* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determine d that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40133

Summary Calendar

BILLIE DORIS MALLORY,

Individually and On Behalf of

the Estate of L.A. MALLORY,

Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY, A U.S. LIFE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

(6:94-CV-841)

August 8, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This is a diversity case from the Eastern District of Texas.

The question is whether an insurance policy provi sion covering

injurie s suffered “while riding in, boarding on, exiting from or

being struck by

. . . [a] land

. . . transport ve hicle which the

insured has not been hired to run” covers a hunting accident whichoccurred aboard a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle. A reading of

“land transport vehicle” to include a four-wheel all-terrain

vehicle would rende r another section of the contract superfluous

a nd the operative language appears in a section entitled “Com mon

Carrier Coverage.” We find no coverage and affirm for essentially

the reasons stated by Judge Hannah.

Decedent L.A. Mallory died as a result of a gunshot wound to

the chest while operating a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle alone on

a private hunting lease in the State of Colorado. Appellee insurer

paid appellant $100,000 in accordance with the “Twenty-Fo ur Hour

Accident Coverage” sectio n of the insurance policy. Appellant

claims she is entitled to an additional $100,000 under the language

of the “Common Carrier Coverage” section quoted above. She appeals

from the district court’s grant o f appellee’s motion for summary

judgment and its denial of her motion for summary judgment.

In Texas, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, “is

interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are a part of the

same transaction are interpreted together.” Restatement (Second)

of Contracts § 202(2) (1981); United American Insurance Company v.

Selby , 338 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. 1960). While a broad reading of

“land transport vehicle” includes a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle,

when the contract is taken as a whole, “land transport vehicle”

takes on a more refined meaning.

A provision in an insurance contract should not be read so as

to render other insuring provisio ns ineffective or meaningless.1 The “Twenty-Four Hour Accident Coverage” section admittedly

renders the “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section

superfluous no matter how the “Common Carrier Coverage” section is

interpreted. Both provisions offer $100,000 in coverage, one for

accidents gen erally and the other for a subset of accidents. It

appears, though, that the schedule is designed to permit an agent

to fill in different coverage amounts for different clients,

“Twenty-Four Hour Accident Coverage” being the broadest category of

coverage and “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” and “Common

Carrier Coverage” being mutually exclusive subsets of that Martindale Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. , 625 F.2d 618,

623 (5th. Cir. 1980); Bright v. New York Life Insurance Co. , 546

S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e).

If we read “land transport vehicle” to include a four-wheel allterrain vehicle, as appellant urges, at least two other parts of

the contract become meaningless. First, the “Private

Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section is rendered superfluous. An

understanding of “land transport vehi cle” which includes a fourwheel all-terrain vehicle also includes a private passenger car--

both are vehicles which transport people across land. The “Private

Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section provides $100,000 for

injuries “suffered when getting into, out of, driving, riding in,

or being struck by a private passenger car”; the “Common Carrier

Coverage” section provides $200,0 00. The contract states that

“[i]f more than one Hazard applies to any one accident, only the

Hazard with the largest principal sum amount will be paid.” Thus

anyone with a $100,000 claim und e r the “Private

Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section would have a concomitant

$200,000 “Common Carrier Coverage” claim. The parties did not

intend such a reading. 1category.

S econd, the title of the relevant section--“Common Carrier

Coverage”--wo u ld be an inaccurate description of the coverage

described in the section. Typically, a “‘[c]ommon carrier’

designates a person engaged in transporting people or things from

place to place for hire, and who holds himself out to the public to

do so for so long as he has room to carry the cargo tendered to

him.” R ailroad Comm’n of Texas v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

, 614

S.W.2d 903, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e)

(emphasis in original). Appellant urges us to disregard this

section title in favor of a general reading of the operative

language which ignores the public/private distinction connoted by

the term “Common Carrier.” But appellee included the term “Common

Carrier” in the section title precisely because it wanted to

describe the nature of the covera ge offered in that section. We

therefore read the oper ative language of the “Common Carrier

Coverage” section in light of its title.

Finally, the term “land transport vehicle” itself can be read

in the manner urged by the title of the section and the structure

of the contract as a whole. While in its most common usage, the

noun “transport” means the act of “carry[ing], mov[ing], or

convey[ ing] from one place to another,” The Random House College

Dictionary 1397 (Rev. ed. 1982), it is also defined as “a system of

public travel,” id. In the absence of other limiting language we

would probably be inclined to adhere to the more generaldefinition. But given the section title and the effect of a broad

reading on the “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section, the

latter definition is the more appropriate one.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.