TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE END

Huba Wass de Czege

Antulio J. Echevarria II

September 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-070-2

ii
FOREWORD

Defense planners and strategists have recently pro

a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what ma

as a dramatically different international situation. M

those proposals, though, continue with a Cold 

paradigm of trying to foresee what the next threat mi

and how the United States might best prepare it

respond to it. Consequently, the possibility of t

advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new se

environment in order to create conditions that 

promote positive ends—long-term peace, stability

prosperity—has remained largely overlooked.

In this monograph, the authors, Brigadier G

(Retired) Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant C

Antulio J. Echevarria II, make a case for a strategy aim

achieving positive, rather than neutral or negative, 

They first discuss the dynamic conditions of th

strategic environment, then explore the options the U

States has available for dealing with those condition

options include (1) preventive defense, (2) neo-isolatio

and (3) a strategy that pursues positive ends. Only th

the authors argue, deals with the new security enviro

in a proactive way. It enables the United States to def

vital interests in terms of conditions—such as 

freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rathe

as the containment or defeat of inimical state or no

actors. The basic approach of a strategy of positive 

would be to build and enlarge a circle of stakeh

committed to creating conditions for a profitabl

enduring peace—thereby reducing the potenti

crises—and to preparing response mechanisms for 

successfully when crises do occur.

As the authors show, a threat-based strategy has s

liabilities in an environment in which the next oppon

the next crisis is nearly impossible to predict. The U

iii
States would do better, therefore, to pursue a strat

positive ends, one that endeavors to maintain a dy

and enduring peace.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

OF THE AUTHORS

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II is a U.S. Army lieut

colonel currently assigned as the Director of Str

Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He grad

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commis

as an armor officer, and has held a variety of comman

staff assignments in Germany and Continental U

States. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria has also served 

assistant professor of European history at the U.S. M

Academy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/T

Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort 

as an action officer at the Army After Next project 

TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter f

U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the U.S. A

Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A

Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton Unive

Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria has published article

number of scholarly and professional journals to inclu

Journal of Military History, War in History, War & S

Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review

Airpower Journal. His latest book is After Claus

German Military Thinkers before the Great War, (U

sity Press of Kansas, 2001).

HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U.S. Army bri

general. During his career as an infantry officer, he s

two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience 

levels up to assistant division commander. General W

Czege was a principal designer of the operational c

known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder an

director of the Army’s School for Advanced Military S

where he also taught applied military strategy. 

retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became h

involved in the Army After Next Project and serv

several Defense Advanced Research Projects A

v
advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. M

Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard Universi

vi
SUMMARY

While defense planners have recently proposed a v

of alternatives for America’s role in what many see as 

World Coming, few of those proposals go beyond th

War paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking

paradigm focuses on deterring or defeating specific th

rather than taking advantage of the intrinsic dynam

the new security environment in order to create cond

that might promote long-term peace, stability

prosperity. 

America’s challenge today is to foster peace and st

in a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partne

allies willing and able to share the costs just as sur

they reap the benefits. Hence, instead of a strategy or

on prevention—a negative aim—the United States wo

better to lead a 21st-century concert of nations t

creating positive conditions, those that promote long

peace, stability, and prosperity. Such a strategy woul

matter of course, preclude a number of threats—pe

even the majority of them—from emerging in the firs

and would better position the United States to cop

unexpected emergencies.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

The forces of globalization are creating somethin

Janus-faced future for the international community. 

extreme, the future takes on the countenance of a 

world in which national interests merge into the g

aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic pros

At the other extreme, the future assumes the face of a 

dangerous and unpredictable world characteriz

shifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangem

and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-n

vii
The face of the future that comes into view 

undoubtedly have features representing both extreme

extent to which the United States and other powers w

concert will make a difference in determining which 

of Janus will become more prevalent. The United Stat

address the challenges of the new security enviro

through any one of three broad strategic appro

preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aim

positive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense ai

forestalling potential problems by deterring, conta

isolating, and defeating specific threats. Its success de

on developing the correct list of threats; and it gen

seeks to preserve or restore the status quo. It provid

deterring —and defeating, if necessary—such pot

aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kim Jon

North Korea. However, a strategy of preventive de

even if successful in deterring or defeating desig

threats, could fail if other threats emerge that m

forces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. 

falls short of providing a rationale for taking con

events that might shape the future or of building a 

multinational basis for anticipating and addressin

type of problems commonly associated with to

strategic environment.

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes 

strategic independence or anti-interventionism. Und

option, the evolution of the international sec

environment is left largely to itself. Neo-isolati

pursues a neutral end, since security interests are s

defined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap

at home. Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue str

defenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize t

from abroad. The principal weakness of a neo-isola

strategy is its lack of practicality. Isolation of any 

becoming difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in t

global village. Ignoring the forces at work beyond 

borders is simply not an effective way of dealing with t

viii
A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of Positive 

aims at building an international environmen

promotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, eco

stability, and the rule of law, and provides a multil

basis for crisis response. It differs from the other str

approaches discussed above in that it is oriented t

achieving a condition, rather than preparing to resp

specific threats. In other words, its ends are positive, 

than negative or neutral. The basic approach would 

build and enlarge a circle of stakeholders commit

reducing the potential for crises and to prepare res

mechanisms for coping successfully when they do

primary weakness of this strategy is that other

misconstrue its goals as a form of Pax Amer

particularly if American leadership appears aggressiv

hegemonic. A second weakness is that positive 

generally require more energy and resources th

negative or neutral ones, which may mean that shor

costs of this policy may be greater than people would 

to pay, at least when compared to other strategies.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy 

around positive ends permits the United States to def

vital interests in terms of conditions—such as 

freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rathe

as the containment or defeat of inimical state or non

actors.

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive 

must, of course, involve all elements of national powe

political and socio-cultural elements would help 

conditions for long-term peace and stabili

strengthening democratic institutions worldwid

advancing human rights, and by respondi

humanitarian crises. The economic element of na

power would contribute to global prosperity by enha

and guiding international financial institution

ix
promoting open trading systems and global bu

enterprises, and by providing for sustainable eco

development worldwide. In broad terms, the m

element of national power must have the capabi

conduct sustained peacetime engagement activities a

as respond to two general types of crises (those 

significant escalation potential and those without).

Peacetime engagement should lay the groun

necessary to ensure such operations are not conduc

the cuff, but reflect adequate planning, preparatio

consensus building among allies and partners with r

to the desired strategic ends, ways, and means. Accord

the day-to-day work of military peacetime engag

should become a high-priority effort for the U.S. d

establishment. The need to respond to two types of 

makes the value of an established multilateral res

mechanism clear, as well as the importance of a 

spectrum force, which can provide an array of res

options. Indeed, the nature of tomorrow’s opponent

destructive power of their weapons, and the environm

which they are likely to operate all underscore the nee

balanced force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environ

the legacies of the Cold War continue to influenc

strategic thinking. The problems associated wit

Strategy Review are evidence of that. The de

community continues to justify its strategic prefe

with threat–based assessments, some of which are l

labeled asymmetric. However, as has been sho

threat-based strategy has serious liabilities 

environment in which the next opponent or the next c

nearly impossible to predict. Instead, the United 

would do well to pursue a strategy focused on positive 

one that endeavors to maintain a dynamic and end

peace.

x
TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE EN

The emergence of a more dynamic and complex se

environment since the end of the Cold War has prom

comprehensive reevaluation of America’s national se

strategy. While defense planners have proposed a var

alternatives for America’s role in what many see as 

World Coming, few of those proposals go beyond th

War paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking. Alt

undeniably effective under certain conditions

paradigm has the distinct disadvantage of yieldin

initiative to outside forces. It focuses on deterr

defeating specific threats, rather than taking advant

the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environm

order to create conditions that might promote long

peace, stability, and prosperity. It has the addi

disadvantage—as reflected in today’s strategic dilem

of placing defense planners in the position of having to 

difficult resource choices in the absence of the unde

rationale that a clear threat would provide. In sho

logic of threat-based planning can lead to str

paralysis, or—worse—a defense establishment orga

for the wrong kind of threat.

America’s challenge today is to foster peace and st

in a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partne

allies willing and able to share the costs just as sur

they reap the benefits. To be sure, deterring and def

threats to U.S. security remain critical priorities. How

it is simply not possible to prepare for every contin

especially since serious adversaries always try to 

where one is least prepared. Hence, instead of a st

oriented on prevention—a negative aim—the United 

would do better to lead a 21st century concert of n

toward creating positive conditions, those that pr

long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. Such a st

would, as a matter of course, preclude a num

1
threats—perhaps even the majority of them—

emerging in the first place and would better positi

United States to cope with unexpected emergencies

monograph describes the primary advantages of a na

security strategy oriented on positive ends.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

Most descriptions of the current and near-f

national security environments indicate that the w

becoming a more dangerous place.

1

 While changes 

contemporary security environment might appear ra

at first blush, closer analysis reveals that they refle

global forces at work. Known collectively as globaliz

these forces include the spread of information 

information technologies, as well as the concom

ever-increasing propensity of the world’s populati

participate in economic and political processes.

2

Globalization has begun to transform every asp

human affairs, from enhancing the real and virtual m

of people and things to reforming the ways in 

economic and political interests are defined. Interest

were once local or special in other ways can now cut 

national boundaries to gain more publicity and suppo

example, corporate interests mobilized via the 

Economic Forum and the International Chamb

Commerce have influenced global policies that 

expanded trade regimes, regulated markets, and pa

redefined the roles of governments and interna

organizations, including the United Nations. Sim

special interest groups, such as Amnesty Interna

Greenpeace, Oxfam, and the International Commit

the Red Cross, have become powerful international fo

their own right. They have effectively promoted trea

limit global warming, to establish an international cr

court, and to outlaw antipersonnel mines. 

transnational forces have challenged state sovereig

the area of human rights. The internationalizat

2
justice, for example, recently brought about the ar

Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator, for h

rights violations committed decades earlier in hi

country. This broad dispersion of the ability to inf

political agendas and outcomes has been both observe

encouraged by a number of the world’s leaders, inc

the secretary-general of the United Nations

director-general of the World Trade Organization, a

managing director of the International Monetary Fu

Yet, all is not good news. While economic globali

has brought greater prosperity to some parts of the w

has also contributed to the quick spread of an 

economic flu to other regions. Even if this crisis has p

recovery might take considerable time.

4

 Other ev

suggests that, despite (or perhaps because of) eco

globalization, 70 percent of the world’s wealth contin

travel back and forth among 28 percent of the w

population, thereby excluding developing and undev

countries and exacerbating the gap between have

have-nots.

5

 Furthermore, growing prosperity doe

preclude economic conflict, as developments in Europ

Asia seem to indicate.

6

 Moreover, despite a decade’s 

of effort, a free market economy has failed to take h

Russia owing to an ineffective government, a 

entrenched organized crime syndicate, and gr

regional fragmentation, among other problems. Tens

the Middle East, where democracy has preciou

footholds, have risen recently, threatening to erup

broader military and political crisis. While democra

made rapid strides in Central and South America, eco

change has exacerbated social inequalities; and corr

and narco-trafficking remain stubborn problems. In A

economic growth has been uneven and intrastate vi

has been extremely bloody.

7

In other words, the forces of globalization are cr

something of a Janus-faced future for the interna

community. At one extreme, the future takes o

countenance of a stable world in which national int

3
merge into the general aim of promoting peace, sta

and economic prosperity. In this world, the rule of la

pluralistic political systems continue to spread, albei

some degree of friction, and the number of free-m

economies expands, distributing economic prosperit

further, if unevenly, due to the influence of state 

institutions, and bureaucracies. Indeed, within th

decade alone, globalization contributed to increasin

number of democracies in the world by 14 percent. 

than half of the world’s population now lives 

democratic rule.

8

 While the argument that democrac

not go to war against each other is based on a limite

base, it is fair to say that democracies with establishe

societies—where strong traditions exist concerning th

of law and citizens feel empowered to participate 

political process—tend to define security pro

similarly.

9

 Historically, they have demonstrated a g

willingness to cooperate in addressing the challenges 

by arms proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime

migrations, ethnic strife, and other security problems

inclinations suggest a greater opportunity for cr

favorable conditions for continued peace and pros

than one would find in a global environment domina

autocratic regimes.

At the other extreme, the future assumes the fa

more dangerous and unpredictable world characteri

shifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangem

and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-n

this future, a number of the world’s new democra

lacking strong traditions for maintaining a bala

power—collapse after experiencing only tran

successes; and transnational threats, such as interna

crime syndicates, terrorist networks, and drug c

continue to grow in strength and influence, thriving a

autocratic, weak, or so-called failed states. Hence, 

these conditions, a greater number of autocratic re

perhaps allied with nefarious transnational actors, 

likely emerge. Since perennial sources of friction—

4
rivalries, nationalism, religious-based antagonisms

competition for scarce resources, including water—wo

unresolved in such an environment, they would conti

provoke serious crises, especially as the world’s popu

increases.

As the Vietnam conflict, the war in Afghanistan, a

Kosovo crisis have shown, a state need not be a 

competitor or even a major regional power to 

significant security problems. Such states could well e

what diplomats and policymakers have rather loosely 

asymmetric strategies, which—despite the con

created by recent rhetoric—amount to little more th

exploitation of an Achilles’ heel.

10

 Even with 

conventional means, small states can prove di

contenders. The Kosovo crisis required the marshal

considerable political and military resources from N

for example. Yet, if supported by a larger state or a ne

of transnational forces or armed with one or more we

of mass destruction, a small state like Serbia would 

presented much greater—perhaps even insuper

challenges even for an alliance as large as NATO. Whe

manifestation of the clash of civilizations or the c

anarchy, therefore, this face of the future poses some 

and rather thorny challenges for the ends, ways, and 

of future strategy.

11

The face of the future that comes into view 

undoubtedly have features representing both extreme

extent to which the United States and other powers w

concert will make a difference in determining which 

of Janus will become more prevalent. The United Stat

address the challenges of the new security enviro

through any one of three broad strategic appro

preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aim

positive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense ai

forestalling potential problems by deterring, conta

isolating, and defeating specific threats.

12

 This 

5
essentially amounts to little more than a complex ver

the threat-based strategy that characterized the Cold 

It orients on the more dangerous and unpredictable 

Janus, pursuing a negative rather than a positive a

success depends on developing the correct list of thre

generally seeks to preserve or restore the status quo

The major advantages of this approach are that 

the momentum of current practice behind it and tha

viewed as defensive as opposed to aggressive or hege

It provides for deterring—and defeating, if necessary—

potential aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq an

Jong Il in North Korea. It also recognizes the n

establish a regional balance of power in areas whe

potential for trouble exists, but where the lines of c

are less clearly drawn, as in the Persian Gulf, the M

East, and the Formosa Strait. Some advocates o

approach argue in favor of shifting U.S. defense 

toward the Pacific Rim, improving the defenses 

homeland, and adjusting the current force-sizing met

redefined threat.

The principal weakness of this strategy, even 

metric is adjusted, is that it tends to focus too narrow

an identifiable and predictable threat list. A p

threat-based metric, such as that associated 

counter-aggression scenarios in Southwest and Nor

Asia, fails to account for the unique requirements of 

kinds of interventions, such as those encounter

Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Libya, Bosnia, K

and elsewhere. While it is prudent not to disregard k

threats, this approach depends too much on plannin

justifying resources in terms of predictable threat

capabilities. It tends to assume that problems not in

in the list are not dangerous, or will not expand or es

into serious crises. Because the logic of the strategy is 

on a consensus regarding specific threats, respon

unforeseen crises will generally be inefficient and in 

cases wholly ineffective. New strategic problem

require considerable time and debate to build supp

6
action, which an adversary can use to its str

advantage. In other words, a strategy of preventive de

even if successful in deterring or defeating desig

threats, could fail if other threats emerge that m

forces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. In 

it could put the nation on the path toward fightin

wrong kind of war against the wrong type of foe.

A second weakness is that this strategic approac

the threat-based metrics that underlie it, do not afford 

in the way of strategic flexibility. The United States a

global security partners have participated in a gr

number of low-visibility peace operations that fac

agreements among states and quasi-states, such as Ec

and Peru, Israel and Egypt, East Timor and Indonesi

the Kosovar-Albanians and Kosovar-Serbs.

13

 They hav

provided military support to long-standing arrange

with other national and international agencies to m

arms control arrangements; counter the drug trade; c

the spread of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nu

High-explosive/High-yield (CBRNE) weapons; m

embargoes; and so on. They have responded to huma

ian crises, such as those in northern Iraq, Somali

Rwanda, where military forces facilitated the w

national, international, private and other nongovernm

agencies. They have also had increasing occas

facilitate the evacuation of American citizens and 

noncombatants when hostilities break out unexpec

Finally, U.S. forces have been committed to exchang

exercises that build a basis for cooperative action 

regional friends and neighbors.

In essence, the logic underpinning the threat

preventive defense approach wrongly assumes that 

committed to these activities are available for 

response elsewhere. Hence, it tends to blur the disti

between forces assigned to the daily work of shapi

international environment and those designated as a 

against strategic risk. Certain of these activities—s

peacekeeping missions based on treaty requirem

7
must continue even during a crisis. Forces engaged in 

cannot readily disengage. Any threat-based metric s

from the same flawed logic.

In sum, preventive defense seeks to forestall pot

problems by deterring, containing, isolating, and def

specific threats to preserve or restore the statu

However, it fails to provide a rationale for taking con

events that might shape the future. It also fails to b

broad multinational basis for responding to the t

problems commonly associated with today’s str

environment. 

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes 

strategic independence or anti-interventionism. Und

option, the evolution of the international sec

environment is left largely to itself. In other word

approach would attempt to isolate the United State

the effects of the dangerous Janus face. Neo-isolati

pursues a neutral end, since security interests are s

defined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap

at home. Resources spent on overseas engagemen

reduced and greater risks are accepted in terms of 

response. One rarely finds neo-isolationist stra

proposed under that name. Instead, the approach typ

takes the form of arguments against U.S. mi

involvement abroad and for extensive defenses at 

U.S. military involvement abroad—usually c

intervention—is seen as either ineffective or too expe

or both.

14

 Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue str

defenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize t

from abroad. They would, for example, favor establ

national missile defenses at the expense of active 

response and overseas engagement forces, and at the 

stability in external relations with key regional or 

powers.

A Fortress America brand of this approach also 

the true colors of which are sometimes partly obscu

vociferous calls for more military force structure a

8
overall increase in defense spending. Nonetheles

missions this larger military force would perf

large-scale conventional wars rather than smaller 

contingencies or operations other than war—reveal th

strategy’s true aim is to limit U.S. military involvem

the big one, which in effect amounts to an overall str

retreat since a large-scale conflict is unlikely in th

term. In short, this more extreme version amou

building a large defense establishment and then 

refuge behind it.

The principal weakness of a neo-isolationist stra

its lack of practicality.

15

 Isolation of any sort is bec

difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in today’s 

village. Ignoring the forces at work beyond U.S. bord

simply not an effective way of dealing with them. A

world becomes more economically interdependen

penalties for withdrawing and allowing stability to 

may prove very costly, perhaps leading to a climate 

conducive to state adventurism, transnational crim

international terrorism. Certainly, efforts to counter 

proliferation and curb mass migrations, both of 

require active measures, would suffer. The foundat

cooperative action in response to crises would also 

Hence, responding to major crises might demand a 

expenditure of resources in the long run than prev

measures would have required, thereby effectively ne

any dividend gained from a strategic retreat. Finally

the case of France in the 1930s, the decision to put res

into a fortress or Maginot-Line type of strategy ultim

means the foreclosure of certain strategic options, s

responding to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhinel

1936, the annexation of Czechoslovak territory in 19

the invasion of Poland in 1939.

16

 The strategic lesson 

far less complex time is that a great power ought to 

broad offensive and defensive options, and that 

matter. 

A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of positiv

aims at building an international environmen

9
promotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, eco

stability, and the rule of law, and provides a multil

basis for crisis response.

17

 This approach seeks to ha

the forces behind one Janus countenance to count

complex and unpredictable forces associated with the 

It differs from the other strategic approaches disc

above in that it is oriented toward achieving a con

rather than preparing to respond to specific threa

other words, its ends are positive, rather than nega

neutral. The basic approach would be to build and enl

circle of stakeholders committed to reducing the pot

for crises and to prepare response mechanisms for 

successfully when they do.

A strategy of positive ends would have two pr

objectives. The first would include performing peac

engagement missions intended to prevent crises 

emerging. When crises do occur, stakeholders would 

proactively to minimize the need for forceful interven

intervention becomes necessary, the United State

other stakeholder nations would take advantage 

regional climate of support that peacetime activitie

created to act rapidly and decisively to resolve the 

The regional balance of power that peacetime engag

would aim to create by enlarging the circle of stakeh

would also help prevent crises from escalating into 

conflicts. In addition, it would contribute to creating a 

for a multilateral response, thereby easing the proc

coalition building.

Second, when responding to a crisis, stakeholders 

endeavor to create political, economic, and mi

conditions more stable than those of the status quo an

example, under a policy of positive ends, stakeholders 

make a commitment to respond to humanitarian cri

establish and maintain political and economic stabi

protect global infrastructures, to guarantee the saf

citizens, and to contain or channel the rise of so-called 

of concern. However, the process of responding wou

10
include identifying the root causes of the problem 

creating conditions that prevent the crisis from recu

Two ways exist to achieve the second aim. 

stakeholders can install a nonaggressive regime in p

the aggressive one, as was done in Germany and Japa

World War II. Or, if that is not possible becaus

aggressor can guarantee its survival by resorting to n

escalation, stakeholders can create a more stable re

balance of power by a combination of actions, su

building up and reinforcing regional allies, instal

verifiable arms control regime, and imposing v

nonmilitary sanctions as was done with Iraq at the 

Operation DESERT STORM. Admittedly, the latter 

tends to add a long-term, day-to-day burden t

maintenance of the peace. Nonetheless, the new re

balance of power can serve to stabilize the area over th

term.

The primary weakness of this strategy is that othe

misconstrue its goals as a form of Pax Amer

particularly if American leadership appears aggressiv

hegemonic.

18

 Some parts of the world see the United 

as the primary force behind the advancement of W

values. They see such values as repugnant and ev

hence, resist them.

19

 Each region has its special pro

and the United States must build partnerships an

conditions for peace and prosperity on a region-by-

basis. The United States and other stakeholders 

therefore, become more aware of and sensitive to the d

of regional affairs. Otherwise, the approach will b

counterproductive, with other states either resisti

aims or stepping aside to allow the United States to ta

lead and shoulder the burdens. Indeed, rather than cr

a world of peace, stability, and economic prosperit

United States could well find itself the target of one o

multinational alliances or coalitions set on curbing, 

undermining, its influence. When it comes to pra

execution, therefore, U.S. representatives abroad wo

well to follow the principal rule of the medical profes

11
first, do no harm—and to emphasize consensus-bu

This emphasis on consensus does not, however, mea

the United States should never take the lead in re

affairs. On the contrary, it can and should do so whe

such action is in its interest.

A second weakness is that positive aims gen

require more energy and resources than do negat

neutral ones, which may mean that short-term costs 

policy may be greater than people would expect to p

least when compared to other strategies. This could 

national consensus more difficult to achieve in the 

term. While the constructive use of those resources 

well reduce the frequency and scale of international 

over the long run—and thus prove a worthwhile investm

the payoffs are not always readily apparent. It is diffi

prove that a particular strategic approach deter

preempted a major conflict. Methods for measurin

effectiveness of peace operations, for example, ar

evolving. An inherent risk, therefore, is that the st

requires a willingness to make possibly large invest

in the short term for results that might not ma

themselves until the long term.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy 

around positive ends permits the United States to def

vital interests in terms of conditions—such as 

freedom and democracy, rule of law, and eco

prosperity—rather than as the containment or def

inimical state or non-state actors. This approac

accords well with the ongoing expansion of open m

economies and pluralistic governments. A positive st

also offers two intrinsic advantages. First, it ten

generate momentum and support as it succeeds. Sec

permits the United States to take the strategic init

allowing it not only to shape the peace, but to have a 

hand in setting the terms for conflict resolution.

Put simply, if the United States wants a world clo

the first Janus face to materialize, it will have to b

12
more actively engaged in the international system. 

have to promote democratic principles, free-m

economies, and human rights, and assume an appro

leadership role in multinational defense arrangemen

short, it will have to pursue a strategy of positive en

A prerequisite, of course, is to build consensus at 

and among key strategic allies and partners. Alt

major differences exist over the specific priorit

America’s national strategy, most policymakers do 

that our strategic ends should be greater peac

prosperity and that the United States should rem

positive force in the world. A number of defense studie

stated that the United States will continue to p

significant part in “shaping the international se

environment” and should actively embrace that 

Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Ri

foreign policy expert Robert B. Zoellick have stress

need to develop “a long term strategy to promote 

security, and liberty” and to “affect the shape of the w

come.”

21

 Foreign policy experts from outsid

administration have also come out in favor of a Globa

Deal that supports the concept of Engagement, but the

imply that it should have gone further.

22

 Thus, Dem

and Republicans alike seem to agree on the ge

strategic ends that the United States should pursue. 

is, therefore, good reason to believe that a determined 

could achieve consensus at home.

The next step would be to build consensus abroad 

widen the circle of stakeholders—those allies and re

security partners who share basic values in ter

democratic principles, the rule of law, and free m

economies. Currently, stakeholders include such sta

Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Australia

Zealand, and Japan. The list should also includ

economic powers, European Union and North Am

Free Trade Agreement members, and most NATO 

Broadening this circle would mean eventually inc

such states as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, 

13
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and others. In addition, 

effort should be made to add Indonesia, India, Chin

Russia to the list of stakeholders.

23

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive 

must, of course, involve all elements of national powe

political and socio-cultural elements would help 

conditions for long-term peace and stabili

strengthening democratic institutions worldwid

advancing human rights, and by respondi

humanitarian crises. The economic element of na

power would contribute to global prosperity by enha

and guiding international financial institution

promoting open trading systems, and by providi

sustainable economic development worldwide. Arg

these elements of national power would contribute the 

share to building conditions of greater peace and stabi

Yet, this strategy will also require certain eleme

military power important enough to address here. In 

terms, the military element of national power must ha

capability to conduct sustained peacetime engag

activities as well as respond to two general types of 

(those with significant escalation potential and 

without). Collectively, these missions more closely 

the requirements of the new security environmen

those of the Cold War.

Peacetime Engagement, which includes stabilit

support operations as well as coalition and al

building, contributes to the creation, improvemen

maintenance of regional systems of collective respon

(1) routinizing the methods and procedures addr

smaller strategic problems, and (2) dealing more effec

with Type I crises (negligible escalation potential) and 

II crises (significant escalation potential).

14
Maintaining and shaping the peace through peac

engagement is a continuous strategic activity. It i

labor intensive. It requires regional street smart

disciplined troops on the ground.

24

 When a crisis erup

generally not advisable or even practical to withdraw 

already carrying out peacetime engagement. For one 

withdrawal may undermine the accomplishme

long-term regional objectives or treaty violations

reasons troops were positioned there in the first 

Secondly, such forces may not have the physical cap

to respond quickly, due to the need to disengage from 

engagement duties. Even temporary substitution o

forces in the region by allies or coalition partners will 

some delay. In short, fulfillment of the national se

strategy will require the commitment of U.S. for

strategic locations throughout the globe. Hon

commitments, in turn, will require leaving a c

number of those forces in place, making them unava

for other missions, despite a reshuffling of priorities 

events elsewhere.

The following stability and support operations fall 

peacetime engagement activities:

25

Stability Operations:

• Show of Force – long and short-term activities de

to reassure allies, deter known or potential threat

gain increased influence.

• Arms Control – assisting in locating, seizing

destroying weapons and otherwise supporting arms c

regimes. 

• Peace Operations – Peace Enforcement (

Peacekeeping (PKO), and other operations supp

diplomatic efforts to establish peace settlements, tr

and accords.

• Noncombatant Evacuations – relocating threa

civilian noncombatants.

15
• Humanitarian and Civic Assistance – pla

assistance conducted in conjunction with military trai

• Security Assistance – providing defense ar

military training, and other services to foreign natio

• Support to Counter Drug Operations – assisting 

detection, disruption, interdiction, and destruction o

drugs.

• Combating Terrorism – offensive and defe

measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terro

• Foreign Internal Defense – assisting legit

governments in freeing and protecting their societie

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

• Support to Insurgencies – logistical and tr

support to insurgencies that oppose regimes hostile 

United States.

Support Operations:

• Domestic Support Operations – supporting eff

state and local government organizations in an emer

situation.

• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance – supporting 

of foreign governments in an emergency situation.

Building Coalitions and Alliances, which also 

under peacetime engagement, includes collective se

exercises and other activities that facilitate team bu

among strategic partners. In the new dynamic se

environment, regional coalitions and alliances will 

increase in strategic value. Indeed, many of the chal

reflected in the new strategic environmen

transnational in character and would, thus, req

multilateral approach for resolution. The United 

may well participate in a greater number of alliance

not necessarily as a leader or even as a dominant me

Alliances and coalitions can help lessen tensions, in

16
communication of intentions and capabilities, and 

understanding among members. They can also contrib

distributing the benefits and costs of maintainin

shaping the peace. Even more important, they pro

valuable strategic mechanism for executing regiona

response. Alliances, especially, can work to

establishing and expanding zones of security compr

multiple collective-security arrangements and arms c

agreements. 

The Organization for Security and Cooperat

Europe (OSCE) is an example of just such a col

security arrangement. Its members—som

states—share core values, institutions, and interest

OSCE has fielded dozens of advisor teams on mi

across Europe and Central Asia to monitor and pr

respect for human rights and democratic proc

including free elections, free speech, and the rule o

Similarly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed For

Europe (CFE), signed in November 1990 by NAT

several members of the Warsaw Pact, is an example 

arms control agreement that spans (or spanned) op

alliances.

26

 Such collective security arrangements fac

crisis response by providing a ready framewo

intelligence sharing, operational planning, access to 

and airfields, and logistical support.

27

In addition, programs like the Partnership for 

(PfP) initiative could serve as a model for future coope

endeavors.

28

 Such programs facilitate interna

cooperation by removing suspicions and by building a 

for future teamwork. In order to ensure that such team

is built on a foundation of jointness, each branch of th

military would have to commit resources in proport

the degree of integration required in wartime.

Accordingly, the day-to-day work of military peac

engagement should become a high-priority effort f

U.S. defense establishment. While such operatio

indeed take away time and other resources necessa

17
preparing for war, they also build strategically va

military skills and capabilities that can enable and 

the U.S. military’s capacity to wage war. In other w

military forces must have the capability to be pro

during peacetime, not just the capability to react to 

Any military response to a crisis must come fro

understanding of the conditions and forces that w

work beforehand and those necessary to produce a 

stable peace afterward. In particular, military a

aimed at defeating and removing adversarial regim

require a balanced—full dimensional—force and the U

States would likely contribute a significant share o

force. Consequently, the defense establishment will h

rethink what military forces can, or should, do in peac

as well as in war.

Crisis Response.

Even with successful peacetime engagement arou

world, unexpected situations are bound to develop th

require some form of crisis response. Such respons

require a flexible basis that accepts the unpredictab

crises and prepares to address them accordingly. In g

terms, crisis response will fall under two categories. 

crises require forceful intervention, but the circums

are such that the risk of escalation to major war 

present. Since this category includes crises tha

relatively isolated politically, they can be resolved w

sudden and overwhelming coup de main approach. 

crises tend to permit the use of decisive force ev

conjunction with the pursuit of limited political obje

Political ends can thus be stated in terms of absolutes

as “enforce . . .,” “gain control of . . .,” “defeat . . 

“reinstate. . . .” Operational details will, of course

according to political aims and other circumstances. 

purpose is punitive, a quick strike using long-

precision engagement munitions may suffice. On the 

hand, a more decisive aim will require full-dimens

joint capabilities.

18
Ideally, peacetime engagement will have lai

groundwork necessary to ensure such operations a

conducted off the cuff, but reflect adequate pla

preparation, and consensus building among allie

partners with regard to the desired strategic ends, 

and means. If so, the principles underlying a trad

coup de main might apply: a sudden, violent applica

force that limits an adversary’s opportunities to react

I crises typically include:

• Enforcing key elements of international law, esp

critical arms control or environmental treaty obliga

international sanctions, or agreements with the we

international law (e.g., Iraq, 1998).

• Gaining control of transnational terrorist or cr

organizations where circumstances are conduc

intervention (e.g., Afghanistan/Sudan, 1998; and Pa

1989-90). 

• Defeating regular/irregular forces of govern

engaged in crimes against humanity (e.g., Cambodia

Rwanda, 1994; Serbia, 1999).

• Reinstating legitimate governments illegally de

(e.g., Haiti).

Type II crises, by comparison, are those wi

apparent potential for vertical or lateral escal

Typically, these crises involve actions—such as 

violations, major economic disruptions, or invasion 

ally or a strategic partner—that directly challenge th

interests of the United States and its allies. Such a

will generally require a rapid military response, but w

necessarily include the removal of the belligerent r

especially if that regime possesses the means to lau

retaliatory strike using nuclear weapons. As such, the

special challenges that require concerted allied effor

relatively large, well-balanced military forces fro

start. In such cases, the value of an established multil

response mechanism becomes clear, as does the impo

19
of a full-spectrum force, which can provide an ar

response options.

Since Type II crises have the potential to esc

political and military leaders will want to exert more c

over the introduction of force, bringing it into the thea

stages and keeping the amount and type of 

appropriately aligned with political and military obje

Such an approach may lead to longer, more deli

campaigns than those typical of Type I crises. Hen

address Type II crises, the United States and its alli

need the capability to fight and win deliberate campai

Although conventional wisdom considers the like

of such conflicts as low, it is irresponsible not to prep

them, particularly as history shows that authori

regimes can generally change policies faster 

democracies can respond. Military response in such c

more akin to a strategic-level meeting engagement in 

one side carefully gages its actions at each stage 

conflict to produce a specific effect and to avoid s

escalation. In other words, the political aims and m

options chosen would depend upon the circumstan

each situation.

It is also important to point out that—regardless 

type of mission—the operational environment in whic

forces must operate is changing. The U.S. military is 

likely to encounter conventional and unconventional 

working in an integrated fashion. The proliferat

CBRNE in combination with the tools and effects 

global age will likely make the latter, especially, much 

dangerous than hitherto. In addition, since the a

rapid pace of urbanization is expected to increas

number of crisis response operations that take pl

urban environments will probably multiply. Indeed

era in which even small powers might possess the cap

to project certain kinds of power globally, espe

CBRNE, the terms smaller-scale contingencies (SSC

major theater wars (MTWs) are no longer useful. Siz

20
intensity have become misleading metrics. For examp

Kosovo conflict (1999), which was officially classifie

SSC, required as many aerospace assets as a typical M

It is equally unhelpful to use the terms convention

unconventional when referring to military conflic

proliferation of CBRNE, the permeability of na

borders, the increasing speed of physical travel, an

ubiquity of internet communications will extend the 

of so-called unconventional forces. This extension, in 

will probably make unconventional forces and for

conflict more frequent, thereby making the unconven

more conventional. In other words, future conflict

likely involve a greater integration of conventiona

unconventional forces and approaches.

Indeed, the nature of tomorrow’s opponent

destructive power of their weapons, and the environm

which they are likely to operate all underscore the nee

balanced force. To be sure, allies and coalition pa

could well contribute a large portion of the require

power with the United States supplying the bulk of a

space, and information systems. Yet, the U.S. milita

probably still have to contribute operationally sign

land-power formations in order to provide techno

overmatch, to demonstrate resolve, and to exert inf

over the pursuit of political aims. Operational signif

varies according to circumstances, but, in general, it 

assuming an appreciable share of the risk and commi

force large enough to make a difference in the battle

Indeed, the continued proliferation of integ

surveillance, missile, and cannon technologies will 

multiply the advantages of the defense, requiring 

forces to possess a significant numerical and techno

overmatch to prevail even against modest adversarie

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to specify 

numbers and types of forces needed for peac

engagement or response to Type I or Type II cris

general terms, however, the U.S. Army’s reg

commitment to a strategy of positive ends should cons

21
baseline force comprised of a theater army, Army s

operations forces, a forward-presence corps, and a 

equivalent of reserve component forces for rota

employment. This baseline force would include activ

reserve component forces. Active components, round

with reserve component elements, would conduct the 

work of peacetime engagement. Concurrently, a 

equivalent of reserve component forces would co

long-range planning for full integration into the rec

work of peacetime engagement. As a rule of thumb

reserve forces would be allocated against the 

predictable requirements of the future, and active 

against initial commitments and those most lik

change. The defense community should also 

combination of historical data, regional political-m

projections, and wargaming analyses to help quantif

requirements. Budget decisions and the risks the po

leadership is willing to accept will, of course, further 

the dimensions of the future force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environ

the legacies of the Cold War continue to influenc

strategic thinking. The problems associated wit

Strategy Review are evidence of that. The de

community continues to justify its strategic prefe

with threat–based assessments, some of which are l

labeled asymmetric. However, as has been sho

threat-based strategy has serious liabilities 

environment in which the next opponent or the next c

nearly impossible to predict.

Instead, the United States would do well to pu

strategy focused on positive ends, one that endeav

maintain a dynamic peace. Under such a strateg

United States and its strategic partners and allies 

concentrate on coping with the many small problem

arise daily and attempt to defuse them before they b

larger crises. At the same time, they would actively 

the necessary mechanisms to facilitate a decisive ou

to a larger crisis by maximizing the number of 

22
interested in maintaining peace and stability. Whi

United States should not cease tracking and prepar

specific threats, it can certainly do more to creat

maintain conditions that promote long-term peac

prosperity. 

ENDNOTES

1. For a representative sample, see National Defense Uni

Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent 

Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 199

World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Sup

Research & Analysis, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on N

Security/21st Century, 1999; Jacquelyn K. Davis and Mic

Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning fo

Era, Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 199

J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the 

Security Environment, 2001-2025, Washington, DC: National D

University, 2000; and Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the 

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends 2015.

2. Perhaps the most popular definition of globalization is 

Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: A

2000, p. 9; see also the IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, N

Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World, Final Repor

where he defines globalization as the dispersion and “democrat

of technology, information, and finance. The genuine exte

implications of globalization have sparked a great deal of deba

Global Transformation and the Third World, Robert O. Slater, B

Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993

Transformation: Challenges to the State System, Yoshikazu Sak

ed., Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press

and The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Res

James H. Mittelman, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

3. Richard Faulk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward 

Parliament,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2

212-220; as a counterpoint, Robert M. Dunn Jr., “Has the U.S. E

Really Been Globalized?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, 

2001, pp. 53-64, argues that the U.S. economy has remained 

independent. Bruce R. Scott, “Measuring Globalization,”Foreign 

January/February 2001, pp. 56-65, points out the diffic

measuring globalization at all.

23
4. Stephen J. Blank, East Asia in Crisis: The Security Impl

of the Collapse of Economic Institutions, Carlisle Barrack

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999; but Hilton R. Root, “Asia’s B

Ways: Reforming Business by Reforming its Environment,” 

Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 9-15, offers 

optimistic forecast of Asian recovery and further development.

5. Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. 

Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globa

and National Security, Washington, DC: Institute for N

Strategic Studies, 2001, p. 9.

6. Bruce R. Scott, “The Great Divide in the Global Village,” 

Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 160-177; and 

Bergsten, “America’s Two-Front Economic Conflict,” Foreign 

Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 16-27.

7. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, “Peace

in Africa,” February 13, 2001.

8. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White 

December 2000, p. 2.

9. One of the most consistent proponents for the vie

“established democracies do not go to war with other demo

because they lack “adequate reasons” to fight one another is Do

Snow, World Politics in a New Century: The Shape of the Future, 

New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 34. However, only a small nu

the world’s democracies fit the description of “established”; and 

the danger that, without considerable support, newer ones coul

way of Weimar’s Germany or Kerensky’s Russia. Moreov

destructiveness and aftermath of the American Civil War demo

that even established democracies can employ violent means 

that might directly or indirectly affect other societies.

10. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the M

Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, Washington, DC: Insti

National Strategic Studies, 2000, shows that tomorrow’s adve

could develop such strategies to undermine the national will t

information warfare, even of a low-tech variety, and acts of ter

including attacks against the homeland. Vincent J. Goulding, Jr

to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters, Vol. XXX

Winter 2000-01, pp. 21-30, reminds us that such approaches ha

been a part of how international competitors have dealt with eac

Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. M

Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carli

24
Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, discuss various catego

asymmetries and what America’s political and military lea

should do about them.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations a

Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 19

Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dream

Post-Cold War World, New York: Random House, 2000. Huntin

balanced by Richard E. Rubenstein, “Challenging Huntington,” 

Policy, No. 96, 1994, pp. 113-128. For more detail on transn

threats, see Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Transnational T

Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies, Carlisle Ba

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.

12. For an example, see Ashton B. Carter and William J

Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, Wash

DC: Brookings, 1999.

13. The increase in U.N. peacekeeping operations since the 

the Cold War has been significant. By comparison, in 1990, the U

5 peacekeeping operations involving about 10,000 troops, not c

Korea. In 1993, it had 24 such operations involving over 75,000 

Peacekeeping costs skyrocketed from $800 million to $4 billion 

the same period. Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, “M

Support for Peacekeeping Operations,” in Ethnic Conflict and R

Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and M

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 241.

14. A brand of this argument accepts that a certain am

political and economic engagement is inevitable, or even desira

draws the line at intervention, particularly military interv

maintaining that military force is often not the most effective, e

or ethical means for protecting or advancing national interests. 

Galen Carpenter, “The Case for U.S. Strategic Independence

Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 16, January 16, 1992; Ivan Eland

U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical R

Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 50, December 17, 1998; and 

Ravenal, “‘Isolationism’ as the Denial of Intervention: What 

Policy Is and Isn’t,” Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 57, April 2

at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ fpbriefs/foreignbriefs.html. Wh

view can provide a necessary corrective to a tendency to rely too 

on the military element of national power, it can go too far in th

direction, failing to integrate military power into a balanced n

strategy. 

25
15. Michèle A. Flournoy, Quadrennial Defense Review 

Working Group, Washington, DC: National Defense Univ

November 2000, p. 25, dismisses neo-isolationism as an imp

alternative for the future. That, however, does not preclude its a

as a form of “very selective” engagement, a policy that migh

considerable support since it has the potential to address the 

mismatch in strategic ends and resources by scaling down the 

16. Numerous works have attempted to explain France’s d

1940. Like Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940, Boston

Brown, 1969, especially pp. 51-52, 70-73, 121-125, most point to a 

in strategy; some to faulty doctrine. In another interpretation, E

C. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler: France and the Limits of M

Planning, Lawrenceville, KS: University Press of Kansas

maintains that France’s defeat was due less to flaws in strate

doctrine than to poor training and leadership, and lack of unit co

Collectively, then, the answer seems to lie in the absence 

congruence in France’s ends, ways, and means.

17. This approach differs from the previous administration

of Engagement in that it calls for proactive involvement and seiz

initiative in global security affairs.

18. A number of sources point out that this perception is 

strong. See Peter W. Rodman, Uneasy Giant: The Challe

American Predominance, Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2000

19. For example, Ming Zhang, “Public Images of the United 

In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, Yong De

Fei-Ling Wang, eds., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 19

141-158, points out that a survey of China’s educated population 

that most Chinese believe that the U.S. national goal is no

democracy and universal human rights, but a USA federal 

uniting the world. When U.S. officials use the term “leadersh

Chinese people read “hegemony.” For other examples, see the 

section “How the World Views America,” in the Wilson Qu

Spring 2001, pp. 45-80.

20. See Part I, New World Coming, p. 3; Part II, Seeking a N

Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting F

Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st C

April 15, 2000, pp. 11-12; and Part III, Building for Peace, 

delivered January 26, 2001; and http://www.nssg.gov. S

America’s National Interests: A Report from the Commiss

America’s National Interests, 2000, Washington, DC: Belfer Ce

Science and International Affairs, July 2001.

26
21. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest” and 

B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign A

January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, and 63-78; here 45 a

respectively.

22. W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero, and Laura D’Andrea 

“New World, New Deal,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000, pp

here 98.

23. A state and its people have to desire to become stakeh

When they do, they will become committed. States that do n

cooperate when it suits them, and may complicate matters when 

not.

24. Colonel George F. Oliver, U.S. Army Peacekeeping In

“Doing the Dirty Work—Peace Enforcement,” unpublished 

details the requirements for peace enforcement, one aspect of pe

engagement, through an analysis of lessons learned from S

Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor.

25. See also Field Manual (FM)-3, DRAFT, The Army and the 

Land Power, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, p

1-16. 

26. The CFE establishes equal East-West limits on f

categories of conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored 

vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopter

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the CFE n

30 treaty parties. Department of Defense, Strengthening Trans

Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: O

Assistant Secretary of Defense, December 2000, pp. 40-41.

27. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kruger, Martin Lubicki, M

Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military A

Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999, warns t

U.S. military’s rapid pursuit of a revolution in military af

contributing to a dangerous (and growing) technological gap b

the United States and its NATO allies.

28. Introduced in January 1994 in order to expand and in

political and military cooperation among NATO and partner co

PfP promotes civilian control of military forces, enables co

operations in NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missio

opens communications among PfP countries; www.nato.

partners. htm, updated December 7, 2000.

27
29. IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, National Strategi

Capabilities for a Changing World, Final Report, p. 94.

28
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Cz

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria 

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams