United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

February 1999 ARMY RANGER

TRAINING

Final Assessment of

Improvements

Mandated By 1996

National Defense

Authorization Act

GAO/NSIAD-99-57

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281816 

February 25, 1999

The Honorable Wayne Allard

Chairman,

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Steve Buyer

Chairman,

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie

Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

This report provides our final assessment of corrective actions taken by

the Army following the deaths of four Army Ranger students in a 1995

training accident. The Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act

requires us to provide a final assessment of the matters covered in our

preliminary report and our recommendation on the need to continue the

required manning levels.1

 Specifically, we are reporting on the status of

(1) Ranger training manning levels required by the act, (2) establishing

safety cell organizations required by the act, (3) corrective safety actions

instituted after the accident, and (4) inspections of identified safety

controls.

Background The Ranger Training Brigade, located at Fort Benning, Georgia, conducts

three phases of Ranger training to develop tactical combat arms and

leadership skills in infantry, airborne, air assault, mountaineering, and

waterborne operations. The initial training phase is conducted at Fort

Benning, the second phase is conducted in the Georgia mountains, and the

third phase is conducted in river and swamp terrain in Florida. In

February 1995, four Ranger students died of hypothermia while

undergoing waterborne training in the Florida swamps.

1

The act (P.L. 104-106, Feb. 10, 1996) set minimum personnel manning levels for the Army’s Ranger

Training Brigade and specified that the manning level requirement shall expire 2 years after the date

on which it is first attained. The act also required us to provide a preliminary report within 1 year of its

enactment, see Army Ranger Training: Safety Improvements Need to be Institutionalized

(GAO/NSIAD-97-29, Jan. 2, 1997), and a final report within 2 years after the Army first attains the

required manning levels.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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The Army’s investigation of the accident recommended corrective actions

to improve Ranger training safety and preserve the lessons learned from

the accident.2

 Corrective actions to improve the safety of Ranger training

were also prescribed by the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense

Authorization Act. The act required the Army to ensure that the number of

officers and the number of enlisted personnel assigned to the Ranger

Training Brigade are not less than 90 percent of required levels. The Army

defines requirements as the minimum number of personnel needed to

perform a unit’s mission effectively. This mandate was to become effective

no later than February 1997 and expire 2 years after it is achieved. The act

also required the Army to establish at each of the three Ranger training

locations an organization known as a “safety cell,” comprising individuals

with sufficient continuity and experience in each geographic area to be

knowledgeable of local conditions and the potential impact of weather and

other conditions on training safety. The act further provided that these

individuals shall serve as advisors to the officers in charge of training to

assist in making training “go” and “no go” decisions in light of weather and

other conditions.

Our preliminary report assessed the implementation and effectiveness of

the corrective actions, the Army’s progress in implementing the mandated

staffing levels and safety cell organizations, and the adequacy of Army

oversight to ensure that the corrective actions are sustained in the future.

We recommended that the Army direct the Ranger Training Brigade to

identify critical training safety controls and ensure that the Ranger training

chain of command, and organizations outside the chain of command,

conduct periodic inspections to determine compliance with the safety

controls implemented after the accident.

Results in Brief Even though the Army placed the Ranger Training Brigade on the list of

units excepted from normal Army personnel priorities and raised the

Brigade’s personnel distribution to 90 percent of required numbers, it was

not able to meet the act’s required personnel levels. In February 1997,

when the Army planned to first meet the act’s requirement, the Brigade

had 97 percent of required enlisted personnel but only 88 percent of the

required number of officers. The Brigade’s personnel strength was below

the mandated 90-percent level for both officers and enlisted personnel

from October 1997 through September 1998. While Brigade officer staffing

2

The Army’s investigation also concluded that officer shortages and personnel turnover at the Florida

training camp contributed to the accident by draining experience and insight and by limiting the ability

to keep operating procedures current, supervise standards and policies, and observe training

exercises.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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levels were below the mandate, they were significantly higher than they

were at the time of the accident. If the Army continues the current

90-percent officer distribution planning level for the Brigade, it is not

necessary to continue the mandated personnel levels in law.

The Army has established safety cells with personnel knowledgeable

about local terrain and weather conditions, but the frequency of personnel

rotations may make it difficult to provide sufficient continuity that the act

requires. Specifically, the Brigade and battalion chains of command who

serve as the safety cell members and supervise daily training safety

decisions generally rotate to new units every 2-3 years. Because of the

act’s requirement that safety cell personnel have sufficient continuity and

experience, the Army has recently authorized the addition of four civilian

personnel to the safety cells at the Brigade and the three training

battalions. The Army plans to fill these positions by September 1999.

The Army has completed and institutionalized most of the recommended

corrective actions, and they appear to be functioning effectively. The

Brigade has improved safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp by

developing systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp

conditions. It has moved waterborne training exercises outside high-risk

areas and eliminated discretion to deviate from established training lanes.

At all three training phases, medical evacuation procedures have been

revised, rehearsed, and inspected; physician assistants have been assigned

to the Brigade and training battalions; and a Brigade communications

officer has been assigned. In addition, the Brigade now requires that its

training companies be commanded by branch-qualified captains.

Although frequent inspections have been conducted since the accident,

they did not evaluate continued compliance with the training safety

controls, as we recommended in our preliminary report, nor were the

results of the inspections adequately documented. Documented

evaluations of the training safety controls would help ensure that the

corrective actions are continued and lessons learned from the accident are

sustained in the future.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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Army Increased

Brigade Personnel but

Many Factors Have

Hindered Meeting

Mandated Levels

At the time of the 1995 accident, the Ranger Training Brigade had a

staffing priority that authorized it to be staffed at about 85 percent of its

personnel requirements. In response to the mandated 90-percent level, the

Army excepted the Brigade from normal Army staffing priorities3

 and

raised the Brigade’s officer distribution and enlisted personnel

authorizations to 90 percent of the required numbers. It expected to staff

the Brigade at this level in February 1997. Despite these measures, the

Army was not able to assign and maintain the numbers of officers and

enlisted personnel the act required for most months since that time. The

Brigade staffing level has improved since the accident, even though the

Army has not maintained staffing at the mandated level.

Mandated Officer and

Enlisted Personnel Levels

Have Not Been Sustained

Although in the aggregate, the Brigade was assigned 96 percent of its

required personnel in February 1997, it had only 88 percent of the required

number of officers. The Brigade’s officer strength has remained below the

mandated 90-percent level for most of the time between February 1997

and November 1998 and fell to under 80 percent for 9 months. While the

Brigade was able to maintain higher enlisted personnel levels because of

the Army priority for assigning enlisted Ranger instructors, its enlisted

strength overall was also under the mandated level for 14 months from

February 1997 through September 1998, as shown in figure 1.

3

Because of Army-wide shortages of personnel, the Army uses a tiered system to allocate personnel to

its units. The Army gives top priority to staffing Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, major

commands, training centers, and special operations forces. These entities receive about 100 percent of

their personnel requirements. Second priority is given to early deploying Army divisions, which

normally receive about 95 percent of their personnel requirements. The Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) and its schools, including the Brigade, receive a “fair share” of the remaining

officers and enlisted personnel, usually about 85 percent of their personnel requirements. TRADOC

receives a higher priority for enlisted instructors, usually about 98 to 100 percent of instructor

requirements.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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Figure 1: Ranger Training Brigade

Personnel Levels, February 1997

Through November 1998

2/97 6/97 10/97 2/98 6/98 10/98

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Percent

Officer Enlisted

At the end of November 1998, when we completed our review, the Brigade

was assigned 59 (or 80 percent) of its 74 required officers and 596 (or

93 percent) of its required enlisted personnel. Although the number of

assigned officers was below the act’s requirement, it was significantly

higher than it was at the time of the accident, when only 38 officers were

assigned. Further, although the Brigade was assigned less than the

required number of enlisted personnel from October 1997 through

September 1998, it did have over 90 percent of its required number of

enlisted Ranger instructors.

As of November 1998, the Brigade would have needed eight more officers

to meet the mandated 90-percent level. Fort Benning officials said that

they would be unable to assign any additional officers until captains

undergoing advanced infantry officer training become available in

December 1998.

Data on the Brigade’s numbers of required and assigned officers and

enlisted personnel by month are included in appendix I.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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Many Factors Have

Contributed to Shortfalls in

Meeting Required

Personnel Levels

Many factors have contributed to the Army’s shortfalls in meeting the

required numbers of officers and enlisted personnel, including unplanned

losses of officers, shortages of branch-qualified captains4

 and certain

enlisted specialties, unfilled requirements for other service’s instructors,

and higher personnel requirements.

Army officials at Fort Benning told us that the unplanned loss of personnel

was the primary reason for not meeting the mandated officer level. The

Brigade lost several officers who resigned their commissions or were

injured while conducting Ranger training exercises. When these

unexpected losses occurred, it was not possible to immediately reassign

officers from other Army units to fill them. Fort Benning officials told us

that replacing experienced and branch-qualified captains was particularly

difficult because they are in short supply throughout the Army. As a result,

Fort Benning was unable to immediately replace the officers lost by the

Brigade and had to wait for graduates of the Infantry Officer Advanced

course at Fort Benning to become available.

Some of the shortfall of enlisted personnel was due to unfilled

requirements for instructors from the other services. For fiscal year 1998,

the Army determined that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps

were to provide 20 instructors, and for fiscal year 1999, 16 instructors,

based on the numbers of students they collectively planned to enroll in the

Ranger course. However, the other services have not provided the

numbers of instructors required. For example, thus far, in fiscal year 1999,

the Marine Corps has provided only 2 of the 13 instructors. If the services

had met their instructor requirements, the Army would have achieved the

mandated enlisted personnel level in most months since February 1997.

Table 1 shows the number of students the Army and other services

planned to enroll in the Ranger course in fiscal year 1999 with the required

and assigned instructors.

4

Branch-qualified captains are those who have had advanced training and have served in command

positions in the field to which they are assigned.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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Table 1: Army and Other Services’

Fiscal Year 1999 Enrollment and

Required and Assigned Instructors Service Studentsa

Required

instructors

Assigned

instructorsb

Army 2,245 281 279

Marine Corps 100 13 2

Navy 12 2 0

Air Force 9 1 0

aPlanned enrollment in fiscal year 1999.

bAs of November 1998.

Two other factors contributed to personnel shortages in the Brigade. First,

the Army had difficulty assigning the required numbers of enlisted training

support personnel, such as medics and signal systems specialists, because

there were, and still are, relatively small numbers of personnel with these

specialties in the force. Second, in October 1997, the Army added 7

additional personnel requirements for officers and 86 additional

requirements for enlisted personnel. Because the numbers of assigned

personnel did not significantly change along with the added requirements,

the percentages of assigned to required personnel declined significantly.

Although Army officials at Fort Benning thought they could fill these

positions within several months, both officer and enlisted personnel levels

remained well below the mandated levels throughout fiscal year 1998.

Other Assignments and

Civilian Personnel

Shortages Reduce the

Availability of the Brigade’s

Personnel

The actual number of personnel available is often less than the number of

personnel assigned to the Brigade. At any given time, some Brigade

personnel are attending Army schools or are assigned to other duties, such

as recruiting, thus reducing the actual number of personnel available to

conduct and support Ranger training. As in all Army units, Brigade

personnel periodically attend Army schools to complete their career

training requirements or perform other duties for their units. In

November 1998, the Brigade was assigned 59 (or 80 percent) of its 74

required officers. However, 3 of the 59 officers were attending schools or

performing other full-time duties. As a result, the Brigade only had

76 percent of its required officers available. In addition, Ranger training

battalion commanders must often assign soldiers to fill vacant civilian

personnel positions. In November 1998, the Brigade had only 10 (or

20 percent) of its 49 required civilian personnel. To compensate for these

shortages, battalion commanders periodically assigned Ranger training

personnel to maintenance, supply, administrative, and other jobs—a

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
B-281816 

common practice throughout the Army when civilian personnel

requirements cannot be met.

Unique Ranger Training

and Personnel

Requirements Are Not

Recognized in Army

Personnel Distribution

Priorities

Both Ranger training and the requirements for the personnel that conduct

the training are unique. Unlike training at other TRADOC schools, Ranger

training is conducted around the clock, under hazardous conditions, at

three separate locations in difficult mountainous, river, and swamp

terrain. The training is designed to subject students to hot and cold

weather temperature extremes and mental and physical stresses, including

nutritional and sleep deprivation—conditions that are intended to

approach those found in combat. To conduct this type of training, Ranger

instructors, battalion and company commanders, and support personnel

must be qualified to function effectively under similar conditions.

Therefore, many Brigade personnel are required to have special

qualifications, including airborne and Ranger qualifications, and some are

required to have swimmer and diver qualifications. Personnel with these

qualifications are in short supply and in high demand throughout the

Army. However, the current Army officer distribution policy gives top

priority units, such as special operations forces, 100 percent of their

requirements for these kinds of specialties. Without the higher priority the

Army implemented to meet the mandated levels, the Brigade would

receive only about 85 percent of its officer requirement. The Brigade

would therefore compete with higher priority units and other TRADOC

schools to obtain personnel with these specialized qualifications. The

Army’s enlisted distribution policy, however, does give a higher priority to

the Brigade for enlisted instructors because it needs between 60 and

180 days to train and certify personnel to become fully qualified Ranger

instructors.

Further, assigning personnel is complicated because, unlike other Army

training units, the Brigade’s headquarters and three training battalions are

located in separate geographic areas. While Army commanders usually

move personnel between positions within their units to compensate for

any losses, the Brigade’s ability to do so is limited because reassigning

personnel from one training battalion to another involves permanent

changes of station for soldiers and their families. Therefore, when losses

occur, the Brigade must wait for available personnel from other Army

units rather than move personnel internally between battalions.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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Army Plans to Staff

Safety Cells With

Civilians

The act specified that safety cell personnel at each location must have

sufficient continuity and experience to be knowledgeable of local terrain,

weather, and other conditions. Currently, members of the Brigade and the

battalions’ chains of command, including the Brigade and battalion

commanders, serve in the safety cells and supervise daily training safety

decisions. While these people have developed a high degree of experience

and knowledge of local conditions, the frequency of their rotations to new

units may prevent the safety cells from obtaining individuals with

sufficient continuity in the local training areas. Army officers usually

rotate to new units every 2 years, enlisted personnel about every 3 years.

In contrast, Army civilian employees do not rotate jobs as frequently and

thus would appear to provide the continuity envisioned in the act.

In 1996, the Infantry Center at Fort Benning and the Brigade considered

requesting civilian personnel for the safety cells but decided to adopt the

current approach of having Brigade personnel serve in the safety cells.

However, in September 1998, TRADOC reconsidered this approach and

began work on a plan to authorize hiring four civilians for the safety cells

at the Brigade and at each of the three training battalions. Army officials at

Fort Benning told us they plan to develop job descriptions, identify

candidates, and hire staff for the safety cells by September 1999.

Corrective Safety

Actions Are

Incorporated in

Standard Operating

Procedures

The Army’s investigation of the accident recommended corrective actions

to improve (1) risk assessments of training conditions, (2) command and

control of training exercises, and (3) medical support and evacuation

procedures. We reported in our preliminary report that the risk

assessments had been improved, command and control procedures had

been revised, and evacuation and medical support capabilities had

increased. In addition, in September 1997, the Army Inspector General

reviewed the corrective actions and waterborne training safety controls at

the Florida Ranger camp and concluded that they were in place and

functioning as intended.

During our review, we found that the corrective actions had been

institutionalized in Brigade standard operating procedures5

 and that the

safety control measures and medical evacuation procedures remained in

place and appeared to be functioning effectively. Specifically, the Brigade

continued to apply safety improvements at the Florida Ranger camp, such

as command and control systems to better monitor and predict river and

5

Brigade standard operating procedures include those of the Brigade’s headquarters and the three

training battalions.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
B-281816 

swamp conditions, and to conduct waterborne training exercises in

designated training lanes outside of high-risk areas. At all three training

locations, medical evacuation procedures had been revised, rehearsed,

and inspected; and physician assistants had been assigned to the Brigade

and training battalions. In addition, the Brigade has improved safety and

the supervision of training by requiring that its training companies be

commanded by experienced and branch-qualified captains. To better

supervise training safety, the Brigade also assigns an officer and an

enlisted noncommissioned officer to serve as training liaisons to

accompany and monitor each Ranger class through all three phases of

training.

A complete description and status of all corrective actions are included in

appendixes II through V.

Safety Inspections Do

Not Evaluate or

Document

Compliance With

Training Safety

Controls

Our preliminary report assessing Ranger training safety recommended that

TRADOC, the Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, the Ranger Training

Brigade, and organizations outside the chain of command, such as the

Army Inspector General, conduct periodic inspections to determine

compliance with the safety controls implemented after the 1995 accident.

Since 1997, the Army Infantry Center commander has conducted 6

personal safety inspections, and Brigade commanders have conducted 23

personal safety inspections. Also, Fort Benning has conducted two

command and staff inspections, and the Brigade has conducted three

command and staff inspections.6

 In addition, the Army Inspector General

has visited all three phases of Ranger training and, in September 1997,

completed an inspection of the safety controls.

However, the scope and results of the personal inspections conducted by

the Infantry Center and Brigade commanders have not been documented.

We were, therefore, unable to determine whether (1) the commanders’

inspections focused on the identified safety control measures or (2) the

commanders had determined that safety controls were working

effectively.

While the scope and results of the Infantry Center’s and the Brigade’s

command and staff inspections were documented, these inspections

covered a broad range of unit activities, including safety. However, the

safety related portion focused entirely on general safety procedures, such

6

Army Inspection Policy, Army Regulation 1-201, gives commanders the flexibility to establish both the

frequency of and criteria for the inspections.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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as fire prevention measures, not on training safety. Also, although the

Ranger training chain of command was briefed on the scope and results of

the Army Inspector General’s safety control inspection, a written report

was not done.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Since the mandated staffing goal was instituted, the Ranger Training

Brigade staffing level has improved, even though the Army has not

maintained staffing at the mandated 90-percent level. A key factor in this

improvement has been the Army’s decision to give priority to staffing the

Brigade. Without sufficient priority, we believe that unplanned losses and

other problems that have kept the Brigade’s officer strength below the

mandated 90-percent levels would, over time, degrade officer strength to

the levels that existed at the time of the accident. In view of the increased

personnel levels since the accident, and provided that the Army continues

the current staffing priority for the Brigade, we do not believe that it is

necessary to maintain mandated personnel levels in law.

Additionally, the failure to evaluate specific training safety controls and

document the results of such evaluations provide inadequate assurance

that safety measures and controls are in place and functioning effectively.

Inspections are vital in ensuring that corrective actions instituted after the

accident are sustained.

We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of the Army

• continue the current 90-percent officer distribution planning level for the

Ranger Training Brigade and

• direct that future inspections of the Brigade include evaluations of training

safety controls and that the inspections’ results are documented.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report (see app.VI), DOD concurred

with the report and its recommendations. DOD stated that the Secretary of

the Army has directed that the officer and enlisted strength of the Brigade

be sustained at or above the 90-percent distribution level and that the

Commander, Total Army Personnel Command, has established procedures

to ensure compliance. DOD also stated that the Army has conducted

frequent inspections to evaluate training safety controls and has moved to

address the documentation of training safety controls inspections.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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DOD also noted that its goal is to provide safe, tough, and realistic training

to Brigade students and that it believes it is meeting this goal. DOD also

provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the status of the mandated Ranger training manning levels,

we reviewed and analyzed personnel requirements and numbers of

officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the Ranger Training Brigade

from February 1997 through November 1998. We reviewed changes in

Army and Fort Benning personnel policies, plans, and distribution

priorities to assess the measures taken to increase personnel to the

mandated levels. To assess the adequacy of current personnel levels and

the need to continue the mandated levels, we analyzed personnel

requirements and obtained the views of Department of Army, TRADOC, and

Fort Benning officials. We assessed the status of establishing training

safety cells by reviewing the duties, qualifications, and experience of

safety cell members and interviewing Fort Benning and Ranger officials.

To determine the status of the corrective actions and determine whether

they are functioning effectively, we received briefings from Brigade

officials, observed training exercises, and reviewed safety procedures at

each Ranger battalion’s facilities. To determine whether the Army has

adequately inspected compliance with the identified safety controls, we

interviewed Brigade officials and reviewed Army and Infantry Center

inspection regulations, procedures, and records.

We conducted our review at Department of Army headquarters, Army

Infantry Center, Ranger Training Brigade headquarters, and the Ranger

training battalions at Fort Benning, Dahlonega, Georgia, and Eglin Air

Force Base, Florida.

Our review was conducted from September through November 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and House

Committees on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and

House Committee on Armed Services and to the Secretaries of Defense

and the Army. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. If you or

your staff have questions about this report, please call me on

(202) 512-5140.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Ranger Training

Brigade Personnel

Levels, February 1997

Through

November 1998

16

Appendix II 

Status of Actions to

Improve Safety

Management: Risk

Assessments

17

Appendix III 

Status of Actions to

Improve Safety

Management:

Command and

Control, Equipment,

and Training

18

Appendix IV 

Status of Actions to

Improve Safety

Management: Medical

Support and

Evacuation

Procedures

19

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Contents

Appendix V 

Status of Actions to

Preserve Lessons

Learned

20

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

21

Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

23

Table Table 1: Army and Other Services’ Fiscal Year 1999 Enrollment

and Required and Assigned Instructors

7

Figure Figure 1: Ranger Training Brigade Personnel Levels,

February 1997 through November 1998

5

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix I 

Ranger Training Brigade Personnel Levels,

February 1997 Through November 1998

Officers Enlisted personnel Brigade total

Fiscal year/month Required Assigned Percent Required Assigned Percent Required Assigned Percent

1997

February 66 58 88 557 539 97 623 597 96

March 66 59 89 557 533 96 623 592 95

April 66 61 92 557 521 94 623 582 93

May 66 61 92 557 514 92 623 575 92

June 66 62 94 557 505 91 623 567 91

July 66 62 94 557 494 89 623 556 89

August 66 63 95 557 490 88 623 553 89

September 66 61 92 557 510 92 623 571 92

1998

October 73 57 78 643 522 81 716 579 81

November 73 57 78 643 539 84 716 596 83

December 73 57 78 643 526 82 716 583 81

January 73 57 78 643 541 84 716 598 84

February 73 57 78 643 541 84 716 598 84

March 73 58 79 643 558 87 716 616 86

April 73 60 82 643 569 88 716 629 88

May 73 59 81 643 574 89 716 633 88

June 73 57 78 643 563 88 716 620 87

July 73 56 77 643 557 87 716 613 86

August 73 60 82 643 552 86 716 612 85

September 73 60 82 643 552 86 716 612 85

1999

October 74 55 74 639 574 90 713 629 88

November 74 59 80 639 596 93 713 655 92

Note: Percentages have been rounded.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix II 

Status of Actions to Improve Safety

Management: Risk Assessments

Planned actions Status Comments

1. Develop a standard operating

procedure to capture and use river

level forecast information from local

agencies.

Completed Weather, river, and swamp information obtained from local and federal

agencies is integrated in training decision-making. Also, three remote

weather sensors on the Yellow River provide real-time water depth and

temperatures.

2. Update risk management

assessment.

Completed Risk management assessments have been completed for all training

activities.

3. Update daily risk assessment. Completed Daily risk assessments capture information on changing weather, water

level, temperature, student conditions, and readiness of support systems.

4. Update current immersion guide. Completed The water immersion guide is briefed at the beginning of each day and

updated as conditions change.

5. Standardize the in-walkers briefing

for instructors.

Completed Written standardized briefing formats are used for daily briefings of

instructors at all three Ranger training battalions.

6. Provide commanders critical

requirements analysis of

class/platoon strengths and

weaknesses as each class moves to

a new training phase.

Completed Medical and other information on selected students and student platoons

is forwarded to each training phase’s incoming commander.

7. Erect staff markers on the lanes. Completed The Army Corps of Engineers erected 32 water depth markers along the

Yellow River and training lanes in the swamps.

8. Examine the effectiveness of the

current buddy system.

Completed System reviewed, and it remains a first line of safety defense. When

assigned buddy is not available, teams will move to three-person system.

9. Reinstate the system of assigning

tactical officers to each class.

Completed The 6th Battalion now assigns a captain or senior noncommissioned officer

and a staff sergeant to each class with responsibility for class cohesion,

student advocacy, feedback to battalion commanders, and other issues.

10. Conduct refresher training on the

use of the immersion guide.

Completed Lesson added to the Ranger course program of instruction.

11. Identify and mark weak swimmers. Completed Weak swimmers are identified during the combat water survival test and

marked on their headgear and equipment.

12. Obtain physiological monitoring

software.

Completed Experimental monitoring software was provided to Ranger medical clinics.

Due to implementation problems, the Brigade has discontinued its use.

13. Conduct nutrition and

immunization study.

Completed The Brigade Commander has increased meals provided Ranger students

from 1-1/2 to 2 per day based on Army nutritional studies.

14. Develop personnel status

monitoring system technology for

possible use in Florida.

Completed Experimental monitors tested in June 1996, but no procurement made.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix III 

Status of Actions to Improve Safety

Management: Command and Control,

Equipment, and Training

Planned actions Status Comments

1. Develop standard operating

procedures for conducting training at

the Florida Ranger Training Battalion.

Completed Procedures have been written and included in the Brigade and the three

training phases daily operating procedures.

2. Clearly identify each training lane. Completed The Florida battalion identified specific lanes from the Yellow River through

the swamps. The lanes were narrowed and adjusted to avoid hazardous

areas. Students are not allowed to deviate from designated boat drop sites

and training lanes.

3. Develop a training and certification

program for instructors.

Completed The Brigade developed a standardized instructor certification program.

The program focuses on the development of instructor competency,

experience, and application of procedures, safety, and risk management.

4. Upgrade tactical operations center

ability to monitor operations.

Completed Communications and computer upgrades were installed and they are

functioning effectively at Florida and mountain phases.

5. Purchase earplug/silent radios. Completed The Florida battalion acquired whisper mikes for use with Motorola radios

during training exercises.

6. Ensure that all patrols are

equipped, trained, and prepared to

conduct stream crossing operations.

Completed Florida battalion students must demonstrate their ability to properly

construct a one-rope bridge in 8 minutes prior to entering the swamp.

7. Develop a decision paper on the

use of precision lightweight global

position receivers by instructors

during emergencies.

Completed A Brigade decision paper concluded that global position receivers will be

used by medical evacuation helicopters and Ranger instructors. The

Brigade acquired 66 receivers to track the movement of students.

8. Develop standard packing lists for

instructors, medics, and

aeromedevac crews.

Completed Equipment and supply packing lists for instructors, medics, and

aeromedevac crews have been updated.

9. Review the winter rucksack

packing list.

Completed The winter packing list has been reviewed, and minor changes were

made. Instructors inspect student rucksacks to ensure they have been

tailored, weight distributed, and waterproofed.

10. Add a waterproofing class to

program of instruction.

Completed A waterproofing lesson has been added to the Ranger course program of

instruction.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix IV 

Status of Actions to Improve Safety

Management: Medical Support and

Evacuation Procedures

Planned actions Status Comments

1. Determine system necessary to

ensure safe medical evacuation.

Completed Air, water, surface, and ground evacuation procedures have been

planned, rehearsed, and inspected. Joint medical evacuation procedures

have been established among the Ranger training battalions and local

medical services.

2. Develop a mass casualty standard

operating procedure.

Completed Mass casualty procedures have been included in each Ranger training

battalion’s standard operating procedure.

3. Initiate a project to build a road into

the swamp area in Florida.

Determined

to be not

feasible

The former battalion commander concluded that the road is not critical for

safe training and that following an environmental assessment, high

construction and environmental mitigation cost estimates, it is not justified.

4. Determine fuel requirement for

medevac helicopters at Florida

training site.

Completed A 2,000-gallon tanker is on hand at the Florida camp and two tankers with

about 10,000 gallons fuel capacity are on hand at the Georgia mountain

camp.

5. Implement plan to revert to full-time

Ranger medic manning.

Completed All three Ranger training battalions now have full-time, Ranger-qualified

medics.

6. Obtain C02 inflatable one-man rafts. Completed The Florida Ranger camp acquired 21 CO2 inflatable rafts, which are used

by each Ranger instructor team.

7. Obtain hypothermia bags. Completed Six hypothermia bags were issued to each of the Ranger training

battalions.

8. Develop a system to check

packing list for medevac helicopters.

Completed All medevac emergency equipment is inspected for accountability and

serviceability upon arrival at the training battalions.

9. Reinforce training and rehearsals of

medical attachments.

Completed Fort Benning Medical Command has developed training guidelines for

medics and Physician’s Assistants in each camp.

10. Ensure compliance with previous

cold weather procedures.

Completed Revised standard operating procedures outline cold and hot weather

training procedures.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix V 

Status of Actions to Preserve Lessons

Learned

Planned actions Status Comments

1. Determine how best to preserve

lessons learned.

Completed 1977 and 1995 accident summaries have been integrated into instructor

certification programs and are required reading for new members of the

chain of command.

VCR tape summarizing the 1977 and 1995 accidents was produced and is

in use in the instructor certification program.

Monument to students who died was erected at the site of the accident.

2. Continue formal command

inspection program.

Completed Although all battalions have been inspected, the inspections do not focus

on training-related safety.

3. Review complete waterborne

procedures.

Completed The Army Inspector General completed a review of waterborne

procedures in September 1997.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster

Reginald L. Furr, Jr.

Atlanta Field Office Kevin C. Handley

Katherine P. Chenault

(703263) Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-57 Army Ranger Training
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