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38–111 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–57]

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI POLICE

SERVICE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

MAY 24, 2007
(II)

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JEFF MILLER, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

SUZANNE MCKENNA, Professional Staff Member

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member

SASHA ROGERS, Staff Assistant
(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, May 24, 2007, Development of the Iraqi Police Service ..................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, May 24, 2007 .......................................................................................... 41

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2007

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 4

Meehan, Hon. Marty, a Representative from Massachusetts, Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 1

WITNESSES

Swengros, Col. Richard W., Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School, U.S. Army; Col. Robert J. Coates, Assistant Chief of Staff

for Training and Experimentation Group, First Marine Expeditionary, U.S.

Marine Corps; and Lt. Col. Robert E. McCarthy, Executive Officer, Fifth

Marine Regiment beginning on ........................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 49

Coates, Col. Robert J. ....................................................................................... 57

Meehan, Hon. Marty ........................................................................................ 45

Swengros, Col. Richard W. .............................................................................. 52

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... 75

(1)

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 24, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:11 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Marty Meehan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MEEHAN. Good morning. Today the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations meets to continue its examination of the

development of Iraqi Security Forces. The focus of today’s hearing

is Iraqi Police Service, or IPS.

The discussion of the Iraqi Security Forces tends to focus on the

Iraqi army and the national police, but there is also a large Iraqi

Police Service force that is intended to carry out a community policing function. They are the traffic cops, the patrolmen and the local

beat cops who are essential to the counterinsurgency effort as well

as establishment of the rule of law. We have witnesses here today

who have been working directly with the IPS and can tell us about

their experiences in advising and mentoring them.

Before we get to our witnesses, I want to bring the subcommittee

up to date on the status of the Defense Department’s compliance

with our first document request, given the discussion that we had

in the subcommittee on Tuesday.

On March 20th, Mr. Akin and I asked for four documents that

we considered essential to studying the development of the Iraqi

Security Forces. Among other documents, we asked for the classified April 2006 Joint Multinational Forces-Iraq and U.S. Embassy

Baghdad Campaign Plan as well as its predecessors and any subsequent revisions to it. Yesterday, we received some of the documents

we requested including part of the Joint Campaign Plan. We anticipate receiving the campaign plan annexes shortly.

The bad news is, before we received a copy, we already read yesterday’s Washington Post article outlining the details of the plan

that will replace the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan. In other words,

March 20th we asked for the documents and yesterday we read

about it in the Washington Post; and I am concerned that the press

had access to this before anyone in Congress saw it, and I do believe the DOD should pursue the leakers to the full extent of the

law.
2

That having been said, we have been assured that once Secretary

Gates signs off on the strategy, it will be delivered to us immediately.

The new plan, if approved by Secretary Gates, appears to contain

a notable shift. As reported in the Post, the new plan shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to

Iraqi Security Forces. The Post goes on to say that one of the

sources of the article—and apparently there are many sources,

some quoted by name—have said that the United States drive to

make Iraqi forces independent has already limited U.S. leverage.

Needless to say, the subcommittee will need additional information regarding the new plan and in particular, its reported annex

on ISF policy.

Moving to today, we had hoped to have two panels of witnesses.

We had asked the Department of Defense to provide appropriate

witnesses who could talk about the DOD plans and efforts to establish, plan and assess the progress of the Iraqi Police Service. I

asked specifically that witnesses be able to provide testimony on

the following issues:

The IPS’s role in and contributions to stabilizing the security

conditions in Iraq; IPS’s role in the counterinsurgency effort; and

how the IPS is managed between the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments.

Unfortunately, the DOD responded that the one witness who

could meet the subcommittee’s need for this first panel is Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, and since General Dempsey could

not be here today, we asked for witnesses who have been very involved in the development of ISF and IPS who are located in the

Washington area. Specifically, we asked if General George Casey

could testify.

Before becoming Army Chief of Staff, General Casey was the

commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq and he reportedly declared the year 2006 as the ‘‘Year of the Police.’’

We also asked for General Chiarelli, who currently is serving at

the Pentagon. General Chiarelli was the previous commander of

the Multinational Corps in Iraq. The Multinational Corps commander assumes the operation and control of the ISF units once

they have been formed, and he could have provided his insight into

the importance of developing a capable and professional police

force.

I think either general could have helped us better understand

the evolution and development of the ISF and the IPS. So there

will be no first panel today to discuss the Department’s plans to

establish the IPS.

In reference to our requests for this past Tuesday and today, Secretary Gates assures us that General Dempsey will appear before

the subcommittee on June 12th. After hearing about the plans, policy and progress of IPS development, we wanted to hear about how

this actually works on the ground.

We appreciate that, for our second panel, the Department has allowed us those people who have hands-on experience to join us. I

would ask witnesses for the second panel to join us at the witness

table now.
3

We are very pleased to have several witnesses today who can discuss their personal experiences in the development of IPS. General

Richard Swengros oversees the training of the Army police transition teams as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School at Ford Leonard Wood Missouri. He also established the Police Partner Program when he served in Iraq as Commander of the 42nd Military Police Brigade from November of 2004

to November 2005.

Colonel Robert Coates served as Assistant Chief of Staff for the

1st Marine Expeditionary Force and was responsible for supporting

the transition teams working with ISF in Al Anbar Province. Now

he is the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Training/Experimentation

Group and is overseeing Police Transition Team training for the

1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert McCarthy, also from the Marine

Corps, has returned this past February after serving as a Police

Transition Team leader in Al Anbar.

We also have 1st Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, who serves as the

Headquarters Detachment Commander of the 372nd MP Battalion

of the DC National Guard. Lieutenant Bridges returned from Iraq

in February after serving as a Police Transition Team coordinator

in Baghdad.

Finally, joining us is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Felling of the Air

Force who just returned from four months in Iraq last Wednesday.

We are pleased that, on late notice, Colonel Felling, after returning

Wednesday, is here before this committee.

I want to thank all of you for your outstanding service to the

United States and thank all of you for being here. And we look forward to your testimony.

I would note that Colonel Swengros and Colonel Coates have prepared statements that will be made a part of the record; and we

will turn to you two gentlemen for any brief opening statements

that you can make, following Mr. Akin.

To encourage discussion, we would like to follow the same procedures that we have been following in the committee, and that is

that we will dispense with the five-minute rule during the hearing,

so there can be some give-and-take with the outstanding witnesses

that we have. I would also like to remind everyone that this is an

open hearing so no classified information should be discussed.

Before I turn to Mr. Akin for any opening remarks, I would like

to take a moment to share news from Iraq. It drives home, I think,

how critical and dangerous the mission that we are discussing is.

Last week an Air Force staff sergeant, John Self, was killed in

Iraq; and he was a part of a police training team much like the

ones that we are discussing here today. And all of our thoughts are

with his family. He was on his fourth tour in Iraq.

Now I would like to turn to my partner on this committee, Mr.

Todd Akin, for any remarks that he would have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]
4

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning to our

witnesses. Thank you all for coming. We are looking forward to

your comments.

Over the course of this investigation, it is becoming increasingly

apparent that the Iraqi Police Service, the IPS, nominally part of

the Iraqi Security Forces, is really a unique organization that requires its own analysis and discussions separate from the Iraqi

army or the National Police. Despite being critical to our effort in

Iraq and the fact that nearly half the security forces we have

trained belong to the Iraqi Police Service, it has been remarkably

difficult to get information about the efforts of the police transition

teams. Along that vein, I want to thank the Department for supporting this important hearing and the ones to follow in June.

If defeating sectarianism and marginalizing militias are paramount to success in Iraq, then the Iraqi Police Service that ensures

law and order and has the respect and trust of the local communities is absolutely essential. A community that relies on the IPS

for safety is a community that will not turn to militias.

It seems to me, as the strategic framework for prioritizing our

police training effort, the police transition teams are an essential

piece of the effort to execute this strategy. I am looking forward to

hearing from our witnesses on this.

Some of the issues I would like for the witnesses to touch on will

be:

First, the competency of the police stations your PTT worked

with, and the extent the Ministry of Interior involved itself in the

work of these police stations;

Second, whether the IPS you worked with was able to carry out

nominal law-and-order police work or they were forced to support

counterinsurgency operations;

Three, the extent of militia infiltration in the police stations you

oversaw; and

Four, how the chain of command supported your efforts.

Once again, thank you all for joining us. We are looking forward

to your testimony.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.

Colonel Swengros and Colonel Coates, if you could proceed with

your opening statements.
5

STATEMENT OF COL. RICHARD W. SWENGROS, ASSISTANT

COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, U.S.

ARMY; COL. ROBERT J. COATES, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR TRAINING AND EXPERIMENTATION GROUP, FIRST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND LT. COL.

ROBERT E. MCCARTHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT

STATEMENT OF COL. RICHARD W. SWENGROS

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. Thank you Chairman Meehan Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the committee. It is my

pleasure to appear before this committee today and give my testimony on the police transition teams and the work of our soldiers

in Iraq and at the U.S. Army Military Police School as we support

their transition team efforts.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you have my opening statement, and if

I could, I will go ahead and summarize to allow more time.

I have been in the Army nearly 31 years, all in the military police. I started out as a private. As I attained the rank of staff sergeant I went to OCS, commissioned as a second lieutenant. I have

had every military police type of duty the Army offers, in corrections, detention operations, military police companies and our

Criminal Investigation Command.

I do keep in contact with the senior military police leaders that

are in Iraq today, and in Afghanistan, as we move forward to develop and enhance the transition team efforts from our bases here

in the United States.

In my experiences in Kosovo and now in Iraq I observed that

building police capabilities in a Third World nation that is encumbered by fallen regimes and police that were part of the oppressive

societies is absolutely the most complex thing I have ever done in

my life. I have done it twice in my first rotation in Kosovo and then

in a third rotation Iraq.

My first day after the transition of authority as brigade commander, I went to a squadron on the west side of Tigris River in

Baghdad and said, I am the new brigade commander. What can I

do to help you in your mission? At that point, it wasn’t a transition

team; it was a program, it was military police squads operating in

the police stations. And the squad leader, without missing a beat,

said, You have got to fix the headquarters.

You can’t just fix the police stations. It has got to be a topdown—from the top all the way down to the bottom approach to

how we fix the problems.

So I took that in. The next day, I am out on the east side of the

Tigris, found a platoon leader out there, asked the same question.

These are different units, different commanders, different brigades

they are working for, and this lieutenant almost verbatim said the

same thing. She said, You have to fix the hierarchy. You have to

fix the structures at the same time you are fixing the police stations because what is happening, as we develop the police station

capability, there are transfers, there are pay problems, there are a

whole number of things that pull away from what the police stations are trying to do.
6

So I went back to my staff, and we sat down and we basically figured out, in order to do this, we had to partner with more than

just our squads; we had to partner with our brigade battalion

staffs. And we formed in early 2005 with General Chiarelli and

Brigadier General Jones the Police Partnership Program. It was

centered specifically at this point in Baghdad, and then by the time

I left—in Iraq, when I first started, we had about 70 teams I could

put out in my entire brigade, and now you are facing almost 230

police transition teams out there. Their number is still growing;

about 85 percent of the stations are being partnered with in one

fashion or another as they go through and address the various

problems and situations that are out in Iraq.

As a result of our working with the current police transition

teams over there, military police school was trying to level the

playing field. When you go over there as a new unit it is more than

just a transition from a right-seat ride to a left-seat ride. There is

a transition process in learning, one month, two months, three

months, whatever that dynamic is, to figure out what forms you

have to fill out.

So we develop a training support package and we now teach it

as a five-day course. We teach, both residents and a military training team, we go out to the units and we will train them on Police

Transition Team. And it is a package of slides and briefings that

will allow units to train on what the PTT program is about, so

when they get in country, all that learning aspect is diminished

and they can concentrate really on who is operating in the area

and how they can make effectiveness quickly at the same time that

the enemy, if you will, operates to undermine or to take advantage

of that scene that typically takes place when we transition units.

Challenges continue to be the environment, the groups vying for

population control; that is, organized crime, criminals, insurgents,

terrorists, political or tribal parties. The number of PTTs, the number of interpreters with each PTT, all those get out the program.

This part of the program is the best chance for success, but it

will take time. It is an expensive effort under trying circumstances.

There are a great majority of Iraqis and Iraqi police who are

grateful for our efforts and are trying to effect change. And we saw

that. We see it in their efforts. We see it in their eyes. Through

my current job, again, I stay in contact. And it is the same feedback we are getting from folks who are returning. I think you will

hear that today from the panel.

I would like to thank this committee again for your time and interest in the Police Transition Team program, and I will be happy

to answer any questions.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you Colonel.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Swengros can be found in the

Appendix on page 52.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel Coates.

STATEMENT OF COL. ROBERT J. COATES

Colonel COATES. Sir, Chairman, Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you this morning to discuss the Marine Corps advisory efforts

in the Iraqi police development in Al Anbar Province. First, on be-
7

half of all marines and sailors and their families, I want to thank

you for your continued support off our Corps as we continue to

fight on in the war on terror.

In February 2006 the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, or I MEF,

created a separate staff section, the G–10, to oversee not only all

Iraqi Security Force development in Al Anbar Province but the formal training of all U.S. Marine Corps and transition teams stemming from I MEF.

As you are aware, we have transition teams assigned to the Iraqi

Army, the Iraqi Police Service, and the Border Protection Service.

Through the IPS, February 2006, approximately 2,143 policemen

were assigned to Anbar Province with an additional 1,599 in training. However, many of these assigned policemen were not actively

working.

There are 10 police districts identified in Al Anbar Province, but

only four of these police districts were operating at that time, with

a total of 14 police stations.

Two of these districts in many of the stations were barely functioning. The provincial headquarters was not operational. The only

truly functioning police force is the City of Fallujah.

The Iraqi Police initiative in Al Anbar to date provides the Coalition the most direct method of Sunni engagement for the populace.

Iraqi Police are nationally controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, the MOI, and are organized along military lines with regard

to rank structures, and distinguished between sworn officers and

policemen. I might add, officers are the ones that have the real authority, the arrest authority and such, and the policemen are more

like an enlisted rank structure.

The Principal Director of the Police, or the PDoP, is appointed

for each province and works directly for the governor of the Province, while adhering to ministerial policies and regulations. The

chief of police appointed in each district is responsible for the management of all stations within the district.

Iraqi Police recruiting in Al Anbar faced many challenges during

most of 2006. Al Qaeda was conducting a ruthless murder and intimidation campaign against the then-fledgling Iraqi Police, causing much of the local populace to adopt a wait-and-see attitude

with regard to Iraqi Police, this wait-and-see attitude exacerbated

by tribal affiliations where prospective recruits must obtain permission from the Sheiks to join the Iraqi Police.

The recruiting process heavily taxed Coalition Forces to provide

adequate security, as recruiting locations made attractive targets

for the insurgents. Of course this created great pause in the minds

of potential recruits. Many of those individuals brave enough to

enter recruiting stations were rejected due to literacy or lack of

proper identification. Once properly screened, the recruit must

graduate from a preapproved police academy such as the Baghdad

Police Force or the Jordanian International Police Training Center,

JIPTC. Upon graduation, the MOI issues hiring orders for new policemen and assigns them to a home province. Policemen who formerly served in the IP could also rejoin the service by attending

a three-week transition integration program refresher course.

From February 2006 to February 2007, all equipment issued to

the IP was from Coalition Forces. During that first half of 2006,
8

Iraqi Police lacked basic equipment, to include vehicles, weapons,

body armor, radios and communications infrastructure. This impacted operations throughout the year. Logistics support was also

an issue. An example of this was a lack of fuel for the Iraqi Police

vehicles. There is no MOI funding for Iraqi fuel nor is there any

infrastructure to hold and distribute fuel.

Problems associated with Iraqi equipment was eventually overcome when large shipments of gear were delivered to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar in the last half of 2006.

Iraqi Police in Al Anbar Province lacked ministerial support from

central government and was unfailingly prioritized last, as with all

other major government programs. Local government tribal support, however, provided the impetus to expand the Iraqi Police in

the province, allowing it to grow to its current size.

Perhaps the greatest factor in sustaining Iraqi Police is pay.

When I MEF arrived in Al Anbar Province, police hadn’t been paid

in four months. The PDoP was arrested for stealing Iraqi Police

(IP) salaries. Baghdad Treasury withheld all police funds from Al

Anbar. Extensive Coalition involvement was required to restart the

pay process because the Baghdad Treasury did not trust provincial

police officials to do so. Restarting the pay process was essential to

recruiting Iraqi Police.

Iraqi Police Service was not designed similarly to fight an insurgency but is an essential element to fighting the insurgency. This

required Coalition and Iraqi Army Forces to set conditions that

would allow the Iraqi Police to conduct day-to-day operations. Coalition and Iraqi units also provided quick reaction forces for the

Iraqi Police in emergency situations. Today there are many locations throughout al Anbar where our Iraqi Police have established

security to a level for allowing schools and shops to open for the

first time in years.

There are no existing criminal courts or judges in Al Anbar Province. This has created obvious problems for the police as there is

no established system of justice outside the Central Criminal Court

of Iraq. The CCCI’s focus was on the prosecution of insurgents,

which neglected the prosecution of common criminals. This greatly

hampered police operations.

There are no existing prisons in Al Anbar Province. Police could

turn the insurgents over to the Coalition for detention, and the regional detention facility only possessed small jails within the police

stations to hold common criminals. These were almost always, always, always overcrowded.

Construction of Iraqi Police facilities was problematic. Threats

and attacks against contractors slowed or halted many of these

projects. In addition, proof of land ownership further delayed many

projects as titles and deeds to most land did not exist, making this

requirement nearly impossible to satisfy.

Al Anbar Iraqi Police are mentored by both U.S. Army and Marine Police Transition Teams or PTTs. Many of these teams proved

to be difficult initially, and a U.S. Army Military Police (MP) battalion was originally tasked to source these teams but was diverted

to Baghdad, leaving only a company in place to provide PTTs. I

MEF created 15 additional PTTs from personnel from staff positions and line units to fill the gap.
9

During the initial stages of the PTT program PTTs received local

generalized adviser training. As the PTT program developed, incoming advisors began to receive more specialized PTT-centric instruction at Camp Fallujah, followed by more detailed on site the

ten-day training with outgoing PTTs. Today I MEF maintains a

dedicated Advisory Training Group board at Camp Pendleton to

train and prepare all transition teams as well as issuing a PTT

handbook.

And, sir, I brought an example of that handbook for your staff.

And it has been distributed and in no way, sir, is the ‘‘dummies’’

portion in there warranted at any anybody——

Mr. MEEHAN. It is not just for the Congress, anyone that gets the

book——

Colonel COATES. Absolutely not, sir. Upon I MEF’s transfer of authority to II MEF on 9 February 2007, Al Anbar had approximately

10,250 assigned IP. And that is school-qualified IP, sir, formally

trained, with approximately 9,211 walking the beat. Provincial

headquarters in all ten districts were operational with a total of 40

active police stations. The IP are being paid on time each month,

and also receive additional funds for operations and maintenance.

The IP are invaluable not only for the security they provide, but

also for the ground level intelligence on local insurgent activities.

During December 2006 to February 2007, four graduating police

academies, each ranging in size from 550 to 1,300, reported to more

than 40 police locations throughout Al Anbar, equipped with complete equipment kits and vehicles, as well as on good pay status.

The Iraqi Police officer has been the subject of much violence in

Al Anbar. Often one to two police officers are killed daily or murdered on a daily basis. That is an indicator of what their impact

has been upon the al Qaeda insurgency. No question in recent

months the IP is taking the fight to the insurgency in Al Anbar

Province.

Additionally, in February of 2007, I MEF installed a commercial

satellite Internet system covering all police stations in Al Anbar,

providing first-ever coverage to the Province, resulting in a capability to coordinate and share information.

Iraqi Police Service in Al Anbar Province has proven to be a good

news story. Much of the recent decline in violence there can be directly attributed to their increased presence in the Province as well

as a form of Sunni engagement by both Coalition Forces and the

government in Iraq. I can provide you today with many examples

of bravery on the battlefield that I know of firsthand.

Again, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear

before you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may

have as well as providing any additional information that you require.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much Colonel.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Coates can be found in the

Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel Swengros and Coates, you have been involved in the evolution of the PTT program from an informal approach to a more formal approach. Can you describe for the subcommittee how the program has evolved and what progress you

have seen in the IPS and how that has evolved?
10

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as I said, when we

got over there what I saw was a lot of policing effort but it wasn’t

synchronized and it wasn’t addressing it from the top to bottom. So

from the very start, we had efforts out there to train stations that

I would classify as very desychronized; everybody doing the right

thing, but it wasn’t connected. So we really concentrated on that.

And I took my brigade staff and my logistics officer and non-com- missioned officer (NCO) and they went out and built the capability

in the Baghdad Maintenance Facility. And that included calling

back to Chrysler and Chevrolet and getting parts lists for vehicles

that were sent over by contributing nations but didn’t come with

the right parts sets to repair the damages from the insurgency.

First day in we had—ball peen hammers was all they had. And

that is the complexity I was talking about. So that is the logistics

side.

I can talk about the accountability system, the weapons, when

we got there. I think our mission in 2004 was really—late 2004, we

had lost the police stations in Mosul, we had lost police stations in

a lot of areas. And so our initial focus entering 2005 was the January 2005 elections and getting the police to really be able to defend

themselves.

I think today you will see that most police stations can and do

defend themselves from attack by the insurgents, and that was not

happening at the onset. It took our intelligence folks. And they

helped develop a criminal intelligence. When the police were disbanded, all their expertise went away. Most of your police leadership in Iraq is Army. And, in fact, the year I was there, the only

former policeman that was a Province police chief was the Baghdad

police chief, General Asad. Everybody else was Army.

So it was the leadership management piece of it, but in terms of

policing, it wasn’t there. And that was the same basically as you

go through the stations. It was very difficult to find some seasoned

police folks, because they were run out of the country and they

were able to stabilize that a little bit.

We brought our operations folks and set up command centers to

try to get at the same thing that he talked about in Al Anbar that

we were doing about a year and a half earlier: communications

across Baghdad where they could actually track where people were,

somewhat of a 9/11 system, the tips lines.

The Iraqis are calling the Iraqi Police now and not the Coalition

tip line to provide information on insurgent or criminal activity in

an area.

Our personnel section in brigade and battalions would go out and

work the personnel and pay issues. From my perspective, and I

have worked with the Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs

in my year there, trying to work that piece of it. But as you can

tell, we are starting to get spread between brigades trying to work

Mosul and trying to work Baghdad, being those are our two top priorities, and then trying to work with the Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs.

But we worked on the pay system and the fuel system and what

we saw was when the government transitioned later on that year

in 2005, a lot of the folks that we had been working with then were

removed or replaced by other party members. And we had to basi-
11

cally start, not really from over, but we had to start pretty close

to ground zero again, getting through all the pay problems, the

badging problems, the weapons problems.

A lot of people will talk about the partnership program and ask

how it works, and I think the clearest example is: I went into

Baghdad, I had a lot of questions coming from me, from the MultiNational Corps Iraq (MNC–I). We operated under 18 Airborne

Corps, saying okay, show me this logistics accountability system.

So I said, okay, you give me a security—a serial number of AK–

47 that you issued to me, and I will use the Iraqis to track it down

and tell you where it is. And we were able to track down in 2005—

if we issued a weapon we could track it down to a certain station.

What we found is as we were going through and tracking computers and weapons and vehicles, there are a lot of folks would get

those, and, because of that distrust, they would not issue them out

to stations that they didn’t trust. So they were kept in the Iraqi

Police warehouses. So we had to go down there and stoke the fire

over that system. And that is, again, in a nutshell, some of the

complexity.

But all of it was a success because it was all working in various

stages. I think the issue is that we really have to keep at it for a

lot of different reasons. We have to keep at that program. But the

Iraqis are capable of doing it.

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel, do you have anything to add to that?

Colonel COATES. In regards to the transition teams, Mr. Chairman, you know at first it was very informal. We had a formalized

period of instruction, but I will tell you, you can be very proud of

the marines, the soldiers, and the sailors assigned to those teams.

And Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy can speak firsthand.

Our goal was to set conditions that would allow the police to

thrive and grow which obviously gets initial security established.

And that was a challenge. But in parts of Al Anbar which have

very unique challenges, what you will find today is not uncommon—and we didn’t have this when we first got there—to have an

Iraqi Police section accompany an Iraqi Army unit and a Coalition

unit and have a combined patrol through neighborhoods. And that

was what was really a key success, because there was much mistrust between the Iraqi Army and the IPS initially. And each considered each other terrorists.

So the vehicle with which we brought about that trust or bringing that coordination together was the PTT team and the associations that the PTT team could have with a partnered unit, and

bringing that joint coordination together, which resulted in better

intelligence to where the police went on patrols with the military

and they could point the street-level bad guys out immediately and

tell them what is right, what is left, and so on so forth.

So that was, you know, the real vehicle of getting that done was

the in emplacement of those PTT teams. And also those PTT teams

gave us true visibility of what was going on at the lowest levels

and then bringing it up.

For the ministerial thing, we had no functioning provincial police

headquarters. Our first step of trying to get that provincial police

established or establishing the provincial police so we could get

that ministerial engagement I will tell you, sir, it is very broken
12

at that level. You know, they consider the Government of Baghdad

as the other side of the world. They do not get much in the way

of day-to-day support. We are getting salaries. But the establishment of our provincial headquarters and engaging ministerial level

is absolutely key to sustaining the future.

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy and Lieutenant

Bridges, I wonder if you would introduce yourself and then tell us

where you served. But I am interested in you describing for the

subcommittee what a typical day for a PTT working with the IPS

would be like.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Good morning, Chairman. Lieutenant Colonel Bob McCarthy from the great Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I was in Al Habbaniya.

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you know how many Bob McCarthys I know in

Massachusetts?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Probably 110, sir.

But Colonel Coates threw me into Al Habbaniya that needed

some adult leadership. There were two squads, military police

squads, that were working with a very corrupt lieutenant colonel

in the Iraqi Police Service. And it was a function of leadership dealing with those folks. Unannounced calls, zero 5 to zero 7 to check

posts. Basic leadership supervisory role. Are you manning your

towers? Are you manning your Entry Control Points (ECPs)? Are

you dressed professionally? Are you wearing your uniform properly? Are you carrying your weapon properly to make things safe?

You would have negligent discharges all over the place and it was

unsafe for the soldiers and the marines. We fixed that immediately.

We would screen and vet their rosters over and over and over

again, because you had ghost policemen on the rosters. I mean, the

administrative burden for the soldiers and marines was gigantic.

But you know, basically the task, man training and equipment,

lead, teach, and mentor 24 hours a day. The Military Police Force,

they never left the station. They waited for a call.

In a counterinsurgency environment, they have to be on the

streets because they are there to provide the basic security for the

locals.

We taught them to do dismounted combat patrols. Let’s walk outside your station. Show them how to walk the beat.

We stand off. They walk in front and get them comfortable showing the blue, showing the police uniform on the streets. And the

people started to recognize their efforts and started to actually

bring information regarding criminal activity and insurgent activity to the stations.

Mr. MEEHAN. Can I ask, how did the international police officers,

contractors, how do they fit into this equation?

Colonel MCCARTHY. The way we broke it down into functional

areas we trained the leadership, you know, to operate along functional lines as a staff and do their admin, do their logistics, do

their intelligence, their communications. We taught them basic police and soldierly skills and virtues. And that’s where the police officers came in, you know; our International Police Liaison Officers

(IPLOs), they would teach investigations, the conduct of investigation, over and over and over again. Sensitive site exploitation, how

to gather and maintain a chain of custody on evidence.
13

And staying on top of that—I mean, we taught the investigative

process every day for six months.

Because if I said Chairman Meehan was a bad man, and Colonel

Coates said Chairman Meehan was a bad man, the report would

be that you are a very bad man because we have two statements

that you are a bad man.

Mr. MEEHAN. Sounds like my local newspaper.

Colonel MCCARTHY. But they did great, great work, with just

how to set up a dispatch center; because if they launched a patrol,

they had no battle-tracking capability. It was God willing.

Insha’allah.

You just launched a patrol, and into a very bad neighborhood;

what is the plan, who is the quick reaction force? Now, when are

they checking in, how are you tracking this on a map? How are

you, you know, registering this for your historical records? They

didn’t track that. So we taught them all those things.

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant Bridges.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Good morning.

Mr. MEEHAN. Basically the question is describe, if you would, a

typical day for the PTT working with the IPS and what it would

be like.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Good morning, Chairman Meehan Mr. Akin

and distinguished panel. Thank you all for allowing me to be here.

I am Lieutenant Bridges, and I was a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) commander in the 322nd.

A typical morning for us was getting my team up 04, convoying

out of the gate, getting to the IP station, to find no one there.

Meaning, sir, everyone was fast asleep.

So our job was to try and discipline the IPs at our subprovincial

headquarters. We had a lot of discipline issues. So we couldn’t even

talk about infrastructure or classroom training until we finally got

them to a place of discipline.

Once we got them to put on their uniform, sir, we started classroom instruction. We started to try and teach them things, just as

Colonel McCarthy just noted, just basic policing, basic reporting.

The reporting system within the station, we managed over 5,000

IPs for nine districts, and the reporting system was: Who is at

work today? So all of the officers—I had nine officers, 06s, there

in their Iraqi chain, they would come to me and say we have 10

people here, we have 20 people here.

And actually sir, they wouldn’t have those people there. Typical.

Let’s talk about the afternoon. We would go into the operation

section. Our job was to try and make sure that these Iraqis knew

how to read the maps. We would bring maps for them that were

made for us at the division level, but they did not know how to

read their own maps. So that was a big issue for us, getting them

to know where their patrols and IPs were being dispatched so that

they could track them. So we had a lot of issues there.

Well into the evening our IPs would leave at two o’clock. So we

had a hard time trying to get them to learn how to stay at the station, do overnight operations. We had a lot of issues in the patrol

issues, sir.
14

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant, do you know whether the IPs that

were present were trained by the Coalition? Were they Coalitiontrained?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Are you speaking of the formal training?

Mr. MEEHAN. Yes.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. All of my IPs, sir, had been to the Jordan

Academy or the Baghdad Academy. There were some who had not

received training because they had been IPs for maybe 20 years,

so they did receive refresher training from those academies.

Mr. MEEHAN. One of the thing the members of the committee—

we took a recent trip to Iraq and we toured the JIPTC in Jordan,

and it was stunning to me and the other members of our delegation. The fact that they couldn’t tell us whatever happened to those

people who graduated from what appeared to me to be a pretty

high-quality police training facility.

Before I was elected to Congress I ran a very large district attorney’s office. And the police training operation itself, we were very

impressed with it. But the notion of not knowing who you are

training, whether they show up for work, how long they stay,

whether they move up in the ranks, or whether they were, you

know, Iraqi Police officers or al Qaeda, was very concerning, I

think, to all of us, keeping track of who we are training and where

they end up.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, sir. That process is very frustrating for

us. I have worked alongside the 463rd MP commander and we

would see the recruiting process, sir, from start to end. And I can

tell you if we sent over 80 IPs to Jordan or Baghdad Academy, we

could not account but, I will say, for maybe 50 percent of those IPs

at the end of the 8-week training, and we just could not get a pulse

on what activity was happening at the school that allowed us not

to, you know, battle-track these IPs.

We vetted them, sir. We would go to the recruitment center and

ensure that these civilians would go through the process, take the

test, the doctor say they are good to go, they cough. They are good,

sir. We wait for them to go to training, we can’t find them at the

end of the course. Maybe like I said, we send 80, we can only account for 40, and I don’t even want to impress upon you the

badging process, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. I am interested if anybody else had comments on

this when you think—I think it was mentioned, there were 50,000

Iraqi Police that had been trained; the cost to the United States

was significant. And again, an impressive facility, but not having

any idea whether we were training insurgents, al Qaeda, or people

that really want to be Iraqi security. And the only way we could

identify them, many would come in and give names and no way

really to identify them until we got their identification. Then there

were instances, if they came back for training, and you would

know, you have already been here for training once. But I would

like to hear from all the panelists on this.

Colonel SWENGROS. Mr. Chairman, we also had responsibility for

the Baghdad Police College when I first got there. When I first got

there it was eight weeks and now it is ten weeks. But, as Colonel

Coates was saying, you start looking at training and you start looking at what the curriculum is. It is good training but the first cou-
15

ple of weeks are human rights-type training, little to do with police

work. And we spend a couple weeks on training them how to survive, a lot of time on the ranges and stuff like that, and when you

get down to policing, out of the ten weeks, you may get four weeks

out of it.

I did try to address the same problem we had in 2005. You send

folks to the Academy and they would be expected to go back to a

certain location, because that is where they recruited from. But the

Iraqi Minister of Interior had a different way of doing business.

They would make the assignments. When we were making the assignments we could track it; and we knew, we had accountability

systems. When they track things they do things by paper, and it

is handwritten, and a lot of things get lost. But they will make decisions. And it will be decisions that we may not agree with, but

that was their decision.

The other dynamic of it is that they did have to fill certain provinces. Ninevah Province at one point had 40 percent at some stations. And then you go out to other provinces and they would only

have 60 percent. So I said, okay, let’s try to fill up this other province. You go to fill them up and say here is your assignment instructions; and it is like a New York State trooper, you graduate,

you may not go back to Buffalo, you may go to the New York City

area. They wouldn’t go. There is no way I am going to go to work

in Mosul if I live in Baghdad. I won’t survive back there, and plus

I am not driving back and forth to take care of my family. So there

is a tremendous dynamic there that we don’t have to deal with.

All those pieces lead to exactly what Lieutenant Bridges said. It

is extremely difficult to track them. They do not have a National

ID card, as many times as they have tried to do that. There are

many, many common names out there. And to us a lot of them

really do cause us difficulties in distinguishing who is who.

That dynamic in and of itself makes it extremely difficult, the entire process.

Colonel COATES. Sir, Mr. Chairman, and, again Al Anbar got

kind of a later start, but in the recruiting process nobody was admitted into it unless they had the proper ID card or papers. We

vetted and we conducted biometric identification of everybody in

that process, and, because Al Anbar is unique, most of them would

only join if they could go to their home areas or hometowns. That

was one of the conditions. That was the appeal of the police force,

that they could stay at home rather than be nationally assigned.

The other thing was that they preferred to go to the JIPTC Academy and they found it to be very professional, but because they

were in the Sunni Province, Jordan was a very appealing place to

go.

When they returned, we had handlers assigned. We picked them

up at Baghdad or Al Asad. They were Coalition-escorted or -driven

to their police districts, to police stations, and almost in all cases

the PTT team was there to receive them, to make sure they were

processed at the station. So we also maintained our own rostering

and tracking of all those assigned because we tied it to the payroll

process.
16

If you do not have a graduation certificate with an identification

of hiring order, you weren’t on that, we screened the pay rosters,

your name was not added to that payroll.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Colonel. Before I go to Mr. Akin, I don’t

want to leave out Lieutenant Colonel Felling. And welcome back

from Iraq.

I understand that you were on a military transition team rather

than a Police Transition Team but worked directly with the Iraqi

IPS. Can you describe your experiences with the IPS?

Colonel FELLING. Yes, sir, good morning. My name is Lieutenant

Colonel Brad Felling, and it is a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. Having just come back last Wednesday, I was intimately familiar with the military transition team operations in the Ninawa

and the MND Center-South Province.

Being the Air Force gentleman on the military transition team

staff, my primary role was air support, but there is a very fine line

in this Coalition area between PTTs and MTTs. A lot of the MTT

functions are served with the PTTs as well. It is almost a graduation, if you will, from PTT up to the MTT areas and the military

transition teams are doing fantastic work.

My responsibility was to make sure that they had whatever they

needed outside the wire; specifically to make sure that, one, they

were protected; two, they felt comfortable; and to, three, make sure

that they had any air support that they possibly needed, be it rotary wing or fixed wing.

The primary effort there pre-plus-up was construction and then

post-plus-up was to make sure that we could assimilate out into

the local neighborhood, and that is where the PTT and MTT members were essential, because they were part of the local neighborhoods.

Mothers, fathers, daughters, sons, you name it, we went out

there and we assimilated with them. And as an Air Force aviator,

my job was to make sure that I could impart as much aviation expertise as I possibly could.

Not being a security policeman, my job was to make sure that

their security policemen were able to maintain their expertise

along with whatever communications we could provide them. So, it

was very, very meaningful work down there. And in a multinational environment in the Coalition sector, be it Polish, El Salvadoran, Mongolian, et cetera, and, specifically, the Mongolians with

their security expertise, were extremely helpful to our effort down

in Diwaniyah.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is fascinating what I am

hearing all of you describe is sort of building from the ground up

on everything. Just starting out, you got to be awake and you got

to be on the job, and it is absolutely amazing. And it sounds like

progress, you know. Hearing from where we started and where we

are moving, it seems like we made considerable progress. It is at

least a picture of things moving forward.

In Al Anbar, is the situation now, in the areas where we have

pretty good cooperation with the local Sheiks and all, are the police

stations and all—is that starting to work reasonably well, and are

they locally supported and respected, Colonel Coates?
17

Colonel COATES. Yes, sir. In Al Anbar what truly, you know,

turned the situation with the police, again, was engagement with

the Sheiks and the local tribal officials. And I think probably, you

know, they saw that they could help shape their future by cooperating and so on. It has been a big turnaround, particularly in

Ramadi, sir, and in the area where Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy

was, in Habbaniya and in Chaldea, where foreign fighters and bad

guys walked the streets during the day.

And what changed the complex of that place was, again, the integration of the police, our Iraqi Army units with Coalition in

overwatch or in Reserve for them and a clearing operation took

place where an Iraqi Army unit would go in, establish initial security, it would be backfilled by police, and we would drive on to the

next street.

But there was no question that the recent events in Al Anbar

have been through the tribal and Sheik engagement. That is what

has brought the numbers to join and the quality people as well.

Again, I think they were very much on a wait-and-see type posture. See how things were going to go. Maybe guys were sitting on

the fence deciding what side they were going to take, but no question, recent tribal engagement with the Sheiks is what brought the

numbers to come join.

Mr. AKIN. So you are talking about Ramadi which has been the

biggest success story because the Sheiks are on board; is that correct?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. AKIN. My son was in Fallujah first half of 2005, and I don’t

think there was any real cooperation from the Sheiks at that point

is what I recall.

Colonel COATES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. AKIN. So in the places where the Sheiks are working with

us, do we now have local police? Are they functioning reasonably

well, would you say?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, sir. And what is happening is the

numbers have shown up and security has been established and a

way of life, with children going to school, shops reopening, no question.

Mr. AKIN. Is that starting to carry over into some of the other

areas of Al Anbar? Are they still full of bad guys and completely

resistant?

Colonel COATES. Al Qaeda, where it was heavy fighting in 2004,

sir, there is probably not much reason to have Coalition Forces

there now. We have a Iraqi battalion brigade headquarted out

there. But the police forces run the show completely. Very little or

no violence at all. Ramadi is a turning point, as we are squeezing

on the Euphrates River. The foreign fighters or the insurgents are

moving toward the center, to the Haditha triangle, but as we left

we had numbers joining from Haditha and those areas, come to

join the police forces.

The challenge in those areas was that MOI had established limits on the number and the size of the police forces in that area

based on paid salaries and structure. And often now these police

forces wanted to exceed their authorized strengths, and trying to

explain to them you are only going to have a set number of salaries
18

to achieve those numbers; we have to get MOI to fund a higher authorization.

Mr. AKIN. How about Fallujah? Is that more under control now

or is that still dicey?

Colonel COATES. Sir, I think it has probably backslided a bit. Initially we had a very strong chief of police in there, as you know,

in 2004. When we took Fallujah in November, the Iraqi Government put police in there. We had a joined—we had a very strong

police chief in there with a deputy. The deputy was killed. The

chief of police was promoted, went to Baghdad, and probably the

personalities and strength of the leadership in Fallujah probably

let the police force itself backslide.

However, when I left, they got a very strong chief of police back

in there. But I think Fallujah, sir, is probably backsliding in my

opinion.

Mr. AKIN. Would you like to add anything else, Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir. When I got to Habbaniya there

were 400 Iraqi Police and probably half of those were schooltrained. From November until January 1, we shipped 400 police to

the Jordanian Police Academy. And when I left in April, there were

800 Iraqi Police on the rolls, all supported by the Sheiks.

As I left, the day before I left, a couple of head Sheiks from our

western sector came in and said, Can you make more police? Now,

I had already been authorized to break our ceiling twice, and I was

told to cease and desist on the recruiting, but with more successes

I believe they can get more police in that region.

Now, when I got there, no one would work with the police. They

had Army units and police units sitting next to each other. The

Sunni kids from the local neighborhood and the Shia kids stationed

there, they got along to get along but that is about it.

After a few months of engaging the Army and the police at the

same time, having security and planning meetings, we started off

with the Army teaching that—you know, giving them some marksmanship courses. Started going into civil military engagements by,

you know, running the medical engagements out in town with police, you know, cordoned Army setting in. You know, the Iraqi

Army running the CMV with some Coalition support but all with

an Iraqi face.

Then we started to plan combined interagency traffic control

points, entry control points. They started to work that way. Then

they started to go out on joint combined patrols, combined combat

patrols to get security presence out in the bad towns.

Now, one night this old guy went along and brought two policemen. The Army planned the patrol and this is a bad neighborhood.

The two police sergeants I brought, they said yeah, the places you

want to go cordon off, and don’t do that. Let’s go here, here, and

here. There are bad guys here. And on the course we chased a couple diggers down the road who were trying to emplace an IED. The

soldiers lined these people up against the wall, and the police said

you need to talk to him, you need to talk to him, you need to talk

to him.

After that, the other battalions, the Iraqi Bronze started requesting police to come on patrols with them. We were pushing patrols
19

out with the Coalition Force and the Battalion Task Force to the

West. We were pushing out Iraqi patrols and Iraqi Police patrols

with the Army to our south. So by the time I had left, we had the

marines, the soldiers, the IPLOs, doing God’s work out there. The

IPs had worked with three Iraqi battalions, the Iraqi brigade, three

rifle companies from the Marine Corps and the Army National

Guard battalion south of us. That is partnership. That is cooperation, that is engagement.

And the Iraqi Army wants to work with the Iraqi Police big time,

because propping them up for success is their exit strategy, too, so

they can push out further to the border, to the hinterlands, and the

police can provide the security.

Now as come, you know, right around March, we under cover of

Camp Habbiniyah, and the, you know, the two camps around

Camp Habbiniyah with just police providing security, the Army

had been able to extend themselves throughout that district with

the police just providing security on the outer boundaries of the

camp which was a gigantic leap forward.

Mr. AKIN. So I think what I am hearing you say, and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take too much time,

I think what I am hearing you say the approach you were using

in Al Anbar in terms of partnershipping with all of your—putting

all of your resources together in building a sense of cooperation and

teamwork, that sounds an awful lot like what we are trying to do

in Baghdad with the surge and everything. It is the same basic

kind of strategy of pulling all of the resources together which then

reduces the sectarian kind of problems. It gets you the information

that you need and the training all across the board so that people

can’t—would you say that is probably correct?

Colonel MCCARTHY. That is exactly correct, sir, and the thing is

it is working in my little slice of heaven, and the Iraqi Security

Forces are winning this fight. And with patience, I mean, when I

got there in September and if I had told you all that stuff was

going to happen, you would have laughed me out of the room. I

would have laughed myself out of the room. But you have to be patient. It took 6 months for them to arrest one insurgent. But then

they were arresting 50 at a time. So it works with patience.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. I ended up with several questions, and I will try to

ask my questions quickly, and if you all can err on the side of brevity then we can get to Mr. Jones and Ms. Davis.

When the concept of the war in Iraq first came about, one of the

things that was said was that the Iraqi people were reasonably

well educated and had a sense of wanting to fully participate in the

modern world and they should do well. My information received

from one of my constituents who spent a year in Iraq, he is a police

chief in Arkansas, training Iraqis, was there. He was really surprised with the low literacy rate, the number of people that can’t

read or write in Arabic, and that it was a real challenge.

Is that your experience?

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir.
20

My experience and it still is now is they have heart. They will

go up there and they will do everything they can to defend their

country but—and the large part, especially as you start talking

about getting them from certain tribal areas and such when you

get outside of Baghdad.

Dr. SNYDER. This was in the Basra area. But that it made it very

difficult when you start pulling out police manuals or training

manuals and it all had to be verbal. He said maybe about a fourth

grade education, which fourth grade reading isn’t bad, but is that

your experience also, Colonel Coates?

Colonel COATES. In Al Anbar.

Once you get west of Fallujah, it is a very farm-based community

in which education competes with the requirement to farm. So a

lot of people wanted to join but didn’t have the reading and writing, and that was the same for the Army.

Dr. SNYDER. So those folks would not make it.

Colonel COATES. And we tried to engage the government of Iraq,

and they were pretty hard over. They weren’t going to change those

requirements. It hurt not only the police recruiting but also the

military recruitment. The easy part you had to have 22 teeth. They

could satisfy that. But the reading—we opened a kind of a prep

school for reading, and we had kind of a pre-recruiting class, and

we would teach them to read capacity exam.

Dr. SNYDER. Reading in Arabic.

Colonel COATES. Most of the test was in reading. They didn’t

have to write. But in Al Anbar, as the region as a whole, the education system really falls off as you get deeper into the farmlands.

Dr. SNYDER. One of the other concerns that my constituent had

was the frustration he experienced that every month he thought it

was about a 75- to 80-page report that he had to do, and he

thought if he could spend more time training and less time filling

out these pages every month, that the whole country would have

been better off, and he uses a specific example. He had to do a

monthly report on the inventory of the furniture. Now the furniture

was adequate. It wasn’t fancy. But it was adequate. But he said

the furniture didn’t change, and yet every month he had to fill out

this new form.

Is that, Lieutenant Bridges, or any of you, is that still your experience?

Colonel MCCARTHY. The police station monthly report, it is a big

beast, sir, but it is a check in the box. But it also helps focus your

efforts on what you are going to work on that month. If——

Dr. SNYDER. One of your trainers said it did not help focus efforts. It took time away and didn’t find the benefit of it. But a

75-, 80-page monthly report.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Assigning the responsibility to one person,

making them the action officer on that one, they contract that, they

can piece off the IPLOs, the, you know, our U.S. police officers

would take a section, the logistics guys would take a section and

you parcel it off along functional lines. It takes, you know, an hour

and a half to fill out and you combine it all and you are done in

three hours. It is not too bad.

Dr. SNYDER. So that is helpful information.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir.
21

Dr. SNYDER. Has the committee had that information made

available? I mean, if you all find it helpful, perhaps we would find

it helpful to get, you know, copies of one month of all of the reports

filled out and then the composite over the last year of the following

trends. Have we had that information available? We have it. And

do we have—the 75, 80 pages of each?

Yes. Okay.

The issue, Colonel Coates, I wanted to ask you, as you have

made progress in Al Anbar in your recruiting and working with the

tribal leaders, what is the current status? I think you touched on

this either in your written statement or orally, but what is the current status? Do you have concerns about—is the policing to enforce

the laws or is the policing to do the will of the tribe?

Colonel COATES. Yes, sir. And that has always been our concern.

One thing we really insisted was a formal training of a police officer. I understand that he is going to be a representative of the government of Iraq and not a militia member.

How they have done their tribal business in the past when they

recruited for the army in the Saddam stage or recruited for the police, they went to the Sheikhs and the Sheikhs would provide the

recruits. And it is pretty hard to break them of that way of doing

business.

But you know, clearly, you know, professionalization of the police

forces or military forces is our number one goal, and we insisted

they are going to go to formal education and training of a JIPTC

or BTC, get back and then, you know, we try to accommodate, you

know, where they recruited from, you know, placing them there in

the town with the police. And so we paid very close attention.

Again, our PIT teams were the vehicles to measure the metrics of

what their police station was doing to—and if the warning lights

came on, you know, we would apply the pressure and make sure

that we could shape it to the direction we wanted to, but militias

was the last thing we wanted.

Dr. SNYDER. Lieutenant Bridges, would you describe for me,

please, your experience as a woman MP both from the directions

you receive from your superiors in our military force and what you

were told to do or advised to do with regards to being a woman in

Iraqi culture and then how that worked out in practice and what

your thoughts are about that whole issue of being a woman officer

serving in the capacity you did.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, sir. I spoke on this a few days ago, but

as I received the training at Fort Dix at the mobilization station,

we were told that, in the classes, not to be too friendly or even

overtly seen because the men in the country would not be receptive

to us as women.

So my instruction or my battalion commander’s instruction was

not really have me out there being forward but have me on the

team. But what we found, sir, is the exact opposite—and it is really

a means of trust or a matter of trust—was able to gain the respect

of the police chief general at the central headquarters as well as

the officers and NCOs that worked with them and being a minority

woman they really felt like we had a lot in common. They knew

a lot about our society so we just talked about things on just a—

just on a common level, sir. Didn’t have anything to do with the
22

military. You know, asking me about my family. And once they

really realized I was really a real person, someone just like them,

it was easy to really work with them.

So it was an easy choice, sir, and once we overcame—once I overcame the barrier of being a woman, I found that it had nothing to

do with my gender but what I knew as a soldier and their belief

in me and my belief in them.

Dr. SNYDER. Were the directions you received before going into

this capacity, is that something you had to kind of ignore? I mean,

should the directions you had been given been changed for women

who are coming through going in that capacity tomorrow?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Sir, you can see that even if it wasn’t spoken, you could see that the direction that the coalition forces was

going, it was changing greatly.

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Felling, you described yourself as an aviator. Colonel Swengros, your bio, you seem to be an MP from the

get-go and have made that as a career. For people in the military

who are not MPs but who have been recruited in this issue of being

on police transition teams, is that a help, hindrance, or neutral

with regard to career advance?

Is there any grumbling about any of the folks who are assigned

to these teams, that it might hold them back?

Colonel MCCARTHY. It was an honor to serve with the soldiers,

sailors and Marines out there, sir. It was a unique opportunity.

That is all that matters.

Dr. SNYDER. Nobody felt they were going to be held back.

And Colonel Swengros, you described that was the most difficult

thing you have ever been involved in. How much of the difficulty

was related to the language training of the American troops, or—

which is a frustration that we all have, whether it is as physicians

or business people, and we have had that for a couple of hundred

of years, but it has been brought home in the last five years.

How much of that could have been overcome if we did a better

job of training our troops in foreign language skills?

Colonel SWENGROS. Sir, I am not sure how much better it could

be. I mean, you are talking dialects. And I think what we are trying to concentrate on is the basic language piece, and we are getting at that piece. But the other piece we are really paying attention to is the cultural awareness, but it is more than just an awareness, it is understanding body languages. And there are actually

some courses we have been working with FLETC down in Georgia

and then on our own trying to look at it.

There are ways that you can talk to people, look at people and

get an idea of just how truthful they are, how truthful they are not

being.

And so we are actually trying to work a little bit more than—

along those lines understanding the dynamics of body language and

expressions and how their expressions are different than ours.

What we used was our interpreters, and as you get very close,

especially my level, because I had interpreters who were American

citizens, and I had one that had grown up in Baghdad and left

after the 1991 Gulf War and came to the United States and he was

coming back to serve. But he would point out to me, because I

could understand, after a few months, I could understand the basic
23

language. I knew kind of what the police chief was saying. But he

would tell me, pull me aside afterwards and say well, he was really

saying it in this manner or saying it in that manner.

So that is a dynamic I am not sure we can get at throughout

training.

Dr. SNYDER. I am not sure we tried very hard, though.

I mean, we had a Cinco de Mayo festival a few weeks ago in Arkansas, and I think the speakers that spoke in Spanish were better

received than the ones who spoke in English and had a Spanish

translator. I think that is true, and I don’t think we put enough

investment in the military in all kinds of languages.

Colonel Coates, you mentioned you could give us anecdotal stories of the bravery in Iraq.

Colonel COATES. Certainly, sir.

I can tell you on a daily basis I was in Ramadi where a police

station was hit, and now that—the vehicle bombs are dump truck

size. Basically loading a dump truck up with a ton or two of explosives and ramming it. It doesn’t even have to get in within the perimeter. Just even if it goes outside the wall, the size and the magnitude of the explosion encompasses the whole complex.

But I have seen a couple of those firsthand, and you saw the police stand their ground, did not run, did not break. They stood

there. The chief of police was in Ramadi, a lieutenant colonel or

colonel. He personally—he had about a 40-man assault with no

U.S. Coalition-Iraqi Army thing on an apartment complex where

the insurgents were holding people in there basically as hostages.

We had Lieutenant Colonel Reed, who is chief of police of the

highway patrol in Al Anbar Province. He personally was out there

every day. We got him his vehicles and his fuels, and without any

urging, he established patrols and routes between Ramadi and

Rutbah and brought back tons of munitions with the people who

were transporting it. There is a place called Humid’s Garage, it is

just on the outskirts of Fallujah. It is a gathering place of military

age people at the truck, kind of pull-over place. One day on his own

initiative he decided well, let us go raid it after the U.S. forces had

done it twice and came up empty handed. He arrested something

like 36 foreign fighters and probably on the order of a hundred insurgents that were mixed in with a group of a thousand there.

So I can tell you that they have all of the abilities. A lot of what

it came down to is what Lieutenant McCarthy said was leadership.

They had somebody that led by example, that was strong. They

were absolutely stone cold brave in the battle.

But, you know, their success is based on getting the right leadership at the right place at the right time.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I wanted

to say to you gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, you are great. I sit

here in bewilderment to think about how difficult your job is. And

yet, as you have acknowledged, it has been slow, but there has

been some progress. But I sit here thinking where this country is

today. I wasn’t going to do this, Mr. Chairman, but I want to read

part of a quote because I think that the American people want this
24

Congress to listen to you and make our decisions as to where are

we going.

General Matthew Ridgeway wrote a book called Soldier: The

Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgeway, 1956.

I am only going to read part of a paragraph.

To me, nothing could more tragically demonstrate our complete

and utter moral bankruptcy than for us to deliberately initiate a

prevented war. Once we take that absolutely fatal step, our civilization will be doomed.

The reason I bring that up is because I think the American people have great love and affection and appreciation for those of you

in uniform. I don’t think there is any question about that. But

when I listen here, you are talking about different cultures. You

are talking about Shiites, you are talking about Sunnis, you are

talking about Kurds, you are talking about what many of us think

is a civil war. Some say sectarian, we think it is a civil war. Right

or wrong, that is what we think.

And then to listen to what you have accomplished and you have

accomplished, there is no question about it, because you have taken

an impossible, an impossible situation and you are giving the light

a possibility. And it is a light at this point.

Each one of you have spoken extremely well and knowledgeable

on your job and what you do.

What would you say to the American people as to how much time

do we need to give to this effort to stand up a police force?

Colonel SWENGROS. That is a very fair question, sir. I personally—you know, we go through these same questions. And I will

personally say I appreciate folks asking the tough questions because at the end of the day, if I am going to be told to go out and

do something, I at least want that decision to be an informed decision.

Right, wrong or indifferent, as history might look at it 10, 15

years from now, for me, going out there and doing what I did every

day for a year, 7 days a week with a squad right in the middle of

Baghdad or other places, and I guess I would tell folks just because

it is hard doesn’t mean it is impossible. Just because it is a long

process doesn’t mean it is a wrong process. I think the question we

have all asked is what do we want at the end, what are the ramifications of not doing something?

I talked to our soldiers about this. You know, what can they really effect and how do they go about doing it, and every one of them,

you know, as they go through, especially having lived it, they really

do see the progress. They see the lights in the eyes of the children.

They see the faces of the female population who, for the most part,

didn’t really have a life as we know it.

You see the direction they are trying to head in with all of the

difficulties out there, and it kind of makes you stop and think from

a ‘‘doer’’ level. I really believe we are on the right track, and we

will continue down that track. We will continue to improve.

We are fighting an enemy. That enemy is out there, and it is

real. You can call it terrorists. You can call it insurgents. There are

different pieces of it. And every one of them are vying for population control or control of that area.
25

And those are dynamics that are causing us to adjust and to

relook different—and go back to different ways of doing things before. And that is the complexity that I have talked about as well

as the complexity of building a police force from nothing.

So we do search for those answers, and we do try to find ways

to effect change quickly. And I think most of the soldiers really do,

when they get out of there, believe that they contributed to something, which, you know, from our standpoint is a good thing. We

do see the progress.

Mr. JONES. Let me just real quickly, I won’t take too much of

your time.

Everything you said, I mean, again, I would agree with you. You

are the professional. But when I came to Congress, this country

was $4 trillion in debt. We are close to now over 10 trillion. According to David Walker, the true debt of this Nation, if you take in

all of the obligations and liabilities and brought them in this year

to pay the bill this year would be $50 trillion. We are spending

roughly $9.2 billion a month in Iraq. The American taxpayers are

going to have to pay the bill.

There is much frustration in this country because we felt, many

of us, that the real war on terrorism was in Afghanistan. Bin

Laden was our enemy. And we, in Iraq, said okay, we won’t go into

that.

But the point is I know you can’t say well, five years from now

I expect this to happen. But if you could, and each one of you, and

I am taking too much time and I will be through in just a second,

would you just say, you know, Congressmen, we are going to be

there ten years before we see a police force in the communities, the

provinces or the country that can pretty much stand on its own.

And I realize this is not really fair to ask you. But I am telling you

that the American people, I feel their frustration. The American

people have got to know that there is a fourth quarter to this game.

Because if we stay in the second quarter, using a football analogy,

and a third quarter and never see the fourth quarter, I don’t know

if this country can afford the blood and the money as it relates to

Iraq.

If you could just tell me, and your best guess, that you know

what you are dealing with, you all articulated that. But tell me

when in the world do you say to the American people I think we

are getting a fairly decent, a fairly decent, not the best, but a decent police force? Some of the provinces or across the nation? I

mean, the American people have a right. They are paying the price.

The families are giving their sons and daughters. They have a

right to know that there is a definition of success. That is the

only—if you can answer that, fine. If you can’t, I understand.

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. I really cannot answer that in terms

of time. I mean, I just—there is no crystal ball out there.

I will tell you that having watched this very closely over four

years from our business and then listening to the Al Anbar, because that was not a priority for us back then, if we are making

progress then I see a brighter light at the end of the tunnel, and

I see a bright light at the end of the tunnel. How much effort we

are willing to continue to impart in that area will determine how

long we are going to be there.
26

We started, again, we are only talking 2 years from a concept of

70 teams, so now 230 to 300 teams, whatever that number is right

now, and we are seeing that significant progress.

The insurgents and the terrorists and the organized crimes all

operate off of a similar aspect, and they go for the seams. They go

where they are not going to be harassed by police, where they are

not going to be harassed by an army. They will operate in areas

that are not patroled just like your criminals here in the United

States, and I think we are getting after that right now with these

surges and these increases.

We are getting after it. We are putting pressure in areas, and

you can tell by the way the enemy is responding that we are having an effect. We, not only just the coalition forces, but the Iraqi

police and the Iraqi army. They are the ones really being targeted

right now. As the difference, if you remember in 2004, 2005, a lot

of attacks, a lot of major attacks on the civilian populace. Right

now taking the brunt of it is the Iraqi army and the Iraqi Security

Police.

I cannot put a time on it. I apologize. I just can’t.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

I have taken too much time, but thank you, Mr. Chairman, and

thank you, Colonel.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, and I want to echo my colleagues’ comments. The military has just performed extraordinarily. I think the concern that we all have, and I have expressed

this before, is that we are a military at war and not a nation at

war.

So all of the burden has really fallen on you and on the families

of our military.

Could you talk a little bit about what we have done to try and

track and identify the people who are serving as the police?

You mentioned obviously pay and how you can track that. But

I am concerned about the folks who don’t show up. Do we know

who they are? Do we know what they are doing? Are they, as far

as you know, engaged in militias, and do we even have officers or

individuals in the Iraqi police force who are engaging in other activities when they are not on the beat? What do we know about

that? What kinds of efforts are being made to track that? Do you

think it is important? Should we know?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, ma’am.

First and foremost, what we are about is accountability. And, you

know, our PTT teams down there, they have accountability, holding

the Iraqi’s completely responsible for what their responsibilities are

to their society, their integrity and so on and so forth. We have had

bad cops, we have had bad chiefs of police. When we find out, we

instantly move to have them removed or in case of—for example,

the chief of police of Sha’aban, who was the provincial chief of police, he stole the payroll one day, and he was thrown in jail, mysteriously released from jail and murdered two days later. Never recovered the money but the accountability is what we are about.

There is no question there are police that have been behind probably insurgent activities and so forth. We, you know——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How are we doing the tracking?
27

Colonel COATES. First of all, we do biometrics. Every police officer in Al Anbar is biometrically recorded and put in a database.

And we hold the key to that database.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So if you mentioned that initially the

Iraqi police arrested one insurgent and now it is more like 50 or

in a short period of time, of the insurgents that they are arresting,

how many of them were identified biometrically to have been part

of the police corps or in the military.

Colonel COATES. I can give you one specific example. Our highway patrol went and arrested people on a highway that were basically robbing cars going back and forth. They had no police officers

in Ramadi. They got their identification, the badges, and they also

were identified in the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) system.

They were arrested by the highway police which, you know, obviously got our attention, and we tried to address that very quickly.

I will tell you that is out there on a daily basis, and we are doing

our best again to hold their system and them individually accountable to what they should be doing.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Lieutenant Bridges, in your experience, what do you think people were doing when they weren’t on

the jobs.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. To speak specifically, Mrs. Davis, I can’t

say exactly what they were doing, but I know they weren’t at work.

I can say that we did have suspicions, but no evidence of some of

the IPs being involved in militias. We would go to different IP stations or we would even communicate within the coalition forces

chain to ensure did you know this person, do you think he was involved, have you heard, maybe I would speak to one of the MIT or

PIT team members, give a name to them to see what they have

heard.

So we were actively engaged in trying to identify some of our

persons with whom we suspected.

But once again, ma’am, we never really, you know, got any hard

evidence, and, of course, they are not going to say we are a part

of it. But my police chief had given us a list of names that he felt

like was a part of the Mahdi militia and we were able to get those

policemen not fired but transferred. Because everyone knows in

Iraq when you do something wrong, you don’t just necessarily get

fired.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If they don’t get fired, where do they

go? Do they join the militia?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. It has been my experience—I have never

seen one of the IPs fired. I have always seen them transferred to

other stations, stations that may not be in their home area. But I

have never experienced where an IP has been actually fired.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think what you are saying then is

they are still in the system essentially. They may be a part of a

militia, but they are transferred to another post.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, ma’am. And that was one of our onground frustrations as platoon leaders and commander. You are

trying to get this guy moved because you really have strong suspicions, no evidence, that he may be a part of the militia or even

part of the insurgency. You can’t prove it. So you bring it to the

general. He brings—feels the same way. Brings it to the Baghdad
28

police. They transfer it. He may be a cousin to the police chief of

the Baghdad headquarters. So the problem still exists, ma’am, but

it just got transferred to somewhere else maybe further out so that

that police chief no longer had to deal with it, and that was a big

frustration.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you have a window on what is

happening once the insurgents are captured, what is going on

there, where are they? Are they in jail? Do we have a role to play

in that?

Colonel SWENGROS. Ma’am, are you talking about the Iraqi—from

the Iraqi system when they are captured by the Iraqis?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes.

Colonel SWENGROS. I don’t think there is any specific system out

there. I mean, that is one of the dynamics of turning things over

to the host nation for the Iraqis. You lose some of that visibility

but as was talked—there is an increasing work on the judicial system, it is a triad out there. The law enforcement, the penal system,

and there is an Military Membership Status Identifier (MMSI)

focus right now, is those three arms and making sure that those

cross-talk between to know what is going on.

We implemented some policies where the four folks who are released, we sent the information to the Minister of Interior into the

deputy minister of police affairs to do the cross-list check, and if

they could spot a name of somebody that we were about to release

because we didn’t have anything more on them or whatever the situation was, then we did that prisoner transfer stuff. So there is

some of that that is going on out there.

But I don’t know of any tracking mechanism.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Did you want to say something, Colonel McCarthy?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, ma’am.

When our police would arrest somebody, our advisors, soldiers,

sailors, Marines, would go down there and do the biometric picture

on them. We would also take a picture on them and put their name

on the picture and put it through our channels.

Now the investigative process, you know, due process for Iraqis

is in 24 hours, they have to have a package against the suspect

ready to go before an investigative person. Our equivalent of a District Attorney (DA). Then—there are no judges. They are hiding

underground. They can’t be found. So the mayor or the police chief

can sign off to allow them to continue the investigation for another

week.

Now, if they have enough information there, a package to put before a magistrate, they can hold that guy until a magistrate appears.

The burden is, you know, in the Muslim culture. They have to

treat the prisoners, you know, like family. So it is a burden on

their system, and they want to release them, but they can’t exercise rule of law when they are continuing to——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess the question is how does all

of that, which is complicated and embedded cultural issues, how

does that impact the work that you do and how—is there anything

in the training that would be helpful to all of you to have been able

to deal with that?
29

Colonel MCCARTHY. Actually, with our U.S. police officers over

there, the IPLOs. They actually work with the investigators to help

them run the investigation properly. They ask these questions, let

us put this evidence together. Have you logged it in? How are we

tracking this so you can put together a, you know, a solid package

before a judge? We use it as a training opportunity. We use it to,

you know, ensure that they are practicing appropriate human

rights behavior in the holding facilities and it keeps bad guys off

the streets.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. One other question, and I am—I know

that I certainly could go on. I think this has been very interesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the issue of translators. It is my understanding that Marines

are training with translators even before they are going versus the

Army, which is expected to find their translators in field. Is that

true? Is that a problem? And do you usually have enough translators?

And Lieutenant Bridges as well, how did you feel about translators and whether you had the support that you needed?

Colonel COATES. If I may, as the committee noted, probably the

biggest disadvantage that a transition team has, whether it is a

military police or border, is the language. No question you are at

a disadvantage and you are kind of doing things through a third

person. All of the translators are, for the most part, contractors in

Al Anbar, which is a Sunni province, all of the translators are Shia.

And of course very quickly you have an Iranian working for you,

you know, just describe some of the atmosphere when you are dealing with the locals when they see that.

What we have done here real recently and one we are about to

start, we are bringing our translators that are going to be paired

up with their teams. They are coming to California, they go

through the six-week course with their transition team and then

they will go forward with their teams. So they have a pre-employment training package.

In addition to that, we are about to establish a language lab in

our transition. We have our own building that will be in there so

that there will be a language threshold mark every day through

the six weeks that all members are going to have to hit. We are

not going to make them native speakers. We are not going to make

them conversational in anything. But they will be evaluated to task

and to standard, and to graduate the course they are going to have

to hit a certain level of Arabic. And with the translator there and

the language lab, we hope to use the vehicle of absorbing some of

those cultural differences that have been described.

In Al Anbar, the dialect is different from town to village. You

know where somebody comes from just by his accent or the words

he uses. You know, you can tell the difference between somebody

from Ramadi, Fallujah, or Al Qa’im. We used to have it years ago

in certain parts of our cities and the States.

Colonel SWENGROS. Ma’am, our training is somewhat along the

same line. And I know we went over there and in preparing to go

over there in 2004, our soldiers got 40 hours of Arabic training. We

brought over linguists that work to help us through the translator

piece together—I know each iteration—I was at Fort Lewis when
30

we were doing this—we tapped into that capability. So and I know

it occurred to me to meet the divisions and what have you.

So it is more localized. We try to expose our folks to that dynamic of working with translators and what have you.

We do meet up with a majority of our translators in theater because they are Iraqis. Those that are part of the military that come

over with the translators, they are linked up with the unit as well.

That was early on, but I couldn’t give you an exact time.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Mrs. Davis, we have four linguists that we

worked with and we did fall in on them and we found out a lot of

information about what they knew based on our relationship with

the outgoing unit. I can tell you that we had a great relationship

with the interpreters. We had no issues of corruptness or them

sharing different information with the Iraqi police. We never felt

like we were set up because they went out with us daily.

We came in trying to let them know that we appreciate what

they do. We appreciate all of the information that they give us.

So from our outgoing unit, it is imperative of us to listen to what

they had to say about the existing linguists and once you show respect, once you show that you kind of trust them, maybe you don’t

totally trust them all the way, but you are trying to show them the

semblance of trust so you can get whatever necessary information

that you can to support the IP’s movement. So we had a good experience with our linguists. We had no issue with them. No cause to

believe that they were not on our team.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

Colonel FELLING. I am a reservist so I went over with my eyes

wide open. I am a full-time law enforcement officer. When I went

over, I had no idea that I was going to be working with Iraqis and

Poles and Romanians, and you are asking specifically about translation. I would have never thought that it would work. Because you

have Iraqis who also speak those languages. And trying to get

things done in that environment is very, very difficult. But something that I thought would not work, it worked. It worked, difficult

at times but it worked and it was—the translators and the interpreters who are really sacrificing themselves physically and taking

themselves out of the environment that they are used to without

the interpreters. It would be an impossible task.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you all very much.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for coming before us today.

I am sorry. They closed down the Capitol compound for something going on in Cannon and didn’t let me through. So I didn’t get

to hear your opening statements. I know some made some and

some didn’t.

I want to associate myself with the initial comments of Ms.

Davis, in particular the ones that talked about what a great job our

military is doing. Because we, I think, to a large extent, almost everybody believes that that is the case. But, you know, we have argued that this is not about the military any longer, that it is about

political and institutional capability by the Iraqi government and

its people and the economic situation that exists in Iraq. And I just

would like to put some comments, Mr. Chairman, into the record.
31

With all due respect, Colonel Swengros, you spoke about our

troops being over there and, you know, learning that, you know,

women somehow have more rights now and the new system that

the Iraq people are under. The reality is that just in March I was

back in Iraq talking to women’s rights groups there, and the fact

of the matter is women had more rights in Iraq under Saddam

than they have under the current constitution.

In fact, one of the women, very well known lawyer, woman lawyer in Baghdad, said to me, my current rights under the constitution that you all have given us now is that I have the same rights

as somebody who is mentally disabled or a child.

So I want to put that on the record because it speaks to this

whole issue of amending the constitution which the Democrats

have pushed for as one of the products, one of the timetables, one

of the milestones that we need to see in place in order to continue

moving forward and putting our resources in and your lives on the

line to get things done in Iraq.

So the amendment of the Constitution is incredibly important.

One, of course, the women know they are not going to get it

through because they don’t have enough representation there and

issues go on, but they have less rights under the current constitution of Iraq than they did under Saddam because, remember, Saddam was secular. He did not put an Islamic overview on the constitution that he had at the time.

This speaks to a lot of these issues of again going back to the

political and the institutional and the economic.

We keep reading in the newspaper and this is the case that there

is really not a banking system in Iraq. So the police officers do the

work, they get paid, now they got to go home wherever it is. They

go home and some of them don’t return and some of them are gone

for a long time and some, many, many of them I would suggest this

is where they are.

So again, it is an institution problem that we have. We have got

to get a banking system going in Iraq in order for us to be able

to augment the great work that you are doing, and that the rest

of our troops have put their lives on the line every day.

This whole issue of the rule of law that the Lieutenant Colonel

spoke to, which is again, so important. I mean, you can apprehend

as many people as you can but if you don’t have judges, you don’t

have magistrates, you don’t have an ability to bring them forward,

again, it is an institution problem and, you know, it is a big problem for us.

We have got to get the local government and the provincial government on the line hitting milestones to put those institutions in

place. It is a very difficult to do. It is not an easy thing. We look

at Kosovo, and we are still nation building. I am not saying it is

easy but we are seeing no improvement in the situation.

So you can be doing a great job or the Iraqi policemen that you

are training can be doing a great job, but it can be going nowhere.

It can be a revolving door the next day out on the street against

you.

This issue of the Arabic language and probably the only—anybody who has lived for a long time in a Muslim country is probably

one of the few who has training in Arabic, and I would just say
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that is an incredible need for our military, and I think it would just

improve our chances of being able to operate in these Muslim/Arabic speaking areas.

And last, I would like to put on the record, Mr. Chairman, that

this whole issue of accountability, and this also goes to our military, how do you account, where are these people, who have we

trained? Where have they gone? Where are they? That is an incredibly important issue, and I would say we are doing a terrible job

at it.

I just mention again back to the recent trip that I took in March

where I went and was talking to General Fell, who is of course the

operating general under Petraeus for the four provinces, including

Baghdad, and I asked him how many security and police from the

Iraqi side do you have in those four provinces? And he said to me,

said to me 37,568 to the number. I told him that just wasn’t possible. There had to be a lot more. Why? Because if you look at the

numbers we have trained, either everybody has gone home or the

fact is that they are not working.

And in talking to Petraeus less than an hour later, of course

Petraeus said he was wrong. You know, maybe he didn’t understand the question. Oh, no. We went completely through it. This

whole issue of who we have trained, if they are on board, if they

are helping, if they are working. If they are working against us,

where are they, is an incredibly important one. And it is one that

we have been asking about now for the last four years since this

whole thing began.

So if there is anything that I could ask the military to do is to

figure out how do we account for these people we are training.

And that is it. I really have no questions of the panel today.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Any of the panelists want to comment?

Colonel COATES. In Al Anbar, there has been a large number of

them killed as well. So there you talk about—the accountability is

everything but to include in those numbers are the numbers that

have been killed in the line of duty as well.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I don’t have a problem. It is just that the military

can’t give me those numbers. You can’t give me an accountability.

I know because I keep asking. How many police have we trained?

Where have they come from? Who are they? What groups do they

belong to? Where do you have them stationed? Why did they run

away? Did you take your weapons with you?

You really don’t have an accountability system and I think this

is something that is going to come back to bite us. We can do a

great job, but you could be training the enemy in the long run.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

It is tradition in this subcommittee to have the staff counsel have

an opportunity to ask some questions. So I would like to ask Susan

McKenna, staff counsel, if she has some questions.

Ms. MCKENNA. As you all know, last year, 2006, was the year

of the police and the emphasis was on the generation of the IPS

force. 2007 was the year of leadership and logistics, and I was wondering if you could comment on what that means on the street for

the IPS.
33

Colonel SWENGROS. I can tell you what I think it means in terms

of how we operate. There are—getting at some of the institutions

out there, there is a tremendous amount of accountability in terms

of logistics. And part of that PMSR we talked about earlier where

68 pages, it started out at 200 pages. It has to get at the questions

that leadership is asking. How many of this is issued? Where is it?

How were these people acting? What is your assessment of the

leadership capabilities?

So all of this, that is part of the assessments and the decisions

to move to really put some emphasis, not that we are not going to

take care of the police in 2007, but we are trying to get at the

evolving issues. As you get a better police, you need better logistic

systems in place. You get the police training in there. We are looking at now the second piece of that, and that is what we would consider as field training. Once you get out of the academy, you have

certain training that you go through.

Ms. MCKENNA. Are you seeing specific initiatives at the station,

district and provincial level, that represent the execution of the

year of leadership and logistics for the IPS?

Colonel SWENGROS. I can tell you what Colonel Mike Lucius, who

is the MP brigade commander who is operating in Baghdad. The

answer is yes. And we started a little bit of this in 2005, leadership

training, where we actually brought in the various leaders and he

is doing that now, and we put them through some leadership training like leadership training seminars that we would do here in our

own military. And that is seeing some pretty positive results.

The logistics is something we continue to work on, and I know

he is working hard with the Iraqis and in addressing some of the

fuel problems and what have you that Lieutenant Bridges talked

about. But I don’t have the specifics on that.

Colonel COATES. Yes. Part of what you brought up earlier was

the settings and the conditions. You have to have a process in

which the training and education system produces the police officer

who can report and then has the proper equipment in place with

a facility that supports his mission. And in Al Anbar, we have only

been able to achieve that probably in the last six or seven months.

That has been very challenging out there to where you can send

people to the police academies. They come back. They have very

limited equipment or they don’t have any vehicles or they didn’t

have the communications infrastructure to do what they were required to do.

And we are achieving that synchronization. The logistics portion

of it is big. I think you know also lending to that accountability,

to all of that that has been invested in this program.

So but the leadership is absolutely huge. Our best districts have

the strongest leaders. We have some of them coming back to the

United States to attend the FBI Academy and to enhance their professionalism, and that will be the solution to the long term.

Ms. MCKENNA. So is there a formal plan in place to develop that

leadership for the IPS, and if so, who is responsible for it and

where could we find it?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I don’t know the answer to that right now,

ma’am. I know of no plan.
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Colonel SWENGROS. I do know that part of the police plan, the

Iraqi police plan, is to really get that Baghdad police college. It

used to be a three-year college and they want that thing—in fact,

I think they have pretty much built it up. I am not sure of the status, but from their standpoint, they recognize the leadership and

the technical development of their police. They are planning to go

to a three-year police academy if they are not there yet.

Ms. MCKENNA. Do the police transition teams have any input

into who is selected to be a part of the—to be trained for the leadership? I mean, I know a lot of this has shifted over to the Iraqis

so I am just interested to hear what your impact is on that selection.

Colonel COATES. We had, ma’am, there is a nomination process

through the governor through the provincial chief of police. He will

submit that nomination to the MOI and the MOI will give its final

blessing to it. But essentially, it lies within the purview of the governor to do that.

Now again, there is a lot of negotiation, tribal influences and the

sheikhs, and so on and so forth, to get to that consensus. Al Anbar

had a very hard time getting a consensus between a governor and

many of the chiefs of police that he nominated. They wanted somebody else, and that was always a daily battle on that.

Colonel FELLING. I think these gentlemen are being humble. I

will speak on their behalf of being an outsider looking in. It takes—

you asked about leadership, physical and moral courage. And these

gentlemen and this young lady, they have got it and that is what

it takes. To be a MIT and PIT team leader, to put your life in

somebody’s hands, being a law enforcement officer, I know there is

a culture and these individuals put their lives in another culture’s

hands to train and to lead, and these individuals are the embodiment of leadership.

Ms. MCKENNA. I am sorry if I was confusing, and I didn’t mean

our service members. I meant how are we developing the leadership of the IPS, and I imagine that they, many of them, are very

courageous as well given the attrition that they suffer.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. I would like to speak to that as well.

When you talk about the year of the police, you envision closing

the P3 book, if you will, and you are opening up the PTT book because the police partnership program went out when we were coming in and was phasing out. And when you talk about the year of

the police, we envisioned trying at first to get an infrastructure of

which we can be safe once we are there because we can’t train

them if our soldiers don’t feel safe. So once we got the infrastructure to somewhat bearable to even train, we started to focus on,

like I said in the beginning, just the basics of discipline, do they

have on a uniform like Colonel McCarthy mentioned. Just those

basic things.

But once we got inside, Ms. McKenna, we really found out that

there was some huge disparities between officers and NCOs. I

mean, officers had uniforms whereas they did not feel that their

peers or subordinates, there was a great need for them to have

that. So we had to fix those issues. And just getting different areas

set up was the most difficult in terms of personnel. Those pay problems.
35

I, literally, my convoy literally went to the banks, we picked the

money up from the bank, brought the money back to the IP station.

Once we got the accounting officer set up, we had all of the IPs and

a long line around the building. Okay. How many days were you

at work. We had the legal officers there to tell us oh, no, they

weren’t there. So let us dock this pay. We are literally detracting

money from his salary.

So it was very difficult to try to implement policing into the year

of the police before even working on the basics.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I could follow up for a second. I

can’t imagine—I mean, what you started with and where you are

now. So I applaud that.

But I just wanted to share because this is what is out in the kind

of public consumption, and I am wondering about the reality on the

ground for your Iraqis as well.

There was a story this morning on NPR about the traffic cop basically and the job that they have to do, no lights are working, and

I still am wondering why don’t they have any traffic lights working

in some areas in some bad intersections, but that basically, you

know, they can’t stop Americans. Every one is plowing through the

intersections because they have to move very quickly, and we are

aware of why.

So how do you train someone to be a traffic cop in the middle

of what sounds like tremendous chaos? And again, this is the story

on NPR today. They have had some good reporters who have been

pretty realistic. How do you deal with that, and again, what can

we take away from that and what we are trying to do here? Any

comments?

Colonel SWENGROS. I would say—I worked with the traffic police.

It is the national traffic police headquarters, it is in Baghdad. They

operate both Baghdad and the other traffic police in each of the

various provinces.

And in terms of professionalism and technological awareness and

development, they were—don’t take this too literally—the model for

what we were trying to do get the Iraqi police to. They actually had

computer systems that somebody saved before all of the records

were destroyed, and they were going through there and trying to—

in the year of time we worked on it, we finally got where a traffic

policeman could call at an intersection and say I have got this vehicle or this person, can you do a background check. Something like

our National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check, and they

would have to go to a separate computer and try to bring up those

records, but that is the way they were working. They actually had

it.

The traffic police were probably one of the most effective police

because nobody would mess with them because they kept the traffic flowing. And the nuances of military convoys rushing through

convoys, they understood that and we never—and I worked in

Baghdad all the time, they saw a convoy come, they actually kept

traffic cleared so we could move through.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So you think the reality on the ground

for Iraqis is one of confidence and at least——

Colonel SWENGROS. I think irrespective of traffic police, again,

because it allows people to move about. So I think traffic police in
36

my dealing with them for a year, I think in the entire year they

had one policeman killed. One traffic policeman killed. And I was

having about 120, 160 every 2 weeks of the regular police killed.

And they were out there. They were out there in numbers.

So I think maybe from an Iraqi person standpoint they say oh,

the traffic is not good. It is not tied up but, you know, in the priority of things I am not sure how much of that really was a burden

versus an inconvenience. But that is my perspective.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay, thank you. I was just curious

because that is what is out in the public, and it is helpful to have.

If you have a different point of view that is right on, I would like

to—I was appreciative of that.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you for your testimony, and I am sorry I was

late arriving.

So the questions I may ask could be redundant, but most of these

cases are probably better repeating some of this.

I was over in Iraq during the year of the police, 2006, and we

had as a special focal point of our trip over there to inquire into

what was happening, what plans were being laid. It seems to me

if you had some basic goals, such as the number of who will process

through police training, you attain those goals; is that correct? I

mean, the object was to train 200,000, the coalition was to train

the lion’s share of those and the Iraqis themselves were training

some.

But as I understand what you are reporting is that the numbers

were attained. A couple hundred thousand troops, police were actually trained for that responsibility.

Is that right or is that wrong?

Colonel COATES. In 2006, sir, for Al Anbar Province we pretty

much came within about a thousand of the set goal of 11,330. So

we had the training pipeline and stuff. We were getting very close

to meeting that goal for that year.

Mr. SPRATT. Is that generally true for every year? The 200,000

man goal was sufficiently attained?

Colonel SWENGROS. I don’t specifically have that—I would kind

of agree with Colonel Coates. I think the numbers were fairly close.

The dynamic that is out there is a number of killed and wounded

in action that have to be replaced. I think you will see some figures

where we were not able to reach the numbers because the numbers

are changing. So I kind of agree with Colonel Coates. I think so,

say yeah, they actually met every goal.

Mr. SPRATT. I am just saying your miracle goals. You are still

short police in most places in Al Anbar. But in other places as

well?

Colonel SWENGROS. I think the question for sure is were you

short trained police, and I think the answer is yes. It is always

that opportunity over need and that continues. I think the number

when we were there we were 74,000 or something. I wish we had

put through more trained. That is why building the additional police academies——

Mr. SPRATT. What are the most notable deficiencies in the forces

that are actually there dressed down, reporting for duty, but never-
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theless not adequate for the job? What are the most glaring deficiencies?

Colonel COATES. I think in the IPS service, the ministerial level

to execute security force policy through the police, we have got a

pretty good foundation going in Al Anbar at the police station and

the district level. The provincial thing we are making progress. It

is not where it should be yet. But the engagement with the ministerial level in Baghdad and all of the support and everything you

need to administer a police department nationally, I think right

now is probably the biggest lacking or the biggest challenge right

out there now.

Mr. SPRATT. One of the apprehensions then, I guess in 2006, I

guess it was, was they were concerned about the performance of

the MOI, Minister of Interior, and corruption at the highest level,

and they were determined about militia infiltration. At the lowest

levels they were concerned about militia infiltration. Is that still a

major concern, corruption in the MOI and militia infiltration in the

likes of local police departments?

Colonel SWENGROS. I don’t have any direct information on that.

I have talked to brigade commanders out there and he did not address that as a major concern that he is working on. But I don’t

have any information, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there a basic division of labor amongst the security forces so that the border patrol will patrol the border and the

armed forces actually engage in counterinsurgency or anti-insurgency and the police deal with crime, murder, assault an battery,

rape, fraud, things of that nature?

Colonel COATES. All of them contribute to overall security and

the challenge has been to bring them all together. So there is a

synchronization of capabilities that allow them to contribute to the

overall security. There is a separate border, protective service, that

clearly is defined. The IPS is clearly defined and the Iraqi Army

is clearly defined.

Our real challenge out there is in bringing them together and the

sharing of information between the two of them. Ideally, in the city

in—except in Ramadi, if the police were responsible for the internal

security on a day-to-day street security, the Army would position

itself on the outside.

To reinforce or support or to make sure that the conditions remained to——

Mr. SPRATT. Are they, being the local police, oftentimes being

pre-empted and pressed into service or with the Iraqi armed forces.

For example, if there is a firefight or something of that nature, are

they being diverted from their basic mission, which is to enforce

civil laws and criminal laws?

Colonel COATES. I think what they are mainly enforcing, sir, is

that of the establishment of security. Bob, you can comment on the

criminal activity.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Sir, right now the criminal activity is insurgency. That is the danger on the street. And if you are worried

about getting blown up at mosque, you are not worried about the

pickpocket in the crowd.
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And we lost a station. We lost eight policemen. We lost 60 citizens now, right after mosque on a Saturday. The police responded

well.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there a distinction made between kidnapping,

let’s say, or a major theft or breaking and entering and fighting the

insurgency and, if the police aren’t allowed to concentrate on what

they are doing, what you are saying is that the main problem is

violence.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir and, in the Habbaniyah district

where I was, tribal law, shari’a law, and then civil law is a distant

show. And any theft and they are pointing fingers at each other,

it goes to Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Hamad determines it and

they do reconciliations.

Mr. SPRATT. So what do the police do then, do they augment the

national armed forces?

Colonel MCCARTHY. They man entry control points into the villages, they man their stations, they man towers, they do security

patrols up and down the different routes and in and about the villages. They maintain a security presence on the street to keep the

insurgents underground because people can’t go to the store without the police there. They can’t go to school without the police there

because the army is focused elsewhere and the coalition is obviously in their own battle space. Where I was, I was in an Iraqi

army battle space where that was superimposed on a police jurisdiction. You know, so you have command and control issues, you

have battle space apportionment issues all the time. So you have

to work together in the counterinsurgency fight or you are going to

fail.

Mr. SPRATT. To what extent are civil police functions operable,

possible, if you don’t have a judicial system and a penal system in

place that is functional? Is that a problem that they arrest people,

put them in jail and don’t have a system of justice that can routinely process them?

Colonel SWENGROS. Sir, as Ms. Sanchez said before, this is more

than—the solution has to be more than a security piece. The security piece is tremendously important but there are those, that triad

that you have to get to in any society, especially in one such as

Iraq with insurgents, the penal, the judicial and the law enforcement piece of it. So yes, it is a problem and it is a problem that

they have been addressing from the start. As simple as in a police

station, we go in there and try and track who is sitting in the local

jail cell for what reason and did they meet the certain timelines

that had been established by the Iraqi government for keeping people under investigation or in jail and those types of things. So that,

is it a problem, overcrowding, if they don’t get to the judicial, it just

compiles as you go through that. But does that, how much does

that really affect the security battle, the insurgents battle, again I

will agree with Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy that you don’t separate the army, you don’t separate the police.

When you do that, the more seams you have in your operations,

the more that the insurgents or the organized crime is going to operate in, and it is trying to close down those seams.

One of the things that the army has pursued over this last year

with JIEDDO, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) defeat orga-
39

nization, is the police intelligence operations. And that is taking

the law enforcement mindset from looking at whether it is an IED

or another criminal activity—stolen cars or those types of things—

and trying to figure out where the dots can be connected and if you

address it from a policing mindset to get at the insurgent activity.

And they are finding some success in that. It is less than a year

old. It is hinged on bringing in retired or other senior law enforcement with criminal investigative type experience to go in there,

and they are putting it in there within the Brigade Combat Teams

(BCTs) to get at the police intelligence to complement the military

intelligence, so when the commander looks at what is going on on

the ground you have both pieces and you make sure you are not

missing any.

So we are seeing some tremendous strides in that. And as you

operate with the Iraqi police, when we started out you may never

see an Iraqi with an army sitting down at a table to plan an operation or conduct an operation, and each one of us have many stories where they do that now to get at that security picture. So I

see some positive stuff in those areas.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony and for your service to our country.

Mr. MEEHAN. Any other questions? Let me just say that all of us

who traveled to meet with our men and women around the world,

whether it be Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo or even in the United

States, we are always impressed but this panel this morning has

been outstanding. And I think I speak for all the members when

I say we thank you from the bottom of our hearts for your service

to your country. We are in awe of the job that you are all are doing

every day for the United States of America. So thank you very

much for your service, and thank you very much for testifying before us this morning. Thanks.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 24, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 24, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MAY 24, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. On page 9 of your testimony, you write that ‘‘I MEF had to send

representatives to MOI, MOF, and the Baghdad treasury in order to get IPs paid.’’

Did you try to engage MNSTC–I or CPATT or the MOI Transition Team to assist

with this? What was their response?

Colonel COATES. We were heavily engaged with MOI–TT and CPATT when I MEF

first began dealing with this issue in the spring of 2006. Upon arrival in Al Anbar

in Feb. 06, I MEF sent a full time liaison officer (LNO) to work at CPATT representing and ensuring that CPATT understood the unique issues of Al Anbar. As such,

this LNO was designated as the action officer by CPATT along with a few other individuals on the CPATT staff to initiate the restarting of the payment of salaries

to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar. I MEF always sent representatives to Baghdad with

our Iraqi counterparts to ensure the pay process was executed (The Anbar Provincial Committee of Three-Senior Iraqi Police officials tasked with the execution of the

pay roll). For the initial trip to Baghdad during mid-June 2006 to broker the initial

meeting with MOI & MOF officials, there was a large delegation from the Coalition

to include the MOI–TT representatives that were primarily from their finance division. After this first meeting, the log jam was cleared and the Iraqi Police of Al

Anbar were issued their salaries. The number of representatives dropped off for

each subsequent salary execution drill. For the next several pay drills/trips to Baghdad, I MEF representatives/LNO along with Mohammed (Iraqi/American who

worked at MOI–TT as an advisor and had a finance/accounting degree), with a Lt.

Col. from MOI–TT (finance background) walked and coordinated the pay day drill

for Al Anbar directly with MOI, MOF and the Central bank. This also included the

transporting of the salaries to Al Anbar by the Coalition.

Mr. MEEHAN. On page 9 of your testimony, you also mention that ‘‘the process

for obtaining hiring orders is relatively simple but often bogged down by the slow

bureaucracy within MOL’’ Does CPATT or the MOI transition team have a plan for

fixing the ‘‘hiring orders’’ after-training delay?

Colonel COATES. By Jan. 07, CPATT was reorganized and remissioned into the

MOI–TT. I am not aware of any plan for the Iraqis to change the process for issuing

‘‘Hiring Orders’’. The I MEF LNO/representatives would initiate the action by sending graduating class rosters to coalition counterparts with in the MOI and in most

cases, hiring orders were issued within a 10 day period by MOI. During our tenure,

the I MEF Liaison Officer brokered the hiring orders process by walking the request

for orders office to office with MOI Iraqi counterparts. The Iraqis were always slow

in dealing with anything and seemed very apprehensive in changing their current

bureaucratic ways.

Mr. MEEHAN. Since JIPTC is no longer training IPs and Al Anbar’s Police College

is not yet operational, are all recruits attending the Baghdad Police College with

all the attendant difficulties you identify in your testimony (page 6)? Has the USMC

chain of command engaged with the MNSTC–I and CPATT chain of command to

try to continue to send recruits to Jordan until Al Anbar’s college is open, particularly given the security and sectarian issues? If so, what was CPATT’s response?

Colonel COATES. I MEF immediately raised the operational impact of the loss of

JIPTC and issues with the Bagdad Police College in Nov. 2006. I MEF requested

in writing that the decision to close JIPTC be reconsidered and that JIPTC remain

open. MNSTC–I with the endorsement of CPATT delayed the closing of JIPTC for

two months which in turn provided I MEF with two additional class dates at JIPTC.

The additional classes provided the opportunity to train over 1500 Iraqi Police in

Al Anbar. In concert with the aforementioned, CPATT funded the construction of

an interim Police Academy for Al Anbar which opened in early June 07 and will

graduate the first class of 550 police recruits in mid August 07.

Æ