COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Al ston, Huff and Chafin Argued by teleconference

MOSES ULYSESS HARRIS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1298-13-4 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF OCTOBER 14, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY Burke F. McCahill, Judge Elizabeth Jean Lancaster, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant. Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant At torney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a three-day jury tria l in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County (“trial court”), Moses Ulysess Harris (“appell ant”) was convicted on two count s of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61, two counts of carnal knowledge, in violation of Code § 18.2-63, five counts of custodial indecent liberties, in violati on of Code § 18.2-370.1(A), and one count of manufacturing child pornography, in violation of Code § 18.2-374.1( B). The trial court imposed the jury’s recommended sentences for a total in carceration period of two life sentences plus seventy-five years. On appeal, appellant pr esents the following assignments of error: 1. The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motion to suppress and subsequently a llowing the introduction of the seized video to the jury, as the video seized exceeded the scope of the search warran t and the introduction of the video was highly prejudicial. 2. The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motion to continue when the Commonwealth amended counts one

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - through nine of indictment 24172 in both substance and timeframe seven (7) days prior to trial, and the lack of a continuance denied [appellant] his right to a fair trial. 3. The evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support each conviction as the Commonwealth failed to prove that [appellant] manufactured child pornography, and that [appellant] did have sexua l intercourse with the alleged victim for each of the specifie d time frames enumerated in counts one through nine of indictment 24172. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the judgments of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND On appeal, “‘we consider the evidence and al l reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Co mmonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) ( en banc ) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows. In July 2011, Virginia State Trooper Justin Huntley (“Huntley”), acting on an anonymous tip, began investigating appellant fo r possible Sex Offender Registry violations relating to his residency status. Appellant’s registered address was in Purcellville, Virginia, but Huntley’s investigation led him to conclude that appellant was liv ing at a residence in Leesburg, Virginia with his girlfriend a nd her two minor children. Conse quently, Huntley obtained two search warrants for the Leesburg residence. The first search warrant authorized the sear ch and seizure of “reco rds, documents, and materials . . . in all forms including paper, phot ographic, mechanical, el ectronic, magnetic, and optical forms. Personal documents including but not limited to drivers licenses [sic], passports . . . [and] [p]ersonal belongings, incl uding but not limited to mens [sic] clothing . . . that show indicia of [appellant] residing at the [L eesburg] residence.” The second search warrant authorized the seizure of- 3 - [a]ll computer systems and digital storage media located therein. Those items are further described as any and all personal computer(s)/computing system(s), digital storage devices including, but not limited to computers, input and output devices, disks, diskettes, optical storage devices, central processing units, peripherals and all associate st orage media for electronic data, together with all other compute r-related operating equipment and materials, and other in strumentalities . . . . The warrants were executed on November 15, 2011. During the search, an officer observed a video camera bag located next to a pi le of laundry in the basement. The officer opened the bag and observed that it contained a video camera loaded with a JVC Hi-8 video cassette HMP 120 (“video cassette”). Using the screen on the camera, the officer played the video cassette, which depicted appellant having sexual intercourse with D.R., a minor female who resided at the Leesburg residence. After being arrested for manufacturing ch ild pornography, appellant moved to suppress the seizure of the video cassette. In the heari ng on the motion to suppress, appellant argued that an unlabeled camera bag provided no indicia of appellant residing in the Leesburg residence, and therefore, its seizure exceededthe scope of the warrant. Atthe suppression hearing, the Commonwealth called John Mocello (“Mocello”), who qualified as an expert in the field of videography, to testify. Mo cello testified that the video cassette seized in this case was a form of media that utilized magnetic particles on a tape that are rearra nged during the production
process. The trial court held that the seizure of the video cassette fell within the scope of the first search warrant and “arguably” fell within the scope of the second. Th e trial court further described the video cassette as a brick in the wall of evidence that was relevant to proving appellant’s residency. Appellant was subsequently indicted on ni ne counts of rape. On February 26, 2013, seven days prior to appellant’s trial, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to- 4 - amend these nine indictments to coincide with D.R.’s date of birth – May 28th, 1996, the nature of the sex offense chargeable given the victim’s age, and, with regards to counts eight and nine, the date of appellant’s arrest. In the first indictment, charging rape, the date of offense range was amended from “May 28, 2007 to on or about December 31, 2007” to “May 28, 2007 to on or about May 27, 2008.” Similarly, regarding the second indictment, the date of offense range was amended from “January 1, 2008 to on or about December 31, 2008” to “May 28, 2008 to on or about May 27, 2009.” The third indictment, which originally ch arged rape in violati on of Code § 18.2-61, was amended to charge carnal knowledge in violati on of Code § 18.2-63, and the date of offense range was amended from “January 1, 2009 to on or about December 31, 2009” to “May 28, 2009 to on or about May 27, 2010.” The fourth indictment, which or iginally charged rape, was also amended to charge carnal knowledge, and its date of offense range was amended from “January 1, 2010 to on or about December 31, 2011” to “May 28, 2010 to on or about May 27, 2011.” Indictments five through nine all originally alle ged rape, but were amended to allege indecent liberties with a child by a custodian in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1(A). Additionally, the date of offense range for counts five thr ough nine was amended to coincide with D.R.’s birthday rather than with each calendar year. Appellant did not object to th ese amendments, but requested a continuance on the ground that he wanted additional time to reconsider his defense strategy. Appellant asserted that he felt the changes in the date ranges were “really significant” as they were not amended to lesser-included offenses, but rather require proof of different elements . Appellant also stated that he wanted more time to consider whether he needed additional witnesses. The Commonwealth responded by arguing that the nature of the char ges was identical and the only real difference- 5 - was the age of D.R. for each sexual encounter. The Commonwealth admitted that some of the amendments added a custodial supervisory relations hip as an element, but argued that the nature of the relationship between appellant and D. R. was the same from the case’s inception. Appellant then conceded to the trial court that he was facing no surpri se in regards to the evidence that the Commonwealth would present at trial. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for a continuance, stating that appellan t “has to articulate something other than a generalized desire to have mo re time.” Nevertheless, the trial court stated that it would reconsider its ruling if appellant discovered additional witnesses he would be unable to call or some other particularized need for a continuance. Appellant renewed his motion for a conti nuance on February 27, 2013. In his renewed motion, however, appellant acknowledged that he was unaware of any additional witnesses who might be useful to his defense if a continua nce was granted. Instea d, appellant argued there could be such witnesses. The trial court deni ed appellant’s renewed motion on the ground that appellant “made no showing of a specific need for additional investigation to prepare a defense, nor did he suggest . . . there was testimony of witnesses or evidence in any other form which could be secured if a continuance was granted.” At trial, Erica Golden (“Golden”) testified that she began dating appellant in 2006. Then, in 2007, appellant moved in with Golden and her two minor children, D.R. and L.R., at Golden’s father’s house in Leesburg, Virginia. From April 2007 to June 2012, Golden worked from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. at Cornwall Hospital. Then, starting in June 2012, Golden began working from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. at a 7-Eleven in Leesburg. Golden testified that there were many times when she would go to work l eaving appellant at home with D.R. D.R was eleven years old when appellant move d into the Leesburg residence. Appellant became involved with D.R.’s participation in athletics, and the two developed a close- 6 - relationship. Eventually, D.R. began referri ng to appellant as “dad.” When the police interviewed D.R. regarding the recording of appe llant engaged in sexual intercourse with D.R., she eventually admitted that the male in the video was appellant. D.R. testified that the first time appellant had “vaginal intercourse” with her was when she was eleven years old and in the fifth grade. She recalled having sex wi th appellant “three or four times” while she was eleven years old. D.R. testified that when it first started happening, she did not think she should talk about it and she did not tell anyone because she did not trust adults. D.R. stated that the sexual intercourse would occur at night in the basement bedroom while her mother was at work. Appellant stipulated that he was in ja il from May 22, 2008 to November 18, 2008. D.R. testified that when she was twelve years old, ap pellant had sexual interc ourse with her “pretty close” to when appellant was released from jail. While D.R. could not remember the specific number of times appellant had sexual intercourse with her, she testified that “it happened every year” and that the frequency of the encounters increased when she was thirteen years old. D.R. similarly testified that the fre quency of the encounters increasedwhen she was fourteen years old. When D.R. was fifteen years old, she recalled one specific encount er with appellant where a video was made while the two engaged insexual intercourse. D.R. testified that the video was appellant’s idea and thatappellant set the video up at th e foot of her “parents” bed. D.R. further described that appellant turned on the video camera, they had sexual intercourse, and then she turned off the video. D.R. also testified that she had sexual intercourse with appellant between November 2011 and March 5, 2012, but she could not recall how many times because she “just didn’t keep count.” She also testified that she and appellant had sexual intercourse during the week of Marc h 31, 2012, when appellant was arrested.- 7 - D.R. admitted that she helped appellant hide in a closet by putting items on top of him when Huntley came to the Leesburg residence on March 31, 2012 to arrest appellant. D.R. testified she helped hide him “b ecause it’s still my dad. And wh at he did was wrong, but I still wanted to help.” A three-day jury trial wa s held from March 5 to March 7, 2013. The jury found appellant guilty of two c ounts of rape, two counts of carnal knowledge, five counts of custodial indecent liberties, and one count of manufacturing child pornography. On June 13, 2013, appellant was sentenced to a total of two life sent ences plus seventy-fi ve years. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Suppress On appeal, appellant first c ontends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the video cassette. Sp ecifically, appellant argues the se izure of the video cassette exceeded the scope of the search warrants. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppre ss, appellant bears the burden on appeal to show that the trial court committed reversib le error. Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980); see also Lebe dun v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 697, 711, 501 S.E.2d 427, 434 (1998). When considering appe llant’s argument, we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are “plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence,” Pyramid Development, L.L.C. v. D & J Associates, 262 Va. 750, 753, 553 S.E.2d 725, 727 (2001), but we review the tr ial court’s application of law de novo , Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419, 620 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2005). The Fourth Amendment requires search warrant s to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be se ized.” “The permissibl e scope of a search is limited by the terms of the warrant pursuant to which it is conducted,” Kearney v.- 8 - Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 202, 204, 355 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1987), and “extends to every place where the object of the search may reasonabl y be found,” Rosa v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 93, 98, 628 S.E.2d 92, 94 (2006). The restriction “that warrants shall partic ularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches unde r them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant that describes another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). A search warrant, however, is not a “cons titutional straight jacket.” United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (cit ation and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, when interpreting search warrants, th is Court must heed the United States Supreme Court’s reminders to employ a “common sense and realistic” approach, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) , and avoid “‘hypertechnical’ scrutin y . . . lest police officers be encouraged to forgo the warrant application process altogether,” United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Illin ois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). Indeed, “[p]olice officers executing a particul arized search warrantneed not read its scope either narrowly or broa dly, only reasonably.” Jeffers v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 151, 156, 743 S.E.2d 289, 291 (2013) (citing United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging “an executing officer must interpret a warrant’s te rms reasonably, but the officer need not give them the narrowest possible reasonable in terpretation”)); see also United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Officers executing a search warrant are ‘required to interpret it,’” but “they are ‘not obliged to interp ret [the warrant] narrowly.’” (quoting Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Ci r. 1992))). The “officers’ interpretation [of a search warrant] must simply be consistent w ith a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searche d, bearing in mind that many situations which confront officers in the course of executing thei r duties are more or less ambiguous.” Jeffers, 62 Va. App. at 156-57, 743 S.E.2d at 291-92 (quotations and citations omitted).- 9 - In the present case, the first search warrant authorized the seizure of “records, documents, and materials . . . in all forms including paper, photographic, mechanical, electronic, magnetic, and optical forms . . . that show indicia of [appe llant] residing at the residence,” and the second search warrant authorized the seizure of [a]ll computer systems and digital storage media located therein. Those items are further described as any and all personal computer(s)/computing system(s), digital storage devices including, but not limited to computers, input and output devices, disks, diskettes, optical storage devices, central processing units, peripherals and all associate st orage media for electronic data, together with all other compute r-related operating equipment and materials, and other in strumentalities . . . . (Emphasis added). Thus, the issue before us is whether, on th ese facts, the video cassette could reasonably fall within the scope of either or both of these warrants. Reasonably in terpreting the language of the first search warrant, this Court holds that th e video cassette fell within its scope and that it carries an indicia of appellant’s residence. “The permissible scope of a search is limited by the terms of the warrant pursuant to which it is conducted,” Kearney, 4 Va. App. at 204, 355 S.E.2d at 898, and in the present case, the search warrant authorized the seizure of “records, documents, and materials . . . in all forms including . . . magne tic, and optical forms . . . that show indicia of [appellant] residing at the residence.” As such, the police were permitted to search for digital storage devices and electronic data tending to in dicate that appellant resided at the Leesburg residence. The video cassette, as a form of magnetic media, r easonably falls within the express terms of the search warrant. Additionally, the video cassette and the camera are items of personal significance that a person would likely keep at the place where he reside s. This is particularly true of a home video depicting the subject of the search engaged in intercourse with a minor. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 172, 178, 497 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1998) (noting that illegal drugs are- 10 - objects “‘of significant value,’” making it unlikely that they were carelessly left somewhere); see also United States v. Zenone, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18561, *7-8 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that video tapes found in a closed and locked basement “[were] plainly authorized [to be seized] by the warrant . . . given their location and tende ncy to link the defendant to the place to be searched”). As such, the seized video cassette carried an indicia that appellant resided at the location it was found. While the video cassette alone may be insufficient to establish appellant’s residence, it forms a brick in a wall of ev idence obtained as a result of the search. Accordingly, this Court holds that the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress the video cassette. B. Motion to Continue Appellant next asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue. Specifically, appellant argues a continuance shouldhave been granted because when the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the indictments, the nature and character of the offenses changed, including changes to the essential and material elements of proof. “‘The decision to grant a motion for a contin uance is within the sound discretion of the [trial] court and must be considered in view of the circumstances unique to each case.’” Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 722-23, 667 S.E.2d 751, 761-62 (2008) (quoting Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)). An appellate court can reverse the denial of a motion for a contin uance only if the trial court committed an “abuse of discretion” and thereby caused “resulting pr ejudice.” Id. at 722, 667 S.E.2d at 762. “This ‘two-pronged’ test . . . has long been the sta ndard under Virginia practice.” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 558, 565, 680 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2009) (quoting Lebedun, 27 Va. App. at 712, 501 S.E.2d at 434).- 11 - Satisfying both prongs of the test is “esse ntial to reversal.” Butler v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 614, 621, 570 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2002) (citations omitted). “The absence of one renders inconsequential the presence of the other.” Bolden v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 285, 290, 640 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2007). Therefore, this Court “cannot reverse if [appellant] ‘has shown no prejudice resulting from what he claims was an abuse of discretion’” in denying his motion for a continuance. Id. (quoting Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 135, 295 S.E.2d 643, 646 (1982)). Additionally, prejudice “‘may not be pres umed; it must appear from the record.’” Id. (quoting Lowery v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. Ap. 304, 307, 387 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1990)). In Ortiz, the Commonwealth moved to amend th e indictment against Ortiz after it had concluded its case-in-chief. 276 Va. at 723, 667 S.E.2d at 762. After granting the Commonwealth’s motion, the trial c ourt denied Ortiz’s motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a continuance because Ortiz “‘made no showing of a specific need for additional investigation to prepare . . . a defense.’ Nor did he ‘suggest to the trial court that there was testimony of witnesses, or evidence in any other form, which he could secure if a continuance was granted.’” Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court concl uded that “[m]ere reference of a need for more time to prepare is insufficient to show that a continuance was improperly denied.” Id. In the present case, appellant has failed to pr ove that he was prejudic ed by the denial of his motion for a continuance. Specifically, appe llant failed to particularize any evidence or witnesses that he might be able to secure through the benefit of a continuance. Rather, appellant stated that he was unaware of any additional witnesses or evidence that would be useful to the defense if a continuance is grante d. Thus, appellant failed to dem onstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion to continue because he “‘made no showing of a specific need for additional investigation to prep are . . . a defense.’” Ortiz, 276 Va. at 723, 667 S.E.2d at 762- 12 - (citation omitted). Appellant is th erefore left only with his asserti ons that more time is needed to prepare, which are “insufficient to show that a continuance was improperly denied.” Id. Accordingly, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a continuance. C. Sufficiency of Evidence Lastly, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Specifically, in regards to the two counts of rape, two counts of carna l knowledge, and five counts of custodial indecent libe rties with a minor, appellant argues that D.R.’s testimony was inherently incredible and cannot support these findings of guilt. Similarly, in regards to the count of manufacturing child pornography, appellant argues that D.R.’s testimony is insufficient, by itself, to support ap pellant’s conviction. In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evid ence, “we ‘presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct,’ and ‘will no t set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002) (quoting Broom v. Broom, 15 Va. App. 497, 504, 425 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1992); Dodge v. Dodge, 2 Va. App. 238, 242, 343 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1986)). The re viewing court, under this standard, does not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (citation omitted). Instead, the reviewing court asks whether “ any rational trier of fact co uld have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt .” Id. at 319 (empha sis in original). “Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the jury, which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the w itnesses as they testify.” Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304, 429 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1993). Therefore, this Court will not disturb the fact finder’s determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, “as- 13 - a matter of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999). In regards to the two counts of rape, two counts of carnal knowledge , and five counts of custodial indecent liberties with a minor, the jury heard D.R. testify that appellant had “vaginal intercourse” with her three or four times when sh e was eleven. She further testified that when she was twelve, appellant began ha ving vaginal intercourse with he r after his release from prison. Additionally, D.R. testified that appellant contin ued to have vaginal intercourse with her every year, with increasing frequency af ter she turned thirteen. Simila rly, in regards to the count of manufacturing child pornography, th e jury heard D.R. testify thatappellant set up the camera, they engaged in vaginal intercourse, and D.R. turned off the camera. After hearing this testimony, the jury convicted appellant of all char ges. Nevertheless, appellant argues that this Court should hold that D.R.’s testimony is inherently incredible, as a matter of law, because the “lack of detail and specificity are contrary to human experience.” For testimony to be inherently incredible, as a matter of law, “it ‘must be either so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or things as to the exis tence and meaning of which reas onable men should not differ.’” Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1968) (quoting Burke v. Scott, 192 Va. 16, 23, 63 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1951)). In other words, it must be “so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 300, 321 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984). Appellant first argues that D.R.’s testimony is unworthy of belief because she could not remember specific details about when each sexual encounter occurred. While it is true that D.R. was unable to recall specific dates regarding each instance appellant had va ginal intercourse with her, this is not so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief. Rather, it is- 14 - reasonable for D.R. to remember that appellant had vaginal intercourse with her multiple times, with increasing frequency, since she was elevenyears old without reme mbering the specific dates of each occurrence years later. Additionally, appellant argues that D.R. shoul d be considered unworthy of belief because “of the impeachments to her testimony.” As the Supreme Court has explained, however, [w]hen the law says that it is fo r the trier of fact to judge the credibility of a witness, the issue is not a matter of degree. So long as a witness deposes as to facts, which, if true, are sufficient to maintain their verdict, then the fact that the witness’ credit is impeached by contrary statements affects only the witness’ credibility . . . [and] the weight a nd sufficiency of the testimony. If the trier of the facts sees fit to base the verdict upon that testimony, there can be no relief in the appellate court. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 549, 557-58, 100 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1957); see also Burke, 192 Va. at 23-24, 63 S.E.2d at 744. Finally, appellant argues that D.R. should be considered unworthy of belief because her testimony lacked corroboration. As sexual offenses are typically cl andestine in nature, seldom involving witnesses to the offens e except the perpetrator and the victim, a requirement of corrobor ation would result in most sex offenses going unpunished. Conseque ntly rape and attempted rape may be sustained solely upon the te stimony of the victim. There is no requirement of corroboration. Garland v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 189, 191, 379 S.E.2d 146, 147 (1989); see also Fisher, 228 Va. at 299, 321 S.E.2d at 203 (“Persuasive author ity also extends [this rule] to prosecutions for sodomy and other sexual offenses .” (emphasis added)). Therefore, in the present case, corroboration of D.R.’s testimony is not n eeded to uphold appellant ’s convictions, and appellant’s argument fails. Accordingly, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions because D.R.’s testimony is not so inherently incredible as to render it unworthy of belief.- 15 - III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court a ffirms the judgments of the trial court. Affirmed.