SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY:

A CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY 

AND PROMOTING FREEDOM 

The Phase II Report on a 

U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2000

Introduction

“We must disenthrall ourselves,” said

Abraham Lincoln, at a time of

much greater peril to the Republic than we face

today. As the times are new, said Lincoln, “so we

must think anew.” At the dawn of this new century, the nation faces a similar necessity. No concern of American society is more in need of creative thinking than the future security of this

country, but in no domain is such thinking more

resistant to change. The very term “security”

suggests caution and guardedness, not innovation. We know that major countries rarely engage

in serious rethinking and reform absent a major

defeat, but this is a path the United States cannot

take. Americans are less secure than they believe

themselves to be. The time for reexamination is

now, before the American people find themselves shocked by events they never anticipated. 

During the last half century, the national

security strategy of the United States was

derived largely from, focused on, and committed to the containment of Soviet Communism.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the

dramatic transformation of world politics resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union

two years later, our leaders have been searching

for a unifying theme to provide a strategic

framework appropriate to current and future circumstances. That search has not been easy.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/

21st Century has been tasked with thinking

anew about America’s national security for the

next 25 years.1 In this report, we suggest the

strategic precepts that should guide the formulation of U.S. strategy, and then take a fresh look

at U.S. national interests and priority objectives.

On that basis, we propose the framework of a

new national security strategy.2 This report is

intended to contribute to a new consensus on

national security strategy to carry the United

States forward into a challenging future.3

Thinking about Strategy

This Commission’s Phase I report

pointed to two contradictory trends

ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and

intellectual forces that is integrating a global

community, amid powerful forces of social and

political fragmentation.4 While no one knows

what the mix of these trends will produce, the

new world coming will be dramatically different in significant respects. Governments are

under pressure from below, by forces of ethnic

separatism and violence, and from above, by

economic, technological, and cultural forces

beyond any government’s full control. We are

witnessing a transformation of human society

on the magnitude of that between the agricultural and industrial epochs—and in a far more

compressed period of time. 

Such circumstances put a special premium on strategic wisdom, particularly for a

country of the size and character of the

United States. In this Commission’s view, the

essence of American strategy must compose a

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

1 This Commission, established to examine comprehensively

how this nation will ensure its security in the next 25 years,

has a threefold task. Phase I, completed on September 15,

1999, described the transformations emerging over the next

quarter-century in the global and domestic U.S. security

environment. Phase II, concerning U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy, is contained in this document. Phase III,

which will examine the structures and processes of the U.S.

national security apparatus for 21st century relevancy, will

be delivered on or before February 15, 2001.

2In the interest of brevity, this Commission has compressed considerable discussion and detail into this document. Further

discussion of the implications of several main themes in

this report will be presented in the Commission’s Phase III

findings.

3This report is built upon a consensus involving all members of

the Commission, but not every Commissioner subscribes

with equal enthusiasm to every statement contained herein.

4See New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century

(Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National

Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999).

5
balance between two key aims. The first is to

reap the benefits of a more integrated world in

order to expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and for others. But, second,

American strategy must also strive to dampen

the forces of global instability so that those

benefits can endure. Freedom is the quintessential American value, but without security,

and the relative stability that results therefrom, it can be evanescent.American strategy

should seek both security and freedom, and it

must seek them increasingly in concert with

others. Hence our title: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.

Our assessment of the new world

emerging, and the core interests and

values of the American people, lead us to offer

the following precepts as a guide to the formulation of national strategy:

Strategy and policy must be grounded

in the national interest. The national interest has many strands—political, economic,

security, and humanitarian. National interests are nevertheless the most durable basis

for assuring policy consistency. Gaining and

sustaining public support for U.S. policy is

best achieved, too, when American principles are coupled with clearly visible national interests. Moreover, a strategy based on

national interest, properly conceived,

engenders respect for the interests of others.

The maintenance of America’s strength

is a long-term commitment and cannot

be assured without conscious, dedicated

effort. If America does not make wise

investments in preserving its own strength,

well within 25 years it will find its power

reduced, its interests challenged even more

than they are today, and its influence eroded. Many nations already seek to balance

America’s relative power, and the sinews of

American strength—social, military, economic, and technological—will not sustain

themselves without conscious national

commitment. Assuring American prosperity is particularly critical; without it, the

United States will be hobbled in all its

efforts to play a leading role internationally.

The United States faces unprecedented

opportunities as well as dangers in the

new era. American strategy must rise to

positive challenges as well as to negative

ones. Working toward constructive relations among the major powers, preserving

the dynamism of the new global economy

and spreading its benefits, sharing responsibility with others in grappling with new

transnational problems—this is a diplomatic agenda that tests American statesmanship and creativity. As in the late 1940s, the

United States should help build a new international system in which other nations,

freely pursuing their own interests, find it

advantageous to do so in ways that coincide

with American interests.

Since it cannot bear every burden, the

United States must find new ways to join

with other capable and like-minded

nations. Where America would not act

itself, it retains a responsibility as the leading power to help build effective systems of

international collaboration. America must

therefore overcome its ambivalence about

international institutions and about the

strength of its partners, questioning them

less and encouraging them more.

This nation must set priorities and

apply them consistently. To sustain public

support and to discipline policy, America

must not exhaust itself by limitless commitments. Especially with respect to military intervention abroad, a finer calculus of

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6
benefits and burdens must govern.

Resisting the “CNN effect” may be one of

the most important requirements of U.S.

policymaking in the coming period.

Finally, America must never forget that

it stands for certain principles, most

importantly freedom under the rule of

law. Freedom is today a powerful tide in

the affairs of mankind, and, while the

means chosen to serve it must be tempered

by a realistic appreciation of limits, it is not

“realism” to ignore its power. At the same

time, if America is to retain its leadership

role, it must live up to its principles consistently, in its own conduct and in its relations with other nations. 

The National Interest in a New

Century

The first of these precepts is the most

crucial of all: American national security strategy must find its anchor in U.S. national interests, interests that must be both protected and advanced for the fundamental well

being of American society. We define these

interests at three levels: survival interests, without which America would cease to exist as we

know it; critical interests, which are causally

one step removed from survival interests; and

significant interests, which importantly affect

the global environment in which the United

States must act. There are, of course, other

national interests, though of lesser importance

than those in the above three categories.

U.S. survival interests include America’s

safety from direct attack, especially involving

weapons of mass destruction, by either states or

terrorists. Of the same order of importance is

the preservation of America’s Constitutional

order and of those core strengths—educational,

industrial, scientific-technological—that underlie America’s political, economic, and military

position in the world.

Critical U.S. national interests include the

continuity and security of those key international systems—energy, economic, communications, transportation, and public health (including food and water supplies)—on which the

lives and well being of Americans have come to

depend. It is a critical national interest of the

United States that no hostile power establish

itself on U.S. borders, or in control of critical

land, air, and sea lines of communication, or—

in today’s new world—in control of access to

outer space or cyberspace. It is a critical national interest of the United States that no hostile

hegemon arise in any of the globe’s major

regions, nor a hostile global peer rival or a hostile coalition comparable to a peer rival. The

security of allies and friends is a critical national interest of the United States, as is the ability

to avert, or check, the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction into the hands of actors hostile or potentially hostile to the United States.

Significant U.S. national interests include

the deepening and institutionalization abroad of

constitutional democracy under the rule of law,

market-based economics, and universal recognition of basic human rights. The United States

also has a significant interest in the responsible

expansion of an international order based on

agreed rules among major powers to manage

common global problems, not least those

involving the physical environment. It is a significant national interest of the United States that

there be economic growth abroad, to raise the

living standards of the poorest and to mitigate

economic and political conflict. It is a significant

national interest of the United States that international terrorism and criminality (including

illicit drug trade) be minimized, but without

jeopardizing the openness of international ecoU.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

7
nomic and cultural exchanges. It is a significant

national interest of the United States that neither

mass murder nor gross violations of human

rights be acceptable in the world’s political life.

It is a significant national interest of the United

States that immigration across American boundaries not be uncontrolled. Finally, the free and

safe movement of American citizens abroad is a

significant national interest of the United States.

Key Objectives

The United States seeks to assure its

own freedom under law, its safety, and

its prosperity. But Americans recognize that

these goals are best assured in a world where

others achieve them, too. American strategy,

therefore, must engage in new ways—and in

concert with others—to consolidate and

advance the peace, prosperity, democracy, and

cooperative order of a world now happily free

from global totalitarian threats. At the same

time, however—also in concert with others—

American strategy must strive to stabilize those

parts of the world still beset by acute political

conflict. To fulfill these strategic goals in a new

age, America’s priority objectives—and key

policy aims—must be these:

FIRST, TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AND

ENSURE THAT IT IS SAFE FROM THE DANGERS OF

A NEW ERA.

I

n light of the new dangers arising from

the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and terrorism, the United States

must focus anew on how to maintain a robust

and powerful deterrent to all forms of attack on

its territory and its critical assets. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of the

highest priority in U.S. national security policy

in the next quarter century. A higher priority,

too, should be given to preventing, through

diplomatic and other means, unconventional

attacks on all states. But should prevention and

deterrence fail, the United States must have

means of active defense against both mortal

danger and blackmail. U.S. military, law

enforcement, intelligence, economic, financial,

and diplomatic means must be effectively integrated for this purpose. 

The United States should seek enhanced

international cooperation to combat the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This should include an effective and

enforceable international ban on the creation,

transfer, trade, and weaponization of biological

pathogens, whether by states or non-state

actors. Also, when available and implemented

with rigor, cooperative programs to deal with

existing stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons are cost-effective and politically attractive ways to reduce the dangers of

weapons and weapons matériel proliferation. 

The United States should also strive to

deepen the international normative consensus

against terrorism and state support of terrorism.

It should work with others to strengthen cooperation among law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and military forces to foil terrorist plots and deny sanctuary to terrorists by

attacking their financial and logistical centers.

The United States should build comprehensive theater missile defense capabilities. It

should also build national defenses against a

limited ballistic missile attack to the extent

technically feasible, fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. As cruise missile and other

sophisticated atmospheric technologies spread,

the United States must address the problem of

devising defenses against such capabilities.

The United States must also develop methods

to defend against other, covert means of attacking the United States with weapons of mass

destruction and disruption. 

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8
The United States must also have specialized

forces capable of combating threats and blackmail from those possessing weapons of mass

destruction and from terrorism. The magnitude of

the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction

compels this nation, as well, to consider carefully the means and circumstances of preemption.

The protection of U.S. and international

access to outer space and cyberspace must

become a high priority of U.S. security planning. Outer space and cyberspace are the main

arteries of the world’s evolving information

and economic systems, and the ability to move

ideas and information through them freely is a

prerequisite for expanding global freedom and

prosperity. Secure access to outer space and

cyberspace is also now the sine qua non of the

U.S. military’s ability to function effectively.

Through both technological and diplomatic

means, the United States needs to guard against

the possibility of “breakout” capabilities in

space or cyberspace that would endanger U.S.

survival or critical interests.

Despite the political obstacles, the United

States should redouble its efforts to deal multilaterally with the diffusion of dangerous dualuse technologies. It must improve its capability

to track the destinations and final uses of its

own high-technology exports, and it must be

prepared to aid allies in similar efforts. 

To deal medically and psychologically with

potentially large losses of American lives in

attacks against the American homeland, U.S.

public health capabilities need to be augmented.

In addition, programs to ensure the continuity of

Constitutional government should be bolstered.

SECOND, TO MAINTAIN AMERICA’S SOCIAL

COHESION, ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS,

TECHNOLOGICAL INGENUITY, AND MILITARY

STRENGTH.

To ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it

a priority of national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of government,

the United States must create more advanced

and effective forms of public/private partnerships to promote public benefit from scientifictechnological innovation. 

The United States must strive to reduce its

dependence on foreign sources of fossil fuel

energy that leaves this country and its allies

vulnerable to economic pressures and political

blackmail. Steady development of alternative

sources of energy production, and greater efficiencies in energy transmission and conservation, are thus national security as well as economic and environmental necessities.

The United States must strengthen the

bonds between the American people and those

of its members who serve in the armed forces. It

must also strengthen government (civil and military) personnel systems in order to improve

recruitment, retention and effectiveness at all

levels. Executive-Legislative relations regarding national security policy need to foster effective collaboration.

THIRD, TO ASSIST THE INTEGRATION OF KEY

MAJOR POWERS, ESPECIALLY CHINA, RUSSIA,

AND INDIA, INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF THE

EMERGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

The United States should engage China

constructively and with a positive attitude, politically and economically. But it must

recognize that the potential for competition

between the United States and China may

increase as China grows stronger. China’s

increasing adherence to global economic, legal,

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9
and cultural institutions and norms will be a

positive factor, and the United States should

encourage and assist this process of integration.

At the same time, the United States should

maintain its deterrent strength and its alliance

system in the Asia/Pacific region. It should

remain committed to the peaceful resolution of

the Taiwan question, consistent with the terms

of the three Sino-American Communiqués and

the Taiwan Relations Act.

The United States should support Russian

economic reform and democratic political

development on a realistic basis, recognizing

that these goals are first and foremost for

Russians themselves to accomplish. It is also in

the U.S. interest to assist Russian integration

into global economic institutions, no less than

is the case with China. 

Clearly, too, relations with Russia should be

appropriate to its importance as a major power.

It does not benefit the United States to pursue

policies that weaken or humiliate Moscow. Still,

the United States must assert its own interests

when they are affected adversely by Russian

policies—as they are, for example, by policies

that encourage or allow the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. The United States

and its allies should also support the continued

political independence and territorial integrity

of the newly independent former Soviet states.

In addition, arms control remains an important facet of U.S. national security policy. But

the United States needs a new calculus for

developing future strategic nuclear arms control

strategy beyond START II. Such a calculus

must include analysis of the implications of the

increase in the number and prospective capabilities of nuclear weapons powers in the world. It

must take account of new Chinese and Russian

nuclear weapons capabilities. It must also take

into account both the potential U.S. need to

respond to chemical and biological threats with

nuclear weapons and the U.S. commitment to

protect non-nuclear states from blackmail and

attack by nuclear weapons states. 

India is the world’s largest democracy and

soon will be the world’s most populous country. Therefore, India is and must be dealt with

as a major power. Pakistan, too, remains a pivotal country in its own right, and good U.S.

relations with Pakistan are in the U.S. national

interest. The United States should also encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences short of violence, and should make its

good offices available to that end. 

It is unlikely that American policy can persuade any Indian or Pakistani government to

abandon its nuclear capacity. But the United

States, together with other major powers, can

play a more active role in discouraging future

testing and the further production of fissile

materials not under safeguards. The United

States should also encourage mutual adoption

of measures to ensure the safety and security of

both countries’ nuclear capabilities. 

Beyond its efforts to bring these three

major states into the mainstream of a new

cooperative international order, the United

States has a strong interest in limiting the further proliferation of sophisticated conventional

weapons around the world. It should therefore

seek support for a multilateral approach to

devising limitations on such proliferation first

with its closest allies and friends, and thereafter

with Russia, China, India, and other significant

arms producing countries.

FOURTH, TO PROMOTE, WITH OTHERS, THE

DYNAMISM OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND

IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

10
The United States, in concert with the

G-7, must strive to manage the elements of turbulence that accompany economic

globalization in order to spread its benefits,

while minimizing social and political dislocations and the system’s vulnerability to financial

crisis. This must include building political

legitimacy as well as an economic architecture.

Continuing trade liberalization remains a

key to global economic advance, particularly for

those regions, countries, and selected economic

sectors in advanced countries—including the

United States—whose trade remains shackled

by protectionist policies. Bilateral and regional

approaches (in addition to the global system

represented by the WTO) should be encouraged.

Environmental concerns and labor rights must

be addressed, although not in a manner that

blocks or reverses trade liberalization.

Similarly, economic sanctions should not

unduly inhibit trade. But, while this Commission is skeptical of the efficacy of broad and

especially unilateral U.S. economic sanctions,

specifically targeted financial sanctions, particularly when employed multilaterally, have a better chance of working. As the United States and

its closest allies erect a new financial architecture, the capability to impose financial sanctions

should be built into the system. 

The United States, in cooperation with others, must continue to ensure that the price and

supply of Persian Gulf and other major energy

supplies are not wielded as political weapons

directed against the United States or its allies

and friends. 

Because this Commission believes that public diplomacy is an important part of American

diplomacy, the United States should help spread

information technology worldwide, to bring the

benefits of globalization and democracy to those

parts of the world now cut off from them. The

United States should also employ new technologies creatively to improve its public diplomacy

in the new Information Age. 

The United States should continue to promote strong international efforts against state

corruption and transnational criminality, and

should help the international community

respond more effectively to humanitarian relief

crises. To do this will require not only working in

new ways with other governments but also with

the burgeoning community of non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), particularly in areas

where U.S. official representation is sparse. 

The United States should, as it has traditionally, support the growth of international

law and remain willing to subscribe to international agreements where they promote overall

U.S. interests. But the United States must

always reserve the right to define its own interests, even if it requires withdrawing from—but

not violating—selected treaty obligations. U.S.

policy coherence and democratic accountability under the Constitution must be preserved. 

The United States has a strong stake in a

reformed and more effective United Nations

system, and should engage constructively to

that end. The UN, when properly supported,

can be an effective instrument for the enhancement of international stability and humanitarian ends. In addition, the United States must be

willing to lead in assembling ad hoc coalitions

outside UN auspices if necessary.

FIFTH, TO ADAPT U.S. ALLIANCES AND

OTHER REGIONAL MECHANISMS TO A NEW ERA

IN WHICH AMERICA’S PARTNERS SEEK GREATER

AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

The cornerstone of America’s regional

policies must be the maintenance and

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11
enhancement of existing U.S. alliances and

friendships. By strengthening relations with

allies and friends, the United States extends

both its influence and the zone of peace and

stability.

In Europe, the United States should be prepared to support the evolution of an independent European Union defense policy in a manner

consistent with the unity of the Atlantic

Alliance. Forward-stationed forces, as the

embodiment of overall U.S. capabilities and

commitments in Europe, should remain an

essential ingredient in that regional security

alliance. The United States should also promote the concept of a Transatlantic Free Trade

Area (TAFTA), as well as encourage the integration of East and Central European democracies into Atlantic and European economic institutions based on free trade. 

The United States should expand the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to

all the democracies of the Western Hemisphere.

It should deepen its ties within this hemisphere

and seek to strengthen the Organization of

American States (OAS). Whatever the merits

of “exporting” democracy, there can be little

doubt that helping to bolster democracies

where they have come to exist of their own

exertions should be high on the list of U.S. priorities. Nowhere is such an effort more important than in the Western Hemisphere.

In the Asia/Pacific area, the U.S.-Japan

alliance should remain the keystone of U.S. policy. The United States should seek a more equal

strategic partnership and a free trade agreement

with Japan. In a region where old rivalries persist and reconciliation and integration have not

advanced as far as they have in Europe, U.S.

alliance and security ties with Korea, Australia

and New Zealand, Thailand, Singapore, the

Philippines, and others remain critical. Such ties

compose a regional security community resting

solidly on the assurance provided by U.S.

engagement and power. The United States

should also support the growth of multilateral

institutions for regional security and prosperity,

including the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC ). 

The United States should plan now for the

possibility of Korean reunification. Some

American troops should remain in a unified

Korea as a factor of reassurance and stability in

the region, including for the purpose of ensuring that a unified Korea remains without

nuclear weapons.

The United States has a continuing critical

interest in keeping the Persian Gulf secure, and

must accept its share of the burden for so doing.

In that light, it must be a high priority to prevent

either Iraq or Iran from deploying deliverable

weapons of mass destruction. The United States

should also support the emerging collaboration

of friendly states—notably Israel, Turkey, and

Jordan—and seek to broaden such a collaboration to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among

others. Assisting the diplomatic settlement of the

Arab-Israeli dispute will advance that prospect.

In collaboration with other OECD countries, the Organization of African Unity (OAU),

and international development institutions, the

United States should assist sub-Saharan Africa

to build stronger economies and strengthen

institutional cohesion and democratic ideals. In

the economic field, emphasis should be put on

promoting private investment, helping to develop West Africa’s offshore energy resources, and

providing debt relief and humanitarian aid

(including resources to combat the AIDS epidemic). The United States should promote the

professionalization of African militaries within

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12
a framework of democratic values, and encourage African governments to engage their militaries in constructive tasks of infrastructure

building. Major emerging democracies such as

South Africa and Nigeria will be key players as

partners with the United States and its allies.

SIXTH, TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TAME THE DISINTEGRATIVE FORCES

SPAWNED BY AN ERA OF CHANGE.

The disruptive new forces of globalization are subjecting many governments

to extraordinary pressures. In many states,

what used to be governmental monopolies on

the use of force, on law making, and over the

supply of money are now “privatized” in various ways. Even the spread of the idea of freedom, while positive in the long run, is often

accompanied by destabilization. The disruption

of the political and territorial status quo in

much of the world will be one of the distinctive

features of international affairs over the next

quarter century.

To address these spreading phenomena of

weak and failed states, ethnic separatism and

violence, and the crises they breed, the United

States needs first to establish priorities. Not

every such problem must be primarily a U.S.

responsibility, particularly in a world where

other powers are amassing significant wealth

and human resources. There are countries

whose domestic stability is, for differing reasons, of major importance to U.S. interests

(such as Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi

Arabia). Without prejudging the likelihood of

domestic upheaval, these countries should be a

priority focus of U.S. planning in a manner

appropriate to the respective cases.

For cases of lesser priority, the United

States should help the international community

develop innovative mechanisms to manage the

problem of failed states. One such mechanism

should include standing procedures to facilitate

organizing peacekeeping operations and UN

“conservatorships.”

In all cases, the United States should resort

first to preventive diplomacy: acting with political and economic tools, and in concert with

others, to head off conflict before it reaches the

threshold of mass violence. 

Preventive diplomacy will not always

work, however, and the United States should be

prepared to act militarily in conjunction with

other nations in situations characterized by the

following criteria:

• when U.S. allies or friends are imperiled; 

• when the prospect of weapons of mass

destruction portends significant harm to

civilian populations; 

• when access to resources critical to the

global economic system is imperiled; 

• when a regime has demonstrated intent to

do serious harm to U.S. interests;

• when genocide is occurring.

If all or most of these conditions are present, the case for multilateral military action is

strong. If any one of these criteria is serious

enough, however, the case for military action

may also be strong. 

Implications for National Security

The strategy outlined here bears important implications for the political, economic, and military components of U.S. national security policy. From the political perspective, American diplomacy must recognize that

the increasingly integrated nature of global

exchanges will render traditional analytical

divisions of the world obsolete. While important relations will continue to take place on a

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13
bilateral basis, many more international phenomena will be increasingly regional in nature

and more will be fully global. The proliferation

of non-state actors will also strain the traditional categories within which American diplomacy

is organized. 

As this Commission emphasized in its

Phase I report, the economic dimensions of

statecraft are also becoming more important.

Among the democracies in what is known as

the “zone of democratic peace,” economic

issues can rival the importance of military

ones. But economic issues are also of critical

importance to the prospect that other emerging

or developing states will succeed or fail with

fundamental political and social reform.

American strategy must also recognize the

importance of technology as the basic underpinning of economic health and military

prowess the world over. 

All this means that the integrating function

of U.S. policymaking processes will be challenged as never before. Traditional national

security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC

staff) will need to work together in new ways,

and economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce,

U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work

more closely with the traditional national security community. In addition, other players—

especially Justice and Transportation—will

need to be integrated more fully into national

security processes. Merely improving the interagency process around present structures may

not suffice. 

Moreover, the U.S. government must learn

to build more effective partnerships with state

and local governments, and government as a

whole must develop new partnerships with nongovernmental organizations—though without

sacrificing its ultimate responsibility and

accountability for determining national policy. 

As to military implications, the world

we see emerging, and the strategy

appropriate to that environment suggest that

the United States needs five kinds of military

capabilities: 

• nuclear capabilities to deter and protect

the United States and its allies from attack;

• homeland security capabilities;

• conventional capabilities necessary to

win major wars;

• rapidly employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities; and

• humanitarian relief and constabulary

capabilities.

Fundamental to U.S. national security strategy is the need to project U.S. power globally

with forces stationed in the United States, and

those stationed abroad and afloat in the forward

presence role. Owing to the proliferation of new

defense technologies in the hands of other

states, effective power projection will become

more difficult for the U.S. armed forces in the

21st century. U.S. forces must therefore possess

greater flexibility to operate in a range of environments, including those in which the enemy

has the capability to employ weapons of mass

destruction. U.S. forces must be characterized

by stealth, speed, range, accuracy, lethality,

agility, sustainability, reliability—and be supported by superior intelligence—in order to

deal effectively with the spectrum of symmetrical and asymmetrical threats we anticipate over

the next quarter century. 

This Commission believes that the “two

major theater wars” yardstick for sizing U.S.

forces is not producing the capabilities needed

for the varied and complex contingencies now

occurring and likely to increase in the years

ahead. These contingencies, often calling for

expeditionary interventions or stability operaU.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

14
tions, require forces different from those

designed for major theater war. We believe these

contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity as to oblige the

United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet these needs. The overall force

would then have the ability to engage effectively in contingencies ranging from humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief, to peace and expeditionary combat operations, to large-scale,

high-intensity conventional warfare. Finally, we

recommend that the force structure designed to

address these needs be developed on the basis of

real-world intelligence assessments rather than

illustrative scenarios.

In short, the capabilities mandated by these

requirements will result in forces able to deploy

rapidly, be employed immediately, and prevail

decisively in expeditionary roles, prolonged stability operations, and major theater wars; a force

to deter wars, to preclude crises from evolving

into major conflicts, and to win wars rapidly

and decisively should it become necessary.

America must also enhance the civil (that

is, non-military) aspects of homeland security.

These functions must be adequately funded and

organized along appropriate lines of authority,

responsibility, and accountability. The National

Guard—successor to the militia, and acknowledged in the Second Amendment as the historic

defender of the Republic—must be trained and

equipped to assume, among its other responsibilities, a significant role in defending the

homeland in the 21st century.

It is imperative, too, that the United States

develop and fund these five kinds of capabilities consistent with the level of need created by

changing political and security realities. Given

the demands now placed upon this nation’s

military, or those anticipated in the next quarter

century, it is evident that modern forces equal

to these demands cannot be sustained by current levels of spending. 

To Phase III—Building for Peace

The strategy articulated here requires

that the United States lead in the construction of a world balanced between the

expansion of freedom, and the maintenance of

underlying stability. To do so it must concert its

efforts with others and, to the extent possible,

in a way consistent with the interests of others. 

Having become a global power, the United

States now holds a responsibility it will not

abandon, both for the safeguarding of American

interests and the broader interests of global

peace and security. The United States is the first

nation with fully global leadership responsibilities, but there are more and less effective ways

to lead. Tone matters. Leadership is not the

same as dominance; everyone else’s business

need not also be America’s. Just as riches without integrity are unavailing, so power without

wisdom is unworthy. As Shakespeare put it: 

O, it is excellent 

To have a giant’s strength; but it is 

tyrannous

To use it like a giant.5

The strategy outlined here for U.S.

national security differs from the

strategic habits of the past half-century. It puts

new emphasis on the economic and other nonmilitary components of national security; it

focuses on opportunities as much as on threats;

and it reminds us of the domestic foundations

of U.S. international strength. It attempts to

clarify U.S. strategy and purposes, and to

match them to a prudent sense of limits. It is

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

15

5 Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2.
not clear to us that the U.S. government is now

organized in such a way that it can execute this

strategy, or any other strategic concept that

departs significantly from past practices. The

world is changing fast, and if the U.S. government does not change with it, it may find itself

forced into one bewildered reaction after

another. If the United States loses the capacity

to respond to dynamic change, the day will

come when we will regret it dearly.

In Phase III of its work, therefore, this

Commission will examine current structures

and processes to determine their relevance to

the 21st century. We will apply the following

criteria: 

First, the U.S. government needs to be

adept at anticipating national security challenges. This requires the best possible system

of intelligence, from collection to analysis to

dissemination to policy review. 

Second, the U.S. government needs the

ability to calculate the longer-term implications

of intervention abroad. It is not enough to be

selective; we must be wisely selective, which

requires a better matching of the instruments of

national power to the problems at hand. 

Third, the U.S. government needs to integrate effectively all non-traditional elements of

national security policy with traditional ones. 

Fourth, the U.S. government needs the

agility to adapt rapidly to changes in the global

environment. 

Fifth, the U.S. government needs new

organizational mechanisms to manage the

increased blurring of lines among military,

police, and legal jurisdictions, and among new

forms of warfare.

Sixth, the U.S. government needs effective

means to assess critically its own performance,

draw lessons from its experience, and adjust

resources, as appropriate. 

Seventh, the U.S. government needs coherence between domestic policies with core

national security implications and national

security policies directed outside U.S. borders.

Phase III of this Commission’s work will

offer recommendations for enhancing the U.S.

government’s ability to function effectively in a

rapidly changing political and technological

environment. As with any kind of travel, clarity with respect to destination and route will

prove unavailing if one’s vehicle is not up to

the journey. It is to that vehicle—the structures

and processes of the U.S. national security

apparatus—that this Commission now turns its

attention. 

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

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