NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VEHICLE IP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AT&T MOBILITY, LLC AND TELENAV, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, NETWORKS IN MOTION, 

INC. AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________ 

2013-1380

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 09-CV-1007, Judge Leonard P. 

Stark.

______________________ 

Decided: November 18, 2014

______________________ 

WILLIAM R. WOODFORD, Fish & Richardson P.C., of 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

With him on the brief were MICHAEL J. KANE and JOHN A.
2 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

DRAGSETH, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and GEOFF D.

BIEGLER, of San Diego, California. 

DAVID R. CLONTS, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 

LLP, of Houston, Texas, argued for defendants-appellees, 

AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al. With him on the brief were 

MANOJ S. GANDHI, of Houston, Texas, and L. RACHEL 

LERMAN, of Los Angeles, California. Of counsel was REX 

S. HEINKE, of Los Angeles, California. 

VINCENT J. BELUSKO, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of Los 

Angeles, California, argued for defendants-appellees 

Cellco Partnership, et al. With him on the brief were 

MARTIN M. NOONEN and ALEX S. YAP. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge

WALLACH. 

REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

Vehicle IP, LLC (“Vehicle IP”) appeals from a final 

judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 

5,987,377 (“the ’377 patent”) from the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware in favor of 

Defendants-Appellees AT&T Mobility, LLC; TeleNav, 

Inc.; Cellco Partnership; Networks in Motion, Inc.; and 

TeleCommunication Systems, Inc. (collectively, “Appellees”). Because we agree with Vehicle IP that the district 

court erred in its construction of the claim terms “expected time of arrival” and “way point(s),” we reverse the 

district court’s constructions, vacate the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, and 

remand for a determination of infringement based on the 

proper constructions of these terms. 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 3

BACKGROUND

I. Background of the Technology

Vehicle IP alleges that the Appellees infringe the ’377 

patent, entitled “Method and Apparatus for Determining 

an Expected Time of Arrival.” The ’377 patent is directed 

to improving vehicle navigation systems through more 

efficient distribution of navigation functions between a 

remote dispatch and a mobile unit located in the vehicle. 

The ’377 patent claims a system in which a remotely 

located dispatch generates destination information for the 

vehicle, while a mobile unit in the vehicle determines 

vehicle position and calculates an expected time of arrival 

at a destination.1 Such destination information may 

include, for example, one or more destinations, routing 

information, information regarding tasks to be performed 

at each destination specified, average travel time to each 

destination, rush hour, traffic and weather information. 

Figure 2 of the ’377 patent illustrates this process. 

1 The patent provides that the destination information may also be generated locally at the mobile 

unit. ’377 patent col. 6 ll. 2-4.

 
4 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

’377 patent fig. 2. Figure 2 shows that dispatch 20 communicates with mobile unit 42 through mobile telecommunications switching office 32 and transmitter site 34. 

The destination information is then sent to mobile unit 42 

and is used to determine the vehicle’s expected time of 

arrival at one or more destinations, such as C, D, or E. 

The ’377 patent also claims the use of a plurality of 

way points for a more accurate calculation of road distance to the destination, allowing for a more accurate 

calculation of expected time of arrival at a final destination. Once mobile unit 42 in the vehicle receives the 

destination information, it determines the vehicle’s current position and compares it to the way points along the 

route, such as way points C and D. Mobile unit 42 then 

determines the expected time of arrival for one or more 

destinations, such as C, D, or E, to provide an updated 

expected time of arrival as the vehicle changes position 

throughout the trip. 

Claim 1 is representative of the ’377 patent’s use of 

the disputed claim terms and is reproduced below.
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 5

1. A system for determining an expected 

time of arrival of a vehicle equipped with a 

mobile unit, comprising:

a dispatch remotely located from the vehicle, 

the dispatch operable to generate destination information for the vehicle, the destination information specifying a 

plurality of way points; 

a communications link coupled to the dispatch, the communications link operable 

to receive the destination information for 

the vehicle from the dispatch; and

the mobile unit coupled to the communications link, the mobile unit operable to receive from the communications link the 

destination information for the vehicle 

generated by the dispatch, the mobile 

unit further operable to determine a vehicle position, the mobile unit further operable to determine in response to the 

vehicle position the expected time of arrival of the vehicle at a way point identified 

by the destination information and 

wherein the communications link comprises a cellular telephone network.

’377 patent col. 14 l. 62-col. 15 l. 13 (claim 1) (emphases 

added). 

II. Procedural Background

On December 31, 2009, Vehicle IP filed this action 

against Appellees in the United States District Court for 

the District of Delaware, asserting that Appellees infringe 

the ’377 patent. On December 12, 2011, the district court 

issued an order construing the disputed claim terms of 

the ’377 patent, including “expected time of arrival” and 

“way point(s).” The district court construed “expected 
6 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

time of arrival” as “time of day at which the vehicle is 

expected to arrive somewhere (and not remaining travel 

time).” The district court construed “way point(s)” as 

“intermediate point(s) on the way to the final destination 

(and not the final destination itself).” 

After the district court construed the claims, Appellees filed two motions for summary judgment. TeleCommunication Systems, Inc.; Networks in Motion, Inc.; and 

Cellco Partnership (collectively, “TCS/Cellco”) filed a 

motion for summary judgment of noninfringement as to 

the TCS/Cellco accused systems. TeleNav, Inc. and AT&T 

Mobility LLC (collectively, “TeleNav/AT&T”) filed a 

second motion for summary judgment of noninfringement

as to the TeleNav/AT&T accused systems.2 

The district court granted both motions. First, the 

district court found that TCS/Cellco’s accused products

did not literally infringe because the accused features do 

not “determine[] a ‘time of day at which the vehicle is 

expected to arrive somewhere’ . . . at ‘intermediate 

point(s) on the way to the final destination.’” The district 

court noted that to the extent the features display an 

“expected time of arrival,” these features did so only for 

single destinations, not for a “way point.” The district 

court went on to hold that the TCS/Cellco defendants did 

not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents because, 

under Vehicle IP’s theory, such a finding would vitiate the 

court’s construction of “expected time of arrival.” The 

district court similarly found that TeleNav/AT&T’s accused products did not infringe because they only determined the expected travel time to a final destination. 

Again, under Vehicle IP’s doctrine of equivalents theory of 

2 The TCS/Cellco accused systems include, inter 

alia, the TCS Navigator and AtlasBook Navigator platform. The TeleNav/AT&T accused systems include Navigator and Track Premium.

 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 7

infringement, the district court determined that a finding 

of infringement would vitiate the court’s claim construction of these terms. Thus, the district court granted both 

motions. 

On April 19, 2013, the district court entered judgment 

in favor of Appellees. Vehicle IP appeals the entry of 

judgment, challenging the district court’s claim constructions and summary judgment rulings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

We review district court claim constructions de novo. 

Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. 

Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

a. “expected time of arrival”

The district court construed “expected time of arrival” 

as “time of day at which the vehicle is expected to arrive 

somewhere (and not remaining travel time).” In doing so, 

the district court determined that “expected time of 

arrival” was consistently used by the patentee to mean a 

time of day. The district court held that “expected time of 

arrival” could not include remaining travel time because 

the mobile unit must be capable of comparing the “expected time of arrival” to an appointment time, which the 

specification repeatedly lists in clock-time format. 

Vehicle IP argues that the district court erred in excluding remaining travel time from the construction of 

“expected time of arrival.” Vehicle IP argues that “as a 

matter of common sense,” if someone were to ask what 

time one expects to arrive, the answers “in 30 minutes” 

and “2:00 p.m.” would be equally acceptable. Vehicle IP 

asserts that the parties’ dispute regarding “expected time 

of arrival” centers on the term “time,” and the colloquial 

meaning of “time” is broad. Vehicle IP also contends that 

the language surrounding the term “time” indicates it 

should not be limited to a particular format. 
8 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

Appellees respond that the parties’ dispute is not focused on the term “time,” as Vehicle IP would like this 

court to believe, but instead is focused on the term “expected time of arrival.”3 Appellees argue that Vehicle IP 

disregards the framework set forth by Phillips v. AWH 

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. 

denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006), by proposing a “dictionarydefinition-first” approach. Appellees further argue that 

“expected time of arrival” must be construed to enable 

comparison to an “appointment time,” which shows it 

must be in clock-time format. Appellees reason that 

“expected time of arrival” cannot include “remaining 

travel time.” 

The district court erred in excluding remaining travel 

time from the construction of “expected time of arrival.” 

Generally, claim terms are given their ordinary and 

customary meaning as understood by one of skill in the 

art at the time of the invention. Id. at 1312-13 (citing 

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 

(Fed. Cir. 1996); Innova Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water 

Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 

2004)). There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when a 

patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer; or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope 

of the claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 

669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Vitronics, 90 

F.3d at 1580). A patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and 

ordinary meaning to act as his own lexicographer. Id. 

(citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 

1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). In order to disavow claim 

3 The TeleNav/AT&T appellees join the arguments 

made by the TCS/Cellco appellees in their brief as to the 

proper constructions of the terms in dispute.

 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 9

scope, the specification must make clear that the invention does not include a particular feature otherwise within the scope of the claim term. Id. at 1366.

As an initial matter, we decline Vehicle IP’s invitation 

to focus our review on the embedded term “time.” Our 

review focuses on the district court’s construction of 

“expected time of arrival,” and our review focuses on this 

term as a whole. See IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc., 

659 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Extracting a single 

word from a claim divorced from the surrounding limitations can lead construction astray.”).

We conclude that the term “expected time of arrival” 

is not limited to clock-time. The term is broadly used in 

the claims of the ’377 patent. See, e.g., ’377 patent col. 14 

l. 62-col. 15 l. 13 (claim 1), col. 15 ll. 18-23 (claim 4). For 

example, claim 1 requires:

1. A system for determining an expected 

time of arrival of a vehicle equipped with a 

mobile unit, comprising:

. . . 

the mobile unit further operable to determine in response to the vehicle position 

the expected time of arrival of the vehicle 

at the destination identified by the destination information, the mobile unit further operable to determine if the expected 

time of arrival differs from the corresponding appointment time for the destination by more than a predetermined 

amount.

Id. col. 14 l. 62-col. 15 l. 13 (claim 1) (emphases added). 

Nothing in this or any other claim of the ’377 patent 

limits “expected time of arrival” to clock-time. 
10 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

 The claim provides that the mobile unit determines 

the “expected time of arrival” in remaining travel time 

based on the destination information transmitted by the 

dispatch. Id. col. 14 l. 62-col. 15 l. 13 (claim 1). The 

mobile unit uses factors such as average travel time, 

weather conditions, and traffic information to determine 

the “expected time of arrival.” See, e.g., id. col. 3 ll. 1-7, 

col. 11 ll. 6-12. To do so, the mobile unit will take the 

average travel time contained in the destination information and modify it based on other destination information, such as traffic conditions, weather, and similar 

information. Thus, the expected time of arrival will be 

calculated in remaining travel time. The expected time of 

arrival may be then converted to clock-time format, but 

the patent does not so require. As such, “expected time of 

arrival” is a broad term that can encompass remaining 

travel time. 

Appellees are correct that some of the disclosed embodiments in the written description focus on clock-time. 

See, e.g., id. fig. 4, col. 10 ll. 28-41. Yet, these examples

are not limiting. The written description of the ’377 

patent uses the phrase “expected time of arrival” numerous times, and it never indicates that the time must be in 

any particular format. Many portions of the written 

description are ambiguous as to the format of the “expected time of arrival.” See, e.g., id. col. 1 l. 44-col. 2 l. 1-

33 (Summary of the Invention section describing two 

embodiments). More importantly, there is no dispute that 

the specification does not contain an express definition of 

the term, and nowhere in the specification do the inventors disclaim remaining travel time. 

We also reject Appellees’ argument that the “expected 

time of arrival” must be in clock-time format in order for 

the mobile unit to compare it to an appointment time. As 

noted previously, the claims focus on the calculation of 

“expected time of arrival” by the mobile unit, which can 

use one format for computing and another format for 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 11

display. Indeed, the mobile unit could be programmed to 

maintain the time in any number of different formats. No 

matter the format, a simple mathematical conversion 

performed by the device would allow the mobile unit to 

perform the claimed comparison. Appellees have failed to 

show that the ’377 patent requires the claim term to be in 

clock-time format or that a clear disavowal or lexicographic choice limits this term to clock-time format.

The prosecution history similarly fails to disavow 

scope or define the term in a limited manner, as Appellees 

suggest. Both parties point to the same portion of the 

prosecution history to support their respective positions. 

This section of the prosecution history provides:

Furthermore, neither Ross nor Jones disclose, teach, or suggest a mobile unit operable to determine if an expected time of 

arrival differs from a corresponding appointment time for a destination by more 

than a predetermined amount, as recited in 

Applicants’ Claim 1.

J.A. 3117 (emphases omitted). This portion of the prosecution history is irrelevant to the parties’ dispute regarding remaining travel time. Indeed, the prosecution 

history, like the specification, is ambiguous as there is no 

disavowal of remaining travel time, nor is the term limited to clock-time format. 

In sum, the intrinsic evidence fails to show that “expected time of arrival” is limited to a time of day. Neither 

the district court nor Appellees point to any express 

disclaimer or independent lexicography in the intrinsic 

record that justifies including the negative limitation “not 

remaining travel time” in the proper construction of 

“expected time of arrival.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek 

Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing CCS 

Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366-67). Thus, the district court 

erred in reading in this limitation. We hold that the 
12 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

proper construction of “expected time of arrival” is “time 

of day at which the vehicle is expected to arrive somewhere.” 

b. “way point(s)”

The district court construed “way point(s)” as “intermediate point(s) on the way to the final destination (and 

not the final destination itself).” The district court determined that the patentee used the term “way point(s)” only 

in the context of determining whether a vehicle is out of 

route and for more accurate calculations of actual road 

distance. 

Vehicle IP argues that the district court erred because 

the written description makes clear that “way point(s)” 

may include the final destination. Vehicle IP argues that 

the written description distinguishes between “intermediate” way points and other way points. Vehicle IP also 

argues that the district court’s construction is wrong 

because it excludes the preferred embodiment described 

with respect to figure 1. Finally, Vehicle IP argues that 

the claims recite the term “way point(s)” without any 

modifiers and provide that the plurality of way points is 

included in the “destination information.” Thus, Vehicle 

IP concludes that “way point(s)” may include the destination. 

Appellees respond that the ’377 patent’s description of 

figure 2 shows that “way point(s)” may not include the 

final destination because it distinguishes way points 

C and D from destination E. Appellees also argue that 

the district court’s construction properly excludes the 

embodiment in figure 1 because this embodiment was 

claimed by the parent of the ’377 patent. Finally, Appellees point to contemporaneous dictionary definitions that 

support their position that a “way point” cannot include 

the final destination. 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 13

 The district court erred in excluding final destinations 

from its construction of “way point(s).” The independent 

claims require that the destination information sent by 

the dispatch include “a plurality of way points” and that 

the mobile unit be capable of determining an “expected 

time of arrival” at a “way point.” See, e.g., ’377 patent col. 

14 ll. 66-67 (claim 1) (“the destination information specifying a plurality of way points”), col. 17 ll. 6-7 (claim 32) 

(“The method of claim 23, further comprising the step of 

displaying the way points on a map.”). The claims use the 

term “way point(s)” in a broad manner.

The written description similarly uses the term in a 

broad manner. First, the written description distinguishes between “way point(s)” and “intermediate way 

points.” Id. col. 9 ll. 33-35 (“Besides reducing out-of-route 

mileage, the use of intermediate way points improves the 

calculation of expected time of arrival.”). It provides that 

“way points may be used as intermediate points between 

the position of vehicle 40 and the destination.” ’377 

patent col. 9 ll. 37-39. This permissive language indicates 

that “way point(s)” may be more than just intermediate 

points along the route. 

The district court misinterpreted the written description. The portion of the written description that describes 

figure 2 provides:

To alleviate this problem, destinations C and D 

may be used as way points to determine whether 

the operator of vehicle 40 has driven out of route

52a specified in the destination information generated by dispatch 20. Referring to FIG. 2, dispatch 20 generates destination information 

specifying that vehicle 40 is to proceed to destination E along route 52a, thus passing through way 

points C and D.

Id. col. 9 ll. 5-12. As Vehicle IP points out, this portion of 

the written description focuses on determining whether a 
14 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

vehicle has driven outside of the intended route. Doing so 

requires looking to way points C and D because they are 

intermediate to the starting point and destination. The 

fact that the specification refers to “destination E” does 

not change this conclusion. The specification uses the 

terms “destination” and “way point(s)” interchangeably. 

E.g., compare ’377 patent col. 8 ll. 28-33 (referring to 

points C and D in figure 2 as destinations), with id. col. 9 

ll. 12-32 (referring to points C and D in figure 2 as way 

points). Nothing about this example excludes the final 

destination E from also being viewed as a “way point.”

The parties present competing extrinsic evidence, including an owner’s manual for one of the first Garmin 

GPS navigation products from 1992, a contemporaneous 

patent from 1992, dictionary definitions from a technical 

dictionary published in 1994 and a non-technical dictionary published in 1993, and two websites from 1998 and 

2009. We need not look at this evidence because the 

intrinsic evidence is clear that there was no disavowal or 

lexicographic choice. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 

(noting extrinsic evidence is properly used in claim construction unless it is used to vary the meaning of an 

unambiguous claim term). As this court noted in Phillips, 

there is an “unbounded universe” of potential extrinsic 

evidence having differing levels of relevance, and each 

party will naturally choose the pieces most favorable to its

position. Id. at 1318. Here we are presented with such a 

situation. The extrinsic evidence conflicts as to the proper 

meaning and is generally of marginal relevance to the 

meaning of the term “way point(s)” as used in the ’377 

patent in February 1995. 

As with “expected timed of arrival,” nothing in the patent shows a disavowal of claim scope or a lexicographic 

decision to limit the definition of this term. For this 

reason, the district court erred in limiting the term “way 

point(s)” to intermediate destinations along a route. We 

hold that the proper construction of “way point(s)” is “a 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 15

geographical point of reference or destination along a 

route.” 

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in its construction of the 

terms “expected time of arrival” and “way point(s),” and 

relying on these erroneous constructions, granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Appellees. 

We reverse the district court’s claim constructions, vacate 

the final judgment of non-infringement, and remand for a 

determination of infringement based on the proper constructions of these terms in the first instance. 

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs. 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VEHICLE IP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AT&T MOBILITY, LLC AND TELENAV, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, NETWORKS IN MOTION, 

INC. AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________ 

2013-1380

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 09-CV-1007, Judge Leonard P. 

Stark.

______________________ 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part.

While the majority opinion correctly recognizes that 

claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and 

customary meaning,” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 

1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), it ignores the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term “way 
2 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

point(s)” in U.S. Patent No. 5,987,377 (“the ’377 Patent”). 

For this reason, I respectfully dissent-in-part.

I. 

As the majority opinion correctly recites, claim terms 

“are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning . . . [which] is the meaning that the term would have 

to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 

time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13 (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion also 

acknowledges the two exceptions to this rule: (1) when a 

patentee acts as his or her own lexicographer by articulating a definition in the specification; or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the ordinary and 

customary meaning of the claim term in the specification 

or during patent prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer 

Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

The ’377 Patent discloses a system in which a remotely-located dispatch generates destination information for 

a vehicle, while a mobile unit in the vehicle determines 

vehicle position and calculates an “expected time of arrival” at a destination. ’377 Patent col. 1 ll. 52–65.

The ’377 Patent also describes using “way points” “to 

determine whether the operator of [a] vehicle . . . has 

driven out of route” or “to more accurately calculate actual 

road distance.” Id. col. 9 ll. 6–8, 39. In doing so, the ’377 

Patent uses the term “way point(s)” according to its 

ordinary and customary meaning in the pertinent art. 

That is, in navigation, a way point, like a way station, is a 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 3

point on the way to a destination.1 As the majority opinion recognizes, “nothing in the patent shows a disavowal

of claim scope or a lexicographic decision to limit the 

definition of this term.” Maj. Op. at 14. 

Claim 1 is representative of how “way point(s)” is used 

in the ’377 Patent’s claims: “the mobile unit further 

operable to determine in response to the vehicle position 

the expected time of arrival of the vehicle at a way point 

identified by the destination information.” ’377 Patent 

col. 15 ll. 7–12. The claims also describe traveling along 

“a predetermined route specified by the way points,” id.

col. 15 ll. 19–20, col. 15 ll. 26–27, col. 16 l. 3, col. 16 ll. 9–

10, col. 16 ll. 53–54, col. 16 ll. 60–61, col. 17 ll. 58–59, col. 

19 ll. 22–23, col. 20 ll. 49–50, and include systems “wherein the way points comprise highway crossings,” id. col. 15 

ll. 16–17, col. 15 ll. 66–67, col. 16 ll. 48–49, col. 17 ll. 36–

37, col. 19 ll. 5–6, col. 20 l. 42.

Besides the use of the term “way point(s)” in the claim 

language itself, the only part of the specification that 

discusses way point(s) is in the description of Figure 2, 

reproduced below. Nowhere else are way points discussed. 

1 Indeed, the United States Army has for decades 

used intermediary points between points of origin and 

destinations to assist with, among other things, calculating the distance to a final destination. See, e.g., Department of the Army, Field Manual 21-26: Map Reading 37–

41 (1956); Department of the Army, Field Manual 21-26: 

Map Reading and Land Navigation App. J (1993).

 
4 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

Id. Fig. 2.

According to the specification, Figure 2 “illustrates a 

system 10a for determining expected times of arrival at a 

plurality of destinations. . . . In this embodiment of the 

present invention, the destination information generated 

by dispatch 20 includes several destinations and corresponding appointment times,” id. col. 8 ll. 28–36, and

“mobile unit 42 determines the expected times of arrival 

of vehicle 40 at destinations C, D, and E,” id. col. 8 ll. 43–

45.

In the context of this embodiment, the specification 

describes “[a] problem that trucking companies have often 

faced,” namely, “that operators of trucks, either intentionally or unintentionally, drive considerable distances

from their assigned routes. Because trucking companies 

must pay for the additional fuel and maintenance expenses associated with the increased mileage, these out-ofroute miles are extremely costly to trucking companies.” 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 5

Id. col. 8 l. 66–col. 9 l. 5. Subsequently, in the first instance where “way point(s)” is used in the patent, the 

specification states: 

To alleviate this problem, destinations C and D 

may be used as way points to determine whether 

the operator of vehicle 40 has driven out of route 

52a specified in the destination information generated by dispatch 20. Referring to FIG. 2, dispatch 20 generates destination information 

specifying that vehicle 40 is to proceed to destination E along route 52a, thus passing through way 

points C and D. Mobile unit 42 may be configured 

to update dispatch 20 when vehicle 40 has 

reached a way point. In this way, dispatch 20 

may be notified that vehicle 40 is still in route.

Id. col. 9 ll. 5–14 (emphases added). In addition, still in 

the context of the embodiment in Figure 2, the patent 

describes an alternate use of “way point(s)”:

Besides reducing out-of-route mileage, the use of 

intermediate way points improves the calculation 

of expected time of arrival. Specifically, the actual 

distance between the position of the vehicle 40 

and the destination may not be the road distance. 

Way points may be used as intermediate points between the position of the vehicle 40 and the destination in order to more accurately calculate actual

road distance.

Id. col. 9 ll. 33–39 (emphasis added).

Relying on this written description, the district court 

construed “way point(s)” as “intermediate point(s) on the 

way to the final destination (and not the final destination 

itself).” Vehicle IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 09-

1007-LPS, at 9 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2011) (J.A. 1452–66) (“Cl. 

Const. Op.”). The district court found support for its 

construction in “the language of the patent,” which “ex-
6 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

cludes a final destination from the definition of a way 

point” because “in a multiple-destination route (having 

destinations C, D, and E) . . . the patent distinguishes 

between intermediate destinations C and D that can be 

used as ‘way points’ on the route and destination E.” Id.

(citing ’377 Patent col. 9 ll. 6–8). As the district court 

points out, “[a] vehicle that has reached the final destination is not ‘in route.’” Id. This construction reflects the 

ordinary and customary meaning of the term in the art.

II. 

Nonetheless, while correctly articulating the governing law, the majority deviates from the ordinary and 

customary meaning of “way point(s),” despite the absence 

of a lexicography or disavowal of claim scope. Specifically, 

the majority opinion points to the patent’s use of the term 

“way point(s)” in a “broad manner,” Maj. Op. at 13, to 

support its conclusions that “[t]he district court erred in 

excluding final destinations from its construction of ‘way 

point(s)’” and “erred in limiting the term ‘way point(s)’ to 

intermediate destinations along a route,” id. at 13, 14. 

In support, the majority opinion points to the claim

language and to the written description, which it states 

both use “way point(s)” “in a broad manner.” Id. at 13. In 

particular, the majority points to language that distinguishes between “way point(s)” and “intermediate way 

points,” and language that “provides that ‘way points may 

be used as intermediate points between the position of 

vehicle 40 and the destination.’” Id. (quoting ’377 Patent 

col. 9 ll. 33–39). The majority then inexplicably concludes 

that “[t]his permissive language indicates that ‘way 

point(s)’ may be more than just intermediate points along 

the route.” Id.

In so stating, the majority uses “permissive language” 

to broaden the term beyond its ordinary and customary 

meaning in the art as a point on the way to a destination. 

While it is not appropriate to restrict the meaning of a 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 7

claim term to something less than its ordinary meaning 

absent explicit lexicography or clear disavowal, Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 

1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011), it is equally inappropriate to expand the scope of a claim term beyond such a meaning. 

The majority does just that in holding “that the proper 

construction of ‘way point(s)’ is ‘a geographical point of 

reference or destination along a route.’” Maj. Op. at 14–15 

(emphasis added). Defining “way point(s)” as including 

final destinations is not part of the term’s ordinary and 

customary meaning, and is unworkable in the context of 

navigation, as explained below.

III. 

The majority also finds support for its unusual construction of “way point(s)” in the specification’s description of Figure 2, which it claims supports the notion that 

a final destination may also be used as a way point. 

See ’377 Patent col. 9 ll. 5–12. The majority states “this 

portion of the written description focuses on determining 

whether a vehicle has driven outside of the intended 

route,” and “[d]oing so requires looking to way points C 

and D because they are intermediate to the starting point 

and destination. . . . Nothing about this example excludes 

the final destination E from also being viewed as a ‘way 

point.’” Maj. Op. at 13–14. However, the majority overlooks the fact that point E cannot be used as a way point, 

either “to determine whether the operator of [a] vehicle . . . has driven out of route” as in this portion of the 

specification, or “to more accurately calculate road distance,” ’377 Patent col. 9 ll. 6–8, l. 39. It is unclear why 

point E, which the patent characterizes as “destination 

E,” would be considered a way point, in conflict with the 

ordinary and customary meaning of “way point(s),” when 

it cannot fulfill the function of that claim term.

In contrast to the majority’s view, the portion of the 

specification it quotes does not demonstrate that “way 
8 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

point(s)” includes a final destination. Describing Figure 

2, the specification states “dispatch 20 generates destination information specifying that vehicle 40 is to proceed to 

destination E along route 52a, thus passing through way 

points C and D.” Id. col. 9 ll. 9–12. This statement, 

describing “way points” as intermediate points on the way 

to the destination, comports with the ordinary and customary meaning of term and does not evince a clear 

lexicography or disavowal of claim scope.

This conclusion is also made clear by the specification’s description of “way point(s)” as points on the way to 

a destination. Id. col. 9 ll. 37–39 (“Way points may be 

used as intermediate points between the position of 

vehicle 40 and the destination in order to more accurately 

calculate actual road distance.”). Furthermore, the specification does not use the words “destination” and “way 

point” synonymously. In addressing multiple-destination 

routes, the specification refers to points C and D as destinations, id. col. 8 ll. 28–65, while the part describing the 

use of way points distinguishes between a way point and 

a destination: “vehicle 40 is to proceed to destination E 

along route 52a, thus passing through way points C and 

D,” id. col. 9 ll. 10–12 (emphases added). The written 

description does not lend support to a construction that 

would alter the ordinary and customary meaning of “way 

point(s).”

IV. 

Finally, in regard to the single-destination embodiment of Figure 1 of the ’377 Patent, as the district court 

noted, the ’377 Patent issued as a continuation of U.S. 

Patent No. 5,724,243 (“the ’243 Patent.”). The claims of 

the ’243 Patent were each directed to determining the 

“expected time of arrival” at “the destination,” e.g., ’243 

Patent col. 15 ll. 10–11, while the claims of the ’377 Patent each determine the “expected time of arrival” at a 

“way point,” e.g., ’377 Patent col. 15 ll. 10–11; see Cl. 
VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC 9

Const. Op. at 10 (“[T]he ’377 patent claims are directed at 

determining expected time of arrival at a way point, while 

its parent patent ’243 claims are directed at calculating 

‘the expected time of arrival of the vehicle at the destination.’”). Thus, the district court concluded that since

the ’243 Parent Patent already covers the singledestination embodiment, it was unremarkable that 

the ’377 Patent does not. Indeed, it is unclear how this 

embodiment fulfills the “plurality of way points” requirement of each independent claim of the ’377 Patent. Even 

if the destination were considered a way point, in order to 

meet the claim limitations, the point of origin would also 

have to be considered a way point. Such a construction is 

not part of the term’s ordinary and customary meaning as 

understood by a skilled artisan; it is simply bizarre in the 

context of navigation.

Nonetheless, that the patentee included the Figure 1 

embodiment does not serve as evidence that the patentee 

“‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ 

other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Thorner, 669 

F.3d at 1365 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick 

Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also id.

(“It is not enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single 

embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all 

embodiments, the patentee must ‘clearly express an 

intent’ to redefine the term.” (quoting Helmsderfer v. 

Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008))). Nor does the inclusion of the singledestination embodiment “‘demonstrate [an] intent to 

deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of 

[way point(s)] . . . by . . . representing a clear disavowal of 

claim scope.’” Id. at 1366 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa 

N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

V.

In the absence of express lexicography or clear disavowal, “way point(s)” should be given its ordinary and 
10 VEHICLE IP, LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

customary meaning in the art. Because the majority fails 

to do so, but rather broadens the scope of the term beyond 

its ordinary and customary meaning, I respectfully dissent.