GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Military Research and Development, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

July 1999 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Evaluation of Navy’s 

Anti-Submarine 

Warfare Assessment

GAO/NSIAD-99-85

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280335 Letter

July 12, 1999

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military

Research and Development

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

This letter responds to your request that we review (1) the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) 1997 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assessment and 

(2) the role and funding influence of the Navy’s recently established 

Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements Division. The conferees on the 

Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act directed the ASW 

assessment and supported the establishment of the ASW Requirements 

Division in response to concerns that ASW funding was declining relative 

to other Navy programs, the Navy lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW 

requirements and funding priorities, and ASW requirements were not being 

adequately considered in establishing overall Navy funding priorities. The 

conferees directed an assessment be made of ASW shortfalls and 

capabilities supported by a rigorous analysis and the establishment of 

priorities among ASW programs. To meet this congressional directive, the 

Navy said it would perform a quantitative analysis of ASW shortfalls and 

capabilities.

As agreed with your representative, we reviewed the assessment to 

determine the extent it was responsive to these requirements and provided 

a sound basis for making resource allocation decisions. In reviewing the 

ASW Requirements Division, we identified activities it had taken to 

influence ASW funding decisions and the outcomes of those decisions.

Results in Brief The ASW assessment concluded that proficiency had declined and that the 

programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as proposed at 

the time of the assessment, provided for adequate equipment to respond to 

the most likely threats. However, in providing its conclusions, the 

assessment notes concerns regarding the data available for its analysis. 

The assessment noted that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW 

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performance--particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available 

ASW studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. Much of the 

assessment’s modeling data was based on open-ocean ASW rather than the 

more complex littoral environment where the Navy now believes the most 

likely threat exists. In our view, the assessment was not fully responsive to 

the conferees’ direction because (1) it was not supported by a rigorous 

analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities, (2) information to support the 

assessment’s findings was not always complete, and (3) priorities among 

ASW programs were not established. The Navy has subsequently provided 

Congress with an ASW Roadmap that places ASW programs in one of three 

priority categories but does not identify program priorities within each 

category. The absence of complete and reliable data--particularly on ASW 

operations in the littoral--and the absence of program priorities limit the 

assessment’s value in making resource allocation decisions. 

The ASW Requirements Division, which prepared the 1997 assessment, has 

sought to influence Navy ASW funding decisions in the fiscal year 1999 and 

2000 budget submissions through briefings and meetings with resource 

sponsors and senior Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations. 

The Division believes it has had some success in influencing decisions to 

fund early ASW-related research and development projects within the 

Office of Naval Research and to restore funding for a number of ASW 

programs whose funding had been reduced, deferred, or eliminated by 

platform divisions under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment. 

Background The primary goal of ASW is to deny the enemy the effective use of 

submarines. To accomplish this goal, the Navy uses ASW systems on 

surface ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters and 

fixed systems to detect, track, classify, localize, and destroy threat 

submarines. Such systems include acoustic and nonacoustic sensors and 

torpedoes. 

Most current ASW systems were designed during the Cold War to pursue 

nuclear submarines operating in the open-ocean environment. During this 

period, ASW was one of the Navy’s highest priority missions because of the 

global threat posed to the United States by submarines of the former Soviet 

Union. Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has shifted its focus to regional 

threats and conflicts. As part of this shift, the Navy is emphasizing 

pursuing smaller diesel-electric submarines operating in the more 

acoustically complex littoral environment. 

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During the Cold War era, naval forces were trained, organized, and 

equipped to counter the Soviet influence throughout the world. With the 

end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline in defense budgets, the 

Navy recognized the need to reshape its forces for regional contingencies. 

Consequently, the Navy began focusing its resources on joint operations in 

the world’s littoral areas. As a result, ASW when compared to joint mission 

areas, such as strike warfare, antiair warfare, missile defense, and 

amphibious warfare, often received a lower funding priority. For example, 

the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 budget projected a decline from about 

$884 million for ASW research, development, test, and evaluation 

(RDT&E), or about 10.9 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E budget for fiscal year 

1999, to about $566 million or about 6.8 percent for fiscal year 2003.

The 1997 assessment, which was submitted in March 1998, was required 

because the previous 1996 assessment did not meet congressional needs. 

The 1996 assessment was to provide the defense committees a long-range 

plan for improving ASW capabilities against potential threats in both 

littoral and open ocean areas. That assessment, however, did not include a 

rigorous analysis of ASW capabilities or establish program priorities. 

The newly established ASW Requirements Directorate prepared the 1997 

assessment. The Directorate was established in September 1996 under the 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, 

and Assessment, to determine and assess Navy requirements in the ASW 

mission area. The Deputy Chief serves as the Chief of Naval 

Operations’(CNO) principal advisor in determining warfare requirements 

and allocating resources among surface, submarine, and air warfare 

divisions; the Expeditionary Warfare Division; and the Special Programs 

Division. In September 1998, after a period of evaluation, the Directorate 

was formally elevated to a permanently staffed division headed by a Navy 

captain assigned to a flag rank billet. The ASW Requirements Division 

monitors platform division program proposals and identifies and provides 

support for ASW programs. The Division has no direct control over 

RDT&E or procurement funds but communicates ASW requirements and 

capabilities to the platform divisions and the Deputy CNO.
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Data Deficiencies Limit 

Responsiveness to 

Congressional 

Directions

In its ASW assessment, the Navy concluded that proficiency had declined 

and that the programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as 

proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for adequate equipment 

to respond to the most likely threats. However, in providing its 

conclusions, the Navy noted concerns regarding the data available for its 

analysis. Much of the assessment’s modeling data was based on 

open-ocean ASW rather than the more complex littoral environment where 

the Navy now believes the most likely threat exists. In our view, the 

assessment was not fully responsive to the conferees’ direction because 

(1) it was not supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and 

capabilities, (2) information to support the assessment’s findings was not 

always complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs were not 

established. The absence of complete and reliable data--particularly on 

ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of program priorities limit 

the assessment’s value in making resource allocation decisions

The 1997 ASW Assessment In its 1997 assessment, the Navy concluded that ASW proficiency had 

declined and that effective organization, comprehensive training, and 

modern equipment were needed to optimize proficiency. The assessment 

noted that organizational improvements were needed to provide an 

integrated approach to ASW and pointed to the establishment of the ASW 

Requirements Division as a step in the right direction. The assessment also 

noted that the opportunity to practice ASW had declined because many 

units are now required to perform multiple missions. For example, it cited 

the change in mission of the S-3 aircraft. Designed as the primary ASW 

aircraft flown from aircraft carriers, the S-3 has now become the air 

refueling platform for the carrier air wing and is not being used for the ASW 

mission. The assessment further noted the potential to gain greater 

performance from ASW systems. The assessment concluded that the 

program of record--programs and funding levels--in the proposed fiscal 

year 1999 budget provides for adequate equipment to respond to likely 

threats to the end of the Future Years Defense Plan. 

The 1997 assessment, which was prepared by the ASW Requirements 

Division, was based on data collected from many diverse sources, including 

fleet observations, at-sea exercises, studies, and simulations. However, the 

Requirements Division noted concerns regarding the data available for its 

analysis. The Division noted that it initially expected to provide a 

straightforward quantitative analysis and that the evidence would be 

consistent and the metrics contained in the evidence would be 
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unambiguous. Division officials said that tools for quantitatively assessing 

ASW performance--particularly modeling and simulation tools--and 

available ASW studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. They stated 

that studies to support ASW investment decisions are often too narrowly 

focused and the whole system of identifying ASW shortfalls and correcting 

them is fragmented.

Assessment Not Fully 

Responsive to 

Congressional Direction

The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, 

in directing the Navy to assess ASW capabilities and shortfalls, stated that 

the assessment be supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and 

capabilities and establish priorities among ASW programs. 

Assessment Lacks Complete and 

Reliable Quantitative Analyses of 

ASW Capabilities and Shortfalls 

The Navy could not rely on the use of modeling and simulation to 

quantitatively analyze ASW capabilities and shortfalls because most of the 

models are based on open-ocean conditions rather than shallow water 

littoral conditions that the Navy believes are the most likely future 

submarine threat environment. Moreover, the models have not been 

updated to adequately depict acoustic and environmental conditions found 

in the littorals or the way the fleet operates during ASW at-sea exercises. 

For example, the Navy said the models

• do not use multiple types of ocean bottoms, such as hilly or rocky 

bottoms;

• do not reflect complex sound velocity profiles typically found in the 

littoral environment;

• assume incorrectly that the loss of signal strength over distance is the 

same in both littoral and open-ocean environments;

• do not adequately account for littoral environmental conditions such as 

changes in temperature and levels of salinity; and 

• make performance predictions based only on one-on-one platform 

engagements, rather than combined ASW force operations. 

The lack of quantitative modeling analyses of ASW capabilities and 

shortfalls in shallow water littoral conditions raises concerns regarding the 

basis and support for the assessment’s conclusions and its usefulness for 

making resource allocation decisions. A Navy modeling official stated that 

about $1.5 million would be required annually to upgrade and maintain the 

full spectrum of ASW simulations and models. The official noted that the 

Undersea Warfare Center received $200,000 to analyze how the littoral 

environment adversely affected ASW system performance during one 
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specific at-sea training exercise and that this data will be used to improve 

its models.

Information to Support Findings 

Was Not Always Complete

The assessment contained significant ASW data and analyses, but in 

several areas the information was not complete. Examples included 

(1) information from ASW at-sea exercises; (2) plans for addressing threats 

from the most advanced submarines; (3) information on key ASW 

command, control, communication, and intelligence requirements, 

capabilities and shortfalls; and (4) the impacts of using multiple platforms 

to conduct ASW. In addition, the assessment’s conclusions assumed higher 

funding levels for ASW programs than were ultimately budgeted. 

At-sea Exercises To assess the performance of ASW systems, the Navy analyzed the results 

of at-sea exercises conducted under the Ship Antisubmarine Warfare 

Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring program in both open ocean and 

littoral environments. The assessment concluded that ASW proficiency 

had declined. However, the exercise data did not provide information on 

the causes for the reduced performance, and the assessment did not 

address the impact of environmental conditions on ASW performance. In 

addition, exercise data on torpedo performance was based on a limited 

number of firings. Officials of the Surface Warfare Development Group told 

us that the small number of torpedo firings in shallow water littoral 

environments made it practically impossible to draw conclusions on 

torpedo performance.

Advanced Submarine Threat ASW modeling results against a technologically advanced nuclear 

submarine in the open ocean identified a number of shortfalls. The 

assessment discussed the capabilities and shortfalls of ASW systems 

against the more advanced threat but provided little information on plans 

to address these shortfalls. According to Navy officials, the assessment did 

not address the shortfalls because it assumed the most likely threat would 

be a diesel submarine operating in the littoral environment. The 

assessment concluded that the program of record in the proposed 

President’s fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the likely 

submarine threat to the end of 2003.

Command, Control, 

Communications, and 

Intelligence Issues

The assessment did not evaluate ASW command, control, communication, 

and intelligence (C3I) capabilities and shortfalls. Because a small, 

slow-moving, and quiet diesel submarine operating in the littoral is difficult 

for ASW platforms to detect, there is a greater need for ASW platforms to 

share submarine threat data. The assessment recognized C3I systems as 
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important components of ASW but did not include information on current 

requirements, capabilities, or shortfalls.

Using Combined Platforms The assessment did not address the use of combinations of ASW assets to 

detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Attrition rates in the Navy 

campaign warfare models considered only one-on-one ASW engagements 

to predict the number of enemy submarines detected and destroyed over 

time. The predictions do not reflect the increased effectiveness of 

combined air, surface, and subsurface assets that the Navy plans to use in 

littoral ASW operations. 

Funding Changes The assessment’s conclusion that there would be adequate ASW 

capabilities to respond to the most likely threats was based on program and 

funding levels projected at the time of the assessment in the fiscal year 

1999 budget. However, ASW funding projected in the fiscal year 2000 

budget submission was lower than the fiscal year 1999 budget projections. 

For example, the Navy reduced funding for the Lightweight Hybrid MK-54 

Torpedo program, which will delay the torpedo’s introduction into the fleet 

by 2 years. Also, the MK-50 Lightweight Torpedo Phase II shallow water 

upgrade was canceled because of funding constraints. 

Assessment Identifies ASW 

Needs but Not Priorities

The assessment concluded that the ASW program of record as contained in 

the proposed President’s fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the 

likely future threat and identified the following near-, mid-, and long-term 

ASW mission requirements. 

• Near-term requirements

• Improve ASW crew proficiency by increasing training.

• Buy additional towed array sensors for submarines.

• Develop an ASW system for the new DD-21 destroyer.

• Accelerate MK-48 torpedo upgrades.

• Mid-term requirements 

• Further improve the proficiency of the entire ASW team. 

• Develop operational concepts for network centric operations.

• Long-term requirements 

• Develop long endurance sensors and unmanned ASW vehicles.

• Design sensors that automatically adjust to a complex acoustic 

environment. 

The assessment did not establish ASW program priorities. However, the 

Navy subsequently developed an integrated ASW Roadmap that defines and 
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prioritizes a set of broad ASW requirements. This document (1) places 

each ASW-related requirement into its primary functional area (i.e., 

surveillance, detection, and localization) and (2) prioritizes each 

requirement into three priority categories—essential, critical, and 

important. This document was completed in late February 1999 and 

provided to Congress. Although the Roadmap does provide priorities by 

category, it does not prioritize programs within the three priority 

categories. Thus, the Roadmap would be of little value in making funding 

decisions among all the programs identified as essential.

Requirements Division 

Seeks to Influence 

ASW Funding Priorities 

and Decisions

In addition to preparing the 1997 assessment, ASW Requirements Division 

officials told us they have sought to restore funding for a number of ASW 

programs whose proposed funding had been reduced or eliminated. For 

the most part, the ASW Requirements Division sought to influence funding 

decisions by the primary resource sponsors—the Surface, Submarine, and 

Air Warfare Divisions. They also sought to influence the funding of early 

ASW-related research and development projects within the Office of Naval 

Research (ONR). 

Efforts to Influence Fiscal 

Year 1999 Funding

According to Division officials, they reviewed the fiscal year 1999 platform 

division program proposals and identified ASW programs for which funds 

had been deferred or deleted and sought to have funding restored on those 

programs they considered to be most important. Since the 1997 ASW 

assessment had not yet been completed, the officials stated that they used 

their judgment in making recommendations affecting fiscal year 1999 

program proposals. Examples of their efforts to influence fiscal year 1999 

funding decisions are presented below. We could not determine that the 

Division’s efforts were the sole cause for the funding decisions, but we did 

verify the Division’s actions and the final outcome of the funding 

decision-making process based on documents and records of meetings and 

decisions.

During development of its fiscal year 1999 program plan, the Surface 

Warfare Division proposed delaying the initial operating capability for the 

Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo Development Program from fiscal year 2001 to 

2005. This would have potentially made available for other uses about 

$82 million of the torpedo’s planned funding over the fiscal year 1999 to 

2003 period. Because ASW Requirements Division officials believed that 

the program represented an important and needed capability for surface 

combatants and air platforms, they questioned the proposed reduction 
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during a July 1997 meeting attended by surface, submarine, and air division 

directors. Though no specific funding restoration decision was made at 

that meeting, about $58 million was eventually restored to the program 

plan. According to an official from the Programming Division, the restored 

funds permitted the program’s initial operating capability to be moved back 

up to fiscal year 2003. 

The ASW Requirements Division also sought to influence ONR funding of 

ASW research projects. For example, due to funding constraints, ONR staff 

tentatively decided to not conduct sea trials of an automated radar 

periscope detection and discrimination technology they had successfully 

tested on land. Because this technology held promise for detecting 

diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements 

Division Director, in an April 1, 1998, memorandum, requested the Chief of 

Naval Research to support continued program testing in fiscal year 1998. 

On May 22, 1998, the Chief of Naval Research committed to providing the 

necessary funding to perform the sea trials during July 1998 and 

demonstrating the system aboard a research maritime patrol aircraft in 

fiscal year 1999.

Efforts to Influence Fiscal 

Year 2000 Funding

The 1997 assessment indicated potential shortfalls in ASW programs 

related to (1) surveillance and cueing; (2) tactical sensors and systems 

needed to improve detection of submarines, including high search rate 

airborne platforms; and (3) torpedo upgrades. Using these as a baseline 

reference, ASW Requirements Division officials sought to influence the 

resource sponsors during the fiscal year 2000 budget development process 

as shown in the following examples. As noted earlier, we could not 

determine that the ASW Requirements Division’s efforts were the sole 

cause for the funding decision, but we did verify the Division’s actions and 

the final outcome of the decision process. 

The Submarine Warfare Division, during development of its fiscal year 2000 

program proposal, decided to terminate the Compact Low Frequency 

Active development program, resulting in the availability of $10.5 million in 

fiscal year 2000 and 2001 development funding to apply to other division 

program needs. Because this program would enhance a very limited ASW 

surveillance capability in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements Division 

Director, during an April 30, 1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for 

Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, and later with the 

CNO, recommended that the entire $10.5 million be restored to the 

program. In late May 1998, the Submarine Warfare Division reinstated this 
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development program and restored a total of $22 million of development 

funding through fiscal year 2004. 

The Submarine Warfare Division proposed to delay the Advanced 

Deployable System development program, resulting in the availability of 

nearly $93 million in out-year development funding to apply to other 

division program needs. This program would develop cueing to enhance 

the ability of Navy submarines and other ASW platforms to conduct ASW in 

littoral waters against diesel-electric submarines. Because of this potential 

enhancement, the ASW Requirements Division Director, during an April 30, 

1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, 

and Assessments, and later with the CNO, recommended that the entire 

$93 million reduction be restored. Based on the ASW Requirements 

Division Director’s recommendation, $92.3 million was initially restored. 

Subsequent adjustments by the Navy Comptroller and DOD resulted in an 

additional $50.2 million being added to the program. 

Although it is not possible to directly or fully attribute the Division’s actions 

to specific budget decisions, ASW Requirements Division officials noted 

that the fiscal year 2000 budget requested about $759 million for 

ASW-related RDT&E funding, or about 9.5 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E 

budget for fiscal year 2000, and projected about $643 million, or about 

7.8 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E budget for fiscal year 2003. This 

$643 million amount is about $77 million more than the amount projected 

for 2003 in the fiscal year 1999 budget.

Conclusions The Navy’s 1997 assessment noted a number of deficiencies in the data that 

was available for its analysis. The assessment was not fully responsive to 

congressional direction because of data limitations and concerns 

associated with the Navy’s shift in ASW emphasis from open ocean to 

littoral operations. Until more data and analyses of ASW operations and 

capabilities in the littoral become available, uncertainties will surround the 

effectiveness of ASW plans, programs, and capabilities. The ASW 

Requirements Division has been active in its efforts to influence ASW 

funding decisions. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation 

In written comments, DOD concurred with a draft of this report 

(see app. I). DOD said the Navy has reaffirmed that ASW is a priority 

mission as well as a core and enduring competency. The CNO has 
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requested a systematic plan to tackle the issues identified in the 1997 ASW 

assessment and integrated roadmap and the ASW Requirements Division is 

leading the development of this plan. DOD also provided technical 

clarifications that we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology 

To determine the extent that the 1997 ASW assessment included a 

quantitative analysis of ASW capabilities and shortfalls, we reviewed the 

data and sources of information used to support the assessment’s findings 

and conclusions. This included discussions with officials of the ASW 

Requirements Division; Office of Naval Research; Office of Naval 

Intelligence; Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Surface Ship 

Directorate and Submarine Directorate; Naval Air Systems Command 

(ASW Division); and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division. 

We also interviewed officials of the Center for Naval Analyses; the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center; Presearch, Inc., a contractor that helped prepare 

the 1997 ASW assessment; and the former Director of Antisubmarine 

Warfare programs, who was responsible for preparing the 1996 ASW 

assessment. We also reviewed modeling documentation prepared by the 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division. We also discussed with 

Center officials the benefits and shortfalls of the Center’s models the Navy 

planned to use to perform the quantitative analysis. We discussed the deep 

water modeling used in the assessment with officials of Johns Hopkins 

University. We also discussed modeling and simulation with the Director 

and Technical Director of the ASW Requirements Division. 

To determine if the Navy performed a sufficient detailed analysis to support 

the assessment’s findings and conclusions, we performed a detailed review 

and analysis of the assessment. We reviewed and analyzed the assessment 

to determine if it established or contained priorities among ASW programs. 

We also reviewed torpedo plans and performance particularly in shallow, 

littoral water. We obtained the views of an ASW Requirements Division 

torpedo official on the effectiveness and capabilities of lightweight and 

heavyweight torpedoes. We reviewed and analyzed the Commander, 

Surface Warfare Development Group’s March 1997 “Cross-Sharem Analysis 

of Antisubmarine Warfare Effectiveness in Shallow Water/Littoral 

Undersea Warfare Exercises.” We interviewed torpedo officials from the 

Undersea Weapons Program Office and the Naval Undersea Warfare 

Center, Newport Division. We discussed torpedo data contained in the 

assessment with an official of the Surface Warfare Development Group. We 

obtained and reviewed heavyweight and lightweight torpedo firing data in 

shallow/littoral water since the assessment was completed. We also 
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obtained data on torpedo upgrades and the schedule status of the new 

MK-54 Lightweight development program.

To identify the impact and influence that the Division has had on Navy ASW 

funding decisions, we asked ASW Requirements Division staff to provide 

examples of where their influence affected funding decisions during 

development of the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget requests. For 

each example identified, we determined the basis for the initiated action 

and collected supporting budget briefings and other documentation from 

both the Division and the respective Navy organization responsible for 

budgeting action. We also reviewed Navy database documentation that 

supported the funding restorations. 

To identify trends in ASW funding, we first determined the ASW-related 

RDT&E programs included in the Navy’s 1997 ASW assessment report. We 

then determined the Navy’s funding projections applicable to these 

programs over the fiscal year 1999 to 2003 period as contained in the fiscal 

year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets. In addition, we compared the 

ASW-related RDT&E funding projections to the Navy’s funding projections 

of total RDT&E budget authority to arrive at the ASW-related percentage. 

We limited our analyses to RDT&E funding because of the difficulties 

associated with classifying the extent to which other appropriations are 

ASW-related. Finally, we asked ASW Requirements Division officials to 

comment on funding projections of ASW-related RDT&E programs 

contained in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets. 

We performed our review between August 1998 and April 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are also sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, 

Chairman, and Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate 

Committee on Armed Services; Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and 

Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 

Appropriations; and Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and 

Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House 

Committee on Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to 

the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard 

Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William J. Lynn, Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Honorable Jacob Lew, 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made 

available to others upon request.
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Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Richard Price on (202) 512-3630 if 

you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key 

contributors to this assignment were John Heere, Richard Silveira, and 

Ralph Tavares.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Wiggins

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix I

Comment from the Secretary of Defense ApeInxdi

(707360) Lret
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