MEDIA INTERACTION WITH THE PUBLIC IN

EMERGENCY SITUATIONS: FOUR CASE STUDIES

A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement

by the Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress

August 1999

 Authors: LaVerle Berry

 Amanda Jones

 Terence Powers

 Project Manager: Andrea M. Savada

 Federal Research Division

 Library of Congress

 Washington, D.C. 20540–4840

 Tel: 202–707–3900

 Fax: 202–707–3920

 E-Mail: frds@loc.gov

 Homepage:http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
i

PREFACE

The following report provides an analysis of media coverage of four major emergency situations

in the United States and the impact of that coverage on the public. The situations analyzed are

the Three Mile Island nuclear accident (1979), the Los Angeles riots (1992), the World Trade

Center bombing (1993), and the Oklahoma City bombing (1995). Each study consists of a

chronology of events followed by a discussion of the interaction of the media and the public in

that particular situation. Emphasis is upon the initial hours or days of each event.

Print and television coverage was analyzed in each study; radio coverage was analyzed in one

instance. The conclusion discusses several themes that emerge from a comparison of the role of

the media in these emergencies. Sources consulted appear in the bibliography at the end of the

report.
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................... i

INTRODUCTION: THE MEDIA IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.................... iv

THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, 1979.......................... 1

Chronology of Events, March 28–April 1, 1979 ................................ 1

The Media and Three Mile Island ........................................... 4

Problems with the Nuclear Industry ................................... 5

The Media at TMI ................................................. 6

The Media and the Public ........................................... 8

Outcome of the Three Mile Island Accident .................................. 13

Summary ............................................................. 13

THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, 1992.............................................. 15

Chronology of Events, April 29–May 3, 1992 ................................ 15

The Media and the Los Angeles Riots ....................................... 17

The Rodney King Affair ........................................... 17

Television as the Instigator of the Riots ............................... 18

Television as a Guide to the Rioting .................................. 19

The Impact of Videotaping ......................................... 21

The Media and Sensationalized Coverage .............................. 21

Outcome of The Los Angeles Riots ......................................... 25

Summary ............................................................. 26

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING, 1993................................. 27

Chronology of Events, February 26–27, 1993 ................................. 27

The Media And The World Trade Center Bombing ............................ 30

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information ....................... 30

Impact of the Media Upon Investigators ............................... 33

The Media and the Public .......................................... 34

Outcome of The World Trade Center Bombing ............................... 36

Summary ............................................................. 37

THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, 1995....................................... 38

Chronology of Events, April 19–21, 1995 .................................... 38

The Media And The Oklahoma City Bombing ................................ 43

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information and Relief .............. 44

Graphic or Sensational Media Coverage and Privacy Violations ............ 45

The Media and the Search for Suspects ................................ 46

Outcome of Oklahoma City Bombing ........................................ 49 

Summary ............................................................. 50
iii

CONCLUSION: THEMES IN THE FOUR MEDIA STUDIES . ...................... 52

Media Response Time ................................................... 52

The Media as "Creator" of Events .......................................... 53

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information and Help ..................... 54

Media Potential to Alleviate or to Exacerbate ................................. 55

The Media as Jury and Judge .............................................. 56

The Tendency to Exaggerate and Sensationalize .............................. 56

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................ 59
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

1

 Ford N. Burkhart, Media, Emergency Warnings, and Citizen Response (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,

1991), 3-4.

2

 Burkhart, 12.

iv

INTRODUCTION: THE MEDIA IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Emergency situations arise from a wide variety of natural and man-made events ranging from

earthquakes and hurricanes to domestic disturbances and terrorist strikes to nuclear power

accidents and airplane crashes. Information about these events can be disseminated by several

means, but one of the most important channels for communicating information about emergency

situations is the modern mass media. Despite reservations that may be expressed about their

ability to play the role of communicator impartially, the media transmit considerable information

about the circumstances and hazards of emergencies to a wide audience.

In attempting to understand how the media function, it may be useful to describe journalists'

work in terms of three types of "games."1

 These "games" help conceptualize the ways in which

the media generally handle the information they pass forward to the public. The first game may

be termed the "gatekeeper game" in which a newsroom, as an organization, sets the rules and

packages "the news" for its readers. Journalists decide what information is to be passed on from

sources of knowledge to a mass audience, what should be changed, and what information should

and should not be passed through media channels.

A second activity could be called the "objectivity game." Here, a newsroom crew simply follows

its own interests in pursuit of news, which journalists may perceive as the equivalent of serving

the public interest. In so doing, however, journalists generally insist upon defining what they do

in their own terms, not those of "the public's interest."

A third perspective is what may be termed "the reporting game." Journalists do not "make" the

news or have a specific agenda, they would argue, they simply "report" it. Their reports mirror

reality. This is the view reflected in CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite's quip at the conclusion of

his newscasts: "And that's the way it is."

In emergency situations, the media may function in a number of ways. They "originate" or

"create" news through their own independent reporting. They also serve as a conduit for

emergency information from official sources and, in addition, function as a filter or independent

check on emergency-related news issued by official emergency personnel.2

 Should private

citizens wish for an alternative to the media, they can turn to government agencies and social

networks for information and help.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

3

 Burkhart, 8.

4

 Burkhart, 20.

5

 Burkhart, 10, 19.

6

 Burkhart, 21-22.

v

From the point of view of disaster management, emergency situations most commonly involve

four phases of activity: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.3

 Although the media

may play a role all four phases, interacting with the public and with disaster response personnel

in a variety of ways, they are least important in disaster mitigation and probably most important

in the response phase.

In the preparedness phase, television and radio normally play the major roles, disseminating

warnings, weather information, and evacuation instructions and airing official bulletins. If the

onset of a disaster is slow, newspapers can also help to transmit preparedness information.

Effective personal relationships between journalists and public officials can greatly facilitate the

dissemination of disaster warnings. Disaster planning since the Three Mile Island nuclear

accident, for example, has focused on including the news media as part of the preparedness team

rather than as an entity to be dealt with after the onset of an emergency.4

During the response phase, emergency managers undertake the immediate, largely local effort to

cope with the disaster as it unfolds. In this phase, the media become one of the most important

sources of local and national information about the crisis. Aside from spreading information

about the emergency, the media can continue to work in a disseminator role, seeking official

information about what happened and how citizens can best respond and giving help and advice

to victims. Television crews can be expected to cover action on the spot, to record relief efforts,

and to document damage to property and the number of persons in need of aid. Radio and

newspapers can also help to publicize officials' instructions and to record relief efforts.5

In the recovery phase of an emergency, the media can often provide documentation of the impact

of a disaster or of a relief operation. Hour-by-hour coverage can be especially valuable in the

absence of information from established formal channels. In addition to continuing to provide

information and advice to victims and others in the wake of disasters, the media may also use

editorials and analytic columns to assess the seriousness of the emergency and the effectiveness

of the relief effort.6

In regard to the roles the media play in disaster situations, it would be well to recall the different

ways in which journalists view themselves—as gatekeepers, objective observers, or reporters of
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

7

 Burkhart, 18.

8

 "All Carnage, All the Time," Newsweek, 23 August 1999, 45.

9

 Peter Ford, "What About Disasters TV Crews Miss?" Christian Science Monitor, 26 August 1999, 1, 8. 

vi

events. Journalists may sincerely believe that through their reporting they render a public

service, but even as they provide news coverage in emergencies, the media insist on control over

selection and presentation of content. Media organizations alter, sift, integrate, condense, and

summarize the information they receive from their sources, whatever they may be.7

While these generalizations hold true in most cases, it is also true that the media are

multifaceted, being composed of print media, television, radio, network news organizations, and

cable companies. As Richard Turner, a Newsweek columnist noted recently in a discussion about

the media, "News consumers in the 1990s need to recognize that there's no media monolith out

there. Everybody's product is different."8 They gather news differently, they package it

differently, and they report it differently.

No matter what form they take, the media play a key role in determining the public's response to

a given situation, especially an emergency. "Nowadays TV crews get to the major crises before

we do," said a source with the humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders. "Television

can almost make or break a humanitarian crisis by deciding how to play it."9

 The four cases

studies that follow show the variety of ways in which the media covered four well-known

emergency situations in the United States and the impact of that coverage on the public.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

10 Based on chronologies in United States, Staff Report to The President's Commission on the Accident at Three

Mile Island: Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force (Washington: GPO, 1979), 24-28; and Robert del

Tredici, The People of Three Mile Island (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1980), 8-11.

1

THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, 1979

Chronology of Events, March 28–April 1, 197910

Day 1: Wednesday, March 28:

4:00 a.m.: A relief valve connected to Unit 2 reactor's primary coolant system sticks open,

releasing radioactive steam and water into a drain tank and then onto the floor of the containment

building. The stuck valve is one of a series of equipment glitches and staff misjudgments that

result in a release of radioactivity from Unit 2 at Three Mile Island (TMI) shortly after 4:30 am.

Further releases of radioactivity follow during the morning.

7:24 a.m.: Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed), the utility operating the TMI nuclear facility, declares

a "general emergency," the first time such a declaration has been made in the history of U. S.

commercial nuclear power. The declaration heralds the danger of off-site radiation.

7:40 a.m.: Two Met Ed spokesmen announce a reactor "malfunction" but do not mention the

general emergency or off-site radiation.

7:50 a.m.: Met Ed contacts the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Bethesda, Maryland.

9:02 a.m.: An Associated Press bulletin reports that a general emergency has been declared at

TMI but that no radiation has been released into the atmosphere.

9:30 a.m.: A Met Ed press release says: "No off-site radiation has been found and we do not

expect any." No mention is made of a general emergency.

12:00 p.m.: Met Ed spokesmen deny significant levels of radiation have been recorded and say

that "none are expected outside the plant."

1:30 p.m.: John Herbein, Met Ed's vice-president for generating and chief utility spokesman

during the accident, admits to low-level radiation at the edge of the plant site.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

2

4:30 p.m.: At a press conference, Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor William Scranton III

confirms off-site measurements of radiation and expresses a lack of confidence in Met Ed's

information.

5:00 p.m.: An NRC press release reports measurement of low-level radiation off the plant site.

7:50 p.m. and after: Unit 2 reactor is put into a "forced cooling mode," but the reactor does not

cool as quickly as planned.

Day 2: Thursday, March 29, 1979:

All day: Low level radiation releases from the plant continue.

10:00 a.m.: At Met Ed's first press conference, Met Ed's president says released radiation has not

been out of the "ordinary realm."

10:20 p.m.: Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh holds a press conference at which an

NRC official says "the danger is over."

Day 3: Friday March 30, 1979:

7:00 a.m.: Beginning of a large, continuous, "planned but uncontrolled" release of radioactive

gas. As radiation levels rise, NRC and state officials weigh evacuation of nearby areas.

10:25 a.m.: Thornburgh advises local residents to remain indoors, close windows, and turn off

air conditioning.

11:00 a.m.: At a press conference, Met Ed's Herbein, in response to reporters' questions about

dumping radioactive water into the Susquehanna River, says, "I don't know why we need to tell

you each and every thing we do," a comment that destroys Met Ed's credibility with the press.

He also reports that a bubble of hydrogen gas has formed in the reactor vessel.

12:30 p.m.: Thornburgh holds a press conference to advise pregnant women and preschool

children within a five-mile radius of TMI to evacuate the area. Some 75,000 residents begin to

evacuate.

2:00 p.m.: Harold Denton, a senior NRC official, arrives at TMI to serve as a spokesman for

NRC and Met Ed.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

3

3:00 p.m.: At an NRC press briefing in Bethesda, one NRC official discusses the "ultimate risk

of meltdown," causing a media sensation. At a 6:30 p.m. briefing, the NRC tells the press that

there is no imminent danger of a core meltdown. Meanwhile, concerns arise about the

explosiveness of the hydrogen bubble.

10:00 p.m.: At a press conference with Thornburgh, Denton calls TMI "easily the most serious"

reactor accident ever.

Day 4: Saturday, March 31, 1979:

11:00 a.m.: At Met Ed's final press conference concerning TMI, Herbein says the hydrogen

bubble has decreased and that he feels the crisis is over. Afterward, Denton disagrees, saying the

crisis is not over.

11:00 p.m.: Denton and Thornburgh hold a press conference at which Thornburgh says, "There

is no imminent catastrophic event foreseeable," and he appeals for calm.

Day 5: Sunday, April 1, 1979:

1:45 p.m.: President and Mrs. Jimmy Carter visit Unit 2 control room with Denton and

Thornburgh. Afterwards, Carter promises a presidential commission of inquiry into the TMI

accident.

2:15 p.m. and after: A Met Ed update says that the hydrogen bubble has been shrinking and

continues to do so. The danger from radiation also declines. The most dangerous phase of the

TMI crisis ends.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

11 Anne D. and Edward V. Trunk, "Three Mile Island: A Resident's Perspective," in The Three Mile Island

Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implications, eds. Thomas Moss and David Sills (New York: New York Academy of

Sciences, 1981), 175-76.

12 David Burnham, "The Press and Nuclear Energy," in The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and

Implications, 107-08.

13 Dennis A. Williams et al., "Beyond 'The China Syndrome,'" Newsweek, 16 April 1979, 31.

4

The Media and Three Mile Island

This case study deals with the first five days of the emergency situation at Three Mile Island

(TMI), from Wednesday, March 28, when the equipment initially malfunctioned, to Sunday,

April 1, the point at which the danger from radiation and explosion had clearly passed. This

period was a time of concentrated media attention and public apprehension. The incident

unfolded slowly in the Unit 2 reactor chamber and control room, a not unusual occurrence in

mishaps involving commercial nuclear power. This slow pace of developments, in turn, meant

that the media and public reaction was delayed by one or more days.

Two factors that conditioned both the media and the public response to the TMI accident bear

mentioning. First, both the press and the local population mistrusted the nuclear power industry.

The locals felt that Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed), the utility operating the TMI facility, had not

been truthful about its operations in the past or about the dangers posed by nuclear power

generation.11 Journalists were even more mistrustful, based on past experiences with the

industry. Consequently, reporters were quick to suspect that Met Ed was hiding important

information to protect itself and its investment, a sentiment that the media conveyed to the

public.12

Second, only 12 days before the TMI affair, Columbia Pictures had released a motion picture

called "The China Syndrome." The movie, an instant box office success, dealt with a nuclear

mishap that bore an uncanny resemblance to what actually happened at TMI, including the

possibility of a reactor core meltdown.13 As events at TMI unfolded and as officials assessed the

chances of a meltdown, some local residents became alarmed, perceiving in the TMI situation

the specter of "The China Syndrome" on their doorsteps.

Three Mile Island is often cited as a case study in the mismanagement of public information

during an emergency situation. This mismanagement concerned both the sources of information

at Met Ed and at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), on the one hand, and media

coverage of the accident on the other. Studies of the TMI accident have concluded that neither

the utility nor the NRC's handling of the public relations aspect of the crisis served the interests
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

14 This point is made in almost all sources on the TMI incident. As an example, see United States, Staff Report, 3-

4, 47-55.

15 Richard Vollmer, "Representing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," in The Three Mile Island Nuclear

Accident: Lessons and Implications, 110.

16Trunk and Trunk, 183; United States, Staff Report, 10.

5

of the general public, especially the resident population close to the TMI facilities. The

following discussion identifies some of the most important issues concerning the media that

arose during the first five days at TMI.

Problems with the Nuclear Industry

The most fundamental public information problem lay in the fact that neither Met Ed nor the

NRC had a "disaster" public information plan. Utility and NRC personnel had no system for

learning what was happening on-site or elsewhere and no predetermined procedures for

providing information to the press and the public.14 Neither Met Ed nor the NRC anticipated that

an accident of the magnitude of TMI would ever happen or that it might last for days rather than

a few hours. These shortcomings meant that the quality of media coverage was significantly less

than it should have been and that the public in turn was left in a state of confusion and

uncertainty.

Richard Vollmer, an NRC engineer sent to TMI on Wednesday morning to find out what was

going on, said that his team had found "sort of a nightmare in terms of communications." He said

that "it was very difficult for me to get any information that I could use for a number of reasons.

I don't think the utility was covering up any information, but... there was so much information...

that it was very difficult to put it together into a comprehensive and logical story."15

Consequently, as the situation unfolded during Wednesday and Thursday, Met Ed and the NRC

spoke with different voices. Met Ed's press briefings were confused, misleading, and at times

inaccurate. Its spokesmen were evasive on such matters as the role of personnel (as opposed to

equipment) in causing the accident and the release of radioactive gas. Met Ed also consistently

downplayed the seriousness of the accident, whereas NRC staff viewed it much more seriously.

Statements from Met Ed and the NRC conflicted with and contradicted each other. As a result,

the media and the local population were perplexed, and both came to suspect that confused and

vague explanations from Met Ed indicated a withholding of information on the seriousness of the

reactor's problems. This suspicion destroyed the credibility of Met Ed as a source of reliable

information.16 Communication between the utility and the media did not improve until Friday
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

17 The role of the media at TMI is extensively analyzed in United States, Staff Report, especially Parts I, VI, and

VIII. See also David M. Rubin, "The Public's Right to Know: The Accident at Three Mile Island," in Accident at Three

Mile Island: The Human Dimensions, eds. David Sills, C. P. Wolf, and Vivien Shelanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982),

131-141; and Sharon M. Friedman, "TMI: The Media Story That Will Not Die," in Bad Tidings: Communication and

Catastrophe, eds. Lynne Walters, Lee Wilkins, and Tim Walters (Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989),

63-70.

18 Rubin, "Public's Right to Know," 134.

6

afternoon, when the NRC dispatched one of its staffers, Harold Denton, to TMI to serve as a

spokesman for the utility and the NRC regulators.

The Media at TMI

Events during the first four days at TMI offer insight into the needs of the media in such

situations—some of which the utility and the NRC failed to appreciate. Reporters were after a

story, they were determined to get it, and they operated under stringent deadlines. They craved

information, which they needed to fill newspaper columns and television and radio air time.

Officials at Met Ed, including public relations personnel and to a lesser extent NRC regulators,

were totally unprepared to deal with the demands of the media during the first few days of the

emergency.17

The lack of preparation for an emergency, together with the contradictions and inaccuracies in

Met Ed statements about what was happening, quickly aroused the interest of the press. Ron

Nordlund, in charge of a Philadelphia Inquirer investigative team at TMI, claimed that "only a

couple of reporters from Philadelphia would have gone if Met Ed had told the truth from the

beginning. It might not even have been a story... if there hadn't been so many contradictions. The

[Lt.] Governor's office broke it on Wednesday when they said they were getting conflicting

stories and didn't know whom to believe. Editors heard that and sent out the reporters."18

Some 300 to 400 reporters swarmed into central Pennsylvania to cover the story. The sheer

number of reporters on the scene overwhelmed the utility's efforts to communicate with them.

What might have remained a relatively low-key regional story was thus transformed into a

national and international cause célèbre that raised alarm about the nuclear industry.

"Pack journalism" of this nature can be alarming to those who have never before witnessed it.

Such was the case when the number of reporters at the evacuation center in nearby Hershey

approached the number of citizens sheltering at the facility. For some at the center, the presence
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

19 Rubin, "Public's Right to Know," 138.

20 Rubin, "Public's Right to Know," 136.

21 United States, Staff Report, 5.

22 United States, Staff Report, 5.

7

of hundreds of competitive, aggressive, and sometimes insensitive reporters became a more

important issue than the damaged reactor.19

When the utility (and the NRC) did not immediately provide authoritative spokesmen and a press

center at the TMI site, reporters contacted other sources for information, such as antinuclear

activists, academics, Met Ed workers, and even local residents. Journalists substituted stories

from such sources for data the utility or NRC should have provided; in some cases, journalists

deliberately sought out human interest stories from nervous or panicked locals. When such

stories appeared in the press, they gave the impression that the press was interested in

sensationalism or that the situation at TMI was a creation of the media rather than a serious

nuclear mishap.20

Like the industry, the news media were largely unprepared to deal with a nuclear accident as it

unfolded. Few reporters who covered the TMI story were familiar with nuclear power or nuclear

technology. Many of the reporters first on the scene were assigned because they were available,

not because they were trained science writers. Most reporters lacked an understanding of light

water reactors or what a general emergency or a meltdown actually meant. Few knew what

questions to ask about radiation releases. Consequently, their reports often did not help the

public evaluate health risks or advice to evacuate.21

There was also a problem with terminology. Any technical industry develops its own specialized

language for use in its daily operations. In the late 1970s, few if any of the reporters at TMI were

familiar with nuclear terminology. Reporters did not understand the terms and concepts Met Ed

engineers used in response to questions about radiation releases or whether or not the fuel rods

were uncovered and the reactor core damaged.22

 As already noted, the utility did not provide sufficient information or technical briefings to help

journalists interpret what they were being told. Even when briefings were held, the problem of

communication was immense. One nuclear engineer with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation

Protection described the difficulty this way:
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

23 United States, Staff Report, 5.

24 Rubin, "The Public's Right to Know," 139, and David M. Rubin, "What the President's Commission Learned

About the Media," in The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implications, 104.

25 Rubin, "What the President's Commission Learned," 98.

26 United States, Staff Report, 187.

8

It was an experience... considering the technical questions I was being asked and

the lack of understanding of my answers. It's difficult for an engineer to respond

to a technical question with anything except a technical response. And I knew by

the questions I was getting back that the press people just didn't understand what

was going on, and I knew there was going to be a real problem about getting

information out to the public.23

Reporters developed a penchant for "what if" type of questioning, for example, what if there is a

large radiation release?, or, what if the core is damaged? Such questions inevitably deal with the

worst case scenarios, in this case, a meltdown of the core and the uncontrolled release of

radiation.24 "What if" questions reflected journalists' unfamiliarity with nuclear reactors, but

reporters resorted to them because they did not comprehend the technical jargon (such as

blowdowns, zirconium cladding, hot legs, etc.,) that Met Ed spokesmen used in briefings.

A core meltdown was a possibility at TMI, however remote. Discussion of a meltdown first

surfaced in an NRC press conference Friday afternoon, and it was featured on the evening news

on national television.25 Media preoccupation with a nuclear meltdown compounded the anxiety

of a local population already trying to cope with the release of radiation, growth of a potentially

explosive hydrogen bubble in the reactor chamber, and the first evacuation advisory.

The Media and the Public

All of the news media devoted an extraordinary amount of broadcast time or newspaper space to

the accident. Each of the three national networks, CBS, NBC, and ABC, presented at least 200

minutes of news about the accident during the week of March 28 to April 3, spread among

morning and evening news shows and specials. On nightly broadcasts, coverage averaged

between 7 and 11 minutes; because a single evening news program offers only about 22 or 23

minutes of actual news, 7 to 11 minutes devoted to a single story is an extraordinary amount of

airtime.26
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

27 As quoted in Rubin, "What the President's Commission Learned," 98-99.

28 United States, Staff Report, 188.

29 United States, Staff Report, 188.

30 United States, Staff Report, 218. On the importance of radio, see also Trunk and Trunk, 178.

9

Perhaps the most celebrated national news broadcast—one that is often cited in discussions

about sensationalist reporting at TMI–was the CBS Evening News broadcast of Friday, March

30, 1979. Walter Cronkite's introduction to a series of reports from CBS correspondents is

usually cited as an example of unduly alarmist newscasting:

The world has never known a day quite like today. It faced the considerable

uncertainties and dangers of the worst nuclear power plant accident of the atomic

age. And the horror tonight is that it could get much worse. It is not an atomic

explosion that is feared; the experts say that is impossible. But the specter was

raised [of] perhaps the next most serious kind of nuclear catastrophe—a massive

release of radioactivity. [The Nuclear Regulatory Commission] cited that

possibility with an announcement that, while it is not likely, the potential is there

for the ultimate risk of a meltdown at the Three Mile Island Atomic Power Plant

outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.27

It was Cronkite's choice of words such as "horror," "specter," and "catastrophe" that caused the

most concern among both the public at the time and media analysts afterward. This CBS clip

also illustrates the differences between the more sensationalist bent of national network coverage

and the less inflammatory tone of local media.

Newspapers varied much more than the networks in the amount of space they allotted to TMI.

The Harrisburg Evening News, for example, printed 148 stories during the week, an average of

21 a day. Aside from the Harrisburg paper, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the major regional paper,

devoted 61 stories to TMI, followed by the New York Times (85 stories), the Los Angeles Times

(49 stories), and the Washington Post (45 stories).28 As for the national wire services, the

Associated Press carried 295 TMI stories during the week, some of them rewrites and updates of

earlier accounts, whereas United Press International carried 216 stories.29

Although TMI occurred in the age of nationwide television news casting, radio was the most

important means of information for the local population. In one post-accident survey, 62 percent

of local residents cited radio as their "most frequent source of news" during the incident.30 The

locals turned to their radios because, as the news director at a Harrisburg radio station put it,

"You can't wait until the newspaper comes out, you're panicked now. Television doesn't interrupt
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

31 United States, Staff Report, 218.

32 United States, Staff Report, 219.

33 United States, Staff Report, 219.

34 United States, Staff Report, 220.

35 United States, Staff Report, 221.

10

its programming that way, nor could it keep constant coverage going. Radio was the medium at

that time."31

As might be expected, the accident dominated radio news in the Harrisburg area. Most radio

programming schedules were changed to allow more news coverage than usual. "We clearly

became an all-news station for more than a week," observed WCMB News Director Steve

Liddick, whose station normally played soft rock music.32 Mike Pintek, news director of "Top

40" station WKBO, agreed: "News totally dominated that period. We continued normal

programming, but stopped everything whenever there was an update on the TMI story."33

Because of the smallness of their operations, few stations were able to do much on-the-scene

reporting and had to rely on the national wire services for events happening only a few miles

away. Local stations, nonetheless, used their broadcasts to inform and even advise residents

about what to do, even in the absence of reliable information. "We would put on the air whatever

we had that we could substantiate as soon as it came in," Liddick said, "but we probably went on

the air at times when we shouldn't have and surmised things... we went on the air and some

assumptions were made that tended to make people more distrustful of the information they were

getting even from us."34

At least a few broadcasters used call-in shows to answer questions as best as they could, and

some tried to calm and reassure concerned callers about the situation and the various officials

dealing with it. "People would call in and ask, 'Is it true that once I leave my house, I won't be

able to come back for a hundred years?', recalled Jeff Bitzer of WHP. "The community was

upset. We wanted them to be upset if there was a reason, but we didn't want to scare them

because we might be careless about what we were doing. Mostly we told people what was being

said. They wanted us to make decisions for them and we couldn't."35

Bitzer stated that WHP attempted to provide listeners with the latest information so they could

decide what to do themselves. "We tried to give the people everything we had on the premise

that a well-informed public would make the right decision.... At the same time, though, we
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

36 United States, Staff Report, 222.

37 Trunk and Trunk, 178.

38 Trunk and Trunk, 179.

11

wanted to present things in a reasoned and cool manner that was not one of panic. We may have

over-reacted on that side—we may have been too cool.... There was a lot of soul-searching."36

The impact of local and national media reporting at TMI is illustrated by the testimony of two

local residents, Anne and Edward Trunk (Anne Trunk was a member of the presidential

commission of inquiry at TMI). The first instance refers to events of Wednesday, March 28, a

day of reassuring announcements from Met Ed and the beginning of conflicting accounts of what

was happening at the plant, especially concerning radiation releases.

According to the Trunks, "Perhaps the most dramatic news of the day was heard on the televised

'CBS Evening News,' when Walter Cronkite informed the nation that we had just taken 'the first

step of a nuclear nightmare.' Just before this newscast, state and local officials had reassured the

TMI community that there was no danger to public health."37 After noting factual errors in the

CBS account regarding the containment building and radiation readings off-site, the Trunks

continued:

This technical mismanagement of the news was typical of the inaccuracy and

sensationalism that the community would be subjected to in the days that

followed. Distant news was always more depressing than was local. People's

hopes would be successively raised and then dashed by conflicting news reports.

TMI would later be labeled the most overrated and overplayed story in the history

of American journalism.38

The second instance refers to events of Friday, March 30, a day the Trunks describe as "the only

day of panic" among local residents:

The morning contained some wild rumors about an early venting [of high levels

of radiation].... These rumors were spread by the news media and by telephone.

They gave the impression that the situation had deteriorated and that the plant was

in trouble. The final trigger of panic had to be the poorly conceived evacuation

order that originated at NRC headquarters... and which was countermanded by

Governor Thornburgh.... News of a possible evacuation leaked to the public and

remained as a threat until the following week.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

39 Trunk and Trunk, 180.

40 Peter Goldman et al., "In the Shadow of the Towers," Newsweek, 9 April 1979, 29; Cynthia Bullock Flynn,

"Local Public Opinion," in The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implications, 146-48.

41 William B. Murray, "Shared Responsibilities of the Utility and the Media in Crisis Situations," in The Three

Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implications, 116-20.

42 Murray, 117.

12

By 11 a.m.... parents in Middletown were already pulling their children out of

school. A blind panic had begun. The press was saying that Met Ed was not

telling everything. Fears of the unknown were heightened. The demand to know

'everything' would produce technical information that the press could not

understand or interpret for the public.39

Major problems with the media at TMI, such as conflicting information, unfounded rumors,

incomprehensible technical data, and sensationalized reporting, are all present in the Trunks'

accounts. But despite the Trunk's opinion, few people actually panicked. In general, the public's

response was a mixture of resignation and alarm but not panic. People who felt threatened

packed up and left, even if only temporarily. Others, feeling less threatened, resigned themselves

to the situation and went about life as usual.40

In a retrospective report on the TMI incident, a Met Ed utility spokesman, William Murray,

offered an assessment of the shared responsibilities of a utility and the media in crisis situations

such as TMI.41 Because serious nuclear plant accidents are by their nature protracted events,

nuclear utilities must be prepared to handle the increased volume and the duration of media

attention that a nuclear mishap generates. Rather than a single spokesman for the press and the

public, Murray felt that this role should be shared by representatives from the utility, the NRC,

and local emergency agencies as a way to address the public's concerns promptly while avoiding

the communications problems that occurred at TMI.

Murray acknowledged the need for utilities to educate media personnel about the workings of

nuclear power facilities so they can better interpret accident situations to the public. This

education should occur before a nuclear accident takes place and should contribute toward

development of a shared language free of technical jargon. Special attention should be devoted

to radiation, which Murray noted "remains the most easily sensationalized and the most

emotional topic associated with nuclear power."42

Utilities must also learn to deal with reporters' "what if" questions, which are natural during a

nuclear mishap. Journalists must learn to accept imprecise and "maybe" answers from nuclear
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

43 Murray, 120.

13

technicians and to report them responsibly. They are also obliged to put developments in an

emergency situation into context for the benefit of a concerned and anxious public.

Finally, Murray dealt with the issue of sensationalism, which he felt characterized some of the

reporting at TMI. He noted post-accident reports by psychologists that found "a direct

relationship between the degree of risk perceived by laymen and the frequency with which a

potential risk is simply mentioned in news reports."43 In the interest of responsible news

reporting, he urged the media to weigh their reports carefully to reduce sensationalism in

reporting on nuclear incidents.

Such advice has value to the extent it is accepted and followed. After TMI, efforts were made to

improve communications between nuclear facilities and the media, and at least some attention

was given to educating media representatives about the intricacies of nuclear power. However,

limited resources and other pressing issues have meant that these efforts have fallen short of

what is needed. In the event of another incident similar to TMI, many of the problems of public

information that arose at TMI would likely arise once more.

Outcome of the Three Mile Island Accident

The period of emergency at TMI extended over a two-week period. About 144,000 people

evacuated the area within a 15-mile radius of TMI, most of them on Friday, March 30. On

Monday, April 2, the NRC belatedly established a press center. On Wednesday, April 4,

Governor Thornburgh declared an end to the threat of immediate catastrophe, by which time

evacuees were already returning to their homes. On Monday, April 9, Thornburgh lifted all

advisories, and on Wednesday, schools within a five-mile radius of TMI reopened. The Unit 1

reactor, which was undergoing maintenance at the time of the accident, was restarted after heated

debate in 1985. The Unit 2 reactor was eventually found to have been damaged beyond use and

was abandoned.

Summary

The utility and the NRC were not prepared to deal with the public information aspect of a

serious, prolonged nuclear accident such as TMI. Utility spokesmen offered explanations that

were confused and often at odds with the views of the NRC. Conflicting statements brought

swarms of reporters to TMI to probe what looked like an industry coverup. Journalists were
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

14

driven by the need for a story, most lacked expertise about nuclear reactors and terminology, and

some developed a penchant for asking questions about worst case scenarios.

Journalists' accounts reflected the confusion of their sources and at times bordered upon the

alarmist or sensationalist. Despite living in an age of television, residents depended far more on

local radio than on national media for up-to-date news about TMI. Communications failings on

the part of the nuclear industry and media produced confusion among local residents,

compounding the public's difficulties in dealing with such matters as radiation and evacuation.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

44 Based on chronologies in Tony Atwater and Niranjala D. Weerakkody, “A Portrait of Urban Conflict: The

L.A. Times Coverage of the Los Angeles Riots,” a paper submitted to the Media Management and Economics Division,

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1994, and

David Whitman, “The Untold Story of the L.A. Riots,” U.S. News & World Report, 114, no. 21 (May 31, 1993), 34-48.

15

THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, 1992

Chronology of Events, April 29–May 3, 199244

Day 1: Wednesday, April 29:

3:10 p.m.: A California Superior court acquits four white police officers charged in the beating

of African-American motorist Rodney King. In little more than an hour, looting and rioting

break out in South Central Los Angeles.

4:20 p.m.: Several African-American males steal malt liquor from a liquor store and attack the

store owner’s son. The burglars flee before the police arrive.

5:27 p.m.: Police arrest one man for breaking car windows with a baseball bat and release others

suspected of throwing bottles at motorists.

5:34-5:48 p.m.: Police make the first arrest of looters. An angry crowd protests. Police

Lieutenant Mike Moulin orders police officers out of the area. New York Times photo-journalist

Bart Bartholemew is attacked.

5:50 p.m.: A crowd chases fleeing police to Florence and Normandie avenues. They hurl rocks, a

metal-covered phone book, and a stand-up, Marlboro sign at the car of motorist Francisco

Aragon.

5:55 p.m.: A passing motorist, Manuel Vaca, his wife, and his brother are pulled from their car,

beaten and robbed.

6:03 p.m.: The looting of Tom’s Liquor, a local business, begins.

6:15 p.m.: While waiting for a bus, Salvador Arzate is beaten and robbed.

6:30 p.m.: An off-duty fireman rescues a badly beaten motorist.

6:43 p.m.: A trucker, Larry Tarvin, is assaulted while his truck is looted.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

16

6:46 p.m.: Reginald Denny, a white trucker, is pulled from his vehicle, robbed, and badly beaten.

A television crew records the incident. He is rescued by a group of African-Americans.

7:16 p.m.: Gregory Alan-Williams, an African-American, saves a bloodied Takao Hirata after

another would-be rescuer is beaten.

7:35 p.m.: A building and a car are reported to be on fire.

7:42 p.m.: Bennie Newton, an African-American minister, saves Fidel Lopez after he is beaten,

robbed, and spray-painted.

8:30 p.m.: Police return in force to Florence and Normandie avenues.

9:00 p.m.: Mayor Tom Bradley declares a local state of emergency. California Governor Pete

Wilson orders the National Guard to report for duty to assist the police.

Day 2: Thursday, April 30:

A dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed. Rioting and looting escalate. Seven people are reported

killed. Public schools are closed. Bus service in the South Central district is halted. Disturbances

break out in San Francisco, Seattle, and Las Vegas. President George Bush announces a

Department of Justice investigation into the trial verdict.

Day 3: Friday, May 1:

Rioting and looting continue. President Bush holds an emergency White House meeting with

civil rights leaders. He also addresses the nation in a special televised speech and promises to 

restore order in Los Angeles. He then orders 1,500 Marines and 3,000 Army infantry troops into

South Central Los Angeles. Troops are given the authority to shoot back if fired upon. National

Guard troops ring shopping centers while residents and merchants clean up debris; they also

keep order around post offices in South Central Los Angeles. Rodney King appeals for calm.

Violence breaks out in other U. S. cities, including Seattle. Twenty-eight fatalities are reported

as a result of the rioting.

Day 4: Saturday, May 2: 
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

17

Rioting ceases, and the cleanup of the South Central district begins. The President of the Korean

American Retail Grocers Association announces damages totaling $700 million to 600 Koreanowned establishments in South Central Los Angeles and 200 in Koreatown.

Day 5: Sunday, May 3:

Eleven hundred Marines and 600 Army troops join 6,500 National Guard troops in the largest

show of armed force in the city. Mayor Bradley appoints Peter V. Uberroth to head the

Commission to Rebuild Los Angeles, which is to oversee the restoration of riot shattered areas.

President Bush meets with top domestic advisors to begin planning a response to the riots.

The Media and the Los Angeles Riots

The Rodney King Affair

Although long-term problems of racism and poverty had plagued South Central Los Angeles and

had poisoned relations between the African-American population and the Los Angeles Police

Department (LAPD), the event that precipitated the 1992 rioting occurred more than a year

before the first rioters appeared on the streets. On March 3, 1991, four Los Angeles police

officers stopped a African-American motorist, Rodney King, and his companions after a car

chase at speeds of more than 100 miles per hour. The officers ordered King, who was allegedly

drunk, to get out of his car. King complied reluctantly, but then resisted the officers' attempt to

handcuff him and scuffled with them. The officers wrestled King to the ground and began to beat

and kick him, ultimately striking him 56 times with a baton. Unbeknownst to the officers, a local

resident captured part of the encounter, the beating episode, on videotape. The tape was passed

to a local television station, which ran it in a newscast. Within hours, the tape was being shown

on all major television networks.

The tape caused an immediate media and public sensation. The images of the police beating and

kicking King were broadcast over and over again in the weeks and months following the incident

and created an indelible impression of police brutality in the minds of millions of viewers who

saw it, including African-American residents of inner-city Los Angeles. In addition to being

angered by what they viewed as indiscriminate racism on the part of the LAPD, as exemplified

by the King beating, African-American residents of South Central Los Angeles felt that

government authorities and the media had neglected them and their neighborhoods for decades.

As evidence, they cited coverage of urban affairs in the Los Angeles Times, in which all

communities received attention except those in the inner city. The King incident struck African-
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

45 John Salak, The Los Angeles Riots: America's Cities in Crisis (Brookfield, Conn.: Millbrook Press, 1993), 28.

A post-trial public opinion poll published in Newsweek magazine found that 73 percent of whites and 92 percent of blacks

felt the verdict of not guilty was not justified; 77 percent of whites and 91 percent of blacks favored further prosecution of

the officers. Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 30.

46 Keesing’s Record of World Events (Cambridge, England: Longman, 1992), 38856.

47 “TV and the 'Firebell',” Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 43.

18

Americans as yet another example of a city administration that routinely abused and ignored

them.

Most Americans who saw the King video felt that the four police officers were guilty of

excessive force, if not of more serious crimes.45 The residents of South Central Los Angeles

certainly felt this way. When the four officers were arrested and scheduled for trial, AfricanAmericans anticipated that the officers would be found guilty in the beating of King and

punished. The decision of Superior Court Judge Stanley Weisberg to move the trial to Ventura

County, an almost exclusively white area inhabited by a disproportionately large number of

police officers, disappointed African-Americans. Prospects for a guilty verdict hardly improved

with the selection of a jury with only two minority jurors, one of whom was Hispanic and the

other Asian-American.46 As the trial neared its conclusion in late April, South Central residents

were prepared to accept only a guilty verdict. Any other decision was likely to lead to an

explosion.

Television as the Instigator of the Riots

Television was the most critical medium of communication in the rioting in Los Angeles. As

Newsweek columnist Jonathan Alter put it, "A fire needs oxygen. From the very beginning, the

oxygen that has given life to the Rodney King story is television."47 Television was instrumental

in fomenting the rioting, and it played a significant role in determining how the rioting unfolded.

In mid-afternoon on April 29, the jury found the four police officers not guilty on charges of the

use of excessive force in the arrest of Rodney King. It was the broadcast media, primarily

television, that informed viewers of the outcome of the trial. The verdict fell like a thunderclap in

Los Angeles and across the nation. The months during which the tape of the beating of Rodney

King had been aired again and again had convinced most viewers that the officers were guilty;

how could anyone argue with the images captured on the videotape or possibly conclude that the

officers were innocent? Indeed, the King tape offers an instance of the media, in effect, serving

as prosecutor as well as jury even before the officers' trial began.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

48 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 34.

49 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 37.

50 Mike Freeman, “L.A.’s Local News Takes to the Streets,” Broadcasting, 4 May 1992, 11.

51 Freeman, 11.

19

Within little more than an hour of the trial verdict, inner-city residents took to the streets in a

form of collective rebellion that degenerated into looting and rioting. At the intersection of

Florence and Normandie avenues, black teenagers began throwing stones and bottles at passing

cars. From that locale, the epicenter of the riots, the violence rippled out into adjacent

neighborhoods. Drivers jumped from their cars and fled while youths smashed windows,

tromped on hoods and roofs, and torched the abandoned vehicles.48 In one instance, a group of

residents watching television reports of the outbreak of violence in their neighborhood jumped

up and ran to join the fray.

As news coverage of the riots continued, other groups, including Hispanics and some whites,

joined in. What was initially a race-based riot quickly broadened into a rampage involving three

or more ethnic groups concerned mostly with looting. A number of racially motivated acts of

hatred occurred, at least a few of them ugly, perpetrated mostly by gangs of young toughs. Much

of the action in the streets, however, was essentially a free-for-all scramble to gather loot in an

almost fiesta-like atmosphere. One store clerk watching the looters at work observed: "They

don't care for justice, they don't care for anything. Right now they're just on a spree.... They want

to live the lifestyle they see people on TV living."49

Television as a Guide to the Rioting

If television can be said to have prejudged the trial outcome and to have provided the spark for

the rioting, it also inadvertently served to perpetuate it. Local TV coverage was instrumental in

televising the riots in South Central Los Angeles almost before the first emergency calls were

answered. Seven stations (KNBC, KABC, KCBS, KTTV, KTLA, KCAL, and KCOP)

dispatched helicopters, some of which gathered video evidence against perpetrators of violence.

Network news shows, even all-news radio stations KFWB-AM, KABC-AM, and CNN dedicated

themselves to covering the repercussions of the unpopular verdict.50 KFWB, for example, broke

from its standard news rotations to emphasize remote reports from scores of field reporters

canvassing the city. KABC provided 163 special news-feeds to its affiliates nationally on the day

of the riots.51
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

52 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 43.

53 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 43.

20

 As the rioting escalated, many residents of South Central Los Angeles relied on television as a

guide to the action. Local media newscasts provided looters with ready-made roadmaps to

neighborhoods where looting was underway or where the police cover was thin or nonexistent.

Jonathan Alter wrote in Newsweek that South Central residents used the airing of the riots as a

visual map of where to loot and riot, a situation that amounted to “a homeshopping network for

crooks.” Alter described the situation as follows:

TV told them [the rioters] where to go. While most of the national coverage was

restrained, local coverage was not. At least a dozen of the helicopters on the first

night—a presence that helped create a wartime atmosphere—belonged not to

police but to local media outlets. In the early going, when the fires were just

beginning, seven Los Angeles TV stations had already begun wall-to-wall

coverage. One airborne reporter for a radio station actually reported the story

before it happened, telling viewers he didn’t see “any fires yet".... Several local

TV reporters described both the exact locations of looting and the fact that police

were doing little to stop it. Was it necessary? Journalists are taught to report

completely, but sometimes a little restraint makes sense.52

It would appear from Alter's account that through their coverage, the broadcast media

encouraged violence and lawlessness during the rioting.

South Central residents used television for purposes other than merely as a guide to the rioting.

A few saw the publicity they were getting as a way to call attention to the plight of their

neighborhoods. "Noise brings the media here. By making noise, we get attention" observed one

African American on television.53 He seemed to be saying that instead of dwelling on millionaire

murders and Hollywood premiers, the media and society at large needed to concentrate on

problems in the inner cities.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

54 Newsweek, 12 May 1992, 43.

55 This video image was published in many sources. A good reproduction can be found in Salak, 36.

21

The Impact of Videotaping

Within the context of television coverage of the riots, videotaping deserves special mention. The

effect of the videotape of the King arrest and beating has already been mentioned—it was

powerful as the tape was replayed time and again on television screens across the nation. "The

videotape of the beating immediately became one of the half-dozen most widely watched TV

clips in the entire history of the medium, right up there with [Jack] Ruby shooting [Lee Harvey]

Oswald and the [Space Shuttle] Challenger explosion," opined Alter. "The trial—and trial by

media—that resulted was essentially about that videotape. TV images of the mayhem in L. A.,

particularly the truck driver being savagely beaten, depressingly mirrored the original video and

conveyed the madness to the rest of the world."54

Another example of the ability of videotaping to convey graphic and ugly acts is, as Apter notes,

the beating of the white truck driver, Reginald Denny, by a group of young black men the first

day of the rioting. As a news helicopter circled overhead videotaping the action, the men pulled

Denny from his truck at Florence and Normandie avenues and kicked and beat him savagely.

One threw a cinder block that struck Denny in the head. Viewers saw Denny stretched on out on

the ground beside the cab of his truck, his face and the pavement crimson red with blood while

one assailant reveled with upstretched arms in glee and another climbed into the truck's cab.55

Such images were frightening to watch, and they brought racial hatred into the country's living

rooms for days on end. These and numerous other episodes similarly recorded by camera crews

during the riots demonstrated the power of on-the-spot videotaping. The ability to record such

imagery is within the reach not only of the media but also of private citizens. The King case

showed how effective videotape in the hands of a private citizen can be—it was successfully

used to defame and prejudge the police officers. Instantaneous videotaping is a reality, and its

potential for positive or negative use must be acknowledged, whether by police and rescuers

during emergency operations or by private citizens engaged in a quarrel on a local city street.

The Media and Sensationalized Coverage

In a situation as dramatic and violent as that of the Los Angeles riots, the quality of media

coverage becomes an issue. In such a situation, is it possible to provide "fair" coverage, whatever

one may consider that to be, or to avoid photography or news stories that may not be judged

sensational so far as their impact on readers is concerned? Standards for judging sensationalism

in various types of media vary, of course, but it is generally conceded that local media,

particularly television, became consumed with coverage of the Los Angeles riots far more than
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

56 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 26-29.

57 Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 34, 38.

58 Atwater, 43.

59 Salak, 36.

22

did national network broadcasting. Much of the imagery captured locally, however, found its

way onto nation's airwaves and into major newspapers.

Among the most widely publicized photographs were those of the beating of Rodney King and

of Reginald Denny. These dramatic photos, as already noted, evoked strong emotions and

responses in almost everyone who saw them, ranging from outrage at the sight of the beating of

King to calls for punishment for those who pummeled Denny. But other photos featured in the

local and national media were equally dramatic and in some cases just as sensational.

Newsweek featured a photo essay with the bold title of "Fire and Fury." The lead photo showed a

man throwing a bucket of water onto a raging storefront fire in a futile effort to extinguish it.

Another photo showed a group of young Hispanic men, grins on their faces, tipping over a

burning police cruiser. In a third photo, a young African-American male made an obscene

gesture to a police officer, his face contorted with hate and defiance.56 Photos in the

accompanying article showed three young Hispanic males reveling in front of flames shooting

100 feet into the air, while yet another image depicted a young Korean-American on a street with

burning buildings guarding his business with a raised gun in his hand, his tee-shirt emblazoned

with the slogan "By any means necessary."57 Such images contain a great deal of shock value.

They played a part in instilling apprehension into many Americans, who feared that such

lawlessness might spread to their communities (violence did break out in Las Vegas, Seattle, and

San Francisco during the Los Angeles riots).

Local television devoted much more air time to broadcasts of images of the riots than did

network television. As soon as the violence began in South Central Los Angeles, local television

stations began virtual nonstop coverage.58 The reporting became so overpowering that Los

Angeles television stations and the press were criticized for making it appear that all of the city

was in flames rather than only certain neighborhoods. Responding to the graphic and pervasive

coverage on the second day, Mayor Tom Bradley urged one station to stop broadcasting violent

images of the rioting and to return to regular programming in an effort to avoid further inflaming

the situation. The station complied, but the rioting continued.59

Coverage in the major local newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, while extensive, appears to have

been more measured. This assessment is based on results of a study of the Times' coverage of the
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

60 Atwater and Weerakkody, “A Portrait of Urban Conflict.”

61 Atwater and Weerakkody, 12-13.

62 Atwater and Weerakkody, 14-15.

63 Atwater and Weerakkody, 15.

64 Atwater and Weerakkody, 17.

23

riots by Tony Atwater and Niranjala D. Weerakkody of Rutgers University.60 The Times carried

between 21 and 78 riot stories per day, for a total of 247 items, during the five-day period from

April 30 to May 4.

Of these, 17 percent concerned the Rodney King trial, whereas nearly 42 percent dealt with the

dramatic and deadly violence in the streets. These finding were consistent with other studies that

have found that the media place heavy emphasis on the dramatic, sensational, or controversial

aspects of domestic and international crises. The editorial focus on violence was strongest on

May 1, when the looting and rioting figured prominently in the paper's second day of riot

coverage. As the violence declined and was finally halted, editorial attention shifted to law and

order stories, especially in the May 2 and 3 editions, when Army soldiers and National Guard

troops began to appear on the streets.61

In terms of story types in the Times, hard news stories predominated (36 percent), whereas

commentaries and analysis accounted for almost 28 percent of riot stories. The Times

consistently published commentary and analysis reports throughout the five-day period, most

frequently in the first two days of riot coverage.62

Photographs accompanied 44 percent of the riot stories, nearly 42 percent of them portraying

acts that the study classified as violent. Photos depicting violence appeared more than four times

more frequently than those associated with the category of "law and order." These findings were

again consistent with other research that demonstrated the media's tendency to dwell on the

dramatic and controversial, if not sensational, elements of an emergency. Finally, Atwater found

that residents and community leaders were cited most often as sources in the Times' riot stories.

This finding contrasted with those of some other studies of similar incidents that indicated a

media preference for "official" sources such as public authorities or police spokesmen.63

Given the expansive region it covers and the resources at its command, the Times was ideally

suited to cover the rioting compared to its peer national newspapers. Atwater concluded that "the

L.A. Times' riot coverage was extensive in terms of the number of stories, news space, diversity

of topics addressed, and sources quoted."64 He also found that the Times covered the antecedent

conditions of the crisis and thus was not vulnerable to the charge that it had not provided

background coverage, a familiar criticism of the media in crisis situations. In September 1992,
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

65 Atwater and Weerakkody, 18.

66 Walter Goodman, “TV, Violence, and the Return of Radical Chic,” Columbia Journalism Review, 31, no. 2

(July-August 1992), 28.

67 M. L. Stein, “"Politicians to Examine Media: California Assembly Committee to Hold Hearings on Media

Coverage of the Los Angeles Riots; Journalists Invited to Testify,” Editor & Publisher, 125, no. 30 (July 25, 1992), 7.

68 Stein, “Politicians,” 7.

24

the paper responded to resounding criticism from its South Central Los Angeles' critics that they

were ignored in local press coverage by creating a zoned section called the "City Times."65

Discussion of controversial and sensational reporting raises the issue of responsibility in the

journalistic profession. Media coverage of the Los Angeles riots has been characterized as

biased, slanted against one or another ethnic group, inflamatory in its news items, and given to

sensationalism in its visual imagery. The role of a journalist in a crisis situation is not necessarily

an easy or safe one, however, and in the case of the Los Angeles riots, some officials and

members of the public were inclined to blame the messenger rather than to face up to the

problems of racism, poverty, joblessness, and neglect that led to the violence in the South

Central district.

Journalists, of course, would most likely take exception to these charges of irresponsibility.

Walter Goodman, a television critic for the New York Times, offered his assessment of the role

and responsibility of the media during the riots:

Television news, particularly in its local manifestations, is not famous for

explaining much of anything, but in the aftermath of the riots, it tried hard. Even

before the fires were doused, the tube was awash in explanations, which

sometimes verged on excuses, for the rage and despair caused by years of

neglect.... Even if a backlash should develop, how could television not have given

its all to such a story? Surely, it was as much a duty to show the beating of

Reginald Denny as to show the King video over and over. And even if the

televised scenes of looting inspired peace-abiding folk to join the rebels, should

reporters and photographers have suppressed their coverage?66

Months after the riots, several journalists, commenting on upcoming hearings in the California

Assembly about media coverage of the riots, also defended their profession. Terry Francke of the

California Freedom of Information Committee commented: "There is a line of argument among

some people that if you don't give events such as the riots nonstop coverage, the rioters will not

persist. The fact is that coverage does not make a difference in the degree of lawlessness."67

Orange County Register editor Chris Anderson asked: "What in the world do they want? I don't

know what role we could play. The media are not monolithic. We do things differently."68
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

69 Stein, “Politicians,” 7.

70 Los Angeles Times, 30 April 1992, A:22.

71 USA Today, 6 August 1992, A:1.

72 Los Angeles Sentinel, 11 August 1994, A:4.

73 Los Angeles Times, 30 April 1992, A:25.

25

An idealistic assessment of the media at Los Angeles came from John Irby, president of the

California Society of Newspaper Editors. "The media's role is not to influence but to report the

news and let people make their own decisions."69 Did the media report the riots in this manner?

Journalists might be expected to agree, but many outside the profession probably would not,

citing the Rodney King video and television coverage of the first day or two of the rioting as

support for their point of view.

Outcome of The Los Angeles Riots

The Los Angeles riots ended after five days, leaving more than 50 people dead, thousands

injured, and almost $1 billion in property damages. A Federal aid package of $100 million in

disaster assistance was given to riot victims, $200 million was designated to rebuild damaged

areas, and $400 million was made available in loans from the Small Business Administration.

The Los Angeles Community Development Agency approved $200 million in emergency relief

for small businesses and homeowners. Rodney King eventually sued the city of Los Angeles for

$83 million dollars, but the city rejected the suit.70 The four police officers who had been

acquitted in the beating of Rodney King were reindicted, this time for violation of King’s civil

rights. Two of the officers were found guilty.71 King was awarded $3.8 million dollars.72 Daryl

Gates, chief of the LAPD, was replaced, and the LAPD undertook to improve its relations with

inner-city residents.73
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

26

Summary

From beginning to end, the riots were a media event. The repeated airing of the beating of

Rodney King, on top of deep-seated grievances in South Central Los Angeles, effectively

prepared the way for violence. News of the acquittal of the four police officers involved in the

beating of Rodney King set off rioting by African-American, Hispanic, and some white residents

of South Central Los Angeles. Televised images of street scenes acted as guides to looters and

helped to propel the rioting. The impact of videotaping was particularly noteworthy; it was

through this medium that images of the beatings of Rodney King and Reginald Denny were

seared into the nation's psyche. Reporting in the Los Angeles Times seems to have been more

restrained than television coverage, but both broadcast and print media engaged in controversial

and sensationalized reporting. Such coverage led many people across the nation to fear that the

lawlessness in Los Angeles might spread to their neighborhoods.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

74 Victoria Sherrow, The World Trade Center Bombing: Terror in the Towers (Springfield, New Jersey: Enslow,

1998), 7.

75 Keesing's Record of World Events (Cambridge, England: Longman, 1993), 39311.

76 Jim Dwyer, David Kocieniewski, Deidre Murphy, and Peg Tyre, Two Seconds Under the World (New York:

Crown, 1994), 29-30, 43-44, 46, 106.

77 Tom Mathews et al., "A Shaken City's Towering Inferno," Newsweek, 8 March 1993, 26.

78 Adrian Kerson, Terror in the Towers (New York: Random House, 1993), 11.

79 Dwyer, 33-34.

27

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING, 1993

Chronology of Events, February 26–27, 1993

Day 1: Friday, February 26, 1993:

12:17 p.m.: A massive explosion shook the two 110-story towers of Manhattan's World Trade

Center. There were approximately 50,000 people in the towers at the time74—about the number

who worked in the Center on a daily basis.75 Some of the people inside the buildings at the time

of the blast were workers; others were among the thousands of people who visit the complex

each day.

Four employees of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the organization which

owns the Center, were killed instantly. A fifth person, who had just parked in the garage, was

thrown 30 feet and died of smoke inhalation and cardiac arrest two hours later. The body of the

sixth and final person killed, a Center restaurant employee, was not found until 17 days after the

explosion.76

The explosion knocked out the Center's emergency public-address system and much of its

electricity, leaving tens of thousands of workers unsure of whether or how to evacuate the

towers. Hundreds of people were stuck in elevators.77 At the same time, many local television

stations lost their ability to broadcast because their antennae were located on top of the Center.78

Just four seconds after the explosion, New York City's 911 system received its first emergency

telephone call reporting that something had blown up under the World Trade Center. The call

was routed to the fire department.79
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

80 Dwyer, 34-35.

81 Dwyer, 41-42.

82 C. Lee Harrington, "'Is Anyone Else Out There Sick of the News?!': TV Viewers' Responses to Non-routine

News Coverage," Media, Culture & Society 20, no. 3 (July 1998), 480.

83 Dwyer, 69.

84 Russell Watson et al., "The Hunt Begins," Newsweek, Monday 8 March 1993, 24.

85 Kerson, 49.

86 Dwyer, 46.

28

12:29 p.m.: A 911 operator dispatched police, an ambulance and the fire department after

receiving a call from an injured woman trapped in the parking garage.80

About 12:45 p.m.: The first news of the blast aired on New York all-news radio stations WINS

and WCBS. The first reports suggested that the cause of the blast was an electrical transformer

fire.81

1:00 to 4:00 p.m.: According to Soap Opera Weekly, "All 10 soaps were pre-empted" nationwide

by the three major broadcast networks. Instead, the networks aired breaking news reports all

afternoon.82

1:35 p.m.: The New York City Police Department's (NYPD) First Precinct received an

anonymous telephone call claiming that the explosion had been caused by a bomb planted by a

group called the Serbian Liberation Front. Numerous 911 calls naming various groups as

responsible for the blast followed throughout the day.83 None of the calls ultimately proved

truthful. One telephone call warned of a bomb at the Empire State Building; the building was

evacuated, but nothing was found.84

1:40 p.m.: Authorities turned off all of the towers' remaining electricity to avoid additional safety

problems.85

2:30 p.m.: Fire Lieutenant Matt Donachie told reporters the damage was not consistent with a

transformer explosion. He declined to tell them that the explosion had been caused by a bomb,

although he had realized that this was the only feasible explanation.86

Mid-afternoon: By this time, officials from several different agencies were on the scene: the

NYPD and its New York City Bomb Squad; the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

87 Sherrow, 17.

88 Watson, 22.

89 Dwyer, 54.

90 Sherrow, 14.

91 Dwyer, 57.

92 Sherrow, 15.

93 Kerson, 84.

94 Dwyer, 65.

29

which owns the Center; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),87 which had begun

rushing additional agents up from Washington.88

4:15 p.m.: A radio station aired interviews with people coming out of the Center. One man said

that basement level B-2 had been completely destroyed.89

About 4:30 p.m.: A group of 72 people made it safely out of the Center after being trapped

together in an elevator for over four hours. They emerged into crowds of police, rescue workers

and vehicles, concerned citizens, and reporters with cameras90.

Late afternoon: Carl Selinger, a Port Authority engineer, finally left the Center after being

trapped for hours. He expected to find a "throng of news cameras. But they all had gone off

chasing the kindergarten kids who had been trapped on an even higher floor. They were brought

home to wild cheers and klieg lights. Selinger chuckled when he got downstairs and realized

how bored the press seemed."91

About 6:30 p.m.: The last survivors were rescued from the Center.92

Day 2: Saturday, February 27, 1993:

4:00 a.m.: Officials finished checking through the buildings for people who might still have been

trapped.93

Early morning: The explosion had not been officially declared a bombing, but security was

heightened all over the city. The bomb scene was quiet, but reporters stood behind sawhorses in

front of the Center trying to get comments from anyone going in or out.94
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

95 Dwyer, 67, 69.

96 Dwyer, 71-72.

30

10:00 a.m.: At a meeting of high-level officials that included New York Governor Mario

Cuomo, Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, and FBI Regional Director Jim Fox, one of the primary

topics was what to reveal at an imminent press conference. Reports in the morning's papers had

quoted "law-enforcement sources" who said that the explosion had been caused by a bomb.

There was disagreement about whether to officially confirm that statement. The officials agreed

to wait for lab results.95

12:00 noon: The governor, the FBI, and the NYPD, among others, held a press conference at

police headquarters. No one revealed that the United Nations had just received a bomb threat.

Kelly told the assembled reporters that had the explosion been caused by a bomb, there was so

far no way to tell who might be responsible. He urged residents of the city not to submit to fear.

Cuomo also delivered an anti-fear message but mentioned terrorists, saying, "Fear is another

weapon.... [T]hat's what terrorists are all about, if these were terrorists." In response to reporters'

questions, Fox conceded, "[T]here's a high probability it is a bombing. It may be terroristrelated." Then Cuomo, who had said in the 10:00 meeting that he favored publicly calling the

explosion a bombing, added, "It's probably a bomb." Finally, Kelly, too, admitted that all signs

pointed to a bombing.96

The Media And The World Trade Center Bombing

During the initial hours and days following the bombing of the World Trade Center, the actions

of the media had powerful effects on three distinct groups of people. First, radio and television

served as sources of emergency information for victims before and during the evacuation of the

towers. Second, in some cases, the media directly affected investigators as they did their jobs.

Finally, press reports on the explosion played a role in determining how the general public

reacted to the situation.

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information

The media today have come to serve as a kind of instantaneous emergency help line for people

directly involved in catastrophic situations. This fact is a new phenomenon in the history of the

press. For decades, people have been able to listen to radio broadcasts in search of emergency

information, but new technology means that a trapped person may have access to television as

well as radio. In addition, the proliferation of cellular phones in recent years has made it possible
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

97 To cite a recent example: A student trapped inside Columbine High School during the April 1999 Littleton,

Colorado, massacre used a cell phone to call Denver NBC affiliate KUSA, and the station broadcast the call. (Lisa De

Moraes, "Denver, We Have a Problem," Washington Post, 27 April 1999, C7.)

98 Kerson, 61.

99 Elizabeth Kolbert, "News Coverage Plays Central Role in Story," New York Times, 27 February 1993, 23.

100 Kolbert.

101 Kerson, 62.

102 Kolbert.

103 Fran Wood, "TV's Window on the Disaster," Daily News [New York], 27 February 1993, 13.

104 Fran Wood, "TV Airs Wrong Help Number," Daily News [New York], 27 February 1993, 13.

31

for emergency victims to interact directly with media.97 The new ability of victims to

communicate with the press has the potential to both ease and complicate emergency situations

and official responses.

Hours after the World Trade Center explosion, many people remained inside upstairs offices that

were filling with smoke. "A few turn[ed] on battery-run televisions to watch the news for advice.

Others use[d] cellular phones to call TV stations for help," wrote one author.98 In response, news

reporters and anchors provided victims with a wide range of suggestions. Chuck Scarborough of

WNBC, NBC's New York affiliate, advised victims to remove office ceiling tiles to create more

space for smoke to rise away from the floor, while WWOR-TV, another local station, asked

those who were trapped to call the station and report their locations. "Throughout the afternoon

and evening, New York City newscasters gave out emergency phone numbers, urged calm on

those trapped inside, and praised the work of the city's emergency crews," the New York Times

wrote the day after the explosion.99

However, one television reporter, Frank Field of local CBS station WCBS, made a potentially

dangerous mistake when he suggested that trapped workers break their office windows to get

fresh air.100 As a result, "inch-thick splinters sharp as knives [fell] toward the sidewalks... at fifty

miles per hour," and firefighters feared the broken windows might create a draft that would carry

smoke through the building even faster.101 Field's action "prompted an outraged phone call from

a New York City firefighter who upbraided Mr. Field on the air," wrote the Times,

102 although

WCBS's general manager later defended breaking windows as an appropriate last resort.103

Another error was made when local TV channels 2, 4, and 9 gave an incorrect emergency phone

number on the air, causing trapped workers to place numerous phone calls to a Brooklyn

woman's home. This mistake was quickly corrected.104
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

105 Wood, "TV's Window..."

106 Dwyer, 60.

107 In this situation, the station's action placed Marchese in no additional danger. However, after the Columbine

shootings, KUSA-TV was criticized heavily for having aired a live cell-phone call from a trapped student and for having

urged other trapped students to call the station as well. Television stations also aired the locations of rescue teams, even

though the shooters had not yet been captured and could have turned on television sets that were inside the school. (De

Moraes, 7.)

108 Martin Gottlieb, "Size of Blast 'Destroyed' Rescue Plan," New York Times, 27 February 1993, 23.

32

"It is not a usual situation where we serve as a source of both information and comfort," said

Bud Carey, the general manager of WCBS, after the bombing.105 However, it seems likely that

the media will play this dual role more and more frequently in the future.

The possibility of viewers receiving incorrect information is not the only risk attached to this

new ease of contact between victims and the media. Although the media often play a public

service role during emergencies, they are still motivated by ratings and readership. The riveting

drama created by comforting trapped victims on the air can be a powerful temptation to

journalists, and safety considerations can suffer.

Mark Marchese, the Port Authority's public affairs director, was trapped in the World Trade

Center for several hours after the blast. "At one point, he... called WCBS [news radio] to see if

he could get some information," wrote one author in a book about the bombing. "To his shock,

he was switched immediately into the studio and put on the air. He politely explained that the

people inside had no idea what was going on."106 News has become so instantaneous that it has

the capacity to affect the course of events rather than simply reporting on them after they have

happened.107

For the most part, this new ability of the press to directly reach victims during emergencies is an

invaluable tool for rescuers. "Charles Maikish, the director of the World Trade Center, said that

it had an elaborate evacuation plan but that it was 'destroyed' by the blast.... Not only did the

explosion severely damage the police desk and the operations center for the entire complex, but

it knocked out their electricity, television, closed-circuit television monitors, and public-address

system," wrote the Times.

108 Thus, media reports served as an essential source of emergency

information for those trapped inside.

It is possible that future terrorist attacks might directly target communications systems such as

the ones in the World Trade Center. The destruction of those systems made the evacuation of the

Center much more difficult and dangerous. Therefore, officials might be well served to help

protect the operation of media outlets, which are themselves potential targets. In fact, the Center

explosion knocked out at least four local broadcast television stations whose transmitters were

on top of one of the towers. Only WCBS, which had a backup transmitter at the Empire State
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

109 Jeff Weingrad and Fran Wood, "Channel 2 Kept Going as Others Lost Power," Daily News [New York], 27

February 1993, 13.

110 Dwyer, 85.

111 Shirley E. Perlman et al., "Focus on Stolen Van," Newsday [New York], 4 March 1993, 4, 21.

112 Ralph Blumenthal, "Insistence on Refund for a Truck Results in an Arrest in Explosion," New York Times, 5

March 1993, A:1, B:4.

33

Building, could still broadcast. Until mid-afternoon, only cable customers could watch the news.

By this time, most of the stations whose transmissions had been interrupted by the blast had

begun to broadcast from different locations.109

Impact of the Media Upon Investigators

Unfortunately, while the media have the power to help victims, in some cases they also have the

ability to directly obstruct officials' work. The first breakthrough in the investigation of the

bombing came on Sunday, February 28, when New York Police Department (NYPD) detectives

found a piece of metal etched with the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of the van that had

carried the bomb. When the group of investigators bringing the piece of metal up in a body bag

saw a "pack" of reporters and photographers on the garage exit ramp they had planned to use,

they turned around and exited by way of another ramp that "hadn't yet been crowded by the

press."110 The investigation was not harmed, but investigators carrying physical evidence crucial

to the case were forced to alter their movements to avoid the media. This suggests that, in some

situations, members of the press can physically obstruct investigators' work.

A potentially much more harmful episode took place four days later, on the morning of

Thursday, March 4, when Newsday [New York] printed a story revealing that investigators had

linked the Center explosion to a yellow Ford van rented from a Ryder franchise in Jersey City,

New Jersey. The Newsday story did not name the man who had rented the van, but it did report

the address of the Ryder office and the fact that the van had been reported stolen.111 According to

the next day's Times, the story forced investigators to arrest the man, Mohammed Salameh,

immediately, although they would have preferred to keep him under surveillance in the hope that

he would lead them to other suspects. However, Newsday claimed that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) and NYPD "knew of the newspaper's plan to publish the article and offered

no objections."112

James Fox, the head of the FBI's New York office, confirmed this, saying, "It was my feeling

that enough newspapers, TV stations, and reporters were beginning to get wind of the fact that

we had traced the van to the rental agency that to ask Newsday to stop publication would be

unfair because I felt perhaps so many other media agencies and newspapers would publish and
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

113 Associated Press, "FBI Did Not Try to Stop Story," Newsday [New York], 6 March 1993, 77.

114 "Target: America," Newsweek, 8 March 1993, 28.

115 Watson, 22.

116 CBS Evening News, 26 February 1993 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System).

34

we couldn't ask all four newspapers and six TV stations to hold back."113 Regardless, the fact is

that no other news outlet reported the story when Newsday did. It is, of course, impossible to

know whether Newsday would have held the story at the FBI's request because the paper was not

asked to do so.

The Media and the Public

The news media exist neither to serve victims in emergency situations nor to help or impede

rescuers or investigators. The central function of the media is to inform the public about events.

Because only a minuscule fraction of those watching television broadcasts and reading

newspaper reports had access to any firsthand information about the explosion, for all practical

purposes, New Yorkers and other Americans saw the bombing only as the press portrayed it.

Although different news outlets displayed varying levels of restraint in speculating about the

cause of the explosion before it was known, the press—and officials—almost universally treated

the bombing as an unprecedented episode in the history of the United States.

Actually, there had been a deadlier attack at New York's LaGuardia Airport in 1975, when 11

people were killed by a bomb suspected to have been planted by a Puerto Rican independence

group.114 However, no one seemed to remember this attack in the days after the World Trade

Center explosion. "No foreign people or force has ever done this to us," said New York

Governor Mario Cuomo. "Until now, we were invulnerable."115 Newsweek also quoted "federal

authorities" who called the explosion "the single most destructive act of terrorism ever

committed on U.S. soil." This statement is accurate only if destruction is measured in financial

terms rather than in terms of loss of life. This casting of the bombing as the first event of its kind

in U.S. history seems designed to heighten the possibility of reader and viewer hysteria.

Even an institution as venerable as CBS News seemed determined to expand the explosion's

significance. On the night of the explosion, CBS Evening News, like other media, focused

heavily on a vague and unconfirmed report that there had been a presidential car in the parking

garage. Reporter Susan Spencer said on-the-air that the car in question "would not have been a

vehicle that [the president] would have ridden in," but anchor Dan Rather still took the

opportunity to say that the rumor "raise[d] serious and troubling questions about the possibility

of international terrorism and about presidential security." Later in the newscast, CBS ran a story

on skyscraper safety, with reporter Giselle Fernandez claiming that people who worked in other

skyscrapers were now afraid about how they would escape in an emergency.116 It is impossible to
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

117 Karen Phillips, "5 Dead in Car Bomb Horror," New York Post, 27 February 1993, 2, 10.

118 Patrice O'Shaughnessy and Gene Mustain, "Bomb Rocks Manhattan," Daily News [New York], 27 February

1993, 2.

119 Lars-Erik Nelson, "Easy Access May Be the Killer," Daily News [New York], 28 February 1993, 2.

120 Mike McAlary, "Fear Not the Faceless Bomber," Daily News [New York], 28 February 1993, 4.

121 Joanna Molloy and Brian Kates, "'It Could Happen Anywhere,'" Daily News [New York], 28 February 1993,

27.

122 "The Uses of Terror," Newsweek, 8 March 1993, 24.

35

know whether this story and others like it addressed legitimate, existing fears or created new

ones.

Not surprisingly, it was the tabloid press that seemed most deliberately to play to its readers'

fears, panic, and desire for speculation. "5 DEAD IN CAR BOMB HORROR," screamed a

banner headline in the New York Post the day after the explosion, even though the story under

the headline gave no evidence at all for the car-bomb allegation.117 Two days later, the paper's

front cover used two-inch high type for the headline "SADDAM'S REVENGE?"

The Saturday cover of the Daily News [New York] proclaimed, "... link to Bosnia airlift feared."

Inside, a large subhead across pages 2 and 3 continued in the following vein: "Eye Serb Faction

in Fatal World Trade Center Explosion." The story made the Serb connection sound like a sure

thing: "Though it is unknown which of the warring factions in the former Republic of

Yugoslavia might be responsible, federal terrorism experts speculated the bomb was a reaction to

President Clinton's decision to airlift food and medicine to starving people half a world away."118

Like the Post's proposed Iraqi connection, this Bosnia link proved to be nonexistent; publicizing

it could easily have undermined public support for a U.S. military operation completely

unrelated to the Center attack.

The next day, the Daily News blamed immigration policy for the bombing, citing "growing

concern that the United States has lost control of its borders and offers easy entry to terrorists."119

Columnist Mike McAlary ruminated on the lack of real suspects: "The killer's bloody canvas is

still unsigned.... So if you want to be afraid, be afraid of this: It could be anybody."120 New York

City Mayor David Dinkins joined in, saying, "If this is indeed a terrorist attack, then no one is

safe."121

More respected news outlets also relied heavily on alarmist speculation. Newsweek ran a box

containing pictures of six "suspects" and gave them provocative nicknames: "Muammar Kaddafi:

Libya's Loony Leader" and "Ahmed Jabril: Gun for Hire," among others.122 The story alongside

the photos almost seemed to guarantee readers that war was on the horizon: "The apparent
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

123 Watson, 26.

124 "Terror in the Towers: A Media Relations Pro Tells His Story," Public Relations Journal 49, no. 12

(December 1993), 6, 12.

125 Kerson, 84.

126 Keesing's Record of World Events, 1993, 39358-39359, 39502, 39590.

127 "The Terrorism Trial," Washington Post, 3 October 1995, A:18.

36

sophistication of the bomb suggests a professional terrorist, the kind of operative who is usually

sponsored, directly or indirectly, by a government.... It's one thing to bomb Libya, a marginal

pariah state.... It's something entirely different to attack a heavily armed regional powerhouse

like Iran or Syria."123

Months after the bombing, Peter Yerkes, the Port Authority's media relations supervisor, offered

an insightful reflection on the coverage of the explosion. "Often... the temptation [for agency

spokesmen and spokeswomen] is to get all the facts; to say that we have to talk to our lawyers

first. But you don't have that luxury.... The press is covering an emergency situation and needs

information.... you have to give them what you know, or there will be a vacuum. And, where

there's a vacuum, reporters will fill it."124

Outcome of The World Trade Center Bombing

Ultimately, six people were killed and 1,042 were injured in the explosion or during the hourslong evacuation. The injured included 44 firefighters, a medic, and 11 police officers.125

The FBI's arrest of Salameh was followed by the arrests of several more suspects. The suspects

were linked to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a New Jersey-based Egyptian cleric who had

previously been accused of leading a group responsible for the 1990 assassination of militant

New York rabbi Meir Kahane. Although the sheik could not be connected to the World Trade

Center bombing, he and several of his followers were indicted in August 1993 on charges of

conspiring to wage a "war of urban terrorism against the United States"; investigators had

uncovered their plans to bomb other targets in New York City.126 The sheik and nine others were

convicted of conspiracy in October 1995.127
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

128 "Verdict Against Terrorism," Washington Post, 5 March 1994, A:18.

129 Pierre Thomas, "Alleged Mastermind of World Trade Center Bombing Is Caught," Washington Post, 9

February 1995, A:12.

130 Blaine Harden, "2 Guilty in Trade Center Blast," Washington Post, 13 November 1997, A:1.

131 However, it should also be noted that bomb-squad investigators working at the scene in the weeks after the

blast read newspapers to find out how this investigation was going because they did not receive their own reports from FBI

scientists. (Dwyer, 87.) This situation could be construed as an example of the media directly aiding investigators rather

than hindering their work.

37

Four World Trade Center bombing suspects were convicted on all counts in March 1994.128

Eleven months later, authorities arrested Ramzi Yousef, believed to be the mastermind behind

the bombing.129 He and another man were convicted in November 1997.130

Summary

The events surrounding the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center illustrate three ways in

which the media may alter a crisis situation. First, they may help or endanger the immediate

victims of the crisis. Second, they may affect investigators' ability to work. Third, they may

dramatically shape public perception of the crisis, thus increasing or decreasing the likelihood of

a mass panic.

Many of the victims trapped inside the Center after the bombing were able to watch television

news, listen to radio broadcasts, and even call newscasters directly. The media were able to give

these people a wide range of emergency information. The link between the victims and the

media was especially important because other information sources, such as the building's

emergency-broadcast system, were unavailable. Newscasters did give victims some flawed

information, but for the most part they provided much-needed aid for the trapped.

The media were not as helpful to the people investigating the bombing. For example, reporters

crowded a building exit that should have been open to detectives searching the rubble for clues.

More importantly, investigators were reportedly forced to arrest a suspect before they were ready

because a newspaper article had already revealed their plans.131

The general tone of the bombing coverage varied greatly among media outlets. Predictably, the

tabloid press displayed the greatest tendency to play to readers' worst fears. However, in some

cases, more respected papers and networks also resorted to alarmist speculation. Fortunately, the

coverage did not lead to any noticeable public hysteria.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

132 April 19, 1995, was the second anniversary of the end of the 51-day standoff between the federal

government—specifically, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI)—and the Branch Davidian cult in Waco, Texas. The standoff ended when the Davidians' compound went up in

flames, killing 76 cult members, including 25 children under the age of 15 (Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse in Oklahoma

(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 104). The ATF had an office in the Murrah Building. Revenge for the

Waco incident was later cited as a motive for the Oklahoma City bombing.

133 Hamm, 47.

134 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," Quill 84, no. 5 (June 1996), 30.

135 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," Quill 83, no. 5 (June 1995), 7.

136 Mark Fryklund, "BOMB!," News Photographer 50, no. 7 (July 1995), 16.

38

THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, 1995

Chronology of Events, April 19–21, 1995

Day 1: Wednesday, April 19, 1995:132

9:02 a.m.: A massive explosion destroyed the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The blast, which was felt at least 15 miles away, left a crater 20 feet

wide and 8 feet deep in front of the building.

Most of the 550 people who worked in the building had arrived for the day when the explosion

occurred. The building contained offices of various federal agencies as well as a day-care center.

The center, called "America's Kids," was on the second floor; the explosion "pushed the first

floor into the second, and simultaneously pushed seven floors of concrete and steel downward

onto the second floor," making the center "the epicenter of human suffering."133

9:04 a.m.: Local television station KWTV, Channel 9, began coverage of the explosion.134

Reporters and photographers from other stations also were on the scene almost immediately. All

three of Oklahoma City’s local television stations stopped airing regular programming and

commercials in favor of live news coverage within minutes of the explosion.135

Mark Fryklund of KOCO-5, Oklahoma City's ABC affiliate, had just arrived at the station's

parking lot when he saw plumes of smoke coming from downtown, about eight miles away, and

felt a shockwave. He was immediately sent up in a news helicopter, which was at the scene for

five minutes before the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ordered it back five miles. Despite

the distance, "We were still able to broadcast live from the helicopter with [a] lens that allowed

us to see the upper floors of the building," Fryklund wrote in an account describing his coverage

of the bombing.136 On a monitor in the helicopter, he could see police pushing back KOCO's

ground units. "Our crews on the ground scrambled to get what video they could of paramedics
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

137 Fryklund, 16.

138 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

139 Fryklund, 14.

140 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," 30.

141 Jon Lafayette, "Covering the Carnage: Oklahoma City Bombing Grips TV Screens," Electronic Media 14, no.

17 (24 April 1995), 51.

142 Hamm, 46.

143 Lafayette, 51.

144 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," 30.

39

treating walking wounded and firefighters climbing ladders to retrieve people on the upper

floors," he wrote.137

All three local stations aired continuous news coverage for at least 36 hours, losing considerable

advertising revenue as a result.138 KOCO stayed with the story live for more than 100 hours.139

KWTV aired no regularly scheduled programs or commercials until Sunday at 8 p.m.—107

hours after the explosion.140

9:20 a.m.: Tulsa, Oklahoma, television station KOTV went on the air with the story, remaining

with it live until 12:30 a.m. Because KOTV is the only Tulsa station with a full-time crew in

Oklahoma City, it was able to beat other out-of-town stations to the story.141

About 9:30 a.m.: White House press secretary Mike McCurry informed President William J.

Clinton that CNN was reporting that an explosion had destroyed part of a federal building in

Oklahoma City. Shortly thereafter, Clinton's chief of staff, Leon Panetta, notified the president

that he had called Attorney General Janet Reno, who had dispatched the FBI. Panetta also told

Clinton to expect heavy casualties.142

About 10:00 a.m.: Within an hour of the explosion, the national broadcast networks had cut into

their regularly scheduled programming. The networks, including CNN, broadcast video from

Oklahoma City television stations, continuing with live coverage until at least early afternoon.143

In the first hour of coverage, reporters had determined that the explosion had been caused by a

bomb.144

About an hour after the blast, Sergeant Melvin Sumter of the Oklahoma County sheriff's office

found a piece of a truck axle near the Murrah Building. On the axle was a Vehicle Identification

Number (VIN), which FBI agents entered into a database. About three hours later, the VIN
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

145 Hamm, 65.

146 Hamm, 50-52.

147 Hamm, 55.

148 Jim Winthrop, "The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and Other Military Assistance

to Civil Authority (MACA)," The Army Lawyer, July 1997, 3.

149 Hamm, 61.

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number was traced to a 1993 Ford owned by a Ryder rental agency in Miami and assigned to

Elliott's Body Shop, a rental outlet in Junction City, Kansas, 270 miles north of Oklahoma City.

Around the time the axle was found, FBI agents viewed tape from a security camera that had

recorded a Ryder rental truck moving toward the building earlier that morning. A meter maid

reported that she had seen the truck about 20 minutes before the explosion.145

About 10:15 a.m.: Oklahoma highway patrolman Charles Hanger, patrolling about 60 miles

north of Oklahoma City, pulled over a 1977 Mercury because it had no license plate. Hanger

arrested the driver, Timothy McVeigh, who was carrying a concealed gun and knife, and took

him to Perry, Oklahoma. Hanger did not suspect McVeigh of the bombing.146

About 1:00 p.m.: Within four hours of the explosion, TV crews and satellite trucks from

neighboring states had arrived on the scene.

Wednesday afternoon: CNN and other outlets aired various unconfirmed reports that authorities

were seeking one or more Middle-Eastern men in connection with the bombing. Some official

governmental sources may have indirectly fueled these rumors. For example, Acting Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Studeman told the Chicago Tribune that the

bombing signaled "the true globalization of the terrorist threat," and Secretary of State Warren

Christopher told the New York Times that he had sent Arabic interpreters to Oklahoma to assist

in the investigation.147

4:00 p.m.: By this time, President Clinton had declared a federal emergency in Oklahoma

City.148 The national-disaster plan put ten 50-person FEMA teams at the scene; they were joined

by local rescuers, air force and National Guard units, FBI counterterrorist teams, forensic

specialists, firefighter specialists, and 100 of the city's leading physicians.149

Even before the disaster plan went into effect, commanders at Fort Sill and Tinker Air Force

Base had stepped in to assist Oklahoma City civil authorities, providing ambulances, medicalevacuation helicopters, explosive-ordnance personnel, bomb-detection-dog teams, and a 66-

person rescue team. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army coordinated 1,000 Department of
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

150 Winthrop, 3.

151 Hamm, 60.

152 Hamm, 63-64.

153 Hamm, 65-66.

154 Lafayette, 51.

155 Victoria Sherrow, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Terror in the Heartland (Springfield, New Jersey: Enslow,

1998), 20-21.

156 Hamm, 68.

157 Jonathan Alter, “Jumping to Conclusions,” Newsweek, 1 May 1995, 55.

41

Defense personnel to provide other support functions; among other things, DOD provided

linguists.150

Early Wednesday evening: The death toll had reached 21; in addition, about 500 people had been

injured and about 200 people were missing. Rescue efforts continued.151

8:00 p.m.: By this time, investigators had two leads on suspects. First, earlier in the evening, a

man named Ibrahim Ahmad who was on his way to Jordan had been detained at Chicago's

O'Hare International Airport. He seemed to fit eyewitness descriptions of one of the three Middle

Eastern men who had driven away just before the explosion. When authorities found electrical

wire, pictures of weaponry, and other items in his luggage, U.S. officials asked British officials

to arrest him when his flight landed in London.152

Second, FBI agents visited Elliott's Body Shop in Kansas, where the clerk who had rented out

the Ryder truck provided a physical description of the two men she said had picked it up. The

agents also obtained a copy of the rental agreement, which said the truck had been rented on

Monday, April 17, to a man named Robert Kling. Kling's birth date was listed as April 19—the

date of the bombing and of the Waco siege in 1993.153 "Robert Kling" later proved to be an alias

used by McVeigh.

Wednesday evening: NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN sent anchors or high-ranking correspondents to

Oklahoma City to provide on-site coverage over the next several days.154

About 10:00 p.m.: Brandy Liggons, 15, was found alive in the building wreckage. It took three

hours for rescuers to extract her; she was the last survivor found.155

Late Wednesday night: Three more Middle Eastern men were detained and questioned—two in

Dallas and one in Oklahoma City.156 The next day, CNN reported the arrests and named the men

even though it had no confirmation that any of the three was connected to the case.157 "We said
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

158 Penny Bender, "Jumping to Conclusions in Oklahoma City?," American Journalism Review 17, no. 5 (July

1995), 11.

159 Hamm, 67.

160 Fryklund, 16.

161 Hamm, 73.

162 Hamm, 71.

163 Hamm, 74-75.

164 Hamm, 76-78.

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what the police and the FBI told us," said Ed Turner, CNN's executive vice president, in

response to criticism later on. "We didn't make this up."158

Day 2: Thursday, April 20, 1995:

Early Thursday morning: Ahmad arrived in London and was arrested by British authorities, who

issued a press release saying he was being returned to the United States under armed escort.

Television news outlets assumed that Ahmad's arrest was a major development in the

investigation and reacted accordingly.159

About 9:00 a.m.: Within 24 hours of the explosion, about 100 television crews and 50 satellite

trucks from all over the world were on the scene. Authorities set up a media area within two

blocks of the Murrah building and media-free areas for families awaiting news.160

Thursday morning: An FBI sketch artist completed composite drawings of two suspects, based

on the descriptions given by the truck rental clerk in Kansas. Both suspects were male and

appeared to be white Americans.161

12:00 noon: The death toll had risen to 53. Rescue efforts continued.162

Thursday afternoon: A motel owner in Junction City told FBI agents that she recognized one of

the composite sketches as Tim McVeigh, who had stayed at her motel from April 14 to April

18.163

4:30 p.m.: Weldon Kennedy, the FBI's special agent in charge of the case, called a press

conference in Oklahoma City. He described the two suspects who had rented the truck,

identifying them as "John Doe Number One" and "John Doe Number Two," and released the

composite drawings, which were also released by Attorney General Reno at a Washington press

conference held at the same time. Reno also announced a $2 million reward for information

leading to conviction of the suspects.164
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

165 Said Deep, "Rush to Judgment," Quill 83, no. 6, (July/August 1995), 20.

166 Hamm, 81.

167 Hamm, 86-88.

168 Hamm, 92.

169 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

170 Hamm, 81.

43

About 5:30 p.m.: The CBS Evening News suggested that the attack had been committed by the

militant Palestinian Muslim group Hamas. The newscast also aired comments from Steven

Emerson, a terrorism expert and documentary producer, who said the bombing was "done with

the intent to inflict as many casualties as possible, a Middle Eastern trait" and told viewers not to

believe Islamic groups' denials of their involvement.165

Day 3: Friday, April 21, 1995:

Early Friday morning: The official death toll had risen to 65, including 13 children.166

About 10:00 a.m.: After the FBI found McVeigh's name in a national crime database, an ATF

agent called Perry, Oklahoma, and asked that McVeigh be held in connection with the bombing.

About 3:30 p.m.: In Perry, FBI and ATF agents began to question McVeigh about the bombing.

About 5:30 p.m.: The minor charges against McVeigh were dismissed. He was turned over to

federal authorities and charged in connection with the bombing. Reno announced his arrest

almost immediately.167

At about the same time, FBI and ATF agents raided the farm of McVeigh associate James

Nichols in Decker, Michigan. They took Nichols into custody as a material witness.168 Earlier in

the afternoon, Nichols' brother, Terry, had turned himself in to police in Herington, Kansas.

About 5:30-6:00 p.m.: For the third night, the explosion dominated the network nightly

newscasts. The story consumed more nightly news airtime over a three-day period than any story

since the 1992 Los Angeles riots.169

Friday night: FEMA officials reported that more than 400 people had been injured and said that

the final death toll might approach 200.170

The Media And The Oklahoma City Bombing
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

171 KFOR-TV, broadcast video coverage, Wednesday 19 April 1995.

172 Michele Marie Moore, Oklahoma City: Day One (Eagar, Arizona: The Harvest Trust, 1996), 547.

173 Fryklund, 16.

174 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," 30.

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After the bombing of the Murrah Building, local and national television and print media were

confronted with a unique set of questions about how best to cover the disaster. First, broadcast

media filled an unusual role in the hours after the bombing, providing emergency information to

victims and their families. Second, media decision makers wrestled with the dilemma of how far

to go in presenting the public with graphic information and images. Finally, in the two days that

elapsed between the bombing and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, news outlets aired and

published stories containing varying degrees of speculation as to who might be responsible for

the explosion.

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information and Relief

During the first hours of the rescue effort, media outlets provided viewers with information to

help them locate relatives and avoid additional danger. For example, television station KFOR-4,

Oklahoma City's NBC affiliate, broadcast a description of an injured 21⁄2-year-old girl with fair

skin, red hair, and blue eyes who had been taken to Southwest Medical Center. The girl's

condition was stable, but doctors needed to find her parents to obtain permission to perform

surgery.171 The report led the parents, Jim and Claudia Denny, to their daughter, Rebecca; she

survived. KFOR also warned viewers about exposed electrical lines, provided a telephone

number for those seeking information about missing persons, and gave blood donation

information.172

Local TV stations also provided less immediate forms of emergency assistance. KOCO-TV

"began broadcasting that we were a collection point for the Oklahoma City food bank," reporter

Mark Fryklund wrote. "We collected 90 tons of food and clothing and more than $200,000 in

contributions."173 Station KWTV found ways to assist victims well into the months after the

bombing by providing "a hotline putting viewers in touch with psychological counseling, by

setting up a clearinghouse for viewers to donate supplies needed by rescue workers, [by] creating

children's programming to answer questions, [and by] celebrating the lives of the victims through

individual profiles."174

In many cases, the media aided rescue and recovery efforts, but in one prominent instance a

network anchor came under fire for supposedly criticizing local rescuers. Oklahoma City

residents accused Connie Chung, who then co-anchored the CBS Evening News with Dan Rather,

of saying that crime in Oklahoma City was out of control because local police were

concentrating on the bombing. Chung's alleged remarks sparked angry calls to local radio shows
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

175 "Two Are Now One," Quill 83, no. 6 (July/August 1995), 2.

176 Lafayette, 51.

177 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," 30.

178 KFOR coverage.

179 Lafayette, 51.

180 "Amateur's Photo Seen 'Round the World," News Photographer 50, no. 7 (July 1995), 19, 25.

181 "Amateur's Photo," 19.

45

and anti-Chung T-shirts. However, Chung did not make the comments. The rumor apparently

began after she asked a fire official on-air if his department could "handle" the rescue-andrecovery job ahead.175

Graphic or Sensational Media Coverage and Privacy Violations

"Some of the early coverage, pumped through live by the networks, was grisly, with cameramen

taking pictures of the wounded in open-air treatment centers," noted Electronic Media.

176

Anchors at KWTV cautioned viewers about the graphic nature of the images as stations aired

live pictures and unedited tape.177 An anchor at KFOR announced on-air, "We apologize for the

raw nature of this video," as the station aired footage of a woman lying on the ground covered in

blood. "If you are watching with your children, we might discourage you from some of that," the

anchor continued.178 Susan Kelley, news director at KOCO, said the explicit nature of the video

was of concern to her station as well.179

The print media, too, were faced with questions about what images to use in their coverage of the

bombing. The most famous picture of the bombing aftermath, taken by amateur photographer

Charles Porter, showed firefighter Chris Fields cradling the body of one-year-old Baylee Almon.

The picture was picked up by the Associated Press and used by newspapers all over the country.

Many papers had significant internal debates about whether or how to use the picture, and many

found that it elicited passionate and conflicting reader reactions. (Newsweek used a similar

picture taken by a different photographer for its cover.)180

When the San Diego Union-Tribune ran Porter's photo on its front page, negative reader calls

initially outweighed positive ones by a count of 80 to seven. Gina Lubrano, the paper's "readers'

representative," said unhappy callers accused the paper of playing into the hands of terrorists by

running the picture. However, over the next few days, there were ultimately more favorable calls

and letters than negative ones.181
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

182 "Amateur's Photo," 25.

183 "Amateur's Photo," 25.

184 "Amateur's Photo," 25.

185 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

186 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

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The night picture editor at the Buffalo News, Jonathan Ehret, wrote that he had to defend his use

of the photo to others at the paper who felt it was "too gory." Ehret felt the picture would "win

awards, stir hearts and tears and other powerful emotions; there was no excuse to not run it."182

Ben Harris of the Grand Forks Herald [North Dakota] said that at a "budget meeting" to plan the

next day's front page, staff members agreed that the paper should use the image but debated

where and how to do it. "This photo clearly captured the intensity and tragedy of the situation,

[but r]eaders here appear to get upset easier than other places I've lived. The dilemma was to

choose what I saw as an important storytelling image without having readers throw up their oat

toasties in the morning when they cracked open the paper," he said.183

The Herald ultimately ran a "good-sized" version of the photo as its lead picture on the front

page and received just four reader phone calls—two positive and two negative—in response.

"[T]he media should be able to convey the news without such a graphic picture," said one of the

dissatisfied callers. One of those who supported use of the photograph said it "sums up with just

one look the horror, tragedy, outrage and injustice of what happened."184

The public's appetite for information about such a violent crime opened the door for some

instances of media abuse. Oklahoma City police arrested two men who were trying to take

pictures of bodies at the scene. The men, one of whom had posed as a volunteer firefighter,

apparently had planned to sell the pictures to tabloid television shows. In another incident, a

tabloid reporter impersonated a priest in order to get into a church where victims' families had

gathered privately.185

Oklahoma City's local television stations, however, were commended by the Chicago Tribune

for the restrained nature of their coverage after the bombing. "Our philosophy is, we're not going

to sensationalize this tragedy that truly happened to our own people," said Michelle Fink, a

spokeswoman for KFOR. "We tried to imagine every story in terms of how we would react if we

were the family."186

The Media and the Search for Suspects
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

187 Hamm, 54-55.

188 Deep, 19-20.

189 Alter, 55.

190 Because of the timing of the story, Newsweek and the other weekly news magazines were spared any

temptation to speculate about who was responsible for the bombing. The bombing occurred on a Wednesday; McVeigh

was arrested for it on Friday. Because the magazines publish on Monday, they had the luxury of reporting the bombing

and the arrest simultaneously, allowing them to comment from a distance on other media’s coverage of the search for

suspects.

191 Alter, 55; Deep, 20.

47

Media speculation about the possible role of Islamic terrorists in the bombing began within hours

of the explosion. First, CBS aired an interview with former Oklahoma congressman Dave

McCurdy, who said there was "very clear evidence" that "fundamentalist Islamic terrorist

groups" were involved. Soon after, CNN and other news outlets reported that investigators were

looking for three Middle Eastern men who had been seen driving away from the Murrah

Building shortly before the explosion. CNN then recanted the story but quickly followed it with

another claim that two or three Middle Eastern men were being pursued. Another similar report

and denial followed. Other news organizations speculated about whether the bombing was the

work of the same group that had bombed the World Trade Center in February 1993.187

During the two-and-a-half days that elapsed between the explosion and the announcement of

McVeigh's arrest, such speculation was rampant. In addition, many reporters who did not

directly speculate commented on perceived similarities between the bombing and disasters

elsewhere in the world. "The media and public's quick assumptions [that] this horrific act of

terrorism had Middle East origins quickly channeled the country's grief and anger into hate,

bomb threats, harassing phone calls, and acts of vandalism," Detroit News reporter Said Deep

wrote in Quill, the magazine of the Society of Professional Journalists. Deep linked a list of antiArab incidents across the country to the press coverage, writing, "Only after federal authorities

released sketches identifying the suspects as wearing tattoos and crew cuts did the siege end."188

Jonathan Alter, writing in Newsweek, agreed with Deep that the press and public had jumped to

conclusions. However, Alter quoted Rashid Khalidi, a Middle East expert at the University of

Chicago, as saying that government officials "showed uncharacteristic restraint in avoiding a

rush to judgment." Alter also wrote that "many papers avoided speculation about Arabs."189

Having thus largely absolved officials and newspapers, he blamed television news and the public

for the burst of anti-Arab sentiment.190

Both Alter and Deep criticized terrorism expert Steven Emerson, who told CBS viewers not to

believe Islamic groups’ denials and said the bombing was "done with the intent to inflict as many

casualties as possible. That is a Middle Eastern trait."191 Deep also condemned remarks made by
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

192 Deep, 21.

193 Deep, 20.

194 Alter, 55.

195 Deep, 20.

196 Fryklund, 16.

197 Alter, 55.

198 Lafayette, 1, 51.

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University of Oklahoma terrorism expert Stephen Sloan, who told CNN's Bobbie Battista, "[T]he

building looks very much like [the Arab-bombed Beirut] Marine Corps barracks or the American

embassy in Beirut.... I think there's a real possibility that it was a Middle Eastern group."192

However, Deep said CNN's worst error was its on-air naming of the three Arab detainees the day

after the bombing.193 Alter also called that report "shoddy journalism—the only major flaw in

CNN’s otherwise strong coverage."194

Despite his criticism of the media, Deep asked a valid question about the Arab-related innuendo:

"[W]as it the media's fault or were they merely reflecting the wisdom on the streets?"195 Fryklund

wrote that journalists drew parallels to Middle Eastern bombings off the air, outside their

professional capacity. "[A]s the first crews came back to the station to regroup... [r]eferences to

the marine barracks bombing in Beirut began surfacing," he wrote.196 Fryklund's comments

suggest that suspicion toward Middle Easterners was a general public reaction as well as a media

one.

Alter suggested that some Americans were eager to blame foreigners for the bombing because it

was too painful to look closer to home for the culprits. "Who can deny that it would have been

emotionally easier if foreigners had done it?" he wrote. "[I]f we couldn’t identify a country to

bomb, at least we could have the comfort of knowing that the depravity of the crime—its

subhuman quality—was the product of another culture unfathomably different from our own."197

Michael Bass, a producer for NBC's Today show, suggested that people were simply

dumbfounded that such carnage could occur in Oklahoma City. "A lot of people were saying that

this is a scene that might normally be reserved for a war zone, but this is Oklahoma City in the

U.S. of A., which was shocking to people," he said. "I think that's one of the reasons it hit people

so hard on the air. They were talking about home rather than talking about some foreign country

where something like this had happened."198 The idea that the perpetrator was relatively local

may have been very difficult for people to accept.
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

199 Lafayette, 1, 51.

200 Alter, 55.

201 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

202 "The 1995 Sigma Delta Chi Awards," 30.

203 Alter, 55.

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David Borman, producer for news specials at NBC News, was vague about where to place the

blame for inflammatory reports, although he seemed to disagree with Khalidi's view of the

government as largely innocent. "It's hard to pin down where information comes from in stories

like this," Borman said. "I think there were a lot of officials... that just looked at the damage and

said, 'God, it looks like a Middle East car bomb,' just because physically the resemblance was so

striking."199 This conclusion was not necessarily unwarranted. "When car bombs are involved,

it's understandable, because there's a long history behind it in the Middle East," Khalidi said.

"But even though there's this history, that's no reason to assume it's true in this case."200

Not everyone was dissatisfied with the coverage of the search for suspects. President Clinton

praised the media at a White House Correspondents Association dinner after the bombing,

saying, "Most of you were able to show commendable restraint and not jump to conclusions."

Clinton also said that news reports did well to focus on victims' families, rescuers, and

investigators rather than giving the suspects undeserved celebrity status.201

Of course, once McVeigh and Nichols were arrested, the press and public turned their attention

away from the idea of Middle Eastern bombers. However, the two suspects’ backgrounds

quickly gave rise to speculation about another group—the militia subculture. KWTV began

working on a report called "U.S. of Anger," an investigation of people throughout the country

who hold anti-government views.202 Alter urged the press and public not to jump to conclusions

about such people, pointing out that no one had yet been convicted of the bombing. "Perhaps the

media are once again rushing to judgment," he wrote.203

Outcome of the Oklahoma City Bombing
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

204 Many accounts indicate that there were 168 deaths. One victim was not conclusively identified.

205 Winthrop, 3.

206 Richard A. Serrano, One of Ours: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: W. W.

Norton, 1998), 275.

207 Keesing's Record of World Events (Cambridge, England: Longman, 1995), 40542.

208 "Tragedy in Oklahoma," 7.

209 Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995, 40672.

210 Serrano, 273, 292, 320.

211 Stephen Jones, Others Unknown: The Oklahoma City Bombing Case and Conspiracy (New York: Public

Affairs, 1998), 311.

50

Ultimately, 169204 people were killed and 467 were injured by the bombing.205 The dead included

19 children, one nurse killed in the rescue effort, and eight federal law enforcement officers.206

President Clinton designated Sunday, April 23, 1995, as a national day of mourning.

Rescue operations ended on May 4, and a memorial service was held the following day. On May

10, Terry Nichols was charged with direct participation in the bombing. The unstable remains of

the Murrah building were demolished on May 23. The massive manhunt for John Doe Number

Two continued amid speculation that he might prove to be Terry Nichols' young son, Josh;207 as

of mid-1999, this mystery had still not been solved. Also in May 1995, Ibrahim Ahmad said that

he planned to sue British authorities and possibly also "some American media who decided in

the first hours after the explosion that I was the main suspect."208

McVeigh and Nichols were indicted by a federal grand jury on August 10 on 11 counts related to

the bombing. The same day, explosives charges against James Nichols were dropped. The two

suspects pleaded not guilty on August 15.209 McVeigh's trial began April 24, 1997. He was

convicted on June 2 and sentenced to death on August 14.210 Nichols, tried separately, was

sentenced to life without parole on June 4, 1998.211

Summary

The coverage of the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building raises several significant

points related to the media. First, today's media have an enormous capacity to participate in relief

efforts while a crisis is ongoing. Television news reports may well have saved Rebecca Denny's

life, and other lives as well, after the bombing. The public has come to rely on television news

for vital information in emergency situations.
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51

Second, the live nature of today's news forces news organizations to make split-second decisions

about whether to air disturbing and unpredictable material. Viewers of the live coverage of the

bombing aftermath could easily have seen badly injured or dead people on their screens; young

children watching at home could have seen people dying horrible deaths. Media outlets also had

to choose whether or not to use graphic images to illustrate their next-day accounts of the

bombing. Many journalists seemed to feel such images were an important way to acquaint the

public with the reality of the catastrophe. Dissenters feared the images' psychological impact as

well as their potential to gratify or encourage terrorists.

Finally, the most powerful and lasting questions about the bombing coverage have to do with the

reporting on the search for suspects. Although there was little or no evidence to support stories

that suggested Islamic terrorists had bombed the building, such stories were aired and are alleged

to have led to serious harassment of Arab-Americans. The explosion's superficial similarities to

previous bombings meant that such speculations were not completely unreasonable, however. It

seems likely that, in this case, much of the public would have jumped to anti-Arab conclusions

with or without speculation from the media or hints from officials. Most news outlets did hesitate

to blame a particular group for the bombing without solid evidence, and it seems likely that the

media will show even more restraint in this area in the future.
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CONCLUSION: THEMES IN THE FOUR MEDIA STUDIES

The four cases of the media in emergency situations examined in this study focused on the role

of the media in three different situations in the United States: two instantaneous and totally

unanticipated terrorist bombings, a riot in a major urban area in which the ingredients for a social

explosion had been simmering for decades, and a nuclear accident that was fraught with great

danger and hidden from first-hand media observation. Despite the obvious differences among

these events, a comparison of the role of the media and their interaction with the public in all

four cases reveals several common themes, each of which demonstrates a range of media

responses. These themes include the capability of the media to "create" an event, to aid in rescue

operations, to alleviate or to exacerbate an emergency situation, to prejudice the outcome of an

event, and to exaggerate or sensationalize news.

In addition to these themes, a major issue to consider is the speed with which the media respond

to an emergency situation and begin to disseminate information about it. Because this issue is of

overriding importance to rescue and law-enforcement personnel, it will be addressed first.

Media Response Time

The interval of time between the occurrence of each of the four events examined in this study

and the arrival of the media on the scene varied widely. On the one hand, the two bombings and

the Los Angeles riots received immediate coverage. On the other hand, there was little media

coverage of the Three Mile Island accident until a day after it had occurred, and full media

coverage did not begin until the second day after the reactor malfunctioned. This difference

resulted from the nature of the different events—the bombings and the riots were instantaneous

events, whereas the incident at Three Mile Island took two days to unfold fully. Today, in most

cases almost no time elapses between the onset of an emergency and the arrival of journalists,

who may appear even before emergency personnel. News itself can be transmitted as fast as

electricity can carry it.

The bombings at the World Trade Center and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and the

riots in Los Angeles were sudden, violent happenings that commanded instant attention and in

which injuries and damage to property was immediately obvious. The first radio reports of the

Center bombing began less than 30 minutes after the explosion (most local television stations

lost their transmission capabilities for several hours because their towers were atop the World

Trade Center). A few newscasters not only reported the explosion but also suggested a cause of

the blast, even though investigative crews had not yet arrived on the scene, let alone begun to

assess the damage.

At Oklahoma City, the first news of the explosion came via local television scarcely two minutes

after the bomb went off. Reporters and camera crews were on the scene within minutes, by
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division The Media in Emergency Situations

53

which time all three local television stations had begun live coverage. In Los Angeles, reporters

at the Ventura County court house relayed the jury's decision in the Rodney King case to the

nation as soon as it was delivered. Little more than an hour later, the first violence broke out in

South Central Los Angeles.

The scene at Three Mile Island did not develop with such speed. In fact, it was two days before

the full press corps contingent arrived in central Pennsylvania to probe what many of them

suspected was a coverup. Even then, reporters could not be certain about what was going on

mainly because Met Ed engineers themselves did not know for certain what was happening in

the Unit 2 reactor and therefore provided incomplete and confusing explanations. As a

consequence, the press and their audience were left in the dark about the state of the reactor and

the danger arising from it. It is worth remembering that the Three Mile Island accident occurred

in the age before the instantaneous transmission of on-the-spot reporting. It is possible that live

coverage, even if off-site, might have magnified the uncertainty of the situation and heightened

the suspicions and fears the local population already harbored.

The Media as "Creator" of Events

A question that arises in situations in which media presence is extensive is whether the media

played a role in "creating" any of these situations. Is it possible that the media, rather than simply

reporting on an event, can actually "cause" it to happen? The media cannot be held responsible

for the bombings in New York and Oklahoma City unless one subscribes to the theory that the

media cause terrorism because of the publicity they invariably give to such acts. It can be argued,

however, that the tension and fear that surrounded the Three Mile Island accident and the rioting

that broke out in Los Angeles were created to one degree or another by the media.

Journalists swarmed into the Harrisburg area because they suspected that there was much more

to the Three Mile Island affair than either Met Ed or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would

admit. The presence of 300 to 400 reporters competing with each other for a story was itself a

factor in drawing attention to Three Mile Island. As the more perceptive journalists probed for

opinions about radiation releases or the chance of a reactor meltdown and as they wrote about

such topics in their reports, the degree of public interest in Three Mile Island accelerated.

Not satisfied with the answers they received from Met Ed and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, reporters turned elsewhere for information, including to anti-nuclear spokesmen.

Such sources were only too willing to discuss nuclear power and its potential for

harm—supplying information that helped drive speculation in the press about what could happen

in the Unit 2 reactor and that added to area residents' anxieties. At least some residents believed

that the press overstated the problem at Three Mile Island and unjustifiably raised the level of

fear about the situation. For these residents, the Three Mile Island affair was a media-created

event.
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The same can be said about the Los Angeles riots. The impact of the King videotape on the

mindset of inner-city residents is hard to overrate. As it was replayed again and again on

television, the video reinforced the sense of injustice and powerlessness felt by the citizens of

South Central Los Angeles, especially African-Americans. The beating was only the latest

incident in a long series of grievances that had gone unaddressed. This time, however, residents

of the area were cocked and primed for action, in large part because of the King videotape.

When the four police officers were found not guilty, inner-city residents went on a rampage of

looting and arson. Local television stations gave the violence nonstop coverage, which, in turn,

helped to propel the carnage. In view of the role and the impact of television in the situation, it

would seem plausible to argue that the riots, to a considerable degree, were created and

perpetuated by the media.

The Media as a Source of Emergency Information and Help

Modern broadcast media have the capability to provide a great deal of information during an

emergency. Radio and television can inform the public or communicate directly with victims and

their families, with or without the knowledge of rescue personnel. They can provide information

on what is happening and give advice about what to do.

In New York, the media provided information that for the most part was beneficial, such as when

they broadcast emergency telephone numbers for victims to call, but occasionally detrimental, as

was the case when a newscaster wrongly advised trapped victims to break windows to let in air.

Breaking the windows sent splintered glass flying through the air, endangering rescuers and

passersby alike, and possibly increasing the flow of smoke throughout the damaged tower. Cell

phones, a form of new technology not confined to the media, enabled trapped victims to call for

help. Reporters and news anchormen advised trapped callers to use their phones to give their

location, and one anchorman recommended removing ceiling tiles to help vent smoke.

In Oklahoma City, television personnel helped to locate victims' families and aided rescue

operations by broadcasting appeals for food and supplies. The degree to which broadcast media

disseminated emergency information during the Los Angeles riots is less clear. Some television

crews, however, did attempt to document looting and violence against motorists as an aid to

eventual prosecution of offenders. The helicopter crew that filmed the beating of Reginald

Denny by gang members is a case in point.

Radio was the primary source of useful information to people in the vicinity of the Three Mile

Island nuclear plant. Television and newspapers provided coverage only once or twice a day, by

which time their reports were out of date and occasionally erroneous. Residents depended upon

local radio for the news they needed because radio could provide the news faster than other

media and because local broadcasters tailored their message to their audience far better than
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national network television. In addition, local news tended to be less alarmist than national

reporting.

Media Potential to Alleviate or to Exacerbate

The four case studies offer instance after instance in which the presence or the reports of

journalists served either to alleviate or to aggravate a given situation. In central Pennsylvania,

radio newscasters in Harrisburg deliberately tried to be helpful during a time of great stress for

their listeners. Although they did not themselves fully comprehend the nature or the implications

of the trouble at Three Mile Island, some of them, nonetheless, tried to use their broadcasts and

talk shows to calm and to soothe rather than to inflame. Those who did so confessed later that

they did so unwittingly; some later wondered if they had been fully honest with their audience.

The point cannot be proven, but local radio hosts probably deserve part of the credit for the

almost complete absence of hysteria and panic among residents close to Three Mile Island.

On the other hand, there were problems at Three Mile Island because of the large number of

journalists (300 to 400) who converged on the Harrisburg area at the time of the accident. A

considerable number of residents complained about the size of the press corps and about some of

the questions the press asked them. It also seems clear that "pack journalism" compounded the

difficulties Met Ed spokesmen and engineers faced as they tried to brief reporters on the

accident, unprepared as the former were to deal with any kind of emergency at the plant. In the

process of give and take between the reporters and the utility, Met Ed lost all credibility, and its

spokesmen were only too happy to turn over press briefings to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

The efforts of television studios to provide information to victims in New York and to locate

relatives of the injured and to collect relief supplies in Oklahoma City are other examples of how

mass media worked to alleviate suffering and promote recovery after such disasters. An incident

in New York, on the other hand, exemplified how the media can hinder a post-incident

investigation. When Newsday revealed information about leads in the bombing, authorities had

to arrest a suspect sooner than they wanted. The arrest possibly cost them leads on other suspects

and demonstrated the ability of news reporting to force the hand of investigators in the midst of

their work.

Far more than the bombings in New York and Oklahoma City or the Three Mile Island nuclear

accident, the Los Angeles riots were a media event. Television reporting, in particular,

exacerbated the violence, even if unintentionally. At least part of the coverage was sensational

and probably inflammatory. Television certainly enticed rioters into the streets, and continuous

coverage kept them informed about what was happening and where to go to join in. Not all of the

televised imagery was negative, of course—some footage, for example, focused on the "good

Samaritans" who helped riot victims. Nevertheless, the amount of negative coverage suggests

that the media was culpable in initiating and driving the violence in Los Angeles.
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The Media as Jury and Judge

Another theme common to all four case studies is the tendency of the media to place blame for

the emergency. In the World Trade Center bombing, the press raised the specter of foreign

terrorists well before evidence surfaced to substantiate the charge. In Pennsylvania, the national

press (and local residents) had long suspected Met Ed of hiding problems and of running the

plant with too little attention to safety. When trouble finally arose, reporters with experience

with the nuclear industry were only too willing to point fingers at Met Ed and to charge the

utility with carelessness and negligence—charges that rang true as details of the cause of the

nuclear mishap came to light. Many area residents agreed with the reporters' assessment.

The Los Angeles riots and the Oklahoma City bombing offer the best examples of the media's

rush to judgement. In the Los Angeles case, the "rush" came before the police officers went to

trial. In Oklahoma City, the "rush" followed the bombing almost before the smoke had cleared.

The Rodney King videotape was ready-made for such a purpose. By repeatedly airing the

videotape on national television and featuring it in newspapers and magazines in the year

following the beating, the media had in effect invited the public to judge and convict the officers

before they went to trial. A nationwide public opinion poll following the verdict indicated that an

overwhelming majority of the public felt that the officers should have been found guilty of the

charges. Sources on the riots generally agree that the King videotape was the single most

important reason the for the public's sentiment.

In Oklahoma City, media speculation about Middle Eastern terrorists began within hours of the

explosion. CNN went so far as to name suspects without any evidence whatsoever of the

suspects' involvement, whereas CBS singled out terrorists from Hamas, the militant Palestinian

organization, again without corroboration. To some extent, such accusations amounted to

scapegoat-hunting as the press and the public groped for answers to the bombing. Suspicion of

Middle Eastern terrorists led to harassing phone calls, vandalism, and acts of hate against Middle

East residents in the United States. Even law enforcement agencies succumbed to the Middle

East terrorist hysteria. They pursued several suspects from the region, one of them all the way to

London, even though officials lacked solid evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the alleged

offenders. When the prime suspect turned out to be a white American, attention focused on antigovernment militiamen, still without real evidence.

The Tendency to Exaggerate and Sensationalize

The propensity of the media to engage in sensationalism is generally recognized. In reality,

sensationalized photographs or televised images leap almost naturally out of many types of news

stories, and the four cases under review here are no exception. Sensationalism is of concern

because graphic images or stories of violence have the potential to alienate or offend some

viewers or readers; sensationalized news coverage may even encourage those who would
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perpetrate violence. The definition of what constitutes sensationalism is, of course, subject to

debate, and what appears as sensational in one context may well not be in another. It is also

worth remembering that sensationalized photography and content help to sell newspapers and

magazines and to attract television viewership.

At Three Mile Island, the issue of sensationalized reporting was viewed differently depending on

which side one was on. Journalists and communications experts tended to regard national press

and television coverage of the incident as balanced and free of exaggeration; any errors were the

fault of sources, not the messenger. The industry, by contrast, thought bias and sensationalism

were present to at least some degree in what was printed and televised about Three Mile Island.

The public generally seemed not to be unduly alarmed except perhaps on Friday, April 30, 1979,

when many people evacuated the immediate Three Mile Island area in response to press reports

that the situation at the plant was more serious than the utility had admitted. The fact that large

numbers of residents did not flee may indicate that the impact of sensationalized news was

considerably less than it might have been.

The Los Angeles riots, however, were certainly characterized by sensationalized reporting.

Televised images of looting and of motorists being pulled from cars and beaten were bound to

provoke strong reactions from viewers. Such images were in addition to the repetitious airing of

the video of the police thrashing Rodney King, the incident that evoked outrage and cries for

justice in living rooms across America. Graphic photos in the press also appear to qualify as

sensational, even if journalists might defend them as merely portrayals of "reality."

Sensational reporting involving the World Trade Center bombing seems to have been confined,

by and large, to the daily tabloids, publications that specialize in such fare. In addition, because

the damage from the bombing was mostly confined to the underground parking area, the episode

did not lend itself to the type of graphic imagery that characterized both Los Angeles or

Oklahoma City.

The bombing of the Murrah federal building, however, produced startling photographs. In human

terms, perhaps none surpassed the photograph of fireman Chris Fields holding the bloodied and

lifeless body of one-year-old Baylee Almon. This image, which appeared in almost every

newspaper and television broadcast in the country, provoked wide debate in countless

newsrooms around the country as journalists questioned how viewers would receive it. Less

sensational but equally graphic were pictures of the gaping hole in the front of the federal

building. These made clear the power of the bomb that crushed the structure and killed 169 of its

occupants. Such photos helped to evoke an outpouring of public sympathy and aid for the

victims as well as the demand that the perpetrators of so vicious a crime be caught and punished.

These five themes, together with the issue of media response time, are among the most obvious

points that emerge from a comparison of the role of the media in the Three Mile Island nuclear

mishap, the Los Angeles riots, and the terrorist bombings in New York and Oklahoma City.
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Other commonalities might be uncovered by a more detailed research effort. There is nothing

startling or unique about these themes or about the conduct of the media in any of them. If future

scenarios resemble any of the cases under review here, as they undoubtedly will, then it is highly

likely that the media will cover those situations and will interact with the public in a manner

similar to the way they did at Three Mile Island, Los Angeles, New York, and Oklahoma City.
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