GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee 

on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

May 1999 SATELLITE 

CONTROL SYSTEMS

Opportunity for 

DOD to Implement 

Space Policy and 

Integrate Capabilities

GAO/NSIAD-99-81

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280224 Letter

May 17, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As requested, we (1) reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

progress in integrating and improving its satellite control capabilities and in 

fostering integrated and interoperable satellite control within the 

government, as directed by the 1996 national space policy and 

(2) determined whether opportunities exist for DOD to standardize its 

satellite control capabilities by using commercial products and practices.

Results in Brief DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and improving its satellite 

control capabilities in accordance with 1996 national space policy. In 1992, 

DOD identified a need for an integrated satellite control system to achieve 

standardization and interoperability across military services and individual 

satellite programs.1

 In 1995, the Air Force, which controls most of DOD’s 

satellites, characterized its satellite control capabilities as aging, 

inefficient, and costly to operate. The Air Force initiated an effort to 

standardize these capabilities and achieve full implementation in 2003—a 

first step toward an integrated and interoperable DOD capability. Air Force 

officials chose to proceed with a conceptual design over operational 

alternatives. However, in 1997, the Air Force terminated this effort because 

of schedule delays resulting from software development problems and the 

additional amount of software that needed to be written. Air Force Space 

Command representatives are now recommending that the use of the Air 

Force’s existing satellite control capabilities be extended to 2005 to provide 

time to acquire an improved capability. Until then, the Air Force will be 

unable to reduce approximately $400 million it spends annually to operate, 

1

In this context, standardization means cooperation among agencies for efficient use of resources and 

for the adoption of common, compatible, or interchangeable components or equipment. 

Interoperability means the ability of systems to provide services to, and accept services from, other 

systems and to use the services so exchanged to enable the systems to operate effectively together.

Letr
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maintain, sustain, and modernize satellite control capabilities. The Navy’s 

satellite control capabilities are not as old, inefficient, or costly to operate 

as the Air Force’s capabilities. Although the Navy upgraded its capabilities 

in the early 1990s, another upgrade is planned because the company that 

provided the existing capabilities no longer provides software support 

services.

DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable 

satellite control for all government space activities since it was directed to 

do so by the 1996 national space policy. Prior studies recommended that a 

high-level interagency management group be established to oversee 

implementation of integrated systems across agency lines. Although DOD 

established a senior steering group in 1998 to address national security 

space management and integration issues, government space agencies 

continue to plan for satellite control capabilities on an independent basis 

rather than coordinate and integrate their efforts on an interagency basis.

Considering the long-standing need to replace the Air Force’s aging and 

costly satellite control capabilities and the Navy’s more recent plan to 

upgrade its capabilities, DOD has an opportunity to revitalize its effort to 

achieve integrated satellite control by acquiring a standardized capability. A 

resumed search for such a capability is appropriate because it would also 

provide an opportunity to review Air Force satellite control decisions for 

future space-based infrared and communication satellite programs that are 

currently in development. Commercial off-the-shelf products that could 

perform core functions for controlling satellites are available, and several 

studies have advocated the use of such products. In making a selection 

among alternatives, DOD could reduce acquisition risk by employing best 

commercial practices—a key element of DOD’s acquisition reform 

initiatives. Commercial firms place a premium on demonstrated 

performance before making critical decisions rather than on predicted 

performance, as was the case with the Air Force’s 1995 selection.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take actions to 

revitalize efforts to (1) integrate and improve DOD’s satellite control 

capabilities, using commercial products and practices and (2) foster 

integration and interoperability of satellite control among government 

space activities.

Background Satellite control systems are used to ensure that satellites reach their 

planned orbits and perform their intended missions while in orbit. There 
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are two types of satellite control operations—platform control and payload 

control. Platform controls involves monitoring the health and status and 

managing the operations of a satellite’s physical structure, sometimes 

called the bus. Payload controls involves monitoring the health and status 

and managing the operations of a satellite’s mission equipment. Specific 

satellite control functions consist of (1) locating satellites and receiving 

and processing data from them, (2) following satellites’ motion over time, 

and (3) transmitting signals to satellites. These three functions are called 

telemetry, tracking, and commanding and are performed by a network of 

ground command and control centers, ground antennas, and 

communication capabilities between the centers, antennas, and satellites.2

There are two types of satellite control networks—common and 

dedicated.3

 DOD operates two common networks that provide primary or 

backup control for communications, environmental monitoring, 

navigation, and intelligence satellites. Examples include the Defense 

Satellite Communications System, Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program, and Global Positioning System. DOD also operates several 

dedicated networks that control missile warning, communications, and 

intelligence missions. Examples include the Defense Support Program and 

Milstar Communications System. 

The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is the larger of the two 

common networks. It supports essentially all national security (defense 

and intelligence) satellites during launch and early orbit periods and is used 

to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites. For certain satellite 

constellations, AFSCN provides essentially all the routine control functions 

needed throughout the satellite systems’ lifetime. AFSCN capabilities 

consist of two command and control centers located at Schriever Air Force 

Base, Colorado, and Onizuka Air Force Base, California; antennas 

dispersed throughout the world; and associated communications 

capabilities.

2In this report, we focused on computer systems used at command and control centers to perform 

satellite control functions.

3

A common network generally performs platform control for multiple satellite constellations, allowing 

its ground antennas and core data processing capabilities to be shared among many satellites and 

therefore reducing costs. Some unique data processing capabilities, however, may be needed for a 

particular satellite system. A dedicated network generally performs platform and payload control for 

one satellite constellation; thus no sharing of its capabilities with other satellite constellations takes 

place. Some reasons for dedicated networks are: (1) continuous contact must be maintained with 

certain satellites and (2) special radio frequencies or high data rates are sometimes used.
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The Naval Satellite Control Network (NSCN)—the smaller of the two 

common networks—controls different satellite constellations. NSCN is to 

undertake increasing responsibilities in 1999 because the control functions 

for a constellation of communication satellites are to be transferred from 

AFSCN to NSCN. NSCN capabilities consist of a primary command and 

control center at Point Mugu, California, with backup capabilities in 

Colorado and Maine; antennas in Guam, California, and Maine; and 

associated communication capabilities.

In a May 1996 report, we discussed opportunities for (1) standardization 

and interoperability among government satellite control networks and 

(2) cost savings and greater efficiencies through network consolidation. 

The three government space sectors—defense, intelligence and civil—were 

operating separate satellite control networks to satisfy their individual 

satellite program needs. These sectors were spending several hundred 

million dollars a year to control their satellites or missions, were planning 

on upgrading their satellite control systems during the next 5 years, and did 

not have the necessary impetus or direction for more efficient use of the 

nation’s satellite control resources. As a result, we recommended that a 

national policy be developed to direct integration, consolidation, and 

sharing, to the extent feasible, of the nation’s satellite control capabilities.4

In September 1996, the administration established a new national space 

policy that included directions for DOD to (1) pursue integrated satellite 

control and continue to enhance the robustness of its satellite control 

capability and (2) coordinate with other departments and agencies, as 

appropriate, to foster the integration and interoperability of satellite 

control for all government space activities.

DOD Has Not 

Effectively 

Implemented Policy 

Guidelines for Satellite 

Control

DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and improving its satellite 

control capabilities in accordance with 1996 national space policy. 

Although the Air Force and Navy have merged some of their capabilities, 

the Air Force was unsuccessful in acquiring a standardized satellite control 

system. Also, DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and 

interoperable satellite control for all government space activities, as the 

1996 policy directed. 

4

Satellite Control Capabilities: National Policy Could Help Consolidation and Cost Savings

(GAO/NSIAD-96-77, May 2, 1996).
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Minimal Progress to 

Integrate and Improve DOD 

Capabilities

Before the 1996 national space policy was established, DOD identified a 

need for an integrated satellite control system, and the Air Force initiated 

an effort to replace its satellite control capabilities with a standardized 

satellite control system (SSCS). However, the Air Force’s effort was 

unsuccessful because of system development problems, and as a 

consequence the Air Force has continued with the costly, aging, and 

inefficient existing system for some satellite programs while seeking 

individual solutions for others. Several government satellite control studies 

have been performed that contain a common approach: integrate and 

upgrade satellite control capabilities to achieve efficiencies and 

economies. The Air Force is currently reviewing approaches to revitalize 

its effort for a satellite control solution.

DOD has made some progress as a result of older studies, which 

recommended that the Air Force and the Navy merge their satellite control 

networks. The two services established a communications link between 

the main Air Force satellite operations center and the Navy satellite 

operations center, allowing the two services to gain access to each other’s 

satellite control antennas. Sharing antennas has allowed the Navy to close 

one antenna site, and there is the potential for closing another site, thus 

reducing costs. However, the two networks are not interoperable because 

they cannot control each other’s satellites or back up each other’s 

capabilities. Therefore, relative to study recommendations, the effort can 

only be characterized as minimal.

Control Systems Lack Necessary 

Capabilities and Need Upgrading 

In 1992, the U.S. Space Command—the military command responsible for 

DOD’s space operations—identified a need for an integrated satellite 

control system because of several existing system deficiencies. The 

Command described the existing satellite infrastructure as fragmented, 

fragile, vulnerable, and lacking standardization and interoperability. In 

1994, the Air Force Space Command—the military command that operates 

AFSCN and provides space support for the majority of DOD’s satellites—

identified the need for improved satellite control capabilities. The 

Command cited aging equipment, manpower and funding reductions, 

future satellite system requirements, and technological opportunities as 

reasons for needed network upgrades, stating that its network must 

become more responsive, standardized, and interoperable; easily 

expandable; and economical to operate and maintain. In 1995, the Air 

Force established operational requirements for new satellite control 

capabilities with the objective of maximizing the use of industry standards 

and commercial or government off-the-shelf hardware, software, and 
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communications if they reduce acquisition timelines and operations and 

maintenance costs.5

The existing AFSCN’s command and control capabilities were designed in 

the early 1980s and include a centralized mainframe computer system, in 

contrast to a modern distributed workstation design. According to Air 

Force documentation, much of the software was written in old, 

customized, and proprietary languages that resulted in (1) lack of 

standardization and interoperability, (2) increasing operations and 

maintenance costs, and (3) difficulties in responding to system requirement 

changes or accommodating new systems. The Air Force budgets over 

$400 million annually for AFSCN operations, maintenance, sustainment, 

and modernization. It programmed $2.2 billion for these purposes for fiscal 

years 1999-2003. Currently, the engineering sustainment contract is 

scheduled to expire in October 2003, and it is unclear whether the network 

can be sustained beyond that point.6

 The sustainment contractor reported 

that there is moderate to high risk that several pieces of system hardware 

may not be supportable beyond 2003 because (1) critical parts can no 

longer be procured, (2) equivalent replacement parts have not been 

identified, or (3) capability to repair the parts no longer exists. Some Air 

Force representatives, however, are more optimistic that sustainment 

could be continued if necessary.

The existing NSCN is a distributed command and control system that was 

designed in the early 1990s. The Navy budgets about $19 million annually to 

operate, maintain, sustain, and modernize the NSCN. It programmed 

$95 million for these purposes for fiscal years 1999-2003. The Navy is 

planning to upgrade NSCN because the company that provided the existing 

computers is no longer providing associated software support services. 

Navy representatives informed us that they plan to begin evaluating system 

alternatives in fiscal year 2001 and complete the replacement of NSCN’s 

data processing capabilities in fiscal year 2003.

Air Force Effort to Standardize 

Capabilities Was Unsuccessful

In 1995, the Air Force initiated an effort to replace the AFSCN’s command 

and control capabilities with SSCS and achieve full implementation in fiscal 

5In this report, the terms commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf mean products 

developed and produced for general and government use, respectively, that have applicability to, and 

use for, satellite control systems without major modification or change.

6

Engineering sustainment involves design and planning for replacement, or continued supply, of parts 

needed to prolong a system’s ability to perform its mission.
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year 2003. The purpose was to establish a standard and interoperable 

satellite control system for multiple DOD satellite programs that was more 

responsive, dependable, and cost-effective than the existing system. 

Following an initial screening of several candidate systems that were to 

serve as a basis for SSCS, four were selected for detailed evaluation. They 

were (1) the Distributed Command and Control System (DCCS)—a 

conceptual system being developed for the National Reconnaissance 

Office; (2) Commercial Off-the-Shelf—Based Research Architecture 

(COBRA)—a system being used by the Air Force to control research and 

development satellites; (3) OS/Comet—a system being used by the Naval 

Research Laboratory; and (4) the Shuttle Mission Control System—a 

capability being used by the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA). None of the four systems satisfied all 

requirements; therefore, modifications would have been necessary for any 

system chosen.

The Air Force selected DCCS as the baseline system, concluding that this 

developmental design (1) would provide the best architecture and 

functional capabilities, (2) would provide a core software system 

standardized over a broader group of satellite systems, and (3) would 

require less modification than the other candidate systems. However, 

according to Air Force officials involved in the evaluation process, less was 

known about DCCS than the other candidates. For example, DCCS had not 

passed its critical design review—a key point in the acquisition of a system 

to assess design maturity—whereas the other three candidates were 

operational.

The DCCS design subsequently encountered development problems, 

requiring design changes and resulting in schedule delays. The design 

changes (1) fundamentally altered the DCCS architecture, restricting the 

hardware that could be used and (2) substantially increased the lines of 

software code that Air Force officials estimated would have to be 

developed to derive SSCS. Because of these system development problems, 

Air Force officials concluded that DCCS would not meet Air Force needs or 

schedule. In October 1997, the Air Force terminated its SSCS effort.

By choosing DCCS instead of an operational system about which it had 

more knowledge, the Air Force took a significant risk and was ultimately 

left without a standardized satellite control capability. This choice appears 

inconsistent with the Air Force’s 1995 requirements calling for maximum 

use of off-the-shelf technology. It also runs counter to the practice of 

leading commercial firms, which want proof that a technological concept 
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will work and can be delivered on schedule. Thus, the Air Force’s choice to 

proceed with this developmental design would have likely presented too 

high a risk for a commercial firm.7

Consequences of No 

Standardized Capabilities

More than 1 year after the Air Force terminated its SSCS effort, no renewed 

effort had been formally initiated. As a consequence, AFSCN command and 

control operations, which the Air Force has described as costly and 

manpower-intensive, may need to be extended to support existing satellite 

programs. Also, managers for the future Space-Based Infrared System 

(SBIRS), who planned to use SSCS, had to continue implementing an 

individualized satellite control solution.

Almost all national security satellites are dependent on AFSCN to reach 

their intended orbit, and several existing satellite programs such as the 

Defense Satellite Communications System are dependent on AFSCN for 

routine satellite control functions. Therefore, until the Air Force replaces 

the AFSCN’s command and control capabilities with a less costly, 

standardized capability, it will be unable to reduce approximately 

$400 million it spends annually to operate, maintain, sustain, and 

modernize AFSCN. Replacing these capabilities is intended to reduce 

operations, maintenance, and sustainment costs. Air Force Space 

Command representatives informed us they were recommending that a 

contract be awarded in fiscal year 2001 to replace the command and 

control capabilities in fiscal year 2005. This would be 2 years later than the 

original plan to achieve full implementation of SSCS. At the end of our 

review, formal approval and budgeting for this recommendation had not yet 

occurred.

Air Force managers of SBIRS—a satellite system being developed to 

replace an older satellite system to provide strategic and theater ballistic 

missile warning and defense capability—had planned to use SSCS, when it 

became available, as the system’s core satellite control capability. Because 

SSCS was not expected to be available for the first phase of the program, 

Air Force managers made plans to use a satellite control system called 

SCS-21 that was being developed by the SBIRS prime contractor. They 

planned to transition to SSCS for the second phase. However, when the 

SSCS effort was terminated, the managers chose a commercial off-the-shelf 

version of SCS-21 that was also being provided by the SBIRS prime 

7

See Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD’s 

Environment (GAO/NSIAD-98-56, Feb. 24, 1998).
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contractor. According to program representatives, the SCS-21 core 

software will provide many, but not all, the satellite control functions 

needed by the SBIRS program. Capabilities to address the extra functions 

are being added to the core software, but no changes are being made that 

would affect the commercial off-the-shelf properties of the core software. 

Although this is an individualized satellite control solution, maintaining 

these commercial properties should make subsequent versions of the 

commercially available SCS-21 core software easy to install.

Several Studies Have Been 

Performed, but a Solution Is Not 

Yet Available

Prior to the 1996 national space policy, DOD led or participated in several 

studies that discussed intra-agency and interagency satellite control 

capabilities. These studies contained a common approach: integrate and 

upgrade satellite control capabilities to achieve efficiencies and 

economies. We discussed portions of four different studies in our May 1996 

report. Since the 1996 national space policy was established, DOD 

components have performed several other studies that address satellite 

control. However, they were all long-range studies, and at the end of our 

review in April 1999, no decisions or implementing actions had been taken 

on them. We discuss three examples below.

• In December 1997, the DOD Space Architect completed a satellite 

operations study to develop architecture alternatives for the 2010-2015 

time frame in support of defense, intelligence, and civil space sector 

needs. The draft report included alternative assessments that both 

emphasized and de-emphasized interoperability. It stated that the lack of 

satellite operations standardization prevents resource sharing and 

interoperability within and between federal agencies and the 

commercial and international community. Although the draft report 

stated that increased interoperability was beneficial, it also stated that 

analytical attempts to quantify the value of interoperability in terms of 

cost and performance were inconclusive. In addition, the draft report 

discussed various ways of using commercial products and services for 

satellite operations, including advantages—cost savings, increased 

performance, and government personnel reductions—and 

disadvantages—market dependency and proprietary interest. At the end 

of our review in April 1999, the Architect’s final report had not been 

released.

• In March 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-range plan, 

which represented a guide for achieving the Command’s vision of how 

military space strategy would evolve in the 21st century, specifically to 

2020. The Command stated that because the operational techniques of 

many military satellites closely parallel those of commercial systems, 
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private industry may be able to operate military systems for less money 

and military personnel could be transferred from satellite operations 

functions to core military functions. In commenting on a draft of our 

report, DOD officials stated that although it may be feasible for private 

industry to operate military satellites, the effect on national security has 

not been addressed.

• In November 1998, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board issued a 

report titled, “A Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force,” 

which included an assessment of satellite operations. One of the report’s 

findings was that commercial satellite ground operations are far less 

people-intensive and far more efficient overall than military systems, 

representing an important potential source of savings. In elaborating, 

the report stated that existing military satellite operations were costly, 

mostly proprietary, user unfriendly, increasingly difficult to support, and 

difficult to upgrade. The report recommended that (1) opportunities be 

evaluated to make selective investments in commercial off-the-shelf 

software packages for legacy satellite systems and (2) best commercial 

practices be used to acquire future satellite control systems.

Given the consequences of terminating SSCS, Air Force Space Command 

representatives are reviewing alternative approaches to acquire modern 

satellite control capabilities. Specifically, they are (1) looking for an 

approach to replace existing capabilities by 2005, (2) proposing to sustain 

existing capabilities beyond the sustainment contract expiration date of 

October 2003 until the replacement is available in fiscal year 2005, and 

(3) attempting to identify viable options to accelerate replacement of 

existing capabilities to fiscal year 2003. No decisions had been made on 

these matters at the end of our review in April 1999, and the Air Force was 

no closer to identifying and implementing a standardized and interoperable 

satellite control system than it was in 1995.

Limited Action to Foster 

Integrated and 

Interoperable Government 

Satellite Control

DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable 

satellite control for all government space activities, as directed by the 1996 

national space policy. Representatives within the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy informed us 

that no formal coordination of such satellite control matters had taken 

place. In July 1998, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence established revised procedures for the management of national 

security (defense and intelligence) space programs and activities. In 

commenting on a draft of our report, DOD acknowledged that greater 

effort should be applied toward satellite control integration and 
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interoperability and anticipated placing greater emphasis during the years 

2000 to 2005. However, DOD commented that similar commitment must be 

made by other government agencies involved in space activities to achieve 

success.

Prior studies recommended that a high-level interagency management 

group be established to oversee implementation of integrated systems 

across agency lines. We made a similar recommendation in our May 1996 

report. The revised national security management procedures for space 

included establishing a National Security Space Senior Steering Group to 

address space management and integration issues. However, government 

space agencies continue to plan for satellite control capabilities on an 

independent basis rather than coordinate and integrate their capabilities on 

an interagency basis. For example, NASA recently contracted to 

consolidate its space operations, including satellite control, at several 

research centers with the long-term objective of increasing operational 

effectiveness and efficiencies at reduced costs. According to NASA 

officials, other agencies were not involved in the process of assessing 

alternatives to achieving consolidated space operations at NASA’s centers, 

although other agencies, including DOD, have expressed interest in NASA’s 

activities.

Integrating satellite control capabilities on an interagency basis is feasible. 

For example, under a separate national policy established in 1994, the 

President directed convergence of DOD’s meteorological satellite system 

and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration’s (NOAA) environmental satellite system. NOAA provides 

the primary satellite operations capability at its control center in Suitland, 

Maryland, for both satellite systems. DOD provides backup satellite 

operations capability for its system at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials emphasized that this 

satellite system convergence constituted significant action to foster 

integrated and interoperable satellite control and has achieved certain 

monetary advantages. However, they claimed that integrating the 

operations of these systems has resulted in unclear lines of authority, less 

timely military decision-making, and increased coordination requirements, 

thus complicating military space planning. Such integrated operations may 

require government agencies to revise their procedures and practices, but 

should afford them an opportunity to achieve significant cost savings.
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DOD Has an 

Opportunity to 

Revitalize Integrated 

Satellite Control Effort

DOD has an opportunity to integrate Air Force and Navy satellite control 

networks by revitalizing the effort to acquire a standardized satellite 

control capability. Such an effort would be timely, considering the Air 

Force’s need and the Navy’s plans to replace each of their satellite control 

capabilities by 2003. Commercial off-the-shelf products that perform core 

satellite control functions and that have a demonstrated record of 

performance are available. Several satellite control studies have advocated 

the use of such products.

Resumed Search for 

Standard Core Capability Is 

Timely

The Air Force has an opportunity to resume its search for a standard 

satellite control system. The unsuccessful attempt to replace its existing 

capabilities with SSCS merely prolonged the retention of an aging and 

costly system. The Air Force could consider introducing a replacement 

capability in 2003, when the existing engineering sustainment contract 

expires.

Also, now is an opportune time to review the SBIRS satellite control 

decision made in 1997. Based on a fiscal year 2000 budget decision, DOD 

plans to delay the first launch of SBIRS by 2 years—from 2002 to 2004. 

Although the SCS-21 system may still be suitable for SBIRS, the planned 

program delay has reduced the urgency of making a final satellite control 

choice. It has also created an opportunity to consider other alternatives 

that may have wider application for DOD satellites.

A decision needs to be made about what satellite control capabilities to use 

for two future DOD communication satellite systems—the Gapfiller Super 

High Frequency and Advanced Extremely High Frequency. DOD expects to 

begin acquiring these satellite systems during the fiscal year 2001 time 

frame. If a standardized satellite control system is not selected in time to 

accommodate these satellites, the Air Force may be placed in a position of 

having to (1) modify its existing capabilities or (2) acquire individual 

satellite control solutions. Both choices would be undesirable.

Commercial Products Could 

Provide Core Capability

As discussed in the previous section, several studies over the years have 

advocated the use of commercial products to provide standard core 

capability for satellite control functions. Most of these studies have 

recognized that the government does not perform such unique satellite 

control functions that commercial products could not satisfy requirements. 

The most recent of these studies, by the Air Force Scientific Advisory 
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Board, claimed that selective use of commercial off-the-shelf products 

could have big payoffs. The Air Force is currently acquiring different 

commercial satellite control packages for the Global Positioning System 

and SBIRS. Although these and other alternatives are available, the Air 

Force is not currently considering them to satisfy multiple satellite control 

requirements. We discuss four examples below.

• One alternative system is COBRA, which was developed by an Air Force 

Space and Missile Center research office as a low-cost means of 

controlling research satellites. The COBRA system consists of multiple 

commercial off-the-shelf products integrated to form a whole satellite 

control capability. It was designed to control different types of 

satellites—a distinct advantage when searching for a standardized 

system to support multiple types of national security satellites. 

According to Center representatives, COBRA has been used to control 

three different research satellites and is to be used to control others. It 

also has demonstrated some capability to control DOD operational 

satellites such as the Milstar communication system and is currently 

controlling nonoperational Defense Support Program and Defense 

Satellite Communication System satellites. An earlier version of COBRA 

was not chosen as SSCS because the Air Force believed that more 

software modification would have been required than with the DCCS 

candidate.

• A second alternative is a system called OS/Comet, which is a 

commercial off-the-shelf product that the Air Force is currently 

acquiring to provide core satellite control capability for the Global 

Positioning System. To accommodate the unique characteristics of the 

satellite system, capabilities are being added to work with OS/Comet but 

no modifications are being made to the OS/Comet software. OS/Comet 

was developed to control satellite systems at the Naval Research 

Laboratory’s Blossom Point Tracking Facility, where it is still being used. 

It is now being made available by the development contractor as a 

commercial off-the-shelf product. Like the COBRA system, OS/Comet 

was a candidate for SSCS but was not chosen because the Air Force 

believed that more software modification would have been required 

than with the DCCS candidate. However, as an indicator of OS/Comet’s 

value, the Iridium company selected the system to control its 

constellation of 66 commercial communication satellites.

• A third alternative is a system called SCS-21, which the Air Force is 

currently acquiring to control SBIRS satellites. Similar to the COBRA 

system, SCS-21 includes commercial off-the-shelf products integrated 

into a package to provide core satellite control capabilities. The SBIRS 
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contractor is adding capabilities to accommodate the unique 

characteristics of the satellite system, but no modifications are being 

made to the SCS-21 software. NASA representatives told us that they 

plan to use SCS-21 under a consolidated space operations contract as 

the core satellite control software at several research center, including 

Goddard Space Flight Center, which controls numerous scientific 

satellites.

• Although we did not perform an exhaustive search, nor do we endorse 

any specific commercial product, other commercial satellite control 

systems are available. One such standard system is Epoch 2000. 

According to the developer, this off-the-shelf system was developed 

through the experience in designing and implementing special control 

systems for NASA’s scientific satellites and NOAA’s environmental 

satellites. It is a modern, distributed software system that can be used 

with many commercial hardware architectures and is being used to 

control a variety of commercial communications satellites and 

government scientific and resource monitoring satellites. The developer 

told us that the functions performed by satellite control systems are not 

substantially different among different satellite systems. Air Force 

Space Command representatives told us that several private firms have 

offered to demonstrate their commercial satellite control products.

Best Commercial Practices 

Could Reduce Acquisition 

Risk 

As discussed above, in its effort to acquire SSCS, the Air Force selected a 

conceptual system as a baseline, which had not passed its critical design 

review and for which little was known, and ultimately encountered 

development problems. Three other candidate systems were operational 

but were not chosen. This approach is not consistent with best commercial 

practices, in which a premium would have been placed on demonstrated 

performance when selecting a product to be acquired. Instead, the Air 

Force selected a product according to the product’s predicted performance 

rather than its known performance.

In our February 1998 report, we noted that early in system development, 

leading commercial firms gained more knowledge than DOD about how 

well a prospective system would satisfy performance, cost, and schedule 

requirements. This is because commercial firms essentially complete the 

discovery process, accumulating knowledge and eliminating unknowns 

about the system before major milestones such as critical design review are 

passed. The first step—ensuring that technology is sufficiently obtainable 

to warrant starting the program—is critical. DOD often accepts more 
B-280224

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

unknowns in its programs than commercial firms and understates the risks 

associated with these unknowns.

Conclusions DOD has not effectively implemented the guidelines for satellite control as 

set forth in the 1996 national space policy. DOD needs to integrate its 

satellite control capabilities to reduce costs and inefficiencies. This could 

be done through standardization and interoperability. Considering the Air 

Force’s need and the Navy’s plan to upgrade their satellite control 

capabilities, now is an opportune time for DOD to consolidate these 

individual efforts to achieve an integrated approach. A sound plan toward 

this end would consider using commercially available products and making 

a selection based on best commercial practices employed by leading firms 

to reduce acquisition risk.

DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable 

satellite control for all government space activities. Under 1996 national 

space policy guidelines, DOD is obligated to coordinate with other 

departments and agencies, as appropriate, regarding integration and 

interoperability of satellite control. DOD’s recently established National 

Security Space Senior Steering Group could be a useful mechanism for 

guiding and overseeing such integration and interoperability. However, the 

Senior Steering Group’s effectiveness at fostering interagency satellite 

control integration and interoperability has yet to be demonstrated. It 

would be timely for the Senior Steering Group to determine whether DOD’s 

plans to replace its satellite control capabilities could be integrated with 

NASA’s efforts to consolidate its satellite control operations. 

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the 

Air Force and the Navy to (1) consolidate their plans to replace existing Air 

Force and Navy satellite control capabilities and (2) consider using 

commercial off-the-shelf satellite control products and best commercial 

practices in making a selection among alternative systems to satisfy core 

satellite control requirements, thus limiting the need for unique 

capabilities. We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Controller/Chief Financial Officer); and the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to 

only consider funding requests for such replacement efforts that make 
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Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

maximum use of commercial products and practices to achieve integrated 

satellite control capabilities within DOD.

We further recommend that, in consonance with the development of DOD’s 

plans to replace its satellite control capabilities, the Secretary take the lead 

in ensuring that the National Security Space Senior Steering Group serves 

as the forum for fostering and overseeing the integration and 

interoperability of satellite control for all government space activities in 

accordance with 1996 national space policy guidelines.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that more 

integrated satellite activity should take place within DOD as well as across 

defense, civil, and commercial space sectors. It stated that integrated 

operations can lead to increased standardization, resulting in lower 

satellite acquisition and operation costs. However, DOD pointed out that 

such integration pursued primarily for the benefit of monetary savings has 

the potential of limiting the ability of military forces to effectively carry out 

their assigned missions. DOD officials emphasized the need to ensure 

military control over such satellite integration. We agree that both cost 

savings and the necessary military control are important and recognize that 

integrated operations present new management challenges.

DOD commented that our draft report made several accurate observations 

of recent and ongoing DOD satellite control planning and operational 

activities but did not properly highlight some significant strides or realistic 

obstacles. For example, DOD mentioned (1) the termination of fractured 

and duplicative operations of communications satellites by the Air Force 

and Navy and (2) satellite control compliant efforts, specifically the 

convergence of DOD’s meteorological and the Department of Commerce’s 

environmental satellites that was initiated prior to the establishment of the 

1996 national space policy. These actions are discussed in the report.

DOD emphasized that fiscal realities cannot be ignored, stating that 

replacing legacy systems is expensive and requires proper planning and 

budgeting. We discussed the Air Force’s effort to standardize its satellite 

control capabilities, which began in 1995, and stated that since terminating 

this effort in 1997, the Air Force has not formally initiated renewed efforts. 

We believe an opportunity now exists for DOD to renew its effort to 

standardize these capabilities using commercially available products and 

agree that effective planning and budgeting are critical.
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Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy to consolidate 

their satellite control replacement plans and consider using commercial 

off-the-shelf products and best commercial practices in making a selection. 

DOD commented that it would not want to migrate toward a “monolithic” 

satellite control capability, and we agree that such a capability may not be 

the optimum solution. Instead, DOD stated that the question is how to 

structure architectures so that national security and civil interests are 

appropriately addressed and so that interoperability and commonality are 

balanced against security requirements to protect DOD systems from 

intrusion. DOD also stated that any resulting architecture should be built 

incrementally and that consolidating satellite control capabilities is an 

appropriate step in that direction. In doing so, DOD expects to take 

advantage of increasing commercial space activity and to pursue 

commercial off-the-shelf solutions for satellite control. We agree that 

structuring architectures for controlling multiple types of satellites could 

be difficult. Also, we believe that DOD’s intention to employ commercial 

capabilities to address such diverse requirements is sound and that greater 

efficiencies should be achievable by using a common core of satellite 

control software capabilities.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense provide directions to only fund satellite control replacement 

efforts that are designed to achieve integrated capabilities. DOD suggested 

(1) adding the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence to implement those directions and 

(2) including a reference to making maximum use of commercial products 

and practices. We agreed and modified our recommendation.

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense take 

the lead in establishing an interagency mechanism to provide a forum for 

fostering and overseeing the integration and interoperability of satellite 

control within the government. DOD commented that significant actions 

in this regard have been taken, citing a memorandum of understanding 

by the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence dated 

July 31, 1998, for national security space management. The memorandum 

implements revised procedures for the management of DOD and 

intelligence community space programs and activities as directed by a 

Presidential Decision Directive. The memorandum establishes a National 

Security Space Senior Steering Group, directing that all interested national 

security and civil agencies be invited as members in the Senior Steering 

Group’s deliberations, and a National Security Space Architect. We are 
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

aware of this revised management structure and believe it could provide 

the proper interagency mechanism to fulfill the intent of the 1996 national 

space policy. Accordingly, we modified our recommendation to identify the 

Senior Steering Group as the appropriate interagency forum. However, the 

revised management structure had only been in effect for about 9 months 

when we completed our review in April 1999, and its effectiveness at 

fostering interagency satellite control integration and interoperability was 

yet to be demonstrated. Toward this end, it would be timely for the Senior 

Steering Group to determine whether DOD’s plans to replace its satellite 

control capabilities and NASA’s efforts to consolidate its satellite control 

operations could be integrated.

DOD’s comments on a draft of this report are reprinted in their entirety in 

appendix I. DOD also provided technical comments on the draft report, 

which we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

To review DOD’s efforts to integrate and improve its satellite control 

capabilities, we evaluated Defense, Air Force, and Navy plans, 

requirements, programs, budgets, and studies associated with current and 

future satellite control capabilities. To review DOD’s efforts to foster 

integrated and interoperable satellite control within the government, we 

discussed the extent of interagency actions with defense and civil agency 

representatives. To identify opportunities for integrating satellite control, 

we discussed the status and capabilities of government-owned and 

commercially available products for satellite control with several 

government agency and private organization representatives.

We performed our work primarily at the Air Force Space Command, 

Colorado Springs, Colorado, and at several Air Force Space and Missile 

Systems Center offices at El Segundo, California; Albuquerque, New 

Mexico; and Colorado Springs, Colorado. To obtain additional information 

and explanations, we met with representatives from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense; Department of the Air Force; Department of the 

Navy; Office of the DOD Space Architect; and NASA in Washington, D.C. 

We also obtained information from the U.S. Space Command, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado; Naval Space Command, Dahlgren, Virginia; NASA’s 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; NASA’s Johnson Space 

Center, Houston, Texas; NOAA’s Satellite Operations Center, Suitland, 

Maryland; Naval Satellite Operations Center, Point Mugu, California; and 

Naval Research Laboratory’s Satellite Tracking Facility, Blossom Point, 

Maryland.
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

To obtain information on the availability and applicability of commercial 

satellite control products, we held discussions with officials representing 

Integral Systems, Incorporated, Lanham, Maryland; Raytheon Systems 

Company, Aurora, Colorado; Lockheed Martin Space Operations Company, 

Houston, Texas; and Software Technology, Incorporated, Alexandria, 

Virginia, and Denver, Colorado. These companies have developed satellite 

control systems for the various government organizations included in our 

review as well as for commercial satellite system operations.

We performed our review from May 1998 through April 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator 

Carl Levin, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator John W. Warner, Representative 

John P. Murtha, Representative Ike Skelton, and Representative Floyd D. 

Spence in their capacities as Chairs or Ranking Minority Members of 

Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending 

copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of 

Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air 

Force; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable 

Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Honorable 

George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence. Copies will also be made 

available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

22

Appendix II

Major Contributors 

to This Report

28

Abbreviations

AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network

COBRA Commercial Off-the-Shelf—Based Research Architecture

DCCS Distributed Command and Control System

DOD Department of Defense

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NSCN Naval Satellite Control Network

SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System

SSCS Standardized Satellite Control System
Contents

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApeInxdi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the 

end of this appendix.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Now on p.15.

See comment 1.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Now on pp.15 and 16.

See comment 2.

Now on p.16.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

letter dated April 12, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. DOD’s comment about its recently completed satellite operations 

architecture study refers to a proposed recommendation contained in a 

draft of the Architect’s report that the satellite control functions for 

individual satellite systems should be integrated with the systems’ mission 

operations in the same radio frequency band. This comment concerns 

communications between satellites and ground command and control 

centers. Our review did not focus on this linkage. Instead, we focused on 

the computer systems located at the ground centers that process the data 

necessary to perform satellite control functions. In addition, we are aware 

of the proposed recommendation in the Architect’s draft report regarding 

the establishment of satellite autonomy goals to reduce the amount of 

needed ground operations. Although at the end of our review in April 1999 

the Architect’s final report had not been released, DOD officials provided 

no information that would alter our assessment.

2. DOD noted that the Space Architect performed a cost-effectiveness 

analysis of dedicated versus common satellite control solutions and was 

unable to substantiate any cost savings for common solutions. We observed 

in a draft of the Architect’s report that, in an attempt to quantify differences 

between common and dedicated infrastructures, both of which included 

satellite mission and satellite control functions, the study team found that 

there was no significant life-cycle cost or performance differences between 

the two approaches. Although the consistency of these two statements is 

unclear, our review did not focus on the merits of dedicated versus 

common infrastructures. We focused on satellite control ground 

processing, irrespective of the type of infrastructure. In consonance with 

our approach, DOD stated that since commercial activity in space is 

increasing (1) there are a number of high-quality commercial products in 

the marketplace that are capable of controlling DOD satellites and 

(2) commercialization will enhance standardization and ensure lowest cost 

because of competition.
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report ApeInxdi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division, Washington, 

D.C.

Homer H. Thomson

James A. Elgas

Denver Field Office Frederick G. Day

Robert W. Stewart

Los Angeles Field 

Office

Larry J. Bridges

David G. Hubbell

(707353) Lret
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