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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39828

CITY OF HOBBS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANK SIFFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY

William G. W. Shoobridge, District Court Judge

Efren Cortez, City Attorney

Valerie S. Chacon, Deputy City Attorney 

Rocio A. Ocano, Assistant City Attorney 

Hobbs, NM

for Appellants

Law Office of Ross Bettis

Ross R. Bettis

Hobbs, NM

for Appellees

MEMORANDUM OPINION

IVES, Judge.

{1} Defendant Frank Sifford appeals a district court denial of his motion to suppress, 

in which he argued that no reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop that led to his 

arrest for aggravated driving while intoxicated, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-

102(D)(3) (2016). On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion because the relevant dashcam footage conflicted with the arresting officer’s 
testimony, and as such the findings of the district court are unsupported by substantial 

evidence. We disagree and affirm. 

DISCUSSION

{2} “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review purely factual 

assessments to determine if the fact-finder’s conclusion is supported in the record by 

substantial evidence.” State v. Cleave, 2001-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 131 N.M. 82, 33 P.3d 

633 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing, we “view the facts in the 

manner most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 

132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. Our review of the application of law to those facts is de 

novo. See State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858. 

{3} In this case, the arresting officer testified that he pulled over Defendant’s vehicle 

because he failed to yield to oncoming traffic when conducting a left turn, in violation of 

a City of Hobbs (the City) municipal ordinance. The relevant ordinance states, in part, 

that a “driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the 

right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the 

intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.” Hobbs, N.M., 

Rev. Uniform Traffic Ordinance ch. 12, art. VI, § 12-6-4.2 (2015). 

{4} Defendant does not argue that the arresting officer’s testimony at the motion 

hearing was insufficient for a showing of reasonable suspicion to pull over Defendant on 

the basis of this ordinance. Indeed, the officer testified that, as he approached a lighted 

intersection showing green, Defendant’s vehicle—traveling in the opposite direction—

turned left across the intersection in such a manner as to force the officer to abruptly 

apply his brakes to avoid an accident. The officer testified that Defendant’s decision to 

turn when he did constituted an “immediate hazard.”

{5} Rather, Defendant argues that the officer’s dashcam video contradicts this 

testimony. As we understand it, Defendant’s view is that this “undisputable” 

documentary evidence shows that the officer was “simply . . . not telling the truth,” and 

therefore his testimony must be disregarded. As a result, Defendant argues, substantial 

evidence does not support the district court’s finding that there was an immediate 

hazard. 

{6} The key precedent here is State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, 410 P.3d 186, in 

which our Supreme Court explained how appellate courts should review evidence when 

a party contends that a video conflicts with testimony. The Court emphasized that these 

scenarios are generally assessed using ordinary appellate principles of evidentiary 

review: that it is the role of the trial court to weigh evidence and make credibility 

determinations; that reviewing courts do not reweigh evidence in the aggregate; and 

that appellate courts must also “avoid reweighing individual factors in isolation.” Id. ¶ 12. 

The Court left open the possibility that reversal of a suppression motion denial might be 

warranted if video evidence “indisputably established” a fact that “squarely 

contradict[ed]” the officer’s testimony. Id. ¶ 17. However, absent a clear incongruence of 
this nature, our standards of review mandate that we view the record in the light most 

favorable to the district court’s ruling, and give appropriate deference to its factual 

findings, even when conflicting evidence may have led to an alternative result. Id. ¶¶ 12-

18.

{7} Here, after viewing the dashcam video and hearing the officer’s testimony, the 

district court ruled that reasonable suspicion existed to stop Defendant based on an 

apparent infraction of the failure-to-yield ordinance. Although the court acknowledged 

that the “speeds and distances [in the video] are uncertain,” it stated that “it does appear 

. . . that [Defendant] turned in front of the officer, and that the officer’s vehicle . . . it does 

appear to slow down.” As a result, the court concluded that “there was reasonable 

suspicion that [Defendant] had violated Hobbs City Ordinance, [Section] 12-6-4.2 in that 

the turn was made so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” As such, to the 

extent the documentary evidence presented a factual dispute, the district court resolved 

that dispute in favor of the City. 

{8} We are not persuaded that the district court erred. We agree with the district 

court that the speeds and distances in the video are inconclusive, and accordingly we 

do not believe that the video “indisputably” establishes the truth of Defendant’s factual 

claims. See Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 17. Moreover, Defendant has not persuaded 

us of any clear contradiction that would justify a disturbance of the district court’s fact 

finding. Defendant does not cite to Martinez, much less explain why the alleged 

inconsistency that he describes merits reversal under the standards described in that 

case. We decline to develop such an argument on Defendant’s behalf. See State v. 

Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181. We conclude that 

substantial evidence existed to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

{9} We affirm.

{10} IT IS SO ORDERED.

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge