Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 KOSOVO AIR

OPERATIONS

Need to Maintain

Alliance Cohesion

Resulted in Doctrinal

Departures

GAO-01-784
Page i GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Politically Constrained Environment Resulted in Departures From

Doctrine 5

Recent DOD Actions Address Wide Range of Doctrinal Issues 11

Observations 14

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15

Scope and Methodology 15

Appendix I Timeline of Major Events Leading Up to and

Including Operation Allied Force 18

Appendix II Political and Military Objectives of Operation

Allied Force 20

Appendix III NATO Member Nations 22

Appendix IV Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force

Studies 23

Appendix V Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After-Action

Reporting 25

Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense 30

Appendix VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 31

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Related GAO Products 32

Tables

Table 1: Significant Departures in Doctrine During Operation Allied

Force 6

Table 2: Status of Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force

Studies 23

Table 3: Status of Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After-Action

Reporting 26

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Page 1 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

July 27, 2001

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Following Operation Allied Force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s

(NATO) 1999 air operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(Yugoslavia), numerous high level U.S. military officials1

 stated that U.S.

military doctrine2

 had not been followed and that not doing so had

impeded military operations and increased risk to alliance forces.3

Doctrine is defined as the principles that shape the way the military thinks

about and trains for warfare. The U.S. military believes that its doctrine

provides a common perspective for planning and conducting effective and

efficient military operations. This report is one of a series associated with

the conduct of Operation Allied Force (see Related GAO Products at the

end of this report). This report, as you requested, addresses the following

objectives: (1) What were the significant departures from U.S. military

doctrine in Operation Allied Force and why did they occur? (2) What

recent actions has the Department of Defense (DOD) taken to address

doctrinal issues related to the U.S. military’s participation in the

operation?

To answer our first objective, we identified significant doctrinal

departures through our review of DOD and service documents and

 1

 Some of these U.S. military officials concurrently held positions in the NATO military

structure during Operation Allied Force.

2

 Unless otherwise noted, all references to doctrine refer to U.S. service and joint military

doctrine. Most doctrine related specifically to air operations originates from the Air Force

and is integrated in joint doctrine. Joint doctrine may not always be as specific as doctrinal

concepts specified in service doctrine.

3

 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federation of the republics of Serbia and

Montenegro. Kosovo and Vojvodina are provinces of Serbia.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

discussions with principal U.S. military officials in organizations such as

the U.S. European Command, the Joint Task Force Noble Anvil,4

 and the

NATO Combined Air Operations Center.5

 To answer our second objective,

however, we focused on a wider range of doctrinal issues, drawing upon

DOD reviews of the lessons learned from the operation and the status of

actions taken to address those lessons.

We identified seven significant departures from U.S. military doctrine

during Operation Allied Force. These departures ranged from not having

clear and attainable objectives to not following various principles

associated with conducting an air campaign to not having a fully

functional command structure. These doctrinal departures were largely

the result of the NATO alliance’s desire to maintain alliance cohesion. To

maintain cohesion, the alliance initially adopted an operation of limited

scope and duration with vague objectives, and it emphasized avoiding

collateral damage and alliance force casualties. The vague and less

decisive objectives were not easily attainable through military means as

recommended in doctrine. Limiting the scope of the campaign prevented

the military from targeting as called for in doctrine. In addition, concern

about collateral damage did not allow the military to strike vital targets in

as decisive a manner as recommended in doctrine. The alliance's desire to

avoid casualties led it to exclude the use of alliance ground forces.

Without alliance ground forces to draw out enemy forces, finding,

identifying, and targeting Yugoslavian ground forces from the air in a

doctrinal manner were more difficult tasks. Finally, the belief that the

operation would be of short duration led to a joint task force that was not

formed according to doctrine. The NATO alliance members remained

united throughout the operation, perhaps because of these doctrinal

departures. However, many U.S. participants in the operation believed that

these departures resulted in a longer campaign, more damage to

Yugoslavia, and greater risk to alliance forces than likely would have

occurred if doctrine had been followed.

DOD has taken actions to address shortcomings in strategic, operational,

and tactical doctrine as a result of Operation Allied Force. For example,

DOD recently issued a new doctrine publication dedicated to providing

 4

 Joint Task Force Noble Anvil controlled the employment and integration of U.S. assets

into Operation Allied Force and was responsible for all NATO targeting.

5

 The Combined Air Operations Center planned, directed, and executed the NATO air

operation in support of Operation Allied Force.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

guidance for multinational operations. Its primary aims are to convey the

fundamentals of multinational operations, such as command relationships,

and the factors affecting the planning and execution of these operations,

including those concerning political, linguistic, cultural, and sovereignty

issues. In addition, a number of Air Force publications have been revised

to reflect lessons learned from the Air Force’s assessment of the air

campaign. For example, the Air Force found little information in doctrine

publications that described how to tie selected targets to intended effects,

and it determined that the concept needed to be addressed formally

through doctrine. Consequently, Air Force doctrine is being revised. In

addition, shortly after the close of Operation Allied Force, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff collected lessons learned from the military services, commands,

and other DOD agencies. This effort led to a number of changes to existing

joint doctrine as well as the development of new joint doctrine

publications, many related to tactical operations. For example, because

commanders did not have adequate information on the status of shipped

items, their ability to manage resources was impeded. After the operation,

many joint doctrine publications were revised to ensure that the

commanders receive timely and complete resource data.

Despite the many activities under way in DOD and the services to study

these doctrinal issues and adjust military doctrine, we offer some

observations for decision-makers to consider about the conduct of military

operations in a multinational environment.

The NATO alliance, which consists of the United States and 18 additional

nations, began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March

24, 1999. (Appendix I contains a timeline of events during the planning and

execution of Operation Allied Force.) This military campaign was the

largest combat operation in NATO’s 50-year history. The NATO alliance

initially adopted a limited response envisioned to be a 2-day air strike. The

NATO alliance planned to use air strikes as a means to compel President

Milosevic to cease the violence in Kosovo and allow all refugees to return

to their homes, which would restore peace throughout the Balkan region.

(Appendix II provides a further description of the political and military

objectives of Operation Allied Force.) When the initial attacks did not

achieve NATO’s objectives, the air campaign gradually grew in intensity to

an around-the-clock air combat operation, which lasted for 78 days. The

United States was a major participant in this NATO-led operation. The

United States provided about 70 percent of the aircraft to the operation

and over 60 percent of the total sorties during the operation.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

The 19 NATO member nations have disparate histories and interests, and

this led to varied support for this operation, which was outside of NATO’s

central mission to provide for the collective defense of its members. The

19 NATO member nations are shown in appendix III. For example, one

member nation, which shared religious and cultural backgrounds with the

Kosovar Albanians, was sympathetic to their plight, while another nation

had historic and religious ties to the Serbian Yugoslavs. Another NATO

nation was led by a coalition government, where part of the coalition

supported the NATO alliance operation while the other part of the

coalition did not want the bombing campaign to continue and said that it

would withdraw from the government if the NATO alliance used a ground

force. Even within the United States, there was not a consensus of support

for this operation.6

 Although the three newest members of the NATO

alliance supported the operation, the level of support expressed by their

governments varied.7

 For example, although one nation offered NATO

forces the use of its air space and military airfields, it was concerned about

Yugoslavian retaliation against a minority population in Yugoslavia that

was ethnically related to this nation.

Military doctrine provides the fundamental principles of how best to

employ the national military power to achieve strategic, operational, and

tactical ends. Each of the U.S. services has doctrine to guide the

employment of its forces, and the military has joint doctrine for operations

involving two or more services. Joint doctrine takes precedence over

individual service doctrine, and service doctrine must be consistent with

joint doctrine. Joint doctrine states that when the United States

participates in multinational operations, U.S. commanders should follow

multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the

United States. Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or

more nations within the structure of an alliance or a coalition. An alliance

is the result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad,

long-term objectives, such as NATO. A coalition is a special arrangement

between two or more nations for a common action, such as the nations

involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq. NATO is currently

 6

 For example, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (S. Con. Res. 21) authorizing military air

operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia on March 23, 1999 (58 for, 41 against).

This resolution failed passage in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 28, 1999 (213

for, 213 against).

7

 The newest members of NATO – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – became full

members of NATO less than 2 weeks prior to the start of Operation Allied Force.
Page 5 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

developing allied joint doctrine, which is applicable to NATO-led

multinational forces conducting operations involving more than one

service.

While doctrine represents the preferred approach to employing military

power, doctrine does not replace or alter a commander’s authority or

obligation to determine the proper course of action for a specific

operation or battle.8 At the same time, the military is subject to civilian

command and control at all times; therefore, decisions made by political

leaders supercede doctrinal guidance, even if those decisions conflict with

doctrine. Doctrine continually evolves based on the experience and

outcome of military exercises and operations and changes in technology.

There are three levels of war – strategic, operational, and tactical. At the

strategic level, a nation determines security objectives and guidance and

develops and uses resources to achieve these objectives. The operational

level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are

planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives

within theaters or areas of operations. At the tactical level of war, battles

and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military

objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Based on discussions with prominent officials who participated in the

operation and on DOD and service reports documenting the doctrinal

departures, we identified seven areas in which significant departures from

military doctrine occurred during Operation Allied Force. The departures

from doctrine ranged from not having clearly defined and attainable

military objectives to not following various principles associated with

conducting air operations (from targeting to conducting strikes) to not

having a fully functional command structure. The departures were caused

in large part by the NATO alliance’s adoption of an operation of limited

scope, a great emphasis on avoiding collateral damage and alliance

casualties, and a desire to achieve its goals within a short time frame to

ensure alliance cohesion. While alliance members remained united and

achieved success in the operation, many U.S. military officials believed

that these departures resulted in a longer campaign, more damage to

Yugoslavia, and greater risk to alliance forces than likely would have

occurred if doctrine had been followed.

 8

 An operation is an arrangement of battles to achieve objectives. A battle is a series of

related encounters with an enemy’s force.

Politically

Constrained

Environment Resulted

in Departures From

Doctrine
Page 6 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Table 1 summarizes the seven doctrinal areas we identified and the

manner in which Operation Allied Force departed from them.

Table 1: Significant Departures in Doctrine During Operation Allied Force

Doctrine Departure from doctrine

Clear military objectives: Military operations should be directed

toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Objectives require an end state (required conditions that show

that the stated objectives were achieved). In addition, guidance

should be given to all personnel engaged in the operation to

provide the commander’s plan for attaining the objectives.

Objectives, an end state, and guidance should be provided at the

start of an operation.

Initial objectives were not clearly defined and militarily attainable.

The end state was not provided until about 30 days into the

operation. Formal commander’s guidance for achieving campaign

goals was not provided until approximately 6 weeks into the

operation, which limited the military’s ability to identify the effects

it should achieve.

Strategic attack: Operations should strike the enemy’s vital

interests such as command elements, war production assets, and

key supporting infrastructure.

The military was not allowed initially to use overwhelming forces

to attack many of the enemy’s vital interests. Some examples of

vital interests that could not be decisively attacked were roads

and bridges, electrical power grids, command and control

facilities, fuel storage facilities, and transportation networks. Initial

targets focused on airfields, air defense and communication

centers, military barracks, and some equipment production

centers.

Effects-based planning and operations: Operations should be

designed to generate the type and extent of effects necessary to

create outcomes that will realize the commander’s objective.

The lack of clear, consistent guidance initially limited the military’s

ability to plan for effects. Air operation officials stated that targets

were struck in a less systematic manner than needed to achieve

measurable effects because, in part, targets were approved

individually instead of as a package.

Mass and parallel operations: Forces should be concentrated

and used simultaneously against varied target sets (i.e., bridges,

communications systems, and electrical power supply). This

approach is intended to shock, disrupt, and overwhelm the

enemy.

Sporadic approval of targets limited the military’s ability to apply

concentrated effects of combat power and to simultaneously

attack multiple targets.

Air interdiction: Air operations (i.e., bombing and shooting)

should destroy, delay, or neutralize an enemy ground force. This

is usually done in support of friendly ground forces.

Air interdiction was done without using alliance ground forces to

draw out the enemy, which made it difficult to find and destroy

mobile targets.

Target approval: The military commander will approve individual

targets and determine target priorities, levels of effort, and the

sequencing of those efforts, based on guidance from political

leadership and higher military authorities.

Initially, political leadership and high level military command

provided approval of individual fixed targets, and even by the end

of the operation, the military commanders were only allowed to

approve fixed, military-related targets with estimated low levels of

collateral damage.

Formation and organization of a joint task force: A joint task

force should be representative of the force that is participating and

trained to be effective.

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil was not staffed with people

representative of the force that was participating nor was the staff

trained to conduct combat operations.

Source: GAO analysis.

Significant Departures

from Doctrine Involved

Aspects of Planning and

Executing an Air

Operation
Page 7 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

The need to build and keep a political consensus among the NATO alliance

members led to many of the departures from military doctrine. Various

alliance members were concerned about inflicting undue punishment on

Yugoslavian civilians, incurring the cost of rebuilding Yugoslavian

infrastructure, or turning public opinion against the operation. To balance

these concerns and to ensure support to begin the operation, the alliance

adopted objectives that were not clearly defined and limited the

campaign’s scope, the potential for collateral damage and allied force

casualties, and the duration of the operation. The vague objectives

adopted by NATO were difficult for the military to attain. The limited

scope of the campaign as well as concerns about collateral damage

affected the target approval process and made it difficult to conduct

strategic attack, effects-based planning, and mass and parallel operations

as described in doctrine. Concerns about alliance force casualties

diminished the effectiveness of air interdiction operations, and the

assumption that the campaign would be of short duration caused

problems in forming the joint task force.

The vague objectives were not easily attainable by the military as

recommended in doctrine. For example, one goal of the alliance’s action

was to stop the violence against the Kosovars and institute a peaceful

solution by “contributing to the response of the international community.”

According to U.S. military officials, it was difficult to translate these

objectives into a clear, attainable military plan, particularly during the first

few weeks of the campaign. Since the goals of the military action were not

to defeat the Yugoslavian leadership but to get it to stop the violence and

reach a peace agreement, it was unclear how to achieve the goals with air

operations. Several officials stated that the NATO alliance’s objective of

demonstrating resolve led initially to approved targets that were selected

to show that the NATO alliance was serious rather than tied to a coherent

military plan. It was not until the objectives were clearer with defined end

states, about 1 month into the operation, that the military leaders

developed guidance that could be translated into a coherent campaign.

The alliance’s decision to limit the scope of the campaign by initially using

minimum force in achieving its objectives prevented the military from

targeting what it considered some of the enemy’s vital interests during the

early stages of the campaign as called for by strategic attack doctrine. The

alliance decided that it would use an incremental air campaign, which

would strike Yugoslavia in a carefully controlled way in the hope that the

initial strikes would quickly convince Yugoslavian President Milosevic of

the NATO alliance’s determination, causing him to back down and accept

its terms. If the alliance’s terms were not accepted, it would gradually

Doctrinal Departures Were

Largely the Result of Need

to Maintain Alliance

Cohesion

Unclear Objectives

Limited Scope
Page 8 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

escalate the intensity of the air campaign. For example, the alliance

approved only about 50 carefully chosen military targets prior to the

campaign. The alliance expected to strike these initial targets, which were

mostly air defense systems, within 2 days. There were no targets approved

for locations in downtown Belgrade to avoid the appearance of conducting

a war against the people of Yugoslavia. Senior military commanders

wanted to focus strikes on targets in downtown Belgrade, which they

believed would be more likely to influence Yugoslavia’s leadership to

accept the alliance’s terms. One high ranking military commander involved

in the air operation stated that he would have destroyed the bridges across

the Danube and would have hit five or six political-military headquarters in

downtown Belgrade immediately. According to the official, the way to

achieve the NATO alliance’s objectives would have been to disable the

Serb leadership as rapidly and as decisively as possible. Instead, according

to this and other U.S. military officials, political pressures from the

alliance led to a selection of scattered targets.

To ensure that collateral damage was limited, alliance members were

involved in the approval of individual fixed targets, which was not

consistent with military doctrine.9

 The alliance emphasized avoiding

collateral damage because it was concerned that unfavorable public

opinion could fracture the alliance. According to doctrine, the military

commander of the operation would have much more discretion in

selecting and prioritizing the individual targets to be struck. However,

alliance members wanted to review individual targets to assess the

potential for collateral damage and the sensitivity of the targets. This

approach led to reviews by multiple levels of command above the

commanding general that often included reviews by the U.S. National

Command Authorities, NATO’s North Atlantic Council, and some

individual alliance members. This cumbersome review process often took

an additional 2 weeks to get individual targets approved. A Center for

Naval Analysis report on targeting stated that of 778 fixed targets that

were approved by the commanding general, 495, or about 64 percent,

required a higher level of approval. At the end of the operation, over 150

targets were still waiting approval. The high level concern about collateral

damage also led to some approved targets being canceled, which caused

some missions to be canceled at the last minute or aborted while aircraft

 9

 The commanding general had the authority to approve fixed targets that would potentially

cause less than 20 civilian casualties and mobile targets. This authority was only given to

him later in the operation.

Collateral Damage Concerns
Page 9 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

were en route. Several senior Air Force officials believed this led to an

inefficient use of assets.

Officials at the air operation center stated that the high level approval

process also led to approved targets being provided on a sporadic basis,

which limited the military’s ability to achieve planned effects and mass

and parallel operations as recommended in doctrine. For example, to

achieve the effect of stopping production of an oil refinery, one official

said that several targets were identified and submitted for approval.

However, the approval was provided only for some of those targets, which

reduced the effectiveness of the strike since the refinery was not totally

disabled. Moreover, several officials said that the process could not

produce enough targets in a timely manner for the number of aircraft

involved to conduct parallel and simultaneous operations as called for in

mass and parallel attack doctrine.

In an attempt to reduce public concern about the potential of allied

casualties, the NATO alliance publicly stated that it would not use ground

forces by directing its militaries not to plan for a ground phase of the

campaign. This limitation made it difficult for air forces to find and target

enemy ground forces without the use or threat of use of supporting ground

forces, as preferred in military doctrine. U.S. military officials familiar with

the air interdiction operations against the Yugoslavian army stated that

they were not prepared to conduct these operations without the support of

ground forces. To conduct air interdiction without ground forces

necessitated air planners to develop tactics for locating mobile targets

without the assistance of ground forces who normally perform the

mission. Finding targets was also difficult because the Yugoslavian forces

were able to disperse since they did not have to mass to prepare to

encounter allied ground forces.

Targeting enemy ground forces was further complicated by concerns that

alliance aircraft were vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft weapons that could

be launched from ground sites. As a result, alliance aircraft were initially

restricted from flying below 15,000 feet. While this restriction reduced the

risk for alliance casualties, it made it more difficult to positively identify

enemy targets. Later in the operation, the altitude restriction was lowered

in Kosovo to allow aircrews to more accurately identify mobile targets in

order to reduce the potential for collateral damage.

Casualty Concerns
Page 10 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Based on the NATO alliance’s previous experience during Deliberate

Force10 and earlier threats of air strikes in 1998, alliance members believed

that only a few days of strikes would be necessary to get the Yugoslavian

leader to comply with the alliance’s demands. Some senior U.S. officials

indicated that they doubted that the air campaign would have ever begun

if some alliance members believed it was going to take almost 3 months to

complete the operation. The expected short duration of the campaign may

have ensured the alliance’s support, but it complicated the planning for the

operation and led to doctrinal departures.

The formation of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, which oversaw much of

the operation, was a prominent example of how the expectation of a short

campaign caused departures in doctrine. Because a short campaign was

anticipated, the joint task force was not staffed with people trained to

conduct combat operations, nor was it established with all the functional

areas that normally comprise a joint task force. For example, the task

force’s commander decided that it would be more expedient to use staff

primarily from U.S. Naval Forces Europe, although some of these officials

have described their peacetime role as administrative and most of these

personnel had little experience in conducting combat operations. As a

result, the joint task force staff was receiving on-the-job combat training at

the same time they were planning the air campaign. Officials also stated

that the short campaign assumption was a factor in using primarily naval

personnel to be the core of the joint task force rather than being

representative of the services participating in the operation as

recommended in doctrine. Since the commander of the joint task force

also commanded U.S. Naval Forces Europe, it was more expedient to use

this headquarters staff for the joint task force. Some air operations

officials stated that by not having more senior officials trained in air

operations in the joint task force, it took weeks for the joint task force to

become an efficient organization. Also, certain functional areas of the task

force, such as intelligence and planning, were not initially formed because

those functional areas would not have been needed in a short campaign

where the targets had already been identified and approved. Once it

became apparent that the operation would last longer than a few days,

officials stated they had to concurrently complete the formation of the

joint task force and oversee the operation, an approach that was less than

optimal.

 10 Deliberate Force was the 21-day 1995 NATO Balkan air campaign against Bosnians of

Serbian ethnicity supported by President Milosevic.

Short Duration Expected
Page 11 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

U.S. officials cited several overall effects that doctrine departures had on

the execution of Operation Allied Force. The effects mentioned were a

lengthened campaign, additional damage to Yugoslavia, and increased risk

to alliance participants. Several officials believed that not following

doctrine likely lengthened the campaign. While their estimates varied,

some senior officials estimated that the campaign was 2-3 times longer

than it would have been without these concerns. One official estimated

that it is likely that a more decisive campaign would have lasted a few

weeks rather than almost 3 months if one of the initial plans developed by

the United States, which adhered to accepted military doctrine, had been

adopted.11 These estimates were largely based on the belief that the

incremental campaign adopted by NATO gave the Yugoslavian forces the

opportunity to adjust to the offensive and possibly led the Milosevic

government to underestimate the alliance’s determination. In addition,

other officials thought that the incremental campaign may have led to

more overall damage to Yugoslavia. They believed that some targets of

limited military value would not have been struck if overwhelming force

on Yugoslavia’s vital interests was used at the outset of the operations.

Some officials also cited an increased risk to alliance forces because of the

decision to pursue targets of limited military value, such as previously

damaged targets and dispersed enemy fielded forces. Because Yugoslavia’s

air defenses had not been destroyed, alliance pilots were at risk every time

they had to enter any part of Yugoslavia. One high ranking official

indicated that it was not uncommon for 15 sorties12 to be needed to

destroy one enemy tank.

DOD has taken a number of actions that address doctrinal issues,

including many of those addressed in the previous section.13 DOD’s

recently issued joint publication for multinational operations conveys

more detailed guidance than had been previously available to

commanders. Although not available prior to Operation Allied Force,

commanders now have available a more detailed discussion on the

strategic context of multinational operations, as well as command

relationships and considerations for planning and execution of operations

conducted within the structure of an alliance. After assessing its

 11 Prior to the start of Operation Allied Force, U.S. military planners developed a number of

plans for conducting combat operations against Yugoslavia.

12 A sortie is one mission or attack by a single plane.

13 In some instances, doctrine was deemed sufficient but was not followed.

Senior U.S. Officials Cited

Several Overall Effects of

Doctrine Departures

Recent DOD Actions

Address Wide Range

of Doctrinal Issues
Page 12 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

participation in Operation Allied Force, the Air Force identified a number

of problematic issues relating to service and joint doctrine and

subsequently revised a number of its doctrine publications. Additionally,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in concert with other services, is considering

whether issues related to targeting, strategic attack, and effects-based

operations should be addressed in joint doctrine. Finally, during the

closing days of Operation Allied Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff collected

lessons learned from the military services, commands, and other DOD

agencies as a result of their participation in the operation. An assessment

of these lessons learned resulted in a number of changes to joint doctrine.

In April 2000, DOD published its Joint Doctrine for Multinational

Operations, which was being developed prior to and at the time of

Operation Allied Force. This publication provides commanders with more

detailed guidance on these operations and is consistent with NATO

doctrine across the full range of operations, from combat to humanitarian

assistance. Its primary aims are to convey the fundamentals of

multinational operations, command relationships, and considerations to

be addressed during the planning and execution of these operations,

including factors concerning political, linguistic, cultural, and sovereignty

issues. Military commanders should expect a high level of political

involvement in the future, regardless of whether the multinational

operation involves war, a mission other than a large-scale war, or a

peacetime engagement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believes the multinational

operations doctrine is a major step forward in the development of joint

doctrine and for the integration of future multinational forces.

The Air Force, a major U.S. participant in Operation Allied Force,

completed two reviews of the operation. First, The Air War Over Serbia:

Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force provides the Air Force’s

perspective on its participation in the air war. By assessing its

participation, the Air Force hoped to determine what it needs to do better

in the future and to decide how it can best organize, train, and equip to

meet future requirements. The second, the Operation Allied Force

Doctrine Summit, was specifically convened to assess the strategic- and

operational-level doctrinal issues arising from the Air Force’s participation

in Operation Allied Force.

As a result of these assessments, the Air Force identified a number of

issues that needed to be addressed in both Air Force and joint doctrine.

Consequently, the Air Force is revising a number of its doctrine

publications. For example, the Air Force identified problems that arose

from the use of an incremental targeting plan during the operation rather

New Joint Doctrine

Publication Focuses on

Operations with Other

Nations

Air Force Takes Action to

Improve Operational

Doctrine
Page 13 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

than the more preferred approach, known as effects-based operations. The

preferred approach begins with the identification of the desired effect and

ends with a selection of targets and a plan designed to achieve the

intended effect. The Air Force found that although this was the preferred

approach used by airmen, it was not well documented in its doctrine

publications and this hindered its efforts to convince leadership on the

merits of an effects-based operational approach. Consequently, four Air

Force doctrine publications are being revised. For instance, the draft

publications state that commanders must be prepared to cope with

political and diplomatic constraints that may affect the planning and

execution of strategic attack operations and provide some suggestions to

help meet these challenges. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

considering many of the Air Force’s doctrinal issues, such as targeting,

strategic attack, and effects-based operations, as part of its doctrine

review and development process. Information on other issues being

addressed within Air Force and joint doctrine can be found in appendix IV.

In the closing days of Operation Allied Force, the Secretary of Defense

directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify the lessons

learned from the operation that were most critical to future joint

operations. About 300 individual responses from the unified commanders,

military services, defense agencies, and defense offices were received. The

responses encompassed a wide variety of both issues and observations

pertaining to logistics, personnel, communications, intelligence, as well as

other areas. We identified 26 issues that pertained to doctrine.14

For the past year, the Joint Staff has been working to resolve these issues.

Our analysis of the issues and actions taken thus far fell into three broad

categories:

• Instances where doctrine was found to be valid and not the root of the

problem. In many of these cases, doctrine that addressed the situation

existed but was not followed or implemented. In several cases, training

was the remedial action recommended. For example, one issue involved

coordination problems between services in identifying in-theater sources

of common supplies. The Joint Staff found that joint doctrine for logistics

adequately assigned responsibility for this function, but it was not properly

 14 Either the issue or the problem, as stated, identified a shortcoming or gap in doctrine or

the remedial action taken to correct the problem involved developing or revising doctrine.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Takes

Action to Remedy

Doctrinal Issues
Page 14 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

implemented. The Joint Staff will monitor the activity during an upcoming

training exercise.

• Instances where gaps or shortcomings in doctrine were found. In these

cases, the remedial action taken was to revise or develop doctrine to

address the issue. For example, because commanders did not have

adequate information on the status of shipped items, their ability to

manage resources was impeded. Twenty-six joint doctrine publications

have been revised to ensure that the commanders receive timely and

complete resource data.

• Instances where DOD has not fully resolved the issue. In some of these

cases, DOD will need the involvement of NATO to resolve the issue. For

example, the Joint Staff believed that doctrinal agreements between NATO

members would facilitate standardization of equipment, munitions, and

communications in order to minimize problems with interoperability when

operating within a multinational environment. The issue was passed on to

the Defense Capabilities Initiative as the preferred pathway to resolving

the issue.

Information on the issues being addressed by the Joint Staff can be found

in appendix V.

The NATO alliance succeeded in achieving the goals of Operation Allied

Force–Yugoslavian forces were removed from Kosovo, refugees returned,

and a peacekeeping force was put in place, with no allied combat

fatalities. Through it all, the NATO allies stayed united and learned much

about working together as a combat force.

These achievements, though, did not come easily, and the departures from

accepted U.S. military doctrine that we described in this report were

troubling for many U.S. military commanders and planners involved in the

operation. DOD has made efforts to address these and other issues

through revisions in its doctrine, and many activities are underway in DOD

and the services to study these issues and adjust military doctrine.

Nevertheless, we are providing two observations for both the executive

and legislative branches to consider about the nature of conducting

military operations in a multinational environment.

• The challenges of dealing with the constraints of working within a

multinational environment may not be completely resolved through the

development of new joint multinational operations doctrine and revisions

to joint and service doctrine. These revisions to doctrine will likely not be

Observations
Page 15 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

able to provide conclusive solutions to these issues because each

multinational operation will differ according to the nations that participate

and the extent of their interests.

• Future multinational operations, particularly those where vital interests

are not at stake, will likely continue to emphasize avoiding collateral

damage and multinational force casualties. These concerns will likely

weigh as heavily in the decision-making process as achieving the military

objectives, and therefore, military commanders of multinational

operations should not expect to always apply decisive military force with a

strict adherence to military doctrine. As a result, to balance the variety of

interests and concerns that arise during multinational operations, these

operations may not be conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations

that more closely follow U.S. military doctrine, which may lead to higher

costs.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the

contents of the report. DOD also provided technical comments, which we

incorporated where appropriate. The comments are presented in

appendix VI.

To determine the significant departures from U.S. military doctrine in

Operation Allied Force and the reasons the departures occurred, we

reviewed DOD’s Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, the

Air Force’s The Air War Over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation

Allied Force report, the U.S. European Command’s Joint After-Action

Report, and various after-action briefings from organizations that

participated in the operation. We also examined our reports as well as

those from the Congressional Research Service and the Center for Naval

Analysis. We interviewed over 50 senior- and mid-level leaders of

Operation Allied Force, who were involved in planning, operations, and

intelligence areas, from the U.S. European Command; U.S. Air Forces,

Europe; Joint Task Force Noble Anvil; and NATO’s Combined Air

Operations Center. We included in these interviews senior leaders and

squadron commanders from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt battle group

and six Air Force air expeditionary wings. The officers interviewed ranged

in rank from general/admiral to lieutenant colonel/commander and were

either active-duty or retired from the military. We solicited from each

interviewee his viewpoints on significant doctrinal issues that affected his

unit’s missions. Based on these interviews, we determined which doctrinal

issues were cited most frequently as adversely affecting the conduct of

Operation Allied Force. We also interviewed staff from DOD’s Balkans

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Scope and

Methodology
Page 16 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Task Force. In addition, we reviewed current and draft joint, Air Force,

and Navy doctrine publications. For this analysis of doctrinal issues from

Operation Allied Force, we reviewed U.S. participation in the NATO

alliance’s operation. Therefore, our focus was on U.S. joint and service

doctrine only.

To determine the status of Operation Allied Force lessons learned, we

collected and reviewed the lessons learned collected by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff’s Joint Exercise and Assessment Division, which was based on

submissions from the military services, unified commanders, defense

agencies, and other defense organizations. The Joint Exercise and

Assessment Division also provided us with information regarding the

actions taken and status of each of the lessons learned. We also collected

and reviewed materials prepared by the Air Force regarding its assessment

of its participation in Operation Allied Force and the implications on

doctrine. The Navy Warfare Development Command and the Joint Forces

Command provided brief summaries of their doctrine-related issues

resulting from U.S. participation in Operation Allied Force. We recently

issued a report on the Army’s lessons learned from its participation in

Operation Allied Force – including actions taken to revise doctrine.15 The

Marine Corps, although it had submitted several lessons learned to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, made no changes to its doctrine based specifically on

its experience in Operation Allied Force. We did not assess the

appropriateness of the actions taken on the doctrinal issues or the speed

in which the recommended changes to doctrine were being implemented.

We conducted our review from June 2000 through May 2001 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 15 days from the date of

this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable

James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable Gordon R.

England, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,

Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make

copies available to others upon request.

 15 Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache

Helicopter (GAO-01-401, Mar. 2, 2001).
Page 17 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Please contact me at (757) 552-8111 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are

listed in appendix VII.

Neal P. Curtin

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading

Up to and Including Operation Allied Force

Page 18 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

1998

Early March The situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate when Yugoslavian security forces launched a series of strikes to

suppress the growing Kosovar insurgent movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. During these

strikes, the Yugoslavians used excessive force and terrorized the Kosovar civilian population.

Mar. 31 The United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1160, condemning the excessive use of force by

Yugoslavian security forces against civilians in Kosovo and also established an embargo against Yugoslavia on

arms and materials.

May The first meeting between Yugoslavian President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova, the leader of the shadow

government in Kosovo, to lay the groundwork for peace talks.

July North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance began planning for a phased air operation.

August U.S. European Command established Joint Task Force Flexible Anvil, a U.S. Navy-led command, to plan and

conduct a limited air response (quick strike, limited duration operation).

September U.S. European Command activated Joint Task Force Sky Anvil, an Air Force-led command, to plan for a

phased air operation (gradually escalating military air operation, targeting Yugoslavia’s air defense system,

command and control sites, fielded forces, and targets of military significance first in Kosovo, then in the rest of

Yugoslavia).

Sept. 23 The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199, which called for a cease fire in Yugoslavia, the

withdrawal of all Yugoslavian security forces, the access for nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations,

and the return home of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Sept. 24 NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning” for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in

Kosovo.

October U.S. European Command ordered both joint task forces to disband after they finalized U.S. planning in support

of NATO planning. NATO’s contingency planning efforts continued through March 1999.

Oct. 5 The United Nations released a report critical of Yugoslavia’s compliance with the most recent Security Council

Resolution.

Oct. 25 Based on an agreement between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Yugoslavia, a

Kosovo Verification Mission was established. The purpose of the Kosovo Verification Mission was to verify

Yugoslavia’s compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199.

Dec. 23 The Yugoslavian army and the internal special police undertook military action near Podujevo, in northern

Kosovo, along the main road linking the provincial capital Pristina to Belgrade.

1999

Jan. 15-16 Yugoslavian security forces arbitrarily detained, killed, and mutilated unarmed Kosovo civilians in three Kosovo

towns.

Jan. 30 NATO’s North Atlantic Council gave NATO Secretary General Solana the authority to authorize air strikes

against targets on Yugoslavian territory.

Jan. 31 Joint Task Force Noble Anvil formed.

Feb. 6 Peace talks began in Rambouillet, France, among representatives from the Yugoslavian and the Serbian

provincial governments and representatives of Kosovo Albanians.

Mar. 15 Second round of peace negotiations at the Kleber Center in Paris, France. Kosovo Albanians signed the

proposed agreement, but Yugoslavian government officials did not sign the agreement. Almost one-third of

Yugoslavian forces were massed in and around Kosovo.

Mar. 19 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe decided to withdraw the Kosovo Verification Mission

from Kosovo.

Mar. 20 Yugoslavian forces launched a major offensive, driving thousands of Kosovo Albanians out of their homes –

executing some and displacing many others.

Mar. 23 With no concessions from Yugoslavia, NATO Secretary General Solana directed General Clark, NATO’s

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to initiate air operations in Yugoslavia.

Mar. 24 The NATO alliance air strikes, known as Operation Allied Force, began. NATO forces shot down three

Yugoslavian fighter aircraft.

Mar. 25 Target list expanded to include forces and headquarters in Kosovo.

Mar. 26 Massive group of refugees fled to Albania.

Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading

Up to and Including Operation Allied Force
Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading

Up to and Including Operation Allied Force

Page 19 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Mar. 27 U.S. F-117 downed pilot rescued.

Mar. 28 The NATO alliance authorized an expanded target list.

Mar. 30 Strikes commenced against targets throughout the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia.

Mar. 31 Three U.S. soldiers captured near Macedonian border.

Apr. 1 Bombers began attacking Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo.

Apr. 3 First NATO force strike on Belgrade –Yugoslavian and Serbian interior ministries destroyed.

Apr. 6 U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt commenced attack sorties.

Apr. 8 Targeting began against mobile targets in Kosovo.

Apr. 13 NATO alliance requested 300 additional U.S. aircraft. Deployment order issued for Task Force Hawk (a

deployment of Army Apache helicopters and supporting equipment and personnel). At NATO’s North Atlantic

Council Ministerial meeting, the alliance defined the five requirements for the end of the air campaign.

Apr. 14 Collateral damage against a civilian convoy.

Apr. 21 NATO forces struck Serbian headquarters and President Milosevic’s private residence. First Task Force Hawk

Apache helicopters arrived in Tirana, Albania.

Apr. 23 NATO 50th Anniversary Summit began in Washington, D.C. – alliance members stated the conditions that

would bring an end to the air campaign and announced that the air campaign will intensify.

Apr. 26 All Task Force Hawk Apache helicopters in Tirana, Albania.

May 1 U.S. F-16 downed, pilot rescued; NATO’s North Atlantic Council approved an expanded target list.

May 2 Three U.S. soldiers released by Yugoslavian President Milosevic.

May 5 Army Apache helicopter crashed during training, both crewmen killed.

May 7 NATO alliance planes accidentally hit Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

May 13 Unintended civilian casualties in Korisa.

May 14 The use of U.S. cluster bomb units was suspended.

May 23 The NATO alliance began bombing campaign of Yugoslavian electrical grid.

May 27 President Milosevic and our other Yugoslavian leaders were indicted by the United Nations War Crimes

Tribunal for crimes against humanity.

May 30 Yugoslavs attacked Kosovo Liberation Army on Mount Pastrik near Albanian border; unintended civilian

casualties during bridge attack in Varvarin.

June 2 Use of U.S. cluster bomb units resumed.

June 3 Yugoslavian President Milosevic agreed to the NATO alliance’s conditions to end air campaign.

June 7 The NATO alliance and Yugoslavian commanders failed to agree to terms of pullout from Kosovo and

suspended talks. The NATO alliance intensified bombing campaign.

June 9 A military technical agreement was signed between the NATO alliance and Yugoslavian representatives.

June 10 NATO Secretary General Solana called for a suspension of NATO force air strikes.

June 20 Yugoslavian forces completely withdrew from Kosovo, leading NATO Secretary General Solana to officially end

the NATO alliance’s air campaign in Yugoslavia.

July 19 Joint Task Force Noble Anvil disbanded.
Appendix II: Political and Military Objectives

of Operation Allied Force

Page 20 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

To achieve consensus among alliance members, the NATO alliance had

limited objectives in the conflict. The operation was not intended to take

the Kosovo province away from Yugoslavia or to remove Yugoslavian

President Milosevic from power. The NATO alliance used air strikes as a

means to compel President Milosevic to cease the violence in Kosovo and

allow all refugees to return to their homes, which would restore peace

throughout the Balkan region. These goals were the basis for the NATO

alliance’s political and military objectives.

The NATO alliance announced Operation Allied Force’s initial political and

military objectives on March 23, 1999–the day before the air campaign

began. The political objectives were to (1) help achieve a peaceful solution

to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international

community and (2) halt the violence and support the completion of

negotiations on an interim political solution. The corresponding NATO

alliance military objectives of the air campaign were to (1) halt the violent

attack being committed by the Yugoslav Army and security forces,

(2) disrupt their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of

Kosovo, and (3) support international efforts to secure Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia agreement to an interim political settlement.

The NATO alliance expanded its objectives by defining five requirements

for the end of the air campaign at the April 12, 1999, North Atlantic

Council Ministerial Meeting and reiterated them during the NATO 50th

Anniversary Summit on April 23, 1999. The NATO alliance stated that

President Milosevic must

• ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending

of violence and repression in Kosovo;

• withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces;

• agree to the stationing of an international military presence in Kosovo;

• agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced

persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid

organizations; and

• provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the

establishment of a political framework agreement based on the

Rambouillet accords in conformity with international law and the

Charter of the United Nations. 1

 1

 The Rambouillet accords were a planned interim agreement among representatives of the

province of Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to

provide democratic self-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.

Appendix II: Political and Military Objectives

of Operation Allied Force
Appendix II: Political and Military Objectives

of Operation Allied Force

Page 21 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

As a member of the NATO alliance, the United States had agreed to the

objectives announced by the alliance for the air campaign. However, the

United States presented its own objectives to measure the progress in

achieving the NATO alliance objectives, although the U.S. objectives were

subordinate to the alliance’s objectives. President Clinton made a

statement in the afternoon of March 24, 1999, stating that the United States

had three objectives for its participation in the air strikes. The objectives

were (1) to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to

aggression and its support for peace; (2) to deter President Milosevic from

continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a

price for those attacks; and (3) to damage, if necessary, Serbia’s capability

to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its

military capability. That evening, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen stated

that the U.S. military objectives were to deter further action against the

Kosovars and to diminish the ability of the Yugoslavian army to continue

those attacks if necessary.
Appendix III: NATO Member Nations

Page 22 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Source: NATO.

Appendix III: NATO Member Nations

United States

Canada

Denmark

Germany

France

Greece

Iceland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Spain

United

Kingdom

Turkey

Kosovo

Czech

Republic

Belgium

Portugal

Hungary
Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced

From Air Force Studies

Page 23 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

The Air Force conducted two assessments of its participation in Operation

Allied Force. These assessments identified a number of issues that needed

to be addressed in Air Force and joint doctrine. As shown in table 2, the

revisions to doctrine publications have begun.1

 In a number of cases, the

Joint Staff is considering the impact of these issues on joint doctrine as

part of its normal doctrine review and development process.

Table 2: Status of Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force Studies

Effects-based operations

Issue Competing objectives, conflicting views, and political and senior military

leadership involvement in the targeting process led to an incremental,

phased plan. As a result, airmen had difficulty applying the concept of

effects-based planning and strategy. Additionally, the lack of written

doctrine restricted their efforts to discuss the merits of this approach with

senior officials.

Resolution A discussion of effects-based operations inserted in four Air Force doctrine

publications–Air Warfare, Strategic Attack, Space Operations, and

Information Operations. The Joint Staff will consider this issue during its

normal doctrine review and development process. Several joint

publications that could be affected are Joint Operations (being revised),

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (being revised), Targeting

(draft), and Strategic Attack (draft).

Mass and economy of force and parallel operations

Issue The principles of mass and economy of force were difficult to apply. This

was partially due to a lack of an effects-based plan but also because

precision weapons might reduce the number of weapons needed to achieve

a desired effect and allow for parallel operation. Doctrine does not reflect

the changing reality precision weapons offer.

Resolution Revise the discussion of the principles of mass and economy of forces to

encompass the changing balance between the quantity and quality of the

force in achieving mass. Revisions are being made in Air Force Basic

Doctrine. The Joint Staff will consider this issue during its normal doctrine

review and development process. Several joint publications that could be

affected are Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (being revised),

Targeting (draft), and Strategic Attack (draft).

 1

Revisions may still be in draft and not yet be available in the published versions.

Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced

From Air Force Studies
Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced

From Air Force Studies

Page 24 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Operating in a military operation other than war

Issue Senior political and military leaders considered Operation Allied Force as a

military operation other than war, while airmen sought to apply conventional

airpower doctrine. This highlighted the need to strengthen doctrine for

military operations other than war.

Resolution Revise the discussion and guidance throughout Air Force doctrine

publication–Military Operations Other Than War. This issue will also be

included in the Aerospace Commander’s Handbook.

Air superiority

Issue The advent of stealth aircraft, standoff precision weapons, and the

experience of airpower-only operations challenged the traditional concept

and achievement of air superiority.

Resolution Revise the discussion of air superiority relative to the operational

environment in Air Force Basic Doctrine, as well as two other Air Force

doctrine publications–Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power

and Strategic Attack.

Space and information operations

Issue Airmen had difficulty differentiating between the capabilities offered by

space assets and the product (information) provided by these assets.

Doctrine needs to clearly establish the differences between the two and

highlight the capability of space assets beyond that of information

production.

Resolution Revise the discussion of counterspace and counterinformation in Air Force

Basic Doctrine as well as three other doctrine publications–Air Warfare,

Space Operations, and Information Operations. The Joint Staff will

consider this issue during its normal doctrine review and development

process. The joint publication Space Operations (draft) could be affected.

Counterland operations

Issue Airmen had difficulty attacking dispersed enemy ground forces without

friendly ground forces to shape the battlespace. Doctrine needs to address

situations where friendly ground forces are not present, when the air

component is the main effort in counterland battles, or when ground forces

support an air component in counterland operations.

Resolution Revise discussion on counterland operations in two Air Force doctrine

publications–Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power and

Counterland Doctrine.

Collateral damage

Issue Consideration of collateral damage was a significant concern in the target

selection process. Doctrine needs to recognize the imperative and find

ways to incorporate such concerns in effects-based planning.

Resolution Revise discussion in Air Force doctrine publication–Strategic Attack. The

Joint Staff will consider this issue during its normal doctrine review and

development process. Several joint publications that could be affected are

Targeting (draft) and Strategic Attack (draft).

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force information.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting

Page 25 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Unified commanders, military services, and defense agencies and offices

assessed their experiences with Operation Allied Force and identified

nearly 300 issues they believed critical to future operations. For the past

year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has worked to resolve these issues. Based on

our review of the issues and actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we

identified 26 issues that pertained to doctrine. By this we mean, either the

issue or the problem, as stated, identified a shortcoming or gap in doctrine

or the remedial action taken to correct the problem involved developing or

revising doctrine.

As shown in the following table, our analysis showed that the issues fell

into three broad categories: (1) instances where doctrine was found to be

valid and not the root problem, (2) instances where a gap or shortcoming

in doctrine was identified and doctrine is being revised,1 and (3) instances

where DOD has not fully resolved the issue.

 1

 Revisions may still be in draft and not yet be available in the published versions.

Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting

Page 26 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Table 3: Status of Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After-Action Reporting

Instances where doctrine was determined to be valid and not the root problem.

Sustainment and theatre distribution support

Issue There was little coordination between services during early phases to determine in-theater supply

sources.

Resolution Joint doctrine publications adequately address responsibility for common-user logistics with the

commander’s staff. Shortcoming was the result of implementation. The Joint Staff will monitor during

major training exercise.

Logistics responsibilities

Issue The delineation of responsibility for logistical support for all phases of the operation was poorly

defined.

Resolution Joint doctrine publications adequately address authority for logistics to the commanders-in-chief and

the delegation of control functions to subordinate joint commands during contingencies. No additional

action is planned.

Air tasking orders

Issue Use of dual air tasking orders (one for the United States and one for NATO) did not effectively support

joint and combined air doctrine.

Resolution Air tasking orders are adequately addressed in joint doctrine. The implementation of air tasking orders

was contrary to doctrine. No additional action is planned.

Frequency list

Issue This issue is classified.

Resolution Issue is adequately addressed in joint doctrine. Lack of training was the probable cause for failure to

follow doctrine, process, and procedures. There are a number of training efforts underway. The Joint

Staff will continue to monitor.

Support vessel deployments

Issue Army support vessel deployments were made without coordination with cognizant fleet commander

who was responsible for the Mediterranean and for ensuring force protection.

Resolution Joint doctrine for logistics for these types of deployment provided sufficient guidance concerning

these operations and coordination. Improper coordination was probably the result of the ad-hoc use of

Army support vessels as ferries and not to unload ships. No additional action is planned.

Intelligence accessibility

Issue An abundance of and access to national-level intelligence information was poorly coordinated.

Resolution Joint doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence exists and is valid.

There are procedures and architecture in place to address this problem. No additional action is

planned.

Targets

Issue This issue is classified.

Resolution Joint doctrine exists and is valid. No additional action is planned.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting

Page 27 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Interoperability of alliance technology

Issue Concerns about the ability to integrate and/or leverage advanced technology to support military

operations were identified.

Resolution Reviewed current process and procedures and found them to be valid. No additional action planned.

Alliance spectrum management (related to frequency list)

Issue A central spectrum manager needed to be assigned.

Resolution Issue is adequately addressed in joint doctrine. Lack of training was the probable cause for failure to

follow doctrine, process, and procedures. There are a number of training efforts underway. The Joint

Staff will continue to monitor.

Instances where gaps or shortcomings in doctrine were found

Use of contractors on the battlefield

Issue When planning for the operation, there was no in-depth analysis of what support and services would

be required by the commercial contractor. Planners need to be sensitive to the needs of contractors in

theater because the contractors will likely ask for force protection and security.

Resolution Joint doctrine for logistics support has been revised and now addresses the use of contractors in

theater. No additional action is planned.

Expeditionary airfields systems installed and operated

Issue Expeditionary airfields systems were successfully installed and operated during the operation. Use of

the systems provided rapid cycle aircraft recovery operations, increasing the sortie rate and improving

ground traffic flow.

Resolution Joint doctrine for engineer operations was revised in concert with Marine Corps Aviation. No

additional action is planned.

Coordination of joint suppression of enemy air defense and integrated air defense systems

Issue At the start of the air war, there was little/no coordination due to the absence of a joint electronic

warfare cell at the Combined Air Operations Center for NATO decision-making.

Resolution During Operation Allied Force, Allied Air and Space Operations Doctrine was under development.

This new doctrine establishes an appropriate electronic warfare cell at the Joint Task Force

Headquarters. No additional action is planned.

Joint information management

Issue There was a lack of coordination and control of information flow during the operation.

Resolution Doctrine is being revised to include specific guidance for the establishment of a joint information

management board.

Information operations

Issue There were shortfalls in training, manning, and doctrine for information operations.

Resolution Doctrine is being revised to address the deficiencies, manning levels have been increased, and

additional emphasis has been placed on information operations training.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting

Page 28 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Intratheater in-transit visibility

Issue There was a lack of supporting doctrine, policy, and plans for intratheater in-transit visibility, which

resulted in ad-hoc planning efforts that affected the commander’s resource management capabilities.

Appropriate doctrine and policies must be outlined in order to provide a solid basis for theater intransit visibility plans.

Resolution As the executive agent for in-transit visibility doctrine, policy, and plans, the U.S. Transportation

Command began inserting appropriate definitions and language in joint publications. To date, 26 joint

publications have been revised and the services are revising their publications. No additional action is

planned.

Imagery intelligence

Issue This issue is classified.

Resolution Joint doctrine is being developed to rectify this issue.

Joint digital network

Issue There were concerns with the interoperability, standardization, and flexibility of the joint digital

network.

Resolution Joint manual has been revised to address the concerns.

Fire support

Issue There were concerns with combined fire support.

Resolution The issue is being addressed in joint doctrine publications.

Instances where the issue has not been fully resolved

NATO command structure

Issue A more effective U.S.-NATO command structure, including access to classified information, was

needed.

Resolution Issue could not be resolved at the Joint Staff level and was passed on to U.S.-NATO working group.

Air tasking order process

Issue The air tasking order process did not lend itself to ensuring the speed of command needed in a

rapidly developing operational environment.

Resolution Issue passed to the Joint Staff for operations target working group for resolution.

Alliance and coalition interoperability

Issue Defense spending dichotomy is making interoperability problems more complex. Since U.S. policy

prefers to engage alongside allies, doctrinal agreements would facilitate the standardization of

equipment, munitions, and communications to minimize problems. Some of the details regarding this

issue are classified.

Resolution This issue was passed to the Defense Capabilities Initiative for corrective action. This initiative, which

began in April 1999, focuses alliance members on attaining interoperability and common capabilities

needed to perform the roles and missions that are outlined in NATO’s new strategic concept. Though

this initiative was not a direct result of Operation Allied Force, shortcomings of the operation gave the

initiative additional impetus.

Allied joint doctrine

Issue There needs to be a more responsive process for developing joint doctrine.

Resolution Issue being addressed through the allied joint doctrine process.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During

After-Action Reporting

Page 29 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Political military interface

Issue The interface between the political process and military planning was less than optimal.

Resolution Issue passed to joint conventional warplans division for resolution.

NATO intelligence

Issue This issue involved the production and dissemination of intelligence information among the allies.

Resolution Issue was passed on to Supreme Commander, Europe, for resolution.

Interface with NATO

Issue Deception planning with NATO was lacking.

Resolution Issue still requires further study.

Joint broadcast system

Issue The joint broadcast systems should continue to be used until operational forces are satisfied that the

global broadcast system is fully ready to take its place.

Resolution Issue requires further study.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix VI: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts

and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 31 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

William Solis (202) 512-8365

Edna Falk Curtin (202) 512-4067

In addition to those named above, Rodell Anderson, Michael Avenick,

Margaret Best, Kathleen Joyce, Madelon Savaides, and Susan Woodward

made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 32 GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations

Kosovo Air Operations: Mission Effectiveness of U.S. Air Strikes Against

Fixed and Mobile Targets (GAO-01-925, forthcoming).

Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in

Advance of Future Conflicts (GAO-01-461, May 29, 2001).

Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the

Apache Helicopter (GAO-01-401, Mar. 2, 2001).

Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional

Stability (GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR, Apr. 24, 2000).

Related GAO Products

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