J udg e Ka rl S. Fore ster, Senior United States District Judge for the E astern D istrict of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0682n.06 F iled: Septem ber 19, 2007 No. 06-1726 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
PAULHOUSE and MI CHEL L E HOUSE, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. J OHNSON CONTROL S, I NC., Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : SUTTON and Mc KEAGU E, Circuit J udg es; FO RESTER, Dist rict Judge. *
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e . A ft e r P a

ul H ou se wa s in

jur e d at wo rk , he fi le d a

tor t a c tio n a g a ins t his employ er, Johnson Cont rols. The dis t ri ct court gr anted summary judgme nt in favor of

the
c o mp an y , h o ld in g th a t M ic h ig an ’ s Wo r k e r ’ s D is a

b ility Co mp e n s a ti o nA c t b ar

r e d th e c la im
. We
a ff ir m.
I.
At J ohnson Controls, House often wor k ed with a tea m of employ ees that perfor med a proce dure known as “die -flipping .” A die is a larg e piec e o f equipment that in this case weig hed b e t w e e n5 , 0 0 0 an d

2 5 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s . D i e - f

l i p p i n g r e qu i r e s e mp l o y e e s t o c o nn e c tt h e d i e t o a s t e e l I-No. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 2 - beam with a c able, pe rmitting t hem t o hoist the I -bea m (and thus the di e) with a vehic le. Once the die has be en lifted, e it her it will flip over of its own a ccor d or the e mploy ees must use a nother vehicle to flip the die manually . Once the die flips, the orig inal vehicle lowe rs the I -bea m, which allows the die to land ba ck on the g round.
Be fore his acc ident, House ha d participated in many die-flippingoperations and seen many oth e rs . B a se d o n th e se e xpe ri e nc e s, he c a me to th e be lie f t hat th e pr oc e ss w a s unn e c e ssa ri ly da ng e ro us ; that the c omp any e mph a size d “ g e t[tin g ] i t do ne a s qu ic k[ly ] as po ssi ble ” a t th e e xpe ns e of pr e c a u t i o n ; an d

t h a tt h e r e w a s n o f

o r m a l p r o c e d

u r e f o r s a f e l y p e r f o r m i n g t h e t a s k
. H ou se
e xpre sse d th e se c on c e rn s to hi s im medi a te su pe rv iso rs —Ca

rl Ha wk ins , Pat O ’H ara

and Chr is Whit e—and s ug g ested that Johnson C ontrols should purchase specia liz ed die- flipping e quipment and esta blish a protocol for the proce dure. A cknowledg ing t h e dang er, H ouse’s super visors conveyed these reque sts to members of the plant’s uppe r mana g ement, b u t t h ey d id not take any action in re sponse. On April 4, 2002, House a nd other e mploy ees attempted to flip a die. Norma lly , the team
us e d a sp e c ia l di e c art to ho ist the die , bu t on thi s oc c a sio n the y us e d a larg e fo rk lif

t kn ow n a s a

“ hilo. ” Th e te a m suc c e ssf

ull y pic ke d up an d fli pp e d the die , b ut i t be c a me stu c k w he n th e y tr ie d to re st it f lat on the g rou nd
. Obs ervi ng the pr oc e ss f ro m a sa fe dis tanc e , H ou se mot ion e d to the ve hic le operator to stop and ran ac ross the fr ont of the vehic le “to the other side to see if it wa s hung up on
so me thi ng .” JA 88
. Sud de nly , “[s]o me thi ng sn a pp e d” or “ br ok e loo se ,” c a us ingthe I -b e a m to fl y off the f orklift and to bounce off the c ement and onto House ’s leg
. Id
. Af t er t h e a c c i d e n t , H u ghNo. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 3 - Guing rich, the pla

nt’s human re source s manag er, tol d Ho u s e t hat the ac cident neve r would have happene d had upper

manag ement approved the purcha se of new equipment. House ’s injury made him eligibl e t o rec eive wor kmen’s compe nsation under Michig an law w ithout reg ard to whe ther J ohnson Controls was responsible for the ac cident. Mich. Comp. L aws § 418.301(1)
. House filed a

tort claim ag ainst J ohnson Controls in state court, c ontending that the company intentionally

cause d the acc ident when it r efuse d to pur chase equipment that would have ma de the proce dure sa fer . The c ompany remove d the ac tion to federa l court on diversity g rounds, then moved for summary

judgme nt, arguing that House could not satisfy the re quirements of a

n intentional-tort action and t h at M i chig an’s wor ker’ s compensation law ba rre d a neg lige nce c laim. I n response , House prof

fer ed the a ffidavit of his super visor, Carl Haw kins, who said (1 ) t h at he had “ actua l kn ow le dg e . . . [th a t] an in ju ry wo uld oc c ur to e mpl oy e e s invo lve d in the die fl ipp ingpr oc e ss” b e c a u s e o f “ t h e l a c k o f a s t an d ar d i z e d p r o c e d

u r e , c o u p l e d w i t ht h e l a c k

o f a p p r o p r i a t e t r a i n i n g , ” JA 14 3, and (2 ) t hat John so n Co ntr ols , “d e sp ite be ingawa re of the c e rt a int

y of inj ur y , . . . de lib e rate ly failed to take steps to avoid said injuries,” JA 144.
The district cour

t gr anted J ohnson Controls’ motion, rea soning that House could not show
an in te nti on a l to rt

and tha t Mi c hig an’ s w or

ke r’ s c omp e ns a tio n la

w f or e c los e d th e a c tio n. Ho us e
a pp e a le d, re qu ir ingus to g ive fr e shre vie w t o th e dis tr ict cou rt ’s de c isi on and to a pp ly the same summary -judg ment standards that the district court applied. Thomas v. Miller , 489 F.3d 293, 297 (6th Cir. 2007).No. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 4 - II. The Michig an W orker ’s Dis ability Compensation Act provides a n exclusive compensation
re me dy fo r e mpl oy e e s in

jur e d o n th e jo b, ex cept wh e n th e inj ur y ste ms f ro m an inte nti on a l to rt
. Mich. Comp. L aws § 418.131; see Travis v. D reis & Krump M fg. Co. , 551 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Mich. 19 96 ). Th e statut or

y e xce pti on

a pp lie s o nly “ wh e n an e mpl oy e e is inj ur e d a s a re su lt o f a

de lib e rate act of the employer a

nd t he employ er spe cifica lly intended an injury .” Mich. Comp. L aws § 4 18 .1 31 (1 ); se e als o He rm an v . Ci ty of D e tro it , 680 N.W.2d 71 , 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (pe r curiam). An injured e mploy ee ma y establish the spec ific intent to injure i n one of two way s: (1) by de mon str a tin g tha

t th e e mpl oy er “ma de a c on sc iou s c ho ic e to i nju re an e mpl oy e e and

ha [s] deliberately

acte d or failed to a ct in f

urthera nce of that intent,” Palazzola v. Karmazin Prods. Corp. , 565 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), or (2) by showin g that “the e mploy er ha d actual knowledge that an injur

ywas c e rta in to o c c ur and willfully disreg arde d that knowledg e,” Mic h. Com p. L aws § 4 18 .1 31 (1 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o Tra v is , 551 N.W.2d at 138. House disclaims any

eff ort to rely on the first method of showing intent, admitting that no one at J o h n s o n Controls made a c onscious eff ort to injure him. At issue is the second method of establishing intent, whic h the Michig an Supreme Court has construe d narr owly
. To prove “ actua l knowledg e that a n injury is certa in to occur,” the employ er’ s knowledg e must be ac tual, not constructive or

implied. Tra v is , 5 65 N. W.2 d at 14 3. An e ff or t to sh owthat “ [ a] n in cid ent [w a s] ‘ce rtain to occ ur,’” moreove r, “c annot be established by relianc e on the law s of proba bility , the mere
occur renc e of a simil ar e vent, or c onclusory statements of e x perts.” Giles v. Ame ritech , 660 N.W.2dNo. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 5 - 72, 73 (Mich. 2003) ( summarily reve rsing a court of a

ppeals’ de cision denying summar y judgme nt to a n employ er whose employ ee was injured while using a torch in a hole with a natur al g as line). To satis fy thi s de fi nit ion , the c la ima nt mus t sh ow that “ no do ubt e xists wi th r e g ard to whether [an injury ] wil l occur ,” Tra v is , 551 N.W.2d at 143 (emphasi s added) , and that the employ er’ s knowledg e conc erns the har m that indeed oc curr ed: “An e mploy er’ s knowledg e of g ener al risks is insufficient to establish an intenti onal tort.” Herman , 6 80 N. W.2 d at 77 ; cf. Oaks v. Twin Ci ty Foods, Inc

. , 497 N.W.2d 196, 197 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (“It is not enough that the employ er a cted r eckle ssly and eve n envisioned the ty pe of a ccide nt th at d i d in fac t occur .”). Dang erous c onditions m ay form the ba sis of a claim only if the injury is “sure a nd inevitable” a

nd “only if the employ er k

no ws the condi t i o n wi ll cause a n injury and re fra ins from informing the employ ee a

bout it.” Alexande r v. De mmer Corp. , 660 N.W.2d 67, 67 (Mich. 2003). To be “ known” a

nd “ce rtain,” an injury must spring direc tly from the employ ee’ s duties and the employ ee c annot have had the c hance t o ex erc ise individual volit ion. I n case s where the
e mpl oy e e make s a de c isi on to a c t or no t a c t in the pr e se nc e of

a kn ow n r isk , th e inj ur

y is n ot c e rt a in bec au s e t h e em ploy er c annot know what the employ ee’ s rea ction will be in advanc e and the employ ee is a

ble “t o t ak e s t eps to kee p from beinginjured.” Tra v is , 551 N.W.2d at 145. J ust as interveningactions by third parties can neg ate pr ox imate ca usation, see M

ilwaukee &St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg , 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876), so an injury cannot be cer

tain to occur

when the individual takes a ffirmative, deliberate ac tion that bri n gs about the har m, se e Pa laz

zo la , 565 N.W.2d at 874 (holding no knowledg e of certa in injury from har mful vapors whe re a

“dec ision to clean the tank w asNo. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 6 - ma de on the sp ot” by a

no ns up e rv iso ry

e mpl oy e e ); Herman , 680 N.W.2d at 77 (holding no int e nti on a l to rt

wh e re de a th f

ro m e le c tr oc uti on

“ wa s th e re su lt o f d e c e de nt’ s mo me nta ry and tr a g ic la ps e in j ud g me nt” ); c

f. T ra v is , 551 N.W.2d at 145 (noting w ith approval a finding of intentional tort ag ainst an employ er that hired employ ees who could not speak English and there fore could not take pr e c a uti on s in lig ht o f t he wa rn ingla be ls on the c he mic a ls w ithwh ic h th e y we re wo rk ing ). Th e on ly situation where the M i chig an Supreme Court has allowed a claim to survive summary judgme nt since the Michig an legislature cre ated the statutory intentional tort exception was in Golec v . Metal Exc hange Corp. , 551 N.W.2d 132, 147 ( Mich. 1996), the c ompanion case to Tra v is . T he c ourt in that case found knowledg e of certa in harm because the employ er had order ed the plaintiff t o g o back to placing scra

p metal with combustible aer osol can s i n to a furna ce—e ven af ter he had just been injured fr om a small expl osion. Id. a t 13 7, 14 7; se eals o P ala zzo la , 565 N.W.2d at 876 ( sug g esting that the employ er’ s conduct must be “e g reg ious”). Measur ed by

these Michig an ca ses, House ha s failed as a matter of law to show that J ohnson Controls h ad “a ct u al knowledg e that an injury was c erta in to occur.” Mich. Comp. L aws § 418.131(1). His e vidence at most establishes that the company knew of the risk of ha

rm, not that it h a d “ a c tua l kn ow le dg e ” of t hi s dan ger and no t th a t it

ha d “ no do ub t” that th is a c c ide nt w ou ld
oc c ur . O n th e da

y of the inc ide nt, H ou se ma de a vo luntary

de c isi on to l e a ve the sa fe ty

zon e to investigate t h e p ro b l em. House kne w that this procedur e wa s g ener ally dang erous a

nd had made numerous complaints about the proce ss, but he still decide d to move out of the saf ety zone to inspect the die. Johnson C ontrols did nothing to inh i b i t Hous e’s a bility to take pre cautions, and no oneNo. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 7 - disputes that th e b o u n ci n g I -beam would not have struc k him had he re mained at a safe distance. Ho u s e’ s i n d ep en d en tex er ci s e o f d i s cr et i o n i nm o v i n g o u to f t h e s af et y z o n e n ega t es an y

kn o wl ed ge of a “ cer tain” har m of this kind of acc ident. Even if House had not taken this i n d ep en d ent ac tion, moreover, he could not show ac tual knowledg e that the injury would occur . Although the company was u n d en i ab l y awa

re of the da ng e ro us ne ss o f the sit

uatio n, kn ow le dg e of the po te nti a l fo r the ty pe of a c c ide nt t hat oc c ur re d f a lls short of the kind of knowledg e Michig an law r equire s. See O aks , 4 97 N. W.2 d at 19 6. At mos t, Ho us e ’s pr inc ipa l pi e c e of e vid e nc e —th e a ff

ida vit by su pe rv iso r H awk ins —c re a te s a fa c t di sp ute about neg lige nce r elatingto the die-flippingproce dure, not intent as de fined by Michig an ca se law. Hawkins, it is true, said “that despite beingawa re of the ce rtainty

of injury , J ohnson Controls . . . deliberately

failed to take steps to a

void sa id injurie s.” J A 144. But no one to this day kn ow s h owthe a c c ide nt i n f a c t ha pp e ned and why

the I -b e a m su dd e nly

fl e w o ff the fo rk lif

t. Hawkins’ know ledg e that inj ury was “ cer tain to occur ” at some point shows only his awar eness that injury was bound to occ ur due to the g ener al risk of the activity , not that injury was inevitable and
cer tain to occur

when a nd how it did. Bec ause the aff idavit ne cessa

rily speculates about the risk of future ha rm, it cannot satisfy

the strict standar d of ce rtainty —of no doubt

—th a t th e Mic hig an c ourt s established in Tra v is an d

i t s p r o g e n y. Herman , 680 N.W.2d at 77. House’s evidence of e mploy er know ledg e, it bear s adding , is far le ss compelling tha n the evidenc e pre sented in seve ral c laims summarily reje cted by

the Michig an cour

ts. I n Alexande r , the plaintiff was injure d while cleaning pinch roll ers when t here had bee n four pr ior injuries from theNo. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 8 - ro l l er s. See A lexande r v. De mmer Corp. , N o . 2 3 0 4 1 7 , 2 0 0 2 WL 1 9 2 1 9 0 0 , a t * 2 ( M ic h
. Ct. App. Au g . 2 0, 20 02 ) (p e r curi am)
. Th e Mic hig an Su pr e me Cou

rt summa ri ly re ve rs e d th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls and gra nted s ummary judgme nt for the employ er. Alexande r , 660 N.W.2d at 67. Simi larly , in J oli ff v. De troit C ity Dairy, Inc

. , 66 4 N. W.2 d 21 1 (M ic h. 20 03 ), the Mic hig an Su pr e me Court

summa ri ly g rante d s umm ary

jud g me nt whe re the e mpl oy e r h a d tw ic e or de re d th e e mpl oy e e —o ve r h is pr ote st— to dr ive a pa lle t jac k that ha d n o b ra ke s, see Joliff v. Detroit City Dairy, Inc. , No. 232530, 20 02 WL31 01 26 27 , at *1 –2 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. Se pt. 6, 20 02 ); se e als o Giles , 660 N. W
. 2 d at 73 (summarily

g rantingsummary

judgme nt where the employ ee w as instructed to use a torch to splice te le ph on e wi re s in a

ho le wi th a

natur a l g a s li ne ); Menze l v. Light Metals Corp. , 627 N.W.2d 601, 601 (M i ch
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( s u m m ar i l y gra n t i n g s u m m ary

j u d gm en twh er e t h e e mp l o y er k n ew t h at a p re ss was do ub le c y c lin g and

that a saf e ty de vic e ha d f

a ile d) ; Gray v . Morley , 596 N.W.2d 922, 923–25 (Mich. 19 99 ) ( ho ldi ngtha

t th e re c ou ld be no int e nti on a l tort eve n whe re the e mpl oy e r s we rv e d v iol e ntl y in his tr uc k wh ile the e mpl oy e e wa s in the be d in

or de r t o s c are the pla int if f) ; Bo c k v . G e ne ra l M

oto rs Cor p ., 637 N.W.2d 825, 829–30 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that GM did not have
a c tua l kn ow le dg e of

c e rt a in i nju

ry fr om e mpl oy e e e xpos ur e to h ig hly c on c e ntrat ed che mic a ls beca use scientific experiments establishing injuries in animals e stablish only a proba bility of injury i nh u m an s )
. H e r e , w h e r e H o u s e h a d e x e c u t e d t h e d i e - f l i p p i n g p r o c e d

u r e m an y t i m e s w i t h o u ti n j u r y, he pr e se nts no e vid e nc e a s to why thi s injury wa s pre or da ine d r a the r t ha n me re ly pr ob a ble . H ou se cannot show that his employ er knew t hat injury was c erta in to occur, a

nd we ther efor e ca

nnot infer the spec ific intent to injure nec essar y for his cla im to survive.No. 06-1726

House v . Johnson Controls, Inc.

- 9 - III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.