United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Personnel, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

April 1998 BOSNIA

Military Services

Providing Needed

Capabilities but a Few

Challenges Emerging

GAO/NSIAD-98-160

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277889 

April 29, 1998

The Honorable Steve Buyer

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Dayton Peace Accords, signed on December 14, 1995, are designed to

end several years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. One part of the

accords involves the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO)-led coalition force to Bosnia-Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as

Bosnia, to implement the peace agreement. In February 1998, NATO’s North

Atlantic Council voted to continue the mission in Bosnia indefinitely.

Concerned about how the military services will obtain the needed

capabilities for continued operations, you asked us to examine how the

military services (1) have provided the needed capabilities for the

operation thus far and (2) plan to provide them in the future. You also

asked us to examine the President’s ability to call up reserves under his

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority. This report focuses

on the Army and the Air Force because they have provided the vast

majority of the needed capabilities.

Background Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces in

and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords.

U.S. forces are part of a multilateral coalition under the command of NATO.

From December 1995 to December 1996, the coalition was called the

Implementation Force (IFOR). In December 1996, NATO authorized a new

mission and renamed the coalition the Stabilization Force (SFOR). That

mission was scheduled to end in June 1998 but has since been extended

indefinitely. In voting to continue the mission, the North Atlantic Council

retained the name SFOR. The Council stated that the extent of support over

time will be adapted to developments in the political and security situation

and to progress in the implementation of the civilian elements of the

accords. Force levels will be reviewed at regular intervals. The United

States has been a major force provider to the mission, as shown in table 1.

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Table 1: U.S. Military Personnel

Contribution to IFOR and SFORa Military personnel

United Statesb Total

IFORc 16,200 54,000

SFORd 8,300 31,000

aU.S. military personnel includes people in both the active and reserve components.

bAdditional U.S. military personnel were located in the neighboring countries of Croatia, Hungary,

and Italy. These persons totaled 6,000 in support of IFOR and 3,400 in support of SFOR.

cAs of July 1996.

dAs of February 1998.

The SFOR level will likely remain at 31,000, but the United States is seeking

to reduce its troop commitment in Bosnia to 6,900. The United States plans

to continue basing about 3,400 troops in neighboring countries.

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active

forces for an operational mission, he may use PSRC authority, which allows

for the activation of up to 200,000 reservists at any one time, with each

reservist limited to no more than 270 days of involuntary service. In

December 1995, the President invoked this authority for the Bosnia

mission.

Results in Brief The military services have successfully provided needed capabilities for

the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years. The U.S. Army Europe

(USAREUR) has provided the majority of Army forces, augmented with

reserve forces and active forces from the United States. Because USAREUR

units are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, the Army had

to borrow personnel from nondeploying units so that deploying units

could deploy with the required number of people. Also, because the

operation did not always require entire units, the Army deployed partial

ones. These steps enabled the Army to meet the mission’s needs but, in

some cases, have had an adverse impact on the parent units that have

provided personnel. The U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) has provided the

majority of air forces, augmented with U.S.-based active and reserve

forces. Both services have used their reserve components to meet the

mission requirements because some critical support capabilities reside

primarily or solely in the reserves and because use of the reserves reduces

the high level of activity of some active forces. Most Army reservists were

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involuntarily activated through PSRC, while most Air Force Air Reserve

Component members were volunteers.

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army and

the Air Force are currently developing plans for a follow-on force. Though

the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and the

aviation-related requirements for the mission can be filled, about a dozen

unit capabilities will require special attention in the future because the

capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these capabilities

have already been used. Requirements for these capabilities have totaled

several hundred persons per rotation. To satisfy future mission needs, the

military services and the U.S. Atlantic Command are considering using

similar capabilities in the other military services, asking for greater

participation from other countries, and contracting for some of the needed

capabilities.

Some reservists have served for fewer than the 270 days that the PSRC

statute allows. Because the statute does not prohibit multiple involuntary

activations if the total does not exceed the 270-day limit, some of these

reservists could be recalled to serve up to the full activation period. In

addition, the Bosnia mission has led to a situation in which in some

instances all of the reservists with needed capabilities have been ordered

to duty and served the maximum time allowed for a single call-up. The

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has stated

that the current policy is that the Department of Defense will not request

that the President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall

reservists who have already served 270 days.

USAREUR and

USAFE Have

Supported Bosnia

Mission With Some

Help From Reserve

and U.S.-Based Active

Forces

USAREUR is the major Army command primarily responsible for providing

people for the Bosnia mission. Because USAREUR units are assigned fewer

personnel than they are authorized, deployed units were augmented with

personnel from other European units and active and reserve forces from

the United States. At the same time, the relatively small size of the U.S.

force in Bosnia required the Army to deploy partial units. USAFE is the

principal Air Force command providing people for the mission. The Air

Force’s personnel requirements are much smaller and the nature of the Air

Force’s responsibilities allows for extensive use of reserve component

volunteers.

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Army and Air Force

Reserves Have Supported

the Bosnia Mission

Almost 16,000 Army reservists and about 10,000 Air Force Air Reserve

Component members have participated in the Bosnia mission between its

inception in December 1995 and January 1998. Most of the Army reservists

were involuntarily called to active duty under PSRC, whereas most Air

Force reservists volunteered to participate in the Bosnia mission. Reserve

units have participated because some required support capabilities reside

primarily or solely in the reserves. For example, most of the Army’s

movement control teams, civil affairs units, and fire fighter detachments

are in the reserves. Of the 36 civil affairs units in the Army, only 1 is in the

active force. The remainder are in the Army reserve. Reserve units also

have been used to reduce the high level of activity of some active forces.

For example, the Army uses reserve military police to relieve the high

personnel tempo of active-duty military police units, and the Air Force

uses reserve aircrews to relieve the high personnel tempo of its active-duty

aircrews.

Army Personnel Needed to

Be Added to Forces/Units

Deploying to Bosnia

Augmentation from reserve forces and U.S.-based active forces was

required because USAREUR did not possess all the personnel and

capabilities the mission needs. According to USAREUR documents, prior to

the first deployment to Bosnia in December 1995, the units chosen to

deploy were staffed at 87 percent of required strength, whereas deployed

forces were required to be at least at 92 percent of required strength.

Further, 8 to 10 percent of these units’ personnel were not deployable for a

variety of reasons. To bring these units to at least 92 percent of required

strength, personnel had to be shifted from other USAREUR units and from

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, a process known as

cross-leveling.

Throughout the Bosnia mission, individuals have been needed to augment

headquarters staffs at USAREUR, U.S. European Command, the American

contingent of various NATO command elements such as the SFOR

Headquarters in Saravejo, and actual units. FORSCOM provided 1,035 active

component individual augmentees to support Bosnia, while the Army

Reserve Personnel Center and the U.S. Army Reserve Command provided

another 1,613 Army Reserve individual augmentees.

Army Deploys Some

Split-Based and New Units

to Bosnia

The relatively small size of the U.S. portion of SFOR has not always required

deploying entire units. According to FORSCOM and USAREUR officials, active

units have employed split-based operations. Split-based operations occur

when only parts of units are deployed and the elements left behind must

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continue to perform their missions at the home station. For example, as of

January 1998, elements of the First Armor Division’s headquarters, military

intelligence, signal, artillery, and support command were deployed to

Bosnia, while the rest of the division, including its combat brigades, did

not deploy. Split-basing has been a strain on USAREUR units. For example,

during SFOR, USAREUR reported to the Department of the Army through its

Status of Resources and Training System, which is used to measure

readiness, that split-basing had a negative impact on the readiness of

several of its units because of reduced personnel, equipment levels, or a

combination of both factors at home station.

For reserve units, the Army also has engaged in split-based operations. In

many instances, the Army extracted elements of existing units and formed

them into what is known as derivative units. It has been staffing derivative

units with individuals drawn from the original unit and other Selected

Reserve units.1

 According to its mobilization data, the Army formed over

700 derivative units for the Bosnia mission since December 1995.

Examples of derivative units that have been mobilized for Bosnia include

the target acquisition radar elements of National Guard divisions, elements

of Army Reserve garrison support units, and platoons from postal

companies. According to a FORSCOM operations official, extracting these

elements often affects the ability of the parent unit to conduct its normal

peacetime activities, such as training, much in the same way that it has

affected split-based active units. In responding to a draft of this report, the

Army stated that a positive effect of split-based operations is that the

redeploying soldiers can bring better developed or newly acquired skills to

the unit.

The Army has also created derivative units, such as various mobilization

support detachments, that are not elements of existing units. These

detachments are ad hoc units created for the sole purpose of activating

individuals with assorted capabilities that are needed to meet

miscellaneous individual requirements. According to an Army Reserve

Personnel Center official, this was done because PSRC authority did not

allow for the call-up of individuals unless they were members of a unit in

the Selected Reserve. The requirements have been met in part by members

who initially belonged to the Individual Ready Reserve2

 but volunteered to

join the Selected Reserve temporarily so that they could be subject to PSRC.

1

The Selected Reserve includes individuals assigned to units, trained personnel assigned to active

organizations, and individuals who have not completed initial training.

2

The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised of officers and enlisted soldiers with prior military service

who are completing their 8-year military service obligation or who are not assigned to units.

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Of the previously mentioned 1,613 reservists provided by the Army

Reserve Personnel Center and the U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1,068

were reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve who transferred to the

Selected Reserve, including 551 who were placed into derivative units.

Follow-on Force

Planning Underway

The Army has conducted multiple force rotations for varying lengths of

time to support the Bosnia mission. With the recent extension of the

mission for an unspecified duration, the Army is planning to (1) replace

forces currently deployed to Bosnia; (2) identify forces needed for future

rotations; and (3) relieve pressure placed upon USAREUR, which has

provided most of the forces for the Bosnia mission to date.

Formal guidance has not been finalized regarding Bosnia mission needs

after June 1998. In the meantime, USAREUR is making plans for a follow-on

force. It intends to provide personnel for the initial follow-on force

according to the current SFOR organization and authorized troop level of

8,500 troops in Bosnia. If the United States succeeds in its effort to have

other troop-contributing nations provide more troops, the U.S. force level

in Bosnia could drop to 6,900. A smaller force, according to USAREUR and

FORSCOM officials, would most likely have fewer combat support and

combat service support units. For example, one of the potential reductions

involves having only one aviation brigade—a combat support

unit—responsible for supporting the forces in Bosnia and the SFOR

Commander’s reserve force. Additional force reductions will come from

units such as the Army Center for Lessons Learned and military history

units.

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army

canceled its June 1998 troop withdrawal and extended its plans for

providing personnel beyond June. A USAREUR document on providing

future forces specifies that the initial follow-on force deployment will be

from June 1998 through October 1998. The Department of the Army has

assigned USAREUR responsibility for providing the Army portion of this

force. USAREUR has developed a strategy and identified those specific

requirements that it can fill, which is most of the initial follow-on force

requirements. According to USAREUR and FORSCOM officials, FORSCOM will

provide most of the requirements that cannot be met by USAREUR units

through October 1998.

The Army plans for FORSCOM to provide most of the forces for the next two

follow-on rotations—one in October 1998 and the other in April 1999. This

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decision was made to relieve USAREUR of the high operating and personnel

tempo it has experienced since the Bosnia mission began and to allow it to

focus on training for its wartime mission. According to USAREUR officials,

FORSCOM’s providing the bulk of the forces for the Bosnia mission for a year

will allow USAREUR to recover from the adverse impacts of almost 3 years

continuous deployment to Bosnia. For example, in June 1995, 6 months

before the first deployment to Bosnia, 46 percent of USAREUR’s units

achieved the readiness rating expected of these units; by August 1997, that

percentage had dropped to 30 percent as a result of personnel, equipment,

and training required for wartime missions being diverted to peacekeeping

operations.3

The Air Force has rotated aircraft, aircrews, and ground support personnel

to support the Bosnia mission. According to a USAFE operations official, to

support the mission in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 the Air Force has

identified capabilities and units possessing those capabilities it plans to

deploy. USAFE will continue to be the principal force provider.

Providing Needed

Capabilities for the

Mission Is Becoming

Difficult in a Few

Instances

Extending the Bosnia mission beyond June 1998 is causing the services to

seek alternative ways to provide some needed capabilities. Although the

vast majority of the ground-based combat support and aviation-related

requirements can be filled, about a dozen unit capabilities will require

special attention in the future because the capabilities are primarily in the

reserves and many of these capabilities have already been mobilized and

deployed in support of the operation. Requirements for these capabilities

have totaled several hundred persons per rotation. Solutions have been

developed for providing some of these capabilities and are being sought

for the others.

FORSCOM recently identified 12 unit types that it may have difficulty

providing from its forces in future rotations primarily because most of

these types of units are predominately or exclusively in the reserves and

have already been called up and participated in the Bosnia mission. Each

succeeding call-up has reduced the available pool of members and units

available for future rotations. Table 2 lists the number of these units in the

Army and their distribution between the active and reserve components.

Table 3 provides details on the 12 unit types, including the number of units

needed per rotation, the number of reserve units remaining, and additional

information on the active units. According to an Army operations official,

3

These data are based on USAREUR reporting on 207 or about 90 percent of its units. Each unit’s

readiness goal is based on the staffing authorization.

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other Army commands, such as the U.S. Army Pacific and Eighth U.S.

Army, have some of the 12 unit types that FORSCOM has identified as

difficult to fill. However, units assigned to those commands generally

would not be able to meet Bosnia mission requirements because many of

the units would be committed to missions in their command’s primary

area of responsibility.

Table 2: Distribution of Hard-to-Fill Army Units Between the Active Force and the Reserves

Type of unit

Active

unitsa

Reserve

units

Reserve units

activated

for Bosnia

Total units

in force

Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment 0 3 3 3

Replacement Battalion Headquarters 0 3 3 3

Rear Tactical Operations Center 0 5 4 5

Target Acquisition Battery/Detachmentb 12c 8d 8 20

Movement Control Battalion Headquarters 3 4 4 7

Centralized Movement Control Team 2 3 3 5

Air Terminal Movement Control Team 1 9 9 10

Public Affairs Detachment 12 10 10 22

Mobile Public Affairs Detachment 1 40 24 41

Engineering Fire Fighter Detachment 1 19 11 20

Military History Detachment 1 16 8 17

Medical Distribution Unit 4 5 1 9

aSee table 3 for additional detail on the active units.

bTarget acquisition batteries are a part of heavy divisions; target acquisition detachments can be

a part of light divisions and corps. Both types of units can meet the Bosnia mission requirement.

cSix of these units are target acquisition batteries; six are target acquisition detachments.

dSeven of these units are target acquisition batteries; one is a target acquisition detachment.

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Table 3: Hard-to-Fill Army Units

Type of unit

Units

needed per

rotation

Reserve

units

remaining

Number of

active units

Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment 1 0 0

Replacement Battalion Headquarters 1 0 0

Rear Tactical Operations Center 1 1a 0

Target Acquisition Battery/Detachment 2 0 12b

Movement Control Battalion Headquarters 1 0 3

Centralized Movement Control Team 2 0 2c

Air Terminal Movement Control Team 2 0 1

Public Affairs Detachment 1 0 12d

Mobile Public Affairs Detachment 4 16e 1

Engineering Fire Fighter Detachment 2 8e 1

Military History Detachment 1 8 1c

Medical Distribution Unit 1 4f 4

aThe Army National Guard has seven rear tactical operations center units that differ somewhat

from the Bosnia requirement, but, if modified, they could be used to meet mission requirements.

bThese are artillery elements within the divisions or corps and, if deployed independently, would

adversely impact the parent unit’s combat capability.

cThese active force units have already deployed to Bosnia.

dFour of these 12 public affairs detachments have already deployed to Bosnia.

eReserve units remaining cannot meet readiness requirements for deployment. With 1-12 months

notice, these units can be made ready to meet deployment standards.

f

Two of the four remaining units cannot meet readiness requirements. With 1-12 months notice,

these two units can be made ready to meet deployment standards.

Three of the 12 unit types—Broadcast Public Affairs, Replacement

Headquarters, and Rear Tactical Operations Center—do not exist in the

active force. The active Army does maintain force structure for the nine

remaining unit types, but two have already deployed to Bosnia and the

availability of others may be limited. For example, a FORSCOM official told

us that each Army division’s artillery has a target acquisition battery or

detachment, but deploying the target acquisition element independently

would severely degrade the readiness of the remaining division. The active

centralized movement control teams and the military history detachment

have already deployed to Bosnia at least once, and FORSCOM would prefer

to not deploy them again. The active movement control battalion

headquarters, air terminal movement control team, mobile public affairs

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detachment, engineering fire fighter detachment, and medical distribution

units have not been deployed to Bosnia.

The availability of the Reserve Component to meet some of the future

Bosnia mission requirements at current force levels is limited to some

extent. According to FORSCOM, all Reserve Component Broadcast Public

Affairs, Replacement Headquarters, Target Acquisition, Movement Control

Headquarters, and some movement control teams already have been called

up under PSRC. Only the Rear Tactical Operations Center, Military History

and Medical Distribution missions can currently be met from existing

reserve force structure. Moreover, FORSCOM told us that some of the

remaining Reserve Component Mobile Public Affairs, Engineering Fire

Fighters, and Medical Distribution units currently cannot meet the criteria

for deployment. According to FORSCOM, these units could be used, but,

depending on the unit, would require from 1 month to 12 months of notice

before deployment to receive personnel, equipment, training, or a

combination of these sufficient to meet the deployment criteria.

FORSCOM requested the U.S. Atlantic Command, which can draw forces

from all services in the continental United States, to assess whether other

services can provide these capabilities. Solutions were identified for two

of these areas for the next rotation. An air movement control unit

requirement will be met by an ad hoc Marine Corps unit, and the

Broadcast Public Affairs unit requirement will be met by an ad hoc unit

that was formed by pooling individuals from the military services because

no one unit was available in any service. According to FORSCOM and

USAREUR, the use of ad hoc units will increase as the Army’s ability to

provide specific capabilites (active or reserve) decreases.

As of April 1998, the U.S. Atlantic Command was developing solutions for

the other areas. If the Atlantic Command is unable to find other services to

meet these requirements, other solutions will be considered. These include

using more ad hoc units, contracting civilians to perform the function, and

seeking to have other NATO partners assume some of these responsibilities.

For example, according to USAREUR, engineering fire fighter requirements

will be contracted out.

In addition to FORSCOM’s identification of types of units that will be difficult

to fill, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has also identified

certain components of its civil affairs and psychological operations

capabilities that may be difficult to fill. However, the Commanding General

of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command told

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us that some of these difficulties will be mitigated as the command

improves its utilization of these capabilities and trains officers from other

nations to undertake some of the mission.

Air Force Has Not Had to

Involuntarily Call Up Many

Reservists

The only instances in which PSRC has been used by the Air Force to

support Bosnia is for the air traffic control and combat communications

missions. Of these two missions, only air traffic control has posed a

problem. Two-thirds of the Air Force’s air traffic control capability is in

the Air National Guard, and the Guard recently reduced its air traffic

control force structure by almost 50 percent. Initially the mission was

handled by volunteers on a rotating basis from air traffic control units, but,

beginning in June 1996, PSRC was used to call up Guard personnel for

between 120 days and 179 days to perform this function. All Guard air

traffic control units already have been activated under the Bosnia PSRC. In

October 1997, the Air National Guard informed the active Air Force that it

would be unable to solely meet these requirements beyond July 1, 1998,

and asked to have the active Air Force provide the personnel to meet the

requirement.

Active and reserve Air Force officials have been seeking short- and

long-term solutions to air traffic control requirements for the extended

mission. To attract more volunteers from the Guard, rotations for Guard

personnel will be decreased from 120 days to 45 days. Overall radar

operator and tower personnel requirements will be reduced, and Guard

personnel will fill only about half of these requirements with the balance

to be filled by active Air Force personnel.

Beginning in October 1998, U.S.-trained Hungarian controllers are

expected to replace U.S. controllers, further reducing operator

requirements. USAFE plans to implement contractor maintenance for the

maintenance portion of the mission by November 1998. This will leave

only one person from the Air National Guard involved with air traffic

control maintenance. The Air Force hopes these actions will reduce the

need to involuntarily activate Guard personnel for the air traffic control

mission.

Air Force Reserve Component officials told us that as the mission

lengthens additional capabilities may require changes from current

practices for providing personnel. Most requirements are now met by

volunteers, but according to an Air Force Reserve official the longer the

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mission lasts the greater the probability PSRC will have to be used to ensure

that needed capabilities are provided.

PSRC Permits

Involuntary Activation

of Selected Reserves

Subject to Limits

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active

forces for an operational mission, he may initiate a PSRC call-up under 

10 U.S.C. § 12304. With this authority, units and members of the Selected

Reserve may be ordered to active duty without their consent. The statute

does not limit the number of missions that may be undertaken with

reserve support. However, reservists cannot be required to serve on a

mission for “more than 270 days.” The 270-day time limit on PSRC

activations is long enough to allow for multiple involuntary activations

that cumulate to less than 270 days, and the statute does not prohibit such

multiple involuntary activations.

Scope of PSRC Authority Authority to mobilize the reserves is governed by statute. Upon declaring a

national emergency, the President is authorized to mobilize the Ready

Reserve under 10 U.S.C. § 12302. That section’s involuntary activation

authority extends to 1 million reservists for up to 24 months’ of service. In

1976, Congress recognized that circumstances at times may exist that

would require access to the reserves but would not support an emergency

declaration.

Congress enacted the PSRC statute to broaden nonconsensual access to the

reserves. This authority was expected to complement DOD’s “Total Force

Concept,” under which well-trained reserves became more fully integrated

into the force structure. The President can initiate a PSRC call-up when he

determines “that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any

operational mission.”4

Units and members of the Selected Reserve are subject to involuntary

activation under PSRC authority. The Selected Reserve is a component of

the Ready Reserves.

Prior to 1995, PSRC authority had been used twice—for the Gulf War and

the operation in Haiti. In each instance, an executive order stated the need

for activating the Selected Reserve and defined the mission. As

implemented in the past, the mission statements were broad in scope.

Consistent with that practice, the scope of the Bosnia PSRC mission is

4

The statute prohibits involuntary activation under PSRC to respond to domestic emergencies and

disasters.

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defined in Executive Order 12982 as the “conduct of operations in and

around former Yugoslavia.”

The PSRC statute allows the Secretary of Defense to prescribe policies and

procedures concerning such matters as the number and types of Selected

Reserve units to be activated, the timing of the calls-ups, the number of

reservists to be activated, and the time required for each reservist to

remain on active duty. These matters are discussed in DOD

Directive 1235.10, July 1, 1995. In addition, an end date for the use of PSRC

authority may be set by the Secretary of Defense. The end date for the

Bosnia PSRC was first set at May 1997, then extended to August 1998, and,

as of February 1998, the end date was extended indefinitely. The Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has stated that the

current policy is that the Department of Defense will not request that the

President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall

reservists who already have served 270 days.

In November 1997, Congress enlarged the reserve components available

for PSRC call-up. Section 511 of Public Law 105-85 directed the Secretary to

create a PSRC mobilization category for members of the Individual Ready

Reserves. Up to 30,000 of the Individual Ready Reserve members who

volunteer for the mobilization category can then be involuntarily activated

as individuals. Before passage of this amendment, members of the

Individual Ready Reserves sometimes volunteered to temporarily join the

Selected Reserve to allow them to be subject to PSRC. Department of

Defense officials believe that this authority is not available for a

Bosnia-type mission because they interpret it as being available only as a

bridge to partial mobilization.

The statute also caps at 200,000 the total number of reservists who may be

serving on active duty under PSRC “at any one time.” This number has

grown since the statute was first enacted in 1976. Originally, the total

number of selected reservists who could be activated at any one time was

set at 50,000. This was increased to 100,000 in l980 and to 200,000 in 1986.5

The PSRC statute has always included a limit on the number of days a

reservist could be required to serve without consent. As originally enacted,

the involuntary activation period was “not more than 90 days.” Over the

years, that limit has been expanded to the current level of “not more than

270 days.” A 270-day limit is long enough to permit multiple involuntary

5

We have previously reported on reserve component responsiveness as directed by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201). See Reserve Forces: Proposals to

Expand Call-up Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations (GAO/NSIAD-97-129, April 18, 1997).

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activations, and the statute does not prohibit such multiple activations.

The Army’s policy, however, is not to allow reactivations. The Air Force

does not have a similar policy, and may soon face the necessity of

reactivating some air traffic controllers who have already served 120 days

under the current PSRC.

Conclusions The military services have successfully provided the needed capabilities

for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years. The Army, which has

provided the bulk of the armed forces, has taken a number of steps to

match its existing units to the mission requirements, including deploying

partial units, creating derivative units by borrowing personnel from

nondeploying units, and creating ad hoc units to deploy individual

augmentees. These steps have met the mission’s needs with varying

impacts on parent units that have provided personnel and have required

the Army to operate in a fashion different from the way in which it

organizes its forces, which is as entire units to fight a major theater war.

The Army also has relied on the reserves both to provide support

capabilities that reside primarily or solely in the reserve component and to

reduce the high level of activity of some active forces. The Air Force has

required a smaller number of forces, and the nature of the Air Force’s

responsibilities has allowed for extensive use of reserve and guard

volunteers.

The recent decision to extend the Bosnia mission will require rotating

military forces for the foreseeable future. While formal guidance has not

been finalized regarding mission needs, the Army is planning for follow-on

forces through late 1999. The first follow-on force is expected to deploy in

June 1998 to relieve the forces that are currently deployed. Although the

vast majority of the types of capabilities needed do not represent

challenges in providing personnel, a handful do, principally in the Army.

These challenges exist because in a few instances all the needed capability

is in the reserves and has already been involuntarily called up under the

current PSRC and in other instances because there is limited capability in

the active force structure or because the active capability is vital to its

parent unit. For these capabilities, the Army’s force structure does not

match the needs of a mission of the duration and with the continuing

requirements of the one in Bosnia. Solutions are being developed to meet

these challenges. These challenges may exist as long as the mission

continues at its current size and with its current tasks.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
B-277889 

The President has statutory authority to involuntarily activate units and

members of the Selected Reserve. The Bosnia mission has led to a

situation in which in some instances all of the units with needed

capabilities already have been ordered to duty and served the maximum

time permitted. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Reserve Affairs has said that the Department of Defense’s current policy is

that the Department will not request that the President invoke PSRC

authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists who already have

served 270 days.

In some instances, the services have activated reservists involuntarily for

shorter periods of time than the statute allows. It is possible that some of

these reservists could be recalled to serve the full activation period under

a single PSRC of 270 days. The statute does not prohibit multiple activations

as long as the total number of days on active duty does not exceed 

270 days.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense

partially concurred with the report. (See app. I.) The Department said that

operations in Bosnia have been and will continue to be a success story.

The Department further said that the overall tenor of our report implies

that despite success in mission accomplishment and active and reserve

component integration, challenges in manning a follow-on-mission to

Bosnia are insurmountable.

We state in the report that the Department has successfully provided

needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years and do

not mean to imply that the Department will be unable to successfully staff

the mission in the future. We do, however, point out that there are a few

types of units that will become increasingly challenging to fill and that

solutions are being developed to meet these challenges. The Department

stated in its technical comments that there are some types of units that

will require more management and we agree.

The Department also stated it will continue to rely on the reserves and to

task organize, split-base, and cross level units to get the right force mix to

accomplish the mission. Our report describes how the Department has

used these capabilities and techniques to meet mission requirements and

explains why they have been used.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
B-277889 

The Department also provided technical comments, which we have

incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine how the military services are providing needed capabilities

for the Bosnia mission and plan to provide follow-on forces for the

extended mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed personnel at

the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs; Department of the Army

headquarters and Department of Air Force headquarters, Washington,

D.C.; U.S. European Command, USAREUR, and USAFE, all located in

Germany; U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; Special Operations

Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Forces Command, Fort

McPherson, Georgia; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base,

Virginia; and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). Because

the Navy and the Marine Corps provided few personnel directly to the

Bosnia mission, we did not include them in our work.

To gain reserve component perspectives on the ability to provide

capabilities in the future, we reviewed documents and interviewed

personnel at the Chief, Army Reserve, Army and Air National Guard,

Washington, D.C.; Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and

the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

Although we obtained documents showing the number of individual

reservists that the Army has deployed to Bosnia, the data did not identify

the specific military skills possessed by these individuals.

To examine the PSRC authority, we reviewed the applicable U.S. statutes

and their legislative history. We also requested and received the

Department of Defense Office of General Counsel’s written interpretation

of the statute with regard to multiple activations within the 270-day call-up

limitation and the ability to invoke the statute’s authority for a second time

for a similar mission.

We performed our review between July 1997 and April 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government accounting standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees;

the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to

others on request.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
B-277889 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. If you or your

staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-3504.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director

Rodell Anderson, Senior Evaluator

Anthony DeFrank, Senior Evaluator

Atlanta Field Office Leo Sullivan, Evaluator-in-Charge

Frank Smith, Senior Evaluator

Kansas City Field

Office

Gregory Symons, Senior Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel

Margaret Armen, Senior Attorney

(701120) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-160 Bosnia
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