J-S68001-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RASHEEM HALL, 

Appellant No. 3161 EDA 2012

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered December 14, 2010,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010569-2009

and CP-51-CR-0010570-2009 

BEFORE: ALLEN, JENKINS, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2014

Rasheem Hall (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, aggravated 

assault, criminal conspiracy, possessing an instrument of crime, and 

violation of the Uniform Firearms Act.1 Appellant’s convictions arose from 

his involvement in a shootout on a residential street in Philadelphia. 

The trial court explained the procedural history of this case as follows:

On August 26, 2010, [Appellant] was found guilty by a jury 

... on case no. CP 51 CR 0010570 2009 of: First Degree 

Murder, as a felony of the first degree; Criminal Conspiracy, as a 

felony of the first degree; Possession of an Instrument of Crime 

(PIC), as a misdemeanor of the first degree; and, Violation of 

the Uniform Firearms Act section 6108 (VUFA 6108), as a 

misdemeanor of the first degree. He was found guilty on case 

____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 2702, 903, 907 and 6108.
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no. CP 51 CR 0010569 2009 of Aggravated Assault, as a 

felony of the first degree.

On December 14, 2010, [Appellant] was sentenced to a 

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole for the First Degree Murder conviction; five (5) to ten 

(10) years’ incarceration for the Criminal Conspiracy conviction; 

two and one-half (21⁄2) to five (5) years’ incarceration for the PIC 

conviction; two and one half (21⁄2) to five (5) years’ incarceration 

for the VUFA 6108 conviction; and five (5) to ten (10) years’ 

incarceration for the Aggravated Assault conviction. All 

sentences to run concurrently.

On March 2, 2011, [Appellant] filed a petition under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) claiming ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failure to file a post-sentence motion and a direct 

appeal. [FN1 It should be noted that Bernard Siegel, Esq., 

[Appellant’s] trial counsel is deceased.]

On May 22, 2012, PCRA counsel was permitted to 

withdraw.

On May 29, 2012, new PCRA counsel was appointed.

On October 22, 2012, by agreement, the PCRA petition 

was granted in part and denied in part. The PCRA court ordered 

[Appellant’s] direct appellate rights reinstated and denied 

[Appellant’s] request to file post sentence motions nunc pro 

tunc.

On November 19, 2012, [Appellant] filed the instant 

appeal.

On June 27, 2013, [Appellant] filed a 1925(b) statement[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/13, at 1-2 (bold in original).

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

I. Is [Appellant] entitled to an arrest of judgment on all 

charges including Murder in the First Degree, Criminal 

Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, PIC and VUFA, where the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict because (1) 

the Commonwealth did not prove by sufficient evidence or 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was a 

principal, accomplice or a criminal conspirator to any crime 
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and (2) where the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had failed to act in selfdefense?

II. Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial where the verdict is 

not supported by the greater weight of the evidence but 

rather, where the verdicts rests [sic] on speculation, 

conjecture and surmise?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Our standard of review is well-settled:

When evaluating a sufficiency claim, our standard is whether, 

viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, the factfinder reasonably 

could have determined that each element of the crime was 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court considers all 

the evidence admitted, without regard to any claim that some of 

the evidence was wrongly allowed. We do not weigh the 

evidence or make credibility determinations. Moreover, any 

doubts concerning a defendant’s guilt were to be resolved by the 

factfinder unless the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that 

no probability of fact could be drawn from that evidence.

Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172, 1178 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

Appellant summarized his argument:

The Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

nor by sufficient evidence that [Appellant] shot and killed anyone 

nor shot and wounded anyone. The Commonwealth did not 

prove that he acted as a criminal conspirator nor as an 

accomplice. The only Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated 

was that [sic] [Appellant] was attempting to protect himself after 

being shot at on the public street by others.

Appellant’s Brief at 7.
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Appellant’s trial lasted four days. The trial court recounted the 

testimony as follows:

[Appellant] was arrested on August 4, 2008 after multiple 

attempts by the Fugitive Squad and other law enforcement 

agencies to locate him. (Notes of Testimony, Trial (Jury) Volume 

1, August 24, 2010, pages 40 – 52).

Police Officer Nona Stokes testified that on May 20, 2007, 

she received a report of shots fired in the area of 16th and York 

Streets in Philadelphia. When she arrived on the scene, she saw 

a female, later identified as Charlene McDonald, standing on the 

corner of 16th and York Streets, bleeding from a gunshot wound 

to her leg. Officer Stokes was advised that another shooting 

victim, later identified as Ronald Kennel, (hereinafter referred to 

as the decedent), was lying in the street in front of 1601 North 

York Street, with a gunshot wound to his head. Medic units 

transported Ms. McDonald and the decedent to Temple Hospital. 

Officer Stokes went to Temple Hospital where she interviewed 

Ms. McDonald and a witness by the name of Tracey Lester. Ms. 

Lester told Officer Stokes at the hospital that she saw the 

shooting and identified “Dave” (later identified as David Satchell, 

hereinafter referred to as Satchell) and “Rasheem” (hereinafter 

referred to as [Appellant], as the shooters. (NT, id, pages 62 –

71, 73).

Tracey Lester testified at the [Appellant’s] trial that on May 

20, 2007, she was at a block party on the 2400 block of Bancroft 

Street in Philadelphia. She was standing in the middle of 

Bancroft Street when she saw the [Appellant], Satchell and other 

boys walking west on Cumberland Street going toward 17th

Street. She has known the [Appellant] and Satchell for years. 

She heard people screaming, “They have guns. Get the kids in 

the house”. Seconds later, she heard gunshots coming from 

around the corner. She ran into her house at 2402 Bancroft 

Street. Satchell and two other males ran up Bancroft Street. 

Satchell ran onto her porch with a gun in his hand. She blocked 

the door so he could not get inside her house. Without being 

asked, she volunteered testimony that the [Appellant] was not 

one of the other two (2) boys she saw running with Satchell up 

Bancroft Street. (NT, id, pages 82 – 88).
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Ms. Lester denied that she told Officer Stokes at Temple 

Hospital that [Appellant] was one of the males she saw running 

with Satchell. She testified that she never spoke to Officer 

Stokes but only to the two (2) homicide detectives at the 

homicide unit. (NT, id, page 89).

In her statement to Homicide Detectives, Ms. Lester 

identified the two (2) males running from the scene with guns in 

their hands as [Appellant] and Satchell. She described the gun 

that Satchell was carrying as a silver, .9mm with a black handle 

and that [Appellant] was holding the gun he was carrying, down 

to his side as he was running. She also indicated that she had 

seen [Appellant] with a gun on a previous occasion. (NT, id, 

pages 97 – 103).

Ms. Lester testified at Satchell’s preliminary hearing and 

trial and at [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing. In each of those 

proceedings, she testified that she saw [Appellant] with a gun 

immediately after she heard gunshots coming from around the 

corner. At [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing, she testified that 

minutes after the shooting stopped she saw [Appellant] running 

up Bancroft Street with a big silver gun in his hand. (NT, id, 

pages 92 – 117).

Charlene McDonald testified that she was standing at 16th

and York Streets waiting for the bus on May 20, 2007. She 

heard a gunshot and started to run and then fell to the ground. 

She had a gunshot wound to her right tibia. She was in the 

hospital for two (2) days and had physical therapy for the next 

two (2) months. She still has pain and experiences discomfort in 

doing everyday activities. (NT, id, pages 133 – 135).

Derrick Williams testified at [Appellant’s] trial that he has 

known [Appellant], (who he knows as “Sheem”), and Satchell for 

most of his life. He also knew the decedent as “Hat”. He was 

present on the 1600 block of York Street when the decedent was 

shot and killed. On the day of the shooting, he was sitting on 

the steps of 1614 York Street with his aunt and a friend. Three 

(3) males came around the corner of 17th Street and started 

shooting at three (3) of his friends: Satchell, Hakim and Faith 

Anderson, who were walking up the block. He testified that 

[Appellant] was not present on the scene. (NT, id, pages 196 –

198).

In the statement Mr. Williams gave to homicide detectives 

on December 4, 2008, he indicated that he was sitting on the 
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steps of 1614 York Street with his Aunt Kim and “TJ” Sikes 

“talking about this boy, Reggie, who got killed earlier that day at 

15th and York”. He saw [Appellant], Satchell, and Hakim walking 

on York Street from 16th Street towards Bancroft Street. He 

looked down York Street towards 17th Street and saw a male he 

knows as “Sife” and two (2) other males holding guns. They 

started shooting at [Appellant], Satchell and Hakim. [Appellant], 

Satchell and Hakim pulled out guns and started firing also. He 

saw the decedent lying on the ground shaking. When the 

shooting stopped, he saw [Appellant], Satchell, and Hakim run 

up Bancroft Street. [Appellant] and Satchell tried to enter 

Tracey Lester’s house. After Ms. Lester refused to allow them to 

enter, [Appellant] and Satchell ran up Bancroft Street and 

jumped over a fence. (NT, id, pages 205 – 208).

In his statement, Mr. Williams described the gun that 

[Appellant] was carrying as a dark grey and light grey .40 caliber 

hand gun. He identified and placed his signature on photographs 

of [Appellant], Satchell, Sife and the decedent. (NT, id, pages 

209 – 210). 

Mr. Williams testified at Satchell’s trial that [Appellant] was 

with Satchell during the shootout at Bancroft and York Streets 

and that after the gunfire stopped, he saw Satchell, [Appellant] 

and Hakim run up Bancroft Street. At that trial, he placed an “R” 

on a diagram used at Satchell’s trial to indicate where 

[Appellant] was standing when the shooting was taking place. 

(NT, id, pages 212 214).

At [Appellant’s] trial, Mr. Williams testified that he did not 

remember identifying [Appellant] in his statement or testifying 

at Satchell’s trial that [Appellant] was with Satchell. He testified 

that homicide detectives inserted [Appellant’s] name in his 

statement.

Dr. Edwin Lieberman, an assistant medical examiner from 

the City of Philadelphia, testified that he reviewed the report and 

slides pertaining to the autopsy of the decedent. Based on his 

independent review, he opined that a gunshot wound to the 

head was the cause of death and that the manner of death was 

homicide. He indicated that a bullet entered the decedent’s body 

in the middle of his right eyebrow over his forehead that resulted 

in instantaneous death. He opined that the gunshot wound to 

the decedent’s head was not a contact wound, meaning that the 

muzzle was not in contact with the decedent’s forehead and as 
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there was no stipple, the shot must have been fired from at least 

two and one-half (2 1⁄2) feet away. (NT, id, pages 138, 141 –

145).

Police Officer John Cannon testified that he is assigned to 

the Firearms Identification Unit. He examined the ballistic 

evidence recovered from the scene. Twenty (20) fired cartridge 

casings were recovered from the scene. Of those twenty (20) 

fired cartridge casings; seven (7) were from a .40 caliber 

semiautomatic firearm, nine (9) were from a second .40 caliber 

semiautomatic firearm and four (4) were from a .9 millimeter 

Luger. He also examined three (3) bullets; two (2) bullet 

jackets; and four (4) bullet jacket fragments. Two (2) of the 

bullets were recovered from the scene and one (1) was 

recovered from the decedent’s head. The bullets were fired from 

different firearms. From this evidence, Officer Cannon opined 

that there was a minimum of four (4) different guns fired. No 

weapons were recovered. (Notes of Testimony, Trial (Jury) 

Volume 1, August 25, 2010, pages 112 – 134).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/13, at 2-6.

Appellant’s sufficiency argument focuses on his first-degree murder, 

conspiracy and aggravated assault convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 8-14. 

First-degree murder is defined as “criminal homicide ... when it is committed 

by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). Conspiracy occurs when 

an individual “has the intent of promoting or facilitating [the] commission [of 

a crime and] agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or 

more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). An 

“overt act” must be “alleged and proved” to support conspiracy. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 903(e). Aggravated assault occurs when an individual “attempts 

to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, 
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knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a). 

Appellant argues that his convictions are unsupported by sufficient 

evidence because he did not shoot or wound anyone, and “the evidence 

established that [Appellant] and others had returned fire after being shot 

at.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

In Commonwealth v. Jones, 610 A.2d 931, 938 (Pa. 1992), the 

defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, 

criminal conspiracy and possessing an instrument of crime as a result of his 

involvement, with two other individuals, in a shooting which resulted in the 

deaths and woundings of bystanders in the courtyard of a Philadelphia 

housing project. In concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the defendant’s convictions, our Supreme Court explained: 

Appellant asserts that, in firing a barrage of twenty bullets at the 

people in the courtyard, he and his cohorts had no specific intent 

to kill. This assertion is patently without merit. Specific intent 

to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a 

vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 463 Pa. 

343, 349–50, 344 A.2d 864, 867 (1975). Further, under the 

doctrine of transferred intent, criminal responsibility is not 

affected by the fact that the bullets struck persons other than 

the one for whom they were apparently intended []. 

Commonwealth ex rel. McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 395–96, 

211 A.2d 460, 461–62 (1965) (transferred intent); 18 Pa.C.S. § 

303(b)(1).

Id. at 938. This explanation is instructive and applicable to the instant case.

Moreover, with regard to Appellant’s claim of self-defense, after 

hearing the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a 
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self-defense justification and the Commonwealth’s burden of disproving the 

elements of self-defense. N.T., 8/26/10, at 39-44. The jury’s verdicts 

demonstrate that they rejected Appellant’s claim of self-defense, and as the 

finder of fact, credited the evidence submitted by the Commonwealth.

In addressing Appellant’s claims, the trial court reasoned:

The jury was instructed that they could consider 

eyewitnesses Lester’s and Williams’ statements to Homicide 

Detectives as substantive evidence. Both identif[ied] [Appellant] 

as being present during the shooting, armed with a weapon.

Pennsylvania courts have permitted non-party witnesses to 

be questioned on prior statements they have made when those 

statements contradict their in-court testimony. Commonwealth 

v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa.Super.2002). Such prior 

inconsistent statements may be offered not only to impeach a 

witness, but may also be offered as substantive evidence if they 

meet additional requirements of reliability. Carmody, id, citing 

Brady, 507 A.2d at 68, Lively, 610 A.2d at 9-10 and Pa.R.E. 

613(a) and 803.1.

***

The evidence showed that [Appellant] and his cohorts were 

involved in a shootout on a public street in broad daylight with a 

rival gang and struck two (2) innocent bystanders, killing one 

and injuring another. 

Furthermore, the specific intent to kill needed for First 

Degree Murder can be transferred. 

The doctrine of “transferred intent” has been codified in 

this Commonwealth and reads: 

(b) Divergence between result designed or contemplated 

and actual result.—When intentionally or knowingly causing a 

particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not 

established if the actual result is not within the intent or the 

contemplation of the actor unless:

(1) the actual result differs from that designed or 

contemplated as the case may be, only in the respect 
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that a different person or different property is 

injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or 

contemplated would have been more serious or more 

extensive than that caused; or 

(2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or 

harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too 

remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on 

the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b) (emphasis supplied). See 

Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 538 Pa. 258, 648 A.2d 295 

(1994) (sets forth Commonwealth’s burden under § 

303(b)).

Furthermore, the ballistic evidence showed that at a 

minimum, four (4) different guns were involved in the shootout.

This evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible from 

that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to establish all 

the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. ...

***

Where an accused raises the defense of self-defense, the 

burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant’s act was not justifiable self-defense. 

Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 456 Pa.Super. 222, 690 A.2d 260 

(1997). The Commonwealth sustains this burden if “it 

establishes at least one of the following: 1) the accused did not 

reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or serious 

bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or continued the use of 

force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat 

was possible with complete safety.” Id. at 264 (citations 

omitted). It remains the province of the jury to determine 

whether the accused’s belief was reasonable, whether he was 

free of provocation, and whether he had no duty to retreat. 

Commonwealth v. Buksa, 440 Pa.Super. 305, 655 A.2d 576 

(1995).

Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, the Commonwealth 

sufficiently disproved [Appellant’s] defense of self-defense by 

establishing that [Appellant] was not free from fault in provoking 

or continuing the gunfire that erupted. The evidence showed 

that the shootout was but part of an ongoing armed war 
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between rival groups, with [Appellant] and his cohorts electing 

to stand their ground, draw their weapons, and fire upon seeing 

armed rivals approaching them. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/13, at 7-10.

Given the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency issue. 

In his second issue, Appellant asserts that his convictions were against 

the weight of the evidence. Appellant states, “the greater weight of the 

evidence in this case only establishes that several young men were involved 

in difficulties on the street and that the Commonwealth witness Derrick 

Williams had offered evidence clearly indicating that [Appellant] and others 

with him open[ed] fire only after they were being shot at. The greater 

weight of the evidence did not establish that [Appellant] shot and wounded 

anyone nor that he acted as a co-conspirator or an accomplice.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 16.

Before addressing the merits of this claim, we note that the record is 

devoid of any evidence that Appellant has preserved his weight claim. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 provides that a claim that a verdict is against the weight of 

the evidence must be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial 

1) orally, on the record before sentencing, 2) in writing, any time before 

sentencing, or 3) in a post-sentence motion. Failure to comply with 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 results in waiver. See Commonwealth v. Little, 879 

A.2d 293, 300-301 (Pa. Super. 2005). The fact that a trial court addresses a 

claim in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion is of no consequence. 

Commonwealth v. Washington, 825 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Super. 2003) (failure 
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to raise a weight issue in a post-trial motion, despite the fact that the court 

addressed it in its opinion resulted in waiver of issue on appeal). 

Here, Appellant did not raise his weight claim orally after the trial court 

rendered its verdict, (see N.T., 8/26/10), or at the sentencing hearing (see

N.T., 12/14/10). Further, the record contains no written or post-sentence 

motion challenging the weight of the evidence.

2

 Appellant’s weight claim is 

waived.

In sum, we find no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency issue, and decline 

to review Appellant’s weight issue because it has been waived. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/24/2014

____________________________________________

2 The trial court granted Appellant nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his 

appellate rights, but denied nunc pro tunc reinstatement of Appellant’s postsentence motion rights. Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/13, at 2.
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