N OT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T HE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 2 1

- 1 1 2 3

__________

R O N A L D J O N E S

,

Appellant

v.

R. KIRCHENBAUER, State P olice Tro oper; A. GREEN, State Police Trooper; PERNA,

State Police Sergeant; E. SCH IAVI, Stat e Police Lieutenant; M. CRAFT, State Police

Captain; HAKE, State Police Internal Affairs; J. R UGALSKY, Civil Rig hts Officer; M.

DENN, Attorney General of the State of D e l a w a r e

____________________________________

O n Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of D e l a w a r e

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 20

- cv

- 00967 )

District Judge: Ho no rable R i c h a r d G

. A n d r e w s

____________________________________

Submit ted Pursu ant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

J u n e 9

, 2 0 2 1

Before: C H A G A R E S

, P H I P P S a n d C O W E N

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed June 11, 2021 )

___________

OPINION *

___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition i s not an opinion of the full C o urt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not2

R o n a l d J o n e s app eals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). For the reas ons set forth below, we will affirm.

O n J u l y 2 1

, 2 0 2 0

, J o n e s f i l e d a com p l a i n t a g a i n s t s e v e r a l D e l a w a r e s t a t e p o l i c e

o f f i c i a l s a n d t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o f D e l a w a r e

. 1 J o ne s al l e g e d t h a t h e a t t e m p t e d t o s e l l hi s

c a r a f t e r i t h a d s o m e me c h a n i c a l i s s u e s

, b u t t h e p r o s p e c t i v e b u y e r t o o k c o n t r o l o f t h e c a r

w i t h o u t t e n d e r i n g p a y m e n t t o J o n e s

. J o n e s c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e t o re p o r t h i s c a r s t o l e n a n d

t w o o f f i c e r s r e s p o n d e d t o t h e s c e n e o n A p r i l 2 4

, 2 0 1 8

. A f t e r s p e a k i n g t o t h e p r o s p e c t ive

b u y e r a n d l e a r n i n g t h a t he h a d a l l e g e d l y p e r f o r m e d m a i n t e n a n c e o n t h e c a r

, t h e o f f i c e r s

i n f o r m e d J o n e s t h a t t h e m a t t e r w a s c i v i l i n n a t u r e a n d t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t h e l p h i m

.

A c c o r d in g t o J on e s

, t h e office r s r e f u s e d t o h e l p h i m b e c a u s e o f t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t J o n e s w a s

c a t e g o r i z e d a s a T i e r 3 s e x o f f e n d e r o n t h e D e l a w a r e s e x o f f e n d e r r e g i s t r y

, w h i c h J o n e s

c o n t e n d s i s n o t a c c u r a t e

. 2 A f t e r t h a t i n c i d e n t

, J o n e s s e n t n u m e r o u s l e t t e r s t o d i f f e r e n t

s t a t e o f f i c i a l s c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t h e w a s l i s t e d o n t h e s e x o f f e n d e r r e g i s t r y a s a T i e r 3

o f f e n d e r w i t h o u t a d v a n c e n o t i c e a n d t h a t t h e l i s t i n g c a u s e d t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t o t r e a t h i m

u n f a v o r a b l y

. O n September 2 4

, 2 0 1 8

, J o n e s s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o f

D e l a w a r e a b o u t t h e i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s

.

constitute bindin g precedent.

1 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we su mmarize only th o se facts

t hat are ne cessar y for the discussion.

2 As the Dist rict Court noted, Jones has been r egister ed in Delaware as a sex offender

sinc e 2012 and was convi cted of failing to re register as a sex offender in 2013. See Jones

v. State , 8 1 A.3d 1248 (Del . 2013)

.3

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t a t s c r e e n i n g u n d e r 28 U.S .C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)

. T h e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e e v e n t s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t

, w i t h t h e

e x c e p t i o n o f t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e D e l a w a r e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l

, o c c u r r e d m o r e t h a n t w o

y e a r s b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g o f t h e c o m p l a i n t a n d w e r e t h u s b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

.

T h e claims a g a i n s t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l w e r e d i s m i s s e d because t h e y w e r e m a t t e r s o f

s t a t e l a w a n d b e c a u s e t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l w a s n o t p e r s o n a l l y i n v o lve d i n t h e i n c i d e n t

.

J o n e s a p p e a l e d

. In th i s C o ur t

, h e h a s f i l e d a m o t io n f

o r a s t a y a n d i n

j u n c t i on

.

We have j urisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over

the Distr ict Court’s ruling

. See Dooley v. Wetzel , 957 F.3d 366, 373

- 74 (3d Cir. 2020) ;

Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F .3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To state a claim , a civil complaint

must se t out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausi ble. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 55 6 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We construe J o n e s ’ s pro se complaint

liberally. S ee Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d c o r r e c t l y t h a t m o s t o f J o n e s ’ s c l a i m s w e r e b a r r e d b y

t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. 3 The statutes of limitations for civil righ ts suit s under §§ 1983

and 1985 i n D e l a w a r e i s t w o y e a r s

. See McDowell v. Del. Stat e Police , 88 F.3d 188, 190

3 Ordinarily, th e statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleade d and

is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street , 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), but

untimeliness may justify sua sponte dismissal where

, as here, “it is c lear from the face of

the complaint t hat there are no meritorious tolling issues .” Vasquez Arroy o v. Sta rks

, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v . Dixon , 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.

200 7)); see also Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 19 9, 214

- 15 (2007 ) (explaining that a district

court may sua sponte dismiss a prisoner complaint that is time

- barr ed).4

(3d Cir. 1996) ; Del. Co de Ann. tit. 10, § 8119. The limitation s period beg a n to run w h e n

J o n e s b e c a m e aware, or should h a v e b e e n aware, that t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n

occurred

. S americ Corp. v. City of Phila

. , 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). J o n e s ’ s

c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g t h e i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a n d h i s p l a c e m e n t o n t h e s e x

o f f e n d e r r e g i s t r y b e g a n t o a c c r u e

, a t t h e l a t e s t

, o n A p r i l 2 4

, 2 0 1 8

, w h e n h e c l a i m s t h a t h e

w a s m i s t r e a t e d b y o f

f i c e r s a n d a l l e g e d l y f

o u n d o ut t h a t h e w a s l i s t e d o n t h e s e x o f f e n d e r

r e g i s t r y

. J o n e s f

i l e d h i s c o m p l a i n t o n J u l y 2 1

, 2 0 2 0

, a f t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o ns p e r i o d e x p i r e d

. 4

Jones argued in his brief that he is entitled to equitab le tolling of the s tatute of

limitations because he attempted in good faith to resolve the dispute before beginning to

prepare his complaint, he had helped care for his ailing sister, and he had focused his

efforts in 2020 on preparing a scientific paper a bout the coronaviru s pandemic. Br. at 8.

We apply Delaware’s to lling rules, see Kach v. Hose , 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009),

although they are similar to federal ru les, see genera lly Wilson v. King , 673 A.2d 1228,

1231

- 32 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); Dicke ns v. Taylor , 671 F . Supp. 2d 542, 547 (D. Del.

2009).

4 T his was also after the expiration of the COVID

- 19

- related extensions provided for by

the Delaware Supreme Court. See generally Simps on v. State Farm Ins. Co. , No. CV

N20C

- 10

- 057 ALR, 2021 WL 1148197, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2021) (discussing

vario us administrative o rders). Under the late st relevant adm inistrative order issued b y

the Delaware Sup reme Court, s tatutes of limitati ons that would h ave expire d during the

period between March 23, 2020

, and June 30, 2020

, were extended through July 1, 2020.

See Admin. Order N o. 7 : Extension of Judicial Emergenc y (Del. June 5, 2020) (Seitz,

C.J.). Because th e stat ute of limitations her e w as set to expire on April 24, 2020, it was

extended throug h July 1 , 2020. However, Jones filed about three weeks after that da te.5

Jones is n ot entitled to equitable tolling. His attempts to resolve the dispute

—

which involved mainly writing let ters to individ uals and entities that lacked the power to

intervene

— did not toll the li mitations period. See generally Mergenthaler v. Asbestos

Corp. o f Am. , 500 A.2d 1357, 1365 n.13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (limitations period is not

tolled “due to the fac t that the part ies are engaged in a period of negotiations”).

Likewise, Jones has not shown that his sist er’s illness or his scientific pursuits “preve nted

timely filing.” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States , 577 U.S. 250, 255

(2016) (quoting Holland v. Flo rida , 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); see generally Ross v.

Varano , 712 F.3d 7 84, 803 (3d Cir. 20 13) (explaining, in the context of equitably t olling

AEDPA’s limitations period, that “there must be a causal connection, or nexus, between

the extrao rdinary circums tances he faced and the petitioner ’ s failure to file a timely

federal pe tition”). Accordin gly, we conclude that Jones’s tolling argument fails.

T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t J o n e s r a i s e d a t i m e l y c l a i m b a s e d o n h i s S e p t e m b e r 2 4

, 2 0 1 8

l e t t e r t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o f D e l a w a r e

, i t i s m e r i t l e s s

. J o n e s a l l e g e d t h a t h e p r o v i d e d

f a c t s t o th e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a b o u t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s ’ c o n d u c t a n d t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y

g e n e r a l h a d “ a l e g a l d u t y t o d e a l w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n

. ” C o m p l

. a t 1 5

. H o w e v e r

, t o state a

cl aim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, J o n e s h a d t o a l l e g e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had “personal

involv ement in the allege d wrongs,” which can be shown through “allegat ions of

pers onal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Del larciprete , 845

F.2d 11 95, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). T h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l w a s n o t involved i n a n d d i d n o t6

a c q u i e s c e t o t h e A p r i l 2 4

, 2 0 1 8 i n c i d e n t

. See generally Dooley v. Wetzel , 957 F.3d 366,

374 (3d Cir. 2020). J o n e s a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l “ k n e w o f t h e c o n s p i r a c y

a m o n g t h e o t h e r s u b o r d i n a t e n a m e d D e f e n d a n t s

, ” C o m p l

. a t 1 5

, b u t s u c h a c o n c l u s o r y

c l a i m i s n o t g r o u n d s f

o r r e l i e f

. S e e B e l l A t l

. C o r p

. v

. T w o m b l y

, 55 0 U.S. 544

, 5 5 5

- 5 7

( 2 0 0 7 )

. F i n a l l y

, i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t a l l f

e d e r a l c l a i m s w e r e d i s m i s s e d

, t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t a p p r o p r i a t e l y d e c l i n e d t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e r e m a i n i n g s t a t e l a w c l a i m s

.

S e e De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 342 F.3d 301

, 30 9 (3d Cir. 2003)

.

A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e w i l l a f

f i r m t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

. J o n e s ’ s M o t i o n

f o r S t a y a n d I n

j u n c t i o n P e n d i n g A p p e a l i s d e n i e d

.