GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives

October 1999 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE 

North Korea Restricts 

Food Aid Monitoring

GAO/NSIAD-00-35

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Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of State and U.S. 

Agency for International Development 24

Appendix II: Comments From the World Food Program 33

Figures Figure 1: Tons of Food Contributed to North Korea Through WFP

From the United States and Other Donors, January 1998 - June 1999 6

Figure 2: U.S. Contributions to North Korea Through WFP,

1996 - July 1999 7

Abbreviations

EU European Union

MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

WFP The World Food Program
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283605 Leter

October 8, 1999

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The United States is one of the largest donors of emergency food to North 

Korea, with cumulative donations since 1995 valued at about $365 million. 

Most U.S. food aid is channeled through the United Nation’s World Food 

Program and as of June 1999 accounted for approximately 88 percent of the 

World Food Program’s distributions to North Korea. According to the 

Department of State and the World Food Program, food aid is being 

provided for humanitarian purposes and is intended to be distributed 

primarily to children, women, and the elderly at schools, hospitals, and 

other institutions. The Department of State also believes that food 

donations may improve the climate of the bilateral relationship with North 

Korea on a host of issues, including concerns about North Korea’s 

development of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of peace on the 

Korean peninsula. Concerned about whether the World Food Program can 

adequately account for U.S. government-donated food aid to North Korea 

and prevent possible diversions of food aid to the military and ruling elite, 

you asked us to examine the procedures the World Food Program has 

established and implemented to monitor and report on U.S. governmentdonated food aid provided to North Korea.1

In carrying out this work, North Korea did not allow us to conduct an incountry review of the World Food Program’s procedures to monitor U.S. 

food aid. However, we collected and analyzed information from the U.S. 

Departments of Agriculture and State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and a consortium of U.S. private voluntary organizations that 

have used World Food Program monitoring systems in North Korea. We 

also performed interviews at and analyzed information from World Food 

1

A second GAO review, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to 

North Korea Under the Agreed Framework (GAO/RCED-99-276, Sept. 30, 1999), addresses 

your concerns over deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea under the Agreed Framework 

between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(North Korea).
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Program headquarters in Rome, Italy; met in Washington, D.C., with the 

World Food Program’s country director for North Korea; and obtained 

written responses to our questions on control procedures from the World 

Food Program’s country office in North Korea.

The World Food Program is the largest provider of donated food in the 

world, and its emergency operation in North Korea is one of its largest. The 

World Food Program negotiates implementation agreements with host 

governments and nongovernmental organizations that distribute the food. 

The World Food Program’s policy manual, Food Aid in Emergencies, 

prescribes standard language for these agreements, requiring—as in the 

case of North Korea—that (1) distributions of World Food Program food 

aid be monitored by the host country or nongovernmental recipient, and 

(2) food use and program audit reports be provided to the World Food 

Program. Once food relief projects have begun, the World Food Program is 

responsible for monitoring the distribution of the food to ensure that host 

governments and nongovernmental recipients use it in accordance with the 

agreements. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture coordinate U.S. donations to the World Food 

Program, while the Department of State is responsible for setting broad 

U.S. policy toward the World Food Program and North Korea.

Results in Brief U.S. policy is that no food aid will be provided to North Korea if it cannot 

be adequately monitored. The World Food Program has established 

procedures to track and monitor food aid deliveries in North Korea. 

However, the North Korean government has not allowed the World Food 

Program to fully implement its procedures, and as a result, it cannot be 

sure that the food aid is being shipped, stored, or used as planned. 

Specifically, the North Korean government, which controls food 

distribution, has denied the World Food Program full access to the food 

distribution chain and has not provided required reports on food use. 

Consequently, the World Food Program cannot be sure it is accurately 

reporting where U.S. government-donated food aid is being distributed in 

North Korea.

This report contains recommendations for improving accountability over 

food aid by using diplomatic means to encourage North Korea to allow 

greater oversight over food distribution and encourages the World Food 

Program to provide more comprehensive and timely reporting on food aid 

distributions within North Korea.
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Background Established by the United Nations in 1961, the World Food Program (WFP) 

is supported by voluntary contributions from donor countries and in 1998 

received more than $875 million worth of contributions from the United 

States, which is by far WFP’s largest donor. In 1998, WFP distributed nearly 

70 percent of all global food aid, feeding an estimated 75 million people that 

year. WFP operates in some of the most difficult environments in the world. 

These include food operations in East Timor, Kosovo, and numerous other 

countries that present political and security challenges for the delivery and 

monitoring of food aid.

Although WFP donations generally become the property of the recipient 

government once they arrive at port on a ship or cross the border on a 

train, WFP has a responsibility to its donors to ensure that donations are 

responsibly managed and reach targeted beneficiaries. WFP carries out its 

responsibility for accountability in part by negotiating implementation 

agreements with recipient governments and nongovernmental 

organizations that distribute its food aid. In most countries in which it 

operates, including North Korea, WFP is not directly responsible for food 

aid distribution, which is the responsibility of the recipient government.

In 1998 the United States provided more than four-fifths of all WFP food aid 

to North Korea2

 (see fig. 1 and 2). WFP donations are intended to help feed 

over 6.5 million people—primarily children, mothers, and the elderly—out 

of a population of approximately 23.5 million.3

 The World Food Program 

plans to deliver more food to North Korea in 1999—primarily anticipated 

donations from the United States—than it plans to provide to any other 

country in the world.

2

The volume and composition of bilateral food transfers, either donations or subsidized 

commercial purchases, between China and North Korea is unknown. WFP, however, 

estimates that China has provided North Korea over 2 million metric tons of food, including 

maize, maizemeal, rice, wheat, and wheat flour, since 1995. WFP’s country director in North 

Korea reported that Syria is also thought to have provided 42,000 metric tons of bilateral 

food aid in 1998.

3

U.S. government-donated food has included cornmeal, blended corn-soya, bulgur wheat, 

maize, rice, wheat, wheat flour, and vegetable oil.
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Figure 1: Tons of Food Contributed to North Korea Through WFP From the United 

States and Other Donors, January 1998 − June 1999

Source: WFP.
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Figure 2: U.S. Contributions to North Korea Through WFP, 1996 − July 1999 

Source: WFP.

WFP reported in 1998 that approximately 66 percent of food aid donated to 

North Korea was distributed to institutions such as nurseries, schools, and 

hospitals and that approximately 34 percent was distributed to unemployed 

laborers through food-for-work projects. (In food-for-work projects, food 

rations are used to compensate laborers and their families working on 

agricultural rehabilitation projects.)

U.S. policy is that food aid will not be provided to North Korea if it cannot 

be adequately monitored. To assist WFP in its monitoring, the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), beginning in 1997, and the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA), beginning in 1998, have given 

approximately $4.5 million to allow a consortium of U.S. private voluntary 

organizations—known as the Consortium—to monitor portions of U.S. 

donations provided through WFP to North Korea.4

 The Consortium also 

4

The composition of the Consortium changes from time to time, but the core member 

nongovernmental organizations include Amigos Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief 

Services, Mercy Corps, and World Vision.
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manages food-for-work projects with U.S. donations provided through 

WFP. The Consortium operates in close coordination with WFP’s country 

office in North Korea, uses WFP tracking and monitoring procedures, and 

reports to WFP’s country director for North Korea. State, USAID, and 

USDA officials have also participated in donor missions to observe WFP 

operations in North Korea.

WFP began food relief operations in North Korea in 1995 with three WFP 

staff (of which one was a full-time food monitor5

) operating out of a single 

office in Pyongyang, the capital city. In that first year, North Korean 

authorities distributed 20,000 metric tons of WFP food aid to a few of North 

Korea’s 211 counties. By 1999, WFP had begun its fifth consecutive relief 

operation, and its 46 staff (of which about 19 are full-time food monitors) 

were responsible for monitoring the distribution within 162 counties of 

hundreds of thousands of tons of food aid from their Pyongyang 

headquarters and five regional suboffices.

State, USDA, and USAID officials told us that international food aid has 

helped improve food availability in North Korea. Rather than widespread 

famine, which killed an undetermined number of people, there is now 

localized starvation and general nutritional deprivation. However, the 

actual scale of humanitarian suffering in North Korea remains unknown 

and widely debated. Although WFP performed a baseline nutritional survey 

in September 1998, WFP said that, despite repeated requests, North Korea 

has not permitted follow-up nutritional assessments. Officials from many 

relief organizations, including WFP, say that—because of North Korean 

constraints on access—the national level of need cannot be accurately 

determined.

According to nongovernmental organizations operating in North Korea, 

European Union reports, WFP, and other U.N. officials, successive floods 

and droughts since the mid-1990s have exacerbated food shortages. 

However, natural disasters are not the principal cause of continuing hunger 

in North Korea. A lack of arable land (18 to 20 percent of this mountainous 

country is arable) and fertilizers, poor agricultural and economic policies, 

subsequent economic collapse and an inability to afford commercial food 

5

A food monitor’s responsibilities, according to WFP’s policy manual, Food Aid in 

Emergencies, include (1) analyzing reports received from ports, regional and local 

warehouses, and distributing agencies; (2) conducting visits to distribution centers to 

inspect records of actual stocks; and (3) spot-checking actual distributions and observing 

distribution procedures.
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imports to replace subsidized imports from former Soviet states, and a 

reluctance to institute economic and agricultural reforms are widely 

considered to have transformed North Korea’s normal state of food import 

dependence into a chronic, life-threatening food shortage. The agricultural 

and food situation in North Korea, therefore, cannot be separated from the 

overall political system and economic condition of the country.

North Korea Limits 

Ability of WFP to 

Ensure Accountability

The World Food Program and State officials told us that there is no 

evidence of significant diversions of food aid to the military or governing 

elite in North Korea and that they have confidence in WFP’s ability to 

account for food aid in North Korea. However, neither organization can 

provide assurance that food aid is being managed according to plan and is 

reaching the intended beneficiaries because North Korea controls 

distribution of the food aid and restricts WFP’s ability to monitor how the 

food is used. The North Korean government has imposed constraints on 

WFP monitors, who do not have random access at all stages of the food 

distribution process. U.S. private voluntary organizations, State, USAID, 

and others have reported that North Korea has prevented effective 

monitoring of a significant portion of food donations, making it impossible 

to verify whether food has reached the target beneficiaries.

WFP Food Aid 

Accountability Standards

According to WFP’s policy manual, Food Aid in Emergencies (Book A, 

Policies and Principles, 1991), (1) WFP is responsible for assuring donors 

that their donations are properly used and (2) recipient governments are 

responsible for facilitating WFP’s oversight of their use of WFP food. WFP’s 

policy manual provides standard language for agreements between WFP 

and recipient governments that stipulate basic accountability, monitoring, 

and reporting requirements to help achieve these accountability objectives. 

For example, WFP’s standard agreement language specifies that a recipient 

government (1) “is responsible for ensuring that the commodities...are 

properly received, handled, distributed to the specified target beneficiaries, 

and accounted for”; (2) “will take measures to prevent unauthorized 

utilization of the commodities and ensure that the commodities are 

exclusively distributed to the beneficiaries”; and (3) within a specified 

period after the date the food aid program is completed, “the government 

will furnish WFP...a final report with final accounts which have been 

audited and certified by the auditor appointed or authorized by the [North 

Korean] Government.” These audit reports should, as described in the 

policy manual, provide WFP information on (1) the number of 

beneficiaries; (2) the quantities of food received; (3) where food was 
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distributed; (4) losses incurred, including the causes and measures taken to 

reduce losses; (5) the use of subsidies provided; (6) the impact on the 

beneficiaries’ nutritional condition as a result of WFP food donations; and 

(7) lessons learned.

According to WFP’s policy manual, monitoring includes (1) a careful 

analysis of reports received from “all operational units, including ports, 

regional and local-level warehouses, and distributing agencies”;

(2) “frequent visits to [distribution centers] to inspect records and actual 

stocks”; and (3) “spot-checking actual [distributions] and observing 

distribution procedures.” WFP’s standard agreement language on 

monitoring further specifies that the recipient government “will facilitate 

travel within the country of WFP officers and consultants and their access 

to all ports, stores, transshipment and distribution points where WFPsupplied commodities are received, stored, handled and distributed, in 

order to observe the handling, distribution and use of the commodities and 

any other inputs provided by WFP, and to observe operations at all stages.” 

WFP has completed four food relief operations and is conducting its fifth in 

North Korea. Each operation, typically about a year in duration, is 

governed by an agreement between WFP and the North Korean 

government. The agreements incorporate WFP’s standard language on 

monitoring and reporting. For example, North Korea agreed to facilitate 

WFP’s access to all distribution points and to allow WFP to observe the use 

of their food donations. 

According to WFP’s policy, the Executive Director can withdraw assistance 

or ask for restitution of donated food if a country has not met its obligation 

under its agreements with WFP. WFP’s policy states that the Executive 

Director is charged with correcting (in consultation with the recipient 

government) any inadequacies in project operations if it is determined that 

recipient governments have not abided by their agreements with WFP. It 

also states that the Executive Director may withdraw assistance in the 

event that essential corrections are not made. WFP’s agreement with North 

Korea states that in the event of a failure by one party to fulfill any of its 

obligations under the agreement, the other party may suspend or terminate 

the agreement.

Senior WFP officials told us that they have invested heavily in a 

comparatively large country presence, including 46 WFP staff (of which 

about 19 are dedicated monitors) that in recent months conducted more 

than 300 monitoring visits per month from WFP’s six offices. According to 
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WFP officials, monitors typically develop weekly monitoring plans and 

share these plans with North Korean government officials to get their 

approval on which counties they can visit. Once in the county, they select 

warehouses and conduct a paper check based on the food tracking system 

in place. After this, WFP monitors request that they be taken to a specific 

type of institution, such as a kindergarten or a hospital, where WFP food 

was sent. WFP officials said that county officials then determine which 

hospital or school the monitors can visit. Once at the institution, the 

monitors check the records, food stocks, and facilities.

WFP Accountability for 

Food Aid Largely Depends 

on North Korean 

Government

WFP is responsible to its donors to ensure food is used as intended. WFP’s 

officials told us one of the primary mechanisms they rely on in North Korea 

is the extreme degree of order imposed by the government, a communist 

dictatorship, on all facets of society. We were also told that diversions of 

food were unlikely because (1) the Army and party elite have preferential 

access to national agricultural production (which is mainly rice and more 

desirable than WFP’s wheat donations), (2) China and other countries 

provide food aid that can be used by the military and elite, (3) the Army has 

its own agricultural production, (4) there is a culture of respect for state 

authority, and (5) intense regimentation of all sectors of society precludes 

theft. The “cultural element,” we were told, is a natural safeguard in WFP’s 

operations in North Korea because it minimizes the risk of diversions due 

to larceny and petty corruption. WFP further describes its operations in 

North Korea as essentially a North Korean government program, in which 

WFP’s role is to help North Korean authorities implement the program by 

providing advice, establishing internal control systems, monitoring to see if 

systems work, and training government officials in food management.

WFP’s Tracking System in 

North Korea Does Not 

Adequately Track Food 

From Time of Arrival to 

Distribution to Final 

Beneficiaries

The internal transport of WFP food in North Korea is the responsibility of 

the North Korean government. WFP and the North Korean government 

established a food tracking system in 1997 to collect information from the 

government about its distribution of WFP food. WFP attempts to track food 

aid trucked from the ports to county warehouses using this system, called 

the “consignment note system,” which is administered by North Korean 

authorities. The tracking system uses multiple, color-coded waybills 

written in English and Korean. (A waybill is a document prepared by the 

carrier of a shipment of goods that identifies the contents of the shipment 

and the location where the food will be delivered.) Waybills are prepared 

by North Korean authorities when a truck leaves a port or rail siding. Food 

aid is generally not transported directly from the port to its ultimate 
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consumers. Rather, WFP told us, the food is trucked to a warehouse, where 

food aid is often stored prior to distribution to recipient kindergartens, 

schools, hospitals, and other institutions. North Korean authorities compile 

the waybills used in the distribution of a particular shipment of food and 

provide them to WFP, which enters the information into a computer 

database. WFP and North Korean government authorities co-develop and 

co-sign food distribution plans and then use the waybills to verify that the 

distribution to warehouses took place as agreed. 

However, North Korean control of the tracking system and the access 

constraints they impose on WFP prevent WFP from independently 

verifying at each step of the process that the North Korean authorities have 

in fact delivered the food to agreed-upon warehouses. North Korean 

authorities transport and store the food, complete the paperwork, manage 

the warehouses, and do not allow WFP to conduct unrestricted spot checks 

along the transportation route or storage sites. Without the ability to 

conduct random spot checks, WFP cannot independently verify the 

accuracy of the North Korean paperwork. A WFP official told us, however, 

that in North Korea no one, including most North Koreans, is granted 

freedom of movement. He also told us that WFP believes county 

warehouse managers, who receive copies of the distribution plans, would 

complain if they did not receive their designated allotment of food. U.S. 

nongovernmental relief organizations (the Consortium), supported by 

USAID and USDA and working collaboratively to monitor U.S. donations to 

North Korea through WFP, use this same tracking system. The Consortium 

reported to USAID in 1997 and 1998 and told us in August 1999 that because 

of North Korean restrictions on access, there was no way anyone could 

independently verify that food was distributed as planned.

According to WFP officials in Rome and North Korea, the tracking system 

in North Korea was designed primarily to track food aid transported by 

trucks from the seaport to county warehouses. The system does not track 

the transportation of some food while it is on trains or barges before it is 

transferred to trucks for delivery to warehouses. Nor does the system track 

food during the period when it is transported from the warehouse to the 

estimated 43,000 institutions where the food is actually distributed to 

individual beneficiaries. The warehouse manager records shipments from 

the warehouses to the institutions, and WFP monitors, we were told, can 

sometimes access and compare these records to those at the recipient 

institutions. According to WFP, food aid transported by rail may take 7 days 

to arrive at its destination, and these shipments are not covered by the 

tracking system during this time. A Consortium member told us that, to be 
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effective, any food tracking system should provide for independent spot 

checks and random sampling along the entire distribution system, 

including the final distribution of food to beneficiaries.

North Korea Precludes 

Effective Food Monitoring

According to senior WFP officials in Rome and responses to our questions 

from the North Korea country office, North Korea has not allowed WFP 

independent, unrestricted access to monitor the food distribution process. 

WFP officials told us that North Korean authorities 

• do not allow WFP monitors to act independently and conduct random 

monitoring visits; 

• have given WFP monitors incomplete information about the numbers, 

names, and location of institutions and the numbers of beneficiaries at 

locations receiving its food; 

• have rarely allowed WFP monitors to select the institutions they wish to 

visit; and

• prevent independent monitoring of the distribution of food aid to the 

vast majority of beneficiary institutions. 

WFP estimates that 90 percent of the North Korean institutions receiving 

food aid have not received monitoring visits, and WFP monitors have rarely 

been allowed to observe the actual distribution of food to beneficiaries. 

WFP officials told us that even with complete access, it would not attempt 

to monitor 100 percent of the institutions receiving its food but would 

instead monitor a smaller, randomly selected set of representative 

institutions. WFP has determined that in North Korea a 10-percent 

sampling rate for monitoring is adequate. However, WFP said that because 

of North Korean restrictions it is unable to randomly select the institutions 

it monitors. As a result, WFP (1) cannot generalize its findings from those 

institutions to which it has been granted access by the government and

(2) cannot randomly visit institutions about which, based on previous 

visits, it may have particular concerns.

According to WFP senior officials in Rome, statements by the WFP 

Executive Director in August 1999, and WFP’s August 13, 1999, weekly 

report (“WFP Emergency Report”), food is getting to the beneficiaries. As 

evidence, they referred to the observations of WFP monitors and the 

Executive Director, based on her August review of WFP operations in 

North Korea, that (1) attendance at institutions receiving food aid—such as 

kindergartens and schools—has increased and (2) the condition of the 

children to whom the bulk of WFP food is supposed to go to has apparently 
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improved. Consortium reports have also noted that they believed that food 

was getting to the target population. While noting progress in reaching the 

needy, the Executive Director also pointed out areas where WFP needs 

greater cooperation from North Korea. According to the September 1999 

report of her visit, the Executive Director emphasized to North Korea’s 

Minister of foreign affairs the need for North Korea to provide WFP 

monitors greater access and a list of institutions receiving its food.

The North Korean government does not allow WFP to independently visit 

beneficiary institutions to confirm the amounts of food they receive. 

Furthermore, a Consortium member told us in August 1999 that North 

Korean government restrictions made it impossible to ensure that food was 

getting to the intended beneficiaries because there was no way to 

independently document where all the food was going. These North Korean 

government-imposed access limitations and WFP’s resulting inability to 

conduct unrestricted, random spot checks seriously hamper WFP’s ability 

to achieve food aid accountability. 

Other Organizations Report 

Similar Concerns About North 

Korean Restrictions on Providing 

Accountability

The Consortium and others have expressed concern over North Korean 

restrictions on both WFP’s and their own ability to adequately account for 

food and other assistance. The Consortium has monitored distributions of 

U.S. donations through WFP in North Korea since 1997, and WFP officials 

told us that the Consortium uses WFP accountability, monitoring, and 

reporting procedures. The Consortium reported to USAID in 1997 and 1998 

and told us in 1999 that, while they feel that most food reaches the intended 

beneficiaries, the North Korean authorities prevented their effective 

monitoring of significant amounts of the food distributed. As a result, 

Consortium monitors reported they could not verify how much food was 

received by the beneficiaries. 

In 1997, the Consortium team reported to USAID concerns about the effect 

of North Korean constraints on WFP food aid monitoring. The team 

reported that (1) some areas of the country that had received food aid had 

never been visited by monitors; (2) donors, such as WFP, had only marginal 

control over the distribution; (3) monitoring for all donors was restricted to 

prearranged visits to a limited number of sites and could not be conducted 

independently; and (4) government-assigned translators—whose first 

priority was reportedly to protect the image of their government—“covered 

up” things that they felt the Consortium team did not need to see or 

understand and worked to restrict the movement of the team. The team 

concluded: “We saw food, people, warehouses, and officials, but cannot 

fully verify where the food goes, how it gets there, and whether the 
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assistance reaches the entire target group.” In 1998, the Consortium team 

reported to USAID concerns about the ability of any organization to 

maintain adequate control over food donations in North Korea. The team 

reported that accountability for food aid was inadequate because (1) the 

Consortium had no control over when or what project site to visit; (2) the 

number of workers participating in the food-for-work projects appeared 

inflated by authorities and therefore food may have been distributed to 

people outside the targeted group; and (3) they remained uncertain of how 

much food was actually provided to laborers.”

USAID, the European Union (EU), and other international relief 

organizations have expressed concerns about the impact of North Korean 

restrictions and their inability to adequately account for donations in North 

Korea

• In 1997, officials of USAID who participated in a donor review of WFP 

operations in North Korea wrote in their trip report that (1) food 

distributions seemed “staged,” with only a limited number of the 

enrolled recipients turning out to receive food, and (2) there was less 

food than they expected, given the agreed-upon distribution plan, in 

county depots and distribution sites.

• EU, a major donor in the past, had problems monitoring food aid in 

North Korea, according to a May 1998 report.6

 After conducting a review 

of WFP operations in North Korea, EU representatives wrote that WFP’s 

monitoring of food aid could be “more rigorously pursued.” In a separate 

report in March 1999,7

 European Commission officials wrote that (1) it 

was seldom possible for EU monitors to follow a distribution of EU food 

through the North Korean distribution system, (2) the actual number of 

children per kindergarten or nursery appeared inflated by 25 to 30 

percent, (3) the number of patients declared by hospitals where food 

was provided was likewise largely overestimated, and (4) the EU 

monitors had doubts as to whether food received by the hospitals was 

distributed to needy patients.

6

“Technical Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 9 - 16 May 1998,” and 

cover letter, by representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 

Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the European Commission.

7

Report on the European Commission’s food aid and agricultural rehabilitation program in 

North Korea during 1998, as prepared for presentation to European Union member states’ 

representatives of the Food Security Management Committee in March 1999.
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• In September 1998, the international humanitarian organization 

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF, Doctors Without Borders) ended its 

nutritional programs and withdrew from North Korea after 1 year 

because, according to a report by the MSF Head of Mission in North 

Korea,8

 (1) North Korean authorities prevented it from evaluating the 

impact of its assistance, (2) many hospitals inflated their registers with 

“fake malnourished” children, and (3) the central government attempted 

to cover up or deny the existence of the most malnourished children and 

denied MSF access to them. MSF officials told us that it left North Korea 

because it was suspicious about the lack of access by final beneficiaries 

to their medical assistance and that they remain convinced—though 

they lack evidence either way—that a large portion of international food 

aid is not reaching the needy.

• In May 1999, WFP, dozens of U.S. and international nongovernmental 

organizations, and United Nations agencies with programs in North 

Korea held an international conference on humanitarian assistance to 

North Korea in Beijing, China.9

 These organizations concluded that 

North Korea (1) has not accepted international standards to ensure that 

assistance has reached those in need, (2) has not allowed adequate 

access to vulnerable groups, and (3) requires prearranged monitoring 

visits. 

Despite concerns about North Korean constraints on WFP’s ability to verify 

the use of food aid, officials of the State Department, USAID, USDA, and 

Consortium members told us that WFP is doing a good job under difficult 

circumstances and that they believe that the vast majority of U.S. 

government-donated food is reaching its intended beneficiaries.

Food Shipped to Counties Later 

Closed to WFP Monitors by 

North Korean Military

North Korea is comprised of 211 counties. For reasons of national security 

or, according to WFP and U.S. nongovernmental groups working in North 

Korea, in order to prevent foreigners from observing the regions most 

severely affected by the food shortage, North Korea routinely forbids 

foreigners entry into many counties. According to WFP officials in North 

Korea, the number of closed counties—counties where North Korean 

8

“Identification of an At-Risk Group: Socially Deprived Children,” released by MSF head of 

mission (Pyongyang, North Korea: Medecins sans Frontieres, Sept. 11, 1998).

9

“International NGO [Nongovernmental Organization] Conference on Humanitarian 

Assistance to the DPR (Democratic People’s Republic] Korea: Past, Present and Future, May 

3−5, 1999” (Beijing, China). This conference was sponsored by a nongovernmental umbrella 

organization, InterAction, headquartered in Washington, D.C.
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authorities forbid WFP monitoring of its donations—has declined from 174 

in 1996 to 49 in 1999, as the North Koreans have developed greater trust in 

WFP. Currently, WFP has controlled access to 162 of North Korea’s 211 

counties.

WFP’s agreements with North Korea stipulate that WFP shall have access 

to monitor wherever WFP food is distributed. These agreements are 

consistent with the frequently stated position of the Department of State—

that no U.S.-donated food shall be distributed that cannot be adequately 

monitored. WFP told us, however, that in 1998 North Korean authorities 

distributed at least 14,738 metric tons of WFP food to counties that they 

had previously agreed would be open to WFP monitors but that after 

distribution, the North Korean military blocked WFP from monitoring how 

the food was used. The ultimate disposition of the food remains unknown. 

WFP said that in one incident in May 1998, North Korean authorities 

trucked food aid to 18 counties previously designated as open and then 

denied access to WFP monitors. WFP reported that in a second incident in 

October 1998, North Korean authorities trucked WFP food aid to 26 

counties previously designated as open and then again denied access. WFP 

did not report food aid shipped to the subsequently closed counties as lost 

or stolen.

As a result of these North Korean actions, WFP, in commenting on a draft of 

this report, stated that it took the following corrective measures. In May 

1998, WFP introduced a policy of “no access-no food.” As a result, the 

delivery of food to counties where WFP had no access was stopped, and 

the corresponding amount of food aid was deducted from the totals 

planned for the overall operation. In August 1999, when WFP could not get 

access to nine counties, WFP decided to reallocate the food originally 

intended for these counties to provide increased rations for pregnant and 

lactating women in accessible counties.

WFP Subsidizes North Korean 

Deliveries of its Donations

To promote North Korea’s compliance with the agreed-upon distribution 

plans, and because WFP relies on the fuel-poor government to transport its 

food, WFP pays a fuel subsidy to the North Korean government of

$8 dollars for every ton of food transported by truck. WFP reported that as 

of August 1999 it had paid North Korea over $5 million in fuel subsidies to 

help pay for transportation services and that it is due to pay $2.6 million 

more for food transported earlier in the year. If WFP learns, through its 

waybill system, that North Korean authorities have transported food to 

counties where monitoring is forbidden, WFP can reduce the total fuel 

subsidy by an amount equal to the subsidy that would have been paid for 
B-283605

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transporting that food. For example, as a result of the 14,738 metric tons of 

food shipped to closed counties in 1998, WFP told us that in late 1998 it 

withheld $117,901 in fuel subsidies.

WFP Not Meeting Reporting 

Requirements, and Loss 

Rates May Not Be Accurate

WFP guidelines require that the program report to donors on food use upon 

the completion of an emergency operation, and host governments are 

required to provide an audit report at the end of each emergency operation. 

We found that North Korea has not provided any audit reports to WFP as 

required by its agreements. This has impacted WFP’s ability to accurately 

report back to its donors. We also found that, partly as a consequence, WFP 

has not provided the latest report to donors. Given North Korean 

constraints on WFP accountability procedures, WFP cannot be sure of the 

accuracy of its reports to donors on food use because it cannot 

independently verify where food aid has been provided.

WFP policy requires it, upon the completion of an emergency operation, to 

provide reports to donors on the use of food, including losses. WFP 

officials in Rome told us that WFP has distributed reports to donors on 

North Korea operations for 1995, 1996, and 1997, but it has not yet met its 

requirement to provide reports on operations in 1998. WFP officials told us 

that they are routinely late—frequently over a year—in providing reports to 

donors, in part because recipient governments are late in providing 

information to WFP. WFP’s project report for 1997, though distributed, is 

incomplete, and its report for 1998 is late in part because North Korea has 

not provided food use information to WFP. 

WFP agreements with North Korea specify that North Korea must provide 

an audit report upon the completion of an operation. These audit reports 

are intended to provide WFP information about the beneficiaries, the 

quantity and condition of the food received, where it was distributed, any 

losses, the government’s use of WFP subsidies, the nutritional impact of 

WFP food donations on beneficiaries, and lessons learned. North Korea has 

not provided any of the audit reports that are due to WFP for programs it 

has already completed. 

WFP policy requires WFP monitors to observe distribution of food aid to 

verify government reports on food use, which together provide the basis 

for the Executive Director’s reports to donors. Because North Korea does 

not allow WFP to fully monitor food distribution as its policies require, 

WFP cannot provide the independent check to ensure the accuracy of 

government reporting. WFP officials told us that the issue of North Korean 
B-283605

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

reporting delays “has consistently been raised with the government.” They 

also told us that WFP’s Executive Director had discussed the importance of 

timely reporting to donors with senior North Korean officials. WFP officials 

could not tell us, however, whether any agreement emerged from this 

discussion.

Conclusions The World Food Program is responsible to its donors to provide reasonable 

assurance that donations are appropriately managed and reach targeted 

beneficiaries and to provide donors timely and accurate reports on food 

use in North Korea. Without this information, donors will be unable to 

make informed decisions to either emphasize to North Korean authorities, 

through diplomatic means, the importance of better accountability or to 

decrease their contributions to the World Food Program’s operations in 

North Korea. The World Food Program agrees that because of the North 

Korean constraints, it is unable to randomly monitor food aid in North 

Korea. As a result, the World Food Program is unable to provide 

independent assurance that food aid distributed by North Korean 

authorities is reaching targeted beneficiaries. North Korean constraints on 

the World Food Program may also put it in the position of inadvertently 

paying fuel subsidies to transport food outside the agreed-upon distribution 

plans. The World Food Program, State, USAID, and USDA officials have 

emphasized that there is no evidence of significant diversions to the 

military or governing elite. However, neither is there evidence that the 

proper amount of food is reaching the intended beneficiaries. Because of 

North Korean restrictions on monitoring, there is insufficient evidence 

either way.

Recommendations In order to comply with State Department policy that no food aid be 

provided to North Korea that cannot be adequately monitored, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. Representative at the 

U.S. Mission to the U.N. Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome, Italy, 

to 

• emphasize to the North Korean representative to the U.N. Agencies for 

Food and Agriculture the importance of meeting its commitments 

agreed to in agreements with the World Food Program, including 

granting World Food Program staff improved access to track and 

monitor World Food Program food donations and providing required 

audit reports in a timely fashion, and 
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• request that the World Food Program’s Executive Director provide the 

U.S. government comprehensive and timely reports on the use of U.S.-

donated food in North Korea, including information on (1) North Korea’s 

monitoring restrictions; (2) the impact of monitoring restrictions on the 

World Food Program’s ability to provide independent, accurate reports 

on food use; (3) the World Food Program’s efforts to persuade North 

Korean authorities to allow the World Food Program to perform 

independent monitoring; (4) North Korean responses to the World Food 

Program’s suggested improvements; and (5) the use by the World Food 

Program’s Executive Director of her authority to withhold food aid and 

fuel subsidies as one method of responding to North Korean-imposed 

constraints to effective accountability.

Should North Korea’s cooperation in working to achieve commonly 

accepted food aid accountability standards—with emphasis on access and 

independent verification—be unsatisfactory, we recommend that the 

Secretary of State consider whether a change in U.S. policy on food aid 

operations in North Korea may be appropriate.

Agency Comments We requested comments on a draft of this report from the World Food 

Program, the Departments of Agriculture and State, and USAID. The World 

Food Program generally agreed with our report findings, detailed its efforts 

to improve monitoring, noted the strong congressional and administration 

support for the program, and stated that despite the difficulties of 

operating in North Korea the humanitarian needs in North Korea were the 

primary consideration of the program. The Department of Agriculture 

provided comments orally and was in general agreement with the findings 

and recommendations in this report. The Department of State and USAID 

provided written comments. Their comments and our evaluation of them 

are in appendix I. The World Food Program’s written comments are in 

appendix II. State and USAID stated that they believed the draft (1) relied 

on the most negative examples available and was overly critical of the 

World Food Program’s ability to provide accountability over U.S. 

donations, (2) noted a linkage between U.S. food donations and overall 

national security goals that did not exist, and (3) mischaracterized U.S. 

policy on monitoring food donations. In addition, USAID stated that famine 

conditions persist in North Korea, and ample evidence exists that the 

proper amount of U.S. donations reaches the target population. However, 

both State and USAID stated that they will work with the World Food 

Program and the North Koreans to implement our recommendations aimed 
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at improving accountability over U.S. donations through improvements in 

monitoring and reporting.

We do not agree with State and USAID on a number of their comments. We 

believe that we were not overly critical of the World Food Program’s ability 

to provide adequate accountability over U.S. food donations. Our 

assessment was based on information we obtained from the World Food 

Program and the Consortium, and officials from these organizations told us 

that because of North Korean restrictions effective monitoring was not 

possible. We did not mischaracterize U.S. policy on monitoring U.S. food 

donations to North Korea. U.S. policy is to insist on adequate monitoring to 

ensure food is distributed to targeted populations. For example, in October 

1998, State said that “no U.S. food aid is distributed if it cannot be 

monitored.” USAID stated that our report could leave the impression that 

the famine in North Korea was over; however, our report is clear that we 

did not assess the impact of the famine or food aid needs, although we 

noted that there is not a consensus on either of these issues. We disagree 

with USAID that there is ample evidence that the proper amount of food is 

reaching the beneficiaries. We found that because of North Korean 

restrictions there is no definitive evidence on how much food aid is needed 

or that food is reaching the beneficiaries in the proper amounts. 

Furthermore, because North Korea has refused to allow the World Food 

Program to conduct follow-on nutritional surveys, the World Food Program 

cannot use this method to determine whether food aid is being used as 

intended. Finally, we have revised the report, based on State and USAID 

comments, to explicitly state the official U.S. position that there is no 

linkage between food donations and overall national security goals in 

North Korea.

State, USAID, and the World Food Program also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine whether the World Food Program had established and 

implemented controls for monitoring and reporting on U.S. governmentdonated food aid to North Korea, we interviewed senior World Food 

Program officials at WFP headquarters in Rome, Italy, and the World Food 

Program’s country director for North Korea in Washington, D.C. We also 

collected written responses to our questions from the World Food 

Program’s country office in North Korea. We solicited additional input from 

spokesmen of the U.S. private voluntary organization Consortium and 

other members of nongovernmental organizations active in North Korea, 
B-283605

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

and we reviewed and assessed World Food Program and Consortium 

reports to the U.S. government, European Union reports, and 

nongovernmental conference proceedings. We collected and analyzed 

information from the Departments of State and Agriculture and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development. North Korea did not allow us to 

conduct an in-country review of the World Food Program’s procedures and 

controls in place to prevent diversions. 

As an agency of the U.S. government, we do not have audit authority over 

the World Food Program. Nonetheless, the organization was generally 

helpful and cooperative in our study.

We performed our review from June 1999 through September 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, 

we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issuance 

date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to other interested 

committees; the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the Secretary of State; 

the Honorable J. Brady Anderson, Administrator, Agency for International 

Development; the Honorable Dan Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture; 

and Ms. Catherine Bertini, Executive Director of the World Food Program.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me or Phillip 

Thomas at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this assignment were Ned 

George and Christian Hougen.

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues 
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development ApendxIi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end 

of this appendix.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.

Now on p. 1.

See comment 2.

Now on pp. 4, 7, and 19.

See comment 3.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

Now on p. 1.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 8.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 12, 14, and 16.

See comment 5.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

Now on p. 14.

See comment 6.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 7.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development’s letters, dated September 27 

and September 29, 1999, respectively.

GAO Commets 1. Our draft report did not present an unbalanced view of WFP’s ability to 

monitor food aid or rely on the most negative examples available. We used 

information from the most knowledgeable sources available: WFP and 

representatives of the private voluntary organizations active in North 

Korea. Both organizations have tried to monitor food aid in North Korea for 

years, and both acknowledge that North Korean restrictions impair their 

ability to provide the independent, random monitoring needed to verify 

that food is reaching the intended beneficiaries. WFP also told us that 

because of these limitations, it has not been able to visit 90 percent of the 

institutions where food is supposed to be distributed. USAID has paid the 

Consortium $4.5 million, in part to report on their ability to monitor food 

aid. Their reports to USAID, covering 1997 through 1999, document a 

persistent inability to independently monitor food donations. These 

limitations were further confirmed by (1) USAID’s 1997 assessment of the 

World Food Program’s program in North Korea; (2) the European 

Commission; and (3) the 1999 Beijing Conference, attended by WFP, other 

U.N. organizations, dozens of private voluntary organizations, and a State 

Department representative. In all these cases, they concluded that because 

of North Korean restrictions it was impossible to conduct adequate 

monitoring to determine if food was reaching the intended recipients. 

2. State and USAID stated that food aid is provided to North Korea on 

purely humanitarian grounds and that there is no explicit link to U.S. 

efforts to promote nuclear deterrence and promote peace on the Korean 

peninsula. We have modified our report as suggested. 

3. We did not mischaracterize U.S. policy on monitoring U.S. food 

donations to North Korea. U.S. policy is to insist on adequate monitoring to 

ensure food is distributed to targeted populations. For example, in October 

1998, State said that “no U.S. food aid is distributed if it cannot be 

monitored,” and in March 1999, the U.S. Department of Agriculture stated 

that “no food aid to (North Korea) is distributed without WFP monitoring.” 

4. USAID agreed that the level of food needed in North Korea cannot be 

accurately determined but expressed concern that our observation could 

leave the impression that the famine is not real. While there is a consensus 

that there have been food shortages, we did not attempt to verify the full 
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

impact of the famine on North Korea or estimate the level of food needs. 

However, we did note, during the course of the review, that there was not a 

consensus on the precise impact of the famine or the food needs. In 

commenting on our draft, WFP agreed that the food needs of North Korea 

could not be precisely determined because of North Korean resistance to 

conducting a nationwide nutritional survey.

5. We agree with USAID that the Consortium member was not officially a 

Consortium spokesman and have modified the report accordingly. 

6. We disagree with USAID that there is sufficient evidence, as documented 

by WFP’s monitoring systems and the observations of independent 

observers, to demonstrate that the proper amount of food is reaching the 

beneficiaries. As we state in the report, we believe that there is insufficient 

evidence to make this determination. WFP agreed that it has not been able 

to make random, independent spot checks on any part of the distribution 

system, and it has not been allowed to visited 90 percent of the institutions 

where food is supposed to be distributed. Moreover, WFP and Consortium 

officials told us that, because of North Korean restrictions placed on WFP 

monitoring, there is simply no evidence that diversions are or are not 

occurring. We also note that North Korea has not agreed to WFP’s plans to 

conduct a follow-on nutritional survey to determine the impact of food aid. 

Finally, we found no independent observers who have been given 

unrestricted access to determine the impact of food aid on the overall 

target population. This includes the WFP Executive Director and 

representatives from USAID and State. 

7. We disagree with USAID that since there is no evidence of any 

significant diversions of food, we should delete any reference to the 

possibility that the fuel subsidies could be paid to help transport diverted 

food aid. As we noted in the report, given the North Korean constraints 

imposed on WFP, there is also no evidence that diversions are not 

occurring. Therefore, references to the payment of fuel subsidies remain in 

the report.
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance

Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program ApendxIi
Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II

Comments From the World Food Program

(711429) Letr Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-35 Foreign Assistance
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