United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1998 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

DOD Does Not Have a

Strategy to Address

Low-Level Exposures

GAO/NSIAD-98-228

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280551 

September 23, 1998

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable John Glenn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The possible exposure of U.S. troops to low levels of chemical warfare

agents in Iraq in the weeks after the Gulf War ceasefire, along with

chemical warfare prophylaxis, vaccines, oil well fire emissions, and other

battlefield effluents, is suspected to be a contributing factor in the

unexplained illnesses that have plagued some Gulf War veterans. Members

of Congress have raised concerns regarding the adequacy of Department

of Defense (DOD) policy, doctrine, and technology to identify, prepare for,

and defend troops against the possible adverse effects of exposure to

low-level chemical warfare agents. As you requested, we examined DOD’s

approach for addressing U.S. troop exposures to low levels of chemical

warfare agents. Specifically, we (1) determined the extent that DOD

doctrine addresses exposures to low levels of chemical warfare agents;

(2) evaluated the extent that research addresses the performance and

health effects of exposures to low levels of chemical warfare agents, either

in isolation or combination with other agents and contaminants that would

be likely found on the battlefield; and (3) identified the portion of

resources in DOD’s chemical and biological defense research, development,

test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program explicitly directed at low-level

chemical warfare agent exposures. Appendix I discusses the scope and

methodology of this review, and a glossary of scientific and medical terms

appears at the end of this report. A subsequent report will assess chemical

and biological defense equipment technology.

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Background Approximately 100,000 U.S. troops may have been exposed to low levels of

chemical warfare agents in Operation Desert Storm. The destruction of

Iraqi chemical warfare munitions by U.S. demolition units in a pit area at

the Khamisiyah Ammunition Depot in March 1991 resulted in the release

of sarin/cyclosarin nerve agents.1

 (See app. II for a listing of common

chemical warfare agents.) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD

estimated in September 1997 that the demolition of Iraqi chemical-filled

munitions released plumes of nerve agent gas that extended over U.S.

troops located hundreds of kilometers away from Khamisiyah.2

 Even

though uncertainties regarding wind, agent purity, released quantities, and

unit locations prohibit definitive calculations of the dose and length of

exposures, if any, to individual soldiers, the agencies estimated that 98,910

U.S. troops were potentially exposed to at least the general population

limit dose.3

 In addition, the CIA estimated that destruction of

sarin/cyclosarin-filled rockets in a Khamisiyah Depot bunker conducted

several days prior to the pit area demolition may have released additional

nerve agents, resulting in further low-level exposures.4

The objective of DOD’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense

program is to enable U.S. forces to survive, fight, and win in NBC warfare

environments. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1994 directed the Secretary of Defense to assign responsibility for

overall coordination and integration of the chemical and biological

defense program to a single office within Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD).5

 The legislation also directed the Secretary of Defense to

1

Chemical warfare agents are categorized based on their primary effects. The categories include nerve,

vesicants or blister, pulmonary, incapacitating, vomiting, cyanides, and tear.

2

Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit, CIA/DOD, Sept. 4, 1997.

3

CIA modeled the estimated area of chemical warfare agent release at six levels of

concentration—lethal, incapacitated/disabled, vision impaired, first effects, 8-hour occupational limit,

and 72-hour general population limit. The general population limit dose is defined as the dosage below

that the general population, including children and the elderly, could be expected to remain 72 hours

with no effects.

4

Low-level chemical warfare agent fallout could have occurred as a result of U.S. bombing of three

Iraqi chemical weapon facilities in central Iraq—Muhammadiyat, Al Muthanna, and Ukhaydir. CIA

estimated that low levels of sarin and mustard were dispersed as far as 300 and 130 kilometers,

respectively, from Muhammadiyat and that sarin was dispersed up to 160 kilometers from Al

Muthanna. Mustard agent released from Ukhaydir would not have exceeded the general population

limit beyond 40 kilometers from the site. CIA modeling estimates indicate that chemical warfare agents

from these releases did not reach areas occupied by coalition troops. However, these incidents of

inadvertent releases of chemical warfare agents due to aerial bombing demonstrate low-level exposure

threats to U.S. troops that can be encountered in future contingencies when the adversary possesses

chemical warfare research, production, or storage facilities. In addition, DOD identified 12 other

instances of suspected chemical warfare agent exposures during Operation Desert Storm.

5

Title XVII of Public Law 103-160, 50 U.S.C. 1522 (b).

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designate the Army as DOD’s executive agent to coordinate chemical and

biological RDT&E across the services. (App. III discusses the institutional

structure and responsibilities derived from this legislation.) As a result,

individual service research programs addressing NBC defense issues,

including the potential adverse effects of low-level chemical agent

exposures, were consolidated into a joint program.

The Army’s Chemical School is responsible for the NBC doctrine, which

consists of joint doctrine,6

 service field manuals,7 and training circulars.

A Joint NBC Defense Concept provides guidance for protecting a force

against existing and emerging threats. Threat information is used to

determine the vulnerability of existing systems. The validation of a

vulnerability leads to a mission and needs statement and operational

readiness document and creates a requirement that can justify additional

research, revisions in doctrine, or new NBC defense equipment

acquisitions.

Results in Brief DOD does not have an integrated strategy to address low-level exposures to

chemical warfare agents. Specifically, it has not stated a policy or

developed a doctrine on the protection of troops from low-level chemical

exposures on the battlefield. Past research indicates that low-level

exposures to some chemical warfare agents may result in adverse

short-term performance and long-term health effects. DOD has no chemical

defense research program to determine the effects of low-level chemical

exposures. Less than 2 percent of the RDT&E funds in DOD’s chemical and

biological defense program have been allocated to low-level issues in the

last 2 fiscal years.

DOD’s current NBC doctrine is focused on mission accomplishment by

maximizing the effectiveness of troops in a lethal NBC environment. It does

not address protection of the force from low-level chemical warfare agent

exposures on the battlefield. According to officials, DOD does not have

doctrine that addresses low-level exposures because there is no

(1) validated low-level threat, (2) consensus on the definition or meaning

of low-level exposures, or (3) consensus on the effects of low-level

exposures.

6

Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense, Joint Publication 3-11, was last issued in July 1995. It is currently

being revised to address deficiencies identified in a 1997 review by the Joint Warfighting Center. The

revised doctrine is scheduled to be delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff no later than September 1998.

7

The Army maintains 20 field manuals that address a range of NBC defense topics and operations, such

as contamination avoidance, fixed site protection, decontamination, potential agents and compounds,

and reconnaissance.

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Past research by DOD and others indicates that single and repeated

low-level exposures to some chemical warfare agents can result in adverse

psychological, physiological, behavioral, and performance effects that may

have military implications. The research, however, does not fully address

the effects of low-level exposures to a wide variety of agents, either in

isolation or combination with other agents and battlefield contaminants;

chronic effects; reliability and validity of animal-human extrapolation

models; the operational implications of the measured adverse impacts; and

delayed performance and health effects.

During the last 2 fiscal years, DOD has allocated nearly $10 million, or

approximately 1.5 percent of its chemical and biological defense RDT&E

budget of $646 million, to fund research and development projects on

low-level chemical warfare agent exposure issues. However, these projects

were not part of a structured DOD research program focused on low-level

effects. Currently, DOD does not have a chemical and biological defense

research program designed to evaluate the potential effects of low-level

chemical warfare agent exposures, but funding is under consideration for

two multiyear research programs addressing low-level effects.

OSD Policy and DOD

Doctrine on

Low-Level Chemical

Warfare Agent

Exposures

OSD has not issued a policy, nor has DOD developed doctrine, to address

exposures of U.S. troops to low levels of chemical warfare agents on the

battlefield. DOD officials explained that low-level exposures were not

addressed because there was no validated threat and no consensus on

what constituted low-level exposures or whether they produced adverse

performance or health effects in humans. Nevertheless, some entities

within DOD are preparing chemical defense strategies and developing

technologies that are expected to address low-level exposures.

No OSD Policy or DOD

Doctrine on Low-Level

Exposures

OSD has not issued a policy on the force protection regarding low-level

chemical weapon agent exposures, and DOD has not developed doctrine

that addresses low-level exposures to chemical warfare agents, either in

isolation or combination with other contaminants that would likely be

found on the battlefield. DOD officials have characterized the primary

intent of existing NBC doctrine for battlefield management as enabling

mission accomplishment by ensuring force preservation rather than force

protection.

The operational concept that underlies NBC doctrine and drives chemical

warfare defense research, development, and acquisition has been to “fight

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through” the chemical and biological threat and accomplish the mission,

with the assumption that overwhelming conventional capabilities will

enable U.S. forces to prevail on the battlefield. Thus, the focus on massive

battlefield chemical weapon use has framed the concepts of the role of

chemical and biological defense in warfare. In a battlefield scenario, the

NBC defense goal is to ensure that chemical exposures to the troops result

in less than 1 percent lethalities and less than 15 percent casualties,

enabling the affected unit to remain operationally effective.

Nevertheless, DOD doctrine differentiates between possible high-level

chemical warfare threats in foreign battlefield scenarios and low-level

chemical exposures in domestic chemical weapon storage and destruction

facilities. In a domestic chemical storage scenario, facilities and

procedures are required to ensure that unprotected workers would receive

no more than an 8-hour occupational exposure limit and that the adjacent

civilian population would receive no more than a 72-hour general

population limit, both of which are not expected to result in any adverse

health effects.

According to DOD, its doctrine does not address low-level exposures on the

battlefield because there is no (1) validated threat, (2) definition of

low-level exposures, (3) or consensus on the effects of such exposures.

Moreover, if low-level exposures were to be addressed, DOD officials said

that the cost implications could be significant. For example, increased

costs could result from the need for more sensitive chemical detectors,

more thorough decontamination systems, or more individual and

collective protection systems. However, no studies have been done to

evaluate the potential cost implications of expanding policy and doctrine

to address low-level exposure concerns for force protection. OSD officials

said that any future low-level requirements would need to compete for

funds with an existing list of unfunded chemical and biological defense

needs.

In October 1997, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War

Veterans’ Illnesses noted that existing DOD doctrine addresses only

exposure to debilitating or lethal doses of nerve or mustard chemical

warfare agents on the battlefield. The Committee subsequently

recommended that DOD develop doctrine that addresses possible low-level

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subclinical exposure to chemical warfare agents.8 Specifically, the

Committee recommended that DOD’s doctrine establish requirements for

preventing, monitoring, recording, reporting, and assessing possible

low-level chemical warfare agent exposure incidents.9

 In his February 1998

testimony before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, the Special

Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses stated

that DOD does not believe there is a need for doctrine concerning low-level

chemical exposures but that DOD would consider taking action if research

indicates a need for such doctrine.

No Validated Low-Level

Threat

DOD officials said that there is no validated low-level threat and that the

probability of encountering low-level contaminated conditions on the

battlefield is minimal. If low-level chemical exposures were to occur, the

officials stated that the exposures would likely be inadvertent and

momentary—resulting from residual contamination after the use of

high-dose chemical munitions. DOD experts on the storage and release of

chemical warfare agents have asserted that only in a laboratory could

agent dosages exist at a low concentration more than momentarily.

Nevertheless, DOD has studied how the intentional use of low doses of

chemical warfare agents could be used to achieve terrorist and military

objectives. DOD raised concerns over the intentional use of low-level

chemical warfare agents in its 1997 study, Assessment of the Impact of

Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010, which

analyzed the impact of state-sponsored terrorist attacks using chemical

warfare agents. The study’s threat scenario, which was not validated by

any intelligence agency, entailed chemical warfare agents being spread

thinly, avoiding lethal levels as much as possible, for the purpose of

stopping U.S. military operations and complicating detection and cleanup.

The study found that massive battlefield use of chemical and biological

weapons is no longer the most likely threat and that U.S. forces must be

able to counter and cope with limited, localized chemical and biological

8

Generally, subclinical manifestations are so slight as to be unnoticeable or not demonstrable.

Nonetheless, subclinical levels of exposure to chemical warfare agents can result in changes in brain

activity as measured by an electroencephalogram (commonly known as an EEG) and may result in

long-term health effects. Clinical levels of exposure result in physiological symptoms ranging from

dilation of the pupils or runny nose up to apnea, convulsions, and loss of consciousness.

9

The Committee had concerns about (1) the lack of doctrine standardizing the reporting and retention

of possible chemical warfare agent detections; (2) the incompatibility of doctrine for the M93A1 NBC

Reconnaissance System (also known as the Fox) to confirm initial chemical detections with battlefield

operations; (3) the capabilities and use of chemical warfare agent detectors of the battlefield to detect

low-level, subclinical concentrations; and (4) monitoring, documenting, and reporting early health

effects of possible chemical exposure incidents by location.

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attacks, including attacks delivered by asymmetrical means.10 This study

exposed serious vulnerabilities to the U.S. power projection capabilities

that could be exploited by the asymmetrical employment of chemical and

biological weapons both in the United States and in foreign theaters of

operation. The study also found that the U.S. intelligence capability to

determine small-scale development and intent to use chemical or

biological weapons, particularly for limited use, is inadequate. Shortfalls

include insufficient ability to collect and assess indications and warnings

of planned low-level chemical and biological attacks. The report

concluded that OSD should significantly increase its level of attention to

vulnerabilities posed by an enemy using asymmetrical and limited

applications of chemical and biological weapons.

Lack of Consensus on the

Definition of Low-Level

Exposures

The absence of an OSD policy or DOD doctrine on low-level exposures is

partly attributable to the lack of a consensus within DOD on the meaning of

low level. DOD officials responsible for medical chemical defense,

nonmedical chemical defense, NBC doctrine, and NBC intelligence provided

varying definitions of low-level exposure, including the Oxford Dictionary

definition, no observable effects, sublethal, and 0.2 LD50.

11 Despite the

differing responses, each one can be depicted as a location along the lower

end of a chemical warfare agent exposure and effects continuum. (App. IV

describes physiological effects from increasing levels of chemical warfare

agent exposures.) Figure 1 shows that one end of the continuum is

extremely high exposures that result in death, and the other end is no or

minimal exposures that result in no performance or health effects.

Between these extremes is a range of exposures and resulting effects.

10In the study, asymmetrical delivery means included a two-seat helicopter, a crop duster, and a used

delivery truck with a makeshift storage tank and discharge valve.

11LD50 is the median lethal dose, meaning that one-half of a population receiving this dose will die.

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Figure 1: Chemical Warfare Agent Exposure and Effects Continuum

Exposure Highest Lowest

Effects Lethal Incapacitating

effects

Clinical

effects

Subclinical

effects None

Note: The various stages of effects are not shown to scale. The specific exposure that would

invoke the various types of effects will vary with the type of chemical warfare agent and the

conditions of exposure, such as agent concentration, agent form, route and time of exposure, and

characteristics of exposed subject.

Lack of Consensus on the

Effects of Low-Level

Exposures

In addition to a lack of consensus on the definition or meaning of low-level

exposures, there is a lack of consensus within DOD and the research

community on the extent and significance of low-level exposure effects.

These differences result from several factors. First, the chemical warfare

agent dose-response curves can be quite steep,12 leading some DOD officials

and researchers to question the concern over a very narrow range of

sublethal dose levels. Second, the extrapolation of findings from studies

on the effects of chemical warfare agent exposures in animals to humans

can be imprecise and unpredictable. Third, the impacts of different

methods of chemical warfare agent exposure, such as topical, injection,

and inhalation, may result in varied manifestations and timings of effects,

even with comparable concentrations and subject conditions. For

example, many of the effects attributable to chemical warfare agent

exposure are subjective and either do not occur or cannot be measured in

many animal species. Fourth, the preponderance of information on the

combined effects of low-level exposures is lacking. Nearly all research on

low-level effects addresses single agents in isolation; defining low levels of

an agent when present in combination with other battlefield contaminants

has not been addressed. In addition, most research has involved single,

12The dose-response curve reflects the change in effects for each additional unit of exposure. For

highly toxic organophosphate nerve agents, the difference between the dose that creates the first

adverse response and the lethal dose can be small. Dose-response curves have been developed for

several animal species through laboratory testing; similar testing to develop a dose-response curve in

humans has not been done.

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acute exposures with observations made over several hours or days. Few

studies have examined the possible long-term effects of continuous or

repeated low-level exposures.

Last, research is not yet conclusive as to what level of exposure is

militarily or operationally significant. The impact of a specific symptom

resulting from chemical warfare agent exposure may vary by the military

task to be performed. For example, miosis (constriction of the eye’s pupil)

may have a greater adverse impact on a pilot or a medical practitioner

than a logistician. Nonetheless, the dose and effects data are only some of

the many factors considered in risk analyses conducted by military

commanders. DOD officials told us that trade-offs among competing factors

are more often than not based on professional judgment of persons with

extensive knowledge based on military and technical education, training,

and experience rather than an algorithm with numerical input and output.

Disparate Independent

Low-Level Initiatives Are

Originating Within DOD

Despite the lack of an OSD policy on low-level exposures, some elements

within DOD have begun to address issues involving such exposures. In

describing DOD’s NBC defense strategy for the future, the Chairman of the

Joint Service Materiel Group noted that the presence of low levels of

chemical warfare agents will be one of the factors to consider before

sending U.S. troops to a contingency. Specifically, the future strategy will

no longer be primarily shaped by the occurrence of mild physiological

effects, such as miosis, but rather the possible long-term health effects to

U.S. forces. Lessons learned from the Gulf War are reflected in DOD’s NBC

defense strategy, which focuses on the asymmetrical threat. Gulf War

Syndrome and low-level threats are identified as two of the concerns to be

addressed in the future NBC defense strategy. The Group Chairman added

that traditionally the de facto low-level definition has been determined by

DOD’s technical capability to detect the presence of an agent. However, the

Chairman stated that the low-level concept in future chemical defense

strategies will need to be defined by the medical community and consider

the long-term health effects of battlefield environments.

The Joint Service Integration Group—an arm of the Joint NBC Defense

Board that is responsible for requirements, priorities, training, and

doctrine—is working with the services to create a joint NBC defense

concept to guide the development of a coherent NBC defense program. One

of the central tenets of the proposed concept is to provide effective force

protection against exposure threats at the lower end of the continuum,

such as those from terrorism and industrial hazards. Also, the proposed

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concept envisions a single process for force protection to provide a

seamless transition from peacetime to wartime. Even though the levels

and types of threat can differ, a single overall process can meet all joint

force protection needs. Thus, the NBC joint concept will address threats

against DOD installations and forces for both peacetime and military

conflicts. In addition, the joint concept will provide a conceptual

framework for defense modernization through 2010, but the specific

programs and system requirements necessary for the implementation of

the concept will not be articulated.

The services are concurrently identifying NBC defense joint future

operational capabilities to implement the joint concept. Several of these

capabilities relate to low-level exposure, such as (1) improving detection

limits and capabilities for identifying standard chemical warfare agents by

50 percent, (2) lowering detection sensitivity limits and detection response

times for identifying standard chemical warfare agents by 50 percent, and

(3) lowering detection response time for standard biological agents by at

least 50 percent.13

Even in the absence of adopted joint force operational capabilities, DOD is

incorporating low-level capabilities in the design of new chemical defense

equipment. For example, the Joint Chemical Agent Detector, currently

under development, is expected to provide an initial indication that a

chemical warfare attack has occurred and detect low-level concentrations

of selected chemical warfare agents. The detector will replace currently

fielded systems that have a limited ability to provide warning of low-dose

hazards from chemical warfare agents.14 The operational requirements for

the detector specify that it will be able to detect low-level concentrations

of five nerve agents and two blister agents. However, the low-level

requirement necessitates trade-offs between the breadth of agents that the

detector can identify and its ability to monitor low-level concentrations for

a select few agents. Thus, the next-generation chemical warfare agent

detector is expected to have a capability to detect lower chemical warfare

agent concentrations in more locations. In the absence of policy—or

additional research on low-level effects—it cannot be known whether the

13Although the joint concept and the joint future operational capabilities reflect a need to improve

force protection capabilities, these initiatives do not define what level of protection is appropriate.

Therefore, we cannot determine if the improved capabilities are either necessary or adequate.

14According to the operational requirements document for the Joint Chemical Agent Detector, existing

systems, such as the M-8 paper, M-9 tape, and M8A1 and M256A1 kits are time-consuming,

labor-intensive, and subject to false readings. The Chemical Agent Monitor and M90 Automatic Agent

Detectors are not sensitive enough to provide warnings of low-dose hazards, leading to miosis. Other

detection systems are limited by shortcomings in mobility; usefulness on aircraft; and sensitivity to

nonchemical warfare agent exposures, such as organic vapors or electromagnetic interference.

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current, less capable detectors would have the appropriate capabilities to

meet the requirements of a low-level exposure doctrine.

Research on

Performance and

Health Effects of

Low-Level Exposures

Research on animals and humans conducted by DOD and others has

identified some adverse psychological, physiological, behavioral, and

performance effects of low-level exposure to some chemical warfare

agents. Nonetheless, researchers do not agree on the risk posed by

low-level exposures and the potential military implications of their

presence on the battlefield, whether in isolation or in combination with

other battlefield contaminants. DOD has no research program to address

the remaining uncertainties regarding the performance and health effects

of low-level exposures to chemical warfare agents; however, two new

research initiatives are currently under consideration.

Previous Research The majority of the chemical warfare agent research has been on

organophosphate15 nerve agents and related pesticides. At low doses,

nerve agents produce a wide range of effects on the central nervous

system, beginning with anxiety and emotional instability. Psychological

effects in humans from nerve agent VX on skin have been noted earlier

than physical effects (e.g., nausea and vomiting) or appeared in the

absence of physical effects. The psychological effects were characterized

by difficulty in sustaining attention and slowing of intellectual and motor

processes. Doses considerably below the LD50 can degrade performance

and alter behavior. These performance and behavioral effects have clear

military implications because affected service personnel exposed to

chemical warfare agents might not only lose the motivation to fight but

also lose the ability to defend themselves and carry out the complex tasks

frequently required in the modern armed forces. Moreover, the detrimental

effects of exposure to single doses of nerve agents may be prolonged.16

Concern about low-level chemical warfare agent effects predate Operation

Desert Storm. In the 1980s, the Air Force conducted research on the

15Organophosphates are a family of chemical compounds that inhibit cholinesterase and can be

formulated as pesticides and nerve agents.

16The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Handbook on Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive

Operations states that (1) daily exposure to concentrations of a nerve agent insufficient to produce

symptoms after a single exposure may result in the onset of symptoms after several days and that

continued daily exposure may result in increasingly severe effects and (2) after symptoms subside,

increased susceptibility may persist for up to 3 months. The degree of exposure required to produce

recurrence of symptoms and the severity of these symptoms depend on the dose received and the time

since the last exposure. Increased susceptibility is not limited to the particular nerve agent initially

absorbed.

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bioeffects of single and repeated exposures to low levels of the nerve

agent soman due to concerns about the effects of low-level chemical agent

exposures on vulnerable personnel—such as bomb loaders, pilots, and

medical personnel—who may be required to work in low-level

contaminated environments.17 The Air Force found that the nerve agent

degraded performance on specific behavior tasks in the absence of

obvious physical deficits in primates. Thus, even for extremely toxic

compounds, such as organophosphate nerve agents, which have a steep

dose-response curve, task performance deficits could be detected at low

levels of exposure that did not cause any overt signs of physical toxicity.

This research was unique because low-level exposures were thought at

that time to be unlikely or unrealistic on the battlefield.

Table 1 shows examples of research conducted or funded by DOD on the

behavioral and performance effects of organophosphate nerve agents. The

research examples reveal that sublethal exposures of an agent can have a

variety of effects (depending on the species, exposure parameters, time,

and combination of exposures) and produce measurable, adverse effects

on physiology and behavior (both motor and cognitive18 performance).

17The Navy also was interested in low-level effects and directly supported the Air Force’s research

projects in the late 1980s.

18Cognitive thought processes are based on perception, memory, and judgment.

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Table 1: Examples of Research on the

Effects of Low-Levels of

Organophosphorus Chemical Nerve

Agents in Animals

Source Agent

Air Force Armstrong Laboratory,

Brooks Air Force Base, Tex.a

Soman

Air Force Armstrong Laboratory,

Brooks Air Force Base, Tex.

Soman

Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio; and

Army Chemical Research and Development Center,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.c

Soman

Neurophysiology Laboratory, Children’s Hospital Center,

Harvard Medical School, Boston, Mass.; and

the Biomedical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.d

Sarin

Medical College of Georgia Research Institute,

Augusta, Ga.e

DFP (Diisopropyl

fluorophosphate)

Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine,

Brooks Air Force Base, Tex.f

Ionizing radiation and

anticholinesterase

physostigmine

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Species Exposure Performance or response test Performance effects

Rhesus monkeys 2.5 μg/kg, acute (e.g., single)

dose; given by injection (dose

is less than one-third of LD50)

Primate equilibrium platform,b

observations in 5-minute intervals

up to 90 minutes after injection

Reliable decrements in sensory-motor

equilibrium performance noted in the

absence of any obvious physical signs of

toxicity

Rhesus monkeys 0.97 μg/kg/day, repeated;

single doses on 5 consecutive

days, given by injection

Primate equilibrium platform,

observations daily

50 percent of primates experience

performance decrements 

(e.g., ED50)

Rats 90, 103, 116 μg/kg, given by

injection (LD50 is 185 μg/kg)

Behavioral parameters: grip

strength; startle response,

conditioned avoidance measured

on days 0, 1, 3, 7, 14, and 21

Sublethal doses of soman can cause

marked and often long-lasting changes in

behavior, such as impaired grip strength,

increased latency, increased spontaneous

motor activity, and hyperexcitability

Rhesus monkeys 1 μg/kg, weekly for 10 weeks,

given by injection

EEG; 24 hours and 1 year

postinjection in three states of

consciousness

Significant increase in beta activity persisted

for 1 year

Rats Daily doses of 0.25 mg/kg for

14 days, given by injection

Water maze and delayed stimulus

discrimination task, 7 to 16 days

after completion of agent regimen

Withdrawal from repeated exposures

impaired acquisition of novel cognitive tasks

but not the performance of memory tasks

dependent on reference concepts

Rats 7 Gy and 0.1 mg/kg, acute

dose, given by injection

Rotarod (balance) and four

general motor activity measures,

observations preirradiation and

45 minutes, 4 days, and

8 days postirradiation

60 percent performance decrement at 45

minutes in combination versus

30 and 40 percent decrements from

radiation- or physostigmine-only exposures,

respectively

Note: The examples were judgmentally selected to illustrate the types of methodologies that have

been applied to the variety of effects that have been observed. This information table is not meant

to be representative of the research literature. See the glossary of terms at the end of the report

for definitions of units of measurement.

aHartgraves, S.L., and M.R. Murphy. “Behavioral Effects of Low-Dose Nerve Agents.” In: ed. S.M.

Somani. Chemical Warfare Agents. San Diego: Academic Press, 1992.

bThe primate equilibrium platform test is a sensory-motor equilibrium task requiring both fine

motor control (for joystick manipulation) and the integrity of the complex sensorimotor system for

maintaining equilibrium and orientation in space.

cHaggerty, G.C., et al. “Duration and Intensity of Behavioral Change After Sublethal Exposure to

Soman in Rats.” Neurobehavioral Toxicology and Teratology, vol. 8 (1986), pp. 695-702.

dBurchfiel, J.L., et al. “Persistent Effects of Sarin and Dieldrin Upon the Primate

Electroencephalogram.” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, vol. 35 (1976), pp. 365-379.

eBuccafusco, J.J., “Chronic Organophosphorus Exposure and Cognition.” Annual Report, U.S.

Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, 1997.

f

Wheeler, T.G., and R.E. Cordts. Combined Effects of Ionizing Radiation and Anticholinesterase

Exposure on Rodent Motor Performance. U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Report

number USAFSAM-TR-83-30, July 1983.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

In our prior report on Gulf War illnesses,19 we summarized research on the

long-term health effects of chemical warfare agents, which were suspected

of contributing to the health problems of Gulf War veterans. The report

cited research suggesting that low-level exposure to some chemical

warfare agents or chemically related compounds, such as certain

pesticides, is associated with delayed or long-term health effects.

Regarding delayed health effects of organophosphates, we noted evidence

from animal experiments, studies of accidental human exposures, and

epidemiological studies of humans that low-level exposures to certain

organophosphorus compounds, including sarin nerve agents to which

some U.S troops may have been exposed, can cause delayed, chronic

neurotoxic effects.20

We noted that, as early as the 1950s, studies demonstrated that repeated

oral and subcutaneous exposures to neurotoxic organophosphates

produced delayed neurotoxic effects in rats and mice. In addition, German

personnel who were exposed to nerve agents during World War II

displayed signs and symptoms of neurological problems even 5 to 10 years

after their last exposure. Long-term abnormal neurological and psychiatric

symptoms, as well as disturbed brain wave patterns, have also been seen

in workers exposed to sarin in manufacturing plants.21 The same abnormal

brain wave disturbances were produced experimentally in nonhuman

primates by exposing them to low doses of sarin.22 Delayed, chronic

neurotoxic effects have also been seen in animal experiments after the

administration of organophosphate. In other experiments, animals given a

low dosage of the nerve agent sarin for 10 days showed no signs of

19Gulf War Illnesses: Improved Monitoring of Clinical Progress and Reexamination of Research

Emphasis Are Needed (GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 23, 1997).

20This syndrome is characterized by clinical signs and symptoms manifested 4 to 21 days after

exposure to organophosphate compounds. The symptoms of delayed neurotoxicity can take at least

two forms. A single large dose may cause nerve damage with paralysis and later spastic movement or

repetitive low doses may damage the brain, causing impaired concentration and memory, depression,

fatigue, and irritability. These delayed symptoms may be permanent.

21Duffy, F.H. et al. “Long-Term Effects of an Organophosphate Upon the Human

Electroencephalogram.” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, vol. 47 (1979), pp. 161-176. Sidell, F.R.,

“Soman and Sarin: Clinical Manifestations and Treatment of Accidental Poisoning by

Organophosphates.” Clinical Toxicology, vol. 7 (1979), pp. 1-17.

22Burchfiel, J.L., et al. “Persistent Effect of Sarin and Dieldrin Upon the Primate

Electroencephalogram.” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, vol. 35 (1976), pp. 365-379.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

immediate illness but developed delayed chronic neurotoxicity after 

2 weeks.23

Nonetheless, some DOD representatives in the research community have

expressed considerable doubt that low-level exposures to chemical

warfare agents or organophosphates pose performance and long-term

health risks—particularly in regard to the likelihood that low-level

exposures are linked to Gulf War illnesses. These doubts stem from the

lack of a realistic scenario, the lack of adverse long-term health effects

observed in studies of controlled and accidental human exposure or

animal studies, and results that are viewed as incompatible with the

principles of biology and pharmacology.24 Researchers we interviewed did

agree that the work that has been done to date is lacking in several

aspects, including (1) the effects of exposure to low levels of chemical

warfare agents in combination with other agents or contaminants likely

found on future battlefields; (2) extrapolation of animal models to

humans; (3) the breadth of agents tested, types of exposure routes, and

length of exposure; and (4) the military or operational implications of

identified or projected low-level exposure effects.25

Proposed Research

Initiatives

Consistent with the absence of an OSD policy on low-level exposures, there

is no research objective under DOD’s Joint Service Chemical and Biological

Defense Program to evaluate the potential effects of low-level exposures.

However, even in the absence of a requirement, there is a consensus

within the research and doctrinal communities that additional research on

low-level effects is needed. Researchers told us that, although they do

know that low-level exposures to chemical warfare agents can have

performance and health effects, more was unknown than known about the

effects of low-level exposures of agents—either in isolation or in

combination—and that more research would be desirable. According to

23Husain, K., et al. “Assessing Delayed Neurotoxicity in Rodents after Nerve Gas Exposure.” Defense

Science Journal, vol. 44 (1994), pp. 161-164. Husain, K., et al. “Delayed Neurotoxic Effect of Sarin in

Mice After Repeated Inhalation Exposure.” Journal of Applied Toxicology, vol. 13 (1993), pp. 143-145.

Husain, K., et al. “A Comparative Study of Delayed Neurotoxicity in Hens Following Repeated

Administration of Organophosphorus in Compounds.” Indian Journal of Physiology and Pharmacology,

vol. 39 (1995), pp. 47-50.

24The human body has a natural ability to scavenge or neutralize organophosphates. For example,

natural scavengers can neutralize approximately 0.2 LD50of soman while the agent is in the blood and

before it can affect the central nervous system. Therefore, for each nerve agent there may be a

threshold of exposure below which no effects will result.

25Much of the historic toxicological research on exposure effects was conducted for an offensive

chemical weapons program; therefore, the results are likely not appropriate for a defensive chemical

weapons program.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

one DOD scientist, “Research can improve our understanding of the

relationships among the many factors, such as effects, time of onset of

effects, duration of effects, concentration, duration of exposure, dosage,

and dose. Improved estimates of effects in humans resulting from

exposure to chemical warfare agents are a requirement that has existed

since World War I.”

Consistent with that assessment, the Army’s Medical Research and

Materiel Command is proposing a science and technology objective26 to

establish a research program on the chronic effects of chemical warfare

agent exposure. Because previous research efforts have emphasized the

acute effects of high (battlefield-level) exposures, there is little

information on the repeated or chronic effects of low-dose exposures. The

Command’s research effort is in response to this lack of information and

joint service requirements for knowledge of the effects on personnel in

sustained operations in areas that may be chemically contaminated, thus

creating the possibility of a continuous low-level exposure.27

Additionally, the Joint Service Integration Group has tasked a panel of

experts to determine an accepted definition for low-level chemical warfare

agent exposure. The panel has proposed a series of research efforts to the

Joint NBC Defense Board to analyze the relationships among dose,

concentration, time, and effects for the purpose of determining safe

exposure levels for sustained combat operations.28

DOD has funded two National Academy of Sciences studies to support the

development of a long-term strategy for protecting U.S. military personnel

deployed to unfamiliar environments. These studies will provide guidance

for managing health and exposure issues, including infectious agents;

vaccines; drug interactions; stress; and environmental and

battlefield-related hazards, such as chemical and biological agents. One

study is assessing approaches and technologies that have been or may be

used by DOD in developing and evaluating equipment and clothing for

physical protection and decontamination. The assessment is to address the

efficacy of current policies, doctrine, and training as they relate to

26An approved science and technology objective validates an area as worthy for research and helps

provide a “fence” to protect funding to the area being investigated or researched.

27We have not analyzed this or other draft research plans to determine if the proposals, if implemented,

would likely achieve their objectives.

28Because the research programs sponsored by the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command

and the Joint Service Integration Group have not been approved or implemented, we cannot assess

their objectives, scopes, or methodologies.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

potential exposures to chemical warfare agents during deployments. The

second study is assessing technology and methods for detection and

tracking of exposures to a subset of harmful agents. This study will assess

tools and methods to detect, monitor, and document exposures to

deployed personnel. These studies do not address issues of risk

management; those will be the focus of a third study.

Low-Level Chemical

Research Funding

Although DOD and congressional interest concerning the effects of

low-level chemical exposure increased after events in the 1991 Gulf War,

relatively limited funding has actually been expended or programmed in

DOD’s RDT&E programs in recent years to address issues associated with

low-level chemical exposure on U.S. military personnel. However, DOD has

developed proposals to fund two low-level research efforts, which are

under consideration for implementation.

Chemical and Biological

Defense Program Research

Funding

For fiscal years 1996 through 2003, DOD has been appropriated in excess of

$2.5 billion for chemical and biological defense RDT&E programs. (See 

app. V for general DOD chemical and biological program funding

allocations and trends for fiscal years 1990 through 2003). Fiscal year 1996

was the first time that RDT&E funding for all of DOD’s chemical and

biological defense programs was consolidated into six defensewide

program element funding lines. These program elements are (1) basic

research, (2) applied research, (3) advanced technology development,

(4) demonstration and validation, (5) engineering and manufacturing

development, and (6) management support. Table 2 shows total actual and

projected research funding by RDT&E program element for fiscal years 1996

through 2003.

Table 2: Chemical and Biological

RDT&E Funding, Fiscal Years

1996-2003

Dollars in millions

Program element

Amount

programmed Percent

Basic research $215.4 8.6

Applied research 518.1 20.6

Advanced technology development 319.7 12.7

Demonstration and validation 356.4 14.2

Engineering and manufacturing development 944.2 37.5

Management support 161.7 6.4

Total $2,515.5 100.0

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

Recent Low-Level

Research Funding

Three low-level research efforts—totaling about $10 million—were

included in DOD’s fiscal year 1997 and 1998 chemical and biological defense

RDT&E programs. These research efforts represented about 1.5 percent of

the approximately $646 million in combined obligational authority

authorized for chemical and biological defense RDT&E for these 2 fiscal

years.

Funding for the largest of the three—an $8-million effort in the fiscal 

year 1998 program that dealt with chemical sensor enhancements—was

provided by the Conference Committee on DOD Appropriations.29 Another

fiscal year 1998 effort—costing almost $1.4 million—involved the

development of sensitive biomarkers of low-dose exposure to chemical

agents. The remaining effort, included in the fiscal year 1997 program,

developed in vitro and in vivo model systems to evaluate the possible

effects of low-dose or chronic exposures to chemical warfare agents. This

project cost approximately $676,000. DOD officials told us that these

projects were not part of a structured program to determine the

performance and health effects of low-level exposures. However, two

elements within DOD have proposed multiyear research programs on

low-level issues.

Proposed Low-Level

Research Funding

DOD has requested funding for the U.S. Army Medical Research and

Materiel Command’s science and technology objective on the chronic

effects of chemical warfare agent exposure. If approved, this research

program is projected to receive an average of about $2.8 million annually

in research funds for fiscal years 1999 through 2003. The purpose of this

undertaking would be to investigate the effects of low-dose and chronic

exposure to chemical agents to (1) gain a better understanding of the

medical effects of such exposure, (2) provide tools for a medical

assessment of personnel, and (3) develop protocols for subsequent

protection and treatment. Figure 2 reflects DOD’s programmed RDT&E

funding for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 and shows the proposed science

and technology objective in relation to other research program efforts.

29The fiscal year 1998 Appropriations Conference Report, House Report 105-265, added funds to the

Chemical and Biological Defense RDT&E program. Specifically, an additional $10 million was added to

the applied research program element for chemical agent sensor technology. Subsequently, the

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for NBC Defense Programs earmarked $8 million of the

$10 million for low-level chemical detection and monitoring technology.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

Figure 2: Programmed RDT&E Funding, Fiscal Years 1999-2003

 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Fiscal year

Programmed applied 

research

Proposed science and 

Technology objective All other programmed

Dollars in millions

RDT & E

Another research program involving low-level chemical exposures will be

proposed in the near future to the NBC Defense Board for approval. A panel

of experts, tasked by DOD to study the issue of defining low-level and

chronic chemical exposure, has proposed a series of research efforts to be

undertaken over the next several years to address the definitional dilemma

surrounding this issue. Funding levels for this effort have not been

established.

Conclusions and

Recommendation

DOD’s current NBC policy and doctrine do not address exposures of U.S.

troops to low levels of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. NBC

defense doctrine is focused on ensuring mission accomplishment through

the prevention of acute lethal and incapacitating effects of chemical

weapons and is not designed to maximize force protection from exposure

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

to clinical and subclinical doses. Moreover, DOD has no chemical defense

research plan to evaluate the potential performance effects of low-level

exposures or the implications they may have for force protection. Even

though research funded by DOD and others has demonstrated adverse

effects in animal studies, the literature does not adequately address the

breadth of potential agents; the combinations of agents either in isolation

or in combination with battlefield contaminants; the chronic effects;

animal-human extrapolation models; or the operational implications of the

measured adverse impacts.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop an integrated

strategy for comprehensively addressing force protection issues resulting

from low-level chemical warfare agent exposures. The strategy should

address, at a minimum,

• the desirability of an OSD policy on the protection of troops from low-level

chemical warfare agent exposures;

• the appropriateness of addressing low-level chemical warfare agent

exposures in doctrine;

• the need for enhanced low-level chemical warfare agent detection,

identification, and protection capabilities;

• the research needed to fully understand the risks posed by exposures to

low levels of chemical warfare agents, in isolation and in combination with

other contaminants that would be likely found on the battlefield; and

• the respective risks, costs, and benefits of addressing low-level chemical

warfare agent exposures within DOD’s chemical and biological defense

program.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense develop a “low-level”

strategy but disagreed with the implied priority order. DOD stated that it is

also concerned with force protection and the possible impact that

low-level chemical agent exposures might have on a service member’s

health and emphasized that a valid data-based risk assessment must serve

as the foundation for any change in policy or doctrine. In addition, DOD

provided us with updated plans and proposals to develop an overall

requirements and program strategy for low-level chemical agent

monitoring.

DOD agreed that the absence of an OSD policy or a DOD doctrine on low-level

exposures is partially attributable to the absence of a consensus within

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

DOD on the meaning of low level. However, DOD expressed concern that we

did not assert a working definition of low level as it might apply to a force

projection or battlefield scenario. DOD disagreed with our selection of

examples of low-level research illustrated in table 1, stating that the

studies were more appropriately categorized as “low dose” rather than low

level. Finally, DOD believed that we misinterpreted the report, Assessment

of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operation in

2010, by failing to understand that the asymmetrical application of

chemical agents does not equate to “low level” for the purpose of

producing casualties, but rather for the purpose of disrupting operations

by the mere detectable presence of these agents at levels that may have no

medical effects.

In our recommendation, we listed a number of elements that should be

addressed in developing such a strategy, but we purposely did not

articulate a priority order beginning with research. Rather, we advocate

that DOD develop a strategy to analyze policy, doctrine, and requirements

based on existing information and to reassess policy, doctrine, and

requirements as the results of a low-level research program are reported.

We did not define low level in our report because the definition requires an

interpretation of both exposure effects data and military risk and

performance data—analyses best performed by DOD. Furthermore,

because a consensus of the meaning or definition of low level is lacking,

we find no basis for DOD’s characterization of the research examples in

table 1 of the report as “low dose,” rather than “low level.”

Regarding the 2010 Study, we disagree with DOD’s statement that there may

not be medical effects for low-level chemical agents. Rather our work

shows that low-level exposure can have medical effects that cannot only

result in casualties, but also disrupt operations.

The plan of action and low-level toxicological and technical base efforts

provided by DOD did not fully address the strategy that the report

discusses. The strategy will require a plan of action incorporating medical

and tactical analyses, as well as the nonmedical research and development

projects described by DOD.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
B-280551 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other congressional

committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies

available to others on request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at

(202) 512-3092. Major contributors to this report were Sushil Sharma,

Jeffrey Harris, Foy Wicker, and Betty Ward-Zukerman.

Kwai-Cheung Chan

Director, Special Studies and Evaluation

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

28

Appendix II 

Chemical Warfare

Agents

31

Appendix III 

The National Defense

Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1994

32

Appendix IV 

Chemical Warfare

Nerve Agent

Exposures and

Effects

34

Appendix V 

Funding Trends in

DOD’s Chemical and

Biological Defense

Program

35

Glossary 38

Tables Table 1: Examples of Research on the Effects of Low-Levels of

Organophosphorus Chemical Nerve Agents in Animals

14

Table 2: Chemical and Biological RDT&E Funding, Fiscal Years

1996-2003

19

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Contents

Figures Figure 1: Chemical Warfare Agent Exposure and Effects

Continuum

8

Figure 2: Programmed RDT&E Funding, Fiscal Years 1999-2003 21

Figure III.1: Joint Service NBC Defense Program 33

Figure V.1: Chemical and Biological Program Funding, Fiscal

Years 1990-1997

36

Figure V.2: Planned Chemical and Biological Program Funding,

Fiscal Years 1998-2003

37

Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DFP diisopropyl fluorophosphate

DOD Department of Defense

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

The scope of our study was limited to chemical defense and low-level

exposures that may cause adverse effects on performance. To determine

the extent to which low-level exposures are addressed in doctrine, we

reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) documents and interviewed

agency officials. We asked questions designed to elicit the treatment of

low-level issues within the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

doctrinal architecture (i.e., Joint Publication 3-11; field manuals; training

circulars; and tactics, techniques, and procedures). After determining that

low-level issues were not addressed in the war-fighting doctrine, we asked

representatives of the doctrinal, intelligence, and research communities

why low-level issues were not addressed and under what circumstances

they would be addressed.

To identify research on the performance effects of low-level exposure of

chemical warfare agents, we reviewed relevant government and academic

research (published and unpublished) and interviewed researchers within

and outside of DOD. To identify relevant literature, we interviewed DOD

officials currently responsible for prioritizing chemical and biological

defense research needs. We also interviewed DOD researchers at the

Army’s primary center of medical chemical defense research and

development (the Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense)

and nonmedical chemical research and development (the Edgewood

Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Aberdeen Proving

Ground). We interviewed staff at the laboratory used by the Air Force to

conduct low-level exposure effects on animals before the Army was

designated as executive agent for chemical defense and the Air Force’s

effort ceased. We sought historic programmatic information from the

Naval Medical Research and Development Command, which funded

portions of the Air Force’s low-level animal studies. We monitored ongoing

DOD-funded Gulf War illnesses research that addresses potential long-term

health effects from low-dose or chronic chemical exposures. Last, we

discussed current research with leading academics in the field.

We reviewed the compilation of relevant low-level research literature to

characterize coverage (variety and combinations of agents or

contaminants), methodologies employed, and effects observed. These

observations were discussed and validated in our interviews with

researchers in chemical defense, both within and outside of DOD. In

addition, we employed a research consultant from academia to review the

literature to substantiate both the comprehensiveness of our compilation

and the validity of our conclusions.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

To determine what portion of the chemical defense budget specifically

addresses low-level exposures, we reviewed DOD documents and

interviewed DOD program officials. We examined DOD planning and budget

documents, including the NBC defense annual reports to Congress and joint

service chemical and biological defense program backup books for budget

estimates. In addition, we analyzed chemical defense-related data for fiscal

years 1991 through 1999 contained in DOD’s Future Years Defense

Program—the most comprehensive and continuous source of current and

historical defense resource data—to identify annual appropriation trends

and ascertain the level of funds programmed and obligated for research,

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), as well as procurement, and the

destruction of chemical munitions. We interviewed DOD officials to verify

our observations about low-level efforts and to obtain information about

potential programs currently being developed to expand DOD’s efforts to

understand the effects of chronic and low-level exposure of chemical

warfare agents on military personnel.

We contacted the following organizations:

• Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland;

• Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.;

• DOD Inspector General, Washington, D.C.;

• Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.;

• Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Maryland;

• Israel Institute for Biological Research, Ness-Zonia, Israel;

• Joint Program Office, Biological Defense; Falls Church, Virginia;

• National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia;

• National Research Council, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.;

• Oregon Health Sciences University, Portland, Oregon;

• University of Texas Health Center at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas;

• University of Texas Southwest Medical Center, Dallas, Texas;

• Air Force Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas;

• Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;

• Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama;

• Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Frederick, Maryland;

• Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland;

• Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.; and

• Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

We performed our review from September 1997 to May 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix II 

Chemical Warfare Agents

Type of agent Common name Symbol

Nerve Tabun GA

Sarin GB

Soman GD

Cyclosarin GF

a VX

Vesicant or blister Mustard HD

Lewisite L

Pulmonary toxicants Phosgene CG

Diphosgene DP

Incapacitating a BZ

Vomiting Adamsite DM

Cyanides Hydrogen cyanide AC

Cyanogen chloride CK

Tear gases a CN

a CS

aNo common names exist for these agents.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix III 

The National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1994

The institutional structure and responsibilities for NBC defense research,

requirements, and doctrine derive from provisions in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.1

 The act directed the Secretary of

Defense to assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of

the chemical and biological program to a single office within the Office of

the Secretary of Defense. The legislation also directed the Secretary of

Defense to designate the Army as DOD’s executive agent to coordinate

chemical and biological RDT&E across the services.

The Joint NBC Defense Board, which is subordinate to the Under Secretary

for Acquisition and Technology, provides oversight and management of

the NBC defense program within DOD. The NBC Board approves joint NBC

requirements; the joint NBC modernization plan; the consolidated NBC

defense program objective memorandum; the joint NBC research,

development, and acquisition plan; joint training and doctrine initiatives;

and the joint NBC logistics plan.

The Joint Service Integration Group and the Joint Service Materiel Group

serve as subordinates to the NBC Board and execute several of its

functions. Both groups are staffed with representatives from each of the

services. The Joint Service Integration Group is responsible for joint NBC

requirements, priorities, training, doctrine, and the joint modernization

plan. The Joint Service Materiel Group is responsible for joint research,

development, and acquisition; logistics; technical oversight; and

sustainment.

These two groups and the NBC Board are assisted by the Armed Forces

Biomedical Research Evaluation Management Committee, which provides

oversight of chemical and biological medical defense programs. The

Committee is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Heath

Affairs and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Figure III.1

illustrates the relationships among the various organizations responsible

for NBC defense.

1

Title XVII of Public Law 103-160, 50 U.S.C. 1522, as amended.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix III 

The National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1994

Figure III.1: Joint Service NBC Defense Program

ASBREM Committee

ASD (HA)

Co-Chair

DDR&E

Co-Chair

ASBREM

Steering Group

JTCG 1

JTCG 2

JTCG 5

JTCG 6

JTCG 7

JTCG 3

Chemical

JTCG 4

Biochemical

USD (A&T)

ATSD (NCB)

DATSD (CBM)

Joint NBC

Defense Board

JSIG Joint Service

Integration Group

Joint Requirements

Joint Doctrine

Joint Professional

 Training

JSMG Joint Service

Materiel Group

Joint Research, Development,

 and Acquisition

Joint Technical Oversight 

Joint Logistics

Sustainment

ASBREM Committee Member

for Medical CB Defense Issues

Medical

Programs

Subpanel

Budget

Subpanel

Other

Subpanels

Service

Subpanels

Army

Navy

Air Force

Marine Corps

Functional Areas

Legend

ASBREM - Armed Service Biomedical Research Evaluation and Management

ASD (HA) - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

ATSD (NCB) - Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

CB - Chemical and Biological

DATSD (CBM) - Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Matters

DDR&E - Director, Defense Research and Engineering

JTCG - Joint Technical Coordinating Group

RDA - Research, Development, and Acquisition

USD (A&T) - Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; serves as the chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board

U.S. Army, Executive Agent

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix IV 

Chemical Warfare Nerve Agent Exposures

and Effects

Chemical exposure level Effects

Clinical

Lethal Death

Severe Loss of consciousness, convulsions, flaccid paralysis

(lack of muscle tone and an inability to move), and apnea

(transient cessation of respiration)

Moderately severe Severe dyspnea (difficult or labored respiration),

gastrointestinal or neuromuscular signs

Moderate Miosis, rhinorrhea, moderate to severe dyspnea, reflex

nausea, and vomiting

Mild Miosis, rhinorrhea, mild dyspnea, reflex nausea, and

vomiting

Minimal Miosis, with or without rhinorrhea; reflex nausea, and

vomiting

Subclinical

No observable effects Measurable changes in EEG and brain anticholinesterase

activity

8-hour occupational limita Exposure would not create any adverse health effect

72-hour general population

limita

Exposure would not create any adverse health effect

Note: The specific dose-response relationship varies with the specific agent, time of exposure,

environmental factors (i.e., wind, humidity, and temperature), method of exposure (i.e., inhalation,

intravenous, and dermal), activity level of subject, and the presence of other contaminants.

aOccupational and general population exposure limits for chemical warfare agents stored by

DOD are determined by the Centers for Disease Control based on linear extrapolations of

experimental results of experiments involving human volunteers as well as animal reactions to

higher doses. The National Academy of Science’s Committee on Toxicology is reviewing the

scientific validity of reference doses developed by the Army for the six chemical warfare agents

currently stored by the U.S. military. The focus of the work is to determine whether all the relevant

toxicity data have been appropriately considered. Particular attention will be paid to the

uncertainty, variability, and quality of data and the appropriateness of the assumption applied

when the current reference doses were developed. In addition, the committee will incorporate

new research as appropriate, identify gaps in the research, and recommend additional research

as necessary.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Funding Trends in DOD’s Chemical and

Biological Defense Program

This appendix provides general information on the funding trends for

DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program for fiscal years 1990-97

and 1998-2003. Funding is shown in four categories: disposal, which

includes the costs associated with the chemical stockpile disposal

program; RDT&E; procurement; and operations and maintenance, including

the costs for military personnel.

After the end of the Cold War, DOD funding for chemical and biological

programs increased from about $566 million in fiscal year 1990 to almost

$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1997. These funds include all military services

and the chemical munitions destruction program.1

 Adjusted for inflation,

the total program funding has more than doubled (see fig. V.1) over that

period and is programmed to continue growing—peaking in fiscal 

year 2002 with a total obligational authority in excess of $2.3 billion (see

fig. V.2).

1

In 1985, Congress passed Public Law 99-145, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986, section

1412 of which directed the Army to destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and

munitions. To comply with this direction, the Army established the chemical stockpile disposal

program to incinerate the agents and munitions on site in specially designed facilities. The stockpile

consists of rockets, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk containers, that contain nerve and

mustard agents.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Funding Trends in DOD’s Chemical and

Biological Defense Program

Figure V.1: Chemical and Biological Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1990-1997

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000

682,314

726,649

854,968

821,249

737,631

838,124

1,197,505

1,483,753

Fiscal year 1997 dollars in thousands

Disposal RDT&E Procurement Operations and

maintenance

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Funding Trends in DOD’s Chemical and

Biological Defense Program

Figure V.2: Planned Chemical and Biological Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1998-2003

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000

1,382,310

1,810,390

2,305,100

2,264,775

2,333,482

1,905,654

Fiscal year

Dollars in thousands

Disposal RDT&E Procurement Operations and

maintenance

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Glossary

Anticholinesterase Agent that inhibits the enzyme acetylcholinesterase.

Apnea Transient cessation of respiration.

Clinical Symptoms as observed by a physician.

Cognitive Process based on perception, memory, and judgment.

Dose-Response Effects resulting from a specific unit of exposure.

Dyspnea Difficult or labored respiration.

Effluent Waste material discharged into the environment.

Flaccid Paralysis Lack of muscle tone and an inability to move.

Gy Gray unit of radiation.

kg Kilogram.

LD50 Median lethal dose.

mg Milligram.

Miosis Constriction of the pupil of the eye.

Neurotoxic Toxins that exert direct effects on nervous system function.

Organophosphate Family of chemical compounds that inhibit cholinesterase and can be

formulated as pesticides and nerve agents.

Prophylaxis Measures designed to preserve health and prevent the spread of disease.

Rhinorrhea Nasal secretions.

Subclinical Manifestations of an exposure that are so slight as to be unnoticeable or

not demonstrable.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
Glossary

μg Microgram.

Vesicant Agent that produces vesicles or blisters.

(713028) Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-228 Low-Level Chemical Weapons
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