March 12, 2010 

MEMORANDUM TO: Roy P. Zimmerman, Director 

 Office of Enforcement 

FROM: David Solorio, Chief /RA/

 Concerns Resolution Branch 

 Office of Enforcement 

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE FEBRUARY 2-4, 2010, PUBLIC 

 MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION AND STAKEHOLDERS REGARDING SAFETY 

CULTURE POLICY STATEMENT, DEFINITION, AND 

DESCRIPTION/TRAITS (ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER 

ML100700065) 

On February 2-4, 2010, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) hosted a 

public workshop. The purpose of this meeting was to meet with stakeholders to develop more 

common terminology for safety culture (SC) as outlined in the agenda (Attachment 1) for NRC 

regulated entities and included: (1) obtaining input regarding a high-level SC definition that 

could apply to all licensees/certificate holders; (2) obtaining input regarding description/traits of 

SC that could apply to all licensees/certificate holders; and (3) receiving comments on the draft 

SC policy statement that was published in the Federal Register Notice (FRN) for public 

comment until March 1, 2010 (75 FR 1656; 74 FR 57525). The SC definition and description 

and traits developed from the workshop will be used to inform the development of a final SC 

policy statement. The final SC policy statement will set forth the agency’s expectations for 

fostering a strong SC for NRC regulated activities. The NRC will continue to work with 

Agreement States to reach alignment on common terminology and the consistent 

implementation of the SC policy. 

Prior to the workshop, the staff reached out to a large number of NRC-regulated entities. The 

staff encouraged their participation in this workshop in order to benefit from consideration of a 

spectrum of views in the development of the SC definition, description and traits, as well as 

encourage these entities to comment on the SC policy statement. The staff’s outreach activities 

included: (1) issuing a FRN (74 FR 66387) announcing the NRC plans for this workshop and 

soliciting nominations for panel members to participate in discussions to develop a SC definition 

and traits; and (2) contacting reactors, materials-industrial, materials-medical, material-fuel 

cycle, new reactor construction, vendors and suppliers and interested members of the public to 

encourage their participation in the workshop. In addition, the NRC solicited input from an 

external workshop planning committee, made up of various stakeholders (external to the NRC) 

that provided feedback to the NRC for conducting this workshop. 

CONTACT: Alex Sapountzis, OE 

 301-415-7822
R. Zimmerman 2 

The structure of this workshop was fairly unique in that the NRC requested external 

stakeholders represent interest from a large spectrum of licensees/certificate holders regulated 

by the NRC. The NRC selected sixteen stakeholders (Attachment 3) from nominations it 

solicited through the FRN (74 FR 66387) to serve as panel members at the SC February 2-4, 

2010, workshop. The workshop was structured so that it included several plenary and breakout 

sessions, where NRC regulated entities were organized into groups by affiliation and interest 

(Attachment 3). Panel members in the breakout and plenary sessions were given samples to 

consider when crafting a new SC definitions and traits. The panel members in the breakout and 

plenary sessions reviewed the samples and proposed new or revised definitions and traits, with 

frequent input provided by the attendees (i.e., individuals present in the audience, participating 

by teleconference, Webinar or web stream/teleconference). The breakout sessions reconvened 

into a plenary group to discuss the results from the breakout sessions and using various 

methods, the panel members first aligned on a single draft SC definition and then proceeded to 

discuss and align on SC traits (Attachment 5). In this workshop, the NRC used a technique 

generally referred to as the “Affinity Diagram” approach to collect and organize the large 

amounts of information submitted from panelist and attendees at the workshop related to the SC 

definition and traits through brainstorming. After performing this exercise, in which information 

is grouped by finding relationships in the content, solutions emerge, or in this case, a decision 

was reached by the group on a common definition of SC and traits that describe a positive 

safety focus. 

The workshop participants collaborated and defined SC as the following: 

“Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment 

by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of 

people and the environment.” 

The major points that were raised during the workshop regarding the development of the SC 

definition and traits were: 

 1. The NRC stated that the goal of this workshop was to develop a SC definition and traits 

by engaging a broad range of stakeholders which would be used along with comments 

received on the SC policy statement to develop a final draft policy statement to be sent 

to the Commission in March 2011. If the Commission approves this policy statement, 

the individual NRC program offices will review their SC programs to determine if they 

need to be updated based on the policy statement. Finally, the NRC mentioned that 

there is a Commission meeting scheduled March 30, 2010, at NRC headquarters that 

will include discussions on SC. 

 2. Some panelists stated in their opening remarks acknowledged that they all strive to 

consider safety in their programs, but that it is difficult to create or change organizational 

cultures and it requires large amount of resources and time. 

 3. Other panelists noted in their opening remarks that leadership should be a key element 

in the definition of SC (e.g., professional leadership attitudes, leadership sets the tone 

for accountability and organizations are driven by their leadership’s behaviors and 

actions). 

 4. During the discussions in the breakout and plenary sessions on the SC definition, the 

sample definitions (Attachment 4) were used to generate thoughts and ideas of what 

constitutes SC, leading to a new draft SC definition (Attachment 5). Some panelists had 

commented that two criteria necessary in a new SC definition should be that: (1) safety 
R. Zimmerman 3 

is a priority; and (2) a strong safety culture should ensure the protection of people and 

the environment. Others indicated that transparency, trust, attitudes, behaviors, leaders 

and actions should be part of a SC definition. Additionally, it was decided by the plenary 

panel that the term security, and other aspects such as emergency preparedness, 

quality assurance and radiation protection, need not be included in the definition of SC 

because these aspects were understood to be necessary for the protection of people 

and the environment. 

 5. During the discussions in the breakout and plenary sessions on traits, the sample traits 

(Attachment 4) and the new draft SC definition (Attachment 5) were utilized to generate 

a list of behaviors needed to support a strong safety culture. The behaviors were 

grouped into categories and a higher level over-arching trait was developed that 

summarized the lower level behaviors that were developed (Attachment 5). Additionally, 

the panel came up with a few words to describe the over-arching new trait (Attachment 

5). 

 6. A panelist indicated at the end of the workshop that adding security to the new draft SC 

definition (Attachment 5) would not resonate with the medical community because 

security is inherent in its safety culture. 

 7. Two workshop attendees offered other definitions of SC, for consideration by the panel, 

however the panel decided to keep the new draft SC definition developed in Attachment 

5. 

 8. A few other workshop attendees expressed the view that the term “over competing goals” 

in the SC definition (Attachment 5) was not appropriate because it could cause 

organizations to implement small improvements to safety (e.g., adding the improvement 

would only increase safety by a factor of 10-19), regardless of the cost and without any 

tangible benefit. Another workshop attendee indicated the public views nuclear power 

plants as regularly facing decisions where competing goals like safety versus the cost to 

implement the safety feature must be addressed. This same individual stated that having a 

strong SC reduces plant operational costs since problems are generally identified early and 

resolved before they can develop into a large more serious and costly problem to resolve. 

Thus, safety and cost are not competing goals. The panel voted to keep the new draft SC 

definition (Attachment 5) developed in the workshop rather than modify it. 

 9. Another panelist at the end of the workshop indicated that the NRC may want to 

consider honoring the products developed from the workshop. Additionally, the panelist 

made an observation that the definition developed at the workshop places more 

emphasis on the individual versus management or leadership found in other SC 

definitions. 

 10. An attendee commented that if you work at a nuclear power plant that lacks a strong SC, 

it is nice to have SC policy statement, with some authority from the NRC that can be 

used as a reference to help promote change. The attendee further stated that the 

workshop attendees and panelists did a good job in producing a SC definition and traits 

(Attachment 5), applicable to various NRC-regulated entities, with the goal of promoting 

a strong SC. 

The major comments that were raised during the workshop regarding the SC policy statement 

(75 FR 1656; 74 FR 57525) were: 
R. Zimmerman 4 

 1. An attendee from Exelon Corporation requested that the NRC consider the products 

developed at the workshop (i.e., safety culture definition and traits; Attachment 5), when the 

NRC presents to the Commission the draft final SC definition and traits. 

 2. An attendee from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) stated the importance of developing 

a common SC language (i.e., definition and traits), and this workshop provided a great start 

on developing a common SC language. The common SC language will allow licensees 

and regulators to understand/communicate with each other and adhere to a common policy 

statement. Furthermore, the nuclear power industry is eager and committed to moving 

forward with this initiative. 

 3. Another attendee from Strategic Team and Resource Sharing (STARS) (i.e., several 

nuclear power reactor sites that share resources consolidate selected support functions 

and purchases) stated that after polling a number of individuals across nuclear power 

plants, security is not accepted as part of the definition to SC, because it is an inherent 

element of safety. Additionally, this individual expressed that he likes the traits 

developed in this workshop since they take into account the individual attributes and 

behaviors in a few areas. One area that is important to this individual is the corrective 

action program (CAP). One of the areas that STARS struggles with regarding the reactor 

oversight process (ROP) implementation is whether something is a program issue, process 

issue, or is it an individual issue. 

 4. An attendee from Kettering Medical Center commented that he liked the NRC draft SC 

definition in the policy statement versus the one developed in the SC workshop, because 

it references the significance of the issue which builds needed flexibility into the 

definition. 

Feedback was received which generally indicated success in achieving the goals of the 

workshop. Additionally, lessons learned on technology shortcomings will be factored into any 

additional workshops and/or meetings, as necessary. 

The NRC is assessing the need for additional workshops and/or public meetings based upon 

the input from the panelist in the safety culture workshop and the safety culture workshop 

planning committee members. 

Attachments: 1. February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Agenda 

 2. Attendance List 

 3. February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Panel List and Affiliation 

 4. Sample Safety Culture Definitions and Traits 

 5. Safety Culture Definition/Traits Developed from the February 2-4, 2010, NRC 

Workshop 
R. Zimmerman 4 

 1. An attendee from Exelon Corporation requested that the NRC consider the products 

developed at the workshop (i.e., safety culture definition and traits; Attachment 5), when the 

NRC presents to the Commission the draft final SC definition and traits. 

 2. An attendee from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) stated the importance of developing 

a common SC language (i.e., definition and traits), and this workshop provided a great start 

on developing a common SC language. The common SC language will allow licensees 

and regulators to understand/communicate with each other and adhere to a common policy 

statement. Furthermore, the nuclear power industry is eager and committed to moving 

forward with this initiative. 

 3. Another attendee from Strategic Team and Resource Sharing (STARS) (i.e., several 

nuclear power reactor sites that share resources consolidate selected support functions 

and purchases) stated that after polling a number of individuals across nuclear power 

plants, security is not accepted as part of the definition to SC, because it is an inherent 

element of safety. Additionally, this individual expressed that he likes the traits 

developed in this workshop since they take into account the individual attributes and 

behaviors in a few areas. One area that is important to this individual is the corrective 

action program (CAP). One of the areas that STARS struggles with regarding the reactor 

oversight process (ROP) implementation is whether something is a program issue, process 

issue, or is it an individual issue. 

 4. An attendee from Kettering Medical Center commented that he liked the NRC draft SC 

definition in the policy statement versus the one developed in the SC workshop, because 

it references the significance of the issue which builds needed flexibility into the 

definition. 

Feedback was received which generally indicated success in achieving the goals of the 

workshop. Additionally, lessons learned on technology shortcomings will be factored into any 

additional workshops and/or meetings, as necessary. 

The NRC is assessing the need for additional workshops and/or public meetings based upon 

the input from the panelist in the safety culture workshop and the safety culture workshop 

planning committee members. 

Attachments: 1. February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Agenda 

 2. Attendance List 

 3. February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Panel List and Affiliation 

 4. Sample Safety Culture Definitions and Traits 

 5. Safety Culture Definition/Traits Developed from the February 2-4, 2010, NRC 

Workshop 

Electronic DISTRIBUTION: 

R. Albert J. Adams V. Barnes J. Braisted J. Cai C. Carpenter G. Carpenter 

M. Cash C. Casto M. Cheok D. Coe M. Delligatti D. Dorman J. Firth 

T. Frye L. Gerke T. Harris P. Hernandez P. Holahan D. Hudson J. Ibarra J. 

Jimenez M. Keefe J. Kotra K. Martin L. Langlie M. Lemoncelli R. Lewis 

J. Luehman D. Pasquale J. Peralta J. Piccone P. Prescott L. Rakovan 

A. Ramey-Smith D. Reinert T. Reis U. Shoop M. Schwartz D. Solorio 

N. Rivera-Feliciano B. Sosa D. Thatcher G. Tracy S. Wastler D. Weaver 

R. Rasmussen K. Witt M. Virgilio R. Virgilio R. Zimmerman C. Lui 

ADAMS: ML100700065 ■ Publicly Available ■ Non-Sensitive 

OFFICE OE OE/BC OE/D 

NAME A. Sapountzis D. Solorio R. Zimmerman 

DATE 3/ 2 /10 3/12/10 3/12/10 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 Attachment 1

February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Agenda

Day 1 (8:30 AM – 5:30 PM) 

8:30 A.M. Opening Remarks (NRC/Roy Zimmerman) (10 min) 

8:40 A.M. Workshop Details (NRC/Lance Rakovan and David Solorio) (65 min) 

a. Purpose of Workshop/What is success for this workshop? (25 min) 

o Develop definition of safety culture (SC) and determine description/traits 

o Discuss relationship between definition and description/traits to SC 

Policy Statement 

o Receive comments on SC Policy Statement 

b. What will be next steps following workshop (including what is plan for 

implementation down the road)? (5 min) 

c. Agenda – How meeting is structured (worked with external stakeholders to 

frame meeting structure) (10 min) 

d. Workshop ground rules (10 min) 

e. Introductions – Name/Organization/Affiliation of Panelist/Why Participating? 

(15 min) 

9:45 A.M. NRC activities related to SC up to SC Policy Statement (NRC/Jose Ibarra and Molly Keefe 

(30 min) 

10:15 A.M. ‘What is Safety Culture” & how it affects big and small licensees (NRC/Dr. Valerie Barnes) 

(30 min) 

10:45 A.M. Break (15 min) 

11:00 A.M. Workshop Panelist Remarks – What does Safety Culture mean in their environment? 

(60 min) (Time will be determined based on number of speakers) 

12:00 P.M. Lunch – (reflect on morning) (75 min) 

1:15 P.M. Safety Culture Work So Far – INPO, NRC and Member of the Public safety culture 

definition (What works for your environment? – Explain what does not) (NRC/Dr. 

Valerie Barnes, INPO/Dr. Ken Koves, Public/Dave Collins) (30 min) 

1:45 P.M. Discuss Objective of Breakout Sessions – What is success? (NRC/Maria Schwartz) 

(15 min) 

2:00 P.M. Develop the SC common definition (3 Breakout Sessions: New ConstructionReactors and Power Reactors (Plaza Ballroom #3), Materials-Industrial and Fuel 

Cycle (Roosevelt Room), Materials-Medical (Plaza Ballroom #1 and #2)) (75 min) 

a. Each breakout group will begin discussions from a SC definition that will be 

provided only as a starting point 
2 

b. Panel members will be asked to add and/or subtract words to definition (using 

projected Microsoft Word document) and explain and discuss their 

suggestions 

c. Goal is for NRC and panel members to arrive at a definition of SC they believe 

is common enough that they can in turn recommend be adopted by the panel 

as a whole 

d. Facilitator presents to breakout audience for comment 

3:15 P.M. Break (15 min) 

3:30 P.M. Breakout sessions regroup/come back together and determine SC common definition 

(Plaza Ballroom #1 and #2) (60 min) 

a. Review definitions produced from breakout sessions 

b. Panel members will be asked to add and/or subtract words to definition (using 

projected Microsoft Word document) and explain and discuss their 

suggestions 

c. Goal is for panel members to arrive at a single definition of SC they believe is 

common enough that they can in turn recommend be adopted by the panel as 

a whole 

4:30 P.M. Opportunity for comment by audience (panel seeks to understand comments) (45 

min) 

5:15 P.M. Closing Remarks/Summary/Agenda for day 2 (NRC/Roy Zimmerman) (15 min) 

5:30 P.M. End of Day 1 

Day 2 (8:30 AM – 5:30 PM)

8:30 A.M. Introduction/Ground Rules (NRC/Lance Rakovan) (10 min) 

8:40 A.M. Recap of Day 1 (NRC/David Solorio) (10 min) 

8:50 A.M. Opportunity for comment by audience (30 min) 

9:20 A.M. Resume If Necessary – Continue with development of the SC common definition (3 

Breakout Sessions: New Construction-Reactors and Power Reactors (Plaza 

Ballroom #3), Materials-Industrial and Fuel Cycle (Roosevelt Room), MaterialsMedical (Plaza Ballroom #1 and #2)) (70 min) 

a. Review definitions against audience comments 

b. Panel members will be asked to add and/or subtract words to definition (using 

projected Microsoft Word document) and explain and discuss their 

suggestions 

c. Goal is for panel members to arrive at a single definition of SC they believe is 

common enough that they can in turn recommend be adopted by the panel as 

a whole 

d. Facilitator presents to breakout audience for comment 

10:30 A.M. Break (15 min) 
3 

10:45 A.M. Breakout sessions regroup/come back together and determine SC common definition 

(Plaza Ballroom #1 and #2) (60 min) 

a. Review definitions produced from breakout sessions 

b. Panel members will be asked to add and/or subtract words to definition (using 

projected Microsoft Word document) and explain and discuss their suggestions 

c. Goal is for panel members to arrive at a single definition of SC they believe is 

common enough that they can in turn recommend be adopted by the panel as a 

whole 

d. Facilitator presents to audience for comment 

11:45 P.M. Lunch – (reflect on morning) (75 min) 

1:00 P.M. NRC Remarks and Questions (NRC/DEDMRT Marty Virgilio) (30 min)

1:30 P.M. Opportunity for comment by audience (60 min) 

2:30 P.M. Break (15 min) 

2:45 P.M. Breakout sessions to determine SC description/traits (3 Breakout Sessions: New 

Construction-Reactors and Power Reactors (Plaza Ballroom #3), MaterialsIndustrial and Fuel Cycle (Roosevelt Room), Materials-Medical (Plaza Ballroom #1 

and #2)) (150 minutes) 

a. Panel members will be asked to write down what they see as primary traits of 

SC on individual post-it notes 

b. Facilitator will collect post-it notes and request panel members provide their 

reasoning behind a sample of the suggestions 

c. Facilitator will aid panel members in organizing the input into broad categories 

d. Goal is for panel members to arrive at a list of SC traits they believe should be 

considered by the panel as a whole 

e. Facilitator presents to breakout audience for comments 

5:15 P.M. Closing Remarks/Summary/Takeaways/Next Steps (NRC/Roy Zimmerman) 

(15 min) 

5:30 P.M. End of Day 2 

Day 3 (8:30 AM – 5:30 PM) 

8:30 A.M. Introduction/Ground Rules (NRC/Lance Rakovan) (10 min) 

8:40 A.M. Recap of Day 2 (NRC/David Solorio) (10 min) 

8:50 A.M. If Necessary – Come Back Together and Determine the Description/Traits (Plaza 

Ballroom #1 and #2) (100 min) 

a. Review description/traits produced from breakout sessions 

b. May massage/revise the description/traits into a smaller number of more 

consistent format 

c. Consensus or present prepared definition 

d. Adding and subtracting words maybe both using yellow post it notes and 

Microsoft Word document to broadcast to audience (if time permits) 
4 

10:30 A.M. Break (15 min) 

10:45 A.M. Opportunity for comment by audience (60 min) 

11:45 A.M. Lunch – (reflect on morning) (75 min) 

1:00 P.M. Continue as a group to determine the description/traits (Plaza Ballroom #1 and #2) 

(120 min) 

a. Review description/traits produced 

b. May massage/revise the description/traits into a smaller number of more 

consistent format 

c. Consensus or present prepared language 

d. Adding and subtracting words maybe both using yellow post it notes and 

Microsoft Word document to broadcast to audience 

3:00 P.M. Comments on Policy Statement (Address questions in FRN) (Plaza Ballroom #1 

and #2) (NRC/Alex Sapountzis and Maria Schwartz) (120 min) 

5:00 P.M. Closing Remarks/Summary/Takeaways/Next Steps (NRC/Roy Zimmerman) (30 

min) 

5:30 P.M. Workshop Conclusion Day 3 
 Attachment 2

Attendance List 

On February 2-4, 2010, the NRC met with stakeholders to obtain input regarding a high-level 

safety culture (SC) definition, description/traits, in order to develop a more common 

terminology for SC across NRC-regulated entities. In addition, the NRC received comments 

on the draft SC policy statement.

Name Organization 

John Adams Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Reactor Regulations 

Ron Albert Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response 

Steve Amer Epsilon Systems Solutions, Inc. 

Valerie Barnes Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Research 

Shannon Barton 

Cheryl Ann Beegle Department of Health and Human Services/CC-National 

Institute of Health 

Charles Bowman STPNOC 

Johnathan Braisted Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 

Kevin Buckley American Association of Physicists in Medicine 

David Burton Walter Reed AMC 

James Cameron Nuclear Regulatory Commission/R III 

Patricia Campbell General Electric Hitachi 

W. Earl Carnes Department of Energy 

Patrick Card Golden Brook Solutions, LLC 

Cynthia Carpenter Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

Gene Carpenter Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Research 

John Carter Virginia Commonwealth University 

Gerard Castro Joint Commission 

Paul Chiasson 

Anisuzzaman Chowdhury George Washington University Hospital 

Larry Chung Washington, D.C. Department of Transportation 

Carlos Coffman Department of Energy 

Nicole Coleman Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Dave Collins Member of the Public 

Lawrence Criscione Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Research 

Mike Crowthers Susquehanna PPL 

Kerstun Day Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Elizabeth Dean Virginia Commonwealth University 

Curt Demaris Department of Health for State of Washington 

Tony DiPalo Member of the Public 

Dan Doorman Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards 

Lynne Fairobent American Association of Physicists in Medicine 

Carolyn Faria-Ocasio Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Nilda Feliciano-Rivera Nuclear Regulatory Commission/New Reactors 

James Firth Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

John Flack Member of the Public 
2 

Attendance List 

On February 2-4, 2010, the NRC met with stakeholders to obtain input regarding a high-level 

safety culture (SC) definition, description/traits, in order to develop a more common 

terminology for SC across NRC-regulated industries. In addition, the NRC received 

comments on the draft SC policy statement.

Name Organization 

Roland Fletcher MD-Radiation Health Program 

Carol Florian Symetosphere, LLC 

Wayne Frazier National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Billie Garde Attorney, Clifford and Garde, LLP 

David Garchow Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

Roy Garris Symetosphere, LLC 

Ron Gaston Exelon 

Ronnie Gardner AREVA 

Laura Gerke Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 

Ian Gifford AFRRI 

Mark Giles Entergy 

Fred Gigliotti Westinghouse 

Ronald Guye Virginia Commonwealth University 

Sonja Harber Consultant- Human Performance Analysis Corporation 

Nasreen Hasan Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 

Elizabeth Hearne Frederick Memorial Health Care System 

Pete Hernandez Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 

Dan Hibbing George Washington University 

Tomas Houghton Nuclear Energy Institute 

Dan Hudson Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Research 

Earl Hughes Department of Energy 

Jose Ibarra Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 

Alan Jacobson MD Radiation Health Program 

Rich Janati Department of Environmental Protection-PA 

Gary Janosko PSEG 

John Jensen Department of Agriculture 

Jose Jimenez Nuclear Regulatory Commission/New Reactors 

Jeffrey Joe Idaho National Labs/Dept. of Energy 

Mike Junge Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ New Reactors 

Martin Kamishan Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Reactor Regulations 

Ernest Kapopulos Progress Energy 

Molly Keefe Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Felix Kellar Nuclear Energy Institute 

Ken Koves Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

Craig Lawrence 

Mauri Lemoncelli Nuclear Regulatory Commission/General Counsel 

Bob Link AREVA 

Lily Lodhi Temple University 

Lucy Lopez Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 
3 

Attendance List 

On February 2-4, 2010, the NRC met with stakeholders to obtain input regarding a high-level 

safety culture (SC) definition, description/traits, in order to develop a more common 

terminology for SC across NRC-regulated industries. In addition, the NRC received 

comments on the draft SC policy statement.

Name Organization 

Phil Lorette Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Research 

George Marshall American Portable Nuclear Gauge Association 

Dr. Charles Martin Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

Jack Martin Backpacker 

Richard Martin ASTRO 

Steve Mattmuller Kettering Medical Center 

Miles McCord Howard University 

Brett McCreary Tennessee Valley Authority 

Dr. Marlene McKetty Howard university Hospital 

Dave Midlik Southern Nuclear Operating Company 

Marie Miller Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Region I 

Steve Miller Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 

Peter Miner United States Enrichment Corporation 

Bruce Montgomery Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 

Raul Munoz UNESA 

Chris Mudrick Excelon 

Tony Muschara Error Management Consulting 

Gwen Nalls Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC 

Jim Nance Symetosphere 

Paul Narbut Paul Narbut and Associates 

Christine Neely PSEG 

Joe Nick Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Region I 

Patty Nibert Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Johnathan OrtegaLuciano Nuclear Regulatory Commission/New Reactors 

Mike Palmer Susquehanna, PPL 

Larry Parscale Honeywell Specialty Materials 

Terry Paterson Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 

Opha Peden Virginia Commonwealth University 

Julius Persensky Idaho National Labs 

Josie Piccone Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

Amanda Potter American Association of Physicists in Medicine 

Lance Rakovan Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Executive Director for 

Operations 

Deann Raleigh SCIENTECH 

Ann Ramey-Smith Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Reactor Regulations 

Kevin Ramsey Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards 

Mark Rasmussen Professional Reactor Operator Society 

Rick Rasmussen Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ New Reactors 

Dustin Reinert Nuclear Regulatory Commission/ Enforcement 
4 

Attendance List 

On February 2-4, 2010, the NRC met with stakeholders to obtain input regarding a high-level 

safety culture (SC) definition, description/traits, in order to develop a more common 

terminology for SC across NRC-regulated industries. In addition, the NRC received 

comments on the draft SC policy statement.

Name Organization 

Wayne Rice Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO 

Donald Richard STARS Licensing Specialist, Callaway Plant 

Robin Ritzman First Energy 

Joe Rizzi Westinghouse Nuclear Corporation 

Rafael Rodriguez Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards 

Kate Roughan QSA Global 

Gabe Salamon Xcel Energy 

Alex Sapountzis Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Maria Schwartz Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Janet Schlueter Nuclear Energy Institute 

Cheryl Schultz William Beaumont Hospital 

Craig Seaman NAC International 

Shawn Seeley Organization of Agreement States-Maine 

Mark Shaffer Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

Vernon Shanks United States Enrichment Corporation 

Karen Sheehan Fox Chase Cancer Center 

Diane Sieracki Dominion Resources 

Anthony Silakoski Florida Power & Light Nuclear Fleet Security 

Timothy Slede American UE/Utlities Service Alliance 

Kevin Smith Savannah River Site Contractor 

Undine Shoop Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Reactor Regulations 

David Solorio Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Belkys Sosa Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 

Gayle Staton Non-Destructive Testing Management Association 

Mike Streitz LLNL 

Leonard Sueper Xcel Nuclear 

Mary Taormina Virginia Commonwealth University 

AJ Teahout Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 

Duann Vanderslice 

Thistlewaite 

Society of Nuclear Medicine 

Richard Todaro Washington CORE 

Cindy Tomlinson Society of Nuclear Medicine 

Dr. Richard Toohey Health Physics Society 

Rich Turtil Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

Marty Virgilio Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Materials, Waste, Research, 

State, Tribal and Compliance Programs 

Rosetta Virgilio Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal and State Materials 

and Environmental Management Programs 

Cindy Wagner General Electric Hitachi Nuclear 
5 

Attendance List 

On February 2-4, 2010, the NRC met with stakeholders to obtain input regarding a high-level 

safety culture (SC) definition, description/traits, in order to develop a more common 

terminology for SC across NRC-regulated industries. In addition, the NRC received 

comments on the draft SC policy statement.

Name Organization 

Joe Wang NdSigma, LLC 

Sandra Wastler Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response 

Doug Weaver Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards 

Bruce Williams Shaw Power Group 

Claude Williams Howard University 

Victoria Winfrey Prairie Island tribal Council 

Kevin Witt Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards 

Charles Workman G4S Regulated Security Solutions 

Roosevelt Word SCE&G SCANA 

Roy Zimmerman Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Enforcement 
 Attachment 3

February 2-4, 2010, Safety Culture Workshop Panel List and Affiliation

Panelist List and Affiliation 

1. Kevin Buckley (American Association of Physicists in Medicine) 

2. Gerard Castro (Joint Commission) 

3. David Collins (Member of the Public) 

4. David Garchow (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) 

5. Billie Garde (Attorney, Clifford and Garde, LLP) 

6. Tom Houghton (Nuclear Energy Institute) 

7. Bob Link (AREVA) 

8. George Marshall (American Portable Nuclear Gauge Association) 

9. Wayne Rice (Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO) 

10. Diane Sieracki (Dominion Resources) 

11. Gayle Staton (Non-Destructive Testing Management Association) 

12. Duann Vanderslice Thistlewaite (Society of Nuclear Medicine) 

13. Dr. Richard Toohey (Health Physics Society) 

14. Victoria Winfrey (Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council) 

15. Bruce Williams (Shaw Power Group) 

16. Chuck Workman (G4S Regulated Security Solutions) 

Breakout Session 1: New Construction-Reactors and Power Reactors 

1. David Garchow (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) 

2. Victoria Winfrey (Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council) 

3. Tom Houghton (Nuclear Energy Institute) 

4. Wayne Rice (Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO) 

5. Diane Sieracki (Dominion Resources) 

6. Bruce Williams (Shaw Power Group) 

7. Chuck Workman (G4S Regulated Security Solutions) 

8. Billie Garde (Attorney, Clifford and Garde, LLP) 

9. David Collins (Member of the Public) 

Breakout Session 2: Materials-Industrial and Fuel Cycle 

1. George Marshall (American Portable Nuclear Gauge Association) 

2. Gayle Staton (Non-Destructive Testing Management Association) 

3. Dr. Richard Toohey (Health Physics Society) 

4. Bob Link (AREVA) 

Breakout Session 3: Materials-Medical 

1. Kevin Buckley (American Association of Physicists in Medicine) 

2. Gerard Castro (Joint Commission) 

3. Duann Vanderslice Thistlewaite (Society of Nuclear Medicine) 
Sample Safety Culture Definitions and Traits

Sample Safety Culture Definitions

European 

Strategic Safety 

Initiative 

UK Health and 

Safety Executive 

(1993) 

U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) 

(Draft-2009) 

Institute of 

Nuclear Power 

Operations 

(INPO) 

International Atomic 

Energy Agency 

(IAEA)/International 

Nuclear Safety 

Group (INSAG-4; 

1991) 

Member of the 

Public Mr. David 

Collins 

Guldenmund (2000) 

Safety Culture is the set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by every member of every level of an organization. Safety Culture refers to the extent to which every individual and every group of the organization is aware of the risks and unknown hazards induced by its activities; is continuously behaving so as to preserve and enhance safety; is willing and able to adapt itself when facing safety issues; is willing to communicate safety issues; and consistently evaluates safety related behavior. 

The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management. 

That assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors in organizations and individuals which establishes that as an overriding priority, nuclear safety and security issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. 

An organization’s values and behaviors— modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members—that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority. 

That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. 

Professional leadership attitudes in a High Reliability Organization that ensure potentially hazardous activities are managed to maintain risk to people and the environment as low as reasonably achievable thereby maintaining stakeholder trust. 

Those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on attitudes and behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk. 
2 

Sample Safety Culture Traits

European Strategic NRC (Draft) INPO IAEA/INSAG-4 Member of the Public Christian, et al

 Safety Initiative Mr. Dave Collins 

Commitment Personnel demonstrate 

ownership for nuclear 

safety and security in their 

day-to-day activities. 

Everyone is 

personally 

responsible for 

nuclear safety. 

Safety is a 

clearly 

recognized 

value. 

Excellence Behaviors:(1) 

Communicates and models 

values; (2) Clearly 

communicates expectations; 

(3) Focus is on value not 

cost; (4) Ensures training, 

resources; (5) Good problemsolver and coach; and (6) 

Promotes open, deep 

organization learning. 

Management 

commitment to 

safety. 

Behavior Process for planning and 

controlling work activities 

are implemented such that 

safety and security are 

maintained. 

Leaders 

demonstrate 

commitment to 

safety. 

Leadership for 

safety is clear. 

Integrity Behaviors:(1) Does 

the right thing (behaves 

ethically); (2) Communicates 

openly and honestly; (3) 

Makes conservative 

decisions; (4) Addresses 

issues promptly, properly; (5) 

Uses failures to learn, not 

punish; and (6) Ensures 

appropriate accountability. 

Human 

resources 

practices. 

Awareness The organization maintains 

a safety conscious work 

environment in which 

personnel feel free to raise 

safety and security 

concerns without fear of 

retaliation. 

Trust permeates the 

organization. 

Accountability 

for safety is 

clear. 

Relationship Behaviors: (1) 

Listens carefully to 

suggestions; (2) Welcoming 

and respectful; (3) Promotes 

diversity, development; (4) 

Compliments more than 

criticizes; and (5) Promotes 

work/life balance. 

Quality of 

safety systems. 

Adaptability The organization ensures 

that issues potentially 

impacting safety or security 

are promptly identified, fully 

evaluated, and promptly 

addressed and corrected 

commensurate with their 

significance. 

Decision-making 

reflects safety first. 

Safety is 

integrated into 

all activities. 

 Supervisor 

support for 

safety. 

Information The organization ensures 

that the personnel, 

equipment, tools, 

procedures, and other 

resources needed to 

ensure safety and security 

are available. 

Nuclear technology 

is recognized as 

special and unique. 

Safety is 

learning driven. 

 Internal group 

processes. 

Justness The organization’s 

decisions ensure that safety 

and security are 

maintained. 

A questioning 

attitude is cultivated. 

 Group 

boundary 

management 

 Roles, responsibilities, and 

authorities for safety and 

security are clearly defined 

and reinforced. 

Organizational 

learning is 

embraced. 

 Risk associated 

with activities/ 

environment 

 The organization maintains 

a continuous learning 

environment in which 

opportunities to improve 

safety and security are 

sought out and 

implemented. 

Nuclear safety 

undergoes constant 

examination. 

 Work pressure 

 Leadership 
 Attachment 5

Safety Culture Definition/Traits Developed from the February 2-4, 2010, NRC Workshop

Safety Culture Definition 

Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment 

by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of 

people and the environment. 

Trait #1: Problem Resolution and Metrics

The organization ensures that issues potentially impacting safety or security are promptly 

identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their 

significance. 

Trait #2: Personal Responsibilities and Attitudes

Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety. 

Trait #3: Processes and Procedures 

Processes for planning and controlling work activities are implemented such that safety is 

maintained. 

Trait #4: Continuous Learning 

Organizational learning is embraced. 

Trait #5: Leadership Safety Behaviors 

Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety. 

Trait #6: Effective Safety Communication 

Effective communication is essential to maintain focus on safety. 

Trait #7: Encouraging Report of Problems 

The organization maintains a safety conscious work environment in which personnel feel free to 

raise concerns without fear of retaliation. 

Trait #8: Respectful Work Environment 

Trust and respect permeate the organization.