IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60070

Summary Calendar

JEAN CLAUDE MUVUNYI,

Petitioner

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A205 456 018

Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jean Claude Muvunyi, a native and citizen of Rwanda, petitions for 

review of the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his 

second motion to reopen his immigration proceedings and denying his motion 

to reconsider the denial of the motion to reopen. The Government moves for 

summary disposition.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 25, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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During his immigration proceedings, Muvunyi sought as relief asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, 

testifying that he had been tortured and imprisoned and faced future torture 

and imprisonment due to his ties to former Rwandan military officer Kayumba 

Nyamwasa. The immigration judge denied Muvunyi relief, determining that 

he lacked credibility. The BIA dismissed Muvunyi’s appeal, and Muvunyi did 

not petition for review. The BIA also denied Muvunyi’s first motion to reopen 

his immigration proceedings. Additionally, the BIA denied Muvunyi’s second 

motion to reopen as time- and number-barred and for failure to demonstrate 

changed country conditions. The BIA then denied Muvunyi’s motion to 

reconsider the denial of his second motion to reopen.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider

under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 

F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). We will affirm the BIA’s decision to deny either 

type of motion if it is not capricious, racially invidious, without evidentiary 

foundation, or arbitrary. Id. at 304. Additionally, we review factual findings 

for substantial evidence and will not overturn them “unless the evidence 

compels a contrary conclusion.” Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 

(5th Cir. 2009). 

There is no time or numerical limit for filing a motion to reopen the 

removal proceedings to seek asylum when the motion “is based on changed 

country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which 

removal has been ordered” if such evidence is material, previously unavailable, 

and could not have been discovered or presented sooner. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A motion to reconsider “shall 

specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by 

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pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); 

Zhao, 404 F.3d at 301.

Muvunyi challenges the BIA’s conclusion that the documents presented 

in support of his motion to reopen were not properly authenticated. He 

contends that the BIA did not provide the basis for its determination that the 

documents presented were not authenticated as required by 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1287.6(b) and argues that (1) the arrest warrant and police correspondence 

submitted were not official records or entries under § 1287.6(b); (2) if they were 

official documents, the original signed and sealed documents, copies of which 

were submitted to the court, were in counsel’s possession and available to the 

court for review; (3) if the documents did not satisfy § 1287.6(b), they were 

authenticated by other means; and (4) the BIA erred in failing to consider two 

signed statements due to the writers’ inability to be cross-examined and the 

lack of notarization because the writers could not be cross-examined for a 

motion to reopen and because it would be irrational to expect an asylum-seeker 

implicating the government in human rights violations to obtain government 

notarization. He also contends that the BIA erred in failing to consider the 

materiality of the documents provided and in determining that he failed to 

make a prima facie case for relief. Muvunyi argues in his reply brief that the 

Government waived many of these issues by failing to respond specifically to 

Muvunyi’s arguments in his opening brief. However, we are not bound by such 

a failure to respond. See United States v. Hope, 545 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 

2008). 

Section 1287.6 provides in pertinent part that an official record or 

document from a foreign country, such as Rwanda, that is not a signatory to 

the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legislation for Foreign Public 

Documents “shall be evidenced by an official publication thereof, or by a copy 

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attested by an officer so authorized.” § 1287.6(b)(1). Muvunyi has not 

established that the proffered arrest warrant and police correspondence were 

not official records subject to § 1287.6(b), nor has he shown that any of the 

proffered documents were properly authenticated in accordance with 

§ 1287.6(b) or by any other means. Especially in light of the immigration 

judge’s adverse credibility determination, Muvunyi has not shown that the BIA

abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen or his motion to 

reconsider. See Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303.

Accordingly, Muvunyi’s petitions for review are DENIED. The 

Government’s motion for summary disposition is also DENIED. See Groendyke 

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

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