Panther I1 


Improving Engineer MobilOty 

By Major General Clair E Gill 

Commandant, U.5. Army Engineer Sehoal 

One Corps, One Regiment, One Fight 

hat an exciting time to be a soldier and an 

engineer! It has been an honor and a great 

privilege to have served as your commandant 

for the past two years. I titled this, my final note to you, 

with a thought that has had special meaning for me 

throughout my 30 plus years in uniform. One Corps, 

One Regiment, One Fight is a unifying theme which 

acknow!edges that we are all part of the same Xeamwhether military, civilian, or contractor: or TO&E/TDA 

Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, or Department of 

Public Works. Ours is a noble profession based on the 

physical and technical realities of nature. It provides 

service and support to the Army, its combat maneuver 

elements, and the soldiers and civilians of this great 

nation. 

E built on the term "relevancy" in two of my State of 

the Branch speeches during annual ENFORCE 

conferences here at Fort Leonard Wood. My intent was 

to awaken the broad engineer community to our raison 

d'etre and to warn that we will be diminished by 

infighting or an unwillingness to change and adapt to a 

rapidly evolving world. We live in an environment that 

is largely governed by immutable laws of economics 

and physics (gravity, force, weather, etc.), but we can 

gain efficiencies through better use of the tools of 

science and technology, improved systems and 

automation, and improved business practices. We will 

never fall to irrelevance because of the critical nature 

of what we do: Engineers provide life support; mobility, 

countemobility, survivability, and topographic support; 

protect the environment; and construct structures and 

facilities. However, if we fail to react to our customers' 

needs, do not demonstrate our ability to help others 

get their jobs done, or point the finger of blame a1 

others, we will continue to suffer at the resource 

troughs. Counter to the basic principles of humility, we 

must extol the virtues of our soldiers and workforce 

and champion the great work that they do. We must 

remain agile and flexible-and ready to do the dirty 

work. 

Our hallowed Engineer School is evolving to meet 

the needs of the 21st century. On the 7th of June we 

broke ground for the construction of more than $200 

million worth of new educational and training facilities. 

We accomplished this with the assistance of the 

Kansas City District of the Corps of Engineers, a great 

civilian contractor, and much support from TRADOC 

and the Department of the Army. Now we are embarked 

on an exciting venture with our brethren from the 

Military Pelice and Chemical Corps branches to create 

a new schoolhouse concept we call the Maneuver 

Support Center or MANSCEN. 

The top-quality facilities we will construct are just the 

visible part of this venture. Far more important is the 

spirit of cooperation we are engendering with our fellow 

leaders from Fort McClellan. Together we will 

consolidate and integrate what is possible, common, 

and makes sense, while protecting our branch 

identities. I can report that we will save the Army a lot d 

dollars and people. With your help we will make this 

venture work really well. 

I've left some work in progress. For example, we are 

fighting to save the principles embodied in our ERI 

organizations, creating joint doctrine (which is moving 

quite well), and developing the Grizzly, Wolverine, and a 

family of mine-detection systems. A never-ending battle 

is the need to gamer crucial resources needed to teach 

and train future generations of leaders and soldiers. We 

are beginning to think of ourselves as "masters of 

terrain," but much remains to be done to make this 

reality. My replacement, MG Bob Flowers, will have his 

hands full as soon as he takes the reins at the end of 

July, but I know he has a competent staff to support 

him. I will tell General Flowers that he can collnt on the 

help and support of our great Engineer Regiment. 

Essayons and farewell. 
G 

August 1997 Headquar 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT 

Major General Clair F: Gill 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer Morgan 

~rs, Department of the Army Volume 27 PB 5-97-3 

FEATURES 

2 The Multlrole Englneer Battallon 

By Lieutenant Colonel James R. Rowan 

6 Multlnatlonal Mlne-Strl ke Reeovery Operation 

By Brigadier General Sfanley E Cherrle 

14 Engineers Working Smarter-Not Harder 

By Major Anthony C. Funkhouser and Second Lieutenant 

Mabry Sumner 

76 ENFORCE Breakout Sesslons Tackle aeglrnental 

Issues 

By Lieutenant Colonel Susan Myers and the ENFORCE 

Team 

21 The Slavonskl Brod Crosslng Slte: A Multlnatlonal EVurE 

In Bosnia 

By Captain Anthony G. Reed 

24 Robotlcs Insertion Technology 

By David G. Knichel 

28 Infrastructure Preservatfon: Extending Road Ufm In 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: I R~~~~~ 

DENNIS J. REIMER 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

JOEL 8. HUDSON 

Administrative Assis tan t to the 

Secretary of the Amy 

03759 

By Major Robin S. Hageriy, George Mason, and Gil Mason 

33 Asphalt-Mlxlng Plants: Baghouse Operatlon Ips 

By Staff Sergeant Jaime Barnentos and James E. Shoenberger 

36 The GPS Computer-Based Tutorlal 

By Major Guy R. Mallow and Edward A. Forman 

38 lntrodvclng Terrabase II 

By Captain Russell Kirby 

40 Command Philosophy for Company Commanders 

By Lieutenanf Colonel Harry W. Christiansen (Retired) 

46 1 he Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon: Overcoming 

the Lack of Recon Assets 

By Michael W. Sayer 

Corps' first functjunaf protome mine roller with 

vehicle-widlh rollers. H /s equippsd with a 

navigation system thal allows an operator lo 

preprogarn a mute or mission. Pholo by Jim 

Ray, Fort Leonard Wood TSC. 

Front Colrec me teleqaerated robo fie Panther 

/I. with its MI chassis, is the Annv and Marine 

12 Personal Vlewpofnt 53 Doctrlne Publlcatlons Survey 

26 Letters to the Edftar 54 Englneer Update 

42 CTC Notes 56 Engineer School Pfrectory 

50 Book Revlew 57 Brldge the Gap 

51 Englneer Doctrine Reduction Survey 

DEPARTMENTS 

1 Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

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Augrist 1997 Engineer I 
By Lieutenant Colonel James R. Rowan 

s U.S. forces prepared to move into Bosnia in late 

1995, crossing the Sava River loomed as a major 

obstacle. In addition to the challenges of the river's 

width, depth, and bank conditions, and the unknown enemy 

and mine-threat situation, there was the overarching 

challenge of command and control of the crossing area. The 

1st Armored Division needed general support engineers to 

emplace a float bridge and execute the engineer tasks 

required to conduct a deliberate river crossing of the division 

and a large portion of V Corps assets. This mission was 

assigned to the 16th Engineer Battalion (Corps)(Mechanized) 

and Task Force Volturno, named for the Volturno river 

crossing conducted by the 1st Armored Division and the 16th 

Engineer Battalion in Italy during World War 11. This article 

describes the formation of Task Force Volturno, the missions 

executed during Operation Joint Endeavor, and the benefits 

of a multirole engineer battalion for future operations. 

Task Force Volturno 

[CSE]). With this organization, the task force had 

mechanized combat engineers capable of conducting any 

combat engineer mission. In addition, there were fixed and 

float bridge companies to cross the Sava River and the CSE 

company to build and upgrade roads, access routes, 

approaches, and ramps into the river. 

The task organization of separate companies under a corps 

mechanized engineer battalion follows current Army 

doctrine. FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, states that one of 

the capabilities of such a battalion is to provide command and 

control for assigned and attached units. Task Force Volturno 

deployed out of Germany ahead of the 1st Armored 

Division's organic engineer assets and arrived in Croatia and 

Bosnia before the direct support engineer units aligned with 

the division's two brigade combat teams. Based on a habitual 

training relationship developed in Germany, two companies 

of the 16th Engineer Battalion were prepared to provide 

engineer support to the 1-1 and 3-5 Cavalry Squadrons and 

the 4-12 Infantry Battalion. Using corps engineer assets 

hen initially formed, Task Force Volturno allowed these key maneuver units to have dedicated engineer 

included the 16th Engineer Battalion, the 502d support as they moved into Bosnia ahead of the other 1st 

Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge), the Armored Division maneuver and engineer elements. 

586th Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge), the 38th Meanwhile, the Task Force Volturno headquarters, one line 

Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge [MGB]), and the company, and the separate companies completed the missions 

535th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment associated with crossing the Sava River. 

2 Engineer August 1997 
A bulldozer from the 535th CSE prepares ramps at the Sava River to support the division's redeployment 

to Germany. 

Missions 

T he 1st Armored Division Engineer Brigade 

commander realized the advantages the multirole 

engineer battalion provided to division operations and 

elected to keep Task Force Volturno intact throughout 

Operation Joint Endeavor. Early in 1996, the float bridge 

companies returned to their home stations, and the 55th 

Engineer Company (MGB) joined the task force. W~th its mix 

of combat engineer companies, bridge companies, and a 

construction company, Task Force Volturno could execute 

almost any engineer mission required in the 1st Armored 

Division sector. As U.S. forces moved farther south into 

Bosnia, elements of Task Force Volturno continued to move 

ahead. They cleared and proofed routes, upgraded main supply 

routes, conducted hundreds of kilometers of route 

reconnaissance, reconned and classified more than 100 bridges, 

emplaced armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs) to 

upgrade key routes, built MGBs, and hauled in gravel to 

construct much-needed parking and maintenance areas. 

Force Structure. Throughout the first 11 months of 

Operation Joint Endeavor, four battalion-sized U.S. engineer 

units operated in the Task Force Eagle sector under the 1st 

Armored Division Engineer Brigade commander. Two 

divisional engineer battalions (the 23rd and the 40th) were 

in direct support of the two brigade combat teams. The 16th 

Engineer Battalion (Corps)(Mechanized) and the 94th 

Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) operated in general 

support of the division. Several smaller engineer units 

operating in the U.S. sector came from multinational 

brigades-Russian, Danish, Finnish, Swedish, Turkish, 

Hungarian, and Romanian. 

Task Organization. Within this robust engineer force 

structure, Task Force Voltumo brought several unique 

capabilities to the fight, the most important being the ability to 

internally task organize for any mission. The combat engineer 

battalion provided a mechanized force capable of conducting 

clearing or proofing missions. Organic SO-caliber machine 

guns mounted on armored vehicles provided security. 

Bridging was possible using either AVLBs or the MGB 

company. Several MGBs were emplaced and later replaced 

with Bailey bridges. Since the bridge companies were 

attached to Task Force Volturno, the security and countermine 

capability typically required for bridging in Bosnia were 

provided without additional units. Task Force Volturno also 

ran a theater bridge park with up to seven sets of Bailey 

bridges on hand. Horizontal construction and a tremendous 

haul capability also were available within the task force. 

Since it had such diverse capabilities, Task Force Voltumo 

was located at Camp Bedrock in the center of the Task Force 

Eagle sector. The 1,200-man base camp was the only base 

camp in Bosnia where an engineer commander served as the 

senior tactical commander. The central location allowed task 

force units to operate anywhere within the U.S. sector. The 

mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles allowed soldiers to 

operate throughout the division's vast geographic area. 

Task Force Volturno units augmented the 23rd and 40th 

Engineer Battalions, which supported the 1st and 2d Brigades 

of the 1st Armored Division. Typical support included 

minefield clearing; bunker destruction; and hardstand, combat 

trail, and ammunition holding area construction. Task force 

companies also provided engineer support to units in the 

division that lacked a task force engineer battalion in direct 

support of their base camps and operations. These units 

August 1997 Engineer 3 
included the corps support group, the divisional aviation 

brigade, the artillery brigade, the division main, the division 

rear, and several remote signal sites within Tuzla Valley. 

Force Protection. For Task Force Volturno units, the 

primary engineer mission was assisting with force protection 

at base camps. The task force constructed several hundred 

bunkers and fighting positions throughout Bosnia. They also 

provided technical expertise and supervised the sandbagging 

of these structures. The task force emplaced more than 100 

kilometers of triple-standard concertina wire and built 

numerous checkpoints and guard points. The division used 

concertainers (cloth-lined, wire mesh bastions filled with 

rocks, sand, shale, and earth) to provide protection against 

direct-fire weapons. Because of the high cost of delivering 

vast amounts of fill to base camps, task force units began a 

shale quarry. They hauled more than 50,000 cubic meters of 

fill for protective structures. This was critical because 

divisional battalions do not have dump trucks. By combining 

the assets of corps mechanized companies, the bridge 

companies, and the CSE company, Task Force Volturno had 

the equivalent of more than 100 5-ton dump trucks to 

conduct their enormous haul mission. 

General Support. The general support role of Task Force 

Volturno allowed the division engineer some latitude. in 

directing engineer efforts. Maneuver brigade commanders 

kept their direct support engineers fully employed. The 

general support engineers gave the division a capability to 

shape the future battlefield. They worked on redeployment 

routes, bridge and raft ramps, bridge anchor systems, and 

redeployment base camps while direct support engineers 

concentrated on such zone-of-separation missions as 

clearing minefields and destroying bunkers and trench lines. 

Each of the multinational brigades brought an engineer 

capability, but they sometimes lacked enough engineer forces 

to complete missions within their sector. The multinational 

engineers were attached to their country's maneuver forces 

and did not receive orders through U.S. engineer channels. 

General support engineers allowed the division engineer to 

influence engineer efforts in the multinational brigade sectors 

without having to change the division's task organization or 

become overly directive with another nation's forces. 

Countennine. As the only corps mechanized engineer 

battalion in Europe, the 16th Engineer Battalion was charged 

with becoming the countermine proponent. Long before 

deployment, battalion officers and senior NCOs and 

engineers from other units in Europe trained at Fort Leonard 

Wood to develop a countermine assessment and a training 

plan for units deploying to Bosnia. The 16th Engineer 

Battalion conducted mine-orientation training for the 

division units deploying first. When the battalion received 

orders to deploy, training was moved to the Combat 

Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. The CMTC 

adopted the battalion's program of instruction as the standard 

for all U.S. soldiers and support personnel deploying into 

theater. 

Benefits 

T he 16th Engineer Battalion was able to successfully 

organize and accomplish a wide range of missions. 

Some benefits of a multirole engineer battalion include: 

As general support engineers, they were not as constrained by habitual relationships as the direct support 

engineers. The unit could internally task organize and 

mass efforts as needed. The direct support engineers of a 

division typically are allocated an engineer company in 

support of a maneuver task force, and it can cause great 

concern within the brigade if one task force loses its normal share of engineer battalion assets. 

The corps mechanized modified table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE) supports a large, diverse organization better than the divisional MTOE. 

Corps mechanized units have a slightly greater command 

and control capability because they are authorized a 

communications officer, an intelligence officer, and a 

maintenance officer. These positions are not supported 

under the divisional MTOE. 

More maintenance personnel are allocated to a corps 

mechanized unit than to a divisional engineer unit. This 

extra maintenance capability allows units to operate over 

greater distances and to be less reliant on a maneuver 

task force for maintenance and recovery support. 

Task Force Volturno also provided several less obvious 

benefits: 

Command and ControL A key advantage was the task 

force's ability to provide command and control to the 

separate engineer companies. Doctrinally, the engineer 

brigade headquarters performs this mission. However, the 

austere headquarters of a division engineer brigade 

supporting 15 brigade-equivalent units could not provide the 

same degree of support to companies as Task Force Volturno. 

Flexible Structure. The capabilities within the multirole 

engineer battalion provided the engineer brigade and the 

division commander with a flexible engineer structure. While 

engineer units were never kept in reserve, the multirole 

battalion was able to reallocate forces and respond quickly to 

several emergencies within U.S. and multinational brigade 

sectors. 

Professional Development. There were many 

developmental opportunities for officers assigned to the task 

4 Engineer August 1997 
force. Officers from attached companies typically worked in 

their specialized area and seldom interacted with other 

companies or a battalion staff as task force officers did 

during Operation Joint Endeavor. In turn, the attachment of 

up to four additional companies with very different 

equipment and personnel provided a tremendous 

opportunity for battalion staff officers to manage a wide 

spectrum of requirements. FM 5-100 states that an engineer 

battalion can provide command and control for up to five 

companies. Task Force Volturno's ability to continuously 

command and control six to eight units was due to the 

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METTT) in Bosnia. Once the Task Force Eagle sector was 

established, the headquarters was relatively stationary and 

secure and could devote additional staff effort to the 

companies. Also, the deliberate pace of this operation 

allowed a greater span of control than the typical fast-paced, 

high-intensity operation allows. A11 task force members 

benefited by working together on the wide variety of 

missions-mine clearing and proofing, bridge and route 

reconnaissance, force protection, road construction and 

repair, airfield construction, bridge construction, overhead 

anchorage system design and construction, security, and 

base-camp construction and decommissioning. 

Limitations 

ask Force Volturno overcame several limitations, 

most of which could have been avoided with proper 

planning. 

Funding. Funds were suspended or diverted from many 

corps units to pay for the 1st Armored Division's mission in 

Bosnia. The 16th Engineer Battalion's deployment 

preparations were halted or delayed several times due to 

insufficient funds. Eventually, the 1st Armored Division 

Engineer Brigade provided funds for critical deployment 

supplies. 

Reports and SOPs. Even though most Task Force 

Volturno units were from the 130th Engineer Brigade and 

were assigned to the same corps as the 1st Armored 

Division, they used different reports and tactical standing 

operating procedures (SOPs). The problems resulting from 

these differences decreased as Bosnia-specific SOPs were 

developed and implemented. 

Equipment. The fielding of new equipment, 

specifically the single-channel, ground-to-air radio system 

(SINCGARS), had not been completed for all corps units 

when the deployment order was received. New radios were 

installed, but this placed great logistics and training burdens 

on units that were already busy with countermine operations 

and deployment preparations. The 55th Engineer Company 

from Fort Riley, Kansas, never received the SINCGARS and 

had to rely on older, less capable, and not fully compatible 12- 

series radio systems. 

Logistics Support. Once in sector, continual changes in the 

maintenance and supply units providing support was a major 

challenge. The 16th Engineer Battalion was supported by six 

different maintenance units during its deployment. With each 

change, the logistics trail became longer. During one period, 

repair parts were unavailable while the supply system tried to 

catch up with the tactical situation. 

Personnel. As the deployment continued, personnel 

shortages increased. Early in the operation, Task Force Volturno 

units were resourced at 100 percent of their authorized 

personnel strength. Throughout the year-long deployment, 

losses exceeded gains, and by the end of the year units were 

down to about 80 percent of their authorized personnel. 

Divisional engineer unit strengths declined at a lesser rate. 

Although Task Force Volturno units were attached to the 1st 

Armored Division, personnel managers in the division could 

not affect personnel strengths in attached corps units since they 

would eventually redeploy to their home stations. 

The Future 

he multirole engineer battalion works-it was validated 

in the Balkan theater of operations. While this operation 

had a specific mission with a unique set of m-T, it is 

possible to extrapolate and visualize that the concept has great 

potential for any operation where corps engineers will be called 

into a division sector. The multirole capability currently is being 

fielded for bridge units. Now is the time to establish the corps 

mechanized engineer battalions as multirole task forces. The 

minor problems encountered in Bosnia could have been resolved 

in a training environment, making the task force more effective 

and quicker to establish when needed. The force structure is in 

place. This proposal does not require additional forces or funds. 

Let's task organize now and get the most out of the engineer 

resources we have available. 

Lieutenant Colonel Rowan commands the 54th Engineer 

Battalion in Bamberg, Germany, and commanded the 16th 

Engineer Battalion and Task Force Volturno in BosniaHerzegovina. He previously served with the 7th, the 82d, and 

the 299th Engineer Battalions; the 4th and the 5th Infantry 

Divisions; and was an assistant professor of mathematics at 

West Point. LTC Rowan is a graduate of the U.S. Military 

Academy and holds a master's degree in Operations Research 

from Georgia Tech and a master's of Military Arts and Science 

from the Command and General Staff College. 

August 1997 Engineer 5 
By Brigadier General Stanley E Cherrie 

uring my 32-year (plus) military career, I have had the 

great fortune to gamer a significant amount of service 

in multinational assignments. It began in 1979 with 

assignment to the British Army Staff College. In 1992, I 

became deputy chief of staff, G2lG3, of the Ace Rapid 

Reaction Corps (ARRC), where we planned and were ready 

for deployment to Bosnia in support of a NATO peaceenforcement mission. In 1994, I moved to the 1st Armored 

Division as the assistant division commander-maneuver. 

Little did I know that I soon would be thrust in the middle of 

NATO's Operation Joint Endeavor peace-enforcement 

mission and be part of the largest multinational peacekeeping 

operation in history. During the fourth month of this 

American-led, Multinational Division North operation, I 

assumed control of the mine-strike recovery operation 

described in this article. 

Diary commentaries are presented to demonstrate the 

complex nature of multinational operations and the 

advantages provided by the breadth of engineering skills 

available in multinational units. The commentary shows how 

difficult it is to operate in a heavily mined area. 

The Mine Strike 

17 April 19%. A multinational patrol from the Nordic1 

Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade became disoriented while 

patrolling the zone of separation. The group, consisting of two 

Danes and nine Lithuanians, entered a minefield and struck an 

antitank mine with their lead vehicle, a Mercedes GD240, 

which is a small, jeep-type vehicle. The driver, a Danish 

private, was thrown from the vehicle and sustained fatal 

injuries. The commander, a Lithuanian lieutenant, was trapped 

under the overturned vehicle and subsequently died. Two backseat passengers were critically injured and thrown free of the 

vehicle. Patrol members in the other two vehicles (another 

GD240 and an ambulance) were not injured. U.S. medical 

evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters carrying Norwegian 

Medical Company personnel were flown to the scene and lifted 

the survivors to safety (see diagram, page 7). 

6 Engineer August 1997 
Diagram of Events 

The Recovery 19 April. The operation started late because the Finnish 

18 April. The Danish Battalion (DANBN) set up a camp 

SISU mine flail, a large, 6-wheeled, armored vehicle, slid off 

about 1.5 kilometers from the accident site and assembled the narrow mountain approach trail, blocking the entrance to 

recovery personnel, equipment, and a command and control the command-and-control site. Then, when it was recovered 

element. The camp was called Camp Highlander because it and began flailing, it hit a large antitank mine and was 

was atop a lofty saddle in the northwest (NORDPOL) sector disabled (see diagram). 

of Task Force Eagle (see diagram). The DANBN conducted An assessment of the events that had taken place thus far 

a photo reconnaissance of the mine-strike area, and their produced the following significant facts and deductions: 

photographic data proved to be invaluable in the recovery 

effort. 

The recovery team discovered that the road to the 

accident site and the associated wood line, although not a 

designated or marked minefield, were heavily mined. Initial 

clearing and proofing operations to approach the accident 

site detonated several antitank and antipersonnel mines, 

making progress very slow and deliberate. Near the end of 

the first day, the body of the Danish soldier was recovered. 

At the end of the day, the Lithuanian soldier's body and three 

vehicles remained in the minefield. 

w This was a NORDPOL mission with Task Force Eagle in 

support. 

W Political decisions regarding the local memorial ceremonies and subsequent national funeral arrangements made 

time an extremely important factor. 

W The major approach route and the area around the vehicles were heavily mined. Examinations of mine-sheet 

data from both NORDPOL and the U.S. indicated mixed 

(Serbian/Muslim) minefields, which made the extrication mission even more hazardous. 

August 1997 Engineer 7 
SPC Orasca, 16th Engineer Battalion, and the U.S. m~niflail depart Camp Hnqhlander enroute to the recovery site. 

Task Force Eagle units pnsscssed the requisite cquipment and expertise to effect the extrication without further loss of life. 

The Twk Force Eagle commander directed rnc to move to 

the site and assure the NORDPOL command swucrure that the 

task forcc would provide any ass~stancc posl;lhlc. We 

conducted a rniniaturc war game of options as ro how to hest 

use all of Task Force Eagle's expertise tn rccovcr !he hndy as 

quickly as pofsihle without further injury or loss nf lift. Wc 

determined that equipment such ap MEDEVAC hclicnpters 

with winches, SlSU mine flails, the U.S. robtic rninitl;111, and 

a "91 1" rcqcue tcam were necdcd to accornplir;h the rn~winn. 

20 April. For a ho~l of cogent reasons, thc U.S. 16th 

Engineer Battalion had independent1 y sohedulcd an aerial 

reconnaissance in preparation lor thc extrication. In an 

operation requiring del iherale action and strict delineatinn of 

responsibilities, [hi% type of indcpcndent action was n 

problem that could not t.R altowcd, so I cancelled it. Wc 

needed nnc chain of command or the operation would hrcak 

into factions working against each (11 her, thus incren\rng the 

potential for further tragedy. The energles of thc cntirc task 

forcc had to he channeled into one recovery cffclrt. 

UH6h flew us to the accident site Bcforc Ianding, we 

made .several aerial passcs over the sitc to become oriented 

and lhring the digital imagcs we had slurlied into perspcctivc. 

From this ovcrfligh~. we pot a true fccling for the 

environment in which our forcer would operare. 

We landcd on a narrow gravcl mountaintop road (see 

diawrn, page 7) and wal kcti 200 meters to Camp Highlander. 

Thc DANBN cornmantics and his opcratinns ofllcer [hen 

hrirfcd us around a small-scnle mdel of the area made from 

hnked mud, twigs. strlnp, etc. It was prirnittvc hut effective. 

We first considcred an aerial option wherein wc would 

I41wer explosive ordnancc dispo~al (EOD) pcnonnel onto the 

second vehiclc, allow~ny them In uss [his "snt'e hnvcn" 8% n 

starting point f'nr hand probing a 1-meter x 35- tn 40-metes 

lane to thc destroyed vehiclc. Once this tir~~e-consunring 

proccdurc was accomplished, I hc 9 1 1 crew would be lowered 

10 thc second jccp, where thcy would use thc clcrrred lane to 

the vchicte and free the licutenant*~ rcrnainl;. Wc discarded 

th~s option, however, kcawe of the Zevcl nl' training neerlcd ro 

lowcr personnel onto s 2-mc!cr-hy.7-metes pI:i!fornl 

~utrounded hy mines and the innrtlinntc amount of trme 

required to dclikmtely probe nearly 40 meters. 

An alternntrvc ernund option was dcvcloped uring ~hc large 

F~nnish SlSU fail to clear a path tn thc arnhulancc, rcrnovc it. 

then flail to lhc second vehiclc. We woulcl rhen use the U.S. 

minifl:111 lo heat a path from the sccond vchiclc tn the nccidenr 

sitc. Wc cans~dercd the ri\k of ruining rhc rn~nillarl 11' i~ hi1 an 

i~ntilsnk mine, hut timc was critical and the risk was 

considcred arceptnhlc. Our rnult~nnt~ona! :tll~c.i had mixcd 

rc:~ctinns 10 thrs plan, 

Another altcrnat~vc jnvotved us in^ the Serhrnn cnpnccrs 

who had supposrdly sifed the rnrncf~cld. Tlrcy wnniccl tn he 
flown to the other side (the Serbian side) of the minefield 

and probe back From there. Data from our Task Force Eagle 

mine center indicated that the area contained mixed Serbian 

and Muslim mines. Therefore, regardless of the Serbian 

engineers' courage, this option was considered to be far 

beyond the prudent risk assessment limits allowed For U.S. 

Forces. 

Everyone reluctantly conceded that the ground option 

was the best alI-around plan. However, the DAMN 

commander informed us that the SISU mine flail, the 

"backbone" of the ~ound option, could not be at the site for 

several hours. This unexpected delay caused us to reevaluate 

our plans because. in my opinion, we could not "burn" 6 or 7 

hours of day tight waiting for the flail to arrive. 

After another hurried meeting around the temin model, we 

decided to use a combination of the ground and air options. 

This was possible because a significant capability had just 

emerged from within the task force. The Russian engineers 

had offered a team consisting of two engineers and a sniffer 

dog with a handler. The Russians had used this combination 

with great success in Afghanisan. and it seemed a great beast 

to our ability to safely approach the area. 

About t 430. the NORDPOL Brigade commander arrived 

en site to assess progress and was briefed on our plan. We 

also conducted operational briefing to the MEDEVAC 

crews and €OD personnel who would do the flying and 

rappelling, Then they returned to their helicopters for some 

on-site crew training and rehearsaI of winch and harnesslowering techniques. Ajthough the rehearsal process 

consumed valuable daylight hours, this was a "no shortcuts" 

operation from start to finish. Rehearsals were a must! 

At 1630, both MEDEVAC helicopters flew to the 

accident site, where the insertion of EOD personnel began. 

The intent was fo conduct both the ground and air operations 

simultaneousty until the flailing and command and control 

Probed work area shews 

the left iron? side of the 

overturned vehlcle. 

helicopter noise became too distracting to the soldiers doing 

rhe deliberate probing. 

Shortly after 1800. whiIe the probing operation was still in 

progress, we gathered again to discuss plans for the next day. 

Thing, command and controi, and equipment positioning 

were key issues that had to be hammered out. 

Meanwhile, with darkness approaching, air removal of the 

EOD personnel was being executed according to plan. Once 

that was done, we made a short telephonic situation report to 

the Task Force Eagle commander. Before retiring: for the 

night, we made sun: that everyone had the next day's 

schedule and their mission order and that the necessary 

equipment was ready and available. 

21 April. Back at Camp Highlander, we gathered around 

the invaluable hand-made terrain model. where the Danish 

engineer company cammandcr gave a briefing on the 

morning's projected activities. The large Finnish flail had 

cleared its way to the ambulance without incident and was to 

retrace its route to the base camp to ensure a mine-safe status 

on the approach road. We had decided to use the larger flail 

for that task because the miniflail could not withstand an 

antitank mine strike. We would save the miniflail for the 

much-needed cIose-in work. Around 0730, while clearing 

behind the ambulance. the large flail hit the first of several 

antipersonnel mines. 

The MEDEVAC helicopters arrived on time and inserted 

the EOD personnel as planned. Shortly thereafter, the combat 

camera crew arrived and was briefed on the situatjon. Their 

mission was to capture the multinational nature of the 

operation and focus on the equipment and techniques used. 

Their photographs were important for later evaluation and 

analysis. 

Now that the mission was in progress, it was time to think 

about what was next. The future challenge was the close-in 

mine clearance near the vehicle itself. The 9 1 I crew needed 

August 1997 Engineer 9 
----- P - 

Russian mine-sniffer dog and handler. 

space to work safely when removing the victim from under 

the vehicle. Although the crew was good, their certification 

training did not include performing in such limited space or 

under these hazardous conditions. 

While gathered around the terrain model, we used aerial 

photos of the site to formulate a plan that integrated the 

probing efforts with that of the miniflail. The miniflail 

operator understood what was required and was qualified, 

trained, and ready to tackle the task. 

The morning quiet was shattered by a thunderous boom 

when Swedish EOD personnel detonated another mine 

along the edge of the access road. Shortly thereafter, the 

Russian sniffer team began to proof the road leading to the 

accident site. 

About 1000, the miniflail operator began the 1 112- 

kilometer walk to the accident site in his leaden shoes and 

antifragmentation gear. Everything we had planned was in 

motion, and there seemed to be more than enough daylight 

to accomplish the task. 

Shortly after 1100, problems began to occur. My 

experiences in the multinational arena had taught me to 

"expect the unexpected." From this point on in the 

operation, that axiom held true. For example, the Russian 

team, whose mission was to clear only to the back of the 

ambulance, took it upon themselves to go half-way to the 

second vehicle, picking up antipersonnel mines by hand, 

disarming them, and throwing them into the woods. This was 

extremely hazardous and not in the plan. It had to be 

stopped-which I did as quickly as possible. 

Another deviation from the plan soon occurred. Although 

we had decided to clear a semicircle around the objective 

vehicle, the probers had begun to clear a full circle. This 

option was the safest to be sure, but it was not possible due to 

the time constraints posed by political pressure to remove the 

body and meet mandated funeral dates. After some discussion 

with the DANBN commander, he reluctantly stopped the EOD 

team from pursuing the circle-clearing option. 

By 1130, the miniflail operator was in position. He was 

extremely warm in his protective gear but had the foresight to 

strap a dozen bottles of water to his machine before leaving 

base camp. The Danes joked about having to take a break to 

turn the miniflail operator upside down to drain the water 

from his suit! Although we were working under extreme 

pressure, spirits were high among the multinational team. 

Around 1300, the EOD personnel completed their mission. 

In addition to the two probers, we had inserted a third EOD 

member after giving him a short lesson on how to operate the 

digital camera and hand-held video camera. We would use his 

close-up photos in a full dress rehearsal with the 911 

personnel. These pictures allowed the 911 crew to determine 

which equipment from their huge arsenal of tools was needed 

at the site. 

After the EOD team had been removed, the SISU flail 

began its flailing operations and set off 10 to 12 antipersonnel 

mines. These explosions confirmed our assessment that the 

area was thickly infested with mines. 

By 1600, conditions were set to begin the extrication phase 

of the operation. An access route to the second jeep had been 

demined and the ambulance removed. The miniflail had cleared 

a lane wider than the probed lane around the second jeep to the 

accident site. The SISU command vehicle and the 91 1 crew and 

their equipment were standing 100 meters to the east of the site 

along with the SISU flail. A second miniflail with an operator 

and Swedish EOD personnel were waiting in reserve. 

At this point, progress seemed to come to a halt. We still had 

more than three hours of daylight and could not afford to 

squander any of it. I discovered that the mission holdup was 

because several Swedish EOD personnel were painstakingly 

hand sweeping an area that had been flailed for two hours. Their 

intent was to gain assurance that the area was cleared of mines. 

While that was the 100-percent risk-free measure, it would 

obviously take until dark to complete. Additionally, their 

activity was not part of the plan and had to be stopped so we 

could continue the operation. I issued orders to curtail this 

activity and soon had it under control. 

10 Engineer August 1997 
Sequence of Events 

17 April 

An 11-man patrol from the NORDPOL Brigade hits an 

antitank mine, killing two soldiers and seriously injuring two others. One of the dead soldiers is pinned 

under the disabled vehicle. 

W MEDEVAC helicopters rescue the survivors. 

18 April 

W Camp Highlander is set up to house the team tasked 

to recover the two bodies. 

w Initial mineclearing operations begin. 

W The body of one soldier is recovered. 

19 April 

A Finnish SlSU mine flail begins to flail toward the 

accident site. 

W SlSU fld is totally disabled when it hits a large AT 

mine. 

20 April 

W Second SlSU flail is ordered to the accident site. 

W EOD personnel rappel into the accident area to probe. 

21 April 

W Flailing operations get to the ambulance and vehicle 2. 

W Ambulance is removed. 

W Russian mine-sniffer team proofs the road to the 

disabled vehicle. 

W Miniflail operations are conduded to the accident vehicle. 

The body of the trapped soldier is recovered. 

be applied to training and preparations for future operationsboth peacekeeping and war. 

Multinational operations take more time! Differences in 

language; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and 

doctrine cause the pace to be much slower than usual. 

Operations must be planned in detail, discussed thoroughly, and rehearsed more often than in a national unit. 

W Other nations sometimes have equipment and capabilities 

that we do not possess. Multinational commanders must 

know the total capabilities of their forces and optimize 

the mixture for efficient mission accomplishment. The 

Swedish EOD capability, the Finnish flail, our miniflail, 

and the Russian mine-sniffer team are perfect examples 

of this mixture. 

Operational commanders must issue orders in a tactful 

and diplomatic manner. The orders process in multinational operations often is more collegial and less structured than the U.S. process. Firm control is still a must. 

Time in the unit and seasoning are the enablers for the 

rookie U.S. commander here. 

w Multinational operations tend to generate actions that are 

independent of the basic plan. I believe this is more a 

function of organizational differences and a lack of understanding than mere impulsiveness by subordinates. Such 

actions must be recognized and kept in check. 

Summary 

E xperience has shown that soldiers of all nations have a 

deep core of professionalism that is displayed by all 

ranks when called upon to tackle tough missions such as 

this mine-strike recovery operation. Although predominantly 

a NORDPOL operation, the entire task force's resources were 

The miniflail began to flail the area along the north side brought to bear in a truly multinational effort to extricate the 

of the destroyed vehicle. On its third pass, the miniflail personnel and equipment involved in this disaster. The EOD 

became stuck. After several attempts to extricate it, we probers, the flailers, the dog handler, the miniflail operator, the opted to leave it there and proceed with the rescue operation. helicopter winch operator, and the pilots all shared a common 

By 1830, the rescue team began to lift the jeep with bond of professionalism. When their skills were combined, hydraulic jacks. We lowered the litter basket to the clearing they spelled Mssion success. 

behind the second vehicle, and at 1835 the body was lifted LI 

out. As the command and control element, we presented 

arms and held our salute until our comrade-in-arms was 

taken aboard the helicopter and flew out of sight. 

Lessons Learned 

pq y 5-year association with multinational forces has 

given me a solid appreciation for the characteristics 4 4 \ d..., of foreign armies, which sometimes are markedly 

different from those of the U.S. Army. The recovery 

operation described herein embodies many of these 

characteristics. Lessons learned from this operation should 

Brigadier General Cherrie is the assistant deputy chief of 

staff for training, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous 

assignments include assistant division commander-maneuver; 

1st Annored Division, Baumholder; Germany; and G2/G3, 

Headquarters, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction 

Corps, Rheindahlen, Germany. BG Cherrie is a graduate of 

the British Army Staff College and the Army War College. He 

holds a master's degree in public administration from 

Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania. 

All photographs by the 55th Signal Company (Combat Camera) 

August 1997 Engineer 11 
Personal viewpoint 

More Than Technology 

By Major Judson Cook 

uch discussion goes on in the 

1 profession of arms about I?l?r whether the technological 

developments and capabilities available to U.S. armed forces constitute a 

revolution in military affairs. The ability to dominate information warfare, 

the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to 

gather intelligence, and a tactical and 

strategic internet supported by satellite 

communications certainly change how 

we plan to fight wars. However, history 

has shown that technological developments alone are not adequate to achieve 

decisive victory. 

In very recent history-28 January 

to 6 February 1997-the U.S. Army 

simulated a future conflict involving 

the U.S. military. Personnel in the 

"Army After Next" program, a 

research group at Training and Doctrine Command, organized the war 

game to examine warfighting issues 

possible within the next 25 years. 

In this war game, friendly (Blue) 

forces were surprised when, at the outset of the battle, the opponents (Red) 

destroyed their satellites. Blue forces 

relied on the satellites to provide the 

intelligence platforms and digital communications links needed to facilitate 

command and control and track logistics flow. The strikes against satellites 

confounded the Blue leadership 

because their war plans were based on 

an assumption of information dominance. While the attack destroyed most 

of both the Blue and the Red satellites, 

Red was willing to sacrifice their satellites because Blue was more dependent 

upon them and, therefore, had most to 

lose from their destruction. One 

observer reported that the strike against 

satellites took the war back to the 

1950s in terms of technology. 1 

Rationale 

ations focus on developing new 

technologies and improving war 

machines that increase their 

ability to directly destroy the opposing 

force. Superior killing systems are 

important, but they are not the only 

basis for winning wars. Regardless of 

technological advances in warfare, 

sooner or later combat becomes closeupa man-against-man struggle for 

survival. This has been true in warfare 

from the first conflict through the last 

and is not likely to change. The following example typifies this maxim by 

showing how technology cannot 

replace the human dimension of war. 

Pacific Theater, World War I1 

lr n the Pacific theater in World War 

11, the United States understood the 

importance of technology but recognized that machines were merely a 

means for achieving a strategic end. In 

the 1930s, Japan and the United States 

(in the U.S. "Orange Plan") envisioned 

similar war plans. The two nations anticipated an initial Japanese conquest of 

the islands in the western Pacific, a U.S. 

effort to fight its way across the ocean 

toward Japan, and that the end of the 

war would result from a fleet-againstfleet battle.2 The United States therefore 

developed machinery and weapons to 

assist in this great naval battle. 

As the war in the Pacific developed, 

the United States equipped itself with 

modem aircraft carriers, bombers, submarines, and destroyers to pursue a 

strategy designed to cut off the Japanese from critical resources, devastate 

the Japanese economy's ability to produce war machines, and demoralize the 

Japanese population, thereby causing 

their government to collapse. In 1941, 

Japan had more naval power available 

than the United States-they had 63 

submarines and 10 camers, while the 

U.S. had 56 submarines and two carriers. By 1942, Japan increased its carrier 

fleet to 11 (with 550 air~raft)~, but by 

1943 the U.S. increased its naval presence to 600 warships with 1,941 carrierbased aircraft4 Although both nations 

developed technologically advanced 

fleets, a great naval battle between the 

opposing fleets did not decide the outcome of the war. 

The Japanese used their modem 

weapons to deliver the first blow. In 

December 1941, Japanese naval vessels 

and aircraft struck a surprise attack 

against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Following that attack, the Japanese 

enjoyed a 6-month winning spree as 

they expanded their base of operations 

from Japan into the Pacific Ocean. 

Because the Pacific is so vast, both 

countries found it necessary to gain 

operating and logistical support bases 

for their great fleets on various islands. 

Land warfare in the Pacific was born 

of the need to maintain these forward 

operating and logistics bases. From 

December 1941 to April 1942, the Jap 

anese gained control of Malaya, the 

Philippines, Singapore, and Bataan. 

The Japanese influence spread over the 

Pacific as powerful U.S. military leaders were forced to withdraw. The 

United States found itself on the losing 

side of a war for control of the Pacific. 

Millet and Maslowski offer a great 

summary of the U.S. perspective on the 

Pacific. They write: 

Afrer the Allied rout in Bum in 

May 1942, General Joseph W Stilwell 

12 Engineer August 1996 
spoke of the disaster in his theater; but 

his words applied to the entire American experience in thefirst six months of 

World War II: 

"I claim we got a hell of a beating ... and it is humiliating as hell. " s 

The United States resorted to a 

ground campaign partly to gain operating and logistics bases and partly to 

gain respect. Regardless of the reasons 

for the island-hopping campaigns 

across the Pacific, the United States 

committed itself to waging battle 

against an enemy prepared to fight to 

the death. Because of the distance of 

these island outposts from Japan (and 

later due to successful U.S. submarine 

attacks against Japan's merchant 

marine), the Japanese land forces were 

cut off and lacked resources. With their 

backs against the wall, the Japanese 

fought to retain their territory. 

U.S. military leaders could not and 

did not rely solely on technology to 

achieve their strategic goals against 

Japan. The battle for Iwo Jima, which 

lasted for a month in 1945, was typical 

of the fierce fighting that occurred in 

the Pacific. The capture of this island, 

valued as a base for crippled B-29 

bombers returning from runs against 

the Japanese, cost the U.S. forces 

26,000 casualties, of which 6,000 were 

deaths. U.S. Marines fought against an 

invisible enemy entrenched in caves 

and bunkers equipped with machine 

guns. U.S. forces used flame throwers, 

grenades, and explosives to route them 

from their hiding places. Thus, the 

United States employed troops on the 

ground who were engaged in close, 

direct combat. Their intent was to gain 

territory that would enable the United 

States to pursue its strategic bombing 

campaign against Japan. U.S. ground 

forces fought the Japanese to gain safe 

airfields for the 25,000 air-crewmen 

(flying 2,400 B-29s) who made emergency landings on Iwo Jima from 

March to August 1945.~ 

In the 2 112-month battle for Okinawa in 1945, the Americans had close 

air support and more artillery than the 

rine campaign against the Japanese 

merchant fleet and strategic bombings ". ..Even as nations on the Japanese mainland left Japanese 

ground forces wanting for supplies, 

develop technology and materiel, and reinforcements. Yet, to be 

decisive, the United States resorted to 

improve weapons sys- close ground combat-the very form of 

warfare that the enemy was most capable of waging. The same argument held they must under- true for the U.S. action in Vietnam. 

Similarly, in the futuristic war game stand that war requires described above, the Red force evened 

the playing field by crippling the Blue the commitment of ~OE~S informational advantage. 

ground soldiers who are The Lesson 

The point is that even as nations 

develop technology and improve weapons systems, they must understand that 

war requires the commitment of ground 

soldiers who are willing to die to defeat 

their enemy. Advanced weapons systems alone have never won a victory. 

Another related point is that a technologically or materially inferior 

enemy can fight on terms that negate 

the superior force's advantage. By 

1945, when the battles at Iwo Jima and 

willing to die to defeat .s. military forces should continue to develop technology 

their enemy." and improve weapons systems. 

Engineer modernization efforts focus 

on systems that improve enemy and 

less situation awareness. As we learned 

in the 1997 Army After Next war game, 

our assumptions may prove invalid. Our 

adversaries may mimic our technology, 

develop a countermeasure that defeats it, 

or resort to a form of warfare that renders it useless. In the end, battles and 

wars are won because of the will and 

determination of young people willing to 

fight against an equally determined 

enemy. It would be an error to convince 

ourselves and our nation otherwise. 

system of caves and bunkers. Even 

with their technological advantages, 

the Americans had to mount an infan,,,, 

assault to overcome the Japanese. As at 

Iwo Jima, the fighting caused heavy 

casualties (100,000 Japanese soldiers 

and 40,000 U.S. killed). 7 The 

Americans were beginning to learn a 

lesson we would have to relearn in the 

Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War: 

...you mayJy over a [and forever; 

you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize 

it, and wipe it clean of life-but ifyou 

desire to defend it, protect it, keep it for 

civilization, you must do this on the 

ground, the way the Roman legions did, 

by putting your young men into the 

mud. 

~a~an&e, who again were dug into a I Okinawa were fought, the U.S. subma- I (Continued on page 15) 

August I996 Engineer 13 

friendly situational awareness, development of digitized terrain systems, and 

development of intelligent mine systems. These systems enhance engineer 

support to the maneuver commander, 

make engineer contributions to 'Ombined arms operations relevant into the 

21st century, and increase the lethality 

of the U.S. Army. But as we develop 

these systems, we must realize that they 

are merely a means to an end. We must 

maintain enough vision to recognize that 

overdependence on dominating the battlefield via technology has failed in the 

past. The human dimension in combat 

must remain paramount. 

We should not develop a force based 

mainly on the assumption that we can 

achieve perfect intelligence and flaw- 
(cfm) cdmpressor set at 90 pounds per 

square inch (psi). It operated off the 

58th Combat Engineer Company's 

(OPFOR) standard 250 cfm compressor and allowed us to connect two 

drivers simultaneously. 

The demonstration was conducted 

in some of NTC's rockiest terrain 

known as the "Iron Triangle." By the 

end of the day, as a battle drill began to 

evolve, a squad with one post driver 

placed 300 meters of triple-standard 

concertina in 17 minutes. 

Advantages 

uring the March 1997 

Advanced Wadighting Erperiment at the NTC, the 

By Major Anthony C. Funkhouser and Second Lieutenant Mabry Sumner 

33 very engineer who has ever 

driven pickets for hours on 

end has little affection for 

the cast iron, 40- to 50-pound driver. 

During countless repetitions, they pick 

it up over their head and drop it to drive 

pickets into ground that is often rocky 

and dense. The opposing force 

(OPFOR) engineers at the National 

Training Center (NTC) drive more than 

3,500 pickets per rotation in some of 

the rockiest terrain at Fort Irwin, Califomia. So the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment set out to find a better way. 

The Regimental Engineer Section's 

NCOIC contacted a commercial vendor for brochures on pneumatic post 

drivers of various sizes and capabilities. A local vendor came to the NTC 

to demonstrate a medium-duty post 

driver weighing 54.6 pounds and 

requiring a 42 cubic feet per minute -- 

Soldiers from the 58th Combat Engineer Company operate the two-man post 

driver. 

1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment used 

the new post drivers, or "automatic 

picket pounders" as we call them, to 

build a motorized rifle battalion 

defense. During this defense, 1st Platoonl58th Combat Engineer Company 

(OPFOR) constructed 14 300-meter 

minefields with antifratricide fences 

and 14 300-meter triple-standard concertina fences in 12 hours. During the 

last 10 defenses before we had the new 

post driver, our average time for this 

work was between 16 and 17 hours. 

The automatic picket pounder operated 

similar to a pneumatic jackhammer and 

drove picket after picket. 

A crew of four soldiers operated the 

automatic picket pounder. One soldier 

drove the 5-ton dump truck pulling the 

250 dm compressor, one carried the 

automatic picket pounder, one operated 

the throttle and untangled the hoses 

from bushes, and the fourth soldier held 

the pickets. The soldier operating the 

automatic picket pounder only had to 

guide the device on the picket. The 

weight of the device was sufficient to 

drive the pickets when it was operating. 

This crew drove pickets for a 300-meter 

triple-standard fence in less than 20 

minutes. Installation time for a 300- 

meter minefield marking fence aver14 Engineer August 1997 
aged between 7 and 8 minutes. It took 

less than one second to drive a single 

picket. 

The speed of the automatic picket 

pounder is only one of its benefits. It 

can also drive pickets in almost any 

type of terrain. When we had to build 

obstacles over broken terrain and on 

hard, compacted tank trails, the automatic picket pounder was extremely 

helpful. We did not put pickets across 

tank trails in the past, because we could 

not drive the pickets to the necessary 

depth with a manual driver. Even with 

the automatic picket pounder, soldiers 

had to increase the time the device 

operated and pull down on its handles 

to get the pickets into the ground. 

On extremely rocky terrain, we only 

had to move the pickets around until 

we could wedge them between the 

rocks. Now that the picket crew was no 

longer exhausted from the endless 

pounding with the manual driver, they 

placed the pickets in deeper than normal, making it difficult to remove 

them. With the manual driver, we normally used 6-foot pickets and drove 

them an average of 6 to 8 inches deep. 

The average depth for the automatic 

picket pounder was 12 to 14 inches. 

The picket pounder ensured that there 

were no gaps in the obstacles and that 

the obstacles would not come out easily 

even in rough terrain. 

Disadvantages 

n the minus side, the hoses 

that connect the automatic 

picket pounder to the compressor seemed to catch on every creosote bush in the desert as we moved 

across the obstacle frontage. The hose 

would then pull back on the 55-pound 

driver that the soldier carried. After 

constructing obstacles for several kilometers, this became very irritating. To 

overcome the problem, we constructed 

a boom to hold the device and route the 

hose up and over the boom to keep it 

off the ground. 

Another problem with the picket 

driver was that it drove the pickets too 

deep! When we policed the battlefield 

the day after a battle, it was hard to get 

the pickets out of the ground. We tried 

pulling them out using straps attached 

to a 5-ton dump truck, but the straps 

could not withstand the pressure without breaking. Then we tried using the 

winches on the 5-ton dump truck and 

the HMMWV and found that steel 

cables worked well in removing the 

pickets. In the future, we will not set 

the pickets so deep that we cannot 

remove them. 

Conclusion 

n light of our experience, we 

recommend units consider locally procuring picket pounders 

if auxilary power units are available. 

We also suggest that the Engineer 

School include hydraulic picket pounders as SEE attachments. 

The automatic picket pounder has 

allowed us to increase the emplacement 

speed and effectiveness of obstacles. Its 

ability to drive pickets in all terrain and 

to any depth without exhausting the 

soldiers was a great benefit to the 

OPFOR. The post driver proved its 

usefulness during the Advanced Warfighting Experiment and will continue 

to be an integral part of OPFOR obstacle emplacement. u 

Major Funkhouser is the Regimental Engineer; 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, Fort Irwin, California. Previous assignments include observer/ 

controller; Fort Irwin; small group 

instructor; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Commander; B/D Company, 8th 

Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. 

He holds a master's degree in engineering management from the University of 

Missouri-Rolla and is a professional 

engineer: 

Second Lieutenant Swnner is the 1st 

Platoon leader; 58th Engineer Company, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

Fort Irwin, California. He holds a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering 

from the University of Tennessee. 

(Continuedji-om page 13) 

Endnotes 

' Sean D.Naylor, "Hidden Soft Spot 

in 

10 March 

Satellite 

1997, 

Might," 

pages 

v, 

20-21. 

Russell F. Weigley, The American 

Way of War; A History of United States 

Military Strategy and Poficy, BIoomington, Indiana, Indiana U~versily 

Press, 1977, page 246. 

John H. Bradley and Jack W. Dice, 

'Waltzing Matilda: The Early Carrier 

War" The Second World War: Asia and 

the Pacific, West Point, New York, 

Department of History, 1977, pages 

161-195. Excerpt reprinted in U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff 

College, The Evolution of Modern Warfare Syllab&ook of Readings, Tms 

I1 and III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

USACGSC, 1966, pages 332-366. 

4~llan R. Millet and Peter 

Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 

A Military ~istory of the United States 

of America, New York, The Free Press, 

1984, page 433. 

Ibid, page 401. 

Larry H. Addington, The Patterns 

of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 2d 

edition, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana 

University Press, 1994, page 260. 

Millet and Maslowski, page 464. 

T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of 

War: A Study in Unpreparedness, 1994, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff 

College Press, pages 426-433. 

Major Cook, an engineer oflcel: is a 

student at the Command and General 

St@ College. He hob a master 5 degree 

from fhe University of Tkm and is a pmfessional engineer in Virgrinia. He has 

served in combat engineer assignments 

with the 1st Infantry and 3rd Infantry 

Divisions. MM Cook is scheduled to 

serve as S3 of the 14th Engineer Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington. 

August 1997 Engineer 15 
ENFORCE Breakout Sessions 

Tackle Regimental Issues 

By Lieutenant Colonel Susan Myers and the ENFORCE Team 

ave you ever wondered what really happens at an 

ENFORCE conference? Breakout sessions held 

throughout the conference are part of an Engineer 

Regiment initiative to pull together all of the experience, great 

ideas, and issues discussed at the conference. The feedback 

generated from these sessions is then incorporated into the 

Engineer Regiment's strategic plan. Eight sessions were 

conducted during ENFORCE 97: Doctrine Development, 

Trend Reversal and Engineer Qualification Tables, Heavy 

Division Engineer Redesign, Light Engineer Force Structure, 

ACE and SEE Readiness, Integrated Concept Team (Combat 

submit comments by 15 May. These chapters appear on the 

Engineer School's home page at http://www.wood.army.miY 

DDD/JOINT/joint.htm. 

FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 

We discussed the breaching challenges facing commanders, 

the theory behind breaching operations, and the various types 

of breaching operations available to commanders. The group 

provided input on planned changes in breaching 

fundamentals and organizations that the author is making in 

the field manual. 

FM 20-32, MineICountermine Operations This manual 

Heavy), Bridging, and Countermine Concept. provides U.S. armed forces with technical guidance for 

Breakout sessions provide a forum to inform personnel conducting mine and countermine operations and emphasizes 

about ongoing schoolhouse initiatives, solicit feedback, and maneuver and engineer staff planning and coordination. It 

formalize strategic planning efforts for issues critical to the will be used by all elements of the combined arms team. 

regiment's success. This year participants selected the 

sessions they wanted to attend from the ENFORCE agenda 

and most came prepared for the discussions, which resulted 

in some lively debates. This was the first year that U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE) division and district 

commanders participated in the sessions, and we intend to 

include more USACE topics next year. Highlights of the 

sessions follow. 

Doctrine Development 

By Captain Shawn Howley 

T he session concentrated on publications currently 

under revision. Feedback and insights gained from the 

discussion will provide a great resource for authors as 

they develop these warfighting manuals. Three manuals were 

discussed: 

Joint Publication 3-34, Joint Doctrine for Engineer 

Operations. We discussed Chapter II, "Joint Engineer 

Fundamentals," which joint force commanders should 

consider when planning and executing engineer operations that 

parallel, support, or enhance the strategic goals and campaign 

plan. Attendees were invited to review Chapters I1 and III and 

'&end Reversal and Engineer Qualification Tables 

By Captain Darrell Stmther 

e began with a demonstration of the "Trend 

Reversal" compact disc (CD) developed by the 

Engineer School's Combined Arms Branch. This 

user-friendly CD will help units reverse problem trends 

identified at the combat training centers by identifying some 

tactics, techniques, and procedures to correct them. The CD 

is scheduled for distribution via Internet by January 1998. 

Resource issues dominated the discussion concerning the 

Engineer Qualification Tables (EQT) (see chart). The major 

issue was the Engineer School's position to constrain 

development of the EQT by the resources provided in DA 

Pam 350-38 (STRAC manual). No consensus was reached by 

the group, and we will continue to study the issue. Another 

point of discussion is apparent redundancy in the tables. 

Active Component units want to eliminate redundant tables. 

The Reserve Component units represented at the session want 

to maintain some redundancy to allow for both unit 

certification and qualification. 

16 Engineer August 1997 
Comments gathered during the session will be used to Heavy Division Engineer Redesign 

revise the EQT. Draft copies will be fielded to selected units By Vern Lowrey 

for comments, and the 

commandant for appro\ 

final EQT will be presented to the 

ral. T he engineer force structure is evolving to support the 

Force XXI heavy division.The conceptual heavy 

division engineer design includes Bradley fighting 

vehicles, Grizzly breachers, and Wolverine heavy assault 

bridges. The design also includes some fixes to the current 

heavy division engineer battalions, such as the addition of 

an S2 officer, a battalion maintenance officer, and a robust 

engineer reconnaissance capability. The battalion will 

focus exclusively on support to obstacle breaching 

operations. Extensive reinforcement from engineers at 

echelons above division will be required for other engineer 

functions. 

During the ENFORCE Conference, TRADOC announced 

a decision by the Army Chief of Staff to provide three 

engineer battalions in support of the three maneuver brigades 

in a "conservative heavy division" design (see chart below). 

This design does not include a separate division engineer 

brigade or group command headquarters. The conservative 

heavy division design will be used during the Division XXI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at Fort Hood, 

Texas, in November. It and two other designs (strike division 

and brigadist division) will be analyzed by the TRADOC 

Engineer Qualification Tables 

CONSERVATIVE HEAVY DIVISION (as of 14 MAY 1997) 

XX 

XX 

- 

- 3 battalions of 3 companies each 

-No group headquarters 

-Support platoon to forward support 

battalion base company 

* Number of authorized personnel 

Number 

I 

II 

I tt 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

Vlll 

IX 

X 

XI . 

XI I 

August 1997 Engineer 17 

Tltle 

IndividuaVCrew Weapons Qualification 

Leader Demolitlons and Mine Qualification 

Individual ~emblttions and Mine Certification 

Individual Demolitions and Mine Qualification 

Preliminary React to Contacf 

Preliminary Training Course 

lnterrnediate Certification Course 

Intermediate Quatification Course 

Advanced React to Contact 

Advanced Training Course 

Advanced Certification Course 

Advanced Qualification Course 
Analysis Command (TRAC) before the end of September, as 

part of the Division Design Analysis, Phase III, process. The 

strike division design incfudes an engineer group that 

commands six engineer companies, The hrigadist division 

design altaches an engineer battalion to the maneuver 

brigade but ha$ no eng~neer brigade headquarters. TRAC 

will analyze only combat capability (nor battle command). 

The Engineer School will attempt to provide TRAC with 

needed battle command insights observed during the 

Division XXI AWE. This AWE will determine the need to 

retain the engineer brigade command structure in the heavy 

division. 

The heavy division will require !he capability to acquire 

and use an increasing Eoad of digital terrain data to support 

Force XXI operations. We identified the need to manage 

digital terrain data at both division and brigade levels to 

provide needed terrain analysis and terrain evaluation 

supprI for the Army Battle Command System. Current 

Force XXI experiments show that terrain analysis teams 

equipped with Digital Topographic Support System 

equipment are required at both the division and maneuver 

brigade levels. 

Light Engineer Force Structure 

@ Peter Malley 

design of the Iight force structure was the main 

topic of discussion. Rather than make small fixes. we 

agreed to fix what is broken throughout the light 

force. By doing this, we will examine the total force 

requiremen1 to derermine units that me no long required or 

where missions may be reassigned to acquire "billpayers" to 

fix broken units. 

Much discussion occurred whcn wc disptayed the 

engineer suppst structure programmed to light forces. All 

atrendees understood the type of support unirs will rcccive 

when they go ro war. We explained how doctrine drives their 

requirements in the total force and that we will correct the 

doctrine if necessary. 

We discussed changes proposed by the light community 

and agreed to work with the 20th Engineer Brigade, Fort 

Bragg, to develop a concept for submission during the Fotic 

Design Update Process (scheduIed for summer 1998). 

Engineer division commanders expressed concern about 

possible changes to the engineer light equipment company. 

They feel this unit is in good shape and should not change. 

The Engineer School will continue to work with the 20th 

Engineer Brigade on proposed changes to the light force 

structure. 

ACE and SEE Readiness 

By Major kwis Sellif IiI 

he diverse audience iociuded equipment users. 

commanders, and representatives from the Marine 

Corps, Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), 

and the manufacturer. Our objectives were t+ 

Provide commanders with systems to improve readiness. 

r Update wends and acquire field input. 

Distribute a CD-ROM about M9 ACE maintenance. 

We discussed initiatives in training. supporting, and 

operating the ACE and SEE that will increase their 

operational rates. We described current training requirements: 

maintenance techniques; and future ~nitiatives on parts 

acquisition, operator and mechanic training, and doctrinal 

employment. Specif c comments follow. 

Training teams. The Amy no longer frlnds maintenance 

and operator rraining teams-that is now a unit-level cost. 

Commanders reported that the teams are worth the cost and 

effort. While the operational readiness rate may drop 

immediately after a training team visit (due partly to 

increased knowledge of the operator or mechanic), overall 

rates soon should rise. 

Schoolhouse focus. The Engineer School will remain 

focused on training and organizational suppart. Training 

includes required operator, mechanic, and suszainment 

training. Organizational support adjusts appropriate TOW 

TDA levels to support equipment. We agreed that the 

organizational structure needs improvement and training 

needs frequent adjustments, but current initiatives adequately 

address rhese issues. 

ACE CD-ROM. The CD-ROM for M9 ACE maintenance 

was demonstrated and issued to attendees. It was well 

received and should be a tremendous asset to units. 

ACE system-{mique ports. We must improve the readiness 

of this equipment and ''pull" information from the user on 

why equipment fails. Users should complete in detail the dab 

sheets that accompany parts orders so that materiel 

devclopcrs know why a piccelpart hiled (o~ralor error, 

rnaIfunction, or mechanical error). This information is 

critical. Units must document problems property [a weight 

the cfforf in resolving systemic problems. Materiel 

deveIopers shou td apply the requirement for each part to meet 

the "form, fit, and function test," and those present agreed 

that user fecdback will assist in this effort. 

hcnl purchase of parts. Local purchases do not create a 

demand on the Dcfcnse Logistics Agency (DLA) and 

therefore adversely impact supply availability. DLA must be 

aware of our actual demand. 

18 Engineer A ligrsst 1997 
Reduced prescded Ioad lisS (PLL) iniliatiye. Reduced 

PLL may adverseIy affect ACElSEE readiness due to heir 

low density and operational requirements. We must closely 

monitor parts availability and their effects on readiness and 

consider an exception to policy. 

Speciar tools and equipment. The availability and 

function of special tools and equipment impact readiness. 

TAACOM wilI soon propose that special tools, such as those 

for the ACE and SEE, be part of a kit, outfit, or set. 

Direct support {DS} maintenance operations. DS-level 

maintainers must not be left out of the loop for maintenance 

training, special tools, and enhancements such as the CDROM. 

Integrated Concept Team (Combat Heavy) 

By Major Shep Barge 

his session described the purpose of the cclnstmction 

inteprated concept team (ICT) and discussed the 

needs and desires of combat heavy and construct ion 

engtneer units in the field. Major conclusions follow. 

Procurement 

m Most participants urged us to maximize the use of commercial construction equipment to accelerate the acquisit ion process and improve parts availability throughout 

the life of equipment. 

Participants agreed that the SEE is not suitable for combat heavy units. They want a sturdy, commercial backhoe in its pIace. 

Contractor/vendor support is necessary for any deployment. Interaction with vendors would he easier if a11 

canstruction equipment was [tom the same company 

(however, contracting laws do not allow this). One participant noted that he was unable to use his International 

Merchant Purchase Authority Card (IMPAC) while 

deployed to Bosnia. The loss of this productive tool 

made it dIFficult to obtain repair parts for construction 

equipment. 

r Units are frustrated that fielding plans for construction 

equipmenr often are lengthened because of the need to 

conven commercial manuals lo Army standards. They 

agreed that new equipment should be ficlded as soon as 

it is physicajly available, even if that means fieIding 

with a draft manual. Participants agreed hat paper manuals are still needed but that manuals on CD-ROMs 

should be distributed to encourage their use. 

Palletfzed loading system transporter 

Combat DeveIopm e n ts 

We discussed rhe concepts and particu tars of upcoming 

construction equipment. The palle[ized loading system (PLS) 

received almost universal praise as a tool that will pay huge 

dividends for engineers (see photo), One dissenting opinion 

was concern that having the same BLS transport chassis as the 

rest of the Army wouId set up engineers to have their PLS 

trucks h ken by thc corps commander to supporl high-priority 

logistics missions. It was noted that the reverse is aIso 

possible: Engineers could receivc assets from other units to 

help during high-priority engineer missions. 

Bosnia Lessons Leanred 

LTC Mike Biering discussed his 6-month tour in Bosnia as 

commander of the 62nd Engineer Barblion (Hcavy) and 

provided the following lessons learned: 

I The deployment was complicated because the entire battalion is not sta~ioned 31 the samc lacadon (split basing). 

SIDPERS (Standard InstallationlDivision Personnel System) reports were submitted to two separate installafions 

for the entire deployment. Unit status reports and METL 

development should be improved to make il easier for 

geographically separated parts of a barralien to deploy as 

one cohesive hatlalion. 

E-mail systems between supported units and depIoyed 

supporting engineer units differ. A solution is (o gather 

information ahout connectivity prior to deployment. 

Eeolextile fabric continues ro be cxrmmely valuable for 

soil and road stabilization purposes. 

a The 62nd Engineer Battalion sustained 24-hour operations because traffic and c~vilian movement were low 

during night hours. Despite the reduced visibility of 

working at night, the Iack of traffic on the roads made 

night operations cfficicnt. 

Reuse of materinls from decommissioned base camps was a 

big success and reducd expenses in subsequent projec~. 

Daily use and modification of risk assessments keep sotdiem safe! 

August 1997 Engineer I9 
The interchange of information between materiel 

developers, field users, and Engineer School integrators is 

critical to providing timely and meaningful support. The 

results of this session will help maintain engineer 

effectiveness into the 21st century. 

Bridging 

By Captain Dan Guilford 

he session 

future of 

A questions 

opened with a brief introduction about the 

bridging. We discussed several doctrinal 

to help guide the development of future 

systems. The three most important questions were how to 

order replacement bridges, where to place unused 

components, and how to account for bridges. We came to a 

consensus on the first two questions and determined that the 

third requires further discussion. 

The future of bridging incorporates units designed to 

emplace both fixed and float bridges. These units are no 

longer tied to their bridges; they can continue forward and 

maintain the momentum of the maneuver force. The PLS 

compatible bridge loads make this possible by enabling 

bridges to become commodities. 

Engineers can manage bridges either by the total bridge 

or by individual loads (flatracks). Everyone agreed that we 

need the capability to order total bridging for corps and 

higher elements to provide bridges for the theater. Once in 

theater, units below corps level need the capability to 

manage bridges by loads. This capability allows planners to 

quickly order large quantities of bridges for transport into a 

theater while providing the flexibility to manage assets to a 

specific gap. 

The group agreed that all components of any load used in 

construction should remain on site (to include flatracks). The 

potential exists to waste some assets when a unit uses only a 

few pieces from a load. However, as we replace those bridges 

with more permanent structures, units can easily inspect and 

repalletize the loads if all components are on site. This 

capability allows units to quickly place loads back into the 

supply system without an additional logistics burden. 

We did not determine how to account for bridges. Whether 

during war or peace, engineers need an organization that 

tracks and is accountable for the location of each load and 

bridge. Units that install bridges will not remain at the bridge 

sites, and follow-on units probably will replace those bridges 

with more permanent structures. Units that install bridges lack 

the capability to maintain accountability. 

One suggestion was for the multirole bridge company 

(MRBC) bridge park to maintain accountability for all 

bridges in a specified area. It was noted that the MRBC 

bridge park has limited assets and is not designed for that 

mission. However, the option exists for the maneuver 

commander to organize a bridge resupply point (such as a 

Class IVN point) from internal assets. Another suggestion is 

to transfer accountability from the emplacing unit to the 

engineer headquarters responsible for that area and later task 

responsibility to the unit designated for main supply route 

maintenance. As units move, bridging assets would transfer 

to the replacement units. 

The information gathered in this session will greatly assist 

efforts to palletize existing and future fixed bridges onto 

flatracks. We will continue to discuss doctrinal questions 

about bridging assets as they arise. 

Countermine Concept 

By Lieutenant Colonel Brigid Ockrassa 

diverse group of materiel developers, project 

managers, combat engineers, Marines, and allied 

officers gathered for a successful session. Each 

attendee was given a copy of the draft countermine concept 

document. Since most of the topics were new, discussion and 

feedback were minimal. However, attendees were favorably 

impressed by the scope and depth of the document and will 

provide comments to assist with the review process. The 

stated objectives for this session were tExplain the new countennine concept and develop 

advocates to aid in its implemention. The concept was 

developed by the TRADOC Countermine ICT, which formed 

in June 1996 to examine countermine issues and propose 

solutions. In the concept document, issues address the 

DTLOMS categories and the future operational capabilities 

of a force operating in a mined environment. The concept 

document is being staffed throughout TRADOC and is 

expected to be forwarded to Headquarters, TRADOC, in July. 

Obtain input regarding the feasibility and completenss of 

new ideas in the concept. The participants' biggest concern 

was resourcing. The countermine concept calls for better 

equipment, expanded fieldings, increased training, and greater 

countermine responsibilities. This concern is not new, but it 

doesn't preclude the ICT from articulating the objective 

endstate, which is not resource constrained. The Army's ability 

to achieve that endstate will be influenced by fiscal constraints. 

The Canadian representative compared our concept to one 

they are writing and intends to incorporate many of our ideas 

in it. The Marine Corps representatives liked the way the 

concept involves the entire Army and saw potential for this to 

influence all ground operations. They requested to participate 

in the countermine ICT and have become active members. 

Session participants were given an in-depth presentation on 

ways to apply risk management to countermine operations, in 

much the same way that it is applied to aviation. Engineers 

(Continued on page 25) 

20 Engineer August 1997 
the sLauonskl BROD cnosslng slte: 

By Captain Anthony G. Reed 

I n May 1996, the two U.S. float bridges in Zupanja were 

removed from the Sava River, leaving only the repaired 

fixed bridge in Brcko, in the northeast sector, connecting 

Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia. To save several hours of 

driving time, Task Force Eagle (1st Armored Division +) 

tasked units to develop a crossing site to link Slavonski Brod, 

Croatia, with Srpski Brod, (formerly Bosanski Brod), 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, The new bridge site would improve 

efficiency for the Nordic/Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade's convoys and help set the stage for the redeployment of the 

Implementation Forces (IFOR). 

This article describes the crossing site mission, which was 

one of many where engineer units worked together to provide a wide range of engineer support to Task Force Eagle 

during Operation Joint Endeavor. 

The Mission 

Hungarian engineer (PMP) float bridge company was 

tasked to emplace the bridge, and the 16th Engineer 

,Battalion (Corps) (Mechanized) was tasked to clear 

and proof three boat ramps where the bridge was to be 

emplaced. The 16th Battalion's B Company organized and 

controlled all required assets and coordinated with the 

NORDPOL Brigade and Bosnian Serb engineers to have the 

Serbs clear their mines before we proofed the area. Based on 

reconnaissance, we took the following equipment and 

personnel: 

W A Panther, a remote-controlled M60 tank with mine rollers used to detonate all types of mines (see article on 

page 24). 

A miniflail, a small remote-controlled, tractor-like 

machine used to detonate antipersonnel mines. 

w An M88 recovery tank, to recover the Panther and use as 

a control vehicle. 

w Tho squads of combat engineers with M113A3s, for 

detecting, marking, and destroying mines. 

w Five-ton dump trucks, for hauling fill material. 

On the southern shore of the river, the west, center, and 

east ramps were potential crossing points. Records showed 

that minefields were on or directly beside all three ramps. The 

center ramp was our first priority, since no mines were on it. 

We only needed to construct a 30-meter road to connect the 

ramp to an existing parking area, which would serve as a 

holding area for future convoys. The west ramp was our second priority, because it had the most gradual slope and was 

twice as wide as the others. 

At the proposed crossing site, we occupied an abandoned 

fuel tank farm that consisted of one large building and a huge, 

fenced parking lot. The building was wrecked and uncleared, 

so we set up tents to live in and secured the area. 

The Hungarian float bridge company was across the river 

in Croatia. Since Croatia is a nonaggressive state, the HunAugust 1997 Engineer 21 
garians built the bridge there and secured it parallel to the 

river bank. 

The Hungarian float bridge is the Former Warsaw Pact 

PMP bridge. It is similar to our assault float bridge (AFB) 

except that the PMP is steel, while the AFB is aluminum. In 

addition, the PMP can be split in half lengthwise to double 

the span for one-way traffic, although this significantly 

reduces the bridge's military load class. The PMP is assembled in the water very much like the AFB. 

Proofing 

'e began proofing with the Panther near the center 

ramp, which was in a field about 30 meters southwest of the parking lot. The entire field had to be 

proofed because of the way the Hungarians had anchored the 

bridge. Rather than use an overhead anchorage system, they 

had tied cables from the bridge to bridge trucks parked on the 

shore. 

The Panther's brakes weren't strong enough (via remote 

control) to prevent it from slipping into the river while proofing the ramps, so we used the M88 recovery tank as a control 

vehicle at the top of the ramp and connected the Panther to it 

with cables. We eased the Panther about halfway into the 

water with the cables, then reeled it back. Maintaining substantial overlap, we moved the Panther over slightly and 

repeated the process. 

We proofed the field several times to ensure that it was 

clear of mines. The only area we didn't proof initially was 

directly to the right of the ramp, because minefield records 

indicated that 12 TMA-4 antitank mines were there. Our 

orders were to wait for the Serbian engineers to destroy those 

mines. They placed a small block of explosive with a blasting 

cap and time fuse next to each mine and blew them in place. 

The Serbs cleared the center and west ramps, and we 

cleared the east ramp. We visually located three TMM-1 antitank mines and one PMR-2A antipersonnel mine. We placed 

half a block of C4 next to each and blew them one at a time. 

The Panther could proof in all the areas where mines were 

destroyed, so we didn't need the miniflail. However, in mud 

such as that encountered near shore, the Panther's desert-type 

mine rollers tended to push a mine around rather than trap it 

between two hard spots and detonate it. We found a TMA-5 

antitank mine in the mud where the Panther's rollers had 

stopped without detonating it. Later, as we reeled the Panther 

out of the water, its track picked up another mine embedded 

in mud. Most of the mud and the mine fell onto the ramp. But 

when we moved over to make another pass, the Panther's 

track solidly wedged the mine against the concrete ramp, 

causing it to detonate. Damage to the Panther included the 

following: 

Two sets of road wheels, three road wheel arms, and a 

shock absorber and mount blew off. 

The torsion bar bent. 

The transmission housing cracked. 

Four days later, the Panther was repaired to a fully 

mission-capable status, and we continued proofing. 

In areas where we couldn't proof mechanically, we used 

mine detectors and probes and discovered three antipersonnel 

mines. During proofing, our soldiers wore their flak vest and 

BASIC (body armor set, individual countermine), which is 

Kevlar-lined protective pants, protective overshoes, and a 

reinforced face shield. 

The Swedish explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, 

with its mine dog and bomb dog, marked the cleared paths 

through minefields and cleared the building in the parking 

area and a concrete bunker near the center ramp. They used 

colored fluorescent spray paints and wooden stakes to mark 

cleared footpaths through the minefields. Each color meant 

something different; for example, blue may mean that an area 

had been cleared by a mine dog, while red may mean it was 

probed by hand. This is a great technique because the proofing results are highly visible. 

The Finnish EOD team removed small trees and brush 

from under the water to ensure a clear path to the west ramp. 

The team packed explosives into a U-shaped channel of aluminum, in much the same way as we make an expedient bangalore torpedo with a U-shaped picket. Then they floated out 

near the trees on a rubber raft and emplaced the charges in the 

water. Initially, they placed the channels of explosives vertically beside the trees, facing the trunks. Later, when most of 

the tree tops were gone but some roots remained, they laid the 

charges into the river bed and gently tamped them into the 

mud. This was extremely effective. 

Bridging 

'hen the center ramp was cleared and proofed, we 

emplaced the float bridge. Security was critical 

because the bridge site had to be protected from terrorist activity from both the southern and northern shores. It 

was the first time in four years that a bridge had been 

emplaced in this sector. Sabotage and a Serbian crossing into 

Croatia were two of our biggest concerns. Therefore, we reinforced the fence around the parking lot on the south side with 

triple-standard concertina wire and several manned gates. 

The north side was manned by Croatian police and Hungarian 

engineers. B Company engineers guarded the gates for the 

first five days until a Swedish mechanized infantry platoon 

assumed responsibility. 

Although B Company engineers initially controlled traffic 

across the bridge, this responsibility soon was transferred to 

the 317th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), a small but 

extremely effective team. Fortunately, we worked well with 

them, because much of the traffic over the bridge was engineer vehicles. 

We had to clear and proof the east and west ramps after the 

bridge was in place. We decided to do this while traffic crossed 

the bridge and close it only to detonate charges. However, it 

became increasingly difficult to coordinate all the proofing and 

demolitions with the large volume of traffic and the number of 

22 Engineer August 1997 
visitors to the site. Then demolition operations became more 

complex as the Serbs and the Finns also began clearing. Again, 

the 317th RAOC worked with us to coordinate demolitions so 

as to maintain the safety of everyone involved. 

PMP Bridge Site (YK333996) 

N 

CROATIA 

f 

StaginglCall-Forward Area 

Levy Road To Slavonski Brod - 

Further Proofing 

ov 

Interconnecting Road 

I 1 

s the river receded, additional proofing was necessary 

on the newly exposed shore next to the ramps. We had 

,to ensure it was safe in case a soldier disembarked 

near the bridge entrance or exit. 

Explosions off the west ramp by the Finnish EOD team 

caused an underwater mine near the center ramp to detonate. 

So the Hungarians wanted us to proof with the Panther again, 

especially on the center ramp. We placed an armored vehiclelaunched bridge (AVLB) over the water, then walked onto the 

bridge and lowered charges into the water on each side of the 

ramps. We detonated four such charges, but there were no 

more sympathetic detonations. 

- 

Horizontal Construction 

West Ramp 

SAVA RIVER 

Center Ramp East Ramp 

piq 

To Doboj Road to Srpski Brod, (Formerly Bosanski Brod) - 

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 

S ince we controlled traffic across the bridge, we could combine the staging areas and call-forward areas. 

North Side Layout. The north side of the crossing site 

needed an area to stage and call forward vehicles waiting to 

cross the river. Access to the site was via a narrow road surrounded by woods on top of an earthen levy. Three ramps, 

called the west, center, and east ramps, corresponded with 

those on the southern shore. The west and center ramps on the 

north side were so close together that a bridge could span 

from the southern center ramp to either of them (see figure). 

The 2d Platoon of the 535th Combat Support Equipment 

Company cleared and constructed a staginglcall-forward area 

just north of the levy road, since the area had a separate 

entrance and exit. The platoon also connected all three northem ramps with a road wide enough to include a staging area 

for priority traffic. 

South Side Layout. On the south side, the abandoned fuel 

tank farm, with access roads constructed by the 535th, could 

be used for a staging/call-forward area. Several enormous 

petroleum product and storage plants with extensive road networks and parking lots about three to five kilometers to the 

northeast would facilitate at least two staging areas. 

Ramp Improvements. As the river continued to recede, it 

left a significant drop-off where the ramps ended. A platoon 

from the 535th hauled in large quantities of fill and 

(Continued on page 32) 

August 1997 Engineer 23 
Robotics insertion Tec 

By David G. Knichel 

E ngineers are leading the way 

into the 21st century by inserting robotics into many existing 

and soon-to-be-fielded systems. As a 

result, the Corps of Engineers will be 

the first ground robotics branch in the 

Army. Robotics are already being used 

by combat engineers in Bosnia and will 

soon be available to many more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

when the first robotic systems are 

fielded in FY99. 

Background 

ndustry has been investing in 

robotics for most of the latter half 

of the 20th century. Robotics 

began with simple manufacturing tasks 

and has progressed to the sophisticated 

human-like android capabilities being 

developed in Japan. Robots offer efficiency, a replacement for human 

labors, and an opportunity to remove 

people from hazardous environments, 

such as environmental cleanup, space 

and underwater exploration, fire fighting, and military operations. 

In the military, robots were first 

used by the German army in World War 

11. Simple remote-control devices for 

mine breaching protected the lives of 

their soldiers. Today, U.S. organizations are advancing robotics technologies in the Army. They include the 

Defense Advanced Research Project 

Agency, Army Missile Command, 

Army Research Laboratory, the Office 

of Naval Research, Sandia National 

Laboratories; universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 

the University of California at Berkeley; and countries such as Germany, 

France, Italy, and Israel. 

Technology 

T' he essential sciences to robotics 

include mechanical engineering 

(ME), sensor technology (ST), 

artificial intelligence (AI), and computer science (CS). ME allows robots 

to be mobile and perform tasks, ST 

allows them to learn about their environments, A1 allows them to "think" 

and "make decisions," and CS allows 

them to process information. These sciences have made tremendous advancements in recent years, and a practical 

"thinking" autonomous robot may be a 

reality in the next decade. Until then, 

robots must operate in fixed-closed 

environments, such as assembly lines in 

industry, or humans must do the sensing, such as seeing and thinking, for 

them. The latter has been termed teleoperation. 

Joint Development 

n 1989, Congress directed the 

Department of Defense to consolidate its robotics efforts to improve 

efficiency, reduce redundancy of 

efforts, and accelerate robotics development. In 1994, the Joint Program Office 

for Unmanned Ground Vehicles (JPOUGV) was established at the Army 

Missile Command's Redstone Arsenal 

at Huntsville, Alabama, as the singular 

managing agency for unmanned ground 

vehicles. To execute it's joint mission, 

JPO-UGV is commanded by a Marine 

Corps colonel who is supported by 

24 Engineer August 1996 
Army program managers. In 1995, an 

agreement between the Army and the 

Marine Corps gave the Army the lead 

as the joint development agency for 

unmanned ground vehicles. As a result, 

the Robotic Technology Insertion 

Activity (R-TIA) was also established 

at the U.S. Army Engineer Center, Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

Insertion Technology 

'hen the U.S. Army deployed 

to Bosnia in 1995, it encountered more than a million land 

mines. In response to this, R-TIA and 

the JPO-UGV developed a prototype 

remote-control system that could be 

inserted in turretless M60 tanks outfitted 

with Israeli tank rollers. The Army built 

six of these systems, which were named 

Panther (see article on page 21). Their 

usefulness quickly became apparent as 

did the need for a standard robotics kit. 

In March 1997, the commandant of 

the U.S. Army Engineer School 

approved the insertion of teleoperation 

robotic technology on engineer equipment. The impact is that approximately 

20 percent of all dozer-type systems 

will have teleoperation robotic capability. In addition, other robotic systems, 

such as an improved prototype Panther 

on an M1 chassis, have been developed 

by R-TIA and are being tested (see 

cover photo). 

A robotic soldier assistant, called 

the Robotic Combat Support System 

(RCSS), is also being evaluated at RTIA. RCSS is the ideal small robot for 

our reduced militaly force. With RCSS, 

one person can lift, transport, or do the 

work of several. This is possible 

because of its multitask attachments 

(including a minibucket loader, miniforklift, and hydraulic tool power cell) 

and its ability to clear mines (such 

as antipersonnel land mines). An 

improved prototype RCSS, with a mine 

flail capability, was sent to Bosnia on 

17 June 1997. Older prototypes of the 

single-use miniflail system have been 

used in Bosnia since 1996. 

User Appraisals 

T oday, R-TIA is combining a mix 

of robotic technologies with current and future vehicle platforms 

and allowing users to evaluate them in 

the development and preproduction 

phase. User appraisals allow the combat developer and program manager to 

get early user feedback from soldiers 

long before the systems go into production. Thus, problems are fixed before 

the systems are fully developed. 

Fort Leonard Wood is an ideal location for the R-TIA joint service robotics 

appraisal site due to the presence of engineers from all services. Army, Air Force, 

Navy Seabee, and Marine Corps engineers have shown great interest in participating in the next round of robotics 

appraisals beginning 1 October 1997. 

Conclusion 

he robotic M60 Panther, which 

was fielded to the Corps of 

Engineers to clear land mines in 

Bosnia, is the most successful robotics 

ground vehicle to date. However, it is 

only the beginning of new robotic 

capabilities for combat engineers. 

Rapid developments in robotics insertion technology allow joint forces to 

upgrade the existing fleet of equipment 

for the 21st century at a much lower 

cost than replacing it. We have learned 

from Bosnia that inserting robotics 

technology gives commanders the 

capability of removing soldiers, sailors, 

iirmen, and marines from the most 

lazardous missions in both war and 

lost-nation assistance. 

Mr. Knichel is the senior Robotics 

Yystems Analyst at R-TJA. A retired 

:ombat engineer oflcer; he has worked 

~ith computers, arti$ciaf intelligence, 

2nd robotics for more than 10 years. MI: 

Knichel designed some of the early 

robotics testing, such as the mine2nd booby-trap-hunting ANDROS, de7loyed to Haiti to support the 10th 

Mountain Division MI: Knichel is a 

praduate of CGSC and has a master's 

iegree in information systems. 

(Continued from page 20) 

need tools to quantify the risks 

associated with mines and various 

countermine systems for their maneuver 

commanders. After a thoughtprovoking discussion, the audience 

expressed interest in developing an 

artificial intelligence system. 

Conclusion 

reakout sessions are one of many 

opportunities for the Engineer 

Regiment to fmus on important 

issues affecting the future engineer force. 

The 18th Airborne Corps engineers' 

quarterly video television conferences and 

the Engineer School's council of colonels 

provide other opportunities. As we expand 

our use of interactive media, we must 

continue to integrate issues into the 

regiment's strategic plan. The Engineer 

School's home page is a major conduit of 

information exchange, but nothing 

replaces face-teface interaction and reallife examples. Thanks to all of you who 

took time to be part of the breakout 

sessions. Whether you attended the 

sessions or paxticipate via interactive 

media, your contributions are valuable. 

You can be part of the 1997 

conference without leaving home by 

sending us constructive comments about 

the breakout sessions described above. 

Send comments to: Commandant, U.S. 

Army Engineer School, Am: ATSETD-TASS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 

65473-6650. The e-mail address is: 

Myerss@ wood.army.mil. 

w 

Lieutenant Colonel Myers is chief of 

the Total Army School System, TRADOC, 

at the Engineer School, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri. She previously served as 

executive oflcer; 1st Engineer Brigade and 

commanded C Company, 94th Engineer 

Battalion (Combat Heavy). LTC Myers 

holds a master's degree in business 

administration from National University, 

California. 

August 1996 Engineer 25 
Death of the CEV 

When I wrote the article, "Death of the CEV" (Engineer, 

December 1996, p. 17), 1 hoped to provoke conversation and 

thought throughout the Corps of Engineers family. Well, that has 

certainly happened and then some! 

I received a phone call that I must share with all of my fellow 

engineers. The caller was the Project Manager-Abrams Tank. 

He shared the following information with me after reading my 

article in Engineer. I found it interesting that the Project 

Manager- Abrams reads Engineer. 

He briefed me about all aspects of building a CEV on an MI 

chassis with very limited modifications to the turret and hull of the 

MI. He informed me that, because the MI CEV (for lack of a 

better name) requires such limited modifications to the hull and 

turret, all necessaty work can happen at the depot level. This 

would drastically reduce the time required to get the updated CEV 

to the field. He estimated that once given a 'Go," it would take 

about one year to build and begin testing the M1 CEV. After a 

production decision, we could build quantity rapldly. 

The 165 mm demolition gun will seat into the basic MI gun turret 

area, because the MI05 main gun breach and Re 165 mm gun are 

the same. When installed, the firing system probably will increase the 

accuracy range of the round significantly. The only major changes 

required inside the turret are to update the ballistic computer and 

replace the ammunition stowage radc system. The NBC 

overpressure system is not on the basic M1 but could be added to it. 

An existing Israeli blade could be attached to the M1 chassis 

to give the MI CEV a blade capability similar to that of the M728 

CEV. This blade has been tested for use with the M1 chassis and 

could be installed at the depot level. 

Finally, an upgrade to the M1 heavy suspension system is 

possible without any modification to the hull. The upgrade of the 

suspension system will give the chassis the same mobility as the 

MIA1 heavy and the MlA2. This upgrade will allow engineers to 

receive suspension repair parts from any tank unit they supporl, 

thus solving some of our recurring maintenance problems. 

The cost of about $900,000 for each M1 CEV prototype is 

minimal when compared with the cost of developing, testing, and 

fielding a new vehicle with the same capabilities. The ability to 

obtain repair parts and maintenance assistance from units the 

engineers support brings this engineer asset into the same 

vehicle generation as that of the maneuver forces. 

The Project Manager-Abrams then informed me that the M1 

hulls, the 165 mm guns, and the Israeli blades can be made 

available. So now, you ask, "When can we expect to get our 'new' 

CEV?" You will not believe the answer to this question: Probably 

never. The Engineer School is not looking to replace the CEV in 

this fashion, and we ail know there is no move afoot to develop an 

M728 CEV replacement. 

When told that the Engineer School appeared uninterested, I 

almost fell out of my chair1 I cannot believe that we are not even 

considering this golden opportunity to replace a lost capability. As 

a combat engineer battalion command sergeant major, I also 

cannot believe that we never heard of this proposal in the field 

and still would not know about it if not for this concerned soldier 

reading Engineer magazine. 

All right; engineer& let's get on the phone, computers, or any 

other communications resource and let our Enqineer School 

know how we feel. We need to address any possible method for 

replacing our lost CEV capability. 

Command Sergeant Major Timothy Chadwick 

4th ID, 299th Engineer Battalion 

Fort Hood 

Engineer School's Reply 

CSM ChadwfcKs letter regarding a replacement for the M728 

Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) raises issues that need to be 

understood by every senior member of the Engineer Regiment. His 

points are sound, and he has obviously done his homework. 1 wwili 

not refute his views about the need for a better CE\! because we 

need that capability The question is how to meet that need. I offer 

anotherperspective about why the Engineer School is not working 

on an Abrams CEV at present. There are two basic reasons. 

First, the world has changed since the original CEV was 

developed. Then the Army was focused on fighting a major war in 

Europe. The anticipated enemy had massive formations of 

armored vehlcles, and we were significantly outnumbered and 

outgunned in many areas. Our strategy was to defend, trading 

space for time. We supported that strategy by becoming the best 

in the worid at countermobility operations. Bear in mind that we 

planned to fight on terrain generally of our own choosing with 

which we were totally famlllar. We were very well prepared for 

that eventuality Mobility operations and the requisite equipment 

to support them were secondary to that primary focus. As a 

result, the Army did not see an overwhelming need for a 

dedicated complex obstacle breaching vehicle, like the Grizzly. 

There was support for an engineer capability to reduce point 

obstacles, such as that likely to be encountered in urban areas or 

obstacles created by nuclear strikes. There also was a secondary 

need for a capability to create obstacles from a standoff position. 

The M728 CEV was developed for that combined requirement. 

Since then, the world has changed dramatically and the U.S. 

Amy's role and anticipated misslons have changed as well. Now 

we must be ready to deploy into areas of the world where 

opponents own the terrain and have ample time to prepare 

deliberate defenses. Potential opponents have had an 

opportunity to learn from our experiences in Europe. They are 

intimately aware of our countermobility doctrine, tactics, and 

equipment. While that change was taking place, we were not 

funded adequately to develop and field an effective 

counterobstacle capability. If our forces had been required to 

breach a complex obstacle against a credible foe who learned 

from our Cold War experiences in Europe, the results would likely 

have been grim. 

26 Engineer August 1997 
The second reason, touched on briefly in the previous 

paragraph, is money. We have two mobility systems approaching 

fielding, the Griuly and the Wolverine. They will provide wofldclass capabilities that no one else has. In the current budgetary 

climate, it is extremely difflcult to get authorization to start a new 

acquisition program. The senior leadership of the Engineer 

Regiment has agreed on a list of priority programs for the future. 

We are addressing as many programs as resources permit. 

Unfortunately, a replacement for the CEV is not one of them. 

In the meantime, we are seeking other ways to solve the 

problem created by the retirement of the CEK The situation is not 

hopeless, and the Engineer School has not given up! The 

challenges of reducing point obstacles and providing engineer 

support to the combined arms team in close or open terrain are 

well understood. TRA DOC, with Headquarters, Department of the 

Army support, is aggressively working on a near-term solution. The 

most likely option is to mount a rubble-clearing blade on the 

Abrams tank. A modified 120 mm tank round has proven to be 

effective against certain types of point obstacles. 

For the long term, we're exploring several methods of 

delivering a demolition charge from a standoff posltion. The 

Grizzly, with its robust blade and arm, can clear rubble. While we 

may not have both demolition and clearing capabilities on the 

same platform, we will continue to acwmplish the mission. 

It is always good to hear from the field, especially on issues of 

great concern to the regiment. Thank you, CSM Chadwick, for 

setting the stage for this discussion. 

Colonel Robert J. Greenwalt, Jr. 

Director of Combat Developments 

Loss of Antipersonnel Mines 

The MI6 bounding antipersonnel (AP) mine is a very effective 

weapon when employed properly. Lately, it and similar nonselfdestructing "dumb" mines have become the center of U.S. policy 

because of their postwar impact on civilians. Thls has resulted in 

restricting their use to the Korean peninsula (Engineer, December 

1996, inside front cover). Considering that the United States has 

approximately 1.5 million M16s in stock, we have a financial 

obligation to taxpayers to consider upgrading the MI6 with a 

reliable self-destruct fuse, rather than destroying millions of dollars 

worth of government property. These mines could be fitted with a 

"smart" fuse similar to one developed by the Italians for their 

Valmara 69 bounding AP mine, called the VS-APFM1. This 

advanced electronic fuse can be programmed to self-neutralize in 

up to 365 days. However, it should be noted that the need for longterm nonselfdestructing mines in barrier mineflelds like those 

found along the DMZ in Korea will continue. 

Alternatively, the M16 could be used as a commanddetonated 

munition similar to the MI8 claymore (within the restrictions 

outlined in the Convention of Conventional Warfare) or it could 

form the basis of a command-activated, close-in vehicle defense 

similar to the one fitted to the famous German Tiger tank. Such a 

system effectively protects tanks from dismounts in urban combat 

(which may become more prevalent in the near future) or other 

restricted terrain. 

Considering that the U.S. military has not performed very 

effectively against dismounted opponents in the last 50 years 

(Korean Conflict, Vietnam War, and Somalia) and that bounding 

AP mines are very effective against such threats, we should make 

every effort to upgrade this valuable resource to make it politically 

acceptable. They are too valuable a resource to waste. 

August 1997 

Major William Schneck 

A DE, 29th Infantry Division (Virglnia Army National Guard) 

Engineer School's Reply 

MAJ Schneck is correct in his position that the MI6 

antipersonnel landmine (APL) is an operationally effective 

weapon. Its battlefield functions are vital to the success of U.S. 

war plans. Unfortunately, APLs are politically unacceptable and, 

as the letter states, nonseif-destruct APLs have been banned. 

The U.S. military has the charter to find an acceptable APL 

replacement--one that fils the operational niche currently filled by 

APLs but does not pose a lingering threat to innocents. The letter 

suggests two possible approaches, which I will address. 

Add a selfdestmct fuse to the M16. The President's policy 

clearly articulates a goal to eliminate all APLs-not "dumb" APLs, 

not "smart"APLs, all APLs. Converting our nonself-destruct to seifdestmct would violate the intent of the President's policy and be 

more fiscally irresponsible than simply destroying our current stock. 

Add a mechanism to make the M1 6 a commanddetonated 

munltion. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is sponsoring a 

malor, three-part study to find an APL replacement. It is a very 

wmprehensive research project. In this unconstrained, 

brainstorming envlronment, we are considering all options across 

the DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leader development, 

organizations, materiel, and soldiers) domains. Options include 

lefhal systems, nonlethal systems, expanding employment of 

currently fielded systems, increasing the force structure, and 

modifying existing mine stocks. To address MAJ SchnecKs 

specific suggestion: 

The technical challenge of adding the control mechanisms 

that make APLs acceptable is not trivial. 

It is unclear what additional target verifications will be 

required to accommodate reduced visibility. 

The command and control and force structure implications of 

fielding this system are not obvious. 

A TRADOC-chartered integrated concept team Is now 

analyzing the effects of current APLs and determining the most 

tactically sound employment of candidate replacements. 

Research confirms that APLs provide many benefits to the 

warfighter. MAJ Schneck's letter touched on just one use of 

APLs--defending a long-term border from a dismounted threat. In 

that role, the APL essentially is a "robotic sentinel," filling a role 

not easily duplicated. The Deparlment of Defense has invested a 

lot of time, money, and energy into the task of finding APL 

alternatives that address all tactical employments. We have not 

acted unilaterally. We have solicited industry and academia for 

possible solutions and are wolking closely with nations that are 

seeking politically acceptable systems that replicate the 

operational functions of APLs. 

Replacing the functionality of APLs has proven to be an 

elusive challenge. Some innovative technologies are beginning to 

emerge. The bad news, however; is that the most promising 

replacement systems tend to operate in a narrow set of conditions 

and address only a single tactical employment. These systems 

are very expensive and they are years from fielding. 

Bottom line: While we have not found the answer yet, we are 

considering all relevant options in pursuit of an appropriate APL 

replacement. 

Lieutenant Colonel Brigid Ockrassa 

Special Countermine Project Officer 

Directorate of Combat Developments 
Infrastructure Preservation: 

Extending Road Life in Remote Areas 

Ry Major Robin C. Hagelty, Geor~e Mason, and Gil Mnson 

ecent humanitarian operations in remote areas of 

Africa and Bosnia have emphasized the nced for a 

strategy to deal with road networks that cannot 

sustain enough Iogistics convoy traffic to support military 

operations. The traditional point of origin for equipment and 

materiel is R fixed seaport or airfield, with the final 

distribution point being at the end of an unimproved dirt 

road. This scenario requires repealed transloading of 

materiels as route conditions and topopphy change. 

Unimproved secondaq mads are commonly built for lightand medium-duty wheel loads, with construction consisting of 

minima[ subgrade prepamtion overlaid with gravel. Normal 

maintenance for these mads consists of periodic blading and 

seasonal applications of new surfacing materials. The 

subgrade's compaction, strength, and drainage determine the 

frequency of maintenance needcd to keep [he road passahfe. 

Initial road railure may be indicated when drivers complain 

about pot holes, surface rutting. and roughness. Road 

deterioration that causes vchiclc vi hration rapidly increases 

driver fatipe and limits the speed he can safely drive. At the 

same time, it accelerates vehicle maintenance rcquircments. 

This article describes roadway deterioration caused hy 

rnilitav transportation in remote areas and presents some 

actions that can extend road life. 

Discussion 

.S. military relief missions often involve transloading 

supplies from large tsanspott trucks onto srnalIer, 

Army series M923 trucks. which are better suited for 

use on unimproved roads. The repeated heavy-duty wheel 

Figure 1. Relatlonshlp between vehlcle speed and surface roughness of selected ride courses. 

28 Engineer Augrrsr 1997 

I 

SPEED MWSURED AT THE I-WATT LIMIT 

MILETAW WEELED VEHICLES MKlTAW TRACKED E!4FCl%S 

80-; 

g - 2 

Ei' 

.- :..:._L-:-.:-:_.:-.:.-: IIIIII,,, 

,,,I,ObII 

I,,,,,,,,, 

IJI,IIII1I 

IJI,JIIbII 

IIII,I,III 

<,,#,a,,,, 

IJI,J,I,,. 

1tI4J4nI1I 

,,r,,,,,,, 

IIJIIIII,I 

-:---;--;-..;- --;- .; ---:. - .; - -4- -*; 

IIII,IIIII 

,,,4,,,,#, 

,,I,,,,,., 

I,,,,,*,., 

III4IInIII ;;:;:-;::; 

,I,*IIIII, 

,,,,,,,,I, 

*IIIIIIIII 

V) , , I, I 

I, 

I,,,,,, 

I, 

,,,,,,, I, , , b,,,,,, 

,,,4,#, 

,,,a,,, 

,,,I,,, 

II.II0I 

,IIIIII,I, 

1JI,JII,I, 

11,0II,II. 

II,I,II1,, 

I I ,,I,,,, I 

,,,,,,,,I, 

O-:..;--:---:--;--:---L--:--;---:- IIIIIIIIII 

0 0.4 0.8 I 2.6 0 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.6 

SURFACE ROUGHNESS, INCHES SURFACE ROUGHNESS, INCHES . 
Figure 2. Estimated cargo movement tlme when speed Is limited by road 

surface roughness. 

I 

loads from these trucks' bias-ply tires may immediately or 

curnulat ive ty affect the roadway until deterioration makes it 

almost impassable. If tire pressure is high, the tire's ability to 

absorb many of the dynamic forces imposed by the vehicle 

traveling along an uneven road surface is limited. Thus, most 

of the dynamic force is transmitted directly down to the road 

and up to the driver. 

Fatigue LeveL The Human Engineering Laboratory at 

Aherdeen Proving Ground has taken the dynamic forces 

exerted on the driver over time and mnsIated them into 

30 - 

25 

20 

S 

15 

J 

m 

E 

I= 10 

5 

0 

Pam Fair Gmd Excallent 

Conditbn d Road 

fatigue levels. Several vehicle-nesting laboratories built 

coarses to represent various levels of surface roughness 

existing in different areas of the wwld. Then rnilita~y vehicles 

were driven over these courses, and on-board measurements 

were recorded. Vertical accelerations at the drivefs seat 

(referred to as absorbed power) were averaged over time and 

defined in units called watts. Further research determined tha~ 

drivers normally did not operate vehicles for long prids 

(8 hours or more) at absorbed power levels of 6 watts or more. 

Speed. Figure 1 represents the relationship of speed and 

surface roughness for military wheeIed and tracked vehicles 

tested on various ride courses. The x axis in Figure 1 ranges 

from a very smooth segment of road (no undulations) to an 

extmmely rough segment (approximatley 2.5 inches). 

Mason. Smith. Gray. and Ahlvin explain in detail this 

method of describing terrain and road surface roughness. ' 

Using Figure I as a means of estimating speed for convoys, 

four conditions were selected to demonstrate the effects of 

different levels of roadway deterioration on convoy speed. 

The average convoy sped is defined at the 1 st quattile, or the 

pint where 25 percent of the wheeld military vehicles tested 

is limited by surface roughness. Thus, a surface toughness of 

approximately O inch, with a corresponding average speed of 

54 rnph, represents extremely smooth roads in excellent 

condition. In the next quartile, roads in good condition are 

represented by a surface roughness of 0.2 inch, with a 

maximum sped of 47 mph. In the third quartiie, a surface 

roughness of 0.6 inch, with mast speeds reduced to 14 mph, 

represents roads in fair condition. FinalIy, a surface roughness 

of 1.5 inches, which may restrict vehicle speed to as low as 7 

rnph. represents roads in poor condirion. 

Wheeled vehicles were selected for the study since they 

normally comprise reIief mission convoys. The doctrinal 

average convoy speed specified in EM 101-10-1, 

Organizational, Tecltnicnl, and hgisticrrl Data, is 40 krnJhr 

(24.8 mph), which includes halts. The convoy is expected to 

travel 320 kilometers (198.4 miles) in 8 hours. Excludin_e 

time for stops, the vehicles will average speeds of 80 kmhr 

(49.6 mph). However, visibility, terrain, and road conditions 

often affect the average speed. 

Figure 2 depicts he relationship between the increase in time 

required to ttanspon supplies and the road condition. 

Calculazions m based on the convoy traveling 200 miles with 

the speed restricted by the 6-watt fatigue maximum of the driver. 

Speeds given for the road conditions in figure 1 are used to 

catculate the time required to move the payloads in Figure 2. 

Soil Stress 

W ithin the parameters of geotechnical engineering, it 

is convenient to view the subsurface soil stress as a 

function of stresses from-' 
Tire Size 11.00~20 LOAD = 5480 LBS 

Tire Pressure 80 psi 

(after Wong: 1989) 

l nches 

Figure 3. Pressure distribution under a statically loaded tire in various soil types. 

Soil and road surface weight (construction). 

Fluid pressures (weather). 

Externally applied loads (traffic). 

Military transporters are primarily concerned with 

changes in road surface conditions that inhibit movement. 

Road deterioration normally occurs through interaction of 

the tire's footprint and the road's ability to absorb and 

disperse stresses imposed by traffic while maintaining its 

surface resiliency. Tire design helps the road retain some of 

its resiliency by absorbing part of the stresses. Without 

periodic maintenance, the road surface's ability to absorb 

load stresses is reduced, causing the surface andlor subgrade 

to fail. As failure continues, the road surface cracks and 

develops ruts. Rutting begins the chain of events that 

quickly makes the road difficult to travel at maximum 

speeds. As traffic accelerates, the deterioration process 

continues to increase and drivers must reduce speeds to 

prevent damage to vehicles, the cargo, or themselves. 

Figure 3 depicts the distribution of radial stresses from a 

5,480-pound tire load in various mediums. It shows the 

relationships between the passing wheel, its loading effects, 

rutting, and the dynamics of the passing shock wave as it 

penetrates the road's subgrade through different soil types.3 

The cross-sectional view shows the downward stresses 

caused by the wheel as it traverses the road and 

demonstrates how these stresses are dispersed and absorbed 

by the subsurface soil. 

The figure depicts the shock wave from an M923 cargo 

truck with bias-ply tires and its cargo centered over the rear 

wheels. The calculated front-wheel load (worst case) 

represents the net vehicle weight of 22,515 pounds, combined 

with its rated gross cargo capacity of 10,000 pounds, and 

divided by six wheel locations. 

Figure 3 shows how different soil types respond to the 

wheel load but does not specifically identify the stresses 

caused by vehicle speed. This figure also shows the 

relationship between soil subsurface strength and the tire's 

ability to penetrate deeper into the subsurface, thus increasing 

the severity of rutting with each additional vehicle pass. 

Alternatives 

E ngineers can calculate the effects of wear on 

unimproved roads.; however, many transporters lack a 

background in using these analytical methods. For 

field applications, convoy planners need an engineerdeveloped methodology that is based on scientific principles. 

It should be easy to understand and simple to apply. 

The relationship between a wheel load and its interaction 

on an unimproved road are predictable. Therefore, the 

transporter has several alternatives for preserving road life. 

These include reducing tire pressure, vehicle speed, and 

vehicle weight. 

Reduce Tire Pressure. This action increases the size of the 

tire footprint and decreases the transmitted wheel-load 

stresses. It more evenly distributes stresses over a wider 

30 Engineer August 1997 
tire-contact area. However, we must exercise caution when 

reducing tire pressure. Total reduction must not exceed 25 

pounds per square inch (psi) per tire. If the pressure 

reduction drops below 25 psi per tire, excessive tire 

deformation may occur, resulting in damage to the sidewall 

or inner tube. Reducing tire pressure also lessens the driver's 

discomfort from road surface roughness. 

Reduce Vehicle Speed. In conjunction with reduced tire 

pressure, a lower speed assists in more even distribution of 

shock waves through the soil. Reducing shock waves helps 

preserve the drivers' comfort. 

Reduce Vehicle Weight. Decreasing the vehicle load 

offers the greatest potential for extending road life while 

preserving the drivers' comfort. When planning throughput 

estimates in remote areas, transporters normally use the 

cross-country load weight, which is approximately 75 

percent of the vehicles' rated capacity, as a base calculation. 

Reducing the estimated cross-country cargo load from 7,500 

to 6,000 pounds reduces vehicular-caused road deterioration. 

The best potential for retarding road deterioration is to 

use a combination of all three alternatives. This commonsense approach can be broken into several independent 

actions. Transporters should apply the alternatives in 

response to changes in weather and road conditions to 

extend road life and lessen potential damage to their trucks' 

suspension components. 

Figure 4 illustrates the net effect gained from these 

alternatives. 

Situation I reflects no action taken. 

Situation I1 reflects reduced tire pressure. 

Situation I11 reflects reduced tire pressure and reduced 

payload. 

Situation IV reflects reduced tire pressure and a reduced 

payload of 1,500 pounds below the normal cross-country 

planning load. 

Calculations are based on research conducted at the U. S. 

Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, using an Army 

series M923 5-ton cargo truck with a cargo weight of 10,000 

pounds.4 The wheel load was calculated using the vehicle's 

rated load capacity of 10,000 pounds and its manufactured 

empty weight of 22,515 pounds. As illustrated, Situation IV 

indicates the greatest potential for increased road life span. An 

interesting observation between Situations III and IV is that 

reducing the cross-country payload and reducing tire pressure 

significantly increases the life of the road. 

Conclusion 

he physical and political environments of a host nation 

influence the execution of military operations. 

Infrastructure limitations due to the remoteness of an 

area, combined with ever-changing political considerations, 

present unique challenges for our military forces. There is a 

direct correlation between road usage and road degradation 

and their effects on limiting convoy throughput operations. 

This correlation has significant influence on vehicle speeds, 

surface roughness, and vehicle maintenance. The alternatives 

discussed above are possible solutions to this problem. 

Reduced vehicle loads and tire pressures may potentially 

double road life. It is critical that military transporters 

understand the correlation between traffic and road 

degradation and between vehicle speeds and surface 

roughness. 

- 

Sltuatlon IV 

65 psi Tire Pressure 

6,000 Ib Payload 

Situation Ill 

65 psi Tire Pressure 

7,500 Ib Payload 

Situation ll 

65 psl Tire Pressure 

10,000 Ib Payload 

Situation I 

80 psl Tlre Pressure 

10.OM) Ib Payload 

0 0.5 I 1.5 2 

Estimated Weeks Until Road Failure 

Figure 4. Estimated changes in road life based on vehicle configurations. 

August 1997 
Engineers have limited assets for maintaining road 

networks. Therefore, military transporters must help reduce 

damage to roads in order to increase their longevity. As the 

focus of our force projections shifts toward humanitarian 

operations, more emphasis is placed on reducing overall 

operational costs and improving timely execution. Each 

member of the humanitarian team must strive to preserve the 

infrastructure while maintaining daily throughput operations. 

Major Hagerty is deputy commander of the Nashville 

District, Corps of Engineers. She was previously stationed at 

the Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi. 

MAJ Hagerty holds a master's degree in civil engineering 

from the University of Texas at Austin and is a registered 

professional engineer 

Mr Gil Mason is a reseamher in the fields of military 

transportm'on and logistics for Applied Research Associates Inc., 

Mckburg, Mississippi. He is a graduate of the Army Command 

and General Staff College and holds a master 's degree. 

DI: George Mason is a registered professional engineer in 

the Mobility Systems Division, U.S. Army Waterways 

Experiment Station, Vickshurg, Mississippi. He holds a 

doctorate in civil engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic 

Institute, Troy, New York. 

Endnotes: 

 ason on, G.L., R.R Smith, M.W. Gray, and R.B. Ahlvin, 

"Development of a Terrain and Road Data Base for HML 

Transporter Concepts" Technical Report GL-85-12, US. 

Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, 

MS. 1985. 

2~ernica, John N., Geotechnical Engineering, Holt, 

Rinehart, &Winston, Inc. 1982, page 156. 

3~ong, J.Y., Erramecknics and Off-Road Vehicles, 

Elsevier Publishing, 1989, page 198, 

4~arber, V.C. and N.R. Murphy, "VehicleIRoad 

Compatibility Analysis and Modification Systems, 

(VRCAMS)" Technical Report S-73-13, U.S. Army Engineer 

Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS. 1973 

Acknowledgment: The tests described and the resulting 

data presented herein, unless otherwise noted, were obtained 

from research conducted under the Research, Development, 

Testing, and Evaluation program of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers by the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment 

Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, Permission was granted by 

the Chief of Engineers to publish this information. 

(Continued from page 23) 

lengthened the ramps so the float bridge's length could be 

adjusted to the water level. 

Clean-Up Operations 

fter the Finns blew charges in the water to clear the 

foliage, they brought in an excavator to clean up roots 

,and debris. To allow them to reach farther across the 

water, we laid out the AVLB so they could move the excavator onto the bridge. This was the second time we had used 

the AVLB in a nontraditional role. 

The Finns had a bucket loader with a revolving street 

broom attachment, which we used to sweep the large parking 

lot. It is a very efficient and useful device. 

Lessons Learned 

ost important, we learned that engineers must 

maintain a wide variety of equipment to accomplish the myriad of tasks expected of them. This 

can be accomplished in two ways: 

Continue to task organize units as required to accomplish the mission. This may include equipment from 

other nations as well as U.S. assets. 

Tailor a battalion-sized unit to give it bridging, horizontal and vertical construction, and combat engineering 

capabilities. (Task Force Volturno is a good example of 

how successful a diverse engineering unit can be. See 

article on page 2). 

We also learned that there is a continued requirement for 

better countermine equipment. The Panther with its desert 

rollers was helpful, but it often failed to detect mines. Until 

technology provides us with that "ultimate" piece of countermine equipment, we must continue to use every tool available to reduce and eliminate the mine threat in every 

situation we encounter. 

u 

Captain Reed is attending CAS3 and will attend the University of Washington this fall. Previous assignments include 

Commander; B Company, 16th and 54th Engineer Battalions; and XO/platoon leader (during Desert Storm), 1st 

Engineer Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in industrial technology from Southern Illinois University . 

32 Engineer August 1997 
By Staff Sergeant Jaime Barrientos and James E. Shoenberger 

drum mixer is shown in Figure 1. 

Asphalt plants have a cold feed system to meter and deliver the aggregates to the plant. There the aggregates and asphalt cement are 

heated and combined into a homogeneous mixture. Among the emission 

control systems available that will 

capture particulate materials, the baghouse is the predominately used system. This method allows trapped 

aggregate fines to be returned to the 

mixture, thus minimizing changes to 

the original aggregate gradation. A 

properly maintained and operated 

baghouse system will remove almost 

all the fine aggregates from the 

exhaust gas stream, thus assuring that 

air quality requirements are achieved. 

he U.S. military maintains a large 

volume of asphalt concrete pavement. In the Army alone, the volume exceeds 7,000 miles. Construction 

support units are responsible for 

asphalt concrete pavement construction 

for Army requirements, and these units 

possess a wide range of equipment, 

an M081 As~halt-Mixing 

Plant. 

TO avoid air pollution, controlling 

dust during asphalt mixing is a must. 

This article describes the function of 

and operational guidelines for a welldevelo~ed, efficient maintenance Program for a baghouse, which is an airfilWat10n System that removes solid particks from the gas stream during asphalt 

mixing. This infofmation will be eSPciall~ useful to Amy engineen invalved in asphalt concrete mixture 

design or any pavement construction. 

The U.S. Army Engineer School's 

62H course, Concrete and Asphalt 

Equipment Operator, provides handsBaghouse Operations 

on instruction on the M081 AsphaltMixing Plant, along with other construction equipment owned by units. 

Introduction 

A sphalt concrete is blended aggregates held together by asphalt 

cement. Aggregates make up 85 to 

90 by volume, of the 

The aggregate materials normally contain at least a small amount of moisture, which must be removed before the 

aggregates are coated with asphalt 

cement. ~t ambient temperature, 

asphalt cement is a black, semisolid, 

highly viscous material. When heat is 

applied, it becomes a liquid and less 

viscous. Heating the aggregates and the 

asphalt cement in an asphalt-mixing 

plant removes moisture and liquefies 

the asphalt cement so it will adhere to 

the aggregates. 

The two main types of asphalt-mixing 

plants-batch and drum mixers-have 

similar basic components. A typical 

aghouse air-filtration systems operate by trapping small particles in a 

series of fabric filter bags, while 

hot exhaust gases pass through and are 

Cotd feed conv 

Figure 1. Baslc components of a typical drum-mixer plant. 

August 1997 Engineer 33 
ature stays above the dew point, 

the exhaust remains a gas as it 

passes through the baghouse and 

exits through the stack. 

(Modified from the AsphaltAant Manual, pubiished in 1958 by the Asphalt Institute, 

College Park, Maryland.) 

Figure 2. Typical layout of baghouse components. 

expelled from the plant (see Figure 2). 

Most baghouse systems employ an 

expansion chamber or knockout box, 

which uses pressure differential methods 

to remove large aggregate particles from 

the air stream before it passes through the 

bags. The bags are attached to a circular 

metal framework in a series of rows or 

columns. As exhaust gases pass through 

the bags, the inside (or exhaust side) of 

the system contains relatively clean air. 

When operating properly, baghouse systems remove up to 99.9 percent of the 

fines in exhaust gases. 

To ensure that a system continues to 

operate properly, the bags must be 

cleaned periodically. This is usually 

accomplished by shaking the bags, back 

flushing them with air, or by using a 

combination of these two procedures. If 

groups or rows of bags are cleaned 

simultaneously, the baghouse system 

can continue to operate. 

The temperature of air passing 

through the baghouse is critical to its 

performance. Normally, the temperature of the exhaust gases should 

remain between 250 and 450 degrees 

Fahrenheit. If the temperature is too 

high, synthetic material in the filter 

bags will be damaged. The efficiency 

of the plant may be impaired as the 

temperature drops below 250 degrees 

Fahrenheit, which is below the dew 

point (the temperature at which vapor 

begins to condense). At higher levels 

of humidity, condensation accelerates. 

Therefore, the natural environment 

(climate and season) existing during 

the mixing process also affects baghouse performance. 

The condensation of moisture 

flushed from the exhaust gases has two 

major effects on the baghouse: 

4 Moisture condenses on the filter 

bags, which causes particles to 

adhere to them and form an 

agglomeration that prevents the 

gases from passing through the 

fabric. This condition can starve 

the production process for combustion airflow, greatly decreasing 

baghouse efficiency. Also, the agglomeration that forms is difficult 

to remove, making normal bagcleaning procedures impossible. 

As long as the exhaust gas temperMetal parts of the baghouse corrode from sulfuric acid. It condenses out of the air stream when 

temperatures fall below the dew 

point. Condensation of the acid 

occurs at a higher temperature than 

water vapor, so the highest component dew point should be considered as the dew point for the 

exhaust gas stream. 

Condensation is more prevalent during plant start-up, because the baghouse 

components are not hot enough to keep 

moisture and acid in the exhaust gas 

stream from dropping below their dew 

points. To ensure that the baghouse is 

properly preheated, the outlet temperature gauge should be monitored and no 

moisture (mixture materials) added until 

a satisfactory temperature level is 

reached. When water vapor is added to 

the gas stream as a result of the drying 

process, the gas stream temperature initially drops. A preheated baghouse will 

not allow the lower-temperature, 

moisture-laden exhaust gas vapor to 

condense into liquid. The following conditions will contribute to moisture development in the baghouse: 

4 Insufficient preheating 

4 Lack of adequate insulation 

Inadequate system purging after 

shut-down 

Introduction of moisture into filters 

through the compressed aircleaning system 

In-leakage of moist ambient air 

Note: A general rule of thumb is to 

operate the baghowe at 250 degrees 

Fahrenheit or higher and employ proper 

start-up and shut-down procedures. Keep 

ing the temperature of the bughouse 

above the acid dew point will greatly minimize moisture and acid condensation 

The 62H course instructors recommend the following procedures to 

maintain and extend the service life of 

all baghouse components. 

34 Engineer August 1997 
A soldier operates the M081 

Asphalt-Mixing Plant from a control van. He is responsible for the 

operation and safety of the plant. 

Start-Up Procedures 

1. Preheat the system (without the 

drying aggregates) long enough to 

ensure that the components are hot. 

This phase may take 15 to 20 minutes 

or more. Note that gas going out may 

be hot even though the steel in the unit 

has not had time to heat up. If aggregates are introduced too soon, moisture 

from the drying process will condense 

on the cooler steel components and 

bags, causing the initial layer of dust to 

dampen and become impermeable. 

2. After preheating the system, and 

without shutting off the fan, begin feeding the aggregates. If possible, start 

with a coarse mix so the amount of fine 

material collected in the baghouse is 

kept to a minimum. In addition, maintain a steady production rate for the initial start-up to build and maintain a 

good dustcake (light coating of fine 

aggregate). If possible, do not run full 

production for a few minutes to allow 

the dustcake to develop. 

3. When feeding aggregates to the 

system, close the fan outlet damper to 

reduce the gas flow so the dryer "puffs" 

at the burner. At that time, slightly open 

the fan damper to stop the puffing. This 

setting will vent the dryer and minimize the amount of air required. At this 

point, fuel usage is minimized to near 

optimum conditions. 

Shut-Down Procedures 

fter shutting down the operation, 

the air ventilation system will 

approach ambient air temperature 

and conditions as the heat generated 

from the process dissipates. Dew points 

will be reached and some condensation 

will occur. When moisture and acids 

form, they remain on the baghouse components until they evaporate or the process starts again. When nearing the end 

of a production cycle, use the following 

procedures to shut down the system: 

1. Stop the feed to the dryer. 

2. After the material is out of the 

dryer, switch the burner to low fuel or a 

lower firing rate and continue to run the 

dryer for 3 to 5 minutes. This "purging" 

action will ensure that any moistureladen gases are evacuated from the 

baghouse and chemically active hot 

gases are not trapped in the baghouse 

as it cools through the acid dew point. 

Because purging removes these gases 

and the baghouse cools quickly, a minimum of condensation forms during the 

shut-down process. 

3. Turn off the burner, but continue 

to run the fan for about 10 to 15 minutes to cool the system or until 160 

degrees Fahrenheit is achieved. It often 

helps to continue the cleaning cycle 

during the cool-down period so that 

hardened or chemically active particles 

do not build up on the fabric. Stop the 

cleaning cycle when the measured 

pressure difference between the dirty 

and clean sides of the baghouse falls 

below 3 inches of water column (15.6 

pounds per square inch). 

4. Remove the material from the 

dust collector so the unit is ready for 

start-up the next operating day. Do not 

store hot moisture-laden dust in the 

hopper because it can create material 

handling and start-up problems. 

Engineering Support 

' he recommended start-up and shutdown procedures detailed above are 

a part of the information available 

from the team of instructors at the 62H 

course at Fort Leonard Wood. Additional information on baghouse operations is available in Technical Manuals 

5-3895-374-10 and 5-3895-374-2. 

M 

Siaff Sergeant Barrientos is assigned to the 

52d Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado. He was previously an instrrcctor/writer 

for the 62H course, 577th Engineer Battalion, 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. SSG Barnentos 

hob a bachelor of science degree in engineering management. 

ME Shoenberger is a research civil engineer in the Materials Analysis Branch, Airfields and Pavements Division, Geotechnical Laboratory, U.S. Army Engineers 

Waterways Experiment Station, Vcksburg, 

Mississippi. He is a registered professional 

engineer in Mississippi. 

August 1997 Engineer 35 
The GPS Computer-Based Tutorial 

By Major Guy R. Mallow and Edward A. Forman 

T he Global Positioning System (GPS) revolutionices 

navigation and positioning capabilities and soon will be 

integrated into everything the military does. The 

engineer community must learn how this technology works, so 

they can take advantage of it. 

'The map, compass, and survey equipment in use will not 

provide the location and navigation information to the degree of 

accuracy and responsiveness required to support the combat user 

of fielded or emerging tactical systems." (taken from a DoD 

required operational capability document, revised in 1991) The 

1994 funding appropriations bill passed by Congress states. 

"Funds may not be obligated after September 30, 2000, to 

modify or procure any DoD aircraft, ship, armored vehicle. or 

indirect-fire weapon system that is not equipped with a Global 

Positioning System receiver." 

Why the GPS? 

T he GPS could be referred to as just anocher device that 

answers the age-old question "Where am I?" However, a 

user can expect seven times better accuracy with a GPS 

receiver than with a map and compass. Because of its accuracy, 

the GPS has replaced all previous positioning systems. 

Many current and future devices used by engineer soldiers will 

incorporate GPS technology. An example is the more than 70,000 

precise Lightweight GPS receivers (PLGRs) fielded to the Army. 

GPS technology also will be included in future minefield recording 

equipment such as the Digital Reconnaissance System and the 

Digital Map Reporting System. (See "Building a Minefield 

Database System," Engineer, Dccember 1996, page 14.) 

The Tutorial 

T he Army Global Positioning System Tutorial is a training 

tool developed to provide a nontechnical, operational 

perspective of the NAVSTAR (navigational, strategic, 

tactical. and relay) GPS. It is primarily intended for officers and 

NCOs responsible for planning and executing operations at theater 

level and below. However, any military personnel wanting to 

maximize the benefits of GPS for their mission, unit, and troops 

can use the training. 

The tutorial consists of 13 modules designed to be viewed in 

sequence (see sidebar, page 37). The program incorporates 

lessons learned as GPS evolved from a developmental program 

to the operational fielding currently undenvay in all U.S. 

military services. 

The Army GPS Tutorial shows how the GPS's diverse 

capabilities can be used to support any mission when you plan 

and conduct combat operations or operations other than war 

(OOTW). It delivers convenient GPS training that will increase 

your unit's mission effectiveness in targeting and navigating 

precision and accuracy. 

36 Engineer August 1997 
The Army GPS Tutorial Modules 

Module 1 - GPS Ovewiew. Explains what GPS is, how R 

works, and what it can do for your unit. It details mllitary 

applications (such as precise positioning and navigation, 

communication time synchronization, confident rendezvous, and 

common language in joint and combined operations) and GPS 

accuracies. 

Module 2 - GPS Policies. Describes DoD and Joint Chiefs of 

Staff policies and guidance for military operations planners. For 

example, all services must employ militarity accurate GPS 

equipment to support their operations. 

Module 3 - GPS Security. Describes how military receivers 

obtain the best accuracies and reduce exposure to electronic 

warfare (spoofing), cryptologic key loading requirements, and 

setting up an account for the cryptologic keys. The GPS keys are 

different than SINCGARS (Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio 

System) keys. 

Module 4 - Maps and GPS. Describes the complementary 

relationship between GPS and maps. It contains eye-opening 

lessons learned and important tips (such as neveruse a map for 

precise positioning or targeting; use the GPS). GPS coordinates 

are seven times more accurate than map coordinates. Failure to 

compwhenctthe new relationship of maps and the GPS can lead 

to confusion in the field, a lack of confidence in the GPS, and 

forfeiture of the precision provided by the GPS. 

Module 5 - GPS Equipment Describes current receivers and 

selected receivers being developed. 

Module 6 - SuwivabUity. Discusses threats to the GPS and 

countermeasures. 

Module 7 - Interoperability. Characterizes the GPS 

contributions to battiefield interoperability and provides guidance 

on relationships between the GPS, maps, fire-control systems, 

command and control systems. and navigation sensors. 

Module 8 - GPS Applications. Explains the diverse 

capabilities of GPS receivers and how military operations 

planners and field users can capitalize on those capabilities during 

combat operations and OOTW. The module reflects on GPS 

applications used by U.S. and allied operational forces since the 

late 1980s, as derived from operational evaluations, Operation 

Desert Storm, and other military operations. The module 

describes premission and postmission applications, as well as 

applications for situabnal awareness, battlefield preparation, 

targeting and fire support, close air support, air drop, 

communications, and navigation. For example, the GPS can 

function as a compass inside a metal vehicle. 

Module 9 - Battlefield Implementation - Operations Planning 

and Execution. Presents a checldist with suggested actions for 

commanders and their staffs to carry out on the airnandlsea 

battlefield. Actions draw on operational experience with the GPS 

and are oriented toward theater and component staffs with 

responsibility to plan, execute, and control an operation. Actions 

can improve target accuracy and reduce the potential for fratricide. 

Module 10 - The Future. Presents future applications of the 

GPS within the U.S. military services. 

Module 11 - GPS Training. Usts DoD training support for the 

GPS. It includes PLGR training, GPS survey receivers, cryptologic 

key ordering procedures, points of contact, and training aids. The 

module shows the classroom setup for PLGR training. 

Module 12 - Feedback. Provides a form to submit comments 

and recommendations. 

Module 13 - Giossary and Terms. Contains more than 130 

GPS-related terms and definitions. 

Note: A HELP key describes additional features in the tutorlal. 

Obtaining the lhtorial 

he National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) 

(formerly the Defense Mapping Agency), Saint Louis, 

Missouri, produces and distributes the Army GPS Tutorial. 

It is free to military units and can be ordered from NIMA through 

normal supply channels. Call the NIMA Order Fulfilment 

Department, DSN 287-2495 or (800) 826-0342, for assistance. 

When ordering, use your DoD activity address code (DODAAC) 

and request national stock number (NSN) 7644-01-416-4051. If 

you do not have a DODAAC, contact the NIMA Army Customer 

Support Team at DSN 570-3001 or (703) 264-3001. 

The tutorial is on eight 3.5-inch discs. Minimum computer 

system requirements for using the program areDOS Windows 3.x 

486PC 

W 256 color VGA monitor 

W 8MBRAM 

NIMA also has three GPS receiver emulators available. They 

are computer-based interactive replicas of the PLGR, the Trimble 

4000SSE, and the Ashtech MD-XII. These emulators are still in 

the Beta versions but can provide valuable training. Order them 

using the same procedure as for the tutorial. The national stock 

numbers for these emulators areW PLGR Emulator 7644-01-41 6-4034 

W Trimble 4000SSE 7644-01-416-4040 

Ashtech MD-XI1 7644-01-416-4036 

Other Resources 

A dditional information about the GPS is available on the 

Internet at the following sites: 

W University of Texas at Austin -http:Nwww.utexas.edu/depts/ 

grg/gcraft/ notes/gps/gps.html 

W U.S. Coast Guard - http://www.navcen.uscg.miygps/gps/gps.htm 

W NAVSTAR GPS Internet Connections - http:// 

gauss.gge.unb.cal GPS.INTERNET.SERVICES.HTML 

W National Geodetic Survey - http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/ 

Major Mallow serves as the survey team chief; Defense 

Mapping School, Fort Belvoir; Krginia, while assigned to the 

National Imagery and Mapping Agency k National Imagery and 

Mapping College. He previously served as regimental engineer; 

75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia. 

MI: Forman is the education advisor for the Defense Mupping 

School, Fort Belvoil; Virginia, as part of the National Imagery 

and Mapping Agency S National Imagery and Mapping College. 

He is a reserve Infantry lieutenant colonel assigned to the Army 

Materiel Command. 

August I997 Engineer 3 7 
By Captain Russell Kirby 

"Our engineers must be terrniti visualiwrion expests so 

they can help rhe maneuver commander use the r~rrnin to ltis 

advantage to win.. .The engineer's business is terrain, pare 

and simple. We own the gmund. " 

Major General Clair E Gill 

Commandant, U.S. A rmy Engineer School 

ow do engineer officers become terrain visualization 

experts? One solution from the U.S. Army Engineer 

School is provided by Terrabase I1 (TB In and an 

instructional CD-ROM. The CD-ROM provides transitional 

training on the capabilities of TB 11 and explains how to use 

digital ternin data to visuaIize banlespace. TB II and the CDROM will be availabte at no cost to military units in l~te 

September 1997, They will enable all officers, not just 

engineers. to understand, use, and obtain digital topographic 

products. 

The following information provides a brief overview of 

the TB I1 softwarc and CD-ROM. Basic knowledge of the 

TB I1 software is a first step toward visualizing terrain, but 

the applied tactical knowledge of the user is what really 

makes this software powerful. 

he Terrabase program was written at the U.S. Military 

Academy in the mid-1980s and was the first 

automated terrain tool used by military occupational 

specialty (MOS) 215D topographic warrant officers and 

MOS 8lQ terrain anaIysts. It allows the user to quickly 

analyze terrain data and provide warfighting commanders 

wifh tactical decision aids (TDAs). 

Terrabase mns on IBM 286 computers, and its output is 

limited to dot matrix printers. The software has changed little 

since its development. Although it is still widely used at the 

brigade level and below, Tembase does not take advantage of 

automation advances and many improved digital data sets. 

Terrabase KI 

he Engineer School's Department of Tactics, 

Leadership, and Engineering, in partnership with the 

Terrain Visualization Center. researched available 

commercial and government-owned programs to find an 

updated terrain evaluation tool. None was found, but a 

government-owned terrain evaIuatian software package 

Dtgital elevation model (DEM) data with SPOT satellite lmage draped over It. This Image shows an area at 

Irish Canyon, Colorado. 
called MicroDEM, dcveIoped hy the U.S. Naval Academy, 

was suitable for tailoring into terrain visualization software. 

This powerful personal-computer-based package operates 

under Microsoft Windows and uses a variety of improved 

digital terrain data available from the National Imagery and 

Mapping Agency and the U.S. Gcotogical Survey. 

MicroDEM was demonstrated to senior leaders and 

approved for adaptadon by Major General Gill on I6 

Decembcr 1996. The Terrain Visualization Center at the 

Engineer School arranged for training development funds, 

Both the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, and the U.S. Space Command at Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, contributed funding to tailor MicroDEM 

into Terrabase 11. The Naval Academy and the Engineer 

School worked together to develop the software. 

The minimum requirement 110 run Terrabase Il is a 486 

computer with 16 MB of RAM and Windows 95, The 

program creates all the tactical decision aids of the original 

Terrabase. In addition. Terrahase canu Change datums. 

Make elevation tints, slope tints, contour plots, lines of 

sight, 3-D views, reflectance maps, weapons fans, and 

visibIe area plots. 

a Print to scale on any Windows-compatible printer or 

plotter. 

leademhip skill. ... A battle mrnmander must understand 

how terrain influences every aspect of military operations. 

Terrain visualization is a component of battlefield 

visualization. It portrays and allows a detailed understanding of the background upon which enemy and 

friendEy forces and actiom are displayed." 

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-41, Topographfc Support 

for Terrain Visvaliration, Operations Concept 

screen looh ss rhc produu~s are created. The ~utor~al is an 

easy-to-use aid that expIains how tn load the software and 

digital data. create TDAs, and save and print producrs. 

Dalubese includes data sets for each area of o~ration for 

the Engineer Officer Advanced Course practical exercises. A 

data set includes digital terrain elevarion data (DTED), land 

satellite (LANDSAT) or Systeme Probatoire d'Ohservation de 

la Terre (SPOT) sa~ellite imagery, contcolted image-based 

imagery, and aerial photographs. Since aIl areas of the world 

do no1 have cornplere data some of the sets arc not complete. 

Product Index is a [is[ of digital products with "hot keys" 

that enable the user to choose to "view the product example" 

or "learn more about the product." 

Conclusion 

The beauty of this software is hat anyone familiar with errabase II fills rbe terrain visualization requirement 

Microsoft Windows can learn to usc it quickly. Terrabase I1 for engineers at the brigade level and below. The 

will be included in the Engineer OfLcer Advanced Course instructional CD-ROM educates engineers on how 

in 997. rt can be taught in the same products look, their avaiiabiti[y and tactical use, and how 10 

of time as the original Terrabase. obtain digital data. TB IT software is not designed to compete 

CD-ROM 

he insrructional CD-ROM can be used for distributive 

training for individuals or groups, such as for ofticcr 

professional development or commanders' calls. The 

CD-ROM inc tudes the foIlowing segments: 

"Inlroduclion lo Terrain V~rralizan'on" provides an 

overview of terrain visualization. Ir includes map 

fundamentals. datums, grids, syrnhology, and accuracy. 

with more advanced temzn analysis systems. Instcnd, it 

introduces some of rhc capabilities of Targcr systems and 

enables users to better understand these products. 

The increased knowledge and cornpurer capability orficerl; 

gain from using Terrahase I1 will give them greater pIannin2 

flexibility by providing a wide range of options for each 

mission. Thc TB It software and instructional CD-ROM 

enable engineers to kcome terrain visualization experts and 

truly earn the title "Masters of Tcmain." 

"Reqt~esl and Manage Terrain Visualizolion Date" 

Nore: TE 11 wilt be nvailublc orr the Forr LRotl~i-d \llnocl provides examples and explanaiions of digital data products home page 6y Iote Septenrb~r: The CD-ROM will be refortnarted from the National Imagery Mapping Agcncy and U.S. nncE added to the homr page I?y December 1997. 

GcologicnE Survey. The examples are expInined in bullet 1y: 

cornmenis with an accompany~ng voice File to provide 

dctails. This segment describes the taclrcal use of each 

product as well as ordering information and price. This is thc 

tirsr time ha1 a simple-to-use viewer has been available for 

digital formats from both mapping agencies. TB I1 makes it 

possible to import these formats. 

Terrabase If Tutorial is a "banledrill" or "haw to'" 

version for creating tactical decision aids. These interactive1 

multimedia battledriIls have pictures that show how the 

Caprain Kirlq is a doctrine ir~sfrlrctos/~'~riter in the 

Departmcnf of Tacrirs, Leadersttip, ntd Ettgitt~ering (DTLE), 

U.S. Army Engineer Scllnol. P~viorrs assignnlents incIrrde 62 

CEO OfJicer; Rosnia- HP rzegnvinn Command, Sarajevo, 

Bosnia; platoon leaclerrX0, 29th Enpin~er Rntrrrlion (Tnpo), 

Eorx Shafrer: Hawaii; and Cftief; Topographic Opera~ions, 

DTLE U.S. Arnry Engineer School. CPT Kirby I~olds o 

bachelor's degree in gcelogyfmnl Iowa Stale University. 
Command Philosophy for 

Company Commanders 

By Lieutenant Colonel Harry W Christiansen (Retired) 

ave you ever been in a unit 

where soldiers were unsure of 

the new company commander's expectations and his method of 

operation? The result is trial and error, 

second-guessing, and misdirected work 

efforts. In short, the unit spends most of 

its energy discovering the commander's 

intent, which detracts from effective 

mission accomplishment. 

The solution is a well-developed and 

communicated command philosophy. If 

you are preparing for your first command, take time to develop a command 

philosophy. This philosophy tells how 

you will run the unit. It communicates 

your expectations of others and what 

they can except from you. It sets the 

conditions that allow subordinate leaders and teams to succeed. A command 

philosophy has four componentsvision, values, leadership expectations 

and personal convictions. As a company 

commander, I used the command philosophy shown on page 41 and distributed 

it in a memo to officers, NCOs and soldiers in my company. 

Vision 

ision provides a common focus 

for the unit's energy and sets priorities. It describes what the unit 

must be capable of doing at some point in 

the future and how to achieve that. To 

help develop your vision, educate yourself about the unit. Visit and talk with key 

members of the battalion and company. 

First, meet separately with the battalion commander and command sergeant 

major. Learn their priorities and expectations for the unit, and get a copy of the 

battalion commander's philosophy. 

Spend time with the outgoing commander and the unit first sergeant. Ask 

about major issues and problem areas 

and the unit's strengths and weaknesses. 

Other key individuals who can help 

are the battalion executive officer, the 

operations officer, and fellow company commanders. Finally, talk to the 

platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, 

and soldiers. As the recipients of your 

command philosophy, they are the ones 

who will get the job done. 

Once you sift through and evaluate 

this information, you will have more than 

enough ideas on where the unit needs to 

go and what the soldiers think should be 

done. A shared vision, one that soldiers 

own and can relate to, will permeate the 

unit and influence all its endeavors. 

In the figure, vision sets the direction. It tells soldiers where the unit is 

going and how it will get there. The 

vision is a journey, not a destination; it 

is something you are always striving to 

achieve. 

Values 

P t is impossible to create a rule or 

policy to cover every possible contingency. However, members in a 

unit who share the same values will view 

the world and their work from a common 

perspective and act accordingly. Values 

express what is important to you and 

subsequently to the unit. They outline 

expectations of unit members and 

express what "we will do." 

You have a professional obligation 

to live and uphold the Army's values 

and ethos as well as the soldier qualities outlined in FM 100-1, The Army. 

That Fh4 is a good place to start developing your value set. To identify your 

values, follow the three-step process: 

List the characteristics, traits, and 

qualities you admire in leaders. 

Circle the qualities that reflect 

what is important to you and that 

reveal the kind of leader y ou are. 

Define those qualities as behaviors 

that you will demonstrate. 

The values on page 41 are tools that 

tell soldiers what is important to the 

unit, and they guide everyday behavior. 

Your values must represent who and 

what you are. They must come from the 

heart. 

Leadership Expectations 

eadership expectations describe 

specific responsibilities and fundamental obligations leaders 

have to their soldiers. This is your foundation for leadership action. Leadership 

expectations describe the leader's role 

in developing combat-ready soldiers 

and teams. 

Think about the few critical principles that you feel are imperative for 

leaders to succeed. These essential 

rules are the cornerstones for your leadership philosophy. If you need some 

ideas, the 11 principles of leadership in 

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, are 

fundamental truths that have stood the 

test of time. Leadership expectations 

can be a series of phrases, statements, 

or a narrative. 

The leadership expectations on page 

41 outline obligations leaders have to 

their soldiers. Whatever you decide are 

your leadership principles, they should 

reflect how you lead and how you 

expect subordinate leaders to lead. 

Personal Convictions 

ersonal convictions tell soldiers 

how you do business, answer 

frequent questions, and give 

40 Engineer August 1997 
runr 

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land philosophy. 

N; I rle MA wrnparly rlas one purpose; vve are a combat-ready 

force prepared to successful ime mission while maximizing 

soldier survival. We will accc I, realistic training focused on 

our mission-essential tasks. 

VALUES: Even if you do not know exactly how to do something, if you 

know what is important to the company, you will do the right thing. The foliowing values, or things that are important, will guide our daily actions: 

W Integrity. We will be truthful and ~thers. We 

will be responsible for taking ac td ensure 

success. 

W Commitment. We will a i 

that must be filled in spi 

cessfully getting the job 

r Caring. We will help each other and take care of our own. We will concern ourselve I 

dignity. 

LEADERSHIP EXPECT1 -ead by example in everything we do 

and never forget that soldie 3 most important part of this company. 

Four obligations leaders hav ?rs are: 

w Educate. Orient new soldiers to I 

teach soldiers who want to grow. 

w Coach. Empower soldiers to contribute to IIIU LUIII~QIIV UIIU UUIIU UII III~ 

strengths of talented performers. 

W Counsel. Lead soldiers to understand and overcome obstacles that get 

in the way of top performance. 

W Confront. Tell soldiers when their performance is consistently below 

expectations and brii to their attention the consequences of continued 

unacceptable performance. 

PERSONAL CONVICTIONS: These key points will help you understand 

how I do business: 

W We are in this together-we are a team. 

W Be sure that what you tell me is correct. 

W Keep me informecCbad news does not get better with time. 

Good tries that fail are okay-only through risk is there growth. 

W Where you spend your time shows what is important to you. 

I use the chain of command-NCOs are the vital link 

W Performance counseling ensures your expectations of others are cleardo it. 

W OERs and NCOER~fficers and NCOs are paid to lead. 

I Power down-If you can handle it, I will give you the controls. 

1 

~gs with o 

t thing ar 

sonal con 

lnd energ] 

3 with fair 

Is and va 

..-.. --A L.. 

Imitments 

I into sue 

mess and 

llues, and 

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soldiers a starting point. They can be 

your dos and don'ts or a mix of diverse 

topics. Personal convictions may 

include bits of wisdom or quotes you 

have retained over the years that reflect 

how you operate. They are key points 

to help soldiers understand you and 

your frame of reference or "where you 

are coming from." You can express personal convictions as a series of bullettype statements or one-liners. 

The personal convictions in the figure provide soldiers further insight on 

what they can expect from their 

commander. This component of your 

command philosophy covers topics 

important to you that are not covered 

elsewhere. 

Walk Your 'Ifalk 

A command philosophy has no 

specific format. It can be a 

one- or two-page memorandum, a series of bullets, or a graphic. 

Every soldier should receive a copy 

and should easily comprehend the 

philosophy. 

A well-developed command philosophy allows you to concentrate the 

unit's energy by creating a shared perception of what the company is all 

about and how you will run it. Vision 

describes the company's future capability. Values outline what is important to 

the company. Leadership expectations 

are the foundation for leadership 

action. Personal convictions tell how 

you do business. Once you publish 

your command philosophy, soldiers 

will watch to see if your behavior 

matches your words-you must walk 

your talk. u 

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Christiansen (Retired) is a Strategic Change 

Management Consultant with Group 

Decision Support Systems, Inc., Washington, D.C. He commanded three 

company-level units and was a leadership instructor at the Infantry School. 

He holds a master's degree in organizational development. 

August 1997 Engineer 41 
Battle Command Raining Program (BCTP) 

By Lieutenant CoEoneI Dave Snodgra.~~ 

T he good news these days is that almost everyone at 

corps level and below is Familiar with obstacle-control 

measures. The bad news is that confusion remains 

about when and how to use the measures and intents, and 

specifically. whether corps and divisions must have zones and 

where they must include intents wilh zones. Thc larger. more 

generic, question is when and how engineers should use zones. 

Doctrinal answers to he specific questions are: No, you 

do not have to use zones. and no, you do not have to include 

intents. According to FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obsracle 

Integration, commanders use obstacle-control measures to 

simplify granting obstade-emplacement authority and 

provide abstacIe conlsol. The overriding principle in our 

current top-down, permissive system is to "...ensure that 

subordinates emplace obstacles that support the higher 

commander's scheme of maneuver and that do not interfere 

with future operations." Obviously, if the higher headquarters 

does not want to grant that authority, [hey do not have to 

designate graphics. Further, FM 90-7 states that "...if the 

obstacle zone encompasses he entire brigade sector, another 

graphic is unnecessary. Commanders may designate the 

entire sector as an obstacle zone, with he unit boundaries 

defining the geographical limits of the zone." Additionally, 

FM 90-7 states that "...commanders can assign an obstacle 

intent to an obstacle zone, but hey normally do not." 

Theoretically, established priorities help identify the obstacle 

main effort to subordinates without restricting their ffexibitity 

with specified zone intents. 

The answer to the generic question of when and how we 

should use zones is more complex. Many engineer planners 

a( division and carps levels fee1 they need to esbblish zones 

to focus subordinate efforts, estimate resources required, and 

show their commanders and staffs that they have integrated 

engineers into the plan. Unfortunately, these zones usually 

are large boxes [hat cover entire sectors, lack intents, and do 

Eitkle to focus anyone or integrate anything. To understand the 

disconnects, one must reduce the scale and return to the 

basics. As an o'bserverlcontroller at the National Training 

Center, I saw the following methodology of engagement area 

design and construct ion validated through numerous rotations 

and units: 

Identify where the enemy is coming from and where it is 

going. 

8 ldentify where you want to kill the enemy (or the desired 

effect), 

1 Identify the location of the shooter. 

W Allocate the resources required to do the killing. 

Identify the location, orientation. and type of obstacles 

that will ksr enhance he effects of your killing systems 

and achieve the overall desired effect. 

Units that used this rnethodoIogy ensured they had a 

coherent defense with concurrently inlegrated ohskaclcs that 

supported the maneuver plan, positions, and systems. Units 

that failed to use this methodology ultimately wound up with 

disjointed obstacles that had little or no impact on the battle 

or, worse yet, ineffective defenses developed around 

obstacles constructed independently (and sometimes before 

completian) d the maneuver plan. 

In theory. pIanning at division and corps levels should be 

very si mi lat: 

Identify where the enemy is coming from and where it is 

going. 

m Identify when and where you want to mass your effects 

ro do the most damage. 

I Identify missions and required resources for subordinate 

units. 

42 Engineer August 1997 
Identify the Iocation, orientation, and type of obstacle 

effects to best enhance your assigned weapons systems 

and the overail impact on rhe enemy. 

Yet, division and corps planners aIrnost always allocate 

sectors for their subordinates. They seldom provide directions 

on when, where, and how to mass unit resources and effects 

an the enemy. The lack of direction hns critical results. When 

the division and corps fail to deveiop a fight based on a 

clearly defined concept that identifies subordinate unit 

purposes and how those purpses internlate to accomplish 

the division's overall task and purpose. they tend to fight 

battles in pieces instead of in a coherent. complementary, and 

focused whole. The lack of vertical and horizontal nesting 

degrades a unit's ability to bring all weapons systems to bear 

on the enemy at a decisive pint and time. If one subscribes to 

the engagement area design and construction methodology, 

how can thc engineer planner design an obstacle plan that 

enhnnccs the defensive plan if the division or corps 

commanders have not clearly defined the purposes of 

subardinate units and how they are intepted to focus power? 

The engineer planner's first responsibiiity is to identify 

the disconnect to maneuver commanders and staffs and seek 

a clear, articulate, maneuver vision of the battle, stated in 

maneuver terns, that will convey to subordinate 

commanders how each subordinate piece supports the 

whole. When this information is provided, the engineer 

pIanner can and should develop obstaclecontroF measures 

that suppart thc operation. If we know who and wher~ the 

unit plans to fight, we should be able to design a reIatively 

small. targeted, and useful zone to support the fight. We also 

should be able to assign it an intent that supports higher 

maneuver commander's concept ef the fight, This is critical 

when planning and preparation time are restricted. When a 

unit has limited rime to esrablish a defense. the: higher 

headquarters should be more prescriptive with the maneuver 

and engineer plans in order to focus the engineer effortand not designate entire sectors as obstacle zones, This 

action will restrict the flexibility of subordinate 

commanders. But it will atso eliminate options that take 

time to evaluate, focus the resources of both higher and 

lower headquarters, and allow the unit to spend the 

maximum time available in executing the obstacle plan. 

Alternatively. If the corps or division fails to develop a 

clear, focused plan of defense that designates the killing 

ground and how subordinate uni ts complement each other, 

the best option may be to designate the entire sector as an 

obstacle zone, with unit boundaries defining the 

geographical limits of the zone. In this case, tell subordinate 

units that they are defending in sector and that their sector is 

an approved zone. Instead of creating redundant and 

essentially useless permissive control measures, focus on 

restrictions that the higher headquarters require to maintain 

obstacle control and that support future operations. Restrictions 

may include obstacle-restricted areas for counterattack avenues, 

reserve demolition targets that support specific tactical 

operations, types or duration (for FASCAM) of obstacles in 

specific areas or on specified mutes, etc. Let subordinate units 

develop their own obstacle-contml measures based on the 

specified restrictions. Then, if required, draw zones around the 

subordinate units' graphics to conform to the doctrinal obstacle 

numbering system and unit tracking and reporting procedures. 

Allocate initial resources for planning based on sector priorities. 

the usable widths of the avenues of approach across the sector, 

and a dismpt planning factor. This prwedure gets the logistics 

system cnergizcd and materials moving, gives subordinate units 

a number to stan planning with, supports the initial (24-hour 

plus) requirements, and allows for future refinernentq. 

We engineers have achieved success in our initfa1 battle to 

familiarize maneuver commanders and get all units using 

obstacle control graphics and intents. The harder battle now 

facing us is to refine how and when we should use, and more 

importantly should no1 use, these new-found tools. When used 

properly, these tools minimize the unnecessary restrictions 

that we place on subordinate units and help streamline the 

planning and preparation of successful battles. 

Lieutenant CoIonel Snodgrass is rh~ st08 engineer for the 

muln'national force in the Sinai Peninsula. He previotrsly 

served as the engineer observer/contmller for the Bartle 

Command Tmining Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 

By Captain John C DeJamene 

E ffective FM radio communications are essential to 

properly synchronize engineer operations in support of 

maneuver units. Tkt, emerging techniques using 

SINCGARS effectively improve engineer command and 

control. The first involves engineer platoon FM 

communications, and the second is he engineer 4Lconference 

call" daily update. 
Engineer Platoon FM Communications 

At the JRTC, engineer platoons are routinely required to 

operate continuously on three FM radio nets: the platoon 

internal net, the supported maneuver commander's net, and 

the parent engineer unit command net. These are minimum 

requirements for commanders to control and synchronize the 

efforts of their supporting engineer units. 

Successful engineer platoons employ the following 

communications technique or a variant of it: 

Engineer squads operate on the engineer platoon net. 

This technique allows the engineer platoon leader to 

control the platoon members' work and also provide 

regular updates on the tactical situation within the battalion area of operations. 

tool. The calls generally are scheduled during lulls in the 

rotational brigade's battle rhythm, typically about 0600 and 

2000 hours. The net control station initiates a call for all 

platoon leaders, the brigade engineer, the executive officer, 

the first sergeant, the supply sergeant, and the maintenance 

team chief. Each section updates the commander with 

changes regarding their combat power (personnel, key 

leaders, critical equipment), supply status (Class I, I11 

[package], V, IX), operations during the last 12 hours and 

anticipated operations during the next 12 hours. Each 

session usually takes from 3 to 5 minutes. The brigade 

engineer provides an overview of the friendly and enemy 

situation across the brigade and any anticipated mobility 

and survivability requirements. The company commander 

then provides planning and execution guidance to the 

The engineer platoon sergeant deploys with a dual-net- platoons. 

capable vehicle. He operates on both the engineer platoon This 'pdate improves the situation awareness of the 

net and the engineer company command net. Dual-net commander, platoon leaders, brigade main engineer cell, and 

capability allows him to remain current on the status of brigade rear engineer cell. It also serves as a basis for revising 

the platoon's mission and respond to routine traffic from the engineer estimate for future operations planning. In the 

the engineer company command post. When the platoon most proficient units, squad leaders monitor the daily updates 

leader is needed on the engineer company command net, in order to clearly understand the commander's intent and 

the platoon sergeant calls him on the platoon internal net gain information on enemy and friendly activities across the 

and directs him to the engineer company command net. brigade area of operations. 

While engineer platoon sergeants currently are authorized The conference call, coupled with the engineer platoon 

only single-net capability, most find an additional radio to sergeant as a control node, are excellent tools to synchronize 

deploy with, mirroring the authorization in tank and engineer operations. 

mechanized infantry tables of organization and equipment. Dual-net capability for the engineer platoon sergeant greatly improves command and control at both the Administrative Notes 

engineer platoon and company levels. LTC Brooks will remain the senior engineer observer1 

The engineer platoon leader uses his authorized two-net controller at the JRTC for the next yea 

capability to monitor both the engineer platoon internal 

net and the supported maneuver unit command net. This 

capability allows him to control the engineer platoon 

and be responsive to the maneuver commander. A key 

benefit of monitoring the maneuver command net is 

improved situation awareness. Dual-net capability 

enables the platoon leader to track the actions of the 

maneuver companies and their enemy contacts. Consequently, he can provide timely and accurate tactical 

updates to his squad leader and provide guidance to the 

JRTC has finalized the Exercise Rules of Engagement 

for Air VOLCANO employment. The VOLCANO control supply rate remains at 720 canisters (two loads) per 

rotation, regardless of the delivery platform. Exceptions 

to this control supply rate are managed by the commander, 21st Infantry Division, with input from the 

assistant division engineer. Units are encouraged to 

deploy with their M87 training canisters in order to fully 

exercise their VOLCANO loading battle drills. 

maneuver battalion command and tactical operations Continue to send us questions and recommendations 

center. This technique allows the engineer platoon about mobility and survivability operations and techleader to better perform his dual role as platoon leader niques. The commercial telephone number is (3 18) 53 1- 

and task force engineer. 026610282 (DSN 673-026610282). The e-mail address is: 

brooksje@polk-emh2.army.mil. 

Engineer Company "Conference Call" Update 

Successful engineer company commanders use two daily Captain DeJarnette is an engineer observer/controller at 

conference calls on their command net as a synchronization the Joint Readiness Training Center; Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

44 Engineer August 1997 
Discussion 

National 'Ikaining Center (NTC) 

By Captain Ed Mead 

T he NTC provides an excellent opportunity for combat 

engineer company commanders to plan and execute 

company-level combat engineer missions. For some 

company commanders, the NTC is their only opportunity to 

get intense company-level training with the brigade combat 

team they support. This article describes some recurring 

trends observed at the company level from units rotating 

through the NTC. Although some trends change from 

W Units do not understand mobility corridors and avenues 

of approach or their fundamental relationships to the target, location, and effects of tactical obstacles. 

Task forces do not develop a conceptual obstacle design 

for company team commanders and engineer platoon 

leaders to help them visualize the obstacle layout within 

the group or the quantity of resources required. 

W Task forces seldom produce a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). This product is essential to help 

visualize enemy avenues of approach. 

W When siting obstacles, units do not understand how to 

integrate obstacles and fires to achieve the desired effects. 

Recommendation 

Engineer commanders should conduct officer professional 

development classes on obstacle planning and siting for their 

habitually associated maneuver units. Each combined arms 

exercise (command post exercise, map exercise, terrain exercise 

without troops, etc.) should include a rock drill that focuses on 

siting obstacles. Company team commanders and engineer 

platoon leaders should be key players in these rock drills. 

quarter to quarter, the following trends were observed Combat service support and maintenance operations at the frequently during the past two years. engineer company level continue to need improvement. Units - - - 

c~mbat engineer companies are not proficient in how to do not always report classes of supply to the company tactical 

maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part oDerations centec 

of a larger maneuver element. 

Discussion 

W Even though possessing a significant amount of fire 

power, units have no fire-control measures for M2s, 

MK19s. AT4s, or attached MIA1 tank plows or rollers. 

Units do not understand mounted or dismounted movement formations at company and platoon levels. 

Units fail to plan for actions on contact. 

Units are unable to effectively integrate into combined 

arms breaching operations. Engineers are especially 

weak at commanding the breach force when called upon 

to do so. 

Recommendations 

Combat engineer leaders must incorporate the strategies 

described in F'M 5-71-2, Appendix E, and FM 71-123, 

Chapters 3 and 4, in their leadership development training. 

Additionally, they should incorporate force protection 

training in every training event. Leaders should ensure that 

some company collective maneuver training is planned and 

executed each quarter. 

Company LOGPACS brought forward from the brigade 

support area are configured to provide only Classes I and 

111, not all classes of supplies and services required by 

line platoons. 

Inadequate time management for maintenance shutdowns 

during continuous operations often cause a steady 

decrease in operational readiness rates. 

There is a lack of discipline in subsystems preventive 

maintenance checks and services for night vision devices, 

machine guns, individual weapons, and communications 

equipment. 

Recommendation 

The engineer company first sergeant must be involved in 

developing and briefing paragraph 5 of the operation order. 

Company commanders and platoon leaders must ensure they 

plan for and conduct precombat inspections, including combat 

service support and maintenance checks. Commanders must 

plan for and incorporate combat service support training in 

every training event. 

Knowledge of FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle 

Integration, is weak. As a result, units fail to effectively Captain Mead is an engineer observer/controller at the 

integrate obstacles with fires. National Training Centel; Fort Irwin, California. 

August 1997 Engineer 45 
The Engineer Recsmwissance F?Latson: 

Overcoming the Lack of Engineer Reconnaissance Assets 

By Michael W. Sayer 

1 t was two hours prior to LD (line of departure) for the 

armored brigade 's deliberate attack. The commander 

arrived for the prebattle update, and each staffmember 

briefed him on the status of his area. The scouts had located 

and reported some obstacles in the area but had not specified their orientation, composition, length, depth, or type 

before losing contact with the brigade. The staff engineer 

could not give more information, because communications 

with the engineers sent to gather engineer-specijic obstacle 

intelligence failed early in the evening. The enemy identified 

additional engineers, who lefr at 2400 hours in their MI13 

Armored Personnel Carrier; and engaged them with direct 

and indirect fires. Due to the lack of information concerning 

enemy obstacles and disposition of his forces, the brigade 

commander had to inform the division that his unit was 

unable to conduct a deliberate attack but would conduct a 

movement to contact. He was not confident of the brigade's 

ability to fEllly accomplish the mission The lack of battlefield intelligence, primarily the lack of mobility and countermobility information, degraded the brigade's capability to 

fight and win. 

The Problem 

ariations of this scenario occur during training at 

the National Training Center (NTC) with disturbing regularity. Scouts often fail to provide leaders 

with specific mobilitylsurvivability Battlefield Operating 

System information. Brigades require solid obstacle intelligence to successfully attack. 

In maneuver battalionsScout platoons lack experience with mobilitylsurvivability 

tasks and the data required for complete reporting. 

Scouts have too many tasks specified in the operations 

order. 

Mobilitylsurvivability tasks generally receive too little 

emphasis during unit training. 

In engineer battalionsA scout capability is lacking on the modified table of 

organization and equipment (MTOE). 

Soldiers tasked with gathering obstacle intelligence usually 

lack scouting experience. 

Training and equipping engineers tasked with reconnaissance is not standardized. 

Communications capability within the force is poor. 

The Solution 

hese are serious problems, but a solution is within reach 

that is both simple and difficult: Place an engineer scout 

platoon within the divisional engineer battalion. The solution is simple in that assigning personnel to such a platoon and 

equipping it can be accomplished quickly. The difficulty lies in 

finding the bodies in a shrunken force structure to support it and 

then training these soldiers to accomplish their mission. 

Most combat engineer companies pick a team to perform as 

engineer scouts. The team's training is usually haphazard and is 

not conducted in conjunction with the brigade S2 section's training of other scouts in the brigade. While the team members probably are highly motivated young soldiers and well-trained 

engineers, the lack of formal training in reconnaissance operations lessens their overall capability. 

Only one position in the current heavy engineer battalion 

MTOE has anything to do with reconnaissance-the reconnaissance noncommissioned officer (NCO). This position requires a 

military occupational specialty (MOS) 12B30, combat engineer 

staff sergeant He receives no special training and often lacks 

reconnaissance experience and the equipment necessary to perform this duty. Frequently, he is part of the battalion intelligence 

section and works for the intelligence NCO, MOS 12250, who is 

a combat engineer master sergeant. As currently structured, any 

reconnaissance effort on the part of the heavy engineer battalion 

comes from the line companies. They must give up squads for 

this mission, which means that those squads are unavailable for 

other offensive and defensive missions. 

One active heavy engineer battalion is working to incorporate 

a dedicated reconnaissance section-the 299th Engineer Battalion, from the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. As part of the 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment, the 299th is seeking ways to 

add new technologies to the tactics needed for Force XXI. The 

unit has organized a reconnaissance section of two teams under 

46 Engineer August 1996 
Fiaure 1 

The Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon 

battalion control. While this is a good starting place, it cannot cover the entire brigade sector. With two teams attempting to gather information from three task force zones, the 

effort is too little and the information probably will be 

received too late. 

HHC 

11-1-142-154 

Reconnaissance Platoon 

I'II 

recommended solution is for the engineer force to 

assign and equip an engineer reconnaissance platoon 

'within the Headquarters Company S2IS3 section. The 

platoon would work for the S2 under the reconnaissance 

NCO (Figure 1). 

Organization and Equipment. By placing the unit in the 

S2lS3 section of the heavy engineer battalion, command and 

control of the platoon is at the proper level. The S3 ensures 

that the unit has adequate resources for training, and since 

the platoon is organic, the S3 knows the capabilities and lirnitations of each squad when he conducts the planning and 

orders process. Additionally, each squad can be broken down 

to the habitually associated task force in a direct-support role 

..,hnn th~ -:L.LI:T\II A;ntnt~~ Tn th;" nn-f:-..mt:~n rh- h.;,mAo WLICIII LllCI IlIIJ~IUlI UlCLC(Lb3. 111 11115 CUIlLIgUlLILLUIl, UIG UIIg'lUG 

order must specify that the task force and engineer company 

pass the proposed tasking of the squad to the engineer battalion for required support. The squad would seldom, if ever, be 

attached to or placed under operational control (OPCON) of 

the task force. 

The purpose of having the intelligence NCO in the chain 

of command is to ensure proper training and required coordination with the brigade and task force S2s. The intelligence 

NCO is the platoon leader and assists the reconnaissance 

NCO in developing training schedules, gathering materials, 

CMD GRP 

6-0-3-9 

and ensuring that all training meets applicable standards. Each 

squad associates with a specific task force to increase interop 

erability and build teamwork. The intelligence NCO, in conjunction with the reconnaissance NCO, is the liaison to each 

task force for training and determines personnel allocations 

within the platoon. 

The engineer reconnaissance platoon is a 25-person unit 

that includes the reconnaissance NCO as platoon sergeant and 

three squads of eight engineer scouts. Two four-person teams 

make up each squad, with the squad leader acting as the A 

Team leader and an engineer sergeant acting as the B Team 

leader. The senior enlisted soldier is the gunner, and of the two 

junior enlisted soldiers, one is the engineer scout and the other 

is the driver. The reconnaissance NCO position changes from 

that of a staff sergeant to a sergeant first class, with the position coded for ranger-qualified NCOs. The squad and team 

leaders and the gunners also should be ranger qualified (Figure 

2, page 49). Each team operates in an MI044 HMMWV. This 

organization provides one engineer scout squad to each task 

force in the brigade, with each scout squad capable of working 

as two teams covering the task-force zone. If the situation 

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1024-25 1-1-56-58 

."\I...."", .U I". .. Y.Y..."U...IU UyyIVUII., .,U".. &.,Y... "U.. "I"- 

into two two-person foot-reconnaissance teams. This configuration allows greater saturation of the area and long-term 

(more than 8 hours) observation of objectives. Possible applications include: 

- 

TACTICAL S21S3 ABE 

RECON 

10-3-4 14-36-37 1-044 

I 

S2 

RECON PLT 

OQ2-2 

I 

RECON 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

Engineer Battalion, Heavy Division 1 &&I525 I 

Inserting the team into the task force zone early to observe 

and report enemy defensive preparations. 

Positioning the team to report enemy movement to bring 

forward engineer-specific breaching or river-crossing 

equipment. 

August 1996 Engineer 47 
Engineer Reconnaissance Squad Equipment 

Equipment Quantity Remarks 

High-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

(HMMWV), MI044 

2 Supplemental armor provides crew 

protection from small-arms fire and 

artillery fragments. 

Mounted on HMMWV 

Machine gun,.50-caliber, M2 or 1 One vehicle has the M2, the other the 

Grenade launcher, 40-millimeter, MK19 MK19; allows both long-range and shortrange indirect fires. 

Short-rangellong-range vehicular radio with dismount, 1 Allows squads or teams to report from 

ANIVRC-91 A most locations within the brigade sector. 

Teams can conduct two-way operations, 

Antenna, OE-254 1 one using the dismount system from the 

ANNRC-91 A, the other the ANIPRC-119A. 

Loudspeaker, LS-671 1 

Intercom set, ANIVIC-1 

Combat vehicle crewman helmet 

Telephone, TA-1 

Control monitor, C-11291 

Precision lightweight global positioning system (GPS) 

receiver, ANIPSS-11 

Pneumatic boat, 3-person 

Camouflage screen and support system 

Mine detector, ANIPSS-12 

1 Allows communication within the vehicle. 

4 

1 

2 

1 

1 For bridge and stream reconnaissance. 

1 

1 For breaching or route reconnaissance. 

Reeling machine with communications wire, RL-39 1 Supports outpostsllistening posts. 

Two-Person Team 

Individual weapon and ammunition 

Night vision goggles, ANIPVS-7B 

Manpack radio, ANNRC-11 9A, or dismounted short-range 

radio, ANIVRC-91 A 

Antenna, OE-254 

Telephone, TA-1 

Precision lightweight GPS receiver, ANIPSS-11 

Compass, lensatic 

Binoculars 

Sniper scope with laser 

Demolition kit 

2 Either the MI6 or M16lM203. 

2 Support all night operations. 

2 

1 

2 

1 Supports split-team operations. 

2 Supports all operations. 

2 Determines tsrget position. 

1 Determines target position. 

1 For breaching or route reconnaissance. 

Clinometer 1 Measures elevation. 

NBC equipment 2 

NOTE: Team equipment load (minus personal bad-bearing equipment [LBE] and spare clothing) is about 120 pounds. 
The Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon 

Organization and Manning Structure 

(Platoon Sergeant) 

FmlmllFm 

Figure 2 

Using the team as "deep eyes" for detailed engineer 

technical reconnaissance. 

Equipment for the engineer reconnaissance squad is 

shown on page 48. 

Zkining the Force. Placing the platoon under the S3 pays 

high dividends for training. During quarterly training briefs 

and regular training meetings with the brigade and task forces, 

the S3 verifies that engineer scouts are part of training events, 

particularly for lane training. Attending these events strengthens their habitual association and improves the level of training for all concerned. Joint training with the task force scouts 

reinforces standard techniques and procedures, improves 

reporting formats, and develops and formalizes policies 

within the tactical SOPS. 

The engineer reconnaissance platoon can help train scout 

platoons within the brigade on the many engineer-related 

tasks included in their mission training plan task list. They 

can also help when scout platoons are scheduled to attend 

the Sapper Leader's Course. Because the prime emphasis of 

this course is on demolition skills and introductoq patrolling techniques, this training will benefit the entire unit. 

To be effective, a scout must train in small-unit tactics and 

techniques. Therefore, the MOS codes for senior platoon members (platoon sergeants, squad leaders, team leaders, and gunners) indicate that their positions should include ranger 

qualification. Normally this does not occur within heavy forces, 

but the requirements for dismounted obstacle reconnaissance 

and deliberate engineer reconnaissance obligate commanders to 

ensure that soldiers are as well prepared as possible. While this 

requirement uses scarce training dollars, the skills acquired will 

pay great dividends during operational deployments. 

Manning Issues and Utilization. The S3 should carefully 

screen soldiers to ensure that only those best qualified are 

assigned to the scout platoon. Due to the difficulty of the 

mission, volunteers are the best choice. Random assignment 

to fill slots is a last resort. 

Platoon sergeants are key to developing platoons. When 

selecting the platoon sergeant, the S3 places him on the battalion staff, where he has the primary mission of reconnaissance. When the reconnissance NCO selects soldiers to fill 

the platoon, he selects soldiers for reconnaissance missions, 

not for staff support. If the reconnaissance NCO is at the brigade tactical operating center, he can help the brigade S2s 

develop the reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Together 

with the engineer battalion S3, he develops a solid plan to 

cover the named areas of interest important to confirming or 

denying the templated enemy mobilitylsurvivability information. By upgrading the duty position's grade from staff 

sergeant to sergeant first class, a more mature, experienced 

leader will be available to assist with all related operations. 

When operating tactically, the engineer reconnaissance 

platoon is the logical choice for covering all mobility1 

survivability named areas of interest. While not limited to these 

areas, the reconnaissance platoon is the best qualified to report 

required information on them. These areas include obstacles on the 

battlefield as well as any deliberate engineer reconnaissance 

required within the brigade zone. Ideally, engineer scouts are a brigade asset, much like the combat observation lazing teams. 

Scouts efforts are wasted unless the information they find is 

reported to all echelons. The operations order must specify which 

reporting nets the teams use and to whom they report. If the scouts 

are task organized under the task forces, reports must be passed to 

the engineer battalion to ensure that an accurate, brigade-wide picture of mobility/survivability data develops. The best choice for 

reporting intelligence is the operations and intelligence net, either 

at the brigade or task-force level. Teams normally do not report 

over the engineer battalion nets unless that is specified in the 

order. An exception is when teams operate solely in support of the 

engineer battalion; then they report either over the battalion command frequency or the company frequency. 

Summary 

y establishing and using a dedicated engineer scout platoon, the engineer battalion and heavy maneuver brigade gain a tremendous tool for gathering information. 

The flexibility, adaptability, and skills of the platoon provide a 

combat multiplier of the first order. The effects of these teams 

in the brigade reconnaissance fight are quantifiable and their 

benefits immediately apparent. While finding personnel to 

staff the platoon may be difficult, the benefits tremendously 

outweigh this difficulty. Only by getting these reconnaissance 

platoons up and running in every battalion can engineers overcome the shortage in reconnaissance expertise and set the conditions for successful battalion and brigade operations. L1 

Mr Sayer is a military analyst employed by Cubic Applications, Inc., which supports the Sidewinder Engineer Battalion 

Trainers, Operations Group, National Training Center; Fort 

Irwin, California. 

August I996 Engineer 49 
Book Review 

Hall, GwendoIyn Midso, ed. hle, Wac ond the 96th of an officer ond leader. The letters to his young wife 

Engineers (Colored). Urbana, L: University of Illinois (they were married only a few weeks heFore he went 

Press. 1995, 3 19 pages. overseas) show the personal stress of separation from 

family. Many of his letters, and hers, are filled with 

personal feelings of lave, anger, and fear, which arc 

seldom printed in histories or biographies. The diary also 

By Dr. Larry D. Roberts, Cnmma~rd Historim, U.S. Army reflects his growing confidence as an engineer and the 

Engineer Center admiration he came to have for his men. In 1943 he wrote. 

n late September 1941. Second Lieutenant Hyman 

Samuelson reported to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

for duty with rhe 96th Engineer Battalion (Colored). 

A graduate of Louisiana State University with a degree in 

civi t engineering, Samuelson was pursuing an advnnccd 

degree at Tulane when called to active duty. 

The 961h was, like many units raised in the hectic days 

of mobilization prior to Pearl Harbor. a confusing 

composite of regular and reserve officers and enlisted men 

quickly brought into service with the minimum of 

eaining. As constituted. the 96th essentially was a general 

service battalion. These units were charged with 

construction duties, freeing the combat battalions lo 

support the maneuver ams. In many instances, black 

engineer units wen considered to be lillle more thnn labor 

baztalions. Often [hey were short: of the heavy equipment 

needed to meet their constmction tasks. The overall lack 

of mechanical and technical pacetime training for many 

of the young black soldiers complicated the problem. 

Gwendolyn Hall's book is, in reality, an edited printing 

of Samuelson's diary and the letters he sent to and 

received from his wife. This is one of the strengths of the 

work, SamueEson spent n lot of time describing his duties, 

the conditions he and his men labored under, and the tasks 

they accomplished. ?he book clearly shows the 

difficulties Samuelson had adjusting to the Army and the 

problems the 96th experienced both in kraining and during 

their service in New Guinea. As one of [he first engineer 

units to arrive in New Guinea early in 1942, the 96th faced 

all of the problems of trying to perform engineer tasks in a 

primilive land, with little support and under the constant 

threat of air or ground attack. Limited recreational 

opportunities, including those imposed on the battalion 

because of segregation policies, often pIaced both officers 

and men under extreme pelsonal pressure. 

"Before I die F must help stamp out this crazy idea that 

while man has about his superiority over the colored 

man.'' The diary and letters also show how his 

understanding of leadership grew as he took on 

increasingly greater responsibility in the unit, ultimately 

serving as company commander. 

Hall's Love, Wac and the Mtf1 Etlgineers is really 

several stories in a single volume. It is a story of a young 

engineer officer at war in the Southwest Pacific in Worid 

War 11. It is aZso a story of a husband separated, by the 

war, from his wife and family far almost three years. It is 

equally the story of the 96th Engineer BattaIion. as told by 

a young officer who is fiercely proud of his men, their 

capabilities, and their accomplishments. Because the book 

contains these different accounts, it has value to a wide 

audience. Young officers will benefit from Samuelson's 

trials and tribulations as a young company-pade officer. 

The leadership approach he developed is worth 

consideration. Senior leaders also will benefit from this 

book. Samuelson was quite pointed in his diary about the 

relative rnerik of his supcrior officers. The views of a 

junior officer concerning the leadership. profession a I' Ism. 

and personat svengths of his superiors often make 

interesting reading. Finally, the book will be of value to 

families. Dora Sarnuelson's thoughts and feelings about 

him and the difficulties of their separation are clearly 

shown in the letters to her husband. Although the world 

and society of the 1990s differ from those of the early 

1940~~ the personal equation of human beings and their 

families has not changed. 

There is little in this book for those preoccupied with 

technology or the often steriIe analysis of ractics and 

strategy. This is a human story. 

Note: Engineer is seeking insighq~l reviews of hooks 

Through the diary and the persona1 letters, the reader of special inreresf to military engineers. Con~rihutions are 

can watch fie maturation of a young man and !he growth welcome. 

50 Engineer R tigttsr 1997 
ENGINEER DOCTRINE 

PUBLICATIONS REDUCTION SURVEY 

PURPOSE: The. Training and Doctrine Command (TILADOC) has directed all U.S. Amy schools re reduce the 

number of dsctrinal publications by 20 percent and also reduce the conrent of doctrinal publications by 20 percent. 

This survey is a tool to request comments and recommendations concerning the feasibility of our consolidation plan 

to meet the reduction goat. 

Unit Name 

Locntian Commercial Phone No. 

Activity Fax No, 

Duty Title E-mail 

Pu bllcations (*) under consideration for consolidation into one manual (bold FM) are indicated below. Using a 

scale of 1 to 5 (I = the most acceptable for consolidating). please rank the logic of each pIanned consolidation and 

haw we11 each will meet your aceds. 

How HLJ w well 

logical is will it meet 

i7!hxdw E&k ~!budmC your neea 

1. FM 5-170, Engineer Reconnaissance - - 

*FM 5-30, Engineer Intelligence 

*FM 5-36, Route Recon and Classification 

2. FM 5-250, ExpIosives and Demolitions 

*W 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions 

*TC 5-250, Dernali tion Effects Simulator 

*TC 5-6-14, How to Prepare a Target Folder 

3. F'M 5-446, Mititary Nonstandard Fixed Bridges 

*FM 5-1 34, Pile Construction 

*FM 5-446, Military Nonstandard Fixed Bridges 

4. FM 5-478, Construction Surveying 

*FM 5-233, Construction Surveying 

*TM 5-232, Elements of Surveying 

*TM 5-235. Special Surveys 

*TM 5-237, Surveying Computers Manuat 

5. FM 5420, Plumbing and Pipefitting 

*FM 5-163, Sewerage 

*FM 5-420, Plumbing & Pipefitting 

6. FM 5-474, Drafting 

"FM 5-553, General Drafting 

*FM 5-58 lB, Constmction Drafting 

*FM 5-704, Construction Print Reading in the Field 
Number -2B.l.e 

7. FM 5-426, Carpentry and Masonry 

*FM 5-426, Carpentry 

*FM 5-742, Concrete & M~SON~ 

8. FM 5-434, Earthmoving Operations 

*FM 5-164, Tactical Land Clearing 

*FM 5-434, Earthmoving Operations 

9. FM 5-436, Paving and Surfacing Operations 

*TM 5-33 ID, Engineer Const Equip , Vol D 

*TM 5-337, Paving and Surfacing Operations 

*TM 5-337-1, Asphalt Plant Layout, 100T-150T 

10. FM 5-432, Pits and Quarries 

*TM 5-332, Pits and Quarries 

*TM 5-33 1 C, Util of Engineer Const Equip, Vol C 

11. FM 5-540, Cartography 

5-240, Comp & Color Sep of Topo Maps 

*TM 5-243, Cartographic Aerial Photography 

12 FM 5-424, Theater of Opns Elec Systems 

*FM 20-3 1, Electric Power Generation in the Field 

*TM 5-760, Interior Wing 

13. FM 5-410, Military Soils Engineering 

* FM 5-410, Military Soils Engineering 

* TM 5-545, Geology 

How How well 

logical is will it meet 

]lie plan? your needs? 

Please explain why you think the consolidation will not work for any particular publication. Return completed 

survey to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATSE-TD-D-WC (Lucius Wamck), Fort Leonard 

Wood. Missouri 65473. 

This survey is available on the Internet at http://www.wood.army.mil/DDD/ddd.htm 

52 Engineer August 1997 
DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS SURVEY 

PURPOSE: To better serve your needs for engineer doctrine manuals, the Doctrine Development 

Division of the Directorate of Training at the U.S. Army Engineer School requests your responses to 

the following questions: 

Unit Name 

Location Commercial Phone No. 

Activity Fax No. 

Duty Title E-mail 

1. Does the current engineer doctrine hierarchy meet the needs of the field? 

- YES. 

NO. If no, please state why. 

2. Is engineer doctrine accurate in reference to how units operate in the field? 

- YES. 

- NO. Why? 

3. Is engineer doctrine relevant to current missions required by engineer units? 

7 

YES. 

- NO. Why? 

4. Does current engineer doctrine meet the needs of the entire engineer community? 

7 

YES. 

- NO. If no, what area(s) is missing? 

5. Do you have access to the engineer home page digital doctrine? 

- YES. 

- NO. 

If yes, circle the average number of accesses you make monthly. 

(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Overlo) 

Circle the home page references that you most frequently use. 

FMs STs TCs ARTEPs GTAs Lessons Learned 

(File location of the homepage is http://www.wood.army.miYDDD/ddd.htm) 

6. Use a scale of 1 to 16 (1 = most useful) to rank the following manuals as to their usefulness: 

- FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data 

- FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engr & Engr Co Cbt Opns 

- FM 5-71-2, Armored TF Engr Combat Opns 

- FM 5-71-100, Division Engr Combat Opns 

- FM 5-100, Engineer Operations 

- FM 5-10, Combat Engineer Platoon 

- FM 5-100-15, Corps Engineer Operations 

- FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 

- FM 5-103, Survivability 

- FM 5-104, General Engineering 

- FM 5-105, Topographic Operations 

- FM 20-32, Mine1 Countermine Operations 

FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions 

- FM 90-13, River-Crossing Operations 

- FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Opns 

- FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engr Combat Opns(Armor) 

August 1997 Engineer 53 
T I ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial Numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

Fort Leonard Wood Electronic Addresses. Electronic mail that formerly 

went to users at wood-vines.army.mil has been changed to wood.army.mil. 

Mail addresses for users at wood-emhl.army.mil have been changed to 

emh 1. wood.army.mil. For example, doe/@ wood-vines.armymi1 becomes 

doej@wood.army.mil. POC is the DOlM Help Desk, -4357. 

Fort Leonard Wood Web Server. Effective 15 July, the Fort Leonard 

Wood web server has a new look. Our name changed to reflect the 

Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) mission, a "topical" information 

layout provides easier navigation, and expanded coverage reflects our 

partnership with the Ozark community. Check us out at http:// 

www.wood.army.mil. An electronic comment form is on the home page. POC 

is Greg Adank, -5368. 

Department of Training and 

Doctrine Development (DOTD) 

Directorate of Combat 

Developments (DCD) 

Field Manuals (FMs) Distributed. The following field manuals are 

scheduled for distribution this summer: 

FM 5-499, Hydraulics, is scheduled for distribution in August. This manual is a guide for personnel who operate and maintain military equipment using hydraulic-powered control systems. 

FM 5-424, Theater of Operations Electrical Systems, was distributed in 

June. It is a training guide for engineer personnel responsible for planning and executing construction in a theater of operations. 

Change 1 to FM 5-410, Military Soils Engineering, was distributed in 

June. This change incorporates applicable geologic information from TM 

5-545, Geology, and supersedes the technical manual. 

Change 2 to TC 5-400, Unit Leaders' Handbook for Environmental 

Stewardship, was distributed in July. This change explains the terms 

"used oil" and "waste oil" and describes appropriate handling and disposal methods. 

These manuals are on the Engineer School's Publications Page: http:// 

www.wood.army.mil/DDD/PUBS/pubs.htm. POC is Lucius Warrick, -4115. 

Updated Experimental Forces (EXFOR) Special Texts (STs). Special 

texts for company-, battalion-, and brigade-level EXFOR were updated in 

June based on the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) conducted in 

February. The revised STs will be used during the division-level AWE 

scheduled for November. They are on the Engineer School's Publications 

Page on the World Wide Web: http://www.wood.army.mil/DDD/PUBS/ 

pubs.htm. POC is CPT Joe Birchmeier, -4115. 

Staffing of FM 5-34. The draft of FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, will be 

staffed to the field for comment using a combination of paper copies and the 

Internet. The draft was posted on the Engineer School's Publications Page 

(see above address) in June. Paper copies were distributed in July. POC is 

CPT Joe Birchmeier, -41 15. 

Global Positioning System (GPS). Users of the GPS are reminded that 

the system is not accurate enough for precise minefield recording. Using 

GPS as the only means of locating or recording minefields will lead to 

avoidable injuries and deaths. Soldiers and civilian personnel must follow 

54 Engineer August 1997 
approved tactics, techniques, and procedures when navigating or working 

near any known minefield. POC is CPT Rick O'Donnell, -5644 

Engineer Force Structure. The Engineer School and MSBL are decisively Maneuver Support Battle 

engaged in a fight to retain engineer force structure at the division, corps, and Laboratory (MSBL) 

theater levels. Proposed heavy division designs remove the engineer 

command group (colonel). Possible reductions in corps engineer force 

structure are being discussed by the TRADOC Force Design Directorate. 

General Reimer is scheduled to reach a decision on 11 August concerning the 

theater support command (TSC) concept proposed by the Combined Arms 

Support Command, which would place the engineer command under the 

command and control of the TSC. We are seeking support from fellow Army 

engineers in all components, including military retirees, in these fights. We are 

also soliciting help from theater commanders in chief and other combined 

arms partners. If you can assist or have questions, please contact us. The 

e-mail address is lowreyv@wood.army.mi1. POC is Vem Lowrey, -4082. 

Unmanned Terrain Domination. Now that the Cold War has ended and 

U.S. forces are drawing down, the U.S. Army is reexamining the way it trains 

and fights. The Army of the future will be smaller but more technologically 

advanced. Potential adversaries will not go away and they, too, are advancing 

technologically. Therefore, U.S. forces must dominate battlespace while 

maintaining economy of force. An integrated concept team is developing a 

concept for unmanned terrain domination as a capability for the Force XXI Army. 

In accordance with Joint and Army visions, this operational capability will 

provide the commander total situational awareness, the ability to evaluate data 

received from unmanned sentries and develop courses of action based on that 

data, and the ability to employ tactics and unmanned systems to achieve 

desired objectives. If you can assist or have questions, please contact us. The 

e-mail address is chapmant@wood.army.mil. POC is MAJ Tom Chapman, -5820. 

Officer Restructure Initiative. General Reimer approved the Office of Engineer Personnel Proponency 

Personnel Management System (OPMS) proposal to restructure the officer Office (EPPO) 

corps' development system into a four-career-path system. The OPMS task 

force is focusing on restructuring branches and functional areas to implement 

the new system. The Engineer Branch has two key concerns: how to balance 

the large number of majors with the small number of branch-qualifying S3 and 

XO positions and if changes to current branch and command qualifications are 

necessary. For more information, refer to EPPO's home page: http:// 

www.wood.army.mil/EPPO/eppo~hp.htm. POC is CPT Matt Zajac, -4087. 

Environmental Partnering Workshop. Reserve 21 -23 October 1997 to News and Notes 

attend a workshop sponsored by the Society of American Military Engineers 

(SAME) at Fort Leonard Wood. The workshop, "Environmental Partnering in 

Engineering Operations," will focus on environmental solutions to military 

engineering challenges. It will look across service boundaries and open 

channels to academia, the private sector, and non-Department of Defense 

government agencies with proven solutions to engineering problems. POCs 

are MAJ Jack Drolet, (573) 596-0224, and LTC Sue Myers, (573) 563-4106. 

August 1997 Engineer 55 
Engineer School Directory 

The following telephone numbers for the U.S. Army Engineer School allow callers to reach key offices. Commercial numbers are 

(573)563-xxxx and Defense System Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

I Commandant 

MG Robert B. Flowers 

563-61 1 6 

Directorate of Maneuver Support Baffle Lab 

Deputy Director, COL Don T. Riley 

563-4082 

Engineer Center Command Sergeant Major TRADOC Systems Manager 

CSM Robert M. Dils COL Edwin P. Janasky 

- 563-6151 563-4085 

Assistant Commandant 

COL(P) Edwin J. Arnold 

563-71 17 

TRADOC Program Integration Office 

Director, COL Robert S. Kirsch (as of October 1997) 

563-4082 

H Deputy Assistant, Army Reserve Department of Training and Doctrine 

COL Michael K. Adams Development (DOTD) 

563-4033 Director, LTC Dale A. Carr 

Deputy Assistant, Army National Guard 

COL Harry L. Bryan 

563-4034 

Chief of Staff 

COL Maynard S. Rhoades 

563-61 18 

Directorate of Training (DOT) 

Director, COL Philip F. Federle 

563-4093 

Allied Engineer Liaison Officers 

Australian Army, LTC Phil White 

563-61 32 

British Army, COL Phil Lilleyman 

563-401 8 

Canadian Army, MAJ Paul Fleet 

563-401 7 

French Army, COL Jean Lafargue 

563-4027 

German Army, LTC Helmut Bach 

563-4029 

Directorate of Combat Developments 

(DCD) 

Director, COL C.M. Ferguson, Jr. 

563-4076 

Department of Tactics, Leadership, and 

Engineering (D TLE) 

Director, LTC James Koch 

563-41 19 

Engineer Hotline 

563-4098 

Engineer Professional Bulletin 

Managing Editor, Catherine Eubanks 

563-41 04 

Engineer Personnel Proponency Office 

(EPPO) 

Chief, Victoria Anthony 

563-4087 

Engineer Branch Safety Office 

Director, Dennis Woolsey 

563-4025 

Garrison Commander 

COL Timothy M. Daniel 

563-4005 

1st Engineer Brigade 

COL Thomas G. Luebker 

596-0224, DSN 581 -0224 

56 Engineer August 1997 
By Command Sergeant Major Julius B. Nutter 

U. S. Army Engineer School 

One Army, One Standard 

T o prepare the Total Army for the 21st century, 

TRADOC formed the Total Army School System 

(TASS). The system is designed to fix the 

problem of "nonstandardizedn training for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) assigned to the Active, 

National Guard, and Reserve Components. In the past, 

NCOs attended Noncommissioned Officer Education 

System (NCOES) courses in either Active, National 

Guard, or Army Reserve academies. Because the 

courses for soldiers in the Active Component were 

considerably longer than those in the Reserve 

Components, training scenarios in the three academies 

differed significantly. Under TASS, the level of training 

NCOs receive will be more equal regardless of their 

component affiliation. TASS will minimize discrepancies 

by utilizing distance-learning media such as CD-ROMs, 

making courses available on the Internet, and 

conducting video-teleconferences. 

To help standardize training, TRADOC established 

seven regions that cover the 50 states and seven 

territories. Under TASS, all initial entry training will 

continue to be conducted at the proponent schools, and 

reclassification training will be taught at a functionally 

aligned TASS school. Responsibility for combat arms 

training usually falls under the National Guard, while 

responsibility for combat support and combat service 

support falls under the Army Reserves. Although the 

Engineer Regiment is a combat arms branch, the Army 

Reserves have responsibility for engineer TASS 

training. 

TASS is an integrated part of the training bridge 

between the Active, National Guard, and Reserve 

Components. The abutments of this bridge are built on 

seven regional training battalions. Structural members, 

such as partnerships, coaching, and leadership, are 

needed to span the gap. One of the Engineer 

Regiment's greatest challenges is to consolidate our 

resources and forge a true partnership that integrates 

the assets of each component to create one viable 

training organization. 

What does this mean to the typical engineer NCOES 

candidate? Soldiers in both the Active and Reserve 

Components can attend the resident course either at 

Fort Leonard Wood or any regional school. For 

example, starting in October 1997, the Total Army 

Training System (TATS) course "Combat Engineer" 

(Career Management Field 12, Advanced NCO Course) 

will be configured with the following academic hours: 

The resident course at Fort Leonard Wood will have 

343 hours. The regional course will have two phases 

spread over two years. The technical phase has 283 

hours-150 hours of active duty training (ADT), 123 

hours of inactive duty training (IDT), and 10 hours of 

distance learning. The second phase, common leader 

training, includes about 85 hours of common tasks. It is 

taught by the professional development battalions and 

at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. 

TASS is the Army's system for training, and our 

readiness is tied to the success or failure of this system. 

Partnerships similar to those created in capstone units 

provide the right environment for success. As with any 

new system, TASS requires structural support from all 

engineer leaders and trainers. Unit leaders must start 

coordinating with the Reserve Component training 

battalions at least a year in advance of the training to 

ensure that all requirements are resourced. Command 

sergeants major must ensure that their NCOs verify 

Army Training Resource Requirements System 

(ATRRS) listings of courses with the regional school 

battalions. They should reverify the course 60 days 

prior to the course date to ensure that soldiers do not 

show up for courses that have been canceled but not 

annotated in ATRRS. Soldiers must ensure they are 

prepared to attend the course by being physically fit and 

familiar with the program of instruction. 

Training the engineer force for the demands of 

America's Army in the 21st century must include 

efficiencies because ~f reduced resourcing. As leaders, 

you are responsible for getting your soldiers trained. 

Implementation of TASS ensures that all engineer 

soldiers are trained to a single standard. It provides 

efficiencies by allowing students to get MOS qualified 

without having to travel great distances. We must 

bridge our training gap and remain a viable part of the 

combined arms team. 

August 1997 
m 

A stubby bulldorrr Mvan by Navy Seabees puffs off an LST d Qrsen klmnkn Mdryci4 duting the invasion by AU1ed troops In 

February 1944.