United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Science, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Wednesday,

June 24, 1998

SPACE STATION

U.S. Life-Cycle Funding

Requirements

Statement of Allen Li, Associate Director, Defense

Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International

Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. funding requirements for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) International

Space Station program.1

 Our testimony today will summarize the results of

recent work we completed at the request of the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation focusing on the station’s

development, assembly, and operations costs.2

 Where applicable, we will

(1) compare the current estimate with the estimate in our June 1995 report3

and (2) provide information on potential cost increases, current program

reserves, the prime contractor’s cost and schedule performance, and the

impact of recent revisions to the assembly sequence.4

The majority of our analysis is based on NASA’s fiscal year 1999 budget

submission and the assembly sequence characterized by NASA as

Revision C.

Summary Based on NASA data and our analysis, we estimate that the U.S. cost to

develop, assemble, and operate the space station has increased to almost

$96 billion.5

 Further, we identified a number of program changes that

could significantly increase this estimate, such as the potential for

additional schedule slippage and the need for shuttle launches to test and

deliver the crew return vehicle. As we have reported previously, we

continue to be concerned about the adequacy of program reserves to deal

with changing program needs. Over 3 years ago, the space station program

had more than $3 billion in financial reserves to cover development

contingencies. In March 1998, with almost 6 years until completion, the net

unencumbered financial reserves were down to about $1.1 billion.

1

NASA and its international partners—Japan, Canada, the European Space Agency, and Russia—are

building the International Space Station as a permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct materials and

life sciences research under nearly weightless conditions.

2

International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-98-147, May 22,

1998).

3

Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. Funding Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-163, June 12, 1995).

4

Space Station: Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-177, June 18, 1997);

Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are Worsening (GAO/NSIAD-97-213, Sept. 16, 1997);

Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under the Prime Contract

(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262, Sept. 18, 1997); and Space Station: Cost Control Problems

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54, Nov. 5, 1997).

5

All dollar estimates in this testimony have been adjusted for inflation.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
After we completed this work and issued our May 1998 report, NASA and its

international partners revised the station assembly sequence again,

resulting in further schedule slippage and one additional shuttle flight.

Additional costs will be incurred as a result of these changes.

Estimate of Total

Space Station Costs

Has Increased

Since June 1995, total space station estimated costs have increased from

$93.9 billion to $95.6 billion. In particular, the development cost estimate

has increased by more than 20 percent, in-house personnel costs have

more than doubled, and eight shuttle flights have been added to the

development program. However, shuttle support costs are lower because

NASA is projecting a significant reduction in the average cost per flight.

Appendix I compares the space station costs we reported in June 1995

with our latest estimate of April 1998. Following are key points regarding

the life-cycle cost estimate presented in our latest report:

• The higher development costs—$21.9 billion versus $17.4 billion—are

attributable to schedule delays, additional prime contractor effort not

covered by funding reserves, additional crew return vehicle costs, and

costs incurred as a result of delays in the Russian-made Service Module.

• The increased in-house personnel costs during development—$2.2 billion

versus $0.9 billion—are attributable to a longer development program,

higher estimated personnel levels, and a more inclusive estimating

methodology.

• Regarding shuttle support, our 1995 estimate was based on 35 flights

during development and 50 during operations. However, NASA’s 1998

estimate was based on 43 flights during development, including 2

additional flights to the Russian space station Mir, 1 flight to test the crew

return vehicle, and flights required by adoption of Revision C to the

assembly sequence. NASA continues to estimate that 50 flights will be

needed during operations.

Program Costs Could

Increase Further

We reported that a number of potential program changes could

significantly increase the current estimate. First, development costs would

increase if the assembly complete milestone slips beyond December 2003.6

Second, it is likely that the program will ultimately require more shuttle

flights than are included in our analysis. A recent independent assessment

by NASA’s Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force suggests that the

6

Subsequent to our report, NASA revised the space station’s assembly sequence. Assembly complete is

now scheduled for January 2004.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
program’s schedule will likely experience further delays and require

additional funding.7

Schedule Changes We believe NASA and its partners face a formidable challenge in meeting

the launch schedules necessary to complete assembly. Those schedules

depend on the launch capacity in the United States and Russia and the

program’s ability to meet all manufacturing, testing, and software and

hardware integration deadlines. Over 90 launches by NASA and its

international partners will be needed for assembly, science utilization,

resupply, and crew return purposes.

Delays in the development program would increase costs because, at a

minimum, fixed-costs such as salaries, contractor overhead, and

sustaining engineering would continue for a longer period than planned.

Assuming NASA would continue to spend at the rate shown in its current

estimate for fiscal year 2003, the program would incur additional costs of

more than $100 million for every month of schedule slippage.

Additional Flights The program could require more shuttle flights than are baselined in our

estimate. For example, the baseline does not include additional flights that

may be needed for crew return vehicle testing and eventual launches and

some resupply flights. Depending on the ultimate life expectancy of the

crew return vehicle, two additional flights could be needed. On the basis

of NASA’s estimate of average cost per flight for the shuttle, this could add

about $1 billion to the total estimate.

It should be noted that the recent revision to the assembly sequence added

an additional shuttle flight. However, that flight does not relate to the crew

return vehicle.

Additions Suggested by

Independent Assessment

Between November 1997 and April 1998, NASA’s Cost Assessment and

Validation Task Force examined the station program’s past and projected

performance and made quantitative determinations regarding the potential

for additional cost and schedule growth. Reflecting many of the same

areas we identified, the task force cited complex assembly requirements

7

Our work and that of the independent assessment task force was performed between November 1997

and April 1998. Our work focused on aggregating the various components of the space station’s

life-cycle cost, based on NASA’s current budget projections. The assessment task force focused on

evaluating the program in terms of potential cost and schedule growth primarily for the program’s

development portion. Report of the Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force on the International

Space Station, April 21, 1998.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
and potential schedule problems associated with remaining hardware and

software development and concluded that the program could require an

additional $130 million to $250 million in annual funding. The task force

also indicated that the program could experience 1 to 3 years of schedule

growth.

Funding Reserves

May Be Inadequate

We have previously expressed our concern with the adequacy of space

station financial reserves.8

 We continue to be concerned. The program has

used, or identified specific uses for, a significant portion of available

reserves, with almost 6 years left before the last assembly flight is

scheduled to be launched.

In January 1995, the space station program had more than $3 billion in

financial reserves to cover development contingencies. Since then, reserve

levels have steadily declined. In March 1998, the net unencumbered

financial reserves available to the program were down to about

$1.1 billion. In the past, reserves have been used to fund additional

requirements, overruns, and other authorized changes. Some of the

potential funding needs include those related to NASA’s decision to add a

third node to the station’s design.

NASA has identified adequacy of reserves as one of the highest current

program risks. We note that the current reserve status could be affected by

additional schedule slips, contract disputes, manufacturing problems, or

the need for additional testing. If the cost to resolve a problem cannot be

covered by available reserves, program managers could be faced with

deferring or rephasing other activities, thus possibly delaying the space

station’s development schedule or increasing future costs.

NASA/Boeing Adopt

New Baseline to

Measure Cost and

Schedule

Performance

In October 1997, NASA granted approval to Boeing to begin tracking cost

and schedule performance using a new baseline. The revised ground rules

permitted Boeing to reset its cost and schedule baseline to the actual cost

incurred and work performed as of September 1997.9

 For reporting

purposes, this had the effect of resetting cost and schedule variances to

zero. NASA did so to incorporate current recovery plans into the new

baseline. We asked officials of the space station program to provide us

8

Financial reserves are used to fund unexpected contingencies, such as cost growth, schedule delays,

or changes in project objectives or scope.

9

At the end of September 1997, prior to resetting the baseline, Boeing reported a cost variance of plus

$398 million and a schedule variance of plus $139 million.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
with an analysis depicting a crosswalk back to the original baseline to

understand the impact on previously reported overruns. That analysis

shows that the February 1998 overrun would have been about $50 million

higher than the $398 million Boeing reported prior to the change. Boeing’s

estimate of overrun at completion remains $600 million, while NASA’s

budget projections assume an $817 million prime contractor overrun at

completion.

Potential Debris

Tracking Costs Are

Not Included

Due to its large size and long operational lifetime, the space station will

face a risk of being struck by orbital debris. NASA plans to provide shielding

against smaller objects and maneuver the station to avoid collisions with

large objects.

The National Space Policy requires NASA to ensure the safety of all space

flight missions involving the space station and shuttle, including

protection against the threat of collisions from orbiting space debris.

However, NASA has no debris tracking capability and must rely on the

Department of Defense (DOD) to perform this function.

NASA recently updated its overall requirement for space debris tracking to

include the ability to track and catalog objects as small as 1 centimeter.

Studies by NASA and DOD indicate that the cost to achieve that capability

could range from $400 million to about $5 billion. We reported that the

sources of the funding for the system were undetermined. Also, while the

more stringent requirement is related to the space station, other space

activities would benefit from the ability to track 1-centimeter-sized debris.

Since debris tracking is a NASA-wide requirement, and the agency relies on

DOD to provide the service, the two agencies will have to work together to

determine an appropriate funding arrangement.

Impact of Recently

Announced Assembly

Sequence

In late May 1998, NASA and its international partners revised the station

assembly sequence. This new assembly sequence impacts the life-cycle

analysis in our report in a number of ways, including the effects of

schedule slippage, the cost associated with one additional shuttle flight,

and the potential effects of more schedule compression.

Regarding schedule slippage, the new sequence shows an assembly

complete date of January 2004, as compared with the previous completion

date of December 2003. We stated in our report that each additional month

of slippage at the end could result in an added cost of more than

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
$100 million. Also, our analysis included a number of areas of support

costs such as for civil service personnel and principal investigators. These

costs would also be higher because the assembly complete date is now in

the second quarter of fiscal year 2004.

The cost of the additional flight would be added to our development phase

estimate. The ultimate impact would be based on new average cost per

flight calculations.

The new assembly sequence adds a flight and reduces the time frame to

assemble the station. Thus, there may be additional stresses on the shuttle

in achieving the new launch schedule. To that end, the need to achieve

greater shuttle processing efficiencies is now even more relevant. If NASA is

unable to achieve those efficiencies, there will be more schedule slippage.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We will be happy to answer

any questions you or Members of the Committee may have.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
Appendix I 

Estimated Space Station Costs

(Current dollars in billions)

Cost category

June 1995

estimate

April 1998

estimate

U.S. requirements through assembly completea

Contract and in-house costs from 1985 through 1993 $11.2 $11.2

Development cost from 1994 to assembly complete 17.4 21.9b

Station-related requirements

In-house personnel 0.9 2.2c

Principal investigators 0.3 0.2d

Shuttle performance enhancements 0.3 0.2

Russian contract 0.4 n/ae

Shuttle launch support 17.8 17.7

Subtotal 48.2 53.4

U.S. requirements after assembly complete

Operations/utilization 13.0 13.0

Principal investigators Unavailable 0.7

In-house personnel Unavailable 2.9f

Shuttle launch support 32.7 25.6

Station decommissioningg Unavailable Unavailable

Total $93.9 $95.6

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aWe define assembly complete as December 2003, when the last assembly flight is currently

scheduled.

bIncludes station development, operations, and research activities through December 2003. Also

includes funding reserves and costs associated with the crew return vehicle and U.S. missions to

the Russian space station Mir. Costs associated with activities from October through

December 2003 are prorated, based on the fiscal year 2004 budget planning estimate.

cEstimate was derived by dividing total personnel cost by the number of full-time equivalents

(FTE). We then multiplied that result by the number of space station program FTEs. Our current

estimate includes an allocation of all research and program management costs to the station

program.

dNASA is continuously adjusting its plans for research as the availability of space station

resources are better defined. NASA plans to increase its number of principal investigations

consistent with resources available for space station utilization through assembly complete. For

the operations period, the estimate assumes a flat or only slightly declining budget in the

out-years.

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
Appendix I 

Estimated Space Station Costs

eU.S. costs associated with the Russian Space Agency contract are included in the development

estimate.

f

Our estimate was derived by using the cost associated with station program FTEs in fiscal year

2003 and escalating that figure by 3 percent a year for 10 years.

gNASA plans to attach a propulsion vehicle to the station and perform a controlled deorbit into the

ocean. The U.S. share of the ultimate disposal cost will depend on the propulsion vehicle chosen.

(707364) Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212
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