Testimony

Before the Subcommittees on Transportation, Senate

and House Committees on Appropriations

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m. EDT

Thursday,

September 20, 2001

AVIATION SECURITY

Terrorist Acts Illustrate

Severe Weaknesses in

Aviation Security

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO-01-1166T
Page 1 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees:

A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the

nation’s overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic

foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have

been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at

this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation’s

aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous events

of last week, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation

security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than

previously imagined.

We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have identified

throughout the nation’s aviation system. Our testimony is based on our

prior work and includes assessments of security concerns with (1)

aviation-related computer systems, (2) airport access controls, and (3)

passenger and carry-on baggage screening, including how the United

States and selected other countries differ in their screening practices. Our

testimony will also offer some observations about improving aviation

security in these various areas.

In summary:

• As we reported last year, our reviews of the Federal Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer

systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its

own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC

buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were

protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had

undergone background checks. As a result, the ATC system was

susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. FAA is making some

progress in addressing the 22 recommendations we made to improve

computer security, but most have yet to be completed.

• Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not

always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our special

agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain

access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and

walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been

issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons,

explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is acting on the

weaknesses we identified and is implementing improvements to more

closely check the credentials of law enforcement officers. The Department

of Transportation’s Inspector General has also documented numerous
Page 2 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

problems with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, the

Inspector General’s staff successfully gained access to secure areas 68

percent of the time.

• As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners revealed significant

weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on

passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. In 1987, screeners

missed 20 percent of the potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its

tests. At that time, FAA characterized this level of performance as

unsatisfactory. More recent results have shown that as testing gets more

realistic—that is, as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might

attempt to penetrate a checkpoint—screeners’ performance declines

significantly. A principal cause of screeners’ performance problems is the

rapid turnover among screeners. Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a

year at most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners,

primarily because of the low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive,

monotonous nature of their work. Additionally, too little attention has

been given to factors such as the sufficiency of the training given to

screeners. FAA’s efforts to address these problems have been slow. We

recommended that FAA develop an integrated plan to focus its efforts, set

priorities, and measure progress in improving screening. FAA is

addressing these recommendations, but progress on one key effort—the

certification of screening companies—is still not complete because the

implementing regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2 1⁄2 years

since FAA originally planned to implement the regulation.

• Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and

the United Kingdom—countries whose systems we have examined—differ

from this country’s in some significant ways. Their screening operations

require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include

higher pay and better benefits, and often include different screening

techniques, such as “pat-downs” of some passengers. Another significant

difference is that most of these countries place responsibility for screening

with airport authorities or the government instead of air carriers. The

countries we visited had significantly lower screener turnover, and there is

some evidence they may have better screener performance; for example,

one country’s screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did

U.S. screeners in a 1998 joint screener testing program conducted with

FAA.

The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country

looks at aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers

implemented new controls that promise a greater sense of security. We

support these actions. Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our

aviation security system, more needs to be done. Additional
Page 3 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

considerations for the immediate future could include prioritizing

outstanding recommendations that address security, developing a strategic

plan to address the recommendations, assigning specific executive

responsibility for carrying out this plan, and identifying the sources and

amounts of funding needed. In establishing priorities, a key action needed

is to complete the promulgation of the screening company certification

regulation, which also implements the requirements of the Airport

Security Improvement Act of 2000, enacted by the Congress last

November. The Congress also needs to reconsider whether airlines should

continue to bear primary responsibility for screening operations at the

nation’s airports. Aviation security has truly become a national security

issue, and responsibility for screening may no longer appropriately rest

with air carriers. Consideration of the role of air carriers in conducting

passenger screening could be examined as part of the ongoing effort to

identify and structure mechanisms to provide financial and other

assistance to help the aviation industry emerge from the current crisis.

It has been observed that previous tragedies have resulted in

congressional hearings, studies, recommendations, and debates, but little

long-term resolve to correct flaws in the system as the memory of the

crisis recedes. The future of aviation security hinges in large part on

overcoming this cycle of limited action that has too often characterized

the response to aviation security concerns.

Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism was

significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U.S. airliners was

discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the task of providing

security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we

must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made

totally secure. The enormous size of U.S. airspace alone defies easy

protection. Furthermore, given this country’s hundreds of airports,

thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly

limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system,

aviation security must be enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding

airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators

are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure

airport areas or to aircraft. Additionally, vigilance is required to prevent

attacks against the extensive computer networks that FAA uses to guide

thousands of flights safely through U.S. airspace. FAA has developed

several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such as

adopting technology to detect explosives and establishing procedures to

ensure that passengers are positively identified before boarding a flight.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that

significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security.

Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation

security in recent years. One such problems is FAA’s computer-based air

traffic control system. The ATC system is an enormous, complex

collection of interrelated systems, including navigation, surveillance,

weather, and automated information processing and display systems that

link hundreds of ATC facilities and provide information to air traffic

controllers and pilots. Failure to adequately protect these systems could

increase the risk of regional or nationwide disruption of air traffic—or

even collisions.

In five reports issued from 1998 through 2000, we pointed out numerous

weaknesses in FAA’s computer security.1

 FAA had not (1) completed

background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2) assessed

and accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3) performed

appropriate risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of the majority

of its ATC systems, (4) established a comprehensive security program, (5)

developed service continuity controls to ensure that critical operations

continue without undue interruption when unexpected events occur, and

(6) fully implemented an intrusion detection capability to detect and

respond to malicious intrusions. Some of these weaknesses could have led

to serious problems. For example, as part of its Year 2000 readiness

efforts, FAA allowed 36 mainland Chinese nationals who had not

undergone required background checks to review the computer source

code for eight mission-critical systems.

To date, we have made nearly 22 recommendations to improve FAA’s

computer security. FAA has worked to address these recommendations,

but most of them have yet to be completed. For example, it is making

progress in obtaining background checks on contractors and accrediting

 1

Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety

(GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998), Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls

Over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55,

Dec. 23, 1999), Computer Security: FAA is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But

Further Action Is Required (GAO/AIMD-00-169, May 31, 2000), FAA Computer Security:

Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other Continuing Weaknesses

(GAO/AIMD-00-252, Aug. 16, 2000), and FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to

Address Continuing Weaknesses (GAO-01-171, Dec. 6, 2000).

Potential for

Unauthorized Access

to Aviation Computer

Systems
Page 5 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

facilities and systems as secure. However, it will take time to complete

these efforts.

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is

another component of aviation security. Among the access controls in

place are requirements intended to prevent unauthorized individuals from

using forged, stolen, or outdated identification or their familiarity with

airport procedures to gain access to secured areas. In May 2000, we

reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained

access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law

enforcement credentials and badges.2

 At these airports, our agents

declared themselves as armed law enforcement officers, displayed

simulated badges and credentials created from commercially available

software packages or downloaded from the Internet, and were issued “law

enforcement” boarding passes. They were then waved around the

screening checkpoints without being screened. Our agents could thus have

carried weapons, explosives, chemical/biological agents, or other

dangerous objects onto aircraft. In response to our findings, FAA now

requires that each airport’s law enforcement officers examine the badges

and credentials of any individual seeking to bypass passenger screening.

FAA is also working on a “smart card” computer system that would verify

law enforcement officers’ identity and authorization for bypassing

passenger screening.

The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General has also uncovered

problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector General’s staff

conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access controls at eight major

airports and succeeded in gaining access to secure areas in 68 percent of

the tests; they were able to board aircraft 117 times. After the release of its

report describing its successes in breaching security,3

 the Inspector

General conducted additional testing between December 1999 and March

2000 and found that, although improvements had been made, access to

secure areas was still gained more than 30 percent of the time.

 2

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-00-10, May 25, 2000).

3

Airport Access Control (AV-2000-017, Nov. 18, 1999).

Weaknesses in Airport

Access Controls
Page 6 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line

of defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the aviation

system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each

day for articles that could pose threats to the safety of an aircraft and

those aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for screening passengers

and their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas of an

airport or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees to

conduct screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security

companies to do the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening

companies are responsible for screening at some of the nation’s larger

airports.

Concerns have long existed over screeners’ ability to detect and prevent

dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were

discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been

found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the

performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect

potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as

passengers. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects

during FAA tests. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects

during the same type of test. Test data for the 1991 to 1999 period show

that the declining trend in detection rates continues.4

 Furthermore, the

recent tests show that as tests become more realistic and more closely

approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint,

screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects declines even further.

As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to

identify dangerous objects.5

 Two conditions—rapid screener turnover and

inadequate attention to human factors—are believed to be important

causes. Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing

problem, having been identified as a concern by FAA and by us in reports

dating back to at least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among

screeners was about 100 percent a year at some airports, and according to

our more recent work, the turnover is considerably higher.6

 From May

 4

Information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security information and

cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss the actual detection rates for

the 1991-99 period.

5

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance

(GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

6

Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO-RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).

Inadequate Detection

of Dangerous Objects

by Screeners
Page 7 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

1998 through April 1999, screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the

nation’s 19 largest airports; 5 of these airports reported turnover of 200

percent or more, and one reported turnover of 416 percent. At one airport

we visited, of the 993 screeners trained at that airport over about a 1-year

period, only 142, or 14 percent, were still employed at the end of that year.

Such rapid turnover can seriously limit the level of experience among

screeners operating a checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low

wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the daily stress

of the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the minimum wage. We

reported last year that some of the screening companies at 14 of the

nation’s 19 largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6.00 an hour

or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the thenminimum wage—$5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at

airport fast-food restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners

receive. For instance, at one airport we visited, screeners’ wages started as

low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport’s fastfood restaurants was $7 an hour.

The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties require

repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare event when

a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has been given

to factors such as (1) improving individuals’ aptitudes for effectively

performing screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to

screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the

job and the distractions that reduce screeners’ vigilance. As a result,

screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary

aptitudes, nor the adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work,

and who then find the duties tedious and dull.

We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions

to improve screeners’ performance. However, FAA did not have an

integrated management plan for these efforts that would identify and

prioritize checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be

resolved, and identify measures—and related milestone and funding

information—for addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA

did not have adequate goals by which to measure and report its progress in

improving screeners’ performance.

FAA is implementing our recommendations. However, two key actions to

improving screeners’ performance are still not complete. These actions are

the deployment of threat image projection systems—which place images
Page 8 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

of dangerous objects on the monitors of X-ray machines to keep screeners

alert and monitor their performance—and a certification program to make

screening companies accountable for the training and performance of the

screeners they employ. Threat image projection systems are expected to

keep screeners alert by periodically imposing the image of a dangerous

object on the X-ray screen. They also are used to measure how well

screeners perform in detecting these objects. Additionally, the systems

serve as a device to train screeners to become more adept at identifying

harder-to-spot objects. FAA is currently deploying the threat image

projections systems and expects to have them deployed at all airports by

2003.

The screening company certification program, required by the Federal

Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish performance, training,

and equipment standards that screening companies will have to meet to

earn and retain certification. However, FAA has still not issued its final

regulation establishing the certification program. This regulation is

particularly significant because it is to include requirements mandated by

the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 to increase screener

training—from 12 hours to 40 hours—as well as expand background check

requirements. FAA had been expecting to issue the final regulation this

month, 2 1⁄2 years later than it originally planned.

We visited five countries—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and

the United Kingdom—viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as

having effective screening operations to identify screening practices that

differ from those in the United States. We found that some significant

differences exist in four areas: screening operations, screener

qualifications, screener pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility

for screening.

First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are more

stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom

routinely touch or “pat down” passengers in response to metal detector

alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed passengers

through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to

more thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also have a greater

police or military presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for

example, security forces—often armed with automatic weapons—patrol at

or near checkpoints. At Belgium’s main airport in Brussels, a constant

police presence is maintained at one of two glass-enclosed rooms directly

behind the checkpoints.

Differences in the

Screening Practices of

Five Other Countries

and the United States
Page 9 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Second, screeners’ qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to

the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France

requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. In the

Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been

residents of the country for 5 years. Training requirements for screeners

were also greater in four of the countries we visited than in the United

States. While FAA requires that screeners in this country have 12 hours of

classroom training before they can begin work, Belgium, Canada, France,

and the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours

of training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an

additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as X-ray machine

operations, that the screener will conduct.

Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of these

countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive wages that are

at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries receive

wages that are viewed as being at the “middle income” level in those

countries. In the Netherlands, for example, screeners received at least the

equivalent of about $7.50 per hour. This wage was about 30 percent higher

than the wages at fast-food restaurants in that country. In Belgium,

screeners received the equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay

higher, but the screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as

health care or vacations—in large part because these benefits are required

under the laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly

lower screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about

50 percent or lower in these countries.

Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these countries is

placed with the airport authority or with the government, not with the air

carriers as it is in the United States. In Belgium, France, and the United

Kingdom, the responsibility for screening has been placed with the

airports, which either hire screening companies to conduct the screening

operations or, as at some airports in the United Kingdom, hire screeners

and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the Netherlands, the

government is responsible for passenger screening and hires a screening

company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are overseen by a

Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other countries with

international airports, 100 have placed screening responsibility with the

airports or the government; only 2 other countries—Canada and

Bermuda—place screening responsibility with air carriers.

Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices,

and because data on screeners’ performance in each country were not
Page 10 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different

practices on improving screeners’ performance. Nevertheless, there are

indications that for least one country, practices may help to improve

screeners’ performance. This country conducted a screener testing

program jointly with FAA that showed that its screeners detected over

twice as many test objects as did screeners in the United States.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any

questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.

For more information, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-

2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included

Bonnie Beckett, J. Michael Bollinger, Colin J. Fallon, John R. Schulze, and

Daniel J. Semick.

Contacts and

Acknowledgments
Page 11 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access

Security Improvements (GAO-01-1069R, Aug. 31, 2001).

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in

Carriage of Weapons Regulations (GAO/RCED-00-181, Sept. 29, 2000).

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses

That Jeopardize Aviation Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-330, Sept. 27,

2000).

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other

Continuing Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-00-252, Aug. 16, 2000).

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’

Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But

Further Action Is Required (GAO/AIMD-00-169, May 31, 2000).

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO-OSI-00-10,

May 25, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to

Combat Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security

System (GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142, Apr. 6, 2000).

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener

Performance Problems (GAO/T-RCED-00-125, Mar. 16, 2000).

Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign

Nationals to Remediate and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23,

1999).

FBI: Delivery of ATF Report on TWA Flight 800 Crash (GAO/OSI-99-18R,

Aug. 13, 1999).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding

for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (GAO/RCED99-53, Feb. 25, 1999).

Related GAO Products
Page 12 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight

Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is

Needed (GAO/T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way,

but Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24,

1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (T-NSIAD98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA

in Identifying and Responding to Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives

Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-ll9R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Aviation Security: Posting Notices at Domestic Airports (GAO/RCED-97-

88R, Mar. 25, 1997).

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the

Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety

and Security (GAO/T-RCED-97-90, Mar. 5, 1997).

Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept. 19, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/TRCED/NSIAD-96-251, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).
Page 13 GAO-01-1166T Aviation Security

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27,

1996).

Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure that Airport’s Access Control

Systems are Cost Effective (GAO/RCED-95-25, Mar. 1, 1995).

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met

Expectations (GAO/RCED-94-142, May 19, 1994).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

(540010)