United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and the Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Personnel, Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate

September 1998 MILITARY ATTRITION

Better Data, Coupled

With Policy Changes,

Could Help the

Services Reduce Early

Separations

GAO/NSIAD-98-213

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280587 

September 15, 1998

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne

Chairman

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

This report responds to the Subcommittee’s request that we analyze historical attrition rates for

enlisted personnel who serve at least 6 months but leave military service before completing

their first contract terms. Specifically, we determined (1) the rate and timing of attrition during

enlistees’ first terms, (2) the extent of the Department of Defense’s investment in recruiting and

training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for first-term attrition after training,

(4) servicemembers’ perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition, and

(5) actions the Department of Defense and the services are taking to reduce enlistees’ attrition.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose In January 1997, GAO reported that each year, around 25,000 enlisted

personnel are being separated from the services in their first 6 months,

during or shortly after they complete basic training.1

 The Chairman and

the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed

Services, Subcommittee on Personnel, asked that GAO similarly analyze

historical attrition rates for enlisted personnel who serve at least 6 months

but leave military service before completing their first contract terms.

Specifically, GAO determined (1) the rate and timing of attrition during

enlistees’ first terms, (2) the extent of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for

first-term attrition after training, (4) servicemembers’ perceptions of

quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition, and (5) actions DOD and

the services are taking to reduce enlistees’ attrition. GAO also agreed to

provide attrition data for enlistees by educational background, Armed

Forces Qualification Test score, age at enlistment, gender, and race/ethnic

group (see app. I).

Background The military services recruit hundreds of thousands of new enlistees each

year. Over the course of their careers, enlistees sign contracts that define

their length of service for the duration of each contract. For the first term

of service, these contracts generally cover between 2 and 6 years, with the

typical contract being for 4 years. While most enlistees complete the terms

of their first contract, many fail to do so. These persons are counted as

“attrition” and are separated from military service. The reasons for

separation vary and are documented in official discharge papers through

the use of separation program designator codes. The Defense Manpower

Data Center (DMDC) is responsible for maintaining data on the attrition

rates of servicemembers.

While GAO developed historical attrition data, it focused its detailed

analysis of attrition rates and the reasons for attrition on enlistees who

entered the services in fiscal year 1993 in order to track all enlistees up to

48 months later, or fiscal year 1997 (the latest year for which data was

available). These enlistees consisted of about 203,000 personnel, including

about 175,000 men and 28,000 women. Of this group, 72,670 did not

complete their first terms. GAO also interviewed a judgmental sample of

254 first-term enlistees and 41 supervisors to gain insight into underlying

causes for attrition.

1

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

Results in Brief First-term attrition has been a long-standing and complex problem for the

services. While all four services are concerned about attrition, they have

made few formal policy changes aimed at reducing attrition in specific

target populations. Although the services collect survey data to assess

attitudes about military service and quality of life, they do not use this data

to analyze why separations are occurring or to formulate policy changes or

actions aimed at reducing early attrition.

Between fiscal year 1982-93, 31.7 percent of all enlistees did not complete

their first terms of service: 11 percent of enlistees were separated during

their first 6 months, and 20.7 percent between their 7th and 48th month.

For Army, Navy, and Air Force enlistees who entered the services in fiscal

year 1993, attrition rates were higher than they had been in over a decade.

These reported attrition rates would be even higher if they included all

persons who did not complete their first terms. DOD’s data on attrition does

not include all enlistees allowed to separate early from the military, for

example, to allow the services to meet mandated personnel levels or to

allow enlistees to attend school. First-term attrition is costly in that DOD

now estimates the services’ recruiting and training investment in each

enlistee during the first term at an average of $35,532. Recruiting and

training cost estimates were somewhat lower in fiscal year 1993. Using the

fiscal year 1993 cost estimates, GAO calculates that the services spent

$1.3 billion on the 72,670 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal 

year 1993 and departed prematurely. Because these enlistees were

separated early, the services did not get a full return on their investment.

Official reasons for the separation of enlistees who entered the services in

fiscal year 1993 varied by gender and by service. For example, higher

percentages of enlisted men than women were separated for misconduct,

drugs, and alcoholism. On the other hand, the leading reason given for

female attrition was pregnancy, and higher percentages of enlisted women

were separated for medical conditions, performance problems, and

parenthood. The Marine Corps separated a greater percentage of enlistees

for medical problems than the other services did; the Army separated a

higher percentage for performance problems; and the Marine Corps and

the Navy separated higher percentages for drug use. Variances in the types

of separations among the services indicate that the services interpret

separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the

services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of

these explanations. In its 1997 report on attrition from basic training, GAO

recommended ways for DOD to improve the use of these separation codes

to build a more complete database on reasons for servicewide attrition.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

GAO’s recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), and DOD has begun to

comply with these legislative requirements. GAO’s current work reaffirms

the need for the consistent use of separation codes. During interviews with

254 first-term enlistees and 41 supervisors, most mentioned quality-of-life

issues as drivers of first-term attrition. Although all the services survey

their personnel on quality-of-life issues, these surveys are not targeted to

first-term enlistees or used to determine underlying reasons that this

particular group may be seeking ways out of completing their contract

terms.

All four services are concerned about attrition, and the Army and the Air

Force have set numerical targets for reducing it. Two studies indicate that

positive leadership—such as the command emphasis now being placed on

attrition—can result in an increase in the percentage of enlisted personnel

who complete their first-term contracts. However, GAO found that the

services did not always have adequate data on the exact reasons for

separation and had only rarely made formal policy changes directed at

populations the services wished to target for remedial action. Without

such data and formal policy changes, numerical targets will be arbitrary,

and success in reducing attrition may either be coincidental or result in

the failure to discharge enlistees who really should be separated. The

Army’s recent policy change to no longer allow persons to separate

voluntarily because of performance problems illustrates the benefit of

targeting a specific group for remedial action. Namely, the Army can now

document how many enlistees it has rehabilitated and why. Finally,

allowing many enlistees to easily separate with honorable discharges may

inadvertently serve as a disincentive for them to persevere.

Principal Findings

About 21 Percent of

Enlistees Are Separated

After Training

Data maintained by DMDC indicates that over the past 12 years, the attrition

rate of enlistees who did not complete their first terms of service averaged

31.7 percent: 11 percent left before they had completed 6 months of

service, and 20.7 percent left after 6 months, when most had completed

training. For Navy, Air Force, and Army enlistees who entered the services

in fiscal year 1993, attrition rates were higher than they had been in over a

decade. The Navy’s rate was 35.8 percent; the Air Force’s was 32.5 percent;

and the Army’s was 39.3 percent. The Marine Corps’ rate was 31.5 percent,

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

continuing a 3-year decline that began in fiscal year 1990. For all services’

202,908 enlistees in fiscal year 1993, 72,670 did not complete their first

terms of service. Of those who left, 45,046 personnel were discharged

between their 7th and 48th month.

DOD does not have complete data on the magnitude of its attrition losses

because currently reported attrition rates do not include all enlistees who

were voluntarily released from the services before the end of their first

terms. The services’ standard policy has been that enlistees are not to be

released more than 90 days before their contract terms are due to expire.

However, during downsizing, all services allowed some first-term

personnel to separate much earlier. The Air Force and the Navy released

large numbers of persons early to meet mandated end strengths, among

other reasons. Not all of these early releases were counted as attrition.

Though voluntary early release programs might have been cost-effective

downsizing tools, such early releases clearly result in a loss in the services’

significant recruiting and training investment.

DMDC data indicates that for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal

year 1993, the Navy separated 2,943 persons more than 90 days before the

end of their first contract terms. The Air Force separated 1,095 enlistees

more than 90 days early. Adding these separated enlistees to the Navy’s

overall attrition rate of 35.8 percent increases it by 4.7 percentage points to

40.5 percent and likewise increases the Air Force’s rate of 32.5 percent by

3.5 percentage points to 36 percent.

Services Received Only a

Partial Return on Their

Investment in the

Recruiting and Training of

Enlistees

Separating thousands of enlistees early means that the services receive

only a partial return on the significant investment they make in recruiting

and training these enlistees. According to DOD, in fiscal year 1993, the

average cost of recruiting and training each enlistee ranged from $19,143

to $24,885, depending on the service. Using these figures, GAO estimates

that the services invested $1.3 billion in the 72,670 enlistees who joined the

services in fiscal year 1993 and did not complete their first contract terms.

According to a DOD official, about two-thirds, or $0.8 billion, of this cost

was for enlistee salaries.

Updated figures provided by DOD indicate that recruiting and training costs

have risen since fiscal year 1993. In fiscal year 1998, the average cost of

recruiting an enlistee was $6,732, and the average cost of training was an

additional $28,800, for a total of $35,532. This entire cost is invested in

enlistees as they are recruited and during their basic and initial training.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

That is, this investment is generally made during an enlistee’s first 

6 months of service. Only after enlistees have been assigned to jobs do the

services begin to receive returns on their investment.

These figures include the cost of the entire recruiting and training

infrastructure, and it is therefore not feasible to expect to save $35,532 for

each enlistee who is not separated. However, these figures demonstrate

the magnitude of the cost of recruiting and training hundreds of thousands

of new recruits each year and the loss to the services when attrition rates

are high. It would be expected that if there were a significant reduction in

attrition, the recruiting and training infrastructure could be reduced,

resulting in major savings.

Official Reasons for

Separation Vary by Gender

and by Service

Official separation codes provide general categories of discharge, but they

record only one of many possible reasons for separation. These separation

codes indicate that over 70 percent of men in this group were separated

for misconduct, medical conditions, performance problems, or drug use.

Over 71 percent of women in this group were separated for pregnancy,

medical problems, misconduct, performance problems, or parenthood.

Collecting better data on why enlistees are being separated is key to the

services’ ability to craft policies that increase the proportion of first-term

personnel who complete their contractual obligations. In a 1997 report on

attrition from basic training, GAO made recommendations to DOD and the

services on ways to improve the use of separation codes to build a

database for DOD to manage attrition. These recommendations were

included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

(P.L. 105-85), and DOD is now working to implement them. GAO’s current

work reaffirms the need for such a servicewide database on reasons for

separation. Differences in the types of separation by service continue to

suggest that the services have different separation policies, that they have

different attrition problems, that they are still inconsistently interpreting

separation codes, or some combination of these three explanations. For

example, separations for medical, performance, and drug problems varied

widely by service. For enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year

1993, 34.2 percent of all Marine Corps separations were for medical

problems, but this category represented only 16.1 percent of Navy

separations, 10.2 percent of Army separations, and 5.8 percent of Air Force

separations. While 26.6 percent of all Army discharges were for

performance problems, the Air Force had only 7.2 percent in this category,

the Marine Corps 1.2 percent, and the Navy 0.5 percent. The Navy and the

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

Marine Corps discharged higher percentages of first-term personnel for

drug use. This type of discharge represented 14.2 percent of all Marine

Corps separations, 13.9 percent of all Navy separations, but only

3.6 percent for the Air Force and 3 percent for the Army.

At present, the services have insufficient data to determine whether some

of the enlistees now being separated represent groups that could be

targeted for remedial action. Examples include persons who are now

being separated for committing minor disciplinary infractions, failing

physical fitness or career development tests, or being one-time drug users.

Neither do the services have data indicating whether policies allowing

women to voluntarily separate when they become pregnant are

cost-effective. The Army and the Air Force allow pregnant women to

voluntarily separate upon request, while the Marine Corps and the Navy

leave the decision on whether to separate the enlistee up to the local

commanders.

Quality-of-Life Issues May

Be Underlying Causes of

Early Separation

During interviews with 254 first-term enlistees and 41 supervisors, GAO was

told that the official reasons listed for separation may not accurately

reflect the true reasons that enlistees separate early. In fact, quality-of-life

issues may lie at the root of many separations. These issues include a

perceived erosion of medical and retirement benefits, advancement

opportunities, and pay, coupled with long hours and difficult and frequent

deployments. GAO found that, while none of the services currently

conducts exit surveys to enlisted personnel, they all administer surveys

that include questions on servicemembers’ perceptions of their quality of

life.

Data now available on the quality-of-life issues underlying attrition is not

tied to the services’ efforts to prevent the attrition of first-term enlistees. If

the services could use the data they collect from their several surveys on

the quality of military life to prioritize first-term enlistees’ concerns, they

could focus their attention on improvements that would have the most

impact on reducing attrition.

Services Have Made Few

Formal Policy Changes to

Target Enlistees They Wish

to Consider for Remedial

Action After Training

For more than a decade, the first-term attrition rate has remained at about

the same level. During this time, the services have targeted their recruiting

efforts toward enlisting high school diploma graduates who score in the

upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test because they have

lower attrition rates than recruits without these qualifications. This group

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

continues to show lower attrition rates than other recruit groups.

However, because the overwhelming majority of all recruits are now high

school graduates with high aptitude scores, the services must turn their

efforts to finding ways to get more high-quality enlistees to complete their

first terms.

All services have expressed their concern about first-term attrition, and

the Army and the Air Force have set numerical goals for reducing it.

However, while research supports the positive effect of such command

emphasis on reducing attrition, GAO believes that setting numerical goals

for reducing attrition without complete information on its underlying

causes or guidance on what specific actions should be taken to reduce it

may turn these goals into arbitrary ceilings.

While the services have emphasized the importance of reducing attrition,

they have rarely accompanied this emphasis with guidance to their

commanders on what accommodations could be made to target certain

categories of enlistees or on what actions should be taken to deal with

identified problems after training. One effort that did include such a

formal policy change targeting a particular group of enlistees

demonstrates the effectiveness of this practice: the Army’s recent decision

to no longer allow enlistees to voluntarily separate because of problems

with performance. In deciding to no longer routinely permit such

voluntary separations, the Army has been able to assess what impact this

policy change has had on this population.

GAO’s interviews with first-term enlistees, supervisors, and service officials

indicate that there may be certain groups of enlistees who could be

targeted for remedial action. For example, enlistees who commit minor

disciplinary infractions, who fail physical fitness or career development

tests, who are one-time drug users, or who become pregnant may simply

need to be provided further counseling, optional testing, other job choices,

or remedial training by their commissioned or noncommissioned officers.

Lastly, granting honorable discharges to enlistees who deliberately seek

ways out of fulfilling their service commitments may simply encourage

others to do likewise. One Army unit GAO visited had already begun to

attempt to close these “escape routes” and impose more punitive measures

against certain enlistees, particularly those found to use drugs. GAO

believes that some enlistees could be motivated to remain in the service if

they knew that there were no easy ways out of their contracts and that

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

there were serious negative consequences associated with behavior or

performance that warranted discharge.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the service

secretaries to take the following actions:

• When reporting first-term attrition rates, include as a separate category the

numbers of first-term personnel released more than 90 days before the end

of their contract terms.

• Use existing quality-of-life surveys or create new ones to (1) collect

information on the factors contributing to first-term enlistees’ separation

and (2) identify quality-of-life initiatives aimed at reducing the attrition of

first-term personnel.

• Continually emphasize to all commissioned and noncommissioned officers

the costs of first-term attrition, the difficulty of acquiring new enlistees to

replace early losses, and the importance of providing positive leadership in

targeting first-term enlistees who could be encouraged to complete their

contractual obligations.

• Collect more complete data on specific groups of enlistees whom the

services wish to target for remedial action and issue guidance and formal

policy changes to local commanders indicating what specific

actions—such as more counseling, optional testing, further job choices, or

remedial training—can be taken to prevent the early discharge of these

targeted groups. Possibilities for targeting include enlistees now being

separated for minor disciplinary infractions, failure to pass physical fitness

tests and career development tests, one-time drug use, and pregnancy.

• Reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharge to

enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation and

ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete

their first terms.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO’s findings

and recommendations. (DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in

app. III.) DOD agreed to direct the services to (1) review their 90-day

release policies and the exceptions granted to those policies, (2) prepare a

report on quality-of-life issues that could be addressed to reduce attrition,

(3) provide local commanders with guidance and formal policy changes

related to specific types of attrition the services target for remedial action,

(4) reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharges

to enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation to

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete

their first terms, and (5) prepare a report by October 1999 documenting

service initiatives related to GAO’s recommendations.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

16

Attrition Rate Is the Percentage of Enlistees Who Do Not

Complete Their Contractual Obligations

16

Composition of Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal

Year 1993

16

Our Previous Work in the Area of Attrition and Recruiting 17

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Chapter 2 

High First-Term

Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on

the Services’

Recruiting and

Training Investment

22

Attrition Rates Have Been Fairly Stable Over the Past Decade,

but Fiscal Year 1993 Data Shows a Slight Increase

22

Overall Attrition Rates Do Not Include All Early Releases 25

Services’ Investment in the Recruiting and Training of Enlistees

Who Entered in Fiscal Year 1993 and Separated Early Totals $1.3

Billion

27

Chapter 3 

Official Reasons for

Early Separations

29

Official Reasons for Separation Vary by Gender 29

Official Reasons for Separation Vary by Service 33

Differing Interpretations of Separation Codes and Policies May

Explain Service Differences in Reasons for Discharge

39

Chapter 4 

Quality-of-Life Issues

Appear to Be

Demotivators for

Completing

Contractual

Obligations for

Military Service

46

Perception Is That Military Benefits Are Eroding or Are Not

Competitive With the Private Sector

46

Further Career Opportunities Are Desired 46

Deployment Schedules Can Be Motivators or Demotivators 47

Perception Is That Married Enlistees Receive Preferential

Treatment

47

Results of Quality-of-Life Surveys Are Not Directly Tied to Efforts

to Reduce First-Term Attrition

48

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Contents

Chapter 5 

Services’ Actions to

Reduce First-Term

Attrition

50

The Services’ Targeting of High School Graduates With High

Aptitude Test Scores Has Met Its Limit in Controlling Attrition

50

Services Have Made Few Formal Policy Changes to Reduce

Attrition After Training

51

Evidence Shows That Positive Leadership May Result in Lower

Attrition

54

Services Do Not Provide Sufficiently Punitive Discharges to

Prevent Enlistees From Seeking Separation

56

Chapter 6 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

57

Recommendations 59

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 60

Appendixes Appendix I: Attrition Rates by Demographics 62

Appendix II: Attrition Rates by Occupation 64

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 72

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 75

Tables Table 2.1: Percentage of Enlisted Personnel Who Were Separated

Before Their 48th Month of Service

23

Table 2.2: Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

and Were Released More Than 90 Days Early During Fiscal Years

1993-97

27

Table 3.1: Principal Reasons That Men Who Entered the Services

in Fiscal Year 1993 Were Separated Between Their 7th and 48th

Month

30

Table 3.2: Principal Reasons That Women Who Entered the

Services in Fiscal Year 1993 Were Separated Between Their 7th

and 48th Month

31

Table 3.3: Attrition Rates for Male and Female Enlistees Who

Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were Separated

Before the End of Their First Terms

32

Table 3.4: Comparison of Official Reasons for the Separation of

Men and Women After Subtracting Discharges for Pregnancy

33

Table 3.5: Separations for Misconduct for Persons Who Enlisted

in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were Separated Between Their 7th and

48th Month

40

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Contents

Table 3.6: Separations for Medical or Physical Problems of

Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were

Separated Between Their 7th and 48th Month

41

Table 3.7: Separations for Unsatisfactory Performance of

Enlistees Entering the Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Being

Separated Between Their 7th and 48th Month

42

Table 3.8: Separations for Drug Use for Persons Who Enlisted in

Fiscal Year 1993 and Were Separated Between Their 7th and 48th

Month

43

Table 3.9: Pregnancy and Parenthood Separations for Female

Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were

Separated Between Their 7th and 48th Month

45

Table I.1: 48-Month Attrition Rates by Education Level for

Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

62

Table I.2: 48-Month Attrition Rates by Armed Forces Qualification

Test Category and Score for Enlistees Who Entered the Services

in Fiscal Year 1993

62

Table I.3: 48-Month Attrition Rates by Age at Enlistment for

Enlistees Entering the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

62

Table I.4: 48-Month Attrition Rates for Male and Female Enlistees

Entering the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

63

Table I.5: 48-Month Attrition Rates by Race/Ethnic Group for

Enlistees Entering the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

63

Table II.1: Army Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation 64

Table II.2: Navy Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation 66

Table II.3: Air Force Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation 68

Table II.4: Marine Corps Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation 70

Figures Figure 2.1: Timing of Attrition for Enlistees Who Entered the

Services in Fiscal Year 1993

24

Figure 2.2: Numbers of Enlistees Who Entered the Services in

Fiscal Year 1993 and Were Separated During Their First Terms

25

Figure 3.1: Top Reasons for Male Attrition in the Marine Corps

Between the 7th and 48th Month

34

Figure 3.2: Top Reasons for Male Attrition in the Army Between

the 7th and 48th Month

34

Figure 3.3: Top Reasons for Male Attrition in the Navy Between

the 7th and 48th Month

35

Figure 3.4: Top Reasons for Male Attrition in the Air Force

Between the 7th and 48th Month

36

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Contents

Figure 3.5: Top Reasons for Female Attrition in the Marine Corps

Between the 7th and 48th Month

37

Figure 3.6: Top Reasons for Female Attrition in the Army

Between the 7th and 48th Month

37

Figure 3.7: Top Reasons for Female Attrition in the Navy Between

the 7th and 48th Month

38

Figure 3.8: Top Reasons for Female Attrition in the Air Force

Between the 7th and 48th Month

38

Abbreviations

AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Since the beginning of the all-volunteer force in 1973, the military services

have recruited hundreds of thousands of new enlistees each year. While

these enlistees are required to sign contracts committing them to remain

on active duty for a specified period of time, the services have found that

many do not fulfill this commitment. In 1997, we reported on the reasons

that enlistees do not complete their first 6 months of service. For this

follow-on report, we have analyzed why enlistees who successfully

complete their first 6 months of service are separated before their contract

terms have expired.

Attrition Rate Is the

Percentage of

Enlistees Who Do Not

Complete Their

Contractual

Obligations

Before new recruits are sent to basic training, they are required to take an

enlistment oath and sign a contract to serve one of the military services for

a specified period of time, generally between 2 and 6 years. For enlistees

who entered the services in fiscal year 1993, about 87 percent signed

contracts for 2, 3, or 4 years. The breakdown of contract length is as

follows: 8.2 percent for 2 years, 15 percent for 3 years, 64.2 percent for 

4 years, 4.1 percent for 5 years, and 8.4 percent for 6 years.

DOD defines attrition as the failure of an enlistee to complete his or her

contractual obligation. Some attrition occurs during basic training, which

lasts from 6 to 12 weeks, depending on the service. Some attrition occurs

during initial skill technical training, which lasts for a few weeks to more

than 1 year, depending on the enlistee’s occupation. Finally, some attrition

occurs after enlistees have reported to their first duty assignments. By the

6-month point in enlistees’ first terms, most have completed both basic

and initial skill training and have been assigned to their first duty stations,

though this is not the case for enlistees whose occupations require longer

and more extensive training. Two examples include the Air Force’s

pararescue occupation, which requires 55 weeks of training beyond basic

training and the Navy’s electronics technician rating, which requires

36.7 weeks of training after basic.

Composition of

Enlistees Who

Entered the Services

in Fiscal Year 1993

In fiscal year 1993, 202,908 enlistees without prior military service signed

first-term contracts. Of this number, 174,555 (86 percent) were men, and

28,353 (14 percent) were women. Women represented 22 percent of Air

Force enlistees, 16 percent of Army enlistees, 13 percent of Navy enlistees,

and 5 percent of Marine Corps enlistees. In terms of quality measures,

91.5 percent of all enlistees held high school diplomas, and 71.1 percent

scored in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

(More data on this group’s demographics is contained in app. I.)

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In presenting our detailed analysis of first-term attrition, we track all

enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 up until the end of

fiscal year 1997, 48 months later, since this is the latest available data. For

enlistees with 2-, 3-, and 4-year contracts, we counted as attrition those

enlistees who did not complete the full length of their contracts. For

enlistees with 5- or 6-year contracts, we counted as attrition those

enlistees who did not complete 48 months of their contracts.

Our Previous Work in

the Area of Attrition

and Recruiting

In January 1997, we reported that one-third of all first-term enlistees do

not complete their first terms of service and that a significant portion of

this attrition occurs in the enlistees’ first 6 months.1

 In our report, we

made recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the

services on how they could improve their (1) use of separation codes to

better analyze attrition, (2) recruiter incentive systems by tying these

systems to recruits’ successful completion of basic training, and

(3) screening of recruits by adding and revising medical screening forms

and moving all drug testing to the Military Entrance Processing

Commands. We testified on this work before the Subcommittee on

Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 1997.2

 The

recommendations contained in our report were incorporated into the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85).

In January 1998, we issued a more detailed report on recruiter incentive

systems and the selection of recruiters.3

 This work was also aimed at

identifying what could be done to reduce attrition. Among our

recommendations were for the services to (1) improve the screening of

recruiters to ensure that those selected for recruiting duty possessed traits

characteristic of successful recruiters; (2) require incoming recruits to

undergo physical fitness tests before they report to basic training to screen

out candidates likely to separate early due to poor physical conditioning;

and (3) encourage the use of quarterly floating goals for recruiters to

relieve pressure on them and to increase their morale and productivity. In

March 1998, we testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services’

Subcommittee on Personnel and the House Committee on National

1

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

2

Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save DOD Millions of Dollars

(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102, Mar. 5, 1997).

3

Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and Incentive Systems

(GAO/NSIAD-98-58, Jan. 30, 1998).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Security’s Subcommittee on Military Personnel on how well the services

were managing attrition and the screening of recruiters and their recruits.4

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee

on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Personnel asked that we continue

our work in the area of attrition by analyzing the historical separation

rates of enlisted personnel who serve 6 months but leave military service

before completing their first contract terms. While we developed some

overall historical attrition data, we focused our detailed analysis on

enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 and were separated

by the end of fiscal year 1997. Specifically, we determined (1) the rate and

timing of attrition, (2) the extent of DOD’s investment in recruiting and

training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for attrition after training,

(4) servicemembers’ perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to

attrition, and (5) actions DOD and the services are taking to reduce

enlistees’ attrition. We also agreed to provide attrition data for enlistees by

educational background, AFQT score, age at enlistment, gender, and

race/ethnic group (see app. I).

To determine historical first-term attrition rates, we obtained data from

the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), whose primary purpose is to

support the management needs of the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The data covered all enlistees

without prior service who entered the military from fiscal year 1982

through 19935

 and included the gender, educational background, age at

enlistment, race, AFQT score, occupational code, and separation code (for

those who left the services).

To ensure a standardized reporting of attrition rates, we measured

attrition at the 48-month point for all enlistees entering the services from

fiscal year 1982 through 1993. These groups of enlistees reached their

48-month points of service from fiscal year 1986 through 1997. Our

calculation of attrition did not include the early separation of enlistees

with 5- or 6-year contracts who were discharged in their final 1 to 2 years

of service. However, because the majority of first-term contracts are for 

4 years, we made our calculation at the 48-month point to include the most

recent data available (fiscal year 1997). Also, like DMDC, we did not count

4

Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting

Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109, Mar. 4, 1998) and Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Analyze

Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-117, Mar. 12, 1998).

5

We chose this period so that we could track trends over at least a 10-year period.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

as attrition persons allowed to separate before the end of their terms

through early release programs. Because our method does not include the

attrition of enlistees with 5- or 6-year contracts who were separated in

their final 1 or 2 years of service and because it does not include

separations under early release programs, our information on attrition

rates is somewhat conservative.

Although we did not extensively test the reliability of DMDC’s database, we

did discuss the Center’s computation of attrition rates with DMDC officials

and recalculated these rates ourselves. Our recalculated rates were

comparable to DMDC’s rates. We also compared our calculated attrition

rates and categories of separation with information in the services’

databases, and officials in each military service who track attrition verified

the accuracy of our data on reasons for early separation.

To determine how much the services spend in recruiting and training each

enlistee, we interviewed cost analysts at the Army’s Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; the Air Force’s Air Education

and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; and the Navy’s

Office of the Chief of Naval Education and Training Command, Pensacola,

Florida. We also discussed the calculation of the services’ cost of

recruiting and training enlistees with officials from the Center for Naval

Analyses, the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center, and the

Naval Center for Cost Analysis, as well as service officials who track

attrition. Because the services calculate recruiting and training costs

differently and because analyzing the various costing methodologies was

beyond the scope of our review, we formulated costs using data provided

to us by DOD-level officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

(Readiness) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force

Management Policy).

To determine reasons that enlistees were separated between their 7th and

48th month of service, we first analyzed DMDC data by separation code. The

separation codes included in DMDC’s database are taken from each

servicemember’s official discharge form, the DD Form 214, “Certificate of

Release or Discharge From Active Duty.”

We then interviewed 254 first-term enlistees and 41 supervisors to gain

insight into root causes for early separation. Prior to our site visits, we

notified service officials that we wished to interview first-term enlistees

who were (1) in occupations that we had determined had

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

higher-than-average attrition rates and (2) being separated for misconduct,

medical problems, unsatisfactory performance, drug use, and

character/behavior disorders. (For a presentation of attrition rates by

occupation, see app. II.)

During our site visits, we interviewed all or nearly all enlistees being

separated at the time. Our interviewees included 110 first-term enlistees

who were being separated early and 144 first-term enlistees who planned

to complete their terms. Of the 110 enlistees who were being separated

early, 97, or 88 percent, were being discharged for misconduct, medical

problems, drug use, performance problems, and character/behavior

disorders. We interviewed an additional 41 enlisted personnel on their

second or subsequent terms, as well as supervisory officer and enlisted

personnel at all locations to obtain insights into their perceptions of what

drives first-term attrition.

We conducted one-on-one interviews with first-term enlistees and

supervisors and conducted large group discussions with other

commissioned and noncommissioned officers. We chose the following

locations to conduct our interviews based on our analysis of where large

concentrations of first-term enlistees were assigned, particularly in

occupations experiencing higher-than-average attrition rates:

• the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, Langley, Virginia;

• the Navy’s Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk,

Virginia, and Submarine Torpedo Facility, Yorktown, Virginia;

• the Marine Corps’ II Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point,

North Carolina; and

• the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

During our one-on-one interviews, we assured interviewees that we would

not associate their names with information they provided to us. Though

we took notes during our interviews, we did not record interviewees’

names. Interviews lasted from 10 to 45 minutes each. We asked

open-ended questions that would allow enlistees to tell us how they felt

about being in the service. In summary, our questions were as follows:

• Are you being separated before the end of your first term? If so, why?

• What do you plan to do after you leave the service?

• Do you want to stay in the service? If given the opportunity, would you

like to reenlist?

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• Do you have any other thoughts on your occupation and your time in the

service? If you want to leave, is there anything the service could have done

to make you want to stay?

While our interviews with first-term enlistees do not represent a statistical

sample, they provided useful insights into enlistees’ perceptions of the

reasons for attrition. Our interviews were intended to solicit any and all

thoughts on why enlistees were not completing their first terms and on the

advantages and disadvantages of military service.

To gain insight into first-term attrition, we interviewed officials in

• the Army’s Directorate of Military Personnel Management, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C.;

• the Navy’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Military

Personnel Policy and Career Progression, Bureau of Naval Personnel,

Arlington, Virginia;

• the Air Force’s Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Washington, D.C.; and

• the Marine Corps’ Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Office of the

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military and Reserve Affairs, Arlington,

Virginia.

We conducted our review between August 1997 and September 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

About one-third of all enlistees who entered the services between fiscal

year 1982 and 1993 did not complete their first contract terms. Most of

these enlistees were separated between their 7th and 48th month of

service, when they had been fully trained and were assigned to jobs. Our

analysis of all enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993 showed

that these general historical trends continued. However, the rates were

slightly higher in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. DOD’s attrition

rates throughout this period are somewhat higher than reported because

they do not include some enlistees who were allowed to separate early for

various reasons, such as to attend a civilian school or to allow the services

to meet mandated end strengths.

DOD estimates of fiscal year 1998 costs indicate that by the time enlistees

have been recruited and trained, generally within the first 6 months of

service, the services have already spent about $35,000 on each one. This

figure includes enlistees’ pay and allowances, as well as the cost of the

services’ recruiting and training infrastructure. For enlistees who entered

the services in fiscal year 1993, the cost of recruiting and training was

lower, ranging from $19,143 to $24,885. Using these earlier costs, we

estimate that the services spent $1.3 billion on recruiting and training the

enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 but did not complete

their first terms. During these enlistees’ abbreviated time in service,

approximately $0.8 billion of the $1.3 billion was spent on enlistees’ pay

and allowances. The remaining $0.5 billion was spent on the services’

recruiting and training infrastructure, which includes recruiting and

training sites, instructors, and recruiters. When the services separate

enlistees between their 7th and 48th month of service, they are not

receiving a full return on their investment in personnel whom they have

partially or fully trained and provided with on-the-job experience.

Attrition Rates Have

Been Fairly Stable

Over the Past Decade,

but Fiscal Year 1993

Data Shows a Slight

Increase

DMDC, as DOD’s primary repository of servicewide attrition data, reports

that for enlistees who entered the services between fiscal year 1982 and

1993, the attrition rate averaged 31.7 percent (see table 2.1). In most of

these years, attrition rates have been lowest for the Air Force and highest

for the Army.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

Table 2.1: Percentage of Enlisted

Personnel Who Were Separated Before

Their 48th Month of Service Fiscal year of enlistment Army Navy

Marine

Corps Air Force

All

services

1982 34.5 30.3 34.4 30.8 32.6

1983 32.7 25.6 31.1 23.4 29.0

1984 31.3 26.1 31.2 24.7 28.7

1985 30.5 30.6 33.7 24.6 29.6

1986 31.3 33.8 35.4 26.3 31.4

1987 31.4 31.5 33.0 25.3 30.5

1988 33.7 31.6 30.4 25.5 31.3

1989 35.3 34.0 32.7 30.1 33.7

1990 36.4 32.6 36.2 30.4 34.2

1991 36.8 30.5 34.2 31.7 33.6

1992 35.9 32.2 32.2 30.0 33.2

1993 39.3 35.8 31.5 32.5 35.8

1982-93 33.6 31.2 33.0 27.4 31.7

As shown in the table, attrition rates increased in the Army, the Navy, and

the Air Force for those entering the services in fiscal year 1993 and being

separated by the end of fiscal year 1997—the latest available data. In fact,

these rates were higher than they had been in over a decade. The Marine

Corps, in contrast, had the lowest attrition rate, continuing a 3-year

decline beginning in fiscal year 1990. Our data indicates that most of the

rise in attrition rates for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force occurred

during enlistees’ first 6 months of service.1

A Large Portion of

Attrition Occurs Between

Enlistees’ 7th and 48th

Month of Service

An analysis of the 35.8-percent attrition rate for enlistees who entered the

services in fiscal year 1993 indicates that 13.6 percent of all enlistees were

separated before they had completed 6 months of service or less. The

remaining 22.2 percent were separated between their 7th and 48th month

of service. (See fig. 2.1.)

1

As we reported in 1997, official reasons for enlistees’ separation during their first 6 months of service

have to do largely with new recruits’ medical conditions, drug use, and problems with entry-level

performance.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

Figure 2.1: Timing of Attrition for Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

All services

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

13.6%

Percentage of accessions

Separations

0-6 Months 7-48 Months

22. 2%

The first 6 months of service represent the period when the highest

concentration of attrition occurred for enlistees who entered the services

in fiscal year 1993. For the 72,670 enlistees who did not complete their first

terms, 27,624 were separated in this initial period. Between month 7 and

12, an additional 7,607 enlistees were separated. During these enlistees’

2nd, 3rd, and 4th years of service, attrition dropped gradually. In the 

2nd year of service, 14,922 enlistees were discharged. In the 3rd year of

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

enlistment, 12,395 persons were separated, and in the 4th year, 10,122

persons were discharged. (See fig. 2.2.)

Figure 2.2: Numbers of Enlistees Who

Entered the Services in Fiscal Year

1993 and Were Separated During Their

First Terms

0-6 7-12 13-24 25-36 37-48

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

27,624

7,607

14,922

12,395

10,122

Monthly intervals

Separations

Overall Attrition Rates

Do Not Include All

Early Releases

DOD-reported attrition rates include some enlistees who are separated

voluntarily under the services’ early release programs, such as enlistees

released from the Air Force voluntarily to take other employment

opportunities. However, the reported rates do not include enlistees

released voluntarily to attend school or for reductions in force. As a result,

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

attrition rates would be even higher if they included all enlistees who did

not complete their first contract terms.

The services’ standard policy has been that enlistees are generally not to

be released more than 90 days before the end of their first terms. However,

in practice, the services have for various reasons released enlistees more

than 90 days early. According to DOD, the 90-day release option exists to

preclude the cost and the inconvenience of transferring servicemembers

to new duty positions just as they are about to complete their terms of

service and be discharged. Marine Corps and Army officials told us that

this 90-day standard remained the policy during downsizing. In contrast,

the Air Force and the Navy deliberately released first-term enlistees much

earlier than 90 days to meet mandated decreases in end strength during

downsizing.

According to Navy data, beginning in fiscal year 1992, enlistees were

voluntarily released up to 1 year before the end of their first terms. The

number of these early releases peaked in fiscal year 1994, with 6,434

first-term personnel being allowed to separate 4 to 12 months early. In

fiscal year 1997, this number was down to 1,604.2

 The Navy’s most recent

authorization for these reduction-in-strength early releases was

disseminated by the Secretary of the Navy in fiscal year 1993 and

continues through fiscal year 1999. None of the persons allowed to

separate early from the Navy under the early release programs are

included in DMDC calculations of attrition rates.

During its downsizing, the Air Force allowed some first-term enlistees to

be released after only 1 year of service to go into the reserves. The Air

Force also allowed enlistees to be released early to attend school or to

take other employment. There was no minimum time-in-service

requirement for these two types of voluntary release. DMDC does not

include Air Force enlistees released to go into the reserves or to go to

school in its attrition statistics; it does include enlistees released early to

take other employment. According to Air Force officials, allowing

first-term enlistees to separate early was one way to avoid having to

separate and pay benefits to more senior enlisted personnel while

downsizing was occurring. The Air Force has recently announced its

decision to reduce the number of early releases it approves, though its

early release programs remain in effect.

2

The Navy’s calculations include all enlistees who were separated between 4 and 12 months early in a

particular fiscal year, regardless of the fiscal year in which they entered the service. The Navy’s data,

therefore, will not match our calculations, which include the separation of all enlistees who entered

the Navy in fiscal year 1993 and were separated more than 90 days early in fiscal years 1993-97.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

Our analysis of DMDC’s data on all enlistees who entered the services in

fiscal year 1993 confirms that the Air Force and the Navy allowed large

numbers of enlisted personnel to voluntarily separate more than 90 days

early under early release programs between fiscal year 1993 and 1997. The

Marine Corps and the Army, on the other hand, released fewer persons

under these programs. (See table 2.2.) Enlistees released early to attend

school or as part of reduction-in-strength programs are not included in

DMDC’s calculation of attrition rates.

Table 2.2: Enlistees Who Entered the

Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were

Released More Than 90 Days Early

During Fiscal Years 1993-97

Time before the end of the contract Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

13 or more months early 110 1,971 3 753

4-12 months early 108 983 2 349

Total 218 2,954 5 1,102

Adding releases more than 3 months early to attrition rates for enlistees

who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 does not affect the Army’s or

the Marine Corps’ rates. However, it adds 4.7 percentage points to the

Navy’s rate of 35.8 percent, increasing it to 40.5 percent, and it adds

3.5 percentage points to the Air Force’s rate of 32.5 percent, increasing it

to 36 percent.

Services’ Investment

in the Recruiting and

Training of Enlistees

Who Entered in Fiscal

Year 1993 and

Separated Early Totals

$1.3 Billion

According to DOD, in fiscal year 1993, the average cost of recruiting and

training each enlistee ranged from $19,143 to $24,885, depending on the

service. Using figures on the cost of recruiting and providing basic training

to these enlistees, we estimate that the services invested $237 million in

the 21,002 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 and were

separated in their first 3 months of service, when most had not yet begun

initial skills training. We estimate that the services invested another

$1.1 billion in the 51,668 enlistees who were separated after they had

begun or completed their initial skills training. Of this total of $1.3 billion

in recruiting and training funding, a DOD official estimates that about

two-thirds, or $0.8 billion, was spent to pay the salaries of student

enlistees, and one-third, or $0.5 billion, was spent to pay for the recruiting

and training infrastructure, which includes recruiting and training sites,

instructors, and recruiters.

Updated recruiting and training costs provided by DOD indicate that these

costs have risen since fiscal year 1993. In fiscal year 1998, DOD estimates

the average cost of recruiting and training each enlistee is $35,500: $6,700

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 2 

High First-Term Attrition Results in a

Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting

and Training Investment

for recruiting and $28,800 for training.3 The fact that recruiting and

training costs are rising demonstrates that if current attrition rates

continue, the cost of attrition to the services will become even greater.

While it is not feasible to expect to save the entire cost of recruiting and

training for each enlistee who is not separated, the cost figures do

demonstrate the magnitude of the cost of recruiting and training hundreds

of thousands of new recruits each year. It would be expected that if there

were a significant reduction in attrition, the recruiting and training

infrastructure could be reduced, resulting in major savings. Also, it is clear

that once the individual has been trained, the longer the services can keep

an enlistee, the more of a return the services will receive on their

investment.

3

This includes the cost of basic training and additional occupational training that takes place generally

within the first 6 months of an enlistee’s first term. In some cases, this occupational training can last

up to 1 year or more.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 3 

Official Reasons for Early Separations

According to the official codes used to categorize enlistees’ separations,

the primary reasons for the early discharge of enlistees who entered the

services in fiscal year 1993 varied by gender and by service. While the

services’ official separation codes capture general categories of discharge,

we continue to find, as we did in our 1997 report on attrition from basic

training, that the services use these separation codes differently and that

these codes capture only one of several possible reasons for a single early

discharge. The services’ sometimes extreme variations in the percentages

of their separations for a given official reason suggest that the services

interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ,

that the services have very different attrition problems, or some

combination of these explanations.

Official Reasons for

Separation Vary by

Gender

The principal reasons that men who entered the services in fiscal 

year 1993 were separated between their 7th and 48th month are presented

in table 3.1 in order of their magnitude. As shown, over 70 percent of the

servicewide men in this group were separated for misconduct,

medical/physical conditions, performance problems, and drug use.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 3 

Official Reasons for Early Separations

Table 3.1: Principal Reasons That Men

Who Entered the Services in Fiscal

Year 1993 Were Separated Between

Their 7th and 48th Month

Official reason

Number of male

enlistees

separated

Percentage of all

male attrition

between the 7th

and 48th month

Cumulative

percentage

Misconduct 12,425 33.4 33.4

Medical/physical problems 5,634 15.2 48.6

Performance problems 4,625 12.5 61.1

Drugs 3,448 9.3 70.4

Character/behavior

disorder

2,548 6.9 77.3

Miscellaneous reasonsa 1,643 4.4 81.7

Weight/body fat 1,552 4.2 85.9

Dependency/hardship 1,311 3.5 89.4

Alcoholism 827 2.2 91.6

Erroneous enlistmentb 326 0.9 92.5

Homosexuality 192 0.5 93.0

Parenthood 143 0.4 93.4

Sexual perversion 85 0.2 93.6

All other reasonsc 2,403 6.5 100.1

Total 37,162 100.0 100.1d

aThe Air Force includes early releases for employment in the category of “miscellaneous” reasons.

b“Erroneous enlistment” is an enlistment that would not have occurred if relevant facts had been

known by the government or if appropriate directives had been followed. The failure to reveal

relevant facts must not have been the result of fraudulent conduct by the enlistee.

cThis category captures all reasons not listed above, such as eneuresis, financial irresponsibility,

unsanitary habits, and unsuitability, among others.

dCumulative total does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

The principal reasons that women who entered the services in fiscal 

year 1993 were separated between their 7th and 48th month are presented

in table 3.2 in order of their magnitude. As shown, over 71 percent of all

women in this group were separated for pregnancy, medical/physical

problems, misconduct, performance problems, or parenthood.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Chapter 3 

Official Reasons for Early Separations

Table 3.2: Principal Reasons That

Women Who Entered the Services in

Fiscal Year 1993 Were Separated

Between Their 7th and 48th Month

Official reason

Number of female

enlistees

separated

Percentage of all

female attrition

between the 7th

and 48th month

Cumulative

percentage

Pregnancy 2,074 26.3 26.3

Medical/physical problems 1,075 13.6 39.9

Misconduct 890 11.3 51.2

Performance problems 864 11.0 62.2

Parenthood 706 9.0 71.2

Character/behavior

disorder

550 7.0 78.2

Dependency/hardship 440 5.6 83.8

Weight/body fat 380 4.8 88.6

Miscellaneous reasonsa 379 4.8 93.4

Drugs 152 1.9 95.3

Homosexuality 97 1.2 96.5

Alcoholism 56 0.7 97.2

Erroneous enlistmentb 9 0.1 97.3

Sexual perversion 5 0.1 97.4

All other reasonsc 207 2.6 100.0

Total 7,884 100.0 100.0

aThe Air Force includes early releases for employment in the category of “miscellaneous” reasons.

b“Erroneous enlistment” is an enlistment that would not have occurred if relevant facts had been

known by the government or if appropriate directives had been followed. The failure to reveal

relevant facts must not have been the result of fraudulent conduct by the enlistee.

cThis category captures all reasons not listed above, such as enuresis, financial irresponsibility,

unsanitary habits, and unsuitability, among others.

Separations for Pregnancy

Explain Some Gender

Differences in Attrition

Rates

Overall attrition rates (or separation rates between 0 and 48 months) are

higher for women who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 than they

are for men. Separations for pregnancy explain the differences in attrition

rates by gender in the Navy and the Air Force. However, this explanation

does not hold true for the Marine Corps and the Army. If separations for

pregnancy are subtracted from the total number of each service’s

discharges, attrition rates for Navy women are actually 2 percentage

points lower than they are for Navy men. After subtracting separations for

pregnancy, attrition rates for Air Force men and women are the same.

After subtracting separations for pregnancy, attrition rates are still

6 percentage points higher for Army women and 9 percentage points

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

higher for Marine Corps women (see table 3.3). It should be noted that a

much larger percentage of female separations are due to reasons related to

parenthood—9 percent for women compared to 0.4 percent for men.

Table 3.3: Attrition Rates for Male and

Female Enlistees Who Entered the

Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and Were

Separated Before the End of Their First

Terms (From 0 to 48 Months)

Figures in percentages

Service

Female attrition rate,

including pregnancy

separations

Female attrition rate,

excluding

pregnancy

separations

Male

attrition

rate

Army 51 43 37

Navy 39 33 35

Marine Corps 49 40 31

Air Force 38 31 31

All services 45 37 34

Subtracting Separations

for Pregnancy Does Not

Explain All Gender

Differences in Reasons for

Separation

Our analysis of reasons for separation between the 7th and 48th month

indicates that, after separations for pregnancy are subtracted, discharges

for misconduct, drugs, and alcoholism continue to represent higher

proportions of separations for men than for women. On the other hand,

discharges for medical/physical and performance problems, for

character/behavior disorders, for dependency/hardship, and for

parenthood continue to represent higher proportions of separations for

women than for men. (See table 3.4.)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Table 3.4: Comparison of Official

Reasons for the Separation of Men and

Women After Subtracting Discharges

for Pregnancy

Official reason

Percentage of all

male attrition

between the 7th and

48th month

Percentage of all

female

nonpregnancy

attrition between the

7th and 48th month

Misconduct 33.4 15.3

Medical/physical problems 15.2 18.5

Performance problems 12.5 14.9

Drugs 9.3 2.6

Character/behavior disorder 6.9 9.5

Miscellaneous reasonsa 4.4 6.5

Weight/body fat 4.2 6.5

Dependency/hardship 3.5 7.6

Alcoholism 2.2 1.0

Erroneous enlistment 0.9 0.2

Homosexuality 0.5 1.7

Parenthood 0.4 12.2

Sexual perversion 0.2 0.1

All other reasonsb 6.5 3.6

Total 100.1c 100.2c

aThe Air Force includes early releases for employment in the category of “miscellaneous” reasons.

bThis category captures all reasons not listed above.

cTotal does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Official Reasons for

Separation Vary by

Service

The incidence of separations within each category varies by service. For

example, for Marine Corps men who entered the service in fiscal 

year 1993, the leading cause of separation was medical problems, and for

Army, Navy, and Air Force men in this group, it was misconduct. (Figs. 3.1

through 3.4 show each service’s major reasons for separation by gender.)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Figure 3.1: Top Reasons for Male

Attrition in the Marine Corps Between

the 7th and 48th Month

Misconduct 25.4%

Character disorder 6.1%

Erroneous enlistment 4.6%

Medical problems 34.3%

Drugs 14.9%

Hardship 3.4%

Alcoholism 2.6%

Other 8.7%

Figure 3.2: Top Reasons for Male

Attrition in the Army Between the 7th

and 48th Month

Misconduct 30.9%

Hardship 4.1%

Drugs 3.6%

 Performance 28.4%

Medical problems 10.1% Weight/body fat 7.1%

Character disorder 3.5%

Alcoholism 2.1%

Other 10.2%

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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Figure 3.3: Top Reasons for Male

Attrition in the Navy Between the 7th

and 48th Month Misconduct 39.0%

Drugs 15.8%

Medical problems 15.5%

Character disorder 13.2%

Weight/body fat 3.1%

Alcoholism 2.9%

Hardship 2.7%

Other 7.9%

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Figure 3.4: Top Reasons for Male

Attrition in the Air Force Between the

7th and 48th Month Misconduct 38.6%

Miscellaneous 31.4%

Performance 7.3% Medical problems 5.0%

Drugs 4.2%

Hardship 4.0%

Character disorder 3.5%

Weight/body fat 1.9%

a Other 4.1%

aThe Air Force includes early releases for employment in the category of “miscellaneous” reasons.

Major reasons for female attrition also vary by service, although

separations for pregnancy represent the largest single category of

discharges for women in all four services. Separations for pregnancy

represent between one-fourth and one-third of all female separations. For

Navy and Marine Corps women who entered the services in fiscal 

year 1993, the second leading cause of separation was medical problems.

For Air Force women, it was “miscellaneous” releases, and for Army

women, it was performance problems. (See figs. 3.5 through 3.8.)

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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Figure 3.5: Top Reasons for Female

Attrition in the Marine Corps Between

the 7th and 48th Month

Pregnancy 36.4%

Performance 1.9%

Hardship 4.6%

Parenthood 1.7%

Medical 32.0%

Misconduct 5.8%

Character disorder 5.3%

Drugs 2.9%

Weight/body fat 1.7%

Other 7.7%

Figure 3.6: Top Reasons for Female

Attrition in the Army Between the 7th

and 48th Month Pregnancy 26.9%

Performance 19.5%

Parenthood 11.8%

Medical problems 10.4%

Character disorder 3.6%

Hardship 8.0%

Weight/body fat 4.7%

Misconduct 9.0%

Other 6.1%

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Figure 3.7: Top Reasons for Female

Attrition in the Navy Between the 7th

and 48th Month

Pregnancy 23.3%

Medical problems 19.6%

Alcoholism 1.3%

Misconduct 12.3%

Character disorder 14.2%

Parenthood 11.5%

Weight/body fat 7.1%

Drugs 4.1%

Homosexuality 1.7%

Other 4.9%

Figure 3.8: Top Reasons for Female

Attrition in the Air Force Between the

7th and 48th Month

Pregnancy 26.3% Miscellaneous 23.0%

Misconduct 16.9%

Medical problems 8.4% Performance 7.0%

Character disorder 5.6%

Hardship 5.2%

Weight/body fat 3.0%

Other 4.6%

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Differing

Interpretations of

Separation Codes and

Policies May Explain

Service Differences in

Reasons for Discharge

In our January 1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made

recommendations for DOD to improve the consistency with which the

services apply separation codes. We found that the data DOD uses to track

attrition is based on separation codes that the services interpret differently

and that capture only one of many possible reasons for discharge. Our

recommendations were incorporated in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), and DOD has formed a

working group that is reexamining the services’ use of these separation

codes.

Our current analysis of separation codes confirms the continued need for

this effort. First, the services’ extreme variations in numbers of

separations for different reasons—such as unsatisfactory performance,

medical conditions, and drug use—suggest that the services have different

attrition problems, are interpreting the separation codes differently, have

different separation policies, or some combination of these three

explanations. Second, current separation codes do not provide

information specific enough for DOD to understand the magnitude of

certain types of discharge. For example, the separation code for

unsatisfactory performance includes discharges for failure to pass physical

fitness tests, career development tests, and on-the-job requirements but

does not distinguish among the various categories of failure.

The following sections describe the variations in percentages of enlistees

separated for the major official reasons for discharge: misconduct,

medical conditions, unsatisfactory performance, drug use, and pregnancy.

Discharges for Misconduct

Represent One-Fourth to

One-Third of All

Separations

The categories of offenses included under separations for misconduct

range from civilian court convictions, courts-martial, and serious offenses,

such as larceny, to the less egregious category of minor disciplinary

infractions, such as being habitually late for work. For all enlistees

entering the services in fiscal year 1993, separations for misconduct

between the 7th and 48th month of service represented about one-third of

all separations for the Navy and the Air Force. Separations for misconduct

represented about one-fourth of all separations for the Army and the

Marine Corps (see table 3.5).

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Table 3.5: Separations for Misconduct

for Persons Who Enlisted in Fiscal

Year 1993 and Were Separated

Between Their 7th and 48th Month

Service

Number

separated

Percentage of

each service’s separations

Navy 4,607 34.7

Air Force 2,235 33.4

Army 4,833 26.4

Marine Corps 1,640 24.2

The Army and the Navy have made it clear that they do not wish to reduce

attrition rates by trying to rehabilitate individuals who engage in

misconduct. For example, the Navy has recently made its definition of a

“pattern of misconduct” more stringent, changing the number of offenses

constituting a “pattern” from three or more to two or more. Also, the

Army’s Director of Military Personnel Management has emphasized to its

major commands that two of the largest areas of separations, discharges

for misconduct and discharges in lieu of court-martial, “are areas that are

absolutely non-negotiable.”

DOD and GAO both have efforts underway to determine whether there are

better ways to screen incoming recruits for criminal backgrounds to

ensure that all available information on past criminal behavior is

considered in deciding whether to enlist new recruits. In April 1998, DOD

issued a report making recommendations to improve the quality of its

databases and to maintain preservice arrest information on recruits. GAO’s

effort involves an examination of (1) the services’ policies, procedures,

and practices for screening and granting enlistment waivers to recruits

who have criminal backgrounds and (2) the completeness of the

information sources used to check criminal records.

Some enlistees now separated for misconduct may be candidates for

rehabilitation. For all services’ enlistees who entered in fiscal year 1993

and were separated between their 7th and 48th month, 12 percent of those

separated for misconduct, or 1,602 persons, were found to have committed

“minor disciplinary offenses.” At one unit we visited, an Air Force officer

told us that most separations for misconduct were not for serious offenses

but rather for minor disciplinary infractions. He said that it was extremely

rare for an enlistee to be granted probation and rehabilitation. In the 

7 months he had been at the unit, he had seen only one case in which an

enlistee had been able to convince the local commander not to separate

him. The officer said that it is almost a “foregone conclusion” that

enlistees whose separations process has begun will be separated. He

viewed it as a “waste” to separate some of these enlistees.

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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Marine Corps Separates a

Higher Percentage of

Enlistees for Medical

Problems Than the Other

Services

As we reported in January 1997, separations for medical problems

represent a large portion of all attrition from basic training. In that report,

we made several recommendations for improving the medical screening of

incoming recruits. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1998 included all of our recommendations, and DOD is now working to

improve medical screening.1

Separations for medical problems are also significant for enlistees in their

7th through 48th months of service. Enlistees may be separated for any

number of disqualifying medical conditions, for example, a separated

collarbone, a brain tumor, fallen arches, a seizure disorder, a broken back,

or a serious knee injury. For enlistees entering the services in fiscal 

year 1993, the Marine Corps separated a higher percentage of its personnel

for medical problems than the other services did (see table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Separations for Medical or

Physical Problems of Enlistees Who

Entered the Services in Fiscal Year

1993 and Were Separated Between

Their 7th and 48th Month

Service

Number

of

separations

Percentage of 

each service’s separations

Marine Corps 2,315 34.2

Navy 2,142 16.1

Army 1,865 10.2

Air Force 387 5.8

Again, the differences in numbers of enlistees placed in this category by

the services may indicate variations in how the services apply separation

codes. The fact that the Marine Corps has a higher number of enlistees

separated for medical problems may also be a result of what may be the

Marine Corps’ more rigorous physical standards and training. Some

Marine Corps officials told us that separations for medical problems are

related to the physical difficulty of some jobs that are very strenuous and

make demands on the body, particularly on the knees and ankles. Army

personnel with whom we spoke said that in many cases involving medical

problems, enlistees arrive at their first assignments already injured as a

result of training.

1

Among other things, we recommended that the services (1) require all applicants for enlistment to

provide the names of their medical insurers and providers and sign a release form allowing the

services to obtain past medical information and (2) use DOD’s newly proposed database of medical

diagnostic codes to determine whether adding medical screening tests or providing more thorough

medical examinations to selected groups of applicants could cost-effectively reduce attrition at basic

training.

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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Army Separates More

Enlistees for Performance

Problems Than the Other

Services Do

Enlistees may be separated for unsatisfactory performance for a variety of

reasons: for failing to perform adequately on their jobs, for failing physical

fitness tests, or for failing career development tests. DMDC data indicates

that the Army separates a far greater percentage of its enlistees for

performance problems than do the other services (see table 3.7).

Table 3.7: Separations for

Unsatisfactory Performance of

Enlistees Entering the Services in

Fiscal Year 1993 and Being Separated

Between Their 7th and 48th Month

Service

Number

of

separations

Percentage of 

each service’s separations

Army 4,860 26.6

Air Force 484 7.2

Marine Corps 84 1.2

Navy 61 0.5

The Army’s larger number of separations for unsatisfactory performance

may indicate that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps list

another reason for separating persons who experience performance

problems. Or it may indicate that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine

Corps retain more of these enlistees. Another possible explanation is that

during downsizing, the Army allowed enlistees with “bars to reenlistment”

to voluntarily separate for unsatisfactory performance. According to Army

regulations, a “bar to reenlistment” is a mechanism whereby Army

commanders may put enlistees on notice that they may not reenlist unless

their performance improves. In December 1996, the Army changed this

policy, no longer allowing such soldiers to voluntarily separate. As a result

of this change in policy, the Army reports that its separations in this

category dropped from 1,050 in fiscal year 1996 to 305 in fiscal year 1997.

Service officials told us that first-term enlistees may also be separated for

unsatisfactory performance if they fail physical fitness tests. During our

interviews with first-term enlistees, some told us that they were being

separated because they had failed one part of the physical fitness test,

such as the running portion or the sit-ups portion. Though we were told

that alternate tests are available to certain enlistees, we spoke with

enlistees who were being separated for failing the physical fitness test and

did not know that such options existed or had not been offered alternate

tests.

In the Air Force, an enlistee may be separated for unsatisfactory

performance if he or she fails career development course tests.2

 Though

2

Career development course tests are examinations that Air Force enlistees must pass to remain in

their assigned occupations, or Air Force specialty codes.

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Air Force policy permits commanders to allow enlistees to change jobs to

stay in the Air Force after failing these tests, we found that commanders

did not always make use of this alternative. The Air Force did not have

data on how many enlistees were separated for failing their career

development course tests or on how many were retained.

Marine Corps and Navy

Separate More Enlistees

for Drug Use Than the

Army and the Air Force

For enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, the Marine Corps

and the Navy separated more persons between their 7th and 48th month

for drug use than the other services did (see table 3.8).

Table 3.8: Separations for Drug Use for

Persons Who Enlisted in Fiscal Year

1993 and Were Separated Between

Their 7th and 48th Month

Service

Number

separated

Percentage of

each service’s separations

Marine Corps 962 14.2

Navy 1,850 13.9

Air Force 239 3.6

Army 549 3.0

Differences in the services’ proportions of drug separations might be

explained by differences in their use of separation codes. Service officials

also speculated that these differences might be explained at least in part

by the frequency of drug testing. For example, according to Navy and

Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps tests its enlistees for drugs a little

over 3 times per year; the Navy tests its enlistees 2.15 times per year; the

Army 2 times per year; and the Air Force 0.75 times per year.

All four services take drug use very seriously. They all have mandatory

requirements that such offenses are to be processed for separation, though

such processing does not result in an automatic discharge for the offender.

According to Navy, Army, and Air Force officials, these services have “zero

tolerance” for drug use, and an enlistee is almost always separated after a

first offense. The Marine Corps also has “zero tolerance” for drug use.

However, two Marine Corps local commanders told us that they are

beginning to reconsider the retention of one-time drug users. Conversely,

officials in the Army appear to be considering actions that would result in

the retention of fewer drug users.

While the Marine Corps separates a much higher percentage of its

enlistees for drug use than the Air Force and the Army, two local Marine

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Official Reasons for Early Separations

Corps commanders told us that they were reviewing all separation

packages and allowing certain enlistees to remain in the Marine Corps

after their drug tests were positive. Each enlistee allowed a “second

chance” was tracked closely to determine whether he or she successfully

remained free of drugs. Both commanders who were granting second

chances to drug users said that the Marine Corps has a monetary

investment in enlistees who have been fully trained and are assigned to

jobs. We interviewed two Marine Corps enlistees who had been given

second chances after testing positive for drugs. The first enlistee said that

a friend had put methamphetamines in his drink at a party without his

knowledge. The second enlistee said that he had tried cocaine for the first

time at a friend’s bachelor party.

The Army’s recent actions, on the other hand, indicate that it is becoming

stricter with drug users. Its current policy allows local commanders to

decide whether to retain first-time drug users if they have 3 years of

service or less. However, the Army has drafted a policy that, if finalized,

will make retention of drug users even rarer. The new policy, if

implemented, will make it mandatory for commanders to initiate

separation processing for all enlistees found to have used drugs, though

commanders will still have the authority to retain these enlistees. Army

officials at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, told us that they had begun to send

drug users to jail, rather than allow them to simply separate. These

officials believed that this more punitive action was sending the message

to enlistees that taking drugs was not an easy way out of the service.

None of the services maintains data on how often drug users are retained.

Because such data is not maintained, the services have no means of

determining whether retaining enlistees found to have used drugs is an

effective policy, that is, whether these enlistees represent good risks for

either continuing to be productive servicemembers or for completing their

first terms.

Services Differ in Their

Policies on Separations for

Pregnancy

Female enlistees in all services may be separated if they become pregnant,

and male and female enlistees may be separated for “parenthood” if they

cannot adequately provide for their children while meeting their service

obligations. For female enlistees who joined the services in fiscal 

year 1993, separations for pregnancy represented between one-fourth and

one-third of all female separations. When separations for parenthood are

added, this portion rises even further (see table 3.9).

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Table 3.9: Pregnancy and Parenthood Separations for Female Enlistees Who Entered the Services in Fiscal Year 1993 and

Were Separated Between Their 7th and 48th Month

Service

Number of

separations for

pregnancy

Percentage of

all female

separations

Number of

separations for

parenthood

Percentage of

all female

separations

Total

separations for

pregnancy and

parenthood

Total

percentage of

all female

separations

Marine Corps 150 36.4 7 1.7 157 38.1

Army 1,010 26.9 443 11.8 1,453 38.7

Air Force 415 26.3 9 0.6 424 26.9

Navy 499 23.3 247 11.5 746 34.8

The services’ policies regarding the separation of pregnant women differ.

The Army and the Air Force allow pregnant women to separate at their

own discretion, upon request. The Marine Corps and the Navy, on the

other hand, place the decision of whether to separate pregnant women in

the hands of the local commanders. That is, for Marine Corps and Navy

women, automatic and voluntary separation for pregnancy is not an

option. According to Marine Corps and Navy officials, the rationale behind

their policies is that enlistees represent a recruiting and training

investment and that the decision should be left up to the local commander.

At present, none of the services maintains data to support the

effectiveness of either allowing all pregnant women to separate or leaving

this decision up to local commanders. For example, the services do not

maintain data on how many enlisted women become pregnant and

voluntarily stay in the service to complete their first terms or, in the case

of the Navy and the Marine Corps, the number of pregnant women who

are required to stay in the service after their requests to separate are

turned down. Without such data, the services will be unable to determine

whether first-term enlisted women who become pregnant and remain in

the service after being denied separation prove to be productive

servicemembers who successfully complete their terms.

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Chapter 4 

Quality-of-Life Issues Appear to Be

Demotivators for Completing Contractual

Obligations for Military Service

In an attempt to find root causes for enlistees’ early separations, we

interviewed 254 first-term personnel and their supervisors. Many

supervisors and first-term enlistees suggested that quality-of-life issues,

such as a perceived erosion of benefits, pay, and advancement

opportunities, coupled with long work hours and frequent deployments,

may lie at the root of many separations. While our interviews do not

comprise a representative, statistical sample of all first-term enlistees and

clearly do not provide a basis for pointing out which quality-of-life

improvements might lead to lower attrition rates, they do provide useful

insights into underlying reasons for current attrition rates.

All four of the services survey their personnel on quality-of-life issues in

some way. However, the services do not currently administer exit surveys

to first-term enlisted personnel, and they have not used available survey

information to help analyze the problem of first-term enlisted attrition.

That is, there is currently no formalized mechanism for prioritizing the

concerns of first-term personnel who are discharged early or allowing the

services to direct their attention to improving quality-of-life issues that will

have the most effect on reducing the attrition of first-term personnel.

Perception Is That

Military Benefits Are

Eroding or Are Not

Competitive With the

Private Sector

Many enlistees expressed the general perception that military retirement

and medical benefits are eroding and that their salaries are not

competitive with those of the private sector. The sense that they could

make more money in the civilian world was most prevalent in occupations

with highly transferrable skills such as those involving computers. The

perception that retirement benefits are eroding was another frequently

expressed demotivator. This was particularly true when first-term

enlistees worked side by side with enlistees who had entered the services

before the retirement system was changed and whose retirement benefits

were seen as clearly better. Finally, the sense that medical benefits were

not as good as they used to be was expressed frequently as another reason

that a career in the military was no longer as appealing.

Further Career

Opportunities Are

Desired

Many enlistees expressed frustration with not having more opportunities

for career advancement. Many said that they felt that advancement

opportunities were limited, that they had few choices to cross-train for

other occupations, and that they were not allowed to transfer to other

locations. Some who had joined the military for college benefits said that

their long work schedules and deployments prevented them from taking

night courses toward obtaining a college degree.

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Demotivators for Completing Contractual

Obligations for Military Service

One subgroup of Navy enlistees for whom career training appeared to be

of particular concern was the general detail sailors. These sailors complete

basic training and a 2.4-week apprenticeship course but do not attend a

technical school that qualifies them for a Navy rating. According to Navy

career counselors we interviewed, the Navy’s policy of not sending these

sailors to technical schools is a primary driver of first-term enlisted

attrition. In fact, Navy data indicates that general detail sailors experience

a higher-than-average attrition rate. For example, for enlistees entering the

Navy between fiscal years 1989 and 1993, the overall first-term attrition

rate ranged from 30.5 percent to 35.8 percent. The attrition rate for general

detail sailors during these years, however, ranged from 39.3 percent to

43 percent.

Deployment

Schedules Can Be

Motivators or

Demotivators

Enlistees’ feelings about their deployment schedules varied, depending on

how frequently they were deployed and on whether they were married. In

some cases, deployment appeared to be a motivator. Some enlistees

complained that they had joined the service to see the world and had not

been able to deploy at all. Marine Corps officials told us that they believed

that first-term enlistees who deployed generally had higher morale, fewer

disciplinary problems, and a greater sense of mission. Other enlistees

expressed frustration with deployment, especially those in occupations

that required extensive and frequent travel away from home. For example,

one supervisor of enlisted personnel in an Air Force fighter squadron said

that his unit’s rigorous deployment schedule was the primary driver of

enlisted attrition. He said that in one 18-month period, from June 1995

through December 1996, his entire squadron was deployed for 205 days.

One-third to one-half of the squadron was deployed for an additional 

134 days during this same period.

Perception Is That

Married Enlistees

Receive Preferential

Treatment

Single enlistees frequently complained that their married counterparts

were treated preferentially because they received housing and subsistence

allowances and were allowed to live and eat off base or off ships. Single

enlistees believed that, because they lived and ate on base or aboard ship,

they were more available and thus were required to perform extra duties.

They also said that they did not have equal amounts of time off and

privacy.

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Quality-of-Life Issues Appear to Be

Demotivators for Completing Contractual

Obligations for Military Service

Results of

Quality-of-Life

Surveys Are Not

Directly Tied to

Efforts to Reduce

First-Term Attrition

All four services have developed surveys to collect information from

servicemembers on their perceptions of the quality of military life.

However, no service currently administers exit surveys to first-term

enlisted personnel or targets the information it collects from these surveys

to the problem of first-term enlisted attrition and ways to reduce it.

The Army currently administers two surveys to its personnel. First,

commanders may administer a “Command Climate Survey” when they

assume a new position, but they have the option of keeping the results

confidential. Second, the Army Research Institute has administered a

“Sample Survey of Military Personnel” to Army officers and enlisted

personnel twice a year since 1943. The latest survey results, from the

spring of 1997, indicate that 52.2 percent of all enlisted personnel are

satisfied or very satisfied with the overall quality of Army life. Only

28.9 percent of enlisted personnel, however, were satisfied or very

satisfied with their amount of basic pay, and only 28.1 percent were

satisfied or very satisfied with their retirement benefits. Two other areas in

which around one-third of enlistees expressed that they were satisfied or

very satisfied were in (1) the number of personnel available to do the work

(35.9 percent) and (2) the opportunity to select a job, training, or station of

their choice (32.8 percent).

In 1994 and 1995, the Army administered an exit survey to its personnel,

but this effort was discontinued because Army officials believed that the

survey duplicated the Army’s other two surveys. The Army Research

Institute is in the process of developing another survey to be administered

to all recruits as they enter basic training and as they either separate from

training or continue on to their first duty stations. Data collection for this

effort is expected to begin in January 1999.

The Navy has administered a “Retention/Separation Questionnaire” to its

personnel every year since fiscal year 1990. The questionnaire asks

officers and enlisted personnel to rate their satisfaction with 45 aspects of

Navy life and to identify the most important reason for leaving or thinking

of leaving the Navy. The 1997 results showed that the top six reasons that

Navy personnel cited for leaving or thinking of leaving the Navy were

(1) lack of promotion and advancement opportunity, (2) family separation,

(3) low basic pay, (4) quality of leadership/management, (5) quality of

Navy life, and (6) lack of fairness in performance evaluations.

The Air Force has administered a “Climate and Quality of Life Survey” to

its officer and enlisted personnel every year since 1995. The survey

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Quality-of-Life Issues Appear to Be

Demotivators for Completing Contractual

Obligations for Military Service

contains questions on a variety of issues, including how many days are

spent away from home, how many hours personnel work each week, and

how personnel perceive the fairness of their pay and benefits. The Air

Force’s latest survey, for 1997, indicates that 69 percent of all first-term

enlisted personnel believe that the Air Force is a good place to work.

However, a summary of the survey results states that the percentage of

enlisted personnel who report that they plan to stay in the Air Force until

they are eligible to retire dropped from 64 percent in 1995 to 58 percent in

1997. The average number of temporary duty days increased in this time

period from 46 days per year to 60 days per year. The average number of

work hours per week rose from 46 hours in 1996 to 49 in 1997. Only

28 percent of all first-term enlisted personnel believe that their pay and

benefits are fair and equitable. Forty-four percent of all married enlisted

personnel and 45 percent of all single enlisted personnel are satisfied with

their medical benefits. When asked which of the programs, services, and

facilities had the most positive influence on career intent, enlisted

personnel tended to identify tuition assistance and Air Force-sponsored

off-duty educational opportunities.

Finally, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center

administered a survey in 1993 for the Marine Corps on quality-of-life

issues. This survey, which contained questions on servicemembers’

perceptions of their residences, incomes, standards of living, and other

things, was given to a sample of all active-duty Marine Corps personnel

except those in the lowest pay grade, E-1. Overall, survey results showed

that junior enlisted personnel were more negative on all measures of

quality of life than members of other pay grades. For example, unmarried

junior enlisted personnel, who are most likely to live in the barracks, had

the lowest scores of all ranks on questions about satisfaction with housing.

Junior enlisted personnel also had the lowest scores for satisfaction with

their incomes. While current deployment status was not a factor in

determining how members felt about their jobs, junior enlisted personnel

reported fewer positive feelings about their jobs than did senior enlisted

members and officers.

The Marine Corps has discontinued this questionnaire while the Center for

Naval Analyses develops a new “Climate Battery Survey.” The new survey

will be divided into two parts, one on retention issues and a second one on

separation issues. The Marine Corps plans to require all active-duty

personnel to complete the separation portion of the survey before they

leave the Marine Corps.

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

Historically, the services have focused their efforts to reduce attrition on

recruiting high school graduates with high scores on aptitude tests

because these types of enlistees have lower attrition rates. Because the

majority of all recruits are now high school graduates with high aptitude

scores, the services must now focus on increasing the proportion of these

enlistees who complete their first terms. The services have taken some

steps to address attrition, such as encouraging commanders to examine

opportunities to review separation packages, setting numerical goals for

reducing attrition, and restricting certain voluntary and early separations.

However, only rarely have these efforts been driven by an analysis of

(1) exactly why attrition is occurring and (2) what separation policies

might be changed to reduce the attrition of specific categories of enlistees.

Two studies suggest that positive leadership, such as the services’ greater

command emphasis on reducing attrition, has the direct effect of lowering

attrition. While we spoke with local service commanders who are now

reviewing separations packages to reconsider the possibility of retaining

enlistees, we also spoke with first-term supervisors who continue to

believe that a “zero defects” mentality remains a driver of attrition. These

supervisors also told us that many enlistees continue to take advantage of

separation policies to seek easy ways out of the military with minimal

consequences.

The Services’

Targeting of High

School Graduates

With High Aptitude

Test Scores Has Met

Its Limit in

Controlling Attrition

Historically, the services have focused on the recruitment of high quality

personnel to minimize the time required for individual training and to

reduce attrition. They have defined “high quality” recruits as young people

who are high school diploma graduates and score in the upper 50th

percentile of the AFQT.

Our analysis of data on all enlistees who entered the services in fiscal 

year 1993 indicates that attrition rates continue to be lower for persons

with higher educational levels. For example, those who entered the

services in fiscal year 1993 with high school diplomas had an attrition rate

of 35 percent. On the other hand, those with 3 to 4 years of high school but

no diploma or general equivalency degree had a rate of 51.1 percent, and

those holding general equivalency degrees had an attrition rate of

54.8 percent. Similarly, enlistees who score progressively higher on the

AFQT continue to have decreasing rates of attrition. Those who scored in

the highest AFQT category, category I, scores of 93 to 99, had an attrition

rate of 27.5 percent. Those in category II, scores of 65 to 92, had an

attrition rate of 32.4 percent; those in category IIIA, scores of 50 to 64, had

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

a rate of 37.6 percent; and those in category IIIB, scores of 31 to 49, had a

rate of 40 percent. (More data on attrition rates by educational level and

AFQT score is contained in app. I.)

Overall attrition rates for first-term enlistees now reflect the fact that the

vast majority of the services’ recruits hold high school diplomas and score

in the upper half of the AFQT. For example, of all enlistees entering the

services in fiscal year 1993, 91.5 percent held high school diplomas, and

71.1 percent scored in the upper half of the AFQT. For these reasons, DOD’s

overall attrition rate of 35.8 percent closely approximates the attrition

rates of high school diploma graduates (35 percent) and persons who

score in category IIIA of the AFQT (37.6 percent). All these statistics

indicate that if DOD and the services did not target these higher quality

recruits, attrition rates would almost certainly be higher. Efforts to reduce

attrition rates below current levels need to be focused on finding ways to

increase the likelihood that these already high-quality enlistees will

complete their first terms.

Services Have Made

Few Formal Policy

Changes to Reduce

Attrition After

Training

Although all four services hope to reduce their first-term attrition rates,

they have made few formal policy changes to target enlistees who have

completed training. The Air Force and the Army have set specific numeric

targets for reducing attrition, and the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine

Corps report that they have been successful in reducing attrition in some

areas. However, only two services have targeted groups of enlistees they

wished to reconsider for remedial action after training. The Army has

targeted enlistees with bars to reenlistment who were previously allowed

to voluntarily separate, and the Air Force has targeted persons allowed to

voluntarily separate in the “miscellaneous” category, which includes

enlistees allowed to separate early to take outside employment. In these

two cases, the services will be able to measure the effect of their policy

changes. Other service efforts have not similarly been linked to clearly

identified problems. As a result, any success these efforts experience in

lowering attrition may be either coincidental or have the unintended effect

of retaining enlistees who really should be separated.

Air Force Hopes to Reduce

“Miscellaneous”

Separations

In an effort to reduce first-term attrition, the Air Force has encouraged its

commanders to look carefully at voluntary separation packages to

reconsider retaining enlistees. It has also set numerical targets for

reducing attrition rates. Specifically, the Air Force has issued a message to

its commanders emphasizing the importance of restricting the numbers of

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

persons allowed to be released in the “miscellaneous” category. Persons

placed in this category include enlistees allowed to separate early to take

other employment, as well as enlistees released for reasons not included in

the Air Force’s list of separation codes. A successful reduction of this

category could have an important impact, as this reason for separation

represents 31 percent of all male and 23 percent of all female discharges.

However, the Air Force will first have to analyze more fully who makes up

this group and why they are being allowed to separate early.

Other than targeting this one type of separation, the Air Force has issued

no other guidance to its commanders on ways to reduce the attrition of

first-term personnel. Specifically, the Air Force has not issued guidance to

commanders that would assist them in identifying exactly what types of

cases should be reviewed or what accommodations should be made to

encourage more enlistees to complete their first terms.

The Air Force’s target is to reduce its overall first-term attrition from the

current rate of 32.5 percent to 27 percent. The Air Force has separated its

target into two parts. First, it hopes to reduce attrition during basic

training from its peak of 11 percent to 7 percent. Second, it hopes to

reduce attrition after basic training by 5 percentage points—to

20 percent—from a peak of 25 percent for enlistees entering the Air Force

in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. The Air Force plans to reevaluate these

targets each year. While setting such numeric targets sends a clear and

positive message to Air Force commanders about the importance of

lowering attrition, Air Force officials provided us with no evidence that Air

Force commanders had been asked to document what actions they take

that are successful. Such documentation would allow the Air Force to

apply successful methods to other units.

Army Plans to Retain More

Enlistees Experiencing

Performance Problems

In December 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed Army leaders to

reexamine their procedures to ensure that they were doing everything

possible to reduce first-term attrition. The Army has also set numerical

targets for reducing attrition. According to Army officials, however, the

only formal policy change is that the Army no longer allows enlistees with

bars to reenlistment to separate voluntarily. Like the Air Force, the Army

hopes that calling its local commanders’ attention to the importance of

retaining first-term personnel will result in lower attrition. Again, while we

believe that such attention is critical, we could not identify any specific

guidance to the commanders as to how they should go about retaining

enlistees other than those with bars to reenlistment.

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

In December 1996, the Army set the following numeric goals for reducing

first-term attrition:

• To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 10 percent by the end of fiscal 

year 1997. This would mean that the Army’s 37-percent rate would be

reduced to 34 percent.

• To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 20 percent by the end of fiscal 

year 1998. This would reduce the attrition rate to 30 percent.

• To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 33 percent by the end of fiscal 

year 2003. This would reduce the attrition rate to 25 percent.

The Army reports that it has met its goal for fiscal year 1997. However,

officials report that first-term attrition rates have leveled off, and the Army

is now reassessing what its long-term goal should be. Its tentative, revised

goal is to reduce the rate to 30 percent by 2003. On July 31, 1998, the

Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel outlined acceptable ranges for

training attrition. These ranges were intended to be used not as attrition

ceilings but rather as indicators. The Army’s focus, again, was on

emphasizing the importance of rehabilitating and instilling values in its

personnel.

Marine Corps Has Begun a

Unit Cohesion Program to

Improve Morale and

Thereby Reduce Attrition

While the Marine Corps has not established a numerical goal for the

reduction of first-term enlisted attrition, local commanders we spoke with

expressed their concerns about first-term attrition and cited their efforts

to reconsider discharging enlistees in their units. Like the Army and the

Air Force, however, Marine Corps officials cited only one formal policy

initiative that they believe may reduce the attrition of enlistees between

their 7th and 48th month of service. The Marine Corps calls this initiative a

“unit cohesion” program. Under this program, some enlistees have begun

to train and serve their first terms in groups of 2 to 13 people, depending

on the military occupational specialty.

Though the primary purpose of this program is to promote a greater sense

of teamwork among Marine Corps enlistees, Marine Corps officials believe

that the resulting higher morale will encourage more enlistees to complete

their first terms of service. While we agree that unit cohesion may have a

positive effect on lowering attrition, this effort is not directly linked to the

primary reasons for separation in the Marine Corps—medical problems,

misconduct, and drug use for men and pregnancy and medical problems

for women.

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

The Marine Corps has other initiatives to reduce first-term enlisted

attrition, but these are aimed at separations before enlistees have

completed their initial 6 months of service. These initiatives include

(1) increasing the amount of time that recruiters spend with their recruits

to improve their physical fitness and (2) restructuring recruit training to

add more core values training and a field event to the end of the basic

training period.

Navy Has Made No Formal

Policy Changes to Reduce

Attrition After Training

The Navy hopes to reduce first-term attrition, and Navy officials said that

initiatives for reducing attrition are aimed at the time enlistees spend in

training, because this is the period in which increases in attrition have

occurred. Among other things, Navy efforts to reduce attrition have been

focused on increasing their recruiters’ interaction with recruits before they

attend basic training and on improving physical training and

student/instructor ratios during training.

Navy officials cited no policy changes intended to reduce the numbers of

enlistees separated after training. Neither has the Navy set numerical

targets for reducing attrition rates.

Evidence Shows That

Positive Leadership

May Result in Lower

Attrition

There is some evidence that positive leadership, such as the type of

command emphasis the services are placing on reexamining the

separation of enlistees, could have a positive effect. However, during our

interviews with first-term enlistees and their supervisors, some continue to

believe that there is a “zero defects” mentality in the services. That is, they

believe that the services are not willing to work with a servicemember at

any pay grade to give him or her a chance at rehabilitation. This mentality

appears to be related to what some researchers have observed is the

“volunteer in, volunteer out” philosophy that came about when the draft

ended. During the draft era, some researchers have commented,

commanders believed that enlistees had an obligation to fulfill and were

more likely to work with enlistees experiencing motivational problems.

With the advent of the all-volunteer force, on the other hand, commanders

became less patient with below-average enlistees and were more likely to

separate them. One obvious result of this change in philosophy was a rise

in attrition after the draft ended.

There is some evidence that positive leadership, including the motivation

of enlistees who have the potential to be rehabilitated, has a direct effect

on lowering attrition. For example, in 1984, an Army Training and Doctrine

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Services’ Actions to Reduce First-Term

Attrition

Command (TRADOC) study of attrition during training found that “trainee

performance is nearly always a function of cadre leadership.” During the

Command team’s visits to training sites, it found that

units with lower attrition demonstrated concern for the individual, expected trainees to

meet standards, and were generally working to produce “a soldier I’d accept in a . . . unit.”

Cadres in units with higher TDP [Trainee Discharge Program] rates tended to be more

concerned with statistical accomplishments, fulfilling the traditional drill sergeant role, and

“weeding out the duds.” They emphasized graduating “the best soldier in the United States

Army” or “one I’d be proud to have in a . . . unit.” Their philosophy produced standards

beyond the norm.

The TRADOC team also found lower attrition rates in units that had higher

numbers of senior grade noncommissioned officers and effective buddy

systems.

A 1988 Rand study also suggested that management policies have an effect

on attrition and reported that the Army’s attrition rates decreased

immediately after the TRADOC study called attention to the issues of Army

leadership.1

 The Rand study compared enlistees with similar educational

levels and AFQT scores and found that the attrition of these groups

depended on what geographical locations they were assigned to. The study

concluded that the differences in attrition rates of similarly qualified

enlistees suggest that “factors such as institutional policies and practices

may have a critical effect on attrition levels.” The study noted that after the

TRADOC study was completed and the Army had begun to focus on attrition,

the Army’s attrition rates decreased in fiscal year 1985, resulting in the

retention of 4 percent more high quality men and 6 percent more high

quality women.

1

Richard Buddin, Trends in Attrition of High-Quality Military Recruits (Santa Monica, California: Rand

Corporation, Aug. 1988).

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Attrition

Services Do Not

Provide Sufficiently

Punitive Discharges to

Prevent Enlistees

From Seeking

Separation

During March 1998 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed

Services’ Subcommittee on Personnel, a panel of recruiters stressed the

importance of making new enlistees more aware of the commitment they

make in signing contracts for military service.2

 They expressed the opinion

that it is too easy for enlistees to get out of their service commitments.

One Army recruiter, for example, said, “Sometimes we have got to hold

them, hold their feet to the fire, so to speak, a little longer, and I think in

the end they would be happy.”

Our analysis of official reasons for separation and our interviews with

first-term enlistees confirm that some enlistees who are now being

separated might be retained if they faced stricter disincentives for early

separation. Some enlistees who may now be seeking “escape routes” by

reporting medical problems; committing minor disciplinary infractions; or

failing their physical training, career development tests, or weight

standards are now able to separate early and easily with honorable

discharges. One Army unit we visited had already begun to attempt to

close these easy ways out of the service by imposing more punitive

measures for behavior such as drug use. We do not believe that current

characterizations of service for enlistees whose behavior does not meet

standards provide adequate incentives for such enlistees to complete their

first terms.

2

Hearing to Receive Testimony on Recruiting and Retention Policies Within the Department of Defense

and the Military Services in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1999 and the

Future Years Defense Program, March 4, 1998.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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Conclusions and Recommendations

The services have been experiencing first-term attrition rates of about

one-third for over a decade. During this time, the services have targeted

their recruiting efforts toward enlisting high school diploma graduates

who score in the upper half of the AFQT because they have lower attrition

rates than recruits without these qualifications. This group continues to

show lower attrition rates than other recruit groups. However, because the

overwhelming majority of all recruits are now high school diploma

graduates with high AFQT scores, the services must turn their efforts to

encouraging more of their high-quality enlistees to complete their first

terms. Reducing attrition rates will be complex and difficult. However,

considering the cost of recruiting and training the thousands of enlistees

who do not complete their first terms of service, the payoff of reducing

attrition will be significant, since savings could then be channeled to other

defense priorities.

In reducing attrition, a first and critical step is for DOD to obtain more

complete data on the magnitude of its losses. We believe that all

separations—including voluntary releases more than 90 days early—need

to be reported so that DOD and the services have a fuller and more accurate

picture of their turnover rates. We are not suggesting that voluntary early

release programs were not cost-effective downsizing tools. Rather, we

believe that early releases should be managed and reported along with

other types of first-term attrition. Releases more than 90 days early clearly

result in a loss in the services’ recruiting and training investment.

Second, collecting better data on why enlistees are being separated is key

to the services’ ability to craft policies that increase the proportion of

first-term personnel who complete their contractual obligations. In our

1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made recommendations to

DOD and the services on ways to improve the use of separation codes to

build a database for DOD to manage attrition. These recommendations

were included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), and DOD is now working to implement them. Our

current work reaffirms the fact that separation codes are used

inconsistently by the services and that these codes are not specific enough

to capture exactly why separations are occurring. The assignment of these

codes requires a degree of subjective judgment. This subjectivity may

mask true reasons for separation and make it more difficult to analyze why

attrition is occurring and to determine what can be done to decrease it.

Third, data now available on the quality-of-life issues underlying attrition is

not tied to the services’ efforts to prevent the attrition of first-term

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Conclusions and Recommendations

enlistees. If the services could use the data they collect from their several

surveys on the quality of military life to prioritize first-term enlistees’

concerns, they could focus their attention on improvements that would

have the most impact on reducing the attrition of first-term personnel.

We believe that all the services are concerned about attrition and that

service leaders are conveying this concern to their local commanders. Two

services, the Army and the Air Force, have even set numerical goals for

reducing first-term attrition. However, while there is research to support

the positive effect of such command emphasis on finding ways to get more

high-quality personnel to complete their first terms, we believe that setting

numerical goals for reducing attrition without complete information on its

underlying causes or guidance on what specific actions should be taken to

reduce it may turn these goals into arbitrary ceilings.

While command emphasis on attrition is critical to the services’ efforts to

reduce it, this emphasis must be linked to clear policy changes that target

specific groups of enlistees the services wish to retain. Better guidance to

commanders on what actions should be taken to deal with identified

problems or what accommodations could be made to retain certain

categories of enlistees is also needed. The Army’s recent decision to

rehabilitate enlistees with bars to reenlistment is one example of a

successful policy change to reduce attrition. In this case, Army

commanders targeted a group of enlistees they wished to

retain—primarily those with performance problems—and made formal

policy changes to do so. The Army will now be able to measure the effects

of its policy change in terms of how many more enlistees it was able to

retain and why.

Our interviews with first-term enlistees, supervisors, and service officials

indicate that other types of enlistees could be targeted for remedial action

if specific mitigating actions are taken. For example, enlistees who commit

minor disciplinary infractions, who fail physical fitness or career

development tests, who are one-time drug users, or who become pregnant

may simply need to be provided further counseling, optional testing, other

job choices, or remedial training by their commissioned or

noncommissioned officers.

Finally, granting honorable discharges to enlistees who deliberately seek

ways out of fulfilling their service commitments simply encourages others

to do likewise. One Army unit we visited had already begun to attempt to

close these “escape routes” and impose more punitive measures against

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Conclusions and Recommendations

certain enlistees, particularly those found to use drugs. We believe that

some enlistees could be motivated to remain in the service if they knew

that there were no easy ways out of their contracts and that serious

negative consequences were associated with behavior or performance that

warranted discharge.

Recommendations To capture more accurately the numbers of enlisted personnel separated

before the end of their first terms, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense direct the service secretaries to include as a separate category the

numbers of first-term personnel released more than 90 days before the end

of their contract terms when they report first-term attrition rates. In order

to provide more information on what factors are related to first-term

attrition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the service

secretaries to use existing quality-of-life surveys or create new ones to

(1) collect information on the factors contributing to first-term enlistees’

separation and (2) identify quality-of-life initiatives aimed at reducing the

attrition of first-term personnel.

To retain as many first-term enlistees as possible, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense direct the service secretaries to take the following

actions:

• Continually emphasize to all commissioned and noncommissioned officers

the costs of first-term attrition, the difficulty of acquiring new enlistees to

replace early losses, and the importance of providing positive leadership in

targeting first-term enlistees who could be encouraged to complete their

contractual obligations.

• Collect more complete data on specific groups of enlistees whom the

services wish to target for remedial action and issue guidance and formal

policy changes to local commanders indicating what specific

actions—such as more counseling, optional testing, further job choices, or

remedial training—can be taken to prevent the early discharge of these

targeted groups. Possibilities for targeting include enlistees being

separated for minor disciplinary infractions, failure to pass physical fitness

tests and career development tests, one-time drug use, and pregnancy.

• Reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharge to

enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation and

ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete

their first terms.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings

and recommendations. (DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in

app. III.) In an overall comment, DOD stated that our focus on the early

separation of enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 might

make it appear that attrition rates are higher than they really are because

the persons in this group enlisted at the peak of military downsizing. As

we state in our report, we concentrated our detailed analysis on this group

of enlistees because they represented the group for whom the latest data

was available 48 months after enlistment. We agree that the services might

have been more willing to release first-term enlistees early during this

period of downsizing. However, it should be noted that the peak of

downsizing did not occur in fiscal year 1993. Rather, by fiscal year 1993,

DOD was well into the downward trend in its force structure that had begun

in the late 1980s.

In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed to direct the services

to (1) review their 90-day release policies and the exceptions granted to

those policies, (2) prepare a report on quality-of-life issues that could be

addressed to reduce attrition, (3) provide local commanders with guidance

and formal policy changes related to specific types of attrition the services

target for remedial action, (4) reassess the appropriateness of providing

favorable types of discharges to enlistees whose behavior or performance

led to their early separation to ensure that proper incentives exist to

encourage enlistees to complete their first terms, and (5) prepare a report

by October 1999 documenting service initiatives related to our

recommendations.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Attrition Rates by Demographics

Table I.1: 48-Month Attrition Rates by

Education Level for Enlistees Who

Entered the Services in Fiscal Year

1993

Figures in percentages

Education level Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

All

services

3-4 years of high school, with no

diploma or general equivalency

degree

54.2 51.6 38.0 37.8 51.1

High school diploma 38.6 34.6 31.1 32.5 35.0

General equivalency degree 56.0 54.9 51.5 45.9 54.8

Alternate education credentiala 52.2 50.0 38.6 38.5 48.2

aPersons who receive home study diplomas are included in the category of those holding

“alternate educational credentials.” In fiscal year 1993, the services enlisted 85 persons who had

home school diplomas. Though their numbers are too small for meaningful interpretations, their

attrition rate was 35.3 percent.

Table I.2: 48-Month Attrition Rates by

Armed Forces Qualification Test

Category and Score for Enlistees Who

Entered the Services in Fiscal Year

1993

Figures in percentages

AFQT category and score Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

All

services

Category III B (31-49) 42.8 40.1 35.1 39.1 40.0

Category III A (50-64) 41.9 37.2 32.3 33.9 37.6

Category II (65-92) 35.6 32.4 28.5 29.5 32.4

Category I (93-99) 29.5 28.4 22.6 25.0 27.5

Note: Attrition rates for enlistees in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category IV C

(with scores ranging from 10-15), category IV B (with scores ranging from 16-20), and category IV

A (with scores ranging from 21-30) were not included in the table because their numbers were too

small to show meaningful patterns. For example, in fiscal year 1993, the services enlisted only 2

persons in category IV C; 8 persons in category IV B; and 1,612 persons in category IV A.

Table I.3: 48-Month Attrition Rates by

Age at Enlistment for Enlistees

Entering the Services in Fiscal Year

1993

Figures in percentages

Age at enlistment Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

All

services

17 38.5 37.3 31.6 34.0 36.2

18 38.7 33.6 28.4 32.5 33.8

19 42.0 36.9 32.6 34.3 37.4

20 41.2 38.2 34.6 34.0 38.1

21 40.5 35.3 33.4 31.9 36.6

22 38.4 35.6 35.3 27.7 35.3

23 34.6 35.3 39.9 28.8 34.3

24 and above 35.4 37.2 38.2 28.8 35.2

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Attrition Rates by Demographics

Table I.4: 48-Month Attrition Rates for

Male and Female Enlistees Entering

the Services in Fiscal Year 1993

Figures in percentages

Service Female attrition rate Male attrition rate

Army 51.5 37.0

Navy 39.2 35.3

Marine Corps 49.1 30.7

Air Force 37.9 30.9

All services 44.5 34.4

Table I.5: 48-Month Attrition Rates by

Race/Ethnic Group for Enlistees

Entering the Services in Fiscal Year

1993

Figures in percentages

Race/ethnic group Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

All

services

White 40.8 36.6 32.2 33.1 36.7

Black 38.1 37.8 35.1 32.1 37.0

Hispanic 29.7 30.1 24.0 24.0 28.1

American Indian/

Alaskan Native

45.0 38.2 32.6 39.3 39.4

Asian/

Pacific Islander

29.1 19.9 22.7 25.8 24.3

Other 37.3 32.1 26.4 32.9 32.6

Note: The small numbers of enlistees in three of these subgroups may limit analysis of these

statistics. For example, for enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, 1,287 were

categorized as “Other”; 1,459 were American Indian/Alaskan Native; and 4,487 were Asian/Pacific

Islanders. On the other hand, 146,568 were white; 33,782 were black; and 15,325 were Hispanic.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Table II.1: Army Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Precision Equipment 32 19 59.4

Radio and Radio Code 6,525 3,244 49.7

Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment 1,047 428 40.9

Food Service 11,541 4,665 40.4

Metalworking 1,410 534 37.9

Artillery/Gunnery, Rockets, and Missiles 30,398 11,130 36.6

Missile Mechanical and Electrical 1,230 448 36.4

Weather 216 76 35.2

Personal Service 668 233 34.9

Construction 5,218 1,817 34.8

Wire Communications 3,202 1,102 34.4

Motor Transport 11,006 3,727 33.9

Religious, Morale and Welfare 1,086 361 33.2

Infantry 61,769 20,493 33.2

Administration 10,166 3,342 32.9

Law Enforcement 14,889 4,883 32.8

Fabric, Leather, and Rubber 232 76 32.8

Mapping, Surveying, Drafting, and Illustrating 1,743 568 32.6

Medical Administration and Logistics 2,147 693 32.3

Information and Education 473 152 32.1

Seamanship 664 213 32.1

Utilities 1,369 438 32.0

Material Receipt, Storage and Issue 7,934 2,517 31.7

Dental Care 1,754 553 31.5

Technical Specialists, N.E.C. 5,225 1,647 31.5

Lithography 325 102 31.4

Communications Center Operations 8,633 2,703 31.3

Armor and Amphibious 11,765 3,645 31.0

Combat Engineering 13,050 4,043 31.0

Armament and Munitions 6,689 2,056 30.7

Other Functional Support 23,731 7,260 30.6

Other Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 1,185 362 30.6

Automotive 30,115 9,152 30.4

Radar and Air Traffic Control 1,551 468 30.2

Fire Control Electronic Systems (Non-Missile) 295 89 30.2

(continued)

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Personnel 7,931 2,374 29.9

Medical Care 21,932 6,563 29.9

Other Electronic Equipment 886 260 29.4

Combat Operations Control 15,660 4,535 29.0

ADP Computers 520 148 28.5

Power Generating Equipment 6,017 1,706 28.4

Accounting, Finance and Disbursing 2,270 643 28.3

Data Processing 1,751 494 28.2

Missile Guidance, Control and Checkout 1,853 521 28.1

Biomedical Sciences and Allied Health 3,100 870 28.1

Ancillary Medical Support 3,465 960 27.7

Forward Area Equipment Support 1,213 329 27.1

Aircraft and Aircraft Related 8,292 1,974 23.8

Shipboard Propulsion 319 75 23.5

Photography 800 175 21.9

Signal Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare 6,591 1,424 21.6

Radio/Radar 16,349 3,470 21.2

Intelligence 5,474 1,057 19.3

Musicians 853 129 15.1

Ordnance Disposal and Diving 498 41 8.2

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Table II.2: Navy Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Missile Guidance, Control and Checkout 18,164 7,106 39.1

Food Service 10,970 3,272 29.8

Seamanship 25,189 7,205 28.6

Material Receipt, Storage and Issue 2,026 567 28.0

Other Craftsworkers, N.E.C. 8,224 2,116 25.7

Construction 3,808 971 25.5

Radio and Radio Code 8,438 2,026 24.0

Lithography 298 71 23.8

Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment 1,020 237 23.2

Automotive 952 218 22.9

Sonar Equipment 4,424 1,008 22.8

Dental Care 2,521 570 22.6

Shipboard Propulsion 22,061 4,906 22.2

Air Crew 10,546 2,297 21.8

Forward Area Equipment Support 976 212 21.7

Radar and Air Traffic Control 10,888 2,315 21.3

Armament and Munitions 4,766 961 20.2

Photography 656 130 19.8

Data Processing 1,446 286 19.8

Wire Communications 3,123 616 19.7

Artillery/Gunnery, Rockets, and Missiles 3,032 595 19.6

Medical Care 15,298 2,809 18.4

Personnel 3,552 625 17.6

Personal Service 1,262 220 17.4

Administration 6,947 1,198 17.2

Precision Equipment 1,051 178 16.9

Other Functional Support 10,707 1,790 16.7

Utilities 2,174 362 16.7

Accounting, Finance and Disbursing 1,358 224 16.5

Metalworking 4,634 756 16.3

Information and Education 366 59 16.1

Religious, Morale and Welfare 633 98 15.5

Weather 1,019 156 15.3

Radio/Radar 13,595 1,931 14.2

ADP Computers 1,635 229 14.0

(continued)

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Fire Control Electronic Systems (Non-Missile) 2,334 325 13.9

Aircraft and Aircraft Related 27,581 3,793 13.8

Power Generating Equipment 15,989 2,015 12.6

Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare 4,940 598 12.1

Communications Center Operations 1,504 182 12.1

Other Electronic Equipment 1,680 179 10.7

Intelligence 1,099 94 8.6

Sonar 1,083 84 7.8

Armor and Amphibious 28 2 7.1

Combat Operations Control 66 4 6.1

Motor Transport 36 2 5.6

Ancillary Medical Support 2,665 145 5.4

Combat Engineering 19 1 5.3

Other Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 887 45 5.1

Musicians 332 15 4.5

Biomedical Sciences and Allied Health 654 28 4.3

Mapping, Surveying, Drafting, and Illustrating 91 3 3.3

Law Enforcement 582 19 3.3

Industrial Gas and Fuel Production 224 4 1.8

Ordnance Disposal and Diving 729 10 1.4

Infantry 659 8 1.2

Technical Specialists, N.E.C. 147 1 0.7

Installation Security 1,510 4 0.3

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Table II.3: Air Force Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Religious, Morale and Welfare 336 152 45.2

Fire Control Electronic Systems (Non-Missile) 48 18 37.5

Lithography 173 56 32.4

Nuclear Weapons Equipment 500 160 32.0

Material Receipt, Storage and Issue 4,161 1,296 31.2

Metalworking 742 215 29.0

Food Service 3,767 1,086 28.8

Missile Mechanical and Electrical 1,027 264 25.7

Motor Transport 2,328 598 25.7

Construction 3,366 845 25.1

Photography 818 204 24.9

Law Enforcement 4,971 1,221 24.6

Utilities 4,532 1,111 24.5

Forward Area Equipment Support 1,077 261 24.2

Armament and Munitions 7,641 1,848 24.2

Personnel 2,803 668 23.8

Medical Care 6,176 1,465 23.7

Fabric, Leather, and Rubber 732 172 23.5

Biomedical Sciences and Allied Health 1,805 423 23.4

Installation Security 9,113 2,102 23.1

Technical Specialists, N.E.C. 3,527 807 22.9

Automotive 2,183 495 22.7

Dental Care 1,669 372 22.3

Administration 5,817 1,293 22.2

Medical Administration and Logistics 2,296 504 22.0

Accounting, Finance and Disbursing 1,772 381 21.5

Wire Communications 1,615 346 21.4

Other Functional Support 14,080 2,973 21.1

Missile Guidance, Control and Checkout 918 192 20.9

Radar and Air Traffic Control 2,596 533 20.5

Weather 1,286 262 20.4

Power Generating Equipment 691 139 20.1

Aircraft and Aircraft Related 22,763 4,504 19.8

Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare 3,367 639 19.0

Radio and Radio Code 1,704 323 19.0

(continued)

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Mapping, Surveying, Drafting, and Illustrating 833 157 18.9

Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment 899 169 18.8

Ancillary Medical Support 2,378 445 18.7

Data Processing 5,679 1,062 18.7

Infantry 489 89 18.2

Combat Operations Control 1,076 192 17.8

Other Electronic Equipment 4,596 813 17.7

Radio/Radar 8,820 1,491 16.9

Intelligence 1,005 164 16.3

Ordnance Disposal and Diving 324 50 15.4

ADP Computers 1,334 203 15.2

Information and Education 367 52 14.2

Air Crew 1,150 161 14.0

Musicians 255 34 13.3

Artillery/Gunnery, Rockets, and Missiles 48 1 2.1

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Table II.4: Marine Corps Attrition by DOD Primary Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Religious, Morale and Welfare 57 16 28.1

Food Service 3,047 798 26.2

Material Receipt, Storage and Issue 4,393 1,035 23.6

Motor Transport 7,688 1,785 23.2

Clerical/Personnel 1,610 365 22.7

Metalworking 482 109 22.6

Personal Service 959 216 22.5

Communications Center Operations 1,493 335 22.4

Construction 1,675 364 21.7

Lithography 88 19 21.6

Combat Engineering 4,042 861 21.3

Fabric, Leather, and Rubber 80 17 21.3

Administration 6,006 1,276 21.3

Accounting, Finance and Disbursing 1,028 217 21.1

Armor and Amphibious 2,654 558 21.0

Utilities 1,670 350 21.0

Artillery/Gunnery, Rockets, and Missiles 4,174 861 20.6

Infantry 34,671 7,041 20.3

Other Functional Support 8,133 1,618 19.9

Radio and Radio Code 6,975 1,355 19.4

Armament and Munitions 4,115 787 19.1

Wire Communications 2,064 394 19.1

Automotive 6,722 1,267 18.9

Law Enforcement 3,491 568 16.3

Industrial Gas and Fuel Production 136 22 16.2

Forward Area Equipment Support 693 112 16.2

Weather 284 44 15.5

Missile Guidance, Control and Checkout 1,362 211 15.5

Technical Specialists, N.E.C. 1,353 209 15.5

Seamanship 54 8 14.8

Musicians 589 86 14.6

Other Electronic Equipment 342 46 13.5

Radar and Air Traffic Control 949 123 13.0

Information and Education 220 28 12.7

Photography 209 26 12.4

(continued)

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Attrition Rates by Occupation

Occupation

Number of enlistees

entering in fiscal years

1989-93

Number who

separated early

Attrition rate

(percent)

Aircraft and Aircraft Related 6,523 779 11.9

Radio/Radar 4,890 567 11.6

Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment 295 34 11.5

Data Processing 1,226 133 10.9

Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare 1,214 130 10.7

Precision Equipment 346 36 10.4

Medical Care 40 4 10.0

Mapping, Surveying, Drafting, and Illustrating 305 30 9.8

Combat Operations Control 55 5 9.1

Intelligence 550 43 7.8

ADP Computers 257 20 7.8

Air Crew 727 36 5.0

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 60.

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 9 and 59.

See pp. 9 and 60.

Now on pp. 9 and 59.

See pp. 9 and 60.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 9 and 59.

See pp. 9, 10, and 60.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol Schuster

William Beusse

Beverly Schladt

James Driggins

Frank Bowen

Julia Kennon

Charles Perdue

Nancy Ragsdale

(703220) Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-98-213 Military Attrition
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