GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 

Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release

Expected at

1:00 p.m., EST

Thursday,

March 11, 1999

COMBATING TERRORISM

Observations on Federal 

Spending to Combat 

Terrorism

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller 

General, National Security and International Affairs 

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss our past and ongoing work and

observations on federal funding of efforts to combat terrorism. As you

know, over the past 3 years we have studied and reported on a number of

issues concerning federal agencies programs and activities to combat

terrorism for this Subcommittee and Representative Ike Skelton. (See

app. I for a list of related GAO products.) In December 1997, we reported

that key federal agencies with responsibilities to combat terrorism spent

about $6.7 billion in fiscal year 1997 for unclassified activities and

programs to combat terrorism and noted that precise funding information

was unavailable for various reasons. 1 That report led to legislation

requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a

system for collecting and reporting information on executive agencies

spending and budgets for combating terrorism. The legislation also

required the President to annually report this information to the Congress. 2

OMBs most recent report identified $10 billion for programs to combat

terrorism in the fiscal year 2000 budget. 3

My testimony will address three issues. First, I will briefly describe the

foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat as we understand it from

intelligence analyses. Second, I will provide some of our overall

observations on program growth and other issues raised throughout our

work on combating terrorism. Finally, I will discuss some steps the

executive branch has taken toward improving crosscutting management

and coordination and provide some preliminary observations on the 1998

and 1999 OMB reports to Congress on governmentwide spending and

budgeting to combat terrorism.

Summary The U.S. intelligence community continuously assesses both the

foreign-origin and the domestic terrorist threat to the United States and

notes that conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the

weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical

1Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

2National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).

3Of the $10 billion, $8.6 billion is for combating terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction, and

$1.4 billion is for critical infrastructure protection.
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the

possibility that they may use chemical and biological materials may

increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies.

Since our work began in 1996, the number and cost of the various programs

and initiatives to combat terrorism have grown significantly. Key agencies

involved in activities to combat terrorism reported to us that they spent

$5.7 billion in fiscal year 1996. The Presidents fiscal year 2000 budget

requests $10 billion, a $3-billion increase over the $6.7 billion originally

requested for fiscal year 1999. This rapid program growth has occurred in

the absence of (1) a governmentwide strategy that includes a defined

end-state; (2) soundly established, defined, and prioritized program

requirements; and (3) crosscutting analyses of individual agencies budget

proposals to ensure that unnecessary duplication and waste are avoided

and existing federal, state, and local capabilities are fully leveraged.

The executive branch has taken some important steps and made progress

toward improving the way it manages and coordinates the growing,

complex array of agencies, offices, programs, activities, and capabilities.

For example, in responding to the legislative requirement, OMB has

performed two governmentwide reviewsone in 1998 and one in 1999of

funding levels and programs to combat terrorism. In addition, in December

1998, the Attorney General issued a classified 5-year interagency plan on

counterterrorism and technology crime that includes goals, objectives, and

performance indicators and recommendations to resolve interagency

problems and issues it identified. The plan, however, does not link its

recommended actions and priorities to budget resources. The Attorney

General is also establishing a National Domestic Preparedness Office at the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 4 to reduce state and local confusion

over the many federal training and equipment programs to prepare for

terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Also, in May

1998, Presidential Decision Directive 62 further articulated U.S. policy and

established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection

and Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council.

Notwithstanding these positive steps, we continue to see opportunities to

better focus and target the nations investments in combating terrorism and

4Under Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI is the lead federal agency for crisis response in the

event of a terrorist incident in the United States. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

is the lead federal agency for consequence management.
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

better assure that the United States is prioritizing its funding of the right

programs in the right amounts. OMBs 1998 and 1999 reports provide

unprecedented and helpful insight into enacted funding and budget

requests that are for the most part not readily identifiable in the federal

budget and appropriations acts. The reports, however, do not clearly or

explicitly describe any established priorities or duplication of efforts as

called for in the legislation. We have not fully evaluated the executive

branch agencies processes or methodologies associated with the OMB

reports and cannot comment on whether they fully and accurately capture

the costs associated with programs and activities to combat terrorism.

The Foreign and 

Domestic Terrorism 

Threat in the United 

States

The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the federal building in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995, along with the use of a nerve agent in

the Tokyo subway in 1995, have elevated concerns about terrorism in the

United Statesparticularly terrorists use of chemical and biological

weapons. The U.S. intelligence community, which includes the Central

Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the FBI and others, has

continuously assessed the foreign-origin and domestic terrorist threats to

the United States. According to intelligence agencies, conventional

explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for

terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons

at least partly because they are more difficult to weaponize and the results

are unpredictable. However, some groups and individuals of concern are

showing interest in chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and

biological agents are still less likely to be used than conventional

explosives. Figure 1 shows the number of terrorist incidents in the United

States during 1992-97, according to the FBI.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1992-97

Source: FBI.

Initiatives and Funding 

to Combat Terrorism 

Are Increasing Rapidly

Annual and supplemental agency appropriations have continued to fund a

growing number of programs, initiatives, and activities to combat

terrorism. For example, for fiscal year 1999, the Congress authorized

$9.7 billion for combating terrorism, including $2.1 billion in an emergency

supplemental following the bombings of two U.S. embassies. Included in

the emergency supplemental was $1.4 billion for the State Department to

reconstruct its embassies and upgrade embassy security. The Presidents

fiscal year 2000 budget proposes $10 billion for counterterrorism programs,

domestic preparedness, and critical infrastructure protectiona $3 billion

increase over the requested funding of $6.7 billion for fiscal year 1999.

Table 1 shows the Presidents fiscal year 2000 budget proposal of

$8.6 billion for programs to combat terrorism, excluding critical

infrastructure programs, by major agency.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Number of Incidents
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request for Combating Terrorism

Note: Totals may not add due to OMB rounding.

Source: OMB.

Certain individual agencies have experienced rapid increases in recent

years in funding for programs and activities to combat terrorism. For

example, the Department of Health and Human Services has increased its

spending from $7 million in fiscal year 1996 to about $160 million budgeted

for fiscal year 1999 and has requested $230 million for fiscal year 2000 for

its bioterrorism initiative. The initiative is intended to improve disease

surveillance and communications systems, establish regional laboratories,

continue to establish a national pharmaceutical stockpile, conduct

research into new vaccines and drugs, and expand the number of local

emergency medical teams. Figure 2 shows the increases in Health and

Human Services funding for efforts to combat terrorism.

Dollars in millions

Department/agency Fiscal year 2000 request

National Security Community $5,052

Department of Justice 838

Department of Treasury 838

Department of Energy 648

Department of State 524

Others 712

Total $8, 613
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Figure 2: Health and Human Services Funding to Combat Terrorism, Fiscal Years 

1996-2000

Source: OMB annual reports and GAO report.

The Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice has also

experienced rapid growth in funds budgeted for its state and local

domestic preparedness programs. As shown in figure 3, funds have

increased from zero allocated in fiscal year 1997, to $21 million in fiscal

year 1998, to $120 million in fiscal year 1999, to a fiscal year 2000 budget

request of $162 million to provide training and equipment to local first

responders and to fund national training centers.

0

50

100

150

200

250

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fisca l Ye a r

Dollars in Millions
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Figure 3: Office of Justice Programs Funding for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal 

Years 1997-2000

Source: Department of Justice.

As discussed in our November 1998 report, 5 and as shown in figure 4, the

FBI more than doubled its allocation of resources for combating terrorism,

from about $256 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $581 million in fiscal

year 1998. As of July 1998, the FBI planned to allocate about $609 million

for its counterterrorism mission in fiscal year 1999 (including about

$70 million in no-year funds carried forward from prior fiscal years). The

estimated fiscal year 2000 FBI allocation for combating terrorism totals

$498 million.

5Combating Terrorism: FBIs Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs

1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fisca l Ye a r

Dollars in Millions
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Figure 4: FBI Funding Allocations for Counterterrorism Mission, Fiscal Years 1995-

99

Source: GAO.

Roughly half of the FBIs funding to combat terrorism was for related law

enforcement and investigative activities, while the other half involved

activities such as preparing for or responding to terrorist acts and

protecting the national infrastructure. Our work also showed that about

25 percent of the funds FBI allocated to counterterrorism was based on

statutory direction or congressional guidance.

Program Growth Areas 

Should Be Based on 

Sound Requirements

I would like to highlight the rapid growth in two program areas that is

taking place in the absence of sound threat and risk assessment to establish

program requirements and prioritize and focus the nations investments:

domestic preparedness programs for responding to terrorist attacks and

public health initiatives. We have previously reported on the benefits of

threat and risk assessments, both in the context of domestic preparedness

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Fisca l Ye a r

Dollars in Millions
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

programs and generally.6 Threat and risk assessments are widely

recognized as sound decision support tools to help define and prioritize

requirements and properly focus programs and investments in combating

terrorism. Soundly established requirements could help ensure that the

specific programs, initiatives, and activitiesand related expenditures

are justified and targeted, given the threat and risk of validated terrorist

attack scenarios as assessed by a multidisciplinary team of experts.

Domestic Preparedness In the absence of sound, well-defined requirements, domestic preparedness

funding increased from $42.6 million, 7 provided mainly to the Department

of Defense under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation 8 in fiscal year 1997,

to about $1.3 billion requested for a number of agencies preparedness

activities in fiscal year 2000. For example, the fiscal year 2000 budget

proposes an additional $611 million for training, equipping, and exercising

cities first responders in preparation for a potential terrorist attack and for

strengthening public health infrastructure. There are many similar

programs and initiatives across several agencies to train and equip local

emergency response personnel, such as those in fire, police, and

emergency medical services, to deal with the consequences of a terrorist

attack. We previously recommended that threat and risk assessments be

performed to establish training and equipment requirements for the

Domestic Preparedness Program. 9

As I mentioned earlier, the Department of Justice has sponsored training

programs and implemented an equipment grant program for state and local

responders. It also is establishing a Center for Domestic Preparedness at

Fort McClellan, Alabama. Other Justice-funded centers and training

venues related to combating terrorism are at universities, such as Texas

A&M and Louisiana State University, and the Department of Energys

Nevada Test Site. FEMA and its National Fire Academy have long-standing

resident and nonresident training programs in emergency management and

6Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

7While other agencies domestic preparedness programs may have also received funding in fiscal

year 1997, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was most visible at the time.

8Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-201).

9See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

hazardous materials. FEMA has requested about $31 million for fiscal year

2000a $13-million increase over fiscal year 1999 funding. Twenty-nine

million of the $31 million is to train and equip state and local responders.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been

establishing Metropolitan Medical Response Systems with trained and

equipped local emergency teams in 27 cities that also participate in the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici domestic preparedness training and equipment

program. HHS has requested fiscal year 2000 funding to include 25 more

cities in its program.

In addition, HHS is contracting with the Department of Veterans Affairs

(VA) to train non-federal National Disaster Medical System hospital staffs

to deal with weapons of mass destruction situations. VA urged that

decontamination and personal protection equipment be provided to the

hospitals. VA pointed out that VA hospitals are not receiving training that is

similar to the HHS-offered training and are not budgeted for

chemical-biological equipment either, even though VA medical centers

could have a role in responding to a terrorist incident.

We also noted growth and potential overlap in federal agencies response

capabilities to support state or local incident commanders. National Guard

Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams 10 are being created

despite numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can perform

similar functions. For example, there are over 600 existing local and state

hazardous materials response teams that can respond to terrorist events,

including those involving highly toxic industrial chemicals. There are also

the Armys Technical Escort Units, the Marine Corps Chemical-Biological

Incident Response Force,11 military reserve components chemical and

medical capabilities, Environmental Protection Agency and Coast Guard

response teams, and other federal response assets organized under the

Federal Response Plan. Included in the fiscal year 1999 appropriations is

$52 million to establish, train, and equip the first 10 of potentially 54 RAID

teams and to establish RAID (Light) teams in states that do not yet have a

full RAID team. A RAID (Light) comprises four regular, drilling Army

10The RAID teams mission is to provide assistance to local incident commanders in the event of an

incident involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons. They are to (1) assess the

situation, (2) advise civilian responders as to appropriate actions, and (3) facilitate the identification

and movement of federal military assets to the incident scene.

11These are highly trained and equipped specialized military units that can provide a wide range of

support to handle, transport, identify, and provide technical and medical advice and assistance on

chemical and biological weapons and agents.
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

National Guard members with a training and awareness mission and

limited response capabilities. The Defense Departments fiscal year 2000

budget requests about $38 million to support the existing teams and to

create five new RAID teams. We are reviewing the roles and missions of

the RAID teams for this Subcommittee and other requesters and expect to

report on those in late May of this year.

In addition to the 27 locally based medical response teams (with more to be

established), HHS has established four specialized National Medical

Response Teams, three of which are deployable in the event of a terrorist

attack involving a chemical or biological weapon. These four special teams

are in addition to 24 deployable Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that are

to provide medical support for any type of disaster, including terrorism.

Another federal response element that appears to be growing is federal

laboratories with capability to analyze chemical and biological agents. The

Army, the Navy, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have

laboratory capabilities. In addition, HHS plans to establish regional

laboratories, and the FBI is establishing a mobile laboratory capability.

Both the FBI and the Environmental Protection Agency have forensic

laboratories, although there are some differences in capabilities, and the

FBI is looking into using existing facilities rather than creating a

specialized laboratory for weapons of mass destruction cases.

Public Health Initiatives HHS has received about $160 million in fiscal year 1999 appropriations and

requested $230 million in fiscal year 2000 for a number of initiatives related

to the possibility of a terrorist event using biological or chemical agents.

HHS expects that creating a national stockpile of millions of doses of

vaccines for smallpox and anthrax, antidotes for chemical agents,

antibiotics for other diseases, and respirators will cost $51 million in fiscal

year 1999 and $52 million in fiscal year 2000. Preliminary observations

from our ongoing work are that HHS did not perform a formal and

complete threat and risk assessment to derive, prioritize, or rankin

accordance with the most likely threats the nation will facethe specific

items it plans to have researched, developed, produced, and stockpiled. In

fact, several of the items HHS plans to procure do not match intelligence

agencies judgments on the more likely chemical and biological agents a

terrorist group or individual might use. For example, smallpox, plague, and

tularemia (a bacteria) are not among the intelligence agencies lists of

agents that are most likely to be used by terrorists. But HHSs stockpile

initiative and plans are geared in part toward these biological threats. In
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

addition, it is unclear from HHS fiscal year 1999 operating plan whether

the Department has fully considered the long-term costs, benefits, and

return on investment of (1) creating and sustaining the production and

inventory infrastructure for such a stockpile, (2) inventory maintenance,

and (3) shelf-life issues. HHS estimates that research and expedited

regulatory review of improved drugs and vaccines, enhancing disease

surveillance and communications systems, and establishing regional

laboratories to identify and diagnose biological and chemical agents will

cost $139.7 million in fiscal year 2000.

We are currently reviewing the scientific and practical feasibility of the

terrorist chemical-biological threat for this Subcommittee, Senator Specter,

Senator Rockefeller, and Representative Skelton. We are examining the

ease or difficulty of obtaining chemical and biological agents and making

mass-casualty chemical and biological weapons outside a state actors

laboratory infrastructure and program. Such information would be among

the inputs to a sound threat and risk assessment by a multidisciplinary

team of experts.

Progress Toward 

Improving 

Management and 

Coordination of 

Programs and 

Activities to Combat 

Terrorism

We believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending and

budgeting to combat terrorism are a significant step toward improved

management and coordination of the complex and rapidly growing

programs and activities. We recognize the challenges and difficulties of

discerning much of the budgeting and spending for combating terrorism,

which is often imbedded in larger accounts. 12 For the first time, the

executive branch and Congress have strategic insight into the magnitude

and direction of federal funding for this priority national security and law

enforcement concern. The 1999 report provided additional analysis and

more detailed information than the 1998 report on budgeting for programs

to deal with weapons of mass destruction. For example, the 1999 OMB

report identified total funding (budget authority) for combating weapons of

mass destruction to be about $1.23 billion in fiscal year 1999 and

$1.39 billion in the fiscal year 2000 budget request.

Nevertheless, OMB officials told us, as we noted in our December 1997

report, that a critical piece of the budget and spending picture is missing

12See Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997) and Combating Terrorism: FBIs Use of Federal Funds

for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO-GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

threat and risk assessments that would suggest priorities and appropriate

countermeasures. These officials notedand we agreethat risk

assessment is key to (1) knowing whether enough or too much is being

spent, (2) judging whether the right programs are being funded, and

(3) determining whether apparent duplication is good or bad. We have not

fully evaluated the processes or methodologies the executive branch

agencies used to derive the information in the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports.

As a result, we cannot comment on whether or to what extent the reports

reflect the best possible estimate of costs associated with programs and

activities to combat terrorism. However, absent from the report was any

discussion about established priorities or efforts to reduce or eliminate

duplicative programs or activities across the government.

Another important step toward improved interagency management and

coordination was the Attorney Generals December 1998, classified 5-year

interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime. The

Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998 Appropriations Act

for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and

Related Agencies required the Attorney General to develop the plan in

coordination with several agencies. The plan includes goals, objectives,

and performance indicators and recommends that specific actions be taken

to resolve interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative

priorities to the actions. The classified plan represents a substantial

interagency effort and was developed and coordinated with 15 federal

agencies with counterterrorism roles. The plan generally does not link its

recommended actions and priorities to budget resources, although the

document states that the agencies hope to improve the link between the

plan and resources in subsequent updates.

Additionally, the executive branch has taken steps to reduce state and local

officials confusion over so many federal agencies programs and

capabilities intended to train, equip, and help them. The Department of

Justice is establishing within the FBI a National Domestic Preparedness

Office to coordinate the programs and other federal support for state and

local governments. The office is intended to reduce state and local

confusion over the multitude of federal training and equipment programs

and response capabilities by providing one stop shopping for state and

local agencies. Also, the office has commissioned a local, state, and federal

interagency board to establish, maintain, and update a standardized

equipment list for use by the interagency community in preparing state and

local jurisdictions to respond to a terrorist incident involving a weapon of

mass destruction.
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

In Presidential Decision Directive 62, issued in May 1998, the President

designated a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection

and Counter-Terrorism who is not to direct agencies activities but is to

integrate the governments policies and programs on unconventional

threats to the homeland and Americans abroad, including terrorism. The

National Coordinator is also to provide advice in the context of the annual

budget process regarding the budgets for counterterrorism. We understand

he has established a number of working groups but have been unable to

obtain any further information.

Conclusions In the absence of well-defined requirements, we are seeing a sudden

increase in federal funding, programs, and capabilities. Specifically, we

observed a rapid increase in recent years in the number of federal

programs and initiatives designed to provide training and equipment to

local emergency responders and to add to federal capabilities to respond to

a chemical or biological terrorist event. Although the executive branch has

taken some steps to better manage efforts to combat terrorism, we believe

that more needs to be done. We have recommended that the National

Security Council, in consultation with the Director, OMB, and the other

executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that governmentwide

priorities to combat terrorism are established, agencies programs and

requirements are analyzed in relation to the priorities, and resources are

allocated based on the priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of

terrorist attack. We also recommended that OMB use data on funds

budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to, among

other things, ensure that programs are based on analytically sound threat

and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication. The National

Security Council and OMB have not fully embraced or implemented our

recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy

to answer any questions at this time.
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Related GAO Products ApendixI

Combating Terrorism: FBIs Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires

Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces

Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management

Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91,

June 11, 1997).

State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167,

May 20, 1997).

Aviation Security: FAAs Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection

Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).
Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing

Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies

(GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13

Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-96-99,

May 9, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27,

1996).

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear

Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89,

Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE's

Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's

Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical

Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy

(GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb. 19, 1992).
Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107

State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction

Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).

Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile

(GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991).

State Department: Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction Program

(GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).

(701166) Letr
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