OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 

July 25, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

GULF REGION DIVISION 

 

SUBJECT: Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the 

Government of Iraq (SIGIR-07-004) 

This audit report is provided for your information and use. This report discusses our 

review of the U.S. Mission-Iraq’s process for transferring completed Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund projects to the Government of Iraq. 

We considered comments received on the draft of this report from the Mission DirectorIraq, U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Gulf Region Division; and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq when preparing the final report. The 

comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and the written responses are 

included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish in Arlington, Virginia (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil

or 703-428-1058) or Mr. Robert B. Gabriel in Baghdad, Iraq (703-343-7921 / 

robert.gabriel@iraq.centcom.mil). For the final report distribution, see Appendix D. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

cc: See Distribution 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 

Background 1 

 Objectives 2 

Findings 

 Asset Transfer Procedures 3 

 Progress Transferring Completed Capital Projects 6 

 Follow-up on Open SIGIR Recommendations 8 

Conclusion and Recommendation 9

Management Comments and Audit Response 10

Appendices 

 A. Scope and Methodology 11 

 B. Summary of Open SIGIR Recommendations 13 

 C. Acronyms 17 

 D. Report Distribution 18 

 E. Audit Team Members 20 

Management Comments 

 U.S. Embassy-Iraq 21 

 U.S. Agency for International Development’s Mission-Iraq 22 

 Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 23 

 
i 

Transferring Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to 

the Government of Iraq 

SIGIR-07-004 July 25, 2007

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

This report is one of a series issued by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) that addresses transferring completed projects funded by the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to the Government of Iraq (GOI). It focuses on the formal transfer 

of IRRF-funded capital assets1

 and follows up on prior SIGIR recommendations relating to 

capital asset transfer. 

As of May 31, 2007, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) have managed 

the completion of 2,797 IRRF-funded capital construction projects valued at approximately 

$5.8 billion. 

A capital project transfer process is essential to both the United States and Iraq for two main 

reasons. First, it allows the GOI to recognize its ownership of the project. Asset recognition is 

the point at which the GOI officially agrees that the project is complete, that all necessary 

project-specific documentation is in place,2

 and that the U.S. government has provided the 

necessary training and orientation to the local Iraqi staff who will be responsible to manage, 

operate, and maintain the new or refurbished facility. Second, it validates that the GOI is now 

responsible for project operation and maintenance (O&M) and capital replacement. As a result, 

ownership enables the Iraqi Ministry of Finance to leverage completed projects to obtain new 

financing for future initiatives from world markets, including the International Monetary Fund, 

the World Bank, and donor nations. 

According to the National Security Presidential Directive 36, United States Government 

Operations in Iraq (May 11, 2004), the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is the Department of State’s 

 

1

 The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office’s Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USG-Funded 

Capital Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, dated April 23, 2006, defines capital asset as “physically 

tangible property which cannot be easily converted into cash and which is expected to be held for a long period—

generally five years or more—including buildings, real estate, equipment, etc.” 

2

 Documentation includes such items as facility as-built drawings, preventive maintenance plans, spare parts lists, 

operations and maintenance plans, and cost estimates for annual operations and maintenance costs. 
ii 

Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission-Iraq and is responsible for the continuous supervision and 

general direction of all assistance for Iraq. This includes the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those 

under the command of an area military commander. The directive also created IRMO as a 

temporary organization within the U.S. Mission-Iraq to facilitate the transition in Iraq. On May 

8, 2007, the President, by Executive Order 13431, created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

(ITAO) as the successor organization to IRMO. 

Objectives 

The overall objective was to determine whether IRMO, USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD have 

developed and implemented plans for the transition of IRRF-funded projects to the GOI. To meet 

the objective, the audit addressed these questions: 

1. Have U.S. agencies involved in IRRF-funded construction projects developed adequate 

procedures for transitioning completed projects to the Government of Iraq? 

2. Have there been delays in transitioning projects to the Government of Iraq; if so, what have 

been the cause and impact of those delays? 

3. What is the status of actions taken in responding to prior SIGIR recommendations on 

transition and sustainment? 

The transition process comprises three steps: (1) asset recognition and transfer, (2) sustainment, 

and (3) capacity development. This audit focused on asset recognition and transfer. SIGIR is 

reporting on sustainment and capacity development in separate reviews and assessments. 

Results 

IRMO and its implementing partners—USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD—have worked hard to put 

a process in place for handing over completed U.S.-built capital projects to the GOI and initially 

were successful in transferring projects. In December 2005, the four organizations and others 

formed the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group to build on earlier informal efforts to 

develop a common transfer process for all U.S. agencies to use. IRMO closely coordinated the 

asset transfer process with the Ministry of Finance because of the Ministry’s broad 

budgetary/financial responsibility and funding authority for the GOI, including providing 

funding for O&M costs for transferred assets. However, a new Minister of Finance was 

appointed in May 2006 who, according to IRMO staff, changed the GOI conditions on the asset 

transfer process, effectively halting further transfers at the national level in July 2006. 

Hoping to break this bottleneck, IRMO and its implementing U.S. partners are developing 

alternatives to achieve the objective of capital asset transfer to the GOI. They drafted a revised 

policy that moves formal recognition and acceptance of asset transfers at the national level from 

the Ministry of Finance to the individual line ministries (for example, electricity). IRMO, 

MNSTC-I, and GRD are prepared to unilaterally transfer to the GOI completed assets as a last 

resort if the line ministries are unwilling to formally recognize and accept them. In addition, 

IRMO officials told us that they have drafted a bilateral agreement on asset transfer to the GOI 

that is intended to be signed by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister. IRMO 
iii 

could not provide a timeline for completion of the bilateral agreement: it depends on input from 

both the U.S. government participants and the GOI.3

 

USAID is the one agency that has not used the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group’s 

common policy. In a previous recommendation, we stated that USAID should participate in this 

process, but it has thus far declined. Instead, USAID plans to execute its own agreement with 

each line ministry. The agreement will include all projects completed by USAID for that 

ministry and a commitment by the line ministry to sustain the completed projects. 

Between April 23, 2006, and June 30, 2006, MNSTC-I and GRD transferred 435 completed 

IRRF-funded projects, valued at $501 million, to the GOI through the Ministry of Finance. No 

completed projects have been transferred to the Ministry of Finance since June 30, 2006. As of 

May 31, 2007, 2,362 completed U.S.-built projects, valued at $5.3 billion, await transfer and 

acceptance at the national level. Delays in transferring completed projects mean that fewer assets 

are available to the GOI as leverage for loans and could result in additional sustainment expenses 

for the U.S. government agencies that completed the projects. We previously identified problems 

in sustaining completed projects.4 

SIGIR has issued four asset transfer reports, each with one recommendation, on the transfer of 

completed projects to the GOI.5 Each recommendation identified the need to develop a common 

transfer process. IRMO and its implementing partners have worked to put such a process in place 

but have been stymied by the GOI’s unanticipated reluctance to accept project responsibility and 

ownership. Thus, each recommendation remains open, and the implementing partners through 

the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group continue to develop a common transfer 

process acceptable to all parties, especially the GOI. We continue to maintain that asset transfer 

to the GOI is best accomplished through a single U.S. government process, rather than by each 

implementing agency independently negotiating its own agreement. Also, the U.S. government 

needs to establish an overall bilateral agreement with the GOI to include any agreed-upon 

procedures for the transfer of assets. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq provide senior-level support to finalize a 

bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq on asset transfer to the Government of 

Iraq. 

 

3

 GOI principals include the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and the Minister of 

Planning. 

4 Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs (SIGIR-05-022, October 24, 2005). 

5

 GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR-05-028, January 

24, 2006); Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR-06-006, April 29,2006); U.S. Agency for 

International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-06-007, April 29,2006); Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-06-017, July 28, 2006).
iv 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments from the U.S. Embassy-Iraq on a draft of this report. The 

Embassy concurred with the recommendation. 

We also received written technical comments on the draft of this report from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division. These 

comments are addressed in the report where applicable. 

In developing the bilateral agreement, the lead activity should consider the suggestion GRD 

made in its response to the draft of this report. GRD suggested a provision whereby when 

ministries take longer than 30 days to formally recognize and accept asset transfer, that there be a 

unilateral transfer procedure for completed projects in order to reduce delays in transfers. While 

SIGIR did not fully evaluate the suggestion, it appears to be one that should be considered. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the recommendations and 

that technical corrections have been made to this final report as applicable. All comments are 

included in the Management Comments section of this report. 
1 

Introduction 

Background 

This report focuses on the formal transfer of completed capital construction projects 

funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to the Government of Iraq 

(GOI). On April 16, 2003, the United States (U.S.) Congress appropriated $2.48 billion 

through Public Law 108-11, commonly called IRRF 1, to finance reconstruction in Iraq. 

On November 6, 2003, it appropriated an additional $18.4 billion through Public Law 

108-106, commonly called IRRF 2, to support security, relief, rehabilitation, and 

reconstruction projects in postwar Iraq. As of May 31, 2007, the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD)6 have managed the completion of 2,797 

IRRF-funded capital construction projects valued at approximately $5.8 billion. It is 

expected that most of the remaining IRRF-funded projects will be completed by the end 

of 2007. 

A capital project transfer process is essential to both the United States and Iraq. First, it 

allows the GOI to recognize its ownership of the project. Asset recognition is the point at 

which the GOI officially agrees that the project is complete, all necessary project-specific 

documentation is in place,7

 and the U.S. government has provided the necessary training 

and orientation to the local Iraqi staff that will have responsibility to manage, operate, 

and maintain the new or refurbished facility. Second, it validates that the GOI is now 

responsible for project O&M and capital replacement. As a result, ownership enables the 

Iraqi Ministry of Finance to leverage completed projects to obtain new financing for 

future initiatives from world markets, including the International Monetary Fund, World 

Bank, and donor nations. 

Responsibilities 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). According to National Security 

Presidential Directive 36, United States Government Operations in Iraq (May 11, 2004), 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is the Department of State’s Chief of Mission at the U.S. 

Mission-Iraq and is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all 

assistance for Iraq. This includes the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. 

government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the 

command of an area military commander. The directive also created IRMO as a 

temporary organization within the U.S. Mission-Iraq to facilitate the transition in Iraq. On 

 

6

 In December 2005, when GRD absorbed the Project and Contracting Office-Iraq, the organization became 

known as GRD-PCO. The PCO mission in Iraq officially ended on October 14, 2006. 

7

 Documentation includes items such as facility as-built drawings, preventive maintenance plans, spare 

parts lists, operations and maintenance plans, and cost estimates for annual operations and maintenance 

costs. 
2 

May 8, 2007, the President, by Executive Order 13431, created the Iraq Transition 

Assistance Office (ITAO) as the successor organization to IRMO.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD). GRD provides planning, 

design, and construction management support for military and civil infrastructure 

construction in the Iraq combat theater to Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Department of 

State, and USAID. 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). As a component of 

the U.S. Central Command’s Multi-National Force-Iraq, MNSTC-I assists in building the 

capability of Iraqi Security Forces through a program of recruitment, training, equipping, 

mentoring, and monitoring. Its Coalition Military Assistance Training Team organizes, 

trains, and equips the Iraqi armed forces. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

staffs, equips, organizes, trains, and mentors the Iraqi Police Service, Iraqi National 

Police, Department of Border Enforcement forces, and other supporting forces. 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To facilitate the reconstruction 

of Iraq, the USAID Mission-Iraq implements specific programs in coordination with the 

United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, coalition country partners, 

nongovernmental organizations, and private sector partners. The USAID programs are in 

education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, economic growth, 

community development, local governance, and transition initiatives. 

Objectives 

The overall objective was to determine whether IRMO, USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD 

have developed and implemented plans for the transition of IRRF-funded projects to the 

GOI. To meet the objective, the audit addressed these questions: 

1. Have U.S. agencies involved in IRRF-funded construction projects developed 

adequate procedures for transitioning completed projects to the Government of Iraq? 

2. Have there been delays in transitioning projects to the Government of Iraq; if so, what 

have been the cause and impact of those delays? 

3. What is the status of actions taken in responding to prior SIGIR recommendations on 

transition and sustainment? 

The transition process comprises three steps: (1) asset recognition and transfer, (2) 

sustainment, and (3) capacity development. This audit focused on the asset recognition 

and transfer portion of the transition process. SIGIR is reporting on sustainment and 

capacity development in separate reviews and assessments. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For the summary 

of open SIGIR recommendations, see Appendix B. For the acronyms used in this report, 

see Appendix C. For the report distribution, see Appendix D. For a list of the audit team 

members, see Appendix E. 
3 

Asset Transfer Procedures 

IRMO and its implementing partners—USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD—have worked hard 

to put a process in place for handing over completed U.S.-built capital projects to the 

GOI. Initially, they were successful in transferring projects. In December 2005, the four 

organizations and others formed the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group to 

build on earlier informal efforts to develop a common transfer process for all U.S. 

agencies to use. IRMO closely coordinated the asset transfer process with the Ministry of 

Finance because of the ministry’s broad budgetary/financial responsibility and funding 

authority for the GOI, including providing funding for O&M costs for transferred assets. 

However, a new Minister of Finance was appointed in May 2006 who, according to 

IRMO staff, changed the GOI conditions on the asset transfer process, effectively 

bringing further transfers to a halt in July 2006. 

Hoping to break this bottleneck, IRMO and its implementing partners are developing 

alternatives to achieve the objective of capital asset transfer to the GOI. They have 

drafted a revised policy that moves formal recognition and acceptance of asset transfers 

at the national level from the Ministry of Finance to the individual line ministries. IRMO, 

MNSTC-I, and GRD are prepared to unilaterally transfer to the GOI completed assets as 

a last resort if the line ministries are unwilling to formally recognize and accept them. In 

addition, IRMO officials told us that they have drafted a bilateral agreement on asset 

transfer to the GOI that is intended to be signed by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the 

Iraqi Prime Minister. IRMO could not provide a timeline for completion of the bilateral 

agreement because it depends on input from both the U.S. government participants and 

the GOI.8

IRMO, USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD recognize the importance of an effective, formal 

capital asset transfer process; through the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working 

Group, they have been collaborating to develop, improve, and implement policies and 

procedures to achieve that goal. Over a four-month period, the group developed a 

procedural document for transferring completed projects. Issued on April 23, 2006, the 

Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USG-Funded Capital Assets to the 

Government of the Republic of Iraq, laid out a three-step process:

1. The implementing agency or department that finances a project involving 

production or improvement of a capital asset will utilize its own rules, policies, 

and procedures to complete such project. 

2. Using its own policies and procedures, each implementing agency or department 

will hand over control of capital assets to the responsible GOI entity for its 

beneficial use, operation, management, control, and protection. Documentation of 

this turnover will include, where applicable, all designs, drawings, operations and 

maintenance manuals, warranty information, and other information in the 

implementing agency’s possession and transmitted to IRMO where feasible. 

 

8

 GOI principals include the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and the Minister 

of Planning. 
4 

3. The implementing agency or department will formally transfer capital assets to 

the GOI, as represented by the Ministry of Finance and the relevant line ministry 

(e.g., electricity). Such transfers will be conducted in coordination with IRMO 

and will be documented using a standardized transfer letter. Each implementing 

agency or department will forward copies of the transfer document to IRMO. 

A key organization in the asset transfer process is the Asset Recognition and Transfer 

Operations Group (ARTOG), established in early 2006 by IRMO and GRD in 

coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. The ARTOG staff included Ministry of 

Finance employees responsible for coordinating with the Ministry of Finance’s Budget, 

Accounting, and Real Estate Departments on any asset transfer documentation received 

from the implementing agencies. Between April and June 2006, the ARTOG successfully 

transferred 435 projects, valued at $501 million, to the Ministry of Finance using the 

April 23, 2006, procedures developed by the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working 

Group. 

In May 2006, a new Iraqi government was elected, and a new Minister of Finance was 

appointed. Unfortunately, there was no formal written agreement with the Ministry of 

Finance to continue the ARTOG operation in the event of changes in key Iraqi personnel 

or governments. According to an IRMO official, the new minister was not supportive of 

the established ARTOG transfer process and requested changes. Among the changes, the 

new minister wanted to develop new Ministry of Finance asset transfer procedures and, in 

the interim, wanted the U.S. government to get a transfer acceptance document signed by 

the relevant line ministry before he would accept the transfer. According to the IRMO 

official, the ARTOG chose to work with the Ministry of Finance to develop new 

procedures. However, the Minister of Finance appears to have given the development of 

those procedures a low priority; as of May 31, 2007, no progress had been made. As a 

result, no capital assets were formally recognized and accepted by the GOI at the national 

level between July 1, 2006, and May 31, 2007. 

Alternatives Proposed for Transfer Process and Agreements 

After the Minister of Finance rejected the ARTOG process, IRMO and its implementing 

partners drafted a revised policy that moves formal recognition and acceptance of asset 

transfer at the national level from the Ministry of Finance to the individual line 

ministries. Copies of all relevant documentation, including cost sustainment information, 

will still be provided to the Ministry of Finance; however, Ministry of Finance personnel 

will not be required to sign the asset transfer acceptance documents. IRMO, MNSTC-I, 

and GRD are prepared to unilaterally transfer completed assets as a last resort if the line 

ministries are unwilling to formally recognize and accept them. 

In addition, IRMO officials told us that they have drafted a bilateral agreement on asset 

transfer between the GOI and the U.S. government. According to an IRMO official, the 

agreement emphasizes the need to ensure that capital assets produced or improved with 

U.S. government funds are properly transferred to the GOI for its continued use and 

ongoing responsibility pursuant to transfer. It recognizes the unique needs of the 
5 

sovereign government and helps clarify the GOI’s support for the recognition, 

accounting, protection, and sustainability of transferred capital assets. Finally, the 

agreement is designed to address and clarify the current issues faced by the ARTOG. 

This agreement is intended to be signed by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Iraqi 

Prime Minister. IRMO could not provide a completion timeline because it depends on 

input from both the U.S. government participants and the GOI. The absence of this type 

of agreement that includes formal Iraqi participation in the process has impeded U.S. 

government efforts to formally transfer capital assets to the GOI in a timely manner.

USAID’s Transfer Process 

Although USAID is a member of the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group, it 

has chosen not to fully participate in the common asset transfer process. USAID endorses 

and uses steps 1 and 2 of the Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USG-Funded 

Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq: it uses its own rules, policies, and 

procedures to complete each project and hand over control of the asset. However, USAID 

does not support obtaining formal recognition and acceptance of completed assets from 

the Ministry of Finance and relevant line ministries through the ARTOG process. That 

step, USAID maintains, does not ensure that the GOI will sustain the asset. Although the 

ARTOG transfer process provides asset sustainment information to the Ministry of 

Finance, USAID believes that the U.S. government should obtain a formal, binding 

commitment on asset sustainment. If the GOI declines to make such a formal 

commitment, then the U.S. government can explore the option of a nonbinding 

commitment through a memorandum of understanding or similar agreement. At present, 

USAID plans to execute one agreement with each line ministry. The agreement will 

include all projects completed for that ministry and a commitment by the line ministry to 

sustain the completed projects. The agreement includes signature blocks for the line 

minister and the Minister of Finance. 

USAID officials told us that it has a standard procedure used in other countries to 

negotiate a bilateral agreement with the host country before initiating aid projects. The 

agreements spell out the responsibilities of each party, including how the asset will be 

transferred and the host country’s role in supporting and sustaining the project. A 

bilateral agreement was not negotiated in Iraq because there was no Iraqi government in 

the early stages of the reconstruction effort. On September 27, 2006, USAID 

management approved procedures for obtaining formal recognition and a commitment to 

sustain capital assets from the GOI,9

 and a USAID official told us that it plans to begin 

discussions in the near future with individual ministries to obtain their commitments. 

USAID has completed all of its 97 IRRF-funded projects, valued at $1.4 billion; 

however, the GOI has not formally recognized and accepted a single project, as of May 

31, 2007. 

 

9

 See USAID Policy and Procedures for Obtaining Formal Recognition by, and as Necessary, a 

Commitment To Sustain IRRF-Funded Assets From the Government of the Republic of Iraq (GOI), 

enclosure to Action Memo for the Mission Director, September 27, 2006, sub: USAID/Iraq Asset 

Recognition Procedures for IRRF-Funded Assets. 
6 

Progress Transferring Completed Capital 

Projects 

The U.S. government’s progress transferring completed capital projects to the GOI has 

been slow. MNSTC-I, GRD, and USAID have completed 2,797 IRRF-funded projects, 

valued at $5.8 billion, as of May 31, 2007. However, only 1,576 completed projects 

(valued at $2.6 billion) have been transferred to, and formally accepted by, GOI officials 

at the local level. Of those 1,576 projects, only 435 (valued at $501 million) have been 

transferred to, and formally accepted by, GOI officials at the national level. For the status 

of projects transferred to and accepted by local and national government officials as of 

May 31, 2007, see the table below. 

Between April 23, 2006, and June 30, 2006, MNSTC-I and GRD transferred 435 

completed IRRF-funded projects, valued at $501 million, to the GOI through the Ministry 

of Finance. No completed projects have been transferred to the Ministry of Finance since 

June 30, 2006. However, 2,362 (of 2,797) completed projects, valued at $5.3 billion, are 

available for transfer and acceptance at the national level, as of May 31, 2007. Delays in 

transferring completed projects at the national level mean that fewer assets are available 

to the GOI as leverage for loans and could result in additional sustainment expenses for 

the U.S. government agencies that completed the projects. We previously identified 

problems in sustaining completed projects.10 

On May 29, 2007, USAID reported to SIGIR the completion of all of its 97 IRRF-funded 

projects, valued at approximately $1.4 billion. However, USAID does not report projects 

in the same manner as MNSTC-I and GRD: the 97 projects reported as completed include 

multiple facilities or sub-projects. Further, USAID considers all projects transferred to 

and accepted by both local and national level GOI officials, without any signed 

documents that acknowledge acceptance of the projects. USAID considers a project to be 

transferred and accepted once the GOI takes custody and control of the project. None of 

the USAID projects have been formally recognized and accepted by the GOI at the 

national level, as of May 31, 2007. USAID plans to obtain recognition and acceptance of 

its completed projects at the national level by executing one agreement with each line 

ministry. USAID does not have a timeline for accomplishing the national recognition and 

acceptance of its completed projects. 

MNSTC-I, GRD, and USAID have had better success obtaining acknowledgement of 

receipt from local Iraqi representatives. This often involved identifying a local official 

who had some responsibility for managing the project or had played a role in local 

governance and having that individual sign for the project. The process was complicated 

by the inability to identify a local official with the authority to sign for the project, 

missing facility documentation (O&M manuals and as-built drawings), a general 

unwillingness to accept responsibility for the asset, and other factors. Nonetheless, 

 

10Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs (SIGIR-05-022, October 24, 

2005). 
7 

MNSTC-I, GRD, and USAID formally transferred 1,576 projects valued at $2.6 billion to 

local officials.11 

Table—Status of Completed IRFF-funded Construction Projects, as of May 31, 

2007 

Completed Projects

Transferred to and 

Accepted by GOI 

Local Official 

Transferred to and 

Accepted by GOI 

National Official Agency 

Number Valuea Number Valuea Number Valuea

GRD b 1,969 $3,140 1,247 c $1,440 427 e $497 

MNSTC-I b 731 1,224 289 d 376 8 e 4 

GRD/MNSTC-I Total 2,700 $4,364 1,536 $1,816 435 $501 

USAID f

 97 1,405 40 775 0 0 

Grand Total 2,797 $5,769 1,576 $2,591 435 $501 a

 Dollars are expressed in millions. 

b

MNSTC-I and GRD data was obtained from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System on June 13, 2007. c GRD provided transfer documents to local Iraqi authorities for 1,531 projects valued at about $1,537 million but was able 

to obtain document signatures for only 1,247 projects. d

 MNSTC-I provided transfer documents to local Iraqi authorities for 542 projects valued at about $1,046 million but was 

able to obtain document signatures for only 289 projects. 

e A representative of the Iraqi Ministry of Finance signed transfer documents for these projects. 

f USAID considers all of its IRRF-funded infrastructure projects transferred to the GOI. Unlike GRD and MNSTC-I, USAID 

considers a project to be transferred and accepted once the GOI takes custody and control of the project. The basis for 

the 40 projects transferred to GOI local officials are signed DD-1149, Requisition and Invoice/Shipping Documents, in 

which Iraqi officials have accepted materials and equipment used on a project. No formal project recognition and 

acceptance documents had been signed by GOI officials, as of May 31, 2007. 

Delays in asset transfers can have serious ramifications. Generally, completed projects 

are handed over to local Iraqi representatives to occupy, operate, and maintain—whether 

or not they sign a project acceptance document. In USAID’s view, there is no 

requirement for either local or national Iraqi officials to sign documents recognizing the 

transfer of IRRF-funded projects to the GOI. However, USAID acknowledges there are 

valid reasons why the U.S. government should seek the GOI’s formal recognition and 

ownership of transferred projects at the national level—primarily to help ensure that they 

are properly accounted for, protected, and sustained for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 

Delays can also lead to unrecognized GOI budget shortfalls, not only for O&M, but for 

future capital replacement. 

 

11 MNSTC-I and GRD consider the transfer as formal because a document is signed by a local official. 
8 

Follow-up on Open SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR has issued four previous reports, with one recommendation in each report, 

addressing the recognition and transfer of capital assets to the Government of Iraq: 

1. GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR 05-028, January 24, 2006)

2. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR 

06-006, April 29, 2006) 

3. U.S. Agency for International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR 06-007, 

April 29, 2006) 

4. Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR 06-017, July 28, 2006) 

Each report recommended the development of a common policy and process to be used 

by IRMO and its implementing partners that would facilitate the transfer of completed 

IRRF-funded project assets to the GOI. As a result of this recommendation, IRMO, 

USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD participated in the Asset Recognition and Transfer 

Working Group to develop a common capital asset transfer policy and procedure. On 

April 23, 2006, IRMO issued Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USGFunded Capital Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, which sets forth 

uniformly agreed-upon guidance for transferring capital assets. The policy is intended to 

be used by all executing agencies and departments that complete projects in Iraq. 

GRD and MNSTC-I agreed to use the common policy. USAID had concerns about the 

viability of the common policy and opted to use its own formal agreements with 

individual line ministries to accomplish the formal recognition of the transfer of the 

capital assets under its control. 

The common policy and process achieved only limited success in obtaining the formal 

recognition and transfer of IRRF-funded capital assets to the GOI and is currently being 

reassessed by the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group. USAID continues to 

participate in the Working Group while attempting to obtain formal agreements with the 

individual ministries. None of USAID’s IRRF-funded capital assets had been formally 

recognized and accepted by the GOI, as of May 31, 2007. 

All four recommendations remain open. Appendix B addresses the SIGIR 

recommendations for each report and actions taken to date. 
9 

Conclusion and Recommendation 

Conclusion 

Successfully transferring completed IRRF-funded capital projects to a GOI that is 

prepared to accept the assets and provide for their long-term management and use is a 

difficult task that requires close coordination between all the participating U.S. 

government agencies and the GOI. 

IRMO, USAID, MNSTC-I, and GRD recognize the importance of an effective, formal 

capital asset transfer process. Through the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working 

Group, they have been collaborating to develop, improve, and implement policies and 

procedures to achieve that goal. Their collaboration resulted in a common policy and 

process to transfer IRRF-funded capital assets to the GOI that took effect in April 2006. 

As a result of this common policy and process, 435 capital assets valued at $501 million 

were transferred to the GOI through the Ministry of Finance through June 30, 2006. 

However, the transfer process began to falter in May 2006 when a newly elected GOI 

took office. No capital assets have been formally recognized at the national level between 

July 2006 and May 2007. 

Currently, while the U.S. government agencies are reassessing their common asset 

transfer policies and procedures, IRMO is developing a bilateral agreement between the 

United States and Iraq to provide a definitive framework for the asset transfer process. 

The absence of this type of agreement that provides for formal Iraqi participation in the 

process has impeded U.S. government efforts to formally transfer capital assets to the 

GOI in a timely manner. 

Further, without this formal recognition and acceptance by the GOI at the national level, 

the U.S. government cannot be assured that its investment in completed capital projects—

approximately $5.8 billion—is properly accounted for, protected, and sustained. In 

addition, delays can lead to unrecognized GOI budget shortfalls, not only for O&M, but 

also for future capital replacement. In summary, the lack of a bilateral agreement on asset 

transfer may impact the success of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq provide senior-level support to finalize 

a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq on asset transfer to the 

Government of Iraq. 
10 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments from the U.S. Embassy-Iraq on a draft of this report. The 

Embassy concurred with the recommendation. 

We also received written technical comments on the draft of this report from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf 

Region Division. These comments are addressed in the report where applicable. 

In developing the bilateral agreement the lead activity should consider the suggestion 

GRD made in its response to the draft of this report. GRD suggested a provision whereby 

when ministries take longer than 30 days to formally recognize and accept asset transfer, 

that there be a unilateral transfer procedure for completed projects in order to reduce 

delays in transfers. While SIGIR did not fully evaluate the suggestion it appears to be one 

that should be considered. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendations and that technical corrections have been made to this final report as 

applicable. All comments are included in the Management Comments section of this 

report. 
11 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated this study on 

January 23, 2007 (Project 7004), specifically to answer these questions: 

1. Have U.S. agencies involved in IRRF-funded construction projects developed 

adequate procedures for transitioning completed projects to the Government of 

Iraq? 

2. Have there been delays in transitioning projects to the Government of Iraq; if so, 

what have been the cause and impact of those delays? 

3. What is the status of actions taken in responding to implementing prior SIGIR 

recommendations on transition and sustainment? 

The transition process includes three steps: (1) asset recognition and transfer, (2) 

sustainment, and (3) capacity development. This audit focuses on asset recognition and 

transfer. SIGIR is reporting on sustainment and capacity development in separate reviews 

and assessments. 

To determine if agencies involved in IRRF-funded construction projects had developed 

adequate procedures for transferring completed projects to the GOI, we obtained and 

reviewed their formal policies and procedures regarding the recognition and transfer of 

capital assets, including: 

• Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Procedure for the Transfer and 

Recognition of USG-Funded Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, 

April 23, 2006 

• Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Procedure for the Transfer and 

Recognition of USG-Funded Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq,

draft revision provided on March 6, 2007 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division Standard Operating 

Procedure no. CN-118, Final Inspection, Acceptance, and Transfer of 

Construction (Revision 2), February 1, 2006 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, Asset Recognition & 

Transfer Execution Plan, October 2006 

• U.S. Agency for International Development, Policy and Procedures for Obtaining 

Formal Recognition by and, as Necessary, a Commitment To Sustain IRRFFunded Assets From the Government of the Republic of Iraq (GOI), September 

27, 2006 

• Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Construction Execution 

Policy, February 13, 2007 

We interviewed responsible U.S. government officials to answer questions we developed 

arising from our review of the procedures. 
12 

To determine if there have been delays in transferring projects to the GOI and, if so, the 

cause and impact of those delays, we obtained schedules from each U.S. government 

agency showing the number of completed projects and the number of those projects that 

were transferred to the GOI at the local and national levels. We provided a questionnaire 

to officials at each agency requesting reasons for delays in obtaining Iraqi acceptance of 

completed projects. We reviewed the completed questionnaires and interviewed the 

responsible officials to clarify their responses. 

To determine the status of actions taken in responding to implementing prior SIGIR 

recommendations on asset recognition and transfer, we reviewed the previously discussed 

policies and procedures to determine if they met the intent of the recommendations and 

discussed them with the responsible officials. 

We conducted this audit from January through June 2007 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-processed Data

To perform this audit, we used data provided by GRD and MNSTC-I that was obtained 

from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. We did not validate the data but 

recognize that this data is used by management in its own reporting of the number and 

value of projects completed, transferred, and/or awaiting transfer. We did not test any of 

the general and application controls of the automated system utilized. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed applicable reports issued by SIGIR. These reports can be obtained at 

www.sigir.mil: 

• Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs 

(SIGIR-05-022, October 24, 2005)

• GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-05-028, January 24, 2006) 

• Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government 

(SIGIR-06-006, April 29, 2006) 

• U.S. Agency for International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR-06-

007, April 29, 2006) 

• Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-06-017, July 28, 2006)
13 

Appendix B—Summary of Open SIGIR 

Recommendations 

SIGIR issued four asset transfer reports between October 2005 and July 2006, each with 

one recommendation, on the transfer of completed IRRF-funded capital assets to the 

Government of Iraq (GOI): 

GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR 05-028, January 24, 2006)

This audit report discusses GRD’s management of the transfer of IRRF-funded assets to 

the GOI. The audit determined that GRD policies and procedures were geared toward 

asset transfer to GOI representatives at the local level and did not address the information 

needs of the Iraqi ministries responsible for planning the integration and sustainment of 

completed projects. 

Recommendation: The Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, direct the GRD-PCO, in coordination with the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, to complete the development of common policy 

and process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Government of 

Iraq. That process should, at a minimum, provide formal notification of the project 

asset transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and the 

appropriate operating ministry central headquarters (Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, 

Education, Transportation, Roads, Communications, Justice, Interior and Defense). 

Notification should also include, at a minimum, relevant data such as operation start 

date, asset cost, estimated short-term and long-term sustainability costs, terms of 

warranties, and the location of maintenance and systems manuals and instructions. 

Action taken: GRD concurred with the recommendation. It recognized the need for 

formal asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures and participated in the 

Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group to develop a common policy and 

process to facilitate the legal, financial, and logistical transfer of assets to the GOI. On 

April 23, 2006, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office issued a procedure 

developed by the Working Group for transferring U.S.-built assets to the GOI. The 

“Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USG (U.S. government)-Funded 

Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq” set forth uniformly agreed-upon 

guidance for use by all executing agencies and departments that complete projects in 

Iraq for transferring capital assets. However, these procedures are currently being 

revised by the working group. 

Status: Open, actions underway. 
14 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer of 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR 06-006, 

April 29, 2006)

This audit report discusses MNSTC-I’s management of the transfer of completed 

reconstruction projects to the GOI. The audit determined that MNSTC-I had developed 

an adequate process for transferring defense-related assets to the Ministry of Defense, but 

a lack of capability in the Ministry of Interior was impeding the transfer of police-related 

assets. In addition, MNSTC-I was working, in conjunction with IRMO, to complete the 

development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of completed 

projects to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning and Development. 

Recommendation: The Commanding General, MNSTC-I, continue to support the 

evolving policies and procedures for transferring completed projects to the Iraqi 

Ministries of Finance and Planning and, once those procedures are finalized, ensure 

sufficient resources are made available to fully implement the procedures in sufficient 

time that the information can be used by the Iraqi government in formulating its 

calendar year 2007 budget. 

Action taken: MNSTC-I concurred with the recommendation. It recognized the need 

for formal asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures and participated in 

the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group to develop a common policy and 

process to facilitate the legal, financial, and logistical transfer of assets to the GOI. On 

April 23, 2006, IRMO issued Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of USGFunded Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, which set forth uniformly 

agreed-upon guidance for use by all executing agencies and departments that 

complete projects in Iraq for transferring capital assets. However, relatively few 

projects have been transferred using this guidance. The Asset Recognition and 

Transfer Working Group is in the process of revising the document. 

Status: Open, actions underway. 

U.S. Agency for International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR 06-007, April 29, 

2006)

This audit report discusses USAID’s management of the transfer of completed 

reconstruction projects to the GOI. 

Recommendation: The USAID Mission Director-Iraq, in coordination with IRMO, 

complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of 

completed project assets to the Iraqi government. That process should, at a minimum, 

provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of 

Finance, Ministry of Planning, and the appropriate operating ministry central 

headquarters (Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, Education, Transportation, Roads, 
15 

Communications, Justice, Interior and Defense). Notification of completed assets 

should also include, at a minimum, relevant data, such as operation start date, asset 

cost, estimated near and long-term sustainability costs, terms of warranties, and the 

location of maintenance and systems manuals and instructions. 

Action taken. USAID did not concur with the recommendation. Although USAID 

worked with the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group to develop a 

common asset transfer policy and process, it did not use the final procedure as 

developed. USAID maintained that the procedure failed to ensure that a key objective 

of the asset transfer and recognition process will be met—the GOI’s sustainment of 

U.S. government-funded capital assets. Although the established process provides 

asset sustainment information to the Ministry of Finance, USAID believes that the 

U.S. government should obtain a formal, binding commitment from the GOI to 

sustain U.S. government-funded capital assets. If the GOI declines to make such a 

formal commitment, the U.S. government can explore the option of a nonbinding 

commitment through a memorandum of understanding or similar agreement. 

Procedures to obtain formal recognition and a commitment to sustain capital assets 

from the GOI were approved by USAID management on September 27, 2006. 

USAID plans to execute one agreement with each line ministry. The agreement will 

include all projects completed for that ministry and a commitment by the line 

ministry to sustain the completed projects. The agreement includes signature blocks 

for the line minister and the minister of finance. USAID told us it plans to begin 

discussions in the near future with individual ministries to obtain their commitments. 

USAID also continues to participate in the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working 

Group. 

Status: Open, actions underway. 

Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government

(SIGIR 06-017, July 28, 2006)

This report discusses the transition of completed projects funded by the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund. It looked at three planning steps in the transition process: (1) asset 

recognition and transfer, (2) sustainment, and (3) capacity development. 

 

Recommendation. The IRMO Director develop a single, uniform process for asset 

recognition and transfer of all completed projects to the Iraqi government. This 

process should be followed by all of the IRRF-implementing agencies, and sufficient 

resources should be made available to implement the process in time for the Iraqi 

government’s use in budget planning. 

Action taken. On April 23, 2006, IRMO issued Procedure for the Transfer and 

Recognition of USG-Funded Assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, which 

set forth uniformly agreed-upon guidance for use by all executing agencies and 

departments that complete projects in Iraq for transferring capital assets. However, 
16 

relatively few projects have been transferred using this guidance, and the Asset 

Recognition and Transfer Working Group is in the process of revising the document. 

In addition to reassessing the current transfer policies and procedures, IRMO, in 

coordination with members of the Asset Recognition Transfer and Working Group, is 

developing a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq that addresses 

this issue. 

Status: Open, actions underway. 
17 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

ARTOG Asset Recognition and Transfer Operations Group 

GOI Government of Iraq 

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

U.S. United States 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
18 

Appendix D—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for 

International Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office* 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development* 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Regional Inspector General-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International 

Security Affairs 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division* 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq* 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

*Recipient of the draft audit report 
19 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic 

Affairs, and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and 

Human Rights 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal 

Services, and International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 
20 

Appendix E—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Karen D. Bell 

Ronald J. Bonfilio 

Glenn D. Furbish 

Robert B. Gabriel 

Clifton E. Spruill 
21 

Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 
22 

Management Comments 

Mission-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) 
23 

Management Comments 

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
24 
25 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Denise Burgess 

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil