J-A08037-18

2018 PA Super 189

BRENDA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF

THE ESTATE OF RUTH ROBERTS, 

DECEASED,

 v.

CENTER MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT OPERATING, LLC 

D/B/A ST. JOHN NEUMANN CENTER 

FOR REHABILITATION AND 

HEALTHCARE, CATHOLIC HEALTH 

SERVICES, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT 

INVESTMENTS, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT 

LIC, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT LOT, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT PARTNERS LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT REALTY, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT VENTURES, LLC, 

CHARLES-EDOUARD GROS, MOSHE 

ROSENBERG, CAROLYN BOEHM, ST. 

JOHN NEUMANN NURSING HOME, AND 

ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA 

D/B/A CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 

SERVICES,

BRENDA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF 

THE ESTATE OF RUTH ROBERTS, 

DECEASED,

 v.

GERMANTOWN HOME AND NEW 

COURTLAND ELDER SERVICES, INC.,

APPEAL OF: ARCHDIOCESE OF 

PHILADELPHIA D/B/A CATHOLIC 

HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND ST. 

JOHN NEUMANN NURSING HOME 

 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 452 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order January 24, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2016 No. 00108

November Term, 2015 No. 03740

BRENDA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF 

THE ESTATE OF RUTH ROBERTS, 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA
J-A08037-18

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DECEASED,

 v.

GERMANTOWN HOME AND NEW 

COURTLAND ELDER SERVICES, INC.,

BRENDA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF 

THE ESTATE OF RUTH ROBERTS, 

DECEASED,

 v.

CENTER MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT OPERATING, LLC 

D/B/A ST. JOHN NEUMANN CENTER 

FOR REHABILITATION AND 

HEALTHCARE, CATHOLIC HEALTH 

SERVICES, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT 

INVESTMENTS, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT 

LIC, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT LOT, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT PARTNERS LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT REALTY, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT VENTURES, LLC, 

CHARLES-EDOUARD GROS, MOSHE 

ROSENBERG, CAROLYN BOEHM, ST. 

JOHN NEUMANN NURSING HOME, AND 

ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA 

D/B/A CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 

SERVICES,

APPEAL OF: CENTER MANAGEMENT 

GROUP, LLC, 10400 ROOSEVELT 

OPERATING, LLC D/B/A ST. JOHN

NEUMANN CENTER FOR 

REHABILITATION AND HEALTHCARE, 

CATHOLIC HEALTH SERVICES, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT REALTY, LLC, 

10400 ROOSEVELT LOT, LLC,

CHARLES-EDOUARD GROS, MOSHE 

ROSENBERG, AND CAROLYN BOEHM

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: No. 562 EDA 2017 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 24, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 
J-A08037-18

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Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2016 No. 00108

November Term, 2015 No. 03740

BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2018

In these consolidated appeals, Archdiocese of Philadelphia d/b/a 

Catholic Health Care Services and St. John Neumann Nursing Home 

(collectively, AOP) and Center Management Group, LLC, 10400 Roosevelt 

Operating LLC d/b/a St. John Neumann Center for Rehabilitation and 

Healthcare, Catholic Health Services, LLC, 10400 Roosevelt Realty, LLC, 

10400 Roosevelt Lot, LLC, Charles-Edouard Gros, Moshe Rosenberg, and 

Carolyn Boehm (collectively, CMG)

1 appeal from the January 24, 2017 orders

overruling their respective preliminary objections in the nature of a petition

to compel arbitration.2 We vacate the orders and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We refer to AOP and CMG collectively as Appellants.

2 The instant case stems from an action filed by Davis as administratrix of 

the estate of Ruth Roberts (Decedent), filed at docket number 00108 of the 

July Term, 2016. Davis had filed a similar complaint against Germantown 

Home and New Courtland Elder Services, Inc. at docket number 03740 of 

the November Term, 2015. On January 19, 2017, the trial court granted 

Davis’s request to consolidate No. 00108 and No. 03740 for purposes of 

discovery and trial. The court designated No. 00108 as the lead case. 

Germantown Home and New Courtland Elder Services, Inc. filed an answer 

to Davis’s complaint instead of preliminary objections; that action is still 

pending. Germantown Home and New Courtland Elder Services, Inc. are not 

participating in this appeal.
J-A08037-18

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Decedent passed away on October 31, 2015. This action involves 

claims of negligence relating to care rendered to Decedent during her stay in 

2014 and 2015 as a patient at a skilled nursing facility, St. John Neumann 

Nursing Home (St. John Neumann), which was owned and operated first by 

AOP, and later, by CMG. 

Decedent was admitted to St. John Neumann on May 5, 2014. She 

remained there until she was hospitalized for several weeks in March 2015. 

On April 3, 2015, Decedent was re-admitted to St. John Neumann. Upon 

Decedent’s re-admission to St. John Neumann, Decedent’s daughter, Davis, 

signed an agreement relating to Decedent’s stay at St. John Neumann 

(Admission Agreement) which, inter alia, details the nature of the services 

provided and the resident’s financial obligations.

3

 Prior to Davis’s signing of 

the Admission Agreement, Decedent had granted Davis certain powers 

pursuant to a written general durable power of attorney dated February 25, 

2015 (Power of Attorney).4 

 

3 There is no indication in the record whether or not Decedent or Davis 

signed a similar Admission Agreement upon Decedent’s first admission. In 

light of our disposition today, we need not decide whether the Arbitration 

Clause was limited to acts or omissions occurring after the date it was 

signed, or whether it required the parties to arbitrate disputes regarding acts 

or omissions occurring prior to Davis’s signing of the Admission Agreement.

4 By its terms, the Power of Attorney instructed the principal to initial in front 

of (N) and to “ignore” the lines in front of (A) through (M) if the principal 

wished to grant all of the powers listed in (A) through (M) to the agent. 

Power of Attorney, 2/25/2015, at 2 (unnumbered; numbering supplied). If 

the principal wished to grant one or more but fewer than all of the powers, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A08037-18

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The Admission Agreement purports to make the following parties to 

the agreement: St. John Neumann, Decedent (known in the agreement as 

“Resident”), and Davis as Decedent’s “legal representative,” (known in the 

agreement as “Responsible Person”). Admission Agreement, 4/3/2015, at 1. 

Decedent did not sign the Admission Agreement. Davis signed on the line 

designated for Decedent’s “Responsible Person.”5 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the Power of Attorney instructed the principal to initial in front of each 

specific power he/she wanted to grant. Id. To withhold a power, the Power 

of Attorney instructed the principal to refrain from initialing in front of the 

power. Id. 

 “R.R.” is handwritten in front of (N), indicating that Decedent wished to 

grant Davis all of the listed powers at (A) through (M). Id. at 4. This would 

appear to include power (I), which permits the agent to “defend, settle, 

adjust, make allowances, compound, submit to arbitration, and compromise 

all accounts, reckonings, claims, and demands whatsoever that now are, or 

hereafter shall be, pending between me and any person, firm, corporation, 

or other legal entity, in such manner and all respects as my Agent shall 

deem proper.” Id. at 3. However, contrary to the instructions regarding the 

method to grant all powers in (N), there is difficult-to-read writing that may 

be Decedent’s initials in front of power (K). Id. 

 Although Davis asserted her lack of authority in her response to Appellants’ 

preliminary objections before the trial court, she does not argue that she 

lacked authority to enter into the Admission Agreement in her brief to this 

Court. Based upon our disposition today, we need not decide whether Davis 

had such authority. 

5 Davis also signed a second agreement (Responsible Person Agreement), 

the purpose of which is “to facilitate the provision of care to [Decedent].” 

Responsible Person Agreement, 4/3/2015, at 1. The parties to the 

Responsible Person Agreement are St. John Neumann and Davis. Id. 

Decedent did not sign the Responsible Person Agreement. Essentially, the 

Responsible Person Agreement obligates the Responsible Person to fulfill the 

duties of the Resident under the Admission Agreement, most of which are 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A08037-18

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Relevant to this appeal, the Admission Agreement contains an 

arbitration clause (Arbitration Clause), which requires the parties to submit 

to arbitration all disputes relating to the Admission Agreement, with the 

exception of guardianship proceedings and disputes involving amounts in 

controversy less than $8,000. Id. at 16-20. The Arbitration Clause

indicates specifically that it applies to disputes relating to personal injury or 

medical malpractice. Id. at 18. 

On July 5, 2016, Davis, in her capacity as administratrix of Decedent’s 

estate, filed a praecipe for a writ of summons against Appellants. The writ 

of summons was issued and served upon Appellants. On November 9, 2016, 

Appellants filed a joint petition to compel arbitration, which alleged that 

Decedent’s estate was bound to arbitrate any disputes pursuant to the 

Arbitration Clause. Davis filed an answer to the petition to compel on 

November 29, 2016, arguing that the case should remain in the court of 

common pleas. The following day, Davis filed a complaint against 

Appellants, alleging various negligence claims relating to the care Decedent

received while at St. John Neumann. 

On December 6, 2016, the trial court denied Appellants’ petition to 

compel without prejudice, holding that Appellants could not petition the 

court to compel arbitration in response to a writ of summons. Trial Court 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

financial in nature, and subjects the Responsible Person to liability for failure 

to do so.
J-A08037-18

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Order, 12/6/2016, at 1 (“A plaintiff must first file a formal [c]omplaint, after 

which a defendant may move to compel arbitration following the procedures 

set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 1028.”).6 The court further specified that “[Appellants] 

 

6 The trial court based its holding upon PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, 61 

F.3d 1063 (3d. Cir. 1995), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Third Circuit held that because a writ of summons in this Commonwealth 

is not a pleading, is silent as to the claims asserted by a plaintiff, and does 

not require the defendant to take any responsive action, the plaintiff’s 

obtaining a writ is not evidence of a refusal to arbitrate, and thus did not 

start the clock on the statute of limitations under the Federal Arbitration Act. 

We question whether this case applied to the situation presented to the trial 

court. The Third Circuit is correct that in Pennsylvania, a writ of summons is 

not a pleading, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit 

a party to file preliminary objections to a writ of summons. Monaco v. 

Montgomery Cab Co., 208 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1965). We agree with the 

Third Circuit that filing a praecipe for a writ of summons alone does not 

constitute a refusal to arbitrate, and the opposing party is not compelled to 

take responsive action upon service of the writ of summons. Nevertheless, a 

preliminary objection pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6) is not the only 

mechanism to attempt to compel another party to arbitrate; courts are 

required to consider applications to compel arbitration pursuant to 

subsection 7304(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act. That section provides:

On application to a court to compel arbitration made by a party 

showing an agreement described in section 7303 (relating to 

validity of agreement to arbitrate) and a showing that an 

opposing party refused to arbitrate, the court shall order the 

parties to proceed with arbitration. If the opposing party denies 

the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall 

proceed summarily to determine the issue so raised and shall 

order the parties to proceed with arbitration if it finds for the 

moving party. Otherwise, the application shall be denied. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(a). See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 7318 (“The making of an 

agreement described in section 7303 (relating to validity of agreement to 

arbitrate) providing for arbitration in this Commonwealth confers jurisdiction 

on the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce the agreement under this 

subchapter and to enter judgment on an award made thereunder.”). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A08037-18

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shall have [20] days from the date of this order to file a [p]etition in 

response to [Davis’s] formal [c]omplaint.” Id.

Appellants each filed preliminary objections to the complaint on 

December 27, 2016. Inter alia, the preliminary objections were filed in the 

nature of a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6), 

and sought to enforce the Arbitration Clause in the Admission Agreement. 

Davis filed responses in opposition to each set of Appellants’ preliminary 

objections, asserting, inter alia, that the Arbitration Clause was 

“unenforceable, void, voidable, invalid, and/or revocable on numerous 

grounds....” Davis’s Responses, 1/17/2017, at 2. Davis included a laundry 

list of various grounds, including the three grounds Davis discusses in her 

appellee brief: (1) that the Arbitration Clause is a contract of adhesion and is 

unconscionable; (2) that the Arbitration Clause violates 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1396r(c)(5)(iii) (prohibiting nursing homes from “charg[ing], solicit[ing], 

accept[ing,] or receiv[ing] ... any other consideration as a precondition of 

admit[ance]”) because it required Davis to waive her right to a jury trial as a 

condition of admittance in addition to payments provided by 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

 Thus, while the obtaining of a writ of summons alone does not constitute a 

refusal to arbitrate, if Appellants had some other basis to demonstrate that 

Davis refused to arbitrate, the lack of a complaint at that junction did not 

render Appellants’ petition to compel arbitration premature, as the trial court 

could have considered it pursuant to subsection 7304(a) of the Uniform 

Arbitration Act. Nevertheless, Appellants do not contest the trial court’s 

December 6, 2016 order on appeal, and at any rate, Davis did file eventually 

a complaint to which Appellants filed preliminary objections, as discussed 

infra. 
J-A08037-18

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Medicaid/Medicare; and (3) that the Arbitration Clause is void due to the 

doctrine of impracticability because the non-arbitrable Wrongful Death Act 

claim should be consolidated with the Survival Act claims.7 Id. at 3-5; 

Davis’s Brief at 9-18.

Meanwhile, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

December 6, 2016 order declining to compel arbitration due to Davis’s not 

having filed a complaint. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion for 

reconsideration on January 4, 2017. In the order denying the motion, the 

trial court clarified that it had issued its December 6, 2016 order solely due 

to Appellants’ purported procedural error in filing prematurely a petition to 

compel, and the issue of arbitrability of the dispute was preserved until 

Appellants cured the errors in procedure. Trial Court Order, 1/4/2017, at 1. 

The trial court noted that Appellants had filed preliminary objections raising 

the issue of arbitration in response to Davis’s formal complaint, which 

preserved their objection. Id. As such, the trial court expressly held that 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(iv) (“Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order 

refusing to compel arbitration, appealable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1) 

and subparagraph (a)(8) of this rule, shall constitute a waiver of all 

objections to such an order.”) did not apply. Id.

 

7 We note our Supreme Court has rejected Davis’s impracticability argument. 

See Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 

2016). 
J-A08037-18

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On January 24, 2017, the trial court8issued the orders in question 

overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections in the nature of petitions to 

compel arbitration. Trial Court Order, 1/24/2017, at 1. The trial court did 

not explain its ruling and ordered Appellants to file answers to the complaint 

within 20 days from the date of the orders. Id.

Appellants timely filed notices of appeal. The trial court did not order 

Appellants to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, but 

did issue an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellants ask this Court to resolve three issues on appeal.9 First, 

Appellants disagree with the trial court’s conclusion in its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion that their claims are untimely, waived, and/or moot. AOP’s Brief at 

5; CMG’s Brief at 8. Second, Appellants contend that the trial court erred by 

refusing to compel arbitration of all claims Davis is making on behalf of 

Decedent and her estate, because such claims are (a) subject to the 

Arbitration Clause in the Admission Agreement executed by Davis on 

Decedent’s behalf pursuant to a valid power of attorney and (b) within the 

scope of the Arbitration Clause. Id. Finally, Appellants argue that the trial 

court should not have overruled their preliminary objections because Davis 

failed to raise a dispute of material fact or legal argument precluding 

 

8 Whereas the Honorable Denis P. Cohen issued the December 6, 2016, and 

January 4, 2017 orders, the Honorable Angelo Foglietta issued the January 

24, 2017 orders.

9 We have reordered Appellants’ issues for ease of disposition.
J-A08037-18

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enforcement of the Arbitration Clause in response to Appellants’ preliminary 

objections. Id. Alternatively, Appellants argue the trial court erred by 

failing to take evidence in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2) prior to 

overruling the preliminary objections. Id. 

“[O]ur review of a claim that the trial court improperly denied 

preliminary objections in the nature of a petition to compel arbitration is 

limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying the petition.” Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 46, 

49–50 (Pa. Super. 2017). “We employ a two-part test to determine whether 

the trial court should have compelled arbitration: [(1)] whether a valid 

agreement to arbitrate exists, and [(2)] whether the dispute is within the 

scope of the agreement.” Washburn v. Northern Health Facilities, Inc., 

121 A.3d 1008, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Before we address the merits of Appellants’ issues, we first address 

whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The trial court contends this 

Court should quash this appeal because the orders appealed from are

interlocutory. Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/2017, at 5-6. While the orders are 

indeed interlocutory, “[a]n order overruling preliminary objections seeking to 

compel arbitration is immediately appealable as an interlocutory appeal as of 

right pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 7320(a) and Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).” 

Petersen v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 641, 644 n.1 (Pa. Super. 
J-A08037-18

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2017). See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) (“An appeal may be taken as of right and 

without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from ... [a]n order that is made final or 

appealable by statute ... even though the order does not dispose of all claims 

and of all parties.”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1), (5) (“An appeal may be taken 

from ... [a] court order denying an application to compel arbitration made 

under section 7304 (relating to proceedings to compel or stay arbitration).”). 

The trial court states that it did not refuse to compel arbitration, as 

“Appellants would have been free to file a petition or motion on this issue at 

a later time and without any prejudice to them.” Trial Court Opinion, 

9/18/2017, at 6. However, not only did nothing about the trial court’s order 

indicate that it entered the order without prejudice, the order plainly denied 

Appellants’ application to compel arbitration (made in the form of 

preliminary objections).

10

 Thus, we decline to quash these appeals.

Next, the trial court requests that this Court dismiss Appellants’ 

appeals because the court granted Appellants permission to re-file their 

petition to remove the matter to arbitration, but they failed to do so. Trial 

Court Opinion, 9/18/2017, at 4. However, the fundamental flaw in the trial 

court’s reasoning is that Appellants did renew their request to compel 

arbitration – they just did so in the form of preliminary objections instead of 

 

10 As such, Appellants had to file an appeal to preserve their objections to the

orders. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(iv) (“Failure to file an appeal from an 

interlocutory order refusing to compel arbitration, appealable under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1) and subparagraph (a)(8) of this rule, shall constitute a 

waiver of all objections to such an order.”).
J-A08037-18

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petition form. This is permissible under the rules. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6) 

(permitting preliminary objections based upon an “agreement for alternative 

dispute resolution;” official note to rule states that “[a]n agreement to 

arbitrate may be asserted by preliminary objection or by petition to compel 

arbitration pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304, or 

the common law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7342(a).”). Accordingly, we will not dismiss 

these appeals on this basis. 

The trial court also urges this Court to dismiss the appeals based upon 

its contention that Appellants rendered the appeals moot by filing an answer 

to the complaint after they filed notices of appeal. Trial Court Opinion, 

9/18/2017, at 4, 7-8. According to the trial court, Appellants waived their 

right to rely upon the Arbitration Clause by continuing through the judicial 

system. Id. at 7. However, Appellants have not done so voluntarily. As 

they point out, the trial court ordered Appellants to file an answer within 

twenty days or risk judgment being entered against them. See Trial Court 

Order, 1/23/2017, at 1. Appellants promptly filed notices of appeal, as well 

as a joint motion for a stay, which was still pending at the time their 

answers to the complaint were due. “[A] waiver of a right to proceed to 

arbitration pursuant to the term of a contract providing for binding 

arbitration should not be [inferred lightly]....” Kwalkick v. Bosacco, 478 

A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. 1984). “Moreover, the mere filing of ... an answer 

without resulting prejudice to the objecting party will not justify a finding of 
J-A08037-18

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waiver of the right to arbitration.” Id. Therefore, we decline to dismiss the 

appeal under these circumstances. See Smay v. E.R. Stuebner, Inc., 864 

A.2d 1266, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“Likewise, since Appellant consistently 

has asserted its right to arbitration and only used the judicial system to 

preserve that right and protect its ... interests, we conclude that it did not 

voluntarily avail itself of the regular channels of judicial process under the 

aforementioned standard.”). 

Finally, the trial court contends that because Appellants did not file 

their preliminary objections within 20 days of service of the complaint, their 

filing was untimely. Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/2017, at 2. We disagree. As 

described supra, the December 6, 2016 order, which denied Appellants’ 

initial petition to compel arbitration without prejudice, explicitly provided 

Appellants with 20 days from the date of the order in which to file a petition 

to compel arbitration in response to Davis’s complaint. Appellants complied 

with that timeframe by filing such a petition in the form of preliminary 

objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6) within 20 days of the December 

6, 2016 order. Thus, to the extent the trial court denied the preliminary 

objections based upon their purported untimeliness, it abused its discretion. 

We turn now to the merits. The essence of Appellants’ arguments is 

that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to decide the issue of 

arbitrability at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings. In its 

1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that in addition to its 
J-A08037-18

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determination that the preliminary objections were filed late, it overruled the 

objections because the issue of “[w]hether a valid agreement exists between 

the parties in this particular case is a question of fact that is well beyond the 

scope of the [p]reliminary [o]bjections.”11 Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/2017, 

at 7. It elaborated on its reasoning as follows. 

[G]iven the underlying factual scenario of the manner in which 

the agreement to arbitrate was entered into, [the trial] court 

was unable to determine from [Davis’s] complaint alone whether 

the agreement to arbitrate was in fact a valid agreement which 

could be determined through preliminary objections.

Clearly, [the trial] court’s January 23, 2017 order did not 

prevent or preclude any party from seeking such relief through 

the filing of a petition to compel arbitration to proceed in that 

manner or once discovery was conducted on that specific issue 

in order for [the trial] court to determine the validity of the 

arbitration agreement.[12] In light of the blanket assertion of the 

requirement to arbitrate by Appellants, [the trial] court had 

nothing more to rely upon which would have warranted 

sustaining the preliminary objections in Appellant[s’] favor. This 

case was not comparable to a basic contract case where the 

parties thereto would have been on equal footing in negotiating 

terms and conditions of the contract[,] which would then provide 

a clear right to remand to private arbitration. In this case, it

involves much more tha[n] simply application of the law to 

negotiated terms. It involves a multipage (24 pages) Admission 

Agreement to Appellants’ facility that was signed by [] Davis, as 

 

11 Based on the language of the Arbitration Clause, the trial court 

determined that the parties’ dispute fell within the scope of the Arbitration 

Clause. Id. at 7. Davis does not appear to challenge this ruling.

12 As discussed supra, this assertion is erroneous, as nothing about the trial 

court’s order indicated that it entered the order without prejudice. 

Furthermore, because the order plainly denied Appellants’ application to 

compel arbitration (made in the form of preliminary objections), Appellants 

needed to file an immediate appeal to avoid waiving their objections to the 

order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(iv). 
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the responsible party of the patient, [Decedent]. Aside from the 

signed [Admission A]greement, [the trial] court had nothing 

more to rely upon at the preliminary objections stage. A proper 

and more analytical determination would have been and could 

have been made upon motion after discovery on the issue. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/2017, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

We agree with Appellants that the trial court’s failure to determine 

whether the dispute was arbitrable at the preliminary objection stage was an 

abuse of discretion. “Our decisional law has made clear that the issue of 

whether a party agreed to arbitrate a dispute is a threshold, jurisdictional 

question that must be decided by the court.” Pisano v. Extendicare 

Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citations 

omitted). When presented with a petition to compel arbitration, the trial 

court must determine whether an agreement to arbitrate the controversy 

exists. Smith v. Cumberland Grp., Ltd., 687 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. 

1997). “If a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and 

appellants’ claim is within the scope of the agreement, the controversy must 

be submitted to arbitration.”13 Id. 

 

13 Our Supreme Court has instructed courts to “consider questions of 

arbitrability with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” 

Taylor, 147 A.3d at 509 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 2 

of the Federal Arbitration Act binds state courts to compel arbitration of 

claims subject to an arbitration agreement. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 

(providing that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 

enforceable”)). “The only exception to a state’s obligation to enforce an 

arbitration agreement is provided by the savings clause, which permits the 

application of generally applicable state contract law defenses such as fraud, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Moreover, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2) states that the trial court “shall 

determine promptly all preliminary objections. If an issue of fact is raised, 

the court shall consider evidence by depositions or otherwise.” Pa.R.C.P. 

1028(c)(2) (emphasis added). Furthermore, preliminary objections in the 

nature of a petition to compel arbitration filed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

1028(a)(6) cannot be determined from facts of record. See id., Note 

(“Preliminary objections raising an issue under subdivision (a)(1), (5), (6), 

(7) or (8) cannot be determined from facts of record. In such a case, the 

preliminary objections must be endorsed with a notice to plead or no 

response will be required under Rule 1029(d).”). “In other words, a dispute 

[raising an issue under Rule 1028(a)(1), (5), (6), (7) or (8)] cannot be 

resolved by reference to facts pled in the complaint. Additional evidence is 

required.” Trexler v. McDonald’s Corp., 118 A.3d 408, 412 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (stating that the trial court properly permitted the parties to conduct 

discovery after receiving preliminary objections and an answer thereto 

raising a question of fact). 

In their preliminary objections, Appellants contended that a valid 

agreement to arbitrate exists, and attached a copy of the agreement along 

with the Power of Attorney they claim established Davis’s authority to bind 

Decedent. After receiving Appellants’ preliminary objections, each set of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

duress, or unconscionability, to determine whether a valid contract exists.” 

Id.
J-A08037-18

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which was endorsed with a notice to plead, Davis responded by denying that 

a valid enforceable agreement to arbitrate existed. Davis’s Responses, 

1/17/2017, at 2-3. Davis based her denials upon various state law contract 

defenses, including unconscionability. Pursuant to the aforementioned law, 

the trial court was required to determine, at the time it ruled upon 

Appellants’ preliminary objections, whether the parties had a valid 

agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, had the trial court required additional 

facts to make such a determination, it should have considered “evidence by 

deposition or otherwise.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2). Because the trial court 

erred in failing to determine at the outset whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists, questions of law and fact remain outstanding and 

unaddressed by the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s 

orders and remand this matter for the trial court to consider Appellants’ 

preliminary objections consistent with Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2), and to 

determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the 

parties. 

Orders vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-A08037-18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/18