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*********************************************** 
ROGER SAUNDERS, TRUSTEE

v. KDFBS, LLC, ET AL.

(AC 40918)

Moll, Alexander, and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real

property owned by the defendant L Co. In the first count of his complaint,

the plaintiff sought foreclosure of the mortgage, alleging, inter alia, that

there were encumbrances on the subject property that were subsequent

and subordinate to his mortgage, including the mortgage of the defendants K and D. In the second count, the plaintiff sought a declaratory

judgment that the mortgage of K and D, which was purportedly recorded

before the plaintiff’s mortgage, was subordinate to the plaintiff’s mortgage on the ground that the plaintiff had no notice of K and D’s mortgage

because it had been incorrectly indexed by the town clerk’s office. K

and D denied the allegation in each count that their mortgage was

subordinate to the plaintiff’s mortgage and asserted a special defense

that L Co. had mortgaged the subject property to them and that their

mortgage was prior in right and title to the plaintiff’s mortgage. Due to

a mistake on the mortgage, the town clerk’s office initially indexed the

deed under S, the sole member of L Co., as an individual, rather than

as a representative of L Co. The trial court rendered judgment for the

plaintiff on both counts and ordered a foreclosure by sale. Prior to the

sale date set by the court, K and D appealed from the judgment of

foreclosure to this court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final

judgment. K and D, on the granting of certification, appealed to our

Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s order and remanded this

case to this court for further proceedings. Held that the trial court’s

finding that the plaintiff’s mortgage had priority over K and D’s mortgage

was not clearly erroneous; K and D’s mortgage did not put the plaintiff

on actual or constructive notice when it was lodged with the town clerk,

as, due to an error in the language of the mortgage, the chain of title

for L Co. was silent as to the existence of K and D’s mortgage, which

was indexed with S as the grantor according to accepted practice, and

there were no documents, information or other matters that appeared

in the chain of title of L Co. to put the plaintiff’s title searcher on any

notice as to K and D’s mortgage.

Argued January 12—officially released July 20, 2021

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the

named defendant’s real property, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Danbury and tried to the court, Hon. William J. Lavery,

judge trial referee; judgment of foreclosure by sale and

determination of the parties’ mortgages as to the subject

property; thereafter, the defendant Karen Davis et al.

appealed to this court, which granted the plaintiff’s

motion to dismiss the appeal, and the defendant Karen

Davis et al., on the granting of certification, appealed

to the Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s order

dismissing the appeal and remanded the case to this

court for further proceedings. Affirmed.

Alexander Copp, with whom were Neil R. Marcus,

and, on the brief, Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the

appellants (defendant Karen Davis et al.).

Ryan S. Tougias, with whom were Michael J. Jones
and John J. Ribas, and, on the brief, Jessica M. Signor,

for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. This appeal returns to us on remand

from our Supreme Court. Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC,

335 Conn. 586, 239 A.3d 1162 (2020). The defendants

Daniel Davis and Karen Davis1 appealed from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court

in favor of the plaintiff, Roger Saunders, Trustee of

Roger Saunders Money Purchase Plan. At trial, the

plaintiff sought a judgment of foreclosure by sale and

a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff’s mortgage had

priority over the defendants’ mortgage. The defendants

argued on appeal that the trial court erred in its determination that the mortgage held by the plaintiff (Saunders

mortgage) on the underlying real property had priority

over the mortgage held by the defendants (Davis mortgage) on the same property. This court summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Our

Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the

decision of this court and remanded the appeal to this

court for further proceedings. Id., 606.

On appeal, the defendants argue that the Davis mortgage has priority over the Saunders mortgage because

the Davis mortgage was a valid mortgage that had been

lodged with the town clerk’s office first. The Davis

mortgage initially was recorded outside the chain of

title for the defendant KDFBS, LLC (KDFBS), due to a

drafting error contained in the grantor clause of the

mortgage. The town clerk’s office recorded the Davis

mortgage within the chain of title for KDFBS after a

correction report was issued in 2009, but this occurred

after the Saunders mortgage had been properly

recorded. The defendants claim that, notwithstanding

the fact that the Davis mortgage was submitted to the

town clerk’s office with a drafting error, the plaintiff

nonetheless had constructive notice of the Davis mortgage when it initially was lodged with the town clerk

in 2008. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its decision, our Supreme Court set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘In March,

2008, [KDFBS] purchased the subject property, a condominium in Ridgefield, by way of a deed that was

recorded under its name in April, 2008. KDFBS is managed by its sole member, the defendant Brian Scanlon.

‘‘In June, 2008, KDFBS executed a mortgage deed on

the property in favor of [the defendants] in the principal

amount of $565,000. Although the signature line and

the acknowledgement clause of the deed reflected that

Scanlon was executing the deed in his capacity as a

member of KDFBS, his designation as a member was

erroneously omitted in the grantor clause at the top of

the mortgage deed. The Ridgefield town clerk’s office

indexed the deed under Scanlon’s personal name as the

grantor.
‘‘In October, 2009, KDFBS executed a second mortgage deed on the Ridgefield property in favor of the

plaintiff as security for a joint loan in the amount of

$110,000 to KDFBS and to Scanlon individually. Scanlon

told the plaintiff that he would have a first mortgage

on the property. To ensure his security for the loan,

the plaintiff had a title search conducted. That search

revealed no mortgages of record in KDFBS’ chain of

title. The [Saunders] mortgage deed was duly recorded

in October, 2009.

‘‘In December, 2009, the Ridgefield town clerk’s office

changed the official index for the Davis mortgage after

an unidentified person brought the indexing error to

the town clerk’s attention. A correction report was

issued, and the Davis mortgage was changed from the

grantor index for Scanlon to the index for KDFBS.

‘‘KDFBS and Scanlon subsequently defaulted on their

obligation to the plaintiff . . . . In the first count of

the complaint, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of [the

Saunders] mortgage. In addition to asserting allegations

regarding the default, this count alleged that there were

encumbrances on the subject property that were subsequent and subordinate to the [Saunders] mortgage,

among which was the purported Davis mortgage, which

was recorded in 2008. In the second count, the plaintiff

sought a declaratory judgment that the 2008 Davis mortgage was subordinate to the . . . 2009 [Saunders]

mortgage because the plaintiff had no notice of it due

to it having been indexed under Scanlon’s name.

‘‘[The defendants] filed an answer denying the allegation in each count that [the Davis] mortgage was subordinate to the [Saunders] mortgage. They also asserted

a special defense that KDFBS, acting through its duly

authorized member, Scanlon, had mortgaged the subject property to them and that this mortgage was prior

in right and title to the [Saunders] mortgage.

‘‘KDFBS was defaulted for failure to appear and Scanlon was defaulted for failure to plead. The plaintiff then

filed a motion for a judgment of foreclosure by sale. The

motion was supported by an affidavit of debt totaling

$176,467.50, an affidavit of attorney’s fees in the amount

of $18,345, and an appraisal assessing the property’s

fair market value at $310,000.

‘‘Following a contested trial between the plaintiff and

[the defendants], the court rendered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff on both counts and ordered a foreclosure

by sale.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 588–90. This appeal

followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The defendants seek reversal of the trial court’s

declaratory judgment in which it found that the Saunders mortgage had priority over the Davis mortgage.

The defendants argue that the language of the mortgage

deed, as recorded in 2008, put the plaintiff on constructive notice of the Davis mortgage. The plaintiff counters
that he cannot be charged with constructive notice of

the Davis mortgage because it was recorded outside

the chain of title for KDFBS.

We begin our analysis by setting forth our standard

of review. ‘‘Our standard of review is plenary when we

are required to determine the intent behind language

in a deed or other written instrument by which litigants

claim an interest in real estate. Under that plenary standard, we are not required to give customary deference

to the trial court’s factual inferences.’’ Ginsberg & Ginsberg, LLC v. Alexandria Estates, LLC, 136 Conn. App.

511, 515, 48 A.3d 101 (2012). ‘‘To the extent that the

court has made findings of fact, our review is limited

to a determination of whether the court’s conclusions

were clearly erroneous.’’ Torgerson v. Sarah Tuxis Residential Services, Inc., 81 Conn. App. 435, 439, 840 A.2d

66, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 903, 852 A.2d 737 (2004).

Further, ‘‘[t]o the extent that our review requires us

to construe statutory provisions, this presents a legal

question over which our review also is plenary.’’ Washington Mutual Bank v. Coughlin, 168 Conn. App. 278,

288, 145 A.3d 408, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 939, 151 A.3d

387 (2016).

In the present matter, the court determined in the

judgment of foreclosure that the Saunders mortgage,

which was recorded in October, 2009, had priority over

the Davis mortgage. The court found that the Davis

mortgage had not been recorded in the chain of title

for KDFBS until December, 2009. ‘‘The law relating to

the priority of interests has its roots in early Connecticut

jurisprudence. A fundamental principle is that a mortgage that is recorded first is entitled to priority over

subsequently recorded mortgages provided that every

grantee has a reasonable time to get his deed recorded.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Equicredit Corp.

of Connecticut v. Kasper, 122 Conn. App. 94, 97, 996

A.2d 1243, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916, 4 A.3d 831 (2010).

In addition, General Statutes § 47-10 (a) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘No conveyance shall be effectual to hold

any land against any other person but the grantor and

his heirs, unless recorded on the records of the town

in which the land lies. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The defendants do not argue on appeal that the plaintiff had actual notice of the Davis mortgage. The plaintiff

testified that he was told by Scanlon that he would have

the first mortgage on the property and that he would not

have engaged in business with Scanlon had he known

of the other mortgage on the property.

The defendants argue that, when the plaintiff

recorded his mortgage in 2009, he had constructive

notice of the Davis mortgage, which had been lodged

with the Ridgefield town clerk in 2008. The defendants

assert that the two elements for constructive notice in

a land record, namely, (1) a valid mortgage2 under either

our common law or the safe harbor provision of General
Statues § 49-31b (a),3 which was (2) ‘‘lodged for [the]

record’’ with the town clerk, were satisfied in this case.

Butchers’ Ice & Supply Co. v. Bascom, 109 Conn. 433,

441, 146 A. 843 (1929); see also Connecticut National

Bank v. Lorenzato, 221 Conn. 77, 82, 602 A.2d 959

(1992). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Davis mortgage did not put the plaintiff

on constructive notice when it was lodged with the

town clerk in 2008.

The defendants claim that, notwithstanding the drafting error naming Brian Scanlon as the grantor in the

grantor clause, the language of the mortgage deed as

a whole put the plaintiff on constructive notice that

KDFBS was the intended grantor of the mortgage. The

defendants assert that ‘‘any possible ambiguity created

by the granting clause is resolved when the Davis mortgage is reviewed in its entirety’’ and that, therefore, the

plaintiff was put on constructive notice of the Davis

mortgage when that mortgage was first lodged with the

Ridgefield town clerk in 2008.

The defendants rely on two separate lines of authority

in support of their constructive notice claim. The first

line of authority stands for the proposition that

‘‘recordation of a valid mortgage gives constructive

notice to third persons if the record sufficiently discloses the real nature of the transaction so that the

third party claimant, exercising common prudence and

ordinary diligence, can ascertain the extent of the

encumbrance.’’ Connecticut National Bank v.

Lorenzato, supra, 221 Conn. 81; see id., 82 (citing

cases).

The defendants argue that Lorenzato controls the

present case. We disagree. In Lorenzato, the mortgage

at issue was recorded in the land records with a signature page that did not have the required signatures and

acknowledgment. Id., 79. Our Supreme Court held that

the recordation was effective, so as to supply constructive notice upon subsequent encumbrancers, because

‘‘an express reference to the omitted documentation in

the recorded mortgage deed would have enabled a title

searcher to make a requisite inquiry to discover the

terms of the mortgage.’’ Id., 83. In its analysis, the court

made the distinction between ‘‘a mortgage deed that is

imperfectly executed and one that is imperfectly

recorded. The former is a nullity and is, therefore, incapable of giving constructive notice; the latter affords

constructive notice to subsequent third party creditors

to the extent that the mortgage, as recorded, contains

sufficient information to put a title searcher on

inquiry. From the point of view of the third party who

relies on that which the recorded conveyance purports

to encumber, it is immaterial whether an imperfect

recordation is attributable to the inadvertence of the

recording clerk or to the inadvertence of the mortgagee.

We have, in effect, so held in Connecticut National
Bank v. Esposito, 210 Conn. 221, 230–31, 554 A.2d 735

(1989), in which the issue was whether a recorded mortgage deed gave constructive notice to [third-party] creditors, even though the mortgagee in recording its deed

had inadvertently omitted documentation containing

important information about the amount of the mortgage obligation. We concluded that the recordation was

effective because an express reference to the omitted

documentation in the recorded mortgage deed would

have enabled a title searcher to make the requisite

inquiry to discover the terms of the mortgage.’’ (Emphasis added.) Connecticut National Bank v. Lorenzato,

supra, 221 Conn. 82–83.

The defendants argue that Lorenzato, and similar

cases, instruct that our analysis should focus ‘‘exclusively on the face of the subject deed at the time it is

lodged with the recording clerk, even if a subsequent

recording error caused the mortgage to be undetectable

by third-party creditors.’’ We disagree. Central to the

holding in Lorenzato was the fact that other documents

recorded within the chain of title would have put a

title searcher on inquiry about the status of the mortgage. Our Supreme Court stated that it was ‘‘persuaded

that the mortgagee’s inadvertent mistake in recordation

gave constructive notice to the lien creditor because

the properly executed rider was sufficient to put a title

searcher on inquiry about the status of the mortgage.’’

(Emphasis added.) Connecticut National Bank v.

Lorenzato, supra, 221 Conn. 83; see also Connecticut

National Bank v. Esposito, supra, 210 Conn. 230.

In Lorenzato, the court also reasoned that ‘‘[m]any

errors in recording . . . are so neutralized by other

matters which do appear in the record, that no searcher

after the title possibly could be misled. Obviously, such

shortcomings should not affect the validity of the record

as notification. Among them are . . . an error or omission cured by the appearance of the information at

some other point in the record. . . . In the cases in

which the defective recordation of a valid deed was

held not to give constructive notice, in contradistinction

to the circumstances here, there appears to have been

nothing on the face of the recorded deed to put a title

searcher on inquiry about the error or omission.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v.

Lorenzato, supra, 221 Conn. 83–84.

The second line of authority on which the defendants

rely consists of cases, dating back to 1795, standing for

the proposition that a valid mortgage, once lodged with

the town clerk, provides constructive notice even if the

town clerk makes a mistake in the recording of the

mortgage or fails to record the mortgage. See id., 82

(‘‘[w]e have held that the imperfect recordation of a

valid mortgage gives constructive notice to third persons, despite a clerk’s mistake in its actual recordation,
at least if the mistake is so obvious as to have put a

[third-party] claimant ‘upon inquiry’ to ascertain what

the mortgage contains’’); Butchers’ Ice & Supply Co. v.

Bascom, supra, 109 Conn. 441 (‘‘if the question arose,

as to the respective priorities of a grantee of a deed

lodged for record but failing of record through no fault

of his, and of a subsequent purchaser without notice,

it seems clear to us that when an attaching creditor has

done all that the law requires of him to perfect his

attachment of real estate, he should not lose the benefit

of his attachment because of the failure of the town

clerk to record the certificate of attachment, and that

by the express terms of the statute his attachment if

completed as therein provided, is made when the certificate is lodged in the office of the town clerk’’); Lewis

v. Hinman, 56 Conn. 55, 67, 13 A. 143 (1888) (‘‘The

consequences of [a] mistake [by the town clerk] should

not be visited upon the mortgagee. He did all he could

do and all that the law required of him. He left his deed

for record, and the record, by the statute, is to be as

of that date. From that time, which necessarily antedates the actual recording, his title is secure. He cannot

be prejudiced by any subsequent action without his

fault.’’); Booth v. Barnum, 9 Conn. 286, 289 (1832) (‘‘[I]t

is settled law, that when a deed is lodged for record

with the [town clerk], it is constructive notice to all the

world. This principle has been so long established, and

it is so essential to the preservation of all the benefits

of the registering act, that it can admit of no doubt.’’);

Judd v. Woodruff, 2 Root (Conn.) 298, 299 (Super. 1795)

(‘‘[t]he plaintiffs’ deed was delivered to the town clerk

and by him entered upon the 26th of June 1766, and it

was the duty of the town clerk to have recorded it at

length; and the plaintiffs are not to suffer for his neglect

[in not recording the deed at full length until 1794]’’).

The defendants argue that this line of cases controls

the resolution of the present case. They claim that their

mortgage provided constructive notice to the plaintiff

because it had been lodged in 2008 with the Ridgefield

town clerk. They assert that the Davis mortgage should

be given priority over the Saunders mortgage because

the Ridgefield town clerk ‘‘misindexed’’ their otherwise

valid mortgage by recording it based on Scanlon and

not KDFBS in the grantor clause. We are unpersuaded

by the defendants’ argument.

In the present case, there were no documents, information or ‘‘other matters’’ that appeared in the chain

of title for KDFBS to put the plaintiff’s title searcher

on any notice as to the Davis mortgage. The plaintiff’s

title searcher, Albert Testani, testified extensively as

to the steps he had undertaken in performing a title

examination for obligations of KDFBS secured by the

underlying property. Testani testified that his search

did not reveal the existence of the Davis mortgage

because it had not been indexed under KDFBS. Testani

testified that, at the time he conducted his title search,
he did not know that Scanlon was a member of KDFBS,

and the documents that he found during the search did

not mention Scanlon or the Davis mortgage. He further

testified that when conducting a title search it is his

standard practice to search by name and not by property

address as that is too ‘‘unreliable’’ and ‘‘dangerous.’’

The trial court found Testani’s testimony to be credible

and concluded that ‘‘the title search was done and the

run of the title was done in a professional manner and

that the plaintiff had no actual or constructive notice

of the [Davis mortgage].’’ We conclude that the face of

the mortgage as recorded did not put the plaintiff on

constructive notice because the chain of title for KDFBS

was silent as to the existence of the Davis mortgage

and could provide no basis for inquiry to the plaintiff’s

title searcher.

Moreover, our review of the record shows that the

town clerk indexed the Davis mortgage in 2008, based

on the standard practice that a mortgage is indexed

according to the grantor clause of the mortgage deed.

Barbara Serfilippi, chief clerk for the town of Ridgefield,

testified that the Davis mortgage was properly indexed.

Further, Serfilippi brought a copy of a handbook that

the Connecticut Town Clerks Association has created

for use by town clerks’ offices as a guide and reference,

which was admitted into evidence. The handbook indicates that, when a mortgage deed is involved, town

clerks should ‘‘not index the names of [comakers] or

guarantors on a note who do not appear in the granting

clause of the instrument. Index the name of the ownermortgagor as grantor and the lender-secured partymortgagee as grantee.’’ Serfilippi testified that the Davis

mortgage was indexed under Scanlon, and not KDFBS

because only Scanlon’s name appeared in the grantor

clause of the mortgage deed.4 Serfilippi testified that the

Saunders mortgage was indexed under KDFBS because

KDFBS was the entity listed in the grantor clause of

that deed in accordance with the handbook guidelines.

Additionally, on cross-examination, the following colloquy took place:

‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: In 2008, was a mistake

made in indexing Scanlon versus [KDFBS]?

‘‘[Serfilippi]: I don’t know if it was a mistake, because

if we follow the guidelines in the handbook, it was not

a mistake, the way that we interpreted it did.

‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Yeah. . . . If . . . .

‘‘[Serfilippi]: That . . . was the granting clause.’’

Our review of the record supports the court’s finding

that the Ridgefield town clerk’s office indexed the Davis

mortgage according to accepted practice and that the

mortgage was not ‘‘misindexed.’’ The present case is

readily distinguishable from those cases relied on by

the defendants in which the town clerk’s office was the

source of the error. In the present case, the source of
the error was the language of the mortgage, specifically,

the omission of KDFBS in the grantor’s clause, that was

lodged with the town clerk’s office for recording. The

Ridgefield town clerk’s actions were not the source of

the error.

The Davis mortgage was not recorded within the

chain of title for KDFBS at the time the Saunders mortgage was recorded because of an error in the language

of the mortgage, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not

on constructive notice of the Davis mortgage. ‘‘The concept of the chain of title is well explained and expressed

in the Connecticut Standards of Title: The chain of title

concept is a principle of case law, developed to protect

subsequent parties from being charged with constructive notice of the existence and contents of those

recorded instruments which a title searcher would not

be expected to discover by the customary search of

land records.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ginsberg & Ginsberg, LLC v. Alexandria Estates, LLC,

supra, 136 Conn. App. 516. It is well established that

‘‘one searching title to land is not bound to search the

records at large, but only is bound with such facts

as appear in the chain of title to the particular lot in

question.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Powers

v. Olson, 252 Conn. 98, 108, 742 A.2d 799 (2000). In the

present case, the plaintiff, through a professional title

searcher, conducted a thorough examination of the land

records and did not discover the Davis mortgage. ‘‘The

law implies notice on the ground that it is conclusively

presumed that a person will not purchase an interest

in a piece of land without examining the condition of

the record. Such an act would be required by common

prudence.’’ Hunt v. Mansfield, 31 Conn. 488, 490–91

(1863); see also Beach v. Osborne, 74 Conn. 405, 412,

50 A. 1019 (1902). The record supports the court’s determination that the plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice of the Davis mortgage.

‘‘It is the policy of our law to make every man’s title

to his real estate, as far as practicable, appear of record,

and the land records are constructive notice to all the

world of any instruments there recorded.’’ Butchers’

Ice & Supply Co. v. Bascom, supra, 109 Conn. 440. We

conclude that the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff

did not have actual or constructive notice of the Davis

mortgage on the property was not clearly erroneous

and, therefore, as a matter of law, the Saunders mortgage had priority over the Davis mortgage.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 KDFBS, LLC, Brian Scanlon, The United States of America, and The

Village at Ridgefield Condominium Association, Inc., were also named as

defendants in the plaintiff’s complaint but have not participated in the

present appeal. We refer to Daniel Davis and Karen Davis as the defendants.

2 Because the trial court made findings as to the priority of the Davis and

Saunders mortgages, and the plaintiff does not contest the validity of the

Davis mortgage on appeal, we limit our analysis to the issue of whether the
Davis mortgage provided constructive notice to the plaintiff when it was

lodged with the town clerk.

3 General Statutes § 49-31b (a) provides: ‘‘A mortgage deed given to secure

payment of a promissory note, which furnishes information from which

there can be determined the date, principal amount and maximum term of

the note, shall be deemed to give sufficient notice of the nature and amount

of the obligation to constitute a valid lien securing payment of all sums

owed under the terms of such note.’’ See also Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg,

202 Conn. 566, 578, 522 A.2d 763 (1987) (concluding that ‘‘§ 49-31b (a) is

a ‘safe harbor’ provision that does not preempt [common-law] standards

governing the validity of mortgages against subsequent lien creditors’’).

4 At trial the following colloquies took place:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Were you able to determine why it is that the

Davis mortgage was recorded under the name Brian Scanlon?

‘‘[Serfilippi]: No, it’s just the way that it was indexed . . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Okay. And, that’s . . . .

‘‘[Serfilippi]: [T]here was no reason, that’s the way

that they did it.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That’s because of the grantor clause?

‘‘[Serfilippi]: Of the grantor clause.’’

* * *

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: As you sit here today, do you think that the

Davis mortgage was properly indexed, um, in 2008?

‘‘[Serfilippi]: Under Brian Scanlon?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct?

‘‘[Serfilippi]: Yes.’’