GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

10:00 a.m., EST

Thursday,

March 4, 1999

MILITARY PILOTS

Observations on Current 

Issues 

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director

Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National 

Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our preliminary 

findings and observations from work on pilot shortages, which we are 

doing at the request of this Subcommittee. Pilot shortages pose significant 

challenges because each pilot replacement, according to service data, costs 

the Department of Defense (DOD) up to $6 million in training and requires 

years of investment in training time and experience.

Today, I will discuss (1) the validity of pilot requirements, (2) the extent of 

the reported shortages and where they exist, (3) the key factors 

contributing to pilot shortages, (4) the services’ plans for correcting such 

shortfalls, and (5) other steps that could be taken to address the problem. 

My focus will be on pilots in the Air Force and the Navy, because these two 

services are reporting the most critical shortages. Let me emphasize that 

this information is preliminary in nature in that we are continuing to 

explore these issues.

Summary The extent of pilot shortages is unclear due to questions over the validity of 

pilot requirements and the availability of the data on which the shortages 

are based. Currently, the services are reporting that they are able to fill all 

of their operational flying positions but are unable to fill all of their 

nonflying staff positions that are designated for qualified pilots. The 

seriousness of these shortages is unclear because the services have not 

made comprehensive assessments of their nonflying positions to determine 

how many of these staff positions might not have to be filled by pilots. The 

services report that 20 to 40 percent of their pilot positions are designated 

as nonflying positions. Notwithstanding difficulties with the requirements, 

the Air Force projects that its greatest shortfall, particularly within its 

fighter community, will occur in fiscal year 2007 and then taper off. Navy 

data indicate that the Navy may have already experienced its greatest pilot 

shortfall, particularly within its helicopter community, in fiscal year 1998, 

and that its pilot shortage will gradually dissipate although not disappear. 

Two key factors have contributed to the reported pilot shortfalls. First, 

during the drawdown in the 1990s, the services reduced their pilot 

accessions. This action has unintentionally resulted in insufficient 

numbers of pilots to support the current force and is driving the need to 

retain more pilots. Second, pilots are unhappy with a number of quality-oflife factors that are causing them to consider leaving.
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

The issue of pilot shortfalls is multi-faceted, and no single step will solve 

the problem. The services are taking steps to address the shortfalls. For 

example, all of the services are filling their flying positions first and then 

their nonflying positions on a priority basis. The Air Force is trying to 

encourage pilots to stay until retirement through a new initiative to ease 

the transition from military service to civilian employment. The Army has 

recently begun to offer a bonus to its Apache helicopter pilots. The 

services will need to continue to explore a variety of innovative approaches 

to alleviate any projected shortfalls. Among the possible solutions, the 

services may wish to review the aviator bonus system and pilot 

assignments. However, before the services take additional steps, they need 

to (1) reassess whether pilots are truly needed to fill all of the nonflying 

positions currently designated for pilots and (2) refine their data to ensure 

that they have a full understanding of the scope and nature of any identified 

pilot shortages. 

Before I discuss each of these issues, let me first provide you with some 

additional background about military aviators and their career paths.

Background DOD’s aviator community consists of pilots, who actually fly the aircraft, 

and navigators, whose responsibilities include tracking an aircraft’s 

position along an intended flight path. (The Navy and the Marine Corps 

refer to their navigators as naval flight officers.) At the beginning of fiscal 

year 1999, DOD had about 28,000 active duty commissioned and warrant 

officer pilots.1

 These include approximately 13,300 pilots in the Air Force, 

6,600 pilots in the Navy, 4,800 warrant officer pilots in the Army, and 3,400 

pilots in the Marine Corps. The Army is the only service that uses warrant 

officers. In addition, there are approximately 5,000 navigators in the Air 

Force, 3,400 navigators in the Navy, and 300 navigators in the Marine Corps. 

All pilot candidates must complete basic flight training to earn their initial 

qualifications, or wings. This course of instruction typically lasts 1 year, 

and upon graduation, each new pilot currently incurs a commitment to 

serve an additional 6 to 8 years of aviation service (the Air Force will raise 

the commitment to 10 years beginning in fiscal year 2000). Pilots can also 

incur other obligations to serve in the military at various points in their 

1

This figure does not include pilots beyond paygrade O-5. It also does not include student pilots who 

are in basic flight training and have not earned their wings.
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

military careers, usually for shorter periods of time, for such things as 

accepting orders to new assignments or attending particular schools.

Upon earning their wings, pilots begin to receive aviation career incentive 

pay, commonly referred to as flight pay, which was designed to attract and 

retain officers in a military aviation career. The amount of flight pay starts 

at $125 a month and peaks at $840 a month for a pilot with 14 to 22 years of 

aviation service. After 22 years, the amount gradually decreases to $250 a 

month.

Once pilots complete their initial aviation commitment, the services are 

authorized to offer bonuses, called aviation continuation pay, to encourage 

them to continue in their military career beyond the initial aviation 

obligation. The services have offered this incentive even in those cases 

where pilots have already incurred an additional obligation to serve the 

military for a few more years.2

 Until September 30, 1999, current law 

authorizes the services to pay aviation continuation bonuses of up to 

$25,000 to pilots for each year of additional commitment if they have 

completed between 6 and 13 years of active duty and agree to remain on 

active duty to complete 14 years of commissioned service. Currently, the 

Air Force offers $22,000 per year to all pilots with the required years of 

aviation service who sign a commitment for 5 years and smaller dollar 

amounts to those who sign a commitment for 1, 2, or 3 years. The Marine 

Corps offers $12,000 a year to pilots in targeted aircraft specialties. The 

Navy targeted its aviation continuation pay bonuses in the past but is now 

offering a flat 2-year bonus of $12,000 per year to all eligible pilots. The 

Army began offering aviation continuation pay for the first time in fiscal 

year 1999. Currently, the Army is offering $12,000 a year to Apache 

helicopter pilots.

The services take several factors into account when they determine their 

flying and nonflying pilot requirements. For example, Defense guidance 

defines the missions upon which the services are to establish their 

operational requirements. From this guidance, the services calculate the 

structure of their squadrons and the number of crews for each aircraft by 

considering such things as the frequency and duration of sorties, time to 

repair aircraft and conduct routine maintenance, and crew rest time. The 

2

We previously reported on the aviation continuation pay bonus in our report entitled Aviation

Continuation Pay: Some Bonuses Are Inappropriate Because of Prior Service Obligations

 (GAO/NSIAD-95-30, Oct. 14, 1994).
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

services consider a number of other factors to determine their nonflying 

requirements. These factors include requirements to send pilots to joint 

duty assignments, assignments to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

staff positions for career enhancement, and pilot instructor positions. In 

addition, the services calculate that a certain percentage of their pilots will 

not be available for assignment at any given point in time due to factors 

such as education and training, medical conditions, and transfers between 

assignments.

Generally, DOD pilots follow career paths that require them to serve in 

both cockpit and staff positions. DOD’s pilots, whether assigned to flying 

or nonflying positions, are eligible to receive both aviation career incentive 

pay and aviation continuation pay, provided they meet the other eligibility 

criteria.

Pilot Requirements 

Have Not Been Fully 

Validated

Two factors must be kept in mind in considering the extent of the reported 

pilot shortages. First, the services have not fully validated their 

requirements, and second, service data to document the extent of the 

shortages is in many instances not readily available.

Pilot requirements, which include both flying and nonflying positions, may 

not be accurately stated. The services report that they can fill their flying 

positions and that, as a result, their shortages are occurring almost 

exclusively in their nonflying staff positions. However, the services have 

not comprehensively assessed all of these nonflying positions to determine 

whether they truly need to be filled with military pilots. Currently, the 

services report that about 20 to 40 percent of all pilots, depending on the 

service, serve in nonflying positions.3

 If some of these positions could be 

filled with other personnel such as retired military personnel, DOD 

civilians, and contractors with the required aviation expertise, the services’ 

pilot requirements, and thus the shortages, could be reduced. It is also 

possible that aviation expertise, while desirable, might not be absolutely 

necessary for some positions. In such cases, other non-aviator military 

3

One of the reasons for the variance is that the services report their nonflying positions differently. 

According to Air Force data, the percentage of pilots in nonflying positions has been less than

22 percent for the past 7 years, and is projected to stay relatively constant at slightly more than

20 percent in the future. Navy data for fiscal year 1998 show that approximately 27 percent of its pilots 

and naval flight officers are serving in nonflying positions, both in shore billets and in ships. Although 

the Marine Corps has the smallest number of pilots, its data show that it has the highest ratio of pilots in 

nonflying positions, at 40 percent. Nonflying positions are not as great a factor for the Army because it 

relies heavily on warrant officer pilots who mostly serve in “fly-only” careers.
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

personnel could replace the pilots holding the positions. The Air Force, for 

example, told us that it currently prepares justifications to demonstrate 

why pilots should fill these positions. However, when pilots are in short 

supply, it might be more appropriate to justify why such positions cannot 

be filled by personnel other than pilots. In 1997, we recommended that the 

services review their requirements for pilots to serve in all of these 

nonflying positions.4

 During the course of our work, the Air Force told us 

that it has prioritized its staff positions and filled those with the highest 

priority. However, the remaining vacant positions are still included as pilot 

requirements. We have found no evidence that any of the services have 

reassessed their nonflying positions, as we previously recommended. 

We are not implying that only flying positions should be considered in 

determining total pilot requirements. Nonflying positions serve several 

purposes. First, nonflying positions can serve to broaden aviators 

professionally and prepare them for leadership positions. Second, these 

positions can also serve to combat cyclical drops in retention. The Air 

Force, in particular, has used this pool of personnel to compensate for 

periods of reduced retention. Last, more military pilots increase the pool 

available to fly more missions and alleviate the operating tempo problems.

In addition to our concerns about pilot requirements, we are not sure that 

the services have based their reported shortages on reliable data. The Air 

Force has routinely provided us with data. However, officials in the Army 

and the Navy told us that they did not have readily available data on 

requirements and pilot inventory. For example, the Navy produced 

different sets of data showing fiscal year 1998 shortages ranging from

321 to 1,153 pilots. We are working closely with Navy officials to resolve 

these discrepancies. In this statement, we are relying on the most recent 

data provided. We will continue to work with the services to resolve our 

data concerns. Furthermore, with the exception of the Air Force, the 

services were unable to provide us with historical and projected data on 

flying and nonflying positions.

4

DOD Aviator Positions: Training Requirements and Incentive Pay Could Be Reduced

(GAO/NSIAD-97-60, Feb. 19, 1997).
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

The Reported 

Shortages Are Most 

Critical in the Air Force 

and the Navy 

Of all the services, the Air Force and the Navy are reporting the greatest 

shortages. Within these two services, the shortages are more apparent in 

some pilot specialties than in others.

Air Force Shortage In fiscal year 1998, the Air Force reported that of a requirement for 13,986 

pilots, it had a shortage of 648, or 5 percent. It anticipates that its most 

critical shortages will occur during fiscal years 2002-2007, when it projects 

shortages of between 1,900 and 2,155 pilots, or up to about 16 percent of its 

overall pilot requirements. The Air Force has recently implemented 

personnel actions that it believes will cause the pilot shortages to decline 

after 2007. For example, the Air Force is now bringing in larger classes of 

new pilots who will incur obligations that will take them through fiscal

year 2007 or beyond. Although reporting that it is currently filling all of its 

cockpits, the Air Force will soon reevaluate whether it will be able to 

continue to do so in the fiscal year 2002-2007 time frame. 

The Air Force projects that its greatest shortages in fiscal year 2007 will 

occur among its fighter, tactical airlift, and bomber pilots. Fighter pilot 

shortages are projected to reach 820 pilots, out of a requirement of 

4,715 fighter pilots, or 17 percent of its fighter requirements. Tactical airlift 

pilot shortages are projected to reach 311 pilots, out of a requirement of 

2,015 pilots, or 15 percent of the tactical airlift requirements. Likewise, in 

fiscal year 2007, the Air Force projects a shortage of 294 bomber pilots out 

of a requirement of 1,049 pilots, representing 28 percent of the bomber 

force requirements. Figure 1 displays the actual Air Force pilot 

requirements and inventory for fiscal years 1992-1998 and projected 

requirements and inventory for fiscal years 1999-2009.
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Figure 1: U.S. Air Force Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory (fiscal

years 1992-2009)

Note: Air Force data include both flying and nonflying positions.

Navy Shortage According to the most recent data provided to us, as of February 4, 1999, 

the Navy has already experienced its greatest shortage of pilots. These 

data indicate that the Navy, whose pilot population is about half that of the 

Air Force, experienced a shortage in fiscal year 1998 that was nearly two 

times greater than the Air Force shortage. Navy officials told us that they 

have filled all of their cockpits by extending sea tours. The Navy’s shortage 

of 1,153 pilots, of a requirement of 7,712 pilots, represented about

15 percent of its pilot requirements. Navy data also show that the greatest 

shortages occurred among those pilots who fly helicopters, followed by 

those who fly propeller aircraft and jets. In fiscal year 1998, the Navy was 

short 536 helicopter pilots, or 17 percent of its helicopter requirements of 

3,195 pilots. In the case of propeller aircraft, the Navy required 1,845 pilots, 

but was short 311, or 17 percent. In the jet community, the Navy had a 

requirement for 2,221 pilots and was short 216, representing about

10 percent of its jet pilot requirements. Over the next 5 years, the Navy 

projects that its aviator shortages will gradually dissipate, but not 

disappear. Figure 2 displays the Navy’s pilot requirements and inventory 

11,500

12,000

12,500

13,000

13,500

14,000

14,500

15,000

15,500

16,000

16,500

17,000

17,500

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09

Fiscal Year

Requirements Inventory
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

for fiscal years 1992-1998 and projected requirements and inventory for 

fiscal years 1999-2009.

Figure 2: U.S. Navy Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory (fiscal

years 1992-2009)

Note: Navy data include both flying and nonflying positions. 

Army Shortage According to Army data, in fiscal year 1998, the Army had an overall 

requirement of 4,745 warrant officer pilots and an inventory of 4,799, for a 

surplus of 54 warrant officer pilots, or 1 percent. As of February 1999, the 

Army reported that it had a shortage of 104 Apache helicopter pilots, out of 

a requirement of 1,059, or about 10 percent of its Apache pilot force. The 

Army plans to compensate for this shortfall by offering the continuation 

pay bonus, by allowing certain pilots who were not promoted to stay on 

active duty, and by allowing others who left the service to return to active 

duty.

5000

5500

6000

6500

7000

7500

8000

8500

9000

9500

10000

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09

Requirements Inventory
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Marine Corps Shortage The Marine Corps reported an overall shortage of 46 pilots in fiscal

year 1998, representing a shortage of about 1 percent of its overall 

requirements of 3,435 pilots. According to the most recent data provided to 

us, the Marine Corps does project an increased shortfall beginning in fiscal 

year 2001. However, the projected overall shortage is 211 pilots, or about

6 percent of its requirement of 3,624 pilots.

Two Key Factors Are 

Contributing to the 

Reported Shortfalls

Two factors are contributing to the pilot shortfalls. First, the services 

reduced pilot accessions during the drawdown in the 1990s. This 

contributed to an insufficient number of pilots to fill the overall current 

pilot requirement. Consequently, certain year groups are atypically small, 

and current aviation personnel managers are challenged to find ways to fill 

requirements as this population matures through the workforce. Second, 

pilots report that they are unhappy with a number of quality-of-life factors 

that are causing them to consider leaving. Pilots state that at the same time 

certain factors are making a career within the military less attractive, other 

factors, such as a good job market, are making a career within private 

industry more attractive.

Reduced Accessions During 

the Drawdown Are Creating 

Unintended Consequences

Air Force and Navy reductions in the number of new pilot accessions 

during the drawdown in the mid-1990s had the unintended result of leaving 

the services with an insufficient number of pilots to support the current 

force. The Air Force, for example, reduced active duty pilot accessions 

from more than 1,500 in fiscal year 1990 to approximately 500 annually 

during fiscal years 1994-96. Recognizing that it needed to increase 

accessions, the Air Force has steadily increased its pilot production since 

that time. The service accessed approximately 900 pilots in fiscal year 1998 

and expects to meet its capacity of 1,100 pilot accessions by fiscal

year 2000. The capacity to access pilots beyond 1,100 is limited by the 

current number of training facilities and training slots for new, 

inexperienced pilots. Figure 3 shows Air Force pilot actual accessions and 

goals for fiscal years 1988 through 1998 and projected goals for fiscal years 

1999 through 2004.
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Figure 3: U.S. Air Force Pilot Accessions and Goals (fiscal years 1988 to 2004)

The Navy experienced a similar pattern. In fiscal year 1990, the Navy 

accessed 1,039 pilots; in fiscal year 1994 the Navy accessed 471 pilots. In 

fiscal years 1999 through 2005, the Navy plans to access 820 pilots each 

year. Figure 4 shows Navy pilot actual accessions and goals for fiscal 

years 1988 through 1998 and projected goals for fiscal years 1999 through 

2004.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04

Actual Goal
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

Figure 4: U.S. Navy Pilot Actual Accessions and Goals (fiscal years 1988 to 2004)

Aviators Are Leaving the 

Service for a Number of 

Reasons

During our work to date, we have reviewed a number of retention studies 

and surveys and administered our own questionnaire to more than

180 pilots and 50 navigators in the Air Force and the Navy. In addition, we 

conducted follow-up group discussions with more than 120 of the aviators 

who responded to our questionnaire. Although we cannot make 

projections from the limited number of questionnaires and interviews, their 

comments are instructive.

The aviators who responded to our questionnaire reported that the three 

most important reasons for wanting to stay in the military are their love of 

flying, the ability to serve their country, and the camaraderie they enjoy 

among their peers. The three most significant reasons for wanting to leave 

the military are better financial opportunities outside of the military, 

improved family life, and frustrations with leadership. When we asked 

aviators to provide us with the single change that would encourage them to 

stay in the military, Navy aviators requested funding for aircraft and parts 

and increased pay and benefits, and Air Force aviators requested a 

relaxation of their deployment schedules followed closely by better pay 

and more choice in assignments.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

Actual Goal
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

In addition to these responses to our questionnaire, we would like to 

elaborate on these and other themes we heard with some regularity during 

our group discussions.

Pilots expressed their frustrations with the current bonuses and stated that 

they are not working effectively, for a number of reasons. Of the 80 bonus 

takers we interviewed, only 32, or 40 percent, told us that they were very 

likely or definitely planning to stay in the military after they completed 

their current obligation. All others were undecided, somewhat likely, or 

very likely to leave the military. Some aviators complained about the 

perceived “cut in pay” that occurs when a pilot reaches 14 years of 

commissioned service and is no longer eligible to receive bonus money. 

Others complained that the services postponed or extended their flight 

training, which in turn reduced the number of years in which they can 

receive an aviation continuation bonus. The extent to which today’s pilots 

are motivated by dollars is up for debate. The pilots who responded to our 

written questionnaire said that they have the potential to pursue financially 

attractive careers with private industry. However, some pilots and officials 

we met said that the irritants within the military that are pushing them out 

are greater than the allure of potentially large salaries within private 

industry. 

Low retention may also be related to current deployment schedules. Pilots 

identified the frequency and the length of deployments, and the lack of 

clear mission objectives as primary concerns.5

 Some pilots referred to 

their deployments as “non value-added deployments.” The Air Force pilots 

we met expressed their specific concerns about the frequency of 

deployments to Southwest Asia, the austere living conditions, and the 

inability to train during those deployments. They questioned the need for a 

sizeable, constant presence in that area, and suggested they would be 

better off training in U.S. air space and deploying on an as needed basis. 

The Air Force is reorganizing itself into an expeditionary force with the 

explicit intent of providing greater stability and predictability in 

deployments. However, pilots expressed their concerns that the length of 

the deployments will increase from 45 to 90 days under this concept. The 

Navy pilots we met understandably had a different expectation about the 

length of deployments since naval deployments are typically 6 months in 

5

Other work we are doing supports these concerns. For example, the Air Force reports that since about 

1989, the average number of personnel deployed for operations other than war has more than 

quadrupled from about 3,400 personnel in 1989 to about 14,600 personnel in 1997. 
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

length. However, Navy and Air Force pilots alike raised concerns about the 

pace of operations between deployments. Several naval pilots told us that 

the schedule between deployments is often more frustrating than the 

deployments themselves. One pilot said that he often gets more sleep and 

communicates with his wife more often via e-mail while on deployment 

than he does when he is working 10-12 hour days between deployments.

Aging fleets, a lack of spare parts, and increased demands on aircraft 

maintainers are also sources of concern. Pilots in both services told us that 

they only learn on a day-to-day basis whether or not they will be able to fly 

on training missions due to the limited number of operating aircraft in their 

squadrons. These pilots expressed concerns that they are not maintaining 

their requisite combat skills under these conditions. Our work has shown 

that the shortage of spare parts within the Air Force may be due to 

deficiencies in forecasting requirements, inventory management, and 

repair problems, as well as budgeting problems. Nevertheless, the 

perception of the pilots we interviewed, clearly, was that spare parts are 

not available to them and that aircraft mechanics spend an inordinate 

amount of time inefficiently removing working parts from one aircraft in 

order to repair another. The pilots also expressed their concerns for the 

enlisted mechanics, adding that it is difficult for them to motivate their 

enlisted personnel in such a difficult work environment.

Pilots told us they are also frustrated by the lack of opportunities for career 

development and promotions. These pilots have “grown up” in a military 

environment in which they have seen separation incentives, 15-year 

retirements, and forced early retirements after 20 years of service. They do 

not see the military as a guaranteed job. Air Force pilots, in particular, 

raised concerns that they are being sent back to junior flying positions and 

not getting assignments to the traditional military leadership positions. 

They believe that the personnel assignment and promotion systems are no 

longer synchronized. On the one hand, the Air Force is reassigning pilots 

to cockpit positions; on the other hand, the promotion boards still expect 

the pilots to gain staff and education experiences to be competitive for 

promotion. Some of the pilots we spoke with said that, in essence, the Air 

Force is creating a fly-only career path and suggested that the services do 

this formally. 

Finally, pilots raised concerns about leadership above their immediate 

chain of command. They perceived a reluctance on the part of leadership 

to stand up and say no to expanded work under decreasing budgets and 

reduced manpower. They cited changes to the retirement system and 
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

medical care, and stated that no one is willing to fight for the military 

member. They suggested that military leaders are holding pilots to new 

missions within old structures. The pilots said that DOD needs to be able to 

cut back on its commitments–to match the drawdown of the force. Finally, 

several pilots commented that they do not wish to stay in the military to 

rise to the senior positions themselves because they do not see their 

superior officers enjoying their jobs or being given the proper tools to do 

their jobs.

The Services Are 

Taking Steps to 

Address the Shortfalls

The issue of pilot shortfalls is multi-faceted, and no single step will solve 

the problem. The services have implemented a number of changes to help 

address the situation. 

All of the services told us they have made cockpit positions a staffing 

priority, making a concerted effort to fill these positions before filling 

nonflying positions. We concur that the services should fill their priority 

positions first. However, longer-term implications may be associated with 

this decision. For example, the Air Force and the Navy told us they are 

presently limiting the number of mid-grade pilots they would otherwise 

send to assignments such as staff positions and formal education programs 

and reassigning them in junior flying positions or extending them in their 

current assignments. While this practice helps to fill the cockpits, it also 

creates some unintended consequences and poses leadership implications. 

Air Force and Navy officials have raised concerns about the future, stating 

that some pilots who have missed some of these career-enhancing 

opportunities and leadership experiences may not be as qualified to be 

promoted to senior paygrades. 

The Air Force is implementing a program called Phoenix Aviator 20. The 

purpose of this program is to make it more attractive for pilots to stay in 

the Air Force until they can retire at 20 years of service by creating a 

“seamless transition” between military service and civilian employment. 

Among the provisions, Air Force pilots who enroll in this program will be 

assigned to a tour of duty that guarantees them flying experience, to keep 

their flight credentials current, during their last 3 years of service. During 

this time period, the Air Force will provide financial assistance for the 

military pilot to obtain his or her civilian certifications. In addition, the 

military pilot will be guaranteed a job interview with private industry. The 

program is new, and few pilots have enrolled to date.
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

In an attempt to provide greater stability and predictability regarding 

overseas deployments, the Air Force is reorganizing itself into an 

expeditionary force. Under this reorganization, air crews and support 

teams will be assigned to 1 of 10 expeditionary forces, 2 of which would be 

on call for one 90-day deployment every 15 months. This reorganization is 

also still in development.

The Air Force will increase the period of obligated service for pilots after 

receiving their wings from 8 to 10 years beginning in fiscal year 2000. 

While this step will have a positive effect on shortages, the effect will not 

be realized for a decade.

The Army began offering the aviation continuation pay bonus to its Apache 

helicopter pilots in fiscal year 1999. In addition, the Army has allowed 

some pilots who left the service to return to active duty, and in other cases, 

has allowed pilots who were not promoted to remain on active duty.

Finally, the Air Force and the Navy have increased the number of new 

pilots they bring in each year. The Air Force is still increasing its pilot 

accessions until fiscal year 2000.

Opportunities Exist to 

Implement New 

Solutions

You asked us to provide some options for the Subcommittee and the 

services to consider in addressing the pilot shortage issue. Indeed, our 

analysis of service data, interviews with service officials, and surveys with 

aviators have generated a number of ideas that merit further exploration. 

We have not yet evaluated the potential or limitation of these options. 

Before I mention these options, I will discuss two steps the services need to 

initiate now.

Initial Steps to Be Taken DOD must develop reliable and consistent data to identify, with precision, 

the year groups and aircraft types in which the shortages currently exist. 

DOD must also be able to measure the magnitude of the current problem 

and project with some accuracy and consistency into the future. For 

example, certain long-term corrective actions might be appropriate if DOD 

determines that the primary reason for the shortages is low retention 

among pilots who are eligible to leave the military. If, on the other hand, 

DOD determines that the primary reason for the shortages is due to 

personnel actions that were made in the past, other short-term corrective 

actions might be more in order. 
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-102

The services should also reexamine their pilot requirements, from two 

perspectives, with the intent of reducing them. First, the services should 

scrutinize all non-cockpit positions, identify those that could be filled by 

other personnel, and convert the positions. Second, the services should 

study the current length and frequency of deployments, as well as the 

operational demands between deployments. 

Other Options to Explore Options identified to us, that we will continue to explore during the course 

of our review, include the following:

• The services could review the aviator bonus system and specifically 

consider aviation continuation bonuses that do not terminate at 14 years 

of service but continue through 20 years and possibly beyond. Such a 

bonus system may encourage some pilots to remain in the service 

beyond 14 years. 

• To the extent that the services are constrained by the number of new 

pilots they can train each year due to limited training capacity, DOD 

could explore additional opportunities to consolidate their pilot training 

programs and increase training flexibility among the services.

• To the extent that pilot shortages are not occurring uniformly 

throughout the services, DOD could consider cross-service assignments 

and assigning pilots in overstrength year groups in one service to staff 

positions in another service where shortages exist.

In summary, the services must first reevaluate their requirements and 

refine their data to better identify their problem areas. The services have 

begun to take steps to address their reported pilot shortages, and we 

believe that opportunities exist to explore additional solutions. We expect 

to complete our work on pilot shortages and issue a final report later this 

summer. We will continue to work with the services to explore solutions. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have.

(703281) Letr
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