1

Rodriguez, also known as and indicted under the name Carlos Armando

Molena, entered into a plea agreement with the government. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-2043

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Nelson Waldemar Garza-Vela, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2001

Filed: October 3, 2001

___________

Before BOWMAN, LOKEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Nelson Waldemar Garza-Vela and his co-defendant, Byron Rodriguez,1

 were

charged with possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(B)(ii) (1994). A jury convicted

Garza of a lesser included offense, possession of a controlled substance with intent

to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The District
2

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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Court2

 sentenced Garza to a fifty-one month prison term. For reversal, Garza

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and asserts that

the District Court erred by giving the jury, over a defense objection, a willful

blindness instruction. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the

District Court.

First, Garza argues that the government's evidence gives rise to no more than

a mere possibility of his guilt, a measure which falls far short of the standard

necessary to uphold the jury's verdict against him. Garza is incorrect. His principal

defense was that he was merely present when the crime was being committed and that

he therefore lacked guilty knowledge. Nevertheless, substantial evidence came to

light at trial demonstrating that Garza either knew that he was participating in an

illegal drug transaction or deliberately remained ignorant of that truth. In evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, "we review the evidence in

the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, accepting as established all reasonable

inferences tending to support that verdict." United States v. Escobar, 50 F.3d 1414,

1419 (8th Cir. 1995).

The first time Rodriguez met the FBI informant to arrange a cocaine

transaction, Garza stepped out of Rodriguez's automobile, then positioned himself

and acted in a manner that strongly suggests he was serving as a lookout. On the day

of Garza's arrest, before he and Rodriguez drove off to the location from which

Rodriguez retrieved the cocaine, the FBI informant showed Rodriguez $100,000 in

$100 bills in order to prove that he had the money to purchase the cocaine.

Rodriguez was concerned that the currency might be counterfeit, and Garza watched

as Rodriguez inspected one of the bills. Later, when Garza and Rodriguez switched

to Garza's automobile to deliver the cocaine, Garza watched Rodriguez place the
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shopping bag in which the cocaine was concealed into the back seat. Garza admitted

at trial that he suspected the shopping bag contained some kind of illegal drugs but

chose not to ask any questions. He does not dispute that when law enforcement

officers approached his automobile to arrest him, he was seated in the driver's seat

within reach of the approximately one kilogram of cocaine concealed in the shopping

bag. Considering all the trial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom

in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we are unable to conclude that "'no

reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Id. at 1419 (quoting United States v. Frayer, 9 F.3d 1367, 1371 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994)); accord United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)

("Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether

the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt."). 

Second, Garza argues that the District Court erred in giving the jury a willful

blindness instruction because, Garza claims, he had no explicit personal knowledge

that he was participating in or furthering an illegal drug transaction and because

nothing he knew or witnessed should have aroused his suspicions. It was not clear

error to give the instruction, however, because Garza contended at trial that he lacked

guilty knowledge of the crime that was committed, and the evidence, including

Garza's own admissions before and at trial, warranted an inference of deliberate

ignorance. See United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir.) (standard

of review), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 873 (1993); United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264,

1271 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a willful blindness instruction is appropriate

when an accused asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence warrants an

inference of deliberate ignorance). 

Accordingly, we affirm.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.