OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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JJJAAANNNUUUAAARRRYYY 222333,,,222000000666
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

January 23, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

OFFICE 

 MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

SUBJECT: Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project (SIGIR-05-024) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and 

operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the 

independent and objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies 

designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such 

programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

This report does not contain recommendations; therefore, no written response to this report is 

required. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on 

this report, please contact Mr. Clifton E. Spruill by email at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil

or at (703) 343-8817, or Mr. Larry T. Monson by email at larry.monson@iraq.centcom.mil or 

at (703) 343-8817. For the report distribution, see Appendix C. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
i 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-05-024 January 23, 2006 

Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. In November 2003, the United States Congress appropriated $18.4 billion 

for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to support security, relief, rehabilitation, and 

reconstruction projects in post-war Iraq. One of the many projects to address 

reconstruction of the Iraq electricity sector was the Natural Gas Development for Power 

Generation Project (commonly referred to as the “Mansuria Project”). 

Objectives. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of 

project management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative 

contracting officers. We also assessed the management control over this project by the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO). Specifically, we reviewed the approval, planning, 

monitoring, and cancellation of the Mansuria Project. 

Results. The Mansuria Project resulted from a February 2004 task order, issued by the 

Coalition Provisional Authority-Project Management Office (CPA-PMO), in response to 

a request by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The task order directed USAID to proceed 

with development and construction of electrical generation facilities in the area of 

Baghdad, Iraq. The approved estimated direct cost of the resulting Mansuria Project job 

order was $381.3 million. The project was subsequently cancelled with the final job 

order direct costs currently estimated to be $62.7 million as of December 22, 2005. 

Of the projected $62.7 million in Mansuria Project direct costs1

 USAID transferred to the 

Iraq Ministry of Electricity approximately $47.9 million in combustion turbines, 

generators, transformers, and related items to support another project planned and funded 

by the Ministry; and $2.8 million in gas line piping that could support future Ministry 

projects. 

Although the Mansuria Project was cancelled, management actions to approve, plan, 

monitor, and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective. Specifically, 

CPA-PMO properly issued a task order to USAID addressing a specific need identified 

by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area. 

We found that USAID had implemented sufficient management controls to plan, monitor, 

and control the resulting Mansuria Project. Further, IRMO and USAID actions to cancel 

the project were supported by appropriate documentation and approved by the 

Government of Iraq. Consequently, this report contains no recommendations. 

Management Comments. The Iraq Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International 

Development concurred with the audit conclusions in a draft of this report, and had no 

additional comments. 

 

1

 USAID could not provide an estimate that reflected any allocation of all indirect costs and fixed-fees. 

Consequently, the estimates presented in this report are estimates of job order direct costs only and may not 

represent all costs associated with the Mansuria project. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Management of the Mansuria Project 

Background 1 

Objectives 1 

 Significant Events of the Mansuria Project 2 

 Amendments to Project Scope and Funding 4 

 Conclusion 9 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 10 

B. Acronyms 12 

C. Report Distribution 13 

 D. Audit Team Members 15 
1

Management of the Mansuria Project 

Background 

According to National Security Presidential Directive 36, titled United States 

Government Operations in Iraq, the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Iraq, under guidance 

from the Secretary of State, is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision 

of all United States government employees, policies, and activities in country, except 

those under the command of an area military commander. This includes the continuous 

supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Directive also creates a 

temporary organization within the Department of State, called the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO), to manage the reconstruction in Iraq. 

There are five implementing agencies2 responsible for providing acquisition and project 

management support for projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. In 

the case of the Mansuria Project, the implementing agency was the USAID. The USAID, 

under the direction of the Department of State, undertakes projects to restore Iraq’s vital 

infrastructure in the areas of electricity, water/sewage, health care, education, 

communications, and transportation. As the implementing agency for the Program 

Management Office tasking order, USAID had primary responsibility for program 

management of the Mansuria Project. 

USAID project management for IRRF funded projects, to include the Mansuria Project, 

begins with the USAID administrative contracting officer, who is in turn, supported by 

the USAID cognizant technical officer. In addition, USAID has a participating agency 

service agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) that provides the 

cognizant technical officer and administrative contracting officer with architectengineering technical advice. 

The participating agency service agreement provided USACE’s technical advisors to 

USAID for a wide range of project management support. The USACE support included 

estimating expertise; assistance in preparing job orders to definitize infrastructure repair; 

related procurement of equipment; technical review of deliverables such as cost control 

reporting systems; matching of resources and budgets for long-term financial 

sustainability; and construction oversight. 

Objectives 

The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of project 

management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative contracting 

officers. We also assessed the management control over this project by the USAID and 

IRMO. Specifically, we reviewed the approval, planning, monitoring, and cancellation of 

the Mansuria Project. 

 

2

 The five implementing agencies are the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department 

of the Treasury, United States Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. 
2

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For definitions of 

the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, 

see Appendix D. 

Significant Events of the Mansuria Project 

On November 6, 2003, the U.S. Congress appropriated $18.4 billion, through Public Law 

108-106, for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to fund Iraq reconstruction 

requirements that were identified by the Coalition Provisional Authority Project 

Management Office (CPA-PMO)3 during the summer and fall of 2003. The CPA-PMO 

identified thousands of projects within various infrastructure sectors in Iraq, such as 

electricity, water and sewage, oil, health care, transportation, communications, and 

education. One of many projects resulting within the electricity sector was one requested 

by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to increase electrical service to the Baghdad area. The 

resulting project, the Natural Gas Development for Power Generation Project, is 

commonly referred to as “The Mansuria Project”. 

In February 2004, the CPA-PMO issued a task order4

 directing USAID to assess, design, 

and build two electrical generation facilities in the area of Baghdad, Iraq. The order 

specified facilities to provide diesel-generated electricity using heavy fuel oil/crude oil as 

a fuel source and to proceed on an urgent basis. Initially, USAID was to conduct an 

assessment and fact- finding effort that identified candidate sites, to include the 

consideration of fuel availability. 

The first stage assessment determined there was insufficient fuel and no fuel delivery 

system of any kind in the Baghdad area, especially diesel, to continue with the project. 

Consequently, CPA-PMO requested USAID to conduct an assessment of available 

natural gas fuel from the existing Mansuria gas field (located approximately 105 

kilometers north-east of Baghdad) and to prepare estimates for development of a gas field 

to support electrical power generation. USAID authorized its prime contractor to begin a 

fuel and generation technology study of the Mansuria gas field. 

 

On June 23, 2004, USAID approved the contractor to incur pre-job order costs for what 

eventually became the Natural Gas Development for Power Generation Project (the 

Mansuria Project), a “fast track” project. Fast-tracking of the project allowed various 

project scope elements to occur simultaneously and addressed the urgency stated in the 

CPA-PMO task order. Pending review and assessment of the anticipated job order scope, 

USAID authorized a limited scope of work and funding for pre-job order costs. 

On August 10, 2004, USAID approved the issuance of Job Order 04-513, Natural Gas 

Development for Power Generation, (the Mansuria Project). The job order scope 

included various studies, initial designs, bid specification development, the acquisition of 

materials and equipment requiring a long lead time such as turbines, generators, 

transformers, and, in the case of Mansuria, gas gathering and gas treatment equipment. 

The rough order of magnitude estimate of direct costs for the initial work was $78.3 

million. 

 

3

 The Coalition Provisional Authority was responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq from April 

2003 until June 28 2004. Thereafter, the Iraqi Interim Government assumed the authority to govern Iraq. 4

 Task Order EG-013, Baghdad Low RPM [revolutions per minute] Diesel Generation, February 20, 2004. 
3

On August 27, 2004, the contractor reported issuing requests for proposal for the power 

island centerline equipment and a gas treatment plant. In early September, construction 

of the pioneer camp for Mansuria began and was completed in November 2004. 

On November 20, 2004, USAID issued amendment 1 to the job order. The amendment 

incorporated the cost of rework on the existing gas wells and the procurement and 

construction of the gas gathering and processing facilities, power generation facilities and 

switchyards. The amendment increased the rough order of magnitude estimate for the job 

order direct costs by $303 million to a total of $381.3 million. 

On February 14, 2005, the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

(IRMO) directed USAID, as part of a reprogramming discussion and in full concurrence 

with the Iraqi Interim Government, the Iraq Ministry of Electricity, and USAID to cancel 

the Mansuria Project. This primarily occurred because in the summer of 2004, the 

Administration began a strategic review of the IRRF that led to significant program 

adjustments5. The adjustments reallocated IRRF funds between competing demands 

including recognition of operations and maintenance (training and spare parts) in the 

Electricity Sector and reallocation of funds from long-term projects, such as the Mansuria 

Project, to address short-term projects. 

As a result, on March 31, 2005, USAID issued amendment 2 to the job order. The 

amendment cancelled the project with the exception of the gas turbines, generators, 

transformers, and gas line pipe. USAID agreed to deliver and transfer this equipment to 

the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The amendment reduced the rough order of magnitude 

estimate by $311.9 million to $69.4 million. 

According to IRMO officials, the Iraq Ministry of Electricity plans to install and utilize 

the electrical generation equipment purchased for the Mansuria Project at another site in 

the area of An Najaf, and will also use funds from the Ministry’s 2006 and 2007 capital 

budget for this other project. On June 25, 2005, representatives of the Iraq Ministry of 

Electricity accepted receipt of two General Electric Frame 9 combustion turbines, two 

associated generators, related accessory equipment, and line piping. On December 28, 

2005, the representatives accepted receipt of two generator step-up transformers and 

related materials. 

On December 22, 2005, USAID received a draft amendment 3 to the job order. The 

proposed amendment reduced the rough order of magnitude estimate by $6,772,041 to 

$62,669,959. 

Table 1 summarizes the chronology of significant events relating to the Mansuria Project. 

 

5

 The Secretary of State notified Congress of the re-programming actions in subsequent Section 2207 

quarterly reports. Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report to Congress every three months 

that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project-by-project basis. 
4

Table 1: Chronology of Mansuria Project 

Date Project Event 

February 2004 CPA-PMO issues initial task order to USAID for power generation 

March 2004 PMO amends the task order to broaden task order fuel assessment 

June 2004 USAID approves pre-job order costs for fast-track project 

August 2004 USAID issues the job order for the Mansuria Project and contractor 

begins procurement for long-lead acquisition items. Rough order of 

magnitude for initial work is $78.3 million 

September 2004 Contractor begins construction of the Mansuria pioneer camp 

November 2004 USAID issues job order amendment 1 to include procurement and 

construction costs. Rough order of cost estimate increases to $381 

million 

February 2005 Director of IRMO directs cancellation of the Mansuria Project 

because of a strategic review resulting in significant program 

adjustments. 

March 2005 USAID issues job order amendment 2 canceling the entire project 

except procurement of the turbines, generators, transformers, and 

line pipe. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate reduced to $69.4 

million. 

June 2005 Turbines and related items received and transferred to the Iraq 

Ministry of Electricity 

December 2005 USAID receives and begins review of the job order amendment 3 

request reducing rough order of magnitude cost to $62.7 million. 

December 2005 Final equipment consisting of transformers received and transferred 

to the Iraq Ministry of Electricity

Source: SIGIR 

Amendments to Project Scope and Funding 

Although the Director of IRMO cancelled the Mansuria Project due to strategic 

programming decisions that shifted focus from long term projects such as natural gas 

development for electrical generation to those that addressed immediate needs, 

management actions taken by CPA-PMO, IRMO, and USAID to approve, plan, monitor, 

and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective. 

The CPA-PMO task order addressed a project requested by the Iraq Ministry of 

Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area. The task order contained 

sufficient guidance to allow effective oversight of task order progression. For example, 

the task order specified six progressive stages of task order work and required specific 

reporting and approval for USAID’s progression from one stage to the next. The fuel 

assessments resulting from stage one caused PMO to appropriately modify the task order, 

reducing it in scope from the generation of 600MW6 to 340MW. Further, the PMO 

modification directed USAID to provide additional reporting on fuel availability prior to 

proceeding to full development. 

 

6

 A megawatt (MW) is 1 million watts of electricity. 
5

IRMO actions were primarily associated with the eventual decision to cancel the 

Mansuria Project and included their actions to determine the best course of action for the 

equipment placed on order. IRMO determined the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s 

continuing need for the equipment; took actions to have the Ministry identify 

representatives authorized to sign for receipt of the equipment; and facilitated the transfer 

and shipment of the equipment to the Ministry. 

USAID had implemented sufficient management controls to plan and monitor the 

resulting task order assessments and control the scope of the resulting job order. 

Specifically, both the USACE support element and the prime contractor provided weekly 

reports to USAID that identified progress attained, work in-progress, project challenges 

or issues, and projections of schedule trends and costs. For example, the weekly project 

reports identified significant challenges such as problems encountered in obtaining 

responsive bids to contract for over-drilling of the Mansuria gas wells. The project 

reports also presented trends that allowed for early identification of the impact of IRRF 

re-programming for the Mansuria Project on overall funding needs in the USAID 

infrastructure portfolio. In addition, all equipment purchased and contractor services 

obtained were within the scope of the task and job orders. 

At the time of this audit, USAID was in the process of reviewing and coordination on a 

third draft amendment, dated December 22, 2005, to the Mansuria Project job order. The 

proposed amendment further reduces the rough order of magnitude estimate by 

$6,772,041 to $62,669,959. 

Pending approval of the proposed third amendment, USAID managers estimate the final 

direct cost of the Mansuria Project at $62,669,959. The majority of the funds already 

spent consisted of equipment purchases that will benefit the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s 

efforts to install additional electrical generation capacity (see Table 2). For example, 

USAID transferred approximately $47.9 million of electrical generation equipment7

 to 

the Iraq Ministry of Electricity for the Iraqi Government’s planned generation project at 

Khor Zubayr. In addition, USAID also transferred $2.7 million of gas line piping to the 

Ministry for future use. 

The remaining approximately $12.2 million8 included: 

• construction camp trailers and associated equipment valued at approximately 

$5.6 million transferred to the Ministry for its use to support construction efforts 

($5.9 million, less $382,000 of communication equipment transferred to another 

USAID job order) 

• $5.4 million in Bechtel engineering support and other surveys and analyses 

(Items 4 and 5, Table 2) 

• transferring, upon job order closeout, of as much as $416,000 to the Mansuria 

Project job order reserve to the basic contract reserve 

• $382,412 of communication equipment re-used for the Daura Power Plant job 

order 

 

 

7

 The equipment included two 108 MW capacity combustion turbines, two generators, two step-up 

transformers, plus related materials. 

8

 Due to rounding, the following amounts do not total $12.2 million. 
6

• a study for transmissions systems model software and data set, valued at over a 

$145,000, transferred to the Project and Contracting Office for a transmission 

line project 

• procurement cancellation fees of approximately $115,000 (Items 8 and 9, 

Table 2). 

Table 2: USAID Estimate of Mansuria Direct Costs and Residual Benefits9 

No Item Comments Rough Order 

of Magnitude 

1 250MW Combustion Turbine 

Generators (Qty 2) & Associated 

Ancillary Equip. including Storage, 

Ocean Freight and Heavy Haul and 

Associated Security 

Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $45,249,266.00 

2 Generator Step Up Transformers (Qty 

2) including Ocean Freight and Heavy 

Haul and Associated Security 

Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $2,617,000.00 

3 Line Piping including Shop Inspection, 

Storage, Freight and Associated 

Security 

Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $2,764,799.00 

4 Bechtel Engineering Effort and Support Scope Book, drawings, specifications and 

operating manuals handed over through 

USAID to the Ministry – 65 boxes 

$5,326,696.00 

5 Geotech, Surveys & Water Analysis Engineering data handed over through USAID 

to the Ministry – part of 65 boxes of 

documents 

$99,000.00 

6 Study for Transmission Systems Model 

Software And Data Set 

Study submitted to USAID then turned over to 

PCO to do transmission line project. 

$145,000.00 

7 Camp and Telecommunication Trailers and Equipment were turned over to 

the Ministry of Electricity and used in 

different Camp Locations after 

Demobilization. Telecommunication 

equipment (valued at $382,412) was 

dismantled and re-used in another Job Order 

(Daura Power Plant). 

$5,937,222.00 

8 Cancellation Of Unit Auxiliaries 

Transformers ( 2 each) 

[Procurement cancellation fee] 

Engineering specifications for this equipment 

turned over through USAID to the Ministry. 

$50,000.00 

9 Cancellation OF Distribution Control 

System (DCS) 

[Procurement cancellation fee] 

Engineering specifications for this system 

turned over through USAID to the Ministry. 

$64,976.00 

10 JO Allocated Reserve This amount will be returned to the Contract 

Reserve upon the closeout of the Job Order 

$416,000.00 

 Total Job order Rough Order of 

Magnitude as of Amendment 3 (in process) 

$62,669,959.00 

Source: USAID 

The following photos show some of the acquisitions made for this project that were 

subsequently transferred to the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. 

 

9

 Draft Amendment 3 to Job Order 04-513, December 22, 2005 
7

Photo 1. This photo, taken on July 2, 2004, shows turbine and 

generator-related equipment and materials after Ministry of 

Electricity transportation to their Khor Zubayr Secure Storage 

Area. 

Photo 2. This photo, taken June 23, 2004, shows one of the 

two GE Frame 9E turbines off-loading from the ship at the Iraq 

port of Umm Qasr. 
8

Photo 3. This photo, taken June 24, 2005, the foreground 

shows the generators and turbines on storage stools while still 

located in the Umm Qasr port prior to the Ministry of 

Electricity transporting the equipment to An Najaf. 

Photo 4. This photo, taken December 11, 2004, shows a 

portion of the secured encampment installed at the Mansuria 

Project site. Billeting trailers are on the left, water storage 

tanks on the right, construction administration and support 

facilities in the background; security wall in the upper right, 

and security/support vehicles in the foreground. 
9

Conclusion 

Overall, although the Mansuria Project was cancelled, management actions to approve, 

plan, monitor, and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective. 

Specifically, CPA-PMO issued a task order to USAID addressing a need identified by the 

Iraq Ministry of Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area. 

Specifically, USAID established and implemented project management controls to 

review and approve the job order scope and estimated costs for the Mansuria Project; 

project schedule and cost reporting controls provided key management information on 

job order schedule and cost issues; and the direct costs incurred with the Mansuria Project 

were within the scope of the task order and subsequent job order. Further, actions taken 

by IRMO and USAID to cancel the Mansuria Project were appropriate when viewed in 

light of the Administration’s strategic review that began in the summer of 2004 and the 

subsequent programming actions to reallocate IRRF funds and place more emphasis on 

short-term projects. Finally, IRMO and USAID took effective project cancellation 

actions that considered the continuing needs of the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to address 

the electrical needs of the Iraqi people. 

We did not identify any needed corrective actions; consequently, this report contains no 

recommendations. 

Management Comments. The Iraq Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International 

Development concurred with the audit conclusions in a draft of this report, and had no 

additional comments. 
10

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We initiated this audit in November 2005 (Project No. SIGIR-2005-17). In the 

performance of the audit, we interviewed key management officials in IRMO, USAID, 

and the USACE element supporting USAID. In addition, we obtained and reviewed 

pertinent documentation associated with the Mansuria Project and the related 

management actions. 

Specifically, in order to evaluate the USAID’s planning, approval, and monitoring 

processes for the project as originally scoped and approved; as well as IRMO and USAID 

actions related to project reprogramming and cancellation, we interviewed key 

management personnel within IRMO, USAID, and USACE element supporting USAID. 

In addition, we: 

• Identified USAID and USACE project cost and schedule management processes 

dictated in pertinent service agreements, contracts, and job orders. 

• Reviewed progress reports and schedules to determine the presence of issues or 

events that would indicate a need for USAID project management actions and 

determined if USAID had taken timely and appropriate actions. 

• Evaluated IRMO and USAID actions to cancel the project and reviewed selected 

congressionally required, Public Law 108-106, Section 2207 reports on Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction issued to Congress that discussed reprogramming 

actions and reallocated funds to address changing priorities. We also reviewed 

USAID project management studies and briefings on both funding status and 

options to address funding shortfalls. 

To determine the contractor’s role in the planning, executing and eventual de-scoping 

and/or cancellation of the original project, we: 

• Requested and received from the USAID Administrative Contracting Officer 

contract documentation that included the contractor’s weekly project status 

reports, project management charts, cost and funding trend reports, and other 

pertinent documents relating to cost, schedule, and overall job order management. 

• Reviewed these documents to determine cost and schedule progress relative to the 

approved scope of the Mansuria Project job order; and the resulting timeliness and 

effectiveness of USAID project management actions. 

To determine the extent to which the equipment purchased and contractor services 

provided were within the project scope, we: 

• Compared the USAID approved Mansuria Project job order scope with both the 

original and amended CPA-PMO issued task order that was the basis for the 

Mansuria Project. 

• Reviewed equipment vendor invoices and determined whether the equipment 

purchases were consistent with the job order scope and traced the equipment costs 

to the USACE project cost reports and USAID approved payment vouchers. 
11

To determine whether USAID, IRMO, or the Iraq Ministry of Electricity have followed 

through with plans to use the equipment for other productive purposes or projects, we: 

• Interviewed the USAID Senior Energy Advisor and the IRMO Electricity Sector 

Senior Consultant and determined that the Iraq Ministry of Electricity had 

received and planned to use the residual equipment. 

• Reviewed pertinent documentation such as the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s 

written designation of representatives authorized to sign for receipt of the 

equipment, photos of equipment delivery, and receipts signed by the designated 

representatives. 

We conducted this audit from November 2005 through December 2005, in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We performed this audit using data obtained from 

the cost reporting system developed by the USACE under the USAID-USACE 

participating agency service agreement. Although we did not assess the system’s general 

or application controls, we did establish the reliability of extracted data through other 

means. Specifically, we compared Mansuria Project job order direct costs for procured 

equipment, related materials, and sub-contracted engineering design work to source 

documents. Our tests disclosed the data were sufficiently reliable to support the reported 

audit conclusions.

Prior Coverage. The USAID Inspector General issued a report in June 2005 whose 

scope was a broader review of 22 projects within the USAID electrical sector 

infrastructure area. The USAID report presented the Mansuria Project as one of two 

examples of the seven projects identified that did not achieve their intended outputs. The 

report identified the Mansuria Project as in the process of cancellation due to funding 

constraints imposed because of earlier efforts to reprogram IRRF funding from the power 

sector. The scope of the prior USAID audit differs from our audit with respect to 

evaluating the effectiveness of PMO, IRMO, and USAID project management actions; 

whether incurred direct costs were within the scope of the approved project; and project 

cancellation actions relative to plans to use the equipment for other productive purposes. 

See USAID Audit Report E-267-05-003, Audit of USAID/IRAQ’s Electrical Power 

Sector Activities, June 29, 2005. 
12

Appendix B. Acronyms 

CPA-PMO Coalition Provisional Authority-Program Management Office 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

MW Megawatt 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PMO Project Management Office 

RPM Revolutions per minute 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
13

Appendix C. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq 

 Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

 Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 
14

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

 
15

Appendix D. Audit Team Members 

This audit report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the 

direction of Joseph T. McDermott, the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members 

who contributed to the report include: 

Clifton Spruill 

Larry Monson