Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Veterans Affairs,

and International Relations, Committee

on Government Reform, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Continuing Difficulty

Keeping F-22

Production Costs

Within the

Congressional

Limitation

GAO-01-782
Page i GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Letter 1

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 13

Appendix II GAO Staff Acknowledgments 15

Related GAO Products 16

Tables

Table 1: Comparison of Latest Air Force and Office of the Secretary

F-22 Production Cost Estimates With the Congressional

Cost Limitation 7

Table 2: Comparison of Production Cost Estimates by the Air

Force and the Office of the Secretary and the Impact of

Cost Reduction Plans on These Estimates 8

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Progression of Production Cost Reduction

Plans 6

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

July 16, 2001

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Air Force F-22 Raptor is designed to be an air superiority aircraft with

an air-to-ground attack capability and is to replace F-15 fighter aircraft.

Lockheed Martin Corporation and Pratt & Whitney Corporation are the

contractors for the airframe and engine, respectively. Development of the

aircraft, which started in 1991, is currently scheduled to be completed in

September 2003, according to the Air Force. The Air Force had planned to

award contracts to begin low-rate initial production in December 2000.

However, award of a fully-funded contract for 10 low-rate initial

production aircraft approved for fiscal year 2001 has been delayed at least

until after completion of the President's review of Department of Defense

(DOD) programs. The Air Force currently plans to procure 333 production

aircraft through 2013. The cost of F-22 production is limited1

 to $37.6

billion by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 19982

, but

the act does not specify the total number of aircraft to be procured.

As requested, we updated information we provided to the Subcommittee

in August 20003

 on the Air Force's F-22 production program and the

service's efforts to offset production cost increases through activities

known as production cost reduction plans. Specifically, this report

(1) identifies the amount of potential offsets attributable to production

cost reduction plans by F-22 contractors, (2) compares the latest F-22

 1

 The cost limitation, as adjusted, is currently $37.6 billion for 333 aircraft and does not include

$1.575 billion associated with six aircraft labeled Production Representative Test Vehicles that are

excluded from the production cost limitation. Those aircraft are funded mostly with appropriations

for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation as approved by the Congress. The production cost

limitation does however, include about $200 million of costs related to those six aircraft.

2

 P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.

3 Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional

Limitation (GAO/NSIAD-00-178, Aug. 15, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

production cost estimates completed by the Air Force and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense with the congressional cost limitation and

determines the extent to which cost reduction plans were considered in

establishing these estimates, and (3) provides the status of DOD's actions

to implement recommendations included in our August 2000 report

concerning production cost estimates and cost reduction plans for the

F-22 program.

F-22 contractors and the Air Force have been developing cost reduction

plans that are created to reduce costs by enhancing production

technology, improving manufacturing techniques, and improving

acquisition practices. The amount of cost reductions the contractors

estimated to be achievable through production cost reduction plans has

increased substantially since 1997. The contractors' estimated reductions

in costs associated with these plans increased from $13.1 billion in January

1997, to $21 billion in mid-2000, to $26.5 billion in January 2001.

In late 2000, both Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators

projected that F-22 production costs would exceed the $37.6 billion

congressional cost limitation if the Air Force were to procure 333 F-22s.

Air Force cost estimators projected the likely cost at $39.6 billion4

; the

Office of the Secretary estimated the likely cost at $46.6 billion.5

 Air Force

and Office of the Secretary estimates differ mainly because their

respective cost estimators made differing judgements about labor

efficiency, engine costs, and the potential impacts of production cost

reduction plans designed by F-22 contractors to reduce the production

costs of F-22s. Cost estimators from the Air Force and Office of the

Secretary both agree that many of the cost reduction plans will result in

cost reductions. However, they do not agree on which of the plans are

fully viable, or the amounts of cost reductions that will be generated. For

example, the Office of the Secretary estimated that $1 billion less would be

 4

 Air Force cost estimators projected the costs for 331 aircraft at $38.5 billion. To arrive at the cost

for 333 aircraft that are planned, $1.1 billion must be added for 2 production representative test

aircraft and advance procurement for 6 production representative test aircraft approved for fiscal

year 1999, making the projected cost $39.6 billion for 333 aircraft.

5

 Briefing documents indicate that Office of the Secretary estimators projected the costs for 331

aircraft at $45.5 billion. To arrive at the projected cost for 333 aircraft that are planned, $1.1 billion

must be added for 2 production representative test aircraft and advance procurement for 6

production representative test aircraft approved for fiscal year 1999, making the projected cost

$46.6 billion for 333 aircraft.

Results In Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

saved by the planned manufacturing cost reductions as compared with the

Air Force's estimated cost reductions. Because F-22 production is in its

early stages (a fully funded contract for production has not yet been

awarded), most of the cost reductions associated with the plans have not

yet been achieved. However, the Air Force asked the Defense Contract

Audit Agency (DCAA), an agency responsible for contract audits at DOD,

to conduct a limited, independent review of the validity of some plans that

accounted for about 2 percent of the estimated cost reductions. DCAA did

not generally take exception to the potential cost reductions associated

with these plans.

DOD and the Air Force have been partially responsive to the

recommendations included in our August 2000 report on F-22 production

cost estimates.6 We recommended that the Air Force improve the

regularity and scope of its reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on the status of the cost reduction

plans. We recommended the reports include summary information such as

the total number of cost reduction plans identified and implemented, the

total estimated cost reductions, and cost reductions realized to date.

However, the Air Force has not regularly reported that information in the

manner we recommended. For example, the information reported did not

include estimated cost reductions realized. We also recommended that

DOD reconcile the number of F-22s needed with the amount of the

congressional cost limitation on F-22 production. DOD partially concurred

with that recommendation and advised us they would make the

judgements as part of the next Quadrennial Defense Review. Since DOD

made that response, the President has directed that the Secretary of

Defense review defense programs.

This report contains no new recommendations as DOD efforts to

implement our prior F-22-related recommendations are still in progress.

Because of potential cost increases, the Air Force established a team—the

Joint Estimating Team—to review the total estimated cost of the F-22

program. This team reported in 1997 that the cost of the F-22 production

program could grow substantially from the amount planned, but that the

contractors should design cost reduction plans to fully offset that cost

 6 Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional

Limitation (GAO/NSIAD-00-178, Aug. 15, 2000).

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

growth. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics generally adopted the team's recommendations

to change certain aspects of the program as well as a plan to define and

implement cost reduction plans. The contractors have continued since

1997 to refine and increase the number and dollar amounts associated

with the plans to reduce F-22 production costs.

Ultimately, the savings to be achieved by production cost reduction plans

must be reflected in lower production contract prices, and lower

expenditures by the Air Force than would have been the case if the plans

had not been implemented. The Air Force and contractors have entered

into memoranda of understanding that relate the affordability of F-22

production to contract prices that will be negotiated for low-rate initial

production. The memoranda established target price objectives against

which the negotiated prices will be evaluated and financial incentives to

achieve the target price objectives for the applicable production lots. To

encourage a reduction in production costs, the Air Force and contractors

agreed that production cost reduction plans would be proposed, approved

and implemented as appropriate. The Air Force agreed to reimburse

certain investment costs and to pay award fees to the contractors based on

negotiating contracts for certain prices. Until contract prices are

negotiated, cost estimates will continue to reflect judgements of

estimators about the potential impact of cost reduction plans when

implemented.

In an effort to offset production cost increases, F-22 contractors have been

developing production cost reduction plans to enhance production

technology, improve manufacturing techniques, and improve acquisition

strategies and subcontract agreements for buying materials. These cost

reduction plans are categorized as: implemented, not yet implemented, or

"challenge". The Air Force and contractors' criteria for determining if a

cost reduction plan is implemented include whether

• the contractor has submitted a firm-fixed price proposal that recognizes

the impact of the cost reduction,

• the impact of the reduction has been reflected in a current contract

price—either with the prime contractor or a supplier to the prime

contractor,

• the contractor has reduced the standard number of hours allocated to a

specific task,

• the reduction has been negotiated in a forward pricing rate agreement, or

the reduction has been negotiated with a subcontractor or vendor.

Potential Cost

Reductions Identified

by Contractors Have

Increased
Page 5 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Plans are categorized as not yet implemented if none of the criteria are

met. Challenge plans represent additional potential savings in areas that

have been identified, but that are not yet well defined.

The contractors' estimated reductions in costs that are associated with

F-22 cost reduction plans increased from $13.1 billion in January 1997, to

$21 billion in mid-2000, to $26.5 billion in January 2001. According to the

contractors, the $26.5 billion is distributed as follows by category:

• About $13.7 billion (52 percent) in cost reductions that have been

implemented;

• About $8.5 billion (32 percent) in cost reductions not yet implemented;

and

• About $4.2 billion (16 percent) labeled as a challenge amount.

Figure 1 shows examples of implemented, not yet implemented, and

challenge cost reduction plans and the relative progression of these plans

toward potentially achieving some cost reductions in the future.
Page 6 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 1: Examples of Progression of Production Cost Reduction Plans

In late 2000, the Air Force cost estimators projected, in an estimate

supporting the fiscal year 2002 budget request, that production costs of

333 F-22s were likely to exceed the $37.6 billion congressional cost

limitation by $2 billion. The cost estimate produced by the Office of the

Secretary indicates that costs will likely exceed the congressional cost

limitation by $9 billion. Important reasons for the differences between Air

Force and Office of the Secretary estimators are differing judgements

about labor efficiencies, engine costs, and the viability of cost reduction

plans and their potential impact on the cost of F-22 production.

Latest F-22

Production Cost

Estimates

Exceed Cost

Limitation by a

Greater Margin
Page 7 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

In late 1999, both the Air Force and Office of the Secretary cost estimators

projected that production costs for 339 aircraft would exceed the

congressional cost limitation of $39.8 billion in effect at that time. The Air

Force cost estimators projected production costs at $40.8 billion, and the

Office of the Secretary estimated $48.6 billion for the 339 production

aircraft. Even though the cost estimates exceeded the $39.8 billion cost

limitation in effect at that time, the Secretary of the Air Force maintained

that the cost would not exceed the limitation, and established the Air

Force's position on F-22 production cost at $39.8 billion.

In estimates made in December 2000 to support the fiscal year 2002 budget

request, both Air Force and Office of the Secretary cost estimators

continue to project that F-22 production costs will exceed the

congressional cost limitation. Table 1 shows the details of these estimates

and the amounts by which the estimates exceed the congressional cost

limitation.

Table 1: Comparison of Latest Air Force and Office of the Secretary F-22 Production

Cost Estimates With the Congressional Cost Limitation

Then-year dollars in billions

Estimates Air Force

Office of the

Secretary

Estimate (333 production aircraft) $39.6 $46.6

Cost limitation (333 production aircraft) $37.6 $37.6

Amount over the cost limitation $2.0 $9.0

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and Office of the Secretary data

The current cost limitation of $37.6 billion has been adjusted to reflect

planned acquisition of 333 production aircraft, 6 fewer than included in the

cost limitation in effect in 1999. This change reflects congressional action

on the fiscal year 2000 Air Force budget, in which the Congress approved

funding for 6 aircraft using appropriations for Research, Development,

Test and Evaluation. Accordingly, the 6 aircraft and associated costs of

$1.575 billion (excluding about $200 million that had been appropriated in

fiscal year 1999 for advanced procurement for those aircraft) were

eliminated from the production cost limitation and added to the

development cost limitation.

If the Office of the Secretary's higher estimate is correct and additional

cost reduction plans are not developed and implemented, we project that

the Air Force would have to buy about 85 fewer F-22s (or about 25

percent) than the 333 aircraft now planned to stay within the cost

Production Cost Estimates

Have Increased
Page 8 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

limitation. In our August 2000 report, we had also calculated that the Air

Force would not be able to procure about 85 F-22s if the Office of the

Secretary's 1999 estimate was correct.

The Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators included in

their projections the effect of cost reduction plans that have been

categorized as implemented. They also estimated the expected future

impact of cost reduction plans that have not yet been implemented.

Neither included challenge plans.. Air Force officials advised us that their

cost estimates consider the same cost reduction plans as the Office of the

Secretary estimators, but that differing judgements regarding the viability

of the plans and potential amounts of cost reductions are applied. Table 2

compares the two cost estimates.

Table 2: Comparison of Production Cost Estimates by the Air Force and the Office

of the Secretary and the Impact of Cost Reduction Plans on These Estimates

Then year dollars in billions

Estimate Air Force

Office of the

Secretary

Production cost estimate including implemented

cost reduction plans $47.2 $51.9

Impact of not yet implemented cost reduction

plans ($7.6) ($5.3)

Total $39.6 $46.6

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and Office of the Secretary data

Air Force and Office of the Secretary officials attributed the majority of

the differences in the estimates to the Office of the Secretary having—

• Estimated higher labor costs than the Air Force relating to subcontractor

efforts,

• Estimated higher costs for the F-22 engines,

• Excluded some cost reduction plans because of the limited viability, and

• Estimated more conservative savings from some cost reduction plans.

Labor costs for subcontractors projected by estimators from the Office of

the Secretary were $3.0 billion more than those projected by Air Force

cost estimators. Projections of engine costs by the Office of the Secretary

estimators were $1.2 billion higher. The Office of the Secretary also

excluded some planned manufacturing cost reduction plans because they

were not adequately detailed, and estimated $1 billion less would be saved

by the planned manufacturing cost reductions than did the Air Force.

Differing Judgements

About Viability of Cost

Reduction Plans in

Developing Cost Estimates
Page 9 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Further, the Office of the Secretary estimated $800 million less in cost

reductions than the Air Force for plans relating to productivity

investments.

Because F-22 production is in its early stages, few plans have resulted in

actual cost reductions. However, analysis of plans categorized as

implemented do show indications that lower costs can be achieved. The

Air Force in mid-2000 asked DCAA7

 to conduct a limited, independent

review of some of these plans. In late 2000, the DCAA examined eleven

cost reduction plans totaling $425 million of total estimated savings of

$26.5 billion. These eleven plans were chosen so DCAA could examine

cost reduction plans at different stages of development and at different

locations including Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta,

Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas;

and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle, Washington. DCAA did not conduct

detailed audits of these cost reduction plans. Their reviews focused

primarily on methodologies used to calculate the reported savings or the

verification of rates or material cost used in the calculations of contractor

reported savings.

DCAA did not take exception to the potential cost reductions for 8 of the

11 plans reviewed; found potential cost reductions on two others to be

based on judgement, not discrete, measurable events; and found

documentation on one to be lacking. Regarding the one plan where

documentation was lacking, DCAA auditors were unable to validate

contractor estimates totaling around $2 million that involved a new

process developed to only require one step to drill a hole in the airframe,

rather than two steps.

Our August 2000 report recommended that the Secretary of Defense

reconcile the number of F-22s that need to be procured with the cost

limitation and report to the Congress on the implications of procuring

fewer F-22s because of potentially higher costs. DOD partially agreed,

stating that the affordability of the F-22 will be evaluated during an

upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review.

 7 DCAA is responsible for contract audits at DOD.

Limited Validation of

Eleven Cost Reduction

Plans at Three Contractor

Locations

Actions to Implement

Prior GAO

Recommendations
Page 10 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

We also found that Air Force quarterly reports provided to the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not

regularly highlight major changes associated with cost reduction plans.

While the status of individual cost reduction plans are tracked by

contractors and the F-22 Program Office, we believe regular reporting by

the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense on the status of these

plans is necessary to continuously assess their impact on the estimated

cost of F-22 production. Achievement of the estimated cost reductions

embodied in the plans is critical to completing F-22 production within the

congressional cost limitation. Quarterly reporting of cost reduction plan

information enhances its visibility. As a result, we recommended the Air

Force report to the Under Secretary of Defense on the status of the cost

reduction plans each quarter and that quarterly reports include summary

information such as the total number of cost reduction plans identified,

the number implemented, the total estimated cost reductions, cost

reductions realized to date, and additions or deletions from the plans

included in the prior report.

DOD concurred with our recommendation in October 2000 and agreed to

report cost reduction plan information in subsequent quarterly reviews to

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

DOD agreed that the achievement of cost reduction plans is essential to

the execution of the F-22 program within the congressional cost limit.

However, our recommendation has not been implemented. In the Air

Force's March 2001 quarterly review to the Under Secretary, the

information reported included only summary information on the total

estimated cost reductions.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed there continues to be

a notable difference between the Air Force and Office of the Secretary

F-22 production cost estimates. They indicated that data would emerge

toward verification of these estimates as the program begins to

accumulate production cost data.

DOD also agreed that the dollar amounts associated with the cost

reduction plans have continued to increase since 1997. They indicated

that as F-22 cost pressures have increased, so have the number of cost

reduction plans and the cost reductions attributed to them.

In commenting on the progress the Air Force has made toward complying

with our recommendation from August 2000 for specific cost reduction

plan information to be reported in quarterly reviews, DOD indicated the

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 11 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

information reported in the last quarterly review (June 2001) contained

more detailed information. We have examined the June 2001 quarterly

review and agree it contains more information on cost reduction plans

than previous quarterly reviews. Information on the total estimated cost

reductions was reported. However, the information reported is still not

consistent with what we recommended be reported in August 2000.

Information was not reported as we recommended regarding the total

number of cost reduction plans identified, the number implemented, the

cost reductions realized to date, and any additions or deletions from the

plans included in the prior report.

To identify the amount of potential offsets attributable to production cost

reduction plans by F-22 contractors we reviewed contractor cost

reduction plans to determine the basis for the reductions expected to be

achieved and whether the reduction was implemented or not yet

implemented. We reviewed the documentation from the contractors and

discussed the plans and the Air Force procedures for reporting on such

plans with contractor and Air Force officials.

To compare the latest F-22 production cost estimates of the Air Force and

the Office of the Secretary with the congressional production cost

limitation and to determine the extent to which cost reductions plans were

considered in establishing these estimates, we reviewed the Joint

Estimating Team's report and various Air Force briefings. We discussed

the estimates with officials in the Office of the Secretary and the Air

Force's F-22 Program Office to determine why they differed. We compared

the two estimates, including the baseline estimate, the estimated

reductions from cost reduction plans, and the net estimates. We obtained a

description of the reasons for the variances between the two estimates.

We also discussed the estimates and production cost limitation with Air

Force and Office of the Secretary officials. The Office of the Secretary cost

estimate shown in this report is recorded in briefing documents we

obtained during the course of our review. The Office of the Secretary

provided us neither its cost estimate nor documentation related to its cost

estimate. Officials from the Office of the Secretary cited their policy of not

allowing access to that information because they considered it

predecisional. However, we corroborated the information contained in the

briefing documents we analyzed. An Office of the Secretary official

reviewed and agreed with the estimated and projected costs included in

this report that are attributed to the Office of the Secretary. To calculate

the number of F-22s that could not be procured within the cost limitation

we allocated the dollars in the Office of the Secretary estimate to

Scope and

Methodology
Page 12 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

production lots 1 through 11 in the previous Air Force estimate. Starting

with the adjusted costs for production lot 1, we determined how many

aircraft could be purchased without exceeding the applicable cost

limitation

To evaluate whether the Office of the Secretary and the Air Force were

complying with our prior recommendations, we determined whether a

defense review, that potentially could reconcile the number of F-22s

needed with the cost limitation, had been completed. We also reviewed

recent quarterly briefings from the Air Force to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to determine how the

information included on production cost reduction plans compared to the

information we recommended be included in the briefings.

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed officials

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.; the F-22

Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Defense

Contract Management Agency, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin

Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical

Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle,

Washington. We performed our work from December 2000 through May

2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate

congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the

Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies

will also be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Robert D. Murphy at (937) 258-7904

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. GAO staff

acknowledgments to this report are listed in appendix II.

Allen Li

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 13 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix II: GAO Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 15 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Marvin E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Edward R. Browning, Arthur L.

Cobb, Michael J. Hazard, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schaik made

key contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 16 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need for

Limit on Low-Rate Production (GAO-01-310, Mar. 15, 2001).

Supporting Congressional Oversight: Framework for Considering

Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work (GAO-01-447, Mar. 9, 2001).

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded

Congressional Limitation (GAO/NSIAD-00-178, Aug.15, 2000).

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22

Total Production Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200, June 15, 2000).

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal

Year 2001 (GAO/OCG-00-8, Mar. 31, 2000).

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are

Avoided (GAO/NSIAD-00-68, Mar. 14, 2000).

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58, Dec. 7, 1999).

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT&E Programs

(GAO/NSIAD-99-233R, Sept. 23, 1999).

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal

Year 2000 (GAO/OCG-99-26, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and

Manufacturing Development Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, Mar. 17,

1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing

Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing

Development Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137, Mar. 25, 1998).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing

Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-98-67, Mar. 10, 1998).

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program

(GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 17 GAO-01-782 Tactical Aircraft

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on

Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100R, Feb. 28, 1997).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, May 5,

1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

(120022)

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