1

LICENSEE NEWSLETTER

NUREG/BR-0117, No. 08-03 Fall 2008

Oce of Federal & State Materials &

Environmental Management Programs

NOTIFICATION OF THE 

SECOND PHASE OF WAIVER 

TERMINATIONS IN THE 

IMPLEMENTATION OF NRC 

REGULATORY AUTHORITY 

FOR CERTAIN NATURALLY 

OCCURRING AND 

ACCELERATOR-PRODUCED 

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The Energy Policy Act (EPAct) 

of 2005 gave the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

regulatory authority over 

certain naturally occurring 

and accelerator-produced 

radioactive material (NARM). 

The NRC published its final rule 

implementing this authority in 

the Federal Register on October 

1, 2007 (72 FR 55863). The final 

rule expanded the definition 

of “byproduct material” in NRC 

regulations and established 

requirements for licensing and 

regulating Section 11e.(3) and 11e.

(4) byproduct material, as required 

by Section 651(e) of the EPAct. 

These final regulations became 

effective on November 30, 2007. 

As authorized by Section 651(e) of 

the EPAct, the NRC issued a waiver 

on August 31, 2005, to allow 

continued use and possession of 

NARM while the NRC developed 

a regulatory framework for 

regulation of the new byproduct 

material. The NRC is terminating 

the waiver in phases. On 

November 30, 2007, the NRC 

terminated the waiver for Federal 

agencies, Federally Recognized 

Indian Tribes, Delaware, the District 

of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. 

Virgin Islands, Indiana, Wyoming, 

and Montana. The NRC also 

terminated the waiver for all 34 

Agreement States that provided a 

certification from their Governor to 

the NRC as described in the EPAct 

and the NRC’s Transition Plan, 

which was published in the Federal 

Register on October 19, 2007 (72 

FR 59157).

The second phase of waiver 

terminations occurred on 

September 30, 2008. Vermont, 

West Virginia, Missouri, Idaho, 

South Dakota, Guam, and all 

territories and possessions of 

the United States that were not 

identified as part of the first 

phase of waiver terminations 

was included in the second 

phase. The timing and schedule 

for the second phase of waiver 

terminations was published in 

the Federal Register on March 18, 

2008 (73 FR 14376). The agency 

anticipates that the waivers for the 

remaining non-Agreement States 

– Connecticut, Virginia, New Jersey, 

Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii – will 

be terminated in the third phase 

of the transition, which will occur 

on August 7, 2009. A notice in the 

Federal Register will be published 

approximately 6 months before 

the effective date of the third 

phase of waiver terminations. 

Additionally, the NRC plans to 

terminate the waiver for nonAgreement States that enter 

into an Agreement with the NRC 

under Section 274b of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

coincident with the effective date 

of such an agreement. At this 

time, Pennsylvania is the only State 

that has become an Agreement 

State prior to the second phase of 

waiver terminations. 

Upon waiver termination, all 

persons who possess the new 

byproduct material in these 

States, U.S. Territories, or areas 

of exclusive Federal jurisdiction 

must be in compliance with 

the NRC regulations. However, 

the rule provides authorization 

for continued use of the new 

byproduct material prior to 

obtaining a license or license 

amendment, as long as 

applications are made within 

specified times. As provided in 

the Transition Plan, users of NARM 

in non-Agreement States and U.S. 

Territories will be required to (1) 

apply for license amendments 

for the new byproduct material 

within 6 months from the date 

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Notification of the Second 

Phase of Waiver Terminations 

in the Implementation of 

NRC Regulatory Authority 

for Certain Naturally Occurring 

and Accelerator-Produced 

Radioactive Material..................................1

FSME Holds Meetings 

in Wyoming ..................................................2

From the Desk of the 

FSME Director..............................................3

National Source Tracking System .........4

Closure of the Salmon River 

Uranium Development Site....................5

FSME Workshop on the 

Use of Cesium Chloride............................6

Generic Communications Issued..........8

Significant Events.......................................9

Significant Enforcement Actions....... 10

Select Federal Register Notices.......... 14
2

the waiver is terminated, if they 

hold an NRC specific byproduct 

materials license; or (2) submit a 

license application for the new 

byproduct material within 12 

months from the date the waiver 

is terminated for their State. 

NRC wants to remind users in 

the States impacted in the first 

phase of waiver terminations 

that the date has passed for the 

timely submission of license 

amendments, which was to occur 

by May 30, 2008; however, users 

have until December 1, 2008, to 

submit new license applications, 

if they have not already done so. 

Users in States impacted in the 

first phase that still need to submit 

license amendments, should 

submit their requests to the NRC as 

soon as possible. 

Those users in States impacted 

in the second phase of waiver 

terminations must submit their 

license amendments by March 

31, 2009, or their new license 

applications by September 30, 

2009, to be in accordance with 

the time frame allotted in the 

Transition Plan. 

Additional details about the 

implementation of the final rule on 

NARM can be found in a recently 

issued Regulatory Issue Summary 

(RIS) 2008-13, “Status and Plans for 

Implementation of NRC Authority 

for Certain Naturally Occurring and 

Accelerator-Produced Radioactive 

Material,” issued on June 16, 

2008 (http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/

narmtoolbox/ris2008-13.pdf). 

This RIS updates the information 

contained in RIS 2007-22, dated 

October 4, 2007.

Also, NRC staff finalized revisions 

to the NUREG-1556 guidance 

for Volume 9, “Program-Specific 

Guidance about Medical Use 

Licenses,” Volume 13, “ProgramSpecific Guidance about 

Commercial Radiopharmacy 

Licenses,” and the new Volume 

21 “Program-Specific Guidance 

about Possession Licenses 

for Production of Radioactive 

Materials Using an Accelerator.” 

The NRC is also planning to make 

minor revisions, which reflect 

the regulation of NARM, to other 

NUREG-1556 licensing guidance 

and related inspection procedures. 

Furthermore, the NRC is preparing 

a set of frequently asked questions 

on radium-226 that will be 

publicly available. The NRC has 

not yet finalized the schedule 

for completing these additional 

activities.

For more information on NARMrelated activities, please go 

to the “NARM Toolbox” at the 

NRC’s Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs (FSME) 

Web site at http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/

narmtoolbox.html.

(Contacts: Kim Lukes or Duane 

White, Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, 

301-415-6701 or 301-415-6272; 

e-mail: Kim.Lukes@nrc.gov or 

Duane.White@nrc.gov)

FSME HOLDS MEETINGS 

IN WYOMING

Staff members from the Office 

of Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management 

Programs (FSME) were in Wyoming 

for a series of meetings, both 

public and private, regarding 

uranium recovery operations.

The trip clearly showed that 

despite all the attention given 

new reactors in the “nuclear 

renaissance,” the NRC is also 

preparing to review nearly two 

dozen applications for new or 

restart uranium milling operations.

The first order of business 

was two public meetings held 

on September 23, in Gillette, 

and September 25, in Casper, 

to present the Draft Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement 

on in-situ leach uranium recovery 

operations. These meetings 

were the last in a series of three 

public meetings that previously 

took place in Nebraska and New 

Mexico.

Public response at these meetings 

differed dramatically. About 

thirty people attended the 

Gillette meeting, and nearly all 

the speakers expressed concern 

about the effects of in-situ 

leach operations would have on 

groundwater resources. More 

than a hundred people attended 

the Casper meeting where several 

people, including State lawmakers, 

urged NRC to complete the report 

as swiftly as possible so in-situ 

leach facility licensing will not be 

delayed.

In addition to participating in 

the public meetings, members 

of the FSME staff led by Patrice 

Bubar, Deputy Director of the 

Division of Waste Management 

and Environmental Protection, met 

with various Federal, State, and 

local agencies regarding the Draft 

Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement and the NRC’s licensing 

process for uranium recovery 

facilities. Also, a team led by 

Region IV inspector Linda Gersey 

conducted an unannounced 

inspection of the Smith Ranch insitu leach facility near Douglas, just 

east of Casper.

continued on page 4
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In last quarter’s Newsletter, I 

discussed some managerial 

changes within NRC and FSME. 

The past few months have 

brought about a few more 

changes. 

In FSME’s Division of 

Intergovernmental Liaison and 

Rulemaking (DILR), the Division 

Director, Dennis Rathbun retired 

in August. His Deputy, Patrice 

Bubar, moved over to our 

Division of Waste Management 

and Environmental Protection as one of its Deputy Directors. These actions created two managerial vacancies 

in DILR. I am proud to announce that Mark Shaffer has been named as the DILR Division Director, and that Mark 

Thaggard has been named as the Deputy Division Director. 

Before joining FSME, Mark was the Deputy Director for Material Security within the Division of Security Policy, 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. Mr. Shaffer joined NRC in 1991 as a Radiation Specialist 

in Region IV’s Division of Nuclear Materials Safety. Since then, he has held progressively more responsible 

positions including Senior Health Physicist, Technical Assistant, State Agreements Officer and Chief of the 

Nuclear Materials Inspection Branch. In 2004, Mark also worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency as 

the Acting Head of the Standards Application Unit, within the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. Prior 

to joining the NRC, Mr. Shaffer worked as a Certified Nuclear Medicine Technologist and as the Radiation Safety 

Officer for a broad-scope medical and academic/research facility. Mr. Shaffer received a B.S. degree in Nuclear 

Medicine Science from Incarnate Word College, San Antonio, Texas.

Mark Thaggard joined the NRC in 1989 as a Hydrologist in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

(NMSS). He has held a number of progressively more responsible positions including, Chief, Decommissioning 

Section, NMSS; Chief, Performance Assessment Branch, FSME; and most recently Chief, Hydrologic Engineering 

Branch, Office of New Reactors. He also briefly served as a Technical Assistant to former Chairman Meserve. 

Prior to joining the NRC, Mr. Thaggard worked for the Southwest Florida Water Management District and the U.S. 

Geological Survey. Mr. Thaggard received a B.A. degree in Geology from the University of South Florida, a M.S. 

degree in Environmental Science from the University of South Florida, and M.S. degrees in Applied Mathematics 

and Environmental Engineering from the Johns Hopkins University. He is a 2008 graduate of the SES Candidate 

Development Program and will serve in an acting capacity pending formal SES certification from the Office of 

Personnel Management.

I am excited about the new DILR management team. I know that they will continue to engage stakeholders 

on important FSME rulemakings and enhance the relationships that are already in place with Native American 

tribes, the States, and others on an array of topics.

Elsewhere in FSME, the Division of Materials Safety and State Agreements (DMSSA) implemented a 

reorganization that took effect on October 1, 2008. The new organization structure will realign DMSSA to 

effectively integrate security activities into FSME program elements while maintaining appropriate focus on 

enabling the safe and secure use of radioactive materials.

Charles L. Miller, Director

From the Desk 

of the FSME 

Director
4

Division staff members also visited 

Moore Ranch, Nichols Ranch, and 

the Iragaray-Christensen site. 

Energy Metals’ Moore Ranch and 

Uranerz Energy Corp.’s Nichols 

Ranch are two of the four sites 

for which the NRC is currently 

reviewing applications for new 

in-situ leach facilities. The NRC 

is also reviewing Cogema’s 

application to restart the 

in-situ facility at the shuttered 

Iragaray-Christensen site.

(Contact: Alan Bjornsen, 

Division of Waste Management 

and Environmental Protection, 

301-415-1195, e-mail: Alan.

bjornsen@nrc.gov)

NATIONAL SOURCE 

TRACKING SYSTEM

Development of the National 

Source Tracking System (NSTS) 

is now complete and licensees 

must begin reporting to the 

system in January 2009. NRC and 

Agreement State licensees must 

report their initial inventory of 

category 1 and category 2 sources 

to the NSTS by January 31, 2009. 

Licensees must begin reporting 

source transactions to the NSTS 

on January 31, 2009. Licensees 

have the option of reporting by 

several mechanisms: (1) on-line 

to the NSTS; (2) batch load using 

electronic file submission; (3) mail; 

(4) facsimile; or (5) by telephone, 

with follow-up by facsimile or 

mail. In order to report to the 

NSTS using the on-line method 

or electronically (batch load), 

you will need to go through a 

credentialing process to receive 

a digital certificate and smart 

card. Although the credentialing 

process will take some effort 

to complete, the process is not 

difficult. Reporting by the on-line 

and electronic file submission 

methods will save time and effort 

when reporting transactions 

to the NSTS. A Help Desk has 

been established to answer 

questions related to credentialing 

and reporting inventory and 

transaction information.

The NSTS is a secure web-based 

system. The security of the NSTS is 

based in part on the use of digital 

certificates. A digital certificate 

is an electronic identification 

that establishes your credentials 

when doing business or other 

transactions on the Web. The use 

of digital certificates allows the 

NSTS to uniquely identify the user. 

You will not be able to access the 

NSTS without a digital certificate. 

This year, the Interim Data Base 

survey requested information on 

licensee staff who will be contacts 

for and receiving credentials 

to use the NSTS. Those named 

individuals should have received 

information on the credentialing 

process. Once an individual has 

completed the credentialing 

process, the individual will receive 

a smart card (hard token) and 

a card reader at no cost to the 

licensee. The smart card and card 

reader will be used for accessing 

the NSTS. 

If you are interested in using the 

on-line or electronic method 

for reporting to NSTS and did 

not provide information for 

credentialing, you may still make 

a request to be credentialed. 

Please contact the NSTS Help Desk 

for instructions on initiating the 

credentialing process. The process 

takes approximately 6 weeks once 

your name has been provided.

You may contact the NSTS Help 

Desk by e-mail NSTSHELP@nrc.gov 

or by phone at 1-877-671-6787.

Training: The NSTS has been 

designed to be intuitive and userfriendly. Extensive user support 

will be available and includes online navigation tools, application 

help, computer-based training, a 

users guide (available on-line), and 

a help desk. NRC is also providing 

classroom training sessions to 

permit users to learn how to use 

the system. These sessions will be 

held in November and December 

in various locations around the 

country. Attendance at one of the 

training sessions, while desirable, 

is not necessary to use the system. 

Those individuals that are being 

credentialed are the ones that 

may be interested in attending 

a training session. One of the 

sessions is designed for those that 

will be using the electronic file 

submission (batch loading). 

Information on the training 

sessions was provided to 

licensees in early October. If 

you are interested in attending 

a training session and did not 

receive information, you may send 

your request to NRC by e-mail at 

NSTSTraining@nrc.gov. The e-mail 

should include the list of licensee 

staff who wish to attend NSTS 

training; contact information for 

each individual, including e-mail 

address and phone number; and 

your first and second choice for 

training sessions. We will try to 

accommodate first choices but 

please understand that this may 

not be possible. If multiple staff 

members are listed, we will give 

them preference in the order 

listed and will try to ensure that 

places are available for at least 

continued from page 2
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one staff member from each 

licensee applying. You will receive 

confirmation by e-mail.

As noted above, the NRC is 

planning to host several training 

sessions for licensees around 

the country. Each session will be 

approximately six hours and will 

include hands-on use. The dates 

and locations are outlined in the 

following table. 

States have issued, or are in the 

process of issuing, equivalent rules 

or legally binding requirements. 

All licensees are required to report 

information on the manufacture, 

transfer, receipt or disposal of 

nationally tracked sources to the 

NSTS beginning January 31, 2009 

and to report the initial inventory 

of nationally tracked sources by 

January 31, 2009.

Nationally tracked sources are 

sealed sources containing a 

quantity of radioactive material 

equal to or greater than the 

Category 2 levels listed in 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 20. A 

nationally tracked source may be 

either a Category 1 source (100 

times the Category 2 threshold) 

or a Category 2 source. Nationally 

tracked sources do not include 

material encapsulated solely 

for disposal, or nuclear material 

contained in any fuel assembly, 

subassembly, fuel rod, or fuel 

pellet. The radioactive material 

and threshold values are based on 

the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct. 

NSTS will eventually provide a 

life history of each nationally 

tracked source. The system will 

contain information on sources 

possessed by NRC and Agreement 

State licensees, as well as U.S. 

Department of Energy facilities. 

Transactions to be reported to 

NSTS include the manufacture of 

new sources, transfer of sources, 

receipt of sources, disassembly of 

sources, and disposal of sources. 

Licensees will be required to make 

the report by the close of the next 

business day after the transaction.

The information to be reported 

for each source includes the 

manufacturer, model, serial 

number, radioactive material, 

source strength, and associated 

date. Also to be included in each 

report is the company name, 

address, and license number. 

Transfer information would include 

the recipient, the shipping date, 

and the estimated arrival date. 

Receipt information would include 

the receipt date, the company 

name, and license number of 

the facility providing the source. 

Information for disposal would 

include the method and date 

of disposal, the waste manifest 

number, and the identification of 

the container with the source.

(Contacts: Merri Horn, Paul 

Goldberg, or Ernesto Quinones, 

Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, 

301-415-8126; e-mail: Merri.

Horn@nrc.gov, 301-415-7842; 

e-mail: Paul Goldberg@nrc.gov 

or 301-415-0271; e-mail: Ernesto.

Quinones@nrc.gov)

CLOSURE OF THE 

SALMON RIVER URANIUM 

DEVELOPMENT SITE

On September 19, 2008, a 

letter was sent to the owners 

of the Salmon River Uranium 

Development (SRUD) site located 

near Fork, Idaho, notifying the 

owners of the completion of the 

NRC and Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) decommissioning 

activities. The letter closes an 

eight year cleanup effort by 

the NRC, EPA, and the State of 

Idaho to release the property for 

unrestricted use.

The SRUD was issued a U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC) source 

material license in 1958 to transfer 

and deliver possession of, and 

NSTS Licensee Training 

Workshops

Date Location

November 5 Rockville, MD

November 7 Rockville, MD

November 12 Rockville, MD

November 14** Rockville, MD

November 18 Atlanta, GA

November 20 Atlanta, GA

December 2 Chicago, IL

December 4 Chicago, IL

December 9 Irving, TX

December 11 Irving, TX

December 16 San Francisco, CA

December 18 San Francisco, CA

**Special session for licensees 

that will be using the electronic 

file submission (batch loading) 

to report large numbers of 

transactions

Background: On November 8, 

2006, the NRC issued the final 

rule incorporating the NSTS into 

its regulations (71 FR 65686). An 

amendment to the rule issued on 

October 19, 2007 (72 FR 59162) 

revised the compliance date to 

January 31, 2009. Agreement 
6

title to, raw source material. In 

1959, the AEC issued source 

material license R-0230 to SRUD, 

authorizing the receipt and 

possession of source material for 

processing. Both source material 

licenses expired on October 

31, 1959. Based on interviews 

with the property owner, both 

uranium and thorium ores were 

processed at the site. Processing 

of source material at the SRUD 

site occurred in two separate time 

frames, the late-1950s and the 

late-1970s. Processing operations 

apparently were conducted in the 

late-1950s in accordance with the 

AEC licenses. During the late1970s, pilot plant operations were 

conducted at the site to determine 

the viability of experimental ore 

processing techniques. 

In 1994, the SRUD site was 

placed on the NRC’s Site 

Decommissioning Management 

Plan (SDMP) list. In May 2001, NRC 

staff visited the SRUD site and 

identified thorium contamination 

in the form of partially processed 

ore. During 2004 and 2005, the 

NRC staff worked with the Idaho 

Department of Environmental 

Quality and the EPA to establish 

a path forward for remediation of 

the site. EPA agreed to perform 

remediation activities at the 

SRUD site in accordance with the 

Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act (CERCLA). The NRC 

activities provided oversight of 

the EPA remediation activities 

in accordance with 10 CFR Part 

40. A Removal Action Work Plan 

was developed by the EPA and 

approved by the NRC, which 

specified its step-by-step process 

for conducting cleanup activities 

at the SRUD site. 

The EPA’s Plan included the 

removal and disposal of hazardous 

chemical and radiological 

contaminants that may pose an 

imminent and substantial threat 

to workers, public health and 

welfare, and the environment. 

Implementation of the EPA’s work 

plan began on October 23, 2007, 

and was completed on June 

3, 2008. Contaminated waste 

material above the unrestricted 

release limit was shipped to 

licensed disposal sites. 

The NRC staff from Region IV 

(Bob Evans, Janine Katanic and 

Vince Watkins, a NASA loanee) 

and Headquarters (Kim Conway 

and Bruce Watson) conducted 

confirmatory radiological surveys 

of site structures and land areas, 

and collected soil samples for 

analysis by the NRC’s independent 

laboratory contractor. The NRC 

performed an independent 

dose assessment assuming a 

recreational land use scenario 

employed by the EPA to evaluate 

the EPA’s cleanup criteria and 

evaluate the as left condition 

of the SRUD site. Based on the 

residual radioactivity at the site, 

the site was determined to be 

significantly less than the criteria in 

10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E and the 

SRUD site was determined to be 

suitable for unrestricted release. 

(Contact: Bruce Watson, Office 

of Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management 

Programs, 301-415-6221; e-mail: 

Bruce.Watson@nrc.gov).

FSME WORKSHOP ON THE 

USE OF CESIUM CHLORIDE

The Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs and 

the Office of Nuclear Security 

and Incident Response held a 

workshop entitled “Stakeholder 

Workshop on the Security and 

Continued Use of Cesium-137 

Chloride Sources” on September 

29-30, 2008, at the Bethesda North 

Hotel and Conference Center. 

Close to two hundred individuals 

from the medical, academic, and 

manufacturing communities 

attended the two-day workshop. 

The workshop was designed 

to solicit early public input on 

issues associated with the use 

of radioactive cesium chloride 

sources. The workshop consisted 

of roundtable sessions on the 

topics of: alternative cesium 

chloride sources, alternative 

technologies, phase out and 

transportation issues, additional 

enhanced security, and potential 

future requirements. For each 

roundtable, five to nine panel 

members provided expert input.

Commissioner Peter Lyons 

addressed the opening of the 

public workshop. In his remarks, 

Commissioner Lyons said, “There 

can be no question that the 

uses of cesium-137 chloride 

sources benefit the world’s 

medical, research, and industrial 

communities and the public. 

However, preserving these 

benefits, coupled with achieving 

adequate security, is a very real 

challenge.” 

Prior to September 11, 2001, 

regulations of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

and the Agreement States 

contained both safety and security 

components appropriate for 

that time. After September 11, 

2001, the safety and security 

requirements were enhanced 
7

through the use of increased 

security controls that aligned 

with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency Code of Conduct 

recommendations. Concerns 

about safety and security of 

radiation sources and devices 

have grown partly in response to 

fears that radiation sources could 

be used to make a radiological 

dispersal device or more often 

referred to as a dirty bomb. 

Congress directed the NRC, via 

the Energy Policy Act of 2005, to 

take several actions. Among them 

was the request to undertake a 

study by the National Academy 

of Sciences to identify the uses of 

high-risk radiation sources and 

the feasibility of replacing them 

with lower-risk alternatives. The 

National Academy of Sciences 

recommendations called for 

stopping the licensing of new 

cesium-137 chloride irradiator 

sources, prohibiting the export 

of cesium-137 chloride sources, 

providing incentives for 

decommissioning of existing 

sources, and replacing existing 

sources with a less dispersible 

form of radioactive cesium, 

with cobalt-60, or with nonradionuclide alternatives. Others 

have called for the replacement 

of cesium-137 chloride sources, 

including House Bill H.R. 6816, 

“Nuclear Facility and Material 

Security Act of 2008.”

Commissioner Lyons said he 

believes that, consistent with 

another recommendation of the 

National Academy of Sciences 

study entitled, “Radiation Source 

Use and Replacement,” any effort 

to replace these radiation sources 

with alternative technologies 

should proceed with caution in 

order to minimize disruption in 

vital areas of industry, medicine, 

and research. To that end goal, 

the NRC is holding this public 

workshop, to ensure that all 

stakeholders are afforded an early 

opportunity to provide input on 

any potential regulatory changes. 

The Commissioner said that 

the NRC has not made any 

decisions regarding the 

suspension of the use of highactivity cesium-137 chloride 

sources, but after the workshop, 

drawing on recommendations 

from the workshop, the staff 

will develop recommendations 

for Commission deliberation. 

This information, combined 

with other studies, will provide 

insight for the Radiation Source 

Protection and Security Task Force 

discussion and consideration of 

the continued use of cesium-137 

chloride sources. The Task Force 

is made up of 14 Federal agencies 

and representatives from the 

Organization of Agreement States 

and the Conference of Radiation 

Control Program Directors, Inc. 

The security of radioactive 

materials has been and continues 

to be a top priority for the NRC, 

he said. Applying a risk-based 

approach, the NRC has enhanced 

security of radioactive materials 

and has reduced the potential 

threat from a radiological dispersal 

device or radiological exposure 

device. The security of these 

materials has been enhanced 

through additional requirements 

on access control, detection, 

trustworthiness, accounting, and 

other measures. Nevertheless, 

NRC continues to work closely 

with its domestic and international 

partners to continuously assess, 

integrate, and improve its security 

programs, and, when deemed 

necessary, to make risk-significant 

radioactive materials still more 

secure and less vulnerable to 

terrorists.

Many workshop participants 

agreed there are specific issues to 

be resolved with any replacement 

technology and that big 

differences exist between x-ray 

and gamma radiation in terms of 

absorbed dose. While there may 

be alternatives to certain types 

of processes, these alternatives 

may not be suitable for other 

The workshop attracted many participants.
8

applications. In addition, several 

medical organizations stated 

concerns that the prohibition or 

elimination of the use of cesium 

chloride irradiators could result 

in a decrease in the standard of 

medical care that exists in this 

country. 

Cesium chloride sources are 

used in many different devices 

including irradiators. However, the 

workshop concentrated on sources 

identified by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency as Category 

1 and 2 sources, which may pose a 

significant risk to public health and 

the environment if not properly 

handled and secured. The National 

Academy of Sciences also recently 

recommended the replacement 

or elimination of certain cesium 

chloride sources.

The comments received in the 

workshop will be considered 

as input into future follow-up 

actions that the NRC may take. 

All documents related to the 

Workshop, such as the agenda, 

attendance list, list of panel 

members, slide presentations, 

and the transcript for both days, 

are accessible on the Workshop 

web-site: http://www.nrc.

gov/materials/miau/licensing.

html#cesium.

For more information, please 

contact Dr. John P. Jankovich, 

Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, 

301-415-7904, e-mail: john.

jankovich@nrc.gov or Dr. 

Cynthia Jones, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response, 

301-415-0298, e-mail: cynthia.

jones@nrc.gov. 

GENERIC 

COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED

(June 30, 2008 - October 3, 2008)

The following are summaries 

of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) generic 

communications issued by 

the Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs. If one of 

these documents appears relevant 

to your needs and you have not 

received it, please call one of the 

technical contacts listed below. 

The Internet address for the NRC 

library of generic communications 

is http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/gen-comm/index.

html. Please note that this address 

is case-sensitive and must be 

entered exactly as shown. 

Bulletins (BLs)

None.

Generic Letters (Gls)

None.

Information Notices (INs)

None.

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RIS)

RIS 2008-17, “Voluntary 

Security Enhancements for 

Self-Contained Irradiators 

Containing Cesium Chloride 

Sources” was issued July 18, 

2008. This RIS was issued to all U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Materials licensees authorized to 

possess self-contained irradiators 

containing cesium chloride (CsCl); 

all Agreement State Radiation 

Control Program Directors 

and State Liaison Officers; and 

all members of the Advisory 

Committee on the Medical Uses of 

Isotopes. 

(Technical contacts: Tomas 

Herrera, FSME, (301) 415-7138, 

e-mail: Tomas.Herrera@nrc.

gov; and John Jankovich, FSME, 

(301) 415-7904; e-mail: John.

Jankovich@nrc.gov; and Regional 

contacts Michelle Beardsley, 

Region I, (610) 337-6942, e-mail: 

Michelle.Beardsley@nrc.gov; 

and Kevin Null, Region III, (630) 

829-9854, e-mail: Kevin.Null@nrc.

gov)

RIS 2008-23, “The Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 

Domestic Threat Reduction 

Program and Federally Funded 

Voluntary Security Enhancements 

For High-Risk Radiological 

Material,” was issued October 3, 

2008. This RIS was issued to all U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

authorized to possess Category 

1 or Category 2 quantities 

of radioactive materials; all 

Agreement State Radiation Control 

Program Directors and State 

Liaison Officers; and members of 

the Advisory Committee on the 

Medical Uses of Isotopes.

(Technical contacts: Doug 

Broaddus, FSME, (301) 415-8124, 

e-mail: Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov; 

Maria Arribas-Colon, FSME, (301) 

415-6026, e-mail: Maria.ArribasColon@nrc.go; and Regional 

contacts Judith Joustra, Region 

I, (610) 337-6942, email: Judith.

Joustra@nrc.gov; Kevin Null, 

Region III, (630) 829-9854, e-mail: 

Kevin.Null@nrc.gov; and Roberto 

Torres, Region IV, (817) 860-8189, 

e-mail: Robertoj.Torres@nrc.gov)

RIS 2008-24, “Security 

Responsibilities of Service 

Providers and Client Licensees,” 

was issued October 3, 2008. This 

RIS was issued to all holders of U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
9

licensees that hire service 

providers to install, service, repair, 

maintain, relocate, exchange, or 

transport radioactive materials 

in quantities of concern; service 

provider licensees; Agreement 

State Radiation Control Program 

Directors; and State Liaison 

Officers. 

(Technical contact: Doug 

Broaddus, FSME, (301) 415-8124, 

e-mail: Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Angela R. 

McIntosh, FSME, 301-415-5030; 

e-mail: Angela.McIntosh@nrc.gov.)

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Event #1: Dose to Embryo/Fetus 

Date and Place: June 4, 2008, 

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

Nature and Probable Causes: 

The U.S. Air Force reported that 

a pregnant patient received 

a therapeutic I-131 dose of 

5.52 GBq (149.2 mCi) on June 

4, 2008, at the Wilford Hall 

Medical Center. The U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

first learned of the incident during 

an unannounced inspection 

conducted on September 5, 

2008. The patient was tested 

for pregnancy on June 2, 2008, 

prior to receiving the ablative 

dose. The serum screening 

result was negative and the 

dose was administered with no 

complications. On August 13, 

2008, the patient was informed 

that she was pregnant. Followup consultation with the 

Radiation Emergency Assistance 

Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) 

and calculations determined 

that the dose to the fetus was 

approximately 31.5 cGy (rad). 

However, since the incident 

occurred early in the zygote phase 

of development, there are no 

anticipated adverse consequences. 

The patient and her physician have 

been consulted regarding the 

hospital’s conclusions. The NRC is 

obtaining the services of a medical 

consultant to assist in its ongoing 

special inspection of the incident.

Event #2: Extremity 

Overexposure

Date and Place: September 29, 2008, 

Houston, Texas

Nature and Probable Causes: The 

licensee reported a potential 

extremity overexposure of 

between 66.5 and 282.2 cSv 

(rem). On September 29, 2008, 

a radiographer was performing 

radiographs in various locations 

at a work site in Houston, Texas. 

He was using a camera that 

contained an Ir-192 source with 

an activity of 3.1 TBq (85 curies). 

At one point, the radiographer 

removed the plug off the front 

of the camera to test the guide 

tube, however his alarming dose 

rate meter began to alarm. He 

then noticed that the source had 

come out of the camera about 

1.3 centimeters. About the same 

time, the radiographer accidentally 

dropped the camera plug, picked 

up the plug, and then made two 

unsuccessful attempts to push 

the source back in with the plug. 

He left his position at the front 

of the camera and walked to the 

back of the camera to turn the 

crank until the source went back 

into its shielded position. The 

radiographer then inserted the 

plug, and notified appropriate 

personnel.

The licensee sent the 

radiographer’s dosimetry for 

processing. The result was a whole 

body exposure of 0.946 cSv (946 

millirem). The radiation safety 

officer discussed the details of 

the event with the radiographer 

and re-enacted the event to 

attempt to estimate the exposure 

to the radiographer’s right hand, 

because of the close proximity 

of the source to the hand during 

the event. Based on the time and 

distance of the source to the hand, 

the estimated exposure is 66 cSv 

(66 rem). The licensee has hired a 

consultant to get a more accurate 

assessment of the exposure to 

the hand. The consultant and 

State regulators are assessing 

the circumstances to determine 

whether the radiographer’s hand 

contacted the source capsule. If 

so, he may have received up to 280 

cSv (280 rem) to the hand.

Event #3: Medical Event 

Involving Wrong Patient 

Treatment

Date and Place: July 17, 2008, 

Allentown, Pennsylvania

Nature and Probable Causes: The 

licensee reported that a patient 

prescribed to receive 0.74 GBq (20 

mCi) of I-131 was administered 

2.78 GBq (75 mCi) of I-131 on 

July 17, 2008. Two patients were 

scheduled for different I-131 

therapy doses and the doses got 

switched. The patient was given a 

blocking agent of 130 milligrams 

of SSKI approximately one hour 

after the I-131 administration. The 

next day, measurements indicated 

a 74 MBq (2 mCi) uptake to the 

patient’s thyroid and a 370 MBq 

(10 mCi) whole body retention. 

Both patients and their physicians 

were notified. Corrective actions 

included procedure modifications.

(Contact: Angela R. McIntosh, 

FSME, (301) 415-5030; e-mail: 

Angela.McIntosh@nrc.gov.)
10

SIGNIFICANT 

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s (NRC’s) enforcement 

program can be accessed via 

NRC’s homepage [http://www.

nrc.gov/] under “What We Do.” 

Documents related to cases can 

be accessed at [http://www.nrc.

gov/], “Electronic Reading Room,” 

“Documents in ADAMS.” ADAMS 

is the Agency-wide Document 

Access and Management System. 

Help in using ADAMS is available 

from the NRC Public Document 

Room, telephone: 301-415-4737 or 

1-800-397-4209. 

Portable Gauges

Alaska Rim Engineering, Inc. 

(EA-08-139 and EA-08-140) 

On September 17, 2008, a Notice 

of Violation and Exercise of 

Enforcement Discretion were 

issued for a Severity Level III 

problem. The violations involved 

possession and use of a portable 

gauge containing radioactive 

material without an NRC license, 

and failure to provide complete 

and accurate information in its 

license application dated March 

6, 2007. Specifically, from May 17, 

2003, until March 6, 2007, Alaska 

Rim Engineering, Inc., possessed 

and used a portable gauging 

device in the State of Alaska, a 

non-Agreement State, without 

an NRC license and on March 6, 

2007, Alaska Rim Engineering, 

Inc., submitted an application for 

an NRC license stating that it was 

planning to purchase and will be 

licensing one portable moisture 

density gauge. This is inaccurate 

because it had purchased and 

used the gauge in May 2003, 

without an NRC license.

R&M Engineering-Ketchikan, Inc. 

(EA-08-076) 

On September 10, 2008, a Notice 

of Violation and Proposed 

Imposition of Civil Penalty 

in the amount of $3,250 was 

issued for a Severity Level III 

violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i). The 

violation involved the licensee’s 

failure to use a minimum of two 

independent physical controls 

that formed tangible barriers to 

secure a portable gauge from 

unauthorized removal when the 

portable gauges was not under the 

control and constant surveillance 

of the licensee. Specifically, the 

licensee stored four portable 

gauges in its warehouse located in 

Ketchikan, Alaska, using only one 

independent physical control that 

formed a tangible barrier and the 

gauges were not under the control 

and constant surveillance of the 

licensee. 

Soil Technology Associates, Inc. 

(EA-08-200) 

On August 27, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the 

failure to use a minimum of two 

independent physical controls 

that form tangible barriers to 

secure portable gauges from 

unauthorized removal, when 

portable gauges are not under 

the control and constant 

surveillance of the licensee. 

Specifically, no tangible barrier 

existed to secure two portable 

gauges from unauthorized 

removal when the gauges were 

unattended and a roll up door 

was open at the licensee’s facility. 

While the gauges were stored 

within locked containers, the 

containers were not secured to 

prevent the containers and their 

contents from unauthorized 

removal, such that no independent 

physical controls that formed 

tangible barriers were present.

Ahern & Associates, Inc. 

(EA-08-150) 

On July 9, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued to Ahern 

& Associates, Inc. This action 

is based on a Severity Level 

III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) 

involving the licensee’s failure 

to maintain a minimum of two 

independent physical controls 

that formed tangible barriers to 

secure a portable gauge from 

unauthorized removal during a 

period when the portable gauge 

was not under the control and 

constant surveillance of the 

licensee. Specifically, a portable 

gauge was left unattended inside 

an unlocked storage area with 

only one physical control (a locked 

cabinet container) that formed 

a tangible barrier to secure the 

portable gauge.

McKinney and Company 

(EA-08-177) 

On July 9, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued to McKinney 

and Company. This action is based 

on a Severity Level III violation 

of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the 

licensee’s failure to maintain a 

minimum of two independent 

physical controls that formed 

tangible barriers to secure a 

portable gauge from unauthorized 

removal during a period when the 

portable gauge was not under the 

control and constant surveillance 

of the licensee. Specifically, five 

portable gauges were found 

unattended inside an unlocked 

building with only one physical 

control (a locked storage area 

door) that formed a tangible 

barrier to secure the portable 

gauges.
11

Morrison-Maierle, Inc.

(EA-08-041) 

On July 9, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a 

Severity Level III violation. The 

violation involved the failure 

to use a minimum of two 

independent physical controls 

that form tangible barriers to 

secure portable gauges from 

unauthorized removal, when the 

portable gauges are not under the 

control and constant surveillance 

of the licensee. Specifically, the 

licensee did not have tangible 

barriers to secure a portable gauge 

from unauthorized removal while 

stored in a building located within 

a secured area.

McCallum Testing Laboratories, 

Inc. (EA-08-004; EA-08-086) 

On May 28, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition 

of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$3,250 was issued for a Severity 

Level III problem. The violations 

involved the failure to control and 

maintain constant surveillance of 

material that is in an unrestricted 

area and not in storage and failure 

to block and brace packages 

containing radioactive material 

to prevent a change in position 

during transport. Specifically, 

a portable gauge fell from the 

back of a pickup truck, after it was 

placed in the back of the truck 

without using a transport case or 

attaching the gauge in any way to 

the truck. After falling, the gauge 

was subsequently damaged, and 

was lost for approximately an hour.

IBS of America Corporation

(EA-08-031) 

On June 6, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition 

of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3,250 was issued to IBS of 

America Corporation for a Severity 

Level III violation of 10 CFR 

30.34(c). Specifically, the licensee 

possessed byproduct material at 

a location not authorized by their 

license.

Industrial X-Ray

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. 

(EA-07-325; EA-08-196) 

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition 

of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $20,800 was issued to Alaska 

Industrial X-Ray, Inc. for a willful 

Severity Level II problem involving: 

(1) performing radiography at a 

location other than a permanent 

radiographic installation without 

the presence of two qualified 

individuals, in violation of 10 CFR 

34.41(a), and (2) failing to provide 

the NRC with information that 

was complete and accurate in 

all material respects, in violation 

of 10 CFR 30.9(a). The NRC also 

issued an immediately effective 

Order Modifying License to require 

additional actions by the licensee 

to provide reasonable assurance 

that the health and safety of the 

public will be protected.

Fuel Cycle Facilities

Global Nuclear Fuel -- Americas, 

L.L.C. (EA-08-187) 

On August 13, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition 

of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $16,250 was issued for a 

Severity Level (SL) III violation 

for circumstances surrounding 

an incorrect emergency action 

level declaration. The incorrect 

emergency action level declaration 

stemmed from an event that 

occurred on January 29-30, 

2008, also categorized as SL III 

(EA-08-123), involving introduction 

of moisture into the Dry 

Conversion Process Line-2 cooling 

hopper containing uranium 

dioxide powder. At the time of 

this event, Global Nuclear Fuels 

– Americas (GNF-A) instruments 

indicated that the cooling hopper 

contained uranium dioxide 

above the safe critical mass limit 

indicating a potential for criticality 

existed from an unsafe mass, 

while the system was undergoing 

maintenance testing. It was later 

determined that the cooling 

hopper contained a safe mass of 

uranium dioxide and the moisture 

in the powder was within normal 

limits. GNF-A initially declared the 

event as an “Off-Normal Condition” 

and later upgraded the event to 

an “Alert” without obtaining any 

new information. NRC concluded 

that GNF-A failed to follow its own 

procedure. GNF-A implemented 

immediate and long-term 

corrective actions to prevent this 

type of event from repeating. In 

this case, no actual consequences 

resulted because an inadvertent 

criticality accident did not occur. 

BWX Technologies, Inc. 

(EA-08-171) 

On August 8, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued to BWX 

Technologies, Inc. for a Severity 

Level III problem involving 

three violations of their license. 

Specifically, the licensee did not 

(1) inspect Raschig ring-filled 

vacuum (RRVCs) cleaners on 

multiple occasions between 

January 28, 2008, and March 5, 

2008, to ensure adequate levels 

of Raschig rings were present to 

prevent inadvertent criticality, (2) 

establish, prior to March 5, 2008, 

double contingency for operation 

of RRVCs to ensure that a criticality 

accident could not occur with only 
12

one change in process conditions, 

and (3) fill, prior to March 5, 2008, 

multiple RRVCs with well-settled 

Raschig rings in accordance with 

ANSI/ANS-8.5-1996 such that 

further settling was not likely 

during use. In this case, no actual 

consequences resulted because an 

inadvertent criticality accident did 

not occur.

Westinghouse Electric Company

(EA-08-165) 

On August 6, 2008, a Notice 

of Violation was issued to 

Westinghouse Electric Company, 

Commercial Nuclear Fuel 

Division, for a Severity Level 

III problem involving three 

violations associated with the 

loss, on February 4, 2008, of 

sixteen sample vials of uranium 

hexafluoride. Specifically, the 

violations involved: (1) the failure 

to properly document and control 

the transfer of sixteen sample 

vials of uranium hexafluoride from 

shipping and receiving to the 

chemistry laboratory as required 

by procedures; (2) the failure to 

secure from unauthorized removal 

the sixteen vials when they were 

stored in a controlled area and 

the failure to control and maintain 

constant surveillance of the 

sample vials when they were not 

in storage; and (3) the failure of 

an individual to annotate that he 

had read and acknowledged the 

procedure governing the disposal 

of empty shipping containers 

prior to performing that work 

assignment. In this case, there 

are no indications of any radiation 

or chemical exposures as a result 

of the licensee’s loss of control of 

the sixteen uranium hexafluoride 

sample vials.

AREVA NP, Inc. (EA-08-122) 

On June 13, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation. The violation 

involved the failure to properly 

prepare a package containing 

fuel service equipment such that 

dose rates on the surface of the 

package would not exceed 10 

CFR 71.5(a) and 49 CFR 173.441(a) 

limits. Specifically, on February 

3, 2008, AREVA shipped surface 

contaminated equipment as an 

open conveyance on a flatbed 

trailer. On February 4, 2008, the 

shipment arrived at a nuclear 

power facility with measured 

contact radiation levels between 

800-2000 mr/hr in a localized area 

on the bottom of the container. 

The localized area was not easily 

accessible and no measurable 

radiation exposures to workers or 

members of the public occurred as 

a result of this event. 

Miscellaneous

American Radiolabeled 

Chemicals, Inc. (EA-08-126) 

On July 22, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition 

of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$6500 was issued for a Severity 

Level III problem. The violation 

involved multiple examples 

of failure to adhere to license 

commitments and regulations. 

Specifically, between January 

22 and March 14, 2008, the 

licensee failed to: (1) secure from 

unauthorized removal or limit 

access to licensed material in an 

aggregate quantity greater than 

1000 times Appendix C to 10 CFR 

Part 20 limits; (2) comply with 

license commitments related to 

management oversight of the 

radiation protection program, 

including a failure to conduct 

monthly meetings of the 

Radiation Safety Committee and 

a failure to implement timely and 

adequate corrective actions for 

issues identified during annual 

program reviews; (3) comply with 

license commitments related 

to radiological surveys; and (4) 

perform and document required 

investigations of contamination 

found in controlled and 

unrestricted areas.

Chevron Environmental 

Management Company 

(EA-08-054) 

On July 8, 2008, a Confirmatory 

Order (effective immediately) 

(CO) was issued to confirm 

commitments made as result of 

an Alternative Dispute Resolution 

(ADR) session, held on June 

5, 2008, between Chevron 

Environmental Management 

Company (CEMC) and the NRC. 

The parties agreed to engage in 

ADR following NRC’s February 

29, 2008, letter to CEMC wherein 

an apparent violation of 10 CFR 

40.7, “Employee Protection” was 

identified. As set forth in the 

CO, CEMC agreed to complete 

a number of actions at its 

Washington, PA decommissioning 

site, including, but not limited to: 

training supervisory employees 

regarding employees’ rights to 

raise concerns; communicating 

CEMC’s policy and management 

expectations regarding employees’ 

right to raise concerns; and 

distributing a questionnaire to 

assess employees’ willingness 

to raise nuclear safety concerns. 

In turn, the NRC agreed to not 

pursue further enforcement action 

relating to this matter.
13

Individual Actions

Charles A. Leet (IA-08-025)

On September 17, 2008, a Notice 

of Violation was issued for a 

Severity Level III violation involving 

a deliberate submission of 

materially inaccurate information 

to the NRC and deliberately 

caused his employer, Alaska Rim 

Engineering, Inc., to be in violation 

of NRC regulations. Specifically, 

Mr. Leet, on behalf of Alaska Rim, 

purchased, received, possessed, 

and used a portable gauge 

device without an NRC license. In 

addition, on May 6, 2007, Mr. Leet 

submitted a license application 

to the NRC stating that Alaska 

Rim was planning to purchase 

the portable gauge when, in fact, 

Alaska Rim had already purchased 

the gauge in May 2003 and used it 

without an NRC license.

Scot A. Menzies (IA-08-010)

On September 10, 2008, a 

Notice of Violation was issued 

for a Severity Level III violation 

involving a deliberate failure to use 

a minimum of two independent 

physical controls that formed 

tangible barriers to secure portable 

gauges from unauthorized 

removal, when the portable 

gauges were not under the control 

and constant surveillance of the 

licensee. Specifically, Mr. Menzies 

did not use tangible barriers to 

secure portable gauges from 

unauthorized removal while in 

storage in the R&M EngineeringKetchikan, Inc., facility located in 

Ketchikan, Alaska.

Joseph S. Shepherd (IA-08-014)

On September 8, 2008, a 

Confirmatory Order (Effective 

Immediately) was issued to Mr. 

Joseph S. Shepherd, a contractor 

for Source Production and 

Equipment Company (SPEC), 

confirming commitments reached 

as part of conjoined negotiations 

with the Department of Justice 

(DOJ). As a result of the plea 

negotiations with DOJ, Mr. 

Shepherd agreed to not contest 

the Order. The Order was issued 

based on Mr. Shepherd’s failure 

to comply with certain NRC 

Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 

requirements regarding a shipping 

package and his engagement 

in deliberate misconduct which 

caused SPEC to be in violation of 

10 CFR 71.3. Specifically, SPEC, 

an NRC licensee pursuant to 10 

CFR Part 110, shipped licensed 

radioactive material to Mexico 

on July 15, 2003, December 4, 

2003, and May 20, 2004 while 

(1) the end caps were physically 

and dimensionally different from 

those approved in the CoC, and 

(2) the package was not inspected 

prior to shipment as required by 

the CoC. Mr. Shepherd agreed 

that he authorized modifications 

to the transportation package 

without prior NRC approval and 

that he concealed these package 

non-conformances from SPEC at 

the time of the shipments. Mr. 

Shepherd also agreed that he did 

not perform inspections of the 

shipping package as required by 

the CoC prior to the shipments 

to Mexico, but provided SPEC 

documentation which indicated 

that he performed the required 

inspections. As a result, SPEC, 

which relied on Mr. Shepherd’s 

representations that the shipping 

package complied with all 

regulatory requirements, shipped 

NRC licensed material without a 

license in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. 

The Order and DOJ agreement 

will prohibit Mr. Shepherd from 

participating in 10 CFR Part 71 

licensed activities indefinitely. 

He also will (1) be subject 

to additional unannounced 

inspections for five years from the 

date of the Order, (2) notify and 

make available copies of the Order 

to customers, (3) attend additional 

regulatory safety training, and 

(4) prepare a presentation for an 

industry conference describing the 

circumstances of his violations.

Patrick A. Kelly (IA-08-008)

On August 20, 2008, an 

Immediately Effective Order 

was issued to an individual 

prohibiting him from involvement 

in NRC-licensed activities for 

a period of one year from the 

date the Order was issued. The 

Order was issued based on 

his engagement in deliberate 

misconduct which caused his 

employer, Alaska Industrial 

X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 

CFR 34.41(a) and for providing 

the NRC with information that 

he knew was inaccurate or 

incomplete. Specifically, the 

individual deliberately violated 

10 CFR 34.41(a) by performing 

radiography with only one 

radiographer present at a 

temporary jobsite, on multiple 

occasions over about a 3-year 

period. In addition, when first 

interviewed by the NRC’s Office 

of Investigations, he deliberately 

provided information that he knew 

was incomplete or inaccurate.

Kenneth J. Vandiver (IA-08-006)

On August 20, 2008, an 

Immediately Effective Order 

was issued to the former 

radiation safety officer (RSO) 

for Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. 

(AIX), prohibiting him from 

Iinvolvement in NRC-licensed 
14

activities for a period of three 

years from the date the Order 

was issued. The Order was 

issued based on his engagement 

in deliberate misconduct on 

numerous occasions over several 

years, and providing the NRC 

with information that he knew 

was inaccurate or incomplete. 

Specifically, as RSO he was 

responsible for ensuring that 

radiation safety activities were 

being performed in accordance 

with approved procedures and 

regulatory requirements in the 

daily operation of the licensee’s 

program. In this case, not only did 

the individual deliberately violate 

10 CFR 34.41(a), he was also aware 

that other AIX radiographers 

were deliberately violating this 

requirement and took no actions 

to stop it. When questioned by 

the NRC, he knowingly provided 

incomplete and inaccurate 

information about the violations. 

Donald M. Miller (IA-08-007)

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation involving 

deliberate misconduct on the part 

of the individual which caused 

his employer, Alaska Industrial 

X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 

10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, 

the individual deliberately 

performed radiography, on 

multiple occasions, without being 

accompanied by at least one 

other qualified radiographer or an 

individual who had at a minimum 

met the requirements of 10 CFR 

34.43(c).

Sean J. Kelly (IA-08-009)

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation involving 

deliberate misconduct on the part 

of the individual which caused 

his employer, Alaska Industrial 

X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 

10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, 

the individual deliberately 

performed radiography, on 

multiple occasions, without being 

accompanied by at least one 

other qualified radiographer or an 

individual who had at a minimum 

met the requirements of 10 CFR 

34.43(c).

William M. Johnston (IA-08-022)

On May 23, 2008, a Notice of 

Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation involving a 

deliberate failure to provide the 

NRC with complete and accurate 

information, as required by 10 

CFR 30.10(a)(2). Specifically, in 

a report submitted to the NRC 

on May 18, 2006, the individual, 

as the radiation safety officer 

(RSO) for Global X-Ray and 

Testing Corporation, described 

an event that took place during 

radiographic operations on 

board a lay-barge on April 20, 

2006, but failed to include 

complete information regarding 

the radiation exposure to the 

radiographer involved in the 

event. He also failed to disclose 

the fact that the radiographer 

reported that his pocket dosimeter 

had gone off-scale and he did 

not reconcile or explain the 

discrepancy between the reported 

dose and the off-scale dosimeter 

reading.

SELECTED FEDERAL 

REGISTER NOTICES

(July 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008)

Governors’ Designees Receiving 

Advance Notification of 

Transportation of Nuclear Waste, 

73 FR 37508, July 1, 2008.

(Contact: Stephen N. Salomon, 

Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, 

301-415-2368; e-mail: Stephen.

Salomon@nrc.gov.)

Notice of Issuance of Regulatory 

Guides: (RG 10.3, Revision 2, 

NRC-2008-0382) 73 FR 39340, 

July 9, 2008; (RG-10.6, Revision 2, 

NRC-2008-0389) 73 FR 39735, July 

10, 2008; (RG 10.5, Revision 2, NRC 

2008-0396) 73 FR 39993, July 11, 

2008; and (RG 10.2, Revision 2, NRC 

2008-0393) 73 FR 39993, July 11, 

2008.

(Contact: Mark Orr, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research, 

301-415-6373, e-mail: Mark.Orr@

nrc.gov.)

10 CFR Part 20 James Salsman; 

Denial of Petition for Rulemaking 

(Docket No. PRM-20-26; 

NRC-2005-0017) 73 FR 4338, July 

25, 2008.

(Contact: Frank Cardile, Office 

of Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management 

Programs, 301-415-6185, e-mail: 

Frank.Cardile@nrc.gov.)

10 CFR Part 73 David Lochbaum, 

Union of Concerned Scientists; 

Consideration of Petition in the 

Rulemaking Process (Docket No. 

PRM-73-13; NRC-2007-0023) 73 FR 

43874, July 29, 2008.

(Contact: Lauren Quinones, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 

301–415-2007, or toll-free: 

800-368-5642, e-mail: Lauren.

Quinones@nrc.gov.)

10 CFR Part 35 Medical Use of 

Byproduct Material-Amendments/

Medical Event Definitions (RIN 

3150-AI26)(NRC-2008-0071), 73 FR 

45636, August 6, in-situ
15

(Contact: Edward M. Lohr, Office 

of Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management 

Programs, 301-415-0253, e-mail: 

Edward.Lohr@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 51 The Attorney 

General of Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, The Attorney 

General of California; Denial of 

Petitions for Rulemaking (Docket 

No. PRM-51-10; NRC-2006-0022 

and Docket No. PRM-51-12; 

NRC-2007-0019), 73 FR 46204, 

August 8, 2008.

(Contact: L. Mark Padovan, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 

301-415-1423, e-mail: Mark.

Padovan@nrc.gov)

NRC Enforcement Policy Revision, 

(NRC–2008–0497) 73 FR 53286, 

September 15, 2008.

(Contact: Doug Starkey, Office of 

Enforcement, 301-415-3456, email: 

Doug.Starkey@nrc.gov)

Notice of Issuance of Regulatory 

Guide (RG-10.8, Revision 3) 

(NRC-2008-0514), 73 FR 63451, 

September 16, 2008.

(Contact: Mark Orr, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research, 

301-415-6373, e-mail: Mark.Orr@

nrc.gov)

10 CFR Parts 2 and 13 

Adjustment of Civil Penalties for 

Inflation (RIN 3150-AI45) RG 10 

(NRC–2008–0412). 73 FR 54671, 

September 23, 2008.

(Contact: Maxwell C. Smith, 

Office of the General Counsel, 

301-–415–-1246, e-mail: Maxwell.

Smith@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Parts 2 and 13 “Adjustment 

of Civil Penalties for Inflation” 

(RIN 3150-AI45) (NRC-2008-0412), 

73 FR 54671, September 23, 2008.

(Contact: Maxwell C. Smith, 

Office of the General Counsel, 

301-415-1246, e-mail: Maxwell.

Smith@nrc.gov)

Notice of Issuance of Regulatory 

Guides (RG 10.7, Rev 2, 

NRC-2008-0533) and (RG 10.9 Rev 

2, NRC-2008-0536), 73 FR 55544, 

September 25, 2008 

(Contact: Mark Orr, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research, 

301-415-6373, e-mail: Mark.Orr@

nrc.gov)

NOTE TO READERS: In an attempt to keep the FSME Licensee Newsletter relevant, useful and informative, 

feedback on the content of the newsletter is welcome. Readers desiring to contribute articles, self-explanatory 

diagrams, suggestions for future articles, bulletins, web-site postings, and other items of interest to the FSME 

Licensee Newsletter readership, should contact Michael Williamson or Gwendolyn Davis, from the Office of Federal 

and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, Rulemaking Branch A. Mr. Williamson may be 

contacted at (301) 415-6234 or Michael.Williamson@nrc.gov. Ms. Davis may be contacted at (301) 415-8165 or 

Gwendolyn.Davis@nrc.gov. In addition, to ensure proper delivery of the FSME Licensee Newsletter, please report 

any address changes to Mr. Williamson to prevent any interruption of service.

Please send written correspondence and requests to: 

Michael K. Williamson, Editor 

FSME Licensee Newsletter

Office of Federal and State Materials and

Environmental Management Programs

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Two White Flint North, Mail Stop: T-8-F42

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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