UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

July 11, 2022

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Clerk - Southern District of Florida

U.S. District Court 

400 N MIAMI AVE

MIAMI, FL 33128-1810

Appeal Number: 21-10696-GG

Case Style: USA v. Real Prop Located 55 Public Sq

District Court Docket No: 1:20-cv-23278-MGC

Secondary Case Number: 1:20-cv-25313-MGC

A copy of this letter, and the judgment form if noted above, but not a copy of the court's 

decision, is also being forwarded to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's decision 

was previously forwarded to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued.

The enclosed copy of the judgment is hereby issued as mandate of the court. The court's opinion 

was previously provided on the date of issuance.

Sincerely,

DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court

Reply to: Lois Tunstall

Phone #: (404) 335-6191

Enclosure(s) 

MDT-1 Letter Issuing Mandate

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AP Jul 11, 2022 MIAMI

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 55 PUBLIC SQUARE, 

CLEVELAND, OHIO, 

Defendant, 

URIEL LABER, et al., 

Claimants, 

LAW OFFICES OF CLEVELAND, INC., 

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit 

____________________

No. 21-10696

____________________

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 07/11/2022

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2 21-10696

Claimant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 1:20-cv-23278-MGC,

1:20-cv-25313-MGC

____________________

JUDGMENT

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion issued 

on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this Court.

Entered: May 17, 2022

For the Court: DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 07/11/2022

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10696

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 55 PUBLIC SQUARE, 

CLEVELAND, OHIO, 

Defendant, 

URIEL LABER, et al., 

Claimants, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10696

LAW OFFICES OF CLEVELAND, INC., 

Claimant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 1:20-cv-23278-MGC,

1:20-cv-25313-MGC

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case arises out of an in rem civil-forfeiture action filed 

by the government against an office building in Cleveland, Ohio,

allegedly bought as part of an international money-laundering 

scheme. When the government filed its complaint, the building 

was under contract to be sold by the building’s owners (and alleged 

money-launderers) to an unaffiliated third party. The government 

agreed to go forward with the sale while the forfeiture case proceeded, and it filed a motion requesting the court’s approval for an 

uncontested interlocutory sale under Rule G(7)(b) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture. The court authorized the sale, which closed in February 2021, 

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21-10696 Opinion of the Court 3

and the sale proceeds were substituted for the building as the res in 

the forfeiture proceeding. 

Appellant Law Offices of Cleveland (“Cleveland Law”), a 

tenant at the office building and a claimant in the forfeiture case, 

timely appealed the interlocutory sale order, seeking to set aside 

the sale as “void” for lack of compliance with, in its view, necessary 

procedural requirements. After careful review, we conclude that 

Cleveland Law was not harmed by and so lacks standing to appeal 

the sale order. We therefore dismiss the appeal. 

I.

In December 2020, the United States filed an in rem civilforfeiture action against the building located at 55 Public Square in 

Cleveland, Ohio. In essence, the complaint alleged that 55 Public 

Square was purchased as part of a scheme to launder hundreds of 

millions of dollars misappropriated from PrivatBank, a Ukrainian 

bank, by two Ukrainian oligarchs, Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennadiy 

Boholiubov. The government filed two other forfeiture actions 

arising out of the same scheme. 

Several individuals and businesses claimed an interest in 55 

Public Square. On January 19, 2021, four entities and persons allegedly involved in the money-laundering scheme filed claims: Optima 55 Public Square LLC, the record owner of the building; Optima Ventures LLC, which owned Optima 55 Public Square; and 

Mordechai Korf and Uriel Laber, who partially owned Optima 

Ventures (collectively, the Optima entities). On January 26, 2021, 

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Cleveland Law, a tenant at 55 Public Square that subleases office 

space to small law firms and solo practitioners, filed a claim asserting a leasehold interest in the property. A few days later, several 

other claimants who had been in litigation against the Optima entities filed a joint claim. 

On Tuesday, February 9, 2021, the district court held a status

hearing, at which counsel for Cleveland Law was present. At the 

hearing, counsel for the Optima entities stated that there was “an 

anticipated closing on the sale of [55 Public Square] scheduled for . 

. . this week,” and that the funds from the sale would be held pending the outcome of the litigation. The court asked the government 

if it objected, and counsel for the government responded that it did 

not object and would soon file a motion to approve the sale. At no 

point during the hearing did counsel for Cleveland Law raise an 

objection to the sale. 

Later that same day, the government filed an “Agreed Motion to Authorize Interlocutory Sale” under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) 

and Supplemental Rule G(7), with supporting documentary evidence. In certain circumstances, Supplemental Rule G(7) permits 

the district court to authorize the sale of real property before the 

forfeiture case is resolved. Supp. Rule G(7)(b). Ordinarily, such a 

sale “is governed by 28 U.S.C. §[] 2001,” among other provisions, 

which requires notice, a hearing, and appraisals before the court 

may approve a private sale. Supp. Rule G(7)(b)(iii); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2001(b). But the court may use other procedures for the sale if 

“all parties . . . agree to the sale, aspects of the sale, or different 

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21-10696 Opinion of the Court 5

procedures.” Supp. Rule G(7)(b)(iii). Once the sale closes, the 

“[s]ale proceeds are a substitute res subject to forfeiture in place of 

the property that was sold.” Supp. Rule G(7)(b)(iv). 

The government’s motion sought the district court’s approval to proceed with the sale under the terms of the private purchase agreement, and without regard to § 2001, by agreement of 

the parties. The government’s evidence showed that, before the 

forfeiture action, Optima 55 Public Square had entered into a contract with KD 55 Public Square LLC to sell the office building for 

approximately $17 million. At that time, the building was in foreclosure and subject to outstanding taxes and penalties. The government agreed to the sale because the buyer had no affiliation 

with the Optima entities and, in its view, a “prompt sale [was] the 

only way to protect the value of the equity in the building.” 

According to a copy of the purchase agreement submitted 

by the government, the sale included the transfer of all leases at 55 

Public Square, including “any and all amendments, modifications 

or supplements.” The buyer further agreed to “assume[] and . . . 

be bound by and to perform and observe all of the obligations, covenants, terms and conditions to be performed or observed under 

the Assigned Property.” It appears, in other words, that the buyer 

assumed and agreed to be bound by all existing leases without alteration. 

On February 10, 2021, one day after the government filed its 

motion, Cleveland Law answered the forfeiture complaint. That 

filing did not suggest any opposition to the sale. Rather, Cleveland 

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Law stated that, as an “innocent owner” of a leasehold interest under 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6), its permissible remedies included compensation “to the extent of Claimant’s ownership interest once a 

final order of forfeiture has been entered and the property has been 

reduced to liquid assets.” 

The next day, February 11, 2021, the district court granted 

the “unopposed” motion to approve the interlocutory sale according to the terms of the purchase agreement. In the weeks that followed, Cleveland Law did not submit any filing to prevent the sale 

from occurring. Instead, after the sale closed, Cleveland Law filed 

a notice of appeal of the sale order on March 1, 2021.1 

II.

Cleveland Law maintains that the private sale of 55 Public 

Square was “governed by” § 2001 because “all parties” did not 

“agree to the sale . . . or different procedures” under Supplemental 

Rule G(7). It notes that the government never sought or obtained 

its agreement to the sale, despite its status as a claimant in the 

1 The parties agree, as do we, that an interlocutory order authorizing the immediate sale of real property in a forfeiture case is a collateral order subject to 

immediate appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Real Prop. & Residence Located 

at 4816 Chaffey Lane, 699 F.3d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2012) (exercising jurisdiction 

over an interlocutory sale order in a forfeiture case under the collateral-order 

doctrine). Cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 336–38 

(5th Cir. May 1981) (holding that “an order in a foreclosure proceeding that 

directs the immediate sale of specified property is in all respects a final order 

for purposes of appeal.”)

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21-10696 Opinion of the Court 7

forfeiture case. And it contends that the failure to comply with

§ 2001’s notice, hearing, and appraisal requirements rendered the 

sale “void” under the former Fifth Circuit’s decision in Acadia Land

Co. v. Horuff, 110 F.2d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1940) (holding that the 

failure to comply with statutory notice, hearing, and appraisal requirements rendered a private sale “void because the court was 

lacking in jurisdiction to confirm it”).2

The government responds that Cleveland Law tacitly 

agreed to the sale or waived the issue by failing to object below, 

and that the appeal is moot because the sale to a good-faith purchaser cannot be undone. It further argues that Cleveland Law was 

not actually harmed by the sale order, and that the sale would have 

gone forward in the same way had the government simply waited 

to initiate a forfeiture case until the sale closed. Cleveland Law replies that it lacked a meaningful opportunity to object and that this 

Court can still grant effective relief.

III.

After this case was fully briefed, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing Cleveland Law’s standing to appeal the interlocutory sale order. Because standing implicates our 

jurisdiction, “we are obliged to consider standing sua sponte,” 

2 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to 

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc). 

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reviewing de novo. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock 

Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2007). 

“Litigants must establish their standing not only to bring 

claims, but also to appeal judgments.” Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351 

F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003). “To have appellate standing, a 

litigant must establish that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and 

is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” United 

States v. Pavlenko, 921 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). The injury 

requirement means that “the appealed order must affect the litigant’s interests in an adverse way.” Id.; see Knight v. State, 14 F.3d 

1534, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994). In other words, “[o]nly a litigant who 

is aggrieved by the judgment or order may appeal.” Wolff, 351 

F.3d at 1354 (cleaned up). 

Cleveland Law says it has standing because the sale order 

“modified [its] ownership interest in the property,” “disrupted its 

business operations,” and violated its due-process rights in the forfeiture proceeding. It asserts that, while the sale order “purportedly” transferred its lease agreement, the order “fail[ed] to ensure 

all lease provisions went undisturbed.” After the sale closed, according to Cleveland Law, the buyer attempted to terminate the 

lease agreement and then began converting the building to residential housing, causing significant disruption and violating a lease provision that limited use of the building to commercial purposes only. 

The government responds that Cleveland Law lacks standing because the sale order kept Cleveland Law’s rights and 

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remedies under the lease fully intact. In the government’s view, 

Cleveland Law’s problems with its new landlord stem from the independent actions of a third party, not the sale order itself, and are 

“outside the ambit of this case.” It notes that the court abandoned 

jurisdiction over the building once the sale proceeds were substituted for the building as the res. It also contends that Cleveland 

Law received due process and was not prejudiced by any procedural deprivation because even if due process as Cleveland Law envisions it was entitled to had been afforded, the same result would 

have occurred. Cleveland Law replies that the Supreme Court has 

rejected similar reasoning.

We agree with the government that Cleveland Law lacks 

standing to appeal. The sale order did not adversely affect Cleveland Law’sleasehold interest in the property. That order permitted 

the sale to go forward under the terms of the purchase agreement, 

which transferred all existing leases to the buyer. 

The record contradicts Cleveland Law’s claim that the sale 

order failed to incorporate addenda to its lease or to document a 

few other lease provisions. Under the purchase agreement, the 

lease transfer included “any and all amendments, modifications or 

supplements” to leases, and the buyer “agree[d] to be bound by and 

to perform and observe all of the obligations, covenants, terms and 

conditions to be performed or observed.” So while Cleveland 

Law’s landlord changed, its lease did not. Indeed, Cleveland Law 

did not raise any objection to the sale until after it had closed, indicating that its problem was with the new landlord, not the sale 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10696

itself. Cleveland Law therefore has not shown that the sale order 

affected its property interests in an adverse way. See Pavlenko, 921 

F.3d at 1289.

Nor are Cleveland Law’s grievances with its new landlord 

sufficient to provide standing to appeal the sale order. To be sure, 

Cleveland Law appears to have been injured by the new landlord’s 

attempt to terminate the lease and disruptive renovations for residential housing, alleged to be in violation of a lease provision limiting use of the building to commercial purposes only. 

But those injuries were caused by “the independent action 

of some third party not before the court,” and are not fairly traceable to the sale order itself. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 

744, 757 (2013) (“[T]he injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action . . . , and not the result of the independent action of 

some third party not before the court.” (cleaned up)). The sale order did not affect Cleveland Law’s property interest or authorize 

the buyer to take the actions of which Cleveland Law complains. 

And Cleveland Law’s injuries to its use and enjoyment of the property are redressable through an action against that third party. 

Cleveland Law fails to explain how undoing the sale and requiring 

additional procedures under § 2001, related to ensuring a fair sale 

price, would remedy these injuries.3 See Pavlenko, 921 F.3d at

1289.

3 In its initial briefing, Cleveland Law also cited the protection of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 985, which states that “the owners or occupants of the real property shall not 

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Finally, Cleveland Law’s alleged due-process injury is not 

enough on its own to create standing to appeal. Because Cleveland 

Law has not shown that the sale order adversely affected its property interest in 55 Public Square, it likewise has not shown that it 

was harmed by any procedural deficiencies in relation to that order. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Cleveland Law lacks 

standing to appeal the district court’s order authorizing the interlocutory sale of 55 Public Square. We therefore dismiss the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction.4

DISMISSED.

be evicted from, or otherwise deprived of the use and enjoyment of, real property that is the subject of a pending forfeiture action.” But as the government 

points out, that protection “does not apply to forfeitures of the proceeds of the 

sale of [real property or interests in real property].” 18 U.S.C. § 985(f)(2). In 

other words, § 985 no longer applied once the sale of the property closed and 

the proceeds were substituted as the res. 

4 The government’s motion for summary affirmance or to dismiss on grounds 

of mootness is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

May 17, 2022

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

Appeal Number: 21-10696-GG

Case Style: USA v. Real Prop Located 55 Public Sq

District Court Docket No: 1:20-cv-23278-MGC

Secondary Case Number: 1:20-cv-25313-MGC

Electronic Filing

All counsel must file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, 

unless exempted for good cause. Although not required, non-incarcerated pro se parties are 

permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an account at www.pacer.gov. Information 

and training materials related to electronic filing are available on the Court's website. Enclosed 

is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered 

pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 

41(b).

The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for 

filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise 

provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is 

timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are 

governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for 

attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.

Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested 

Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by 

any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be 

reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See

11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .

Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming 

compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate 

or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via 

the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or 

cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher 

system.

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For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number 

referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Joseph Caruso, GG

at (404) 335-6177.

Sincerely,

DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court

Reply to: Djuanna H. Clark

Phone #: 404-335-6151

OPIN-1 Ntc of Issuance of Opinion

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