United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and the Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Personnel, Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate

February 1999 MILITARY

RECRUITING

New Initiatives Could

Improve Criminal

History Screening

GAO/NSIAD-99-53

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281719 

February 23, 1999

The Honorable Wayne Allard

Chairman

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

To enter the military services, applicants must meet several Department of

Defense (DOD) entrance qualification standards, such as moral character,

physical fitness, and dependency status, or be granted a waiver.

Notwithstanding the moral character standards, a criminal history record1

for any type of crime, including a felony, does not automatically eliminate

someone from consideration because they may be granted a “moral

character waiver” (referred to in this report as moral waiver)—an

agreement to enlist an individual despite past behavior. Of the 1.5 million

individuals the military services enlisted in fiscal years 1990 through 1997,

about 192,000 were granted a waiver for moral character reasons.

Concerned about the moral character qualifications of enlisted personnel,

you requested that we (1) determine the extent to which relevant criminal

history information on potential enlistees is available to the military

services and (2) identify any federal government initiatives that could

improve the process of obtaining criminal history information. We are also

providing data comparing enlistees entering military service with moral

waivers to those without, and their reasons for separation. This

information is presented in appendix I.

Results in Brief The military services have extensive policies and procedures for

encouraging applicants to self-report criminal history information. Among

other things, the services repeatedly query each applicant, providing as

many as 14 opportunities to disclose any criminal offenses to as many as

seven different service and military entrance processing station officials.

The services also conduct periodic inspections and investigations to

ensure the integrity of the entire recruiting process, which includes the

disclosure of disqualifying information. The services, however, are not

1

“Criminal history records” are fingerprint cards or their electronic counterparts, linked with

identifying information and available data on arrests, convictions, and sentences. Not included are

state or local criminal justice agency records sealed under law. Records of offenses committed by

juveniles are frequently sealed.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

always able to obtain or substantiate all available criminal history

information because of service policies and federal, state, and local laws

and policies that sometimes preclude access. First, the services do not use

fingerprints to substantiate the majority of enlistees’ criminal histories.

Without full fingerprint searches, the services cannot detect undisclosed

aliases and ensure that they are aware of all available criminal history

information. Second, federal law and state and local laws and policies,

which generally limit or prohibit disclosure of criminal history

information, impede the recruiting community’s access to certain criminal

history information. In addition, state and local governments sometimes

charge fees or require fingerprints to release the information. Third,

available criminal history databases (not controlled by DOD) are

incomplete. Of further concern is the services’ practice of sending

enlistees to basic training before the results of criminal record checks are

received. This practice results in training costs that could be avoided.

Several DOD and Department of Justice initiatives are underway that could

improve the process of obtaining criminal history information. These

initiatives have the potential of making available to DOD and the services

more complete information upon which to make moral waiver decisions

and expedite the process for obtaining record checks. However, DOD and

the services have not yet formulated a coordinated approach for using

these initiatives to better ensure that the military does not enlist and train

individuals with undesirable backgrounds.

Background Military enlistees must meet basic DOD and military service entrance

qualification standards on age, citizenship, education, aptitude, physical

fitness, dependency status, and moral character. Screening to determine

whether applicants meet these standards or merit being granted a waiver

begins with a recruiter’s initial contact with a potential applicant and

continues through their entrance into basic training. In deciding whether

to grant a moral waiver, the services employ the “whole person” concept:

They consider the circumstances surrounding the criminal violations, the

age of the person committing them, and personal interviews.

As figure 1 shows, the services differ in both the way they categorize

criminal offenses and the criteria they use for requiring moral waivers. In

general, however, the services require moral waivers for convictions or

adverse adjudications for criminal offenses as follows:

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(1) “felonies”—such as murder and grand larceny;2 (2) “non-minor

(serious) misdemeanors”—assault and petty larceny; (3) “minor

misdemeanors”—discharging a firearm within city limits and removing

property from public grounds; (4) “minor non-traffic”—disorderly conduct

and vandalism; (5) “serious traffic”—driving with revoked license and

failure to comply with officer’s directions; and (6) “minor

traffic”—speeding and driving without a license. The services, except for

the Army, also grant moral waivers for preservice drug and alcohol abuse.

None of the services grant waivers for certain offenses, such as the

trafficking, sale, or distribution of illegal drugs.

2

10 U.S.C. 504 provides that no person convicted of a felony may be enlisted in any of the armed

services; however, the secretaries of the respective services are authorized to make exceptions in

meritorious cases.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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Figure 1: Level of Offenses and Military Service Criteria for Requiring Moral Waivers

One through five; no waiver 

allowed for six or more.

Marine Corps

Two through nine; no 

waiver allowed for 10 or 

more.

One; no waiver allowed for 

more than one. 

Two or more; no 

waiver allowed for six 

or more.

Five or more.

Three through five; no 

waiver allowed for six or 

more.

One or two; no waiver 

allowed for three or more.

Navy

One or more.

Six or more in any 

12-month period during 

3 years preceding 

enlistment. Ten or more 

within 3 years preceding 

enlistment.

Three through five; no 

waiver allowed for six or 

more.

Army

Three or more; three 

convictions of a combination 

of misdemeanors and minor 

non-traffic.

One: no waiver allowed for 

more than one.

Two through four; no waiver 

allowed for five or more. 

Six or more where the 

fine was $100 or 

more per offense.

Depending on the 

seriousness of the offense: 

(1)two in last 3 years, or 

three or more in a lifetime

or (2) six or more minor 

traffic or five minor traffic 

and one minor non-traffic in 

any 1-year period within the 

last 3 years.

Air Force

One or more.

One or more.

One or more.

Depending on the 

seriousness of the offense: 

One or more, or two in the 

last 3 years, or three or 

more in a lifetime.

Level of offense

Felony

Non-minor (serious)

misdemeanor

Minor non-traffic 

Minor misdemeanor

Minor traffic

Serious traffic Category not used. Category not used. Category not used.

Category not used. Category not used.

Source: Service regulations.

Appendix I provides detailed information about how often and for what

reasons the services granted moral waivers to enlistees during the fiscal

years 1990 through 1997 period. Overall, DOD’s Defense Manpower Data

Center (DMDC) data for this 8-fiscal year period shows the following:

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• moral waivers accounted for 62 percent of all waivers granted3 and

represented 13 percent of all individuals enlisted;

• although annual DOD-wide enlistments fluctuated between about 162,000

and 223,000 during this period, the rate of granting moral waivers

consistently declined from 17.5 percent to 7.8 percent of all enlistees—a

total decrease of over 60 percent;

• of the moral waivers granted, non-minor (serious) misdemeanors and

preservice drug and alcohol abuse categories accounted for over

75 percent, minor non-traffic and traffic offenses for about 20 percent, and

felonies committed either as an adult or juvenile about 3 percent; and

• the number of moral waivers granted in all categories decreased, but

felony and non-minor misdemeanor waivers increased as a percentage of

total moral waivers granted.

Screening Policies

and Procedures Are

Extensive, but Record

Checks Are Limited

The services’ policies and procedures for screening for criminal histories

and granting moral waivers are extensive and are intended to encourage

applicants to reveal their criminal history information. However, because

of limitations in records checks, the services are not always able to obtain

or substantiate all available criminal history information. First, the

majority of the national agency checks are conducted without using an

applicant’s fingerprints to verify or search for records. Also, service

policies and federal, state, and local laws and policies sometimes limit or

preclude access to criminal history information, and the criminal history

databases relied on by the services for record checks are incomplete. Of

further concern is the services’ practice of sending enlistees to training

before the results of criminal record checks are received, which incurs

unnecessary costs.

Extensive Policies and

Procedures Exist for

Gathering Criminal History

Information

Each service screens for criminal background information in a similar

manner. Figure 2 shows how the following screening tools fit in the

recruiting process: (1) face-to-face interviews, briefings, and completion of

forms; (2) law enforcement agency record checks at the state and local

levels; and (3) national agency record checks conducted by the Defense

Security Service.4

3

Includes waivers granted for age, citizenship, education, aptitude, physical fitness, dependency status,

and moral character.

4

This check, referred to as the Entrance National Agency Check, is a records search by appropriate

federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (for felony and serious

misdemeanor offenses), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization

Service.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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Figure 2: Recruiting Process and Criminal History Screening Tools

Applicant

Delayed Entry Program

(Enlistee is unpaid member of 

reserves.)

(Up to 1 year)

entrance national agency checks

periodic enlistee contacts/

 interviews

opportunity for discharge for 

unsuitablility

Military Entrance Processing Stations

physical exam

interviews/briefings

final review and processing of forms

briefing and second enlistment oath

opportunity for discharge for unsuitability

Basic Training

(Enlistee is active duty servicemember.)

(6 to 12 weeks)

"moment of truth" briefing

opportunity for discharge for unsuitability

Service recruiter contacts

interviews/briefings

completion of forms

state and local records checks

Military Entrance Processing Stations

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test

physical exam

interviews/briefings

review of forms

fingerprints

briefing and first enlistment oath 

Note: A moral waiver can be initiated when criminal history information is disclosed during any of

these steps.

Source: Data compiled from the Military Entrance Processing Command and the military services’

policies and procedures.

According to recruiting officials, screening to identify criminal histories

begins when recruiters contact potential applicants informally—over the

telephone, at shopping malls, or in schools. Through interviews and

briefings listed in figure 3, the services provide applicants with as many as

14 different opportunities to disclose any prior criminal offenses and

convictions to as many as 7 different recruiting, military entrance

processing station, and training officials. The recruiting officials also

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stated that security interviews are conducted for applicants enlisting in

jobs requiring secret or top secret clearances.

Figure 3: Interviews and Briefings for

Gathering Criminal History Information Conducted by the 

Military Entrance 

Processing Station:

Medical personnel

Processing personnel

Enlisting officer

Medical personnel

Processing personnel

Enlisting officer

Pre-interview

Initial interview

Pre-enlistment medical interview 

Guidance counselor/ liaison 

interview

Pre-enlistment interview

First enlistment ceremony 

briefing

Delayed Entry Program follow up

Active duty briefing

Pre-accession medical interview

Guidance counselor/liaison 

interview

Pre-accession briefing

Second enlistment ceremony 

briefing

Basic training briefing

Pre-Military Entrance Processing 

Station briefing 

Interview or 

briefing Conducted by the 

service:

Recruiter

Recruiter

Guidance counselor or liaison

Recruiter

Basic training personnel

Recruiter and/or recruiter

chain of command

Recruiter and/or recruiter

chain of command

Guidance counselor or liaison

(Figure notes on next page)

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Notes: Slight variations occur by service. Recruiter chain of command personnel include Army

recruiting station commanders, Marine Corps substation noncommissioned officers in charge,

and Air Force flight chiefs. Service liaisons include Army guidance counselors, Navy liaison petty

officers and classifiers, Marine Corps noncommissioned officers, and Air Force liaisons. Basic

training personnel include personnel from the Army Training Battalion, Navy Recruit Quality

Assurance Team, Marine Corps Basic Training Recruit Liaison Section, and Air Force Training

Squadron.

Source: Service and Military Entrance Processing Command interviews, briefings, and

regulations.

Applicants are required to complete the following forms used in obtaining

criminal history information: (1) Record of Military Processing—Armed

Forces of the United States (DD Form 1966), (2) Personnel Security

Questionnaire (SF-86), (3) the Police Record Check (DD Form 369),5

 and

(4) the Armed Forces Fingerprint Card (DD Form 2280). These forms elicit

information on police record histories, drug and alcohol use and abuse,

financial records and delinquencies, and any juvenile arrest or criminal

activity. At this point, recruiters may request state and local background

checks.

After formal interviews with recruiters, applicants go to 1 of 65 military

entrance processing stations to take the Armed Services Vocational

Aptitude Battery test; undergo a physical exam; submit fingerprints;

participate in more interviews and briefings; and take their first oath of

enlistment, which formally enlists them as unpaid members of the

Individual Ready Reserve forces and places them into the Delayed Entry

Program.6

Entry into the Delayed Entry Program signals the beginning of the national

agency check. Most of these record checks are conducted using

descriptive data—an applicant’s name, social security number, sex, date of

birth, and race—without using fingerprints. When the checks involve

fingerprints, the services request a fingerprint verification—a comparison

of an enlistee’s fingerprints against FBI criminal records to ensure that they

5

In this form, applicants give state and local law enforcement agencies permission to disclose

(1) police or juvenile records (including minor traffic violations) and (2) any ongoing court action.

6

The Delayed Entry Program is intended to serve as a time for enlistees to make the necessary

arrangements in their personal lives before embarking on their new career. For example, enlistees that

are seniors in high school when they make the commitment need the extra time to get their diploma.

The program also helps the military services meet their recruiting goals and training schedules. (For

example, applicants may enlist for specific career fields that are not immediately available but offered

at some future date.) The program also prepares the enlistees for basic training.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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are from the same individual whose name was associated with a possible

arrest record identified through the descriptive data search.

Also, during the Delayed Entry Program, recruiters are in contact with the

enlistees and continue to inquire about their criminal background and any

current contact with law enforcement agencies. If recruiters discover that

enlistees have a criminal history or that they committed offenses while in

the Delayed Entry Program, the enlistees may be discharged.7

 After the

Delayed Entry Program period, enlistees report again to a military

entrance processing station where they undergo a second physical

examination and more interviews and briefings and, if qualifications are

met, take a second enlistment oath (which places them on active military

duty). Subsequently, enlistees are asked again to disclose disqualifying

information when they report to basic training, which lasts from 6 to

12 weeks depending on the service. By the 6-month point in their first

terms, most enlistees have completed follow-on training in technical skills,

though the length of such training can vary widely (from a few weeks to a

year or more).

Moral waivers can be initiated at any stage of the recruiting

process—during contacts with recruiters, visits to the military entrance

processing stations, or the Delayed Entry Program. The level at which the

moral waivers are approved depends on the seriousness of the offense.

Waivers for the most serious offenses must be approved by the

commanders of the recruiting commands in the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force and by the two regional recruiting commanders in the Marine

Corps. Applicants or enlistees that intentionally conceal any disqualifying

information may be refused enlistment at any point during the recruiting

process or, after enlisting, discharged for fraudulent enlistment.

Quality control procedures have been incorporated into the recruiting

process to ensure that recruiters do not conceal negative information

about applicants. Each service (1) has established performance and moral

character standards that recruiters must meet; (2) requires successful

completion of a recruiter training course; (3) assigns some of its most

senior recruiter personnel to military entrance processing stations;

(4) conducts periodic inspections of recruiting activities; and

7

Based on DMDC data, 987,368 enlistees entered the Delayed Entry Program during fiscal years 1993

through 1997; 219,500 (22.2 percent) of these were discharged from the program for a variety of

reasons, including moral character. Complete information regarding the specific reasons for these

discharges was not available in the DMDC database. However, according to data provided by three of

the four services, 13,866 (8.3 percent of these three services’ total discharges of 166,420) were

discharged from the Delayed Entry Program for moral character reasons.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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(5) investigates all allegations relating to recruiter improprieties, which

include an irregularity, misconduct, or malpractice.8

 Malpractice, in

particular, is considered by DOD to include willfully concealing

disqualifying factors, misleading or misinforming applicants, or violating

recruiting policies and procedures resulting in processing an ineligible

applicant. Examples of recruiter malpractice include telling the applicant

to not claim all dependents or to conceal bankruptcies or previous

criminal history. DOD data for the 7-fiscal year period ending September 30,

1997, show that the percentage of recruiter impropriety investigations

opened was less than 1 percent of the total DOD enlistments; the

percentage of investigations substantiated was less than 0.1 percent of

these enlistments.

Limitations Exist for

Record Checks

DOD’s checks of criminal history records are limited because (1) the

majority of national agency checks are conducted without using

fingerprints, (2) the services have limited access to criminal history

information, and (3) criminal history data sources are incomplete.

Majority of National Agency

Checks Are Conducted Without

Using Fingerprints

The services do not always require fingerprint verification because they do

not believe the risk is great that enlistees will enter the service with

undisclosed serious criminal histories, and they are concerned about the

time and cost associated with fingerprint verification.9

 However, it is the

services’ policy to conduct national agency checks with fingerprint

verifications when (1) the descriptive data check reveals a possible arrest

record; (2) applicants are aliens in the United States, prior service persons,

or individuals who have criminal record activity; or (3) any information is

revealed that may require more investigation for a security clearance. As a

result, 73 percent of the enlistees in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 were

checked for criminal history information at the national level using only

descriptive data—name, social security number, race, sex, and date of

birth. Fingerprint verification checks were made on the remaining

27 percent, accounting for 32 percent of the cases in the Army, 25 percent

in the Navy, 22 percent in the Marine Corps, and 20 percent in the Air

Force.

8

DOD considers that an “irregularity” is an intentional action to mislead or misinform a prospective

applicant about any aspect of processing to induce enlistments. “Misconduct,” such as sexual

harassment or misuse of a government vehicle, is considered willful behavior that is contrary to law,

regulation, or policy, but does not apply to recruiting someone into the military fraudulently as

malpractice impropriety does.

9

During fiscal years 1992 through 1997, the average processing time for national checks using

descriptive data was 10 to 14 days; fingerprint verifications took 25 to 38 days. The FBI charged DOD

$4.00 for national descriptive data checks and an additional $8.00 for checks requiring fingerprint

verification.

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According to FBI officials, this fingerprint verification currently used by the

services provides less certainty than a full fingerprint search, which

compares an enlistee’s fingerprints against all criminal records in the FBI

files. For example, fingerprint verification does not assure the services

that the search results are accurate if an applicant has used an alias not

recorded in the criminal records. A full fingerprint search is required to

positively identify the person and detect when they have used undisclosed

aliases.

Services Have Limited Access

to Criminal History Information

The services do not obtain or substantiate all available criminal history

information because federal, state, and local laws and policies limit or

prohibit access.

DOD policy states that the military services shall obtain and review criminal

history record information from the criminal justice system and Defense

Security Service to determine whether applicants are acceptable for

enlistment and for assignment to special programs.10 However, under the

Security Clearance Information Act (5 U.S.C. 9101), criminal justice

agencies are required to provide this information to DOD only when an

individual is being investigated for eligibility for access to classified

information or sensitive national security duties. These agencies, which

include federal, state, and local agencies, are not required to provide this

information for determining basic eligibility or suitability for enlistment

(i.e., employment). DOD gains access to this information through the

national agency checks, which are used for granting security clearances to

enlistees.11 These national agency checks are initiated by military entrance

processing station personnel for all enlistees soon after they enter the

Delayed Entry Program and are employed as unpaid members of the

reserves. Recruiters attempting to gain assess to this information for

screening applicants prior to sending them to the military entrance

processing stations, however, cannot obtain it when state and local laws

and policies restrict access. The sooner applicants’ criminal records are

10According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the criminal justice system includes state,

county, and local law enforcement agencies; courts and clerks of courts; and other government

agencies authorized to collect, maintain, and disseminate criminal history record information.

11According to an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications,

and Intelligence) official, between 50 to 60 percent of all enlistees require a security clearance during

their first term of enlistment. Air Force Recruiting Service officials told us that all Air Force enlistees

require a security clearance.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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known to military managers, the sooner they can make informed decisions

about whether to grant moral waivers.12

Section 520a of title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes DOD and the services to

request from state and local government criminal history record

information regarding enlistees.13 However, state and local policies

sometimes prohibit the release of information, or require fees or

fingerprints to obtain it. A telephone survey of the states by the Navy

Recruiting Command in 1996, showed that 43 states released information

on crimes committed by adults. The survey also showed that 33 states

charged fees ranging from $5 to $59 and that 18 states and the District of

Columbia required fingerprints before releasing information. The Army

has a policy to request local and state record checks for all applicants, but

will not pay these fees, and therefore, does not obtain information from

states that charge fees. The other services request these record checks

only if an applicant admits to a criminal history. Navy and Marine Corps

policy allows recruiters to pay for the checks; Air Force policy requires

applicants to obtain the checks and pay any fees associated with the

checks. Further, because the services do not take fingerprints until after

local and state record checks have been requested, the services do not

obtain information from 18 states and the District of Columbia.

Finally, recruiters frequently cannot obtain information on applicants’

juvenile criminal records. Generally, most state laws restrict access to

juvenile records. The 1996 Navy survey showed that only three states

release these records. In addition, under 18 U.S.C. 5038, federal juvenile

delinquency proceedings’ records are safeguarded from disclosure to

unauthorized persons. Specifically, federal juvenile records may not be

disclosed for any purposes other than judicial inquiries, law enforcement

needs, juvenile treatment requirements, employment in a position raising

national security concerns, and disposition questions from victims or

victims’ families. These juvenile crime records are likely to be a major

source of criminal history information for the population targeted by

military recruiters—men and women generally 17 to 21 years old.

However, according to Department of Justice officials, when juveniles are

charged with serious crimes such as murder and rape, most states try

12For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, DOD proposed legislative changes to give it the authority to readily

obtain access to state and local criminal history information at reasonable costs for the purpose of

accepting or retaining individuals into military service. According to one assistant secretary of defense

official, DOD plans to continue pursuing these changes because their proposals have not been enacted.

13Under this law, criminal history record information pertaining to any juvenile or adult arrest, citation,

or conviction describes the offense involved; age of the person involved; dates of arrest, citation, or

conviction, if any; place of the alleged offense; place of arrest and assigned court; and disposition of

the case.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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them as adults in criminal court. Their records, if reported by states, are

available in the FBI’s national criminal records system. Criminal history

checks, therefore, should identify many of the more serious juvenile

criminal offenders who are tried as adults.

In 1992, the Department of Justice revised its regulations (28 C.F.R.

20.32) to allow the FBI to collect, maintain, and provide authorized access

to juvenile records for juveniles tried or otherwise adjudicated in juvenile

proceedings. Before 1992, the FBI was prohibited from collecting juvenile

records with the exception of those cases when a juvenile had been

processed as an adult. However, according to Department of Justice

officials, each state determines whether its own laws permit submitting

these juvenile records to, or authorizing access through the FBI. Also,

states may elect not to record the offense, and local law enforcement may

decide to label the offense a status violation (truancy, for example) rather

than a criminal violation. As of February 1998, about 213,700 (less than

1 percent) of the 37,857,111 criminal subjects in the FBI’s identification

records system were under the age of 18.

Criminal History Data Sources

Are Incomplete

Department of Justice studies have shown for decades that criminal

history databases are incomplete and, as discussed in the next section,

they have funded initiatives for improvements. The FBI considers a record

to be complete when all significant events, such as the arrest and

disposition, are available. A complete record also includes the individual’s

name, social security number, age, sex, fingerprints, and other physical

descriptive type information. According to FBI officials, completeness of

the FBI database is dependent upon states’ submissions of arrest

information and court disposition actions, and the states depend on local

agencies to submit information to the state repository. Reporting of this

information by all levels of law enforcement agencies to the next higher

level is voluntary and does not always occur.

The Department of Justice periodically requests information from the

states regarding the completeness of their criminal history databases. As

of December 31, 1997, among the 50 states and the District of Columbia,

the percentage of arrest records that have final dispositions recorded

varied greatly, ranging from 5 to 98 percent. Also, for arrests within the

last 5 years, three states reported that less than 30 percent of their records

were complete. Conversely, nine states reported that 90 percent or more

of their records were complete for the same period. At the federal level, as

of June 1998, the FBI database had a total of 76,427,487 active arrests, but

dispositions were on file for only 46 percent of the arrests.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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According to a Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General, state

criminal records systems tend to be more comprehensive than the federal

system. This is particularly true in the case of non-felony arrests and

convictions. Many nonserious offenses are either not reported to the FBI

or, once reported, are not retained because they fail to satisfy retention

criteria specified in regulation (28 C.F.R. 20.32). For example, the FBI is

prohibited from maintaining nonserious offenses such as drunkenness,

traffic violations, and vagrancy. The FBI database, however, includes

reports of vehicular violations, which resulted in personal injury or

property damage and driving while under the influence of alcohol or

drugs.14

Services Risk Incurring

Unnecessary Costs When

Enlistees Are Sent to

Training Before Results of

Record Checks Are Known

The military services’ policies allow enlistees to begin basic and follow-on

training and, in some cases, enter their first-duty stations before

investigative results of record checks are available. If the national record

search does not reveal that an enlistee has a criminal history, results from

the national agency check are usually received during the Delayed Entry

Program. If the national record search reveals that an enlistee has a

criminal history, the national agency check usually takes longer in order to

positively identify the individual, obtain records, and in some cases,

conduct an investigation. The results of this check may not be available

until after the beginning of basic training. In some cases, an enlistee may

be in a follow-on technical school or even at a first-duty station before the

results of investigative reports are received.

The frequency with which enlistees enter basic and follow-on training with

undisclosed serious criminal histories and are subsequently discharged

because of unfavorable record checks is unknown. The Navy, however,

had limited data regarding the actions taken as a result of this unfavorable

information. During the first 11-1/2 months of 1997, the Navy reviewed

2,368 enlistee cases that contained unfavorable criminal history

information; 389 (16.4 percent) were subsequently discharged because of

unfavorable information.

When enlistees are discharged from service after beginning basic training,

the services incur training costs that could have been avoided. On the

basis of the Navy’s 389 discharges, we estimate that the Navy incurred

14Although the more complete state criminal history records are currently unavailable for responding

to noncriminal justice inquiries to the FBI system (such as those for military recruiting), these records

are available for criminal justice purposes under the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index that was

operational in 39 states as of February 1999.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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over $2 million in unnecessary costs.15 The other services could not

provide data that would allow us to make comparable estimates. The

services risk having to absorb these costs because they are trying to avoid

the cost of not filling allotted training slots.

Only the Army conducts an in-depth interview with enlistees whose record

checks have not been received to determine the possibility of a concealed

record and assigns them control numbers before sending them to basic

training. Army officials told us that, with few exceptions, no one is sent to

a first-duty station unless the records check has been received.

New Initiatives Could

Improve Record

Checks, but DOD

Lacks an

Implementation

Strategy

There are several ongoing initiatives that would help DOD to improve the

process for obtaining complete and timely criminal history information

and avoid enlisting and training individuals with undesirable backgrounds.

These initiatives include more thorough background checks using full

fingerprint searches and credit checks, automation of security

questionnaire information, a new FBI fingerprint imaging and classification

system, and continuing efforts to improve the completeness of the

criminal history database. Although these initiatives cover several aspects

of the criminal history screening process, fall under the responsibility of

various organizations, and would require some changes in current policies

and procedures, DOD has not developed an approach for planning and

coordinating their implementation. As a result, it is not yet in a position to

take full advantage of the benefits of these initiatives.

Initiatives Are Underway

That Could Improve DOD’s

Process for Obtaining

Criminal Background

Information

First, on January 1, 1999, DOD implemented Executive Order 12968, signed

August 4, 1995, which expands the requirements for background

investigations for all individuals in jobs requiring a security clearance. The

Defense Security Service will be responsible for conducting a (1) national

agency check using fingerprints; (2) local agency check, which requests

local jurisdictions to provide criminal record information; and (3) credit

check that provides information on financial responsibility. (Prior to

January 1, 1999, the minimum requirement for background investigations

for enlistees requiring secret and confidential clearances included the

15The Navy discharged 332 enlistees from basic training, 22 from follow-on training, and 35 from

first-duty stations during the first 11-1/2 months of 1997. To estimate costs incurred, we used the

Navy’s cost estimates for pay, food, and housing of $146 per day, clothing costs of $817, transportation

costs of $166 (to and from recruit training), and basic training medical examination costs of $91. For

the 332 enlistees separated from basic training, we used the Navy’s estimate that a recruit remains at

basic training an average of 25 days before being separated. We used the full 9-week (63 days) basic

training period to estimate the costs for the 57 enlistees that were separated during follow-on training

or first-duty stations.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

national agency check using only descriptive data, not fingerprints.) This

new requirement will increase the quality of criminal history record

checks for those enlistees filling jobs requiring a security clearance.

Second, the Defense Security Service requested that, by January 1, 1999,

all DOD activities exclusively use the Electronic Personnel Security

Questionnaire, which replaces the paper version of the SF-86. The

automated form allows personnel security data to be more efficiently

recorded, checked for completeness, and transmitted in electronic form.

Also, the Defense Security Service will be able to expedite its performance

of background investigations and efficiently store information for future

retrieval.

Third, in July 1999, the FBI plans to implement the Integrated Automated

Fingerprint Identification System. The FBI developed this system to

capture, submit, process, match, and store fingerprints in a paperless

environment, which will permit electronic—rather than

manual—fingerprint searches. With it, the FBI expects that

(1) electronically scanned fingerprints will be more readable—thereby

eliminating the delays caused by rejecting smudged fingerprints, which

must be resubmitted; (2) fingerprint matches will be more accurate

because more fingerprint detail will be taken into account; (3) the

turnaround time for fingerprint searches for DOD national agency checks

will be reduced—24 hours instead of the current average of 16 days; and

(4) the workload of full fingerprint searches for DOD could be processed in

a timely manner without a significant change to current fees.

Finally, during the last several years, the need to improve the quality of

criminal history records has been one of the major challenges facing

federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies. The FBI Criminal Justice

Information Services Division’s Strategic Plan has a goal of having at least

80 percent of its criminal history records complete (containing both arrest

and disposition information) by fiscal year 2003. Also, the Department of

Justice has supported three major programs since 1988 that provide

funding incentives to the states to improve the accuracy and completeness

of criminal record information. During fiscal years 1990 through 1998,

these programs awarded over $1.47 billion to the states.

DOD Needs to Develop a

Strategy for Implementing

the New Initiatives

DOD does not have a clear strategy for implementing these initiatives. First,

regarding the implementation of Executive Order 12968, the services have

not determined the number of enlistees that will require a security

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

clearance and, therefore, be subject to the required expanded background

checks. Currently, about 50 to 60 percent of military jobs require a security

clearance, and according to an Assistant Secretary of Defense official, the

number may increase as technology becomes more sophisticated. Also,

the services have not determined when these investigations will occur. If

the Defense Security Service initiates record checks early in the recruiting

process, the services could avoid the costs incurred when enlistees are

sent to basic training before receiving disqualifying criminal history

information.

Second, the Defense Security Service has made the new Electronic

Personnel Security Questionnaire available and provided training;

however, with the exception of the Air Force, use of the form has been

extremely limited. According to Military Entrance Processing Command

officials, the services have not used the new form because of technological

limitations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,

Control, Communications, and Intelligence) told the services that

investigations may take longer and be more costly when this new form is

not used.

Third, regarding electronic fingerprinting, although several military

entrance processing stations have tested electronic fingerprint scanners,

DOD has not determined how it will use this automated system to enhance

the quality and timeliness of their record checks. Also, DOD and the FBI

have not reached agreement regarding the options that will be available

for new services and costs that will be incurred under the FBI’s Integrated

Automated Fingerprint Identification System.

Furthermore, DOD has not formulated a coordinated approach for

integrating these initiatives into the recruiting process to address some of

the deficiencies in their record checks. The DOD officials pointed out that

the initiatives have not been implemented yet and that DOD was dependent

on the Department of Justice to make available the new fingerprint

technology and provide greater completeness of the national criminal

records database. However, DOD is responsible for and will be

implementing in 1999, the Executive Order 12968 requirements for more

thorough security clearance background investigations and the Electronic

Personnel Security Questionnaire. The services and their recruiting

commands, the Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Defense

Security Service have not yet determined how they will implement these

initiatives within their current recruiting practices or whether new

practices are needed to take full advantage of the possible benefits.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

The services have extensive policies and procedures for gathering

self-reported criminal history information and granting moral waivers.

Their reliance, however, on applicant self-disclosure, completion of

required forms, and criminal history record checks from state, local, and

national criminal history databases without a full fingerprint search limits

the screening process and increases the risk of enlisting individuals with

undesirable backgrounds. Use of the Electronic Personnel Security

Questionnaire could minimize the time and costs associated with

investigations conducted as part of the Defense Security Service’s national

agency checks. Use of the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint

Identification System could facilitate the use of full fingerprint searches as

part of the recruiting process and make the record checks more thorough.

Collectively, these initiatives give DOD the opportunity to more fully obtain

and substantiate criminal history information in a timely manner, avoid

enlisting individuals with undesirable backgrounds, and eliminate the need

to send enlistees to training before all criminal history information is

available. Implementing these initiatives would also enable DOD to benefit

from having more complete criminal history information available as a

result of the database improvements funded by the Department of Justice.

However, DOD has not determined how it will integrate these initiatives

into its current criminal history screening process and, therefore, has not

put itself in a position to take full advantage of them. Because these

initiatives cover several aspects of the screening process, fall under the

responsibility of various organizations, and represent some changes in

current policies and procedures, it is essential that DOD carefully plan and

coordinate its efforts to implement them. Therefore, we recommend that

the Secretary of Defense take the following actions:

• Develop and monitor a DOD-wide plan to use the initiatives cited in this

report. Such a plan should, at a minimum, incorporate the benefits of using

the Defense Security Service’s Electronic Personnel Security

Questionnaire and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint

Identification System. Additionally, the plan should address the integration

of these two initiatives with the expanded security clearance background

investigation requirements contained in Executive Order 12968. The plan

should also include specific time frames and budget requirements for

implementation.

• Require all national agency checks for enlistment into the military services

to be based on a full fingerprint search to (1) reduce the risks associated

with enlisting individuals who have been convicted of the more serious

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

misdemeanors and felonies and (2) identify individuals who have used

aliases.

• Direct the services, after the initiatives available in 1999 are in use, to end

their practices of sending enlistees to training and to first-duty stations

without having all available criminal history information.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD and the Department of Justice

generally concurred with the report findings and recommendations, and

emphasized several areas of concern.

DOD described its plans to act on the report recommendations as follows:

• To develop and monitor a DOD-wide plan to use the initiatives cited in this

report, DOD stated that the Defense Accession Data Systems Integration

Working Group, chaired by the Deputy Director of Operations, Military

Entrance Processing Command, has identified the need to establish a

subgroup led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to address these

initiatives and develop a DOD-wide plan. The Working Group discussed

plans for the subgroup at its quarterly meeting in January 1999.

• To reduce the risks associated with enlisting individuals who have been

convicted of the more serious misdemeanors and felonies, and to identify

individuals who have used aliases, DOD stated that it will require a full

fingerprint search for all potential enlistees. It noted, however, that

implementation will depend upon availability of automated fingerprint

scanners at the military entrance processing stations.

• Regarding the services’ practices of sending enlistees to training and

first-duty stations without having all available criminal history

information, DOD stated that before directing such a change, a system

needs to be developed to ensure a prompt turnaround time and allow the

flexibility to process applicants without completed criminal history checks

as exceptions to policy when criminal history information is delayed. DOD

emphasized that enlistment screening will be improved with a system that

ensures prompt availability of all applicant criminal history information,

including that from state and local law enforcement agencies, including

juvenile records.

DOD noted that our report does not fully address its need for timely access

to state and local criminal information at a reasonable cost. It noted that

many records of youth crime do not reach national databases. DOD

commented that the absence of complete data makes it difficult to

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

evaluate enlistment waiver rates because the services cannot waive

offenses they cannot identify. The Department of Justice also stated that

DOD needs to obtain juvenile records presently protected under existing

state laws. We agree that juvenile criminal records may contain

information that would provide DOD with a more complete assessment of

the criminal histories of applicants and our report generally describes

limitations on access beginning on page 12. However, evaluating the pros

and cons of access to juvenile records was beyond the scope of our

review, and we clarified the Scope and Methodology section accordingly.

The Department of Justice also emphasized that fingerprint verification

currently used by the military services is not to be confused with, nor is it

a substitute for, positive identification by a full fingerprint search. It

believes that only through a full fingerprint search can the military be

assured that enlistees have not fraudulently listed their identities. The

Department of Justice provided additional information to support its views

on the importance of full fingerprint searches, which our report

recommends. We agree with the distinction between fingerprint

verification and full fingerprint searches and modified the report to clarify

this point.

DOD’s and the Department of Justice’s comments are presented in their

entirety in appendixes II and III, respectively. DOD and the Department of

Justice also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as

appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

This review focused on DOD’s policies and procedures for screening

criminal history information for enlistees, including national agency

checks, and for granting moral character waivers. To determine the extent

to which relevant criminal history information on potential enlistees is

available to the DOD military services, we reviewed the Air Force, the

Army, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the U.S. Military Entrance

Processing Command policy guidance and regulations and discussed them

with recruiting command and U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command

officials. Also, we discussed with these officials the internal control and

quality assurance procedures used to monitor screening procedures. We

reviewed applicants’ enlistment files at three military entrance processing

stations to determine whether screening procedures had been followed.

To identify federal government initiatives that could improve the process

of obtaining criminal history information, we interviewed DOD and

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

Department of Justice officials and discussed the new requirements for

security clearances, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification

System, automation of security questionnaire information, and continuing

efforts to improve the completeness of the criminal history database.

Regarding the completeness of and access to state and local records, we

obtained information from DOD and Department of Justice officials. We did

not obtain information directly from state and local officials regarding

their laws and policies pertaining to DOD’s access to their criminal history

records. Also, we did not assess the pros and cons of restricted access to

juvenile criminal history records.

To supplement our objectives, we analyzed DMDC enlistment and waiver

data for fiscal years 1990 through 1997 to determine the extent to which

the services granted moral waivers and the type of moral waivers

approved. To determine the reasons and rates of separations for enlistees

granted moral waivers compared with those without moral waivers, we

analyzed DMDC separation data for enlistees entering the military in fiscal

years 1990 through 1993 who separated within their first 4 years of service.

Fiscal years 1990 through 1993 were the most recent years for which

complete separation data were available.

We performed our work at the following DOD, service, and Department of

Justice locations:

• Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;

• Security Directorate, Security and Information Operations, Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence), Washington, D.C.; and Defense Security Service, Baltimore,

Maryland;

• U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, Kentucky; Navy Recruiting

Command, Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Recruiting Command,

Arlington, Virginia; and Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force

Base, San Antonio, Texas;

• U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago, Illinois;

Military Entrance Processing Station, San Antonio, Texas; Military

Entrance Processing Station, Chicago, Illinois; and Military Entrance

Processing Station, Richmond, Virginia; and

• FBI, Washington, D.C.; FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division,

Clarksburg, West Virginia; Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
B-281719 

Statistics and Bureau of Justice Assistance, Washington, D.C.; and Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.

We conducted our review from October 1997 to January 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine

Corps. We are also sending copies to the U.S. Attorney General; the

Director, FBI; the Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention; and the Administrator, Office of Justice Programs. We will

make copies available to others upon request. Please contact me at

(202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral

Waiver Data

26

Trends in Granting Moral Waivers 26

Comparison of Separation Reasons for Enlistees With and

Without Moral Waivers

29

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

36

Appendix III 

Comments From the

U.S. Department of

Justice

39

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

42

Related GAO Products 44

Tables Table I.1: Number and Percentage of Enlistees Granted Moral

Waivers

27

Table I.2: Type, Number, and Percentage of Moral Waivers

Granted to Enlistees DOD-wide

28

Table I.3: DOD-wide Separation Rates for Misconduct by Type of

Moral Waiver 

34

Figures Figure 1: Level of Offenses and Military Service Criteria for

Requiring Moral Waivers

4

Figure 2: Recruiting Process and Criminal History Screening

Tools

6

Figure 3: Interviews and Briefings for Gathering Criminal History

Information

7

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Contents

Figure I.1: Reasons and Rates for DOD-wide Separations for

Individuals Enlisting During Fiscal Years 1990-93 and Separating

Within Their First 4 Years of Service

30

Figure I.2: Reasons and Rates for DOD-wide Separations for

Enlistees With and Without a Moral Waiver 

32

Figure I.3: Time of DOD-wide Separations for Misconduct and

Substandard Performance Reasons for Enlistees With and

Without a Moral Waiver 

35

Abbreviations

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

To supplement the overall objectives of this review, we analyzed Defense

Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlistment and separation data. Our

objectives were to (1) determine how often and for what reasons the

services granted moral waivers to enlistees and (2) compare the reasons

for separation for those enlistees who entered the services with and

without moral waivers. For sound analyses, we needed high-quality data

that were accurate, reliable, and comparable. DMDC data, however, are of

limited quality because enlistees may have entered military service

without their past criminal history records being discovered and,

therefore, entered without a moral waiver that should have been granted.

Also, the services and the Military Entrance Processing Command apply

moral waiver codes inconsistently, and the services differ in the way they

use separation codes.1

 Nonetheless, until the Department of Defense (DOD)

completes its database improvements to standardize definitions and

coding structures for enlistment and separation data,2

 the DMDC data are

the best available for describing DOD’s experiences with granting moral

waivers.

Given these data limitations, however, the following analyses generally

indicate that the number and percentage of new active duty enlistees3

granted moral waivers has consistently decreased during the 8-year period

ending fiscal year 1997. Furthermore, during the first 4 years of service,

enlistees granted moral waivers in fiscal years 1990 through 1993 generally

separated from military service for similar reasons and at comparable

rates to those enlistees who were not granted moral waivers.

Trends in Granting

Moral Waivers

Table I.1 shows the number and percentage of enlistees granted moral

waivers for fiscal years 1990 through 1997 for each service and DOD-wide.

1

To assess data quality, we reviewed DMDC documentation and our previous reports that used DMDC

data, performed tests of ranges and frequencies to identify missing data and unusable data elements,

and discussed service data with service recruiting command officials for corroboration and to

determine data anomalies. We could not determine, however, the extent to which data quality

problems affected the results of our analyses.

2

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) directed DOD to improve

the system of pre-enlistment waivers and separation codes, which was recommended by us. Our

analyses for this report reaffirm the need for a consistent DOD-wide database that contains reasons for

separation and enlistment waiver data. The services and DMDC recognize the need for these

improvements and plan to implement waiver revisions in 1999 to make these data more complete and

consistent.

3

The data presented in this appendix do not include enlistees discharged from the Delayed Entry

Program before taking the oath for active duty.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Table I.1: Number and Percentage of Enlistees Granted Moral Waivers (fiscal years 1990-97)

Service 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Army 5,989 5,648 5,186 4,301 3,304 3,203 2,260 2,394

(Percentage of

Army

enlistments) (6.7) (7.2) (6.7) (5.6) (4.9) (5.1) (3.1) (2.9)

Navy 11,890 9,016 7,244 8,028 5,759 6,248 7,323 6,554

(Percentage of

Navy

enlistments) (18.6) (18.2) (16.7) (16.2) (16.2) (17.3) (18.8) (14.7)

Marine Corps 20,451 17,610 15,791 10,162 6,997 5,205 4,076 3,992

(Percentage of

Marine Corps

enlistments) (61.2) (59.2) (49.7) (29.3) (22.0) (16.2) (12.4) (11.7)

Air Force 712 850 1,672 2,269 1,883 2,093 1,945 1,868

(Percentage of

Air Force

enlistments) (2.0) (2.9) (4.8) (7.2) (6.2) (6.7) (6.3) (6.2)

DOD waivers 39,042 33,124 29,893 24,760 17,943 16,749 15,604 14,808

DOD

enlistments 222,567 187,156 187,146 193,029 164,921 161,707 175,466 190,464

(Percentage of

DOD

enlistments) (17.5) (17.7) (16.0) (12.8) (10.9) (10.4) (8.9) (7.8)

Note: The services differ in the criteria they use for granting moral waivers. For example, the Army

is the only service that considers preservice drug or alcohol abuse a medical, not a moral

character, issue.

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

Table I.2 shows the types, number, and percentages of moral waivers

granted to enlistees DOD-wide for fiscal years 1990 through 1997. As shown,

the services are granting fewer moral waivers in all categories. Although

felony and non-minor misdemeanor waivers increased as a percentage of

total waivers granted over the period (from 2 to 5 percent for felonies and

33 to 58 percent for non-minor misdemeanors), the actual number of these

waivers granted decreased from 857 to 705 for felonies and from 12,858 to

8,542 for non-minor misdemeanors.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Table I.2: Type, Number, and Percentage of Moral Waivers Granted to Enlistees DOD-wide (fiscal years 1990-97)

Type of moral waiver 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Total

(1990-1997)

Felony 857

2.2%

913

2.8%

776

2.6%

738

3.0%

593

3.3%

617

3.7%

725

4.6%

705

4.8%

5,924

3.1%

Non-minor

misdemeanor

12,858

32.9%

11,077

33.4%

10,343

34.6%

12,027

48.6%

8,889

49.5%

8,845

52.8%

8,043

51.5%

8,542

57.7%

80,624

42.0%

Preservice drug and

alcohol

16,401

42.0%

12,605

38.1%

10,396

34.8%

7,504

30.3%

5,754

32.1%

5,119

30.6%

4,964

31.8%

3,442

23.2%

66,185

34.5%

Minor traffic/non-traffic 8,446

21.6%

8,061

24.3%

7,995

26.7%

4,323

17.5%

2,559

14.3%

1,981

11.8%

1,560

10.0%

1,709

11.5%

36,634

19.1%

Other/unknown 480

1.2%

468

1.4%

383

1.3%

168

0.7%

148

0.8%

187

1.1%

312

2.0%

410

2.8%

2,556

1.3%

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

The services could not explain the reasons for these trends. However, we

were told that the following service policy changes in waiver criteria

account for some, but not all of the changes:

• In July 1994, the Marine Corps, which had the largest decrease, loosened

its requirements for minor traffic offense criteria from “more than three”

to “more than four.” At the same time, preservice drug abuse criteria were

tightened to include any marijuana experimentation or use.

• In fiscal year 1995, the Army revised its moral waiver criterion for

non-minor misdemeanors from one offense to two.

• The Navy’s granting of moral waivers remained fairly constant until fiscal

year 1997. Prior to 1997, the Navy waivers included the moral waivers

granted for both enlistment and special programs such as advanced

electronics and nuclear fields, which required more stringent moral

character standards. In fiscal year 1997, however, the Navy began to report

enlistment and program moral waivers separately.

• The Air Force’s granting of moral waivers increased during the 8-year

period. Air Force officials could not specify the reasons for this increase,

but suggested the following factors: (1) fluctuations in Air Force moral

waiver criteria for minor traffic violations; (2) changing attitudes of law

enforcement and judicial communities, such as getting tough on crime,

greater use of adverse adjudications, and community service; and

(3) decreasing trends in Air Force enlistments.4

4

Air Force officials noted that their enlistments declined over the 8-year period from a high of 36,090 in

fiscal year 1990 to 30,310 in fiscal year 1997; as their granting of moral waivers to deserving individuals

continued over this period of declining enlistments, the percentage of moral waivers granted

increased.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Comparison of

Separation Reasons

for Enlistees With and

Without Moral

Waivers

Of the enlistees beginning service during fiscal years 1990 through 1993

(the most recent years for which most separation data are available),

573,160 separated within their first 4 years of service for the reasons

shown in figure I.1.5

 Of these separations, the 93,632 enlistees granted

moral waivers separated from the enlisted force within 4 years of service

for generally the same reasons and at similar rates as the 479,528 who

enlisted without moral waivers.6

5

In collaboration with officials in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel

Policy, we grouped the DMDC’s 72 interservice separation codes into several broad categories to

facilitate our analyses.

6

At the time of our review, fiscal year 1993 was the most recent year for which complete separation

data was available because 4 years is the typical enlistment commitment term; those enlisted during

fiscal years 1994 through 1997 could not have completed their first 4-year term of service. To provide a

complete and consistent analysis across the 4 fiscal years, we further focused our analysis on

separations that occurred during the first 4 years of service—the time period during which most

enlistees will have separated.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Figure I.1: Reasons and Rates for DOD-wide Separations for Individuals Enlisting During Fiscal Years 1990-93 and

Separating Within Their First 4 Years of Service

Exp. Term of Service

OCS Released

Hardship/Death/Other

Medical/Physical

Substd. Performance

Misconduct

Imm. Reenlistment

26.7%

7.5% 0.9%

6.6%

16.6%

11.1%

14.5%

16.1%

Substandard performance 11.1% (63,609) Completed enlistment term and reenlisted

16.1% (92,144)

Categories used in our analysis

Reenlisted 17.4%

Released 7.8% OCS 1.0%

Hardship 

6.7%

Medical 

16.3%

Substandard 

performance 11.6%

Misconduct 13.3%

Completed enlistment 

25.9%

DOD-wide Separations

573,160

Separated Enlistees

Not Granted Moral Waivers

479,528

Released 6.1%

Hardship 6.0%

Medical 17.9%

Substandard 

performance 8.5%

Misconduct 20.6%

Reenlisted 9.3%

OCS 0.6%

Completed enlistment 31.1%

Separated Enlistees 

Granted Moral Waivers

93,632

Medical/physical 16.6% (95,075)

Hardship/death/other 6.6% (37,716)

Released 7.5% (42,953) Officer Candidate School (OCS) 0.9% (5,171)

Completed enlistment term 26.7% (153,302)

Misconduct 14.5% (83,190)

(Figure notes on next page)

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Notes: These charts depict the population of enlistees who entered military service in fiscal

years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their first 4 years of service.

OCS—Officer Candidate School

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

Regarding the principal positive reasons for separating, 31 percent of

those granted a moral waiver completed their term and left the service

compared with 26 percent of those without a moral waiver. However, as

shown in figure I.2, an additional 17 percent of those without a moral

waiver not only completed their initial term but also immediately

reenlisted compared with 9 percent of those with a moral waiver.7

7

The services decide which members are eligible or ineligible to reenlist and which may reenlist with a

waiver. Generally, enlistees granted moral waivers have a similar rate of reenlistment eligibility as

those without moral waivers. For example, in the Army, 42 percent of those without a moral waiver

were eligible for reenlistment compared with 38 percent of those with a moral waiver. On the other

hand, in the Air Force, 57 percent of those without a moral waiver were eligible for reenlistment

compared with 60 percent of those with a moral waiver.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Figure I.2: Reasons and Rates for DOD-wide Separations for Enlistees With and Without a Moral Waiver (fiscal years

1990-93) (excludes medical, hardship, and other)

 

Completed term Reenlisted Misconduct Substandard perf.

0

20

40

60

80

100

25.9

17.4

13.3 11.6

31.1

9.3

20.6

8.5

Percent

Without moral waiver With moral waiver

Substandard performance

124,221 29,081 83,447 8,697 63,879 19,311 55,658 7,951

Note: This chart depicts the population of enlistees who entered military service in fiscal

years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their first 4 years of service.

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

For those leaving the service before completing their initial terms,

enlistees not granted a moral waiver left more often for substandard

performance reasons (such as failure to meet minimum qualifications and

unsatisfactory performance), and enlistees granted moral waivers left

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

more often for misconduct reasons.8 Of the 16 misconduct reasons, drugs

and fraudulent enlistment accounted for about two-thirds of the

7.3 percentage point difference between separating enlistees with and

without moral waivers;9

 the two groups differed very little in the other 14

misconduct reasons. Further, as shown in table I.3, enlistees with moral

waivers for minor traffic and minor non-traffic offenses and preservice

drug and alcohol abuse separated more often for drugs, fraudulent entry,

alcoholism, and court martial than those enlisted with no moral waiver.

Enlistees that entered the services with non-minor (serious) misdemeanor

waivers generally separated at similar rates and for the same misconduct

reasons (except for drugs and alcoholism) as those without waivers.

Enlistees with felony waivers separated at a higher rate for fraudulent

entry, court martial, and alcoholism.

8

The misconduct category (83,190) included 16 different reasons. The five reasons that accounted for

68.7 percent of this category were commission of a serious offense (18.1%), drugs (16.0), discreditable

incidents (13.7%), fraudulent entry (10.7%), and good of the service in lieu of court martial (10.2%). The

substandard performance category (63,609) included 11 different reasons. The three reasons that

accounted for 92.1 percent of this category were trainee discharge/entry level performance and

conduct (54.0%), expeditious discharge/unsatisfactory performance (21.6%), and failure to meet

minimum qualifications for retention (16.5%).

9

Fraudulent enlistment is intentional concealment of any disqualifying information. The database does

not specify the type of information concealed, such as criminal backgrounds or medical and

psychological conditions.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Table I.3: DOD-wide Separation Rates for Misconduct by Type of Moral Waiver (fiscal years 1990-93)

Type of moral waiver

Reason for separation

Without moral

waiver

Minor traffic

and minor

non-traffic

Preservice

drug/alcohol

abuse

Non-minor

misdemeanor Felony

Drugs 9,094

14.2%

591

17.9%

1,780

25.3%

1,700

20.8%

85

17.4%

Fraudulent enlistment 5,753

9.0%

594

17.9%

1,670

23.7%

773

9.5%

101

20.7%

Commission of a serious offense 12,225

19.1%

331

10.0%

636

9.0%

1,737

21.2%

40

8.2%

Discreditable incidents 8,959

14.0%

416

12.6%

775

11.0%

1,132

13.8%

69

14.1%

Good of the service in lieu of court martial 6,857

10.7%

299

9.0%

512

7.3%

724

8.9%

41

8.4%

Alcoholism 3,271

5.1%

242

7.3%

487

6.9%

706

8.6%

35

7.2%

Court martial 1,707

2.7%

243

7.3%

464

6.6%

166

2.0%

58

11.9%

Pattern of minor disciplinary infractions 5,636

8.8%

293

8.9%

353

5.0%

246

3.0%

30

6.1%

Dropped for imprisonment 984

1.5%

15

0.5%

2

0.0%

103

1.3%

2

0.4%

Civil court conviction 505

0.8%

27

0.8%

29

0.4%

72

0.9%

0

0%

All other misconduct reasons 8,888

13.9%

259

7.8%

332

4.7%

819

10.0%

27

5.5%

Note: Bold numbers indicate that those enlistees with moral waivers in that category had a

separation rate that was at least 25 percent greater than those without moral waivers. Shaded

numbers indicate that those enlistees with moral waivers in that category had a separation rate

that was at least 25 percent less than those without moral waivers.

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

In addition, figure I.3 shows that enlistees granted moral waivers leave at

generally the same point (first year, for example) during their first

enlistment for misconduct and substandard performance as those without

moral waivers.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Analysis of Moral Waiver Data

Figure I.3: Time of DOD-wide Separations for Misconduct and Substandard Performance Reasons for Enlistees With and

Without a Moral Waiver (fiscal years 1990-93)

1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

Without moral waiver With moral waiver

Misconduct reasons

Substandard performance reasons

1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

Without moral waiver With moral waiver

Note: This chart depicts the population of enlistees who entered military service in fiscal

years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their first 4 years of service.

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 18.

Now on pp. 18-19.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 19.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

Justice

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

Justice

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

Justice

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol Schuster

Christine Fossett

Norfolk Field Office Dudley Roache

Bradley Simpson

Paul Gvoth

Patty Lentini

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
Related GAO Products

Military Attrition: Better Data, Coupled With Policy Changes, Could Help

the Services Reduce Early Separations (GAO/NSIAD-98-213, Sept. 15, 1998).

Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Analyze Reasons for Separation and

Improve Recruiting Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-117, Mar. 12, 1998).

Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation

and Improve Recruiting Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109, Mar. 4, 1998).

Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and

Incentive Systems (GAO/NSIAD-98-58, Jan. 30, 1998).

Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save

Millions of Dollars (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-120, Mar. 13, 1997).

Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save

Millions of Dollars (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102, Mar. 5, 1997).

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted

Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed (GAO/NSIAD-95-22,

Dec. 22, 1994).

(703226) Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-53 Military Recruiting
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