## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-15-00195-CV

TERRY REVELLAPPELLANT
V. MORRISON SUPPLY COMPANY, LLC APPELLEE

---------- FROM COUNTY COUR T AT LAW NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 2014-001828-2

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### OPINION

---------- Appellant Terry Revell appe als the trial court’s take -nothing judgment in favor of appellee Morrison Supply Company, LLC (Morrison Supply). In two issues, he contends that the trial c ourt erred by granting Morrison Supply’s traditional motion for summary judgment on the basis of his alleged lack of standing. We reverse the trial court’s ju dgment and remand th is case to that court for further proceedings.2 Background Facts Revell sued Morrison Supply. In his or iginal petition, he pled that in February 2013, while he was at Morri son Supply’s business, one of Morrison Supply’s employees caused 4, 000 pounds of pipe to fall on him, which caused him to suffer severe injuries. He brou ght a claim for neg ligence and sought damages. Morrison Supply answered the suit by pleading that Revell lacked standing. Specifically, Mo rrison Supply pled in its first amended answer that Revell had previously filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy; 1 that his negligence claim against Morrison Supply, which was based on an injury occurring during the bankruptcy case, was property of the bankruptcy estate ; and that he therefore had no standing to pursue the claim. Morrison Supply filed a tr aditional motion for summ ary judgment on the standing issue. In the motion, Morrison Supply argued in part, [Revell] has no standing because an y interest he had in the instant action was transferred to his bankru ptcy estate before he sued. As such, there is no controversy between [him and] . . . Morrison Supply. Further, because [Revell] failed to disclose his claim to the bankruptcy court, despite his affirm ative duty to do so, the claim did not return to him when his bank ruptcy case was dismissed and closed.

1 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–30 (West 2016). Chapter 13 allows wageearning debtors to “reorganize with a repayment plan as an alternative to seeking a complete discharge of debts thro ugh the . . . liquidation process.” In re Meza , 467 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2006).3 To its summary judgment motion, Morrison Supply attached evidence showing that Revell filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy pet ition in December 2012, that he filed an amended bankruptcy pl an that same month, that creditors objected to the confirmation of the plan, t hat the trustee filed a motion to dismiss for Revell’s failure to obtain timely confirma tion of the plan in February 2013, and that the bankruptcy court di smissed the case in April 20 13 while explicitly stating that Revell’s debts were not discharged. 2 The evidence also showed that Revell never formally disclosed his potential cl aim against Morrison Su pply as an asset in any document he filed with the bank ruptcy court even though one schedule asked him to list “contingent and unliq uidated claims of every nature.” Revell responded to Morrison Supply’ s summary judgment motion. He argued, in part, that he had met any disclosure requirem ent because his wife had verbally informed the bankruptcy trustee about his injury at Morrison Supply, that any property vested in the bankruptcy estate was revested in him when the bankruptcy case was dismissed, and th at Morrison Supply’s motion was based on a “discredited” and “rogue” case from this court, Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick , 205 S.W.3d 690, 700–03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). 3 He also contended that Morrison Supply would rece ive a windfall if the trial court granted summary judgment on the sta nding argument, stating,

2 Another document from the bankruptcy court’s record shows that the amount of “unsecured claims dischar ged without paymen t” was “$0.00.”

3 We discuss Kilpatrick below.4 This Court must ask itself: who is prejudiced if this case proceeds? Because there was no bankruptcy plan ever confirmed and the bankruptcy was di smissed, [Revell’s] credit ors have full collection rights and [Revell] is still obligated to pay each creditor in full. If this case proceeds, [Morriso n Supply’s] obligation s remain exactly the same as they would have had the bankruptcy trustee brought the claims: to pay [Revell] damages on ly in the event a jury determines they have liability. Finally, Revell contended that a federal statute—11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3) (West 2015)—unambiguously revested all assets (including a ll potential claims) in him upon dismissal of th e bankruptcy case. To his response, Revell attached su mmary judgment evidence, including affidavits from him and his wife. Revell testified through his affidavit that his injuries occurred in February 2013 but that he did not re alize that he “had a claim at that point.” He stated that he learned he had a cl aim against Morrison Supply well after the dismissal of the bankruptcy case, when his attorney in this case completed the investigation about the incident leading to his injuries. Revell’s wife swore that after Reve ll was injured, she called the bankruptcy trustee to inform the trustee about th e injury. She stated, The Trustee told me that the bank ruptcy court has no sympathy for injuries and our case w ould be dismissed if we were unable to timely make our payments. I told them there was no way to make a payment and thought the case woul d just be dismissed. I had no idea my husband actually ha d a claim at that point. A few days after calling the Trus tee, Terry continued to talk about how his injuries occurred[,] and I thought [M orrison Supply] should be held resp onsible. We met with an attorney a few days later. The attorney to ok the case under investigation. I was unsure if a case would be filed until afte r the investigation was complete. After the attorney receiv ed all the information, he let us know he was5 going to file a lawsuit on behalf ofTerry. This was about 14 months after the injuries occurred. In its reply to Revell’s response, Mo rrison Supply contended, in part, that although Revell may have disclosed his in jury during the bankruptcy case, he had not disclosed a potential cause of action formally th rough schedules as required. Morrison Supply also argued th at section 349(b)(3) did not revest the potential claim in Revell after the bankru ptcy’s dismissal be cause the potential claim arose during the pendency of the bankruptcy (rather than before its commencement) and because section 349(b)(3) does not apply when a party fails to disclose an asset in the bankruptcy court. The trial court granted Morrison Supp ly’s summary judgment motion and ordered that Revell take nothing. Revell brought this appeal. Revell’s Standing In his two issues, Revell contends th at the trial court erred by granting Morrison Supply’s summary judgment motion based on his alleged lack of standing because his chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed, 4 the property subject to the bankruptcy revested in him, there is no prejudice to the creditors or Morrison Supply by allowing him to proc eed on his claim in this suit, and a genuine issue of material fact exists co ncerning whether he adequately disclosed

4 Revell argues in part, “The trial court erred in finding that the personal injury claim belonged to the bankrupt cy estate and [finding that] once the bankruptcy estate was dismissed, Revell was deprived of stan ding to bring the claim.”6 his potential claim in the ba nkruptcy case by verbally informing the trustee about his injuries. Morrison Suppl y contends that Revell’s negligence claim is the property of his bankruptcy estate and th at he therefore lacks standing to assert the claim in this suit. Morrison Supply also contends that while Revell may have disclosed his injuries to the trustee, he did not properly disclose the potential claim in the bankruptcy ca se by amending his person al property schedule, and the dismissal of Revell’s bank ruptcy case did not revest in him property that he had failed to disclose. We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). A defendant that conclusively negates a plaintiff’s standing is entit led to summary judgment. See Bland ISD v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000); Duque v. Wells Fargo, N.A. , 462 S.W.3d 542, 550 (Tex. App.—Houston [1stDist.] 2015, no pet.). St anding is a component of subject matter jurisdiction that focuses on who may properly bring a claim. Lake v. Cravens , 488 S.W.3d 867, 885, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Arlington v. Centerfolds, Inc. , 232 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“The issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a justiciable interest in its outcome.”). A court mu st have subject matte r jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, and without it, the me rits of a case may not be reached. Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co. , 362 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).7 As both parties focus their briefi ng and their contentions concerning standing, in part, on our prior decision in Kilpatrick , we will begin by discussing that decision. There, the plaintiff in a state case concerni ng the ownership of certain stock had filed separ ate federal bankruptcy peti tions in 1990, 1995, and 1996 without disclosing his ownership of the stock as an asset in any of the bankruptcy cases. Kilpatrick , 205 S.W.3d at 693–95. The plaintiff received a discharge in the first bankruptcy, while the second and third bankruptcies were dismissed. Id. at 695. The defendants in the state litigation obtained a summary judgment on the basis that the stock was the property of the bankruptcy estates created by the bankruptcy f ilings and that, ther efore, only the bankruptcy trustees had standing to bring claims related to the stock. Id. at 699. We upheld the summary judgment, stating, When a debtor files a bankruptcypetition, all of his property, including all legal and equitable interests, instantly becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Antonov v. Walters , 168 S.W.3d 901, 904–05 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. d enied). When property passes into the bankruptcy estate, the de btor loses all right, title, and interest in the property. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West [2016]). [5]

5 Section 541 states that the commence ment of a bankrupt cy case creates an estate that holds the debt or’s legal or equitable in terests in property, with some exceptions. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1); see also Norris , 362 S.W.3d at 231 (“[V]irtually all of a debtor’s assets , including causes of action at the commencement of the case, vest in the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.”). Once an asset becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, all rights held by the debtor in the asset ar e typically extinguish ed unless the asset is abandoned by the trustee. Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(d) (Wes t 2016) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, property ofthe estate that is not ab andoned under this section and that is not administered in the ca se remains property of the estate.”); Norris , 362 S.W.3d at 231.8 When this occurs, a debtor also lose s standing to pur sue claims held by the bankruptcy estate. [ Douglas v. Delp , 987 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. 1999).] The trustee, as the representative of the estate, gains exclusive standing to assert any cl aim arising from the violation of rights associated with the estate. Id. Here, [the plaintiff] asserts that because the 1995 a nd 1996 bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed before a final disposit ion was made, the . . . stock revested with him, giving him stan ding to bring this claim. We disagree. When a bankruptcy case is di smissed, the property of the estate revests in the entity in which the property was vested immediately before the commencemen t of the case. 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3). [6] The practical effect of a dismissal is to “undo” the bankruptcy case by restoring all property rights to the person to whom they belonged immediately bef ore the initiation of the case. Kunica v. St. Jean Financial, Inc. , 233 B.R. 46, 53–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). But there is an important caveat to this rule on which we base our decision: up on the dismissal of a bankruptcy case, the estate’s assets revest in the debtor only if the assets were disclosed to the bankruptcy court when t he debtor scheduled his assets. Id. Here, [the plaintiff] filed two Chapt er 13 bankruptcies in 1995 and 1996. As a result of these filin gs, all assets he held became the property of the bankruptcy estates. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a). [The plaintiff] did not disclose any inte rest in . . . stock within his bankruptcy schedules as required pu rsuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a). Therefore, when the 1995 bank ruptcy was dismissed, the 900 shares of . . . stock remained with the bankruptcy estate. In making our decision, we have carefully considered the importance of the disclosure requirem ent in bankruptcy cases. Full disclosure of the debtor’s assets is absolutely required when a bankruptcy case is first initiated, and the debtor is required to

6 Section 349(b)(3) states that “[u] nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal” of a bankruptcy case “revests the propertyof the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of t he case.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3); see also Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. , 758 F.3d 473, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that section 349(b)(3) controls over section 554(d) because after dismissal of a bankruptcy case, there is “no longer an y bankruptcy estate . . . [and] no longer any property of the estate”).9 provide a complete schedule of his assets to the trustee. [7] In re Coastal Plains, Inc. , 179 F.3d 197, 207–08 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1117, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2 000). . . . Full disclosure is crucial to the integrity of bankruptcyproceedings; thus, we hold that all nondisclosures of assets, whatev er the reason, must be treated the same. To hold otherwise woul d encourage a procedural end-run around the disclosure requirements. It would provide the opportunity for debtors to assert ignorance abou t ownership of an asset only to conveniently discover owne rship of the asset at a later time. Hence, differentiating between intentional and unintentional disclosure would undermine the Bankruptcy Code ’s requirement of [disclosure], and we hold that all instances ofnondisclosure ofassets will be treated the same. It is for this reason that we accept the reasoning of Kunicaand hold that only disclosed asse ts will be revested to the debtor upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding. . . . Here, the 900 shares of stock remained with the bankruptcy estate upon the di smissal of the 1995 bankruptcy because [the plaintiff] did not di sclose the asse ts when the proceedings began . . . . As such, the 900 sh ares of undisclosed . . . stock remained with the bankruptcyestate, and [the plaintiff] has no standing to assert claims arising from the sale of the 900 shares. . . . [T]he law established in Kunica. . . applies to all bankruptcy proceedings: estate a ssets can revest in the debtor only if the assets were disclos ed to the bankruptcy court. Id. at 701–03 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).

7 We have stated, In a bankruptcy action, the d ebtor must disclose all assets including contingent or unliquidated cl aims. The duty to disclose is a continuing duty that requires the debtor to amend schedules and forms if circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy change. If the debtor knows enou gh information to sugges t that she might have a cause of action, then she must disclose th e potential cause of action. Horsley-Layman v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. , 221 S.W.3d 802, 806–07 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (citations omitted).10 The principal takeaway from our decision in Kilpatrick is that based on one federal districtcourt decision— Kunica 8 —we held that the revesting of assets in a debtor that usually occurs upon the dism issal of a bankruptcycase under section 349(b)(3) does not occur when the assets were not disclosed in a bankruptcy schedule. See id. But this holding from Kilpatrick (along with the holding in Kunica , which Kilpatrick echoed), which is untethered to the plain and unambiguous revesting langua ge of section 349(b)(3), 9 has been criticized by state and federal courts. For example, in Norris , our sister intermediate appellate court in Dallas considered the question of whether a debt or lacked standing to litigate a lawsuit because of her failure to di sclose the claim in her di smissed bankruptcy case.

8 In Kunica , the court concluded that only disclosed assets revert to a debtor under section 349(b)(3) after dismissal. 23 3 B.R. at 54–55. The court stated that certain factors “militate[d] in favor” of that conclusion, including that the debtor in that case “obtained . . . dismissal after [the bankruptcy] case was fully administered and all of its assets scheduled, [so] it ar guably obtained the functional equivalent of a discharge.” Id. at 55. Similarly, although two of the bankruptcies at issue in Kilpatrick had been dismissed, it appears that the debtor received some relief because our opinion re cites that the “creditors in all three bankruptcies were paid in full, with inte rest.” 205 S.W.3d at 695. There is no indication in the record of this appeal that Revell re ceived any relief from his debts during his bankruptcy.

9 We generally apply a statute accord ing to its plain and unambiguous language unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. See Jack Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Jack Cty. Hosp. Dist. , 484 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); see also Lippincott v. Whisenhunt , 462 S.W.3d 507, 508 (Tex. 2015) (“A court may not judicially am end a statute by adding words that are not contained in the la nguage of the statute. Instead, it must apply the statute as written.”).11 362 S.W.3d at 229, 231. The Dallas court noted that the “basic purpose” of section 349(b)(3)’s revesting la nguage is to “und o the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable, and to restore all property rights to the po sition in whic h they were found at the commencement of the case.” Id. at 232 (citing In re Petty , 848 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 1009 (1989)). Applying section 349(b)(3)’s plain wording, the court concluded that No rris’s lawsuit revested in her at the dismissal of her bankruptcy de spite her failure to disclose it during the bankruptcy; the court explicitly rejected our contrary holding in Kilpatrick

. 10 Id. Similarly, in Crawford , a federal court of appeals, rejecting Kunica ’s holding, held that a debtor’s claim revested in her despite her failure to disclose it during a dismissed bankruptcy . 758 F.3d at 485. The court noted that section 349(b)(3)’s revesting language is broa d and “makes no distinction between [assets] that were listed in the debtor’s schedule . . . and those that were not.” Id. at 484. The court stated that the “dis missal of [a] case under [section] 349, automatically revesting all of the property of the estate in its prior owners, means that there are no assets remaining to be abandoned or administered.” Id . at 485.

10 Morrison Supply contends that “Revell does not argue on appeal that his claim revested in him when his bankruptcy case was di smissed and closed.” We conclude that he does so in hi s original brief by challenging Kilpatrick and by relying on Norris while quoting its discussion of se ction 349(b)(3) and in his reply brief by explicitly contending that the dismissal of the ba nkruptcy case vested this claim in him under section 349(b)(3). Morrison Supply also argues that Norris is distinguishable because it concerned a chapter 7 bankruptcy, but Morrison Supply does not explain why this differenc e affects the applic ation of section 349(b)(3).12 Several other courts across the country have joined these criticisms of the holdings in Kunica and Kilpatrick and have applied the pl ain language of section 349(b)(3) to conclude that a debtor had standing to bring a suit despite the debtor’s failure to di sclose the claim in a di smissed bankruptcy. See Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 356 P.3d 946, 950 (Colo. App. 2014) (holding that upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy case , “[a]ll of the property that was transferred from the debtor to the estate revests in the de btor regardless of whether the debtor di sclosed it to the b ankruptcy court”); Ass’n Res., Inc. v. Wall, 2 A.3d 873, 889 (Co nn. 2010) (concluding that un der section 349(b)(3), the “failure to disclose a cause of action in bankruptcy proceedings does not preclude the assertion of that claim in proceedings instituted after the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings”); B.N. Realty Assocs. v. Lichtenstein , 801 N.Y.S.2d 271, 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[T]he dismissal of the bankruptcy case had the effect, pursuant to [section 349(b )(3)], of restoring [the debtor’s] standing to assert his [claims] in this action, notwithstanding his failure (which we obviously do not cond one) to disclose such matt ers in the bankruptcy case . . . .”). 11 These courts’ conclusions are supp orted by the longstanding principle that the dismissal of a bank ruptcy case has the effect of the case having never been filed. See In re Dumontier , 389 B.R. 890, 897 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008); In re

11 We have not found any case citing Kilpatrick in support of the proposition that a debtor’s failure to disclose an as set precludes revesting of the asset under section 349(b)(3).13 Derrick , 190 B.R. 346, 350 (Ban kr. W.D. Wis. 1995); see also In re Income Prop. Builders, Inc. , 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1983) (op. on reh’g) (“After an order of dismissal, the debtor’s debts and prop erty are subject to the general laws, unaffected by bankruptcy concepts.”); In re Garnett , 303 B.R. 274, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that “dismissal undoes the bankruptcy estate”); In re Sports & Sci., Ind., Inc. , 95 B.R. 745, 747 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (“[Section 349(b)(3)] attempts to place the parties in the same position they had prior to the commencement of the case.”). The language of se ction 349(b)(3) is unqualified; it states simply that unless a court orders otherwise, the dismissal of a bankruptcy revests the estate’s property in the enti ty in which the property wa s previously vested. 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3). Noth ing in the section states that revesting is subject to disclosure requirements. Id. Rather, the section pr otects the interests of creditors and the bankruptcy process by allowing a court, for cause, to alter the general rule of revest ing upon dismissal on a case-by-case basis. Id. Thus, if a bankruptcy court finds that undisclosed assets, if in ex istence, could impact the decision to dismiss, or if the debtor is receiving a “functional equivalent of a discharge” through the dismissal (as in Kunica ), or if other considerations exist impacting the fairness to debtors or cr editors of the revesting of undisclosed assets, the court has the authority to fashion an appropriate remedy in its14 dismissal order. 12 See id. ; Kunica , 233 B.R. at 55; see also Iannini v. Winnecour , 487 B.R. 434, 439 (W.D. Pa . 2012) (“[A] bankruptcy co urt has the ability under [section 349] to retain jurisdiction over the administration of the estate in its dismissal order, if it fi nds cause to do so.”). We conclude that the “cav eat” to section 349(b)(3) that formed the basis of our holding in Kilpatrick is neither supported by th e plain, unambiguous language of that section nor necessary to protect the interests of creditors or the integrity of the bankruptcy process. Therefore, we ho ld that to that exte nt, our decision in Kilpatrick was erroneous, an d we overrule it. 13 We hold that under the plain language of section 349(b)(3 ), the dismissal of a bankruptcy case revests the property of the bankruptcy estate “in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the comm encement of the case” ev en if the debtor did not properly disclose the property during the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3); see Crawford , 758 F.3d at 485; Norris , 362 S.W.3d at 231–32. Thus, when the bankruptcy court dism issed Revell’s bankrupt cy petition, property that the estate once held revested in him, and he has stan ding to pursue his claim in this suit. 14 See Norris , 362 S.W.3d at 231–32; B.N. Realty Assocs. , 801 N.Y.S.2d at 276.

12 The bankruptcy court did not do so here.

13 Furthermore, we now expressly reject the holding in Kunica

.
14 Given this holding, we ne ed not decide other lega l disputes presented in the parties’ briefs, including whether Reve ll otherwise had standing to bring this suit based on distinct aspects of a c hapter 13 bankruptcy and whether Revell adequately disclosed his po tential claim to the bankruptcy trustee by informing15 To the extent that Morrison Supply contends that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6009 c onflicts with this holding, we disagree. That rule states, “With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence an d prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6009 (emphasis added). We conclude that this rule does not applyhere because upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy case, no bankruptcy estate continues to exist. See Crawford , 758 F.3d at 485; Garnett , 303 B.R. at 278; Mackall , 356 P.3d at 951. Morrison Supply argues that the “plain terms of [section] 349 provide that assets that existed before the commencement of a b ankruptcy return to the person . . . that owned thos e assets before the bankru ptcy.” Thus, according to Morrison Supply, because Revell acquir ed his potential claim during his bankruptcy (when he was injured) rather than before it, section 349(b)(3) does not apply. We cannot agre e because the effectof section 349(b )(3) is to divest the bankruptcy estate of all property upon a case’s dismissal, to revest the property in the person or entity that prev iously owned it, and to allow parties to proceed as if a bankruptcycase had not been filed. See Crawford , 758 F.3d at 485; Income Prop. Builders, Inc. , 699 F.2d at 965; see also In re Edwards , 538 B.R. 536, 541–42 (Ban kr. S.D. Ill. 2015) (holding th at section 349(b)(3) required the trustee about his injury. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin , 449 S.W.3d 665, 677 n.19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied).16 the return of the debtor’s post petition wages after dismissal); In re Hamilton , 493 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2013) (reac hing a similar conclusion). To “hold otherwise would be to fail to give full effe ct to [section] 349(b)’s broad scope.” See Edwards , 538 B.R. at 542; see also In re Slaughter , 141 B.R. 661, 663 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (“It would be anomal ous to give prepetition property of the estate to the debtor under [section] 349( b)(3) and postpetition property of the estate to creditors.”). For all of these reasons, we conclude that we must reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Morrison Supply on the basis of Revell’s alleged lack of standing. We su stain Revell’s first issue, which is dispositive. Conclusion Having sustained Revell’s first, dispositive issue, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
/s/ Terrie Livingston TERRIE LIVINGSTON CHIEF JUSTICE PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J .; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ. DELIVERED: August 29, 2016