United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to Congressional

Requesters

June 1998 UNITED NATIONS

Financial Issues and

U.S. Arrears

GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280216 

June 18, 1998

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,

 State and Judiciary

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

According to the United Nations Secretary General, the U.N.’s financial

situation is precarious, due to the nonpayment or late payment by the

United States and other U.N. members of their assessed contributions.

Department of State officials have asserted that unpaid U.S. assessments

(arrears) limits the U.S.’ ability to effectively pursue its interests through

the United Nations. This report responds to your concerns regarding the

validity of these claims. Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) the U.N.’s

financial status and (2) the impact of U.S. arrears on selected U.N.

decisions, including U.N. resolutions dealing with Iraq and U.S. efforts to

secure a change in its regular budget assessment rate. Our observations

concerning the impact of U.S. arrears on selected U.N. decisions is limited

to those specific decisions we examined and cannot be generalized to the

broader range of issues and proposals that have been debated at the

United Nations. We briefed members of your staff about these issues on

February 13 and 24, 1998. This report summarizes and updates the

information provided at those briefings.

Background The U.N. Charter—an international treaty—provides that the expenses of

the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the

General Assembly. The U.N.’s basic operations, including most

headquarters activities, are funded through regular budget assessments

paid by its member states. Member states are assessed separately for

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peacekeeping operations and international criminal tribunals,1 but at

different rates than for the regular budget. The United Nations uses the

budget levels set by the General Assembly as the basis for assessing its

members and planning its activities. The unpredictability of U.N. members’

payments is not a factor in developing its budgets.

The United States is the U.N.’s largest contributor and, in 1997, it paid

about 89 percent, or $627.8 million, of its assessments of $707.7 million. In

1997, the United Nations assessed its 185 members a total of $2.4 billion

for its regular, peacekeeping, and tribunal budgets. The United States is

assessed 25 percent of the U.N.’s regular budget and about 30.5 percent of

peacekeeping budgets. In addition, the United States is assessed

25 percent for one-half of the international criminal tribunals’ budget and

about 30.5 percent for the other half. According to the United Nations, the

United States has on average paid about 90 percent of its regular budget

assessment over the last 17 years.

Regular budget assessments are due on January 31 of each year and are

considered to be in arrears if they are not paid by December 31.

Assessments for peacekeeping missions and the tribunals are due within

30 days of the billing dates. Article 19 of the U.N. Charter states that a

member that is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to

the United Nations will have no vote in the General Assembly if the

amount of arrears equals or exceeds the assessments due for the

preceding 2-full years. Security Council rights, such as the power of a

permanent member to veto any resolutions, are not affected by article 19.

Since 1983, the United States has paid its calendar year assessments with

funds appropriated for the following U.S. fiscal year. For example,

calendar year 1998 assessments, which were due by January 31, 1998, will

be paid after October 1, 1998, with fiscal year 1999 appropriations. In

addition, since the early 1980s, the United States has withheld portions of

its assessed contributions for legislative and policy reasons. For example,

in 1994, Congress enacted legislation to cap the U.S. peacekeeping

assessment at 25 percent.2

 The United Nations counts the difference as

arrears.

1

The United Nations has established two international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal

Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—to investigate and prosecute persons responsible

for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in those

regions.

2

22 U.S.C. 287e note.

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B-280216 

Results in Brief Our analysis indicates that the United Nations has been able to pay its

external creditors and its personnel costs while maintaining an overall

positive cash balance. Although the United Nations has reported a

negative year-end cash balance in its regular budget account for the past

several years, it has been able to cover operating expenses by deferring

payments to countries contributing troops, equipment, and other services

to peacekeeping efforts—essentially borrowing from these countries—and

spending cash kept in peacekeeping accounts. These peacekeeping

accounts are reimbursed as U.N. members pay their regular budget

assessments.

The U.N.’s financial problems have been primarily caused by the

accumulation of unpaid assessments and the late payments of assessments

by a large number of members. Although some members pay their

assessments by the due date, most make partial payments throughout the

year. A large number of members also have unpaid assessments from prior

years (arrears). According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for

Management, in comparison to past years, a growing number of members

are now paying more or all of their assessments. For example, over the

past 3 years, the Russian Federation has paid over $300 million of its

unpaid assessments from prior years. Despite this improved payment

pattern, in recent years, the U.N.’s regular budget account has run out of

cash around the end of August and, to continue operations, cash is

borrowed from its peacekeeping mission accounts.

As of February 28, 1998, the United Nations reported that 166 member

states owed about $2 billion for arrears; 6 countries owed about 91 percent

of this amount: the United States (64.2 percent), Ukraine (11.2 percent),

Russian Federation (7 percent), Japan (4.4 percent), Belarus (2.7 percent),

and Brazil (1.4 percent). The other 160 countries owed about 9 percent of

the unpaid contributions. In some cases, unpaid contributions have been

the result of the members’ inability to pay. For example, Brazil, Belarus,

and Ukraine have experienced financial difficulties for several years and

have not paid their assessments in full or on time. Japan makes partial

payments during the assessment year. The U.N.’s records show that the

United States is about $1.3 billion in arrears for the regular and

peacekeeping budgets and is not in arrears for the international criminal

tribunals. Of the amount in arrears as of February 28, 1998, the United

States has agreed to pay $723 million—$60 million for the regular budget

and $663 million for peacekeeping. The United States has not agreed to

pay $567 million based on legislative requirements or policy

determinations.

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According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for Management, the

continuing large amount of arrears (both the failure to pay assessments in

full and to pay them on time) has created a structural deficit that could

develop into a serious financial crisis if members begin demanding

payment of amounts due them for providing goods and services to U.N.

peacekeeping operations. The structural problem arises from the fact that

U.N. programs and activities are implemented on the basis that

100 percent of the budgeted amounts will be assessed to members, and

that assessments will be paid in full and on time. Although member states,

including the United States, approved these activities, they are not being

fully funded in a timely manner. Moreover, the U.S.’ practice since 1986 of

withholding part of the assessed contributions until certain conditions

have been met, sometimes for many months beyond the due date, has

exacerbated this problem. This condition has prevailed for many years.

According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for Management, the only

way for the United Nations to circumvent the chronic deficits in the

regular budget is to borrow from peacekeeping accounts; and with

peacekeeping funds diminishing, “the time is fast approaching when this

will no longer be feasible.” Our analysis shows that year-end cash balances

in the peacekeeping accounts have declined from $923 million in 1995 to a

projected $761 million in 1998.

The U.S. arrears situation at the United Nations has contributed to a

difficult environment for advancing U.S. positions and has distracted the

debates away from the merits of the particular issues. However, on

specific cases we examined, arrears sometimes had a clear impact on

outcomes and sometimes did not. In the security arena, the ultimate

outcome of the cases we examined did not appear to be affected by the

U.S. arrears, whereas other U.S. interests, such as obtaining a lower

regular budget assessment rate clearly were.

The U.S. arrears situation was raised by Iraq during the Security Council

debate concerning Iraq’s compliance with weapons inspections and

distracted attention from Iraq’s violations. Nonetheless, Security Council

resolutions were firm, consistent, and unanimous in condemning Iraq and

maintaining the weapons inspections in accord with U.S. positions.

According to U.S. officials, the resolutions did not reflect the increased

difficulty that arrears caused in obtaining Security Council support.

On other issues we examined, the arrears issue had a clearly negative

impact. For example, while consensus had not been reached among the

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members to reduce the U.S. regular budget assessment rate from 25 to

22 percent, according to U.S. mission officials, the inability to resolve this

issue legislatively in 1997 ensured that agreement on reducing the rate

would not be reached. In addition, documents we obtained cited U.S.

arrears as the primary reason the United States lost its seat on the

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions—whose

role is to report to the Fifth Committee on its examinations of the regular,

peacekeeping, and international criminal tribunal budgets and other

accounts of the United Nations. Moreover, U.S. officials have been

informed by representatives of other U.N. members that the United States

will not regain the Advisory Committee seat until its arrears are paid in

full.

By April 4, 1998, 39 U.N. members in arrears had lost their vote in the

General Assembly under article 19. By May 11, 1998, that number was

reduced to 27 as payments were made by member states, thus permitting

them to regain their voting privileges. Our analysis of U.S. payments due

through 1998—including the estimated payments of between $363 and

$393 million the United States says it intends to make from its 1998 and

prior year appropriations—indicates that the United States could be

sufficiently in arrears to lose its General Assembly vote in January 1999 if

it does not legislate or pay an additional amount between $211 and

$241 million by December 31, 1998. We noted that other members,

including France, the former Soviet Union, and China—have been in a

similar situation for their refusal to pay certain assessments but were

allowed to continue their voting privileges. In the case of China, the

General Assembly authorized the United Nations to place the amounts

owed in a special account. However, according to U.S. officials, to date,

U.S. efforts to have such an account established for the amounts in dispute

have been rebuffed. Recently, the General Assembly allowed three other

U.N. members that failed to pay their dues—Comoros, Liberia, and

Tajikistan—to continue their voting privileges because of conditions

beyond their control.

The briefing sections provide more information on the U.N.’s financial

status and the impact of U.S. arrears on the U.S.’ ability to prevail on U.N.

decisions significant to U.S. interests. Appendixes I through III list unpaid

contributions by U.N. account, unpaid contributions by U.N. member

state, and reimbursements owed to U.N. members for peacekeeping

contributions.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Department of State and the United Nations provided written

comments on a draft of this report. The Department of State commented

that, while the facts of the report are accurate, the report was narrowly

focused and has not captured the atmosphere at the United Nations

toward the United States and loss of influence and prestige of the United

States within all the bodies of the United Nations that has been caused by

U.S. arrears. Specifically, State believes that it is impossible and imprudent

to assess the impact of the arrears by studying only selected activities in

the Security Council and on the recent effort to change the regular budget

assessment.

Our report states that despite the fact that the United States is the largest

contributor to the United Nations, the arrears problem has contributed to

a difficult environment for the State Department and the U.S. Mission to

operate in. It also makes clear that our observations concerning the impact

of U.S. arrears are limited to outcomes for the specific decisions we were

asked to examine. We do not attempt to generalize these observations to

the broader range of issues that the United States is involved with at the

United Nations.

The United Nations agreed with the factual information presented in the

report, and reiterated its view that the U.N.’s financial situation is

precarious and that borrowing from one account to cover deficits in

another is imprudent. The Department of State and the United Nations

also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

Department of State and U.N. comments are reprinted in appendixes IV

and V, respectively.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the U.N.’s financial status, we reviewed audit reports and

U.N. budgets and analyzed data on cash flow projections, unpaid

contributions, and internal borrowing. We also met with the U.N. Under

Secretary General for Management, other U.N. officials, and the U.N.

Board of Auditors. We did not include the U.N. specialized agencies or

other affiliated agencies in our review.

Because we are an agency of the United States, we do not have direct

audit authority to review the operations of international organizations,

including the United Nations. This lack of audit authority resulted in

certain limitations being placed on the scope of our work. Although U.N.

officials consented to our study and Secretariat staff were helpful and

forthcoming in interviews, the United Nations did not provide access to

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internal financial documents nor information about what is owed to other

peacekeeping contributors for specific peacekeeping missions. Also,

information on year-end cash balances prior to 1994 was not available.

These restrictions did not allow us to verify the U.N.’s cash flow estimates

and total amounts owed to member states for troops and

contingent-owned equipment.

To determine the impact of unpaid contributions on U.S. policy interests,

we reviewed recent U.N. Security Council and General Assembly

decisions, delegation statements before the U.N. Security Council and

General Assembly, and U.S. policy statements. We also interviewed U.S.

officials at the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United

Nations responsible for managing U.S. participation in the United Nations.

We did not independently verify the information obtained from the United

Nations and the State Department.

We conducted our work from February to April 1998 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the U.S.

Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the U.N. Secretary

General, and the Chairman, U.N. Board of Auditors. This report will also

be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

about this report. Major contributors to the report were Harold Johnson,

Tetsuo Miyabara, Zina Merritt, Michael Rohrback, and David Bruno.

Benjamin F. Nelson

Director, International Relations

 and Trade Issues

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Background

12

Background 12

Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget

and Peacekeeping

Cash Flows

14

Regular Budget and Peacekeeping Year-End Cash Balances,

1994-98

14

Regular Budget Year-End Cash Balances, 1994-98 16

Peacekeeping Year-End Cash Balances, 1994-98 18

Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments

by U.N. Members

20

Unpaid Assessments by All U.N. Members, 1990-97 20

Outstanding Contributions by Country, 1997 and Prior Periods 22

Structural Impact of Unpaid Contributions 24

U.N. Calculation of Regular Budget Arrears, 1997 and Prior

Periods

26

U.N. Calculation of Peacekeeping Arrears, 1997 and Prior Periods 28

Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements

Deferred to

Peacekeeping

Contributors

30

Countries Not Paid for Peacekeeping Contributions 30

Total Owed Peacekeeping Contributors, 1994-97 32

Top Five Countries Owed Reimbursement for Contributions to

Peacekeeping

34

Briefing Section V 

Impact of Unpaid

Contributions on U.S.

Interests

36

Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.N. Decisions We Examined 36

Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on Security Decisions 38

Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on Other U.N. Issues 40

Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on Reducing the U.S.

Assessment Rate

42

Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on Reopening Scale of

Assessments

44

Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on General Assembly Vote 46

Voting Rights Have Been Denied, but Some Exceptions Have

Been Made

48

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Contents

Appendix I 

Status of Unpaid

Contributions by U.N.

Account, as of

February 28, 1998

50

Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid

Contributions for

Regular Budget,

Peacekeeping

Missions, and

International Criminal

Tribunals by Member

State, as of February

28, 1998

51

Appendix III 

Reimbursements

Owed to U.N.

Members for

Peacekeeping

Contributions, as of

December 31, 1997

56

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of State

58

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Contents

Appendix V 

Comments From the

United Nations

61

Tables Table III.1: U.S. Regular Budget Withholdings as of February 28,

1998

27

Table III.2: U.S. Peacekeeping Withholdings as of February 28,

1998

29

Table V.1: Projected U.S. Arrears on January 1, 1999 47

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Contents

Abbreviations

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

MINUGUA United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human

Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the

Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in

Guatemala

MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western

Sahara

MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America

ONUC United Nations Operation in Congo

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF United Nations Emergency Force

UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMLT United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia

UNMOT United Nations Mission Observers in Tajikistan

UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern

Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO Background

U.N. operating funds obtained through

regular budget assessment

peacekeeping assessment

international criminal tribunals 

assessment

United States is the largest contributor to 

the United Nations

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section I 

Background

The United Nations obtains its operating funds through (1) regular budget

assessments, (2) peacekeeping assessments, and (3) international criminal

tribunals assessments. About 98 percent of these funds come from regular

budget and peacekeeping assessments and 2 percent from international

criminal tribunals’ assessments. In 1997, these assessments totaled about

$2.4 billion—$1.1 billion for regular budget, $1.2 billion for peacekeeping,

and $35.2 million for the international criminal tribunals. By February 28,

1998, U.N. members owed about $2 billion in unpaid contributions for 1997

and prior years (arrears)—$461.3 million for regular budget, $1.5 billion

for peacekeeping, and $10.7 million for the international criminal

tribunals. U.N. members also owed about $1.2 billion for the current year’s

assessments.

The United States is the U.N.’s largest contributor. In 1997, the United

States paid about $627.8 million of the $707.7 million it was assessed to the

United Nations—more than any other member state. It paid about

$315.6 million for the regular budget,1

 $302.4 million for peacekeeping, and

$9.8 million for the international criminal tribunals. However, the United

States still owes the largest amount of unpaid contributions, particularly

for peacekeeping missions, for 1997 and prior years (arrears).

1

The $315.6 million for regular budget payments includes a $27.3 million credit from surplus funds in

the U.N.’s Tax Equalization Fund.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

GAO Regular Budget and Peacekeeping 

Year-End Cash Balances, 1994-98

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

-200

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

453

728

677 669

577

Calendar year

Dollars in millions

(projected)

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

The U.N.’s combined regular budget and peacekeeping cash balance

between 1994 and 1997 has ranged from $453 million to $728 million at

year end. The U.N. Under Secretary General for Management estimates

that the United Nations will have a 1998 year-end cash balance, excluding

funds for the international criminal tribunals, of about $577 million. The

U.N.’s monthly operating expenses, including staff costs, average about

$200 million, or $2.4 billion per year. In addition, the United Nations

currently owes about $1.2 billion to members who have contributed

troops, equipment, and services to peacekeeping missions. As shown in

the following two slides, from 1994 to 1997, the United Nations has had

negative regular budget year-end balances and positive peacekeeping

balances. It has been able to maintain an overall positive cash balance by

deferring payments to countries that contribute to peacekeeping efforts

and covering regular budget shortfalls from peacekeeping account funds.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

GAO Regular Budget Year-End Cash 

Balances, 1994-98

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

-26

-195 -197

-122 -184

Calendar year

Dollars in millions

(projected)

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

Beginning in 1994, the gap between assessment levels and member states’

irregular payments has caused the regular cash account to be in deficit by

the end of each year. Based on the payment patterns of the prior 4 years,

particularly the last 4 months of each year, the U.N. Under Secretary

General for Management projects a regular budget deficit of about

$184 million for the end of 1998. He estimates that during 1998 the United

Nations will have to borrow 25 percent of the available cash in the

peacekeeping accounts to cover the deficit in the regular budget.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

GAO Peacekeeping Year-End Cash 

Balances, 1994-98

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

479

923

874

791 761

Calendar year

Dollars in millions

(projected)

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section II 

Regular U.N. Budget and Peacekeeping Cash

Flows

As the number of large and complex peacekeeping operations authorized

by the U.N. Security Council grew between 1990 and 1994, so did U.N.

member states’ peacekeeping assessments. This resulted in significant

on-hand cash balances in the peacekeeping accounts for the U.N.’s fiscal

years beginning in 1994. Between 1995 and 1997, these operations

decreased, as did member states’ assessments. As a result, the levels of

peacekeeping cash decreased from $923 million in 1995 to $874 million in

1996 and to $791 million in 1997.

According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for Management,

forecasting needs for peacekeeping operations is very difficult because the

levels of assessments change, the frequency of assessments is

unpredictable, the timing of the receipt of credits of unspent funds from

closed peacekeeping missions is uncertain, and the troop and equipment

requirements change. Based on prior year’s payment patterns, the U.N.

Under Secretary General projects that the cash in the peacekeeping

accounts would be about $761 million, the lowest level in 4 years, by the

end of 1998.

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Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

GAO Unpaid Assessments by All U.N. 

Members, 1990-97

1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

0

0.3

0.6

0.9

1.2

1.5

1.8

2.1

2.4

2.7

Dollars in billions

Regular Peacekeeping Tribunals

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

The United Nations depends on the contributions of its 185 member states

to maintain its operations. U.N. members have traditionally been slow in

making their current year contributions, and as of February 28, 1998, 

166 members had arrears. According to statements by the U.N. Secretary

General and the Under Secretary General for Management, arrears are the

major cause of what they consider to be a precarious financial situation.

According to the United Nations, as of February 28, 1998, member states

owed about $2 billion in unpaid contributions for 1997 and prior years

(arrears)—$461.3 million for regular budget, $1.5 billion for peacekeeping,

and $10.7 million for the international criminal tribunals. See appendixes I

and II for the status of unpaid contributions for each U.N. account and by

member state. According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for

Management, in comparison to past years, a growing number of members

are now paying more or all of their assessments. For example, over the

past 3 years, the Russian Federation has paid over $300 million of its

unpaid assessments from prior years. However, in some cases, unpaid

contributions have been the result of the member’s inability to pay. For

example, Brazil, Belarus, and Ukraine have experienced financial

difficulties for several years and have not paid their assessments in full or

on time. Other members, such as Japan, make partial payments during the

assessment year. Although Italy usually makes its payment in full at the

beginning of each calendar year, it has yet to pay its 1998 assessment.

Since the early 1980s, a portion of the U.S. payment has been withheld for

specific activities or because U.S. law caps the peacekeeping assessment

at 25 percent. Other portions have been conditioned on the U.N.’s

undertaking reforms.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

GAO Outstanding Contributions by Country, 

1997 and Prior Periods

United States

Ukraine Russian Federation

Japan

Belarus

Brazil

All others

64.2%

11.2% 7.0%

4.4%

2.7%

1.4%

9.0%

$2.0 billion

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

As of February 28, 1998, 166 U.N. members were $2 billion in arrears to the

U.N.’s regular, peacekeeping, and international criminal tribunal budgets.

Members owing the most were the United States, with about $1.3 billion,

or 64.2 percent; Ukraine, $226 million, or 11.2 percent; Russian Federation,

$140 million, or 7 percent; Japan, $89 million, or 4.4 percent; Belarus,

$55 million, or $2.7 percent; and Brazil, $29 million, or 1.4 percent. The

other 160 countries owed about $180 million, or 9 percent. The Russian

Federation is rapidly paying down its arrears. Ukraine, Belarus, and Brazil

have been experiencing severe financial problems and have indicated that

they are unable to pay their arrears at this time. According to a State

Department official, only the United States has not paid its arrears because

of policy reasons.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

GAO Structural Impact of Unpaid 

Contributions

According to the United Nations, unpaid 

contributions has created a structural 

deficit and could develop into a serious 

financial crisis if members demand 

reimbursement for peacekeeping 

contributions

Programs and activities are implemented 

on the basis of full and timely payment of 

assessments by U.N. members

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

According to the U.N. Under Secretary General for Management, the

continuing large amount of arrears (both the failure to pay assessments in

full and to pay them on time) has created a structural deficit that could

develop into a serious financial crisis if members begin demanding

payment of amounts due them for providing goods and services to U.N.

peacekeeping operations. The structural problem arises from the fact that

U.N. programs and activities are planned and implemented on the basis

that 100 percent of the budgeted amounts will be assessed to members,

and that assessments will be paid in full and on time. The unpredictability

of U.N. members’ payments is not a factor in developing its budgets. As

noted, this condition has prevailed for many years, and arrears have

continued to accumulate.

According to U.S. Mission officials, the U.S. payment practice of starting

regular budget payments no earlier than October 1, 8 months after they are

due, and completing regular budget payments up to 22 months after due

dates has a much more serious affect on the U.N.’s cash flow and ability to

meet its obligations than do the arrears. The U.N.’s cash flow problems

stem largely from this U.S. delay in payments. The United States is the only

major country that regularly schedules payments with this delay factor.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

GAO U.N. Calculation of Regular Budget 

Arrears, 1997 and Prior Periods

Member state Arrears Percent of total 

arrears

United States

 Withheld amount

 Undisputed amount

$373

(313)

(60)

80.9

Brazil 17 3.7

Others (71 members) 71 15.4

Total $461 100

Dollars in millions

(as of February 28, 1998)

Note: The United States withheld $162 million for legislative and policy actions and $151 million is

conditioned on the State Department’s certification that certain legislative requirements have been

fulfilled.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

The U.N.’s records show that the United States owes about $373 million

for regular budget arrears. Of this amount, as of February 28, 1998, the

United States has agreed to pay $60 million and withhold $313 million for

legislative requirements or policy determinations; $151 million of which

will be paid when specific conditions are met. Table III.1 shows the U.S.

withholdings for the U.N. regular budget.

Table III.1: U.S. Regular Budget

Withholdings as of February 28, 1998 Dollars in millions

Purpose

Withheld

amount

U.S. legislative withholdings

Construction of the Conference Center for the Economic

Commission of Africa (Addis Ababa) in the late 80s during

the famine

$29

U.N. assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization 17

Sunquist Amendment prohibiting a portion of the U.S.

payment to the U.N. because of kickbacks paid from Soviet

nationals’ salaries to their governments for their salaries

6.3

Kasten Amendment of the mid-1980s preventing payment for

excessive U.N. post adjustments

1

Assessment rate increase in early 1980s following the

breakup of Czechoslovakia

0.7

Subtotal $54

U.S. policy withholding

Withheld payment to the U.N. Tax Equalization Fund

because of the asserted excessive tax reimbursements 

paid to U.S. nationals employed by the United Nations

$100

Law of Sea Preparatory Commission 8

Subtotal $108

Funds withheld until U.N. meets reform conditionsa

Office of Internal Oversight Servicesb $51

U.N. regular budget not to exceed $2.533 billion 100

Subtotal $151

Total $313

aThese amounts are not disputed.

bThis amount was paid in March 1998.

Source: Department of State.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

GAO U.N. Calculation of Peacekeeping 

Arrears, 1997 and Prior Periods

Member state Arrears Percent of 

total arrears

United States

 Withheld amount

 Undisputed amount 

$917

(254)

(663)

59.6

Russia 136 8.8

Japan 89 5.8

Others (159 members) 396 25.8

Total $1,538 100

Dollars in millions

(as of February 28, 1998)

Note: The United States withheld $254 million for legislative and policy actions. This amount does

not include $14 million to be paid from fiscal year 1998 appropriations.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section III 

Unpaid Assessments by U.N. Members

The U.N.’s records show that the United States owes about $917 million

for peacekeeping arrears. Of this amount, as of February 28, 1998, the

United States has agreed to pay $663 million and withhold $254 million for

legislative requirements or policy determinations. Table III.2 shows the

U.S. withholdings for U.N. peacekeeping.

Table III.2: U.S. Peacekeeping

Withholdings as of February 28, 1998 Dollars in millions

Purpose

Withheld

amount

U.S. policy cap on peacekeeping assessment at 30.4 percent versus the

31.7 percent set by the General Assembly to cover peacekeeping

contribution shortfalls following the breakup of the Soviet Union

$123

U.S. legislative cap on peacekeeping assessments at 25 percent after

October 1, 1995, versus U.N. assessment of 30.4 percent

128

U.S. policy withholding of U.S. payment for the United Nations Mission for

the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) pending outcome of U.S.

negotiations

3

Total $254

Source: Department of State.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

GAO Countries Not Paid for Peacekeeping 

Contributions

Borrowing from peacekeeping accounts 

prevents full reimbursement of countries 

contributing troops, equipment, and other 

assistance to U.N. peace operations 

Largest reimbursements owed to France 

and the United States

Largest reimbursements for troops owed 

to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Finland

Countries are reimbursed as payments 

are remitted

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

Although the United Nations has been able to pay for external services

provided by contractors and personnel costs, it has not paid all U.N.

members for troops, equipment, and other services contributed for peace

operations. The U.N.’s regular budget cash deficits have led to prolonged

periods of borrowing from its peacekeeping accounts to maintain its

operations. These funds are reimbursed to the peacekeeping accounts as

U.N. members pay regular budget assessments. The availability of

peacekeeping cash from which to borrow has sustained the United

Nations. However, the U.N.’s ability to borrow will, over time, diminish

because funds flowing in from the assessments for peacekeeping missions

have declined. The following slides and appendix III show the amounts

owed by the United Nations to peacekeeping contributors.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

GAO Total Owed to Peacekeeping 

Contributors, 1994-97

(as of December 31, 1997)

1994 1995 1996 1997

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

927

1,386

1,202 1,175

Calendar year

Dollars in millions

Troops Contingent owned equipment Letters of assist Death & disability

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

At the end of December 1997, the United Nations owed about $1.2 billion

in reimbursements to U.N. member states for contributions for

peacekeeping operations, including troops, equipment—referred to as

contingent-owned equipment—letters of assist requesting specific

services, and death and disability payments. According to the United

Nations, in some cases, the debt poses a hardship for those member states,

such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe, that cannot afford to go

unpaid for long periods of time.

Payments for contingent-owned equipment constituted about 63 percent

of the amount the United Nations owed to member states as of December

1997. Before April 1996, the amounts owed for the use of

contingent-owned equipment were based on the contributing countries’

estimates. In some cases, the United Nations disputed these claims. After

an extensive review, the U.N. General Assembly adopted new guidelines

for determining reimbursement to member states for contingent-owned

equipment provided to peacekeeping missions. These guidelines include

standards for record keeping, classification of equipment, and rates for

equipment use. Reimbursement rates for troop costs are based on rates

established by the General Assembly; currently, this rate is $988 monthly

for each troop of the contributing country’s armed forces.

The Secretary General announced in 1996 his intention not to allow the

amounts already owed to member states to increase, if at all possible. The

Secretary General intends to pay down the level of debt to member states

when substantial arrearage amounts are paid. Actual reimbursement for

troop costs and contingent-owned equipment will be paid when amounts

over and above the day-to-day requirements become available to make a

payment. Death and disability payments and payments for letters of assist

are normally made to governments shortly after the claims are certified. In

1997, the United Nations paid peacekeeping contributors $327 million.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

GAO Top Five Countries Owed Reimbursement 

for Contributions to Peacekeeping

Country Troops

Contingent 

owned 

equipment

Letters of 

assist

Death and 

disability Total

France $2.0 $125.1 $16.5 $7.6 $151.2

United States 3.5 25.4 80.3 0.0 109.2

United Kingdom 3.1 45.2 15.4 2.2 65.9

Italy 0.4 29.1 29.4 3.6 62.5

Belgium 4.6 39.9 13.5 0.1 58.1

Others 126.4 480.1 99.3 22.5 $728.3

U.N. total $140.0 $744.8 $254.4 $36.0 $1,175.2

(as of December 31, 1997)

Dollars in millions

Note: Voluntary contributions are not included. Not all equipment cost are reported to the United

Nations. In some cases, countries dispute amounts owed. The United Nations recently adopted new

guidelines for reimbursing contingent-owed equipment costs.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section IV 

Reimbursements Deferred to Peacekeeping

Contributors

As of December 31, 1997, the United Nations owed 71 member states

about $1.2 billion for troops, equipment, and other services they had

provided to peacekeeping missions. The members owed the most were

France, $151.2 million; the United States, $109.2 million; the United

Kingdom, $65.9 million; Italy, $62.5 million; and Belgium, $58.1 million. The

remaining 66 countries were owed $728.3 million. The largest amount

owed for troops alone was to Pakistan for about $20 million. Appendix III

provides a complete listing of countries owed reimbursements for

contributions to peacekeeping operations. The United Nations maintained

an overall positive cash balance by deferring reimbursement payments to

these countries and, in effect, borrowing from these countries to pay

current operating expenses of the United Nations. According to U.N.

officials, if members’ arrears were paid, the funds would likely be used by

the United Nations to liquidate these debts.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.N. 

Decisions We Examined

U.S. arrears 

appeared not to impact decisions on 

Iraq, Congo, and Central African 

Republic, but prevented administrative 

changes in Lebanon

stopped progress towards reducing the 

U.S. assessment rates

was primary cause for losing ACABQ 

seat

could cause loss of Assembly vote

Note: Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

The U.S. arrears situation at the United Nations has had an effect on some

U.N. decisions of interest to the United States. On U.N. decisions

concerning Iraq, the Congo, and the Central African Republic, arrears did

not appear to have an impact and U.S. positions prevailed. However,

evidence we found suggests that U.S. arrears have created a more difficult

environment in which to advance U.S. initiatives in other areas. For

example, a U.S. initiative to streamline administrative operations for a

peacekeeping operation in Lebanon was deflected when U.S. arrears were

discussed. According to U.S. Mission officials, the inability to enact

legislation to pay U.S. arrears in 1997 ensured that the assessment rate for

the regular budget would not be reduced and caused the United States to

lose a seat on the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions. In addition, the United States could potentially lose its vote in

the General Assembly if it does not pay some of its arrears by January 1,

1999. The following slides discuss the impact of U.S. unpaid contributions

on U.S. interests.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on 

Security Decisions

Security Council resolutions condemn 

Iraq and maintain sanctions; however, 

arrears cause a distraction

Decisions on Congo, Central African 

Republic consistent with U.S. position, 

but arrears discussed

U.S. administrative initiatives on the U.N. 

Interim Force in Lebanon diverted by 

arrears

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section V 

Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

Although U.S. arrears created a more difficult environment to advance

U.S. positions, the impact on the security issues we examined appeared to

be limited. For example, U.S. arrears were raised by Security Council

members when negotiating resolutions on Iraq and according to U.S.

officials made their work more difficult. Nonetheless, the Security Council

passed resolutions in March 1998 and in December, October, and June

1997 condemning Iraq and reaffirming Iraq’s obligation to cooperate fully

and unconditionally with the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), which is

charged with ensuring that Iraq destroy, remove, or render harmless its

chemical and biological weapons. On March 2, 1998, the Security Council

passed Resolution 1154, which stressed Iraq’s obligations to give UNSCOM

immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to carry out its work

and stated that any violation would have the severest consequences for

Iraq. The President of the United States said that this resolution sends the

clearest message to message to Iraq and that if the resolution is complied

with it would achieve what the United States wanted. Further indicating

that U.S. arrears had a limited impact on decisions regarding Iraq, an

ambassador to the United Nations from another country stated that U.S.

arrears is a separate issue and is not linked to a situation as critical as Iraq.

The U.S. position that there is no clear mandate or rationale for

establishing a peacekeeping mission in the Congo was supported by the

Security Council. Further, the United States has been able to sustain its

position on the Central African Republic that certain conditions, such as

supplying a smaller force than proposed, must be agreed to before the

United States can support a peacekeeping mission. These revisions were

made to the U.N.’s plan for the peacekeeping mission. In both of these

cases, U.S. arrears had a limited impact on the decisions because the

United States could veto any new operations and the U.S. power to veto

would not be effected by arrears.

U.S. proposals to consolidate the administrative units of the U.N. Interim

Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with several other U.N. missions in the Middle

East were rebuffed, according to a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

These discussions were deflected when Security Council members made

reference to U.S. arrears. According to State Department and U.S. Mission

officials, discussions on other peacekeeping missions have also been

interrupted by questions about U.S. arrears.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on 

Other U.N. Issues

State Department documents and the 

U.S. Ambassador to U.N. indicate 

arrears was primary reason the U.S. lost 

ACABQ seat in 1996

Support for U.S. seat on ACABQ 

contingent on clearing arrears

General Assembly resolution requires 

study on limiting U.N. procurement to 

countries current in payments 

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section V 

Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

According to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. arrears was

the primary reason why the United States lost its seat on the ACABQ in 1996.

State Department documents indicate that a number of factors contributed

to this decision, but the deciding factor was U.S. arrears. These documents

indicated that other members would not vote for a country in arrears to sit

on the most important U.N. budget and financial committee. This

committee reports to the Fifth Committee on its examinations of the

regular, peacekeeping, and international criminal tribunal budgets and

other accounts of the United Nations. It also advises the General Assembly

on other administrative and financial matters referred to it. The United

States had maintained a seat on the ACABQ since its inception in 1946. To

regain a seat on the ACABQ, the United States plans to submit the name of a

candidate to the Fifth Committee for a seat that will become vacant on

December 31, 1998. Members of the committee are appointed by the

General Assembly on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee on the

basis of broad geographical representation, personal qualifications and

experience. However, some delegations have stated that they will not

support a U.S. seat unless the U.S. arrears are paid in full.

With respect to U.N. procurement, an attempt was made in March 1998 to

pass a General Assembly resolution restricting U.N. procurement to

countries that are current in their assessed payments. However, to gain

consensus, the resolution was modified and merely called for a study of

this matter. Specifically, the resolution requests the Secretary General to

study the practices being implemented at other multilateral organizations.

In 1997, the U.N. headquarters procurement division procured about 

61.4 percent, or $189.9 million, of its goods and services from U.S. vendors.

In 1996, the U.N. system, including specialized and other affiliated

agencies procured about 10.4 percent, or $276.7 million, from U.S.

vendors.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on 

Reducing the U.S. Assessment Rate

Regular budget 

Some members were open to reducing 

U.S. scale to 22%

China and Group of 77 had not agreed

Contingent on U.S. paying arrears

Peacekeeping budget

Based on regular budget plus 

percentage points

No agreement to reduce assessment

 rate

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Briefing Section V 

Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

According to State Department officials, the United States may have been

able to reach its goal of reducing its regular U.N. budget assessment rate

from 25 percent to 22 percent had it not been for the U.S. arrears, although

opinions on this issue are mixed. The U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations for U.N. Reform and other U.S. officials said major U.N.

contributors were somewhat open to the possibility of a 22-percent cap as

the maximum assessment for any individual U.N. member. Since the other

major contributors would most likely have had to make up for this

reduction in funding, State officials said their consent was crucial.

However, U.S. officials also stressed that the Group of 77 (a group of

developing nations), and China in particular had not reached consensus on

the 22-percent cap and their consent was also necessary. U.S. and Chinese

representatives had begun to discuss the possibility of a 22-percent ceiling,

but the discussions were ended when U.S. legislation to clear the arrears

was not enacted in 1997.

The special peacekeeping assessment scale is based on a complex formula

adopted by the General Assembly in 1973.1

 The underlying rationale for the

formula was that (1) permanent Security Council members should pay

more than others to recognize their veto power over peacekeeping

missions and (2) developing countries should be given some relief. Since

this special scale was adopted, the United States has paid in excess of

30 percent for peacekeeping missions. However, beginning in

October 1995, U.S. law limited the amount that the United States could pay

to 25 percent.2

 The United Nations, however, continues to assess the

United States at the higher special peacekeeping rate—currently about

30.5 percent. If the regular budget were capped at 22 percent, the U.S.

peacekeeping assessment would automatically be reduced; however, using

the U.N. formula, the amount would still likely exceed 25 percent.

According to officials at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations,

discussions had begun with China and the Russian Federation to see if

they would agree to pay a greater portion of the reductions for developing

countries. U.S. Mission officials also said that although no agreement has

yet been reached, both have agreed to the principle that the permanent

members of the Security Council should pay a minimum or floor amount.

1

The U.S. assessment is calculated by taking the regular budget assessment of 25 percent and adding to

it the proportionate share of the reductions allowed for developing countries. The five permanent

members of the Security Council pay for the reductions allowed for developing countries in proportion

to their regular budget assessment. For a discussion of how the peacekeeping and regular budget are

calculated, see United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations Are

Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).

2

22 U.S.C. 287e note.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on 

Reopening Scale of Assessments

Reopening 1999-2000 scale 

Requires legal obligation to pay arrears 

by May 1998

No assurance that ceiling will be 

lowered to 22%

Several outstanding issues 

How to allocate lowered U.S. share

How to adjust the scale for Japan and 

China

How to deal with residual arrears

In December 1997, the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing

the scale of assessments for 1998-2000. The resolution (1) set the U.S.

assessment at 25 percent; (2) lowered the assessment rates for 133

countries; and (3) stated the United Nations would “consider reviewing the

scale for the years 1999-2000 during its resumed fifty-second session,” in

light of all relevant factors, including the status of contributions.

According to U.S. and U.N. officials and documents, the Fifth Committee

may, but is not bound to, request that the Committee on Contributions

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

reopen discussions depending on whether the United States enacts

legislation to provide sufficient funding to pay all arrears, including

disputed amounts.

Officials indicated that the timing of enacting such legislation is important

because the Fifth Committee meets in a resumed session in May 1998 and

sets the agenda for the Committee on Contributions’ annual meeting in

mid-June. The European Union delegate has said that European Union

countries would only agree to reopen the discussions after the United

States has enacted legislation enabling it to clear its arrears in full. 3

 Unless

these conditions have been met assessments, the Committee on

Contributions will not discuss the issue and will be unlikely to convene

again in 1998.

If discussions on the scale of assessment are reopened, the probability of

lowering the ceiling to 22 percent is remote, according to U.S. officials.

Consensus is required to readjust the scale of assessments. Therefore, any

country on the Fifth Committee can block proposed changes by

dissenting, as the United States could have done when the decision was

adopted to leave the U.S. contribution rate at 25 percent. Several issues

would have to be resolved in this regard. First, any reduction of the U.S.

assessment rate would require other members to make up the difference

and negotiations would be complicated. Members of the European Union

would most likely have to increase their assessments, and poorer and

heavily indebted countries have already accomplished their objective of

substantially lowering their assessment rates, an act they would not easily

reverse.

Japan will be assessed at 20.5 percent for the year 2000 and it has stated a

desire to reduce this rate by renegotiating the discounts given to

developing countries. As for China, its regular budget assessment rate is

less than 1 percent, and it has dismissed any idea that its assessment rate

should be increased. Moreover, U.N. members would have to decide how

to deal with U.S. residual arrears, or amounts that the United States have

refused to pay because of U.S. legislative or policy reasons. The General

Assembly could authorize the United Nations to place the amounts owed

by the United States in a special account. However, according to U.S.

officials, their efforts to have such an account established for the amounts

in dispute have been rebuffed.

3

Clearing arrears in full would mean that the United States would have to pay the arrears amount

calculated by the United Nations, including the amounts deducted by the United States for legislative

and policy withholdings.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

GAO Impact of U.S. Unpaid Contributions on 

General Assembly Vote

Under Article 19 of U.N. Charter

Vote lost if arrears exceed assessments 

for preceding 2 years

All Security Council rights retained

U.S. arrears ($1.5 billion) projected to 

exceed its 2-year assessment ($1.3 billion) 

by November 1998

Assumes 1998 appropriation disbursed 

and no 1999 disbursal

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

Article 19 of the U.N. Charter states that a member that is in arrears in the

payment of its financial contributions to the United Nations will have no

vote in the General Assembly if the amount of arrears equals or exceeds

the assessments due for the preceding 2-full years. Security Council rights,

such as the power of a permanent member to veto any resolutions, are not

affected. The United States received notice that it would not be in

jeopardy for 1998.

By the end of 1998, however, the United States could have arrears

exceeding its assessments for the last 2 years, based on estimates by the

Department of State and the U.S. Mission. In this regard, the assessment

for 1997 and 1998, including the regular budget, peacekeeping, and

tribunals, is about $1.3 billion ($708 million for 1997 and $572 million for

1998). Based on the existing U.S. arrears (as determined by the United

Nations) and an estimated U.S. payment of between $363 million and

$393 million from its 1998 and prior year appropriations, the U.S. arrearage

would be about $1.5 billion by January 1, 1999. The United States could

retain its vote by paying between $211 and $241 million from funds

reallocated from other accounts within the existing appropriations or paid

from fiscal year 1999 appropriations for the United Nations before the end

of 1998. Table V.1 shows the projected U.S. arrears on January 1, 1999.

Table V.1: Projected U.S. Arrears on

January 1, 1999 Dollars in millions

Assessments and payments Range

U.S. payments due through 1998 

(arrears plus 1998 assessment)

$1,884

Less estimated payments made during 1998

(fiscal year 1998 and prior years appropriations)

393-363

Subtotal: Arrears balance on January 1, 1999 $1,491-$1,521

Less cumulative assessments for most recent 2-year period $1,280

Net shortfall on January 1, 1999, to retain voting privilege $211-$241a

aThis amount could be paid from the fiscal year 1999 appropriation for the United Nations or other

yet-to-be-enacted legislation to pay U.S. arrears.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Interests

GAO Voting Rights Have Been Denied, but 

Some Exceptions Have Been Made

39 members lost voting rights in 1998

Comoros, Liberia, and Tajikistan retain 

voting rights due to conditions beyond 

their control

Article 19 not applied to any members 

when the Soviet Union and France 

refused to finance UNEF and UNOC 

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
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Impact of Unpaid Contributions on U.S.

Interests

As of February 4, 1998, 39 members had lost their vote under article 19. By

May 11, 1998, that number was reduced to 27 as payments were made by

members, thus permitting them to regain their voting privileges. Other

U.N. members, such as France, the former Soviet Union, and China have

been in similar situations for their refusal to pay certain assessments but

were allowed to continue their voting privileges. In the case of China, the

General Assembly authorized the United Nations to place the amounts

owed in a special account. However, according to U.S. officials, to date,

U.S. efforts to have such an account established for the amounts in dispute

have been rebuffed. Recently, the General Assembly agreed to allow three

other members—Comoros, Liberia and Tajikistan—to maintain their

voting privileges because their failure to pay was due to conditions beyond

their control.4

In the past, a number of governments have contested U.N. arrears, and the

General Assembly has agreed to either waive article 19 or forgive the debt

owed. For example, in 1964-65, although the former Soviet Union, France,

and several other countries supported the resolution creating the United

Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF, later referred to as

UNEF I) and the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC), they refused to

pay for peacekeeping operations and U.N. regular budget expenses related

to the operations. By 1964, arrears of the former Soviet Union exceeded

the level permitted to maintain its voting rights in the General Assembly.

France became subject to the article 19 sanction by January 1, 1965. The

U.S. Representative to the United Nations announced before the General

Assembly that there could be no double standard in the United Nations. If

any member state could insist on making an exception to its obligations

with respect to certain activities, “the United States reserves the same

option to make exceptions.” The General Assembly decided to waive all

member’s arrears for these operations. The arrears for these countries are

still counted in the total unpaid contributions owed, but are not included

in calculations for article 19.

4

Article 19 of the U.N. Charter provides that the General Assembly may permit these members to vote

if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix I 

Status of Unpaid Contributions by U.N.

Account, as of February 28, 1998

U.N. account Arrears

1998 Unpaid

contributionsa Total

Regular budget $461,265,034 $781,526,082 $1,242,791,116

Peacekeeping missions

UNEF/UNDOF 13,340,226 16,375,356 29,715,582

UNIFIL 109,735,917 60,304,686 170,040,603

UNIMOG 124,691 0 124,691

UNAVEM, UNAVEM II,

UNAVEM III, MONUA 115,085,899 34,337,444 149,423,343

UNTAG 410,972 0 410,972

UNIKOM 9,794,359 5,654,260 15,448,619

MINURSO 48,009,658 8,795,977 56,805,635

ONUSAL, ONUCA 3,273,521 0 3,273,521

UNTAC, UNAMIC 46,276,497 0 46,276,497

UNPROFOR 691,186,539 0 691,186,539

UNOSOM, UNOSOM II 290,371,428 0 290,371,428

ONUMOZ 38,595,279 0 38,595,279

UNFICYP 14,920,258 13,663,103 28,583,361

UNOMIG 6,389,790 8,854,960 15,244,750

UNMIH 8,269,744 0 8,269,744

UNOMIL 8,169,798 0 8,169,798

UNAMIR, UNOMUR 26,802,341 0 26,802,341

UNMLT 13,913 0 13,913

UNMOT 1,853,084 2,912,941 4,766,025

UNPREDEP 7,212,272 24,894,744 32,107,016

UNSMIH 9,446,798 0 9,446,798

MINUGUA 324,737 0 324,737

UNMIBH 33,988,318 86,216,525 120,204,843

UNTAES 54,219,277 12,605,397 66,824,674

International criminal tribunals

ICTY 6,922,707 48,292,999 55,215,706

ICTR 3,765,214 50,802,376 54,567,590

Total $2,009,768,271 $1,155,236,850 $3,165,005,121

Note: See contents page for list of abbreviations.

Source: United Nations.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid Contributions for Regular

Budget, Peacekeeping Missions, and

International Criminal Tribunals by Member

State, as of February 28, 1998

Member state Arrears

1998 estimated

assessment Total unpaid

United States $1,290,335,659 $414,602,512 $1,704,938,171

Japan 89,032,241 255,151,287 344,183,528

Ukraine 225,889,568 9,059,415 234,948,983

Russian Federation 139,994,014 12,910,755 152,904,769

Germany 10,359,020 86,412,206 96,771,226

Italy 5,201,455 76,626,355 81,827,810

Belarus 54,906,593 1,926,309 56,832,902

United Kingdom 0 49,279,146 49,279,146

Brazil 29,429,892 17,634,465 47,064,357

Spain 0 36,406,393 36,406,393

France 6,558,519 28,570,973 35,129,492

Iran (Islamic Republic of) 14,261,888 3,533,086 17,794,974

Yugoslavia 14,923,183 699,957 15,623,140

Belgium 100 15,434,470 15,434,570

China 0 13,410,655 13,410,655

Poland 10,519,746 2,830,088 13,349,834

Argentina 3,645,610 8,934,864 12,580,474

Iraq 11,455,764 1,014,776 12,470,540

Republic of Korea 147,318 10,803,316 10,950,634

Mexico 3,994 10,903,364 10,907,358

Canada 0 10,478,377 10,478,377

Saudi Arabia 936,673 6,794,956 7,731,629

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 5,612,883 1,821,998 7,434,881

Kazakhstan 5,922,823 1,446,060 7,368,883

Azerbaijan 6,470,523 700,263 7,170,786

Georgia 6,454,415 677,032 7,131,447

Israel 3,105,087 3,829,380 6,934,467

Turkey 1,775,926 5,142,735 6,918,661

Uzbekistan 5,569,889 579,034 6,148,923

Netherlands 0 5,975,607 5,975,607

Greece 740,201 4,912,061 5,652,262

United Arab Emirates 3,490,032 2,048,641 5,538,673

Australia 30,202 5,434,779 5,464,981

Portugal 226,019 5,034,383 5,260,402

Republic of Moldova 4,385,872 501,889 4,887,761

Indonesia 2,313,116 2,013,650 4,326,766

Sweden 155,538 4,079,441 4,234,979

(continued)

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid Contributions for Regular

Budget, Peacekeeping Missions, and

International Criminal Tribunals by Member

State, as of February 28, 1998

Member state Arrears

1998 estimated

assessment Total unpaid

Austria $552,409 $3,443,610 $3,996,019

Croatia 2,834,625 619,192 3,453,817

Venezuela 770,268 2,637,096 3,407,364

Lithuania 2,542,047 525,119 3,067,166

Latvia 2,665,928 398,424 3,064,352

Tajikistan 2,926,802 93,533 3,020,335

Peru 1,853,330 989,097 2,842,427

Bulgaria 2,077,813 525,119 2,602,932

Denmark 0 2,542,622 2,542,622

Nigeria 1,434,385 771,409 2,205,794

Norway 17 2,003,516 2,003,533

Finland 0 1,999,782 1,999,782

Thailand 78,548 1,839,122 1,917,670

Democratic P. R. of Korea 1,549,277 361,592 1,910,869

Armenia 1,589,107 287,133 1,876,240

Chile 825,498 997,924 1,823,422

Cuba 1,305,060 454,509 1,759,569

Syrian Arab Republic 999,068 721,648 1,720,716

Kyrgyzstan 1,504,679 175,142 1,679,821

Qatar 1,257,949 384,516 1,642,465

Estonia 1,282,779 268,368 1,551,147

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,440,010 58,380 1,498,390

Romania 341,932 1,141,308 1,483,240

Uruguay 870,772 570,348 1,441,120

Algeria 174,040 1,262,388 1,436,428

Ecuador 984,638 256,141 1,240,779

Turkmenistan 1,145,561 17,398 1,162,959

Guatemala 938,516 221,295 1,159,811

Liberia 1,098,338 23,536 1,121,874

Czech Republic 420,214 636,663 1,056,877

Philippines 65,644 895,328 960,972

Somalia 949,296 11,464 960,760

New Zealand 0 819,219 819,219

Central African Republic 781,523 22,773 804,296

Egypt 0 802,872 802,872

Comoros 771,264 11,464 782,728

Slovenia 93,454 689,001 782,455

Oman 67,918 581,964 649,882

(continued)

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid Contributions for Regular

Budget, Peacekeeping Missions, and

International Criminal Tribunals by Member

State, as of February 28, 1998

Member state Arrears

1998 estimated

assessment Total unpaid

El Salvador $433,583 $139,685 $573,268

Sao Tome’ and Principe 547,933 11,464 559,397

Gambia 547,897 11,464 559,361

Yemen 423,949 113,252 537,201

Colombia 32,759 499,322 532,081

Morocco 46,354 476,925 523,279

Congo 477,296 35,154 512,450

Nicaragua 476,935 23,536 500,471

Dominican Republic 310,346 186,145 496,491

Panama 279,760 185,968 465,728

Costa Rica 254,716 197,760 452,476

Honduras 401,225 46,764 447,989

Haiti 413,753 22,773 436,526

Chad 419,738 11,464 431,202

Grenada 419,672 11,464 431,136

Cape Verde 419,035 11,464 430,499

Guinea Bissau 417,561 11,464 429,025

Burundi 417,496 11,464 428,960

Dominica 412,392 11,464 423,856

Seychelles 394,260 22,773 417,033

Bolivia 307,864 91,225 399,089

Gabon 365,388 31,490 396,878

Sierra Leone 380,774 11,464 392,238

Togo 364,314 22,773 387,087

Vanuatu 366,418 11,464 377,882

Angola 260,374 113,252 373,626

Cambodia 357,050 11,922 368,972

Lebanon 180,338 186,078 366,416

Sudan 263,476 101,943 365,419

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 309,927 53,380 363,307

Trinidad and Tobago 346,026 10,488 356,514

Rwanda 329,283 22,773 352,056

South Africa 0 350,730 350,730

Equatorial Guinea 337,370 11,464 348,834

India 0 344,554 344,554

Afghanistan 281,390 45,393 326,783

Djibouti 312,175 11,464 323,639

Mongolia 304,386 15,516 319,902

(continued)

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid Contributions for Regular

Budget, Peacekeeping Missions, and

International Criminal Tribunals by Member

State, as of February 28, 1998

Member state Arrears

1998 estimated

assessment Total unpaid

Niger $293,140 $22,773 $315,913

Guinea 280,380 34,086 314,466

Luxembourg 64,043 244,375 308,418

Democratic Republic of the Congo 209,095 93,225 302,320

Bahrain 84,891 207,608 292,499

Solomon Islands 278,449 11,464 289,913

United Republic of Tanzania 236,859 45,393 282,252

Mauritania 266,213 11,464 277,677

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 253,407 11,464 264,871

Cameroon 77,912 162,913 240,825

Madagascar 201,229 24,485 225,714

Mali 185,719 34,086 219,805

Ireland 0 214,281 214,281

Viet Nam 201,133 11,293 212,426

Bahamas 36,953 169,836 206,789

Fiji 161,042 40,764 201,806

Côte d’Ivoire 50,996 139,685 190,681

Malaysia 0 188,840 188,840

Paraguay 25,885 162,913 188,798

Ghana 108,144 80,038 188,182

Singapore 0 187,745 187,745

Tunisia 149,656 31,680 181,336

Bhutan 160,235 11,464 171,699

Senegal 105,439 61,853 167,292

Burkina Faso 152,601 7,247 159,848

Suriname 113,414 45,393 158,807

Zimbabwe 45,272 99,474 144,746

Maldives 137,355 2,464 139,819

Kenya 61,129 78,650 139,779

Hungary 0 135,014 135,014

Kuwait 26,907 108,045 134,952

Swaziland 109,643 23,536 133,179

Bangladesh 19,714 113,252 132,966

Lesotho 106,248 22,773 129,021

Barbados 35,938 91,225 127,163

Papua New Guinea 48,966 76,312 125,278

Pakistan 52,171 66,795 118,966

Botswana 1,690 110,516 112,206

(continued)

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix II 

Status of Unpaid Contributions for Regular

Budget, Peacekeeping Missions, and

International Criminal Tribunals by Member

State, as of February 28, 1998

Member state Arrears

1998 estimated

assessment Total unpaid

Myanmar $11,046 $100,767 $111,813

Antigua and Barbuda 86,118 22,773 108,891

Mauritius 4,656 103,839 108,495

Belize 105,669 948 106,617

Iceland 21,530 74,776 96,306

Jordan 2,317 90,053 92,370

Marshall Islands 89,941 1,406 91,347

Guyana 78,772 11,922 90,694

Namibia 736 76,320 77,056

Jamaica 1,842 65,806 67,648

Andorra 9,493 51,762 61,255

Saint Lucia 57,107 2,464 59,571

Benin 41,906 14,773 56,679

Albania 24,462 28,154 52,616

Ethiopia 45,330 5,706 51,036

Uganda 14,045 25,872 39,917

Cyprus 0 38,269 38,269

Zambia 8,654 26,984 35,638

Sri Lanka 17,236 14,587 31,823

San Marino 8,769 21,649 30,418

Brunei Darussalam 7,163 21,235 28,398

Malawi 13,130 14,652 27,782

Malta 11,362 15,674 27,036

Samoa 23,719 2,464 26,183

Mozambique 24,288 1,741 26,029

Slovakia 0 25,867 25,867

Lao People’s Democratic Republic 23,843 948 24,791

Nepal 12,576 3,087 15,663

Monaco 0 12,155 12,155

Saint Kitts and Nevis 8,963 948 9,911

Eritrea 6,228 1,794 8,022

Micronesia 3,956 2,922 6,878

Liechtenstein 0 4,804 4,804

Palau 1,861 1,471 3,332

Total $2,009,768,271 $1,155,236,851 $3,165,005,122

Source: United Nations.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix III 

Reimbursements Owed to U.N. Members for

Peacekeeping Contributions, as of

December 31, 1997

Dollars in thousands

Member state Troops

Contingent owned

equipment

Letters of

assist

Death &

disability Total

Argentina $3,608 $14,371 $109 $3,126 $21,214

Australia 0 5,207 148 0 5,355

Austria 6,047 2,350 1 1,018 9,416

Bangladesh 9,936 7,487 236 714 18,373

Belgium 4,646 39,869 13,473 97 58,085

Botswana 0 1,082 310 0 1,392

Brazil 1,744 14,389 1,851 451 18,435

Bulgaria 0 390 0 512 902

Canada 2,749 29,209 13,084 5,348 50,390

Chile 0 86 0 0 86

China 0 228 16 0 244

Czech 273 13,783 42 0 14,098

Denmark 359 17,440 6,059 0 23,858

Djibouti 0 181 0 0 181

Egypt 3,334 10,309 7,415 188 21,246

Estonia 913 0 0 0 913

Ethiopia 0 185 0 0 185

Fiji 4,520 0 0 0 4,520

Finland 6,515 16,036 1,450 28 24,029

France 2,039 125,136 16,530 7,610 151,315

Germany 114 6,562 27,367 30 34,073

Ghana 4,950 364 0 0 5,314

Greece 0 184 0 0 184

Guatemala 0 19 0 0 19

Honduras 0 40 0 0 40

Hungary 525 9 1 0 535

India 5,949 36,196 5,208 0 47,353

Indonesia 413 6,670 2,409 105 9,597

Ireland 4,943 1,027 51 3,388 9,409

Italy 369 29,070 29,398 3,653 62,490

Jamaica 0 2 0 0 2

Japan 2,364 2,322 0 0 4,686

Jordan 1,990 9,384 1,793 98 13,265

Kenya 0 5,257 2,203 0 7,460

Republic of Korea 441 2,642 148 0 3,231

Kuwait 0 1,458 0 0 1,458

(continued)

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix III 

Reimbursements Owed to U.N. Members for

Peacekeeping Contributions, as of

December 31, 1997

Dollars in thousands

Member state Troops

Contingent owned

equipment

Letters of

assist

Death &

disability Total

Luxembourg 0 $78 0 0 $78

Malawi 0 140 0 0 140

Malaysia $1,581 16,518 $6,498 0 24,597

Mali 0 46 0 0 46

Morocco 0 3,556 0 0 3,556

Namibia 1,489 3,516 0 0 5,005

Nepal 4,621 520 1,063 0 6,204

Netherlands 37 45,308 5,567 0 50,912

New Zealand 29 1,874 1,033 0 2,936

Nigeria 108 4,516 0 0 4,624

Norway 4,993 13,763 1,373 0 20,129

Pakistan 20,071 25,183 132 $30 45,416

Philippines 0 115 0 0 115

Poland 5,942 5,470 574 1,326 13,312

Portugal 2,695 4,904 0 0 7,599

Romania 1,448 16,919 0 0 18,367

Russian Federation 6,261 28,572 1,161 64 36,058

Saudi Arabia 0 958 0 0 958

Senegal 0 194 2 1 197

Singapore 0 0 1 0 1

Slovakia 3,337 21,470 111 0 24,918

Slovenia 34 0 0 0 34

Spain 0 20,127 2,543 5,086 27,756

Sweden 305 15,267 5,367 0 20,939

Switzerland 0 2,432 0 0 2,432

Thailand 0 190 1,639 344 2,173

Tunisia 0 286 0 299 585

Turkey 0 4,189 1,548 0 5,737

Ukraine 1,583 17,110 440 95 19,228

United Arab Emarites 0 106 380 0 486

United Kingdom 3,062 45,190 15,420 2,175 65,847

United States 3,498 25,396 80,289 0 109,183

Uruguay 158 9,264 0 100 9,522

Zambia 3,834 7,075 0 0 10,909

Zimbabwe 6,121 5,613 0 71 11,805

Total $139,948 $744,809 $254,443 $35,957 $1,175,157

Source: United Nations.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
 Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
 Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
 Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the United Nations

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