seaport communications can be hampered by the

widely dispersed areas of activity,

the canyons created by stacked

containers, and the difficulty in

communicating aboard vessels and

below decks. Radio repeaters may

be needed on towers to improve

system reliability; all voice and

data transmissions should be in a

protected or secure mode to prevent eavesdropping and jamming.

Cargo security. The fences, lighting,

closed-circuit television, access controls,

and other perimeter security measures

cles, and weigh-in-motion sensors might

be used to detect unusual loads or weight

distribution in vehicles.

Adequate lighting throughout the port is

another security necessity. Lights should

be automatically controlled with an alarm

to indicate any that are not operating. They

should be sufficient to light all areas of the

port, including the adjacent water. They

also should be placed to prevent the creation of shadow areas if containers are

stacked unusually high.

Closed-circuit television systems are a

traditional means of providing perimeter

and internal security, but their installation

at seaports presents unusual problems. Like

lights, they should be placed where they

provide full and overlapping coverage of

the fence, container, warehouse, office, and

waterside areas. Cameras should have day

and night capabilities and use motion sensors or alarm zones to home in on suspect

activity. To avoid sabotage, power and signal cables should be hardened, and cameras

should be programmed to automatically

look at any camera installation that suddenly goes out of service. New advances in

cameras providing a full 360-degree

panoramic view should be explored.

Infrared sensors could be used to complement the closed-circuit television systems,

although they are less effective in moist air

and fog. Long-range cameras mounted off

port property often can provide surveillance

of waterside activities, including gangways

and the side of a ship away from the pier.

The design of the closed-circuit television

display room is as important as the camera

installations themselves. Operators should

not have to stare at multiple screens waiting

for something to happen; the system should

automatically alert them to actions of interest. Recording should be automatic to provide records for subsequent investigations.

Underwater sonar and passive sensors

can be used to detect materials thrown into

the water from a pier or ship regardless of

whether the materials are packaged to float

Appendix E: Technology ■ 223

Figure 1. Parcel X-Ray

Figure 2. Portable X-Ray
224 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

suitable for being carried on a ship for use

at intermediate ports of call; the larger,

more expensive, and higher-throughput

inspection devices may be feasible only at

the port of embarkation. The applicable

technologies include:

■ Drug and explosive particle and

vapor trace detectors.

■ Drug and explosive wipes and sprays.

■ Portable contraband detection systems,

including dielectrometers and magnetic

resonance for drugs and explosives in

liquid form.

■ Low-dose full-body X-ray.

■ Medical X-ray.

■ Ultrasonic and video scanners for

liquid-filled drums and tanks.

■ Baggage and parcel X-ray systems,

including the computed tomographic

(CT) X-ray systems used for airport

baggage.

■ Mobile X-ray and gamma-imaging

systems.

■ Trace detection using saliva, perspiration, or urine testing.

■ Canines.

Access control and ID systems can be

used to ensure that unauthorized persons

leave a ship before it sails, and that all passengers return to a ship before it leaves a

port of call. Bag match systems similar to

those used at airports can guard against the

introduction of terrorist devices or other

unauthorized materials.

Military mobilization security. Using a

seaport for a military mobilization greatly

increases the security stakes. An act of terrorism or sabotage certainly can harm our

overseas national defense actions, but in

light of the munitions and other potentially

dangerous materials that would be present,

it also harms persons at the port and in surrounding areas. As the threat increases, the

only way to control the risk is to reduce

described above will help prevent unauthorized access to containers and stored cargo.

If a criminal does reach containers and

cargo, security measures at the vehicle and

pedestrian gates, at ship lading areas and

gangways, and at waterside will make it

difficult for stolen or smuggled goods to

leave the port.

Inspection systems that permit the rapid

nonintrusive examination of containers as

they are unladed will reduce the opportunities for internal conspiracies and the

removal of contraband before the container

reaches the usual inspection site. These

systems also will reduce the need to physically escort suspect containers from the

pier to the federal inspection area. Appropriate systems are described in the Contraband Detection Technology section.

Additional cargo security enhancements

include placing tamper-proof seals on containers and trucks, using container tracking

technology to monitor containers, use

micro-encapsulated taggants to reveal

when containers have been approached or

breached, and the use of information technology systems to integrate data used by

both the public and private sector within

seaports.

Passenger and crew security. Cruise

ships transporting thousands of passengers

represent both a potential means of transporting contraband and a potential terrorist

target. Seaport security measures must

ensure that passengers, crew, baggage, or

ships stores are not used to get explosives

and other dangerous materials aboard such

ships or any other vessel, or used as a

means of getting prohibited materials off

of ships when they return to U.S. ports.

Technology is available to identify passengers and crew with a high likelihood of

having handled drugs, explosives, or

firearms; to examine passengers and crew

for internal and external body carries; and

to examine baggage, stores, and equipment

for concealed contraband. The smaller and

less-expensive devices and equipment are
security and contraband detection technologies with high probabilities of detection but with false alarm rates deemed too

high for ordinary use.

Military mobilization conditions at a

seaport would also mean more concern

over the introduction of a weapon of mass

destruction for activation in the port, while

ships were in transit, or even after the military materiel was unladed at its destination.

The portal and personal radiation detectors

and isotope identification systems

described earlier in this section and under

Contraband Detection Technology would

provide useful barriers against the introduction of nuclear material, but there is

still little that can be done against the

introduction of timed-release chemical and

biological agents. A biological weapon can

be as simple as a small aerosol can containing a liquid or powder, very difficult to

distinguish from a spray lubricant or other

innocuous item. A biological or chemical

weapon also could be a fragile container

designed to be crushed when a vehicle is

unladed. Such small items are not likely to

be detected by today’s counterdrug or

antiterrorism inspection technologies; even

if detected they are not likely to be recognized as dangerous by the technology operator unless they were very much out of

place. At this time, the best defense against

such weapons is to limit access to as few

persons as possible, to ensure that those

few persons are a low risk, and to conduct

frequent and thorough physical inspections. Should a remote prerelease trace

detector for biological or chemical agents

become available, it could be deployed at

key locations around the port or operated

from a low-flying remote pilotless vehicle.

Technology Under Development

Security technology is constantly being

improved, driven by both private sector and

government requirements for the increased

protection of vital assets. As a result, we

can expect to see considerable improvevulnerability (risk equals threat times vulnerability). This means increasing the level

of security and control throughout the port.

It may be necessary to increase security

rather quickly. The need for rapid security

improvement can be offset to some degree

if military assets can be used in addition to

commercially available security technology, especially if the military assets are

already in place.

The exact requirement for additional

technology to raise security levels at a seaport will of course depend on the technology and the security level already in place.

For example, if the existing perimeter

fences are adequate but there is no protected buffer zone to prevent access to the

fences, then the military can install ground

and area sensors from its standard suite of

unattended ground sensors. These sensors

also can be used to quickly establish protected zones within the port. If the closedcircuit television coverage of the port is

not sufficient to prevent and detect unauthorized movement, then military

unmanned remote pilotless vehicles

equipped with closed-circuit television and

infrared sensors can be put in orbit over

the seaport and its surroundings for 24-

hour surveillance. A small tethered aerostat

with a downward-looking radar launched

from within 10 or 20 miles of the port

would also provide continuous surveillance

of vessel and vehicle traffic in and around

the port in the absence of a Vessel Tracking System or ground-based marine radar.

A heightened level of security would

justify using technology that might be considered too time-consuming or intrusive to

protect normal commercial traffic and

cargo. This might be as simple as increasing the quantity of nonintrusive contraband

detection technology to permit more containers, trucks, cars, and people to be physically examined as they enter and leave the

port. It might mean adding fingerprint and

facial recognition technologies linked to

automated databases of terrorist and criminal identifications. Or it might mean using

Appendix E: Technology ■ 225
226 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

with this problem by looking at changes in

crime over time and attributing the changes

to the security technology added over that

period, but it must also account for exogenous changes over the same period having

nothing to do with the security technology.

Finally, there can be tremendous disparities

between the small cost of a single security

component and the very large dollar value

of the crime that was prevented by having

that component in service.

The most likely approach to a costbenefit analysis of security technology is

to make it an incremental analysis—to

look at the most likely added benefit of

each increment of technology over the

benchmark of the existing security system.

In doing this analysis, it is essential to

include the initial and recurring costs of

acquiring and training the personnel who

will be operating the security technology;

ignoring this cost and the actual training

activity means that the technology will

soon fall into disrepair.

Any cost-benefit analysis of security

technology is very dependent on the particular circumstances of each seaport, and a

general quantitative analysis should not be

attempted. However, several qualitative

comparisons can be made as a guide to

future technology choices.

■ The most important technology components are the fences and gates for the

perimeter of the port and high-risk

interior areas. An automated ID access

control system at all gates is preferable;

at the minimum, a manual access control system can be handled by security

guards if the system uses badges with

the holder’s picture and an indication of

the areas to which he/she has access.

■ The next requirement is adequate lighting and video coverage for all areas

of the port, with a central control and

monitoring facility.

■ Reliable and protected communications

are the third requirement.

ment in system performance, especially in

signal processing, and in unit cost.

Specific near-term improvements will

include biometric technologies, including

systems offering comparison of more than

one biometric for each individual;

improved facial recognition algorithms and

database capabilities, including practical

face-in-the-crowd systems; trace detection

techniques using saliva and sweat analysis

to detect internal body carries of drugs;

more sensitive vapor trace detectors for

drugs and explosives, enabling reliable

screening of larger volume containers and

spaces; and sensors to detect chemical

and/or biological agent contamination on

the outside of shipping containers. Electronic tagging and tracking systems for

commercial trucks, railcars, and marine

containers will be widely adopted by

industry, making it easier to track these

conveyances when approaching or within

the seaport. Efforts spearheaded by the

Australian Customs Service to develop a

universal standardized system for reading

and recording container IDs as they are

being off-laded from ships may also be

successful within the next five years. Commercial satellite systems providing highresolution sea and land-surface images on

demand are starting to become available,

and competition should make accessibility

affordable and easy.

Comparison of Security Technologies

Cost-benefit analyses for security technologies have some of the same pitfalls as

for other types of law enforcement systems. For example, the security systems

installed by the port operator are intended

to prevent crimes such as cargo theft and

drug smuggling, but the primary beneficiaries of such prevention are the shippers,

consumers, and the public—that is, the

entity incurring the costs receives little of

the economic benefit. It is also difficult to

measure the benefit of an event that does

not happen—that is, the benefit of deterrence. The cost-benefit analysis can cope
can be concealed in high-value items or

drug loads and detected if someone

attempts to take the item through an exit

gate are useful for theft and smuggling

investigations.

Intrusion sensors can be built into gangways to alert monitoring personnel to

attempts to board or leave a ship outside of

normal access hours. Radiation sensors

also can be built into the gangway or

incorporated in mats at the foot of the

gangway to detect the movement of

radioactive materials.

First responders for a weapons of mass

destruction alert or a hazardous material

spill need information about the layout of

the port or perhaps of a particular ship, as

well as the nature of the hazard, likely contamination zones, and appropriate containment actions. Information on many hazardous spill situations is already available

on small hand-held data units such as the

Palmtop Emergency Action for Chemicals,

and some is available in computer databases such as REACT that are readily accessible by subscribers to the service. Computerized layouts of the port that note

hazardous material locations, sensitive

building sites, emergency supplies, water

hydrants, and other pertinent information

for first responders can be loaded onto

computer databases, provided to emergency response teams, and updated as situations change. Plans and drawings for

cargo ships can also be put into a database.

First responders also may need protective

clothing and special material-handling

equipment that is positioned close to entry

points and readily accessible in emergencies.

Special technology can detect and

record the evidence of environmental

crimes such as the dumping of oil, hazardous waste, toxic substances, and other

pollutants from ships moored in the port or

underway. Airborne infrared sensors can

detect many of these spills even if they

are not visible to the naked eye; they also

■ Nonintrusive inspection technology

should be provided as soon as funding

and staffing permit. Smaller, inexpensive units, including radiation sensors,

hand-held contraband detection devices,

and small X-ray systems should be part

of the immediate equipment inventory.

This technology should be augmented

by mobile and relocatable X-ray and

gamma-imaging systems phased into

port operations as soon as possible, with

the total number of systems depending

on the vulnerability, criticality, workload, and physical layout of the port.

Surveillance/Monitoring

Technology

Available Technology

Most of the technology required to investigate crimes in or involving seaports is the

same as that required to investigate any

type of crime anywhere. Obtaining this

technology investigate seaport crimes is

more a matter of priorities and resources

than of new technology breakthroughs.

New technology that is more specific to

the seaport environment includes covert or

drop-and-run audio and video units to surveil suspect activities or containers. These

units need to be concealed in the types of

items normally found in the seaport environment. Preinstalled repeaters may be

needed to ensure good communications

from wherever the units are placed back to

the monitoring point. Electro-optic systems

must be adaptable to the contrasting lighting conditions of the seaport, from bright

worklights to deep shadows in a single

scene.

Smugglers will often relocate a container several times within the yard if they

believe it is the object of surveillance;

agents need covert radio frequency tags

that can be quickly affixed to such containers so that their location can be tracked.

Passive miniaturized microwave tags that

Appendix E: Technology ■ 227
228 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

offender, who may be subject to fines, but

also can provide early warning of a spill so

that preventive measures can be initiated

immediately.

Contraband Detection

Technology

These new contraband detection technologies, also called nonintrusive inspection

technologies, use different approaches

from the physical and chemical sciences

and several packaging configurations to

provide a variety of systems and devices

addressing specific requirements. While a

full discussion of the possible technology

variations is beyond the scope of this

report, the most significant characteristics

and distinctions are these:

■ Substance-specific or anomaly detector: Able to detect and identify a specific target substance, or able only to

indicate something abnormal about

the item being examined.

■ Trace detector or bulk detector:

Able to detect minute particles or

vapors, or able only to detect larger

quantities. Most trace detection devices

are substance-specific; a bulk detector

can be either substance-specific or an

anomaly detector.

■ Imaging or nonimaging: Provides a

visual depiction of the item being examined, or provides a graphical display or

signal (e.g., a red or green light). Trace

detectors are usually nonimaging. Bulk

detectors can be either, and sometimes

provide both an image and a signal.

■ Portable, mobile, relocatable, or fixed:

A portable system can be easily carried

or moved from place to place, either

while in use or between uses. A mobile

system may be in its own vehicle or on

a towed trailer. A relocatable system can

be disassembled and reinstalled at a new

location in a few hours or days. A fixed

can track the spill back to the vessel and

provide documentation of the crime. Sensitive multispectral sensors developed for

defense and intelligence requirements may

provide even greater capabilities, including

the opportunity for remote sensing. Small,

relatively inexpensive sensor-equipped

remote pilotless vehicles can perform

aerial surveillance of suspect vessels or

areas where spills often occur.

Technology Under Development

Improvements in these technologies can

be expected over the next several years,

particularly with respect to the availability

of new sensors to detect environmental

crimes. Incremental improvements in the

surveillance, monitoring, and tracking

equipment will also occur as data and

signal processing capabilities improve

and become less expensive.

Comparison of Surveillance/Monitoring

Technologies

Investigative technologies are not very

expensive, especially when compared with

large-scale contraband detection systems

or the fencing and access controls necessary to protect an entire seaport. In many

cases it is difficult to predict in advance

exactly what monitoring equipment or type

of sensor will be needed for an immediate

investigation. Therefore, it is prudent to

acquire a reasonable inventory of equipment in advance based on experience and

judgment about the number and types of

investigations that may need to be conducted. Information technology and protective

equipment for emergency response teams

is also not very expensive, particularly in

light of the lives and property that might

be saved, and it should be a priority for

acquisition at every seaport. The cost of

environmental contamination along our

waterfront and beaches can also be very

high. The cost of acquiring and operating

suitable monitoring equipment should not

be very high by comparison. Such equipment not only can help pinpoint the
probes and needles, chemical reagent

sprays and wipes, and pager-sized

radiation detectors.

Figure 3 depicts a Customs contraband detection kit, which is a suitcase containing a gamma backscatter

unit, fiber optic scope, rangefinder,

detection sprays, segmented steel

probe, needle probes, undercarriage

or ceiling mirror, and flashlight. The kit,

which is commercially available, provides

the basic tools to search for concealments

in the structure of a container, truck, or

car, in baggage, and in small parcels.

Several systems are commercially available to detect trace levels of drug and

explosive particles or vapor. The particle

trace detectors are about the size of a desktop computer; the sampling device is carried to the suspect item, wiped over the

surface, and then returned to the unit for

analysis. The devices typically provide a

“go/no go” signal and identify the item

detected in 5 to 10 seconds. Units like

these are in frequent use by the Coast

Guard, the Customs Service, and Revenue

Canada to check for traces of drugs on

cargo and cruise ships, particularly in the

crew’s quarters, around popular hiding

places, and on ship and crew papers. The

vapor detectors are more widely used

detecting explosives than drugs; they are

easily carried, and they provide specific

identification of the detected explosive

within 5 to 10 seconds.

Particle detectors are also being used to

detect drugs or explosives concealed within containers, vehicles, and baggage. Their

accuracy of detection in such cases often

depends on whether exterior surfaces have

been contaminated by minute traces of the

concealed substances, and they usually

require physical contact with the surfaces

being checked. However, current research

in sampling techniques indicates that there

may be ways around these limitations for

the examination of closed marine containers and trucks.

system is essentially limited to a single

permanent location.

Each type of inspection technology will

have its own set of operational characteristics, such as examination speed or throughput rate, probabilities of an accurate detection or of a false alarm, cost,

maintainability, ease of operation, and

safety. While the bad news may be that

there is no silver bullet technology that

will solve all seaport detection needs, the

good news is that there are an increasing

number of technology choices designed to

meet one or more of those needs in an

optimum fashion. The “correct” choice for

each situation will be the best match of the

technology’s capabilities and characteristics with the intended operational application and requirements.

The choices can also be improved by

combining different technologies in a single examination system—for example,

combining a technology that is substancespecific with another that is an anomaly

detector, or with technologies specific for

different targets. One current example

using both types of combinations is the

mobile system that combines X-ray imaging, a drug and explosives trace detector,

and a radiation sensor. As a result, an item

can be examined quickly and reliably in

one pass through the system for substances

as diverse as drugs, guns, knives, explosives, munitions, radioactive weapons and

waste materials, currency, and any other

suspect materials whose presence might be

indicated by an unusual shape or density.

Available Technology

Portable systems. Portable and hand-held

inspection devices have long been the

mainstays of the inspection process, particularly when looking for concealed drugs,

explosives, and weapons. The list of popular devices includes gamma backscatter

units, fiber optic scopes, laser and sonic

rangefinders, trace particle and vapor

detectors, flashlights and mirrors, steel

Appendix E: Technology ■ 229

Figure 3. Contraband Detection Kit
230 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

gling, regulatory compliance, hazardous

waste evaluation, and emergency response.

Mobile systems. The availability of

mobile inspection technologies for seaport

applications has improved considerably in

the past year. Until then, mobile inspection

technology was limited to relatively lowpower and limited-capacity X-ray units

mounted in small vans or trucks. These

were essentially the same type of X-ray

units used to examine baggage and parcels

at airports and building entrances, with

X-ray energy levels typically about

150,000 electron-volts (150 keV) or less.

While the ability to move the X-ray equipment between loading docks was useful,

the systems were limited to breakbulk

cargo, which meant that containers had

to be emptied and most pallets broken

down to individual boxes. Figure 4 illustrates one of these mobile X-ray vans.

The Customs Service has recently begun

to equip its version of a mobile X-ray van

with a particle drug and explosive detector

as well as a radiation detector. Although

the capacity is still limited to the equivalent of large packages, they can be

checked for a variety of materials with

one pass through the van.

Figure 5 illustrates the first in a new

series of mobile inspection systems with

higher energy levels than prior systems.

Developed for Customs by the Department

of Defense, this system was designed to

inspect trucks and cars at land border

crossings and is still being evaluated for

use at seaports. In operation, the system

moves along a line of stationary vehicles

or containers using a 450-keV X-ray system to capture transmission and backscatter images of the targets in real time. It

requires about 70 seconds to scan a 20-foot

container, although under some circumstances, both sides of the container must be

scanned, doubling the time. The average

throughput rate is expected to be 7 to 15

vehicles or containers per hour. Based on

experience with similar systems at land

ports, this system should do well at imagNew types of hand-held devices can

detect the radiation emitted by nuclear

weapons of mass destruction or other

radioactive materials. One devise is a

pager-sized radiation detector developed by

a Department of Energy National Laboratory for the Customs Service. The device is

extremely sensitive and will detect gamma

radiation at levels only 2 to 4 times normal

background and, depending on the radiation intensity, at distances up to 30 feet

away. The isotopes detected include U-238,

U-235, U-233, Pu-239, Pd-103, Co-60,

Ces-137, K-40, and many others. The unit

is worn on the inspector’s belt and provides

an automatic alert if radiation is detected.

Customs is using more than 3,000 of these

units at ports around the country.

Although the radiation pager is sensitive

to a wide spectrum of radiation, it cannot

identify a specific isotope. The radiation

source could be as innocent as a medical

implant or as dangerous as an improperly

shielded commercial shipment or a terrorist device. While the specific situation usually will provide clues as to the correct

interpretation, another device is needed to

identify the specific nuclear material. One

such commercially available device weighs

about two pounds, stores the spectra of

more than 250 isotopes, and will quickly

provide the operator with exact information on the detected isotope(s), count rate,

and other data. In practice, the two units

complement each other, with the pagers

providing continuous monitoring wherever

personnel are working and the isotope

identifier used when a radiation source is

detected. The equipment inventory at a

port could include a large number of the

relatively inexpensive

pagers backed up by

just a few of the isotope

identifiers. Together, the

units provide an effective, affordable, and

user-friendly nuclear

detection capability for

purposes of antismug- Figure 4. Mobile X-Ray Van
or examination sites; it

provides a real-time

scan as it is driven over

a row of stationary targets. The X-ray system

can be operated at 2,000

or 6,000 keV (i.e., 2

meV or 6 MeV), and it

can examine full-height

trucks, roll-on/roll-off

units, single marine

containers, or the upper

container in a double

stack. The scan time for a container is

expected to be about 15 seconds. The

2 MeV energy level should be sufficient

to examine all but the densest of cargoes,

and the 6 MeV level

should take care of most

of those, including liquid-filled tanks. One

drawback is that the

system may not see the

full height of an International Standards

Organization container

in a single scan. Customs expects to begin

its operational evaluation of the first system

at a South Florida seaport early in 2000.

Relocatable systems. A relocatable

inspection system cannot move between

inspection sites under its own power, but it

can be disassembled and reassembled for

operation at a new location within a few

days. Systems that

require several

weeks to disassemble and reassemble

are sometimes

called “transportable,” but for

this report they are

considered fixed

systems.

Only two relocatable inspection sysing most drugs, explosives, and other contraband that are hidden in the structure of

containers, trucks, and cars or within relatively light cargo.

Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the most

recent mobile inspection technologies for

seaport applications. Although neither

system had been deployed to a seaport as

of October 1999, Customs and other agencies have done some evaluations that permit reasonable assessments of expected

performance.

The system in Figure 6 uses gamma

radiation rather than X-rays as the basis of

its imaging capability. Like the mobile

truck X-ray, the system moves along a row

of stationary containers or vehicles and

produces a real-time image very similar to

that of an X-ray system. The cesium-137

source generates a beam energy of 662

keV, which approximates the penetration

capability of a 1 MeV (million electric

volt) X-ray source against typical targets.

The scan time for one side of a 20-foot

container is about three to four seconds,

but again, both sides may sometimes need

to be scanned. Based on its operational

experience with a similar relocatable system at Port Everglades, Customs expects

this system to perform well in examining

trucks and containers loaded with light- to

moderate-density cargo. Like the mobile

truck X-ray, the system presents no radiation hazards to operators, bystanders, or

the items being examined when it is operated in accordance with normal procedures, including personnel exclusion areas.

The vendor claims that the system also can

be used to examine a moving vehicle by

ensuring that the cesium source is closed

as the truck cab and driver pass through

the inspection portal.

The system shown in Figure 7 was

designed specifically to examine marine

containers in a seaport environment. It

features a high-energy X-ray system built

into a container straddle carrier that can

move under its own power between piers

Appendix E: Technology ■ 231

Figure 5. Mobile Truck X-Ray

Figure 6. Mobile Gamma-Imaging System

Figure 7. Mobile Container X-Ray System
232 ■ Report on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

moving railcars for hidden compartments,

contraband, and persons. If that is successful, the same type of system could be used

to scan railcars entering and leaving the

seaport.

The Stolen Automobile Recovery System (STARS) is a gamma-imaging system

demonstrated at a south Florida seaport to

screen outbound containers for concealed

stolen vehicles. STARS has the same

cesium-137 source as the mobile and relocatable gamma-imaging systems described

above, but it has a different set of detectors

that decrease the imaging resolution so that

only large items can be recognized. This

change also reduces the cost of the system.

During an operational evaluation at Port

Everglades, STARS detected and identified

vehicles in closed containers as they were

driven into the port. Although not tested

for other contraband detection applications

or for vehicles leaving the port, it is possible that STARS could detect bulk quantities of drugs, weapons, or explosives being

smuggled out of the port in a supposedly

empty truck or container.

Fixed systems. A variety of fixed inspection systems are available for use at seaports. Figure 10 depicts a pallet examination system using two 450-keV X-ray

systems, one scanning from the side and

the other from the top. The system can

handle pallets and cargo up to 4 feet wide,

6 feet high, and 10 feet long, and weighing

6,000 pounds. Although still using 450-

keV X-ray systems, the side and top-down

views provide a greater imaging capability

than would a single-view system.

Several permanent facilities incorporate

a high-energy X-ray system to examine

trucks and marine containers. Systems

operating at 8 to 10 MeV are being used in

Europe and Asia, and 5-MeV systems are

being used in England and France to scan

trucks entering the EuroTunnel. At these

energy levels the penetration and imaging

capabilities are extremely good, but the

facilities are quite large and expensive. The

tems are believed to be in use at seaports

anywhere in the world. The system depicted

in Figure 8 is said to be operational at a

seaport in South Africa, and the system in

Figure 9 is being operated by Customs at

Port Everglades, Florida.

The system in Figure 8 is essentially a

reconfiguration of an earlier dual-view

450-keV system developed to examine trucks

on the Southwest border

and later adapted to the

single-view 450-keV

mobile truck X-ray

system illustrated in

Figure 5. It requires

that the target container

or vehicle be towed

between two 40-foot

ISO containers that

house two X-ray systems scanning each side of the target.

Scan time for a 20-foot

container is said to range

between 45 and 180 seconds. Penetration capability should be better

than in the mobile truck

X-ray as a result of

improved detector technology.

The system in Figure

9 is a different configuration of the mobile

gamma-imaging system in Figure 6. In this

case, the target vehicle or container is positioned between two parallel tracks on

which the gamma source and the detector

array move synchronously to create a

scanned image. Scan time for a 20-foot

container is under 30 seconds. This system

also can be equipped with a cobalt-60

radioactive source, which increases the

beam energy level to about 1.3 MeV and

provides some increase in penetration and

imaging capability over the cesium-137

version. The vendor is building for the

Customs Service a stationary version of

this gamma-imaging system to scan slowFigure 8. Relocatable Seaport X-Ray System

Figure 9. Relocatable Gamma-Imaging System
■ A 1-MeV X-ray system for

cargo pallets and containers up

to eight feet high and wide and

weighing up to 10,000 pounds.

■ Automatic alert to the probable

presence of concealed drugs

or explosives based on image

interpretation.

■ Central analysis and storage

of container and truck images

from remote inspection systems.

■ A mobile STARS unit for detecting concealed vehicles and expected by the vendor to also be capable of detecting

currency, high-tech exports, and other

bulk materials concealed in empty or

lightly loaded vehicles and containers.

■ Application of the CT X-ray systems

developed for fast, automated screening

of air passenger baggage to the examination of the baggage and stores being

laded aboard a passenger or cargo ship.

■ Scaling-up of CT baggage systems to

examine breakbulk cargo.

■ Improved trace detection of drugs and

explosives based on vapor.

■ Micro-miniature electronic or biological

sensors for the trace detection of drugs

and explosives.

■ Sensors to detect chemical or biological

weapons or hazardous materials while

in transit.

■ Substance-specific detection systems to

remotely examine containers and trucks

using neutron analysis or other nuclear

interrogation techniques.

However, as useful as some of these

improvements and new products may be,

their future availability does not justify

delaying prudent investments in many of

the systems currently available. In brief,

there will always be a better technology

just around the corner—but waiting until

it appears can prevent any progress at all.

scan time for a single container ranges

from one to three minutes, but throughput

can be increased with multiple inspection

stations. Vendor claims for throughput are

typically 20 to 35 containers per hour.

A prototype inspection system, built by

a Department of Energy National Laboratory for the Customs Service, detects hazardous radioactive materials and bulk

quantities of marijuana. This system

detects potassium-40 (K-40) emissions that

are several levels above background.

Detectors below and on either side of the

roadway automatically scan a truck as it

approaches the exit gate of the port. By the

time it arrives, the exit control officer

knows whether there are radioactive materials in the truck and whether the source is

likely to be a weapon, marijuana, or an

industrial radiation isotope. The prototype

system is still undergoing evaluation on the

Southwest border; a relocatable K-40

detection system is also being tested on the

Canadian border. If these prototypes are

successful, they could fulfill both counterterrorism and counterdrug roles when

installed at vehicle gates in a seaport.

Technology Under Development

Several of the technologies identified as

available are in fact still undergoing prototype evaluation and are not in commercial

production. However, there is already

sufficient experience to permit high confidence in their becoming commercially

available within the next 12 to 18 months.

In addition, there are several new

inspection systems and enhancements to

existing systems under development that

may become commercially available and

operationally viable within the next five

years. Although some are only for smaller

applications such as the examination of 55-

gallon steel drums, or for specific targets

such as drugs or explosives, most should

have a more general application. Among

the most likely and most significant potential improvements are these:

Appendix E: Technology ■ 233

Figure 10. Dual-View Heavy Pallet

450 keV X-Ray System
234 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

of the source and the number of inches

of steel that the energy would penetrate.

As a general rule, the sides, top, and

floor of marine containers are built of heavier-gauge material than those of trucks.

Marine containers also tend to be more

tightly packed and to have heavier or more

dense contents than truck cargoes. Therefore, the inspection of marine containers

often requires greater penetration power

than the inspection of trucks. While 450-

keV units do well on most trucks, Customs

expects that the examination of large, heavy

cargo pallets will require an energy level of

about 1 MeV, and that the thorough examination of most loaded marine containers

will require 2 MeV or more.

■ While the scan rate of an inspection system does have some influence on the

overall throughput rate, the determining

factors are more likely to be the time to

move and prepare the containers or

trucks that are to be examined and the

time required to interpret the image.

The time required to stage and remove

vehicles depends on the space available

to line them up; longer rows mean less

time consumed in turning or reversing

the system. The time needed to interpret

the image also depends on many factors,

but the Customs experience is 5 to 10

minutes for a large tractor-trailer combination or a loaded container. As a result,

unless more image display stations are

Comparison of Contraband

Detection Technologies

This section provides an initial and somewhat qualitative basis for comparing the

operational and economic value of available contraband detection technologies.

A more detailed quantitative analysis

would require information that is not readily available, such as the significance of

the threat or of not detecting every smuggling attempt, the nature and quantity of

the conveyances or materials to be examined, the actual performance of systems

still being evaluated, and the true acquisition and life cycle costs of each system.

Even without information for a quantitative comparison of the various systems,

some general guidelines and comments are

possible as a guide to further investigation

and decision making:

■ The true detection performance of X-ray

and gamma-imaging systems is a function of several factors, most notably the

actual radiation energy level, the sensitivity and arrangement of detectors, and

the signal processing and display characteristics. However, because it is easier to

describe the energy level than the other

parameters, that is the usual method for

comparing systems. It is important to

realize that changes in energy level and

penetration level are not proportional.

The table below is an approximation of

the relationship between the energy level

X-Ray/Gamma Energy Levels and Approximate Penetration of Steel

Approximate Energy Level Penetration (inches)

Less than 400 keV Less than 1

400 to 700 keV 1.5 to 4

1 MeV 4.5 to 6

2 MeV 6 to 7

6 MeV 10

10 MeV 12
designed marine container systems

described in the table below can play a

valuable role at seaports even though they

provide lower energy levels and thus less

penetrating power. Mobile systems can be

used to screen trucks, containers, and cars

at entry and exit gates. They also can be

used to examine empty or lightly loaded

containers within the container yard and

to scan containers at the pier as soon as

they are offladed. Relocatable systems

can be used in either temporary or permanent installations to augment the overall

examination capability of the seaport.

Although there is not much experience or

data thus far on the use of mobile truck

X-ray systems in a seaport environment,

Customs is successfully using the relocatable gamma-imaging system depicted

in Figure 9 at Port Everglades against a

variety of marine cargoes and containers.

While X-ray systems have long been the

traditional imaging tool for customs-type

inspections, the new gamma-imaging

systems have the potential for performance comparable to a higher-energy X-ray

system but in a simpler, more reliable,

and less expensive package.

The available CT X-ray systems are

designed specifically to examine airline

baggage and have not been tried in other

environments. They are limited in the size

of the objects they can examine, and they

offer energy levels of 200 keV or less.

However, their ability to create 3-D images

of the target and to provide an automatic

alarm for even very small quantities of

suspect materials may be useful for the

rapid screening of baggage and similarsized stores being laded aboard a ship.

Inspection systems that are mobile or

easily relocatable can be an essential component of military mobilization or emergency response plans. The mobile 450-keV

X-ray and mobile/relocatable gammaimaging systems described above can be

quickly moved over the road or by rail;

several versions can be easily airlifted.

The mobile 2- and 6-MeV X-ray system

added, the sustained operational

throughput rate of most imaging systems may be about the same regardless

of differences in their individual scanning speed.

■ Determining the real cost of the larger

inspection systems must include consideration of the recurring costs of operation and maintenance. System reliability

and the frequency and ease of maintenance should also be considered.

With these caveats in mind, some conclusions can be drawn about the relative

value of the available systems.

Only three of the systems previously

described were designed for seaport and

marine container applications-the mobile

2- to 6-MeV system in Figure 7, the relocatable dual 450-keV system of Figure 8,

and the fixed-site 8- to 10-MeV system.

This is not surprising, since the impetus

for the development of large new inspection systems was primarily the need to

inspect the truck traffic crossing the U.S.-

Mexico border. The table on the next page

compares some of the salient features of

each system. It is important to remember

that no first-hand information exists on the

operational performance of the mobile and

relocatable systems; the former because

the prototype system has not gone to the

field, and the latter because information is

not yet available from the South African

operator of the system. Some system characteristics, such as the realistic sustainable

throughput rate, can be determined only by

operational experience.

Although the relocatable gammaimaging system was initially envisioned

for vehicle examination at landports, the

Customs Service is using one at a seaport

now and plans to add more at seaports

over the next year. For this reason it is also

included in the table below, based on the

current configuration.

Examination systems that are smaller

and less expensive than the specially

Appendix E: Technology ■ 235
236 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

are commercially available with a range of

selectivity and sensitivity. Radiation detectors also can be added to standard imaging

systems; Customs is currently completing

the installation of such detectors on all of

its fixed and mobile X-ray systems for

examining cargo and baggage. The small,

inexpensive radiation detectors can extend

radiation detection capability to every location visited by inspection personnel. Technology to detect chemical and biological

weapons during transit (i.e., prerelease) is

still under development; the applicability

of vapor and particle trace detectors will

depend in very large measure on the presence and detectability of external contamination of the container used to transport

the agent. Unusual packaging to protect

these weapons during transit may also

be recognizable on imaging inspection

systems.

built into a straddle carrier can be moved

between ports by barge. Operator training

on all of these systems can be accomplished in a very short time, or a cadre of

trained operators could be available for

call-out.

Technology now available for the specific detection of nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons of mass destruction

while in transit is limited to the detection

of nuclear materials, primarily by the detection of gamma radiation. While the radiation detectors could be defeated by heavy

shielding, the shielding itself should be

detected by X-ray and gamma-imaging

systems and recognized by inspectors or

automatic detection systems unless it was

designed to look like a normally dense

commercial product. Fixed sensors to

screen moving trucks and containers for

radioactive materials at traffic chokepoints

Comparison of Marine Container Systems

Mobile Relocatable Fixed Relocatable 

2 & 6 MeV Dual 450 KeV 8 to 10 MeV Cesium 137

Estimated acq. Cost $4M $3M $10–12M $1M

Site/space req. Minimal Moderate Extensive Minimal

Penetration—inches 7 & 10 3 10–12 5–6

Transmission image Yes Yes Yes No

Backscatter image No Yes No No

Scan full-height No Yes Yes Yes

Scan double-stacked Yes No No No

Examine at pier Yes No No No
types of threats, the model port should be

flexible enough to fit all types of commercial ports at both normal operating conditions and heightened periods of risk, primarily as a result of increased threat and

medium or high vulnerability. At a minimum, the following criteria should be

incorporated into the desired attributes of

a model port.

Physical Security and

Access Control

Standard Operating Procedures

■ A local port security committee is chartered, comprised of appropriate federal,

state, and local agencies, as well as port

stakeholders. 

■ The port has conducted, in conjunction

with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies, a crime threat

assessment. 

■ The port has, through the port security

committee, received information from

the results of the terrorism threat and

vulnerability assessments. 

■ The port authority or terminal operator

provides a current security manual

incorporating standard operating procedures, standards of conduct, and a

definitive statement of what the management expects of the security force.

■ The security manual is fully documented, complete, and accurate, and consistently adhered to. 

■ The security director formulates written

operating procedures for security-related

As noted in Chapter 5 and articulated in

Recommendation 14 of the Commission’s

report, the proposed national-level security

subcommittee should develop a “model

port” and draft guidelines for its use by

seaport stakeholders in reducing port security-related vulnerabilities. The subcommittee should then manage an associated

outreach program to ensure that the model

port is broadly disseminated and widely

accepted. The reduction of vulnerabilities

would, in turn, be an integral element of

effective risk mitigation. The relationship

between threats, vulnerabilities, and risk is

discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 

The model port guidelines should be

sufficiently flexible to be applicable to all

domestic ports, regardless of size, management, or type, and spectrum of potential

threats. Local and national crime and terrorism threat assessments, along with

national threat-warning information, are

tools that should be used in conducting a

vulnerability assessment at the port level.

These assessments are included in recommendations 5 and 7 of the Commission’s

report. This vulnerability assessment is the

primary tool by which risk should be determined at the seaport. 

Stakeholder input to the subcommittee

should be sought from such industry

groups as the Maritime Security Council,

the National Cargo Security Council, the

International Association of Airport and

Seaport Police, and the American Association of Port Authorities. Furthermore, security practices at ports throughout the world

should be analyzed for potential “best practices” that can become guidelines.

Because U.S. seaports vary significantly

in size, management scheme, trade, and

Appendix F: Model Port

237
238 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

outward facing angle irons, and stands

at least 8 feet (2.5 meters) in height.

■ Reinforcement of the fence line with a

barrier (e.g., ditch or berm) is used to

enclose wheeled operations involving

containers on chassis or trucks loaded

with consolidated cargoes overnight,

to render certain parts of the fence line

physically impassible for a trailer.

■ Alarms are installed to complement

the security of a reinforced fence line

to form a system capable of monitoring

many alarm zones from a central control room manned by terminal security

personnel.

Parking

■ Parking areas are situated outside of

fenced operational areas or a substantial

distance from cargo handling and storage areas and buildings, and passenger

embarkation areas.

■ Employees exiting to the parking area

from a cargo or passenger facility are

required to pass through a controlled

area under the supervision of security

personnel.

■ Employees visiting their motor vehicle

during work shifts are required to notify

management or security personnel.

■ Control of access to employee parking

areas is supervised, and is restricted by

a permit system, with records maintained that include matching personnel

with permit number and motor vehicle

identification. Temporary permits are

issued to vendors and visitors for parking in designated controlled areas. 

Access Points

■ Gates in disuse are permanently sealed

or removed.

■ Gates considered indispensable and in

daily use are secured by two sets of padlocks and case-hardened steel chains, or

matters, including bomb threats and

alert levels, and collaborates with relevant government and law enforcement

agencies to develop an emergency

response plan. 

■ Adequate and reliable communications

are provided to enable contact between

elements of the terminal security force

and from the security force to local law

enforcement.

■ Terminals handling a substantial volume

of cargo or passengers to identify personnel authorized to enter cargo, passenger, and document processing areas

employ an employee identification card

system.

■ Display of an employee identification

card, visible at all times, is required of

each employee.

■ Supervisory personnel are present during lunch and breaks if taken in the

work area.

■ Truck drivers, vendors, and other visitors are not permitted in the general

offices of any terminal other than as

required to conduct their business, and

only authorized personnel are permitted

in warehouses.

■ Computer security formal guidelines

are in place for each marine terminal.

■ Computerized information access is

password-controlled, and is restricted on

a need-to-know basis, which includes

dissemination of information no sooner

than required to complete transactions

involving, for example, shipping agents. 

■ Firearms are restricted in the seaport to

law enforcement personnel and other

approved individuals.

Perimeter Fence Line

■ Fence line is intact, taut, well-secured

to upright supports anchored into the

ground, topped with barbed wire on
when there is no activity. While in port,

the ship’s deck and hull is illuminated

in periods of darkness and restricted

visibility, but not so as to interfere with

the required navigation lights and safe

navigation.

Buildings

■ In areas adjacent to warehouses, sheds,

and passenger terminals, a buffer zone

of at least 10 feet is created around the

entire building and must be enforced at

all times. 

■ Containers obstructing the view of

building entrances by police and

security guards are removed. 

■ All exterior doors and windows are

equipped with properly installed locks

or locking devices, and incorporated

with detection or alarm systems.

■ Area alarm systems are installed to

secure computer rooms and office

spaces where confidential documents

are stored.

■ A key control system is implemented,

with a formal policy governing which

personnel have right of access to specified areas. A master ledger is maintained recording the legitimate holder

of each copy of each key, issuance for

which is controlled by management or

security personnel.

■ Locks, locking devices, and key control

systems are inspected regularly, and

malfunctioning equipment is repaired

or replaced.

Security Force Management

■ The security director establishes minimum hiring standards, and ensures

their compliance. 

■ Training is made imperative for in-house

or contracted security force personnel,

all of whom receive adequate pre-work

classroom training and certification by

deadlocking bolt or an equivalent device,

that does not require use of a chain.

■ Gates are equipped with a recording

system to document inspection stops

by security personnel during routine

patrols. 

■ Separate gates are constructed for the

use of personnel and vehicular traffic,

which include personnel screening

points.

■ Gate alarms are installed and monitored

from a central point (e.g., main guardhouse).

■ Gatehouses at all vehicle entrances and

exits are manned during business hours

by operators of facilities handling a

substantial volume of high value cargo,

and are situated so that exiting vehicles

may be halted and examined on terminal

property, and are equipped with telephones or other communications devices.

■ Closed circuit television systems are

used for control of the interior and

perimeter of the terminal; they record

entry and exit through the main gate,

and images of container and vehicular

license or registration numbers. Drivers

are stored for designated periods.

■ Operational information obtained by

terminals during the entry stage is made

available to the security department for

its purposes to, for example, ensure and

verify that a particular container was

released to a specific driver.

Lighting

■ Controlled adequate lighting is provided

to enable clear illumination for all facility areas, including perimeter fence lines,

entrances, exits, and gatehouses, and

sufficient to assure proper visibility of

approaching persons and vehicles.

■ The seaport authority ensures that all

areas of the terminal are illuminated

to at least the level of twilight, even

Appendix F: Model Port ■ 239
240 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

Cargo Security

Delivery of Cargo

■ Gate passes are issued to truckers and

other carriers to control and identify

those authorized to pick up cargo. 

■ The company name of carriers is clearly

shown on all equipment.

■ Cargo is only released to the carrier

specified in the delivery order unless a

release authorizing delivery to another

carrier is presented and verified. 

■ Personnel processing delivery orders

verify the identity of the trucker and

trucking company before releasing the

shipment.

■ Access to areas where documentation is

processed is limited solely to authorized

personnel, and shipping documents are

safeguarded from theft.

■ Seal numbers on containers are verified

against documents, and seals are

checked for integrity.

■ The insides of conveyances are checked

for stolen merchandise.

■ Drivers sign for shipments legibly and

in ink.

Reception of Cargo 

■ Drivers entering facilities with deliveries

in all cases obtain gate passes.

■ Drivers show identification, and the

company name of carriers is clearly

shown on all equipment.

■ Delivery documents (such as bills of

lading) are closely scrutinized, seal

numbers on containers are verified

against documents, and seals are

checked for integrity.

■ Cargo shipments should be verified

upon receipt. 

a qualified professional. The training

includes completion of basic security

topics, and at least 16 hours of on-thejob training. If national, state, or local

standards or certification regimes are in

place, training meets or exceeds those

requirements. 

■ The security director’s written job specifications include the task of maintaining

and validating the published information

in the security manual, and this is an

assessment element in the manager’s

formal performance review. 

■ Security personnel frequently patrol

terminals to ensure that gates, fence

line, and buildings are secure.

■ Security personnel are required to complete a work sheet during each shift,

recording the duties performed by

them and at the times of occurrence.

Enhanced Measures for Physical Security

and Access Control in Periods of

Heightened Risk

■ All individuals employed in the seaport

who have access to restricted or secure

areas have been subject to background

and criminal record checks.

■ In addition to port facility employees,

photo ID badges are displayed by vessel

crewmembers, other carrier employees,

vendors, longshoremen, passengers, and

visitors to prevent unauthorized access

to restricted areas.

■ Intrusion Detection Systems including

video monitoring, remote sensors and

alarms, and computerized recording

instrumentation are employed to facilitate

real-time evaluation and response and

subsequent investigation and analysis. 
Security of Cargo During Lading and

Unlading from Vessels and Railcars

■ Cargo is moved directly from railcars or

vessels to storage facilities, and directly

from storage facilities to railcars and

vessels.

■ Seals are checked on all containerized

shipments before arrival/departure/

transfer. 

■ Empty containers are opened, examined,

and resealed, and stored door-to-door in

facilities.

Storage of Loose Cargo

■ Cargo stored in open areas, and palletized or stacked cargo stored in warehouse facilities, are properly stacked

and placed within, away from, and

parallel to fences and walls, to ensure

unimpeded views for security personnel.

Documentation Review and Control

■ Ocean manifests for cargo to be

unladed are transmitted electronically

to Customs in advance of vessel arrival.

■ Bills of lading for cargo and containers are checked for accuracy before

acceptance.

■ Cargo on documentation is adequately

described, and the weights and piece

counts indicated on documentation.

■ Cargo documentation is closely

guarded to avoid documentation fraud.

Cargo Control, Inventories, and

Cargo Reconciliation

■ Facility operators maintain, and continuously update, an accurate list (paper or

electronic) of all cargo in facilities and

a location chart of all cargo, and containers in their facilities.

■ Import cargo, export cargo, and domestic cargoes are segregated.

Appendix F: Model Port ■ 241

■ Delivery and receiving operations are

segregated.

■ Overages and shortages are reported

immediately.

High Value Merchandise

■ High value commodities are stored in

cribs or security cages designed to resist

forcible entry from all sides, and separate logs and procedures for the release

and receipt of these commodities are

maintained.

■ High value merchandise in mounted

containers is placed in a secure holding

area where it can be observed by management or security personnel at all

times, and separate logs and procedures

for the release and receipt of these containers are maintained.

■ High value cargo in containers is placed

on the upper tiers of container stacks in

order to limit their accessibility, and the

containers are also stacked so that the

doors of each container abut each other.

Seals and Sealing Practices

■ Seals are inspected whenever a sealed

containerized shipment enters or leaves

a facility. If the seals are not intact, or

there is evidence of tampering or the

seals are not correct, security is notified

and the cargo in the container is tallied.

■ Unsealed containerized shipments are

sealed at the point of entry to the facility and the seal number is noted on shipping documents.

■ Seals are stored in a secure place, access

to seals is restricted, and a log noting the

distribution of seals is kept.

■ Seals are also checked and their numbers, date, time, and place of examination

recorded at each of the following times:

arrival at/leaving the terminal gate, during stacking; relocation within the terminal; loading/discharge from a vessel;

whenever the container doors are opened.
242 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

Enhanced Measures for Cargo Security

During Periods of Heightened Risk 

■ Seaports where foreign cargo arrives

have a separate Federal Inspection Station. Access to these areas is limited

solely those to that have previously

received approval to enter the area. 

■ A closed circuit television system is

used to record activities during lading

and unlading procedures, and within

cargo processing and trucking facilities.

■ Port authorities, terminal operators,

warehouse operators, and trucking companies have installed automated access

control systems in order to monitor

access to restricted areas.

■ Port authorities, or terminal operators,

employ non-intrusive technology (such

as X-ray or gamma ray systems) to

identify contraband and/or verify cargo

shipments.

■ Trucking companies use an automated

system (such as Global Positioning

Systems or cellular) to track trucks and

shipments. 

■ Firms have developed and implemented

“Integrated Security Concepts” into

their operations to deter and prevent

internal conspiracies from occurring. 

Security of Passengers

and Crew

■ The introduction of prohibited weapons,

incendiaries, or explosives aboard passenger vessels, on persons, within personal articles or baggage, or in stowed

baggage, cargo, or stores is prevented

or deterred. 

■ Passenger vessels throughout a voyage

maintain a high level of gangway security. These security measures include

some form of biometric identifier (such

as a photograph), to prevent the unauthorized boarding and re-boarding of

persons after port calls.

Equipment Control 

■ Access and keys to equipment such as

yard mule tugmasters, trucks, or high

loaders are strictly controlled. 

■ Equipment is kept in a secure and

specified area when not in use.

Personnel Security

■ Prospective employees are required to

provide background information about

previous employment history, criminal

records, and drug use.

■ All prospective employees are fingerprinted as part of the application process, and criminal history records are

performed on all prospective employees

(to the extent permitted by law).

■ Employers have “drug awareness” and

security education” programs in effect

for all employees.

■ Employees wear distinctive identification cards or badges that act as authorization for accessing restricted areas. 

Audit Trails, Correcting Vulnerabilities,

and Reviewing Procedures

■ Procedures are in place that will permit

investigators, when reviewing documentation, to determine how and when any

cargo or containers were removed from

an operator’s custody in an unauthorized

manner.

■ When an operator’s system is compromised, and cargo or containers are

removed from an operator’s custody in

an unauthorized manner, procedures are

in place to identify the deficient procedures/practices and corrective action is

taken to ensure that a similar incident

does not occur.

■ Managers review procedures periodically to ensure that new threats and procedural vulnerabilities are identified as

they arise.
■ The Port Readiness Committee has a

written and current memorandum of

understanding.

■ A Port Readiness Exercise has been

conducted within the last two years.

■ The local Port Readiness Committees

actively participate in Defense Department-sponsored mobilization exercises/

cargo movements in addition to their

own exercises.

■ The local Coast Guard Captain of the

Port addresses security for military

mobilization in his/her planning

documents.

Enhanced Measures for Military

Mobilization Security During Periods

of Heightened Risk

■ Any “lessons learned”/problems, as

outlined in the latest Port Readiness

Exercise Final Report, have been

resolved or are in the process of being

actively resolved.

■ If a Department of Defense vulnerability assessment was done on this port,

the vulnerabilities, if any, have been

adequately addressed by the Port Readiness Committee.

In order to assist local governments and

the commercial maritime industry in managing security risk, the model port should

also employ recommendations or procedures that are applicable at varied risk

levels in order to reduce specific or general vulnerabilities. The matrix on the

next page is an example of the type of

format that can be employed to show the

flexible measures that can be taken in

the face of variable threats and different

types of ports. Details regarding the

specific vulnerability reduction guidelines that populate the outline can be

disseminated via media such as Transportation’s Port Security: A National

Planning Guide series. 

■ Timely, accurate, and complete passenger and crew arrival and departure manifest information is submitted by carriers

to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service.

■ All members of a passenger vessel’s

crew are adequately trained to perform

their security-related duties. 

■ Physical and operational security measures are coordinated between passenger

terminals and passenger vessels whenever a vessel is moored at the terminal.

Enhanced Measures for Passenger and

Crew Security During Periods of

Heightened Risk

■ Seaports where international passengers

arrive have a separate Federal Inspection

Station. Access to these areas is limited

only those to that have previously

received approval to enter the area. 

■ Visitors/passengers gain access to a

terminal facility through a designated

screening point that should include a

metal detector and X-ray system.

■ Automated access control or magnetic

stripe cards are utilized rather than keys

to enter terminal facilities. 

■ The Advance Passenger Information

System is utilized by carriers and is submitted in a timely fashion to Immigration and Customs so that law enforcement checks can be performed before

a vessel’s arrival in the United States.

Military Mobilization

Security

■ The local Port Readiness Committee

actively meets and coordinates its effort

with the local port security committee.

All applicable federal, state, local, and

commercial entities must be included

in its membership.

Appendix F: Model Port ■ 243
244 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

Crime Prevention

Standard Actions ■ Low Risk actions plus

implement additional

steps identified in

Security Plan.

■ Conduct regular

assessments.

■ Comply with applicable

federal regulations.

■ Complete vulnerability

and threat assessments.

■ Develop Security Plan.

■ Table top exercise.

■ Conduct periodic

assessments.

■ Personnel awareness

training.

■ International cooperation.

■ Enhanced Surveillance

Systems.

■ Cargo tracking systems.

■ Increased coordination

with law enforcement.

■ Security guards

certificated to meet

standards.

■ Credentialing.

■ Access control to terminal

property.

■ Security guards from

reputable company.

■ Video surveillance system.

Terrorism ■ Increased coordination

with Joint Terrorism

Task Force.

■ Increased number of

guards patrolling.

■ Attend to gaps identified

in vulnerability

assessments.

■ Same as Crime Prevention

steps.

Intelligence/

Information Security

■ Anti-hacking measures

employed.

■ Outreach to maritime

community regarding

threats and preventive

measures.

■ Links to local/state/federal

law enforcement and

federal government

intelligence.

■ Password security.

Cargo Security ■ X-ray and other sensor

scans of import and

export cargo.

■ Increase targeting

cargo shipments.

■ Cargo tracking systems.

■ Low and Medium

Risk actions plus

implement additional

steps identified in

Security Plan.

■ Conduct regular

assessments.

■ Implement critical

infrastructure protection

measures.

Model Port Concept Outline

I. Intent: To provide local governments and the commercial maritime industry with a common basis upon

which to establish port security standards and the outcomes expected from meeting those standards.

II. Standards Matrix:

Focus Area High Risk Medium Risk Low Risk
with no electronic or automated access

controls. Perimeter buffer zones would

be unsensored. The only interior security

area would be the federal inspection facility. The investment in radio and data communications would be minimal; waterside

security would be primarily by closedcircuit television and physical patrol.

Approximate cost would be $2 million.

Cargo security and passenger/crew

security would be accomplished with

handheld/portable inspection technologies

augmented by parcel X-ray systems, and

by a badging system for persons boarding

and leaving ships. Approximate cost would

be $1 million.

Because military mobilization is not

anticipated for this port, there is no technology requirement for this application.

The investment in investigative, firstresponder, and environmental crime technology would also be minimal. Investigative equipment would be limited to a small

selection of the most frequently used

equipment and devices and no preinstalled equipment; the investigative posture would be reactive rather than proactive. First-responder protective equipment

and clothing investments would be small;

Selecting Technology for a

Model Seaport

Selecting the appropriate complement of

security, surveillance, and contraband

detection technology for a seaport requires

a case-by-case analysis of the current

security status of each port, the size of its

physical facility and annual workload,

geographic considerations, and other factors. Nonetheless, it is possible to arrive at

three nominal levels of technology deployment based on arbitrary estimates of port

requirements.

Minimal Low-Cost Implementation

At this level, we assume a relatively small

seaport that is considered to have a low

risk of criminal activity and is not designated as a military mobilization port. The

goal is to bolster security at the port to

the level at which most criminal activity is

deterred, although the port would still be

vulnerable to a dedicated exploitation by

the criminal element.

The investment in physical security

technology would be primarily for fences,

lighting, and closed-circuit television,

Appendix F: Model Port ■ 245

Passenger and 

Crew Security

■ 100 percent screening 

of people and baggage.

■ At least 30 percent

screening of people

and baggage.

■ Biometric and photo ID.

■ Some screening of

people and baggage.

■ Accurate, timely 

manifests.

Military Mobilization 

Security

■ Constant communications between

agencies/facilities.

■ Updated planning.

■ Updated memorandum

of understanding.

■ Port Readiness

Committee meetings.

Inter-Agency Coordination ■ Live watch command

center with agency

representation.

■ Outreach to

commercial facilities.

■ Regular meetings

at port level.

Model Port Concept Outline (cont.)

Focus Area High Risk Medium Risk Low Risk
246 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

er systems would be added to receive electronic ID information from tagged trucks

and containers. Radio repeaters would be

installed to provide reliable voice communications. Waterside security would use

closed-circuit television and towed sonar

systems. Approximate cost would be $3.5

million.

Cargo security and passenger/crew

security would be augmented with additional technology to detect explosives,

firearms, drugs, and other contraband.

Automated ID badges would be required

for all crewmembers. All vehicles entering

and leaving the port area would be

inspected with a STARS-type system;

these inspections would be randomly

heightened by using a higher-energy

mobile X-ray or gamma-imaging system.

Approximate cost would be $3 million.

Technology for use in the event of a

military mobilization would be staged at a

military depot where it could be deployed

to several different ports depending on

the mobilization scenario. This technology

would include waterside sensors to detect

swimmers or packages dropped into the

water, a remote pilotless vehicle system

with air vehicles and control system,

electronic sensors to establish additional

security boundaries, and additional portal

and personal radiation detectors. Approximate cost would be $0.5 million.

Investigative, first-responder, and environmental crime technology would be

increased to allow a proactive investigative

mode and significant interactions to prevent criminal activity. First-responder

technology would include computerized

information on the port and on actions to

be taken in the event of chemical spills,

improperly packaged hazardous materials,

and other crises. Environmental technology would include an infrared system

installed in a rented helicopter for regularly scheduled surveillance flights.

Approximate cost would be $2 million.

considerable dependence would be placed

on outside fire and police resources to

deal with any emergencies. Surveillance

for environmental spills would be by

periodic rental of a light aircraft with

hand-held cameras and electro-optic

equipment. Approximate cost would be

$1 million.

Contraband detection technology

would consist of one mobile 2- and 6-

MeV X-ray system, three mobile or relocatable gamma-imaging systems, a mobile

X-ray van, and a number of portable and

handheld devices including particle and

vapor trace detectors for drugs and explosives. Radiation sensors would be at

vehicle and pedestrian gates but no other

locations. Approximate cost would be

$8 million. 

Total estimated cost is $12 million,

with a probable range of $10 to $15

million.

Mid-Range Implementation

This port requires a higher level of security because it handles shipping from politically sensitive foreign countries and/or

large amounts of high-value commodities,

because it is a potential military mobilization port, or because it has a high volume of cruise ship traffic. The goal is to

actively deter and deny most criminal or

terrorist activity and to have the port at

a state of security preparation that could

readily be increased to the maximum

level if necessary.

The physical security investment would

be increased to provide external and internal sensors protecting the federal inspection area, high-value storage areas, the

security/closed-circuit television control

room, and access to arriving or departing

vessels. All gates would have electronic

access controls; the interior security areas

would incorporate biometric systems for

added protection. Unattended ground sensors to detect movement near the exterior

fences would protect buffer zones. Receiv-
Investigative technology would be

increased, primarily for electro-optic

and audio monitoring systems. Environmental technology would include a multisensor aerial or remote sensing surveillance system. Approximate cost would

be $3 million.

Military mobilization technology

would be deployed to the port to ensure

routine nonintrusive inspection of all

containers and trucks entering the staging area for military materiel. Sensorequipped remote pilotless vehicles

would be used to monitor the port and

surrounding areas. Approximate cost

would be $3 million.

Contraband detection technology

would be increased by two more 2- to 6-

MeV mobile X-ray systems, two more

mobile gamma-imaging systems, a

gamma-imaging system for rail traffic

entering the port, and two mobile truck

X-ray systems. Approximate cost would

be $27 million.

Total estimated cost is $44 million,

with a probable range of $38 million to

$50 million.

Technology Summary

Keeping in mind that the cost of technology implementation for a specific port

will depend on its individual characteristics, requirements, and existing capabilities, the estimated cost of the technology

described above for the three nominal

levels of implementation is summarized

in the table below.

The complement of contraband detection technology would be increased to add

a second mobile 2- and 6-MeV container

X-ray system, two more mobile or relocatable gamma-imaging systems, additional

portable inspection systems including

small and parcel X-ray units, radiation

pagers for all inspection personnel, and a

number of isotope identifiers. Approximate cost would be $15 million.

Total estimated cost is $24 million

with a probable range of $18 million to

$27 million.

Maximum-Level Implementation

At this level the intent is to reduce cargo

theft, smuggling, and other criminal activity to a minimum in order to protect military assets and high-value cargo and to put

maximum interdiction pressure on a major

smuggling route. Sufficient technology

would be employed to provide the necessary levels of enforcement and compliance

measurement without impeding the movement of legitimate traffic.

The physical security investment in

technology would add biometric sensors

at all entry and exit points; electronic

tracking of all vehicles moving within the

port; and a full complement of waterside

sensors including marine radars, closed

circuit television, and fixed and towed

sidescan sonars. Redundant voice and data

communication links would be installed,

and closed-circuit television cameras to

surveil areas outside of the port for suspicious activity would be added. Approximate cost would be $7 million.

Cargo security and passenger crew

security technology would be increased

by additional systems to screen incoming

and departing vehicle and pedestrian

traffic and to screen all materials and

baggage going aboard ship. Approximate

cost would be $4 million.

Appendix F: Model Port ■ 247
248 ■ Report on Crime in and Security U.S. Seaports

money laundering, and general port security problems. This plan is covered in

Appendix C.

The State of Florida Seaport Security

Study topics clearly have relevance to the

work of the Commission, and the study

presents an opportunity to prototype many

of the items listed earlier in this appendix.

State of Florida Seaport

Security Study

Finally, the state of Florida’s Office of

Drug Control is sponsoring a broad,

comprehensive assessment of security

(and related issues) at the state’s 14 deepwater ports. This objective assessment

is to develop a viable plan to implement

enhancements that solve drug interdiction,

Estimated Cost of Technology By Implementation Level ($ Million)

Application Minimum Mid-Range Maximum

Physical security 2 3.5 7

Cargo, passenger, crew security 1 3 4

Military mobilization — 0.5 3

Investigative, first responder, 

environmental crime 1 2 3

Contraband detection 8 15 27

Total 12 24 44

Probable range 10–15 18–27 38