United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

John E. Sununu,

House of Representatives

December 1998 MILITARY BASES

Status of Prior Base

Realignment and

Closure Rounds

GAO/NSIAD-99-36

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278553 

December 11, 1998

The Honorable John E. Sununu

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Sununu:

This report responds to your request that we review important issues associated with the four

rounds of military base realignments and closures (BRAC) beginning in 1988. Through closure

rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected to significantly

reduce its domestic infrastructure and provide needed dollars for high-priority defense

programs such as modernization. This report addresses (1) DOD’s progress in completing action

on BRAC recommendations and transferring unneeded base property to other users, (2) the

precision of DOD’s estimates of BRAC costs and savings, (3) environmental cleanup progress and

estimated associated costs, and (4) reported trends in economic recovery in communities

affected by base closures.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Senate

Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense; Senate Committee on Armed

Services; House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on National Security; House

Committee on National Security; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force; the Directors of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Information Systems

Agency; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available

to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of David R. Warren, Director, Defense

Management Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any

questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General
Executive Summary

Purpose By 2001, four rounds of base realignments and closures (BRAC) will have

reduced the domestic military basing structure by about 20 percent from

its 1988 level. The Department of Defense (DOD) has asked the Congress

for further rounds to align basing structure with force structure and to free

up funds for programs such as weapons modernization. Mr. John E.

Sununu, House of Representatives, requested that GAO provide analyses

and information on closures and realignments as the Congress considers

whether to enact new BRAC legislation. Accordingly, this report addresses

(1) DOD’s progress in completing action on BRAC recommendations and

transferring unneeded base property to other users, (2) the precision of

DOD’s estimates of BRAC costs and savings, (3) environmental cleanup

progress and estimated associated costs, and (4) reported trends in

economic recovery in communities affected by base closures.

Background The Congress authorized four BRAC rounds, beginning in 1988, 1991, 1993,

and 1995. Generally, bases were selected for closure or realignment by an

independent commission based on DOD’s recommendations. While DOD has

6 years to complete implementation of closure or realignment decisions,

other related actions, such as the cleanup of environmental contamination

and transfer of unneeded base property to other users, can extend the

process many years beyond the 6-year period. Property DOD no longer

needed was to be offered first to other federal agencies, then to state or

local authorities by various means. Any remaining property could be sold.

DOD is primarily responsible for cleaning up environmental contamination

at military bases. Generally, cleanup remedies must be in place, meeting

both federal and state regulatory requirements, before base property can

be transferred to nonfederal entities. For each BRAC round, the Congress

appropriated funds for environmental cleanup of unneeded property.

Results in Brief By September 30, 1998, DOD had completed actions on about 85 percent of

the four BRAC commissions’ 451 recommendations.1

 The pace of

completion accelerated after the first round. In taking action on the

recommendations, DOD declared about 464,000 acres of base property as

excess. As of September 30, 1997, 46 percent, or about 213,000 acres, of

the unneeded BRAC property was to be retained by the federal government;

33 percent, or about 154,000 acres, was slated for nonfederal users such as

state and local authorities or private parties; the disposition of 21 percent,

1

The four BRAC commissions generated 499 recommendations. However, only 451 of these ultimately

required action primarily because 48 were changed in some manner by recommendations of a later

commission.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Executive Summary

or about 98,000 acres, had not yet been decided. However, most of this

property is still awaiting transfer. Eight percent of the property slated for

federal use has been transferred, while 31 percent of the property slated

for nonfederal use has been transferred. DOD officials noted a number of

obstacles that must be overcome before transfer can occur. To help ease

this situation, DOD is leasing some property, pending actual transfer of the

property.

By 2001, DOD estimates it will have spent $23 billion on BRAC and saved

$37 billion in costs it would have incurred if BRAC actions had not

occurred, for a net savings of $14 billion. Beyond 2001, when the last of the

four rounds is complete, DOD expects to save $5.7 billion annually as a

result of BRAC actions. However, the cost estimates exclude certain types

of federally incurred costs, some of which are funded outside of DOD BRAC

budget accounts, while the savings estimates have not been routinely

updated and thus are not precise. For example, the Air Force’s savings

figure reflects initial rough estimates that predate any actual closures.

Despite the imprecision of DOD’s savings estimates, GAO believes BRAC

savings will be substantial.

A major cost factor in BRAC actions, as well as a major obstacle to the

disposal of unneeded property, is the need for environmental cleanup at

BRAC bases. Both the eventual cost and the completion date for the

BRAC-related environmental program are uncertain. However, available DOD

data indicate that the total environmental cost will likely exceed $9 billion

and that cleanup activities, including monitoring, will extend well beyond

2001. The potential for higher costs exists, given uncertainties associated

with the extent of cleanup of unexploded ordnance and monitoring of

cleanup remedies needed at selected sites. DOD has made progress since

the earlier BRAC years when it was investigating sites for contamination. Its

emphasis now is on implementing cleanup measures.

The majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well

economically in relation to the national average, according to the latest

data available at the time of GAO’s analysis, and show some improvement

since the time closures were beginning in 1988. Of the 62 communities

surrounding major base closures, about two-thirds had 1997

unemployment rates equal to or lower than the national average; the

remaining one-third had rates higher than the national average. Of the 49

surrounding communities involved in the first three rounds, 31 had equal

or higher average per capita income growth rates compared to the national

average for the period 1991-95.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Recommended Actions Are

on Track, but Property

Disposal Is Progressing

Slowly

The military services have been completing recommended actions within

the 6-year period permitted by law. Further, although first-round actions

required nearly 5-1/2 years to complete on average, DOD learned from this

early experience, and it has accelerated the pace for subsequent rounds to

an average of 3 years. By September 30, 1998, DOD had completed

85 percent of the recommended actions. However, property disposal

involves factors not completely under DOD’s control and has not been easy

to manage. Completing actions and disposing of property quickly not only

puts excess property into alternative use sooner but also increases

savings.

At BRAC-affected bases, the military services have identified about 464,000

acres that are excess to their needs. As of September 30, 1997, the federal

government, including DOD, was expected to retain about 46 percent, or

about 213,000 acres, of that property. While most, or about 163,000 acres,

of this federally retained property is being transferred to the Fish and

Wildlife Service, DOD is retaining about 13,000 acres for other uses.2

 State,

local authorities, and private parties are expected to take ownership of

33 percent of the unneeded property. The recipients of the remaining

21 percent have not been determined.

The amount of unneeded acreage actually transferred has been relatively

small. Overall, as of September 30, 1997, about 14 percent of the unneeded

property had been transferred; about 8 percent of the property destined

for federal parties had been transferred and about 31 percent of the

property destined for nonfederal parties had been transferred. The steps

that must be taken to accomplish transfers include preparing and

approving property reuse plans; negotiating the terms of transfer,

including the transfer method and the price and payment terms, if any;

lining up a community organization with adequate financing to administer

and maintain the transferred property; and in many cases, addressing

environmental concerns.

To help get property into use as quickly as possible, DOD is often leasing

property prior to actual transfer. The services do not centrally maintain

leasing information and could not readily provide comprehensive data.

2

Additionally, DOD is retaining over 330,000 acres at both closing and realigning bases for use by the

reserve components—this involves acreage that was not formally declared excess and not included in

the 464,000 acres noted previously.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Executive Summary

However, data GAO was able to obtain indicated that during the second

quarter of fiscal year 1998, at least 38,000 acres, or 8 percent of the

unneeded BRAC acreage, were operating under some type of leasing

arrangement. According to these data, about 25 percent of the property

awaiting transfer to nonfederal recipients is under interim leases.

Costs and Savings

Estimates Are Not Precise

While the military services have updated their cost estimates annually,

they have not routinely updated their savings estimates based on their

experience with carrying out BRAC actions. To assist in choosing among

potential BRAC actions at the start of each round, the services initially

estimated implementation costs and savings using a rough methodology

for comparative purposes. Once decisions had been made on which bases

to close and realign, DOD planned to replace these estimates with more

site-specific estimates in its budgets.

Beginning with the 1993 budget, DOD required the services to annually

update these estimates. However, the Air Force is still reporting its initial

rough estimates with some adjustments for inflation. The Army and the

Navy have refined their estimates for budget purposes and have updated

these estimates for some bases, but neither has performed a

comprehensive update for all actions or even those actions defined as

major. Nevertheless, the current estimates are incorporated annually into

DOD’s 5-year spending plans as prospective savings. Service officials stated

that keeping track of savings would be costly and labor intensive and that

they have not had systems in place for doing so.

BRAC savings do not take into account expected environmental costs

beyond 2001 and financial assistance provided by federal agencies to

BRAC-affected communities and individuals. While BRAC implementation

authority expires in 2001, post-BRAC cleanup costs may exceed $2.4 billion.

Further, over $1 billion in grants have been provided by the (1) Economic

Development Administration to assist communities with infrastructure

improvements, building demolition, and revolving fund loans; (2) Federal

Aviation Administration to help convert military airports to civilian use;

(3) Department of Labor to help retrain civilian workers who lose their

base jobs; and (4) DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment to help

BRAC-affected communities develop former base property reuse plans.

While inclusion of these costs in the estimates would reduce overall net

savings estimates, BRAC net annual savings will be substantial once

implementation costs have been offset.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Executive Summary

Environmental Cleanup Is

Progressing, but Is Costly

and Time-consuming

DOD is making progress toward cleaning up contamination at BRAC bases

and now reports spending more funds on implementing cleanups than on

studying the problems. A program initiated in 1993 to accelerate the steps

leading to cleanup appears to have improved progress.

Through fiscal year 1997, DOD estimates it has spent $4.1 billion to bring

excess property at BRAC bases up to environmental standards that must be

met before property can be transferred. By the time BRAC implementation

authority expires in 2001, DOD expects to spend an additional $3.1 billion.

Beyond 2001, DOD expects it will need an additional $2.4 billion to

complete cleanup. However, because of the expiration of BRAC authority at

that time, the BRAC cleanup effort would then be funded through the

overall DOD environmental budget. In response to congressional direction,

DOD is preparing legislation to create a new account to fund the remaining

cleanup.

Additionally, the estimate of post-BRAC environmental costs is uncertain,

but likely conservative, because DOD has not projected all costs for the

program’s duration. Costs could increase if (1) cleanup requirements

change; (2) DOD is required to extensively clean up unexploded ordnance

such as shells, grenades, and mines that misfired and still pose a danger;

and (3) selected remedies fail to clean up contaminated sites. Given such

uncertainties, it is difficult to identify a date for completing BRAC-related

environmental activities. However, DOD estimates that monitoring to

ensure the effectiveness of remedies will continue for many years beyond

2001.

Most Communities Where

Bases Closed Are

Recovering

The majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well

economically in relation to the national average, according to the latest

data available at the time of GAO’s review, and show some improvement

since the time closures were beginning. As of 1997, 68 percent had average

or lower unemployment, compared with 60 percent in 1988. During

1991-95, incomes in 63 percent of the communities were growing faster

than the national average, up from 55 percent during 1988-91. Rural

communities seemed to be doing about as well as cities. Notwithstanding

trends, a few communities were struggling—two had double-digit

unemployment rates and five had declining average incomes.

Officials in the communities GAO visited recalled an initial period of

disruption, followed by recovery. In some cases, the panic resulting from

the announcement of a closure seemed to have a more severe economic

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Executive Summary

impact than the closure itself. Officials noted, however, some adverse

impacts are not reflected in economic measurements, such as social losses

felt in local schools, churches, and organizations that benefited from

active military personnel and families.

Local officials also mentioned several factors contributing to recovery,

including the health of the regional economy and successful

redevelopment of base property. However, some expressed impatience

with the slow pace of property disposal. For example, community officials

from the Castle Air Force Base area told GAO they have yet to take

ownership of property from the former base even though it closed in

September 1995.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO’s findings

and conclusions (see app. V for DOD’s comments). DOD also provided

technical comments, which GAO has incorporated as appropriate.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Assessing the Magnitude of Base Closures and Realignments Is

Difficult

12

The Process for Terminating Military Involvement and Disposing

of Unneeded Property Can Be Complicated and Time-consuming

14

Accounting Precisely for Costs and Savings Is Difficult 16

Community Economic Impact Concerns Are of Lower Value in

the BRAC Decision-making Process

18

DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Closures Addressed Various BRAC

Issues

19

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19

Chapter 2 

Most BRAC

Recommendations

Completed, but

Transfer of Unneeded

Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

25

Most Recommended BRAC Actions Are Complete 25

Recipients Have Been Identified for Most Unneeded Real

Property, but Transfers Are Proceeding Slowly

28

Conclusions 33

Agency Comments 34

Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings

Estimates Are Not

Routinely Updated,

but Evidence Points

to Substantial Savings

35

DOD Expects Substantial Savings From BRAC 35

BRAC Cost Estimates Are Revised Annually, but Savings

Estimates Are Updated Infrequently

39

Net Savings Estimates Exclude Some Costs 42

Despite Estimation Difficulties, BRAC Savings Should Be

Substantial

43

Conclusions 44

Agency Comments 44

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Contents

Chapter 4 

Environmental

Cleanup Is

Progressing, but It Is

Costly and

Time-consuming

46

BRAC Environmental Program Is Complex and Costly 46

DOD Reports Cleanup Program Is Moving From Investigation to

Implementation, but Challenges Remain

52

The Fast-Track Cleanup Program Is Improving Progress and

Supporting Reuse

54

Conclusions 57

Agency Comments 58

Chapter 5 

Most Communities

Are Recovering From

the Economic Impacts

of Base Closures

59

Most Communities’ Economic Indicators Compare Favorably to

National Averages

59

Communities Recovering, Despite Pains of Adjustment 65

Conclusions 79

Agency Comments 80

Appendixes Appendix I: Federal Cash Grants Given to Facilitate Base Reuse

for the Four Base Realignment and Closure Rounds

82

Appendix II: Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major Base

Realignments and Closures During the Four Rounds

86

Appendix III: Status of Property Disposition at Selected Bases

Visited

89

Appendix IV: Selected Environmental Laws and Regulations

Pertinent to Cleanup at BRAC Bases

92

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense 94

Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report 96

Related GAO Products 98

Tables Table 3.1: BRAC Estimated Costs and Savings by Round Through

2001

37

Table 4.1: BRAC Estimated Environmental Program Costs 48

Table 5.1: Unemployment Rates and Per Capita Income Growth

Rates of Selected Communities

67

Table 5.2: Job Creation From Base Reuse at Selected Bases 76

Figures Figure 1.1: DOD’s Usual Procedures for Transferring Property 16

Figure 2.1: BRAC Recommendations by Round and Type 26

Figure 2.2: Pace of Completing Recommendations by Round 28

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Contents

Figure 2.3: Planned Disposition of Unneeded Property 29

Figure 2.4: Planned Disposition of Federally Retained Property 30

Figure 2.5: Planned Nonfederal Transfers 31

Figure 3.1: BRAC Costs and Savings for 1990 Through 2001 36

Figure 5.1: 1997 Unemployment Rates of BRAC-Affected Areas

Compared to National Average

61

Figure 5.2: 1991-1995 Average Annual Per Capita Income Growth

Rates of BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to National Average

62

Figure 5.3: Unemployment Rates of Less Populated

BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to the National Average

64

Figure 5.4: Per Capita Income Growth Rates of Less Populated

BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to the National Average

65

Figure 5.5: Reported Community Impacts Resulting From Base

Closures

68

Figure 5.6: Factors Affecting Economic Recovery From Base

Closures

72

Figure 5.7: Economic and Regional Context of Selected

Communities

74

Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

GAO General Accounting Office

LMI Logistics Management Institute

NPL National Priorities List

UXO unexploded ordnance

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Between 1988 and 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD), acting under

special legislative authorities, conducted four rounds of base realignments

and closures (BRAC).1

 According to DOD’s calculations, when all BRAC

actions from those rounds are completed, no later than 2001, DOD will have

reduced its domestic military basing structure by about 20 percent. DOD

believes it needs to reduce its domestic basing infrastructure even further

to bring it more into line with reductions in its force structure and funding

levels and free up funds for other programs, including modernization.

Consequently, in 1997 and 1998, the Secretary of Defense requested the

Congress to authorize additional rounds of base closures.

However, the Congress continues to have many questions about the four

BRAC rounds and has not been willing to authorize additional ones to date.

Some in the Congress, noting the lengthy time frame allowed for closures

and realignments to be completed, have suggested that additional BRAC

rounds should not be authorized until prior recommendations have been

implemented and the effects of those decisions fully assessed. Some

members have also raised questions about the adequacy of DOD’s

accounting for the costs and savings associated with BRAC decisions,

including environmental restoration costs and other costs to the

government not borne directly by DOD; the extent to which environmental

restoration associated with BRAC might continue beyond 2001; and the

economic impact on communities affected by closures and their ability to

recover.

Assessing the

Magnitude of Base

Closures and

Realignments Is

Difficult

DOD has characterized the four rounds of BRAC actions as representing

about 20 percent of its major bases, producing decisions to close 97 out of

495 major domestic installations and many smaller ones and to realign

many other facilities. However, trying to fully assess the magnitude of

closures, tally the precise numbers of bases closed or realigned, or

differentiate between the two is difficult. For example, individual BRAC

commission recommendations may have included actions affecting

multiple bases. Additionally, BRAC commissions in the later rounds made

1

The initial round was completed under the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and

Realignment Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-526). The last three rounds were completed under the Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, title XXIX, part A, as amended). Under the latter

legislation, an independent BRAC commission reviewed recommendations for closure or realignment

submitted by the Secretary of Defense. The commission either approved or modified the Secretary’s

recommendations and ultimately forwarded its own recommendations to the President who, in each

instance, forwarded the recommendations to the Congress. The Congress generally had 45 days in

which to enact a joint resolution should it desire to disapprove the recommendations - - in each

instance, the absence of a disapproval action by the Congress resulted in the recommendations

becoming effective.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

changes, or what are termed “redirects,” to prior BRAC decisions.2 In total,

the four BRAC rounds produced 499 recommendations affecting about 450

military activities.

In our 1995 report on the BRAC process, we noted that the term base

closure often leaves the impression that a larger facility is being closed.3

However, that may not actually be the case. Military installations are

diverse and can include a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, home

port, or leased facility and can vary in size from a few acres to hundreds of

thousands of acres. Further, an installation may house more than one

mission or function. For example, in 1993 the Navy closed the Norfolk

Naval Aviation Depot, which was located on the Norfolk Navy Base, which

included the Norfolk Navy Station, Supply Center, and Air Station. Our

report noted that full closures may involve relatively small facilities, rather

than the stereotypical large military base. It also noted that the number of

bases recommended for closure or realignment in a given BRAC round was

often difficult to precisely tabulate because closure decisions did not

necessarily completely close facilities.

In the BRAC process, decisions generally were made to either close or

realign facilities. While the 1990 BRAC enabling legislation did not

specifically define what is meant by “close,” it did define a realignment as

any action that reduces and relocates functions and civilian positions.4

 Our

1995 report noted that an individual BRAC recommendation may actually

affect a variety of activities and functions without fully closing an

installation. More specifically, the nature of closures and realignments was

such that both could result in the closure of portions of facilities, and the

distinction between the two was not always clear. For example, our 1997

report on BRAC lessons learned contained a listing of base closure

decisions DOD reported as major closures.5

 Excluded from that list was the

BRAC 1995 decision regarding Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, which DOD

characterized as a major base realignment. The actual decision included

shifting a portion of the base’s property to the adjacent Lackland Air Force

2

Likewise, individual bases may be the subject of more than one BRAC recommendation as succeeding

BRAC rounds occur, especially where realignments occur.

3

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment

(GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

4

For BRAC purposes, the Office of the Secretary of Defense defined “close” as meaning all missions of

the installation would cease or be relocated. It also used the term “close, except” to mean that the vast

majority of missions on an installation would cease or be relocated and all but a small portion of the

base would be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained would often be

facilities in an enclave for use by a reserve component.

5

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Closure Rounds (GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Base and moving the depot maintenance workload of the Air Logistics

Center located on Kelly to other DOD depots or to private sector

commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance

Council.6

 Some closures, as well as realignments, such as those involving

the Army’s Fort Pickett, Virginia, and Fort Hunter Liggett, California,

essentially call for cessation of active military presence on the installations

while retaining nearly all of the property for use by reserve components.

Finally, efforts to precisely determine the numbers of bases closed or

realigned are complicated by changes that are made to BRAC decisions in

later BRAC rounds. The BRAC process allowed DOD to propose changes to

previous commission recommendations, or redirects, while it was

considering new base closures in rounds conducted in 1991, 1993, and

1995. Redirects often meant redirecting the planned movement or activity

to a base other than the one cited as the receiving base in a prior BRAC

round.

The Process for

Terminating Military

Involvement and

Disposing of

Unneeded Property

Can Be Complicated

and Time-consuming

By law, DOD must initiate closure or realignment actions no later than

2 years after the President submits the recommended BRAC list to the

Congress and must complete implementation within 6 years. However, this

6-year period refers only to the time permitted to implement realignment

or closure decisions, such as moving functions from one base to another

or halting military activities on a base as a base closes. DOD’s involvement

on an installation can go beyond the 6 years as it completes the process of

cleaning up environmental contamination on the bases and disposing of

the unneeded property.

Environmental Cleanup

Can Take Many Years to

Complete

DOD must comply with cleanup standards and processes associated with

laws, regulations, and executive orders in conducting assessments and

cleanup of its base closure property. DOD spends about $5 billion annually

to fulfill its environmental mission, including compliance and cleanup of

contamination from hazardous substances and waste on active, closing,

and formerly used DOD sites. While DOD has an ongoing environmental

program at each of its military bases, the decision to close a military base

and dispose of unneeded property can require expedited cleanups that

may not have otherwise occurred. The time needed to accomplish required

cleanup activities can extend many years beyond the 6 years allowed

under BRAC legislation for ceasing military operations and closing a base.

6

Kelly Air Force Base is in the process of realignment; the maintenance depot on the installation is

being closed as a government-owned facility; and the depot maintenance workload is undergoing

public-private competition to determine where the work will be done in the future.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The status of cleanup activities can also affect transferring title of the

property from the federal government to others.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 ( 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) provides the

framework for responding to contamination problems. CERCLA authorizes

the federal government to respond to spills and other releases of

hazardous substances. It generally requires that the government warrant

that all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the

environment has been taken before property is transferred by the United

States to nonfederal entities, such as communities or private parties. While

CERCLA had originally authorized property transfers to nonfederal

ownership only after all remedial action had been taken, the act was

amended in 1996 to expedite transfer of contaminated property.7

 Now

such property, under some circumstances, can be transferred to

nonfederal users before all remedial action has been taken. However,

remedial action must still be taken at some point.

Given the large amount of land being affected by the BRAC process and the

delays that could be encountered due to environmental cleanup, the

Congress included provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) that were intended to stimulate base

reuse prior to property transfer. That legislation authorized the military

services to lease property to facilitate state or local economic reuse

without limiting the length of a lease. Previous leases were subject to

certain limitations, including a term not to exceed 5 years and DOD’s right

to revoke the leases at will. Although leasing property allows its reuse

before cleanup has been completed, DOD is still liable for environmental

cleanup costs.

Various Alternatives for

Disposing of Unneeded

Real Estate

Once property is no longer needed by a federal agency, the property is

declared excess by the agency and is offered to other federal agencies to

satisfy their requirements. Excess property that is not selected by federal

agencies is declared surplus to the federal government. At that point, the

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 authorizes

disposal of the property through a variety of means, including transfers to

states and local governments for public benefit purposes and negotiated or

public sales. Additionally, a 1993 amendment to the BRAC legislation states

that under certain circumstances, surplus real property can be transferred

to local redevelopment authorities under economic development

7

Section 334, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

conveyances for economic development and job creation purposes. This

section enables communities to obtain property under more flexible

finance and payment terms than previously existed. For example, a

community can request property at less than fair market value if it can

show the discount is needed for economic development.

An important step for communities as they seek to recover from the

adverse effects of base closures is to organize local base reuse authorities

to interact with DOD on base closure, property disposal, and reuse issues.

As shown in figure 1.1, local reuse authorities generally seek surplus

property under one of the public benefit transfer or economic

development authorities because these can be no-cost or no-initial cost

acquisitions. If the property reuse does not meet the requirements for

these conveyances, local reuse authorities can still pursue a negotiated

sale without competing with other interested parties. Any surplus property

that remains is available for sale to the general public.

Figure 1.1: DOD’s Usual Procedures for Transferring Property

Excess Surplus

Other 

defense

activities

Other 

federal

agencies

Public

benefit

transfers

Economic 

development

conveyances governments

Public sale or local

 sale to states

Negotiated 

Source: Our analysis.

Accounting Precisely

for Costs and Savings

Is Difficult

While our previous work has shown that BRAC savings are likely to be

substantial, accounting precisely for the costs and savings of BRAC actions

is a difficult task. DOD does not have systems in place to track and update

savings. Further, some costs associated with BRAC actions, such as federal

assistance to BRAC-affected communities, are not included in BRAC

implementation budgets and are not considered when calculating overall

costs.

We have previously reported that savings from prior BRAC rounds are

expected to be substantial, although DOD has not always documented them

well or updated them on a regular basis so as to provide the precision

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

needed to support savings claims. Likewise, as stated in our July 1997

report, significant net savings are likely once up-front closure costs have

been paid, although such costs have been higher than initially estimated

and have caused net savings not to be realized as quickly as DOD projected.

The first publicly released costs and savings forecasts from BRAC actions

are the numbers typically associated with DOD’s list of proposed closures

and realignments that are endorsed by the commission. DOD’s and the

commissions’ initial BRAC decision-making did not include the cost of

environmental restoration, in keeping with DOD’s long-standing policy of

not considering such costs in its BRAC decision-making, whereas

subsequent BRAC implementation budget estimates do. This policy is based

on DOD’s obligation to cleanup contaminated sites on military bases

regardless of whether they are closed. We agree with DOD in not

considering these costs in developing its cost and savings estimates as a

basis for base closure recommendations. At the same time, we agree with

DOD’s position that environmental restoration costs are a liability to it

regardless of its base closure decisions, and we have reported that these

costs are substantial. The subsequent inclusion of environmental cleanup

costs in DOD’s budget has the practical effect of reducing the short-term

savings from BRAC actions and delaying the beginning of net annual

recurring savings.

We have also reported that another difficulty in precisely determining BRAC

savings is that accounting systems—not just those in DOD—are designed to

record disbursements, not savings. The services develop savings estimates

at the time they are developing initial BRAC implementation budgets, and

these are reported in DOD’s BRAC budget justifications. Because DOD’s

accounting systems do not track savings, updating these estimates

requires a separate data tracking system, which DOD does not have. The

lack of updates is problematic because initial savings estimates are based

on forecasted data that can change during actual implementation, thereby

increasing or decreasing the amount of savings. We have recommended

that regardless of whether the Congress authorizes future BRAC rounds,

DOD needs to improve its periodic updating and reporting of savings

projections from prior BRAC decisions. As stated in our July 1997 report,

this information has been needed to strengthen DOD’s budgeting process

and ensure that correct assumptions were being made regarding expected

reductions in base operating costs, as well as to provide greater precision

to DOD’s estimates of BRAC savings.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We have also noted that not all federal costs associated with implementing

base closures are included in DOD’s BRAC implementation budgets. We

previously reported that various forms of federal assistance have been

made available to communities, including planning assistance to help

communities determine how they could best develop the property, training

grants to provide the workforce with new skills, and grants to improve the

infrastructure on bases. Our 1996 report stated that over $780 million in

direct financial assistance to areas affected by the 1988, 1991, and 1993

BRAC rounds was not included in the BRAC budget.

Community Economic

Impact Concerns Are

of Lower Value in the

BRAC

Decision-making

Process

The economic impact on communities affected by BRAC actions has been a

long-standing source of public anxiety. Because of this concern, DOD

included economic impact as one of eight criteria it used for making BRAC

recommendations in the last three BRAC rounds. While economic impact

did not play as large a role in initial BRAC deliberations as did other criteria

and was not a key decision factor, such as military value, its importance

was such that DOD components were required to calculate the economic

impact of each of their recommendations.

For BRAC 1995, where the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC

rounds also became a concern, we found little documentation indicating

that DOD components had eliminated potential closure or realignment

candidates from consideration for economic impact reasons. While

defense civilian job loss and other adverse effects on communities are an

inescapable byproduct of base closures, at least in the short term, we

noted in our July 1997 report that some limited studies indicated that, in a

number of BRAC-affected communities, the local economies appeared to be

able to absorb the economic losses, though some communities were faring

better than others. To some extent, it appears that the various federal

programs and benefits provided to those communities affected by BRAC

actions helped to cushion the impact of base closures. Still unanswered

were questions about overall changes in employment and income levels in

the broad range of communities affected by BRAC actions, particularly

those in less urban areas with less diverse economic bases.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

DOD’s 1998 Report on

Base Closures

Addressed Various

BRAC Issues

In part, because of lingering questions about the costs and savings

generated by previous BRAC rounds, in 1997 the Congress required the

Secretary of Defense to report on the costs and savings attributable to

prior BRAC rounds and the need, if any, for additional BRAC rounds, among

other issues.8 DOD issued its report in April 1998 and concluded that BRAC

costs were below or close to its original estimates and that BRAC actions

would save billions of dollars after up-front costs were paid. DOD

emphasized that excess capacity in its installations warrants two

additional BRAC rounds and that upkeep for unneeded installations wastes

resources needed for modernization. DOD also reported that BRAC rounds

enhanced military capabilities primarily by enabling the services to

consolidate activities and shift funding from infrastructure support to

other priorities. In our review of DOD’s report, we agreed that BRAC savings

would be substantial after up-front costs were paid but questioned the

preciseness of the estimates. We also agreed that DOD had excess capacity

at its installations, but questioned DOD’s methodology for assessing its

infrastructure capacity.9

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

To assist the Congress should it consider the need for future BRAC rounds

in the future, we reviewed a number of important issues associated with

the prior rounds. At the request of Mr. John E. Sununu, House of

Representatives, we are providing information that addresses (1) DOD’s

progress in completing action on BRAC recommendations and transferring

unneeded base property to other users, (2) the precision of DOD’s estimates

of BRAC costs and savings, (3) environmental cleanup progress and

estimated associated costs, and (4) reported trends in economic recovery

in communities affected by base closures.

Completing BRAC

Recommendations and

Transferring Unneeded

Property

To determine whether DOD has taken action on BRAC commissions’

recommendations as required by law, we compiled a comprehensive

listing of recommended actions included in the commissions’ reports.

Because DOD reports typically focus on major closures and realignments

and it is not readily apparent what constitutes a major action because the

military services define the term differently, our listing is as complete as

possible. We compared the commissions’ recommended actions to military

service and defense agency data to determine if they were completed

8

Section 2824, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85).

9

The Congress required that we review DOD’s report, The Report of the Department of Defense on

Base Realignment and Closure, issued in April 1998. Our assessment is found in Military Bases: Review

of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure (GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998).

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

within a 6-year period specified by law. We also performed a comparative

analysis of the completed actions by round and the time to complete them.

To assure that we were using the most reliable data available, we followed

up to reconcile discrepancies. While we examined the timing of the

completed actions based on March 1998 data, we did not attempt to

determine whether the specific actions taken complied with the

commissions’ recommendations.

To assess DOD’s progress in transferring unneeded base property to other

users, we reviewed property disposition plans as of September 30, 1997,

and compared the plans with available data on actual property transfers.

We collected transfer data from the services and defense agencies and

reconciled discrepancies with data from our prior reviews. We validated

selected data by visiting several closing bases and comparing their

property records to those provided by the services’ and defense agencies’

BRAC offices. The bases where we performed work included Lowry Air

Force Base, Colorado; Mather Air Force Base, California; Mare Island

Naval Shipyard, California; Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah;

Tooele Army Depot, Utah; Cameron Station, Virginia; and Vint Hill Farms

Station, Virginia. Our visits provided us with a mix of service and defense

agency BRAC sites across various closure rounds.

Precision of DOD’s BRAC

Cost and Savings

Estimates

To determine to what extent DOD has routinely updated its cost and

savings estimates for BRAC actions, we relied, in part, on our prior BRAC

reports and reviewed Congressional Budget Office, DOD, DOD Office of

Inspector General, and service audit agency reports. We also interviewed

officials in the DOD Comptroller office and the BRAC and budget offices of

the military services and two defense agencies—the Defense Logistics

Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency—to obtain their

views concerning DOD policy, procedures, and practices for updating cost

and savings estimates. To determine how frequently these estimates were

updated, we compared estimates presented in DOD’s fiscal year 1993-99

BRAC budget submissions for the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds. We did not

evaluate the 1988 round because DOD and military service officials cited

numerous budget estimation difficulties with BRAC 1988 activities. While

we did not independently determine the reliability of the budget data we

used for our analysis, we did examine data included in the services’ and

DOD’s budget submissions to ensure that the figures were consistent. In

this regard, we found some inconsistencies and informed appropriate

officials who took corrective actions.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To assess the completeness of DOD’s cost and savings estimates for

BRAC-related actions, we reviewed data included in the estimates. Because

two major cost elements—expected environmental costs beyond 2001 and

certain federal agency economic assistance provided to BRAC-affected

communities—were not included in the estimates and not used to

calculate savings, we obtained available cost data for these elements to

assess their relative impact on BRAC net savings.

Environmental Cleanup

Progress and Associated

Estimated Costs

To determine DOD’s progress and costs associated with its environmental

work at BRAC bases, we

• analyzed DOD documentation on environmental program initiatives and

costs;

• met with officials from the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency,

and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for

Environmental Security to discuss difficulties in cleaning BRAC bases and

overall program status;

• contacted U.S. Environmental Protection Agency officials to obtain

financial data and their views on DOD’s environmental cleanup efforts;

• spoke with California, Colorado, and Utah environmental regulators to

obtain their views on the cleanup process; and

• visited several BRAC bases to discuss environmental issues with base

officials and community personnel.

The bases where we performed work were Lowry Air Force Base; Mather

Air Force Base; Mare Island Naval Shipyard; Fort Ord, California; Defense

Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah; and Tooele Army Depot. These bases

provided us a mix of service and defense agency BRAC sites across various

BRAC rounds. Some sites afforded us an opportunity to gain insights into

specific environmental issues. For example, the Fort Ord site has

extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, which presents a

costly and challenging cleanup task for DOD.

10

Because DOD has not developed a total environmental cost estimate for its

BRAC bases, we developed such an estimate, using available program cost

data from various DOD financial sources. We had to reconcile discrepancies

in environmental cost data in multiple DOD documents in order to use the

most reliable data for developing that estimate. Even so, the estimate is

subject to variability because of unknowns and unresolved cleanup issues

10Ordnance that remains unexploded either through malfunction or design can injure personnel or

damage material. Types of UXO include bombs, missiles, rockets, artillery rounds, ammunition, or

mines.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

associated with UXO. To gain a sense of the potential costs of removing

UXO, we discussed the matter with DOD and Environmental Protection

Agency officials.

Trends in Economic

Recovery of BRAC-affected

Communities

To assess the economic recovery of communities affected by base

closures and realignments, we reviewed several studies dealing with this

issue. We also (1) performed an economic assessment of communities

where more than 300 civilian jobs were eliminated in the four closure

rounds and (2) visited the surrounding communities of six major base

closures. In performing our economic assessment, we used unemployment

rates and per capita income as measures for analyzing changes in the

economic condition of affected communities. We chose to use

unemployment rates and per capita income as key performance measures

because (1) DOD used these measures in assessing the economic condition

of local areas in its economic impact analysis for recommended BRAC

locations in the closure rounds and (2) these measures are commonly used

by economists to gauge changes in the economic health of an area over

time. During our site visits, we collected additional information to

(1) enhance our understanding of the relationship between base closures

and local communities and (2) provide a close-up of how a base closure

affects individual communities.

To establish a baseline for our economic analysis, we obtained selected

economic indicator data from the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), a

Federally Funded Research and Development Center that maintains a

database of key economic data for impact areas surrounding base closures

during the four rounds. Data obtained were multiyear data (1988 through

September 30, 1997) on total employment, unemployment rate, total

income, per capita income, and population for local economic impact

areas that experienced a base closure. The employment data originated in

the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics and the income and

population data, which were only available through 1995, came from the

Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. The economic

impact areas, based on 1990 census data, were defined using accepted

standard definitions for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan statistical areas

and reflected the impact areas used in the 1995 BRAC round. The 1995 BRAC

areas were configured to reflect the residences of the majority of military

and civilian employees at an activity. LMI routinely validates data and

reconciles discrepancies as necessary. We also performed a limited

reliability assessment of the data by comparing selected data to Bureau of

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis data available on those

agencies’ Internet sites.11 We did not find any discrepancies.

In analyzing the economic condition of BRAC-affected communities over

time, we compared unemployment rates and per capita incomes to

national averages for the time period encompassing the four BRAC rounds

to the present to assess if communities were below national averages. We

analyzed the data for bases closed under BRAC that had government and

contractor civilian personnel reductions of 300 or more. While our

assessment does provide an overall picture of how these selected

communities compare to other communities based on national averages, it

does not necessarily isolate the condition or the changes in that condition

that may be attributable to a BRAC action.

In selecting sites for our visits, we sought to satisfy several criteria:

significant civilian job loss; at least one site from each military service;

geographic diversity; at least one major shipyard or depot complex; and a

mix of urban and rural sites. We focused on 1991 BRAC round sites because

DOD and communities had more experience than those in the 1988 round,

and the 1993 and 1995 rounds did not provide enough time to assess

recovery. Our site visits included Philadelphia Naval Base and Shipyard,

Pennsylvania; Naval Air Station, Chase Field, Texas; Eaker Air Force Base,

Arkansas; Castle Air Force Base, California; Fort Devens, Massachusetts;

and Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. At these sites, we met with various

local officials, including business leaders and government officials, to gain

their perspective on how the closures affected their communities and how

the communities recovered. While information of this nature reflects

unique experiences and thus presents a limited basis for drawing general

conclusions about the impacts and recovery of all communities

undergoing base closures, we were able to highlight common trends and

themes.

In performing site visits, we asked local officials to discuss how base reuse

contributes to economic recovery, and some of those discussions covered

governmental assistance and the property disposal process. We also

collected data on certain federal assistance provided to BRAC communities

(see app. I). Because of data problems and the subsequent inability to

make valid projections or generalizations, we did not track the

after-closure employment status and job quality of specific individuals

who lost their jobs due to base closures. Personnel data were generally

11When the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis report new employment

and income estimates, they also adjust estimates for past years. The local level estimates used in this

report were obtained in January 1998 and may not exactly match estimates available at a later date.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 1 

Introduction

incomplete or not readily available at closing bases, and local employment

officials had only limited relevant data. We did, however, obtain data on

the estimated number of civilian jobs lost and actual jobs created at major

base closures and realignments for the four rounds (see app. II).

We performed our review between August 1997 and September 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We

obtained DOD comments on a draft of this report. The comments have been

summarized in chapters 2 through 5 and are presented in their entirety in

appendix V.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

By the end of fiscal year 1998, DOD had completed action on about

85 percent of 451 BRAC commissions’ recommendations for the four BRAC

rounds.1 The four BRAC commissions actually generated 499

recommendations; however, only 451 of these ultimately required action

because 48 were changed in some manner by recommendations of a later

commission. According to DOD documentation, all of the 1988 and 1991

round recommendations have been completed within the statutory 6-year

period. Furthermore, from the first round to the second, the services

accelerated the pace at which they completed recommendations, from an

average of just under 5-1/2 years for the first round to just over 3 years for

the second. DOD’s plans to complete remaining 1993 and 1995 round

recommendations indicate that the pace will be consistent with the 1991

round.

Despite timely completion of BRAC recommended actions, disposal of

unneeded base property is proceeding slowly. About 464,000 acres were

designated as unneeded real property at closing or realigning locations,

but, as of March 1998, only about 31 percent of the property designated for

nonfederal users had actually been transferred by formal deed, and only

8 percent of the property designated for federal entities had actually been

transferred.2 DOD and service officials cited various impediments such as

environmental cleanup that extend property disposal time frames. To help

ease this situation, DOD has been using interim leasing to get usable

property to users quicker until a deed transfer can be issued. Nonetheless,

DOD has much to do before it completes the transfer of its unneeded

property.

Most Recommended

BRAC Actions Are

Complete

DOD has typically reported to the Congress on its progress in implementing

BRAC actions that the services have defined as major. According to a DOD

official, DOD has completed 77 of 152 major recommendations. However,

what constitutes a major or minor recommendation is not always apparent

because the services define these terms differently. We analyzed all BRAC

commissions’ recommendations directed to the military departments and

1

A BRAC recommendation is considered completed when all activities relating to an installation’s or

activity’s operational mission have ceased or been relocated. After completion, a caretaker work force

may remain to bridge the period between operational closure and actual property disposal.

2

These figures exclude property vacated by a military service’s active component but set aside for use

by reserve components within that service. Data for these types of property reuse are not readily

available and not maintained centrally within DOD.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

defense agencies.3 Our count of 499 recommendations is based on the BRAC

commissions’ reports, which are somewhat arbitrary in the way they

enumerate recommendations. For example, a closure or a realignment in

which several missions are disestablished or relocated may count as one

recommendation or several. The types of recommendations are shown in

figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: BRAC Recommendations

by Round and Type

BRAC 88

BRAC 91

BRAC 93

BRAC 95

Closure Realign Redirect Disestablish Relocate

Type of recommendation

0

100

200

300

Number of BRAC recommendations

Source: BRAC commission reports for the four rounds.

3

The recommendations included closures, realignments, disestablishments, relocations, and

redirections. In a closure, all missions carried at a base either cease or relocate (although some

property may be retained for new purposes), while in a realignment, a base remains open but loses and

sometimes gains missions. Disestablishments and relocations refer to missions; those disestablished

cease operations, while those relocated are moved to another base. Redirection refers to cases in

which a BRAC commission changes the recommendation of a previous commission.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

Overall, according to DOD data, 383, or about 85 percent, of 451

recommendations were completed as of September 30, 1998, including all

recommendations associated with the 1988 and 1991 rounds; 68 actions

remain in process.4

 For the 1993 and 1995 rounds, the completion rates

were 87 and 60 percent, respectively, at that time. Further, DOD reported

completing recommendations within mandated time frames. The statutory

completion dates for the four rounds were September 30, 1995, July 11,

1997, July 2, 1999, and July 13, 2001, respectively. Our review showed 1988

and 1991 round recommendations were completed within the required

time frames. DOD’s schedule for the 1993 and 1995 rounds also anticipates

completion within mandated time frames.

According to DOD, the sooner a BRAC recommendation is completed, the

faster savings can begin to materialize and unneeded property can be

transferred to users who can benefit by putting the property to alternative

use. We agree that recurring savings could begin to accrue earlier and the

property disposal process could be underway earlier to the extent that

military operations at a closing base can be terminated earlier than

expected. The average time required to complete a BRAC recommendation

has been shortened in all rounds since the 1988 round, which took an

average of nearly 5-1/2 years to complete. As a result, the subsequent

rounds were over two-thirds complete after 3 years. Service officials

generally attributed the faster completion rate to lessons learned during

the first round. However, they added that implementation of individual

recommendations could be slowed by unavailability of funds or

complexity of actions required to construct new facilities and move

organizations and units. The cumulative pace of completion for each

round and the average completion pace for all four rounds are shown in

figure 2.2.

4

As noted previously, only 451 of the 499 BRAC commissions’ recommendations ultimately required

action primarily because 48 were changed by a later commission.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

Figure 2.2: Pace of Completing Recommendations by Round

Average for the four BRAC rounds

BRAC 1995 round 

BRAC 1993 round 

BRAC 1991 round

BRAC 1988 round

Year during which recommendations were completed

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

0

20

40

60

80

100

Cumulative percentage of completed recommendations

Note: The completion rates for years five and six of the 1993 round and years three through six of

the 1995 round are DOD’s estimates.

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

Recipients Have Been

Identified for Most

Unneeded Real

Property, but

Transfers Are

Proceeding Slowly

BRAC-affected installations contained about 464,000 acres that the

individual military services and components did not need. Property

disposition has been decided for about 79 percent of this acreage. Plans

indicate that federal entities, including DOD activities, are the largest

recipient of this property. As of September 30, 1997, 46 percent, or about

213,000 acres, of the unneeded BRAC property was to be retained by the

federal government; 33 percent, or about 154,000 acres, was slated for

nonfederal users such as state and local authorities or private parties; and

the disposition of 21 percent, or about 98,000 acres had not yet been

determined. However, only about 8 and 31 percent of the property

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

designated for federal and nonfederal recipients, respectively, had been

transferred.

DOD officials cited various factors that affect property disposal. These

factors include the iterative process of preparing site-specific reuse plans,

environmental cleanup, preparing conveyance documentation, and, in

some cases, communities’ delays in assuming responsibility for the

property. To get more property to users faster, DOD has been leasing

property for several years, pending transfer of title.

Planned Disposition of

Unneeded Property

As shown in figure 2.3, DOD data indicate that a substantial portion of BRAC

acreage will be retained by DOD or transferred to other federal agencies.

Figure 2.3: Planned Disposition of

Unneeded Property

Undetermined

(97,899 acres)

Federal

(212,719 acres)

Nonfederal

(153,594 acres)

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

Most of the property to be retained by the federal government is to go to

the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, for use as

wildlife habitats (see fig. 2.4). Other federal agencies, such as the National

Park Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of

Veterans Affairs, are also to receive property. Further, DOD intends to

retain property for, among other things, administrative space for the

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

Defense Finance and Accounting Service. As previously noted, DOD is

actually retaining more property than this because, in many cases during

the BRAC process, the property of an active military service base was

turned over to a reserve component without being declared excess; such

actions would not be displayed in the figure. In particular, available DOD

data indicate that over 330,000 acres of BRAC property are being retained

for use by the reserve components. About 324,000 acres of this amount are

attributable to five Army BRAC 1995 round bases—Fort Hunter Liggett,

California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Pickett, Virginia, Fort Dix, New

Jersey; and Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Figure 2.4: Planned Disposition of

Federally Retained Property

Other federal agencies

(31,890 acres)

Fish and Wildlife Service

(167,379 acres)

DOD

(13,450 acres)

Note: In addition to the acreage shown in the figure, DOD is retaining over 330,000 acres at its

closing and realigning bases for reserve component use. This acreage was not formally classified

as excess; thus, it is not displayed.

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

In transferring property to nonfederal entities, several conveyance

methods—public benefit transfers, economic development conveyances,

and sales—are used (see fig. 2.5). Through public benefit transfers,

property can usually be obtained at no cost for public benefit purposes

such as airports, parks and recreation, education, and homeless

assistance. Through economic development conveyances, property can

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

usually be obtained at no-cost or no-initial cost for economic development

and job creation purposes. To use this authority, however, a nonfederal

entity must show that economic development and job creation cannot be

accomplished under established sales or public benefit transfers.

Finally, property can be sold. Our work at seven BRAC sites showed the

various forms of property conveyance the communities were using to

obtain property. Appendix III provides a summary of the status of property

disposition at these sites.

In the early years of BRAC, DOD was projecting higher revenue from land

sales than it is now experiencing. DOD originally projected about 

$4.7 billion in revenue from such sales for the four closure rounds;

however, according to the fiscal year 1999 budget, total expected sales are

about $122 million for those rounds. The decrease in sales is attributable

primarily to national policy changes and legislation that emphasize

assisting communities that are losing bases.

Figure 2.5: Planned Nonfederal

Transfers

Other (17,490 acres)

Economic development

conveyance (75,269 acres)

Market sales (12,227 acres)

Parks and recreation (9,926 acres)

Airports (35,685 acres)

Education (2,502 acres)

Homeless (495 acres)

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

Most Unneeded Property

Awaits Final Disposition

While DOD has plans for transferring most of its unneeded property, actual

transfers are much less than planned. Overall, DOD data indicate that about

14 percent, or about 64,000 acres, of the 464,000 acres of unneeded

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

property has been transferred to federal or nonfederal entities.

Specifically, about 17,000 acres have been transferred to federal entities

and about 47,000 acres have been transferred to nonfederal entities.

Excluding that property for which no plans have been established for final

disposition, DOD has reportedly transferred about 8 percent of the property

to federal entities and about 31 percent of the property to nonfederal

entities.

Progress in transferring title of BRAC property to users is slowed by many

factors. Planning for reuse can be a lengthy process and many actions

must precede disposition. For example, the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, requires the Secretary of Defense to

consult with local authorities about their plans before transferring former

military property. The law also states that the Secretaries of Defense and

of Housing and Urban Development must review and approve the reuse

plan of a local redevelopment authority before DOD can transfer property

to assist the homeless. In addition, DOD guidelines require that a

redevelopment authority complete a reuse plan before DOD can transfer

property for economic redevelopment and job creation purposes.

Furthermore, the need to address environmental contamination can also

delay final disposition. (See ch. 4 for a discussion of environmental laws

and regulations and other environmental issues.) Finally, according to DOD

officials, some communities are not prepared to assume responsibility for

control of unneeded base property. Specifically, communities need to,

among other things, establish an organization to administer prospective

property, determine uses, and arrange for financing for providing for

property protection, maintenance, and improvements.

Leasing Allows Property

Reuse Pending Transfer

While awaiting property transfers, communities can sometimes begin

using base property through interim leasing. Military service leasing

policies and practices provide opportunities for communities to lease

property before environmental cleanup and final disposal are complete,

then find tenants to sublease it. According to community representatives,

leasing is a useful interim measure to promote reuse and job creation. It

can also help DOD gain an advantage as the community assumes

responsibility and pays for protecting and maintaining the property.

Interim leasing may not always be viable, however. Prospective tenants

may experience financing difficulties or are sometimes reluctant to

sublease property while DOD retains title. For example, DOD and

community officials told us that tenants may have difficulty obtaining

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

financing for redevelopment because banks are disinclined to lend money

under these circumstances. Also, since much of the property under

consideration has remaining environmental contamination, there are

liability issues to be addressed, and tenants are reluctant to lease until

these are resolved.

The services do not centrally maintain leasing information and could not

readily provide comprehensive data. However, service data we were able

to obtain indicated that during the second quarter of fiscal year 1998,

nearly 38,000 acres, or 8 percent of the unneeded BRAC acreage, were

operating under some type of lease. According to these data, about

25 percent of the property planned for nonfederal recipients and awaiting

transfer was under interim leases.

Three of the sites where we performed work on property disposal (see

app. III) were using leases while actions for final disposal progressed. The

conditions we noted regarding leases are summarized below:

• At the former Mather Air Force Base, California, about 93 percent of the

property requested under an economic development conveyance is

operated under an interim lease. The remaining property under this

conveyance has already been deeded, although a portion of the property

devoted to family housing has been vacant since the base closed in 1993

and has increasingly deteriorated as negotiations continued between the

Air Force and the community over property transfer. Agreement was

recently reached for a negotiated sale of the property. Also, the airport

property is under a 55-year lease to Sacramento County, California,

pending a public benefit conveyance.

• At the former Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia, the Army has approved

several interim leases and is planning an additional lease to support

development of a golf course.

• At the former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California, the Navy and the

local reuse authority have entered into a short-term lease for about

48 percent of the property requested under an economic development

conveyance. As of July 1998, the local authority had 58 subleases that

covered over 178 acres of land and buildings.

Conclusions DOD has reportedly completed most of the commissions’ recommendations

and accelerated the pace of completion since the 1988 round. Those

recommendations that remain outstanding are generally attributable to the

1993 and 1995 rounds, and DOD’s plans call for closing them out within

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 2 

Most BRAC Recommendations Completed,

but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is

Proceeding Slowly

required time frames. However, the actual transfer of unneeded base

property has been slow due to a variety of factors. Activities and rules

governing the disposition process, while designed to ensure that all

requirements of applicable laws and regulations are met, contribute to the

slow rate of progress. This situation has been somewhat eased by the use

of leases. Nonetheless, DOD has much to do before it completes its task of

transferring remaining BRAC property it no longer needs.

Agency Comments DOD stated that its goal in property disposal is to convey property as

quickly as possible to advance both the local communities’ economic

recovery and to accelerate DOD savings by eliminating costs associated

with maintaining the property. However, DOD acknowledged that property

transfer is a complex process involving many challenges, including time

needed to clean up BRAC property. In this regard, DOD stated it supports a

variety of initiatives to accelerate, refine, or simplify the process.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

Through 2001, DOD estimates it will achieve a net savings1 of about 

$14 billion as a result of BRAC actions. Beyond 2001, DOD expects to save

about $5.7 billion annually.2

 Because DOD is relying on BRAC savings to help

free up funds for future defense programs, such as weapons

modernization, and has adjusted its prospective budgets to reflect savings,

it is important that savings estimates be adjusted to reflect experience.

The services have updated costs annually, but they have not routinely

updated savings. The lack of current data on savings raises doubts about

the precision of net savings estimates, and estimates should be considered

a rough order of magnitude.

In addition, DOD cost estimates exclude two categories of closure-related

costs. First, one-time costs of over $1 billion in federal financial assistance

provided to communities affected by BRAC actions are excluded. While

these costs are incurred by the federal government, they are not funded

through BRAC budget accounts. Second, DOD has not included estimated

costs of at least $2.4 billion to complete environmental cleanup at BRAC

bases for its annual savings projections beyond 2001. Including these costs

would reduce overall savings and delay the point at which net savings

begin, even though the impact is relatively small. Despite these omissions

and the lack of current savings data, our prior work and the work of

others, such as the DOD Inspector General, indicate that BRAC net annual

savings will be substantial once implementation costs have been offset.

DOD Expects

Substantial Savings

From BRAC

DOD expects that the four BRAC rounds will cumulatively result in

substantial net savings through 2001 and in additional ongoing recurring

savings after that time. DOD expects one-time costs of about $23 billion for

the period of 1990 through 2001, while achieving total savings of almost

$37 billion, resulting in net savings of about $14 billion (see fig. 3.1).3

 As

shown in the figure, DOD reports that cumulative BRAC savings are expected

to surpass cumulative BRAC costs for the first time in fiscal year 1998. If

community assistance costs of over $1 billion are considered as a BRAC

1

The term savings includes costs avoided, such as planned military construction projects that are

canceled due to BRAC actions, and reductions in operating costs, such as the reduction of civilian or

military personnel positions that recur for an indefinite time.

2

DOD reports the expected annual savings at $5.6 billion, but because recurring savings estimates for

the Navy were underreported by $100 million in the fiscal year 1999 budget request, the savings

estimate should be $5.7 billion.

3

The Congress recognized that an up-front investment was necessary to achieve savings and

established two Base Closure Accounts to fund certain implementation or one-time costs. The initial

account funds 1988 round actions while the second account funds the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

cost and included in the costs and savings calculations, the breakeven

point for costs and savings would occur later in fiscal year 1998.

Figure 3.1: BRAC Costs and Savings

for 1990 Through 2001

Cumulative costs

Cumulative savings

22.9

Net savings

 $14 billion

36.9

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

0

10

20

30

40

Fiscal year ending September 30

Billions of dollars

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

BRAC costs and savings differ by round because of variations in the number

and scope of closures and realignments in each round. The BRAC 1991

round is the only one where DOD expects to achieve a net savings during

the 6-year implementation period; after the implementation periods,

however, DOD expects substantial recurring savings for all BRAC rounds.

The highest costs occurred in the BRAC 1993 round, but this round also

accounted for the highest level of estimated recurring net annual savings.

The lowest costs occurred in the BRAC 1988 round, but this round is

expected to produce the lowest annual estimated recurring savings. For

the 6-year implementation periods for the rounds, total estimated costs are

slightly higher than total estimated savings; however, following 2001, DOD

estimates annual recurring savings of $5.7 billion (see table 3.1).

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

Table 3.1: BRAC Estimated Costs and Savings by Round Through 2001

Implementation period estimatesa

Dollars in billions

Round 6-year period Costs Savings

Net annual

recurring

savingsb

Total savings

through 2001c

Net savings

through 2001d

BRAC 1988 1990-1995 $2.7 $2.4 $0.8 $6.9 $4.2

BRAC 1991 1992-1997 5.2 6.4 1.5 12.4 7.2

BRAC 1993 1994-1999 7.7 7.5 2.1 11.7 4.0

BRAC 1995 1996-2001 7.3 5.9 1.3 5.9 (1.4)

Total $22.9 $22.2 $5.7 $36.9 $14.0d

Note: Amounts presented are current-year dollars consistent with DOD’s budget submissions;

totals may not add due to rounding.

aImplementation period estimates are the one-time BRAC costs and savings for the 6-year period

authorized to complete a BRAC action. The cost estimates are less any revenues from the sale of

unneeded base property.

bNet annual recurring savings start the year after completion of the round and are usually based

on estimated savings during the last implementation year for each round.

cTotal savings through 2001 consist of 6-year implementation period savings plus recurring

savings for each year after the end of a round through 2001. For example, BRAC 1991 total

savings of $12.4 billion through 2001 consist of $6.4 billion in savings during the implementation

period and $6 billion in recurring savings for the years 1998 through 2001 ($1.5 billion for 

4 years).

dNet savings through 2001 consist of total savings through 2001, less the costs incurred through

2001.

Source: DOD fiscal year 1999 BRAC budget submission.

DOD’s Development of

Cost and Savings

Estimates

Potential costs and savings of a BRAC action were factors the BRAC

commissions considered in recommending which bases to realign and

close. DOD developed initial cost and savings estimates by using its Cost of

Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, to compare various alternative

BRAC actions. While COBRA was useful in the decision-making process, it

was not intended to produce data for developing specific cost and savings

estimates for any particular action that was to be implemented. After BRAC

decisions were finalized, DOD intended to replace the COBRA estimates with

more refined estimates for submission in its annual budgets to the

Congress. Starting in fiscal year 1993, DOD was required to update these

estimates on an annual basis in its budget submissions.

The COBRA model consists of a set of formulas that incorporate standard

factors, such as moving and construction costs, as well as base-specific

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

data, such as average salaries and overhead cost computations. It

incorporates data pertaining to three major cost elements—the current

cost of operations, the cost of operations after a BRAC action, and the cost

of implementing the action. In our analyses of the BRAC commissions’

recommendations for the four BRAC rounds, we found and reported on

various problems with COBRA.

4

 Improvements were made to the model

after each BRAC round. In our review of the 1995 BRAC round, we stated that

COBRA estimates are only a starting point for preparing BRAC

implementation budgets and that COBRA is a comparative tool, rather than a

precise indicator of budget costs and savings. DOD agrees that COBRA

provides a methodology for consistently estimating costs and savings for

alternative closure options but that it is not intended to be used in its

budget submissions.

DOD submits costs and savings estimates for BRAC actions with its annual

budget. COBRA estimates were a starting point for the military services in

preparing initial BRAC implementation budgets. BRAC legislation,

supplemented by DOD Financial Management Regulations, requires that for

fiscal year 1993 and thereafter, DOD submit annual schedules estimating

BRAC cost and savings, as well as the period during which savings are to be

achieved. DOD components are required to prepare budget justification

books for each BRAC commissions’ recommendations with narrative and

financial summary exhibits. Each service is also required to prepare a cost

and savings exhibit for each base closure package, showing one-time

implementation costs, anticipated revenues from land sales, and expected

savings.5

 The projected BRAC costs and savings are reported in the budget

for the 6-year implementation period for each round. The Congress uses

these estimates in appropriating funds annually for BRAC actions.

Data developed for the budget submissions differ from those in COBRA for a

variety of reasons, including the following:

• Some factors in COBRA estimates are averages, whereas budget data are

more specific.

4

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and Closure Recommendations

(GAO/NSIAD-90-42, Nov. 29, 1989), Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed

Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-224, May 15, 1991), Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s

Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15,

1993), and Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and

Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

5

One-time costs, less any estimated land sale revenues, constitute the BRAC budget request. Some

costs resulting from implementing BRAC actions are not authorized funding from the Base Closure

Account and are funded by other appropriations. Savings may be one-time or recurring. One-time

savings are cost avoidances or revenue gains that result from BRAC actions, while recurring savings

are reductions in operating costs at BRAC sites that continue for an indefinite period.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

• COBRA costs are expressed in constant-year dollars; budgets are expressed

in inflated dollars.

• Environmental restoration costs are not included in COBRA estimates, but

these costs are included in BRAC implementation budgets.

• COBRA estimates show costs and savings pertinent to a given installation

even if multiple tenants are involved; BRAC implementation budgets

represent only a single component’s costs.

BRAC Savings Estimates

Are Applied to Future DOD

Budgets

Accurately gauging BRAC savings is important because DOD is depending on

them to help fund future defense programs, such as weapons

modernization. To the extent that the savings are greater than estimated,

DOD could have more resources for future programs than needed while the

opposite would hold true if the savings are less than estimated. DOD and

service BRAC officials stated that estimated BRAC savings are applied to

future annual budgets formally in the budget process. Estimated amounts

of net savings projected at the beginning of a BRAC round are subtracted

from the expected future cost of each service’s plans in DOD’s Future Years

Defense Program (FYDP).6

 These early estimates, according to DOD and

service officials, are generally not updated for more current estimates of

savings. Further, the services have discretion in how they apply the

estimated savings. DOD officials told us, for example, that the Army

distributes savings across a number of different budgetary accounts, while

the Navy applies savings as a lump sum against future budget authority.

We could not confirm that all BRAC savings estimates were applied to

future budgets because they may be combined with savings from other

initiatives or, as in the Army’s case, distributed as small amounts across

many accounts.

BRAC Cost Estimates

Are Revised Annually,

but Savings Estimates

Are Updated

Infrequently

While DOD and its components have emphasized the importance of

accurate and current cost estimates for their annual BRAC budgets, the

military services have not placed a priority on updating BRAC savings

estimates. DOD has consistently updated BRAC costs in its annual budget;

however, the services seldom update estimates of BRAC savings and do not

change savings estimates to reflect actual savings. Among the reasons

savings estimates are not updated are that DOD’s accounting system, or

other accounting systems, is not designed to track savings and that

updating savings has not been a high priority.

6

The FYDP is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and personnel

levels approved by the Secretary of Defense. The 1998 FYDP supported the President’s fiscal year 1998

budget and included budget estimates for fiscal years 1998-2003.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

For BRAC 1991, 1993, and 1995 round budget submissions, the military

components reviewed and revised their total cost estimates for base

closures and realignments annually.7

 The components provide guidance to

their major commands and/or installations detailing instructions for

supporting BRAC costs included in budget submissions. Each service’s

estimated costs in the budget requests showed annual changes of varying

size. Costs for two defense agencies—the Defense Logistics Agency and

the Defense Information Systems Agency—did not change in some years,

but agency officials told us that the costs were carefully evaluated during

the budget process. We did not verify the accuracy of the estimates;

however, the DOD Inspector General, in a BRAC 1993 audit of costs and

savings, noted that DOD has a reasonably effective process for updating

BRAC cost estimates.

In contrast, savings updates were infrequent. Although our review showed

the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Information Systems

Agency updated savings projections annually, the services have seldom

revised savings estimates, despite requirements to do so. The BRAC 1990

legislation required that, for fiscal year 1993 and thereafter, DOD submit

annual schedules estimating the cost and savings of each BRAC action. In

1996, DOD provided additional budget guidance to the military components,

requiring that savings estimates be based on the best projection of the

savings that would actually accrue from approved realignments and

closures. DOD Defense Planning Guidance issued that year stated that, as a

matter of general policy, the military components should track actual BRAC

savings and compare them with projected savings.

The Air Force has not updated its savings estimates, and the Army and the

Navy have rarely done so. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds, each

service had 11 opportunities in its annual budget submissions to update

savings estimates for one round or another—for a total of 33

opportunities. Altogether, they submitted a total of seven updates. The

Navy updated savings in four budget submissions and the Army updated

savings in three submissions.

In addition to not updating its savings estimates, the Air Force did not

refine its initial COBRA estimates for its annual budget submissions. The Air

Force’s budget estimates consist of COBRA data, with adjustments for

7

Because the requirement to update cost and savings estimates was not effective until fiscal year 1993,

we did not evaluate costs and savings estimates for the 1988 round. To determine the frequency of cost

and savings estimate updates, we reviewed annual budget submissions for the other BRAC rounds as

follows: BRAC 1991, 6 years (1993-1998); BRAC 1993, 5 years (1995-1999); and BRAC 1995, 3 years

(1997-1999).

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

inflation and recurring cost increases at gaining installations. Air Force

officials stated that its BRAC office never instructed major commands to

update savings estimates. They stated that at the beginning, the Air Force

decided not to update savings estimates because there was no accounting

system to track savings changes and no resources to create one. These

officials agreed that COBRA estimates are broad estimates that may differ

from actual savings.

In contrast, the Navy refined COBRA estimates for its budget submission at

the start of each round. Thereafter, according to Navy officials, it was

Navy policy to update savings only when major BRAC changes occurred

that could affect overall savings. For example, the Navy’s 1998 budget

submission for the 1995 round showed increased savings over the prior

year’s submission. Specifically, Navy officials stated that the decisions to

privatize workloads at the Naval Air Warfare Center at Indianapolis,

Indiana, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Louisville, Kentucky,

instead of closing them and transferring some jobs to other locations,

resulted in greater savings estimates at both locations. These centers were

the only 1995 round installations for which the Navy updated the savings

estimates; savings for other locations were neither reviewed nor revised.

However, we believe the revised savings estimates for these two locations

may be overstated because our previous reviews of BRAC actions involving

privatization have questioned the cost-effectiveness and whether it

reduces excess capacity.8

 In particular, our 1996 report on the Navy’s

Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville showed that the plan for

privatizing workloads in place will not reduce excess capacity in the

remaining depots or the private sector and may prove more costly than

transferring the work to other depots.9

Like the Navy, the Army revised COBRA savings estimates to more precise

estimates based on its BRAC implementation plans but, until recently, had

not instructed commands to annually update initial savings estimates.

Acting on Army Audit Agency recommendations, the Army updated its

savings estimates for selected BRAC 1995 actions in the fiscal year 1999

budget.10 The Army Audit Agency reviewed costs incurred and avoided at

10 BRAC 1995 closures and developed revised savings estimates. In

8

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly While Excess Capacity Exists

(GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

9

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville,

Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202, Sept. 18, 1996).

10Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Audit Report 

AA 97-225, July 31, 1997.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

August 1997, the Army BRAC office instructed major commands to

incorporate these revised savings estimates in the 1999 budget request and

to update estimates annually in future budgets. The Army, however, did

not review or revise savings estimates for any installations that were not

included in the Army Audit Agency review.

Officials cited a number of reasons for not routinely updating savings

estimates. BRAC officials told us that the emphasis in preparing the annual

budget has always been to update costs—not savings. Service officials

stated that updating savings estimates would be very labor intensive and

costly and that a fundamental limitation in updating savings is the lack of

an accounting system that can track savings. Like other accounting

systems, DOD’s system is oriented toward tracking cost-related

transactions, such as obligations and expenditures. In addition, as we

reported in July 1997, some DOD and service officials stated that the

possibility that the components’ appropriations would be reduced by the

amount of savings gives them a disincentive to separately track savings.

Net Savings Estimates

Exclude Some Costs

BRAC net savings estimates consist of a comparison of BRAC expenditures

with anticipated savings, but they exclude some BRAC-related costs. First,

expected environmental cleanup costs of at least $2.4 billion after 2001 are

not included in annual recurring savings estimates. (See ch. 4 for a

discussion of DOD’s environmental program for BRAC bases). Second,

BRAC-related economic assistance costs, much of which are funded

through agencies other than DOD, are not included in the calculation of

one-time implementation savings. We identified about $1.1 billion that was

provided in assistance for purposes such as base reuse planning, airport

planning, job training, infrastructure improvements, and community

economic development.11

• About $334 million was provided by the Department of Commerce’s

Economic Development Administration to assist communities with

infrastructure improvements, building demolition, and revolving fund

loans.

• About $271 million was provided by the Federal Aviation Administration

to assist with converting military airfields to civilian use.12

11Economic Development Administration costs cover fiscal years 1992 through 1997. Federal Aviation

Administration costs cover fiscal years 1991 through 1997. Department of Labor costs cover from 

July 1, 1991, through September 30, 1997. DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment costs cover fiscal

year 1988 through February 17, 1998.

12Some consider this more of an investment in the national airport system than a BRAC cost.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

• About $210 million was provided by the Department of Labor to help

communities retrain workers who have lost their jobs because of closures.

• About $231 million was provided by DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment

to help communities plan the reuse of BRAC bases.

• About $90 million in unemployment compensation was provided for

employees who lost jobs during the four BRAC rounds. According to DOD,

data were not available to provide base-by-base estimates for this cost.

Despite Estimation

Difficulties, BRAC

Savings Should Be

Substantial

Despite the imprecision associated with DOD’s cost and savings estimates,

our analysis continues to show that BRAC actions will result in substantial

long-term savings after the costs of closing and realigning bases are

incurred. For example, we reported in April 1996 that overall base support

costs for DOD had been reduced, although DOD’s reporting system could not

indicate how much of the reduction was due to BRAC and how much was

due to force structure or other changes.13 We found that by fiscal 

year 1997, DOD had expected to reduce annual base support costs by

$11.5 billion annually from a fiscal year 1988 baseline, resulting in a

cumulative reduction over the period of about $59 billion.

In addition, an Army Audit Agency audit concluded that BRAC actions

would result in overall savings, although savings estimates were not

precise. In its July 1997 report, the Army Audit Agency concluded that

savings would be substantial after full implementation for the 10 BRAC 1995

sites it had examined but that annual recurring savings beyond the

implementation period were 16 percent less than the major commands’

estimates.

DOD Inspector General audits have also concluded that savings estimates

will be substantial. The Inspector General’s report on bases closed during

BRAC 1993 stated that for the implementation period, savings will overtake

costs sooner than expected.14 DOD’s original budget estimate for the 1993

round indicated costs of $8.3 billion and savings of $7.4 billion for a net

cost of $900 million. The Inspector General’s audit showed that the costs

were closer to $6.8 billion and that savings could approach $9.2 billion,

which would result in up to $2.4 billion in net savings. The report indicated

that the greater savings were due to factors such as obligations for

one-time implementation costs (which were never adjusted to reflect

13Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily Quantified

(GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

14Costs and Savings for 1993 Defense Base Realignments and Closures, Office of the Inspector General,

Department of Defense, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

actual disbursements), canceled military construction projects, and less of

an increase in overhead costs than originally projected at a base receiving

work from a closing base. Additionally, some undefined portion of the

savings included personnel reductions that could not be solely attributed

to BRAC.

The Inspector General’s audit of selected BRAC 1995 closures showed

variation between budget estimates and implementation experience.15 The

audit of 23 closed bases noted savings during the implementation period

were within 1.4 percent and costs were within 4.3 percent of budget

estimates. However, the audit excluded costs and savings from two

activities—the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis and the Naval

Surface Warfare Center in Louisville—that were privatized-in-place.

However, our prior reviews have raise cost-effectiveness questions about

privatization-in-place efforts. As noted previously, our 1996 report on the

Navy’s Louisville activity showed that the plan for privatizing workloads

may prove more costly than transferring the work to other depots having

underutilized capacity.

Conclusions DOD is depending on BRAC savings to help fund future defense programs.

Although evidence indicates that BRAC savings should be substantial,

savings estimates have not been routinely updated and certain costs are

not considered in developing estimates, thereby calling into question the

degree of precision that is associated with the expected savings. To the

extent that actual BRAC savings differ from the estimated amounts applied

to future budgets, DOD either will have to seek additional funds for

programs it hoped to fund with BRAC savings in the future or may have

more funds available than anticipated.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our conclusion that BRAC savings will be substantial

once implementation costs have been offset. DOD acknowledged that

savings estimates are important because they help measure the value of

the BRAC process. However, DOD stated that such estimates are difficult to

track and update, and that it does not maintain a separate system to

account precisely for savings. Nonetheless, DOD stated it is taking

measures to improve the accuracy of its savings estimates. For example,

DOD cited that the DOD Comptroller, in a May 1998 memorandum to the

15Analysis of the 1995 Defense Bases Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Costs and Savings,

Memorandum for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), Inspector

General, Department of Defense, March 20, 1998.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 3 

BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely

Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial

Savings

military services, had reiterated the requirement to update savings

estimates in annual budget submissions as much as practical.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

The process of making BRAC property available for transfer and reuse

involves cleaning up environmental contamination resulting from years of

military operations. While DOD had an environmental program at its

military bases prior to BRAC 1988, the onset of realignments and closures

and the desire to cease operations and transfer property as quickly as

possible have heightened the interest in environmental cleanup.

Addressing environmental problems has proven to be both costly and

challenging for DOD. Although DOD has not compiled a total cost estimate,

available DOD data indicate that BRAC environmental costs are likely to

exceed $9 billion, of which at least $2.4 billion is needed to continue

restoration after the BRAC implementation authority expires in fiscal 

year 2001. Cleanup is expected to continue many years beyond that time

and the potential for higher costs exists, given uncertainties associated

with the extent of cleanup of UXO and monitoring of cleanup remedies

needed at selected sites.1

In the early years of the BRAC program, much of the emphasis was on site

studies and investigations. Now, DOD has reported that, with much of that

investigative work completed, the program’s emphasis has shifted to

actual cleanup. To expedite cleanup and help promote the transfer of BRAC

property, DOD established the Fast-Track Cleanup program in fiscal 

year 1993 to remove needless delays in the cleanup process while

protecting human health and the environment. Most of the key provisions

of the program have been met. Further, DOD, the services, and regulators

generally agree that the program has contributed to environmental

program progress. However, while some of the steps leading to actual

cleanups have been accelerated, actual cleanups can still be lengthy and

projections for completing cleanups extend well into the next century.

BRAC Environmental

Program Is Complex

and Costly

The BRAC environmental program involves restoring contaminated sites to

meet property transfer requirements and ensuring that the property is in

compliance with federal and state regulations. The program consists of

restoration, closure-related compliance, and program planning and

support activities. Restoration activities involve the cleanup of

contamination caused by past disposal practices, which were accepted at

the time but which have proved damaging to the environment. Compliance

activities ensure that closing bases clean up hazardous waste following

1

UXO is unexploded ordnance. It is ordnance that remains unexploded either through malfunction or

design and can injure personnel or damage material. Types of UXO include bombs, missiles, rockets,

artillery rounds, ammunition, or mines.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

specific practices outlined in environmental laws and regulations.2

Program planning is generally associated with examining the

environmental consequences of property transfer and reuse decisions.3

Program support activities include program management, administration,

travel, training, and other support requirements, such as funds provided to

the federal and state environmental regulatory agencies and the Agency

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

Of the $23 billion estimated cost for the entire BRAC program through 2001,

about $7.2 billion, or 31 percent, is associated with environmental

protection efforts. Also, additional environmental costs of at least

$2.4 billion are expected after that time because the duration of

environmental activities is dependent on the level of cleanup required for

reuse and the selected remedy. In some cases, the contamination problem

can be addressed quickly, but in other cases, the cleanups may require

years to complete. The estimated costs after 2001 are expected to be

incurred over a number of years and would therefore only slightly reduce

DOD’s projected annual recurring savings over the long term.4 Currently,

available data indicate that environmental program costs at BRAC locations

are expected to exceed $9 billion (see table 4.1); however, this estimate is

conservative because DOD has not projected all costs for the program’s

duration. Further, costs could increase if (1) cleanup standards or

intended property reuses are revised, (2) DOD undertakes significant UXO

cleanups, or (3) selected remedies fail to clean up contaminated sites.

Likewise, costs could decrease if (1) cleanups standards or intended

property reuses are revised or (2) new cleanup technologies are developed

and implemented.

Over 40 percent of the $9.6 billion estimate had been obligated through

fiscal year 1997. Over 75 percent of the total environmental cost is

expected to be devoted to restoration actions. As noted in the table, some

cost estimates are not all inclusive because either DOD had not estimated

future costs or the data were commingled with other environmental data.

2

Compliance activities are those closure-related activities that must be undertaken to transfer

property. They include the cleanup of friable asbestos, polycholorinated biphenyls, lead-based paint,

and UXO; the removal of underground storage tanks that are (or will be) no longer in compliance

when property is leased or transferred; and responses to leaks from in-service underground storage

tanks.

3

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that federal agencies assess the impact of

major federal actions affecting environmental quality and consider alternatives to those actions.

4

An additional perspective on the out-year cost is that some undefined portion of them would have

likely been incurred, regardless of BRAC actions at these bases.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

Table 4.1: BRAC Estimated

Environmental Program Costs Dollars in billions

Cost category

Through

fiscal

year 1997

Fiscal years

1998-2001

Fiscal years

2002 –69 Total

Restorationa $3.19 $2.15 $2.10 $7.44

Compliance 0.94 0.58 Unavailableb 1.52c

Program planning Unavailabled 0.01 Unavailableb 0.01c

Program support Unavailabled 0.35 0.30 0.65c

Total $4.13c $3.09 $2.40c $9.62c

aIncludes costs for 205 installations with cleanup activities for contaminated sites.

bDOD does not estimate these costs after 2001.

cTotals are incomplete because of unavailability of some estimated cost data.

dThe services were unable to provide estimates because they were not required to separate

obligation data among different environmental subaccounts until fiscal year 1996.

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

A major potential compliance cost that is not included in DOD’s estimate is

the cleanup of UXO. However, DOD does not define the cleanup of UXO as a

restoration activity. Thus, UXO cleanup costs are not included in DOD’s

estimate for the restoration of BRAC bases. For example, according to Fort

Ord’s base environmental coordinator, DOD’s annual restoration report

does not include the estimated $150 million cost of UXO cleanup at the fort.

The Army indicated that such costs were not included in DOD’s annual

cleanup report because they were considered compliance, not restoration,

costs. Regardless, UXO must be cleaned up or addressed in some manner

before property can be transferred and reused.

DOD’s Cleanup Cost

Estimates Are Decreasing

While environmental cost estimates have risen over the years and the

potential exists for even greater costs, DOD has decreased its cost estimate

to complete BRAC cleanup at identified sites by about $900 million over the

last year. Among the reasons the services have given for the estimate

decrease are factors such as enhanced estimating capability based on

experience, improved site identification, and use of innovative technology.

As DOD noted, some early estimates were based on worst-case scenarios,

which have generally not occurred. DOD also sometimes assumed that it

would be required by local redevelopment authorities to clean property to

the highest cleanup standard, that of unrestricted use; this assumption has

proved to be untrue in some cases. For example, at the Long Beach Naval

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

Station, the estimated cost to complete cleanup at the installation

decreased from $152.4 million in fiscal year 1996 to $85.4 million in fiscal

year 1997. While the earlier estimate was based on dredging all

contaminated harbor sediments, Navy officials said they were able to

decrease the estimated cleanup cost by negotiating a reduced amount of

dredging and cleanup with the community. Further, the adoption of some

innovative cleanup technologies is expected to reduce costs.

Ten years into the cleanup process, the military services have voiced

increased confidence in their environmental cleanup estimates for sites

where contamination exists. This confidence is due, in part, to what they

perceive as their enhanced experience in identifying contaminated sites

and selecting appropriate cleanup methods. The services report that they

have used the experiences of successive closure rounds and their

continued programs at active installations.

Assessing the accuracy of estimates, however, is difficult because data

upon which to base conclusions are limited. Fiscal year 1996 was the first

full year in which the services used a new model, referred to as the

cost-to-complete model, to develop their estimates. Whereas earlier

estimates were based on completing “projects,” which could involve

multiple sites with differing cleanup requirements, the new model

formulates estimates on a site-by-site basis. The services stated that these

cost-to-complete estimates are based on current remedies and known

contamination; the discovery of new contamination or the development of

new technology could change them. The cost to complete cleanup could

increase if selected remedies are unsuccessful, and other remedies are

required.

Key Factors Drive the High

Cost of Cleanup

While overall cleanup cost estimates for BRAC bases are decreasing, the

processes of identifying, designing, and implementing a cleanup program

are nonetheless costly. As we reported in 1996, key factors contributing to

the high cost of cleanup are the (1) number of contaminated sites and

difficulties associated with certain types of contamination,

(2) requirements of federal and state laws and regulations, (3) lack of

cost-effective cleanup technology, and (4) intended property reuse.5

5

Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup Requires Difficult Choices

(GAO/NSIAD-96-172, Sept. 5, 1996).

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

Contaminated Sites Are

Numerous and Costly to Clean

Up

Although most bases had some type of environmental cleanup activity

while the bases were active, DOD officials told us that the requirements for

disposing of property usually entail a more extensive review of potential

contamination than is necessary for ongoing operations. As a result of

such a review, more contaminated sites are often identified. While most

BRAC bases have been closed and most investigative studies have been

completed, new sites are still being identified. For example, DOD reported a

total of 4,960 sites requiring cleanup in fiscal year 1997, an increase over

the 4,787 sites reported in fiscal year 1996.

As we have reported, the extent of site contamination is often difficult,

time-consuming and costly to investigate and may not be fully determined

until environmental cleanup is underway. For example, at the Tooele

Army Depot, the base environmental coordinator indicated that by 1990

sufficient sites had been identified to place the depot on the National

Priorities List (NPL), yet nine additional sites were identified after the

property was selected for closure in 1993.6

 With cleanup underway in 1995,

another contaminated site was identified. The coordinator estimates the

additional necessary cleanup cost for the last site alone would be

$12 million.

The type of contamination also affects cleanup costs. For example,

cleaning up contaminated ground water, an environmental problem at

many closing bases, is often expensive. Further, given available

technology, cleaning up UXO is costly, labor intensive, time-consuming, and

dangerous. According to a recent Defense Science Board Task Force

report, DOD does not know the full extent of the UXO problem at its

domestic bases, BRAC or otherwise, so it cannot accurately estimate

cleanup costs.7

 However, the Board’s report indicates that over 15 million

acres on about 1,500 sites are potentially UXO contaminated. The report

notes that even if only 5 percent of the suspected sites require cleanup,

costs could exceed $15 billion. While BRAC bases represent only a portion

of this acreage, UXO contamination is a potentially costly and unresolved

problem at BRAC bases. Issues still to be determined are how much acreage

will require cleanup and to what degree.

According to DOD, efforts are underway to identify requirements and

provide a comprehensive evaluation of the need for a UXO program, and

6

The NPL is the Environmental Protection Agency’s list of highest priorities for further study and

cleanup.

7

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance, Active Range UXO Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Programs (April 1998).

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

the services are identifying UXO requirements in their budgetary planning.

Also, DOD is developing policy delineating the methods it will use for UXO

cleanup. Until that policy is published in mid-1999 and experience is

gained using the methods, it will be difficult to predict reliably what the

cleanup will cost.

Environmental Laws and

Regulations Influence Costs

As we reported in September 1996, the requirements of federal and state

environmental laws and regulations have a significant impact on the cost

of environmental cleanup. Under the existing environmental legal

framework, cleanup standards and processes associated with existing

laws, regulations, and executive orders establish procedures in conducting

assessments and cleanup of DOD’s base closure property. (See app. IV for a

partial listing of these requirements.) In addition to federal requirements,

states may have their own requirements. These requirements vary by state

and, in some instances, may be more stringent than the federal

requirements. For example, California has some drinking water standards

that are higher than federal standards and thus contamination could be

more costly to clean up.

New Technology Can

Potentially Reduce Cleanup

Costs

In many cases, technology that is used to clean contaminated property

may reduce the costs of cleanup. However, there is some expected

reluctance on the part of the regulatory community, the services, and the

communities to experiment with unproven technology because of the risks

associated with innovation. While innovative technology offers the

potential for reducing the cost of cleanup, it also entails a risk that the

desired goal will not be achieved. In that case, both time and money will

be lost and another remedy must be implemented.

New technologies that are being tested offer the potential to greatly

decrease the cost of cleaning up groundwater, UXO, and other

contaminants. However, their effectiveness has not yet been validated. For

example, at the former Mare Island Shipyard, the Navy is testing a new

technique that could significantly reduce the cost of cleaning up

contaminated soil. An engineer in the Environmental Protection Agency

noted that this technique could reduce the per-ton cleanup cost of

contaminated soil from $1,000 to $300. Although initial results have been

promising, a Navy official cautioned that the new technique has been

tested on a small area only and that the results not been validated.

Following validation, the technique must also go through the approval and

adoption process before it can be put into practice.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

Community Reuse Plans

Influence Costs

The cost of cleanup also depends partly on the intended reuse of the

property, as the reuse in part determines cleanup level standards. For

example, if there is interest in developing residential housing on a former

industrial site, a higher level of cleanup will be required than if the

property is slated for industrial reuse similar to its former use. The

residential cleanup standard, which involves having no restrictions on the

future use of the property, can be the highest and costliest to achieve. A

less expensive alternative (at least in the short run) is to limit the reuse of

property and maintain institutional controls, such as deed restrictions,

fences, and warning signs to inform the public of restricted activities.8

While the services noted that estimates were initially developed based on

the expectation that property would be cleaned to the highest standard,

this has not always occurred. Both DOD and environmental regulators

indicate that communities have generally been reasonable in their

expectations for cleanup. For example, recognizing the magnitude of the

UXO problem at the Army’s Jefferson Proving Ground, the community has

not sought to have the property cleaned up. Instead, it is considering

making the area a wildlife refuge.

DOD Reports Cleanup

Program Is Moving

From Investigation to

Implementation, but

Challenges Remain

Fiscal year 1996 was a turning point for the BRAC environmental cleanup

program with a greater emphasis on cleanups than studies to determine

what cleanups are needed. According to DOD, cleanup efforts since fiscal

year 1996 have shifted from the investigative arena to the implementation

phase. Thus, for the first time since 1988 when the first closure round was

announced, DOD reported that 55 percent of BRAC-obligated environmental

funds were spent on cleanup activities and 45 percent on investigations.

Prior to that year, more money was obligated for investigations than for

cleanup, primarily because disposing of unneeded property requires a

more comprehensive review of the property. Not only are these

investigations time-consuming, but they often uncover contaminated sites

not previously identified. While DOD has made progress in identifying

contaminated sites and developing solutions, cleanup actions at most sites

have yet to be completed, and long-term monitoring may be needed at

many sites. As a result, DOD will continue having financial obligations at

BRAC installations for many years.

8

Institutional controls are mechanisms such as deed restrictions, fences, and warning signs, which

inform the public that certain activities may not be conducted on property.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

DOD Reports Progress

Toward Cleanup

Milestones, but When

Work Will End Is Difficult

to Predict

DOD has made progress in identifying contaminated sites and developing

solutions, although cleanup actions at most sites have yet to be completed.

However, it is difficult to estimate when operations and maintenance and

long-term monitoring and associated costs of the activities will end.

DOD has established milestones for (1) forming BRAC cleanup teams,

(2) completing environmental baseline surveys, and (3) putting remedies

in place or completing responses at its BRAC bases.9 DOD data indicate that

it has achieved the first two goals. The services are working toward the

third milestone, set in defense planning guidance, of (1) having remedial

systems in place or responses complete at 75 percent of the bases and

90 percent of the sites by 2001 and (2) having 100 percent of the

installations and sites with remedial systems in place or responses

complete by 2005. According to DOD, as of September 30, 1997, 77 of 205

BRAC installations had all remedial systems in place or achieved responses

complete.10 Twenty of the 77 bases had achieved response complete for all

sites.

In some instances, response complete is the end of any activity at a site;

however, in other cases, long-term operations and maintenance and

monitoring may still be needed depending on the specific site conditions

and the chosen remedy. For example, soil contamination can be addressed

by physically removing the contaminated soil or by implementing some

type of on-site soil treatment system. These activities have different time

and cost requirements associated with their use. Additionally, the chosen

remedy may need to be replaced or modified over time if it failed to

achieve the expected cleanup standard or if a new method of cleanup was

warranted and adopted. To ensure the effectiveness of a remedy and that

cleanup goals are met, long-term monitoring may be necessary—possibly

in perpetuity.

While DOD cannot provide dates when operations and maintenance and

long-term monitoring will be completed, estimated long-term monitoring

costs associated with remedies are included in its projected costs after

2001. DOD officials indicated that such estimates assume that site closeout

will occur 5 years after the remedial action is completed. A review of the

site remedy is required by law no less often than each 5 years after the

9

The term “remedy in place” indicates that a functioning cleanup solution is underway, while “response

complete” indicates that the cleanup action is finished; however, monitoring may still be necessary to

ensure that it has been effective.

10DOD reports there are actually 207 installations in the BRAC environmental cleanup program.

However, two installations were unable to provide DOD with data so they were not included in the

analysis.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

initiation of remedial action if hazardous substances remain at the site to

ensure that ongoing response actions are still protective of human health

and the environment. However, it is possible that operations and

maintenance and monitoring costs could continue beyond this period.

BRAC-earmarked funding ceases in 2001, however, and although the

services are committed to completing cleanup, the BRAC environmental

program will have to compete for funding with other DOD needs, such as

active base cleanup and mission requirements. To the extent that funding

available for BRAC cleanup is curtailed, the program’s completion could be

delayed.

The Air Force expects to spend more than any other service for

environmental efforts after 2001. The Air Force estimates it will require

$1.3 billion for cleanup, operations, and monitoring after that time. At

McClellan Air Force Base, California, a 1995 BRAC activity, cleanup costs

after 2001 are expected to be about $396 million, with cleanup completion,

except for continued monitoring, expected in 2033. Activities associated

with completing cleanup include operation of cleanup systems, sampling

and analysis, long-term monitoring of contaminated ground water, landfill

cap maintenance, institutional control monitoring, regulatory reporting,

and performance reviews. The Air Force estimates that one-third of its

installations will complete long-term monitoring and operations by 2011,

another one-third by 2021, and the remaining one-third, where there is

extensive groundwater contamination, some decades later. Mather Air

Force Base is among the bases that require many years of monitoring and

operations, extending to an estimated closeout in 2069.

The Fast-Track

Cleanup Program Is

Improving Progress

and Supporting Reuse

In September 1993, DOD established the Fast-Track Cleanup program to

overcome obstacles associated with environmental cleanup and to help

make BRAC property available quickly for transfer and reuse. DOD reports

that 110 BRAC bases participate in the program, 32 of which are also NPL

sites. Through this program, DOD expected to support the President’s Five

Part Community Reinvestment program, which was established in

July 1993 and made early community redevelopment of BRAC property a

priority.

According to DOD, the services, and regulators, the program has been

successful in improving environmental cleanup progress, particularly in

the processes leading up to the actual cleanup of contamination. However,

actual cleanups can still be lengthy, depending on, among other factors,

site conditions and available technology. In a January 1996 report, DOD

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

asserted that cleanup schedules had been accelerated as a result of the

program; we did not, however, independently verify DOD’s findings.11

Further, our analysis showed that most key program provisions had been

met. The key provisions are (1) establishing cleanup teams at major BRAC

bases, (2) making clean parcels quickly available for transfer and reuse,

(3) providing indemnification, and (4) accelerating the review process

associated with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act.

While DOD has been successful in meeting the first three provisions, it has

not been fully successful in meeting the fourth.

In addition to the specified program provisions, several mechanisms were

developed to support the program. Two of the mechanisms focus on

identifying and documenting properties that are clean or that are in the

process of cleanup and can thus be transferred or leased to the

community. The third mechanism, which is generally referred to as early

transfer authority, makes it possible to transfer property prior to it being

cleaned up, thus making it available for reuse more quickly.

Most Program Provisions

Have Been Met

DOD has created BRAC cleanup teams at its major bases. The teams, made

up of state and federal regulators and service officials, were developed

with the expectation that they would find ways to expedite cleanup

actions to prepare real property for transfer and reuse. By working

together and fostering communication and coordination, DOD hoped to

avoid the slow, uncoordinated reviews and comments and have a forum to

settle disagreements over cleanup standards and methods. DOD indicated

that the creation of the teams has reduced the time and costs to complete

cleanup actions. For example, DOD reported in January 1996 that the

program eliminated nearly 80 years from the cleanup process and that

more than $100 million was saved due to the early involvement of

stakeholders in that process. Team members we spoke with during our

site visits agree that the collaborative effort has created a more efficient

working environment, allowing them to make decisions more quickly,

resolve disputes, and thus save time and money. However, many of the

cleanup activities are still lengthy. Thus, while the initial steps of the

cleanup process were shortened (i.e., reaching agreement on both the

level of cleanup and the remedy), actual physical cleanups may extend

many years.

DOD has also been successful in making clean parcels of BRAC property

immediately available for transfer and reuse. Under the requirements of

11Fast Track Cleanup Successes and Challenges 1993-1995 (January 1996).

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

the Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act, DOD is to seek

concurrence from the Environmental Protection Agency on the

identification of uncontaminated parcels within 18 months of the BRAC

round being approved. DOD data indicate that it has fulfilled this

requirement, identifying approximately 100,000 acres of uncontaminated

property for disposal from all four BRAC rounds.

In 1993, the Congress authorized DOD to indemnify future owners for the

cleanup of contamination resulting from past DOD operations. According to

DOD, this allows it to more readily lease or transfer real property and

promote reuse.

DOD, however, has not in all instances met the fourth provision of speeding

the review process associated with the National Environmental Policy Act.

By statute, DOD is required, to the extent practicable, to complete any

environmental impact analysis required with respect to an installation and

any redevelopment plan for an installation no later than 1 year after the

redevelopment plan is submitted. This requirement significantly shortens

the usual time frame of 2 to 4 years. DOD officials acknowledge, however,

that this requirement has not been met in all instances and are attempting

to determine the cause of the delays. DOD reports that, as of

September 1998, 37 of the 101 installations that it tracks had not

completed the required environmental documentation within the specified

time frame; another 30 were in the process of preparing the

documentation, and their compliance is undetermined at this point.

DOD Has Several

Mechanisms to Support Its

Efforts to Make Property

Available Quickly

In an effort to achieve the Fast Track’s goal of making property available

for reuse as quickly as possible, DOD has developed additional mechanisms

for speeding up the availability of unneeded base property. In 1994, DOD

developed two mechanisms to identify and document properties that are

clean and thus can be transferred or that are in the process of cleanup and

can thus be leased to the community. These mechanisms are referred to as

the Findings of Suitability to Lease and the Findings of Suitability to

Transfer. According to DOD officials and regulators, the documents serve

to (1) act as a link between the environmental efforts and community

reuse and (2) inform the public about the types of contamination on the

base, actions taken or to be taken to address the problems, and

restrictions associated with the use of that property. This information is

important for both the environmental and real estate sides of the reuse and

transfer process. As of September 30, 1997, DOD reported that lease or

transfer documentation had been prepared for 25 percent of the acres that

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

were available for transfer. Of about 438,000 acres at 112 major BRAC

installations, 43,000 acres had completed transfer documentation, and

68,000 acres had completed lease documentation.

In fiscal year 1997, DOD obtained the early transfer authority to transfer

property before all remedial action has been taken. To assure new owners

of DOD’s commitment to cleaning up contamination after a transfer occurs,

deeds contain an assurance stating that necessary response actions to

clean up the property will be taken and a schedule for completion of the

response actions. Also, the deed is to contain use restrictions and

schedules to further uninterrupted response actions. While this authority

allows DOD to make property available for reuse more quickly, it is too

early to determine what impact this will have on property transfers. As of

July 1998, only acreages at Grissom and Mather Air Force Bases had been

transferred under this authority. Several other reuse authorities, including

those at Griffiss Air Force Base, Naval Air Station, Memphis, and Tooele

Army Depot, are pursuing early transfers. Concerns, however, are being

raised. For example, during a meeting between the Army, and state and

local reuse authority officials over the early transfer of Tooele Army Depot

property, the issue of enforcement of land use restrictions was raised.

State officials wanted to know how restrictions would be monitored and

enforced and by whom because the Army would no longer retain the

property’s deed and therefore enforcement powers. According to DOD and

Environmental Protection Agency officials, these issues are being

examined.

Conclusions As is the case for its active bases, cleaning up environmental

contamination on BRAC bases has proven to be costly and challenging for

DOD. However, it is a task that must be done to meet environmental laws

and facilitate the transfer of unneeded property to other users. While DOD

has made progress from the earlier BRAC years when much of its efforts

were largely devoted to investigative studies and has established initiatives

to expedite cleanup, many cleanup activities remain. As a result, DOD

expects to continue its environmental efforts beyond 2001, the final year of

BRAC implementation authority. Further, DOD estimates that $2.4 billion is

required after 2001, not including estimated costs for UXO, a potentially

costly issue at this point in time. Until such time that this issue is fully

addressed and questions regarding how long sites will require monitoring

before achieving site closeout, determining the overall cost of the program

is difficult.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 4 

Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing, but

It Is Costly and Time-consuming

Agency Comments DOD stated that time and cost associated with the cleanup at BRAC bases is

driven by the regulatory framework. Nonetheless, DOD cited its Fast-Track

Cleanup program as one initiative that has accelerated the cleanup

process through partnerships with state and regulatory agencies as well as

with local communities. DOD believes these partnerships produce more

cost-effective cleanups with consideration to future reuse and community

concerns.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

The expected negative economic impact of base closures on local

communities has long been a concern for the citizens of those

communities, as well as Members of Congress. A base closure can result in

the loss of hundreds or even thousands of jobs in a community.

Nevertheless, most communities where bases were closed under the four

BRAC rounds have fared relatively well over time. A majority of such

communities had 1997 unemployment rates that were lower than or equal

to the national average and had per capita income growth rates that

exceeded the national average during 1991-95. A few communities,

however, continued to experience high unemployment rates and/or

declining per capita incomes.

Our work at six selected base closure sites with varying population,

economic circumstances and geography not only showed that the

surrounding communities were recovering from BRAC but also that the

transition was not necessarily easy. Community officials told us, in

general, that they were recovering from the impacts of base closure and

were optimistic about the future of their communities. Many of these

officials credited the strong national economy and diversifying economic

activity in their regions as key to their economic recovery. At the same

time, they pointed to the considerable difficulties, frustrations, and losses

that communities experience as they adjust to the loss of military jobs and

the redevelopment of base property. These pains of adjustment included

decreasing retail sales at some establishments, leading to some business

closings; declining residential real estate values in areas predominately

populated by base personnel; and social losses felt in local schools,

churches, and organizations that benefited from military personnel and

their families.

Most Communities’

Economic Indicators

Compare Favorably to

National Averages

Selected economic indicators for BRAC-affected communities compared

favorably to national averages. We used unemployment rates and real per

capita income growth rates as indicators of the economic health of those

communities where base closures occurred during the prior BRAC rounds.1

We identified 62 communities involving 88 base closures in which

1

Ideally, to assess how the local communities fared after each BRAC round, we would need economic

information on how those communities would have fared without each BRAC round compared to how

they have fared since the BRAC program began. Because we do not have this ideal baseline and since

we want to have some sense of how the communities fared, we have used the national averages for

unemployment and real per capita income as a benchmark to compare how well the communities have

fared. This comparison does not isolate economic effects of a base closure from the effects of other

economic events occurring in a particular region.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

government and contractor civilian job loss was estimated to be 300 or

more.2

Unemployment rates for BRAC-affected communities compared favorably

with national averages. About two-thirds of the communities affected by

recent base closures (42 of 62) had a 1997 unemployment rate at or below

the national rate of 5.1 percent.3

 This situation compared favorably to

when the BRAC process was beginning in 1988. At that time, 37

communities, or 60 percent of the 62 communities, had unemployment

rates at or below the U.S. average (then 5.5 percent).

For all BRAC-affected communities with a higher than average 1997

unemployment rate, only two—the Merced area surrounding the

now-closed Castle Air Force Base and the Salinas area surrounding the

now-closed Fort Ord (both in California)—had double-digit unemployment

rates: 15 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively. A comparison of the

communities’ 1997 unemployment rates to the national rate of 5.1 percent

is shown in figure 5.1.

2

One of the limitations of our approach to selecting communities is that some areas may have also

been the receiving location for DOD realignments and may have gained jobs. For example, St. Mary’s

County, Maryland, is included because of the closure of Navy facilities at St. Inigoes, Maryland in the

1993 BRAC round. However, in the 1995 round, the area gained DOD jobs at the Patuxent River

facilities due to the relocation of Navy activities from the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.

Nevertheless, the communities we selected for our analysis lost a significant number of DOD jobs.

3

The 1997 unemployment data for counties and metropolitan statistical areas represent the annual rate

as of September 1997. The U.S. average through September 1997 was 5.1 percent.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Figure 5.1: 1997 Unemployment Rates

of BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to

National Average

0

10

20

30

40

50

At or below 5.1% 5.2 % to 9.9% At or above 10%

Unemployment rate

Number of local impact areas

Note: The 1997 unemployment rates for the United States and the local impact areas were

averaged through September 1997. The U.S. rate was 5.1 percent averaged through

September 1997.

Source: Our analysis of LMI data.

Similarly, a June 1996 report by the Congressional Research Service found

that a majority of the localities affected by BRAC actions had

unemployment rates that were near to or well below the 1995 U.S. rate of

5.7 percent. It states that most communities affected by any one of the

BRAC rounds “have a relatively low degree of economic vulnerability to job

losses that are estimated to result from these actions.4

As with unemployment rates, real per capita income growth rates for

BRAC-affected communities compared favorably with national averages.

From 1991 to 1995, 63 percent, or 31, of the 49 areas (excluding the 1995

round) had an estimated average per capita income growth rate that was

4

Military Base Closures Since 1988: Status and Employment Changes at the Community and State

Level, Congressional Research Service, June 17, 1996.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

at or above the average of 1.5 percent for the nation.5 Of the 18

communities below the national average during this period, 13 had average

per capita income growth rates above zero percent, and 5 had declining

income (see fig. 5.2).

Figure 5.2: 1991-1995 Average Annual

Per Capita Income Growth Rates of

BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to

National Average

0

10

20

30

40

At or above 1.5% 0% to 1.49% Below 0 %

Income growth rate

Number of local impact areas

Note: The U.S. real average annual per capita income growth rate for 1991-95 was 1.5 percent.

Source: Our analysis of LMI data.

These figures show some improvement since the 1988-91 period, when the

BRAC process was just beginning to take effect and the U.S. average rate of

growth was only 0.2 percent. At that time, 55 percent, or 27, of the 49

communities had estimated average rates of real growth in per capita

income at or above the national average. Twenty of the 49 communities

showed decreases in per capita income during this period.

5

The per capita income estimates for counties and metropolitan statistical areas were available only

through 1995 at the time of our analysis. Therefore, we did not analyze per capita income for local

communities that were affected only by the 1995 BRAC round.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Because a less diversified economy might make smaller communities

more vulnerable to the adverse effects of a base closure, we analyzed their

economic performance separately.6

 As shown in figure 5.3, 10 of the 18

small city and rural areas, or 56 percent, had a 1997 unemployment rate

above the U.S. average, compared to 32 percent of BRAC-affected

communities overall. On the other hand, 10 of 14 communities (again

excluding those involved only in the 1995 round), or 71 percent, had a per

capita income growth rate that was greater than or equal to the national

average between 1991 and 1995, a higher proportion than that of

BRAC-affected communities overall (see fig. 5.4).

6

For the purposes of our analysis, smaller cities and rural areas were those with estimated populations

of less than 200,000 from the 62 communities we identified for our overall analysis. These areas ranged

in 1995 population from approximately 24,000 in Iosco County, Michigan, where Wurtsmith Air Force

Base closed, to 192,000 for the Merced area in California, where Castle Air Force Base closed.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Figure 5.3: Unemployment Rates of Less Populated BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to the National Average

Fauquier County, Va.

St. Mary's County, Md.

Jefferson County, Ind.

Miami County, Ind.

Franklin County, Pa.

Carroll County, Ill.

Bee County, Tex.

Marquette County, Mich.

Clinton County, N.Y.

Iosco County, Mich.

Aroostook County, Maine

Mississippi County, Ark.

Anniston, Ala.

Myrtle Beach, S.C.

Champaign-Urbana, Ill.

Hagerstown, Md.

Alexandria, La.

Merced, Calif.

Rural impact areas

Unemployment percentage in 1997

0

5

10

15

4.3

15

9.7

8.5 8.3

6.6

6.2 6.1 6.1 5.9

5.2 5 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6

3

2.5

U.S. unemployment rate = 5.1%

Source: Our analysis of LMI data.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Figure 5.4: Per Capita Income Growth Rates of Less Populated BRAC-Affected Areas Compared to the National Average

0.5

0.7

1

1.5

1.7 1.8 1.9

2.3

2.5

2.8

3.5

4 4.1

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5 Income growth rate during 1991-95

U.S. average annual real PCI growth rate = 1.5 %

-0.8

Fauquier County, Va.

St. Mary's County, Md.

Jefferson County, Ind.

Miami County, Ind.

Bee County, Tex.

Marquette County, Mich.

Clinton County, N.Y.

Iosco County, Mich.

Aroostook County, Maine

Mississippi County, Ark.

Myrtle Beach, S.C.

Champaign-Urbana, Ill.

Alexandria, La.

Rural impact areas

Merced, Calif.

Source: Our analysis of LMI data.

Communities

Recovering, Despite

Pains of Adjustment

In general, the communities where we performed work reported suffering

initial economic disruption, followed by recovery. Less tangible, but

harder to correct, were social losses resulting from the departure of base

personnel, such as the cultural diversity base personnel and their families

brought to the local communities. As factors in economic recovery,

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

officials pointed to the strong national economy, diversifying local

economies, government assistance, and base redevelopment. However,

some local officials were dissatisfied with the pace of redevelopment,

citing delays in the transfer of base property. (See ch. 2 for our discussion

on DOD’s progress in transferring base property.)

Through our work at the surrounding communities of six major base

closures, we were able to learn how each community was unique in how it

drew on local and regional strengths to recover from the job losses

associated with base closures.7

 We also identified common economic

impacts and trends across the communities. The local impact areas for

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Fort Devens, and the Philadelphia Naval Base and

Shipyard fell within large metropolitan regions. These areas had low 1997

unemployment rates and 1991-95 average real per capita income growth

rates near or higher than the national average and past trends. The rural

area around Eaker Air Force Base had a relatively high 1997

unemployment rate compared to the national average, though it was

significantly lower than the 1988 rate when it was 13.5 percent, and the

average real per capita income growth rate was considerably higher than

the national average.

In contrast, the rural area surrounding Merced and Atwater had a high

unemployment rate and declining real per capita income, though the rate

of decline decreased in 1991-95 compared to 1988-91. Local officials told

us that Merced and surrounding communities have a high unemployment

rate because of the large seasonal employment associated with the

agriculture and canning industries and the large Hmong and Punjabi

populations that have migrated into the area and are still assimilating into

the American culture. The other rural area that showed some economic

decline was Beeville, Texas. Though its 1997 unemployment rate was

relatively low compared to the 13.2 percent it experienced in 1993, the rate

in per capita income growth from a healthy 2.9 percent during 1988-91

declined to a below average of 0.5 percent during 1991-95. Local officials

told us that the new prisons have created many new jobs and boosted the

population in the Beeville area, but the decline in income growth suggests

that the level of total personal income has not kept pace with the

population growth. However, prisoners are counted in the population

estimates used to calculate per capita income and thus partially explain

much of the decline in the rate of growth.

7

We selected the sites to ensure that we had a range of experiences. Because each community is

unique, the experiences of these communities cannot be generalized. More information on how we

selected the site visits is in the scope and methodology section of chapter 1.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Table 5.1 shows preclosure and recent economic data for each of the local

impact areas representing the communities we visited.

Table 5.1: Unemployment Rates and Per Capita Income Growth Rates of Selected Communities

Average rate of

real income

growth (in

percent) Unemployment

rate (in percent)

Communities visited Local impact area

Closed military

base/Date of closure

Population

1995

Average

per capita

income 1995

1988-

91

1991-

95 1991 1997

Ayer, Shirley, Harvard,

Leominster, Mass.

Worcester County

(part of the Boston

metropolitan area)

Fort Devens (March

1996)

716,666 $23,712 –2.5 1.2 10.0 4.0

Indianapolis and

Lawrence, Ind.

Indianapolis

metropolitan area

Fort Benjamin

Harrison (Sept. 1996)

1,475,925 24,664 0.8 2.2 4.5 2.6

Beeville, Tex. Bee County Naval Air Station

Chase Field (Feb.

1993)

27,665 13,681 2.9 0.5 7.2 6.1

Philadelphia, Penn. Philadelphia, PA-NJ

metropolitan area

Philadelphia Naval

Base and Shipyard

(Sept. 1996)

4,952,955 26,959 0.9 1.5 6.8 4.9

Merced and Atwater,

Calif.

Merced metropolitan

area

Castle Air Force

Base (Sept. 1995)

192,754 15,653 –1.7 –0.8 14.8 15.0

Blytheville and

Gosnell, Ark.

Mississippi County Eaker Air Force Base

(Dec. 1992)

50,777 17,027 2.7 3.5 10.0 9.7

Source: LMI.

Our findings are consistent with a 1996 report by the RAND National

Defense Research Institute, which studied the impact of three base

closures on neighboring California communities. It concluded that “while

some of the communities did indeed suffer, the effects were not

catastrophic [and] not nearly as severe as forecasted.8

Impacts on Communities

Range From Temporary

Setbacks to Painful Losses

Impacts of closure that officials conveyed to us included initial economic

disruption caused by the news of impending closure; decreasing retail

sales at some establishments, leading businesses to close; declining

residential real estate values in areas predominately populated by base

personnel; and social losses felt in local schools, churches, and

organizations that benefited from active, educated military personnel and

8

The Effects of Military Base Closures on Local Communities: A Short-Term Perspective, RAND

National Defense Research Institute, 1996. The report used a case study approach to examine the

impact on nearby communities of three base closures in California: George Air Force Base, Fort Ord,

and Castle Air Force Base.

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

families. Examples of how a base closure affects the surrounding

community and its business establishments, schools, real estate markets,

and social network, as provided by local officials, are shown in figure 5.5.

We did not independently verify the data.

Figure 5.5: Reported Community Impacts Resulting From Base Closures

a a

Philadelphia, Pa. Indianapolis and Lawrence, Ind.

Merced and Atwater, Calif.

Ayer, Shirley, Harvard, and Leominster, Mass. Blytheville and Gosnell, Ark.

Beeville, Tex.

 Real estate values in Atwater dropped 25 to 30 percent, 

partly because the government purchased departing military 

personnel's houses and placed them on the market. New 

housing construction stopped.

 Atwater schools lost enrollment, as well as tax base. The 

Atwater elementary school district had to reduce budget and 

staff, canceling some programs.

 Local businesses had to reduce staff; some closed, and 

some changed ownership. Several small businesses shut 

down, including restaurants, insurance vendors, and dry 

cleaners.

 Atwater municipal utilities lost income from the base.

 The community lost the military families, who contributed to 

local organizations, such as churches and hospitals.

 Retail businesses, such as furniture rental stores, south of 

the fort, suffered from lost business.

 The rental housing market south of the fort suffered high 

vacancy rates.

 The retired military population lost services provided by the 

fort.

 Schools in Lawrence lost a more culturally diverse student 

body.

 The region lost its largest industrial facility--the shipyard.

 The city government lost about $10 million in wage tax 

revenues.

 Retail stores near the shipyard lost income.

 Vendors who supplied materials to the shipyard lost 

business.

 Several retail establishments lost sales initially but have 

since recovered.

 The home-building business was hit hard for a couple of 

years after the closure, but has more recently experienced 

a dramatic increase in business.

 A few used car dealers lost income.

 Many military families, who had brought a range of 

experiences to the community, left.

 The community college lost about 20 percent of its students 

and had to lay off teachers and close courses.

 Gosnell closed one school and laid off 60 faculty members 

and 40 staff members.

 The town lost about $2.8 million per year in state aid due to 

the reduced enrollment.

 Retail stores, including electronics shops, auto dealerships, 

food stores, and gas stations, experienced reduced sales.

 High apartment vacancy rates, in some cases as high as 65 

percent, forced landlords to reduce rents as much as 25 to 

30 percent. Home sales prices decreased as much as 30 

percent, and new home construction stopped.

 One elementary school, located on the fort, closed.

 Sales of expensive items, such as automobiles, dropped.

 Automobile dealerships had to reduce staff, and some 

businesses closed, including high-end clothing stores, a 

discount department store, an automobile dealership, a local 

janitorial service, a tortilla factory, and about four 

convenience stores.

 Real estate values in the residential market declined, and 

housing in the $75,000+ range remains stagnant.

 Many military families, who had brought a range of 

experiences to the community, left.

 Skilled workers are now either commuting long distances to 

other bases, retired, unemployed, underemployed or no 

longer residing in the area.

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Local officials from each of the communities we visited described the

initial reaction to the announcement of a base closure as one of anger,

fear, panic, and denial. They said that people in the affected area feared

the worst, in some cases predicting the dissolution of their town itself. At

the very least, the loss of the base was expected to cause significant

economic disruption. The rumors of a closure generated fear throughout

the community, driving down consumer spending on major items and

business expansion. This initial public reaction resulted in real economic

impacts, such as a drop in real estate values and car sales. Officials from

several communities told us that the announcement of the closure and

previous threats of closure were more damaging to economic activity in

the area than the actual closure. Each of the communities made an effort

to reverse the decision, but eventually resigned itself to the loss and

organized a base reuse authority to represent its interests in the base’s

redevelopment. Generally, we were told that the citizens and businesses

overcame the turmoil associated with base closure and adjusted their lives

to a new environment.

For the communities we visited, the closure of a military base led to a

decline in retail sales, affecting some stores more than others and forcing

some to close. Local officials said businesses affected the most included

new and used car dealers, clubs, small personal service businesses such as

barbers and some nearby “mom & pop” stores. On the other hand, some

local officials emphasized that it was often difficult to determine whether

the demise of a business was caused by a base closure or other economic

factors. Two officials from communities outside of Fort Devens suggested

that the recent growth in large discount stores and chains also hurt small

retail businesses during the same period of the base closure. A local

business official in Blytheville said that some businesses survived the

closure of Eaker Air Force Base and were now doing better than ever,

while others failed because they could not seem to adjust their business

plans to serve a new environment. Some cases were more clearly

attributable to the base closure. For example, officials in Beeville pointed

to the demise of several small businesses, including a convenience store

and a janitorial service that contracted with the base.

At the same time, we were told by local officials that the economic impact

of the departure of base personnel was not as severe as had been feared.

Some local officials believed that military bases tended to be closed

environments where personnel spent much of their income on base to take

advantage of favorable prices at the commissary and post exchange. Also,

local business officials in Beeville told us that many of the Navy officers

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

and pilots and their families may have spent more of their disposable

income in the nearby urban areas of San Antonio and Corpus Christi.

Local officials cited three events following a base closure that they believe

can cause residential real estate values to decline. First, the demand for

housing drops as base employees and their incomes leave an area. Second,

base housing may be placed on the market, increasing the supply of

housing. Third, DOD often purchases the off-base housing units of

transferring base personnel and places these units back in the market for

resale, also increasing supply.9

 The net result of these factors is an

increase in supply of housing units at the same time that a community may

be losing people who would most likely be buying homes. Local officials

from Atwater (Castle Air Force Base area), Gosnell (Eaker Air Force Base

area), and Ayer and Shirley (Fort Devens area) described how rental units

that catered to single service personnel had to lower rents and perhaps

offer weekly rents to stay in business. In two communities, local officials

told us that the result was an influx of a less stable population, which

often led to undesirable conditions, such as increased crime and

disorderly conduct and a drain on public assistance resources. Several

officials from Atwater mentioned that DOD’s program to purchase housing

from transferring military and defense personnel lowered housing values.

However, officials from communities surrounding Eaker Air Force Base

and Fort Devens told us that the market for single-family homes has

recovered and in some cases has exceeded preclosure levels. For example,

housing values have increased in the communities surrounding Eaker Air

Force Base.

The communities we visited generally regretted the loss of base personnel,

with whom they had good relationships. The loss was often described as a

cultural loss rather than an economic one. This loss was less pronounced

in the urban areas, but in the rural towns, the bases had brought in people

with diverse backgrounds from various parts of the country. Officials

described how local institutions benefited from these outsiders’

viewpoints and experiences, particularly in communities where the

military people became involved with the local government, the schools,

and the arts. An official from one of the communities near Fort Devens

remarked about the high quality of people that had entered the community

who worked at the Army Intelligence school. In Beeville, some local

9

DOD’s Homeowners Assistance Program provides assistance to eligible service members and civilian

employee homeowners who have suffered losses through the depression of the real estate market

resulting from actual or pending base closures. Approximately $500 million has been appropriated

through fiscal year 1998 for program funding associated with BRAC. This funding is included in the

calculation of overall BRAC costs and savings estimates.

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

officials told us about the pride they had at being the home of Chase Field,

which trained naval pilots.

Base employees were also affected by an installation’s closure. While

many base employees accept transfers to other facilities during a base

closure, those who choose to remain in the local community may face

periods of unemployment. In cases where the military base provided most

of the high-paying, high-skilled jobs for the area, as was the case at Castle

Air Force Base and Naval Air Station Chase Field, some former base

employees who chose to remain in the area reportedly had difficulty

finding a job at a comparable salary.

Strong National Economy

and Diversified Local

Economies Help

Communities Recover

Several factors play a role in determining the fate of the economies of

closure communities and the recovery of communities (see fig. 5.6).

Officials from several of the communities we visited cited the strong

national or regional economy as one explanation of why their

communities were able to avoid economic devastation and find new areas

for economic growth. The national unemployment rate for 1997 was the

lowest in a generation. Officials from the communities surrounding Castle

and Eaker Air Force Bases said employers are now finding their

communities attractive because these rural areas have higher

unemployment rates and therefore a large population looking for jobs.

These observations are consistent with a 1993 report in which the

Congressional Budget Office reviewed the impacts of DOD’s downsizing on

defense workers, stating that the best solution for displaced defense

workers is a growing economy.10

10Reemploying Defense Workers: Current Experiences and Policy Alternatives, Congressional Budget

Office, August 1993.

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Figure 5.6: Factors Affecting Economic Recovery From Base Closures

Strong

national

economy

Diversified

local

economy

Regional

economic

trends

Reuse

of base

property

Natural

and labor

resources

Government

assistance

Public

confidence

Economic recovery

Source: Our analysis.

Officials from each of the communities expressed the importance of

having other local industries that could soften the impact of job losses

from a base closure. Urban communities, as officials from the more urban

areas confirmed, are better able to absorb the job losses from a base

closure because they have more diversified economies that provide a

wider range of job and business opportunities. In a January 1998 report,

we examined defense-related spending trends in New Mexico and the

relationship between those trends and New Mexico’s economy.11 We

reported that while defense-related spending has been declining in the

state, the state’s gross product and total per capita income have been

increasing and that this economic growth may be due to efforts to

diversify the economy away from defense.

11Defense Spending and Employment: Information Limitations Impede Thorough Assessments

(GAO/NSIAD-98-57, Jan 14, 1998).

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Officials also pointed to several other economic forces at work in their

regions at the time of a closure, during the transition period, and at the

current time. For example, officials from the communities surrounding

Fort Devens said that at the time of the closure, the area was suffering

from the downsizing and restructuring of the computer industry. Today,

those same communities are benefiting from the economic growth in the

larger Boston metropolitan area. Philadelphia has been going through

deindustrialization for the past 20 years. Officials from Philadelphia said

their city has been also losing job and population for many years—the

closure of the shipyard was not the first big loss they have experienced.

However, at the time the closure was announced, the shipyard was the

largest manufacturing concern in the region, and one official said that it is

difficult for any city to lose such a large employer even if the loss does not

fundamentally hurt the local economy of a large metropolitan area like

Philadelphia. Figure 5.7 describes the economic and regional context of

the base closure for the communities we visited.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Figure 5.7: Economic and Regional Context of Selected Communities

The 1991 BRAC Commission chose to close the Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service center, along with the rest of the 

fort, but a later DOD consolidation plan found in favor of retaining 

the center, saving many of the base's jobs. The rest of the fort 

closed in September 1996. 

Lawrence is an autonomous municipality within Indianapolis. Its 

early development was tied to the fort. In the 1950s, Chrysler, 

Ford, and Western Electric located plants in Lawrence; these 

became the center of the town's activity. In the 1980s, the 

Western Electric and Chrysler plants closed, resulting in the loss 

of 11,000 jobs, from which parts of Lawrence still have not 

recovered.

Philadelphia, Pa.

The shipyard, the largest heavy manufacturing plant in the 

region, closed in September 1996. The yard was initially going to 

be mothballed based on the 1991 BRAC decision, but the 1995 

round closed it, allowing the city to ultimately take ownership and 

attract businesses. The Navy will remain active on portions of 

the naval base. 

Philadelphia is part of the nation's fourth largest metropolitan 

area. While downtown Philadelphia, "Center City," is growing, 

the city as a whole is losing people and jobs and is unable to 

compete with the suburbs. Its high labor taxes, high utility costs, 

high worker salaries, and surplus of old industrial buildings 

discourage economic growth.

The fort closed in March 1996, but a portion remains active for an 

Army Reserve enclave. From 1988 through the early 1990s, a 

recession hit the area. Along with the base closure, Desert 

Storm, cutbacks in the personal computer industry along 

Boston's technology corridor, and the restructuring of the 

banking industry all contributed to this downturn. The economic 

outlook began to improve in early 1995. Plastics and paper are 

major industries in the area, but service industries are beginning 

to grow in the strong economy. 

The three towns bordering the closed portions of the fort are 

Ayer, which has a strong, diverse industrial and retail base; 

Shirley, with a modest commercial base and large residential 

community; and Harvard, an upscale bedroom community. 

Leominster is a larger town nearby that was home to many base 

employees. 

Ayer, Shirley, Harvard, and Leominster, Mass.

Indianapolis and Lawrence, Ind.

Blytheville and Gosnell, Ark.

The base closed in December 1992. Gosnell is a bedroom 

community adjacent to the base, and many of the base 

employees lived within Gosnell's city limits. Nevertheless, 

Gosnell continues to be a desirable residential community 

because of its excellent school district. 

In the 1950s, Blytheville was dominated by agriculture. The first 

industrial park appeared in the early 1960s and the area began to 

diversify. Now, it is half industrial and half agricultural. The 

Blytheville area historically has had double-digit unemployment 

rates, partly due to seasonal employment related to agriculture. 

The first steel mill to come into the area was announced in 

November of 1987. The steel industry has invested over $100 

million per year in the area over the last 10 years, and is still 

expanding. Mississippi County is now the number two steelproducing county in the United States.

Naval Air Station Chase Field closed in February 1993. The 

station had fostered Beeville's growth, and other industries had 

become secondary to the Navy's operations at Chase Field. 

Bee County and its surrounding counties are generally rural. A 

historical economic dependence on nonrenewable fuels, for 

which price and demand fluctuate, has had a detrimental effect 

on the regional economy. Agriculture and ranching are other 

industries found in the area. Beeville was economically 

depressed in the 1980s due to an oil and gas bust, as well as a 

decline in uranium mining. The largest sectors in Bee County 

are now local government, trade, and services. The Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice selected Beeville as the site of a 

prison in 1989. The prison opened in October 1992, bringing 

hundreds of jobs to the area. 

Beeville, Tex. Merced and Atwater, Calif.

The base, located in mostly residential Atwater, closed in 

September 1995. A statewide recession was in progress at the 

time.

Merced County is a rural area largely dedicated to agriculture and 

related industries, with much of its labor force seasonally 

employed in farming and canning. The county is ranked third out 

of California's 58 counties in percentage of population living in 

poverty. Even during seasons of "full employment," the 

unemployment rate remains high, around 14 percent; during the 

off season, the rate can rise to between 19 and 22 percent. The 

area is home to large Hmong and Punjabi populations, many of 

whom are first-generation immigrants who cannot speak 

English.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

The rural areas we visited, where agriculture has historically dominated

the economy, have benefited from their efforts to diversify. In Blytheville,

Arkansas, for example, where Eaker Air Force Base closed, the steel

industry found a foothold in the late 1980s before the announcement of the

base closure and has been a growing presence ever since. The Blytheville

area is attractive to the steel companies because of its access to the

Mississippi river and a major interstate as well as an available labor pool.

Beeville, Texas, where Chase Field closed, has a long history of farming

and ranching, but has recently benefited from an expanding state prison

industry. In these cases, the emergence of major employers was

coincidental with the base closure, but officials in both towns stated the

importance of these employers to recovery.

Local Officials Stated That

Base Reuse and

Government Assistance

Contribute to Economic

Recovery

The redevelopment of base property is widely viewed as a key component

of economic recovery for communities experiencing economic dislocation

due to jobs lost from base closures. The closure of a base makes buildings

and land available for a new use that can generate new economic activity

in the local community. DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment surveys the

local reuse authorities representing base closures from all four rounds on

the number of jobs that have been created from redevelopment of bases.

As of March 1998, the Office of Economic Adjustment reported that reuse

of base property from closed bases had generated almost 48,000 new jobs

(compared with approximately 100,000 government civilian and contractor

estimated job losses from BRAC actions). Table 5.2 shows the number of

jobs created from redevelopment of base property at the six closed bases

we visited.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Table 5.2: Job Creation From Base Reuse at Selected Bases

Closed military base

Estimated no.

of civilian

jobs lost

No. of jobs

created from

base reuse Examples of base reuse

Fort Devens, Mass. 2,178 1,470 Gillette has located a major distribution facility at the fort, with plans to

expand operations. As of November 1997, more than 30 leases had been

signed, and 7 sales had been completed. The Federal Bureau of Prisons will

use the base hospital as a medical facility specializing in cardiology and

dialysis. The recreational facilities, including the health club and ball fields,

are being used by local youth and community organizations.

Fort Benjamin Harrison,

Ind.

4,240a 563 The Defense Finance and Accounting Service center has been retained in

the largest building on the base. The state of Indiana obtained 1,700 acres

through a public benefit conveyance for a state park. Other uses of base

property include a medical facility with diagnostic and radiology laboratoties

and a growing YMCA. Officials also cited plans to reuse some of the base

housing.

Naval Air Station Chase

Field, Tex.

956 1,290 The Texas Department of Criminal Justice has located a prison complex on

the former naval air station. The off-base housing complex is being reused,

primarily as housing for department personnel.

Philadelphia Naval

Base and Shipyard,

Penn.

8,119 528 The Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation has leased space at the

shipyard to 18 companies. Norway’s Kvaerner, a shipbuilding company, will

be reusing the shipyard’s drydocks, bringing in several hundred jobs and

creating many more subcontractor jobs. Other firms include tugboat

companies and steelworks.

Castle Air Force Base,

Calif.

1,149 1,881 Pacific Telesis refurbished the base commissary for a customer service call

center, employing hundreds of people. Other companies on site include a

trailer manufacturing firm and a company that makes modular classrooms.

Educational activities using base facilities include the Aviation Challenge and

the Challenger Learning Center.

Eaker Air Force Base,

Ark.

777 416 The former base now hosts a Federal Express truck-driving school, a

pediatric care facility, and a YMCA. The airport is used by a delivery service

during the holiday surge. The Presbyterian Development Corporation is

creating a retirement community using some of the housing on site. The base

includes some farmland which is being leased out, as well as some

archaeological sites.

aThe estimate of civilian jobs lost for Fort Harrison includes the closure of the Defense Finance

and Accounting Service center. In a process following BRAC 1991, DOD selected building one

on Fort Harrison to continue housing the center, in effect saving many of the jobs estimated to be

lost.

From our meetings with local officials, publicizing redevelopment goals

and efforts for former bases is a key strategy for attracting industry and

helping communities gain confidence in recovery from the closure. For

example, Philadelphia officials recently closed a deal with Kvaerner

Shipbuilding of Norway that will bring several hundred shipbuilding jobs

back to the shipyard. Though this deal will not replace about 7,000

shipyard lost jobs from the closure, it has helped to allay fears that the

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

shipyard would stay idle in the long term. Officials from other

communities stressed the importance of successful base redevelopment to

their communities’ long-term economic health.

We did not attempt to assess the extent that government assistance

programs speeded economic recovery of communities experiencing base

closures. However, some officials emphasized that federal assistance in

the form of planning and infrastructure grants helps communities

overcome many barriers to redevelopment, such as the complex property

disposal process and deteriorating or outdated infrastructure. Specifically,

local officials told us that Office of Economic Adjustment grants helped

them plan for redeveloping base property and Economic Development

Administration grants provided funding for infrastructure improvements

to integrate base property into the community’s infrastructure. A recent

study requested by the Economic Development Administration and

prepared by a research team led by Rutgers University evaluated the

success of the Economic Development Administration’s defense

adjustment grants in helping local communities diversify away from

dependence on former military bases or defense contractors.12 The study

concluded that the assistance succeeded in aiding job creation and

economic recovery from base closures and defense downsizing.

In helping base employees adjust to closures, the communities took

advantage of federal, state, and local programs to provide displaced

workers with career transition counseling, job retraining, and placement

services. One major effort to assist displaced workers occurred in

Philadelphia. According to Navy data, about 8,000 civilian jobs were

eliminated by the shipyard’s closure from 1991 to 1996. Of these 8,000

employees, about 1,400 were laid off, 2,000 accepted separation incentives,

and almost 2,000 transferred to other military installations while hundreds

left through retirement, disability separation, and resignation. The

Philadelphia base created a career transition center that provided

one-on-one counseling to over 4,000 workers, as well as skills

assessments, workshops, on-site retraining, and information on career

choices. The center formed partnerships with the Private Industry Council,

state employment office, and local colleges to ensure that every

opportunity for retraining and assistance was used. The shipyard

developed flexible training plans for the employees with the Navy

reassigning people to new positions that supported their training. One

official expressed frustration that more shipyard workers did not use the

training opportunities and suggested that a barrier to assisting workforces

12Defense Adjustment Program Performance Evaluation, Rutgers University et al., November 1997.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

similar to the one at the Philadelphia shipyard is the older age of this

workforce. Most of the shipyard work force had been doing shipyard work

all their working lives and did not want to start at the bottom again or

learn a new trade despite the fact that the Philadelphia area has a lot of

jobs, such as in construction, that would be suitable with some retraining.

Property Transfer Process

Continues to Frustrate

Local Leaders

The most consistent major concern cited by the officials in the six

communities we visited was that the transfer of property to the reuse

authority was slow. (See ch. 2 for a discussion on DOD’s progress in

transferring base property.) In the case of Eaker Air Force Base, some of

the property was conveyed to the reuse authority through an economic

development conveyance just this past September. The Bee Development

Authority still does not have title to a large portion of Chase Field. The

local reuse authority for Castle Air Force Base is in the process of

obtaining an economic development conveyance. In each of these cases,

the base had been closed sometime between 1993 and 1996. However,

both Fort Benjamin Harrison and Fort Devens reuse authorities have title

to base property, and the Fort Devens authority has been especially

successful in turning over property to commercial enterprises.

One problem caused by transfer delays is the increased cost of

rehabilitating the facilities, which continue to deteriorate from the time of

closure to the transfer of title.13 This situation is occurring in Beeville,

Texas, despite the fact that a large portion of the base was transferred to

the state of Texas through a public benefit conveyance for state prison

facilities. Officials from the Bee Development Authority said they wish to

diversify the local economy by attracting manufacturing to the area; they

see the remaining base property as an asset to attract such development.

However, a large hangar and office facility is deteriorating because the

reuse authority does not have the money to maintain it, nor can it attract

businesses that would supply maintenance funds without title to the

facility. Two Beeville officials suggested the absence of a DOD base

transition coordinator, an on-site official who serves as an advocate for

the community and a local point of contact with the federal government,

may have contributed to the local authority’s problems.

Local officials stated that DOD officials responsible for property disposal

do not seem to understand that delaying property conveyance is bad for

business. Some local officials told us they do not think that responsible

13Military Bases: Update on the Status of Bases Closed in 1988, 1991, and 1993 (GAO/NSIAD-96-149,

Aug. 6, 1996).

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

offices have enough real estate expertise. For example, some officials told

us that property appraisals did not consider the cost of bringing a building

up to local health and safety codes and therefore overvalued the property.

Consistent with DOD statements in chapter 2, local officials acknowledged

that some of the delay is due to property disposal process requirements. In

addition, some local officials said transition delays are due to the lengthy

environmental cleanup process.

DOD officials agreed that the property disposal process can be frustrating

to base reuse and economic recovery efforts but explained that DOD was

using all available policy options to speed the process and remain within

the boundaries of the law. A DOD official also noted that 1991 base closures

may not have benefited as much from initiatives begun in 1993 to speed

the process of transferring property to communities. These initiatives

included the creation of economic development conveyances and base

transition coordinators. Many officials said that once the transition is

completed, they will be able to attract tenants, and they believed that in

the long run, the community could generate more economic activity and

accrue other quality of life dividends such as parks and recreation

facilities than when the base was active.

Conclusions A majority of base closure communities have been able to absorb the

economic loss without a significant economic decline. A growing national

economy and a diverse regional economy play significant roles in

economic recovery, making it easier for communities to absorb job losses

and generate new business activity. However, some communities are not

economically strong based on economic indicators and may have incurred

deeper and longer economic impacts from base closures.

Local officials said the impact from base closure was not as bad as they

had feared. Though some communities encountered negative economic

impacts during the transition from the announcement of base closure to

recovery, local officials said they are optimistic about the long-term

outlook for their communities. They told us they now view a base closure

as an opportunity for their community to craft a new identity for itself and

diversify the local economy. To the extent that redevelopment of the base

may play a role in economic recovery, the speed of the property disposal

process remains a local concern.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Chapter 5 

Most Communities Are Recovering From the

Economic Impacts of Base Closures

Agency Comments DOD agreed that most base closure communities have been able to absorb

the economic loss associated with closures and show positive economic

growth at or above national averages. DOD cited this as a tribute to the

initiative and persistence of local and state redevelopment officials who

take advantage of the regional opportunities that an expanding national

economy can offer. DOD stated it will continue to support the base

redevelopment efforts of local and state officials as they transition to a

more diversified economy.

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix I 

Federal Cash Grants Given to Facilitate Base

Reuse for the Four Base Realignment and

Closure Rounds

The loss of a military base can cause economic distress to the locally

affected communities. To support dislocated workers and help

communities plan and implement their economic redevelopment

objectives, the federal government provides assistance through numerous

programs. Among the major sources of assistance are the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) Office of Economic Adjustment, the Federal Aviation

Administration, the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development

Administration, and the Department of Labor. Grants are awarded to

communities for activities such as reuse planning and job training, as well

as infrastructure improvements and community economic development. In

addition to this federal assistance, there are other federal, state, and local

resources available to assist with the retraining of workers and the

redevelopment of closed bases.

Base

Total OEA

grantsa

Total FAA

grantsb

Total EDA

grantsc

Total DOL

grantsd

Total all

grants

Adak Naval Air Facility 0 200,000 120,000 0 $320,000

Alameda Naval Air Station and Naval Aviation

Depot

$4,048,039 0 $8,734,605 $2,500,000 15,282,644

Annapolis Naval Surface Warfare Center 75,000 0 0 0 75,000

Anniston Army Depot 0 0 1,382,500 0 1,382,500

Barbers Point Naval Air Station 1,308,855 0 0 0 1,308,855

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal 695,022 0 1,500,000 0 2,195,022

Blackstone Army Airfield 0 72,000 0 0 72,000

Bergstrom Air Force Base 200,000 129,104,128 0 1,228,260 130,532,388

Camp Bonneville 126,341 0 0 0 126,341

Camp Pedricktown 25,030 0 0 0 25,030

Carswell Air Force Base 478,855 380,000 0 1,800,000 2,658,855

Castle Air Force Base 1,491,907 1,615,000 7,537,500 0 10,644,407

Cecil Field Naval Air Station 1,399,052 0 2,472,150 0 3,871,202

Chanute Air Force Base 1,154,866 936,500 7,622,250 3,000,000 12,713,616

Charleston Naval Station and Naval Shipyard 3,991,049 0 14,464,460 17,975,755 36,431,264

Chase Field Naval Air Station 1,105,411 140,000 4,162,500 875,151 6,283,062

Columbus Defense Distribution Center 0 0 0 746,186 746,186

Dallas Naval Air Station 667,815 0 0 0 667,815

Davisville Naval Construction Battalion Center 133,000 0 0 0 133,000

Dayton Defense Electronics Support Center 1,250,252 0 0 0 1,250,252

Detroit Arsenal 100,000 0 0 0 100,000

Eaker Air Force Base 2,673,608 0 8,450,100 0 11,123,708

El Toro Marine Corps Air Station 1,651,933 5,503,335 0 0 7,155,268

(continued)

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix I 

Federal Cash Grants Given to Facilitate

Base Reuse for the Four Base Realignment

and Closure Rounds

Base

Total OEA

grantsa

Total FAA

grantsb

Total EDA

grantsc

Total DOL

grantsd

Total all

grants

England Air Force Base 2,652,115 1,362,500 6,411,800 500,000 10,926,415

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center 1,303,780 0 469,240 0 1,773,020

Ft. Benjamin Harrison 1,895,329 0 4,045,000 4,592,752 10,533,081

Ft. Chaffee 348,434 0 3,188,000 1,250,000 4,786,434

Ft. Devens 3,126,039 0 4,425,000 2,000,000 9,551,039

Ft. Dix 67,000 0 4,408,000 1,150,000 5,625,000

Ft. Greely 442,725 0 0 0 442,725

Ft. Indiantown Gap 0 0 0 1,192,000 1,192,000

Ft. McClellan 1,200,020 0 510,000 0 1,710,020

Ft. Meade 0 126,350 0 126,350

Ft. Monmouth 175,000 0 0 0 175,000

Ft. Ord 3,916,543 155,700 63,514,880 800,000 68,387,123

Ft. Pickett 400,436 0 0 0 400,436

Ft. Polk 135,000 0 2,553,750 500,000 3,188,750

Ft. Ritchie 1,167,717 0 1,000,000 825,000 2,992,717

Ft. Sheridan 534,964 0 0 0 534,964

Ft. Totten 65,965 0 0 0 65,965

Gentile Air Force Base 0 0 2,500,000 285,317 2,785,317

George Air Force Base 533,648 2,219,088 6,525,000 1,000,000 10,277,736

Glenview Naval Air Station 798,943 300,000 2,971,125 598,468 4,668,536

Grand Forks Air Force Base 0 0 1,000,000 0 1,000,000

Griffiss Air Force Base 2,665,383 0 6,000,000 2,600,000 11,265,383

Grissom Air Force Base 1,685,661 0 3,649,500 612,500 5,947,661

Guam Naval Complex 2,568,767 26,046,248 100,000 2,750,000 31,465,015

Hill Air Force Base 0 0 1,500,000 1,954,211 3,454,211

Homestead Air Force Base 1,739,420 418,630 16,125,000 0 18,283,050

Indiana Army Ammunition Plant 0 0 3,152,650 750,000 3,902,650

Indianapolis Naval Air Warfare Center 1,620,775 0 0 0 1,620,775

Jefferson Proving Ground 358,600 0 850,000 875,000 2,083,600

K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base 2,028,026 2,893,543 2,277,600 1,045,000 8,244,169

Kelly Air Force Base 4,074,181 0 8,632,400 14,500,000 27,206,581

Key West Naval Air Station 135,000 0 0 0 135,000

Letterkenny Army Depot 1,663,092 0 2,300,000 3,261,759 7,224,851

Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot 100,000 0 1,007,778 0 1,107,778

Long Beach Naval Station and Naval Hospital 5,503,284 0 0 0 5,503,284

Long Beach Naval Shipyard 0 0 8,030,000 6,120,000 14,150,000

Loring Air Force Base 2,935,012 17,300,000 4,567,000 2,100,000 26,902,012

Louisville Naval Surface Warfare Center 822,223 0 0 0 822,223

(continued)

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix I 

Federal Cash Grants Given to Facilitate

Base Reuse for the Four Base Realignment

and Closure Rounds

Base

Total OEA

grantsa

Total FAA

grantsb

Total EDA

grantsc

Total DOL

grantsd

Total all

grants

Louisville Naval Ordnance Station 0 0 1,000,000 0 1,000,000

Lowry Air Force Base 2,637,932 0 12,338,500 800,000 15,776,432

MacDill Air Force Base 137,000 0 2,550,000 0 2,687,000

Malmstron Air Force Base 0 0 750,000 0 750,000

March Air Force Base 1,684,770 0 75,000 0 1,759,770

Mare Island Naval Shipyard 3,263,983 0 8,050,000 10,448,000 21,761,983

Mather Air Force Base 630,500 1,692,688 9,794,451 1,750,000 13,867,639

McClellan Air Force Base 2,803,511 0 0 11,670,000 14,473,511

Memphis Defense Distribution Depot 858,637 0 1,400,000 2,258,637

Memphis Naval Air Station 1,461,983 2,311,330 1,252,000 0 5,025,313

Mobile Naval Air Station 200,000 0 93,750 0 293,750

Moffett Field Naval Air Station 0 0 0 5,010,678 5,010,678

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base 1,408,264 23,832,303 3,500,000 925,000 29,665,567

New London Naval Underwater Warfare

Center

187,500 0 0 0 187,500

Newark Air Force Base 800,602 0 0 2,750,000 3,550,602

Norfolk Naval Aviation Depot 108,561 0 0 0 108,561

Norfolk Naval Shipyard 0 0 1,000,000 0 1,000,000

Norton Air Force Base 741,000 10,424,638 9,383,660 2,916,000 23,465,298

Ogden Defense Distribution Depot 1,056,805 0 75,000 0 1,131,805

Orlando Naval Hospital 0 0 735,000 0 735,000

Orlando Naval Training Center 1,658,536 0 118,875 3,392,374 5,169,785

Pease Air Force Base 859,790 20,617,344 8,475,000 0 29,952,134

Pensacola Naval Aviation Depot 341,546 0 0 5,300,000 5,641,546

Philadelphia Defense Personnel Supply Center 321,306 0 0 4,500,000 4,821,306

Philadelphia Naval Station, Naval Hospital

and Naval Shipyard

105,015,640 0 14,273,850 45,970,000 165,259,490

Plattsburgh Air Force Base 2,159,844 0 4,843,000 1,296,684 8,299,528

Point Molate 149,901 0 0 0 149,901

Port Hueneme Naval Construction

Engineering Lab

159,900 0 2,306,395 0 2,466,295

Portsmouth Naval Station, ME 0 0 500,000 0 500,000

Portsmouth Naval Station, N.H. 0 0 4,450,000 2,700,000 7,150,000

Presidio of San Francisco 0 0 0 500,000 500,000

Pueblo Army Depot 194,000 0 70,000 0 264,000

Puget Sound Naval Station (Sand Point 120,000 0 850,000 1,188,000 2,158,000

Red River Army Depot 631,247 0 0 0 631,247

Reese Air Force Base 919,980 0 2,584,250 1,268,622 4,772,852

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station 241,985 3,817,235 0 0 4,059,220

(continued)

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix I 

Federal Cash Grants Given to Facilitate

Base Reuse for the Four Base Realignment

and Closure Rounds

Base

Total OEA

grantsa

Total FAA

grantsb

Total EDA

grantsc

Total DOL

grantsd

Total all

grants

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base 111,000 4,456,060 0 684,545 5,251,605

Sacramento Army Depot 436,010 0 75,000 1,750,000 2,261,010

San Diego Naval Training Center 1,783,996 0 389,000 0 2,172,996

Savanna Army Depot 525,852 0 0 0 525,852

Seneca Army Depot 1,189,730 0 2,706,250 0 3,895,980

Sierra Army Depot 626,734 0 0 0 626,734

South Weymouth Naval Air Station 422,000 0 120,000 925,000 1,467,000

St. Louis Aviation Troop Command 341,587 0 0 5,850,000 6,191,587

Staten Island Naval Station 527,244 0 0 636,000 1,163,244

Stratford Army Engine Plant 615,553 0 0 0 615,553

Suffolk Naval RadioTransmission Facility

Driver

90,000 0 0 0 90,000

Tooele Army Depot 562,260 0 2,575,000 3,244,000 6,381,260

Treasure Island Naval Station 0 0 735,000 0 735,000

Trenton Naval Air Warfare Center 134,902 0 0 850,000 984,902

Tustin Marine Corps Air Station 1,392,543 200,000 0 0 1,592,543

Vint Hill Farms Station 1,355,564 0 0 0 1,355,564

Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center 1,583,558 0 2,000,000 3,030,000 6,613,558

Watertown Army Materials Technology

Laboratory

185,000 0 1,762,500 0 1,947,500

Williams Air Force Base 1,869,702 14,253,961 7,057,250 2,000,000 25,180,913

Woodbridge Air Reserve Facililty 50,000 0 0 0 50,000

Wurtsmith Air Force Base 1,997,015 139,500 9,717,500 1,250,000 13,104,015

Othere 15,516,542 0 0 7,008,152 22,524,694

Total $231,310,632 $270,518,081 $334,366,019 $210,400,414 $1,046,595,146

aOffice of Economic Adjustment; data through Feb. 17, 1998.

bFederal Aviation Administration; data through Sept. 30, 1997.

cEconomic Development Administration; data through Sept. 30, 1997.

dDepartment of Labor; data through Dec. 30, 1997.

eThese funds went to California Community Colleges, East Bay Pilot Project, California Community

Assistance, Oakland Military Complex, Virginia Defense Project, San Francisco Complex and

Hamilton Military Complex.

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix II 

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major Base

Realignments and Closures During the Four

Rounds

The closure and realignment of military bases creates job losses at these

facilities, but subsequent redevelopment of the former bases’ property

affords opportunities for the creation of new jobs. DOD estimates that, for

major closures and realignments for the four rounds, the number of

civilian job losses will exceed 135,000 (as shown in the following table);

this number was derived from estimates made during the base realignment

and closure (BRAC) decision-making process for each round. As of

March 31, 1998, DOD reports that the number of jobs actually created at

these activities exceeded 49,000. Over time, the number of jobs created

will increase as more bases are closed or realigned and additional

redevelopment occurs. As a result, the recovery rate, which provides a

rough indicator of how base reuse is contributing to the economic

recovery of BRAC-affected communities, will also increase. The data

presented in the table do not include the job losses from base closures that

may have occurred elsewhere in a community, nor do they capture jobs

created from other economic activity in the area.

Base

Estimated

civilian

jobs lost Jobs created

Recovery

(percent)

Alameda Naval Air Station and Naval Aviation Depot 3,228 598 18.53

Army Materials Technology Lab (Watertown) 540 0 0

Barbers Point Naval Air Stationa 618 0 0

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminala 2,015 0 0

Bergstrom Air Force Base 927 53 5.72

Carswell Air Force Base 869 688 79.17

Castle Air Force Base 1,149 1,881 163.71

Cecil Field Naval Air Stationa 995 0 0

Chanute Air Force Base 1,035 1,416 136.81

Charleston Naval Complex 6,272 3,087 49.22

Chase Field Naval Air Station 956 1,290 134.94

Eaker Air Force Base 777 416 53.54

El Toro Marine Corps Air Station 979 0 0

England Air Force Base 682 1,527 223.90

Fitzsimons Army Medical Centera 1,612 54 3.35

Ft. Benjamin Harrison 4,240 563 13.28

Ft. Devens 2,178 1,470 67.49

Ft. Dix 2,186 0 0

Ft. Greelya 291 0 0

Ft. McClellana 2,156 0 0

(continued)

Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix II 

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major Base

Realignments and Closures During the Four

Rounds

Base

Estimated

civilian

jobs lost Jobs created

Recovery

(percent)

Ft. Ord 2,835 1,135 40.04

Ft. Pickett 245 61 24.90

Ft. Ritchiea 1,373 21 1.53

Ft. Sheridan 1,681 20 1.19

Gentile Air Force Station 2,804 1,819 64.87

George Air Force Base 506 673 133.00

Glenview Naval Air Station 389 52 13.37

Griffiss Air Force Base 1,191 1,175 98.66

Grissom Air Force Base 792 402 50.76

Guam Naval Complex 980 705 71.94

Homestead Air Force Base 136 388 285.29

Indianapolis Naval Air Warfare Center 2196 2,010 91.53

Jefferson Proving Ground 387 10 2.58

Kelly Air Force Basea 10,912 144 1.32

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base 788 657 83.38

Lexington Army Depot 1,131 379 33.51

Long Beach Naval Complex 4,487 200 4.46

Loring Air Force Base 1,311 588 44.85

Louisville Naval Surface Warfare Station 1,435 501 34.91

Lowry Air Force Base 2,275 1,490 65.49

March Air Force Base 997 443 44.43

Mare Island Naval Shipyard 7,567 1,038 13.72

Mather Air Force Base 1,012 1,807 178.56

McClellan Air Force Basea 8,828 0 0

Memphis Defense Distribution Depot 1,289 185 14.35

Memphis Naval Air Station 250 39 15.60

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base 784 926 118.11

Newark Air Force Base 1,760 887 50.40

Norton Air Force Base 2,133 2,490 116.74

Oakland Naval Complexab 2,834 0 0

Ogden Defense Distribution Depot 1,105 130 11.76

Orlando Naval Training Centera 753 1,125 149.40

Pease Air Force Base 400 1,385 346.25

Philadelphia Defense Personnel Supply Centerab 1,485 300 20.20

Philadelphia Naval Complex 8,119 528 6.50

Plattsburgh Air Force Base 352 249 70.74

Presidio of San Francisco 3,150 1,779 56.48

(continued)

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix II 

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major Base

Realignments and Closures During the Four

Rounds

Base

Estimated

civilian

jobs lost Jobs created

Recovery

(percent)

Reese Air Force Base 1,238 104 8.40

Red River Army Depota 386 5 1.30

Sacramento Army Depot 3,164 5,000 158.03

San Diego Naval Training Center 402 8 1.99

Savanna Army Depota 436 0 0

Seneca Army Depota 273 0 0

Sierra Army Depota 374 44 11.76

Staten Island Naval Station 1,001 50 5.00

Stratford Army Engineering Plant 1,400 5 0.36

St. Louis Aviation Troop Command 4,263 0 0

Tooele Army Depot 1,942 577 29.71

Treasure Island Naval Station 454 1,703 375.11

Tustin Marine Corps Air Stationa 348 0 0

Vint Hill Farms Station 1,472 30 2.04

Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center 2,311 277 11.99

Williams Air Force Base 728 1,418 194.78

Wurtsmith Air Force Base 690 1,070 155.07

Total 135,259 49,075 36.28

Note: The number of “estimated civilian jobs lost” is a projection of DOD civilian and contractor

personnel losses at the major BRAC bases for the four rounds, even though such losses may not

have actually occurred as yet, particularly at BRAC bases that have not yet completed

realignment or closure. The number of “jobs created” included only civilian jobs created at major

BRAC locations as of March 31, 1998.

aThese are remaining base closures and realignments that have not been completed; the

estimated jobs lost for these bases are 34,624 and the jobs created are 1,393.

bThe Oakland Naval Complex includes Oakland Naval Hospital, Oakland Army Base, and

Oakland Fleet Industrial Supply Center. Philadelphia Defense Personnel Supply Center includes

the Philadelphia Clothing Factory and Philadelphia Defense Personnel Supply Center.

Source: DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment, as of March 31, 1998.

Page 88 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix III 

Status of Property Disposition at Selected

Bases Visited

We performed work at seven BRAC bases to gain a sense of the property

transfer mechanisms—public benefit transfers, economic development

conveyences, or sales—being used to dispose of unneeded property. The

bases selected for visits represent a mix of military service and BRAC round

closures or realignments, as follows:

• Mather Air Force Base, California—a 1988 round base closing in 1993;

• Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado—a 1991 round base closing in 1994;

• Cameron Station, Virginia—a 1988 round base closing in 1995;

• Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah—a 1995 round base closing in

1997;

• Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia—a 1993 round base closing in 1997;

• Tooele Army Depot, Utah—a 1993 round base realigning in 1997; and

• Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California—a 1993 round base closing in 1996.

Mather Air Force Base

Mather Air Force Base, located on 5,716 acres near Sacramento,

California, enjoyed a long history as a military installation. The

base was first activated in 1918 as an airfield and combat pilot

training school, then placed on inactive status from 1922 until

1930 and again from 1932 until 1941. The base was used for pilot

and navigator training activities during World War II and

continued as a training center after the war. It was selected for

closure in the 1988 BRAC round and closed in September 1993.

Property Disposition: The Air Force and Sacramento County

are in negotiations for the sale of 329 acres containing 1,271

housing units and 176 acres containing a golf course. The

county is acquiring another 771 acres through an economic

development conveyance at a cost of about $8 million with no

down payment and no payment during the first 5 years. As of

June 1998, about 55 acres of the property requested under the

economic development conveyance had been transferred by

title and the remaining property was under lease. Specifically,

the Air Force executed one deed under the early transfer

authority (see ch. 4) and is processing a second early transfer

deed for the remaining acreage. Public benefit conveyances

included 2,875 acres for an airport, 1,470 acres for local parks,

34 acres for homeless services and a housing center; and 43

acres for schools and churches. The balance is used by federal

and state agencies, including 31 acres for a California National

Guard unit.

(continued)

Page 89 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix III 

Status of Property Disposition at Selected

Bases Visited

Lowry Air Force Base

Lowry is located on 1,866 acres in a suburban area between

Denver and Aurora. The base was originally established in 1937

as an Army Air Corps technical school. It was selected for

closure in the 1991 round and closed in September 1994.

Property Disposition: The Lowry Redevelopment Authority,

representing the cities of Denver and Aurora, is the lead agency

for redeveloping the former military base. It is pursuing about

755 acres through an economic development conveyance and

about 580 acres through a negotiated sale. As of June 1998,

about 310 acres had been deeded. The sale price was 

$32.5 million, with a 15-year repayment schedule. Parcels

totaling about 115 acres are being retained by the Air Force.

Several public benefit transfers are planned for educational

(220 acres), recreational (175 acres), and homeless (25 acres)

use. The homeless service providers agreed to accept 10

percent of existing base housing and a federal grant (plus local

matching funds) to purchase about 200 units in a five-county

area.

Cameron Station

Cameron Station, located in Alexandria, Virginia, provided

logistical and administrative support to the local military district. It

was selected for closure in the 1988 BRAC round and closed in

1995.

Property Disposition: Plans were to make 165 excess acres

available to the community for redevelopment. Accordingly, 64

acres were granted to the city of Alexandria through a public

benefit transfer, and a competitive bid sale of 101 acres to a

developer provided the Army with $33.3 million in revenue.

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden

Defense Depot Ogden was established in Ogden, Utah, in 1941

and was used to store, maintain, and ship a variety of materials

for DOD and other agencies. The site encompasses about 1,128

acres and is located 35 miles north of Salt Lake City. The depot

was selected for closure in the 1995 BRAC round and closed in

September 1997.

Property Disposition: Army plans indicate that the local reuse

authority has requested about 1,020 acres through an

economic development conveyance. The remaining property

will be divided between a military enclave and a public benefit

conveyance for a nature center. Although no property had been

transferred as of June 1998, an interim master lease was in

place.

Vint Hill Farms Station

Vint Hill Farms Station is located in northern Virginia, about 40

miles from Washington, D.C. It includes 721 acres of land, of

which 148 acres are developed. The Army purchased the land in

1942 and used it as a signal school, signal training center, and

refitting station. After World War II, the installation engaged in

communication intelligence activities. It was selected for closure

in the 1993 BRAC round and closed in September 1997.

Property Disposition: An application for an economic

development conveyance was submitted to the Army in April

1997. Negotiations are complete and as of July 1998, the Army

was awaiting final agreement by the local reuse authority.

Payment terms are $925,000 for the real property and some

personal property. Payments are to be made in equal amounts

beginning in year 8 and concluding in year 15, at an interest

rate of 7.625 percent commencing upon transfer of the

property, expected sometime during spring 1999. Although no

property has been formally transferred, the Army has approved

several interim leases to the reuse authority. Following final

approval of the economic development conveyance, the Army

intends to execute a lease in furtherance of conveyance for

land to support development of a golf course.

(continued)

Page 90 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix III 

Status of Property Disposition at Selected

Bases Visited

Tooele Army Depot

Tooele Army Depot is a 25,172-acre installation located 35 miles

west of Salt Lake City. Originally established and constructed as

an ordnance depot in 1942, it began operating as a storage,

supply, and repair depot in 1947. By 1993 there were three main

missions at the depot: ammunition operations, ammunition

equipment design and development, and the overhaul of military

locomotives and rail-mounted generators. Although the base is

remaining open, a 1993 BRAC recommendation to close and

transfer the ammunition operations and overhaul missions has

led to actions to dispose of 1,707 acres, completed in September

1997.

Property Disposition: The local reuse authority requested

approximately 1,700 acres via a rural no-cost economic

development conveyance. The first portion of the excess

property, about 42 acres, which includes a 400,000-square foot

state-of-art consolidated maintenance facility, was transferred in

June 1996 to the local reuse authority, which later sold it to

Penske Corporation. Subsequent to the economic development

conveyance application, the local reuse authority and the Army

began discussions of expediting the property transfer using the

section 334 early transfer authority. Nine leases were executed

in 1996 at the local reuse authority’s request to facilitate initial

reuse of the property. Additionally, a lease in furtherance of

conveyance for 1,447 acres was completed in September 1997.

Mare Island Naval Shipyard

Mare Island occupies a 4,895-acre peninsula at the northeastern

edge of San Francisco Bay and includes approximately 1,400

acres adjacent to the city of Vallejo. From the mid-1800s until its

closure, it operated as a naval shipyard, conducting numerous

industrial activities. It was selected for closure in the 1993 BRAC

round and closed in March 1996.

Property Disposition: The city applied for an economic

development conveyance of 1,412 acres, which covers most,

but not all, of the land excessed in January 1996. It is expected

to be approved in February 1999. While the Navy continues to

hold title to the property, it has agreed to an interim lease that

allows the city to sublease facilities. The ultimate plan for the

property (mostly wetlands) covers 8 years and includes a

$26-million loan from the Navy for infrastructure improvements.

Under the agreement, about 3629 acres will revert to California

and DOD will retain about 35 acres. About 170 acres will be

divided among three federal agencies: the Fish and Wildlife

Service, the Forest Service, and the Coast Guard.

Approximately 50 percent of Mare Island is subject to the

Tidelands Trust. Most of this land will revert to the state.

However, some of this land is to be conveyed to the local reuse

authority and the Tidelands Trust would restrict development

and conflicts with some elements of the reuse plan. The city

and the State Lands Commission are working to resolve these

issues.

Page 91 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix IV 

Selected Environmental Laws and

Regulations Pertinent to Cleanup at BRAC

Bases

Property disposals resulting from BRAC rounds are governed by various

laws and regulations relating to the disposal of unneeded government

property, environmental cleanup, and the protection of natural and

cultural resources. DOD must comply with these laws and regulations

shown below in order to put BRAC property back into reuse by either

federal or nonfederal users.

Title Summary

Primary sources of authority

Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-526, 102 

Stat. 2627) and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of

1990 (P.L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808), 10 U.S.C. 2687 Note

Requires DOD to comply with a variety of laws—including the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA) and the National Environmental Policy

Act—to effect federal real property disposal at most BRAC

installations.

CERCLA, section 120, 42 U.S.C. 9620 Defines the roles for the Environmental Protection Agency, state

agencies, and DOD components. Section 120 compliance is

required for all federal facilities, including BRAC bases. Generally

requires for that all remedial action necessary to protect human

health and the environment has been taken prior to property

transfer. Also requires the federal government to assume financial

responsibility for any additional cleanup of DOD-caused pollution

discovered in the future.

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan, 40 C.F.R. part 300

Sets criteria for an installation’s inclusion on the National Priorities

List (NPL). Establishes procedures for conducting response

actions.

Executive Order 12580 Authorizes DOD components to conduct site investigations and

cleanups.

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, section 211,

10 U.S.C. 2701

Used as the basis for the Defense Environmental Restoration

Program. Authorizes removal of unexploded ordnance and unsafe

buildings and debris on BRAC bases.

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C 4331 Defines the process for examining potential impacts to the

environment that may result from disposition of BRAC installation

property. Requires that reuse alternatives are identified and

characterized and that the environmental impacts associated with

each are disclosed.

State laws and other statutes CERCLA section 120(a)(4) states that “State laws concerning

removal and remedial actions, including State laws regarding

enforcement, shall apply to removal and remedial action at

facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or

instrumentality of the United States when such facilities are not

included in the National Priorities List.”

Other relevant federal environmental laws

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. Establishes the framework for managing solid and hazardous

wastes. Applies to both NPL and non-NPL installations.

Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. Regulates specific chemical substances, including

polychlorinated biphenyls and asbestos.

(continued)

Page 92 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix IV 

Selected Environmental Laws and

Regulations Pertinent to Cleanup at BRAC

Bases

Title Summary

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C.

1251, et seq.

Regulates discharges of pollutants into waters. Requires the

establishment of criteria and standards to protect water quality.

Requires federal permits for dredge and fill operations.

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f, et seq. Establishes regulations to protect human health from

contaminants in drinking water.

Clean Air Act 42, U.S.C. 7418 Regulates releases of pollutants into the air.

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 135,

et seq.

Establishes a registration program for pesticides. Governs

disposal of pesticides.

Other selected federal laws affecting land use

American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996 Protects and preserves access to religious sites of Native

Americans.

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 469 Protects historic or archaeological resources threatened by

federal dams or construction projects.

Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 668 Governs activities and facilities that may threaten protected birds.

Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464 Requires federal agencies to observe state Coastal Zone

Management Plans for activities near shorelines.

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531-1544 Protects threatened and endangered species and their habitats.

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. 663 Requires federal agencies to consider the effect of their land and

water use activities on fish and wildlife.

National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470 Establishes a program for the preservation of designated historic

properties throughout the nation.

Water Resources Development Acts, 33 U.S.C. 2283 and 2317 Establishes a national goal of no net loss of wetlands. Provides for

mitigation of negative effects of water resource projects on fish

and wildlife.

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. 1271 Preserves and protects the free-flowing condition of designated

rivers.

Page 93 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 94 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 95 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Barry W. Holman, Associate Director

James R. Reifsnyder, Evaluator-in-Charge

Kay Kuhlman, Senior Evaluator

Richard R. Irving, Evaluator

San Francisco Field

Office

Julie M. Hirshen, Senior Evaluator

Randolph D. Jones, Senior Evaluator

Alexandra Y. Martin-Arseneau, Senior Evaluator

Jonathan M. Silverman, Communications Analyst

Karen D. Wright, Evaluator

Page 96 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Page 97 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Related GAO Products

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and

Closure (GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998).

Military Base Closures: Issues Related to Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request

(GAO/NSIAD-98-169, July 30, 1998).

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Reform

Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, Mar. 18, 1998).

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds

(GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

Military Base Closures: Detailed Budget Requests Could Improve Visibility

(GAO/NSIAD-97-170, July 14, 1997).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,

Sept. 18, 1996).

Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup

Requires Difficult Choices (GAO/NSIAD-96-172, Sept. 5, 1996).

Military Bases: Potential Reductions to the Fiscal Year 1997 Base Closure

Budget (GAO/NSIAD-96-158, July 15, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Military Bases: Challenges in Identifying and Implementing Closure

Recommendations (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-107, Feb. 23, 1995).

Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations

(GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-3, Nov. 1, 1994).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selecting Process

for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

Page 98 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Related GAO Products

Military Bases: Varied Processes Used in Proposing Base Closures and

Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-133, Mar. 1, 1991).

Military Bases: Process Used by Services for January 1990 Base Closure

and Realignment Proposals (GAO/NSIAD-91-109, Jan. 7, 1991).

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and Closure

Recommendations (GAO/NSIAD-90-42, Nov. 29, 1989).

(709278) Page 99 GAO/NSIAD-99-36 Military Base Closures
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100