United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Readiness, Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate

November 1998 MILITARY

PREPOSITIONING

Army and Air Force

Programs Need to Be

Reassessed

GAO/NSIAD-99-6

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281047 

November 16, 1998

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Charles Robb

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

This report responds to your request that we review the readiness of Department of Defense

(DOD) prepositioning programs. Specifically, we examined (1) the basis for the program

requirements and (2) the rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition of prepositioned

stocks and the reliability of this readiness data.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The U.S. military stores, or prepositions, reserves of military equipment

and supplies near potential conflict areas to ensure that the material

would be quickly available to forces in the event of a crisis. During a crisis,

prepositioning would speed U.S. response times because only the troops

and a relatively small amount of materiel would need to be brought by air

to the conflict area. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) could

field heavily equipped, combat-ready forces in days rather than the weeks

it would take if the forces and all necessary equipment and supplies had to

be brought from the United States. Collectively, the services spent over

$1 billion in fiscal year 1997 to operate and maintain their prepositioning

programs.

The Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed

Services, U. S. Senate, asked GAO to assess the readiness of prepositioning

programs. Specifically, GAO examined (1) the basis for program

requirements and (2) the rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition

of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data. GAO

focused its review on the Army and the Air Force programs because of

concerns that emerged about the sufficiency, condition, and management

of their prepositioned stocks. Information on the Marine Corps and the

Navy programs is in appendix I.

Background While the prepositioning concept is not new, it has gained importance in

the post-Cold War world. With fewer troops forward stationed today,

prepositioning has become increasingly important because it allows DOD to

project forces into conflict areas faster. It can lessen the strain on scarce

airlift capabilities and reduce reliance on relatively slow sealift deliveries.

Consistent with the two-war strategy adopted during the 1993 Bottom-Up

Review, DOD has expanded prepositioning efforts in Korea and the Persian

Gulf. Military planners in both these regions foresee heavy reliance on

prepositioned stocks during the first days of conflict and believe that such

stocks are an important deterrent to potential aggression.

The Army has given priority to its seven combat brigade sets, each of

which provides prepositioned combat and support equipment for 3,000 to

5,000 soldiers. The Army prepositions three sets in Europe. The other four

sets are prepositioned in Kuwait, Korea, Qatar, and aboard a fleet of ships.

Other Army prepositioning efforts include operational projects and

sustainment stocks stored ashore worldwide and on ships. The

operational projects program is intended to provide stocks for special

missions. This program contains a range of support equipment and

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Executive Summary

supplies, from fuel pipelines and bridges to clothing and chemical gear.

The sustainment program is intended to provide battlefield replacement

equipment, food, fuel, ammunition, and other consumable supplies to

support a theater until resupply is established. Other Army stocks include

ammunition in Korea, Thailand, and Israel as well as artillery equipment

and ammunition in Norway. The Air Force prepositions “bare base” sets in

the Persian Gulf, Korea, and Europe, which include items such as tents,

kitchens, and hangars to create or augment an air base. This program is

critical to the Air Force because the sets support early arriving combat

forces and are especially critical in austere environments, such as the

Persian Gulf, where they would provide the bulk of living and working

facilities at many planned operating locations. The Air Force also has

programs for vehicles, munitions, and other supplies. The worldwide

vehicle program includes both general purpose vehicles, such as trucks

and buses, and special purpose vehicles, such as materiel handling and

fire-fighting equipment. The Air Force prepositions munitions in land

facilities and afloat, on three ships. In addition, the Air Force stores other

items, such as aircraft fuel tanks and pylons, refueling equipment, and

medical sets and supplies, at land facilities worldwide.

In measuring readiness, military managers told us that they use two

primary criteria: inventory fill and maintenance condition. Stocks on hand

are compared against required levels to assess inventory fill; thus,

requirements must be valid to achieve a reliable, objective assessment.

Maintenance condition describes whether on-hand items work well

enough to perform their mission. If on-hand stocks are not what is

needed—or are in poor condition—the purpose of prepositioning may be

defeated because the deploying unit will lose valuable time repairing or

replacing equipment.

Results in Brief The Army and the Air Force have poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise

questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed. The

Army and the Air Force have reported significant shortages and poor

maintenance conditions in their prepositioning programs. In some cases,

however, reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance condition

was unavailable. Thus, the precise readiness of the prepositioned

stocks—and the impact of any shortfalls—is difficult to determine because

of the questionable requirements that underpin the programs and the poor

information that the services use to manage the programs. While the

services are taking steps to address the requirements and reporting

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Executive Summary

problems, it may be several years before these problems are resolved and

readiness can be reliably assessed.

The positioning of the Army’s brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and

afloat supports the current two-war strategy. The three brigade sets in

Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army recognizes the need to revisit

and evaluate the requirements for those sets. Despite questions about the

overall brigade set requirements, GAO was able to assess the readiness of

individual sets because the Army periodically reports on the readiness of

these sets. The Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets

afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is

added to these sets. The readiness of the European sets is declining,

however, and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages

caused by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia.

The Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational

projects and sustainment programs. The Army is reviewing these programs

to establish requirements, but these reviews had not been completed at the

time GAO completed its work. Furthermore, the Army has unreliable or

incomplete data to manage the programs and assess their readiness. Until

the Army establishes valid requirements for these programs and improves

inventory reporting, their readiness cannot be reliably and

comprehensively assessed.

Similarly, the Air Force has not determined precise requirements for its

bare base and vehicle programs. In the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not

completed the detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations

to determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to

deploying forces. Thus, current requirements are outdated, based on a

worst-case scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all

the facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur. In

Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current

requirements for the vehicles to be stored there. The Air Force reported

significant shortfalls in its prepositioning programs, and GAO found

equipment in poor condition. The most significant shortfall reported by the

Air Force is in the Persian Gulf bare base program; the program has less

than one-third of the sets that the Air Force projects it would need for a

major war there. In the vehicle program, the Air Force does not have

reliable, comprehensive reports of inventories on hand or their

maintenance condition. At one location visited, GAO found that over

40 percent of the Air Force’s aging vehicles were in poor condition and

would require repair before being used. Until the Air Force determines

requirements for these programs and improves reporting, however, the

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Executive Summary

impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance conditions will be difficult to

discern.

Principal Findings

Requirements for Brigade

Sets in Europe Are

Questionable, and

Capabilities Among All

Sets Vary

The Army’s positioning of brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat

reflects DOD’s current two-war strategy. However, the requirements for the

three brigade sets in Europe are questionable. GAO found wide variations in

the readiness of the individual brigade sets. Specifically, in the Persian

Gulf, the brigade set in Kuwait has most of its required equipment, and this

equipment is in good condition. This set has certain readiness advantages

over the other sets. For example, the Kuwait equipment is kept ready to be

issued with only a few hours of notice; the other brigade sets are kept in

storage. Also, the U.S. Central Command has a recurring exercise program

in which a battalion of soldiers—about one-third of the combat

brigade—performs exercises with this equipment, resulting in well-defined

procedures for drawing the equipment. Kuwait pays most of the

approximately $60 million annual cost of this program.

The three brigade sets established or expanded since the adoption of the

two-war strategy in Korea, Qatar, and on ships are improving steadily.

According to the Army, the sets in Korea and Qatar should both reach

acceptable inventory and maintenance condition levels before the end of

1999, except for repair parts. The Korea set is already over 90 percent

complete. However, it has not been exercised and still has shortfalls of

support equipment and spare parts. As a result, the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Forces, Korea, has said that this set is “not fightable.” In Qatar, the

brigade set is awaiting the completion of new facilities currently under

construction. The Army has stored two battalions of combat equipment

(about two-thirds of the combat capability of the brigade) in

controlled-humidity storage bags and tunnels to protect it from extreme

desert conditions while new facilities are completed. This brigade set is

not combat ready primarily due to shortages of critical equipment. In

addition, the desert heat has ruined many of the batteries in the equipment

being stored. These batteries would need to be replaced at the onset of a

contingency.

Among its combat brigade sets, the Army views the afloat set as its most

important due to its ability to quickly deploy to any conflict area.

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Executive Summary

However, GAO reported in July 1997 that critical stock items aboard

prepositioning ships were missing and that some equipment was originally

loaded in poor condition. The afloat stocks have since been improving as

the equipment aboard the ships is taken off, repaired, and reloaded in

good condition. By the fall of 1998 all original brigade set equipment will

have been repaired and reloaded on new ships.

The combat capability of the three brigade sets remaining in Europe is

declining, and the need to retain three brigade sets there is questionable.

The Army recognizes a need to examine whether the brigades are needed

to fill a current war-fighting requirement and whether authorizations for

the brigades should be maintained. Each set in Europe has shortfalls

resulting from transfers of equipment to U.S. forces in, or returning from,

Bosnia. Portions of the sets have been issued in response to requests for

individual items to support the contingency in Bosnia and exercises.

However, the Army has no immediate plans to fill the shortages that have

resulted from these equipment issues. Overall, Army officials have

concluded that the shortfalls would not critically affect the war-fighting

efforts in Korea or the Persian Gulf because the sets in Europe would

likely be used later than those positioned nearer to potential conflict

areas.

Army Operational Projects

and Sustainment Programs

Cannot Be Reliably

Assessed

The capabilities of the Army’s operational projects and sustainment

programs cannot be reliably evaluated because the Army does not have

valid requirements or reliable reports of inventory levels and maintenance

conditions for these programs. While the Army acknowledges these

problems and is now focusing attention on them, the programs have

received low priority compared to the brigade set program. In addition,

while the status of the Army’s brigade sets is reported quarterly under the

unit status reporting system, operational projects and sustainment stocks

are not reported under this, or any, reliable reporting system. Despite their

lower priority, these programs can be critical during a war because they

include items like petroleum and water distribution systems, chemical

defensive equipment, and repair parts that may be needed to keep combat

equipment operational.

The Army is taking steps to correct its requirements problems, but these

efforts may not produce valid requirements. An aircraft matting project,

which includes metal mats used to construct airfields, accounts for over

83 percent of the Army’s total operational projects requirements and

87 percent of its reported shortfall, according to Army Materiel Command

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Executive Summary

figures. The Army reported that this $10.3 billion project has been

completely revalidated. However, the requirements for this project are

questionable because (1) about 70 percent of the worldwide requirement

for aircraft matting is designated to support contingencies in Europe and

Africa, not the major theater wars in Korea or the Persian Gulf and (2) the

Army could provide no documentation to indicate that the war fighters in

Europe had analyzed or otherwise validated this requirement. While the

Army allows approval of operational projects to support regional

contingency plans, DOD has directed the services to size their programs to

meet the demands of the two-war strategy.

Even if the Army develops its requirements, it will still face considerable

reporting problems because it does not have reliable information on

inventory and maintenance condition. GAO found discrepancies amounting

to billions of dollars between the data from the Total Asset Visibility

system—the Army’s system for tracking operational projects and

sustainment stocks—and the stocks actually on hand. The Total Asset

Visibility summary reports do not include condition code data, and they

record on-hand stocks only by dollar value or tons.

Poorly Defined

Requirements Make

Assessment of Air Force

Prepositioning Programs

Difficult

The most pressing concern in the Air Force’s bare base and vehicle

programs is the lack of valid requirements underpinning the programs.

Without this foundation, it is impossible to reliably assess the impact of

reported shortfalls or equipment in poor maintenance condition, and as a

result, the Air Force cannot assess the overall readiness of the programs.

The bare base program, which includes such items as tents, portable

kitchens, and aircraft hangars, provides temporary living and working

facilities. But requirements for this program have remained constant since

the late 1980s, and GAO found that the Air Force had not thoroughly

reviewed the requirements since the level was set. Such reviews, called

base support plans, would include an assessment of the infrastructure

available in the region, such as housing and food and laundry sources.

These plans must be developed to determine true requirements. Without

these, the Air Force tends to assume a worst-case scenario for which it

must provide facilities for virtually all deployed forces. As of August 1998,

none of the base support plans for operating locations in the Gulf had been

finished.

Notwithstanding the outdated requirements, the Air Force and U.S.

Central Command are concerned about the shortfalls in the Persian Gulf

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Executive Summary

bare base sets. In August 1998, when the Air Force measured the sets

against its requirements it had less than one-third of the sets (29 of 93) it

would reportedly need should a major conflict erupt in the Gulf. Some Air

Force officials are concerned that these shortfalls would negatively affect

the ability to project forces for a major war in the Gulf. Shortfalls have

worsened because these sets have been used heavily since the Gulf War,

and the Air Force’s efforts to rebuild the sets have not kept pace.

However, these significant shortfalls are not insurmountable, according to

the Air Force, because personnel can be housed in barracks or hotels if

bare base facilities are not available. Forces may not be as well-protected

in such locations, however, and force protection concerns are paramount

in the region since the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.

Requirements have not been precisely determined for the vehicle program

in the Gulf region. The Air Force was working to develop vehicle

requirements during GAO’s review, but as of October 1998, the Air Force

had not determined how many vehicles it would be able to obtain from

host nation sources. In addition, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles

in Europe but has no current requirements for these vehicles.

In addition, the Air Force has little reliable data with which to measure the

readiness of its vehicle program. Readiness is not routinely reported, and

the Air Force could not tell us precisely how many prepositioned vehicles

it had on hand worldwide or what condition these vehicles were in.

However, many of the vehicles at major storage locations worldwide are

aging and a high number are not mission capable. For example, over

40 percent of the vehicles at a major location in the Persian Gulf were not

mission capable as of July 1998.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of

the Army and the Air Force to reassess their prepositioning programs, with

the goal of establishing sound requirements based on the prevailing

wartime strategy, and to develop reliable inventory information to

measure the readiness of the programs. GAO specifically recommends that

the services determine, reevaluate, prioritize, or improve requirements for

European prepositioning; the Army’s operational projects and sustainment

stock programs; and the Air Force’s vehicle and Persian Gulf bare base

programs. GAO also recommends that the services develop reliable reports

of inventory fill and maintenance condition for the Army’s operational

project and sustainment stock programs and for the Air Force’s vehicle

program. Finally, GAO recommends that the Air Force maintain its required

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Executive Summary

vehicles in good condition and that the services dispose of unneeded

prepositioned stocks.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To reliably assess DOD’s readiness status and evaluate its future budget

requests, the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of

Defense periodically report on the (1) progress by the Army and the Air

Force to address the requirements and reporting recommendations made

in this report and (2) impact of any shortfalls that remain after

requirements and reporting problems are addressed, including how DOD

and the services would mitigate these shortfalls in the event of a major

conflict.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report’s

recommendations and agreed that Army and Air Force prepositioning

programs need to be reviewed with an emphasis on validating

requirements based on a two-war strategy, streamlining maintenance, and

improving readiness. DOD stated that the Joint Staff and the respective

services are examining many of the issues raised in this report.

Specifically, the Army is (1) reviewing its prepositioning requirements for

Europe to assess whether, in light of projected missions, European stocks

should be configured in brigade sets; (2) refining its sustainment

requirements with the intent of redistributing or disposing of any excess

war reserve stocks; and (3) resolving data accuracy problems for its

operational project and sustainment programs to assist in management

and readiness assessments.

DOD said that the Air Force plans to complete its ongoing war reserve

materiel study within a year. This study is expected to verify and validate

European prepositioning requirements, develop base support plans for

Southwest Asia, and address vehicle requirements determination

problems. DOD also said that the Air Force would redistribute or dispose of

any excess vehicles identified through its reassessment of this program.

DOD disagreed that it had not updated its bare base requirements since the

late 1980s, commenting that the Air Force reviews and modifies these

requirements biennially in conjunction with updates of operational plans.

However, GAO notes that although the Air Force has reviewed overall troop

deployment levels, it has not developed base support plans as part of these

reviews. Such analysis is needed to arrive at precise bare base

requirements.

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Executive Summary

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided

technical comments, which GAO has incorporated as appropriate.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Prepositioned Materiel Helps Speed Response to Crises 14

The Army’s Prepositioning Program 16

The Air Force’s Prepositioning Program 18

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20

Chapter 2 

Army Prepositioning

Programs Are Built on

Questionable

Requirements, and

Some Have Limited

Readiness Reporting

24

Requirements for Brigade Sets in Europe Are Questionable, and

Capabilities Among All Sets Vary

24

Readiness of Other Army Prepositioning Programs Cannot Be

Measured Due to a Lack of Reliable Information

34

Chapter 3 

Air Force

Prepositioning

Programs Have Poorly

Defined Requirements

and Incomplete

Readiness

Information

41

Air Force Has Outdated Requirements for Bare Base Program 41

Reported Shortages in the Bare Base Program Concern War

Fighters

43

Peacetime Use Is Outpacing Efforts to Rebuild the Bare Base

Program

45

The Air Force Has Not Determined Valid Requirements for the

Vehicle Program

49

Air Force Has Little Reliable Data to Measure Vehicle Program

Readiness

51

Air Force Recognizes Need to Develop Prepositioning Strategy

and Improve Inventory Reporting

56

Chapter 4 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

57

Conclusions 57

Recommendations 57

Matter for Congressional Consideration 58

Agency Comments 59

Appendixes Appendix I: Marine Corps and Navy Prepositioning Programs 60

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 63

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Contents

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 67

Products Related to

Prepositioning Issues

71

Tables Table 1.1: Army Brigade Sets, by Region, and their Authorized

Major Combat Systems

17

Table 2.1: Prepositioned Operational Projects Locations and

Equipment

35

Table 2.2: Comparison of Required Levels and On-Hand Inventory

in Army Operational Projects Program

37

Table 3.1: Shortages in Harvest Falcon Sets Needed for a Major

Conflict in the Persian Gulf

44

Figures Figure 1.1: Air Force Bare Base Set in Use in Bahrain 19

Figure 2.1: Unit Training With Army Brigade Set Equipment in

Northern Kuwait

26

Figure 2.2: Bags and Tunnels Used for Temporary Storage of U.S.

Army Prepositioned Equipment in Qatar

30

Figure 2.3: A High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Left in

Poor Condition at a Prepositioning Site in Europe

33

Figure 2.4: U.S. Army Abrams Tanks Stored Outside in Livorno,

Italy

34

Figure 3.1: Harvest Falcon Equipment Before Shipment

Compared to Similar Containers of Equipment Returned From

Deployment

47

Figure 3.2: Vehicles Awaiting Disposition Decisions at European

Storage Site

50

Figure 3.3: Mission-Capability Rates for Prepositioned Vehicles in

Oman and Bahrain

52

Figure 3.4: Air Force Truck With Exploded Tire, in Storage at

Thumrait, Oman

53

Figure 3.5: High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

Returned from Bright Star Exercise to Thumrait, Oman

55

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GPRA Government Performance and Review Act

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To help respond quickly to crises overseas, the military services store, or

preposition, military equipment and supplies on land and on ships near

potential conflict areas. With these stocks prepositioned near danger

spots, U.S. response times to a crisis are shortened, since only the troops

and a relatively modest amount of materiel must be brought by air to an

area where the stocks are located. With fewer troops stationed abroad

today, prepositioning has become increasingly important. All four military

services have programs to preposition a broad range of stocks to be used

for various purposes. Some stocks are positioned afloat, which allows

responsiveness nearly anywhere in the world, and other stocks are stored

ashore near the likely areas of conflict in the Persian Gulf and Korea. This

report focuses on the Army and Air Force prepositioning programs

because of concerns that emerged about the sufficiency, condition, and

management of their prepositioned stocks. The Navy and Marine Corps

prepositioning programs are discussed in appendix I.

Prepositioned

Materiel Helps Speed

Response to Crises

The goal of prepositioning programs is to make military equipment and

supplies available to deploying forces faster than would otherwise be

possible. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three

ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. While airplanes travel quickly,

they are expensive to use and impractical for moving all the materiel

needed for a large-scale deployment. And though ships can carry large

loads, they are slow. Prepositioning lessens the strain of using expensive

airlift and reduces reliance on relatively slow sealift deliveries. In its 1997

Annual Report to the President and the Congress, DOD noted that moving

an Army brigade of soldiers and 20,000 tons of equipment from the United

States to the conflict area (by sea and air) would take 20 to 30 days. By

contrast, fully deploying a prepositioned brigade should take just 4 days

because only the soldiers, with a small amount of equipment, would be

flown to the location of the prepositioned stocks.

Although the concept of prepositioning is not new, it has gained

importance in the post-Cold War world. Since its 1993 Bottom-Up Review,

DOD has focused on maintaining capabilities to fight and win major

conflicts in the Persian Gulf region and on the Korean peninsula.

Concerned about the reduction in U.S. forces overseas and their ability to

move forces in the time required to resolve potential conflicts quickly, the

services have expanded prepositioning ashore and on ships in those

regions. In the Persian Gulf, where the United States has few permanent

forces, prepositioned stocks would be the primary source of combat

equipment for ground troops and would be critical in setting up air bases

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Chapter 1 

Introduction

there. In Korea, the Army has prepositioned a brigade set to augment the

combat capabilities of U.S. forces there.

While prepositioning figured prominently in the previous mobility studies

performed by DOD, the Quadrennial Defense Review completed in 1997 did

not consider prepositioning as a major part of its scope. Instead, DOD

officials told us that prepositioning was to be reconsidered as part of the

planned update to the mobility studies, scheduled to begin in 1999.

The services generally measure the readiness of prepositioned stocks by

determining their inventory fill and maintenance condition—that is, do

they have the required stocks on hand and are those stocks in condition to

fulfill the mission. To assess inventory fill, the rate of fill is compared to

the requirements. These requirements must be valid to achieve a reliable

objective assessment. To assess both inventory levels and maintenance

condition, the services must have reliable information about the on-hand

stocks and their current condition. Other factors affecting the readiness of

the prepositioned stocks are their location, that is, are they close to where

they are needed, and the training of the units to use them. Unless required

stocks are available and in good condition, the purpose of prepositioning

may be defeated because the deploying unit will lose valuable time

repairing or replacing equipment.

To provide a context within which to assess the services’ programs, we

used the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which

suggests that agencies working toward results-oriented management

should take three steps, including (1) defining their mission and

identifying desired outcomes; (2) measuring performance; and (3) using

performance information to improve organizational processes, identify

gaps, and set goals for improvement.

We have published several reports about prepositioning, including three in

1997 about various aspects of the Army’s program.1

 A list of related

reports by GAO and other organizations is at the end of this report.

1

Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets the Army’s Readiness Goal (GAO/NSIAD-97-169, July

23, 1997); Strategic Mobility: Late Deliveries of Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-Off Ships

(GAO/NSIAD-97-150, June 16, 1997); and Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by Aligning

Resources With the Reduced European Mission (GAO/NSIAD-97-158, July 11, 1998).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Army’s

Prepositioning

Program

The Army prepositions materiel for three primary programs: prepositioned

equipment sets, operational projects, and sustainment stocks. This

materiel ranges from Abrams tanks to cold weather clothing. In 1992, the

Army shifted responsibility for managing these stocks, except for medical

items, from its theater commanders to the Army Materiel Command. The

purpose of the shift was to establish a common stockpile of equipment to

support worldwide requirements. According to the Army, the budget for

operating and maintaining its prepositioning programs in fiscal year 1997

was about $536 million.

Prepositioned Equipment

Sets

The Army’s goal for prepositioning is to establish eight brigade sets, seven

of which are fully or partially in place. Each brigade set contains tanks,

Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, trucks, and other rolling stock to

support three or four battalions of Army combat troops, or about 3,000 to

5,000 soldiers. A support battalion is placed with each brigade set to

maintain it and provide other critical support unit equipment. In addition

to the brigade sets, the Army also has a division base set planned for

Southwest Asia, which would provide support equipment for aviation and

other equipment, and an artillery battalion and ammunition in Norway.

Of the seven established brigade sets, six are ashore and one is afloat.

Three of the six ashore are in Europe; the other three are in Kuwait, Qatar,

and Korea. The brigade set afloat is being placed on a fleet of ships being

bought for prepositioning purposes. The eighth brigade set, approved in

mid-1998 by DOD, is to be placed afloat in 2001. This brigade set will be

smaller than the others and is designed to complement equipment already

afloat. Table 1.1 shows the location of and major combat systems in each

brigade set.

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Army Brigade Sets, by Region, and Their Authorized Major Combat Systems

Region Location Abrams tanks

155 mm

self-propelled

howitzers

Bradley fighting

vehicles M2A2s

Persian Gulf Kuwait 116 18 58

Qatar 116 18 58

Pacific Korea 116 18 68

Europe Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg (2 sets) 232 36 116

Italy 116 18 124

Afloat Split between Guam/Saipan, Diego Garcia, and the

Persian Gulf

123 18 116

Total 819 126 540

Source: U.S. Army Materiel Command.

Operational Projects Operational projects provide equipment and other items for specific

missions. Prepositioned materiel for these projects includes equipment

and supplies that are not usually maintained by units. For example, some

projects provide petroleum distribution and water systems, aircraft

landing mats, and bridges. Projects can contain a single type of materiel,

such as aircraft landing mats, or hundreds of different items such as hot

and cold weather clothing. Of the 15 operational projects authorized, 10

are prepositioned on ships or outside the United States. These projects are

lower in priority for funding than the prepositioned brigade sets.

Sustainment Stocks Sustainment stocks are intended to provide consumable supplies and

support troops by repairing and replacing equipment that is damaged or

lost during a conflict until resupply lines are opened. They include items

from almost all classes of supply, including meals, clothing, petroleum,

barbed wire, ammunition, tanks, trucks, medical supplies, and repair parts.

Major items such as tanks and trucks are authorized only to support

operational plans for the Persian Gulf and Korea. Other stocks are stored

afloat and on land and can be used to support any scenario. These stocks

are among the lowest in priority for prepositioning funding.

Other Prepositioned Army

Stocks

The Army owns and controls reserve materiel that is excess to U.S. needs

and may be turned over to allies during a crisis. This materiel is located

primarily in Korea, Israel, and Thailand. Initiated in 1972, the materiel in

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Introduction

Korea now includes over 550,000 short tons of ammunition and some older

equipment that would normally be disposed of through foreign military

sales or other means. The materiel in Thailand and Israel consists

primarily of ammunition, but in much smaller amounts than that in Korea.

The Air Force’s

Prepositioning

Program

The Air Force prepositioning program includes bare base sets; vehicles;

munitions; and a variety of consumable stocks such as rations, fuel

support equipment, aircraft accessories, and medical supplies. These

programs are to initiate and maintain flight operations until supply

channels can be established. The prepositioning programs of the Air Force

are managed regionally. According to the Air Force, the budget for

operating and maintaining these programs in fiscal year 1997 was about

$72 million.

Bare Base Sets The Air Force’s bare base program comprises air transportable sets of

equipment to be used to quickly establish or augment air bases worldwide

in support of combat forces and aircraft. Each location must have minimal

infrastructure such as usable runways, taxiways, parking areas, and a

source of water that can be made drinkable. Equipment in the sets

includes tents for troops, latrines, kitchens, aircraft hangars, maintenance

shops, generators, and environmental control systems. These sets are

especially critical in austere environments, such as the Persian Gulf, where

they would provide the bulk of living and working facilities at several

planned operating locations. Figure 1.1 shows a bare base facility that is

set up in Bahrain.

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Introduction

Figure 1.1: Air Force Bare Base Set in

Use in Bahrain

Source: GAO.

The bare base program is authorized 109 prepositioned bare base

equipment sets worldwide. The bare base sets designated for the Persian

Gulf, called Harvest Falcon, includes 93 sets of prepositioned materiel.

The Air Force said that for this program, it requires bare base facilities to

house 55,000 personnel and support over 800 aircraft at 15 different

locations in the Persian Gulf region. The Air Force established the number

of sets in the late 1980s, and it has remained constant since then. The bare

base sets designated for Europe and Korea, called Harvest Eagle, includes

8 sets each authorized for Europe and Korea. These sets are designed for

more temperate climates, and augment existing base facilities. Each set

provides living facilities for 550 personnel.2

Vehicles The Air Force prepositions a wide variety of vehicles worldwide, including

general purpose vehicles such as trucks and buses and special purpose

vehicles such as materiel-handling and fire-fighting vehicles. These

vehicles, particularly special purpose vehicles, are critical to the Air

Force’s ability to generate combat sorties and sustain flight operations.

Requirements for the program are established based on the number of

2

This does not include 12 sets for Harvest Falcon and 8 for Harvest Eagle, which are authorized for

storage at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, because they are not prepositioned.

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Introduction

aircraft and personnel that will be deployed to each operating location. To

establish the requirement, the Air Force reviews the operational plan for

each location and calculates how many vehicles would be needed to

support the plan. According to Air Force guidance, this requirement is

then to be reduced by the number of vehicles that the Air Force can obtain

from the host nation or through local purchases. Funding for the vehicles

program has in recent years been a low priority, and the Air Force has

been operating with some equipment that was purchased during the Cold

War.

Other Prepositioned Air

Force Stocks

The Air Force prepositions a wide variety of other materiel at different

locations worldwide. This materiel includes fuels; rations; medical

equipment; and expendable aircraft equipment such as fuel tanks, racks,

adapters, and pylons.

The Air Force also prepositions munitions on land and on three ships,

where it can provide maximum flexibility to support the two-war

scenario—in the Persian Gulf and Korea. Two of the ships are located in

the Indian Ocean; the other is in the Mediterranean Sea. The Air Force

used some of these stocks during Operation Desert Storm to support its

requirements. In 1996, DOD’s Inspector General found that the Air Force

munitions afloat program was well managed.3

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Senate

Committee on Armed Services, we assessed the readiness of

prepositioning programs. Specifically, we examined (1) the basis for

program requirements and (2) the rates of inventory fill and maintenance

condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data.

Our review included the prepositioning programs of the Army, the Navy,

the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. We concentrated our efforts on the

Army’s brigade set, operational projects, and sustainment programs and

the Air Force’s bare base and vehicle programs because of concerns that

emerged about the sufficiency, condition, and management of these

programs. We describe the Navy and the Marine Corps prepositioning

programs in appendix I. We gathered information on, but did not review,

the programs of the Defense Logistics Agency, which manages food and

bulk fuel to meet requirements of the services.

3

Equipment Pre-positioned Afloat, Department of Defense Inspector General (97-054, Dec. 20, 1996).

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To determine the basis for program requirements, we reviewed

requirements documents and processes for each program to see whether

they reflected current war-fighting needs and were based on sound

analysis. We discussed the validity of program requirements with officials

from the services and the unified commanders and obtained the results of

recent or ongoing reviews of requirements. We reviewed the results of the

Bottom-Up Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and recent mobility

studies to determine the basis for the brigade sets, and we discussed the

need for the European brigade sets with officials from the Army, Joint

Staff, and U.S. European Command. For the Army’s operational projects

program, we reviewed the documents authorizing each project, if

available, and gathered information about the Army’s ongoing efforts to

revalidate the projects. For the Army’s sustainment program, we discussed

the models used by the Army to determine requirements and gathered

information about the Army’s ongoing efforts to improve the inputs to

these models. For the Air Force bare base and vehicle program, we

reviewed requirements documents and discussed how required levels

were determined with cognizant Air Force officials. We reviewed the

process the Air Force uses to determine the gross requirements to support

operational plans and obtained information about the Air Force’s efforts to

determine what host nation support will be available at planned operating

locations.

To determine the rates of inventory fill, we compared inventory

information from service managers to program requirements. To

determine the condition of prepositioned material, we reviewed available

maintenance reports used by the services to measure condition. We also

examined the physical condition of stored materiel in prepositioning sites

in Korea, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and

the Netherlands. To selectively verify the maintenance condition reported

by the services, we reviewed the maintenance records for judgmentally

selected pieces of equipment, as well as summary reports, data, and

maintenance plans available at the prepositioning sites we visited. We

reviewed formal readiness reports from the Status of Resources and

Training System, if available, to determine the readiness ratings assigned

to the prepositioned stocks. We discussed reporting processes and data

reliability with responsible officials in the services and with the unified

commanders.

To determine the impact of reported shortfalls and obtain a broad

perspective on the readiness of prepositioned stocks, we reviewed joint

monthly readiness reports provided by the services and unified

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Introduction

commanders and recent quarterly reports to the Congress. We also

interviewed officials of the Central Command, the European Command,

the Pacific Command, and U.S. Forces, Korea to obtain their views

regarding the sufficiency of prepositioned stocks to execute operational

plans. We did not do a detailed assessment of medical stocks or munitions.

We obtained information, documents, and perspectives from headquarters

officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the

four services. We obtained information from Army officials at the

following locations:

• the U.S. Army Materiel Command;

• the U.S. Army War Reserve Support Command and its subordinate

commands in the Netherlands, Korea, Qatar, and Charleston, South

Carolina;

• the Army Materiel Support Analysis Activity;

• the U.S. Army, Central Command;

• the U.S. Army, Pacific Command; and

• the Eighth U.S. Army and selected subordinate commands in Korea.

We obtained information from Air Force officials at the following

locations:

• the Air Combat Command;

• the U.S. Air Force, Central Command;

• the U.S. Air Forces in Europe; and

• the U.S. Air Force, Pacific Command, and its subordinate command in

Korea.

We obtained information from Navy officials at the Naval Facilities

Engineering Command, the Military Sealift Command, and the Naval

Supply Command Fleet Hospital Program Organization. We also obtained

information from Headquarters Marine Corps officials.

To provide a context within which to assess the services’ programs, we

used the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which

suggests that agencies working toward results-oriented management

should take three steps, including (1) defining their mission and

identifying desired outcomes; (2) measuring performance; and (3) using

performance information to improve organizational processes, identify

gaps, and set goals for improvement. These steps are suggested in our

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Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance

and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June, 1996).

We built on our past reports and reviewed reports of the Congressional

Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and DOD and service

auditors. We discussed these reports with responsible service officials but

did not verify the findings of other organizations.

We performed our review between September 1997 and October 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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Questionable Requirements, and Some Have

Limited Readiness Reporting

The Army has poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable

requirements that limited our ability to provide reliable composite

readiness assessments for the Army’s three major prepositioning

programs. Within the Army’s high priority brigade set program, overall

readiness was difficult to assess due to questions about European brigade

set requirements. The Army’s brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and

afloat reflect the current two-war strategy, but Army officials have

expressed a need to reevaluate the requirements for three brigade sets in

Europe. Despite concerns about overall brigade set program requirements,

we were able to assess the readiness of the individual sets. The Kuwait set

is currently at a high, stable level of readiness. The readiness of the afloat,

Korea, and Qatar sets is improving, and despite present shortages these

sets could provide a significant combat capability, if needed. Readiness is

declining in the European sets, and the Army has no immediate plans to

fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to support

troops in, or returning from, Bosnia.

Army’s managers lack the critical information that they need to effectively

administer the operational projects and sustainment stock programs. Our

readiness assessments of these programs were hindered by both

requirements and inventory reporting problems. Requirements for most of

the Army’s operational projects were outdated, and the Army was working

to revalidate the requirements. However, revalidation dates for many

projects had slipped, and requirements were still questionable for one

project that had been revalidated. Inputs were being updated for one of

the Army’s sustainment requirement models, but valid requirements were

not expected until the spring of 1999. In addition, inventory summary

reports for both the operational projects and sustainment stock programs

were incomplete or unreliable. The Army has recognized these problems

with its programs and has begun taking steps to correct them, but it may

be several years before the problems are fully resolved and it can reliably

assess the readiness of its prepositioning programs.

Requirements for

Brigade Sets in

Europe Are

Questionable, and

Capabilities Among

All Sets Vary

The Army’s positioning of brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat

reflects DOD’s current two-war strategy. However, the requirement for

three brigade sets in Europe is questionable. We found wide variations in

the readiness of the individual brigade sets, but each is intended to provide

a fully outfitted combat brigade within a few days. The readiness of each

brigade set reflects the Army’s priorities and ranges from high in Kuwait to

low in Europe. The high readiness of the brigade set in Kuwait reflects its

importance in the Persian Gulf region, whereas the sets in Europe are not

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Limited Readiness Reporting

combat ready, reflecting the Army’s low priority for those sets. Despite the

differences in its sets, the Army has established standard issuance

procedures, timelines, maintenance requirements, and readiness reporting

requirements to ensure that its brigade sets are available and in good

condition. It reports the readiness of these sets through the Status of

Resources and Training System. Recently, the Army said that it has

insufficient funds to properly maintain the seven brigade sets currently

fielded and that as a result maintenance is being deferred and issue times

could increase. In addition, the Army noted that it has insufficient funds to

properly care for the additional eighth set planned to be put afloat in 2001.

We could not validate the Army’s statement due to questions about the

requirements for the three sets in Europe.

The Brigade Set in Kuwait

Is Ready for Combat

The brigade set in Kuwait has almost all its required equipment and spare

parts on hand and maintenance condition levels are high, according to

recent Army readiness reports. Thus, this set is at a high level of readiness.

Three unique circumstances enhance the readiness of the Kuwait set.

First, the Kuwait set is kept ready to be issued with only a few hours

notice, and it is never placed in long-term storage like the other sets.

Second, exercises that use approximately one-third of the brigade set

equipment are conducted on an almost continual basis and result in welldefined procedures for issuing the equipment. Third, the Kuwaiti

government pays for most of the costs of this set—approximately

$60 million annually, according to Army officials in Kuwait. Kuwait pays

for all maintenance and operation costs associated with this set, including

lease costs at the storage site, repair part costs, and the salaries of over

700 contractor maintenance personnel and hundreds of other support

personnel. The Kuwaiti government has also agreed to pay for extensive

military construction projects. The Army pays the vast majority of costs

for its other brigade sets.

Recent exercises have confirmed the readiness of the Kuwait brigade set.

For example, of the 1,700 pieces of prepositioned equipment issued to

Army troops deployed to Kuwait in February 1998, only 4 pieces did not

work properly, according to Army and maintenance contractor officials.

And in May 1998, additional forces arriving in Kuwait unloaded their

planes, drew materiel from the prepositioning site, and moved to the field

within 16 hours; one unit made it in about 10 hours.

During our May 1998 visit to Kuwait, unit personnel training with the

brigade set told us that the equipment was in good condition when it was

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issued to them in February 1998 and that they had maintained 95 percent

or more of the equipment in operational condition during each month of

their deployment. They also said that the deployment had offered

excellent, realistic training opportunities unavailable at their home bases.

Figure 2.1 shows soldiers using brigade set equipment for training in

Kuwait in May 1998.

Figure 2.1: Unit Training With Army

Brigade Set Equipment in Northern

Kuwait

Source: GAO.

The Brigade Set Afloat Is

Improving as New Ships

Are Delivered and

Equipment Is Repaired

Until recently, the brigade set on ships lacked equipment, and some of the

equipment on hand was in poor condition. However, among its combat

brigade sets, the Army views the afloat set as its most important due to its

ability to quickly deploy to any conflict area. The Army has been steadily

filling equipment shortages and repairing equipment within this set. By the

end of 1998 the Army expects the set to have over 99 percent of its

principal weapons systems and critical equipment on hand. The set will

still have small shortages of some support equipment, but the equipment

on hand should remain in good condition. As a result, this set should

report a high readiness level by the end of the year.

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Limited Readiness Reporting

In 1995, the Army Inspector General reported that maintenance standards

had not been enforced when the brigade set equipment was initially loaded

on Ready Reserve Force ships.1

 We reported in 1997 that about

one-quarter of the set’s reportable units were not capable of fully

performing their missions according to the Army’s standards.2

 Since then,

the Army has taken equipment off the Ready Reserve Force ships;

repaired, maintained, or replaced the equipment; and then loaded it on

large, medium-speed, roll-on, roll-off ships specifically designed to carry

prepositioned equipment. In May 1998, the last Ready Reserve Force ship

containing brigade set equipment unloaded its cargo. The Army plans to

repair or replace this equipment and load it, with additional parts and

equipment, onto the U.S. naval ship Watson, a new large, medium-speed,

roll-on, roll-off ship. According to Army managers, when the Watson is

fully loaded in fall 1998, all of the afloat brigade set equipment will have

completed its initial repair cycle, and most major equipment shortages will

be filled. However, fill rates for repair parts are expected to remain below

60 percent and will be the largest remaining concern for this brigade set.

Although the brigade set is expected to be fully capable before the end of

the year, the five ships carrying the brigade set are just a portion of the

Army’s afloat prepositioning program. Seven additional ships are currently

in the fleet, and the Army plans to eventually use 15 ships to carry

prepositioned materiel. The additional ships carry operational projects and

sustainment items.

Brigade Set in Korea Is

Improving but Concerns

Remain

The brigade set in Korea has most of its required equipment, and

maintenance conditions are high, according to recent Army readiness

reports. Thus, the Army reports that this set is at a high level of readiness.

However, the Commander of the U.S. Forces, Korea, described the set as

“not fightable” because it has materiel shortages and has never been

issued and exercised.

Equipment on hand has increased dramatically in the set, from 8.5 percent

in August 1996 to 88 percent in January 1998. Since January, inventory

levels have continued to climb, and critical shortages of armored

vehicle-launched bridges and fuel trucks have been filled. By the summer

of 1998, the Korea brigade set had about 96 percent of its principal

weapons systems and critical equipment on hand. However, the set had

1

Assessment of Army War Reserve Materiel, Department of the Army Inspector General (Oct. 25, 1995).

2

Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets the Army’s Readiness Goal (GAO/NSIAD-97-169, 

July 23, 1997).

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some support equipment shortages and only had about 40 percent of its

required repair parts.

Because the Army accelerated filling the brigade by about 18 months, most

equipment arrived in Korea before storage facilities were completed or

plans were developed for storing, issuing, and maintaining the equipment.

In May 1995, the Army completed its first and largest controlled-humidity

warehouse for prepositioned equipment in Korea. Two more warehouses

were completed in September 1997. These three warehouses were able to

hold the brigade set’s tracked vehicles. However, many of the set’s

wheeled vehicles were stored outside for over a year, awaiting the

scheduled completion of the final two warehouses in the fall of 1998.

Storing vehicles outside results in increased maintenance costs or reduced

maintenance conditions because equipment that is exposed to the

elements must undergo maintenance every 6 months (versus every 4 years

for equipment in controlled humidity warehouses). When the last two

warehouses are finished, maintenance personnel will move equipment

from outside into the warehouses.

While the Army reports the brigade set in Korea at a high state of

readiness, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces, Korea, said that he will

not consider this set ready to fight until it is as ready as the brigade set in

Kuwait. In the fall of 1998, a portion of the set will be issued for the first

time for an exercise called Foal Eagle. This exercise should provide the

Commander in Chief some measure of the set’s capabilities and limitations

as well as a measure of the time required to issue the set. An officer from

the unit scheduled to use the equipment during Foal Eagle said that he had

inspected the equipment and was pleased with the condition of the

tracked equipment but was concerned about the condition of the vehicles

that had been stored outside.

Army Is Awaiting

Construction of New

Facilities Before

Completing the Qatar

Brigade Set

As of August 1998, the Army had not completed the prepositioning of its

brigade set in Qatar, and the set still had significant shortages of both

equipment and spare parts. According to recent Army readiness reports,

maintenance conditions are generally high for equipment on hand, but

shortages of major equipment still exist. In addition, dead batteries in

some of the on-hand equipment may delay its issuance.

In January 1996, the Army began fielding the Qatar brigade set. It shipped

equipment for the first battalion task force to Qatar and placed it in

temporary storage facilities. In the fall of 1997, a second battalion task

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force was added. These two shipments provided about two-thirds of the

combat capability of the brigade, but they did not include the equipment

for the forward support battalion, engineer battalion or other support

equipment. Consequently, the overall equipment fill rates for the brigade

remained low. In March 1998, fill rates declined somewhat when 105

vehicles and 24 other major pieces of equipment were transferred from

Qatar to Kuwait to support Operation Desert Thunder. In June 1998, the

set’s overall fill rate was about 28 percent, and repair parts were filled to

about 53 percent.

Although the brigade set is incomplete, Army officials said it could provide

some limited combat capability if needed. On hand are 700 vehicles,

including 88 Abrams tanks and 98 Bradley fighting vehicles. The next

major shipment of equipment, scheduled to arrive in September 1998,

includes major equipment for the brigade’s forward support battalion as

well as repair parts and supplies. According to Army officials, this

shipment will increase the overall fill rate for equipment to 38 percent, and

the fill rate for repair parts will increase to 69 percent. Additional

equipment is scheduled to arrive as facilities are constructed to house the

equipment, and the Army plans to have the entire brigade set in Qatar by

September 1999.

The Army is constructing facilities to store prepositioned equipment on a

262-acre site outside Doha, Qatar. This three-phase project will eventually

provide 2.1 million square feet of storage facilities, consisting mainly of

humidity-controlled warehouses, at a cost of $149 million. The first phase

of the project, which included six warehouses and a maintenance building,

was nearing completion during our visit in June 1998, and the Army

expects to begin storing equipment in the warehouses by the fall of 1998.

While warehouse facilities are being constructed, the on-hand equipment

for the two battalion task forces is being stored in humidity-controlled

bags and tunnels, which protect the equipment and slow deterioration (see

fig. 2.2).

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Figure 2.2: Bags and Tunnels Used for

Temporary Storage of U.S. Army

Prepositioned Equipment in Qatar

Source: GAO.

The condition of the equipment stored in bags and tunnels was generally

good based on our observations and review of equipment records.

However, the bags and tunnels are not air-conditioned, and outside

temperatures of 120 degrees and above had caused the batteries in some

equipment to fail. According to an Army maintenance official in Qatar,

batteries would have to be replaced in at least 75 percent of the first

battalion task force equipment before the equipment could be issued.

Although Army storage procedures call for the removal of batteries,

officials in Qatar were leaving the batteries in the equipment and exploring

maintenance alternatives because, they contended, the removal of

batteries increases the amount of time necessary to issue the equipment.3

The Army currently has batteries in storage in Qatar to replace the

batteries that have failed.

Despite concerns about the batteries, Army leaders in Qatar said the

brigade set could be issued and moved where needed within the time

envisioned by current operational plans. However, these officials doubted

3

Army officials in Korea were also exploring ways to keep batteries in their equipment, but officials in

Europe told us they follow procedures and remove the batteries.

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that the equipment could be issued within the standard brigade set

requirement of 4 days, given its storage conditions and the dead batteries.

Requirements for Brigade

Sets in Europe Are

Questionable

The Army faces a difficult set of circumstances in Europe. It has used

equipment from the three brigade sets in Europe to support operations in

Bosnia and other higher priority brigade sets. At the same time, it has

considerable potential excesses—over 50,000 pieces of equipment for

which it has no identified need anywhere in the Army. To complicate

matters, the Army is trying to reduce infrastructure and personnel in

Europe. By 2000, after infrastructure is reduced, the budget requirements

to operate and maintain the three brigade sets in Europe will be about

$65 million, of which $48 million is funded. If a major conflict breaks out

in Korea or the Persian Gulf region, the European brigade sets are likely to

be used much later than those sets on ships or already in the regions.

The European brigade set equipment has been used extensively to support

ongoing operations in Bosnia, but the equipment has never been deployed

in brigade, or even company, sets. As a result, some senior officials from

the Army Materiel Command favor reconfiguring the European brigade

sets into stocks tailored for contingencies. U.S. European Command and

other Army officials told us that these sets are important as a sign of

commitment to allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but none

of these officials could produce a document formalizing this commitment.

In our discussions, Army logistics and operations officials told us that they

need to reevaluate the requirements for the European brigade sets, but

they had not begun any formal process to do so by September 1998.

Readiness of Brigade Sets in

Europe Is Low, and No Fix Is

Projected

Because the Army has transferred much of its European brigade set

equipment to troops in or coming from Bosnia, these sets are no longer

capable as brigade sets and have relatively low readiness ratings. The

Army has no plans to fill equipment shortages until after the return of

equipment from Bosnia, reflecting the relatively low priority given to the

sets.

Between the beginning of Operation Joint Endeavor in 1995 and June of

1998, the Army lent over 7,900 pieces of prepositioned equipment to units

deployed to Bosnia. This equipment included Abrams tanks, Bradley

fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers among other items.

Although this equipment was hundreds of miles away and its condition

was unknown, the Army continued to report the European brigade set

readiness as high because Army policy allowed lent equipment to be

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reported as if it were on hand and serviceable. However, in 1998, the Army

changed its policy and required that equipment be transferred, not lent, to

a gaining unit if the equipment was expected to be issued for more than 6

months. One of the reasons the Army changed its policy was that it was

losing accountability of the equipment in Bosnia. The Army Audit Agency

reported that records did not accurately show the locations and units

having physical custody of lent assets valued at about $165 million.4

 When

we visited Europe in June 1998, 37 percent of the lent equipment had been

returned, but about half of the equipment that was still lent out had not

been properly accounted for. Army officials said they would not issue

additional equipment until the status of all the lent equipment was

resolved, and they expected resolution soon.

The Army expects equipment shortages in the three European brigade sets

to increase in the fall of 1998 because equipment is scheduled to be

transferred to units in Bosnia and units returning to Germany from Bosnia.

The returning units will receive brigade set equipment because they are

leaving their equipment in Bosnia for follow-on forces deploying from the

United States. The brigade set in Italy will provide much of this equipment,

and its inventory levels are projected to drop dramatically by late 1998.

The two central region sets are being tapped as well and are also projected

to have lower inventory levels by the end of 1998.

Because the Army is issuing European brigade set equipment piece by

piece, the sets can have significant shortages of some critical items such

as ambulances and little or no shortages of other items. In June 1998, the

equipment proposed to be transferred in support of operations in Bosnia

included over 16,700 items—62 tracked vehicles, 1,365 wheeled vehicles,

398 trailers, and almost 15,000 pieces of other equipment such as

telephones, antennas, and tool kits. Although much of this equipment has

and will continue to come from the three brigade sets, some requirements

for Bosnia have been met with undesignated equipment that has been

located at the European prepositioning sites since the end of Operation

Desert Storm and the drawdown of U. S. forces in Europe.

The Maintenance Condition of

Prepositioned Stocks Has Been

Poor Since the Drawdown in

Europe

When the Army Materiel Command became responsible for managing the

Army’s prepositioned stocks in Europe beginning in 1993, much of the

equipment was in poor condition. After the Gulf War and during the rapid

drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe, equipment was left in poor condition

and transferred “as is” by units departing Europe (see an example in

fig. 2.3). A primary mission became repairing the equipment and

4

Army Prepositioned Stock Program: Combat Equipment Group-Europe (AA 98-138, Mar. 31, 1998).

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redistributing it to the brigade sets on ships and in Kuwait, Korea, and

Qatar.

Figure 2.3: A High-Mobility,

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Left in

Poor Condition at a Prepositioning Site

in Europe

Source: GAO.

The maintenance condition of some equipment in Europe is still a concern

today. For example, when we visited a prepositioning site in Italy in

February 1998, recently repaired Abrams tanks were stored outside with

very little protection from the weather, even though controlled-humidity

storage bags were available (see fig. 2.4).5

 Officials in Italy acknowledged

that equipment may suffer significant deterioration as a result of exposure

to the weather.6

 Our analysis of their inspection data for several months

between January 1997 and January 1998 supported this: inspectors found

that roughly 30 percent of the equipment stored outside had problems that

would limit the equipment’s ability to perform its intended missions. In

5

When we told Army Materiel Command officials about this, they said they would have the tanks

placed in their bags immediately.

6

The Army sought new facilities for storing this brigade set in the early 1990s, to be funded from North

Atlantic Treaty Organization common funds. However, this request has not been approved, and several

Army officials expressed doubts that the request would ever be approved in light of the recently

announced closures of other prepositioning sites in Europe.

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addition, officials from the Combat Equipment Group-Europe told us that

virtually all the prepositioning sites in Europe have deferred periodic

maintenance on at least some of their equipment to give priority to

maintenance and repair of equipment to be redistributed.

Figure 2.4: U.S. Army Abrams Tanks

Stored Outside in Livorno, Italy

Source: GAO.

Readiness of Other

Army Prepositioning

Programs Cannot Be

Measured Due to a

Lack of Reliable

Information

The readiness of the Army’s operational projects and sustainment stock

programs cannot be reliably measured because managers lack critical

information on them, including valid requirements for equipment. In

implementing GPRA, agencies must clearly define their goals and objectives

and use reliable data to measure performance against those goals and

objectives. Because the Army does not have validated requirements for its

operational projects and sustainment programs, it does not have objective

goals to measure readiness within these programs. The Army is taking

steps to revalidate requirements for these programs, but it has not yet

finished. Even after the Army develops valid requirements, however,

unreliable and missing data concerning inventory fill rates and

maintenance conditions will prevent Army managers from measuring the

readiness of the operational projects and sustainment programs. The Army

recognizes these problems and has begun taking steps to correct them, but

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it may be several years before it can reliably assess the readiness of these

prepositioning programs.

Operational Projects

Program

Revalidation of Operational

Projects Requirements Is Not

Yet Complete

When the Army centralized management of prepositioned materiel at the

Army Materiel Command, 54 worldwide operational projects were

consolidated by functional purpose and mission, and the Army now has 15

operational projects. Ten of these projects have all or a portion of their

stocks prepositioned on ships or at overseas locations (see table 2.1); the

five remaining projects are stored at locations throughout the Continental

United States.

Table 2.1: Prepositioned Operational Projects Locations and Equipment

Project Authorized location Equipment and supplies

Collective support

system

Afloat Bare base life support items, including food, tents, and water supply and waste

disposal equipment; large area maintenance shelters; forklifts; and solar screens

Inland petroleum

distribution system

Afloat,

Europe and

Japan

Equipment to provide forces with petroleum during contingency operations, including

pipelines, fuel storage equipment, pump stations, tool kits, and radios

Water supply support Afloat Distribution equipment for potable water, including well drillers, water chillers, storage

systems, purification equipment, generators, landing craft, and trucks

Port clearance support Afloat Equipment to open and support port entries during contingency operations, including

cranes, barges, jacks, bridges, trestles, forklifts, and generators

Aircraft matting Korea and

Europe

Landing mats to support construction of airstrips during contingency operations

Receiving and staging

materiel

Europe and

Korea

Equipment for receiving and staging troops, including tents, beds, cots, field kitchen

equipment, generators, and trucks

Bridging materiel Europe and

Japan

Equipment to provide road-building and water-crossing capabilities, including rafts,

bridge sets, and trucks

Hot/cold weather

clothing

Europe and

Korea

Hot/cold weather clothing, chemical defense equipment, coveralls, heaters, field gear,

tent repair kits, and battle dress uniforms

Aerial delivery Europe and

Korea

Equipment to air-deliver resupply items to a brigade-sized force, including

parachutes, cargo nets, and rail platforms

Medical materiel

support

Europe, Persian Gulf,

Korea, and Japan

Combat support hospitals, including X-ray apparatus, mobile respirators, operating

tables, sterilizers, cots, blankets, tents, and ambulances

Source: Army Materiel Command.

Officials at the Army Materiel Command and the Office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Logistics have incomplete records documenting the

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consolidation of operational projects and could not say whether

requirements were reviewed when the projects were consolidated.

However, in 1995, an Army Inspector General report described the

operational projects requirements as “old and now potentially invalid.”7

In a 1997 report, the Institute for Defense Analysis criticized the Army

requirements, stating that the requirements process appeared to be

designed more to build a stockpile requirement than to solve problems or

minimize risks.8

 The Institute estimated that requirements for two

operational projects were overstated by $280 million. The Army was

reviewing requirements for both these projects but had not finished by

August 1998.

Army managers are revalidating all operational projects requirements by

asking proponents throughout the world to justify projects; the

justifications are to be reviewed and approved or disapproved at the

Department of the Army staff level. This process was to take place

between July 1997 and September 1998. However, by July 31, 1998, the

Army had completed revalidations for only 5 of the 15 projects, and

revalidation dates had slipped for 7 of the other projects. Under Army

regulation, commands must review their projects yearly and completely

revalidate their projects, updating equipment lists at least once every 

5 years.

Our analysis of the $10.3 billion aircraft matting project, which consists of

metal landing mats used to construct airfields, indicates that the Army may

not have valid requirements even after completing its project revalidations.

The aircraft matting project accounts for 83 percent of the Army’s total

operational projects requirement of $12.4 billion and 87 percent of the

Army’s reported $10.4 billion shortage in operational projects. This was

one of the five projects reported as completely revalidated in 1998.

However, we question the project’s requirements for two reasons. First,

most of the matting sets (160 of 230) are required to support contingencies

in Europe and Africa, not major wars in Korea or the Persian Gulf. While

stocks may be used to support regional contingency plans under the

Army’s policies and procedures, the overarching DOD instruction requires

the services to size their prepositioning programs to meet the demand of

the two-war strategy. Second, officials responsible for the Army’s

operational projects could not supply documentation showing that the

7

Assessment of Army War Reserve Materiel, Department of the Army Inspector General (Oct. 25, 1995).

8

IDA Review of the Army War Reserve Program, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA Paper P-3310,

Apr. 1997).

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combat commanders in Europe had analyzed or otherwise validated this

requirement. Based on our analysis of the aircraft matting requirement, the

Army has considerable work to do to ensure that requirements are valid,

and this may take years.

Reporting System Does Not

Accurately Capture

Requirements, Inventory Data,

or Maintenance Conditions

Although by Army draft regulation operational projects are to be made

visible through the Total Asset Visibility database, Army managers cannot

use this system to effectively oversee the operational projects program.

The system’s summary reports do not capture data on the condition of

operational projects stocks, the inventory data that is captured is

incomplete, and requirements and shortages are quantified only in dollars

or in tons. Thus, neither field personnel nor the Army’s central managers

can use the system to manage operational projects, and they do not know

what inventory is on hand or its condition.

In November 1997, the Army Audit Agency reported that Army managers

did not generally use the Total Asset Visibility system to manage

operational projects stocks.9

 The Agency found that at three locations,

asset balances were not properly reported for stocks worth over

$390 million. Furthermore, users of the systems said that they could not

rely on the system’s summary reports to manage operational projects

because both requirements and inventory data are unreliable. Our review

of system data confirmed the users’ statements: we found wide

discrepancies between system data and figures provided by the Army

Materiel Command. For example, in March 1998, the system showed total

operational project authorizations as $1 billion, or only about 8 percent of

the $12.4 billion reported by the Command. Likewise, the on-hand

inventory for operational projects was only $367 million according to the

system but about $1.966 billion according to the Command. Table 2.2

shows the differences between the Command’s figures and the figures in

the Total Asset Visibility system.

Table 2.2: Comparison of Required

Levels and On-Hand Inventory in Army

Operational Projects Program

Dollars in millions

Operational projects

Total Asset

Visibility System

Army Materiel

Command figure Difference

Required level $1,020 $12,404 $11,384

On-hand inventory $367 $1,966 $1,599

Reported shortfall $653 $10,438 $9,785

Source: March 1998 Total Asset Visibility Report and Army Materiel Command data.

9

Total Asset Visibility - Operational Projects, U.S. Army Audit Agency (AA 98-31, Nov. 17, 1997).

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Another problem with the Total Asset Visibility summary reports is that

they list shortages and on-hand quantities in terms of dollars or tons,

rather than numbers of items. This type of reporting emphasizes heavy and

expensive items. However small, inexpensive items can be just as critical

in a war. For example, gas masks, which are relatively light, may be just as

or more critical than aircraft landing mats, which weigh over 

600,000 pounds per set.

Because the Total Asset Visibility System’s summary reports are suspect

and the system lacks information of the condition of on-hand assets, the

Army’s central managers do not have sufficient information to oversee

operational projects effectively. One manager told us that requirements for

three of the operational projects (petroleum distribution, water

distribution, and collective support) are not in the system and must be

obtained directly from the program managers. Army procedures require

personnel at the operational projects storage locations to provide

quarterly reports on the maintenance condition and fill rates of each

operational project. However, at the time of our review, reporting had not

yet begun.

During our visits to the Army’s prepositioning sites, we examined some

operational project equipment and supplies. In Belgium, for example, we

saw clothing and bridging stocks transfered from a U.S. Army, Europe,

facility in Kaiserslautern, Germany. Maintenance personnel at the site

were sorting the stocks and repairing them, but they did not have

authorization documents and did not know whether the stocks were part

of a validated operational project. In Italy, we found operational project

stocks such as hot and cold weather clothing, vehicles, tents, and

parachutes but no recent authorization documents for them. Site

personnel did not know the maintenance condition of the stocks and said

they were doing no maintenance on them. In Korea, Command personnel

expressed frustration at the poor reporting procedures for the operational

projects program and were concerned about shortages in chemical

defensive equipment within their operational projects.

Sustainment Stock

Program

The Army Has Not Established

Credible Requirements but Has

Reduced Reported Shortages

The Army could not provide reliable requirements for the sustainment

program during our review. The Army is working to resolve requirements

problems but has not yet developed valid requirements for sustainment

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stocks. Army managers have set a goal to have justifiable requirements for

the overall sustainment program by the spring 1999, when they submit the

Army’s next budget request.

Developing sustainment requirements is complicated and involves two

different processes. Using one process and set of computer models, the

Army determines requirements for ammunition and major items such as

tanks and trucks. Using another process and a different set of computer

models, the Army determines requirements for secondary items, including

repair parts and other classes of supply. Sustainment stock requirements

are further complicated because they rely on inputs from entities outside

the Army’s control, namely industrial base companies and foreign host

nations. If industrial base companies or host nations can produce and

deliver equipment and supplies within the Army’s required timelines, the

Army can reduce the amount of sustainment stocks it is required to hold.

Until recently, the sustainment program received relatively little attention

because it was among the Army’s lowest funding priorities. However, the

Army claimed in 1997 that shortages in secondary items created a

significant war-fighting risk. Concerned about this assertion, the Office of

the Secretary of Defense brought in outside contractors to analyze the

Army’s requirements process. In April 1997, the Institute for Defense

Analysis reported that the Army’s requirements appeared to be

significantly overstated because planning factors used in Army models

were inappropriate, obsolete, or incorrect. It estimated that industrial base

and host nation contributions were understated by almost $1 billion.10 In

1998, Coopers & Lybrand reported that although the Army had progressed

since the Institute’s 1997 report, questions remained about model inputs

and requirement offsets based on industrial base and host nation

capabilities.11 The report also identified some shortages that were likely to

be critical in the early phase of a conflict. These shortages included spare

parts for the brigade sets outside Europe and medical items.

Recent Army efforts to refine requirements have reduced the reported war

reserve secondary item shortages to $1.8 billion—a significant reduction

from the $3.1 billion reported in September 1996. The Army has reworked

portions of the process to determine requirements for secondary items,

replacing model inputs that were questioned in the two contractors’

reports. The Army is also trying to update its industrial base information,

10IDA Review of the Army War Reserve Program, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA Paper P-3310,

Apr. 1997).

11Army War Reserve Secondary Items, Coopers & Lybrand (Mar. 31, 1998 and June 11, 1998).

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but a senior official said that response rates to industrial base surveys are

still below 50 percent. The Army disagreed with the contractors’

conclusions that host nation support was understated. Army officials

contend that guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the

Unified Commanders does not require them to offset sustainment

requirements unless a formal, signed host nation support agreement is in

place. Host nation support is a known concern, within both the Army and

the Department of Defense. In fiscal year 1997, the U.S. Central Command

identified the lack of host nation support agreements in the Persian Gulf

and host nation support planning as material weaknesses under the

reporting requirements of the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of

1982, as amended.12

The Army Does Not Have

Reliable Data on Sustainment

Stocks

The Army could not provide us reliable data on the inventory fill and

maintenance condition of sustainment stocks from its reporting systems;

therefore, we could not reliably assess what stocks it had or their

condition.

As with its operational projects, the Army is trying to use its Total Asset

Visibility System to manage sustainment stocks. It uses summary reports

generated from the system, but these reports do not include all stocks on

hand or provide centralized managers with information about the

maintenance condition of stocks. For example, in March 1998, the system

showed that for major equipment, the Army had on hand sustainment

stocks worth $11,000. However, documentation from U.S. Forces, Korea,

showed that its command alone had major equipment sustainment stocks

worth almost $50 million. In addition, the Army Audit Agency recently

reported that prepositioning sites in Europe had $258 million worth of

major equipment that was unneeded in Europe and could be redistributed

to offset reported shortages in the sustainment program.13

12This act requires agencies to report material weaknesses to the President and Congress on an annual

basis until the material weaknesses are corrected. (31 U.S.C. 3512(d).)

13Sustainment Requirements for the Army Prepositioned Stock Program, U.S. Army Audit Agency 

(AA 98-99, Feb. 23, 1998).

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The Air Force does not have precise requirements established for its

prepositioned bare base and vehicle programs. Without this foundation, it

is impossible to reliably assess the impact of reported shortfalls and

maintenance concerns and, thus, the overall readiness of the programs.

The bare base program provides items critical in the Persian Gulf, but

requirements for this program have not been thoroughly updated since the

late 1980s. Because the Air Force has not assessed the infrastructure

available in the region, current requirements are based on worst-case

scenarios that assume the Air Force must provide virtually all of the living

and operating facilities required by deploying forces and will not have any

other sources of supply for housing, food, or laundry requirements.

Similarly, the Air Force has not determined the number of vehicles it can

obtain from host nation sources, a prerequisite for determining precise

requirements. The Air Force is likely overstating requirements, since some

host nation facilities and vehicles will probably be available. In addition,

the Air Force is storing over 900 general purpose and specialty vehicles in

Europe but has no current requirements for these vehicles to be stored

there.

The Air Force used bare base sets heavily during the Gulf War and has

continued that use since the war; however, its efforts to reconstitute the

sets have not kept pace. The Air Force reported in August 1998 that it had

less than one-third of the sets it would need if a major conflict erupts in

the Gulf. The Air Force and U.S. Central Command have expressed

concern about the shortfalls they perceive in the bare base program. In the

vehicle program, the Air Force does not require readiness reporting and

has little comprehensive readiness data. However, the Air Force’s vehicle

fleet is aging, and much of it is in poor maintenance condition. We found

that significant numbers of the vehicles at major storage locations we

visited were not mission capable. The Air Force recognizes that it needs to

reevaluate its prepositioning strategy and improve inventory visibility and

has begun a broad-based study to accomplish this. The results of this study

were not available when we concluded our work, and Air Force officials

told us that it will likely take several years to address the many issues

facing the program.

Air Force Has

Outdated

Requirements for

Bare Base Program

The Air Force has not precisely defined requirements for the bare base

program in the Persian Gulf. Currently, the Air Force plans for a

worst-case scenario for which it must provide virtually all of the facilities

it will need to operate in the Persian Gulf. Current requirements were set

in the late-1980s and have not changed substantially since. Some

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infrastructure, such as barracks and operating facilities, are available in

the Persian Gulf region.

According to its guidance, the Air Force is required to determine what

infrastructure and resources are available at its planned operating

locations, a process called base support planning. Base support plans

cover virtually all functions required to support an air base. These plans

are intended to provide detailed information about air base locations,

including overall layout, aircraft parking plans, host nation support,

available equipment, and prepositioned assets. The Air Force’s plan for

addressing shortfalls in the bare base program notes that base support

plans “must be completed to determine true requirements.” It set

June 1997 as a target date for completion of these plans. However, as of

August 1998, none of the 18 required base support plans had been

completed, though 6 were partially completed, according to U.S. Air Force,

Central Command, officials.

These base support plans are essential in determining precise

requirements, according to Air Force guidance. With the information from

these plans, the Air Force can tailor bare base equipment to meet the

needs at each location. Without them, however, planners have assumed a

worst-case scenario that may provide too much or the wrong type of

capability. Planning for a worst-case scenario may result in significantly

overstated requirements. For example, at some planned operating

locations in the Gulf, the Air Force has bought commercially available

substitutes to replace some Harvest Falcon capabilities, according to

program managers. In Bahrain, we saw trailers that were outfitted with

showers and laundry equipment (that is, washers and dryers); these

semipermanent facilities have been left in place and obviate the need for

similar bare base capabilities. In addition, new housing and other facilities

are being built at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

Air Force officials pointed out that they did not consider base support

plans a panacea for determining requirements but acknowledged the need

to complete them. Officials told us that their efforts to complete base

support plans in the Gulf region had been hampered by access restrictions

imposed by host nations. As noted in chapter 2, host nation support is a

general concern throughout the Gulf. This concern was demonstrated in

fiscal year 1997 when the U.S. Central Command identified host nation

support planning as a material weakness under the reporting requirements

of the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act.

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To effectively implement GPRA, a results-oriented organization should

determine what its programs are intended to accomplish. The Air Force’s

bare base program is generally intended to provide housing for personnel

and equipment to support flight operations in austere locations. The Air

Force mission has changed considerably since the late 1980s, and the Air

Force must also consider how it will operate in the future when

determining its bare base requirements and configurations. According to

U.S. Central Command, the operational plan for the Persian Gulf region is

soon to be revised, which may change the Air Force’s planned operating

locations and thus its bare base requirements. For example, the Air Force

plans to use a large new air base being built by the Qatar government. This

air base will have many permanent facilities, such as barracks, shops, and

hangars, that would normally be taken from bare base stocks, according to

the Air Force. Moreover, the bare base sets were configured during the

Cold War and do not reflect the Air Force’s emerging war-fighting

approach, which involves smaller, more customized air expeditionary

forces. These forces do not deploy with as many aircraft or personnel and

thus may require less support equipment.

Reported Shortages in

the Bare Base

Program Concern War

Fighters

When measured against the Air Force’s existing requirements, the bare

base program shows significant shortages of equipment, particularly the

Harvest Falcon sets designated for the Persian Gulf region. Although the

number of on-hand prepositioned bare base sets has improved

considerably since 1996, the Air Force has less than one-third (29 of 93) of

the sets it currently says are required in the Persian Gulf region for a

worst-case scenario. Generally, bare base sets are intended to be stored

until needed for a major conflict; however, many have been used for

contingencies and exercises, and many equipment items from these sets

are being replaced or repaired. Since late 1996, the Air Force has made a

concerted effort to increase the number of bare base sets in storage

through implementation of its bare base “get well” plan. According to the

Air Force, only 2 sets were available in late 1996 when the plan was

established, versus 29 sets in storage today. The plan focused on

improving on-hand levels through reconsititution and acquisition as well

as through revision and enforcement of peacetime use policies, to include

consideration of alternative means of supporting peacetime needs. The

Department of Defense recently approved an additional $71 million, to be

allocated over the next five years, to fix some of the bare base programs

immediate shortfalls. The Air Force estimates that it will still take roughly

9 years and cost about $223 million to rebuild the Harvest Falcon sets,

assuming that peacetime use is stopped.

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Harvest Falcon includes three types of equipment sets: housekeeping (for

example, tents, showers, and latrines), used to house and sustain Air

Force personnel; industrial operations (for example, utility equipment and

civil engineering shop facilities), used to create and sustain air base

infrastructure; and flightline (for example, aircraft maintenance shops and

hangars), used to support flight operations. In total, the Air Force projects

that it needs 93 sets of housekeeping, industrial operations, and flightline

equipment to be prepositioned in theater.1

 All three segments of the

Harvest Falcon program have significant shortages, as shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Shortages in Harvest Falcon

Sets Needed for a Major Conflict in the

Persian Gulf (as of Aug. 1998) Set

Stated

requirement In storage

In usea

or short

Housekeeping 46 16 30

Industrial operations 13 6 7

Flightline 34 7 27

Total 93 29 64

aSets currently in use could be used if a conflict erupted while the sets were erected. However,

most of these sets would require substantial reconstitution before they could be returned to

storage. The Air Force currently has about 14 sets in use.

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

The number of sets in storage is somewhat overstated because the Air

Force considers a set complete if missing components can be airlifted to

the region. For example, the Air Force has counted 16 housekeeping sets

in storage as complete, even though water distribution systems—an

essential housekeeping capability, particularly in the arid Gulf region—are

reported to be stored in the United States. Some Air Force officials

questioned whether the airlift needed to move these systems to the region

would be available during the initial phases of a large-scale conflict. If not,

bare base operations could be delayed significantly. Other critical systems

such as airfield lighting systems and runway repair kits are also in short

supply and would either need to be airlifted or bought locally.

The U.S. Central Command has raised concerns about these shortfalls in

the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, a monthly report in which the

command assesses its preparedness. Central Command views bare base

shortages as a predominant prepositioning concern in the theater. These

1

The Air Force determined that an additional 12 sets are to be stored at Holloman Air Force Base, New

Mexico. These sets are intended for use in the Persian Gulf region but are not prepositioned.

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concerns have been mentioned in the Quarterly Readiness Report to the

Congress, a process that we reported on earlier this year.2

The impact of these reported shortages proved difficult to pinpoint.

Although of concern to the combat commanders, these shortages are not

viewed as insurmountable because alternate means for housing personnel

may be available. According to Air Force and U.S. Central Command

officials, shortages would likely force the Air Force to house personnel

outside of bare base facilities, raising force protection concerns. Since the

1996 terrorist bombing in Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia force

protection issues have been a paramount concern in the region. Without

sufficient bare base equipment, airmen could be housed at host nation

facilities (for example hotels, barracks, and apartments), rather than at

bare base locations where special security precautions can be provided.

The Air Force and U.S. Central Command could not be specific about the

impact of the shortages mainly because base support plans have not been

completed to determine what infrastructure is available, and they have no

plan to mitigate the impact of these shortages should a large-scale

contingency arise.

Although shortages also exist in the Harvest Eagle program, the Air Force

does not consider these to be as severe as the shortfalls in the Harvest

Falcon program. The Harvest Eagle program is authorized 16

prepositioned sets to be split equally in Korea and Europe.3

 In Europe,

three of eight sets are not mission capable. However, these shortages do

not have a severe impact, according to the Air Force, because the

European sets would likely be used much later in a major conflict than the

sets located in Korea or the Persian Gulf. In Korea, all eight sets are

considered mission capable. The U.S. Air Forces, Pacific, has raised

concerns, however, about the advancing age of those sets and low funding.

Peacetime Use Is

Outpacing Efforts to

Rebuild the Bare Base

Program

Since the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force has repeatedly used its bare base

sets to support numerous contingencies and exercises in that region. The

heavy use of these sets during the last few years has outpaced efforts to

repair and rebuild the sets. Efforts to restrict use of the bare base assets

have been frustrated by continuing activities in the region. As of

August 1998, approximately 14 sets were in use at locations throughout the

2

Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and Solutions

(GAO/NSIAD-98-68, Mar. 30, 1998).

3

The Air Force has authorized eight additional Harvest Eagle sets to be stored at Holloman Air Force

Base, New Mexico. These sets are intended to be used to support contingencies in the Pacific or

elsewhere.

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Gulf region. Nine of these sets are in use at Prince Sultan Air Base, where

the Air Force relocated its forces following the bombing of Khobar

Towers.

Since the Gulf War, items have been taken from the bare base sets to

support a large number of contingencies and exercises. In 1992, bare base

equipment was used to support two operations—Joint Endeavor in Bosnia

and Provide Comfort in Iraq. In 1996, it was used to support 22 exercises

and contingencies, ranging from the Dhahran bombing to Operation

Desert Strike. Certain key items, such as tents, generators, and air

conditioners, have been used the most and replaced most frequently. For

example, between January 1996 and April 1998, more than 3,000 tents and

nearly 4,500 air conditioning units—about the number required for 27 and

30 complete housekeeping sets, respectively—were deployed from storage

locations in Oman and Bahrain to locations throughout the theater. At

Prince Sultan Air Base alone, approximately 3,000 air-conditioning units

are currently either in use or have been designated as backup units.

Equipment from these operations has often been returned in poor

condition and has required significant repairs, according to program

managers. In a recently issued report, the Air Force Inspector General

noted that prepositioned equipment was generally treated as a disposable,

one-time use commodity, and that user attitudes had often led to

equipment abuses.4

 The contractor conducting reconstitution of Air Force

equipment in the Gulf region told us that efforts to reconstitute assets and

move them into storage to meet prepositioning objectives have been

frustrated by the Air Force’s continuing heavy use of these assets. 

Figure 3.1 shows Harvest Falcon equipment before shipment compared to

similar containers of equipment returned from a deployment.

4

Worldwide War Reserve Materiel (WRM), Air Force Inspector General Documented Briefing

(PN 97-701, June 8, 1998).

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Figure 3.1: Harvest Falcon Equipment

Before Shipment Compared to Similar

Containers of Equipment Returned

From Deployment

Source: GAO

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Bare base equipment was originally intended to be used as temporary

facilities for short durations; however, much of this equipment has been

used repeatedly and for long periods of time. For example, at Prince

Sultan Air Base, bare base equipment has been in use for nearly 2 years. In

the fall 1998, the Air Force is planning to move its personnel from tents

into permanent buildings. According to the contractor responsible for

reconstituting the assets at this location, many of the tents will be

condemned. During a preliminary inspection in April 1998, they estimated

that over 530 tents (about 68 percent) could not be reconstituted due to

dry rot and general deterioration.

According to Air Force Instruction 25-101, bare base sets are to be held in

reserve for war and used only as a last resort for exercises and

contingencies. This instruction encourages Air Force managers to identify

and use alternative sources for bare base equipment to help ensure that it

will be available should a major contingency arise. The instruction further

states that the use of bare base equipment should be severely limited,

since extended use reduces life expectancy and these assets need to be

available to support operational plans. Concerned about the heavy use and

degraded inventories, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command,

wrote a February 1997 message urging that the “use of these assets move

from an option of first choice for exercises and peacetime operations to an

option of last resort.” The Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force issued a

similar message in December 1997 stating that “bare base assets should be

reserved for major theater wars” and that “alternative sources should be

used to meet peacetime requirements.”

The Air Force has recently begun to explore the use of commercial

sources to support future exercises in the region. In the past, this option

was dismissed because it was perceived that using commercial sources

would be more expensive and less responsive than using existing bare

base assets. In 1997, for example, the Air Force considered using

contracted equipment for an exercise called Bright Star. They concluded

that it would be much more expensive to use commercial sources than

existing bare base equipment. The Air Force calculated that it would cost

approximately $1.7 million to use existing bare base equipment compared

to approximately $10.5 million to obtain this equipment through a

commercial source. The Air Force is currently examining the use of

commercial sources to provide support for the next Bright Star exercise,

which is scheduled for 2000. No agreement has been reached, but officials

are considering several options that would make commercial sources

more attractive. These options include purchasing or leasing equipment

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such as tents, latrines, and showers that could be reused to support future

exercises.

The Air Force Has Not

Determined Valid

Requirements for the

Vehicle Program

The Air Force has not precisely defined requirements for its prepositioned

vehicle program. Requirements in the Persian Gulf do not factor in host

nation support, and requirements for Europe are based on outdated Cold

War plans.

The Air Force recognizes that it needs to refine its requirements for the

vehicle program and has been working toward this. By late 1997, the Air

Combat Command had determined the gross number of prepositioned

vehicles it believes will be needed to support a major war in the Persian

Gulf region. This worst-case assessment assumes no host nation support.

The Air Force has not yet determined how many vehicles would be

available from host nation sources, which will offset the number of

vehicles that the Air Force must supply. This is part of the base support

planning process. This information would be helpful in determining what

vehicle requirements could be met by host nation sources. Like the bare

base program, the Air Force needs to consider changes to operational

plans and the move toward smaller expeditionary force deployments

because these will likely change the number of vehicles required in the

prepositioning program.

The Air Force also has not defined requirements for prepositioned

vehicles in Europe. The current requirement in Europe is outdated and is

based on Cold War plans. As a result, at one location in Europe, the Air

Force is storing and maintaining over 900 vehicles that may no longer be

needed or that could be used elsewhere in the Air Force. Since no major

conflict is envisioned in Europe, Air Force officials do not believe they will

need a large number of vehicles there. Air Force officials told us that some

vehicles may be needed to augment vehicle stocks elsewhere or to help

move personnel, equipment, and supplies through European air bases to

potential conflict areas. However, many of these vehicles, especially

general purpose vehicles such as trucks and buses, are old and some are

obsolete. Figure 3.2 shows vehicles in Europe awaiting disposition

decisions.

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Figure 3.2: Vehicles Awaiting

Disposition Decisions at European

Storage Site

Source: GAO.

In recent years, the Air Force has sought in some locations to obtain

vehicles from host nation sources or to lease vehicles when possible. In

Korea, for example, the U.S. Air Forces, Pacific, is relying heavily on host

nation support to provide general purpose vehicles for the prepositioning

program. Air Force managers are concerned, however, that leasing

vehicles will not solve the problems within the prepositioning program,

since even general purpose vehicles may not be readily available in some

areas outside of the United States. This is particularly the case in the

Persian Gulf, where Air Force managers are concerned that leasing

vehicles could be significantly more expensive than purchasing them.

Based on experience, some support by host nations is likely. During the

Gulf War, allies provided thousands of general purpose vehicles for use by

U.S. forces, according to the Air Force.

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Air Force Has Little

Reliable Data to

Measure Vehicle

Program Readiness

In addition to our concerns about the requirements underpinning the

program, we found that the Air Force has little reliable data with which to

measure the readiness of its vehicle program. The Air Force could not tell

us precisely how many vehicles it had on hand worldwide or what

condition these vehicles were in, and readiness is not routinely reported.

In implementing GPRA, the Air Force must have reliable data—like

inventory fill and maintenance condition—with which to measure the

performance of its prepositioned vehicle program.

In 1996, the Air Force Inspector General reported that the Air Force did

not have an accurate accounting of the prepositioned vehicles in the

Persian Gulf. In June 1998, officials from the Air Combat Command

conducted physical inventories to determine how many and what type of

vehicles were actually on hand. One Air Force manager estimated that it

might take as much as a year to manually load this information into Air

Force systems. Until that time, the Air Force will be unable to accurately

assess its inventory levels in the Persian Gulf.

The Air Force could not provide detailed information on the condition of

its prepositioned vehicles. Thus, it is difficult to assess readiness

comprehensively. However, much of the Air Force’s vehicle fleet is aging

and in poor condition. In July 1996, the Air Force Inspector General

reported that prepositioned vehicles were aging and that a high number of

them were not mission capable at some locations.5

 Our examination of

vehicles at storage locations we visited indicated that the condition of the

vehicles is similar today. During our field visits, we found large numbers of

vehicles that were not mission capable. Air Force managers noted that

many vehicles are old, have surpassed the end of their projected service

life, and are difficult to maintain. Furthermore, Air Force officials told us

that vehicles have received a relatively low priority for funding due to a

concern that considerable excesses existed throughout the Air Force after

the Cold War.

Vehicles Prepositioned in

Persian Gulf Region

In the Gulf region, the Air Force’s contractor reported that 977 of the 2,414

vehicles (40 percent) at major storage locations in Oman and Bahrain were

not mission capable. About 13 percent were in use. (See fig. 3.3.) These

figures represent the vehicles managed by the Air Force’s contractor in

Oman and Bahrain but do not represent all vehicles in the Gulf region.

5

Functional Management Review: Management of War Reserve Materiel Vehicles and Support

Equipment, Air Force Inspector General (PN 96-607, July 29, 1996).

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Figure 3.3: Mission-Capability Rates

for Prepositioned Vehicles in Oman

and Bahrain (as of July 1998) Nonmission Capable

Mission Capable

In Use or Deployed

977

313

1,124

Source: GAO analysis of contractor data.

The Air Force’s largest storage area in the Persian Gulf region is in

Thumrait, Oman. At Thumrait, the Air Force stores over 1,700 of the

vehicles depicted in figure 3.3. Over 40 percent of these vehicles were not

mission capable as of July 1998. Officials estimated that it would take 2 to

3 years to repair the vehicles if there are no further deployments. Most

vehicles are stored outside because the site does not have covered storage

facilities. This exposes vehicles to the extreme heat and blowing sand of

the Omani desert. During our visit, we found numerous vehicles with

heat-related damage, including damaged windshields and blown tires.

Figure 3.4 shows an example of damage caused by lack of storage facilities

combined with extreme desert conditions.

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Figure 3.4: Air Force Truck With

Exploded Tire, in Storage at Thumrait,

Oman

Source: GAO.

Even if the vehicles were mission capable, the storage site is several hours

from the nearest port, and it would likely take weeks to move the vehicles

from Thumrait to operating locations throughout the region. This may

defeat the basic purpose of the program, which is to locate this equipment

where it can be drawn quickly when needed. When vehicles are stored in

centralized storage locations like Thumrait and not at the locations where

they will be used, a plan for moving the vehicles quickly to their operating

locations is needed. The Air Force, however, has not developed plans for

moving the vehicles it has in theater to their planned operating locations.

Moving these assets to their final operating locations is likely to be chaotic

and prolonged, even with a plan, according to Air Force managers.

Thumrait is located in a remote area of Oman that presents considerable

challenges to moving vehicles to their eventual operating locations. The

site is about 4 hours from the nearest port by mountainous roads. During

the 3- to 4-month monsoon season, this road can be nearly impassable, and

transporting vehicles could take even longer. In the event of a major

conflict, quickly moving over 1,700 vehicles from this site would pose a

significant challenge and is a concern to Air Force officials.

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Vehicles stored in other locations in the Gulf are also in poor condition. In

an open storage location near Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the

Air Force has stored about 840 vehicles for several years without

conducting maintenance, sheltering them from the elements, or

establishing accountability. Many of the vehicles were left at this location

in 1995 and are in poor condition, according to Air Force officials. In

mid-1998, the Air Force estimated that about 600 of these vehicles could

be salvaged. The Air Force is currently working to have these vehicles

repaired and moved into storage at other locations in the region. The cost

or time required to repair these vehicles has not been fully determined.

The remaining vehicles, about 240, are not salvageable and have been, or

will be, discarded.

In some cases, maintenance problems have hampered deploying unit

operations. For example, a unit that deployed in mid-1997 to an operating

location in Bahrain found that 37 of the 130 vehicles (28 percent) they

were issued from prepositioned stocks were not mission capable. Some of

these vehicles were critical to generating combat sorties, for example,

refueling trucks and aircraft towing vehicles, and needed immediate repair

before they were used. Problems ranged from damaged tires to bad brakes

and other major mechanical defects. These vehicles had been reported as

mission capable when issued to the deploying unit. According to the

inspection report of the incident, operations were hampered while unit

maintenance personnel repaired the vehicles.

Heavy peacetime use of war reserve vehicles to support operations has

also contributed to condition problems. According to the Air Force’s

contractor in the Gulf region, Airwork Vinnell, keeping pace with the

constant requests for prepositioned vehicles is extremely difficult.

Representatives told us that once they repair vehicles, many of them are

shipped elsewhere in the theater to support ongoing operations. They ship

vehicles that are in the best working condition, leaving

nonmission-capable vehicles behind at the storage locations. This

frustrates their efforts to improve mission-capable rates. Also, vehicles

that are returned after deployment are often in poor condition and require

significant repairs before they can be restored to mission-capable status.

Sometimes, vehicles are cannibalized and are returned missing significant

parts, like the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles shown in

figure 3.5. During a recent review of the prepositioning storage sites, Air

Force vehicle managers noted that some vehicles had been returned to the

storage locations in unrepairable condition.

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Figure 3.5: High-Mobility, Multipurpose

Wheeled Vehicles Returned From

Bright Star Exercise to Thumrait,

Oman

Source: Airwork Vinnell.

Vehicles Prepositioned in

Pacific and European

Regions

In the Pacific, the Air Force reports that it has over 2,500 vehicles

prepositioned. Officials from the U.S. Air Forces, Pacific, told us that their

vehicle program had experienced significant maintenance problems during

the early 1990s but was improving due to concerted efforts throughout the

theater. Vehicle storage and maintenance problems currently exist in some

locations in the Pacific. Air Force officials reviewed operations at each

base in the Pacific region in November 1997 and in a report of this visit

cited improvements but also significant storage and maintenance

problems at some locations. For example, at Osan Air Base, Korea,

problems with the 350-vehicle fleet included (1) delayed maintenance on

some vehicles due to lack of orders to initiate the work, (2) improper

storage practices and unreported damage, and (3) heavy use of the

prepositioned vehicles to augment the peacetime fleet at this location. The

report also raised vehicle maintenance as a problem area at Kunsan Air

Base, Korea. During our review, no maintenance contract had been

secured for the site, and the lack of local, trained mechanics as well as

extensive peacetime use of these vehicles were noted as negatively

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affecting the program. A contractor is scheduled to begin maintenance at

this site starting in October 1998, according to the Air Force.

In Europe, the Air Force has stored most of its war reserve vehicles at a

warehouse facility in Sanem, Luxembourg. This location holds the

majority of the vehicles stored in Europe and provides humidity-controlled

storage. According to Air Force officials at the site, many of these vehicles

were brought to Sanem from other locations in Europe. Many are in poor

condition or had not been inspected when they arrived. As of July 1998,

523 (56 percent) of the 926 vehicles stored at this location were not

mission capable or had not been inspected.

Air Force Recognizes

Need to Develop

Prepositioning

Strategy and Improve

Inventory Reporting

Our guidance for implementing GPRA provides a framework for moving

toward a results-oriented organization. The first step is to determine what

an agency’s programs are intended to accomplish. For the Air Force’s

prepositioning programs, this would address the strategy and

requirements concerns. The second step is to measure performance,

which for the Air Force would require sound data on its inventories and

maintenance conditions. Only after the Air Force has taken these

fundamental steps can it move on to the third step in implementing

GPRA—using performance information to improve the program.

In September 1997, the Air Force tasked its Logistics Management Agency

to assess its prepositioning programs. This study resulted from Air Force

concerns that its strategy governing its prepositioning program had not

been implemented as well as concerns over the visibility of its inventory.

Officials cited long-standing problems in the prepositioning program, and

one program manager indicated that concerns about the Air Force’s

prepositioning program had been raised as early as 1993. The Air Force

formed a working group of senior program managers to conduct the study;

the results were not available when we concluded our work. Air Force

officials admitted that it will likely take several years to address the many

issues facing the programs.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions To operate and maintain the services’ prepositioning programs, DOD is

making a significant annual investment—more than $1 billion. Despite this

investment, these programs are not being managed efficiently. The Army

and the Air Force have not validated requirements for these programs and

determined what they need to support DOD’s strategy to fight and win

conflicts in Korea and the Persian Gulf. Valid requirements that reflect this

strategy should be the foundation of the programs, and such requirements

are imperative for DOD to objectively assess the programs. As suggested,

the first step for any agency is to determine what it is trying to accomplish

and its desired outcomes.

Even if the Army and the Air Force had valid requirements, they could not

assess the on-hand inventories of prepositioned materiel or its condition

because the two services have little reliable data for some programs.

Without such data, they cannot measure performance of these programs.

Such measurement requires complete, accurate, and consistent data.

While the Army and the Air Force report readiness on brigade sets and

bare base sets, reporting on their operational projects, sustainment, and

vehicle programs is limited and unreliable.

Today, these combined requirements and inventory reporting problems

prevent us—and DOD—from comprehensively assessing the readiness of

prepositioned stocks. This is a problem because the military envisions

heavy reliance on prepositioned stocks in future conflicts. Service claims

that the programs are underfunded or that shortfalls affect war-fighting

ability are difficult to validate. Only after fundamental requirements and

reporting problems are addressed can DOD begin to reliably assess the

performance of the programs. Then it can move to the third and final step

in implementing GPRA—using performance information to improve

organizational processes, identify gaps, and set improvement goals.

The services, Joint Staff, and DOD recognize the concerns raised in this

report. The update to the mobility requirements study planned to begin in

1999 provides an excellent opportunity for the services and other

stakeholders to work together to determine the future of these programs.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the

Army and the Air Force to reassess their prepositioning programs with the

goal of establishing sound requirements based on the two-war strategy and

develop reliable inventory information to measure the readiness of all

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Conclusions and Recommendations

programs. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

direct the Secretary of the Army to

• reevaluate the requirements for European prepositioning, including

whether the current brigade set configurations best meet the envisioned

missions;

• take steps to ensure that the operational projects requirements meet

operational needs and are prioritized in accordance with DOD’s current

wartime strategy;

• complete ongoing efforts to improve the processes used to determine

sustainment requirements and work with other DOD stakeholders to

determine what stocks will be available from the industrial base and host

nations;

• develop reliable reports of inventory fill and maintenance conditions for

the operational projects and sustainment programs so that their readiness

can be reliably measured; and

• dispose of unneeded stocks.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force to

• determine current requirements for European prepositioning;

• develop precise bare base requirements by assessing the infrastructure

available in the Persian Gulf region;

• complete efforts to determine worldwide vehicle requirements,

considering what is or will be available from the host nations;

• develop reliable reports of inventory levels and maintenance conditions

for the vehicle program so that its readiness can be reliably measured;

• maintain needed prepositioned vehicles in good condition; and

• dispose of unneeded stocks.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To reliably assess DOD’s readiness status and evaluate its future budget

requests, the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of

Defense periodically report on (1) the progress by DOD, the Army, and the

Air Force to address the recommendations made in this report and (2) the

impact of any shortages that remain after requirements and reporting

problems are addressed, including how DOD and the services would

mitigate shortages in the event of a major conflict.

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Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report’s

recommendations and agreed that Army and Air Force prepositioning

programs need to be reviewed with an emphasis on validating

requirements based on a two-war strategy, streamlining maintenance, and

improving readiness. DOD stated that the Joint Staff and the respective

services are examining many of the issues raised in this report.

Specifically, the Army is (1) reviewing its prepositioning requirements for

Europe to assess whether, in light of projected missions, European stocks

should be configured in brigade sets; (2) refining its sustainment

requirements with the intent of redistributing or disposing of any excess

war reserve stocks; and (3) resolving data accuracy problems for its

operational project and sustainment programs to assist in management

and readiness assessments.

DOD said that the Air Force plans to complete its ongoing war reserve

materiel study within a year. This study is expected to verify and validate

European prepositioning requirements, develop base support plans for

Southwest Asia, and address vehicle requirements determination

problems. DOD also said that the Air Force would redistribute or dispose of

any excess vehicles identified through its reassessment of this program.

DOD did not agree with our observation that the Air Force has not updated

its bare base requirements since the late 1980s. The Air Force indicated

that it has reviewed this requirement biennially in conjunction with its

updating of commanders-in-chief operational plans. However, the Air

Force was unable to produce documentation to show it had conducted any

rigorous, methodologically sound, reviews of its Persian Gulf bare base

requirements. We found that the bare base requirements established in the

late 1980s far exceeded the number of Air Force troops that were actually

housed in bare base sets during the Persian Gulf War. Also, despite the

fact that Iraq’s military is substantially smaller than it was during the

Persian Gulf War, the Air Force’s bare base requirements have remained

substantially unchanged since the late 1980s. In addition, base support

plans that would identify available infrastructure within the region have

not yet been completed.

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

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Appendix I 

Marine Corps and Navy Prepositioning

Programs

The Marine Corps relies heavily on prepositioned equipment, while the

Navy has a relatively small program, since it tends to deploy with most

needed equipment on its ships. Programs include (1) the 13-ship Maritime

Prepositioning Force; (2) a brigade of equipment in Norway; and (3) other

items, including hospitals, ordnance, and a small amount of other materiel.

According to the Navy and Marine Corps, the annual budget for operating

and maintaining the Maritime Prepositioning Force, Norway brigade set,

and hospital programs in fiscal year 1997 was approximately

$463.6 million. About $441.8 million of this amount was for operating and

maintaining the Maritime Prepositioning Force.

Maritime

Prepositioning Force

The top priority in the Marine Corps and the Navy prepositioning

programs is the Maritime Prepositioning Force. This force consists of

equipment and supplies prepositioned on a fleet of 13 prepositioning ships.

The fleet is organized into three squadrons kept afloat near Guam and

Diego Garcia and in the Mediterranean. Each squadron is designed to

support and sustain 17,300 marines and 2,100 naval personnel for 30 days.

The equipment and supplies in each squadron mirrors the others. Each

squadron is designated for use by expeditionary forces that will deploy

from the United States to meet the equipment in a conflict area. According

to the Marine Corps, these ships carry much of what the expeditionary

forces need for initial operations, including tanks, personnel carriers,

ammunition, food, fuel, and spare parts, among other items. The force also

contains Navy equipment, including construction equipment and crafts

used for off-loading and ferrying equipment and supplies ashore, among

other items.

The force is being expanded by adding two ships to the fleet. The extra

space afforded by the expansion will allow the Marines to add or augment

existing capability, in two of its squadrons. Additions to each squadron

will include an expeditionary airfield, a fleet hospital, and heavy

engineering and construction equipment. The Marines intend to use

converted commercial ships for the expansion. The two ships have been

acquired and are being converted. The Marines expect to load the first of

the two ships by September 1999. The other ship is scheduled to be added

to the force by 2001. The Marine Corps originally planned to add a third

ship. However, cost escalation on the second conversion ship necessitated

canceling the request for proposal on the third ship. As of October 1998,

the Marine Corps had not decided whether it would seek additional

funding for the third ship.

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The Marines are concerned about the growing airlift required to deploy the

force. The Marines originally estimated that it would require about 250

airlift sorties (C-141 equivalents) to move the troops and additional

equipment needed to employ the expeditionary forces associated with

each Maritime Prepositioning Force squadron. In our discussions,

however, officials from Marine Corps Headquarters and the U.S. Central

Command told us that the actual number today is probably

higher—perhaps as many as 350 airlift sorties. This presents a burden on

airlift and could affect the Marines’ ability to deploy the full force. In

September 1998, the Marines began to better tailor the equipment aboard

the ships to meet unit needs and decrease the airlift requirement,

according to a Marine Corps official.

The Maritime Prepositioning Force—operational since 1984—has been

given high marks for management by service auditors. In December 1996,

the DOD Inspector General reported that Marine Corps systems provide

reliable inventory data and that equipment afloat is maintained at high

readiness levels.1

 In April 1998, the Marine Corps reported that inventory

fill and mission-capability rates were near 100 percent. The Marines have

begun to look at concepts for the next generation of prepositioned ships

under a program called Maritime Prepositioning Force-2010 and Beyond.

The concept envisions elimination of the current requirement for access to

secure ports and airfields for assembly of the force. The next-generation

force is envisioned to be assembled with its equipment at sea and then

delivered ashore as a combat-capable force.

Norway Air-Landed

Marine Expeditionary

Brigade

The Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade was established in

the 1980s to rapidly reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s

northern flank. This program contains support equipment and ammunition

for about 13,000 Marines. Stocks are kept in underground,

climate-controlled warehouses in central Norway. In recent years,

Congress, the DOD Inspector General, and others have questioned the value

of the brigade in the post-Cold War world. However, the Center for Naval

Analyses reported in early 1996 that, given the relatively low total

economic costs associated with the program, there was no compelling

economic reason to remove the prepositioned stocks from Norway.2

Under an arrangement between the United States and Norway signed in

1995, the two countries agreed to split the costs of the program. For fiscal

1

Equipment Pre-positioned Afloat, Department of Defense Inspector General (97-054, Dec. 20, 1996).

2

Retention of the Norway Airlanded Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Center for Naval Analyses (Quick

Response Report No. CQR 96-4, Mar. 1996).

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Marine Corps and Navy Prepositioning

Programs

year 1997, the U.S. operations and maintenance costs of the brigade

totaled $3.1 million.

Other Prepositioned

Stocks

The Fleet Hospital program was designed to provide deployable medical

care capability for Navy and Marine Corps forces. As currently designed,

the program is authorized ten 500-bed, modular hospitals that include

rapidly erectable medical and surgical facilities. The Navy prepositions

eight of these hospitals outside the United States, with seven positioned

ashore and one afloat. The other two hospitals are kept in the United

States undergoing refurbishment and are routinely exchanged for the

prepositioned hospitals. Ashore hospitals are prepositioned in Guam (1),

Japan (3), Korea (1), and Norway (2). The Navy is planning to transfer

three of these hospitals to the expanded Maritime Prepositioning Force.

The Navy plans to identify two hospitals currently prepositioned overseas

and reallocate them and the currently afloat assets to the enhanced

Maritime Prepositioning Force ships. The operations and maintenance

costs of the fleet hospital program during fiscal year 1997 totaled about

$18.7 million.

Most of the Navy’s reserves of ordnance are carried aboard deploying

battle groups. Since these stocks are part of normal Navy operations, we

did not consider this ordnance to be part of a prepositioning program.

Other Navy stocks include ordnance located at several locations

worldwide, including in or near Spain, Iceland, Norway, Italy, Greece,

Korea, Japan, Guam, and Diego Garcia. In addition, the Navy has small

amounts of other materiel that it prepositions ashore outside the United

States. For example, fire-fighting equipment to augment shipboard

materiel in the event of major fires afloat is positioned at the Naval Air

Station in Sigonella, Italy.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8 and 58.

Now on pp. 8 and 59.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8 and 59.

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 9 and 59.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster

Reginald L. Furr

Michael J. Ferren

MaeWanda M. Jackson

Atlanta Field Office John H. Pendleton

Kurt A. Burgeson

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Products Related to Prepositioning Issues

GAO Products Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets the Army’s Readiness Goal

(GAO/NSIAD-97-169, July 23, 1997).

Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions By Aligning Resources With

the Reduced European Mission (GAO/NSIAD-97-158, July 11, 1997).

Strategic Mobility: Late Deliveries of Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off

Ships (GAO/NSIAD-97-150, June 16, 1997).

War Reserve Materiel (GAO/NSIAD-94-196R).

Other Products Army Prepositioned Stock Program: Combat Equipment Group - Europe,

U. S. Army Audit Agency (AA98-138, Mar. 31,1998).

Army War Reserve Secondary Items, Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. (Briefing

Report Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mar. 31, 1998,

and June 11, 1998).

Sustainment Requirements for the Army Prepositioned Stock Program,

U.S. Army Audit Agency (AA 98-99, Feb.23, 1998).

IDA Review of the Army War Reserve Program, Institute for Defense

Analyses (IDA Paper P-3310, Apr. 1997).

Moving U. S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility, Congressional Budget

Office (Feb. 1997).

Equipment Pre-positioned Afloat, Department of Defense Inspector

General (Report No. 97-054, Dec. 20, 1996).

Functional Management Review: Management of War Reserve Materiel

Vehicles and Support Equipment, Air Force Inspector General

(Report No. PN 96-607, July 29, 1996).

Retention of the Norway Airlanded Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Center

for Naval Analyses (CQR 96-4, Mar. 1996).

Assessment of Army War Reserve Materiel, Department of the Army,

Inspector General (Oct. 25, 1995).

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
Products Related to Prepositioning Issues

Army and Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs: Size and

Responsiveness Issues, RAND (PM-378-CRMAF, Apr. 1995).

Navy Fleet Hospital Program, Naval Audit Service Audit Report

(NAVAUDSVC P-7520.1, 059-W-94, July 1994).

(703218) Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-99-6 Army and Air Force Prepositioning
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