First Annual Report

to

The President and The Congress

of the

ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS

DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I. ASSESSING THE THREAT

15 December 1999
Publication Notice

The following document is a reprint of the First Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass

Destruction, submitted to the President and the Congress on 15 December 1999. It is

a report of the Advisory Panel, not a RAND publication. It was reviewed and edited by

selected RAND professional staff, and was submitted for review and comment within

the U.S. Government Interagency process. It is not copyrighted, but does contain

material from copyrighted sources. Copies of the report may also be obtained via the

Internet at:

HTTP://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel

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PREFACE

Report Structure and Rationale

Many government officials and concerned citizens believe that “it is not a

question of if, but when” an incident will occur that involves the use by a terrorist of a

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon—a so-called “weapon of

mass destruction” (WMD)—that is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause

“mass destruction” or “mass casualties.” In recent years, some have depicted terrorist

incidents as causing catastrophic loss of life and extensive structural and

environmental damage as not only possible but probable. Such depictions do not

accurately portray the full range of terrorist threats. While such a devastating event is

within the realm of possibility, the first annual report to the President and the

Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “Panel”) delves into a broad

range of issues, chronicles actual terrorist attacks, considers potential terrorist

incidents, and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of “Who?,” “What?,” and

“Why?;” and accordingly begins to consider what must be done to prepare for the

“When.”

Chapter Two of the report chronicles CBRN schemes, attempts, and actual

attacks by terrorists and the known or assumed motives or intentions behind them,

with a thorough analysis of such incidents, in an attempt to provide insight into the

current discussion of potential threats and possible consequences. That portion of the

report focuses as well on the potential for incidents involving CBRN devices that are

more probable, and will have less than mass-casualty consequences; but which could,

nevertheless, have devastating effects—economically, politically, or psychologically.

Chapter Two also provides an overview and analysis of the principal issues involving

the threat posed to the United States by terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the

identification of the range of potential adversaries and perpetrators who might employ

such weapons, and the dimensions of the threat given the individual types of weapons

and their technical and material requirements. In turn, Chapter Two explores in some

detail the difficulties inherent in producing any CBRN weapon that has truly massdestructive or mass-casualty capabilities.

Chapter Three of the report focuses on an analysis of the circumstances and

facts—as they have come to light—surrounding the 1995 attack in the Tokyo subway

system by the fanatic, apocalyptic religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo. That seminal

event—the first time a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against

civilians—is a benchmark against which all potential terrorists’ attacks involving

chemical or biological weapons will likely be measured in the near term. The analysis

delves into all of the implications of that most ambitious undertaking—including
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extensive research and development efforts spanning chemical, biological, and even

nuclear weapons aspirations—but one that ultimately fell far short of its intended

purposes. Specifically, it examines the implications of the group’s attempts in the

CBRN arena and assesses the inferences and lessons that can be drawn from Aum’s

activities, in the context of deliberations about and U.S. domestic preparedness for

potential acts of CBRN terrorism.

The report describes, in Chapter Four, some preliminary conclusions and

hypotheses reached by the Panel, based on a thorough analysis and discussion of the

threat and other information presented to the Panel, and the relevance of that analysis

and information to the broader issues of preparedness, planning, training, and

coordination at the Federal, state and local levels. The Panel makes several initial

broad policy recommendations, as a result of its first two official meetings and

analyses and information provided to it, on such topics as the need for a national

strategy to address domestic response to terrorism; a better understanding by both

policymakers and responders of the threats; the complexity of the current Federal

structure; inherent problems associated with the manner in which Congress and the

Executive Branch have addressed the issue; the need for more comprehensive and

authoritative threat assessments and related analyses; the requirements for better

information sharing among governmental entities at all levels; the need for clear,

concise, and consistent definitions and terms of reference; the necessity for standards

in planning and training, for the compatibility and interoperability of equipment

among responders, and related research, development, test, and evaluation issues;

and the issue of who or what entity is “in charge” if an event does occur.

The report concludes with an overview of the activities of the Panel being

undertaken in the current fiscal year, which include a comprehensive review of related

Federal programs; a survey of local and state emergency management and response

officials; interviews with a number of related Federal, state, and local officials; case

studies of jurisdictions where such events have occurred or been threatened; and

future meetings of the Panel.

Working Definitions Used in the Report

For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term CBRN (chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in preference to the more commonly

used, yet potentially misleading term, “weapons of mass destruction” or WMD.1 It is

intended that the term CBRN, within the construct of this report, include potential

terrorist attacks on industrial chemical facilities that do not necessarily involve an

 1 The NLD (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) Act defines a “weapon of mass destruction” as “any weapon or

device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant

number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of—(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or

their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity.”
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actual CBRN weapon, where the purpose is to engineer the hazardous release of a

toxic gas or gases as a means to kill and injure surrounding populations.

Nevertheless, with the exception of nuclear weapons, none of the unconventional

weapons by itself is, in fact, capable of wreaking mass destruction, at least not in

structural terms. Indeed, the terminology “weapons of mass casualties” may be a

more accurate depiction of the potentially lethal power that could be unleashed by

chemical, biological, or nonexplosive radiological weapons. The distinction is more

than rhetorical and is critical to understanding the vastly different levels of

technological skills and capabilities, weapons expertise, production requirements, and

dissemination or delivery methods needed to undertake an effective attack using either

chemical or biological weapons in particular.2 

The definition of terrorism employed in this report, and used as the framework

for the Panel’s deliberations to date,3 is essentially one used by RAND for more than a

quarter of a century. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to

create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, through acts designed to coerce others into

actions they otherwise would not undertake or into refraining from actions that they

desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the

rules of war, if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally

directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist

actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The

perpetrators are usually members of an organized group, although increasingly lone

actors or individuals who may have separated from a group can have both the

motivation and potentially the capability to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Unlike other

criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are

intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage that they cause.4 

For the purposes of this report, a terrorist group is defined as a collection of

individuals belonging to an autonomous nonstate or subnational revolutionary or

antigovernment movement who are dedicated to the use of violence to achieve their

objectives. Such an entity is seen as having at least some structure and command

 2 Although biological agents “are often described as ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ it does not follow

that the ability to inflict mass casualties is an intrinsic property. Key variables in determining the impact

of a [biological] terrorist attack are the quantity of agent employed and the means of dissemination.” See

Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4

(July/August 1999), which can be accessed at: http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/

ja99tucker.html 3 Several Federal agencies (e.g., the FBI and the Department of Defense) have their own definition of

terrorism. 4 Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1986

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3890-RC, 1990), p. 1 (with slight modifications), which in turn is taken

from Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND

, P-5261, 1974).
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and control apparatus that, no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an

overall organizational framework and general strategic direction.5 This definition is

meant to include contemporary religion-motivated and apocalyptic groups, such as the

Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult and other movements that seek theological justification

or divine sanction for their acts of violence. Although religion, often coupled with

profound millennialist convictions, is of course the predominant motivation of such

groups, their aims and objectives inherently involve a quest for power—in this specific

context, power used to defend the faith, to defeat secular enemies, or to establish a

national, or even aglobal, hegemony based on that particular sect’s (or its leaders’)

self-defined theological precepts.

As the quest for power is inherent to politics, violence committed by these

groups as having a political intent is, in the opinion of the Panel, terrorist in nature.

In Aum’s case, for example, the group’s objective in staging the 1995 nerve gas attack

was (among other aims) to lay the foundation for a revolt against the Japanese

government that would result in the creation of a new regime dedicated to the service

of the sect’s founder and leader, Shoko Asahara.

This report also includes a discussion of potential acts of state-sponsored

terrorism employing CBRN weapons. State-sponsored terrorism is defined here as the

active involvement of a foreign government in training, arming, and providing other

logistical and intelligence assistance as well as sanctuary to an otherwise autonomous

terrorist group for the purpose of carrying out violent acts on behalf of that

government against its enemies. State-sponsored terrorism is, therefore, regarded as

a form of surrogate warfare.

 5 The “Leaderless Resistance” strategy embraced today by the far-right paramilitary white

supremacist movement in the United States would be included in this definition and the words “loose and

flexible” have been deliberately included in the above to take into account this phenomenon. “Leaderless

Resistance,” also called “phantom cell networks,” lays down a strategy of violence perpetrated by

“autonomous leadership units” (e.g., terrorist cells) operating independently of one another that, it is

intended, will eventually join together to create a chain reaction leading to a nationwide, white

supremacist revolution. Although no clear, identifiable chain of command is evident in this structure,

overall ideological direction and strategic guidance is nonetheless disseminated to individuals both

actively and passively by leading white supremacist figures and key racist umbrella organizations. The

“Leaderless Resistance” strategy is meant specifically to maximize security and thwart penetration and

compromise from law enforcement personnel. Adherents of this strategy thus strike when the

opportunity presents itself and against targets that have often been previously designated in hate

literature or posted on the Internet by persons or organizations within this loose framework. The concept

of “Leaderless Resistance” is described in the white supremacist adventure novel, Hunter, written by

William Pierce (under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald) and published by National Vanguard Books in

Hillsboro, Virginia. Hunter, it should be noted, is the sequel to The Turner Diaries (which

Pierce/MacDonald also wrote)—the novel described by the FBI as the “bible” of the American white

supremacist movement (Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat

to Nuclear Facilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-3351-DOE, 1986), p. 42.
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Excluded from this report are acts of violence committed by bona fide state

agents—that is, clandestine acts of sabotage perpetrated by military, intelligence, or

security officials in the service of a foreign government’s armed forces or intelligence

agencies. Though the distinction between a state-sponsored act of terrorism and an

act of clandestine sabotage by a state agent may seem semantic, it is a critical

difference that distinguishes terrorism from warfare and from the type of violence

examined in this report. Having said that, the Panel nevertheless acknowledges that

capabilities must also exist for responding to such an incident, and that the foregoing

distinction will, therefore, likely be lost on those who must respond to an incident

involving the use of any one of a number of very lethal agents in the CBRN arsenal,

regardless of the perpetrator.

Cyber Terrorism

This report does not specifically address any issues related to cyber terrorism.

A strict interpretation of the Panel’s enabling legislation, and related Federal statutes

that provide definitions of “weapons of mass destruction,” would indicate that the

issue is not within the purview of the Panel’s mandate. Nevertheless, the Panel has

concluded that the issues of cyber terrorism and the forms of terrorists activities that

the Panel has considered thus far are so inter-related that the Panel cannot ignore the

issue. The Panel will, therefore, consider issues related to cyber terrorism in its

activities, and include in its subsequent reports conclusions and recommendations on

the subject.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The possibility that terrorists will use “weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”6 in

this country to kill and injure Americans, including those responsible for protecting

and saving lives, presents a genuine threat to the United States. As we stand on the

threshold of the twenty-first century, the stark reality is that the face and character of

terrorism are changing and that previous beliefs about the restraint on terrorist use of

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) devices may be disappearing.

Beyond the potential loss of life and the infliction of wanton casualties, and the

structural or environmental damage that might result from such an attack, our civil

liberties, our economy, and indeed our democratic ideals could also be threatened.

The challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to be able to

detect and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, we must be

confident that local, state, and Federal authorities are well prepared to respond and to

address the consequences of the entire spectrum of violent acts.

In recent years, efforts have clearly been focused on more preparations for such

attacks. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and Alfred P. Murrah

Federal Building in Oklahoma City, coupled with the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in

Tokyo and the U.S. embassy bombings this past summer, have heightened American

concern and have already prompted an array of responses across all levels of

government. At the same time, the country’s seeming inability to develop and

implement a clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic

preparedness strategy means that we may still remain fundamentally incapable of

responding effectively to a serious terrorist attack.

The vast array of CBRN weapons conceivably available to terrorists today can

be used against humans, animals, crops, the environment, and physical structures in

many different ways. The complexity of these CBRN terrorist threats, and the variety

of contingencies and critical responses that they suggest, requires us to ensure that

preparedness efforts are carefully planned, implemented, and sustained among all

potential responders, with all levels of government operating as partners. These

threats, moreover, will require new ways of thinking throughout the entire spectrum of

local, state, and Federal agencies. Effecting true change in the culture of a single

government agency, much less achieving fundamental changes throughout and among

all three, presents formidable hurdles. Nonetheless, the nature of these threats and

their potential consequences demands the full commitment of officials at all levels to

achieve these goals. Indeed, the need to ensure that a strategic national vision

regarding domestic preparedness is in place, so that the country is better able to

 6 For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term CBRN (chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in preference to the more commonly used, yet potentially misleading

term, “weapons of mass destruction” or WMD.
- vii -

counter these threats and to respond effectively to the challenges that they present, is

among the reasons that this congressionally mandated Advisory Panel to Assess

Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

was established.

The enabling legislation7 directs the Panel to assess Federal efforts to enhance

domestic preparedness, the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency

responses, and deficiencies in Federal programs for response to terrorist incidents

involving WMD; to recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination of Federal

agency response efforts and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for

WMD terrorism incidents; and to assess appropriate state and local funding for

response to WMD terrorism.8 

To meet those objectives, the Panel determined that it must first understand the

full range of potential CBRN threats from terrorists, based on the belief that without a

fundamental understanding of the threats, preparedness efforts by Federal, state, and

local entities could be misguided, uncoordinated, and wasteful.

The Panel’s analysis of such threats points out that CBRN terrorism has

emerged as a U.S. national security concern for several reasons:

• There has been a trend toward increased lethality in terrorism in the past decade.

• There is an increasing focus on the apparent dangers posed by potential CBRN

terrorism.

• Terrorists may now feel less constrained to use a CBRN device in an attempt to

cause mass casualties, especially following the precedent-setting attack in 1995 by

the Aum Shinrikyo.

The reasons terrorists may perpetrate a WMD attack include a desire to kill as

many people as possible as a means “to annihilate their enemies,” to instill fear and

panic to undermine a governmental regime, to create a means of negotiating from a

position of unsurpassed strength, or to cause great social and economic impact.

Given any of those potential motives, the report identifies the “most likely

terrorists groups” to use CBRN as fundamentalist or apocalyptic religious

organizations, cults, and extreme single-issue groups but suggests that such a group

 7 Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261

(H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

 8 For purposes of the Panel’s activities and recommendations, it has included the state level within

the scope of its mandate.
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may resort to a smaller-scale attack to achieve its goal. The analysis, however,

indicates two additional possibilities:

• A terrorist attack against an agricultural base.

• A terrorist use of a CBRN device with the assistance of state sponsorship.

In the latter case, nevertheless, the Panel concludes that several reasons work against

state sponsorship, including the prospect of significant reprisals by the United States

against the state sponsor, the potential inability of the state sponsor to control its

surrogate, and the prospect that the surrogate cannot be trusted, even to the point of

using the weapon against its sponsor.

The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum

of potential terrorist threats – both the unprecedented higher-consequence attack, as

well as the historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist attack, which the

Panel believes is more likely in the near term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a

favorite tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of choice in the

near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or conventional, any such lowerconsequence event—at least in terms of casualties or destruction—could,

nevertheless, accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting response

capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government credibility, or provoking an

overreaction by the government. With that in mind, the Panel’s report urges a more

balanced approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be considered,

but that increasing attention must now also be paid to the historically more frequent,

more probable, lesser-consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications

for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to optimize local response

capabilities. A singular focus on preparing for an event potentially affecting

thousands or tens of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal attack

involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate response in the first critical minutes

and hours.

While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists to

produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, the report also describes the current

difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing,

transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to cause “mass

casualties.” Those difficulties include the requirement, in almost all cases, for highly

knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources, obtainable but fairly

sophisticated production facilities and equipment, quality control and testing, and

special handling. In many cases, the personnel of a terrorist organization run high

personal safety risks, in producing, handling, testing, and delivering such a device.

Moreover, the report notes, the more sophisticated a device, or the more personnel,

equipment, facilities, and the like involved, the greater the risk that the enterprise will
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expose itself to detection and interdiction by intelligence and law enforcement

agencies—particularly in light of the increasing attention focused on terrorism today.

The report explains, with some specificity, the challenges involved in each of the

four device or agent topic areas—biological, chemical, nuclear, and

radiological—which suggests that some public pronouncements and media depictions

about the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction or inflict

widespread casualties do not always reflect the significant hurdles currently

confronting any nonstate entity seeking to employ such weapons. The report

acknowledges, nevertheless, that the situation now facing a terrorist could change

dramatically because of new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other

material factors. No matter how difficult or improbable such higher-consequence

incidents may be, prudence requires that appropriate steps be taken across the broad

spectrum of terrorist threats to deter, prevent, or interdict a terrorist attack before it

occurs or failing that, to respond in a way that will—first and foremost —minimize

human casualties and also mitigate damage to property and to the environment.

Part of the report focuses on the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the

Tokyo subway, which marked the first time that a nonstate group had used a

chemical weapon against civilians. The conventional wisdom—that terrorists were not

interested in killing, but rather in publicity, or were concerned about a loss of popular

support or international recognition—has increasingly been called into question, not

only by the Aum event but also by others, such as the World Trade Center and

Oklahoma City bombings.

Nevertheless, Chapter Three, which chronicles Aum’s attempts to develop a

variety of lethal agents or devices, indicates that, despite Aum’s considerable

resources and the superior technical expertise and state-of-the-art equipment and

facilities at its disposal, the group could not effect a truly successful chemical or

biological attack. The lesson of Aum is that any nonstate entity faces organizational

and significant technological difficulties and other hurdles in attempting to weaponize

and deliver chemical and biological weapons, arguably providing a refutation of the

suggestion voiced with increasing frequency about the ease with which such weapons

can be made and used.

The report contains several conclusions and recommendations, as a result of the

threat analysis and other information provided to the Panel and the collective

expertise and experience of its members:

• The conclusion that the United States needs to have a viable national strategy to

guide the development of clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national

domestic preparedness plans to combat terrorism, one that recognizes that the

Federal role will be defined by the nature and severity of the incident but will
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generally be supportive of state and local authorities, who traditionally have the

fundamental responsibility for response, and the recommendation for

promulgation of a national-level strategy, with a “bottom-up” perspective—a

strategy that clearly delineates and distinguishes Federal, state, and local roles

and responsibilities and articulates clear direction for Federal priorities and

programs to support local responders;9 and a comprehensive, parallel public

education effort.

• The conclusion that initial and continuing, comprehensive and articulate

assessments of potential, credible, terrorist threats within the United States, and

the ensuing risk and vulnerability assessments are critical for policymakers and

the recommendation that more attention be paid to assessments of the higherprobability/lower-consequence threats—not at the expense of, but in addition to,

assessments of the lower-probability/higher-consequence threats.

• The conclusion that the complex nature of current Federal organizations and

programs makes it very difficult for state and local authorities to obtain Federal

information, assistance, funding, and support; that a Federal focal point and

“clearinghouse” for related preparedness information and for directing state and

local entities to appropriate Federal agencies, is needed; and that the concept

behind the National Domestic Preparedness Office is fundamentally sound.

• The conclusion that congressional decisions for authority and funding to address

the issue appear to be uncoordinated, and the recommendation that Congress

consider forming an ad hoc Joint Special or Select Committee, to provide more

efficiency and effectiveness in Federal efforts.

• The conclusion that much more needs to be and can be done to obtain and share

information on potential terrorist threats at all levels of government, to provide

more effective deterrence, prevention, interdiction, or response, using modern

information technology.

• The conclusion that many definitions and terms in this arena are ambiguous or

confusing (e.g., “weapons of mass destruction” and “mass casualties”), and the

recommendation that there be a revision and codification of universal and easily

understood terms.

 9 The Panel has chosen to use “local responders” – as opposed to “first responders” -- to

characterize those persons and entities that are most likely to be involved in the early stages following a

terrorist attack. That characterization includes not only law enforcement, fire services, emergency

medical technicians, emergency management personnel, and others who may be required to respond to

the “scene” of an incident, but also other medical and public health personnel who may be required to

provide their services in the immediate aftermath of an attack.
- xi -

• The conclusion that national standards for responders at all levels, particularly for

planning, training, and equipment, are critical, and the recommendation that more

emphasis be placed on research, development, testing, and evaluation in the

adoption of such standards.

• The conclusion that, despite recent improvements, too much ambiguity remains

about the issue of “who’s in charge” if an incident occurs, and the recommendation

that efforts be accelerated to develop and to test agreed-on templates for command

and control under a wide variety of terrorist threat scenarios.

The report concludes with an overview of the activities of the Panel being

undertaken in the current fiscal year:

• A comprehensive review of related Federal programs, placing emphasis on training;

communications; equipment; planning requirements; the needs of maritime

regions; coordination among the various levels of government; the effectiveness of

the structure of military organizations for responses across a broad spectrum of

potential threats; and research, development, testing, and evaluation.

• A survey of local and state emergency management and response officials to elicit

their views on the efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in the areas of

training, equipment, planning, communications, and Federal agency coordination

among the various levels of government.

• Interviews with a number of related Federal, state, and local officials to obtain

more detailed information on their views of current Federal programs and activities

and their specific proposals or recommendations to improve or enhance Federal

efforts.

• Case studies of jurisdictions where such events have occurred or have been

threatened, to review and analyze lessons learned from the full range of elements

and issues involved in each specific plan or actual response.

• An analysis of the status of existing or the development of appropriate standards in

the areas of training for responders at all levels, equipment, notification

procedures, communications, and planning

• Consideration of cyber terrorism issue in the future work of the Panel

• A plan for future meetings of the Panel.
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CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. ASSESSING THE THREAT: CBRN TERRORISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS

 FOR U.S. SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CBRN Terrorism’s Emergence as a National Security Concern . . . . . . . 7

 Reasons and Rationales Behind Potential CBRN Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Agricultural Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 State-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Other Higher-Probability/Lower-Consequence Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 Impediments to Developing Effective WMD Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 Biological Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 Chemical Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 Nuclear Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 Radiological Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

 The CBRN Terrorist Threat in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

III. A RETROSPECTIVE: THE LESSONS OF AUM SHINRIKYO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Aum Shinrikyo and the “New Terrorism” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Lessons of Aum: A Reassessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Threat Assessments and Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

A National Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Complexity of the Federal Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Congressional Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Definitions and Terms of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Standards, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation . . . . . . . . 60

The Issue of “Who’s in Charge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

V. PLANNED PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR . . . . . . . . . . 63

Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Federal Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Survey of Local Responders and State Emergency Management

 and Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Interviews with Federal, State, and Local Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
- xiii -

Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Participation in Related Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Continuing Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Cyber Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Future Meetings of the Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

APPENDIXES:

A—FEDERAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

B—PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS

C—PANEL ACTIVITIES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1999

D—BIBLIOGRAPHY

E—INTERAGENCY COMMENTS

F—RAND STAFF PROVIDING ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO THE PANEL

G—TRANSMITTAL LETTERS
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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States has focused increasing attention and

resources on countering the threat of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological

and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The main catalyst behind this concern was the 1995

sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, in which 12 persons were killed and

more than 5,000 injured. This incident, perpetrated by an apocalyptic Japanese

religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo, appeared to underscore both the vulnerabilities and

potentially catastrophic consequences of unprotected societies and ill-prepared

governments in the face of indiscriminate attacks by enigmatic adversaries employing

so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two years earlier, the bombing of New

York City’s World Trade Center by Islamic fundamentalists had demonstrated that the

United States itself was not immune to acts of terrorism intent on causing large

numbers of casualties. Indeed, the six persons who perished in that attack and the

approximately 1,000 others who were injured paled in comparison to the tens of

thousands who might have been harmed had the terrorists’ plans to topple one of the

Trade Center’s towers into the other actually had succeeded. If any further evidence

were needed of this potential, it was provided less than a month after the Tokyo attack

when Timothy McVeigh used a large truck bomb to demolish the Alfred P. Murrah

Federal office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons and injuring hundreds

more.

In the wake of these incidents, a new era of terrorism was perceived by experts1 0 

and government officials1 1 alike who foresaw a potentially bloodier and more

destructive age of violence emerging as we approached the twenty-first century. The

changes in terrorism that they described raised concerns in the United States,

especially within Congress and the Executive Branch, about the implications of

evolving terrorist threats that were now seen to include use of CBRN weapons.

Congressional legislation was passed and Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) were

implemented that sought to strengthen the ability of the United States to prevent and

 1 0 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and WMD: Preliminary Hypotheses,” NonProliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 45–53; Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with

Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, Va.: The Chemical and

Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); the “Roundtable Article” in Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 15,

no. 2, pp. 167–183, (especially the contributions by Jonathan B. Tucker, “Chemical/ Biological Terrorism:

Coping with a New Threat” and “Measures to Fight Chemical/Biological Terrorism: How Little Is

Enough?”); and, John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter

1996/1997), pp. 3–14. 1 1 See, for example, Testimony of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, William O. Studemann,

Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, House Judiciary Committee, 6 April 1995 at:

http://www.odci.gov/cia/ public_affairs/speeches/archives/1995/dci_testimony_4695.html; Louis J.

Freeh, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, Washington, D.C., 4 May 1995

at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/dirspch/94-96archives/amjc.htm; and, U.S. Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction, Parts I, II, III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), passim.
- 2 -

respond to terrorist acts involving CBRN weapons within our borders. Among the

most significant of these initiatives was PDD 39, which President Clinton signed in

June 1995, less than three months after the Oklahoma City bombing. This executive

order sought to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks, especially those

involving mass casualties and/or CBRN weapons: directing Federal agencies to

improve domestic response capabilities to manage the consequences of attacks

employing such unconventional weapons.1 2 The following year, Congress passed “The

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,” also known as the Nunn-LugarDomenici (NLD) Act. This legislation was derived from a series of hearings conducted

in 1995 and 1996 that had not only highlighted the growing dangers posed by

potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and the need to curtail the risk of nuclear

materials theft and diversion from the former Soviet Union’s hemorrhaging stockpiles,

but also the inadequate state of domestic preparedness efforts to respond to such

threats. The key domestic component of the NLD Act, accordingly, focused on

programs designed to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities to

incidents of CBRN terrorism.1 3 

In the respectively three and four years since both of these measures were

promulgated, Federal spending on terrorism in general and on CBRN terrorism in

particular has increased considerably. The contrast is all the more striking given the

paucity of funds allocated for these activities prior to the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attack

and the bombing in Oklahoma City. In fiscal year 1996, for example, the principal

Federal agencies involved in activities to combat terrorism spent $5.7 billion; for fiscal

year 2000 the President’s budget request called for $10 billion to be devoted to

counterterrorism programs and efforts—a sum almost double the 1996 amount and

nearly $3 billion more than the sum originally required for fiscal year 1999.1 4 The

 1 2 See PDD 39, 21 June 1995 at http://www.fas.org.irp/offodcs/ pdd39.html. PDD 39 designated

the FBI as the lead Federal agency for managing all terrorist crises, including those perpetrated with

CBRN weapons that either occur in the U.S. or break U.S. law. FEMA was designated as the lead Federal

agency for managing the consequences of mass–casualty terrorist attacks, including those employing

CBRN weapons. The FBI, FEMA, and other Federal agencies were further directed to review the adequacy

of their response plans to CBRN terrorism. See the analysis of PDD 39 in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert

D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism

and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 268–275. 1 3 Among other things, the NLD Act required the Department of Defense (DoD) to “carry out a

program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, state, and local agencies with training and expert advice

regarding emergency response to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or related

materials.” DoD has undertaken to do that training, initially in 120 cities. The Act also allocated funds

for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) for the establishment of metropolitan

emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as “Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams”),

which has been initiated for 27 cities on a national basis. (Public Law 104-201, National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV—Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23

September 1996) 1 4 Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and

International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on National

Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of

Representatives, “Combating Terrorism: Observation on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,” 11

March 1999, pp. 1 and 6.
- 3 -

budgetary increases for key individual agencies are even more pronounced. Only $7

million was allocated to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in

1996 for its bioterrorism initiatives; by comparison, $230 million has been requested

for DHHS programs in fiscal year 2000—an increase of more than 3,000 percent.1 5 

The Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice has experienced an

equally profound increase in its resources to support state and local domestic

preparedness programs. These activities had a zero budget line in fiscal year 1997:

they received a budgetary allocation of $21 million in 1998; followed by a nearly

fivefold increase in fiscal year 1999 to $120 million; with a sum of $162 million

requested in that office’s fiscal year 2000 budget.1 6 

Yet, despite these many new legislative and programmatic initiatives and

appreciably increased funding levels, valid concerns remain that the United States is

still not appropriately organized and prepared to counter and respond to the threat of

either mass-casualty or CBRN terrorism. Authoritative oversight bodies, such as the

U.S. General Accounting Office, for instance, have argued that this rapid growth in

expenditures and attendant proliferation of ambitious programs and broad initiatives

has occurred in the absence of the critical analysis and rigorous prioritization needed

to establish clear and well-defined requirements for these efforts. 1 7 In the absence of

such measures, the GAO and other critics have argued, coordination among the

multiplicity of Federal agencies involved in these efforts cannot be ensured, much less

the effective provision of needed support and assistance by these same agencies to

their counterparts at the state and local levels. This need is especially acute among

so-called “first responders”1 8 —that is, the fire, emergency medical services, public

health, other medical providers, and emergency management and law enforcement

personnel at the state and local levels who are most likely to be the first on the scene

in the event of any terrorist incident and, in the case of an attack involving a CBRN

weapon, who would have the primary responsibility to address the immediate

consequences in coping with and managing such an event.

Accordingly, Congress directed the establishment of a panel of private citizens1 9 

to assess current capabilities for domestic response to terrorist acts that involve WMD,

 1 5 The increased funds will provide for expanded disease surveillance programs, improvements in its

communications capabilities, and the establishment of regional laboratories. See Ibid., p. 7. 1 6 These monies are to be devoted to training and equipment for local responders and for the

establishment of national training centers. See Ibid., p. 8. 1 7 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

1 8 The Panel has chosen to use “local responders” – as opposed to “first responders” -- to

characterize those persons and entities that are most likely to be involved in the early stages following a

terrorist attacks. That characterization includes not only law enforcement, fire services, emergency

medical technicians, emergency management personnel, and others who may be required to respond to

the “scene” of an incident, but also other medical and public health personnel who may be required to

provide their services in the immediate aftermath of an attack. 1 9 Private citizens of the United States are all citizens of the United States not currently employed

by the United States government, including nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, or members of the
- 4 -

and to recommend appropriate policies and strategies for managing and mitigating the

effects of such incidents.2 0 Specifically, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter

referred to as “the Panel”) is charged with five main responsibilities. They are:

• to assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for terrorist

incidents involving WMD;

• to assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency

responses to terrorist incidents involving WMD;

• to assess deficiencies in programs for response to terrorist incidents involving

WMD, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and

planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions;

• to recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to

Federal agency WMD response efforts and for ensuring fully effective local

response capabilities for WMD terrorism incidents; and

• to assess the appropriate roles of state and local government in funding

effective local response capabilities for WMD terrorism. 2 1 

The legislation that established the Panel called for the Secretary of Defense to

enter into contract with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)

to provide the appropriate analytical and logistical support to facilitate the Panel’s

performance of these tasks. RAND’s National Defense Research Institute was selected

as the FFRDC contractor for this purpose.

The legislation also mandated that the Panel submit to the President and to the

Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for

improving Federal, state, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to

incidents involving WMD no later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999

and ending in 2001. This report represents the fulfillment of part of that requirement,

and as such presents the Panel’s first annual report.

A principal focus of this report is on the threat dimension of CBRN terrorism.

From the outset of its work, the Panel concluded that Federal, state, and local

domestic response capabilities for potential acts of CBRN terrorism could not be

critically assessed, neither could well-informed public policy be developed, in the

absence of a thorough understanding of the threat—specifically, the type and

magnitude of attacks for which each of the above jurisdictional levels of government is

 

United States armed forces on active duty, and who are not barred from employment or service under a

United States government contract. 2 0 The legislation establishing the panel is contained in section 1405 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616), 105th Congress, 2nd Session),

October 17, 1998).

 2 1 For purposes of the Panel’s activities and recommendations, it has included the state level

within the scope of its mandate.
- 5 -

charged with preparing.2 2 The Panel, moreover, sees the threat not as a rigidly static

phenomenon but as a dynamic and evolving one that requires constant monitoring,

assessment, and evaluation. For example, the fundamental assumptions, on which

critical legislation, such as the NLD Act, and executive orders, such as PDD 39, were

based, arose from incidents that had then only recently occurred. The Panel was thus

concerned that conclusions reached during the 1995–1996 time frame regarding the

threats might possibly have derived from information that was not then as complete or

as well understood as it is today or that was unduly influenced by threat perceptions

that were either reactive or distorted by insufficient opportunity for detailed analysis

and deliberate reflection.2 3 

As a result, the Panel commissioned the staff of its supporting FFRDC, RAND,

to provide an articulate, comprehensive, and current assessment and analysis of the

potential domestic threats from terrorists who might seek to use a CBRN device or

agent. That assessment and analysis, with some condensation, is embodied in this

report.

The Panel has drawn some conclusions from that comprehensive assessment

and analysis of the potential threats, from briefings and other information provided to

the Panel and from the Panel’s collective knowledge and experience. Furthermore, the

Panel is recommending several procedural changes and is proposing that several

issues be addressed in the near term, both in Congress and in the Executive Branch.

Those conclusions and recommendations are contained in Chapter Four. The Panel

will make more specific recommendations on funding priorities and programmatic

changes in subsequent annual reports.

 2 2 Opening Statement of the Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia,

at the first meeting of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism

Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, RAND, Washington, D.C., 9 June 1999. See

http://www.rand.org/organizations/nsrd/terrpanel/minutes.6.9.html. 2 3 Similar arguments have been presented by both the GAO and independent experts in testimony

before the U.S. Congress. See the three statements of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller

General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, before the

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on

Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives on (1) “Combating Terrorism: Observations on

Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,” 11 March 1999; (2) “Combating Terrorism: Observations on

Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,” 16 March 1999; and (3) “Combating Terrorism:

Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” 20 October 1999; as well as testimony

before the same subcommittee by John Parachini, Senior Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,” 20 October

1999.
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II. ASSESSING THE THREAT: CBRN TERRORISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR

U.S. SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS

Until recently, most Americans thought that terrorism was something that

happened elsewhere. However frequently U.S. citizens and interests were the target of

terrorists abroad, many nonetheless believed that the United States itself was

somehow immune to such violence within its own borders. Terrorism, accordingly,

was regarded as a sporadic—albeit attention-grabbing—problem that occasionally

affected Americans traveling or living overseas and concerned only those U.S.

government agencies with specific diplomatic and national security responsibilities. If

the 1993 World Trade Center bombing shattered that complacency, then the explosion

in Oklahoma City two years later dramatically underscored the breadth of grievances

felt toward the U.S. government. The list of potential adversaries had seemed

suddenly to grow from the foreign radicals and religious extremists located in other

regions of the world about whom we had always worried, to include wholly domestic

threats, such as those posed by the militantly antigovernment, white supremacist

organizations that had come to light in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City tragedy.

In addition, even mentally deranged loners, like the so-called “Unabomber,” were seen

as also presenting a serious terrorist danger to their fellow Americans.

The threats confronting the United States in the post–Cold War era have become

more diffuse and amorphous and are disturbingly as frequently homegrown as they

are foreign. Terrorism, it is also argued, is changing—with new adversaries,

evidencing new motivations and different rationales, having surfaced both in the

United States and elsewhere. The resurgence of extreme, Manichean2 4 religious

imperatives, for example, coupled with the breakdown of traditional group constraints

and the proliferation of millennialist, apocalyptic2 5 cultist sentiments are the key

factors associated with this development, and are among the main concerns to those

charged with protecting and defending the United States against terrorist attack. In

this respect, a new terrorist mindset is seen to have emerged—one that might not

draw the line at mass, indiscriminate murder involving chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear weapons. The next part of this chapter, accordingly, examines

 2 4 Manichean groups adhere to the dualistic religious system of Manes, a combination of Gnostic

Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and various other elements, with a basic doctrine of a conflict

between light and dark—matter being regarded as dark or evil. 2 5 Apocalyptic and millenarian beliefs both concern themselves with a preordained event that will

bring about the end of human history but differ on what will happen after this event. Millenarian

doctrines promise their adherents that this cataclysmic episode will deliver them from a world of

increasing evil and corruption to one of perfection and peace. Apocalyptic dogmas, on the other hand,

focus on the imminent eschatological event and do not concern themselves with their believers’ existence

after that time. See Martha Lee, “Violence and the Environment: The Case of ‘Earth First!’” Terrorism and

Political Violence, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 110; See also Michael Barkun, “Introduction:

Understanding Millennialism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1995).
- 7 -

this development, and assesses the rationales and motivations that would most likely

impel terrorists to employ CBRN weapons.2 6 

CBRN Terrorism’s Emergence as a National Security Concern

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the New York and

Oklahoma City bombings and Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Japan—which has specific

CBRN implication that are described and analyzed in detail in the next chapter—there

has been a dramatic shift in the perceived threat of CBRN terrorism. This has been

especially evident in the United States, where, as previously noted, Federal funding for

domestic preparedness and homeland defense programs aimed WMD terrorism has

increased enormously. What accounts for this sudden shift in direction and

appreciation of what was previously dismissed as a far less realistic threat scenario?

A number of developments seem to be relevant.

First, terrorism itself has arguably shown a marked trend toward greater

lethality. While some observers point optimistically to the decline in the number of

international terrorist incidents during the 1990s as a noteworthy and salutary

development in the struggle against terrorism, the percentage of terrorist incidents

with fatalities has paradoxically increased. For example, at least one person was

killed in 29 percent of terrorist incidents in 1995. This represents the highest ratio of

fatalities to incidents recorded since 1968.2 7 The U.S. Department of State has also

called attention to this trend of increasing terrorist lethality in its own authoritative

annual compendium and analysis, Patterns of Global Terrorism.

2 8 As the 1998 State

Department analysis reports:

There were 273 international terrorist attacks during 1998, a drop from the

304 attacks we recorded the previous year and the lowest annual total

since 1971. The total number of persons killed or wounded in terrorist

attacks, however, was the highest on record: 741 persons died, and 5,952

persons suffered injuries.2 9 

 2 6 It is of course impossible within the context of this report to consider on an individual basis every

terrorist organization active throughout the world today and to determine the threat that it poses

regarding the potential use of CBRN weapons. Distinct groups will almost certainly hold different views

on the various advantages and disadvantages associated with CBRN weapon use—the idiosyncratic

nature of which would clearly need to be considered in any detailed “WMD” terrorism threat assessment. 2 7 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Goldberg, 1998), p. 201, citing the RAND

Chronology of International Terrorism. 2 8 See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication 10433, 1997), p. 1; and, idem, Patterns of

Global Terrorism 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication 10535, 1998), p. 1. 2 9 Idem, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication

10610, 1999), p. 1.
- 8 -

This development, moreover, conforms to a pattern of worldwide terrorist activity

observed throughout the current decade. The trend toward increased lethality

becomes more apparent, for example, when statistics over time are analyzed and

compared. Between 1990 and 1996, for instance, a total of 50,070 people were killed

in the combined indigenous terrorist incidents (against fellow citizens or foreigners

within the terrorists’ country’s borders) and international terrorist attacks around the

world. This nearly doubles the 28,110 who lost their lives in comparable incidents in

the 14 years between 1970 and 1983. With respect to nonfatal casualties, the figures

are even more dramatic. The 69,833 injured in such incidents between 1990 and

1996 more than triples the figure of 18,925 recorded between 1970 and 1983, with the

annual average rising more than sevenfold, from 1,352 (1970–1983) to 9,976

(1990–1996).3 0 Indeed, in a study conducted by two American economists involving

time-series techniques and different data sets to measure whether international

terrorism has become more deadly during the 1990s, they similarly conclude that,

“Despite a decline in transnational terrorism of nearly fifty incidents per quarter

during some of the post–Cold War era, terrorism still presents a significant threat.

This conclusion follows because each incident is almost 19 percentage points more

likely to result in death or injury as compared with the previous two decades.”3 1 

This growing proclivity toward violence appears to be evidence of a portentous

shift in terrorism, away from its traditional emphasis on discrete, selective attacks

toward a mode of violence that is now aimed at inflicting indiscriminate and wanton

slaughter. Certainly such attacks as the 1993 car bomb attack that convulsed

Bombay, India; the 1994 truck bomb explosion outside a Jewish community center in

Buenos Aires, Argentina; the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building

in Oklahoma City; the 1996 suicide truck bomb attack against the Central Bank in

Colombo, Sri Lanka; and, the 1998 twin U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and

Tanzania, all illustrate this development.3 2 The implication, therefore, is that

terrorism is now on an escalation spiral of lethality that may well culminate in the

indiscriminate use of CBRN weapons.

Second, the dangers posed specifically by chemical and biological weapons have

become increasingly apparent. In part, this is a function of the demise of the Cold

 3 0 Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services (PRAS), Terrorism, 1990–1996 (Washington, D.C.:

Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services Inc., 1991–1997); Alex Jongman, “Trends in International and

Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968–88,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter

1992), p. 36. 3 1 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A

Time Series Investigation,” Unpublished ms. (October 1998), p. 21. 3 2 These attacks resulted in the following fatalities: 317 killed in the Bombay attacks; 96 killed in

Buenos Aires; 168 dead in Oklahoma City; 86 killed in the Sri Lanka suicide bombing; and the 258

persons killed in the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings.
- 9 -

War preoccupation with the nuclear dimension of international relations.3 3 Perhaps

more significant, however, is the possibility that, given the ongoing travails of the

Russian economy, poorly paid, disgruntled former Soviet scientists might attempt to

sell their expertise in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on the “open market”

to terrorists or rogue states.3 4 

Finally, a precedent for mass destruction may have been set in the guise of the

1995 Aum nerve gas attack. That incident, as described in detail in Chapter Three,

represented the first widely known attempt by a nonstate group to use a CBRN

weapon with the specific intent of causing mass civilian casualties.3 5 Moreover, Aum’s

use of such an exotic weapon as sarin may have raised the stakes for terrorists

everywhere, who now might feel driven to emulate or create their own version of the

Tokyo attack to attract attention to themselves and their causes. As Jenkins observed

shortly after the Tokyo attack, “It breaks a taboo and has psychological import.

Others will ask whether such tactics should be adopted by them. It is now more likely

that at least some of them will say ‘yes’.”3 6 

Reasons and Rationales Behind Potential CBRN Terrorism

If, in fact, we are approaching a new era of “super” CBRN terrorism, why would

groups seek to escalate to this level? One can identify five possible motivating

rationales .

First , and at the most basic level, may be simply the desire to kill as many

people as possible. CBRN weapons could give a terrorist group the potential ability

(especially if a nuclear weapon were used) to wipe out thousands, possibly even

hundreds of thousands, in a single strike. The following statement of a former FEMA

director gives an indication of the potential killing power of these agents compared to

conventional high explosives (HE): “To produce about the same number of deaths

 3 3 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and WMD: Preliminary Hypotheses,” Non-Proliferation Review, vol. 4,

no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 45. 3 4 See Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian

Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1996), passim;

Carnegie Corporation of New York, “Heading Off A New Nuclear Nightmare: Illicit Trade in Nuclear

Materials, Technology, and Know-How,” Carnegie Quarterly, vol. xii, nos. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1996), pp.

1–7; CSIS Task Force Report, Global Organized Crime Project, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington,

D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), passim; Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’

Heel, passim; Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, pp. 89–106; and, Peter Chalk, “The Evolving Dynamic of

Terrorism,” The Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), p. 163. 3 5 James K. Campbell, “Excerpts From Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and

Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer

1997), p. 29. 3 6 Quoted in David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible

Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996), p. 200.
- 10 -

within a square mile, it would take 32 million grams of fragmentation cluster bomb

material; 3,200,000 grams of mustard gas; 800,000 grams of nerve gas; 5,000 grams

of material in a crude nuclear fission weapon; 80 grams of botulinal toxin type A; or

only 8 grams of anthrax spores.”3 7 

 Such weapons would provide terrorists with the

perfect means to seek revenge against, even to annihilate, their enemies, however

defined, categorized, or otherwise determined.3 8 

A second reason for groups to seek to escalate to the CBRN level could be to

exploit the classic weapon of the terrorist—fear. Terrorism, in essence, is a form of

psychological warfare. The ultimate objective is to destroy the structural supports

that give society its strength by both showing that the government is unable to fulfill

its primary security function and, thereby, eliminating the solidarity, cooperation, and

interdependence on which social cohesion and functioning depend. 3 9 Viewed in this

context, even a “limited” terrorist attack involving CBRN agents would have

disproportionately large psychological consequences, generating unprecedented fear

and alarm throughout society.4 0 The 1995 Aum sarin nerve gas attack, for instance,

which resulted in 12 deaths, not only galvanized mass panic in Tokyo, it also

shattered the popular perception among the Japanese people who, hitherto, had

considered their country to be among the safest in the world. Moreover, it served to

galvanize American attention to CBRN terrorism, despite taking place overseas.4 1 

A third possible rationale for resorting to CBRN weapons could be the desire to

negotiate from a position of unsurpassed strength. A credible threat to use a

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon would be unlikely to go unanswered by a

government and could, therefore, provide an organization with a tool of political

blackmail of the highest order.4 2 

 3 7 Louis Giuffrida, “Dealing with the Consequences of Terrorism—We Are Not Yet Where We Must

Be,” Terrorism. An International Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (1987), p. 73 3 8 See, for instance, Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, “International Terrorism on the Eve of a New

Millennium,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20, no. 3 (July-September 1997), p. 292. 3 9 Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, The Evolving Dynamic, (London:

MacMillan, 1996), p. 13; Martha Crenshaw, “The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict

Resolution, vol. 16, no. 3 (1972), p. 388. 4 0 Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and

Motivations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , P-8039, 1999), p. 53; Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the

Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3771-

AFMIC, December 1989), p. 8. 4 1 Despite the initial and continuing reaction in Japan and around the world to the Aum chemical

and biological weapons program and the prosecution of several of its members the group is apparently

back in operation, although its plans for further terrorists activity are unclear. 4 2 It should be noted, however, that any terrorist group would face two major obstacles in

attempting to use CBRN weapons for political blackmail. First would be the difficulty of establishing the

credibility of the organization’s coercive threat by demonstrating that it does, in fact, possess a CBRN

weapon. Second would be the problem of defining the conditions for the return of the weapon and the

fulfillment of the terrorists’ demands, both of which would be virtually impossible without leaving open

the possibility of a double-cross by either the government in question or the perpetrators themselves. For
- 11 -

A fourth reason, with specific reference to biological agents, could derive from

certain logistical and psychological advantages that such weapons might offer

terrorists. A biological attack, unlike a conventional bombing, would not likely attract

immediate attention, and could initially go unnoticed, only manifesting itself days or

even weeks after the event. This would be well suited to groups that wish to remain

anonymous, either to minimize the prospect of personal retribution or to foment

greater insecurity in their target audience by appearing as enigmatic, unseen, and

unknown assailants.4 3 As Jeffrey Simon observes, “[W]hile we tend to think about

biological weapons as agents of mass destruction—which they certainly can be—there

is also a more ‘practical’ side to these weapons from the terrorists’ perspective.”4 4 

Fifth , a group may wish to use CBRN weapons, and more specifically biological

agents, to cause economic and social damage by targeting a state’s or region’s

agricultural sector. On several previous occasions in other parts of the world,

terrorists have contaminated agricultural produce or threatened to do so. Between

1977 and 1979, more than 40 percent of the Israeli European citrus market was

curtailed by a Palestinian plot to inject Jaffa oranges with mercury. In 1989, a

Chilean left-wing group that was part of an anti-Pinochet movement claimed that it

had laced grapes bound for U.S. markets with sodium cyanide, causing suspensions

of Chilean fruit imports by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Hong

Kong.4 5 In the early 1980s, Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka threatened to infect Sri

Lankan rubber and tea plantations with nonindigenous diseases as part of a total

biological war strategy designed to cripple the Sinhalese-dominated government.4 6 

Many Western countries remain particularly susceptible to this form of

aggression, given the integrated and intensive nature by which farm animals are bred,

transported, and sold, as well as the high degree of genetic homogeneity and

 

further details see Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear

Facilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-3351-DOE, 1986), p. 5; Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood

of Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , P-7119, July 1985), p. 10. 4 3 For an interesting discussion on why terrorists may be less willing to take credit for their acts,

see Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 1

(Spring 1997), pp. 1–6 and 18–19. 4 4 Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, p. 10. 4 5 See Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: A New Threat to Public Safety? Conflict

Studies No. 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism,1996/1997), pp.

13–14; Ron Purver, The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism. Commentary No. 60 (Ottawa, Canadian

Security Intelligence Service,1995), p. 7; and David Rapoport, “Terrorists and Weapons of the

Apocalypse,” paper presented before the “Future Developments in Terrorism Conference,” Cork, Ireland,

March 1999, pp. 13–14. 4 6 W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1999) p. 175.

See also Rohan Gunaratna , War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Institute of Fundamental Studies,

1987), pp. 51–52.
- 12 -

concentration found in their main crop-growing regions.4 7 Disrupting this vital and

vulnerable industry could not only damage the economy, it could also undermine

confidence in government’s capability to protect the very rudiments of American

society. Moreover, it would underscore the terrorists’ coercive potential without

crossing the threshold of mass murder and could potentially avoid the attendant risk

of attracting massive government reprisals.

Based on this analysis, the most likely terrorist groups that would seek to cause

mass civilian casualties with CBRN weapons are fundamentalist religious

organizations or cults that embrace adversarial, Manichean worldviews, or other

extremist single-issue groups. The uncompromising and absolute dualism of such

organizations lends itself to highly extreme mechanisms of violence legitimization that

could easily justify CBRN use. For the most part, however, these groups lack the

means to translate their desire for mass murder into effective action. As such, it is

more probable in the near term that CBRN employment will be a small-scale attack

designed to elicit far greater psychological reactions. However, there are two scenarios

that are conceivable exceptions to this hypothesis. One is the use by terrorists of

biological agents as a way of destroying, or at least undermining, an adversary’s

agricultural base. Such discrete, deliberate attacks, as noted above, have the

potential to cause sociopolitical and economic damage without crossing the threshold

of mass civilian casualties and, thereby, attracting the type of public and

governmental revulsion that this would entail. The other would necessitate statesponsorship, which has the advantage of enabling terrorists to leapfrog the technical

hurdles associated with CBRN weaponization and, thereby, allow them to translate

their desires into meaningful action. Given the extreme, although potentially very

different, consequences that might result from either category, examining each in

more detail is worthwhile.

Agricultural Terrorism

One area of the CBRN terrorism debate that deserves more attention concerns

the biological threat to agriculture.4 8 Weaponizing pathogenic agents to destroy

livestock and crops is far easier than creating munitions designed to kill hundreds,

much less thousands, of people. This latter process requires at least a limited

knowledge of microbiology, something not required in agricultural delivery. Over the

years, farm animals have become progressively more disease-prone as a result of

increased stress levels brought about by intensive antibiotic and steroid treatment

 4 7 In the United States, for instance, it would not be uncommon to find livestock feedlots containing

between 5,000 and 10,000 animals at any given time. The outbreak of a contagious disease at one of

these facilities would be extremely difficult to control and could easily necessitate the wholesale

destruction of all the animals, a formidable and, arguably, unrealistic task. 4 8 Agriculture, as used in this report, is intended to include the production of crops, livestock, and

poultry.
- 13 -

programs, as well as by husbandry changes designed to elevate the volume of meat

production and the quality and value of meat products. In addition, many more

agents are highly infectious to animals than is the case with humans. Many of these

agents will spread quickly because of the vertical integration of modern farming

practices.

Sabotaging organic agricultural material is potentially just as easy. All major

food crops come in a number of varieties, each generally suited to specific soil and

climatic conditions and with differing sensitivities to particular diseases. Plant

pathogens, in turn, exist in different strains with varying degrees of contagion to

individual crop types. A terrorist could take advantage of these properties to isolate

and disseminate disease strains that are most able to damage one or more of a state’s

major arable food supplies. Intensive fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide treatment

programs, designed to increase production yields, compound this potential threat,

creating the possibility of highly resistant “super diseases” and nonnative organisms

and weeds that could be deliberately harvested and introduced with devastating

effect.4 9 

Quite apart from their operational ease, bioattacks against agriculture are also

comparatively risk free. They do not cross the threshold of mass human killing (at

least directly) and are, therefore, unlikely to attract an especially strong government

reaction in the way that a civilian bioattack would. Just as important, because there

is no large-scale loss of human life, perpetrators may, by targeting the attack

discretely, be able to avoid a substantial loss of political support or perceived loss of

“legitimacy.” There is little danger of inadvertent infection, as nonzoonotic diseases

(which do not affect humans) can be used, while attacks themselves can be executed

in such a way that they mimic natural disease occurrences—helping both to delay

suspicion as well as reduce residual dangers of detection.5 0 

In essence, a concerted biological attack against an agricultural target offers

terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success

and which also has the prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining

confidence in the ability of government or giving the terrorists an improved bargaining

 4 9 Correspondence between RAND project research staff and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

officials, Washington, D.C., July-September 1999. See also Agricultural Research Service (ARS),

Agriculture’s Defense Against Biological Warfare and Other Outbreaks (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1961);

Corrie Brown, “Emerging Animal Diseases,” in W.M. Schield, W. Craig, and J. Hughes, eds., Emerging

Infections 3 (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 1999); Siobhan Gorman, “Bioterror Down on the Farm,”

National Journal 27 (July 1999); and John Gordon and Steen Beech-Nielson, “Biological Terrorism: A

Direct Threat To Our Livestock Industry,” Military Medicine, vol. 151 (July 1986). 5 0 Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, “Biological Warfare Against Crops,” p. 72; Gordon and BeechNielson, “Biological Terrorism: A Direct Threat to Our Livestock Industry,” p. 362; and, Stephen

Goldstein, “US Could Face New Terror Tactic: Agricultural Warfare,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 June

1999.
- 14 -

position. This may be especially true if the agricultural bioterrorism attack is part of a

carefully planned escalation—each attack or threatened attack having the potential to

be more severe, perhaps more lethal—to attain the terrorists’ ultimate objectives. This

is important, as one of the main factors that appears to have limited terrorist

experimentation with WMD is lack of predictability, defined in terms of both state and

popular reaction and of the perceived inability to carry out the operation in question

effectively with minimal risk to the terrorists themselves.

The consequences of a successful bioattack on a sector of a country’s meat or

food-crop base could extend beyond the immediate agricultural community to affect

other segments of society. A successful attack could result in local or regional

economic destabilization and even the disruption of overseas commerce in the trade of

a particular commodity, especially if foreign importers moved to erect trade barriers as

a “protective” measure.5 1 

Failing to prevent the release of contagious agents against crops and livestock

would also undoubtedly prompt a loss confidence in the government and may lead

citizens to question the effectiveness of existing contingency planning against CBRN

terrorism in general. The mechanics of dealing with a mass act of agricultural

bioterrorism could generate additional public fallout in the form of criticism from

animal rights activists and farmers, particularly if containment operations required

the large-scale culling of high-risk, but not necessarily disease-showing, livestock.5 2 

Beyond immediate economic and political ramifications, biological attacks

against agriculture have the potential to undermine social stability, to create fear, and

to galvanize public opinion against the government. Infected farms would have to be

quarantined and perhaps permanently closed, affecting not only the agricultural

workers themselves, but also the employees of businesses that rely on their produce.5 3 

If attacks involved zoonotic diseases, a major public scare could well

result—particularly if human deaths occurred—allowing terrorists to create a general

atmosphere of fear and anxiety without having to carry out mass indiscriminate

civilian slaughter.

The U.S. agricultural sector is especially vulnerable to agroterrorism, given its

vertical integration and the way in which animals are bred, transported, and sold in

this country, as well as the high degree of genetic homogeneity and concentration

found in America’s main crop-growing regions. Moreover, readily available and

 5 1 See, for instance, Corrie Brown, “The Impact and Risk of Foreign Animal Diseases,” Vet Med

Today, vol. 208, no. 7 (1996); and Judith Miller, “Administration Plans to Use Plum Island to Combat

Terrorism,” The New York Times, 21 September 1999. 5 2 Correspondence between RAND project research staff and USDA officials, Washington, D.C.,

July-September, 1999. 5 3 See, for instance, Brown, “The Impact and Risk of Foreign Animal Diseases.”
- 15 -

relatively inexpensive livestock and produce are important to the health of the U.S.

economy. Domestic cattle ranchers and dairy farmers earn between $50 billion and

$54 billion a year through milk and meat sales, a figure that rises to more than $100

billion, once related domestic industries and services are taken into account.5 4 While

that figure is a tiny fraction of the total U.S. Gross Domestic Product,5 5 disrupting this

vital and vulnerable industry could cause economic damage beyond the specific

livestock or other agricultural commodity, as well as undermine confidence in the

responsible stewardship of much of what is seen as contributing to the “American way

of life,” from fast-food outlets to clothing, pharmaceuticals, transportation,

entertainment, and general public safety.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

As will be discussed in greater detail below, one of the most significant barriers

associated with CBRN terrorism relates to the difficulties of actually transforming

nuclear or radiological material or chemical or biological agents into effective weapons

suitable for mass destruction. This particular problem would be greatly reduced,

however, if terrorist groups were able to benefit from external state-sponsored CBRN

weapons programs. Several countries with a record of actively supporting terrorism

are known, or at least alleged, to have embarked on the covert development of one or

more CBRN capacities. The fear is that one of these states might be prepared to

sponsor a CBRN attack, either to expand its own regional influence or as a way of

contesting the prevailing power structure of the dominant international system.

In the current global context, the most important of these polities include Iraq,

Iran, Sudan, and North Korea. All of these “rogue” states continue to shun

internationally accepted norms of behavior; remain—at least outwardly—irreconcilably

opposed to the major Western powers; and persist in their support for antigovernment

movements, a number of which exhibit highly violent, Manichean tendencies and

worldviews. Should any one of these countries view it in their wider geopolitical

interest to provide a “client” group with the wherewithal to carry out a major CBRN

attack, including a finished weapon, the prospect for a true act of mass destruction

would become a distinct possibility.

Particular attention has focused on the proliferation threat emanating from

Iraq, especially since the extent of its chemical and biological warfare programs

became apparent in the years following the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War.

Independent weapons inspectors currently claim that Baghdad possesses no less than

3.9 tons of VX gas, 4,000 tons of ingredients to make chemical weapons, and at least

25 missile warheads containing germ agents—including anthrax, botulinum toxin, and

 5 4 Ellen Shell, “Could Mad Cow Disease Happen Here?” The Atlantic Monthly, (March 1998); and,

“Stockgrowers Warned of Terrorism Threat,” The Chieftain, 19 August 1999. 5 5 U.S. GDP for 1999 is estimated to be approximately $9 trillion (chain weighted). Source: Bureau

of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
- 16 -

aflatoxin—that have yet to be declared to the United Nations Special Commission

(UNSCOM).5 6 Fears have been expressed that Saddam Hussein might provide some of

these agents to American extremist organizations, such as antigovernment militias, as

well as to other transnational groups fighting “hostile NATO countries,” in retaliation

for the punitive sanctions imposed on his country since 1991.5 7 Iran has also been

the focus of growing concern, largely due to the extreme anti-Western sentiments

shared by the country’s clerical elite and the vitriolic opposition they express to the

U.S. military and political presence in the Middle East.5 8 In 1996, American and

Israeli intelligence sources warned that Teheran was holding stocks of chemical and

biological agents—as well as a portable aerosol generator that could be used to

disseminate anthrax—for possible future terrorist strikes against major American

cities.5 9 

Attention has also focused on North Korea ever since the country’s covert

nuclear weapons program was discovered in 1994. Concern has grown in tandem

with the country’s deteriorating internal condition and rising tensions in this part of

Northeast Asia. In particular, there is a growing fear that the Pyongyang regime will

support a chemical, biological, or even nuclear terrorist attack on American forces in

South Korea—and perhaps even on U.S. soil—in a last-ditch attempt to undermine

Washington’s backing for Seoul and, in so doing, augment its own bargaining position

with South Korea. In the wake of the bombings against the American embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania, Sudan has additionally been brought under increasing scrutiny,

with U.S. and British officials both claiming that Khartoum has chemical and

biological weapons programs that have allegedly provided support to the Osama bin

Laden terrorist network.6 0 

Although one can never completely discount the possibility that any one of

these or other “terrorist-prone” states (such as Libya and Syria) will deliberately assist

 5 6 Gary Milholin and Kelly Nugent, The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, reproduced in

“Germs, Atoms and Poison Gas: The Iraqi Shell Game,” The New York Times, 20 December 1998. In

addition to this material, Milholin and Nugent, whose report was based on reports from UNSCOM and the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), claim Baghdad has yet to disclose the whereabouts of

approximately 600 tons of ingredients for VX gas; up to 3,000 tons of other poison gas agents; 500 bombs

with parachutes to deliver gas or germ payloads; approximately 550 artillery shells filled with mustard

gas; 107,500 casings for chemical weapons; 31,658 filled and empty chemical munitions; at least 157

aerial bombs filled with germ agents; and spraying equipment to deliver germ agents by air. 5 7 See, for instance, “Iraq Revenge Fears as Extremists are Held,” The Daily Telegraph (UK), 20

February 1998; “Anthrax Alert on Duty-Free Spirits,” The Times (UK), 24 March 1998; and “UK Ports on

Alert Over Deadly Anthrax From Report,” CNN World Wide News, 24 March 1998. 5 8 Richard Falkenrath, “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, vol. 40,

no. 3 (Autumn 1998), p. 57. 5 9 “Iran Ready to Unleash Germ Warfare: US,” The Australian, 8 December, 1996. 6 0 See W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th

Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, March

1999), pp. 35–36. Al Venter, “North Africa Faces New Islamic Threat,” Jane’s Intelligence Review Pointer

(March 1998), p. 11.
- 17 -

a terrorist proxy in its acquisition of a CBRN capability, three main factors appear to

militate against such a scenario. First, governments that have devoted considerable

time, effort, and resources to a covert buildup of their CBRN capacity—sometimes at

the expense of international legitimacy—are unlikely to want to place these weapons in

the hands of groups over which they have no ultimate control. The sponsor in

question would likely have no direct ability to influence how the weapons are

ultimately used (this, in the final analysis, being the decision of the surrogate group).

Moreover, there would doubtless be grave concerns regarding the security of the

weapons once in the hands of the terrorist proxy, the security infrastructure and

resources of which are unlikely to match those of the supporting state.

Second, if it were ever discovered that a terrorist CBRN attack had been

perpetrated with agents procured from a third party state sponsor, extremely strong,

international pressure would build to strike back at the supplier. In this respect, the

U.S. cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan,

following last year’s embassy bombings, arguably sent a powerful deterrent message to

would-be state sponsors or suppliers of such unconventional weapons to international

terrorists. More important, if the targeted state happened to be a nuclear power,

retaliation could well be in the form of a nuclear counterattack, something the U.S.

has specifically suggested on a number of occasions. Third, given the unpredictable

nature of the terrorist groups that would be most interested in gaining a CBRN

capacity, the possibility of proxies using weapons against the supporting state itself

could never be entirely discounted by the terrorists’ patron.6 1 

Accordingly, rogue regimes should be viewed in the same manner as

“mainstream” nation-states in the sense that, for the most part, they act according to

clearly defined cost/benefit ratios—the classic statecraft of realpolitik. While there

may well be some advantage to supporting a CBRN terrorist attack against an enemy

state, the national and international ramifications of being implicated in such an

assault are sufficiently significant that even outlaw governments would likely be

deterred from considering this course of action. That is, the costs of sponsoring CBRN

terrorism would be perceived as outweighing the benefits. As long as this holds true,

one can reasonably expect state sponsorship of terrorism to continue to adhere to the

form that it has traditionally taken since the late 1960s, namely the limited provision

of guns, explosives, ordnance, money, and safe havens.6 2 

 6 1 For more on these barriers see Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism. A New Threat to

Public Safety? Conflict Studies No. 295 (1996), p. 8; Carl-Heinz Kamp, “An Overrated Nightmare,” The

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 4 (1996), p. 33; and, Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of

Biological Weapons, p. 7, footnote 3. 6 2 This point was also made by Parachini in his testimony before the Subcommittee on National

Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of

Representatives “Combating Terroism: Assessing the Threat,” 20 October 1999, pp. 15–16.
- 18 -

It is significant that, to date, there is no evidence that any formal link exists

between terrorist groups and state-assisted CBRN programs. Indeed, a 1997

assessment made by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states:

Most of the state sponsors have chemical or biological or radiological

material in their stockpiles and therefore have the ability to provide such

weapons to terrorists if they wish. However, we have no conclusive

information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to

terrorists . . . . The likelihood is believed to be low.6 3 

Other Higher-Probability/Lower-Consequence Threats

As noted earlier, the Panel believes that the historically more frequent, lesserconsequence terrorist attack, is more likely in the near term—one involving a weapon

on a relatively small-scale incident, using either a chemical, biological or radiological

device (and not a nuclear weapon), or conventional explosives. Rather than having the

intention of inflicting mass casualties, such an attack could be designed to cause a

limited number of casualties, but at the same time cause mass panic. Such an attack

could be more along the lines of the biological terrorism incident that occurred in the

U.S. a decade before the 1995 Aum nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway—although

the perpetrators’ intention in that instance was not to cause panic. Nevertheless, even

limited casualties could precipitate a disproportionate psychological response among

the public. The resulting panic by citizens who perceive that they have been exposed,

but who (like many in Tokyo) in reality have not been exposed, could effectively

paralyze response capabilities even among the most prepared.

In 1984, members of a religious cult led by the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh

contaminated the salad bars of ten restaurants in The Dalles, Oregon, with salmonella

bacteria, in the hope of debilitating the local populace and thereby rigging a key

municipal election in the cult’s favor. Although their plot was unsuccessful in

achieving the group’s political aims,6 4 some 751 people reportedly became ill with

salmonella gastroenteritis as a result of the attack.6 5 Interestingly, the event was not

immediately reported and it was only later that the group’s activities came to light.

Perhaps because no one (fortunately) perished, it did not, moreover, receive the often

feverish media attention that has accompanied many of the recent domestic anthrax

hoaxes or, for example, the recent scare posed by the outbreak of West Nile Fever in

 6 3 Quoted in Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, p. 37. 6 4 Mary Thornton, “Oregon Guru Disavows Rajneeshism, Vows to Survive Investigations,”

Washington Post, 20 October 1985; and, Peter H. King, “Guru Revels in Revelation of a ‘Paradise’ Defiled,”

Los Angeles Times, 22 September 1985. 6 5 Thomas J. Török et al., “A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional

Contamination of Restaurant Salad Bars,” JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association), vol. 278,

no. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 389–395.
- 19 -

New York City. The Rajneesh incident, furthermore, inspired none of the “copycat” or

similar repeat attacks that might have been expected; nor did it provoke any hoaxes.

An equally plausible scenario is a series of simultaneous (or near-simultaneous)

terrorist attacks using or threatening to use chemical, biological or radiological

materials, mounted across a city, a wider metropolitan area or geographical region, or

even a number of locations throughout the United States. The intent would similarly

not be to kill large numbers of people or wreak mass destruction but to exhaust the

capabilities of local authorities rapidly, thus creating panic, instilling widespread fear,

and likely undermining confidence in government—perhaps even deliberately

provoking counterproductive governmental and law enforcement overreaction. Such

attacks need not kill anyone, to prove to negate governmental preparedness plans by

overwhelming existing response capabilities. The comparative ease with which such

low-level chemical, biological, or radioactive incidents could be orchestrated, at least

in contrast to the more considerable resources and lower assurances of success that a

true WMD or mass-casualties attack would entail, might therefore appeal more to

prospective CBRN terrorists. The effects, though certainly less catastrophic, might be

sufficient to achieve the terrorists’ principal aims.

Indeed, the ease with which the Russia, for example, was thrown into panic this

past August and September, by a handful of enigmatic adversaries using conventional

terrorist weapons and tactics, is evidence that terrorists can still ably achieve their

objectives of fear and intimidation without resorting to more exotic weaponry or

futuristic tactics—an important lesson for the United States not to discount the

continuing use by terrorists of explosives and other conventional weapons. Attention

to the “worst-case scenario” of lower-probability/higher-consequence CBRN terrorism

should not be at the expense of higher-probability/lower-consequence incidents, such

as the conventional terrorist bombings that rocked Moscow, or deliberate, more

terrorist, discrete attacks involving smaller amounts of chemical, biological, or

radioactive materials.6 6 This point is demonstrated by another incident in Moscow

four years ago that was claimed by Chechen rebels. In November 1995, on the first

anniversary of the outbreak of fighting between Russia and the breakaway Republic of

Chechnya, Chechen separatists threatened to detonate radiological devices in and

around that city.6 7 The rebels attempted to back up their threat by directing a

Russian television news crew to a site in a popular Moscow park where the Chechens

had buried a large radioactive parcel containing approximately 70 pounds of cesium137.6 8 Admittedly, this incident neither involved an actual nuclear weapon or device,

 6 6 See Bruce Hoffman, “Conventional Terrorism Still Works,” Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion

Section, 26 September 1999, p. M2.

6 7 Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” p 3.

6 8 See Transcript of NTV Television News, “Chechen Commander Basayev Warns Radioactive

Packages Planted in Russia Ready to Explode,” 23 November 1995; Michael Spector, “Chechen Insurgents

Take Their Struggle to a Moscow Park,” New York Times, 24 November 1995; Brian Killen, “Russia:

Moscow Radioactive Parcel Harmless, Officials Say,” Reuters Business Briefing (London), 24 November
- 20 -

nor did it, pose any immediate danger to the news crew or any passersby.

Nevertheless, it was sufficient to generate considerable alarm within Russia and to

attract worldwide attention to the Chechens, their cause, and their

demands—precisely the terrorists’ primary objectives.

Such scenarios, however, are at odds with the focus of current policy and

preparedness efforts—which have been based on less than comprehensive information

and analysis—which seem to emphasize the lower-probability/higher-consequence

attacks at the expense of higher-probability/lower-consequence incidents. The

guiding assumption has been that smaller-scale, non-mass-casualty events are a

lesser-included contingency that can be addressed adequately by preparations for

higher-end mass-casualty attacks.6 9 This is by no means axiomatic. The higherprobability/lower-consequence incident will more likely require a state and local

response—perhaps exclusively—rather than the lower-probability/higher-consequence

event that would almost assuredly emphasize Federal action. Moreover, the number

of threats involving the use of smaller-scale CBRN devices continues to increase

(although most turn out to be hoaxes).7 0 

By continuing a policy that emphasizes high-end threats, there is a very real

danger of failing to optimize state and local response capabilities to deal with the more

probable terrorist threats confronting the United States today.

Impediments to Developing Effective WMD Capabilities

The detailed description, in Chapter Three, of the Aum Shinrikyo incidents

suggests that the hurdles faced by terrorists seeking to develop true weapons of mass

casualties and mass destruction are more formidable than is often imagined. This

report does not argue that terrorists cannot produce and disseminate biological or

 

1995; and, “Russia: Moscow Radioactive Parcel Sparks Chechen-Raid Fear,” Reuters (London), 24

November 1995; “Russian Film Crew Alleges Chechen Connection in Moscow Radiation Scare,” Interfax

News Agency (Moscow), 24 November 1995; “Chechen separatists hid case of radioactive cesium,” Agence

France Presse, 23 November 1995; and, “Rebel’s Threat to Moscow,” Daily Telegraph (London), 25

November 1995. 6 9 This issue emerged as a salient area of concern to the Panel as a result of information provided

to it by the local responder and medical communities as well as by State and local government officials.

Accordingly, during subsequent phases of the project further attention and investigation will be focused

on this specific issue. 7 0 The number of criminal investigations opened by the FBI in response to threats regarding the use

of CBRN materials has grown considerably in recent years: from 37 incidents in 1996 to 74 in 1997 to

181 in 1998. Three-quarters of these have threatened biological release, with anthrax the agent most

frequently cited. The vast majority of these threats, however, have been “determined to be non-credible . .

. have been small in scale and committed primarily by individuals or smaller splinter/extremist elements

of right wing groups which are unrelated to larger terrorist organizations.” Statement for the Record of

Robert M. Burnham, Chief, FBI Domestic Terrorism Section, before the U.S. House of Representatives

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 19 May 1999, at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/

bioleg3.htm 
- 21 -

chemical agents capable of injuring or indeed killing relatively small numbers of

persons (such as the Aum event) or perhaps inflicting serious casualties even in the

hundreds. The point is that creating truly mass-casualty weapons—capable of killing

in tens of thousands, much less in the thousands—requires advanced university

training in appropriate scientific and technical disciplines, significant financial

resources, obtainable but nonetheless sophisticated equipment and facilities, the

ability to carry out rigorous testing to ensure a weapon’s effectiveness, and the

development and employment of effective means of dissemination. Developing a

nuclear weapon requires even greater skills, financial resources, and infrastructure.

In these respects, accordingly, the resources and capabilities required to annihilate

large numbers of persons—i.e., to achieve a genuinely mass-casualty chemical and

biological weapon or nuclear/radiological device—appear, at least for now, to be

beyond the reach not only of the vast majority of existent terrorist organizations but

also of many established nation-states.7 1 Moreover, significant personal risks are run

by those who would be involved in the acquisition, development, production, testing,

and handling of any such lethal weapon or agent.7 2 The Panel recognizes that, while

the analysis indicates significant difficulties currently faced by terrorists who may

wish to perpetrate a major CBRN incident, such a catastrophic event is within the

realm of possibility. Therefore, the Panel believes that comprehensive capabilities

must be developed to respond to incidents across a broad spectrum.

There is an important corollary to the previously mentioned requirements

inherent in such an undertaking (personnel, money, facilities, equipment, testing, and

related logistics). All of that activity inevitably will materially increase the risk of

exposure of the terrorist group to detection by intelligence and law enforcement

agencies.7 3 

 7 1 The same point is made in Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, pp. 30–34. 7 2 These points are echoed in a recent U.S. government report entitled, “Combating Terrorism: Need

for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks,” U.S. General

Accounting Office (NSIAD-99-163) (September 1999), pp. 10–15. 7 3 Even in the case of Aum there was ample intelligence pertaining to the group and its various

nefarious activities that was in fact known to the Japanese authorities months before the Tokyo subway

attacks. However, for a variety of reasons, this information was either willfully ignored or deliberately

disregarded. For example, in June 1994, the group had tried to kill three judges presiding over a civil

suit brought against Aum in the town of Matsumoto. Members of the group sprayed the apartment block

where the judges were sleeping with sarin. Seven persons were killed and more than 250 others were

admitted to hospital with nerve-gas induced symptoms (although taken seriously ill, the judges survived).

Amazingly, though, a report subsequently issued by a special unit of the Tokyo metropolitan police

department's criminal investigation laboratory pointing to the nerve gas' presence in the environs of the

judge’s residence went ignored——despite a record of repeated local complaints of strange odors

emanating from the sect's nearby compound alongside previously raised questions about unexplained

disappearances of both former Aum members and other individuals who had attempted to investigate the

sect's activities (see Jonathan Annells and James Adams, 'Did terrorists kill with deadly nerve gas test?',

Sunday Times (London), 19 March 1995. Interestingly, this news account was published only a day

before the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway took place). The lesson from the Aum case, therefore, is
- 22 -

The Panel acknowledges that the situation now facing a terrorist, who may seek

to use a CBRN weapon to achieve mass effects, could change dramatically because of

new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other material factors. This is

particularly true with respect to potential improvements in aerosolization techniques

and processes; advances in the isolation, purification, stability, and quality of certain

biological strains; or enhancements to delivery devices, such as nozzles or other

sprayers. Future progress in any two or more areas would be especially troubling.

Nevertheless, a survey of the challenges that currently confront any terrorist group

attempting to develop its own “WMD” capability is illustrative.

Biological Terrorism

There are at least four primary acquisition routes that terrorists could

conceivably pursue in acquiring a biological warfare capability. They are

• purchasing a biological agent from one of the world’s 1,500 germ banks, as

Larry Wayne Harris did;

• theft from a research laboratory, hospital, or public health service laboratory,

where agents are cultivated for diagnostic purposes;

• isolation and culturing of a desired agent from natural sources; or

• obtaining biological agents from a rogue state, a disgruntled government

scientist, or a state sponsor.

The principal obstacle is less the development of a biological agent than the

development of a genuinely lethal strain of the agent in sufficient quantities to cause

mass casualties—precisely as Aum’s experience indicates. Acquiring the “most

infectious and virulent culture for the seed stock is the greatest hurdle,” a former

senior official in the U.S. military’s biological warfare program maintains.7 4 As Aum

clearly demonstrated, this is not an easily surmountable obstacle. The most obvious

route would be by attempting to acquire the strain from nature, e.g., obtaining

potentially lethal anthrax spores from soil and then culturing sufficient quantities to

produce mass casualties. While theoretically conceivable, this is nonetheless difficult

in practice and doubtless well beyond the capabilities of most terrorist groups.

Acquiring a biological agent of sufficient virulence is only one of the prerequisites

for conducting biological terrorism on a mass scale. As Ken Alibek, one of the former

Soviet Union’s leading biological weapons scientists has argued, the “most virulent

culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a

 

less a matter of having intelligence, than being able to recognize its significance and being prepared to act

decisively based on such information. 7 4 Quoted in Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, “How Japan Terror Alerted

World,” New York Times, May 26, 1998.
- 23 -

process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a

sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents.”7 5 Airborne

viral agents, in particular, are extraordinarily difficult to work with, since the mass

production, packaging, and storage of viruses are by themselves difficult and

complicated tasks, demanding advanced biotechnical skills,7 6 in addition to the

attendant risks to personnel involved in the process.

In the specific case of botulinum toxins, there are difficulties in purifying these

agents, which then will likely become unstable once they are purified. According to

one biological warfare authority, “maintaining the high toxicity in the culture and the

properties of the toxin as you purify it are what you have to have a lot of years [of

experience] to know how to do.”7 7 The same problem of maintaining toxicity during

the purification process hampered U.S. government researchers during the Cold War.

They discovered that attempting to achieve 95 percent purity of a biological agent—the

level needed to render it effective as a weapon—in turn reduced the bulk amount of

the toxin by 70–80 percent.7 8 

Producing other types of bioterrorism agents similarly requires training,

advanced techniques, and specialized equipment. In the case of B. anthracis, for

example, transforming the bacterium into spore form suitable for use in a wide-scale

terrorist attack necessitates a combination of skill and extreme care during a

production technique that involves the application of heat or chemical shock. During

all stages of the process, B. anthracis, like all other biological agents, must also be

continuously tested to ensure its purity and lethality and thus its utility for weapons

purposes. Although small-scale laboratory testing might be concealed, any largerscale tests will likely invite the attention of law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

Indeed, any group aiming at developing a weapon capable of inflicting mass casualties

would almost certainly require sophisticated, though not exotic, laboratory equipment.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, this would include “fermenters, largescale lyophilizers or freeze dryers, class II or III safety hoods, High-Efficiency

Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, and centrifuges.”7 9 Estimates for the cost of equipping a

facility for the production of biological agents for mass-casualty terrorist operations

vary widely but would likely seem to fall anywhere in the $200,000 to $2 million

range—certainly not trivial sums.

 7 5 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 97. 7 6 Raymond Allen Zalinskas, “Terrorism and Biological Weapons: Inevitable Alliance?” Perspectives

in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Autumn 1990), p. 51. 7 7 Quoted in Tom Waters, “The Fine Art of Making Poison,” Discover, August 1992, p. 33. 7 8 Faced with such difficulties, the United States abandoned its efforts to develop botulinum toxin

as a biological warfare agent. Interview by RAND staff with David Franz. 7 9 Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hearings before the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Congress, 1st

Session, Part I, October 31 and November 1, 1995, p. 529.
- 24 -

Although there remains a widespread public perception that it is easy to acquire

and use highly lethal biological agents, there is no clear consensus among analysts

about how much scientific and technological expertise and prior training are needed.

Some authorities maintain that having an “experimental microbiologist and a

pathologist, or someone who combines these capabilities, would be crucial. . . .

[s]upplemented with a little help and advice from an aerosol physicist and a

meteorologist.”8 0 Other experts are even more conservative in their assessments. In

their view, the creation of a mass-casualty biological weapon would entail scientific

teams composed of persons highly trained in “microbiology, pathology, aerosol

physics, aerobiology, and even meteorology.”8 1 The acquisition of dedicated staff with

the appropriate scientific and engineering knowledge and credentials may, therefore,

be the greatest hurdle to developing an effective biological terrorism capability.

Finding trained and skilled personnel, who could also overcome obstacles of perhaps

working in less-than-ideal environments and who are willing to participate in mass

murder, is a profound organizational roadblock, inherent to terrorist development of

biological weapons, that is perhaps too readily discounted.8 2 In addition, the

paranoid, stressful, and fantasy-prone atmosphere almost certain to be present in a

terrorist organization most likely to seek to acquire biological weapons would make it

difficult for personnel to perform efficiently the careful and demanding work required

for a successful program. In the case of Aum, the atmosphere within the cult,

characterized by extreme paranoia, intense stress, and widespread delusion, likely

contributed to its failure to develop an effective biological weapons capability. That

atmosphere could exist in any number of potential terrorist organizations with similar

intentions or motivations.

Finally, terrorists intent on inflicting hundreds of thousands of casualties with

biological agents would have to create an aerosol cloud to disseminate the toxin.

Aerosol clouds can be created from biological agents in either a mud-like liquid

(“slurry”) form or in a dried, talcum powder-like form. The latter is far more difficult.

In the case of B. anthracis, turning the spores into a powder requires the use of large

and expensive centrifuges and drying apparatus. Powder, moreover, clings to

surfaces, making it both difficult to handle and more probable that those handling it

will accidentally infect themselves.8 3 In addition, the drying process needed to create a

pathogenic powder tends to kill inordinate amounts of the organisms. The use of

slurry, on the other hand, while less technically challenging, still presents significant

problems. For example, the slurry must be continuously refrigerated until it is used,

 8 0 B.J. Berkowitz et al., Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons (Santa

Barbara, Calif.: Adcon Corporation, 29 September 1972), p. 8–65. 8 1 Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature

(Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995), p. 11. 8 2 Conrad V. Chester, “Obstacles to Large-Scale Biological Terrorism,” paper presented at the

Annual Meeting of Doctors for Defense Preparedness, Las Vegas, Nev., September 22, 1991, p. 3. 8 3 Frederick R. Sidell, M.D., William C. Patrick, III, and Thomas R. Dashiell, Jane’s Chem-Bio

Handbook (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1998), p. 232.
- 25 -

and unless it is extremely pure, material is likely to settle at the bottom of a container

and clog the sprayer or aerosol dissemination device. As is detailed below, this is

precisely what happened when Aum Shinrikyo members sprayed what they believed to

be a lethal strain of B. anthracis from the roof of a Tokyo building in 1993.8 4 A slurry

concoction is also tricky to disseminate as an aerosol of particles of an optimal

size—in other words, that will readily be inhaled into the victims’ lungs.8 5 

Disseminating particles of the proper size (1–5 microns) is critical to the success of any

large-scale attack. Building a disseminator capable of dispersing 1- to 5-micron

particles in dry form would, however, be a major technical hurdle for any prospective

biological terrorist.8 6 That being said, the dissemination itself could conceivably be

physically accomplished in any number of different ways: from low-flying airplanes,

crop dusters, trucks equipped with sprayers, or with an aerosol canister situated in

one place and activated by a remote timing device.

Even if a terrorist group succeeded in producing a virulent biological agent, even

if it conducted rigorous tests to ensure that virulence was maintained, and even if it

prepared the agent properly for aerosolization and acquired the proper equipment with

which to disseminate it, at least one major hurdle would remain. As bioagents are

aerosolized and become airborne, they decay rapidly. It is estimated, for example, that

90 percent of the microorganisms in a slurry are likely to die during the process of

aerosolization.8 7 Environmental conditions are likely to reduce the effectiveness of

biological agents still further. Sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes

reduce the ability of pathogens to survive and multiply, although biological agents

dispersed in a subway station or other enclosed area may not be subjected to

conditions as adverse as those in open areas. Potential users of biological weapons

must, therefore, take into account other disruptive meteorological conditions as well.

Rain will wash most aerosol particles out of the air, and high local wind speed will

disrupt an aerosol cloud.

In sum, while the technical challenges in producing an effective biological

weapon are not insurmountable, they are neither as straightforward nor as simple as

has often been claimed and presented publicly. The latter view, based on the limited

information previously available, has heretofore primarily served as the basis for the

public and for many decisionmakers to draw conclusions about the direction of related

public policy. The level of difficulty was in fact what Aum discovered for itself and why

it elected to pursue, in tandem with its continuing biological weapons R&D program, a

 8 4 WuDunn, Miller, and Broad, “Japan Germ Terror,” p. A10.

8 5 Zalinskas, “Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program,” p. 144.

8 6 Chester, “Obstacles,” p. 3.

8 7 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Bioterrorism: Threats and Responses,” in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological

Weapons: Limiting the Threat, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass., and London:

MIT Press, 1999), p. 302.
- 26 -

concerted and even more expensive effort to produce chemical weapons.8 8 Moreover,

as previously mentioned, the requirements to amass personnel, money, facilities,

equipment; to conduct testing; and to execute related logistics tasks, will materially

increase the risk of exposure to detection by intelligence and law enforcement

agencies.

Chemical Terrorism

Chemical agents fall into four broad categories:

• Choking agents, such as phosgene and chlorine.

• Blood agents, including hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride.

• Blister agents, e.g., mustard gas.

• G-series nerve agents, such as tabun (GA), sarin (GB), and soman (GD); and

V-series nerve agents, e.g., VX.

Although any of these agents could be used for the purpose of causing masscasualty attacks, it appears likely that terrorists would reject most of them. In the

case of choking agents, for example, very large amounts would be needed to inflict

mass fatalities. Blister agents, while capable of causing injury on a large scale, are

very unlikely to cause death en masse. VX and other V-series nerve agents would also

be unlikely candidates, because the technical challenges associated with weaponizing

them are formidable. Sarin, on the other hand, is highly toxic, volatile, and relatively

easy to manufacture. Indeed, it was these same qualities that attracted Aum

Shinrikyo’s scientists to sarin and why Shoko Asahara, the group’s leader, so

enthusiastically supported the ambitious chemical weapons R&D program that they

pursued in parallel to the cult’s biological efforts.8 9 Accordingly, for these reasons, it is

perhaps worthwhile to focus on the technological requirements needed to produce

sarin, especially because it is the only chemical agent to have been employed

successfully for mass-casualty purposes by a terrorist group, even though its ultimate

use fell far short of the effects intended.

Although often referred to as a nerve “gas,” sarin is, in fact, a liquid at any

ambient temperature. When in vapor form, it is heavier than air and, as a result, will

cling to floors, sink into basements, and gravitate toward low terrain. Like all nerve

agents, sarin works by interfering with the mechanisms through which one’s nerves

communicate with one’s bodily organs, causing the latter to become highly

overstimulated.9 0 Although the effects on persons who inhale small amounts of

vapor—such as occurred in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack—normally are limited to

 8 8 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 85–86. 8 9 Ibid.

9 0 Sidell, Patrick, and Dashiell, Chem-Bio Handbook, p. 72.
- 27 -

tightness in the chest, shortness of breath and coughing; victims who inhale larger

amounts soon lose consciousness, go into convulsions, and stop breathing altogether.

It has sometimes been claimed that producing sarin and other nerve agents is a

relatively easy process, to the extent, according to one authority, that “ball-point pen

ink is only one chemical step removed.”9 1 While sarin may be less complicated to

synthesize than other nerve agents, the expertise required to produce it should not,

however, be underestimated. The safety challenges involved would, at a minimum,

require skill, training, and special equipment to overcome. For this reason, the level of

competency required for producing sophisticated chemical nerve agents, including

sarin, will likely be on the order of a graduate degree in organic chemistry and/or

actual experience as an organic chemist—not simply a knowledge of college-level

chemistry, as is sometimes alleged.

Moreover, as with biological weapons, developing a means to disseminate sarin

effectively is likely to prove a far greater challenge to terrorists than is producing the

agent itself. Although sarin’s high volatility greatly simplifies weaponization, terrorists

who may seek to cause mass casualties will need a fairly sophisticated means of

spreading the agent in sufficiently large quantities over their intended target area. For

wide coverage in an open area, such as a city, an airplane equipped with a suitable

industrial or crop sprayer could be a satisfactory mechanism for dissemination.

Alternatively, terrorists could equip a truck and drive through the target area, taking

care, of course, to ensure that its passengers are properly sealed off from the chemical

agent. Temperature, wind speed, inversion conditions, and other meteorological

factors, however, would likely determine the effectiveness of any attack. For example,

as sarin and other chemical agents are exposed to the environment, they tend to be

dispersed by the wind, which necessitates the use of large amounts of material to

ensure that a given target receives a sufficiently high dose.

In fact, the need to produce and disperse sufficiently large amounts of sarin or

other chemical agents to achieve the mass-casualty levels that may be sought by

terrorists arguably drawn to chemical weapons in the first place ironically may be the

biggest disincentive for their use. A U.S. Defense Department model illustrates the

problem.9 2 Releasing ten kilograms (22 pounds) of sarin into the open air under

favorable weather conditions covers about one-hundredth of a square kilometer with

lethal effects. Since population densities in U.S. urban areas are typically around

5,000 people per square kilometer, such an attack would kill about 50 people.

Releasing 100 kilograms (220 pounds) of sarin into the open air affects about ten

 9 1 Wayman C. Mullins, “An Overview and Analysis of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism:

The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem,” American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol.

16, No. 2 (1992), pp. 108–109. 9 2 The model, known as VLSTRACK 3.0, was developed by the Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface

Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.
- 28 -

times as much area and therefore would kill approximately 500 people. Releasing

1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) into the open air would cover several square

kilometers, killing about 10,000 people. Thus, only in an open-air attack using

amounts approaching 1,000 kilograms of sarin would the effects become distinctly

greater than that attainable by such traditional terrorist means as conventional

explosives. One way for terrorists to overcome these problems would be to carry out

an attack in an enclosed space, such as a domed stadium, office building, or subway

system.9 3 

Again, Aum’s experiences in the chemical weapons domain are instructive.

Clearly, the cult was able to acquire the knowledge, chemicals, and equipment needed

to synthesize sarin. It was an expensive research and development effort, with cost

estimates as high as $30 million. Aum’s 80-man program, housed in state-of-the-art

facilities, was led by a Ph.D.-level scientist, and it took at least a year between the time

of conception and the initial production of sarin. Nevertheless, the Tokyo subway

attack, and the cult’s earlier sarin attack in Matsumoto, succeeded in killing (though

no less tragically) only a dozen people.

Given these impediments, a terrorist interested in harming large numbers of

persons might prefer to attempt to engineer a chemical disaster using conventional

means to attack an industrial plant or storage facility, rather than develop and use an

actual chemical weapon. In this way, significant technical and resource hurdles could

be overcome, as well as reducing the profile of the terrorist organization to potential

detection by intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

Common industrial and agricultural chemicals can be as highly toxic as bona

fide chemical weapons and, as the 1984 Bhopal, India, catastrophe demonstrated, just

as (if not even more) effective when unleashed on a nearby populace. In that incident,

a disgruntled employee at a pesticide plant precipitated an explosion in one of the

storage tanks by simply adding water to it. In the massive release of methyl

isocyanate that followed, the noxious fumes affected thousands of people living near

the plant. Four months later, some 1,430 persons were reported to have died as a

direct result of the leak—a figure that increased to the 3,800 reported by Indian

officials seven years later. A total of 11,000 persons were listed as having been

disabled or harmed from exposure to the gas9 4 —in both instances, exponentially

greater numbers than Aum was able to achieve in its attacks using sarin.

 9 3 An attack on an enclosed structure would of course require less sarin to be effective. There are,

however, operational problems associated with conducting chemical attacks in such environments that

would first have to be overcome. The perpetrators, for example, will first need to heat the sarin to make it

volatile; otherwise, the formation of sarin vapor would be slow enough to allow the victims to flee the area

as they experienced early symptoms of exposure. 9 4 Jessica Stern, “Apocalypse Never, but the Threat Is Real” in “WMD Terrorism: An Exchange,”

Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998–1999), p. 177.
- 29 -

Nuclear Terrorism

Perhaps the only certain way for terrorists to achieve bona fide mass destruction

would be to use a nuclear weapon. In this area, however, the challenges are arguably

the most formidable.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union heightened Western fears about

security at Russian military facilities, it appears that Russian strategic and tactical

weapons are perhaps more secure than had been initially feared.9 5 Where there may

be particular concern, however, is during their transportation for maintenance or

dismantling, when the Russian weapons apparently are not subject to the same strict

security measures.9 6 But even if terrorists were able to steal or acquire through black

market purchase a stolen nuclear weapon, they would still face a number of

significant obstacles in using or detonating it. Strategic nuclear warheads are

immense and would be extremely difficult to move either easily or clandestinely.

Tactical nuclear weapons, such as artillery projectiles, admittedly, are far lighter and

easier to conceal, making them potentially much more attractive items for terrorist

theft or illicit acquisition. Moreover, many tactical nuclear weapons, and most

strategic nuclear devices, are equipped with permissive action links (PALs) or other

protective mechanisms designed to prevent accidental or unauthorized detonation.9 7 

In addition, some nuclear devices have tamper-proof seals that will disable the weapon

if unauthorized personnel attempt to disassemble it. It would be extremely difficult,

therefore, for terrorists to circumvent or overcome these built-in protective measures;

some of the smaller tactical weapons (including the KGB’s alleged nuclear bombs

concealed in small suitcases) admittedly may have had little or no protective devices or

locks installed and, thus, the safety measures designed to thwart unauthorized

detonation would be more easily overcome.9 8 In the absence of assurance about the

status and control of all Russian nuclear weapons, we must remain vigilant.

Terrorists who were either unable or unwilling to steal a nuclear device or were

unsuccessful in obtaining one on the putative black market that has surfaced in the

countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,9 9 might attempt to build one

 9 5 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuclear Terrorism is Not the Core Problem,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter

1998–1999), p. 170. 9 6 Oleg Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union,” Survival, Vol. 36,

no. 4, p. 62. 9 7 Peter deLeon et al., The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination, N-2706 (Santa Monica,

Calif.: RAND, January 1988). 9 8 See also, Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1999), pp. 89–99 9 9 For detailed analyses of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman with David Claridge, “Illicit Trafficking in

Nuclear Materials,” Conflict Studies nos. 314/315 (London), January/February 1999; Karl-Heinz Kamp,

“Nuclear Terrorism—Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?,” Aussenpolitick—German Foreign Affairs Review,

vol. 46, no. 3. (1995) World-Wide Web Page of the International Security Net, Center for Security Studies,

ETH Zurich ( www.ethz.ch/au-pol/kamp.htm); Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, “The Real Threat of
- 30 -

themselves. Their first hurdle, however, would be in acquiring sensitive nuclear

material (SNM), that is, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu)

suitable for fashioning a nuclear device.1 0 0 Mining and processing uranium or

building a reactor to create plutonium would of course be impractical (although, it

should be noted, Aum’s most grandiose aims embraced this possibility); terrorists

would, therefore, have to steal SNM or conceivably purchase it on the black market. A

number of authorities in recent years repeatedly have expressed concern about illicit

access to nuclear materials and technology, particularly in the former Soviet Union.

Minatom, the Russian entity with responsibility for nuclear weapons, has itself

complained about a lack of qualified personnel and adequate control systems, and the

security at HEU storage facilities has also been reported to be grossly inadequate.1 0 1 

Given this apparent lack of security, and the fact that 250 tons of HEU and 50

tons of weapons-grade plutonium has been stockpiled in Russia,1 0 2 the risk of illicit

acquisition from SNM storage facilities should be considered a serious threat.

Potentially less worrying, however, is the supposed “black market” for these

substances. Between 1992 and 1996, more than 1,000 claims were made involving

the illicit sale and smuggling of nuclear material;1 0 3 however, only six instances were

substantiated, and none of those involved the quantities needed to construct an

effective “homemade” device that could cause mass casualties—thereby suggesting

that the black market, if it exists at all, is limited in size and grossly exaggerated in

impact.1 0 4 

 

Nuclear Smuggling,” Scientific American, vol. 274, no. 1 (January 1996); William C. Potter, “Before the

Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States,” Arms Control Today,

October 1995; Rensselear W. Lee III, “Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and the

Reality,” Current History, October 1995; Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, “Nuclear Material

Trafficking: An Interim Assessment,” Transnational Organized Crime, vol., 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995); and,

Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, “Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

May-June 1995. 1 0 0 U-235 and Pu-239 are optimal weapons grade material for use in a nuclear weapon. However, a

device using reactor grade, mixed isotope plutonium was detonated successfully during the 1960s. While

less efficient, reactor grade material would presumably be easier to acquire. Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, April 1996), p. A-1. 1 0 1 Malcolm Gray and William Lowther, “The ‘Loose Nukes,’” Maclean’s, Vol. 109, No. 17, pp. 25–26. 1 0 2 Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards,” p. 59. 1 0 3 Tom Wilkie, “Terrorists and the Bomb,” World Press Review, Vol. 43, No. 9, p. 36. It is worth

noting, however, that due in part to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, “individual

commercial power reactors are neither the most vulnerable nor the most fruitful sites for diverting nuclear

materials.” OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 131. 1 0 4 To be sure, small amounts of SNM have been diverted illegally, apparently from Russian

facilities. It is worth noting, however, that all of the SNM stolen to date is not sufficient to make a single

nuclear device and that reported thefts of weapons grade material have dropped in recent years. Ongoing

improvements in Russian nuclear security procedures should further reduce the incidents of theft. OSD,

Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997), accessed at

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ trans.html#terrorism.
- 31 -

Building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents

Herculean challenges for terrorists and indeed even for states with well-funded and

sophisticated programs. According to one analysis, minimum requirements include

“personnel, skills, information, money, facilities, equipment, supplies, security, special

nuclear materials. . . and, usually, other specialized and hard-to-obtain material.”1 0 5 

According to another assessment, a successful program hinges on

obtaining enough fissile material to form a super-critical mass for each of

its nuclear weapons (thus permitting a chain reaction); arriving at a

weapon design that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a

second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart; and

designing a working device small and light enough to be carried by a given

delivery vehicle.1 0 6 

It is important to emphasize that the above represents the minimum

requirements. If each one is not met, concludes the assessment, “one ends up not

with a less powerful weapon, but with a device that cannot produce any significant

nuclear yield at all or cannot be delivered to a given target.”1 0 7 

That being said, it is clear that certain types of nuclear devices are easier to

create than others.1 0 8 Two types of weapons systems, for example, can create nuclear

fission: the implosion device and the “gun” type. In the former, explosives compress a

sphere of HEU or plutonium into a small ball, thus achieving supercriticality and a

nuclear chain reaction. Even the simplest implosion weapon, however, requires the

fabrication of complex components, such as high-explosive lenses, high-performance

detonation systems, and fusing and firing circuitry.1 0 9 The gun-type device, on the

other hand, employs HEU exclusively. Using a high explosive, the system fires a

subcritical HEU projectile into a subcritical cylinder of HEU to form a solid mass of

critical material. Although it uses relatively scarce HEU, the gun-type device is

considered technically easier to fabricate; and many analysts accordingly argue that

terrorists attempting to make a bomb “in house” will build a gun-type device.

There is disagreement, however, about what level of expertise and other

resources are required to construct such a weapon. According to one authority, “most

states and some exceptionally capable non-state actors” could build a highly

destructive 10-kiloton weapon in several months at a cost of a few hundred thousand

 1 0 5 Berkowitz et al., Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction, p. 7-2. The general steps

involved in producing a nuclear weapon are described in Appendix I. The resources required to fabricate

plutonium and uranium devices are outlined in Appendix II. 1 0 6 OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 129. 1 0 7 Ibid., p. 129. 1 0 8 There is a consensus among experts that building a fusion or thermonuclear weapon is well

beyond the capability of any terrorist organization. For this reason, these devices will not be considered

in this paper. 1 0 9 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, pp. 135–136.
- 32 -

dollars—assuming they had access to sufficient quantities of fissile material.1 1 0 Other

experts, however, are far more skeptical in their estimates of the capabilities required.

Although much of the information about nuclear weapons design and production has

become public knowledge during the past 50 years, it is still extraordinary for

nonstate entities to attempt to embark on a nuclear weapons R&D program.1 1 1 

Indeed, even technical requisite knowledge and hands-on experience are not enough to

build an effective nuclear weapon. As an Office of Technology Assessment report

explains, “[k]nowledge must be supplemented by industrial infrastructure and the

resources to carry a nuclear weapon program to completion. The technologies for

building cars and propeller-driven airplanes date back to early in this century, but

many countries still cannot build them indigenously.”1 1 2 

Moreover, the fact that a number of states—despite aid from other nuclear

powers, their own intense motivations, the provision of considerable resources,

alongside concerted espionage activities designed to support their R&D programs—still

struggle to build a nuclear weapon capability, suggests that the technical challenges

remain immense.1 1 3 In the case of South Africa, for example, it took scientists and

engineers—who were endowed with a large and sophisticated infrastructure—four

years to build their first gun-type system.1 1 4 

Nevertheless, any nuclear weapons program will inevitably involve a number of

people, and significant resources, equipment, and facilities. As noted earlier, all of

that activity inevitably will materially increase the risk of exposure of the terrorist

group to detection by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Radiological Terrorism

In the view of some authorities, theft of a nuclear device or building a weapon

“in house” are the least-probable courses of action for a prospective nuclear terrorist.

Far more likely—for all the reasons cited above—is the dispersal of radiological

material in an effort to contaminate a target population or distinct geographical

area.1 1 5 The material could be spread by radiological dispersal devices (or RDDs)—i.e.,

 1 1 0 Ibid., p. 126. 1 1 1 Berkowitz et al., Superviolence, p. 8-5. Given the complexity and range of the tasks involved, it

appears highly unlikely that any single individual would possess all of the knowledge and skills required

to fabricate even a crude nuclear weapon. J. Carson et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” in

Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the

International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p.

58. 1 1 2 OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 150. 1 1 3 Kamp, “An Overrated Nightmare,” p. 53. 1 1 4 David Hughes, “When Terrorists Go Nuclear: The Ingredients and Information Have Never Been

More Available,” Popular Mechanics, Vol. 173, No. 1, pp. 57–59. 1 1 5 U.S. Congress, OTA, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481

(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, July 1991), p. 20.
- 33 -

“dirty bombs” designed to spread radioactive material through passive (aerosol) or

active (explosive) means. Alternatively, the material could be used to contaminate food

or water. This latter option is, however, considerably less likely given the huge

quantities of radioactive material that would be required. The fact that most

radioactive material is not soluble in water means that its use by a terrorist would be

unlikely and impractical, if the purpose is to contaminate reservoirs or other

municipal water supplies, because the radioactive material will settle out or be

trapped in filters. Those factors, coupled with the fact that any radioactive material

will present safety risks to the terrorists themselves, collectively indicate the serious

difficulties for any adversary attempting to store, handle, and disseminate it

effectively.

Radiological weapons kill or injure by exposing people to radioactive materials,

such as cesium-137, iridium-192, or cobalt-60. Victims are irradiated when they get

close to or touch the material, inhale it, or ingest it. With high enough levels of

exposure, the radiation can sicken and kill. Radiation (particularly gamma rays)

damages cells in living tissue through ionization, destroying or altering some of the

cell constituents essential to normal cell functions.1 1 6 The effects of a given device will

depend on whether the exposure is “acute” (i.e., brief, one time) or “chronic” (i.e.,

extended).

There are a number of possible sources of material that could be used to

fashion such a device, including nuclear waste stored at a power plant (even though

such waste is not highly radioactive), or radiological medical isotopes found in many

hospitals or research laboratories. Although spent fuel rods are sometimes mentioned

as potential sources of radiological material, they are very hot, heavy, and difficult to

handle, thus making them a poor choice for terrorists. Other sources, such as

medical devices, might be much easier to steal and handle. These materials, however,

have a lower specific activity than the materials in reactor fuel rods (although large

unshielded sources are quite dangerous). Presumably, terrorists could steal a device

(either in transit or at the service facility or user location) and remove the radioactive

materials. Radioactive materials are often sintered in ceramic or metallic pellets.

Terrorists could then crush the pellets into a powder and put the powder into an RDD.

The RDD could then be placed in or near a target facility and detonated, spreading the

radiological material through the force of the explosion and in the smoke of any

resulting fires. Of course, the larger the radioactive material dispersal area, the

smaller the resulting dose rate.

Although incapable of causing tens of thousands of casualties, a radiological

device, in addition to possibly killing or injuring any people who came into contact

 1 1 6 See: “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” compiled and edited by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J.

Dolan, prepared and published by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy,

1977.
- 34 -

with it “could be used to render symbolic targets or significant areas and

infrastructure uninhabitable and unusable without protective clothing.”1 1 7 A

combination fertilizer truck bomb, if used together with radioactive material, for

example, could not only have destroyed one of the New York World Trade Center’s

towers but might have rendered a considerable chunk of prime real estate in one of

the world’s financial nerve centers indefinitely unusable because of radioactive

contamination. The disruption to commerce that could be caused, the attendant

publicity, and the enhanced coercive power of terrorists armed with such “dirty”

bombs (which, for the reasons cited above, are arguably more likely threats than

terrorist use of an actual fissile nuclear device), is disquieting.

The CBRN Terrorist Threat in Perspective

“Since 1996, the number of weapons of mass destruction threats called in

to fire fighters, police and the FBI has increased fivefold. The threat comes

not just from conventional weapons, like the bomb used in Oklahoma City,

but also from chemical weapons, like the nerve gas agent that killed 12,

but injured thousands in Tokyo, in the subway, just four years ago; and

even from biological weapons that could spread deadly disease before

anyone even realized that attack has occurred.

“I have been stressing the importance of this issue, now, for some time. As

I have said repeatedly, and I want to say again to you, I am not trying to

put any American into a panic over this, but I am determined to see that

we have a serious, deliberate, disciplined, long-term response to a

legitimate potential threat to the lives and safety of the American people.”

President Clinton1 1 8 

As the President’s remarks suggest, there is a thin line between prudence and panic.

The challenge in responding to the threat of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is

to craft defense capabilities to respond to an incident if it occurs that are not only both

cost-effective and appropriate, but dynamic enough to respond as effectively as

possible in a wide a range of circumstances or scenarios. Because of the extreme

 1 1 7 Robins, “How Realistic is the Threat?”, p. 53. In November 1995, in one of the few recorded

incidents of nuclear terrorism, Chechen rebels placed Cesium-137 in a busy Moscow park. Although the

material was packed in a protective canister, and thus posed no real threat, the incident embarrassed the

Russian government, which may have been the Chechens’ goal. OSD, Proliferation (1997). Most other

criminal acts involving nuclear facilities or materials have been in the form of sabotage. In 1982, for

example, the terrorist wing of the African National Congress destroyed nonoperational reactors at two

South African power stations. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass

Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 72. 1 1 8 Remarks By The President to 17th Annual Legislative Conference Of The International

Association of Fire Fighters, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Washington, D.C., 15 March 1999, p. 3 at

http://www.usia.gov/topical/ pol/terror/ 99031502.html.
- 35 -

consequences that could result from a successful attack involving nuclear or

radiological material or a chemical or biological agent, even the remotest likelihood of

one cannot be dismissed as insignificant. The challenge, therefore, is to avoid reaction

too strongly to only one aspect of the problem, while still preparing adequately for a

threat that remains uncertain but could nonetheless have profound repercussions.1 1 9 

A critical step in this process is to reconsider the “worst-case scenario” threat

assessment approach that has dominated domestic planning and preparedness for

potential acts of CBRN terrorism.1 2 0 The narrow focus lower-probability/higherconsequence threats, which in turn posit virtually limitless vulnerabilities, does not

reflect the realities of contemporary terrorist behavior and operations. “This kind of

analysis,” Brian Jenkins recently warned in testimony before Congress, “can

degenerate into a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments—dramatic, emotionally

powerful, but analytically feeble.”1 2 1 Similarly, at the same congressional hearing,

another expert, John Parachini, counseled that the “apparent over reliance on worstcase scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerability assessment rather than an

assessment that factors in the technical complexities, motivations of terrorists and

their patterns of behavior seems to be precisely the sort of approach we should

avoid.”1 2 2 The main weakness in such an approach is in the axiomatic assumption

that any less serious incident can be addressed equally well by planning for the most

catastrophic threat—ignoring the fact that higher-probability/lower-consequence

attacks might present unique challenges of their own.

Finally, this approach may be the least efficacious means of setting budgetary

priorities and allocating resources and indeed assuring the security of our country. In

its future assessments and analyses of resource allocation and priorities, the Panel

will look closely at the issue of whether current U.S. government policies may be—as

 1 1 9 For analytical conclusions that agree in part, but also diverge in certain respects with the

analyses contained in sections two and three of this report, see “Supporting Research and Analysis,” “The

Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century,”

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (also known as the “Hart-Rudman

Commission”), September 15, 1999, which can be accessed at: http://www.uscns.gov/

Reports/reports.htm 1 2 0 This same argument has been made repeatedly by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller

General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Before the

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on

Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives in (1) “Combating Terrorism: Observation on Federal

Spending to Combat Terrorism,” 11 March 1999; and (2) “Combating Terrorism: Observation on the

Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” 20 October 1999; as well as by Parachini in “Combating

Terrorism: Assessing the Threat” and Brian Michael Jenkins in their testimony before the same House

subcommittee on 20 October 1999.; and the Hinton testimony “Combating Terrorism: Observation on

Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,” before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs and

Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Senate Committee

on Appropriations, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-12, General Accounting Office Washington, D.C., 16 March 1999. 1 2 1 Jenkins, “Testimony,” 20 October 1999, p. 4. 1 2 2 Parachini, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,” 20 October 1999, p. 17.
- 36 -

some have suggested—fundamentally an attempt to overcompensate for previous years

of neglect and the dismissal of the domestic terrorist threat, through spending that is

divorced from any rigorous appreciation or detailed understanding of current terrorist

trends. This was precisely the point made by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., the Assistant

Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General

Accounting Office, when he testified before Congress in March 1999. “The [most]

daunting task before the nation,” he argued,

is to assess—to the best of its ability—the emerging threat with the best

available knowledge and expertise across the many disciplines involved.

The United States cannot fund all the possibilities that have dire

consequences. By focusing investments on worst-case possibilities, the

government may be missing the more likely threats the country will face.

With the right threat and risk assessment process, participants, inputs,

and methodology, the nation can have greater confidence that it is

investing in the right items in the right amounts. Even within the lower

end of the threat spectrum—where the biological and chemical terrorist

threat currently lies—the threats can still be ranked and prioritized in

terms of their likelihood and severity of consequences. A sound threat and

risk assessment could provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target

spending. . . .1 2 3 

Indeed, at a time when the “high-end” terrorist threats involving mass

destruction CBRN weapons, the series of apartment building bombings that occurred

in Russia and Dagestan during August and September 1999 is a salutary reminder of

how terrorists can still achieve their dual aim of fear and intimidation through entirely

conventional means and traditional methods—using bombs to blow things up.1 2 4 This

fact has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism preparedness. As fanatical

and irrational as terrorists often appear, they remain remarkably conservative

operationally, adhering to the same uncomplicated weapons and tactics on which they

have relied for more than a century. Given the limited resources and constrained

capabilities typical of most terrorists, they perhaps reflexively shun weapons and

tactics that either cannot be relied on completely or that pose such enormous

complexities in terms of their employment (e.g., achieving effective dispersal or

dissemination) as to border on the unappealing, if not useless.1 2 5 For this reason, it

more probable that terrorists will remain essentially content with the limited killing

potential of their handguns and machine guns and the slightly higher rates that their

 1 2 3 Hinton, “Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives,” GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, 16 March 1999, pp. 4–5. 1 2 4 Hoffman, “Conventional Terrorism Still Works,” Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion Section,” 26

September 1999. 1 2 5 And see “Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of

Chemical and Biological Attacks,” U.S. General Accounting Office (NSIAD-99-163)(September 1999), pp.

10–15.
- 37 -

bombs can achieve.1 2 6 In other words, they seem to prefer the assurance of the

modest success provided by their more conventional weapons and traditional tactics to

the risk of failure inherent in more complex and complicated operations involving

CBRN weapons. Indeed, of the more than 9,000 incidents since 1968, fewer than 100

evidence any indication of terrorists plotting or attempting to use chemical, biological

or radiological weapons, or to steal or otherwise fabricate nuclear devices on their

own.1 2 7 

There is another relevant paradox affecting terrorist behavior. Terrorists have

long been seen as far more imitative than they are innovative.1 2 8 To date, however, no

similar or copycat act of terrorism, which at the time was thought might likely follow

in the wake of Aum’s use of sarin nerve gas, has materialized. In this respect, the

Tokyo subway incident has been the exception rather than the rule in terms of

terrorist behavior. “This fact gains significance,” Jenkins also observed in his recent

testimony, “when we note that past terrorist and criminal innovations—airline

hijackings, political kidnappings, malicious product tampering—were promptly

imitated. And terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents, if they do

occur, are likely to remain rare events—they will not become the truck bomb of the

next decade.”1 2 9 

It should be noted that, as serious and potentially catastrophic as a domestic

terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely

undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival, of the United States

as a nation. This point should be self-evident, but given the rhetoric and hyperbole

with which the threat of CBRN terrorism is frequently couched, it requires reiteration.

Even Israel, a comparatively small country in terms of population and landmass, who

throughout its existence has often been isolated and surrounded by enemy states and

subjected to unrelenting terrorist attack and provocation, has never regarded

terrorism as a paramount threat to its national security and longevity, worthy of

profligate budgets or the diversion of disproportionate resources and attention.1 3 0 To

take any other position risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely

the terrorist’s stock in trade. Indeed, following the 1995 nerve gas attack, the

Japanese government did not fall, widespread disorder did not ensue, nor did society

collapse. There is no reason to assume that the outcome would be any different in the

 1 2 6 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman, “Responding to Terrorism

Across the Technological Spectrum,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994). This

was subsequently reprinted in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena’s Camp: Preparing For

Conflict In The Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), pp. 339–368. 1 2 7 Review of incidents recorded in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism, 1968–present. 1 2 8 Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND , November 1985, R-3302-AF), p. 12. 1 2 9 Jenkins, “Testimony,” 20 October 1999, pp. 2–3. 1 3 0 Gérard Chaliand, “Preface” to Bruce Hoffman, Le Mechaniqué Terrorisme (Paris: Calmann Levy,

1999), p. 9.
- 38 -

United States. “The strength and resilience of liberal-democratic societies in the face

of such threats,” one analyst points out, “tend to be underestimated.”1 3 1 America’s

ability to address these challenges and cope with their consequences should likewise

not be underestimated.

Summary

In sum, even if the motives of terrorists may be changing in such a way that they

are becoming more lethal, and even if this in turn may lead them to contemplate ever

more bloody and heinous acts that might lead to the use of CBRN weapons, these

trends do not necessarily imply that terrorists have either the requisite scientific

knowledge or technical capabilities to implement their violent ambitions. Accordingly,

as easy as some argue that it may be for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew

up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the effective dissemination or dispersal of these

viruses and poisons still presents serious technological hurdles that greatly inhibit

their effective use. Indeed, the technological difficulties and other impediments

encountered by a group as well endowed as Aum—the apocalyptic religious cult whose

activities are most directly responsible for precipitating our current concern over

terrorism and CBRN weapons—is precisely the case in point.

This is not to suggest, however, that there either is no threat of terrorist use of

CBRN or that it is one that should be dismissed or discounted. Indeed, as noted

above, the difficulties now facing a terrorist, who may seek to use a CBRN weapon to

achieve mass effects, could change dramatically, because of new discoveries, further

advances in technology, or other material factors. Moreover, any assessment of a

potential terrorist group or organization should seek to determine—through the

terrorists’ doctrine, dogma, public pronouncements, and the like—into which of two

general categories the organization may fall:

1. Those organizations who seek some type of support for their cause; or

2. Those who simply do not care.

It is the latter type for which we should have the greatest concern in terms of potential

use of a “mass-effect” CBRN device.

What this section has argued is that some public pronouncements and media

depictions, about the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass

destruction or inflict widespread casualties, do not always reflect the significant

hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity seeking to employ such weapons. In

this respect, it should be stressed that a limited terrorist attack involving not a WMD

 1 3 1 Joseph F. Pilat, “Apocalypse Now—or Never?” in “WMD Terrorism: An Exchange,” Survival, vol.

40, no. 4 (Winter 1998–1999), p. 174.
- 39 -

per se, but an unconventional chemical, biological, or radiological weapon on a

deliberately small scale—either alone or as part of a series of smaller incidents

occurring either simultaneously or sequentially in a given location—could have

disproportionately enormous consequences, generating unprecedented fear and alarm,

and thus serving the terrorists’ purpose just as well as a larger weapon or more

ambitious attack with massive casualties could have. Hence, the issue here may not

be as much a ruthless terrorist’s use of some WMD designed to achieve mass

casualties, as the calculated terrorist’s use of some unconventional weapon to achieve

far-reaching psychological effects in a particular target audience. To focus on

weapons of truly “mass destruction” may, therefore, be missing the point and

sidestepping the potential, credible threats posed by terrorists in this regard. As the

evidence presented in this section suggests, it will likely not be the destruction of an

entire city (as often proclaimed by fictional thriller writers and some government

officials), but the far more deliberate and delicately planned use of a chemical,

biological, or radiological agent for more discrete purposes.

By the same token, policymakers should assume, for planning purposes, that

terrorism will continue to increase in both the number of actual incidents and threats,

as well as in lethality. For the reasons stated above, the current hurdles for developing

and delivering a true “weapon of mass destruction” are formidable, but, as noted, that

situation could, in the future, take a nasty turn for the worse. Plans and programs to

deter, detect, interdict, prevent, or respond to incidents must be designed to be flexible

and adaptable to changing threats. Intelligence and other information collection and

sharing techniques and procedures will need to be improved. As noted elsewhere,

continued monitoring and assessments of this dynamic and amorphous threat will be

critical to countering this challenge effectively.
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III. A RETROSPECTIVE: THE LESSONS OF AUM SHINRIKYO

The 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway marked a turning point in

the history of terrorism.1 3 2 Indeed, it has become the defining incident for all

discussion about terrorist use of CBRN weapons. For the first time, a nonstate group

had used a chemical weapon against civilians. Subsequent investigations by the

Japanese authorities, the press, and the U.S. Congress revealed that Aum had even

more sinister terrorist ambitions. Beginning in 1990, cult scientists sought to develop

biological weapons, and on a number of occasions, Aum members sprayed biological

material in an attempt to kill large numbers of people, including members of the

Japanese royal family. Testimony during the trials of the Aum leadership also alleged

that the cult had unsuccessfully attacked U.S. military bases in Japan, including the

naval installation at Yokosuka.1 3 3 

More than four years later, the attack’s implications are still as fiercely debated

as they are incompletely understood. Was the incident a harbinger of future terrorist

actions or a dramatic aberration? Had a profound taboo been broken by Aum’s use of

chemical weaponry or were the circumstances, capabilities, and resources at the

disposal of this particularly idiosyncratic religious group so unique as to defy

duplication or emulation by more common and stereotypical terrorist organizations?

This chapter considers these questions and related issues raised by the Aum

attack. Specifically, it examines the implications of the group’s ambitious research

and development efforts—spanning chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons

aspirations—and assesses the inferences and lessons that can be drawn from the

apocalyptic cult’s activities, in the context of deliberations about and U.S. domestic

preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism.

The Aum Shinrikyo and the “New Terrorism”

Until the Tokyo attack, most terrorism experts and other observers of this

phenomenon could take solace in the belief that terrorists were fundamentally

rational.1 3 4 The conventional wisdom that therefore followed was that terrorists would

 1 3 2 For the most complete account of the Aum sect’s aims, motivations, and capabilities see David

E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London:

Hutchinson, 1996). See also D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York and Tokyo:

Weatherhill, 1996) and the recently published book by Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It:

Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999). 1 3 3 Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, “How Japan Terror Alerted World,” New

York Times, May 26, 1998. Although most of Aum’s original leadership is in jail, the cult remains active

in Japan and Russia. Kevin Sullivan, “Japan Cult Survives While Guru Is Jailed’, Washington Post,

September 28, 1997. 1 3 4 See, for example, the studies conducted by RAND during the 1970s for Sandia National

Laboratories and, in particular, Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, et al., Motivations and Possible Actions of

Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-2554-SL, 1980).
- 41 -

refrain from using CBRN weapons simply because they could make few realistic

demands by threatening the use of such indiscriminate weapons. In this context, it

was further argued that the terrorists’ aims and objectives could just as easily be

attained or realized through less extreme measures than the detonation of a nuclear

device, the dispersal of radioactive materials,1 3 5 or by attacks employing either

biological or chemical warfare weapons. In perhaps the most important book written

on terrorism in the 1970s, Walter Laqueur clearly echoed this school of thought,

concluding unambiguously that, “It can be taken for granted that most of the terrorist

groups existing at present will not use this option, either as a matter of political

principle or because it would defeat their purpose.”1 3 6 

The terrorists’ perceived obsession with controlling events was also regarded as

an important constraint.1 3 7 “Terrorists, like war planners,” one unidentified expert

opined at a mid-1980s symposium on the subject of nuclear terrorism, “believe they

can control what they start . . . and CB [chemical and biological agents] seems too

uncontrollable.” Hence, this line of argument went, terrorists would most likely

eschew weapons that could not be discriminatingly targeted against their enemies

only. Indiscriminate weapons could also harm their ethnic brethren, co-religionists,

or that often declared but amorphous constituency, the so-called “people.” Of equal

significance was the argument that, whereas terrorists had mastered operations using

conventional weapons, they would doubtless be very wary of venturing into such

unknown territory as CBRN weapons. Like most ordinary people, terrorists were also

believed to harbor profound fears about dangerous substances of which they knew

little and, if handled improperly, would affect them as adversely as the substances

would their intended targets. Even when experts in the 1970s thought about possible

terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, the prevailing consensus was that

terrorists would obviously prefer nuclear or radiological weapons to chemical or

biological ones.1 3 8 As Brian Jenkins, perhaps that era’s most influential terrorism

expert, explained in a paper presented at the same conference noted above:

Terrorists imitate governments, and nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of

the world’s major powers. That makes them “legitimate.” Chemical and

biological weapons also may be found in the arsenals of many nations, but

their use has been widely condemned by public opinion and proscribed by

treaty, although in recent years the constraints against use seem to be

eroding.1 3 9 

 1 3 5 See, for example, the discussion in Peter deLeon, Bruce Hoffman, et al., The Threat of Nuclear

Terrorism: A Reexamination (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , N-2706, 1988), pp. 4–6. 1 3 6 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 231. 1 3 7 Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of

Possibilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3771-AFMIC, 1989), p. 12. 1 3 8 Robert L. Beckman, “Rapporteur’s Summary,” in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.),

Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), p. 13. 1 3 9 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?” in Ibid., p. 31.
- 42 -

But most important, there was a general acceptance of the observation made famous

by Jenkins that: “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening

and not a lot of people dead.”1 4 0 This maxim was applied directly to potential terrorist

use of CBRN weapons and in turn was often used to explain the paucity of actual

known plots, much less verifiable incidents. In this context, Jenkins argued in a 1975

paper assessing potential terrorist use of radiological or nuclear weapons that

Scenarios involving the deliberate dispersal of toxic radioactive material . . .

do not appear to fit the pattern of any terrorist actions carried out thus far

. . . . Terrorist actions have tended to be aimed at producing immediate

dramatic effects, a handful of violent deaths—not lingering illness, and

certainly not a population of ill, vengeance-seeking victims . . . . If

terrorists were to employ radioactive contaminants, they could not halt the

continuing effects of their act, not even long after they may have achieved

their ultimate political objectives. It has not been the style of terrorists to

kill hundreds or thousands. To make hundreds or thousands of persons

terminally ill would be even more out of character.1 4 1 

This was also the conclusion reached by a contemporary of Jenkins, the noted

authority on subnational conflict, J. Bowyer Bell. He too had dismissed the possibility

that terrorists might target a commercial nuclear power plant in hopes of engineering

a meltdown or large-scale atmospheric release of radioactive materials on similar

grounds of political expediency and logical instrumentality. “[T]here is no evidence,”

Bell wrote in 1978,

that terrorists have any interest in killing large numbers of people with a

meltdown. The new transnational television terrorists want media

exposure, not exposure of the masses to radioactive fallout. And finally,

the technological capacities of organizations with sufficient military skills to

launch an attack . . . are not great. The mix of motive, military and

technological skills, resources, and perceived vulnerability simply does not

exist.1 4 2 

Despite the events of the mid-1980s—when a series of high-profile and particularly

lethal suicide car and truck-bombings were directed against American diplomatic and

military targets in the Middle East (in one instance resulting in the deaths of 241

 1 4 0 Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict” in David Carlton and

Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15. 1 4 1 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica, Calif.: P-5541, November

1975), pp. 6–7.

1 4 2 J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence

(New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 121.
- 43 -

Marines)—many analysts saw no reason to revise these arguments. In 1985, Jenkins,

for example, reiterated that, “simply killing a lot of people has seldom been one

terrorist objective . . . Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force

necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for

their purposes.”1 4 3 In the revised version of his earlier work, Laqueur similarly

emphasized that

Groups such as the German, Italian, French, Turkish or Latin American

terrorists are unlikely to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons,

assuming that they have any political sense at all—an assumption that

cannot always be taken for granted. They claim to act on behalf of the

people, they aspire to popular support, and clearly the use of arms of mass

destruction would not add to their popularity.1 4 4 

In sum, the conventional wisdom held that terrorists were not interested in

killing but in publicity. Violence was employed less as a means of wreaking death and

destruction than as a way to appeal to and attract supporters, focus attention on the

terrorists and their causes, or attain tangible political aims and concessions—for

example, the release of imprisoned brethren, some measure of political autonomy,

independence for an historical homeland, or a change of government. Terrorists, it

was therefore argued, themselves believed that only if their violence were calculated or

regulated would they be able to obtain the popular support or international

recognition they sought or achieve the political ends that they desired.

Since the Tokyo incident, however, these long-standing assumptions have

increasingly been called into question by terrorist attacks that have not only involved

CBRN weapons but that also have caused large numbers of casualties—such as the

World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings and, more recently, the massive

explosions at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As these and other

particularly lethal incidents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Russia, and elsewhere

have demonstrated, the more traditional and familiar types of ideological, ethnonationalist and separatist organizations who dominated terrorism for the past 30

years—and on whom many of our most fundamental assumptions about terrorists and

their behavior are based—have now been joined by a variety of different terrorist

entities with less readily comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations. This

new generation of terrorists not only embraces far more amorphous religious and

millenarian aims but in some cases are themselves less cohesive organizational

entities with a more diffuse structure and membership.1 4 5 

 1 4 3 Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 6. 1 4 4 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 319. 1 4 5 See, for example, the analysis of the international terrorist campaign allegedly orchestrated by

Osama bin Laden in Neil King, Jr., “Moving Target: Fighting Terrorism Is Far More Perilous Than It Used

to Be,” Wall Street Journal Europe, 25 August 1998. This type of loose, networked (as opposed to
- 44 -

The emergence of obscure, idiosyncratic millenarian movements—such as Aum;

the militantly antigovernment, Christian white supremacist militias in the United

States that are fuelled by a volatile mixture of religious, racial, and seditious dicta;1 4 6 

and the shadowy, transnational extremist Islamic movement that has been linked to

the World Trade Center bombing, the attacks in 1995 and 1996 on U.S. military

targets in Saudi Arabia, the 1997 slaughter of Western tourists in Luxor, and the

embassy bombings in East Africa—represents a different and potentially more lethal

threat than the more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries. As former U.S. Senate

staff member John Sopko explained in one of the first analytical efforts to map the

contours of the “new face of terrorism” and assess the implications of Aum’s activities

on future potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons:

. . . past assumptions that those in possession of weapons of mass

destruction are rational, informed opponents who calculate the risks and

benefits before using such force do not apply when these groups are driven

by “divine intervention,” messianic leadership or suicidal instincts. As one

FBI terrorist specialist notes, “it is extremely difficult to deal with someone

not playing with a full deck of cards.”1 4 7 

The appearance of these new types of adversaries, accordingly, may require an

equally profound change in our thinking about terrorist interest in CBRN weapons.

Their markedly different motivations and intentions, coupled with their aspirations

toward more lethal capabilities—compared with the conservatism of their more

traditional, secular counterparts—may already have set in motion a drift toward the

use of less discriminate weapons. It was, of course, international terrorist Osama bin

Laden’s alleged interest in developing a chemical warfare capability for use against

U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia that was cited to justify the August 1998 American cruise

missile attacks on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum.1 4 8 Information has

 

hierarchical) organization also reflects the “Leaderless Resistance” strategy advocated by the Christian

paramilitary, white supremacist movement in the United States today. “Leaderless Resistance,” also

called “phantom cell networks,” lays down a strategy of violence perpetrated by “autonomous leadership

units” (e.g., cells) operating independently of one another that, it is intended, will eventually join together

to create a chain reaction leading to a nationwide, white supremacist revolution. “Leaderless Resistance”

is described in the white supremacist adventure novel, Hunter, written by William Pierce (under the

pseudonym Andrew MacDonald) and published by National Vanguard Books in Hillsboro, Virginia.

Hunter, it should be noted, is the sequel to The Turner Diaries (which Pierce/MacDonald also wrote)—the

novel described by the FBI as the “bible” of the American white supremacist movement and is thought to

have inspired Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Federal office building in Oklahoma City. 1 4 6 For a more complete analysis of the cement that bonds together this seemingly diverse and

disparate collection of citizen militias, tax resistors, antifederalists, bigots, and racists, see Bruce

Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND , R-3618, 1988), pp. 26–27. 1 4 7 Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” p. 15. 1 4 8 See Barbara Crossette et al., “U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production of Chemical Weapons in Sudan,”

New York Times, 25 August 1998; Michael Evans, “Iraqis linked to Sudan Plant,” The Times (London), 25
- 45 -

subsequently emerged alleging that, in 1993, a follower of bin Laden’s had attempted

to purchase enriched uranium in hopes of fabricating a nuclear weapon;1 4 9 while other

unconfirmed (and perhaps less reliable) reports have surfaced that bin Laden may

have already acquired a tactical nuclear weapon or at least attempted to do so.1 5 0 

Moreover, according to U.S. intelligence sources, the fugitive terrorist leader retains a

continuing interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons.1 5 1 Although the

veracity of all these reports cannot be confirmed through open source literature, they

nonetheless suggest a chilling confluence of motive and opportunity perhaps leading

to capability. Admittedly, any number of technical factors greatly inhibit the

deployment and effective use of an illegally acquired nuclear weapon. Similarly, there

remain formidable1 5 2 (but perhaps not insurmountable) barriers that would attend the

construction and detonation of even a primitive device.1 5 3 At the same time, however,

it is fundamentally troubling that terrorists today may increasingly be thinking along

these lines. Moreover, it is sobering to consider, as one terrorism scholar suggests,

that terrorists’ interest in chemical and biological weapons might be impelled by their

frustrations in trying to acquire a real nuclear capability.1 5 4 These developments have

already prompted at least some of terrorism’s leading analysts to revise their previous

thinking on the WMD issue. In his seminal 1996 article, which defined the new era of

terrorism in the post–Cold War world, Laqueur observed: “Proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction does not mean that most terrorists are likely to use them in the

foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating

against it.”1 5 5 This point was even more forcefully presented in the book that followed.

“In an earlier work I warned against overrating the danger of terrorism,” Laqueur

writes,

 

August 1998; James Risen, “New Evidence Ties Sudanese To Bin Laden, U.S. Asserts,” New York Times, 4

October 1998; Gregory L. Vistica and Daniel Klaidman, “Tracking Terror,” Newsweek, 19 October 1998. 1 4 9 Benjamin Weiser, “U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material,” New York Times, 26

September 1998; and, Michael Grunwald, “U.S. Says Bin Laden Sought Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post,

26 September 1998. 1 5 0 Michael Binyon, “Bin Laden ‘now has nuclear arsenal’,” The Times (London), 7 October 1998. 1 5 1 Statement for the record of Louis J. Freeh before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations,

Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies,

4 February 1999 at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/freehct2.htm. 1 5 2 See, for example, the compelling arguments presented in Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuclear

Terrorism—Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?,” Aussenpolitik—German Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 46, no.

3. (1995) World-Wide Web Page of the International Security Net, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

(http://www.ethz.ch/au-pol/kamp.htm), pp. 4–7. See also, Karl-Heinz Kamp, “‘Loose Nukes’: A Distant

But Still Critical Threat,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 19 August 1996. 1 5 3 On the surmountable hurdles regarding the relative ease with which a radiological device could

be constructed see Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, pp. 57–61; and, Arbman, “A Swedish View on

Nuclear Terrorism,” pp. 56–57, 59 and 60. 1 5 4 There is evidence that suggests both Aum and bin Laden either turned to, or redoubled, their

efforts to develop chemical and/or biological capabilities when their respective nuclear ambitions could

not be realized. See Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Micro-proliferation: Lessons from the Aum Shinrikyo

and al Qaida,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 22, no. 4 (September-December 1999), forthcoming. 1 5 5 Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5 (September-October

1996), p. 34.
- 46 -

which was neither a new phenomenon nor as politically effective as we are

often led to believe. . . . While I decried the idea that terrorism was steadily

growing into a global threat, I also wrote that it could become one as the

result of technological developments. . . . The ready availability of weapons

of mass destruction has now come to pass, and much of what has been

thought about terrorism, including some of our most basic assumptions,

must be reconsidered. The character of terrorism is changing, any

restraints that existed are disappearing, and, above all, the threat to

human life has become infinitely greater than it was in the past.1 5 6 

The Lessons of Aum: A Reassessment

The repercussions of the Tokyo nerve gas attack have exerted a profound

impact, beyond that incident itself, on our thinking CBRN terrorism. This is not

surprising, given the 12 persons who were killed and the thousands of casualties

thought to have been caused by the attack. Moreover, it was only after the subway

incident that evidence came to light revealing the enormity of Aum’s catastrophic

ambitions. When police raided the sect’s laboratories following the nerve gas attack,

for example, they found enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million persons.1 5 7 In

addition, Aum had either already produced or had plans to develop other powerful

nerve agents, such as VX, tabun, and soman; chemical weapons, such as mustard gas

and sodium cyanide; and deadly biological warfare pathogens that included anthrax,

the highly contagious disease known as Q-fever1 5 8 —and possibly the deadly Ebola

virus as well.1 5 9 Aum’s most ambitious project, however, was doubtless its efforts to

develop a nuclear capability. To this end, the group had purchased a 500,000-acre

sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia. There, they hoped to mine

uranium to be shipped back to Aum’s laboratories in Japan, where scientists using

laser enrichment technology would convert it into weapons-grade nuclear material.1 6 0 

 1 5 6 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York and

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7. 1 5 7 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Sect’s poisons “could kill 4.2m’,” The Independent on Sunday (London), 26

March 1995; and, Andrew Pollack, “Japanese Police Say They Found Germ-War Material at Cult Site,”

New York Times, 29 March 1995. 1 5 8 Reuters, “Aum Cult Gas Cache,” International Herald Tribune (Paris), 13 December 1996. See

also, National (Japanese) Police Agency, “Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group’s

Organization and Activities,” Shoten (Tokyo), no. 252 (1995), pp. 10–12; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at

the End of the World, pp. 10, 95–97, 121–125, 151, 211–221 and 232. 1 5 9 Following an outbreak of Ebola in Zaire in 1992, Asahara and 40 followers traveled to that

country ostensibly on a humanitarian aid mission. Associated Press and Agence France-Presse, “Cult

‘studied deadly Ebola virus’,” New York Times, 25 April 1995. See also, Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at

the End of the World, pp. 96–97. 1 6 0 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 85, 126–133; 190–192 and 208; and,

Sopko, ‘The Changing Proliferation Threat’, p. 13.
- 47 -

The group had also assembled an impressive array of conventional weaponry.

Aum is believed to have purchased large quantities of small arms from Russian

sources and to have been in the market for advanced weaponry, such as tanks, jet

fighters, surface-to-surface rocket launchers, and even a tactical nuclear weapon.

What is known is that Aum succeeded in obtaining a surplus twin-turbine Mi-17

helicopter—complete with chemical spray dispersal devices. The group also

planned—and had gone as far as to acquire—sophisticated robotic manufacturing

devices, to produce at least 1,000 operational replicas of Russia’s world-famous AK-47

assault rifle along with one million rounds of ammunition. Finally, the sect had

determined how to manufacture TNT and the central component of plastic explosives,

RDX.1 6 1 

As this inventory of armaments and technological and engineering

accomplishments suggests, Aum was no ordinary terrorist group. Rather than the

handful of men and women with limited training, technical capabilities, and resources,

that has long colored our conception of the archetypal terrorist organization, Aum

was—by any measure—unique. It was a religious movement with upwards of 60,000

members, with offices in New York, Germany, Australia, and Sri Lanka—in addition to

Japan and Russia.1 6 2 Aum had assets estimated to be as high as $1 billion1 6 3 —at least

in the hundred millions. It recruited graduates with scientific and engineering degrees

from Japan’s leading universities and provided them with state-of-the-art laboratories

and with lavish budgets to fund the group’s variegated weapons R&D programs.1 6 4 

Indeed, up to 80 scientific personnel were detailed to work on the group’s chemical

weapons programs, according to one estimate; its biological weapons research,

however, never employed more than perhaps 20 persons at most.1 6 5 

 1 6 1 See Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 76, 88, 107–112, 151, and

190–193; Campbell, “Excerpts from Research Study: ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism:

Proliferation by Non-State Actors,’” pp. 35–37; Ron Purver, “Chemical Terrorism In Japan” (unpublished

paper by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada, June 1995), p. 15; and, National

Police Agency, “Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group’s Organization and Activities,”

p. 10. 1 6 2 U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,

Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1996), p. 16. See also, Andrew Pollack, “Japanese Sect May Struggle To Get By Without Its

Leader,” New York Times, 17 May 1995; Alessandra Stanley, “Russians Shut Down Branch of Japanese

Sect,” New York Times, 30 March 1995; and, William J. Broad, “Seismic Blast: Bomb or Quake?,” New

York Times, 23 January 1997. One account, however, puts Aum membership at 10,000 persons. See

Kevin Sullivan, “Japan Cult Survives While Guru is Jailed,” Washington Post, September 28, 1997. 1 6 3 U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,

Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 16; and, Broad, “Seismic Blast: Bomb or Quake?,”

23 January 1997. Indeed, when police searched Asahara’s office, they reportedly discovered 22 pounds of

gold and about $7.5 million in cash. See Shoichi Okawa, “Aum Shinrikyo,” at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/ cults/a-z-cults/a_cults.html. 1 6 4 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 199–222. 1 6 5 Telephone interviews by RAND research staff with Professor Anthony Tu, July 21, 1999, and

Milton Leitenberg, July 16, 1999.
- 48 -

Despite Aum’s considerable financial wealth, the technical expertise that it

could call on from its well-educated members, and the vast resources and state-of-theart equipment at their disposal, the group could not effect even a single truly

successful chemical or biological attack. On at least nine occasions the group

attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin (Clostridium botulinum) or anthrax (Bacillus

anthracis) using aerosol means; each time they failed either because the botulinum

agents they grew and enriched were not toxic or the mechanical sprayers used to

disseminate the anthrax spores became clogged and inoperative.1 6 6 Even the more

successful sarin attack on the Tokyo subway would almost be laughable, if not for the

tragic deaths of 12 persons and harm caused to thousands more. For all its

sophisticated research and development, the best means the group could find to

disseminate the nerve gas was in plastic trash bags that had to be poked open with

sharpened umbrella tips to release the noxious mixture.1 6 7 

Finally, the group’s distinct lack of success in wreaking the mass destruction or

mass casualties ascribed to these types of weapons, despite the considerable

resources at its disposal, speaks volumes about the challenges facing any lessendowed terrorist organization. New research has revealed that, of the 5,000 persons

who received medical treatment in the aftermath of the subway attack, the vast

majority suffered from shock or emotional upset, or evidenced some psychosomatic

symptom. Accordingly, the number of persons physically injured or affected by the

attack may be much lower than previously reported.1 6 8 

In sum, Aum’s experience suggests—however counterintuitively or contrary to

popular belief—the significant technological difficulties faced by any nonstate entity in

attempting to weaponize and disseminate chemical and biological weapons

effectively.1 6 9 Although the Aum experience represents only a single point of reference,

it provides a striking refutation of the claim about the ease with which such weapons

can be fabricated and made operational. Public officials, journalists, and analysts, for

example, have repeatedly alleged that biological attacks in particular are relatively

easy for terrorists to undertake. According to one state emergency management

official, biological weapons “are available—and easy to make. . . . One does not need a

degree in microbiology to make this work, being able to read is enough. . . . It’s not

like enriching uranium.”1 7 0 Similarly, both the White House and some senior FBI

 1 6 6 Two attempts were made with anthrax and seven with botulinum toxin. Carus, Bioterrorism and

Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, p. 62. 1 6 7 Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, pp. 126 & 129. 1 6 8 Milton Leitenberg, “The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological

Agents,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999), forthcoming. 1 6 9 Indeed, this same point can also be made of the formidable hurdles faced by many established

states in developing their own effective weapons programs in the same areas of chemical, biological, and

nuclear warfare. 1 7 0 Quoted in Grant Sasek, “Officials in State Warn of Biological Terrorism,” Helena Independent

Record (http://billingsgazette.com/region.990125_reg009.html).
- 49 -

officials have previously argued that the information needed to develop chemical and

biological weapons can be readily obtained from the Internet and other open

sources.1 7 1 Although some biological and chemical agents may be easier to develop

than others, such claims do not readily square with the facts known about the Aum

incident, given Aum’s experience and its concerted, years-long R&D activities.1 7 2 

While much information has emerged since the 1995 attack regarding Aum’s

chemical and biological warfare activities, crucial details are still missing or remain

hidden that might conclusively reveal precisely why Aum’s ambitious efforts in both

these areas failed. Japanese authorities have released little public information, and

the cult itself is believed to have destroyed key evidence regarding its bioterrorism

programs. Moreover, a senior Aum official with extensive knowledge about these

programs was himself murdered by the group.1 7 3 Accordingly, the majority of what we

do know has come mostly from court documents and testimony pertaining to the trials

of leading cult members. According to one expert, who has followed both the Aum and

other actual and putative biological terrorist incidents closely, “Too little is known

about the Aum’s activities to determine why they failed.”1 7 4 

Nevertheless, it is possible to use the available unclassified information to make

some informed, preliminary hypotheses about why the cult did not achieve its

bioterrorism objectives. These fall into three interrelated categories:

First, Aum was unable to surmount the challenge of acquiring sufficiently lethal

strains of botulinum toxin and anthrax bacilli. Although terrorists have obtained

biological agents from nature or cultured these pathogens themselves, acquiring

virulent strains appears to be a major challenge. While Aum apparently developed a

 1 7 1 See, for example, the White House, “Fact Sheet on Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision

Directive 62,” May 22, 1998, accessed at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdd-62.htm , which states

that, “easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is

greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of

mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government”; statement for the

record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998, http://www.fbi.gov/

congress/98archives/threats.ht m, of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh: “The ease of manufacturing or

obtaining biological and chemical agents is disturbing. Available public source material makes our law

enforcement mission a continuous challenge.”; and statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic

Terrorism Section, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, 19 May 1999, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/bioleg3.ht m, which states that,

“literature containing recipes and modes of dissemination are available through ‘how to’ literature and

over the Internet.” 1 7 2 In the words of one senior intelligence analyst, “while popular culture can explore the potential

BW threat, actually developing and using an effective biological weapon poses certain technological

challenges.” U.S. Congress, “Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A.

Lauder on the Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

3 March 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/lauder_speech_030399.html 1 7 3 Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, “How Japan Terror Alerted World,” New

York Times, 26 May 1998. 1 7 4 Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, p 24.
- 50 -

lethal biological agent that they used to contaminate cult members’ food, the strains of

botulinum toxin and B. anthracis they used in their attacks, which were intended to

cause mass casualties, were either insufficiently toxic or were disseminated in

quantities too small to have any lethal effects.1 7 5 The mistakes that Aum made in its

attempt to develop a lethal strain might not be repeated in the future by other

terrorists. Moreover, it is possible that terrorists in the future may steal highly lethal

pathogens or toxins from government or private facilities. Indeed, illicit acquisitions of

biological agents have already taken place. In May 1995, for example, the FBI

arrested Larry Wayne Harris, a one-time member of the American white supremacist

organization, the Aryan Nations, who had acquired freeze-dried Yersina pestis, the

organism that causes plague, from the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville,

Maryland, using falsified documents.1 7 6 Sophisticated terrorists may also seek to

culture pathogens or toxins “in-house” or acquire them from nature; but as the Aum

case suggests, this is a far greater challenge than is generally thought.

Second, Aum found that it was extremely difficult to prepare chemical and

biological agents for dissemination and dispersal. As the group learned from its failed

biological attacks, dissemination remains a major hurdle for any terrorist seeking to

kill with biological agents on a mass scale. Drying anthrax spores or other living

organisms for the purpose of aerosolization demands great skill as well as

sophisticated equipment. Even if terrorists manage to acquire a lethal pathogen, it

appears relatively easy to destroy large amounts of it unintentionally during the

aerosolization process. An alternative to a dry aerosol is the use of a liquid slurry.

But as Aum discovered when it attempted to disseminate anthrax bacillus from the

roof of its Tokyo building, slurries are likely clog sprayers. Terrorists may overcome

these dissemination hurdles by using a highly contagious agent, such as

smallpox—itself a highly infectious organism—assuming that they could overcome the

difficulty in acquiring it.1 7 7 According to a former Soviet biological warfare expert,

“with smallpox, you [could simply] use people as disseminators.”1 7 8 

 1 7 5 Ibid., p. 62. 1 7 6 Ibid., pp. 184–185. It should be noted, however, that Harris maintained that he needed the

cultures to pursue his interest in developing medical treatments for the disease. Subsequent

investigations uncovered no information suggesting a more malevolent intention, and Harris was indicted

only for wire fraud (e.g., for misrepresenting himself on the order form to purchase the organism). 1 7 7 Only two WHO-authorized repositories for smallpox exist. One is at the Centers for Disease

Control in Atlanta, and one is in Russia, at the State Research institute of Virology and Biotechnology.

There are suspicions, however, that illicit stockpiles of smallpox exist in other parts of Russia, and

perhaps elsewhere. 1 7 8 Quoted in Richard Preston, “The Demon in the Freezer,” The New Yorker, July 12, 1999, p. 56.

Preston also quotes a bioterrorism expert who claims to have discovered a credit-card sized machine used

by the silicon-chip industry that is capable of making “an invisible mist of particles in the one-to-five

micron size range—that size hangs in the air for hours, and gets into the lungs. You can run it on a

camcorder battery.” Ibid., p. 60.
- 51 -

Third, there were the limitations imposed on Aum’s biological weapons effort by

the nature of the organization itself. Terrorists hoping to acquire and use biological

weapons on a mass scale face a major hurdle within their own organizations. Unless

terrorists steal or are given an effective system, they will have to create one. This

requires scientific and other technical expertise, sophisticated equipment, financial

resources, and the management and leadership to plan and organize a complex

enterprise. Cult-like terrorist organizations—the ones that appear to have the greatest

interest in biological weapons—may be least suited to meet the complex demands

associated with a bioweapon program. Throughout the existence of its biological

weapons program, Aum scientists seemed hampered by the cult’s fickle and irrational

leadership and by poor scientific judgment and a lack of experience in working with

such agents as B. anthracis and botulinum toxin.1 7 9 Aum scientists, socially and

physically isolated and ruled by an increasingly paranoid leader, became divorced

from reality and unable to make sound judgments.1 8 0 

 1 7 9 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, p. 23. 1 8 0 Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, p. 158.
- 52 -

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the publication date of this report, the Panel will have been formally

conducting business for about six months, and will have had three official

meetings—the most recent on December 13, 1999. During that time, substantial

information and authoritative analyses have been presented to or have come to the

attention of the Panel and its members. Moreover, the Panel is composed of members

who have significant expertise and broad experience in this field.

Based on the information provided, the thorough analysis of the potential threats

contained in this report, and the collective knowledge and experience of its members,

the Panel has drawn some initial conclusions and is making several broad

recommendations. In its two subsequent annual reports, the Panel will make more

comprehensive and definitive recommendations on a variety of topics.

These initial conclusions and recommendations should not be construed to

suggest that the Federal government—either in its executive or legislative

branch—currently undertake a major restructuring for this (or any other) potential

crisis. The recommendations are intended to propose solutions to this critical national

problem to assist in making Federal programs and activities more effective and

efficient.

It is axiomatic that, the better we prepare, through a broad spectrum of

antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities, the more likely we are to reach the ideal

situation—the deterrence, prevention, or interdiction of any terrorist event before it

occurs. Given the nature of the potential threats, it is likely that no amount of

preparation will cover all possible threat scenarios, and that adequate measures must

be undertaken to respond, if an event should occur, in a way that will—first and

foremost—minimize human casualties, and that will also mitigate damage to property

and to the environment.

In order to achieve these inter-related goals—effective deterrence, prevention,

interdiction, and response—efforts at all levels of government must be concerted,

concentrated, and collective.1 8 1 

Threat Assessments and Analyses

This report observes that there has not been universal agreement on several

aspects of the potential threat or threats from terrorists who may use or attempt to

 1 8 1 The Panel notes with much interest the recent announcement by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation of its plan to reorganize the bureau, creating a separate Counterterrorism Division, which

will focus on terrorist threats, domestic preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection. See “FBI to

Restructure, Adding Emphasis on Crime Prevention,” The Washington Post, November 11, 1999, p. A2. 
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use CBRN devices or other “weapons of mass destruction.” Early in its deliberations,

the Panel determined that, for it to make well-reasoned and informed assessments and

to offer substantive, comprehensive, and articulate policy recommendations to the

nation’s executive and its legislature, a complete, current, and realistic analysis of the

potential domestic threats from terrorists was an essential condition precedent to

fulfilling the Panel’s legislative mandate. With some condensation, this report sets

forth the analysis commissioned by the Panel.

That fundamental philosophy—the need for comprehensive, definitive,

authoritative, articulate assessments and analyses of the potential domestic threats

from terrorists on a continuing basis—has application to policymakers at all levels of

government who may have any responsibility for addressing this issue.

Because the United States is very much an open society, it always will be

vulnerable to terrorism. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that, just because

a particular locality or facility is vulnerable to terrorist attack at any point in time, a

credible threat exists that can exploit that vulnerability. On the other hand, because

of the potential catastrophic consequences of a successful incident perpetrated by a

terrorist using a CBRN or other device that has the capability to cause “mass

destruction” or “mass casualties,” agencies at all levels must be diligent in developing

and assessing information on credible terrorists threats. Only through thorough,

comprehensive, articulate, and continuing threat assessments and analyses will

appropriate entities at the various levels of government be able to conduct the ensuing

risk and vulnerability assessments, to develop and conduct activities to counter any

credible threat, or to respond if an event occurs. A recent report of the United States

General Accounting Office (GAO) entitled “Combating Terrorism: Need for

Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks,”1 8 2 

succinctly states:

A formal assessment of the domestic-origin threat, combined with existing

assessments of the foreign-origin threat, would provide an authoritative,

written, comprehensive, intelligence community view on specific chemical and

biological terrorist threats. . . . Soundly performed risk assessments could help

ensure that specific programs and related expenditures are justified and

targeted according to the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack scenarios

generated and assessed by a multidisciplinary team of experts.1 8 3 

The Panel has indicated its concern about a preoccupation with the “worst-case

scenario,” and the attendant assumption that any lesser incident can be addressed

 1 8 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 1999. The report is the fourteenth comprehensive analysis in

an impressive list of reports on combating terrorism. The report and its related predecessors may be

ordered from the GAO or accessed at its Website at: http://www.gao.gov 1 8 3 Ibid., at p. 3.
- 54 -

equally well by planning for the most catastrophic threat—ignoring the fact that

higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks might present unique challenges of

their own. As noted, this approach may not be the best means of setting budgetary

priorities and allocating resources. The Panel is convinced, therefore, that more

attention should be directed to assessments of the higher-probability, lowerconsequence end of the potential terrorist threat spectrum—not at the expense of, but

in addition to, assessments and analyses of the higher-consequence threat scenarios.

The Panel has been provided with the recent FBI report on “Project Megiddo,”

and considers that effort to be clearly within the ambit of the foregoing assessment

and recommendations. With respect to this topic, and other recommendations and

initiatives addressed elsewhere in this report (notably on the subject of information

sharing, which follows), the Panel is sensitive to the civil liberties implications and

issues that may arise in the course of such activities. In the interest of sustaining the

broadest-possible public support, the Panel urges officials at all levels of government

to ensure that the civil liberties of our citizens are protected.

A National Strategy

Based on the Panel’s threat analysis, other relevant information that has come to

its attention, and the knowledge and experience of its own members, the Panel is

convinced that a national strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and

response to terrorist incidents involving CBRN and other types of weapons is urgently

needed.

Combating terrorism is clearly a national issue, but the responsibility for the

domestic response to a terrorist CBRN incident is not necessarily—and will almost

never be exclusively—a Federal one. For a response to those incidents described as

“higher probability, lower consequence,” the Federal role is essentially one of providing

support to state and local responders, fundamentally in reaction to a request for

assistance. It is at the local and state level where the task of the initial response and,

in almost every case, the primary responsibilities lie. It is only in the case of a

catastrophic event—certainly possible, but of the “lower probability, higher

consequence” type—that major responsibilities will reside at the Federal level.

Federal involvement in an incident, which could include numerous civilian

departments and agencies as well as military entities, will be defined by the nature

and severity of the incident. As an example, in any case where an incident may be a

terrorist act, the FBI will have an initial involvement in an investigation; if the incident

is determined to be terrorism, the FBI will assume a leading role. Nevertheless, the

Federal role will, in most cases, be supportive of state and local authorities, who

traditionally have the fundamental responsibility for responding.
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At the same time, the Federal government can and must provide significant

support and assistance, both in preparation and in the event that such an incident

actually occurs. There are considerable Federal resources that can be brought to bear

in the areas of planning, training, standards, research and development, and

equipment. Consequently, there needs to be a “Federal Government Strategy”

component of the national strategy—one which clearly articulates Federal

responsibilities, roles, and missions, and distinguishes those from state and local

ones. Federal funding, and the activities and programs of a number of Federal

agencies, to address domestic preparedness and response to such incidents, have

increased dramatically in recent years, especially in the wake of the New York World

Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and the Aum Shinrikyo attack in the

Tokyo subway system. Despite good intentions, and recent improvements in

coordination and implementation, Federal programs addressing the issue appear, in

many cases, to be fragmented, overlapping, lacking focus, and uncoordinated. The

Federal component of a national strategy can help to reduce the redundancy,

confusion, and fragmentation of current Federal efforts.

Representatives of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO)(which will

be discussed in more detail below) have stated that the NDPO will develop a “national

strategy” to address domestic preparedness issues. Given the fact that the

responsibility for the initial and, in large measure, continuing response to any such

incident will likely fall most heavily on the backs of state and local responders, the

Panel suggests that a true national strategy must have a “bottom-up” approach—that

it be developed in close consultation and collaboration with state and local officials,

and the law enforcement and emergency response communities from across the

country. This Panel can help to forge that collaboration. Moreover, any such national

strategy—despite its “bottom-up” structure—must have the direct leadership,

guidance, and imprimatur of the President. Only that way can a strategy have a truly

national tenor; but more importantly, it will contain a comprehensive, articulate

expression by the nation’s chief executive of the appropriateness of and distinctions

between the Federal role and missions and those at state and local levels.

By focusing on higher-probability/lower-consequence threats, while recognizing

and addressing concerns about lower-probability/higher-consequence events, a

national strategy can lay the groundwork for assessing and monitoring the threat, and

for making adjustments to response strategies as required. As has been argued

elsewhere, too much of the Federal effort to date—even those programs that ostensibly

are designed to enhance state and local response capabilities—has been predicated on

the tacit assumption that preparing for the “worst case” will automatically encompass

lesser threats. The foregoing analysis suggests otherwise, because the nature and

scale of the consequences can vary so widely. This needs to be recognized and

articulated at the national level.
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The Panel is aware of the “Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime Plan”—recently released (September 1999) by the Attorney General

of the United States, under the auspices of Department of Justice “lead agency”

responsibility—as well as the interagency working group process dedicated to “WMD

preparedness” within the National Security Council structure. Although significant

steps in the right direction, the five-year plan does not equate to a comprehensive,

fully coordinated national strategy—nor for that matter even the Federal government

component of such a strategy—one with clear, concise, and unambiguous leadership

and direction from the President in consultation with all who share responsibility for

related Federal efforts.

The Panel also recommends that any such strategy include, within its purview,

incidents involving more conventional weapons—such as conventional high-explosive

or fabricated weapons (e.g., the type used in the Oklahoma City bombing)—that have

the potential to cause significant casualties or physical damage; as well as incidents

involving CBRN devices that may not be capable of producing “mass casualties” but

that can, nevertheless, produce considerable fear, panic, or other major disruptions to

the infrastructure or economy of the potential domestic target.

Considering the serious nature and potential consequences of any terrorist

incident, the Panel is convinced that comprehensive public education and information

programs must be developed, programs that will provide straight-forward, timely

information and advice both prior to any terrorist incident and in the immediate

aftermath of any attack. The national strategy should lay the groundwork for those

programs.

Complexity of the Federal Structure

As indicated by the charts at Appendix A, which depict departments and

agencies that have various programs addressing antiterrorism or counterterrorism, or

both, the Federal bureaucratic structure is massive and complex. In various forums,

state and local officials consistently express frustration in understanding where or

how to enter this bureaucratic maze to obtain information, assistance, funding and

support. In addition, Federal programs, especially those involving grants for funding

or other resources, may be overly complicated, time consuming, and repetitive.

In recent months, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, pursuant to its “leadagency” role (specified in the related Presidential Decision Directives) for crisis

management for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, was directed by the

Attorney General of the United States to organize, within its own resources, a National

Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The ostensible purpose of the NDPO is to serve

as a focal point and “clearinghouse” for related preparedness information and for

directing state and local entities to the appropriate agency of the Federal government
- 57 -

for obtaining additional information, assistance, and support. There has been

discussion about the issue of whether the FBI is the appropriate location or whether

the NDPO structure and approach is the most effective way to address the

complexities of the Federal organization and programs designed to enhance domestic

response capabilities. The Panel is convinced that the concept behind the NDPO is

sound, and notes with interest that the Congress has recently authorized and

appropriated funds ($6 million) for the operation of the NDPO. While that authority

will give the NDPO some wherewithal to operate and to hire persons from outside the

FBI, the Panel has seen no specific direction to other Federal agencies to provide

personnel or other resources to the NDPO, to assist in a concerted, well-coordinated

effort.1 8 4 

Congressional Responsibilities

In much the same way that the complexity of the Federal bureaucratic

structure is an obstacle—from a state and local perspective—to the provision of

effective and efficient Federal assistance, it appears that the Congress has made most

of its decisions for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and

response issues with little or no coordination. The various committees of the Congress

continue to provide authority and money within the confines of each committee’s

jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and programs.1 8 5 The

Panel recommends, therefore, that the Congress consider forming an ad hoc Joint

Special or Select Committee, composed of representatives of the various committees

with oversight and funding responsibilities for these issues, and give such an entity

the authority to make determinations that will result in more coherent efforts at the

Federal level.

Information Sharing

State and local officials express the need for more “intelligence”, and for better

information sharing among entities at all levels on potential terrorist threats. While

the Panel is acutely aware of the need to protect classified national security

information, and the sources and methods by which it may have been obtained, the

Panel believes that more can and must be done to provide timely information—up,

down, and laterally, at all levels of government—to those who need the information to

provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection, or response to potential

 1 8 4 Some Federal agencies have, however, agreed to “detail” personnel to the NDPO. 1 8 5 With coordination from the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council

staff, the budget submission from the Executive “rolls up”—for display purposes—all related programs to

combat terrorism, including those designed to strengthen domestic preparedness. Nevertheless,

representatives of the Executive Branch must “market” those programs to the individual oversight and

appropriating committees.
- 58 -

threats.1 8 6 This may entail granting security clearances to additional officials at the

state and local level. And as noted, the FBI report on Project Megiddo, and the

briefings of its findings to state and local officials, is salutary.

The Panel is also aware of efforts in the Los Angeles area, in connection with the

operational area terrorism working group (TWG) composed of LA county and municipal

agencies, and the area’s terrorism early warning (TEW) group; and of the multijurisdictional effort in New England aimed at collective information sharing of terrorist

and other criminal threats. Those initiatives, as well as others that have been formed

under the auspices of the FBI program to establish joint terrorism task forces, could

be models for other regional programs, and for Federal interface with state and local

jurisdictions, to improve and facilitate information sharing.

The Panel is convinced that efforts in this area must be based on the use of the

most modern information technology available.

Definitions and Terms of Reference

Many of the terms and definitions that are essential to the instant discussion

are ambiguous and confusing. The definition contained in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

(NLD) Act—which directed specific actions in this arena, and which has been used as

the basis for the development of others—defines “weapons of mass destruction” as

. . . .any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to

cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people

through the release, dissemination, or impact of—

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;

(B) a disease organism; or

(C) radiation or radioactivity.

Nevertheless, 18 U.S.C, Section 2332a, which makes it a Federal crime—carrying a

maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment—to use “certain weapons of mass

destruction,” includes in its definition of such weapons not only definitional elements

substantially similar to those contained in NLD, but also “any destructive device as

defined in section 921” of that title, which includes

(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

 1 8 6 From discussions at Panel meetings, and from comments that have been made by officials in

other forums, information-sharing apparently has been improving in recent months.
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(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than onequarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;

(B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which. . .is

generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by

whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to,

expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, and

which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter;

and

(C) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in

converting any device into any destructive device described in

subparagraph (A) or (B) and from any combination of parts either designed

or intended for use in converting any which a destructive device may be

readily assembled.

While the Title 18 definition is more inclusive in terms of certain conventional

explosive devices that do not fit within the traditional categories of chemical,

biological, radiological or other nuclear devices, both definitions beg the question of

what constitutes a “significant number of people.” A single CBRN or conventional

weapon that is neither intended nor has the capability “to cause death or serious

bodily injury to a significant number of people” is not included within the actions

proscribed; but could, either alone or in a series of actual or threatened events create

panic or other significant disruptions.

A recent GAO report on Combating Terrorism flatly states, “no federal agency

has defined what constitutes ‘mass casualties’.”1 8 7 

And several Federal agencies (e.g., the FBI and the Department of Defense) have

their own definition of terrorism.

The Panel recommends that there be a revision and codification of universal,

unambiguous, and easily understandable definitions of the various terms used in this

context.

 1 8 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-163, at p. 6. The Department of Health and Human Services has arbitrarily

determined that it will use the figure of 1,000 casualties for planning purposes in establishing its

Metropolitan Medical Response System.
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Standards, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

The Panel will devote significant attention during its current fiscal year

activities to standards, especially for training and equipment. Given the likelihood

that multiple jurisdictions in one or more states, as well as agencies of the Federal

government, will be involved in any serious terrorist incident, it will be critical that

every responder in a particular emergency function be trained to the same standard.

The types of equipment used by response entities—detection devices, personal

protective equipment, and communications equipment—must be compatible and

inter-operable. The Panel commends the efforts being undertaken by the Interagency

Board (IAB) for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability—composed of

representatives of various Federal, state, and local entities, as well as some

nongovernmental professional organizations—in its attempt to develop a national

“standardized equipment list,” to provide responders at all levels with a resource with

which to make better-informed decisions about the selection and acquisition of

equipment. Such efforts are a positive step toward ensuring better compatibility and

inter-operability of equipment among potential responders.

Local responders continue to express frustration at the vast array of devices

and equipment available from industry that may have application for domestic

preparedness for terrorist attacks. At the same time, some have expressed displeasure

at the fact that certain items, previously purchased by local responders, do not

measure up to the claims of manufacturers.

In order to develop and maintain operationally effective standards for

equipment compatibility and inter-operability, the Panel has determined that more

research and development is required to meet local responder needs. Given the

significant costs associated with sophisticated equipment, such as certain chemical

and biological detection devices, emphasis should be placed on the development of

multi-purpose pieces of equipment, which can be used not only in the terrorism

context, but which will also have application in other fields, such as the detection of

naturally transmitted infectious diseases.

To help to reassure responders that the equipment that is being used is in fact

capable of doing what it is designed to do, it is likely that an ambitious program of

independent testing and evaluation will have to be undertaken. The Panel recognizes

that any such program will likely have to be conducted—because of its national

implications—under Federal sponsorship; and will require the addition or reallocation
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of significant resources.1 8 8 For reasons that are self-evident, local responders are

insisting that testing be done with “live” agents.

The Panel is aware of a project being undertaken by the National Institute of

Justice (NIJ), an agency the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs,

which is ultimately designed to be a “consumer report” catalogue of available

equipment that meets certain listed standards.

The Issue of “Who’s in Charge”

Increasingly, the Panel and its supporting staff have heard the question raised,

“When an incident occurs, who’s in charge?” The Panel has initially concluded that

there is no single answer to the question—a determination will likely have to be made

on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, among other factors, the nature of

the incident; the perpetrator source; the actual or potential consequences immediately

and over time; and the then-current capabilities for effective response at various

levels. In every actual terrorist incident, non-Federal local responders will always be

in charge initially, unless of course the incident occurs on a military or other Federal

reservation which has its own response capability. Even in the latter case, an incident

may be of such proportions that non-Federal responders may be just as engaged, if

not more so, as the Federal responders on the government enclave may be.

The issue may be compounded by the fact that certain responsibilities at the

Federal level have been bifurcated. Under the related Presidential Decision Directives,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the “lead agency” responsibility for “crisis

management,” while the Federal Emergency Management Agency is “lead” for

“consequence management.” The “five-year plan,” recently released by the

Department of Justice, acknowledges that

there is often no clear point in time when resolution of a terrorist

incident moves from the crisis to the consequence management stage.

Indeed, these phases may occur simultaneously or, in some cases, the

consequence management phase may actually precede the identification

of a terrorist event.1 8 9 

At this point, the Panel reserves judgment on the issue of whether changes should be

made in Federal “lead agency” responsibilities, but will include the issue as a “thread”

 1 8 8 At a recent conference of the IAB, it was noted by an official from the National Institute of

Occupational Safety and Health that there are some 7,000 respiratory devices—mostly protective

masks—that have potential application to a response to a chemical or biological incident, and that to test

a device properly will take form four to six weeks—per device. 1 8 9 “Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan,” p. 21.
- 62 -

which runs throughout its consideration of many aspects of preparations for response

at all levels.

Many local responders are also justifiably concerned that Federal agents will

assume command following almost any terrorist attack. In more discrete terms, local

responders express concern that, having established an excellent relationship with

Federal agencies at the local or regional level, when the “planes from Washington”

start to arrive, local agencies will be faced with an entirely new team—one which may

set different ground rules than those to which local responders and their local or

regional Federal counterparts have previously agreed. Nevertheless, in various

forums, local responders have noted improvement in this area during the past year,

especially in the out-reach and bridge-building initiatives of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

When an actual incident is or becomes one that requires a major Federal

response, to the point that a Federal entity may have to “take command” of an

operation, the issue of when and how an appropriate “hand-off” from local to Federal

authorities takes place continues to be a significant one for resolution—sooner rather

than later. While the Panel is aware that the issue is being addressed in inter-agency

and inter-governmental agreements, and is being included in a number of exercises,

efforts by entities at all levels must, in the opinion of the Panel, be accelerated to

provide the necessary agreed-on templates for such hand-offs to take place. This

issue, especially any specific agreements that may be reached between Federal and

local officials, should always be included in related training, exercises, and other

appropriate forums, to ensure that any such transition will be as smooth as possible

in an actual operation.

Summary

Regardless of the level of consequences from a terrorist event, we must as a

nation ensure that we have programs that will provide the capabilities for local, state,

and Federal authorities to respond effectively. Existing local, state and national

response systems, used for a variety of emergency situations, may provide a solid

foundation for preparedness for a terrorist incident. Managing the consequences of

any type or size terrorist event may require, however, a somewhat different approach

on the part of state and local officials and their Federal partners. Thus, we must

ensure a basic ability for the three levels of government to integrate activities laterally

and vertically in the development of policy and operational guidelines.
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V. PLANNED PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR

Having obtained the comprehensive “benchmark” threat analysis contained in

the foregoing sections of this report, and considering additional analyses and other

significant information that has come to its attention, the Panel has embarked on an

ambitious program of activities for the current fiscal year, which began October 1.

As noted in section one, the enabling legislation that created the Panel charged it

with five specific responsibilities:

• To assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for

incidents involving WMD;

• To assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency

responses to incidents involving WMD;

• To assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving WMD,

including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning

requirements, and the needs of maritime regions;

• To recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to

Federal agency WMD response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local

response capabilities for WMD incidents; and

• To assess the appropriate roles of state and local government in funding

effective local response capabilities. 1 9 0 

Activities in the current year will be particularly focused on the first three of the

Panel’s responsibilities. The Panel, in its next annual report due to the President and

the Congress on December 15, 2000, will provide a comprehensive report of those

activities, along with additional analyses, conclusions, and recommendations.

Comprehensive analyses, conclusions, and recommendations with respect to the

fourth and fifth responsibilities, as well as those related to maritime regions, will be

contained in the third and final annual report, due December 15, 2001. The Panel will

likely make some interim recommendations in connection with those latter

responsibilities in its next report.

Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Federal Programs

The panel, in conjunction with its supporting FFRDC, will undertake a thorough

review and analysis of existing Federal programs that are designed, in whole or in

part, to support or enhance domestic preparedness programs for terrorist incidents

involving CBRN weapons. That review and analysis will include, among other things,

consideration of:

 

 1 9 0 For purposes of the Panel’s activities and recommendations, it has included the state level

within the scope of its mandate.
- 64 -

• The complexity of the Federal organizational structure for providing

information, assistance, or enhancements to local responders

• Duplicative or overlapping Federal programs for or obstacles to providing such

information, assistance, or enhancements

• Analyses of the potential effectiveness and efficiency of each such program,

based on the program description, additional information provided by the

affected Federal agency, and other information available to the Panel

The review and analysis will place particular emphasis on those areas specifically

mentioned in the enabling legislation: training, communications, equipment, planning

requirements, the needs of maritime regions, and coordination among the various

levels of government.

As a key element in its review and analysis of Department of Defense programs,

the Panel will consider appropriate missions of the U.S. armed forces, in either direct

or supporting roles, for responses to such terrorists incidents, with emphasis on an

evaluation of the effectiveness of the current and proposed structure of military

organizations for responses across the entire spectrum of potential threats.

Based on presentations given to the Panel, other information that has come to the

Panel’s attention from a variety of sources, and discussion among Panel members, the

review and analysis of equipment issues will include a focus on research,

development, testing, and evaluation of equipment currently available, as well as

emerging technologies. In addition, the Panel’s review and analysis will also place

special emphasis on the development and timely dissemination of various categories of

critical information between and among entities at the Federal, state, and local level.

Survey of Local Responders and State Emergency Management and Response

Organizations

The Panel is cognizant of the fact that many local responders—“first

responders” as they are frequently called—have participated in one or more surveys on

the issues being addressed by this Panel. Nevertheless, given the dynamic nature of

the potential threats, coupled with a number of initiatives and activities in this arena

at the Federal, state, and local level, which have been and are proposed to be

undertaken contemporaneously with the Panel’s efforts, the Panel has determined that

it is important to have current responses to questions about issues that may also have

been addressed in prior surveys, as well as responses to specific questions that may

not have been previously asked. As in the case of the review and analysis of Federal

programs outlined above, the survey will be designed to elicit the views of those

surveyed with respect to the efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in the

areas of training, equipment, planning, communications, and Federal agency

coordination among the various levels of government. The survey will be conducted
- 65 -

with a targeted survey audience that will include all geographic regions of the country,

and in states and localities with a broad range of population densities.

Interviews with Federal, State, and Local Officials

To complement the first two activities outlined above, members of the Panel and

staff of the supporting FFRDC will conduct interviews with selected senior and midlevel officials at the Federal, state, and local level—including, at the local level, law

enforcement, fire services, emergency and other medical providers, public health

personnel, and other emergency service officials. The purpose of the interviews will be

to obtain more detailed information on programs and activities currently being

conducted in certain jurisdictions, as well as specific proposals or recommendations

that any of those persons interviewed may have to improve or enhance Federal efforts

designed to strengthen local emergency responses to any such incident.

The specific officials to be interviewed will be determined at the December 1999

and subsequent meetings of the Panel. As in the case of the survey, interviews will be

conducted with officials in several geographic regions of the country, and in states and

localities with a broad range of population densities. Certain officials will be selected

based on the depth of involvement of that official, or his or her state or locality, in

efforts already undertaken by that state or locality to prepare for responses to terrorist

incidents involving CBRN weapons. Nevertheless, officials will also be interviewed in

some jurisdictions or agencies that have undertaken little or no preparation for

potential response operations.

Case Studies

With the assistance of its supporting FFRDC, and in collaboration with other

entities, the Panel will conduct a series of case studies that will focus on lessons

learned, in several jurisdictions, from actual incidents and hoaxes of terrorism

involving the potential use of CBRN weapons or other “weapons of mass

destruction”—including, in the latter terminology, more conventional weapons with

actual or potential mass-casualty results; and of several jurisdictions at the state or

local level that have devoted significant resources to the preparation for a response to

such an incident. The purpose of the case studies will be to review and analyze, in a

consolidated form, the full range of elements and issues involved in each specific plan

or actual response.

Standards

In parallel with the foregoing efforts, the Panel and the staff of its supporting

FFRDC will also undertake a comprehensive analysis of the issue of standards for
- 66 -

adequate preparation and response, which will include the status of existing, or the

development of, appropriate standards in the areas of:

• Training for responders at all levels

• Equipment

• Notification procedures

• Communications

• Planning

On the assumption that no individual locality, arguably no individual state, will have

the wherewithal by itself to respond to an incident that actually involves mass

casualties or mass destruction—that responders from many jurisdictions will be

required to augment or perhaps supplant responders in a locality where an incident

occurs—standards in each of the areas listed above will be critical to an effective

response.1 9 1 In conducting this analysis, the Panel will consult with a variety of law

enforcement, fire services, emergency and other medical, public health, and other

emergency services professional organizations, which have, in many cases, established

standards for other purposes within their specific fields of endeavor. The Panel will

also consult with various Federal entities—agencies within the Departments of Health

and Human Services, Defense, and Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management

Agency, to mention a few—which are or have been involved in establishing standards

in other contexts. Assessment and analyses of the Panel will be designed to

determine, among other things, certain “baseline” standards for both training and

equipment. In the equipment category, determinations by the Panel will not include

the endorsement of any particular commercial product.

Participation in Related Activities

Panel members and the staff of its supporting FFRDC will continue to attend

and to participate in a variety of conferences, symposiums, exercises, meetings, and

congressional hearings where terrorism, CBRN and WMD, and related domestic

preparedness issues are discussed. As part of its continuing deliberations and in the

development of its annual reports, the Panel will also review and analyze the reports

and recommendations emanating from such activities, as well as relevant reports,

recommendations, or analyses of other public and private organizations and experts in

the field.

 1 9 1 The Panel is aware that the currency and sustainment of a particular level of training, as well as

the maintenance of any equipment acquired by or provided to a response entity, are issues in this subject

area. The Panel will, therefore, emphasize those issues in its research and analysis.
- 67 -

Continuing Threat Analysis

As indicated in previous sections of this report, the nature, scope, and sources

of potential threats from terrorists, who may seek to use CBRN weapons, is

exceptionally dynamic. A continuing, comprehensive analysis of the potential threats

from terrorists, and attendant issues of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with

those threats, will be critical to the development and implementation of any strategy,

plan, or program to prepare for and to provide an effective domestic response to such

an incident. As an integral part of its efforts, the Panel will continue to monitor, from

a variety of entities and sources, related information and intelligence, both classified

and open-source, on the nature and sources of potential threats.

Cyber Terrorism

This report does not specifically address any issues related to cyber terrorism.

A strict interpretation of the Panel’s enabling legislation, and related Federal statutes

that provide definitions of “weapons of mass destruction,” would indicate that the

issue is not within the purview of the Panel’s mandate. Nevertheless, the Panel has

concluded that the issues of cyber terrorism and the forms of terrorist activities that

the Panel has considered thus far are so inter-related that the Panel cannot ignore the

issue. The Panel will, therefore, consider issues related to cyber terrorism in its

activities, and include in its subsequent reports appropriate conclusions and

recommendations on the subject.

Future Meetings of the Panel

The Panel has met and will plan to continue to meet at least once in each

calendar quarter—normally in the last month of the quarter—for the duration of its

existence.1 9 2 In the course of those meetings, the Panel will continue to obtain and to

discuss information relevant to its congressional mandate. The Panel also plans to

conduct several of its meetings in different parts of the country, to elicit the views and

recommendations of the public at large on this issue of critical national importance.

 1 9 2 The dates, times, and locations of the two upcoming meetings of the Panel will normally be

determined at each of the Panel’s quarterly meetings, and will subsequently be posted to the Panel’s

public Website at: http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/
A-1

APPENDIX A—FEDERAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR COMBATING

TERRORISM

The charts that follow are intended to depict, in two-dimensional form, the

organizational structure of the Federal government for dealing with all aspects of

combating terrorism—intelligence, law enforcement, health and medical, energy,

commercial, diplomatic, military, research and development—both domestically and

internationally, including deterrence, prevention, interdiction, and response.

The charts include references to the interagency working group structure for

“weapons of mass destruction preparedness” under the auspices of National Security

Council structure, and to a similar intra-departmental structure with the Department

of Defense.

The charts only depict structure down to the Assistant Secretary and the

“bureau” or “agency” level, and do not, therefore, include every “program office” with

any responsibility for these issues.
A-1-1

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

THE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Special Assistant to the President,

Intelligence Programs

Special Assistant to the President, and

National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism

Special Assistant to the President,

Nonproliferation and Export Controls

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Director

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Director

Associate Director,

National Security and International Affairs

Special Assistant to the President,

Defense Policy and Arms Control

* Directed by legislation; not appointed

National Coordinator on 

Nonproliferation Matters*

ssistant to the Vice President for

National Security Affairs

Principal Associate Director,

National Security & International Affairs

HE VICE PRESIDENT
A-1-2

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE1

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE2

 of Mass

Preparedness

up3

Counter-Terrorism

Security Group3

Critical Infrastructure

Protection Group3

nt for National Security Affairs

the United Nations

gence

hiefs of Staff

nt for Economic Policy

esident for National Security Affairs

quired]

2 - Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy [Others as Invited or Required]

haired by National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism
A-1-3

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Preparedness

Group

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure

Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, Chair

ch &

ment

P

Preventing

WMD From

Entering

the U.S.

TREASURY

Security of

WMD Related

Materials &

U.S. Facilities

DOE/HHS

Contingency

Planning &

Exercises

FEMA/FBI

Legislative &

Legal Issues

DOJ

Intelligence

CIA/FBI

Agriculture

& Food

Safety

USDA
A-1-4

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

THE PRESIDENT

Special Assistant to the President,

Intelligence Programs

Special Assistant to the President,

Defense Policy and Arms Control

Special Assistant to the President and

National Coordinator for Security,

 Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism

Special Assistant to the President,

Nonproliferation and Export Controls

INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Director of

Central

Intelligence

NUCLEAR

REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Chairman

FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Director

he Vice President for

 Security Affairs

NATIONAL

RESPONSE

SYSTEM

NATIONAL

RESPONSE

CENTER

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY

Administrator

DEPARTMENT

OF

AGRICULTURE

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH AND

HUMAN

SERVICES

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF STATE

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF

COMMERCE

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF

TREASURY

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF INTERIOR

Secretary

DEPARTMENT

OF

TRANSPORTATION

Secretary

CE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Director

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Director

Principal Associate Director,

ational Security & International Affairs

Associate Director,

National Security and International Affairs

National Coordinator on 

Nonproliferation Matters

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs

E PRESIDENT
A-1-5

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

Department of Defense

Secretary, Deputy Secretary

ssistant Secretary

or Health Affairs

Director, Joint Staff

J-2, Intelligence

J-3, Operations

J-4, Logistics

J-5, Strategic Plans &

Policy

J-6, Command,

Control,

Communications &

Computer Systems

J-7, Operational Plans

& Interoperability

J-8, Force Structure,

Resources &

Assessment

The Army Staff

U.S. Army

Medical

Research and

Materiel

Command

Soldier &

Biological

Chemical

Command

Arsenals

Rapid

Response

Teams

U.S.Army

Medical Research

Institute of

Chemical Defense

U.S.Army Medical

Research Institute

of Infectious

Diseases

U.S.Army

Medical

Materiel

Command

U.S. Army

Materiel

Command

Defense

Research and

Engineering

Defense Threat

Reduction

Agency

Ballistic

Missile Defense

Organization

Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense - Nuclear, Chemical

and Biological Defense

Programs

ssistant Secretary

r Reserve Affairs

Assistant

Secretary for

Manpower &

Reserve

Affairs

Assistant

Secretary for

Installations

&

Environment

Director of

Military Support

erSecretary for

ersonnel and

Readiness

UnderSecretary Secretary of the Army

for Acquisition

and Technology

Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff

Vice Chairman

Chief of Staff, Army

Chief of Naval

Operations

Chief of Staff, Air

Force

Commandant,

Marine Corps

ense Intelligence

Agency

ense Information

stems Agency

onal Imagery and

apping Agency

tional Security

Agency

National

nnaissance Office

t Secretary for

and, Control,

nications, and

elligence

Chief of Staff,

Army

fense Security

Service

Assistant

Secretary for

Acquisition,

Logistics &

Technology

Joint Task Force -

Civil Support

U.S. Joint Forces

Command

Other Unified

Commanders-inChief

Special Assistant for

Civil Support

Defense

Logistics

Agency

Joint Program Office for

Biological Defense
A-1-6

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

ass Destruction

oup (WMDPG)

Counter-Terrorism

Security Group (CSG)

Critical Infrastructure

Protection Group (CIPG)

Mass Destruction

oup (WMDPG)

DOD Counter-Terrorism

Security Group (CSG)

DOD Critical Infrastructure

Protection Group (CIPG)

DOD PARALLEL SENIOR MANAGEMENT GROUPS

(DOD Chairs act as the single points of entry and 

coordination for all matters affecting DOD that emanate 

om the NSC Interagency Groups and will coordinate the 

propriate DOD attendance at all NSC Interagency Group 

Meetings)
A-1-7

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

DOD WMDPG MEMBERSHIP DOD WMDPG MEMBERSHIP

DOD WMDPG

Co-Chair: Principal Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense (Policy) (PDUSD(P))

 Co-Chair: Principal Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (PDUSD(P&R))

Co-Chair for Implementation: Secretary of the Army (SecArmy)

Director, Joint Staff (DJS)Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC))Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs (ASD (RA))Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs (ASD (HA))Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Threat Reduction (ASD (S&TR))General Counsel (GC)UnderSecretary of Defense, Comptroller (USD (C))UnderSecretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T))Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence (ASD (C3I))

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs (ASD (LA))
A-1-8

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

NSC WMDPG

&

nt

Preventing

WMD From

Entering the

U.S.

TREASURY

Security of WMD

Related Materials &

U.S. Facilities

DOE/HHS

Contingency Planning

 & Exercises

FEMA/FBI

Legislative &

Legal Issues

DOJ

Intelligence

CIA/FBI

Agriculture &

Food Safety

USDA

NSC and DOD WMDP Sub-Group Comparison

ch &

ment

&T),

HA)

Legislative &

Legal Issues

GC, LA

Agriculture &

Food Safety

TBD

DOD WMDPG

Preventing WMD

From Entering

the U.S.

ASD (SO/LIC)

RA

O/LIC)

C

 (C)

RA)

USD (A&T)

ASD (HA)

ASD (S&TR)

ASD (C3I)

GC

DTRA

DJS

USD (C)

USD (A&T)

ASD (HA)

ASD (C3I)

GC

DTRA

USD (A&T)

ASD (HA)

ASD (RA)

ASD (S&TR)

GC

USD (C)

DTRA

ASD (C3I)

ASD, International

Security Affairs

ASD (S&TR)

Security of WMD

Related Materials &

U.S. Facilities

ASD (SO/LIC), DJS

Contingency Planning

ASD (SO/LIC), DJS,

SECAR

SECAR

USD (C)

USD (A&T)

ASD (HA)

ASD (RA)

ASD (SO/LIC)

ASD (S&TR)

DJS

ASD (C3I)

DJS

ASD (S&TR)

USD (A&T)

GC

Defense

Intelligence

Agency

National

 Security

Agency

Intelligence

ASD/C3I
A-1-9

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

artment of Justice

ney General, Deputy

Attorney General

Associate Attorney

General

Bureau of Justice

Assistance

National Institute of Justice

International Center

 Office for State and Local

Domestic Preparedness

Support

National Criminal Justice

Reference Service

U.S. Marshals Service

Director

Office of Intelligence

Policy and Review

U.S. National CentralBureau - INTERPOL

y

Assistant Attorney

General -- Office of

Justice Programs

ce

The Intelligence Community

Director of Central Intelligence

Central

Intelligence

Agency

Director of Central

Intelligence

Deputy

Director for

Intelligence

Deputy

Director for

Operations

Defense

Intelligence

Agency

National

Security

Agency

Army

Intelligence

Navy

Intelligence

Air Force

Intelligence

Marine Corps

Intelligence

National

Imagery and

Mapping

Agency

National

Reconnaissance

Office

Federal Bureau

of Investigation

Department of

the Treasury

Department of

Energy

Department of

State

Nonproliferation

Center

Counterterrorist

Center

m

nal

m

ons

n

r

m

n

ic

m/

r

m

n

re

nter
A-1-10

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

Department of State

Secretary, Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary for

Arms Control and

International Affairs

Under Secretary for

Political Affairs

Regional Assistant

Secretaries

Under Secretary for

Global Affairs

International

Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs

Assistant Secretary

Counter-Terrorism

Coordinator

Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency

Office of Defense Trade

Controls

Political/Military

Assistant Secretary

Research &

Development

International Nuclear

Safety

Arms Control and

Nonproliferation

or

s

n

Office of

Counterintelligence

Communicated Threat

Assessment Program

or

artment of Energy

tary, Deputy Secretary,

Under Secretary

fice of Security and

mergency Operations

Assistant Secretary for

Nonproliferation and

National Security

Chief Information

Officer

Emergency Operations
A-1-11

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

Department of Agriculture

Secretary

Assistant Secretary

for Administration

Disaster Management

and Coordination

Staff

Under Secretary for

Food Safety

Under Secretary for

Research, Education,

and Economics

Agricultural Research

Service

Under Secretary for

Marketing and

Regulatory Programs

Animal and PlantHealth Inspection

Service

Centers for Disease

Control and

Prevention

Health and Human Services

Secretary

National Institutes

of Health

National Institute of

Environmental

Health Sciences

National Center for

Infectious Diseases

National Center for

Environmental Health

Emergency Response

Coordination Group

Department of Commerce

Secretary, Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary for

Export Administration

Assistant

Secretary for

Export

Enforcement

National

Oceanographic and

Atmospheric

Administration

Food Safety and

Inspection Service

Assistant

Secretary for

Export

Administration
A-1-12

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

retary for

ement

Under Secretary for

International Affairs

U.S. Customs

Service

Federal Law

Enforcement

Training Center

Export Controls and

Embargo Enforcement

Office of Investigations

Office of Field Operations

Office of International

Affairs

Department Of Interior

Secretary

Assistant Secretary for

Policy, Management

and Budget

Office of Managing

Risks and Public

Safety

National Park

Service

Department of Treasury

Secretary, Deputy Secretary

Office of Intelligence and

Security

U.S. Coast Guard

National Response

Center

National

Response

Teams

Marine Safety

Office/Group

Level “First

Responders

Research and Special

Programs

Administration

Department Of Transportation

Secretary

Federal Highway

Administration

Federal Aviation

Administration

Federal Railroad

Administration

Maritime

Administration
A-1-13

al Agencies with Responsibilities for WMD and Terrorism Issues

Environmental Protection Agency

Administrator, Deputy Administrator

Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste

and Emergency Response

Chemical Emergency Preparedness and

Prevention Office

Emergency and Remedial Response

Office (SUPERFUND)

for

nse

for

rt

for

United States Fire

Administration

 Affairs

National Fire Academy

National Emergency

Training Center

Emergency Management

Institute

ear Regulatory Commission

Chairman and Commissioners

Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards

Response Operations

Deputy Executive Director

for Regulatory Programs

ctor for Regulatory Effectiveness,

Investigations & Enforcement

national

s

Executive Director for

Operations

rgency Management Agency

ector, Deputy Director

Assistant Administrator for Enforcement

and Compliance Assurance

Criminal Enforcement, Forensics, and

Training Office

National Enforcement

Investigations Center

Assistant Administrator for Air and

Radiation

Radiation and Indoor Air Office

Radiation Protection

Division

Associate Director for

Preparedness, Training

and Exercises
B-1

APPENDIX B—PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS

The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia,

Chair

James Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Retired), Private Consultant,

and Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Chair

L. Paul Bremer, Private Consultant, and Former Ambassador-at-Large for CounterTerrorism, U.S. Department of State

Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, City of New York Fire Department

George Foresman, Deputy State Coordinator, Department of Emergency Services,

Commonwealth of Virginia

William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Army, Retired), Independent Consultant, and

Former Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Delta Force

Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency Management Division, Department of

Public Defense, State of Iowa, and President, National Emergency Management

Association

James Greenleaf, Independent Consultant, and Former Associate Deputy for

Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate Executive, and Chief of Fire and Rescue Services,

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

William Dallas Jones, Director, Office of Emergency Services, State of California

Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical

Technicians, and Deputy Chief/Paramedic, NYFD EMSC

Ronald S. Neubauer, Chief of Police, St. Peters, Missouri, and Immediate Past

President, International Association of Chiefs of Police

Kathleen O’Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota

Dr. M. Patricia Quinlisk, Medical Director/State Epidemiologist, Department of Public

Health, State of Iowa

Patrick R. Ralston, Executive Director, State Emergency Management Agency;

Executive Director, Department of Fire and Building Services; and Executive Director,

Public Safety Training Institute, State of Indiana

William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired), Former Senior Vice President

of Operations, American Red Cross

Dr. Kenneth Shine, President, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences

Ellen Embry, U.S. Department of Defense Representative
C-1

APPENDIX C—PANEL ACTIVITIES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1999

For reasons that are stated in the main body of the report, the first two official

meetings of the Panel (in June and September 1999) concentrated specifically on the

potential threats of terrorism involving CBRN weapons. In the course of those

meetings, the Panel received the following formal briefings:1 9 3 

• Dr. Christopher Davis, InSight International, “The Threat of State-Sponsored

Biological Terrorism” (unclassified), which provided information on the CBRN

weapons programs of the former Soviet Union and Russia, as well as CBRN

programs in Iraq

• Larry K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology,

Central Intelligence Agency, “Threat Posed to the U.S. by International

Terrorism Using Chemical and Biological Weapons” (classified)

• Commander John Weidner, Acting Director, Office of Emergency Response,

Defense Programs, Department of Energy, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from

Explosives Employing Fissile and Non-Fissile Materials” (classified)

• Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from

Radioactive Release and Attacks on Commercial Power Plants” (classified)

• Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Director, Combating Terrorism Transnational Threats,

National Security Council, “Terrorism and WMD: The Threat to the U.S. and

the National Policy in Response” (classified)

• Dr. Floyd P. Horn, Administrator, Agricultural Research Service, U.S.

Department of Agriculture, “The Potential Terrorist Threat to U.S. Agriculture

and Livestock” (unclassified)

• Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism

Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Threat of WMD

Terrorism in the United States” (unclassified)

• Thomas Kuker, Director, National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, “The National Domestic Preparedness Office: Roles

and Responsibilities” (unclassified)

The Panel also received briefings from several individual members of the Panel

on their personal and institution perspectives as local responders:

• Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, Fire Department of the

City of New York

 1 9 3 Details of the Panel’s sessions and minutes from those meetings (as well as from the Panel’s

organizational meeting in April 1999), an extract of the enabling legislation, a list of Panel members, and

the Charter of the Panel, may all be accessed at the Panel’s dedicated web site at:

http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/
C-2

• Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical

Technicians, and Deputy Chief/Paramedic, NYFD EMSC

• Kathleen O’Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota

In addition, the Panel was also briefed by another Panel member, James Clapper

(Lt. Gen., USAF, Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on the

Integrated Threat Data Base Initiative, currently under consideration at the

Department of Defense.

At its September 1999 meeting, the Panel also received a briefing from The

Honorable Curt Weldon (R-PA), Chairman of the Military Research and Development

Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, the

sponsor of the Panel’s enabling legislation.

In parallel with these efforts, the RAND research staff, tasked with providing

research and analytical support to the Panel, was directed to focus its attention on the

threat issue during these first six months of the Panel’s existence. RAND provided to

the Panel members extensive threat-related research and analysis covering the broad

spectrum of risks from CBRN devices and agents, and potential sources of terrorism

involving their use.
D-1

APPENDIX D—BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Outbreaks, Washington D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1961.

Alibek, Ken with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard, New York: Random House, 1999.

Allison, Graham T. et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian

Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1996.

“Anthrax Alert on Duty-Free Spirits,” The Times (UK), March 24, 1998.

Arbman, Gunner, “A Sedish View on Nuclear Terrorism,” in Gunnar Jervas (ed.), NBC-Weapons

and Terrorism: Two Foreign Contributions and Four Swedish Views, Stockholm: Defence

Research Establishment, Division of Defence Analysis, FOA-R-98-00787-170-SE, October

1998.

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict In The

Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.

Associated Press and Agence France-Presse, “Cult studied deadly Ebola virus’,” New York

Times, April 25, 1995.

Barkun, Michael, “Introduction: Understanding Millenialism,” Terrorism and Political Violence,

Vol. 7, No. 3, Autumn 1995.

Bass, Gail, Brian Jenkins, et al., Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal

Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R-2554-SL,

February 1980.

Beckman, Robert L., "Rapporteur's Summary," in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.),

Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986.

Bell, J. Bowyer, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence,

New York: Basic Books, 1978.

Berkowitz, B.J. et al., Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons, Santa

Barbara, CA: Adcon Corporation, 29 September 1972.

Binyon, Michael, "Bin Laden 'now has nuclear arsenal'," The Times (London), October 7, 1998.

Blitzer, Robert, “FBI’s Role in the Federal Response to the use of Weapons of Mass

Destruction,” testimony before House of Representatives Committee on National Security,

accessed at www.fbi.gov/archives/congress/wmd.html, Washington, DC, November 4, 1999.

Brackett, D.W., Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, New York & Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1996.

Broad, William J., “Seismic Blast: Bomb or Quake?” New York Times, January 23, 1997.

Brown, Corrie, “Emerging Animal Diseases,” in W.M. Schield, W. Craig and J. Hughes eds.,

Emerging Infections 3, Washington D.C.: ASM Press, 1999.

Brown, Corrie, “The Impact and Risk of Foreign Animal Diseases,” Vet Med Today, Vol. 208, No.

7, 1996.
D-2

Bukharin, Oleg, “Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union,” Survival, Vol.

36, No. 4, 1994.

Bukharin, Oleg and William Potter, “Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” The Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, May-June 1995.

Burnham, Robert M., before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, 19 May 1999, accessed at www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/ bioleg3.htm .

Cameron, Gavin, “Multi-track Micro-proliferation: Lessons from the Aum Shinrikyo and al

Qaida,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 4, September-December 1999.

Campbell, James K., “Excerpts From Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and

Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2,

Summer 1997.

Carnegie Corporation of New York, "Heading Off A New Nuclear Nightmare: Illicit Trade in

Nuclear Materials, Technology, and Know-How," Carnegie Quarterly, Vol. xii, Nos. 2-3, SpringSummer 1996.

Carson, J. et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” in Paul Leventhal and Yonah

Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task

Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.

Carter, A., J. Deutch, and P. Zelikow, “Combatting Catastrophic Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998.

Carus, W. Seth, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th

Century, Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense

University, March 1999.

Chaliand, Gerard, “Preface” to Bruce Hoffman, Le Mechaniqué Terrorisme, Paris: Calmann Levy,

1999.

Chalk, Peter, “The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism,” The Australian Journal of International

Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1999.

Chalk, Peter, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, The Evolving Dynamic, London:

Macmillan, 1996.

"Chechen Commander Basayev Warns Radioactive Packages Planted in Russia Ready to

Explode," NTV Television News, November 23, 1995.

Chester, Conrad, V., “Obstacles to Large-Scale Biological Terrorism,” paper presented at the

Annual Meeting of Doctors for Defense Preparedness, Las Vegas, NV, September 22, 1991.

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E-1

APPENDIX E—INTERAGENCY COMMENTS

The Panel provided a draft of the Report to be circulated within the Federal

interagency process. The following agencies provided comments on the draft report.

Following receipt of the comments, each agency was contacted given the opportunity

to have its comments included in their entirety in this appendix. As of the date of the

publication of the Report, the only agency that requested that its comments be

included is the National Domestic Preparedness Office. In the event that an agency

wants its comments provided separately after the report is published, those comments

will be forwarded to the President and the Congress under separate cover.

Comments Received

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Threat Reduction)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low

Intensity Conflict]

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

The Joint Staff

Department of the Army

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

National Domestic Preparedness Office

Domestic Terrorism/Counterrorism Planning Section

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Office of Emergency Preparedness, National Disaster Medical System

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Emergency Response

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

U.S. Coast Guard

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
E-1-1

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

 December 1, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO: Ms. Ellen Embry

 Special Assistant to the ASD/Reserve Affairs

FROM: Thomas Kuker /S/

 Director

 National Domestic Preparedness Office

SUBJECT: Draft Review: First Annual Report to the 

President and the Congress of the

 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response

 Capabilities for Terrorism Involving

 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report of the

Department of Defense WMD Advisory Panel. The National Domestic Preparedness

Office (NDPO) appreciates the work of the Panel thus far and the thoroughness

of the report.

The enclosed document constitutes the National Domestic

Preparedness Office's (NDPO) input to the report. The NDPO point of contact

for this matter is Unit Chief Gary Rohen, telephone (202) 324-9032, facsimile

(202) 324-2224.

enclosure
E-1-2

The NDPO recommends that the draft report be edited to reflect the

following changes:

Page 72, line 22:

Delete: "Although representatives of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation's NDPO have stated that the NDPO will develop a national

strategy..." replace with, "the NDPO will develop a national strategy...

(The NDPO should not be referred to as "the FBI's" - it was

conceptualized by the Attorney General, the NSC, and other agencies as an

interagency office, which will ultimately include federal, state, and local

representatives. For purely administrative purposes, it is housed in the FBI.)

Additionally, the National Strategy is the foundation of the NDPO's mission, not

merely a statement of NDPO representatives.)

Page 73, line 4:

add after last sentence:

"A coherent national strategy for domestic preparedness will depend on the needs

and capabilities of individual jurisdictions. The NDPO's incorporation of state

and local planning groups and state points of contact through each governor's

office, as well as utilization of the State and Local Advisory Group to the NDPO,

will ensure that a bottom-up approach is attained.

(The NDPO strongly concurs with the draft report requirement

that the National Strategy have a "bottom-up" approach.)

Page 74, line 11:

delete "has organized", replace with "was directed by the Attorney

General to organize..."

Page 74, line 27: add after last sentence:

"When necessary, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness (WMDP)

Group, as outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 62, will provide

the conduit for interagency coordination and dispute resolution below

the Principals level. The WMDP Subgroup I, Assistance to State and

Local Authorities (ASLA) will be the vehicle to accomplish these tasks.

Although the National Security Council is the Chair, the National

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism has offered to relinquish this position to the Director, NDPO,

for this purpose, as the NDPO serves as the national voice of the state

and local emergency communities. The appointment of the NDPO Director

will serve to elevate issues of state and local stakeholders for

resolution to the highest levels of government. This relationship

between the ASLA Subgroup and the Director NDPO in no way alters the

reporting or command channels between the NDPO and the Attorney General,

and reflects the evolution of the NDPO in that the Federal Leadership

Advisory Group is replaced by ASLA in an attempt to work through

existing mechanisms for federal coordination and avoid duplication of

effort among agencies."
E-1-3

Page 76, line 5:

insert after last sentence:

"In keeping with stakeholders' recommendations that the federal

government improve the information sharing process with the state and

local authorities, the NDPO will focus the majority of its resources and

efforts to facilitate the dissemination of WMD-related information among

federal, state, and local offices and agencies. The NDPO's Information

Sharing program incorporates various mechanisms to accomplish this,

including Special Bulletins, a toll-free assistance number, websites, a

monthly newsletter, and public speaking assistance."
F-1

APPENDIX F—RAND STAFF PROVIDING ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO THE

PANEL

Project Leaders

Bruce Hoffman (1/99-9/99)

Michael Wermuth (9/99-Present)

Research Staff for the Report

Jennifer Brower

Peter Chalk

Bruce Hoffman

Gregory Jones

Richard Mesic

William Rosenau

Michael Wermuth

Administrative Support

Nancy Rizor

Priscilla Schlegel

Other RAND Research Staff Providing Analytical Support

James Bartis

Roger Brown

Marvin Heinze

William Hix

Jeffrey Isaacson

Brian Jenkins

Leslie Lewis

Kenneth Myers

Jonathan Schachter

James Nickerson

John Schrader

Lorne Teitlebaum

Traci Williams

International Security and Defense Policy Center (National Defense Research

Institute)

Jeffrey Isaacson, Program Director

Forces and Resources Policy Center (National Defense Research Institute)

Susan D. Hosek, Program Director
G-1

APPENDIX G—TRANSMITTAL LETTERS

Following are reproductions of the original letters that were used to transmit

the report on 15 December 1999 to the President, to the Vice President in his

capacity as President of the U.S. Senate, and to the various Members of

Congress in leadership positions.
F-1

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The President

The White House

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to you the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The advisory panel

is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616,

105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-2

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Al Gore, Jr.

President of the Senate

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-3

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-4

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

President Pro Tempore

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-5

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Richard K. Armey

Majority Leader

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Leader

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-6

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt

Minority Leader

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Leader:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-7

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Trent Lott

Majority Leader

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
F-8

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

James Clapper, Jr.

Vice Chairman

L. Paul Bremer

Raymond Downey

George Foresman

William Garrison

Ellen M. Gordon

James Greenleaf

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones

Paul M. Maniscalco

Ronald S. Neubauer

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston

William Reno

Kenneth Shine

Ellen Embrey*

* U.S. Department of Defense

 Representative

15 December 1999

The Honorable Thomas Daschle

Minority Leader

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit

to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The

advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-

261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).

The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has

held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory

panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will

hold meetings in various parts of the country.

The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from

terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration

by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the

advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific

conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling

legislation.

Very respectfully,

/S/

James S. Gilmore, III

Chairman

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

RAND

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX: 202-296-7960

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel