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NANCY BURTON v. COMMISSIONER OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL.

(SC 19664)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js.*

Argued October 18—officially released December 13, 2016

Nancy Burton, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Matthew I. Levine, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Michael W. Lynch, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (named defendant).

Elizabeth C. Barton, with whom were Harold M.

Blinderman and, on the brief, Michael L. Miller, for

the appellee (defendant Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.).
Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The issue that we must resolve in this

appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed

the complaint claiming a violation of the Connecticut

Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (act), General

Statutes § 22a-14 et seq., on the ground of mootness.

The plaintiff, Nancy Burton, brought this action against

the defendants, the Commissioner of Environmental

Protection (commissioner) and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion), claiming that the operation

of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station (Millstone),

which is owned and operated by Dominion, is causing

unreasonable pollution of the waters of the state in

violation of the act. Thereafter, the defendants filed

motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that

the plaintiff lacked standing, which the trial court

granted. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of

dismissal and, in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 792–93, 970 A.2d 640

(2009) (Burton I), this court reversed the judgment of

dismissal. We concluded that the plaintiff had standing

to bring her action under General Statutes § 22a-161

because she had alleged facts that would support inferences that: (1) unreasonable pollution, impairment or

destruction of a natural resource would probably result

from Millstone’s operations; id., 804; and (2) pursuant to

General Statutes § 22a-20,2

the pending administrative

permit renewal proceeding for Millstone’s operation

was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by the

act because the hearing officer and the Department of

Environmental Protection3

(department) had not conducted the proceeding fairly and impartially. Id., 812.

As the remedy, we ordered that the trial court conduct

a hearing to determine whether the pending administrative proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights

recognized by the act. Our decision in Burton I was

officially released on June 2, 2009. On September 1,

2010, the administrative proceeding terminated when

the commissionerissued a renewal permitfor Millstone.

Thereafter, the defendants filed separate motions to

dismiss the plaintiff’s action, contending that, because

no hearing on the adequacy of the permit renewal proceeding had been conducted pursuant to this court’s

order in Burton I, and because the permit renewal proceeding had terminated, the plaintiff’s action was moot.

The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, and

this appeal followed.4 We reverse the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts are set forth in our

opinion in Burton I. ‘‘Millstone is an electric generating

facility that is located in Waterford and powered by

two nuclear power generating units. During operation,

Millstone withdraws water from Niantic Bay to cool

the generating units and then discharges the water into

the Long Island Sound. These activities are authorized
by a permit (discharge permit) issued by the [department] pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342 and General Statutes

[Rev. to 2007] § 22a-430. The department originally

issued the discharge permit in 1992 to Dominion’s predecessor, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Northeast). On June 13, 1997, Northeast submitted to the

department an application for renewal of the discharge

permit. After Dominion purchased Millstone on March

31, 2001, the department approved the transfer of permits and authorizations for the operation of the facility

from Northeast to Dominion, including an emergency

authorization that the department had issued pursuant

to General Statutes § 22a-6k. The discharge permit

remained in effect pending disposition of the renewal

application pursuant to General Statutes [§] 4-182 (b)

and [General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) §] 22a-430 (c).

‘‘In August 2006, the department issued its tentative

draft decision to renew the discharge permit.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 793–94. Thereafter, the plaintiff

brought the present action alleging that Millstone’s

operation was causing harm to the environment in a

variety of ways, that the hearing officer assigned to the

permit renewal proceeding had a conflict of interest

and was biased, and that the department had prejudged

the permit renewal application. Id., 796. The defendants

filed motions to dismiss the action for lack of standing.

Id. The trial court, treating the plaintiff’s action as having been brought pursuant to § 22a-16 and General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 22a-19 (a),5 concluded that the

plaintiff lacked standing under those statutory provisions because the conduct that the plaintiff alleged

arose out of a permitting proceeding. Id., 797. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Id.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal

to this court. Id. We concluded that, because ‘‘the plaintiff’s complaint adequately sets forth facts to support

an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment

or destruction of a natural resource will probably result

from Millstone’s operation,’’ she had standing to bring

her complaint under § 22a-16. Id., 804. Responding to

the defendants’ claim that the plaintiff lacked standing

because her claims were premised entirely on alleged

flaws in the permitting process, we stated that ‘‘the

mere fact the conduct comes within the scope of a

statutory permitting scheme does not preclude a claim

under the act if, as in the present case, the plaintiff

makes a colorable claim that the conduct will cause

unreasonable pollution.’’ Id., 807.

We then addressed the issue of the appropriate remedy on remand. We stated that, ‘‘[if] the trial court

determines that the plaintiff has not established that

the hearing officer is biased or the department has

prejudged the permit renewal application and that the

permit renewal proceeding is adequate to protect the
rights recognized by the act, the court then will have

the discretion to stay this action pending completion

of the permit renewal proceeding. See Waterbury v.

Washington, [260 Conn. 506, 546, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002)]

(‘under the . . . doctrine of primary jurisdiction,

which is embodied by [General Statutes] § 22a-18 of

[the act], the court has discretion, and in certain cases

should refer the case, or certain aspects of it, to the

administrative agency, yetretain jurisdiction for further

action, if appropriate, under that section’). If, on the

other hand, the trial court determines that the permit

renewal proceeding is inadequate to safeguard the

rights recognized by the act, the court may stay those

proceedings and craft orders to ensure that those rights

are adequately protected. We leave the scope of any

such orders to the informed discretion of the trial

court.’’ Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental

Protection, supra, 291 Conn. 813.

Our decision in Burton I was officially released on

June 2, 2009. The plaintiff, having received an advance

copy of the decision, filed a motion to stay the permit

renewal proceeding on May 26, 2009. The commissioner

then requested that the trial court schedule a status

conference in the present case. On June 18, 2009, after

the trial court, Aurigemma, J., had granted the request

for a status conference, the plaintiff filed a second

motion to stay the permit renewal proceeding, which

the trial court, Elgo, J., denied. On July 29, 2009, the trial

court, Graham, J., conducted the status conference.

Because Judge Graham had previously worked with

the attorney who represented Dominion, the plaintiff

requested that he recuse himself from the matter. Judge

Graham denied the request to recuse himself, but indicated that he would continue the status conference so

that Judge Aurigemma, who had originally scheduled

the status conference and who was unavailable because

she was presiding over the trial of another case, could

conduct it. Judge Graham then indicated that he would

inform Judge Aurigemma that he had continued the

status conference and that it was his expectation that

she would reschedule it for some time in August, 2009.

For reasons that are unclear from the record, the status

conference was never rescheduled.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff, who, in November, 2006,

had intervened in the permit renewal proceeding pursuant to § 22a-19, continued to participate in that proceeding. An administrative hearing on the permit renewal

was conducted over the course of eighteen days in

January and February of 2009, at which the plaintiff

cross-examined witnesses, offered exhibits and made

objections. On February 17, 2010, the hearing officers

issued a proposed final decision and a draft permit. The

plaintiff filed exceptions to the proposed final decision

and, on May 24, 2010, participated in a hearing before

Deputy Commissioner Susan Frechette, who was

charged with issuing a final decision on the permit
renewal. On September 1, 2010, Frechette issued the

renewal permit. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a timely

administrative appeal from the permit renewal.

In December, 2011, the trial court, Robaina, J., sua

sponte, scheduled a status conference in the present

case for March 6, 2012. The trial court, Miller, J., subsequently granted the plaintiff’s request for a continuance

and, ultimately, Judge Robaina held the status conference on March 15, 2012. The plaintiff indicated at the

status conference that she intended to file discovery

motions within thirty days ‘‘in order to begin to meet

[her] burden to establish . . . that the hearing officer

is biased, and/or that the department prejudged the

permit renewal application and therefore the permit

renewal proceeding is inadequate to protect the rights

recognized by the [act] . . . .’’ The defendants contended that the action should be consolidated with the

plaintiff’s administrative appeal, which involved many

of the same issues. Judge Robaina stated that he would

allow several weeks for the parties to file motions and

memoranda in support of their positions.

On March 27, 2012, the department filed a motion to

consolidate the administrative appeal with this action,

and, on March 28, 2012, Dominion filed a similar motion.

On April 13, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for an

immediate hearing on the issue of whether the permit

renewal proceeding was adequate to protect the rights

recognized by the act. The defendants filed a response

and objection to the plaintiff’s motion in which they

argued that the court should defer ruling on the motion

until it ruled on the defendants’ motions to consolidate

and that there was no compelling reason why the matter

required immediate action. The trial court, Berger, J.,

denied the plaintiff’s motion for an immediate hearing

on the ground that it could not ‘‘logically take place

until after a decision on the [defendants’ motions] to

consolidate.’’ Thereafter, Judge Robaina granted the

motions to consolidate.

On March 25, 2014, the trial court, Scholl, J., conducted another status conference. The defendants contended at that hearing that the case was moot because

the permitrenewal proceeding had terminated. The trial

court ordered the defendants to submit motions to dismiss by May 2, 2014. Thereafter, Dominion and the

commissioner filed separate motions to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that it was moot, and the

plaintiff objected to the motions. After a hearing, the

trial court, Sheridan, J., granted the defendants’

motions to dismiss. The court reasoned that, ‘‘[i]n light

of the completion of the permit renewal proceeding

more than four years ago, there is no relief the court can

grant on the claim advanced in [the] plaintiff’s [action]

consistent with the remand of the Supreme Court. The

court cannot ‘compel compliance with a statutory

scheme’ or ‘stay those proceedings and craft orders to
ensure that . . . rights are adequately protected’ for

permit renewal proceedings that have long since concluded.’’ The plaintiff filed a motion forreconsideration,

which Judge Sheridan denied.6 This appeal followed.

The plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court

improperly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss

because this action is not moot. We agree.

‘‘Mootness implicates this court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, raising a question of law over which we

exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v.

Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 84, 942 A.2d

345 (2008). ‘‘A case becomes moot when due to

intervening circumstances a controversy between the

parties no longer exists. . . . An issue is moot when the

court can no longer grant any practical relief.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Zoning Board of

Appeals, 71 Conn. App. 43, 46, 800 A.2d 641 (2002).

We conclude that the present action is not moot

because a controversy continues to exist between the

parties and there is practical relief that the trial court

can provide. Specifically, this court concluded in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection,

supra, 291 Conn. 804, that the plaintiff had standing to

bring her complaint pursuant to § 22a-16 because she

had alleged that ‘‘unreasonable pollution, impairment

or destruction of a natural resource will probably result

from Millstone’s operation.’’ We further concluded that

the plaintiff had standing because she had alleged pursuant to § 22a-20 that ‘‘the permit renewal proceeding

is inadequate to protect the rights recognized by the

act . . . because the hearing officer and the department have not conducted the proceeding fairly and

impartially.’’Id., 812. The issuance ofthe renewal permit

did not resolve or terminate these controversies, and

they continue to exist. Moreover, if the trial court were

to determine that the permit renewal proceeding was

inadequate to protect against unreasonable pollution,

the court would have the authority to adjudicate the

plaintiff’s complaint. See General Statutes § 22a-18 (c)

(‘‘[i]f the agency’s consideration has not been adequate,

and notwithstanding that the agency’s decision is supported by competent material and substantial evidence

on the whole record, the court shall adjudicate the

impact of the defendant’s conduct on the public trust

in the air, water or other naturalresources of the state’’).

If the court were to determine that, contrary to the

commissioner’s decision in the permitrenewal proceeding, Millstone’s operations will create pollution in

excess of that permitted by the applicable statutory

scheme, the court would have the authority under § 22a16 to grant ‘‘declaratory and equitable relief . . . for

the protection of the public trust in the . . . water and

other natural resources of the state . . . .’’ See also

General Statutes § 22a-18 (a) (‘‘[t]he court may grant
temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may

impose such conditions on the defendant as are

required to protect the public trust in the air, water and

other natural resources of the state from unreasonable

pollution, impairment or destruction’’). Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial court improperly granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss.7

In support of their claim to the contrary, the defendants contend that this court’s remand order in Burton

I contemplated that the plaintiff would be entitled to

relief only as long as the administrative proceeding

continued to exist. Specifically, the defendants point

out that this court stated in Burton I that the trial court

would have the discretion to stay the permit renewal

proceeding if it determined that that proceeding was

not adequate to protect the rights recognized by the act.

Because the permitrenewal proceeding has terminated,

they argue, there is nothing to stay. The commissioner

further contends that § 22a-20 provides that an action

pursuant to § 22a-16 may be brought ‘‘where existing

administrative and regulatory procedures are found by

the court to be inadequate for the protection of the

rights’’ recognized by the act. (Emphasis added.) The

commissioner contends that, when those administrative and regulatory procedures have terminated, they

no longer exist and, therefore, no such action may be

maintained. We disagree with both contentions.

With respect to the defendants’ claim that this action

is moot because there is no longer any permit renewal

proceeding to stay, this court did not hold in Burton I

that a stay of the permit renewal proceeding was the

exclusive relief that the trial court could grant on

remand. Rather, we merely held that, under the then

existing circumstances, a determination as to whether

either this action or the permit renewal proceeding

should be stayed was an appropriate preliminary step

toward the ultimate resolution of the plaintiff’s claims.

We expressly recognized that, if the plaintiff failed to

establish that the permit renewal proceeding should be

stayed because the hearing officer was biased or the

department had prejudged the permit renewal application, the trial court would have ‘‘the discretion to stay

this action pending completion of the permit renewal

proceeding. See Waterbury v. Washington, supra, 260

Conn. 546 (‘under the . . . doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which is embodied by § 22a-18 of [the act], the

court has discretion, and in certain cases should refer

the case, or certain aspects of it, to the administrative

agency, yet retain jurisdiction for further action, if

appropriate, under that section’).’’8

(Emphasis added.)

Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection,

supra, 291 Conn. 813. Thus, we expressly contemplated

that, even if the trial court determined that the permit

renewal proceeding should go forward, the trial court

could reassert jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s complaint

after the completion of that proceeding to determine
whether further action was necessary to protect the

rights recognized by the act. Thus, we anticipated that,

even if the hearing was conducted fairly, the plaintiff

could still claim after the conclusion of the hearing

that it was ‘‘inadequate for the protection of the rights

[recognized by the act]’’; General Statutes § 22a-20;

because, for example, the department had misinterpreted or misapplied governing environmental law, and

the permit should, therefore, be invalidated.9

With respect to the commissioner’s claim that § 22a20 refers only to ‘‘existing administrative and regulatory

procedures’’; (emphasis added); we do not agree that

the word ‘‘existing’’ means live or ongoing in this context. Rather, the most reasonable interpretation of the

phrase ‘‘existing administrative and regulatory procedures’’ is that it refers to administrative and regulatory

procedures that are currently authorized or required by

statute or regulation. We note, for example, that § 22a18 (b) refers to ‘‘administrative, licensing or other such

proceedings [that] are required or available to determine the legality of the defendant’s conduct . . . .’’

Indeed, as we have indicated, § 22a-18 (c) expressly

authorizes the trial court to adjudicate the environmental impact of a defendant’s conduct after an agency

has issued a decision on the same issue if the court

determines that the agency’s consideration has not been

adequate. See General Statutes § 22a-18 (c) (‘‘[i]f the

agency’s consideration has not been adequate, and notwithstanding that the agency’s decision is supported by

competent material and substantial evidence on the

whole record, the court shall adjudicate the impact of

the defendant’s conduct on the public trust in the air,

water or other natural resources of the state’’).

Of course, if the administrative agency’s decision is

no longer operative because it has expired or has been

superseded by other decisions, an action challenging

the decision pursuant to § 22a-16 would be moot

because judicial invalidation of the decision would have

no practical effect. That is not the case here. Contrary

to Dominion’s claim that this action is moot because

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon the 1992 permit

and related emergency authorizations, all of which have

been superseded by the 2010 permit, the plaintiff specifically challenged the adequacy of the permit renewal

proceeding that resulted in the issuance of the renewal

permit in 2010 in her complaint. See Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 291 Conn.

796 (plaintiff’s complaint alleged that ‘‘the hearing officer assigned to the permit renewal proceeding ha[s] a

conflict of interest and [is] biased, and . . . the department has prejudged the permit renewal application and

has declined to consider the environmental impact of

Millstone’s discharge water’’). Because a determination

that the renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect

the rights recognized under the act could result in the

invalidation of the 2010 permit under which Millstone
is currently operating, the claims are not moot.

Dominion further contends that the trial court properly dismissed this action as moot because of the plaintiff’s inaction and delay. The sole basis for the trial

court’s ruling, however, was that this action is moot

because the court could no longer provide practical

relief. Neither the trial court nor the defendants relied

on the provisions of Practice Book § 14-3 (a), authorizing the dismissal of an action for the plaintiff’s failure

to prosecute it with reasonable diligence, and this court

has no authority to make a determination pursuant to

that rule in the first instance. Even if we were to assume

that the plaintiff has engaged in inaction and delay, the

defendants have not explained how that fact, in and

of itself, would prevent the trial court from providing

practical relief.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson. Although Justices McDonald and Robinson

were not present when the case was argued before the court, they have

read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral

argument prior to participating in this decision.

1 General Statutes § 22a-16 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency

of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership,

corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an

action in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant

is located, resides or conducts business, except that where the state is the

defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district of Hartford,

for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision

thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision

thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or

other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the

state from unreasonable pollution . . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 22a-20 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Sections 22a-14 to

22a-20, inclusive, shall be supplementary to existing administrative and

regulatory procedures provided by law and in any action maintained under

said sections, the court may remand the parties to such procedures. Nothing

in this section shall prevent the granting of interim equitable relief where

required and for as long as is necessary to protect the rights recognized

herein. Any person entitled to maintain an action under said sections may

intervene as a party in all such procedures. Nothing herein shall prevent

the maintenance of an action, as provided in said sections, to protect the

rights recognized herein, where existing administrative and regulatory procedures are found by the court to be inadequate for the protection of the

rights. . . .’’

3

In 2011, the Department of Environmental Protection became the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. See Public Acts 2011, No.

11-80, § 1, codified at General Statutes § 22a-2d.

4 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the Appellate

Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

5 General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 22a-19 (a) provides: ‘‘In any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, and in any judicial review thereof made

available by law, the Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state,

any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof,

any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or otherlegal

entity may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting

that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has,

or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting,
impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural

resources of the state.’’

6 Hereinafter, all references to the trial court are to Judge Sheridan.

7 We emphasize that, if the trial court determines that the hearing officer

was biased or that the department prejudged the 1997 permit renewal application, the plaintiff is not entitled to an order that would somehow retroactively stay the permit renewal proceeding while this action is adjudicated.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s suggestion, our remand order in Burton I did not

contain any mandatory language requiring that the trial court automatically

conduct such a hearing and grant such a stay in the absence of any request

by a party. Rather, it was the plaintiff’s responsibility to request a stay.

Indeed, that is exactly what the plaintiff did immediately upon learning of

our decision in Burton I. For reasons that are not entirely clear from the

record, however, after her June 18, 2009 request for a stay and a hearing

was denied, the plaintiff failed to make any further request for a hearing until

April 13, 2012, at which time the permit renewal proceeding had terminated.

Underthese circumstances, an orderretroactively staying the permitrenewal

proceeding and invalidating the permit pending adjudication of the plaintiff’s

claims by the trial court would be unwarranted. Cf. 49 C.J.S., Judgments

§ 156 (2016) (‘‘[R]elief by entry nunc pro tunc will not be granted where

the failure to enter the judgment at the proper time was due to the party’s

own carelessness or negligence. So, a court should enter a nunc pro tunc

judgment only when it is apparent that the delay in rendering the judgment,

or a failure to enter it after its rendition, is the result of some act or

delay of the court, and is not owing to any fault of the party making the

application.’’). The only relief that is now available to the plaintiff is a

determination by the trial court as to whether the permitrenewal proceeding

was inadequate because the department misinterpreted or misapplied the

applicable environmental law and, if the hearing is determined to have been

inadequate, an order of appropriate declaratory or equitable relief. To the

extent that the plaintiff continues to believe that the hearing officer was

biased and the department prejudged the proceeding, any such claims relating to procedural irregularities are relevant only insofar as they purport to

provide an explanation for why the defendant issued a permit for activities

that, according to the plaintiff, do not comply with the substantive law.

Procedural irregularities would not provide the basis for a stand-alone claim.

We further emphasize that we express no opinion here regarding the

extent to which the plaintiff’s claims in this action are duplicative of her

claims in the pending administrative appeal from the decision granting the

permit renewal, which, as we have indicated, has been consolidated with

this action, the effect of any such duplication or the proper procedures for

litigating the consolidated case. The sole issue that is before us is whether

there is practical relief that the trial court can grant in this action.

8 The commissioner suggests that the provision of § 22a-18 (b) authorizing

the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a complaint brought pursuant to

§ 22a-16 if it remands the parties to an administrative proceeding does

not apply if an administrative proceeding is already under way when the

complaint is brought and the trial court takes no action to remand the matter

to the agency. We disagree. Although § 22a-18 (b) and (c) assume that, when

administrative proceedings are available, the trial court will either remand

the matter to the administrative agency or immediately adjudicate the complaint, the choice being in the court’s discretion, we see nothing in the

statute that deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction merely

because it fails to take either action before the termination of the administrative proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that the court retains jurisdiction

over an action pursuant to § 22a-16 as long as a controversy continues to

exist and the trial court is able to provide practical relief. In any event, the

effect of the failure to conduct a hearing to determine whether this action

or the permit renewal proceeding should be stayed in accordance with our

remand order in Burton I was to allow the permit renewal proceeding to

proceed, which was the practical equivalent of a remand to the department.

9 The commissioner contends that the only relief that the plaintiff has

sought was a reduction in ‘‘Millstone Units 2 and 3 water intakes to ‘cold

shutdown’ levels from April 1 through May 15, 2007,’’ and an order ‘‘to

convert Millstone to a closed cooling system by a date certain prior to 2010

. . . .’’ Because that relief is no longer available, the commissioner argues,

the plaintiff’s complaint is moot. The plaintiff also requested, however,

‘‘[s]uch other relief as is appropriate.’’ The plaintiff’s failure to specify the

precise nature of such other relief is not grounds for a motion to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Colon v. State, 129 Conn. App.
59, 66, 19 A.3d 699 (2011) (when plaintiff fails to comply with rules of

practice governing form of prayer for relief, ‘‘the defects are technical or

circumstantial and do not warrant dismissal of the action’’).

Dominion contends that this court recognized in Burton v. Dominion

Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 560–61, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011) (Burton II), that our decision in Burton I was intended only to provide a remedy

during the pendency of the permit renewal proceeding. Specifically, Dominion relies on our statement in Burton II that ‘‘[w]e ultimately concluded in

Burton [I] that the plaintiff had standing to bring an action pursuant to § 22a16 on regulatory grounds, and we did not consider whether her allegations as

to the effect of the contaminated and heated water on the environment,

standing alone, were sufficient to support a claim of unreasonable pollution.’’

(Emphasis in original.) Id., 561. In the present case, Dominion contends

that this language supports the conclusion that the remedy in Burton I was

intended to ‘‘ensure that [the] plaintiff’s administrative and regulatory rights

under [the act] were protected during the then ongoing . . . [p]ermit

[r]enewal [p]roceeding.’’ We disagree. The intent of our statement in Burton

II was simply to recognize that the primary jurisdictional claim that this

court considered in Burton I was the defendants’ claim that, ‘‘because the

plaintiff’s claims are premised entirely on alleged flaws in the permitting

process, she has no standing to bring an action pursuant to § 22a-16.’’ Burton

v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 291 Conn. 805. Moreover, to the extent that this court concluded in Burton I that the plaintiff

had adequately alleged that the claimed pollution was unreasonable within

the meaning of the act, that conclusion was premised on the plaintiff’s

claim that the hearing officer and the department were not enforcing the

substantive provisions of the existing statutory scheme; see id., 812; a claim

that the plaintiff did not raise in Burton II.