IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

A.C.-B.,

Appellant.

No. 85270-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — A.C.-B. appeals from a juvenile proceeding in which 

the trial court found him guilty of one count each of rape of a child in the first degree 

and child molestation in the first degree. He challenges only his adjudication of 

guilt as to child molestation on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence of 

sexual gratification. Because sufficient evidence establishes that A.C.-B. had 

sexual contact with the named victim, his sufficiency claim fails and we affirm the 

conviction. However, as the trial court erred when it imposed certain legal financial 

obligations, we remand with an order to strike them from the adjudication order. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FACTS

In August of 2017, A.C.-B. was removed from his mother’s care in New York 

and placed with Amanda and Ronald Rollins1 in Lynnwood, Washington. A.C.-B.

 1 Because they share the same last name, this opinion refers to Amanda and Ronald 

Rollins by their first names as needed for clarity. No disrespect is intended. 
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lived at the Rollins’ home with his two younger half-siblings, R and S, until August 

of 2019 when he was returned to his mother. On August 28, 2019, shortly after

then-15-year-old A.C.-B. moved out of the Rollins’ residence, R, who was seven 

years old at the time, told Amanda that R would rub A.C.-B.’s “boobs and his 

privates” and “milk comes out.” Amanda reported R’s statements to a Child 

Protective Services caseworker who referred the investigation to the Snohomish 

County Sheriff’s Office. 

On September 11, 2019, Amanda took R to Dawson Place Child Advocacy 

Center for a child forensic interview. Heidi Scott, a licensed social worker and child 

interview specialist, conducted the interview. R explained that A.C.-B. would give 

her back massages in his bed. When Scott asked about the massages, R stated 

that “he touches my butt too.” R said that A.C.-B. would touch her “[u]nderneath 

[her] clothes” and would “pull[] down [her] pants and touch[] her butt.” When this

occurred, according to R, she would be lying down on her stomach on the floor

and A.C.-B. would lie down on top of her.

During the forensic interview, Scott asked R about particular statements she 

had made to other adults. R responded by describing sexual contact with A.C.-B. 

in great detail. When A.C.-B. engaged in what R alternately referred to as the 

“eating game” and the “milk trick,” R explained that sometimes A.C.-B. would also 

pull down her pants and underwear, and then A.C.-B. would pull up her pants and 

underwear after and give her a “wedgie.”

On June 29, 2021, the State charged A.C.-B. with one count of rape of a 

child in the first degree (Count 1). Thereafter, the State filed an amended 
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information and added one count of child molestation in the first degree (Count 2). 

The State alleged that A.C.-B. committed both offenses against R between August 

1, 2017 and August 31, 2019. 

On January 17, 2023, after A.C.-B. entered pleas of not guilty to both 

counts, the case proceeded to a fact-finding hearing. The State’s witnesses 

included Amanda, Ronald, Scott, and R. The recording and transcript of R’s 

forensic interview were also admitted into evidence. When the State rested, A.C.-

B. decided to testify on his own behalf. A.C.-B. claimed to have almost no memory

“from [his] fifth birthday all the way up until [he] started living with [his] mother” in 

August of 2019. When asked whether he knew that he lived with the Rollinses

from 2017 to 2019 because he had a “memory of that” or because he had “heard 

that,” A.C.-B. testified, “Because I heard that.” Still, A.C.-B. denied the accusations 

against him and insisted that he never touched R in an inappropriate way.

On January 19, 2023, the trial court provided its oral rulings and found A.C.-

B. guilty of both Count 1, rape of a child in the first degree for having sexual 

intercourse with R, and Count 2, child molestation in the first degree for having 

sexual contact with R. The court later entered its written findings of fact (FF) and 

conclusions of law (CL).

On April 14, 2023, the court conducted the disposition hearing and it 

imposed the standard range sentence on both counts, which required commitment 

of 15 to 36 weeks on each count, to run consecutively, for a total of 30 to 72 weeks’

commitment. The court also imposed the $100 victim penalty assessment (VPA) 

and $100 DNA collection fee.
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A.C.-B. timely appealed.2

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A.C.-B. avers that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for child 

molestation in the first degree. Specifically, he contends the State failed to prove

that the “touching was done for sexual gratification.” 

“In a juvenile proceeding, as in an adult case, the evidence is sufficient to 

support an adjudication of guilt if any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State, could find all the essential elements of the 

crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. E.J.Y., 113 Wn. App. 940, 

952, 55 P.3d 673 (2002). “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s 

evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. 

Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences 

from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly 

against the defendant.” State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 597, 888 P.2d 1105 

(1995). “We consider circumstantial and direct evidence equally reliable.” State 

v. Bass, 18 Wn. App. 2d 760, 782, 491 P.3d 988 (2021), review denied, 198 Wn.2d 

1034 (2022). We also defer to the fact finder’s “evaluation of witness credibility, 

resolution of testimony in conflict, and weight and persuasiveness of the evidence.” 

Id.

 2 On appeal, A.C.-B. does not challenge his adjudication of guilt for rape of a child in the 

first degree. 
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RCW 9A.44.083(1) provides that an individual is guilty of child molestation 

in the first degree when that individual “has or, knowingly causes another person 

under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with another who is less than 

twelve years old and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the 

victim.” RCW 9A.44.010(13) defines “[s]exual contact” as “any touching of the 

sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual 

desire of either party or a third party.” In briefing, A.C.-B. contends there is 

insufficient evidence of sexual contact because he “touched [R]’s buttocks over 

her underwear” and the “prosecution failed to prove this contact was done for the 

purpose of [his] sexual gratification.” We disagree.

The element of sexual contact may be established as matter of law when 

the contact is “directly to the genital organs or breasts.” In re Welfare of Adams, 

24 Wn. App. 517, 519, 601 P.2d 995 (1979). Where, as here, the contact at issue 

is to the buttocks, the element of sexual contact is a question of fact. Id. at 520. 

As this court has explained, the offense of child molestation “require[s] a showing 

of sexual gratification because without that showing the touching may be 

inadvertent.” State v. T.E.H., 91 Wn. App. 908, 916, 960 P.2d 441 (1998). 

However, when the touching is not inadvertent, sexual gratification may be shown

by the “nature of the act itself” and inferred from the evidence. Id. at 916-17. 

A.C.-B. cites to State v. Powell in which Division Three of this court noted 

that “some additional evidence of sexual gratification” may be required to establish 

the element of sexual contact in cases where “the evidence shows touching 

through clothing, or touching of intimate parts of the body other than the primary 
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erogenous areas.” 62 Wn. App. 914, 917, 816 P.2d 86 (1991) (footnote omitted). 

However, A.C.-B. fails to recognize that those circumstances alone do not 

mandate a heightened showing of sexual gratification. Powell’s molestation 

conviction was based on two separate contacts with W: (1) “while [W] was sitting 

on [Powell’s] lap he hugged her about the chest and later touched her bottom while 

lifting her off his lap;” and (2) “while [W] was alone with [Powell] in his truck waiting 

for her cousin, he touched both her thighs.” Id. at 916-17. Because Powell touched 

W on the outside of her clothes and both contacts were “fleeting” and “susceptible 

of innocent explanation,” this court held that the evidence was insufficient to 

support an inference that Powell touched W for the purpose of sexual gratification. 

Id. at 918. Here, unlike in Powell, the record does not show a fleeting or 

inadvertent contact for which there could be an innocent explanation. Quite the 

opposite.

R explained in the forensic interview which was admitted as evidence that 

A.C.-B. would approach her and say, “[I]f you let me give you a back massage, 

then I will give you something.” A.C.-B. would then make R lay down on his bed 

for a massage during which he would pull down her pants and touch her buttocks. 

R testified that A.C.-B. would both “spank” and “rub” her buttocks. When asked 

how it felt when A.C.-B. would touch her buttocks, R said, “Not really any good. 

It’s not good. I don’t like it.” During her forensic interview, which was admitted at 

trial, R noted, “Mostly he pulls . . . pulls my underwear when he touches my butt.” 

R also separately described that sometimes A.C.-B. “pulls down [her] pants and 
No. 85270-1-I/7

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[her] underwear and then starts laying down and doing this (demonstrating) moving 

his body around.” 

As A.C.-B.’s contact with R’s buttocks was far from fleeting, the record 

reflects no innocent explanation, and there is no claim that the touching was in any 

way inadvertent, sexual gratification may be properly inferred here. State v. Price, 

127 Wn. App. 193, 202, 110 P.3d 1171 (2005), aff’d, 158 Wn.2d 630, 146 P.3d 

1183 (2006); see also T.E.H., 91 Wn. App. at 916-17. Viewed in the light most 

favorable to the State, the evidence is more than sufficient to support an inference 

that A.C.-B. touched R’s buttocks for the purpose of sexual gratification. Drawing 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, it is clear that a rational trier of fact 

could have found that A.C.-B. had sexual contact with R, and thus, the evidence 

is sufficient to support A.C.-B.’s adjudication of guilt for child molestation in the first 

degree. See Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 597; E.J.Y., 113 Wn. App. at 952. 

On the same proffered basis that A.C.-B. challenges his adjudication of guilt

to one count of child molestation—that “the prosecution failed to prove the alleged 

touching was done for sexual gratification”—he also challenges FFs 37 and 39 and 

CL 3.3 Specifically, he argues the court referred only to R’s testimony, which was 

 3 FFs 37 and 39 and CL 3 are as follows:

[FF] 37. Beyond a reasonable doubt, between 8/1/17 and 8/31/19, in an incident 

separate from Count 1, [A.C.-B.] did have sexual contact with [R]. [R] was 

under the age of 12 and the respondent was more than 36 months older 

than [R] at the time, as charged in Count 2 of the [a]mended [i]nformation.

. . .

[FF] 39. The above facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . .

[CL] 3. The respondent is guilty of the crime of FIRST DEGREE CHILD 

MOLESTATION, as charged in Count 2 in the [a]mended [i]nformation. 

The respondent, on one or more dates between on or about the 1st day 

of August, 2017, and on or about the 31st day of August, 2019, did have 

sexual contact with [R] . . . who was less than twelve years old and not 
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less specific than her statements in the forensic interview, as the basis for these

findings. However, he offers no authority to suggest that the court must distinguish 

between distinct sources of admitted statements of a witness when entering 

findings and conclusions. R’s statements from the forensic interview that were

admitted as evidence and her live testimony were both before the court, and the 

variance between those accounts was noted, and resolved, by the court. We 

review challenged findings for substantial evidence and conclusions of law de 

novo. State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007). Just as we 

determined the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that A.C.-B. had sexual 

contact with R for purposes of sexual gratification, we also conclude that the 

evidence supporting that finding, which is incorporated in FF 37 and 39, constitutes 

“substantial evidence.”4 Because the trial court’s findings support its conclusion 

that A.C.-B. is guilty of child molestation in the first degree as provided in CL 3, the 

record evinces no error and A.C.-B.’s sufficiency claims fail. See B.J.S., 140 Wn. 

App. at 97.

II. Victim Penalty Assessment and DNA Collection Fee

A.C.-B. assigns error to the imposition of the $100 VPA and $100 DNA 

collection fee and seeks remand to the trial court with an order to strike both from 

the disposition order. The State concedes both errors and agrees that remand 

with an order to strike the VPA and DNA fee is appropriate.

 

married to the respondent and not in a state registered domestic 

partnership with the respondent, and the respondent was at least thirtysix months older than [R]. 4 “Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the truth of 

the finding.” State v. Klein, 156 Wn.2d 102, 115, 124 P.3d 644 (2005).
No. 85270-1-I/9

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When A.C.-B.’s disposition hearing occurred on April 14, 2023, the VPA and 

DNA collection fee were both mandatory, regardless of indigency. Former RCW 

7.68.035 (2018); Former RCW 43.43.7541 (2018). Thus, the trial court imposed 

the VPA and DNA collection fee, even though A.C.-B. was indigent at the time.

5

Shortly after the trial court entered the order on adjudication, our legislature

amended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit trial courts from imposing the VPA on 

individuals who are indigent at the time of sentencing. RCW 7.68.035(4); LAWS OF

2023, ch. 449, § 1. Additionally, our legislature amended RCW 43.43.7541 and 

eliminated the mandatory DNA collection fee. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 4. Though 

these amendments took effect on July 1, 2023, they apply to A.C.-B. because his 

case is on direct appeal. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16-17, 530 P.3d 1048 

(2023). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with an order to strike the VPA 

and DNA collection fee from the disposition order.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

 5 Though the trial court did not make an express finding of indigency, the record reflects

that the court accepted A.C.-B.’s assertion that he was indigent. At the disposition hearing, A.C.-

B.’s counsel explained that “[A.C.-B.] is indigent. He does not work. His family has very limited 

income.” The trial court then waived all discretionary fees. Further, the State does not contest that 

A.C.-B. was indigent at the hearing.