Albanians in the Balka n s

B r i e f l y. . .

• T he status of the Albanian population in several Balkan count r ies is now the gre a test challenge to peace and stability in the re g io n .

• A l b a n ian ex t remists attacked the Ma c e do n ian state, and the re s p o nse of Ma c e do n ia n

security fo rces bro u g ht the country close to civil war. Despite the agre e me nt me d ia ted by the European Un ion and the United States, the country re ma i ns da nge ro u s l y

polarized and impleme nt a t ion of the agre e me nt is in do u b t .

• T he Kosovo Albania ns seek inde p e nde nc e, but the Yu goslav and Serbian go v e r nme nts—with support from the Kosovo Serb mino r i t y — w a nt to ma i ntain sovere ig nt y

over the pro v i nc e. The int e r na t io nal community is unable to de c ide Kosovo's status,

c re a t i ng unc e r t a i nty that some see as de s t a b i l i z i ng, and others view as a “least bad”

c ho ice for the mo me nt .

• N ATO me d ia t ion and Yu go s l a v ia's hand l i ng of ex t remist vio l e nce in southern Serbia

has pro v ided an opening for the re i nt e g ra t ion of Albania ns and peaceful re s o l u t ion of

t heir legitimate conc e r ns, as well as the re - e s t a b l i s h me nt of Yu go s l a v ia’s cont rol over

t he area. This could serve as a mo del for the re g ion, if promised int e r na t io nal assist a nce ma t e r ia l i z e s.

• While the Albanian population of Mo nt e ne g ro is well int e g rated under Pre s ide nt

D j u ka no v ic, political or cons t i t u t io nal change the re could unsettle the situa t io n .

• “ G reater Albania,” cons i s t i ng of the Albanian populatio ns of Kosovo, Mo nt e ne g ro ,

Ma c e do n ia, and Albania, is an objective of some in the dia s p o ra, and a conc e r n

a mo ng go v e r n me nts in the re g ion. Ho w e v e r, few Albania ns in the re g ion are willing

to fig ht for it.

• T he int e r na t io nal community will not be able to re move its military fo rces from the

B a l ka ns without first re s o l v i ng issues re l a t i ng to the Albanian population in the re g io n .

I n t ro d u c t i o n

In the early 20th century the “A l b a n ian question” was widely debated amo ng Euro p e a n

p o w e r s. Simply stated, the question these powers sought to resolve was how to handle the

A l b a n ian population in the Balka ns, which was split between Albania and Slavic ma j o r i t y

c o u nt r ie s. The Albanian question has once again become pro m i ne nt, especially in the wake

of the 1999 NATO campaign against Yu go s l a v ia, fo u g ht on behalf of the ethnic Albania n

p o p u l a t ion of Kosovo, and re c e nt Albanian ins u rge nc ies in southern Serbia and Ma c e do n ia .

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

N ovember 1, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report is the pro duct of a series of me e t i ng s,

d i s c u s s io ns, and travels between Ja nuary and July

of 2001 conducted through the United States Ins t itute of Pe a c e. Each event analyzed the role of Alban ia ns thro u g hout the Balka ns as it has evolved

s i nce the 1999 NATO air campaign. The re p o r t

exa m i nes the Albanian populatio ns of Serbia, Ko s ovo, Mo nt e ne g ro, Ma c e do n ia, and Albania, and outl i nes the major issues Albania ns face in each of

t hese are a s. The report also discusses the views of

t he go v e r n me nts and majority populatio ns in

B a l kan states with large Albanian mino r i t ie s.

Written by Balka ns Initiative re s e a rch assistant

S a ma ntha Willia ms, the report also inc l udes cont r ib u t io ns by Daniel Serwer, director of the 

B a l ka ns Initia t i v e.

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pe a c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 1

Ma c e do n ia: Can It Ho l d ? 2

Kosovo: Inde p e nde nce 

or Sovere ig nt y ? 4

S o u t hern Serbia: A Mo del Solutio n ? 7

Mo nt e ne g ro: Bulwark of Stability? 9

A l b a n ia: Part of the Solution? 1 0

C o nc l u s io ns 1 1
T he Albanian population in the Balka ns, which is de f i ned as a lang ua ge group and

i nc l udes Catho l ic s, Ortho dox Christia ns, and Mu s l i ms, is scattered thro u g hout the re g io n ,

with the largest conc e nt ra t io ns ex i s t i ng in Albania proper; Ma c e do n ia; Kosovo; the are a s

of Presevo, Bujano v a c, and Medvedja in southern Serbia near the border with Ko s o v o ;

a nd Mo nt e ne g ro. The re is also a substant ial population of Albania ns, known as Chams,

in no r t hern Gre e c e. The exact population fig u res for Albania ns in the Balka ns are he a vily disputed, and de p e nd on who is pro v id i ng them. Albania ns tend to see the mselves as

u nde r re p re s e nted in the na t io nal censuses conducted by the go v e r n me nts of Ma c e do n ia

a nd Yu go s l a v ia, whe reas the go v e r n me nts view their numbers as accura t e. The fo l l o w i ng

a re the of f ic ial population fig u re s :

The Albanian Population in the Balkans 

S e r b i a M o n t e n e g ro M a c e d o n i a A l b a n i a

( i n c l u d i n g

Ko s ovo )

Po p u l a t i o n 9 , 9 8 1 , 9 2 9 6 8 0 , 1 5 8 2 , 0 4 1 , 4 6 7 3 , 4 9 0 , 4 3 5

Albanian Pe rc e n t a g e 1 4 % 7 % 2 2 . 7 % 9 5 %

S o u rce: 2001 CIA World Factbook

T hese fig u res are certainly low, but they ne v e r t heless illustrate the stro ng pre s e nce of

A l b a n ia ns in the re g io n .

Macedonia: Can It Hold? 

Macedonian Pe r s p e c t i ves 

Te ns ion between ethnic Albania ns and Ma c e do n ia ns ex p l o ded into vio l e nce in Februa r y

2001. The eme rge nce of the Na t io nal Libera t ion Army (NLA) along the Ma c e do n ia - Ko s ovo border bro u g ht a ne w, militarized eleme nt to Albanian grie v a nces that the Ma c e do nian go v e r n me nt, security fo rc e s, and public were largely unpre p a red to hand l e.

Ma c e do n ia ns ge ne rally re g a rd the NLA rebels as terrorists imported from Kosovo, with

t he tacit or even ex p l icit support of NATO. Ma ny Ma c e do n ia ns believe the objective of

t he NLA is to create a Greater Albania, or at the least a Greater Kosovo. They doubt the

objective is greater rig hts for Albania ns, whom most Ma c e do n ia ns re g a rd as having

enjoyed equal rig hts since inde p e nde nc e. Although an agre e me nt was sig ned between

t he Ma c e do n ian and Albanian political parties on August 13, 2001, tens io ns between the

two ethnic groups re main hig h .

F rom the perspective of the Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt, bring i ng an end to the NLA

mo v e me nt, by fo rce if ne c e s s a r y, and re e s t a b l i s h i ng peace in Ma c e do n ia were the country’s most imme d iate ne e d s. After the July cease-fire, the Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt part icipated in peace talks with Albania ns on possible changes to the cons t i t u t ion and the

c re a t ion of laws to pre v e nt discrimina t ion against ethnic Albania ns. Though the ultima t e

a g re e me nt pro v ides gua ra ntees to the Albanian population, ma ny Ma c e do n ia ns view the

a g re e me nt ne g a t i v e l y, and believe that Albania ns were legally protected even befo re the

f ig ht i ng began. 

Under the agre e me nt, the Ma c e do n ian parlia me nt is re q u i red to ratify the politic a l

re fo r ms being ex t e nded to the Albanian population. To da t e, ra t i f ic a t ion has no t

o c c u r re d, and ma ny of the proposed re fo r ms re main cont e nt ious issues for ethnic Ma c edo n ian parlia me nt a r ia ns and citizens. The re are also serious conc e r ns that once the

a g re e me nt is ra t i f ie d, it will not be properly impleme nted by Ma c e do n ian autho r i t ies on

t he gro u nd.

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote the pre v e nt ion, ma na geme nt, and peaceful re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Institute me e t s

its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of

p ro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships,

p rof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms, confere nces and

w o r k s ho p s, library servic e s, public a t io ns, and

o t her educ a t io nal activitie s. The Institute’s Board

of Directors is appointed by the Pre s ide nt of the

United States and confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, F o u nder and 

fo r mer Pre s ide nt, Peace Links, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns fo r

Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. 

• M o ra L. McLean, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t it u t e, New York, N.Y. • María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C IO N

I nt e r na t io nal, Some r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling,

State Senator and fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne,

Vt. • S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd • Harriet Zimmerman,

V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is rael Public Affairs 

C o m m i t t e e, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Demo cra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Douglas J. Fe i t h , Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • Paul G. Gaffney II, V ic e

Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r -

s i t y • R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
3

Albanian Pe r s p e c t i ve s

Most Ma c e do n ian Albania ns were upset by the vio l e nce that erupted in Februa r y, and the

A l b a n ian political leadership in Ma c e do n ia has been careful to distance itself from the

N L A’s tactic s. Ho w e v e r, ma ny re ma i ned sympathe t ic to the avowed goals of the NLA,

w h ich are ide nt ical to the goals of the main Albanian political parties: elimina t ion of

c o ns t i t u t io nal pro v i s io ns fa v o r i ng the Ma c e do n ian ma j o r i t y, inc reased pre s e nce of Alban ia ns in the public adm i n i s t ra t ion, re c o g n i t ion of Albanian as a second of f ic ial lang ua ge,

de c e nt ra l i z a t ion of go v e r na nc e, and public fund i ng for the Albania n - l a ng ua ge university in Tetovo. 

Ma ny Albania ns in Ma c e do n ia feel like second class citizens, and they would like mo re

access to jobs, educ a t ion, and go v e r n me nt ins t i t u t io ns, as well as the use of Albania n

symbols and the Albanian lang ua ge. Albania ns have pressed for these rig hts thro u g ho u t

t he 1990s, and ma ny believe that little pro g ress has been ma de. The 1998 electio ns that

b ro u g ht to power a new Albania n - Ma c e do n ian coalition gave hope to ma ny Albania ns

that positive changes would be ma de re g a rd i ng their rig ht s. Results befo re the outbre a k

of vio l e nce were real, but limited: inc reased Albanian re p re s e nt a t ion in go v e r n i ng struct u res and a plan for an int e r na t io nally supported but private university in Tetovo using

A l b a n ian as well as other lang ua ge s. 

A l b a n ia ns believe the Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt prefers not to deal with other ma j o r

p ro b l e ms that exist for Albania ns in Ma c e do n ia, inc l ud i ng the fact that ma ny have re latives from which they are cut off due to Ma c e do n ia’s borde r s. Te ns of tho u s a nds of ethn ic Albania ns living in Ma c e do n ia — s o me for de c a des—lack citizenship, while ma ny

Ma c e do n ia ns living abroad have it. In the midst of poor econo m ic cond i t io ns, and with

a weak civil socie t y, whe t her Albania ns ultimately embrace the NLA or stand by the

Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt will greatly effect the future na t u re of int e r - e t h n ic re l a t io ns. 

Despite their conc e r ns over their status within Ma c e do n ia, du r i ng the course of

mo nt hs of fig ht i ng the majority of Albania ns have not joined the ranks of the NLA, or

even de c l a red their support for the guerillas. Ma ny cont i nue to ide ntify with the stated

goals of the NLA, ho w e v e r, and want to see Albanian rig hts in Ma c e do n ia impro v e d. Mo s t

A l b a n ia ns were also supportive of the peace talks with the Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt, and

a re satisfie d, if somewhat ske p t ical, with the agre e me nt. For no w, the majority of Alban ia ns want to go on with their lives and live peacefully within the Ma c e do n ian state. 

International Community Pe r s p e c t i ve s

T he re c e nt guerrilla mo v e me nt in Ma c e do n ia has prompted a limited re s p o nse by the

i nt e r na t io nal commu n i t y. Expre s s i ng support for Ma c e do n ian sovere ig nty and territoria l

i nt e g r i t y, the United States and European Un ion int ro duced me d iators to assist in re a c hi ng a political solution to the conflict. The United States and the European Un ion have

e nc o u ra ged the Ma c e do n ian go v e r n me nt to adopt polic ies of re s t ra i nt, and have stre s s e d

t he importance of compromise and the cre a t ion of a dialogue between the Ma c e do n ia n

majority and the Albanian population. At int e r na t io nal ins i s t e nc e, the Ma c e do n ian go ve r n me nt has eng a ged in a serious discussion of the situa t ion with Albanian politic a l

l e a de r s, and participated in successful talks on ex t e nd i ng and impro v i ng Albanian rig ht s. 

In July, NATO agre e d, once a political solution was ne go t ia t e d, to take part in a 30-

day mission in Ma c e do n ia, du r i ng which time the Allia nce would de s ig nate 15 weapons

c o l l e c t ion points in western and no r t hern Ma c e do n ia. The fo rce was led by the British

a nd consisted of 4,500 tro o p s. Under the sig ned peace agre e me nt, NLA guerillas agre e d

to voluntarily give up their weapons and cease all vio l e nt activitie s. NATO’s mission of f ic ially began the last week of August, and was ma r red almost imme d iately by the de a t h

of a British soldie r, whose vehicle was allegedly attacked by a group of Ma c e do n ia ns.

After this initial event, the mission pro c e e ded almost without inc ide nt. By the end of

S e p t e m b e r, ethnic Albania ns turned in 3,300 weapons to NATO fo rc e s, and the NATO miss ion, known as Opera t ion Essent ial Harvest, was completed on sche du l e. 

M a ny Albanians in Macedonia

feel like second class citizens,

and they would like more access

to jobs, education, and gove r nment institutions, as well as the

use of Albanian symbols and 

the Albanian language. 

The United States and the European Union have encoura g e d

the Macedonian government to

adopt policies of re s t raint, and

h a ve stressed the importance of

c o m p romise and the creation 

of a dialogue between the

Macedonian majority and the

Albanian population.
4

To ens u re complia nce with the agre e me nt, as well as the safety of the 120 mo n i t o r s

f rom the Org a n i z a t ion for Security and Coopera t ion in Europe (OSCE) who are overseei ng its impleme nt a t ion, a re duced NATO fo rc e, nu m b e r i ng approx i mately 1,000, will

re main in Ma c e do n ia. The new mission, Opera t ion Amber Fox, will be led by Germa ny

a nd will re main in the country for six to nine mo nt hs.

Both Albania ns and Ma c e do n ia ns have qua l ms with some of the conc e s s io ns that were

ma de, though Albania ns are overall much happier with the agre e me nt than are Ma c e don ia ns. Under the agre e me nt, Albanian will become a second of f ic ial lang ua ge in Ma c e don ia, certain powers will be devolved to the mu n ic i p a l i t ie s, and the number of Albania ns

in the police fo rce and public adm i n i s t ra t ion are to inc re a s e. As a result of these conc e ss io ns, ethnic Albania ns are obligated to recognize Ma c e do n ia’s curre nt borders and abandon ideas of partitio n i ng the country along Albanian and Ma c e do n ian line s. 

Po l i cy Options

For the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, the key questio ns are ens u r i ng impleme nt a t ion of the

p o l i t ical aspects of the agre e me nt, and ens u r i ng that NLA guerrillas and Ma c e do n ia n

security fo rces keep their commitme nt s. Ma c e do n ian stalling of cons t i t u t io nal change s

could elicit a vio l e nt Albanian re s p o ns e. A vigo rous approach to border patrols and an

a g g ressive effort to end arms supplies to any re ma i n i ng ex t remist groups is the re fo re still

i m p o r t a nt. So, too, is pre s s u re on the Ma c e do n ia ns to fulfill their commitme nt s.

If the ne go t iated solution does not ho l d, NATO faces difficult cho ic e s. It can try to

s t a nd aside while fig ht i ng cont i nu e s, but its troops in Ma c e do n ia would clearly be at

risk. Withdrawal of NATO from Ma c e do n ia would precipitate inc reased fig ht i ng. Ma i nt ena nce of NATO in Ma c e do n ia in a non-permissive enviro n me nt is some t h i ng NATO go ve r n me nts want to avoid, but it may need to be cons ide red if all else fa i l s.

Ko s ovo: Independence or Sove re i g n t y ?

Albanian Pe r s p e c t i ve s

For Kosovo Albania ns, the pre e m i ne nt issue on the age nda is inde p e nde nce for Ko s o v o .

T hey face opposition not only from the go v e r n me nts of Yu go s l a v ia and Serbia, but also

f rom the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, which has supported the ma i nt e na nce (at least fo r

t he time being) of Yu goslav sovere ig nt y. Only Albania of f ic ially supports Kosovo indep e nde nc e. Add i t io na l l y, due to re s t r ic t io ns put in place by United Na t io ns Security Council Resolution 1244, the settleme nt of Kosovo’s ultimate status will be tricky at best.

R e s o l u t ion 1244 both re a f f i r ms the territorial integrity of the Fede ral Republic of

Yu go s l a v ia and the need for “substant ial autono my and me a n i ngful self-adm i n i s t ra t io n

for Kosovo.” Resolution 1244 does not, ho w e v e r, set forth a fra mework through whic h

t he final status of Kosovo will be de t e r m i ne d. The Rambouillet Ac c o rd s, which were

never accepted by the Yu goslav go v e r n me nt, state that after three years, an int e r nat io nal me e t i ng will be convened to de c ide upon a mechanism for de t e r m i n i ng Ko s o v o ’ s

f i nal status. Whe t her such a me e t i ng will occur, and what it will result in, re ma i ns

u nc l e a r.

While Kosovo re ma i ns a de facto int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o ra t e, the Albanian populatio n

w a nts the Yu goslav and Serbian go v e r n me nts to admit to atro c i t ies committed du r i ng

a nd prior to the 1999 conflict between NATO and Yu go s l a v ia, conduct trials for tho s e

re s p o ns i b l e, and ex t radite ind ictees to The Hague Tr i b u nal. Kosovo Albania ns have been

l a rgely successful at seeking the release of Albanian political prisoners held in Serbia, and

a re pre s s i ng for investig a t io ns of missing Albania ns. These things are beginning to happen in Serbia, as the re c e nt ex hu ma t io ns of Albania ns buried in mass graves in Serbia

Both Albanians and Macedonians

h a ve qualms with some of the

concessions that we re made,

though Albanians are ove ra l l

much happier with the agre e m e n t

than are Macedonians.

For the international community,

the key questions are ensuring

i m p l e m e n tation of the political

aspects of the agreement, and

ensuring that NLA guerrillas and

Macedonian security fo rces keep

their commitments.

For Ko s ovo Albanians, the

p reeminent issue on the agenda

is independence for Ko s ovo. 
5

a nd trials of Yu goslav soldiers for atro c i t ies committed in the 1999 conflict de mo ns t ra t e. 

D i rect commu n ic a t ion between the Yu go s l a v / S e r b ian autho r i t ies and the Kosovo Alban ia ns on missing persons has been almost no nex i s t e nt. Albania ns re g a rd Serbian investig a t io ns as exc r uc ia t i ngly slow and suspect that ma ny army and police fo rce investig a t o r s

w e re involved in atro c i t ies since they are ho l dovers from the Milosevic re g i me. 

Until re c e nt l y, most Kosovo Albania ns were re l uc t a nt to eng a ge Serbs, even those assoc iated with the new de mo c ra t ic re g i me, on issues of common int e rest. Kosovo Albania ns

re g a rd Pre s ide nt Ko s t u n ica and the Demo c ra t ic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) as differing little from Milosevic in attitudes toward Kosovo and Albania ns. Few high-level me e t i ng s

between Yu goslav and Kosovo Albanian of f ic ials are publicly known to have taken place,

a nd the tone of Albanian leaders toward the Belgra de go v e r n me nt re ma i ns ho s t i l e. 

At t i t udes amo ng the Albania ns toward contacts with Serbia and Serbs are, ho w e v e r,

c h a ng i ng. Ma ny in Kosovo recognize that Kosovo’s fate is inevitably int e r t w i ned with Serb ia ’ s, and that an inde p e nde nt Kosovo could not survive with Serbia as a hostile ne ig hb o r. In add i t ion, proper hand l i ng of the ide nt i f ic a t ion of Albanian bodies fo u nd in Serbia

will de p e nd on coopera t ion between Serbs and Albania ns. Unof f ic ial contacts on a wide

ra nge of issues between leaders in both commu n i t ies have begun and are likely to gro w.

For Albania ns, the November 17, 2001 Ko s o v o - w ide electio ns re p re s e nt an important

opportunity for the Kosovo Serbs to de mo ns t rate their good faith and int e rest in being

re i nt e g rated into Kosovo. If the Serbs do not vote, the Albania ns will likely accept the

a p p o i nt me nt of parlia me ntary re p re s e nt a t i v e s, as they did for mu n icipal of f ic ials after

t he October 2000 electio ns. If this occurs, it will be a severe setback for coopera t io n

between Albania ns and Serbs. 

Yugoslav/Serb Pe r s p e c t i ve s

T he Yu goslav go v e r n me nt, while it accepts the int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o rate in Ko s o v o ,

seeks to ma i ntain Serbian sovere ig nty over what it cont i nues to re g a rd as a Serbia n

p ro v i nc e. Privately, Yu goslav and Serbian leaders accept the fact that Kosovo can ne v e r

again be go v e r ned from Belgra de, but they cont i nue to want to ma i ntain the hope that

Kosovo will be re t u r ned to Yu goslav sovere ig nt y, at least no m i na l l y, when the int e r nat io nal pro t e c t o rate end s. 

While cont e nt to see the int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o rate ma i nt a i ned inde f i n i t e l y, Belgra de

is conc e r ned about the tre a t me nt of the minority Serb population still living in the

p ro v i nce and highly critical of the fa i l u re of the UN Mission and NATO to protect the

Kosovo Serbs. After the end of the 1999 NATO conflict, perhaps 200,000 Serbs and othe r

m i no r i t ies left or were fo rced out of Kosovo, or went missing. Those who re main live

l a rgely in enc l a v e s, inc l ud i ng Mitro v ica, and the no r t he r n - most mu n ic i p a l i t ie s. The s e

e nclaves are isolated from each othe r, and travel between them re q u i res NATO escorts.

I m p ro v e me nt of these cond i t io ns is an important Yu go s l a v / S e r b ian objective. The Ko s ovo Serbs have tried to ma ke their partic i p a t ion in local go v e r na nce and Kosovo electio ns

c o nd i t io nal on better pro t e c t io n .

Kosovo issues have important political re s o na nce in Serbia. The DOS coalition fears

that it may suffer political losses if Kosovo Serbs are not pro t e c t e d, or if the Yu go s l a v

claim to sovere ig nty is weake ne d. DOS of f ic ials argue that inde p e nde nce for Ko s o v o

could further destabilize Ma c e do n ia, ins p i r i ng separatist sent i me nt in its large Albania n

p o p u l a t ion and pro v id i ng na t io nalists in the Bosnian Republika Srpska (RS) entity with

an example upon which claims to inde p e nde nce could be based.

At the same time, some in Serbia look to Bosnia as a mo del for Kosovo. In Ma y, Serb ian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, head of the Yu goslav Coord i na t i ng Cent re fo r

Kosovo, proposed the cre a t ion of two ent i t ie s, one Serb, one Albanian, within Ko s o v o .

Each would be self-go v e r n i ng and both would be under Yu goslav sovere ig nt y. Ac c o rd i ng

to Covic’s plan, the Serb entity would inc l ude major mo nu me nts in Serb culture and hist o r y, as well as several no r t hern mu n ic i p a l i t ie s, while the Albanian entity would inc l ude

For Albanians, the November 17,

2001 Ko s ovo-wide elections re present an important opportunity

for the Ko s ovo Serbs to

d e m o n s t rate their good faith and

i n t e rest in being re i n t e g ra t e d

i n to Ko s ovo .

P r i va t e l y, Yugoslav and Serbian

leaders accept the fact that

Ko s ovo can never again be governed from Belgra d e, but they

continue to want to mainta i n

the hope that Ko s ovo will be

returned to Yugoslav sove re i g nt y, at least nominally, when the

international pro t e c to rate ends. 
6

most of Kosovo’s Albanian population. Ac c o rd i ng to Covic, “Both sides should rid the mselves of the illusion that the whole of Kosovo belongs to them. . . . Serbs and Albania ns must unde r s t a nd that avoid i ng compromises fo rever will pro l o ng the war in whic h

both sides will be losers for sure. ”

International Community Pe r s p e c t i ve s

T he int e r na t io nal community has not supported inde p e nde nce for Kosovo, even du r i ng the

N ATO air campaign. This puts it in the difficult position of supporting the territorial int e g r ity of Yu go s l a v ia, while re c o g n i z i ng that Yu go s l a v ia cannot govern the Kosovo Albania ns.

Members of the int e r na t io nal community share Serbia’s concern that inde p e nde nce fo r

Kosovo could harm the pro g ress of Yu go s l a v ia’s de mo c ra t ic tra ns i t ion and ge ne rate a

na t io nalist backlash. Albanian vio l e nce against Serbs and other mino r i t ies has stre ng t he ned those within the int e r na t io nal community who oppose Kosovo inde p e nde nc e. The

no t ion that Albania ns are ade q uately protected under the int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o rate has

also re duced the urge ncy of a definitive re s o l u t ion to Kosovo’s political status. 

T he United Na t io ns Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been partially successful. Ho we v e r, UNMIK was unable to pre v e nt the ethnic cleans i ng of Kosovo Serbs that occurre d

after the NATO air campaign even with over 40,000 troops in place. Add i t io na l l y, UNMIK

do nor count r ies have been slow to pro v ide fund s, which has resulted in only limited

i m p l e me nt a t ion of de mo c ra t ic, jud ic ial, and police re fo r ms. 

Po l i cy Options

T he re are four basic optio ns for Kosovo’s status: (1) cont i nua t ion of the int e r na t io na l

p ro t e c t o rate indefinitely; (2) a re f e re ndum by a date certain, followed almost certainly

by inde p e nde nce; (3) a promise of future inde p e nde nc e, pro v ided certain cond i t io ns are

met; and (4) partition or division. 

Under option one, the int e r na t io nal community could seek gra dually to tra nsfer go ve r n i ng authority to Kosovo’s de mo c ra t ically elected ins t i t u t io ns, but without settling the

f i nal status issue. Those who support this option believe the time will come when a solut ion will eme rge. Those who oppose it believe Albanian aspira t io ns for inde p e nde nc e

c a n not be postponed inde f i n i t e l y.

O p t ion two, a re f e re ndum most likely followed by inde p e nde nc e, was first discussed

du r i ng the Rambouillet ne go t ia t io ns. It is seen by some as the most de mo c ra t ic way of

de t e r m i n i ng Kosovo’s future, as well as one of the few legitimate ways of bre a k i ng the

link between Belgra de and Kosovo. Oppone nts of the re f e re ndum option cite the ethnic

v io l e nce that has plagued Kosovo since 1999 as the chief reason why a re f e re ndu m

s hould not occur. They argue that if Kosovars vote for inde p e nde nc e, as they are overw he l m i ngly expected to do, without an int e r na t io nal pre s e nce to protect mino r i t ie s,

Kosovo is likely to quickly de s c e nd down a path of vio l e nce and crime. 

P ro p o ne nts of option three argue that when certain cond i t io ns (such as rule of law,

respect for minority rig ht s, and gua ra ntees of territorial integrity thro u g hout the re g io n )

have been met, inde p e nde nce can be re s p o nsibly gra nted to Kosovo by the int e r na t io na l

c o m mu n i t y. Others argue that even if these cond i t io ns are met, the re is no way of kno wi ng what will happen to mino r i t ies and de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns once the int e r na t io na l

p re s e nce leaves Kosovo. Others argue that inde p e nde nce cannot be gra nted re g a rd l e s s

of what cond i t io ns are met within Kosovo unless Belgra de agrees to a fo r mal change of

S e r b ian borde r s.

O p t ion three has also been termed quasi- or cond i t io nal inde p e nde nc e. The no t ion of

c o nd i t io nal inde p e nde nce is most pro m i ne ntly described by the Inde p e nde nt Int e r nat io nal Commission on Kosovo, which re c o m me nded it in a report on the future status of

Kosovo issued in October 2000. If agreed to by the go v e r n me nts of Yu go s l a v ia, Ko s o v o ,

a nd the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, cond i t io nal or qua s i - i nde p e nde nce would consist of

“Both sides should rid thems e l ves of the illusion that the

whole of Ko s ovo belongs to

them. . . . Serbs and Albanians

must understand that avo i d i n g

c o m p romises fo rever will

p rolong the war in which both

sides will be losers for sure. ”
7

s e l f - go v e r na nce for Kosovo without actual inde p e nde nc e. This solution would address the

c o ncern that outrig ht inde p e nde nce mig ht be de s t a b i l i z i ng for the re g ion, as well as the

w idely held position that Kosovo is not yet viable as an inde p e nde nt ent i t y. 

This arra nge me nt would allow Kosovo to gra dually move toward inde p e nde nc e, while

at the same time working to build better re l a t io ns with its ne ighbors in the re g ion. Over

t i me, inc reased econo m ic links, coopera t ion, int e g ra t ion, and safer boarders would

result. In appro a c h i ng inde p e nde nce for Kosovo slowly and in a limited way, the go ve r n me nts of Yu go s l a v ia, Ma c e do n ia, and Bosnia would not be de s t a b i l i z e d, as some

b e l ieve they mig ht be with a sudden gra nt of inde p e nde nc e. This approach also has the

b e nefit of not re w a rd i ng vio l e nce or separatism, because ultimate inde p e nde nce would

be cont i nge nt upon re s p o nsible go v e r na nce and the pro t e c t ion of hu man rig ht s.

T he cond i t io na l - i nde p e nde nce solution could also be used to pre v e nt the cre a t ion of

a “Greater Kosovo,” by placing re s t r ic t io ns on Kosovo’s territorial ambitio ns as a pre c o nd i t ion for outrig ht inde p e nde nc e. A “Greater Albania” is equally unlikely to be cre a t e d

because the re is curre ntly little conne c t ion between Albania ns in Kosovo, Ma c e do n ia, and

Mo nt e ne g ro, and Albania ns in Albania. Though this may change as time goes on and mo re

re g io nal coopera t ion is ge ne ra t e d, it is still unlikely that an enlarged Albanian state will

e me rge. No ne t he l e s s, any settleme nt leading to event ual inde p e nde nce for Kosovo will

need to contain a gua ra ntee that Kosovo’s leaders will not seek to annex the Albania n

p o r t io ns of Ma c e do n ia or Mo nt e ne g ro, and that unific a t ion with Albania will not occur.

O p t ion four is perhaps the most cont e nt io u s. Pro p o ne nts of partition argue that Ko s o v o

Serbs and Albania ns simply do not want to live toge t he r, and should not be fo rced to. Rathe r

than cont i nu i ng bouts of ethnic cleans i ng on both side s, Kosovo Serbs in the no r t he r n

mu n ic i p a l i t ies should be go v e r ned by Belgra de, and Kosovo Albania ns should be left to go vern the ms e l v e s. Oppone nts of partition argue that any type of division will never be clean,

a nd that Albania ns will be stuck in Serb are a s, and Serbs in Albanian are a s. It is also arg u e d

that the division of Bosnia into ent i t ies has hinde red its de mo c ra t ic tra ns i t ion, and that the

s a me could occur in a divided Kosovo. Furthe r mo re, accord i ng to some, partition would set

a bad example for the rest of the re g ion, and would result in Serbs seeking to partitio n

B o s n ia, or Albania ns seeking to partition Ma c e do n ia and the Presevo Va l l e y. 

Southern Serbia: A Model Solution?

Yugoslav/Serb Pe r s p e c t i ve s

Until this spring, Yu goslav armed fo rces and police faced a challenge from an Albania n

guerrilla army known as the Libera t ion Army of Presevo, Bujano v a c, and Medvedja, or

t he UCPMB. The UCPMB operated in the “gro u nd safety zone,” a thre e - m i l e - w ide buffer

z o ne ins ide Serbia along the border with Kosovo, which was created when the Yu go s l a v

fo rces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999. The UCPMB was not fig ht i ng for equal rig ht s

for Albania ns in Serbia, but ex p l icitly to unite the ethnic Albanian villages of the Pre s evo Valley in southern Serbia with Kosovo. 

T he situa t ion was peacefully resolved on May 21, 2001 when most of the key me mbers of the UCPMB agreed to disband the army by the end of the mo nth, and NATO gave

Yu goslav armed fo rces permission to ent e r, in phases, the gro u nd safety zone. The

Yu goslav and Serb go v e r n me nts also gra nted amnesty to those who participated in the

re b e l l ion, as long as they gave up their arms and agreed to turn the mselves in by Ma y

24. A ne w, ethnically mixed police fo rce is in the process of being cre a t e d, and it will

u l t i mately inc l ude 400 of f ic e r s. Though cont rolled by the Serbian Int e r ior Ministry, the

new police fo rce will be tra i ned by the OSCE.

Despite some cont i nu i ng Albanian guerrilla activity and terrorist attacks, Yu go s l a v s

re g a rd the Presevo Valley settleme nt as re a s o na b l e, de mo ns t ra t i ng unequivocally that

Despite some continuing 

Albanian guerrilla activity and

t e r rorist atta c k s, Yugoslavs re g a rd

the Pre s evo Va l l ey settlement as

re a s o n a b l e, demonstra t i n g

u n e q u i vocally that attitudes in

B e l g rade have changed.
8

a t t i t udes in Belgra de have change d. They have also used the agre e me nt to enhanc e

c o o p e ra t ion with NATO and gain acceptance in allia nce circ l e s.

The Albanian Pe r s p e c t i ve

Most ethnic Albania ns in the Presevo Va l l e y, especially those not involved in the fig hti ng, are re l ieved that the crisis is over. Ho w e v e r, the re re ma i ns suspic ion of the Serbia n

a u t ho r i t ies who ne go t iated the deal. Ma ny Albania ns are appre he nsive re g a rd i ng Serbia n

p l a ns to int e g rate the Albanian population into police and go v e r n me nt ins t i t u t io ns, and

fear that once int e r na t io nal int e rest in Presevo wane s, so will Serbian efforts to impro v e

A l b a n ian living cond i t io ns. Albania ns are even mo re conc e r ned by the fact that ma ny of

t he police of f icers and Ministry of the Int e r ior troops involved in polic i ng the de m i l i t arized zone are the same ind i v iduals who patrolled the area under Milosevic, and in some

c i rc u ms t a nces committed crimes against the Albanian populatio n .

Add i t io na l l y, ma ny Albania ns feel that ethnic int e g ra t ion, the return of Albania ns who

fled from Kosovo, and the impro v e me nt of the econo m ic situa t ion are not occurring fa s t

e nough. They complain that the re is no real mechanism for promised changes to occur,

a nd no specific forum for them to air their conc e r ns. Albanian une m p l o y me nt re ma i ns

h igh, and those fo r mer UCPMB members who re c e ntly turned in their weapons now find

t he mselves with no jobs and few prospects to ma ke a de c e nt living. Whe t her this situat ion will incite a return to UCPMB vio l e nce re ma i ns uncertain, but re c e nt reports of a

re s u rge nt UCPMB in southern Serbia are cause for conc e r n .

A related issue that re ma i ns cont e nt ious for Albania ns is re c o g n i t ion in Serbia of

de g rees conferred by the unof f ic ial university in Kosovo run by Albania ns du r i ng the

M i l o s e v ic period and attended by Albania ns from the Presevo Va l l e y. The Serbian go ve r n me nt cont i nues to refuse to accept these de g re e s, primarily because the diploma s

state that the de g ree was achieved in the Republic of Kosova. This irritates Albania ns

a nd hinders their ability to get jobs re q u i r i ng university de g re e s, inc l ud i ng promised jobs

in the public adm i n i s t ra t io n .

International Community Pe r s p e c t i ve s

For the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, the settleme nt of the situa t ion in southern Serbia was seen

as a victory for the new de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt in Belgra de, and as a possible mo del for de a li ng with the Albanian guerrillas in Ma c e do n ia. NATO go v e r n me nts were particularly pleased

that the re b e l l ion was halted through political dia l o g u e, without the need for NATO military

a c t ion. Add i t io na l l y, the Serbian go v e r n me nt has been praised for working with the Albania n

p o p u l a t ion to address their grie v a nc e s, as well as for coopera t i ng with NATO and the West in

de v e l o p i ng a compre he nsive solution. The int e r na t io nal community has also ma de it clear,

ho w e v e r, that Serbia must take steps to improve its tre a t me nt of ethnic Albania ns, and ma ke

good on its promises to int e g rate them into police and political ins t i t u t io ns. 

T he int e r na t io nal community also saw the Presevo settleme nt as a me a ns of discoura g i ng Albania ns thro u g hout the re g ion from using vio l e nce to achieve their go a l s. Southern Serbia NATO envoy Peter Feith stated that the re s o l u t ion to the fig ht i ng “sends a

s t ro ng sig nal to the re g ion as a who l e, especially to the Albanian community in and

a ro u nd Kosovo, that armed vio l e nce has no future, and that it is best to pursue the i r

p o l i t ical aspira t io ns through political me a ns.” 

While pro g ress has been ma de between Belgra de and the Albania ns in the Pre s e v o

Va l l e y, the situa t ion is not completely re s o l v e d. The new leadership in Belgra de seems

to have learned from the mistakes ma de by the Milosevic go v e r n me nt re g a rd i ng Ko s o v o ,

a nd has thus far handled the situa t ion well. Belgra de has begun the process of int eg ra t i ng the Albania ns into police fo rces and other ins t i t u t io ns in the re g ion. Ho w e v e r,

this process is far from complete, and must cont i nue if re l a t io ns are to truly impro v e

between Serbs and Albania ns in the are a .

M a ny Albanians are

a p p re h e n s i ve re g a rding Serbian

plans to integrate the Albanian

population into police and government institutions, and fear

that once international intere s t

in Pre s evo wa n e s, so will

Serbian efforts to improve

Albanian living conditions. 

For the international community,

the settlement of the situation in

southern Serbia was seen as a 

v i c tory for the new democra t i c

g overnment in Belgra d e, and as a

possible model for dealing with the

Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia.
9

Po l i cy Options

C u r re nt l y, the int e r na t io nal community has two policy optio ns in re g a rd to the settleme nt in southern Serbia. The first option is to re main relatively uninvolved in the impleme nt a t ion of the agre e me nt, and let Serbian and Albanian autho r i t ies work it out

t he ms e l v e s. A second option calls for int e nse int e r na t io nal involveme nt in overseeing

t he impleme nt a t ion of the May agre e me nt. By do i ng this, the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y

could better assure that Serbs or Albania ns, fa c i ng une m p l o y me nt and poverty, would

not turn to vio l e nce as a me a ns of re s o l v i ng their grie v a nc e s.

As the situa t ion stand s, both Albania ns and Serbs in the Presevo Valley feel that NATO

a nd the int e r na t io nal community have abando ned them, largely as a result of int e ns i f ie d

i nt e r na t io nal int e rest in the Ma c e do n ian conflict. Both Serbs and Albania ns feel that

c o nt i nued NATO eng a ge me nt would pro v ide stability while int e g ra t ion occurs in southern Serbia, as well as a sense of security that no other guerrilla groups will de c ide to

t a ke up arms and de s t roy the fragile peace that now ex i s t s. On a pra c t ical level, inc re a s e d

i nt e r na t io nal attent ion to the impleme nt a t ion of re fo r ms in southern Serbia now mig ht

p re v e nt a mo re serious conflict later.

M o n t e n e g ro: Bulwark of Stability?

Albanian Pe r s p e c t i ve s

S i nce the late 1990s and the rise of Milo Djuka no v ic, Mo nt e ne g ro has successfully ma na ge d

to int e g rate its Albanian minority into its political system. Ho w e v e r, Albania ns in Mo nt e ne g ro still have conc e r ns, ma ny of which are similar to those of other Albania ns in the

re g ion. Ma ny feel that they are unde r re p re s e nted in go v e r n me nt of f ices and public adm i ni s t ra t ion bodie s, and that electoral promises are not always fulfilled once a ruling coalitio n

c o mes into power. Ne v e r t he l e s s, Albania ns ackno w l e dge that efforts to deal with the s e

c o nc e r ns through further int e g ra t ion of the Albanian population into Mo nt e negrin socie t y

a nd the go v e r n me nt have been largely successful. Albanian support for Mo nt e negrin indep e nde nce reflects in part confide nce in Mo nt e ne g ro’s leadership and ins t i t u t io ns.

Montenegrin Pe r s p e c t i ve s

T he int e g ra t ion of Albania ns into the political system has been do ne through a nu m b e r

of me c h a n i s ms, but primarily through Mo nt e ne g ro’s cons t i t u t ion. The Mo nt e negrin 

c o ns t i t u t ion focuses mo re on civil and hu man rig hts than do others in the re g ion, whic h

has allowed the go v e r n me nt to create org a n i z a t io ns to monitor minority rig ht s. One suc h

o rg a n i z a t ion is the re c e ntly created Ministry for the Pro t e c t ion of the Rig hts of Pe r s o ns

B e l o ng i ng to Ethnic and Na t io nal Mino r i t ie s, which is he a ded by an Albanian. Other gua ra ntees inc l ude a cons t i t u t io nal pro v i s ion that re q u i res five parlia me ntary seats to be

reserved for ethnic Albania ns. 

Add i t io na l l y, the Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt has cons i s t e ntly pursued polic ies de s ig ne d

to pre v e nt ethnic vio l e nce from erupting, and has go ne out of its way to assist Albania ns in the re g ion, especially du r i ng the war in Kosovo in 1999. Serbian na t io nalist camp a ig n i ng in the last parlia me ntary electio ns was, ho w e v e r, a re m i nder that ethnic

t e ns io ns could be ignited in Mo nt e ne g ro if the opposition comes to power.

International Community Pe r s p e c t i ve s

T he int e r na t io nal community has been less conc e r ned with the lot of Albania ns in 

Mo nt e ne g ro than with Mo nt e ne g ro’s drive for inde p e nde nc e. Some believe Mo nt e ne g r i n

Albanian support fo r

Montenegrin independence

reflects in part confidence in

M o n t e n e g ro’s leadership and

i n s t i t u t i o n s.

The Montenegrin gove r n m e n t

has consistently pursued

policies designed to preve n t

ethnic violence from erupting,

and has gone out of its way to

assist Albanians in the re g i o n ,

especially during the war in

Ko s ovo in 1999.
1 0

i nde p e nde nce would raise a new Albanian issue in the Balka ns, because it would enc o u ra ge Albanian aspira t io ns to join Kosovo. Others believe—with mo re reason—that Albanian support for inde p e nde nce reflects real satisfa c t ion with the Djuka no v ic go v e r n me nt

a nd doubts about re ma i n i ng in Yu go s l a v ia. Support for Yu go s l a v ia and opposition to

i nde p e nde nce alig ns the int e r na t io nal community with Serb na t io nalists and ant i - re fo r m

fo rces in Belgra de and Po dgo r ica. 

Po l i cy Options

It is clear that if ant i - i nde p e nde nce fo rces led by pro - Yu go s l a v ia Serb na t io nalists come

to power in Mo nt e ne g ro the re will be serious pro b l e ms in the Albanian commu n i t y. If

Mo nt e ne g ro de c ides in favor of inde p e nde nc e, it is unlikely that its polic ies toward Alban ia ns and other mino r i t ies will change. The int e r na t io nal community needs to re c o g n i z e

t he steps Mo nt e ne g ro has taken to protect its Albanian minority and enc o u ra ge the go ve r n me nt to do mo re of the same. Recognition of inde p e nde nce should de p e nd on gua ra ntees of respect for minority rig ht s. 

While Mo nt e ne g ro is not perfect, it illustrates that in the Balka ns, We s t e r n - s t y l e

de mo c racy can accommo date a substant ial ethnic minority in a way that allows sovere ig nty and territorial integrity to be re s p e c t e d. Mo nt e ne g ro's success also shows that

e t h n ic diversity need not be an obstacle to a stro ng de mo c ra t ic state, but ra t her that it

can serve as an asset.

Albania: Part of the Solution? 

A l b a n ia has had a difficult tra ns i t ion from a closed, communist society to an open,

de mo c ra t ic one. These diffic u l t ies have involved political assassina t io ns, the bre a kdown of law and orde r, and a virtual security and econo m ic collapse in 1997. Albania ’ s

i nt e r nal pro b l e ms have ma de it difficult for Albania to support a pan-Albanian mo v eme nt or better tre a t me nt for Albanian mino r i t ies in other Balkan count r ie s. Still, Alban ia is seen by some in the Balka ns as the “mo t her country” that will one day unite all

A l b a n ia ns in the re g ion. This has caused count r ies in the re g ion with substant ia l

A l b a n ian mino r i t ies to view Albania with distrust, especially conc e r n i ng its ultima t e

t e r r i t o r ial aspira t io ns and the flow of arms from Albania that can reach Albania ns

t h ro u g hout the Balka ns. 

F rom the inc e p t ion of the most re c e nt crises in Presevo and Ma c e do n ia, the Albanian go v e r n me nt has been unw i l l i ng to support the goals of ins u rge nts in either are a .

P re s ide nt Rex hep Me idani has criticized the vio l e nce in Ma c e do n ia, and stated that

Ma c e do n ian stability is absolutely necessary for re g io nal stability. Similarly, Prime Minister Ilir Meta has re i t e rated that Albania does not support any border changes in the

P resevo Va l l e y, nor the actio ns of the ins u rge nts in the re g io n .

As it becomes mo re stable and pro s p e ro u s, Albania will become mo re influent ial in

t he Balka ns, especially on matters re l a t i ng to the tre a t me nt of Albania ns. Some Alban ia ns alre a dy see Albania as a source of support and pro t e c t ion. Within the int e r nat io nal commu n i t y, Albania is inc re a s i ngly seen as a country that is conc e r ned fo r

A l b a n ian mino r i t ie s, but not willing to risk re g io nal instability by supporting ra d ic a l

A l b a n ian eleme nt s. 

T he Albanian go v e r n me nt deserves to be applauded for the re s p o nsible positio ns

it has taken on the re c e nt vio l e nc e, and Albania should cont i nue to enc o u ra ge ethn ic Albania ns in the Balka ns not to use fo rce as a me a ns of re s o l v i ng their grie v a nc e s.

Because Albania occupies a special position on Albanian issues in the Balka ns, it

must cont i nue to steer such conflicts toward peaceful re s o l u t io ns that are fair to all

i n v o l v e d. Fortuna t e l y, this seems to be widely recognized within the Albanian go ve r n me nt .

While Montenegro is not perfect,

it illustrates that in the Balkans,

Western-style democra cy can

accommodate a substantial ethnic

minority in a way that allows 

s ove reignty and territorial 

integrity to be re s p e c t e d .

Albania is seen by some in 

the Balkans as the “mother country” that will one day unite all

Albanians in the region. 

Within the international

c o m m u n i t y, Albania is

i n c reasingly seen as a country

that is concerned for Albanian

m i n o r i t i e s, but not willing to

risk regional instability by 

supporting radical Albanian 

e l e m e n t s. 
1 1

Po l i cy Options

A l b a n ia’s re l a t io nship with Albania ns who live in ne ig h b o r i ng count r ies and with the

go v e r n me nts of those count r ies will be critical to stability in the re g ion. Ma ny Albania ns thro u g hout the Balka ns would like to see much freer mo v e me nt and exc h a nge amo ng

t heir commu n i t ies in Albania, Mo nt e ne g ro, Kosovo, Ma c e do n ia, and Serbia. Ho w e v e r, the

only way to achieve mo re liberal border re g i mes is through confide nce and trust. Ma c edo n ia and Yu go s l a v ia will not allow this to occur if they believe it will be used to unde rm i ne the integrity of their states. Regaining fre e dom of mo v e me nt for ord i nary citizens

will also re q u i re an end to fre e dom of mo v e me nt for ins u rge nts or smu g g l e r s. Albania

can do a great deal to end tra f f ic k i ng of this sort. 

A l b a n ia can also contribute by cont i nu i ng to build a viable state and a stro ng de mo cracy within its borde r s. Albania ns in Albania can act as mo dels for Albania ns whe rever the y

l i v e, and at the same time enc o u ra ge them to live their lives as citizens of other count r ie s.

C o n c l u s i o n s

Ten years of war and ethnic conflict in the Balka ns have left the re g ion far behind the

rest of Cent ral and Eastern Europe in the tra ns i t ion to de mo c racy and free ma r ke t

e c o no m ie s. Albania ns, along with others in the re g ion, will benefit if the relatively ne w

a nd de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nts in Cro a t ia, Bosnia, Serbia, Mo nt e ne g ro, and Albania can

f i nd their way toward establishing the rule of law, opening tra de and investme nt flows,

i nc re a s i ng fre e dom of mo v e me nt, and fig ht i ng organized crime and corruption. For the

first time, almost all of the go v e r n me nts in the Balka ns are de mo c ra t ically elected and

a re voic i ng their de s i re to end, once and for all, the conflicts that began in the early

1 9 9 0 s. The curre nt situa t ion pro v ides unique opportunities for all the go v e r n me nts in the

re g ion to work toge t her on an unpre c e de nted scale.

Na t io nalist ex t remism amo ng a relative few is now the major security threat to the

re g ion. Albania ns, mistreated by the Milosevic re g i me in Serbia and discoura ged by the

lack of pro g ress in Ma c e do n ia, have not been immu ne to ex t remist appeals. Crime and

c o r r u p t ion have helped to fuel na t io nalist vio l e nc e, amo ng Albania ns as it did pre v io u sly amo ng other ethnic gro u p s.

Stability in the Balka ns has become a long-term mission for NATO and the EU. Only

by of f e r i ng the prospect of close associa t ion with European and tra ns - At l a nt ic ins t i t ut io ns can the int e r na t io nal community hope to create the rig ht inc e ntives in the Balka ns. And only in a re g ion that finds its proper place in Europe can the Albanian quest ion at long last be re s o l v e d.

A l b a n i a n s, along with others in

the region, will benefit if the

re l a t i vely new and democra t i c

g overnments in Croatia, Bosnia,

Serbia, Montenegro, and

Albania can find their wa y

towa rd establishing the rule 

of law, opening trade and

i n vestment flow s, incre a s i n g

f reedom of movement, and

fighting organized crime and

c o r r u p t i o n .
For mo re info r ma t ion, see our 

website (www. u s i p . o rg), which has an

o n l i ne edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related websites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 7 7

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036

Of Related Intere s t

Ma ny other public a t io ns from the United States Institute of Peace address issues that

relate directly to the Balka ns and European security. 

Recent Institute reports include:

Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia

( S p e c ial Report, August 2001)

American Civilian Police in Peace Operations ( S p e c ial Report, July 2001)

Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce, or Something Else? by Stojan Cero v ic (Spec ial Report, April 2001)

The Future of Macedonia: A Balkan Survivor Now Needs Refo r m ( S p e c ial Report, Ma rc h

2 0 0 1 )

Europe in the 21st Century: A Strategy for Achieving Stable Peace ( S p e c ial Report, No v e mber 2000)

B o s n i a ’s Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond ( S p e c ial Report, November 2000)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of

Pe a c e, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-

3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_re q u e s t s @ u s i p . o rg .

Recent books from USIP Press include:

Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, edited by Chester A.

C ro c ke r, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pa mela Aall (2001)

N ATO Tr a n s formed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, by David S. Yo s t

( 1 9 9 9 )

Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex Wo r l d , edited by Chester A. Cro c ke r, Fen

Osler Hampson, and Pa mela Aall (1999)

For book sales and order info r ma t ion, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 703-

661-1590, or fax 703-661-1501.