* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." 

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10539

Summary Calendar

__________________

WILLIAM HENDREN and ANNE GRAY

Plaintiffs-Appellants

versus

FRED SEAL, of the Texas Department of Protective &

Regulatory Service

Defendant-Appellee

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

(3 95 CV 687 T)

______________________________________________

(October 20, 1995)

Before KING, SMITH and BENAVIDES Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellants William Hendren and Anne Gray ("Plaintiffs") appeal

pro se from the dismissal of their lawsuit against appellee Fred

Seal of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Service

("TDPRS") for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.
2

DISCUSSION

On April 11, 1995, Plaintiffs sued Fred Seal of the TDPRS for

unspecified civil rights violations stemming from the alleged

denial of visitation with their grandchild. Plaintiffs sought

$10,006,000 in damages. Seal moved to dismiss the suit on immunity

grounds contending that he was being sued in his official capacity.

The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs appeal pro

se.

We review the district court's dismissal for failure to state

a claim for relief de novo. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Smith, 62

F.3d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1995). It is well-settled that the

Eleventh Amendment bars a suit in a federal court against a state

unless the sovereign has unequivocally expressed waiver of its

immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 98-99 (1984). Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against state officials when the state is the real, substantial

party in interest. Id. at 101. Furthermore, state officials sued

in their official capacity are not liable for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 because they assume the identity of the government

that employs them. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1991).

The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims

because the suit was against Seal in his official capacity.

Plaintiffs' complaint states that "Defendant, styled above, is now

and at all times mentioned was, a state agency operating in the

state of Texas." The complaint also alleges that "Plaintiffs were

harmed by Defendant through the action of agents of Defendant." On
3

its face, Plaintiffs' petition reveals that the real substantial

party in interest is a state agency, TDPRS. As recently as their

late-filed reply brief, Plaintiffs continue to refer to "the

supervisory staff of Defendant, The Texas Department of Protective

and Regulatory Services." It is clear to this Court, as it was to

the district court, that regardless of how it is styled,

Plaintiffs' suit is one against a state agency or its officer

acting in an official capacity. Consequently, absent consent to

suit, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by absolute immunity.

Plaintiffs argue that our holding in Doe v. Taylor Independent

School District, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

115 S. Ct. 70 (1994), dictates a different result. In Taylor, we

adopted a test for whether a supervisory school official can be

held personally liable for a subordinate's violation of a student's

right to bodily integrity. 15 F.3d at 454. The three-part Taylor

test is inapplicable in this situation where it is clear from the

face of the pleadings that Seal is being sued in his official

capacity, rather than in his individual capacity.

CONCLUSION 

The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs'

claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

judgment is AFFIRMED.