UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

CHRISTINA ROSSI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

F. EDWARD DUDEK, an individual, in 

his official and individual capacities; 

KRISTEN A. KEEFE, an individual, in her 

official and individual capacities; JOHN A. 

WHITE, an individual, in his official and 

individual capacities, 

 Defendants - Appellants, 

and 

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, Utah state 

educational institution; JEFFREY J. 

EKSTRAND, an individual, in his official 

and individual capacities; BRADLEY 

GREGER, an individual, in his official and 

individual capacities; JEFFREY BOTKIN, 

an individual, in his official and individual 

capacities; and DOES 1 through 25, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

No. 20-4062 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00767-CW-DAO) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 5, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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_________________________________ 

Christina Rossi was a Ph.D. student at the University of Utah from 2008 until 

2014. Her dissertation committee dismissed her for failing to meet academic 

standards and the administrative appeals process upheld that decision. Rossi sued, 

alleging a due process violation, and the district court denied qualified immunity to 

several members of her committee. They now appeal. Exercising jurisdiction over 

this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the denial of 

qualified immunity. 

I. 

a. 

When reviewing the denial of a summary judgment motion asserting qualified 

immunity, we must accept “the district court’s conclusions as to what facts the 

plaintiffs may be able to prove at trial.” Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191, 1194 

(10th Cir. 2013). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rossi, the 

district court determined that a reasonable jury could find the following facts. 

Christina Rossi attended Boston University (“BU”) for college. During her 

freshman year, Rossi began working in the laboratory of Dr. Michael Hasselmo, a 

BU professor. After Rossi obtained her bachelor’s degree, she entered BU’s Ph.D. 

program and continued in Hasselmo’s lab. Two years later, she withdrew from the 

program. According to Rossi, another graduate student treated her like a technician, 

which interfered with her work. Although she brought the issue to Hasselmo’s 

attention, he declined to address it. Because of this, and because she was working on 

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a “fluff project” that had run out of funding, she opted to depart, having earned a 

master’s degree. App’x Vol. VII at 1618. 

Rossi still wanted to pursue a Ph.D., and Dr. Raymond P. Kesner’s lab at the 

University of Utah (“University”) caught her attention. Rossi believed working in 

Kesner’s lab would be “a natural extension of . . . the general area that [she] was 

working with . . . in the Hasselmo Lab,” and her understanding was that Kesner “had 

a good relationship with the Hasselmo Lab.” App’x Vol. V at 1036–37. Rossi 

applied to the University’s Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program. 

Dr. John A. White, a bioengineering professor at the University who worked at 

BU until 2007, had heard that Rossi’s time in BU’s Ph.D. program had not gone well. 

Hasselmo told White that Rossi was a “mediocre” or “poor” student who would 

“struggle in many environments.” Id. at 1057. But Hasselmo also said that the 

University was a good fit for Rossi and that he was uncomfortable arguing that she 

should not be admitted. White reported these concerns to the program director at the 

University, and Rossi was admitted. 

In 2008, Rossi matriculated at the University. She started in Kesner’s lab, 

where she studied learning and memory in rats. During her second year, she 

switched to the lab run by Dr. F. Edward Dudek, a professor in the University’s 

Department of Neurosurgery. Rossi asked Dudek, Kesner, White, Dr. Kristen A. 

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Keefe,1

 and Dr. Bradley E. Greger to serve on her dissertation committee. Keefe was 

a professor in the University’s College of Pharmacy and the Director of the 

Interdepartmental Program in Neuroscience. Greger was brought on for his expertise 

with analyzing electrical signals. Dudek chaired the committee and became Rossi’s 

mentor. 

Until early 2013, by all accounts, Rossi succeeded at the University. She 

earned good grades. She received a stipend. She represented Dudek’s lab at a 

neuroscience conference. According to her committee, Rossi was making progress 

and would likely defend her dissertation—essentially the final step toward receiving 

her Ph.D. degree—by mid-2013. 

Rossi obtained several glowing letters of recommendation from committee 

members during this time. Keefe wrote two such letters. In the first, she stated that, 

“relative to other graduate students at this stage in their development,” Rossi stood 

out. Id. at 1051. In the second, Keefe characterized Rossi’s work as “scholarly, 

well[]written,” and “well defended by reference to the literature or her own research 

findings.” App’x Vol. VI at 1248. Dudek wrote Rossi a letter of recommendation to 

support her application for a post-doctoral position at the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology (“MIT”). In the letter, Dudek said that Rossi’s experiments were unique 

and would yield interesting results. Rossi was “a dedicated and thoughtful 

1

 Keefe’s first name is misspelled as “Kristin” throughout this litigation, 

including in the caption on appeal. We use the correct spelling in this order, and 

direct the Clerk’s Office to correct the case caption as well. 

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researcher,” as well as “a hard worker who . . . works well with others and is 

well[]liked and highly respected.” Id. at 1250. Rossi received the post-doctoral 

position, pending the outcome of her dissertation defense. 

White wrote a letter to support Rossi’s application for a fellowship to fund the 

MIT position. He described Rossi’s research as “a challenging project, involving 

elaborate surgeries, instrumentation, data collection and processing, and 

immunocytochemistry.” Id. at 1364. Rossi had “systematically mastered these 

disparate techniques,” and “[t]he results and quality of the story [we]re more 

impressive at each committee meeting.” Id. Rossi did not get the fellowship.2

Around this time, Dudek co-invented the “Epoch,” a wireless recording device 

that could obtain electrophysiological data from animals. Dudek partnered with the 

University’s Technology Commercialization Office to develop it. Dudek claims this 

was “a scientific endeavor” and he “never really thought [he was] going to make any 

money selling telemetry devices for rats and mice.” App’x Vol. V at 1192. 

However, the University determined that the device had commercialization potential, 

so those involved could gain financially from its success, which would create 

pressure to produce favorable results. In 2009, Dudek received a grant from the 

National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) to study Epoch. The grant required Dudek to 

“have a written administrative process to identify and manage financial conflict of 

2

 White later tried to retract this letter of recommendation. 

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interest and [to] inform [researchers] of the conflict of interest policy.” App’x Vol. 

VI at 1220. 

Dudek created Epoch as Rossi’s dissertation was undergoing significant 

changes. Rossi began with a focus on learning and memory, which she had been 

studying since BU. At Dudek’s direction, Rossi eliminated all components of her 

project involving memory and shifted focus to whether interneuron loss in a certain 

area of the hippocampus caused progressive epilepsy. This was a generally accepted 

hypothesis in Dudek’s area of interest. To test it, Dudek pushed Rossi to record her 

data with Epoch rather than a traditional tethered device, and to use mice instead of 

rats. The switch to mice was important because Epoch had not been validated in 

mice for Rossi’s intended use. If Epoch worked, that would help Dudek. But Epoch 

was a risk for Rossi if it failed. Rossi also later learned that Dudek did not expect the 

studies that used Epoch during this time to produce publishable findings. 

Rossi was aware of Dudek’s stake in Epoch, but claims she did not know the 

device was in a “primitive” state. App’x Vol. V at 1122. Despite the NIH 

requirements, Dudek did not provide Rossi with formal notice of his Epoch conflict 

until after she had completed her data collection. The notice informed Rossi that she 

could use a different device for her experiments. Because Rossi had already 

completed her data collection by this point, switching to another device would have 

required her to restart. In late 2012, Rossi reported to Dudek that, contrary to their 

hypothesis, the experimental treatment did not induce seizures. 

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In September 2012, Rossi’s committee indicated that she would likely 

complete her degree in June 2013. But in October 2012, Dudek started to take a 

contrary view. He told White over email that he thought Rossi would need more time 

to address issues the committee identified. In a letter submitted on Rossi’s behalf the 

same month, Dudek stated that Rossi would “probably need another year to complete 

the studies and write two or three full-length papers.” App’x Vol. VI at 1250. 

Around this time, Rossi began to feel that Dudek’s support was fading, and she 

reports that they had minimal contact over the next five or six months; Dudek 

disputes her account. On April 2, 2013, Dudek finally gave Rossi feedback on the 

key papers she was preparing for her dissertation project. 

On April 10, 2013, the submission deadline for Rossi’s dissertation was near, 

with her defense scheduled for April 25. Rossi had recently rearranged her 

committee, replacing Kesner with Dr. Jeffrey J. Ekstrand, a professor who 

specialized in seizures. Dudek was out of town and had not reviewed Rossi’s latest 

revisions. Rossi emailed the other committee members, asking if they wanted to see 

her papers anyway. On April 15, 2013, Rossi asked White how she should proceed. 

White advocated for postponing the defense and suggested talking to Keefe. Keefe 

recommended asking others to review the project. Keefe also warned Rossi that, 

without responding to feedback, she risked failing the defense. Rossi told Keefe that 

other Dudek lab members had been involved, and that Dudek himself had reviewed 

the dissertation with her that night. 

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On April 16, 2013, Dudek emailed Rossi with several serious concerns about 

her dissertation. Dudek urged Rossi to postpone her defense, saying it would not 

impact her postdoctoral fellowship because a delay “happens all the time.” Id. at 

1386. Dudek claimed he had previously questioned whether defending before 

November 2013 would be feasible. He said that while the committee would be fair, 

the defense would be rigorous. 

Rossi ignored her mentors’ recommendations to postpone. She complained to 

Dudek that she had “tried multiple times to . . . get some in-depth guidance” from 

him, but he had not been available. Id. at 1385. She explained she was prepared to 

defend her project and believed the committee members knew epilepsy was not her 

“main field.” Id. On April 19, 2013, Rossi told Dudek that all other members of her 

committee supported her proceeding to her defense without delay. She claimed that 

they considered her work “enough to graduate, and that they [did not] anticipate any 

problems with [her] writing.” Id. at 1407. 

On April 22, 2013, three days before the defense, Dudek accused Rossi of 

falsifying data and told her that she could no longer access his lab without an escort. 

Rossi reported this to Keefe and White, seeking their help. Keefe responded that 

neither she nor White could resolve the problem because they were both on Rossi’s 

committee. Keefe advised Rossi and Dudek to “work civilly together to reach” a 

solution and, if that failed, contact University administration. Id. at 1405. Keefe also 

told Rossi and Dudek to decide whether Rossi’s defense should proceed as planned. 

Dudek replied twenty minutes later. He quoted from Rossi’s April 19, 2013, email 

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that incorrectly claimed that the entire committee supported Rossi proceeding with 

her defense, saying: “You all have made a decision, and it is clear that you all want to 

go forward.” Id. at 1407. Later that evening, White responded, stating: “This 

situation is unprecedented in my career. If the defense goes forward, I will do my 

part. However, I want to go on record that this defense should be postponed (if 

necessary) until [Rossi and Dudek] agree that the work is ready to defend.” Id. at 

1409.

These developments impacted how the committee members saw Rossi. In 

White’s view, Rossi acted in a “slippery and manipulative” manner because “she 

went to committee members individually and told [them] different stories.” App’x 

Vol. VII at 1596–97. He also believed Rossi misrepresented Dudek’s availability. 

Her conduct “reflected poorly on her professional character.” Id. at 1597. And 

White had already been hesitant to serve on Rossi’s committee, having never let go 

of his concerns about her time at BU. Meanwhile, Keefe felt Rossi had engaged in “a 

blatant misrepresentation” about committee members’ positions on delaying Rossi’s 

defense. App’x Vol. V at 1076. 

Despite the growing tension, Rossi went forward with her dissertation defense 

as scheduled. On the day of the defense, Dudek emailed Vicki Skelton, an 

administrative assistant. Dudek told Skelton that he thought the defense would be 

“unpleasant,” but he would “hold [his] nose and try to ‘do the right thing.’” App’x 

Vol. VI at 1416. Although he had considered resigning from the committee, he 

indicated he was leaning against it and would see how the defense went. Dudek 

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stated: “I am almost certainly going to vote to fail, because [Rossi] does not have an 

adequate thesis.” Id. Dudek was not the only committee member with concerns. 

White later called Rossi’s submission the “worst dissertation [he] had ever read.” 

App’x Vol. V at 1062.

Rossi’s defense went poorly. White called it the “worst defense [he] had ever 

attend[ed].” Id. Asked how many days of seizure data she analyzed, Rossi replied 

(according to the committee) that she analyzed seizure data for only the fifth day. 

Rossi contends that she said she analyzed all thirty days of recorded data, but “had 

observed seizures mainly on the fifth day of experimentation, hence the figure 

focusing on that day.” Id. at 1123. The evidence supports Rossi’s position that she 

analyzed more than a single day’s data, but the impression that Rossi analyzed only 

day-five data proved fatal. White called it “an extremely important moment that led 

to . . . her failure at the defense.” App’x Vol. VII at 1600. Keefe similarly described 

that moment: “We were all floored by the fact that [Rossi] answered . . . she had only 

analyzed day five, because that was not the impression given at all the way she wrote 

her dissertation.” App’x Vol. IV at 546. 

Based on the perceived weaknesses in Rossi’s dissertation and the 

misunderstanding about day five, the committee did not let Rossi proceed to the oral 

examination. Because Rossi had expressed concerns about Dudek’s mentorship, the 

committee agreed not to formally fail her. Instead, the committee gave Rossi the first 

of several second chances, clarifying its concerns in writing and providing feedback 

on how to fix the problems identified at the defense. Keefe informed Rossi that she 

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could no longer contact committee members individually. All communications were 

to be sent to the entire committee because it was clear that Rossi had misrepresented 

committee members’ views. 

Over the next six months, Rossi attempted to improve her dissertation, but her 

efforts were largely unsuccessful. She had limited authorization to use Dudek’s lab, 

and was denied access to her data for about a month. Meanwhile, the advice Rossi 

received about what steps to take and what methodological techniques to use to 

improve her dissertation was sometimes difficult to follow. On November 20, 2013, 

the committee dismissed Rossi from the program. Keefe promised a formal letter of 

dismissal that would explain the decision. 

Before such a letter was sent, Dudek spoke with the University’s general 

counsel. On the advice of counsel, the committee concluded it needed to give Rossi 

(1) “another chance with very clearly defined dates and expectations” and 

(2) “written warning that her performance” was “not meeting academic standards.” 

Id. at 557. On November 22, 2013, Keefe informed Rossi that the committee had 

engaged in “considerable additional deliberation” and “decided to not move forward 

with dismissal.” App’x Vol. II at 345. Keefe attached a letter detailing the 

committee’s expectations going forward and setting deadlines for Rossi’s progress. 

The committee never revealed its concern that it could not legally dismiss Rossi 

without giving her another chance. 

On November 27, 2013, Rossi filed a grievance with the University stating that 

her committee was not providing her “clear support, feedback, and constructive 

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criticism.” Id. at 353. She incorrectly maintained that the committee had supported 

her proceeding with her scheduled defense, and that she had received no negative 

feedback on her suggested plan. 

On December 9, 2013, the first deadline set by the November 22 letter, Rossi 

submitted another draft of her methods section to the committee. Several committee 

members expressed concerns over email. Keefe pointed out that the committee had, 

back in July, approved parts of Rossi’s approach. Keefe asked if the committee was 

“obligated to help” Rossi by “provid[ing] a bit more direction.” App’x Vol. III at 

416. Dudek responded that it was clear what methods Rossi should use, as he had 

told Rossi to use them before her defense. Keefe and the rest of the committee 

informed Rossi that the methods needed more work. 

The committee was also not impressed by the next round of submissions under 

the plan set out in the November 22 letter. Over email, White called Rossi’s 

revisions “rote and uninspired,” saying he could not understand how she made so 

little progress since the defense.3

 App’x Vol. VI at 1497. In his view, Rossi did the 

“bare minimum,” described questionable methods, and did not support her 

conclusions with analysis. Id. He reminded the committee members that she 

3

 We can recount additional comments in emails quoted by the district court in 

part, as well as replies from fellow committee members, even though the district 

court did not specifically cite these details below. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 

1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Those facts explicitly found by the district court, 

combined with those that it likely assumed, then form the universe of facts upon 

which we base our legal review of whether defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity.”). 

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defended against their advice, and catalogued repeated “evidence of low character,” 

including her misrepresentations about committee members’ positions, the 

“circumstances under which she left BU,” and an “infamous Facebook posting.” Id. 

He concluded that Rossi was “not capable of the level of independent work needed 

for a PhD.” Id. While he was open to being persuaded otherwise, in his opinion the 

“time ha[d] come to remove her from the PhD program.” Id. Ekstrand agreed. As 

did Dudek. Keefe summed up the situation: “I think we all know what the next step 

is.” Id. at 1500. The committee dismissed Rossi from the program on January 13, 

2014. By letter, it informed her that (1) she had “failed to demonstrate competence 

in independent research,” (2) her work since the defense was untimely, and (3) she 

lacked professional character. App’x Vol. IV at 456. The dismissal letter did not 

allude to the concerns that White had about her time at BU, or that Dudek had raised 

about academic integrity.4

After the committee dismissed Rossi, she appealed the decision internally, 

following the University’s established administrative procedures.5

 Rossi’s appeal 

4

 In the months leading up to Rossi’s dismissal, Dudek had formally, but 

privately, accused Rossi of falsifying data. In November 2013, Dudek contacted the 

University’s Research Integrity Officer, Dr. Jeffrey Botkin, concerned that Rossi did 

not have some of the data that she claimed supported her thesis. Dudek was 

simultaneously attempting to obtain Rossi’s data and analysis for potential future use 

by his lab. In December 2013, Botkin told Dudek that he would not pursue the 

allegations against Rossi further; the alleged flaws in her research that Dudek brought 

to his attention would not amount to academic misconduct under University policy. 

5

 We discuss Rossi’s administrative appeals in somewhat greater detail than 

the district court because they are important to understanding the process Rossi 

received. See id.

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went through three different levels: first, to Dr. Richard I. Dorsky, the Director of the 

Interdepartmental Program in Neuroscience; then, to the Academic Appeals 

Committee for the School of Medicine, which made a recommendation to Dr. Dean 

Y. Li, Associate Vice President for Research and Chief Scientific Officer, Health 

Sciences; and finally, to Dr. Vivian S. Lee, Senior Vice President for Health Sciences 

and Dean of the School of Medicine. As part of the monthslong appeals process, 

Rossi received a hearing at which she was represented by counsel. The committee’s 

initial decision to dismiss Rossi was affirmed at each level of the appeal. In the end, 

Dean Lee concluded that Rossi was dismissed due to “her continuing failure to meet 

the Program’s academic requirements,” specifically her “failure to attend to the 

substantive feedback she was given by experienced scientists and mentors,” and her 

“inability to analyze her data and tie her conclusion to the data in the appropriate 

scholarly fashion necessary to obtain a Ph.D. degree.” Id. at 472–73. Dean Lee 

stated that the members of Rossi’s committee had “strong established track records of 

mentoring graduate students,” and their decision “was neither arbitrary nor 

capricious.” Id.

b. 

In October 2015, Rossi sued, among others, the members of her committee. 

She alleged that they violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when 

they dismissed her. The district court dismissed Greger, Ekstrand (in his individual 

capacity), and the University. Dudek, Keefe, White, and Ekstrand (in his official 

capacity) moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district 

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court dismissed all four in their official capacities, which left Dudek, Keefe, and 

White in their individual capacities. The court found that Rossi’s due process claims 

failed to the extent they were premised on stigmatization or an infringement of her 

liberty interests. But it concluded that Rossi had a protected property interest in 

continued enrollment in the Ph.D. program. It held that Dudek, Keefe, and White 

violated clearly established law pertaining to academic dismissals. Dudek, Keefe, 

and White appeal. See Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under collateral order 

doctrine). 

II. 

Dudek, Keefe, and White maintain that the district court erred for two reasons. 

First, they argue that Rossi’s clearly established rights were not violated because “the 

University . . . gave Rossi extensive process” by allowing her to pursue an “academic 

appeal . . . through [multiple] different levels.” Aplt. Br. at 43–44. Second, they 

contend that, even ignoring the administrative appeals, their own conduct did not 

violate clearly established law. We begin by discussing the applicable legal 

framework. We then resolve this appeal on the first ground without reaching the 

second. 

a. 

This appeal turns on qualified immunity. “[T]he doctrine of qualified 

immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from 

individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly 

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established statutory or constitutional rights.” Janny v. Gamez, 8 F.4th 883, 913 

(10th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 

971 (10th Cir. 2001)). “‘We employ a two-part test to analyze a qualified immunity 

defense,’ asking ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of 

a constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the 

time of [the official’s] alleged misconduct.’” Dalton v. Reynolds, 2 F.4th 1300, 1308 

(10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011)). 

“After a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff.” Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). “If the plaintiff 

fails to satisfy either part of the two-part inquiry, the court must grant the defendant 

qualified immunity.” Id. Our review is de novo. Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 

1282 (10th Cir. 2020). 

“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear 

foundation in then-existing precedent.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 

577, 589 (2018). To demonstrate such foundation, “the plaintiff must point to ‘a 

Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight 

of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff 

maintains.’” Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1027 

(10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 427 (10th Cir. 

2014)). Relevant cases cannot merely suggest an answer; rather, “‘existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate’ to clearly 

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establish a right.” Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018)). 

“The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly 

prohibit the [official’s] conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 

138 S. Ct. at 590. In other words, “[t]he rule’s contours must be so well defined that 

it is ‘clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.’” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “This 

requires a high ‘degree of specificity.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 

(2015) (per curiam)). “We do not require a case directly on point.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). But we do require that “the precedent . . . be 

particularized to the facts.” Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir. 

2017). “A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not 

follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’” 

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). That said, “‘general statements of the law’ can clearly 

establish a right for qualified immunity purposes if they apply ‘with obvious clarity 

to the specific conduct in question.’” Halley, 902 F.3d at 1149 (alteration omitted) 

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

b. 

Rossi’s constitutional claims sound in due process. The Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

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A party claiming a due process violation must allege that the government “has 

deprived [her] of an interest in liberty or property” that is constitutionally cognizable. 

Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1986). “A protected interest in liberty 

or property may have its source in either federal or state law.” Elliott v. Martinez, 

675 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012). On appeal, the parties do not dispute that 

Rossi had a constitutionally protected property interest in enrollment in her Ph.D. 

program that triggered the requirements of due process. 

A student with a constitutionally protected interest in attending a public 

academic program may not be dismissed from the program without due process of 

law. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978). 

The process that is due depends on whether the dismissal is based on academic 

performance or is disciplinary in nature. See Harris, 798 F.2d at 423. Where, as 

here, a student is dismissed on academic grounds—another aspect of this case 

uncontested on appeal—our review of the decision is highly deferential. See id.

(explaining that “less stringent procedural requirements attach” to academic 

dismissals). “[T]he determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons 

requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to 

the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.” Horowitz, 435 

U.S. at 90. “When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic 

decision, . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.” 

Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); see also Horowitz, 435 

U.S. at 92 (“Courts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic 

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performance.”); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975) (“The courts 

are not equipped to review academic records based upon academic standards within 

the particular knowledge, experience and expertise of academicians.”). 

A student alleging a due process violation can bring a procedural or 

substantive challenge. Procedural due process as applied to academic dismissals 

ordinarily “requires no more than that ‘the student [have] prior notice of faculty 

dissatisfaction with his or her performance and of the possibility of dismissal, and 

[that] the decision to dismiss the student [be] careful and deliberate.’” Trotter v. 

Regents of Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1986)). 

That said, “the notion of judicial deference to academic decisions loses force when 

. . . the decisionmaker is ‘accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally 

impermissible reasons’ for its action.” Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for 

Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 

225). Even if the requirements of procedural due process are otherwise satisfied, 

“the court may grant relief . . . [when] the student presents positive evidence of ill 

will or bad motive.” Gaspar, 513 F.2d at 851. 

Substantive due process also prohibits academic officials from dismissing a 

student because of improper motives. “Under Supreme Court authority, a plaintiff 

asserting a substantive due process claim based on an academic decision must show 

that the decision was the product of arbitrary state action rather than a conscientious, 

careful and deliberate exercise of professional judgment.” Gossett, 245 F.3d at 1182. 

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“A plaintiff may make such a showing by evidence that the challenged decision was 

based on ‘nonacademic or constitutionally impermissible reasons,’ rather than the 

product of conscientious and careful deliberation.” Id. (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 

225). 

The parties suggest that the procedural and substantive due process standards 

are effectively the same in a case like this, as Rossi alleges she was dismissed for 

impermissible reasons. See Aple. Br. at 36; Reply Br. at 1 n.1. We agree, so we 

analyze Rossi’s due process challenges together, focusing on whether it was clearly 

established that the decision to dismiss her was anything other than careful and 

deliberate. We conclude that, because the University provided an extensive 

administrative appeals process which Rossi does not directly charge with bias, Rossi 

cannot show that her clearly established rights were violated.

 c. 

When assessing whether a dismissed student’s due process rights were 

violated, we ask whether “the decision to dismiss the student [was] careful and 

deliberate.” Trotter, 219 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Schuler, 788 F.2d at 514). Our focus 

is not on whether any given academic official’s actions comported with due process 

in isolation—it is on whether the decision itself did so. See id. Our analysis thus 

encompasses the entire process that rendered the decision final, which includes any 

opportunities that the institution provided to the student to revisit or overturn it. See

id. (“The number of appeals and review hearings afforded [the student] convince us 

that the [university’s] decision was careful and deliberate.”). The degree to which 

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that review process may have been compromised is critical to whether it can produce 

a careful and deliberate decision, as two of our cases illustrate. 

In Harris v. Blake, a university student studying psychology withdrew from a 

counseling course over the professor’s objection. Harris, 798 F.2d at 420. The 

professor wrote a letter calling the student “incompetent and unethical.” Id. The 

letter was placed in the student’s academic file, where it was seen by other 

instructors. Id. at 421. Two professors who read the letter gave the student poor 

grades, pushing his grade point average below the required minimum and compelling 

him to withdraw. Id. The student brought suit, claiming he had been deprived of his 

constitutionally protected interest in attending the academic program without 

procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 422. On appeal, we acknowledged 

that “[a]rguably, both the . . . letter and the poor grades [the student] received were 

not careful evaluations.” Id. at 423. But the letter and the grades were not what 

mattered. What mattered was that the university had allowed the student to lodge an 

official grievance, culminating in a hearing before the university’s academic appeal 

board. See id. We explained that “the procedures [the student] received were more 

than adequate to protect his property interest in continued enrollment” because 

(1) the university had “provided an established appeals procedure” that allowed 

Harris to “participate[] personally in the hearing to challenge his grades,” and (2) that 

“[i]ndependent review confirmed the propriety of the grades and further 

demonstrated that the ultimate decision concerning his case was a careful one.” Id. 

We observed that it was the decision of the academic appeal board “that ultimately 

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resulted in [the student’s] forced withdrawal,” and the student “failed to show that 

this decision was not made with conscientious deliberation through the exercise of 

professional judgment.” Id. at 425. 

Similarly, Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents for Langston 

University involved a student who involuntarily withdrew from a university nursing 

program and then brought suit, alleging due process violations. Gossett, 245 F.3d at 

1175. The student maintained that the decision to require his withdrawal was the 

product of gender discrimination, so it was not careful and deliberate. Id. at 1181–

82. We agreed with the student that he had raised a question of fact. Id. And, this 

time, it did not prove sufficient that the student had been afforded an administrative 

appeal. See id. at 1176. Although we did not address the import of the 

administrative appeal directly, we observed in a footnote that the appeal had been 

potentially tainted, as the student “claim[ed] that illegal discrimination played a role 

in his unsuccessful grade contest proceedings and in his failure to be readmitted.” Id.

at 1182 n.7. Under Gossett, an academic decision may not be careful and 

deliberate—notwithstanding a student’s administrative appeals—where it is the 

product of a process “motivated by impermissible gender discrimination rather than 

based on an exercise of professional judgment as to . . . academic ability.” Id. at 

1182.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rossi, this case falls, at 

best, somewhere between Harris and Gossett. Like in Harris and unlike in Gossett, 

Rossi makes no claim that the University officials who decided her administrative 

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appeals, which rendered final the decision to dismiss her, were biased or otherwise 

unqualified in any respect—and certainly not with respect to gender discrimination, 

the only impermissible motive that Gossett clearly establishes. However, in contrast 

to Harris, there was arguably not a completely independent review of the decision to 

dismiss Rossi. There appears to have been de novo review of Rossi’s bias 

allegations. See App’x Vol. IV at 469. And, on the merits of the academic decision, 

Dean Lee stated that Rossi’s dismissal “was based on failure to attend to the 

substantive feedback she was given” and her “inability to analyze her data and tie her 

conclusions to the data in the appropriate scholarly fashion necessary to obtain a 

Ph.D. degree.” Id. at 472–73. But Dean Lee also afforded some deference to Rossi’s 

committee, noting its members had “strong established track records of mentoring 

graduate students,” and upholding the dismissal as “neither arbitrary nor capricious.” 

Id. To the extent the University’s administrative review reaffirmed the committee’s 

judgment, which Rossi alleges was based on impermissible motivations, it is not 

implausible to suggest that the review may not have been entirely independent under 

Harris. However, this notion is undermined by the administrative reviewers’ 

knowledge of Rossi’s allegations concerning the committee’s motivations. 

 On the merits, our typical task would be to consider the principles that underlie 

our past decisions and determine whether the administrative appeals in this case 

make it more like Harris or Gossett. Reviewing a denial of qualified immunity, 

however, we have a slightly different task: we must determine whether Rossi has 

shown a violation of her clearly established rights. To be clearly established, “[w]e 

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do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the 

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 

Precisely because, when construed most favorably to Rossi, this case sits between our 

relevant precedents, Rossi cannot make that showing. It was not clearly established 

that an administrative appeals process fails to produce a careful and deliberate 

decision just because it may not have involved de novo review of all aspects of an 

academic determination that is alleged to have been based on nonacademic factors.6

The district court erred by failing to consider Rossi’s administrative appeals. 

Because of them, we need not dissect the committee’s initial decision to dismiss her. 

Unlike in Gossett, Rossi raises no concern about the administrative reviewers’ 

impartiality regarding her gender, nor any other shortcoming that our precedent 

clearly establishes as improper. Rossi fails to state a constitutional claim sufficient 

to defeat the assertion of qualified immunity. Dudek, Keefe, and White are entitled 

to qualified immunity. 

6

 Rossi points to several out-of-circuit cases where, she says, courts permitted 

due process claims to proceed even though “the educational institution ha[d] 

administratively affirmed its initial discipline of the student.” Aple. Br. at 41. 

However, as Rossi acknowledges, all these cases concerned discipline. Id. Our due 

process inquiry is much more demanding for disciplinary decisions than for academic 

dismissals. See Harris, 798 F.2d at 423. 

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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying 

Dudek, Keefe, and White qualified immunity. 

Entered for the Court 

Allison H. Eid 

Circuit Judge 

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