United States Commission

on

National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2001

National Security Study Group

assisted by

Booz·Allen & Hamilton
i

PREFACE

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The chapters in this volume provide information concerning organizations in the Intelligence

Community, including the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence

Agency, the National Intelligence Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National

Security Agency, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Congressional

Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence.

Each chapter is designed to serve as a stand-alone reference for a specific organization and its

role in national security processes. Chapters are presented in standard format to permit

comparisons and facilitate research. That format is:

• An executive summary that provides an organizational overview and

observations.

• Section 1 identifies the legal basis for the organization and significant

organization and interagency directives.

• Section 2 notes the major responsibilities of the organization, identifies

subordinate organizations, and delineates the organization's major products.

• Sections 3 and 4 deal with the vision, strategy, values, culture, leadership, staff

attributes, and structure of the organization.

• Section 5 discusses the organization's formal role seven key processes.

• Section 6 provides information on the organization's roles in informal

processes.

• Section 7 outlines the responsible Congressional committees, the budget, and

the personnel strength of the organization.

• Section 8 provides observations on ways in which the organization contributes

to national security.

Descriptions of organizations deemed most significant in terms of the current national security

apparatus include matrices that relate products and roles to processes. Process maps have been

added as appendices for these organizations. Where it may be helpful for readers to consult other

chapters to gain a more complete understanding of particular concepts or issues, the appropriate

references are included in the text or in footnotes. An acronym glossary is included at the end of

Volume VII.
ii

The entire series consists of seven volumes:

• Volume I contains descriptions of the overarching interagency and inter branch

processes as well as key observations on organizations and processes;

• Volume II contains chapters on the Executive Office of the President.

• Volume III contains chapters on key Congressional Committees.

• Volume IV provides descriptions of key Department of State Organizations.

• Volume V discusses Department of Defense organizations.

• Volume VI covers intelligence community organizations and activities.

• Volumes VIIa and VIIb describe Executive Branch organizations not covered

elsewhere.

These volumes are based on comprehensive searches of available literature, laws, and directives

and extensive interviews with current and former practitioners. Research included both formal

and informal processes. There is sufficient information on each organization to fill several

volumes, thus the synthesis of this information focuses on national security processes as defined

by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.
Volume VI – Intelligence Community

Activities

Chapter 1 Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI)

Chapter 2 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Chapter 3 National Intelligence Council (NIC)

Chapter 4 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Chapter 5 National Security Agency (NSA)

Chapter 6 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

Oversight Committees

Chapter 7 Congressional Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence

(HPSC(I)/SSC(I))

Bibliography
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Overview.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) plays a vital role in today’s national security

environment. At the highest level, his responsibilities include:

• Serving as the head of the U.S. intelligence community (IC);

• Acting as the President's principal advisor for national security intelligence matters;

and,

• Serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Recent legislation has aided the DCI in fulfilling his IC management responsibilities and

his responsibilities as a trusted Presidential advisor, by creating the position of the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence/Community Management (DDCI/CM). The DDCI/CM serves as

the DCI's chief advisor on IC policy, planning, resource, and management issues.

As the primary executor of the DCI’s community responsibilities, the DDCI/CM directs

the operations of the Community Management Staff (CMS), including the overall management

of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the umbrella program for intelligence

activities supporting “national” (versus single agency) intelligence needs, as well as oversight of

IC personnel and resources.1 He also ensures the efficient and effective collection of national

intelligence using technical means by IC component agencies through the Assistant Director of

Central Intelligence (ADCI) for Collection. Additionally, the DDCI/CM conducts oversight of

intelligence analysis and production by IC component agencies through the ADCI for Analysis

and Production.

Organization.

The Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Title VIII,2 mandates the current

structure of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI) and establishes the

DDCI/CM position. Title VIII also establishes the positions of the ADCIs for Collection and

Analysis and Production to assist the DCI and the DDCI/CM in ensuring efficient and effective

intelligence collection, analysis, and production.

The CMS serves as the primary staff element for carrying out the DCI’s and DDCI/CM’s

community responsibilities and also assists the DCI in his advisory role to the President on

intelligence issues.

 

1 Preparing for the 21st CenturyAn Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities

of the United States Intelligence Community. Washington, DC. Page 71, March 1, 1996.

2 Title VIII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 805.
3

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes.

Strategy Development. The ODCI develops the DCI’s Strategic Intent, which serves as

the DCI’s primary articulation of his vision, goals, and objectives for the IC.3 The DCI and the

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) participate in National Security Council (NSC)

Principals and Deputies Committees, while they or their designates serve as representatives to

the NSC’s Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). The ODCI also manages and supports the

 

3 The ODCI published the DCI’s Strategic Intent for the first time in 1999.

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

DCI Strategic Intent 











 





IC Head 

Principal Intel Advisor 

CIA Head 

IC/PC Chair 

NFIB Chair 

E/DRB Co-Chair 

NSC PC Member 

CIA Oversight 

DCI Role (in DCI's 

Absence)



IC/DC Chair  

NFIB Vice Chair 

NSC DC Member  

IC Management 

CMS Management 

ADCI/Collection 

ADCI/Analysis & 

Production 

IPRG Chair  

DCI

Products

DDCI

Roles

DDCI/CM 

(ExDir/ICA)

Congressional Budget Justification 

Book (CBJB)

DCI Intelligence Guidance

Intelligence Program Decision 

Memorandum (IPDM)

Intelligence Program Budget Decision 

(IPBD)

DCI Directives (DCIDs)

Mission Area Assessments (MAAs)

DCI Strategic Intent

Independent Cost Analyses 

Annual Report on Intelligence 

Community 
4

Intelligence Community Principals Committee (IC/PC) (consisting of the directors of the

individual intelligence agencies, such as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]

and the National Security Agency [NSA]), and the Intelligence Community Deputies Committee

(IC/DC) (composed of the deputy directors of the individual intelligence agencies), which serve

as the senior advisory boards advising the DCI on intelligence policy and planning, needs

management and evaluation, and decisions affecting NFIP programs. Support to the IC/PC and

IC/DC in its strategy function takes the form of formal and ad hoc preparation of briefings, issue

papers, and talking points. The IC/PC and IC/DC produce issue papers and memoranda for the

DCI, who uses these products in his interactions with the President, the NSC, and Congress on

IC program needs.

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation. The ODCI, through CMS’ Requirements, Plans, and

Policy Office (RPPO), plays a major policy role in the development and dissemination of DCI

Directives (DCIDs) covering a variety of issues that affect the IC as a whole or its component

parts. In addition, the ODCI’s pivotal role in the IC/PC and IC/DC has significant policy

implications for the IC. Support to the IC/PC and IC/DC in its policy function, as in its strategy

function, takes the form of formal and ad hoc preparation of briefings, issue papers, and talking

points.

Planning. In support of the NFIP’s planning phase, the ODCI prepares and disseminates

the DCI’s Intelligence Guidance to the NFIP agencies for preparation of Intelligence Program

Objective Memoranda (IPOM), the IC’s programming process that identifies the funding

objectives for the two-year budgeting cycle. The DCI Intelligence Guidance reflects the strategic

intent and policy priorities of the DCI. The ODCI’s role in managing and supporting four

committees and boards (i.e., the IC/PC, the IC/DC, the National Intelligence Collection Board

(NICB) and the National Intelligence Production Board (NIPB)) also touches upon planning

responsibilities.

Mission Execution. Much of the ODCI’s efforts are tied directly to the support of

intelligence missions. The ODCI manages support to collection, analysis, production, and

dissemination activities on designated hard targets, and coordinates collection, analysis,

production, and dissemination in support of defined national security missions.

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight. A variety of ODCI activities fall into this

category. The ODCI prepares an annual review of IC programs and activities that reaches many

target audiences, including Congress. CMS’ Program Assessment and Evaluation Office

(PA&EO) conducts mission area assessments (MAAs) designed to evaluate a program’s

satisfaction of performance objectives in a particular intelligence mission area (e.g.,

counterproliferation). PA&EO also oversees as other studies and assessments of the efficacy of

IC assets and programs in meeting defined national security missions and intelligence needs.

Both MAAs and other studies and assessments are used by programming and budgeting officials

in developing program objectives and budget requests. Other recent and important activities

include the establishment of the Hard Target Joint Review and the Integrated Collection

Management Task Force.

Preparation. CMS’ PA&EO manages the Cost Analysis Group (CAG), modeled on the

Department of Defense's (DoD) capability. The CAG produces independent cost analyses of

proposed major acquisitions, which the DCI relies upon in making acquisition decisions.
5

PA&EO’s MAAs and other studies and analyses can also support acquisition decisions on an asrequired basis.

Resourcing. The ODCI undertakes all programming and budgeting activities for the

NFIP for the DCI. The CMS Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs

(EXDIR/ICA) co-chairs the Intelligence Program Review Group (IPRG), which reviews issues,

analyzes priorities, and studies NFIP funding alternatives. Through CMS’ Resource

Management Office, the ODCI conducts NFIP program reviews and crosswalks (special

programmatic and budgetary reviews between two or more NFIP and/or non-NFIP component

programs whose interests overlap and where close coordination is necessary); manages reviews

of major and minor program and budget issues; prepares and issues key DCI programmatic and

budgeting decisions; submits the NFIP budget to President; and prepares and issues the

Congressional Budget Justification Book to Congress.

Observations.

The majority of those interviewed indicated that while the IC functions extremely well as

a community to provide support during crises, in day-to-day operations full collaboration is

generally in short supply. Stovepiping thus remains an IC reality, but it is a function of culture

rather than organization.

Having the DCI focus only on community issues is not desirable, interviewees indicated.

The DCI needs a powerful agency not only to provide staff to execute his planning,

programming, and budgeting functions, but also to provide needed credibility with the President

and Congress. Although planning, programming, and budgeting are on a interagency basis

through the NFIP, resource allocation decisions are ultimately made at the agency levelthus

making a strong case for the DCI to retain his CIA head role in order to reap fully the respect due

to the agency heads who make these allocation decisions.

At the same time, a full sense of community can be achieved within existing authorities

and under the current operating structure if the DCI demonstrates a robust interest in community

affairs and does not become overly focused on the CIA.4 This demonstrable interest will go a

long way towards dispelling the widespread community notion that the DCI has been captured

by the CIA. With the creation of the DDCI/CM position (and the supporting ADCIs for

Collection and for Analysis and Production), the DCI now has the staff support— both in terms

of numbers and quality—to be an effective community leader if he desires to do so.

Two of the primary values of the DCI and DDCI/CMfostering collaboration across the

community while maintaining each agency’s sense of independencecreate a level of tension

that interviewees found to be healthy. While the policy and planning functions encourage

cooperation, those performing the resource and evaluation functions strive to be seen as honest

brokers in conducting their activities.

 

4 An interviewee observed that the two most recent DCIsthe ones under whom the intelligence “community” concept has

been more fully developed through statute and directive have nevertheless not demonstrated this robust interest in

community affairs. Interview with former CMS official, November 11, 1999.
6

Informal processes and products dominate the conduct of IC business. Much of the

support, especially in the strategy and policy area, consists of working groups and individual

staff members producing issue papers, talking points, briefings, and Congressional testimony on

an ad hoc basis.

The current CMS staff, consisting of a blend of permanent staff and detailees, is reaching

an overall equilibrium of needed talent, although the staff quality remains mixed across

functions. The continued presence of detailees fosters a sense of collaboration, improves the

level of expertise, and provides community agencies with a greater sense of having a “seat at the

table.”

Those interviewed indicated that, with the advent of the IC Chief Information Officer’s

office and the DCI’s commitment to technology investments, an Assistant DCI for

Dissemination, chartered with the responsibility to improve dissemination of products to the

policy community, is not required to improve the community’s dissemination record.

Cooperation between the IC and the law enforcement community has improved

significantly over the past several years (particularly in support of counterintelligence

investigations and criminal prosecutions). Law enforcement community detailees now support

the Counterterrorism Center and the Crime and Narcotics Center. Interviews indicate that the

flow of information remains largely one way (i.e., from the IC to the law enforcement

community), however, suggesting the need to improve cooperative exchanges of intelligence.
7

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Statutes: Authorized by the National Security Act of 19475 (as

amended).

(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) formally

establishes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in law.

(2) The Intelligence Organization Act of 1992 recognized the National Foreign

Intelligence Program (NFIP) in law, and provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),

through the Community Management Staff (CMS), with the authority to transfer funds and

personnel (for up to one year) between and among NFIP programs.

(3) The Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Title VIII,6 mandates

the current structure of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI). It also

establishes the position of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence/Community Management

(DDCI/CM) as the chief advisor to the DCI on Intelligence Community (IC) policy, planning,

resource, and management issues. Additionally, Title VIII establishes Assistant DCIs for

Collection (ADCI/Collection) and Analysis and Production (ADCI/Analysis & Production)

positions to assist the DCI and the DDCI/CM by assuring efficient and effective intelligence

collection, analysis, and production.

B. Department Directives: DCI Directive (DCID) 3/3 (January 1992), the organizing

directive for CMS, will be amplified and/or amended with the issuance of three DCIDs currently

in draft form. These new DCIDs will provide the basis for the implementation of a new

community-focused approach to intelligence activities.7

(1) DCID 3/3 formally establishes the Community Management Staff, headed by

the Executive Director (ExDir)/ICA (who has functioned as the de facto chief of staff to the

DDCI/CM since the creation of the latter position in 1996) to support the DCI in his community

activities. DCID 3/3 resulted from National Security Review (NSR) 29, conducted by the Bush

Administration in 1991 to identify anticipated intelligence needs through 2005. NSR 29

recommended a more community-oriented staff element to replace the existing Intelligence

Community staff. In March 1992, President Bush approved the DCI’s proposal to replace the IC

staff with CMS.

(2) A draft DCID on collection management establishes guidance for collection

management and defines the relationship between the ADCI/Collection and the National

Intelligence Collection Board (NICB) on collection management issues. CMS staff indicates

that this DCID should be issued in spring 2000.8

 

5 An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide. Joint Military Intelligence Training Center. Washington, DC. Page 6, 1997.

6 Title VIII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 805.

7 Interview with CMS staff, November 12, 1999.

8 Interview with CMS staff, November 12, 1999.
8

(3) A draft DCID on analysis and production outlines the ADCI/Analysis &

Production’s authorities and responsibilities and defines the relationship between the ADCI and

the National Intelligence Production Board (NIPB) on production management issues. CMS

staffers indicate that this DCID should also be issued in spring 2000.9

(4) A draft DCID on overall community management is currently being

developed. No release date for this DCID, currently in its very early stages, has yet been

determined.10

C. Interagency Directives: Executive Orders (EO) 11905, 12036, and 12333 provide the

interagency basis for the DCI’s community activities.

(1) EO 11905 (issued February 19, 1976), the first public directive on U.S.

intelligence roles and responsibilities, created the NFIP by formally implementing a concept

proposed by President Nixon to consolidate all national intelligence funding into a unified

intelligence budget submission.11

(2) EO 12036 (issued January 24, 1978) provided the DCI with specific

responsibility for approving the consolidated NFIP budget. While the DCI approves the

consolidated budget, funds appropriated for NFIP activities are made available to the parent

Department or Agency and not to the DCI.12

(3) EO 12333 makes the DCI responsible directly to the President and the

National Security Council (NSC) on matters related to national foreign intelligence, assigning 18

distinct responsibilities and/or authorities to the DCI. First issued in 1981, the directive remains

in force today.

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes. The structure and the major responsibilities of the ODCI are

specified in the Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996.13

A. DCI: The DCI’s major responsibilities include:

(1) Serving as the head of the U.S. intelligence community [Key Processes

Relation: All];

(2) Acting as the principal advisor to the President for intelligence matters related

to national security [Key Processes Relation: Strategy]; and

(3) Serving as head of the CIA [Key Processes Relation: All].14

 

9 Interview with CMS staff, November 12, 1999.

10 Interview with CMS staff, November 12, 1999.

11 JMITC, Pages 8-9.

12 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities, Page 71.

13 Title VII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 805.

14 See the section entitled Central Intelligence Agency in this volume.
9

B. DDCI: The DDCI’s major responsibilities include:

(1) Overseeing the day-to-day operations of the CIA [Key Processes Relation:

All]; and

(2) Acting for, and exercising the powers of, the DCI during the Director’s

absence or disability or during a vacancy in the DCI position. [Key Processes Relation: All]

C. DDCI/CM: The DDCI/CM, the DCI’s primary executor of his community

responsibilities, is assisted in this effort by an ADCI and (primarily) by the EXDIR/ICA. The

DDCI/CM’s responsibilities include:

(1) Performing community-wide IC management functions, including

management of personnel and resources. He also directs CMS operations, serves as the program

manager for the Community Management Account (CMA) (which funds the DCI’s IC oversight

activities) [Key Processes Relation: All].

(2) Through the ADCI/Collection, the DDCI/CM ensures the efficient and

effective collection of national intelligence by IC component agencies using technical means

[Key Processes Relation: All].

(3) Through the ADCI/Analysis & Production, the DDCI/CM provides oversight

of the analysis and production of intelligence by IC component agencies [Key Processes

Relation: All].

D. IC Committee Structure:

(1) IC Principals Committee (IC/PC): Chaired by the DCI, the IC/PC

(consisting of the directors of the individual intelligence agencies, such as the National Imagery

and Mapping Agency [NIMA] and the National Security Agency [NSA]) serves as the senior

advisory board to advise the DCI on intelligence policy and planning, needs management and

evaluation, and decisions affecting NFIP programs. The IC/PC provides the principal

mechanism through which major policy issues affecting the IC are addressed.15 The IC/PC

regularly, with staff support provided as required by CMS [Key Processes Relation: Strategy;

Policy, Guidance and Regulation; Planning].

(2) IC Deputies Committee (IC/DC): The IC/DC, the other primary venue for

senior-level coordination, also addresses major policy issues affecting the IC. Chaired by the

DDCI (and the DDCI/CM in the DDCI’s absence) and consisting of the deputies of the IC

component agencies, this body addresses and often resolves issues, thus dispensing with the need

to take those issues to the IC/PC16 [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy, Guidance and

Regulation; Planning].

 

15 The IC/PC’s predecessor organization is the IC Executive Committee (IC/EXCOM). Although the IC/EXCOM still exists

on paper, it does not meet and its role and responsibilities have been completely superseded by the IC/PC. Interview with

CMS staff, November 16, 1999.

16 Interview with former CMS official, November 11, 1999.
10

 (3) Expanded Defense Resources Board (E/DRB): This deliberative body

meets during the decision making stage of the Capabilities Programming and Budgeting System

(CPBS) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to deliberate on major

issues involving all Department of Defense (DoD) NFIP programs, the Joint Military

Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)

program. The board makes recommendations to the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

who co-chair the board. During each budget cycle, the E/DRB is formed by temporarily

expanding the membership of the standard Defense Resources Board (DRB) to include the DCI

and several senior IC officials for the purpose of reviewing major defense intelligence issues17

[Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing].

(4) Intelligence Program Review Group (IPRG): The attempt to integrate

program and budget review across the three major intelligence programs has also led to the

development of the IPRG, which reviews issues, analyzes priorities, and studies funding

alternatives. The IPRG relies on input from a variety of sources, including NFIP program

managers and their staffs, additional functional managers and issue coordinators from throughout

the IC, CMS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, and Communications (OSD/ASD[C3I]). The EXDIR/ICA chairs the IPRG

on behalf of the DDCI/CM. CMS staff serves as the IPRG’s permanent executive secretariat and

provides ongoing administrative support to IPRG members18 [Key Processes Relation: Policy,

Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing].

 (5) National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): The oldest of the DCI’s

advisory bodies, the NFIB is chaired by the DCI, with the DDCI serving as Vice Chairman;

membership consists of representatives, generally at the assistant secretary level or equivalent,

from the departments/agencies charged with intelligence functions. The NFIB addresses

production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; interagency exchanges of

foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;

and protection of sources and methods, activities of common concern, and other DCI-directed

issues. In practice, the NFIB serves as the review and approval body for the National

Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) 19, 20 [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation,

Oversight].

(6) National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB): The NICB acts as the IC’s

coordinating mechanism for “seamless, cross-discipline, collaborative intelligence.”21 The

NICB is composed of representatives from all of the intelligence agencies involved in collection,

both all-source and discipline-specific (e.g., NIMA, NSA, CIA). The NICB holds quarterly offsite meetings for principals to address strategic collection issues. It also addresses many of its

major concerns in interagency working groups designed to develop recommendations for

collection strategies. A new working group, co-managed with the National Intelligence

 

17 For a description of the DRB, see the section entitled Office of Management and Budget in the volume entitled Department

of Defense.

18 JMITC, pp. 85-6. The IPRG’s membership is composed of the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council

(Evaluation) as well as representatives from the individual intelligence agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, the

State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence. Langley, VA, 1995, p. 39.

20 See also the section in this volume entitled the National Intelligence Council.

21 Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Central Intelligence Annual Report for the United States Intelligence Community,

May 1999. Langley, VA, May 1999, p. 3 (Introduction).
11

Production Board, has been established to review current collection and analysis capabilities and

to develop alternatives for improving IC performance in these areas.22 The ADCI/Collection

chairs the NICB [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission

Execution; Observation, Orientation, Oversight].

(7) National Intelligence Production Board (NIPB): The NIPB, chaired by the

ADCI/Analysis & Production, addresses analysis and production issues by serving as the major

conduit for customer-driven intelligence priorities; encouraging cross-community initiatives in

these areas; and leading assessments and evaluations of the IC’s analytic capabilities. The NIPB

consists of representatives from all of the intelligence agencies involved in analysis and

production of both all-source and discipline-specific intelligence (e.g., NIMA, NSA, CIA) [Key

Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution;

Observation, Orientation, Oversight].

E. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:

(1) CMS: CMS serves as the primary staff element for carrying out the DCI’s

community responsibilities and also assists the DCI in his advisory role to the President on

intelligence issues. CMS’s major responsibilities include:

(a) Managing the development of policies for and operation of the

Capabilities Planning an Budgeting System (CPBS) for NFIP, including the fiscal and

programmatic guidance upon which NFIP program projections are based, as staff element for the

IC/PC and the IC/DC [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(b) Managing the planning and programming phases of the CPBS, using

Mission-Based Budgeting (MBB), an approach designed to capture how intelligence resources

contribute to the accomplishment of U.S. intelligence missions, for setting planning priorities

[Key Processes Relation: Planning];

(c) Managing the program review phase of CPBS, including serving as the

staff element for the IPRG and the Expanded Defense Resources Board (E/DRB) [Key Processes

Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing];

(d) Analyzing and evaluating alternative plans, programs, and budget

submissions in relation to mission accomplishment, estimated costs, and resource constraints

[Key Processes Relation: Planning; Preparation; Resourcing];

(e) Supporting the identification of intelligence required to address

national security interests; establishing priorities among programs, projects, and activities that

address interests and requirements; and establishing policies supporting the conduct of these

activities as staff element to the IC/PC and IC/DC, and as required, in support of the DCI’s

participation in the NSC Principals Committee [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy,

Guidance, and Regulation];

 

22 Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Central Intelligence Annual Report for the United States Intelligence Community,

May 1999. Langley, VA, May 1999, p. 3 (Introduction).
12

(f) Developing policies and guidance (in the form of DCIDs) on a range of

community issues in support of the DDCI/CM [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and

Regulation];

(g) Providing leadership in developing and promoting improved analytic

tools, data, and methods for analyzing: intelligence support to national security planning; the

effectiveness of intelligence in accomplishing national security missions; and the allocation of

resources [Key Processes Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing];

 (h) Supporting formal and informal interagency working groups on policy,

planning, resourcing, and oversight issues [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and

Regulation; Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing];

 (i) Supporting efforts to perform critical reviews of requirements,

performance, and life-cycle costs of intelligence systems to support acquisition [Key Processes

Relation: Preparation; Resourcing]; and

 (j) Performing such other duties as the DDCI/CM, the ADCI, or the

EXDIR/ICA may prescribe [Key Processes Relation: Potentially All].

(2) National Intelligence Council (NIC) Staff:23 The Director of the NIC, who

is dual-hatted as the ADCI/Analysis & Production (following the issuance of the Jeremiah report

on intelligence failures at the time of the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests), utilizes his staff to

fulfill analysis and production responsibilities prescribed under the Intelligence Renewal and

Reform Act.24 These responsibilities include:

(a) Evaluating community-wide production of intelligence and the

requirements and resources of such production [Key Processes Relation: All];

(b) Developing the Future of Intelligence Analysis, a comprehensive

report to the DCI on the state of the IC’s analytical capabilities, including an assessment of those

capabilities against priorities and a plan for strategic investment in IC analytical resources [Key

Processes Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Resourcing];

(c) Developing DCI guidance on intelligence priorities, linking specific

intelligence needs to capabilities, identifying gaps, and establishing a process for periodic review

[Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(d) Providing staff support to the NIPB in its production management

responsibilities [Key Processes Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight;

Resourcing]; and

(e) Preparing testimony and testifying before the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence (SSC[I]) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSC[I])

[Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight].25

 

23 See the section in this volume entitled the National Intelligence Council for a detailed description of NIC activities.

24 Title VIII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 806.

25 See section in this volume entitled Congressional Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence.
13

(3) ADCI/Collection Staff: The staff assists the ADCI/Collection in his

responsibilities to for carrying out the Director's responsibilities under the Intelligence Renewal

and Reform Act of 1996, to ensure the efficient and effective collection of national

intelligence.26

F. Major Products:

(1) DCI Strategic Intent;

(2) Congressional Budget Justification Book (CBJB);

(2) DCI Intelligence Guidance;

(3) Intelligence Program Decision Memorandum (IPDM);

(4) Intelligence Program Budget Decision (IPBD);

(5) DCIDs;

(6) Mission Area Assessments (MAAs);

(7) Other studies and assessments;

(8) Independent Cost Analyses;

(9) Annual Report on the Intelligence Community; and

(10) Future of Intelligence Analysis.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: The CIA’s vision and mission statement makes direct reference to the DCI’s

role as the chief advisor to the President on intelligence issues as well as to his role as the head of

the Intelligence Community:

"Our Vision: To be the keystone of a U.S. Intelligence Community that is pre-eminent in

the world, known for both the high quality of our work and the excellence of our people.

Our Mission: We support the President, the National Security Council, and all who make

and execute U.S. national security policy by:

(1) Providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence

related to national security; and

(2) Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions

related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President."27

 

26 Title VIII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 809.

27 “CIA Vision, Mission, and Values,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/mission.html.
14

The ODCI does not have a separate vision statement.

B. Core Competencies: CMS, as the primary ODCI staff element, defines its core

competencies as the ability to provide an independent assessment of IC needs through missionbased budgeting and assessment activities and to provide coordinated, community-supported

policy positions in its staff support role to the DCI, the DDCI, and the DDCI/CM. CMS prides

itself on its professionalism and strives to employ staff that brings the most highly prized skills

(i.e., broad-based policy skills, program assessment and budget skills, collection management

expertise, and specific functional skills).

4. Organizational Culture. By definition, the concept of a community implies a high degree of

collaboration across a broad range of activities. Research and interviews indicate that

collaboration is pursued to differing degrees in varying circumstances. Several interviewees

noted that, while the IC functions very well as a community in crisis situations, in day-to-day

activities the community has some distance to go before achieving full cooperation in every

situation. CMS itself emphasizes both collaboration (in its policy and guidance development

role) and independence (in its budget development and evaluation roles). The organization also

thrives on informal processes and thus provides a fertile atmosphere for continuous interactions

between CMS and its major partners in policy, planning, oversight, and resourcing activities. A

third key cultural description is CMS’ emphasis on nonhierarchical internal operations. The

EXDIR/ICA works closely with the office directors and spearheads the community coordination

activities.28

A. Values: CMS emphasizes effective and efficient processes for community affairs.29

As a result, it does not stress the development of “products” in the same sense as the IC’s

component agencies do, but instead strives to develop methods, techniques, and tools to facilitate

the community’s business.

Within CMS, collaboration and independence are both highly valued. Cooperation with

the IC component agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and others is critical

to policy and planning activities. Budget and evaluation activities require a more independent

approach, which CMS prides itself on providing.

B. Leadership Traditions: According to those interviewed, those carrying out the DCI’s

advisory and community management roles support the organization's culture and values. This

is due in part due to the professionalism of the leadership (both the DDCI/CM and the

EXDIR/ICA are community veterans) and the staff, which largely consists of seasoned

intelligence employees, many of whom have experience spanning several agencies (and

intelligence disciplines). CMS’ mix of core staff and detailees also bolsters its commitment to

collaboration and expertise development. CMS’ relatively flat organization fosters extensive

interaction between the leadership and the staff. CMS’ relatively small size (approximately 250

employees) facilitates communication of senior leadership views and agendas.

 

28 One interviewee noted that, with the creation of the DDCI/CM position, the EXDIR/ICA now essentially serves as the

DDCI/CM’s chief of staff. Interview with CMS staff, October 4, 1999.

29 An interlocutor emphasized that “CMS doesn’t run agencies, it runs processes.” Interview with former CMS official,

November 11, 1999.
15

C. Staff Attributes: CMS has faced significant hurdles in finding talented staff in

sufficient quantities. One interlocutor described CMS’ challenges, observing that, until recently,

CMS has not been seen as a “magnet” for the IC’s best talent.30 CMS’ staff is generally quite

senior (GS-14 being the most junior rank) and highly experienced in the intelligence community.

Consisting initially only of detailees from IC component agencies, today’s staff represents a mix

of core staff and detailees. Interviews indicate that CMS now has sufficient numbers of qualified

budget staff; however, one interviewee observed that employees supporting policy and planning

activities are of mixed quality. CMS has struggled to develop adequate evaluation expertise,

resorting to recruiting from outside the IC (primarily in the Department of Defense (DoD)) and

training budget staff on assessment methods and techniques. CMS’ Program Assessment and

Evaluation Office (PA&EO) emphasized the recruitment of cost analysts to support its Cost

Analysis Group (CAG). PA&EO has also engaged contractor support (e.g., in developing crossintelligence assessment methodologies) to carry out its evaluation responsibilities.31

The ADCI/Collection maintains a small, dedicated staff of senior intelligence

professionals. The ADCI/Analysis & Production relies primarily on the NIC staff for support.

D. Strategy: The DCI’s community management approach is reflected in the DCI’s

Strategic Intent, a classified document that addresses the IC’s goals and objectives in support of

national security policy and strategy.

CMS has no published strategy. Interviews indicate that its strategic approach is in line

with its vision and values.

 

30 This same interviewee praised CMS for taking strides to address this perception problem by building a high-quality core

staff.

31 Interview with CMS staff, November 16, 1999.
16

E. ODCI Organizational Structure:

Figure 1: Organization of the ODCI

(1) DCI and DDCI: See Section 2, Missions/Functions/Purposes.

(2) DDCI/CM and ADCI: See Section 2, Missions/Functions/Purposes.

 (3) ADCI/Collection and NICB: See Section 2, Missions/Functions/Purposes.

(4) ADCI/Analysis & Production and NIPB: See Section 2,

Missions/Functions/Purposes.

(5) EXDIR/ICA: See Section 2, Missions/Functions/Purposes.

(6) Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC/CIO): The IC/CIO

oversees the IC’s information technology and information security programs and is responsible

for ensuring compliance with DCIDs addressing these issues. Among the IC/CIO’s

responsibilities is infrastructure assurance planning under the auspices of Presidential Decision

Directive 63 (PDD-63).

(7) Administration (Admin): Assists the EXDIR/ICA with CMS’s

administrative functions.

EXDIR/ICA

DCI

DDCI

ADCI/ Analysis &

Production

ADCI/Collection

DDCI/CM

ADCI

ADMIN

ATG

IC/CIO RPPO

RMO

NICB NIPB

PA&EO
17

(8) Advanced Technology Group (ATG): The ATG provides executive

management of Community advanced research and development.

(9) Requirements, Plans, and Policy Office (RPPO): RPPO addresses planning

and policy for the IC, emphasizing information operations; counterintelligence and security;

workforce issues (including the Special Assistant for Diversity); intelligence capabilities policy;

policy support; Hard Target requirements coordination; and other requirements and plans.

(10) Resource Management Office (RMO): RMO oversees the development of

CBJBs. RMO also prepares congressional testimony and responses to Congressionally-Directed

Actions (CDAs) and Questions for the Record (QFR). The office is responsible for program

integration, budget and execution reviews, and the implementation of the IC Budget Information

Systems (ICBIS).

(11) Program Assessment and Evaluation Office: PA&EO administers CMS’

oversight functions, including conducting MAAs and other studies and assessments. PA&EO

prepares the DCI Intelligence Guidance and conducts the Intelligence Program Objective

Memorandum (IPOM) (the IC’s programming process that identifies the funding objectives for

the two-year budgeting cycle) review process on behalf of the DDCI/CM and the EXDIR/ICA.

The office performs other program evaluation functions, including independent cost analyses of

major acquisitions through the Cost Analysis Group. PA&EO also houses the IPRG secretariat.
18

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

DCI Strategic Intent 











 





IC Head 

Principal Intel Advisor 

CIA Head 

IC/PC Chair 

NFIB Chair 

E/DRB Co-Chair 

NSC PC Member 

CIA Oversight 

DCI Role (in DCI's 

Absence)



IC/DC Chair  

NFIB Vice Chair 

NSC DC Member  

IC Management 

CMS Management 

ADCI/Collection 

ADCI/Analysis & 

Production 

IPRG Chair  

DCI

Products

DDCI

Roles

DDCI/CM 

(ExDir/ICA)

Congressional Budget Justification 

Book (CBJB)

DCI Intelligence Guidance

Intelligence Program Decision 

Memorandum (IPDM)

Intelligence Program Budget Decision 

(IPBD)

DCI Directives (DCIDs)

Mission Area Assessments (MAAs)

DCI Strategic Intent

Independent Cost Analyses 

Annual Report on Intelligence 

Community 
19

A. Strategy Development:

(1) Major Activities: Develops DCI Strategic Intent; participates in NSC

Principals and Deputies Committees and Interagency Working Groups (IWGs); manages IC/PC

and IC/DC.

(a) DCI Strategic Intent: A major innovation of the DDCI/CM, the

Strategic Intent, a classified document, articulates the DCI’s vision for the future. The 1999

version depicts a unified IC brought together by the best use of advanced technologies.32

(b) NSC Principals and Deputies Committees: The DCI and DDCI

serve as representatives on these bodies that address national security strategy. ODCI elements

provide staff support in the form of talking points, briefings, and issue papers.

(c) IWG participation: The ODCI participates in NSC IWGs on a variety

of topics. When major issues are discussed, the ODCI (through CMS) develops an initial

position on behalf of the DCI and staffs it throughout the community, consolidating comments

and developing a final position. Depending on the issue and the representation required various

ODCI representatives could participate.33 ODCI elements provide staff support in the form of

talking points, briefings, and issue papers.

(d) IC/PC and IC/DC: These committees, managed and staffed by the

ODCI, serve the senior advisory bodies advising the DCI on intelligence policy and planning,

needs management and evaluation, and decisions affecting NFIP programs. The IC/PC and

IC/DC Committees serve as the principal mechanism through which major policy issues

affecting the IC are addressed. ODCI elements provide staff support in the form of talking

points, briefings, and issue papers.

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, NSC, DoD, and IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: IC/PC and IC/DC.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: NSC Principals and Deputies

Committees.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: DCID development, CPBS guidance,

IPOM development.

B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:

(1) Major Activities: Develops and issues DCIDs; manages IC/PC and IC/DC.

(a) DCID Development: CMS’ Requirements, Plans, and Policy Office

(RPPO) helps formulate DCI policy and disseminates it through DCID development. RPPO (and

now the IC/CIO’s office) develop DCIDs in a variety of policy areas, including personnel

 

32 CIA, DCI Annual Report, May 1999, p. 2 (Introduction).

33 CMS staff cited the development of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) as an issue on which it was heavily

engaged at the interagency level on the DCI’s behalf. Interview with CMS staff, October 4, 1999.
20

management, information technology and physical security, communications, infrastructure

assurance and information operations, and space. RPPO drafts the DCID and coordinates it

through relevant community officials before submission to the DCI.

(b) IC/PC and IC/DC Committees: See Section A, Strategy.

(2) Major Stakeholders: IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: DCI Strategic Intent; IC/PC and IC/DC participation

and support; NICB and NIPB participation and support.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Support to strategy development in an

interagency context.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IPOM preparation; issue/alternative

development.

C. Planning:

(1) Major Activities: Prepares and disseminates the DCI Intelligence Guidance;

manages IC/PC and IC/DC; manages NICB and NIPB.

(a) DCI Intelligence Guidance Preparation: CMS plays a key role in

developing the Joint Intelligence Guidance, which provides integrated planning and

programming guidance for the NFIP.34

During the late fall and early winter months, CMS gathers community inputs and

performs analyses needed to formulate the direction to be taken in the DCI Intelligence

Guidance. CMS then develops a “for comment” draft version of the guidance document, which

reflects the inputs and analyses and is then jointly issued to NFIP and JMIP program managers

and Service and Defense Agency intelligence headquarters. The draft Guidance provides initial

guidance on policy, requirements, and priorities; gives preliminary fiscal guidance on anticipated

funding levels for NFIP programs; and provides important information on the DCI’s priorities at

an early stage of the program building process. With the receipt of comments, CMS prepares the

final version of the Guidance that is then issued to the NFIP program managers by the DCI. The

final version gives direction and guidance to those addressing NFIP programming actions.

The DCI Intelligence Guidance reflects the IC’s use of mission-based budgeting in the

CPBS. The MBB process consists of four major steps: determination of missions; determination

of intelligence contribution and capabilities required; associating capabilities with missions; and

translating mission-based data to budgets. The MBB approach aims to determine how

intelligence contributes to the accomplishment of specific missions; to identify the specific

 

34 Throughout the mid-1990s, the NFIP and DoD’s non-NFIP programs ( the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and

the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)) had been viewed as so highly interrelated as to lead to the

issuance of joint intelligence guidance by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef). This practice was

discontinued in 1997. Interview with CMS staff, November 16, 1999.
21

intelligence capabilities that make such contribution; and to link those capabilities to the

investment made to create and maintain the capabilities.35

(b) IC/PC and IC/DC Committees: See Section A, Strategy.

(c) NICB and NIPB: The ODCI chairs and staffs these boards, which

provide strategic planning for collection, analysis and production capabilities. These boards

meet approximately quarterly and address many of their major concerns in interagency working

groups designed to develop recommendations for collection, analysis, and production strategies.

(2) Major Stakeholders: IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: CPBS (planning phase); IC/PC and IC/DC

Committees; collection, analytical, and production management through the NICB and NIPB.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: DCI Strategic Intent development; NSC

Principals and Deputies Committees.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: CPBS (programming, budgeting, and

execution phases); Mission Area Assessments; other technology-oriented studies and

assessments; independent cost assessments.

D. Mission Execution:

(1) Major Activities: Manages support to collection, analysis, production, and

dissemination on designated Hard Targets; coordinates collection, analysis, production, and

dissemination in support of defined national security missions.

(a) Hard Target Support: CMS’ RPPO serves as the main integrator and

disseminator of requirements for designated Hard Targets. The Hard Target Executive Board,

consisting of representatives from the major intelligence agencies, determines collection

requirements against those countries and assets determined to be of the highest intelligence

priority to meet a specified intelligence mission.

(b) Collection Management: Through the ADCI for Collection, the

ODCI ensures an appropriate allocation of collection assets against critical developments by

coordinating strategies for imagery, signals intelligence, and measures and signatures

intelligence against key collection targets; ensures that collection managers have adequate

contingency plans in place to collect in crisis situations.36

(c) Analysis and Production Management: Through the ADCI for

Analysis and Production, ODCI ensures that the IC’s production posture against Hard Target

countries meets customer needs; and develops specific actions to address analytical shortfalls

discussed in the Future of Intelligence Analysis.

 

35 JMITC, p. 120.

36 CIA, DCI Annual Report, May 1999, p. 3 (Introduction).
22

(d) Dissemination Management: Through the IC/CIO and RPPO, the

ODCI manages the implementation of policies, procedures, processes, and technology to assure

the effective dissemination of intelligence according to defined priorities.

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, NSC, DoD, State Department, and IC

Component Agencies.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: Collection, production, analysis, and dissemination

management.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: DCI Strategic Intent development;

associated DoD processes.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: MAAs; other technology-oriented

studies and assessments; IC Component Agency collection, production, analysis, and

management strategies.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:

(1) Major Activities: Prepares an annual review of the elements of the IC in

order to determine success in meeting intelligence requirements; conducts MAAs on IC support

to the defined national security missions; conducts other studies related to technology

performance; manages the Hard Target Joint Review; and manages Integrated Collection

Management Task Force.

(a) Annual Report: CMS prepares an annual report on the IC’s major

accomplishments that fulfills several oversight and observation requirements (including the

submission of an annual report on IC activities to the Congress).37 To prepare this report, CMS

collects inputs from agencies throughout the IC; no analysis or evaluation is performed.38

(b) MAAs: A particular suite of assessments performed by CMS’

PA&EO, MAAs are directly tied to the adoption of MBB under the CPBS. MAAs focus on

identifying relationships between projects and technologies on the one hand and the

accomplishment of defined national security missions on the other. One interviewee described

the ultimate goal of these assessments as defining a return on investment for IC “dollars.”39

(c) Other Studies and Assessments: Other studies performed by PA&EO

focus on technology adopted by the IC and how well that technology meets intelligence needs as

defined through various community processes. Both MAAs and these technology-focused

studies result in briefings and reports presented to senior IC leadership individually or

collectively through the IC/PC and/or IC/DC.

(d) Hard Target Joint Review: Led by the DDCI/CM, this review

process involves representatives from across the IC brought together to assess the effectiveness

of the IC’s assets in generating needed intelligence on designated “hard targets.” The NICB and

 

37 Title VIII, Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Section 805.

38 Interview with CMS staff, November 16, 1999.

39 Interview with CMS staff, November 16, 1999.
23

NIPB are both active in assessing the Hard Target Executive Board’s strategies and executing

after-actions stemming from the Joint Review.

(e) Integrated Collection Management Task Force: Chaired by the

ADCI for Collection, the Task Force has as its primary charter the development of a plan to

overhaul the current stovepipe intelligence collection management system.40

(2) Major Stakeholders: Congress; NSC; OSD; IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: MAA development; Program Reviews for the IPRG

and the E/DRB; ad hoc studies and analyses; collection management.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: CPBS (planning phase).

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: CPBS (programming, budgeting, and

execution phases), IPOM submissions.

F. Preparation:

(1) Major Activities: Manages CAG, producing independent cost analyses of

proposed major acquisitions; and develops MAAs and other studies and analyses.

(a) CAG: The CAG, modeled on OSD’s Program Analysis and

Evaluation Cost Analysis and Improvement Group, provides the DCI with independent cost

analysis to assist in major acquisition decisions.41 The independent cost assessments that result

are generated by a dedicated, professional core of cost analysts under the direction of PA&EO’s

director.

(b) MAA: See Section E, Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.

(c) Other Studies and Assessments: See Section E, Observation,

Orientation, and Oversight.

(2) Major Stakeholders: IC component agencies; NSC; Congress.

(3) Key ODCI Processes: Program evaluation and assessment; acquisition

support.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: CPBS (planning phase).

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: CPBS (programming, budgeting, and

execution phases), IPOM submissions.

 

40 CIA, DCI Annual Report, May 1999, p. 3 (Introduction).

41 See section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in the volume entitled Department of Defense for a

description of the CAIG process.
24

G. Resourcing:

(1) Major Activities: (See Appendix 1 for process map) Co-chairs IPRG;

conducts program reviews; conducts program crosswalks (special programmatic and budgetary

reviews) between two or more NFIP and/or non-NFIP component programs; conducts DCI/DoD

Joint Topical Reviews; manages and participates in IPRG issue and study teams; manages and

participates in E/DRB meetings; prepares and issues IPDM; conducts budget reviews; prepares

and issues IPBD; submits NFIP budget to President; prepares and issues CBJB.

(a) IPRG: CMS, through the EXDIR/ICA, co-chairs and staffs the IPRG,

which reviews priorities, analyzes issues, and investigates funding options. Co-chaired by the

DASD (I&S), IPRG representation includes the Vice Chairman of the NIC; USD(P), USD

(A&T), USD (C), D/PA&E, and the C4I Integration Activity (CISA); the JCS (J-2 and J-8) and

the operations and intelligence components of the Services; Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), Department of State (State/INR), Department of Energy (DoE), and Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) representatives; representatives from the major intelligence agencies; and

other representatives on an ad hoc basis depending on the issue reviewed.

(b) Program Reviews: In May-June (16-17 months prior to budget

execution), CMS’ RMO reviews the IPOM submissions on behalf of the ODCI. RMO’s program

monitors determine what issues need to be addressed during the program reviews. Generally

each program will provide an overview of their IPOM, showing consistency with the DCI

Intelligence Guidance. The reviews focus on the following topics: the feasibility of proposed

new projects and operations; evidence of tradeoffs to accommodate priority projects; and

identification of any potential redundancies. The information the reviews generate is used to

prepare issue and decision papers for senior IC managers, either individually or as a body

through the IC/PC and/or IC/DC.42

(c) Program Crosswalks: Crosswalks (special programmatic and

budgetary reviews) are performed in the June-July period (16-15 months before budget

execution) between two or more NFIP and/or non-NFIP component programs whose interests

overlap and where close coordination is necessary. RMO program monitors work with their

NFIP and non-NFIP counterparts to determine projects for crosswalks. Following internal

coordination, RMO produces a final list for each program crosswalk.43

(d) DoD/DCI Joint Topical Reviews: Conducted during April-August

(18-14 months prior to budget execution), these senior-level reviews, hosted by the DCI and the

Deputy Secretary of Defense, focus on three to four selected IC topics. Similar reviews may be

called for by the DDCI/CM or the EXDIR/ICA, focusing on seven to eight topics.44

(e) IPRG Issue and Study Teams: During the June-October period (16-

12 months before budget execution), the IPRG meets on a regular basis to receive briefings on

major issues prepared by its supporting issues and study teams. For these issues, a written

summary of the IPRG’s discussion is prepared by the CMS component serving as the IPRG

Secretariat. A report describing the issue, the alternatives, and the key points raised by the IPRG

 

42 JMITC, p. 129.

43 JMITC, p. 129.

44 JMITC, p. 129.
25

members is then forwarded to the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for their

consideration. For minor issues, an Issue Decision Book, representing the findings of the

IPRG’s supporting issues teams, is assembled and provided to IPRG members, who vote on the

alternatives by secret ballot. The tabulated results and the book itself are then forwarded to the

DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense jointly resolve the issues raised in the

Issue Decision Book, with the decisions captured as IPDMs (for the NFIP agencies).45

(f) E/DRB meetings: The E/DRB is also used as a venue for discussing

and resolving issues. The DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense meet privately after the

E/BRD’s deliberations in late July – early August (15-14 months before budget execution) to

consider the board’s recommendations. They then resolve any remaining issues and make final

decisions on the major issues for the NFIP (DoD portion), JMIP, and TIARA. 46

(g) IPDM: Following the deliberations of the IPRG and E/DRB, the

DCI’s decisions on the NFIP IPOMs are recorded and submitted to the NFIP program managers

in the form of IPDMs, establishing the programmatic baseline for NFIP. 47

(h) Budget Reviews: With the submission of the Intelligence Budget

Estimate Submissions (IBES), RMO initiates budget reviews, or “hearings,” in the midSeptember – October timeframe (12-11 months prior to budget execution). These hearings are

formal meetings at which NFIP agencies present and justify their IBESs to RMO, the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), OSD, and other relevant attendees. These reviews aim to

gather information for making budget assessments in terms of compliance with program

decisions.48

(i) IPBD: The DCI’s final budget decisions are recorded in forms

compatible with respective departmental budgets. For the DoD-NFIP programs, these decisions

are issued as IPBDs.49

(j) Submission of NFIP Budget to the President: In November (11

months prior to execution), the DCI forwards the NFIP budget to the President for consolidation

into the overall budget.

(k) CBJB: In early February (8 months prior to execution), the DCI

forwards the CBJBs prepared by RMO, providing written support for the testimony of the DCI,

the NFIP program managers, and others called to testify during the authorization and

appropriation processes.50

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, OSD (ASD [C3I], PA&E), Joint Chief of

Staff (J-8), Military Services, IC Component Agencies, OMB, and Congress.

 

45 JMITC, p. 130.

46 JMITC, p. 130.

47 JMITC, p. 130.

48 JMITC, p. 138.

49 JMITC, p. 138.

50 JMITC, p. 139.
26

(3) Key DCI Processes: CPBS (programming and budgeting phases).

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: CPBS (planning phase), IPOM

submissions.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: CPBS (execution phase).

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement. Although several formal national

security-related processes exist in the IC, much of the ODCI’s business is conducted informally.

ODCI staff elements continually produce briefings, talking points, questions and answers, and

testimony as a result of ad hoc requests from the DCI and other senior IC officials. Informal,

issue-oriented working groups associated with the NSC’s IWG, IC/PC, IC/DC, and other seniorlevel bodies involve the generation of the same types of products on an ad hoc basis. For

Congress, CDAs and QFRs are addressed as they are presented to the DCI for action. Even

within the structure of CPBS, the ODCI interacts extensively with its counterparts in an informal

manner before, during, and after the scheduled program and budget reviews.

7. Funding and Personnel.

A. Authorization and Appropriations: For authorization, the primary legislative

committees are the HPSC(I), the SSC(I), and the House Armed Services and Senate Armed

Services Committees. Appropriations are addressed by the National Security Subcommittee of

the House Appropriations Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate

Appropriations Committee.

B. Funding Sources: Funded from NFIP appropriations; community functions funded

out of the Community Management Account (CMA).

C. Budget: Part of the overall CIA budget (classified).

D. Manpower: Publicly available estimates put the size of the CMS staff at

approximately 250.

8. Observations.

A. The majority of those interviewed indicated that while the IC functions extremely well

as a community in a crisis, in day-to-day operations full collaboration is generally in short

supply. Stovepiping remains an IC reality in practice, but it is a function of culture rather than

organization. Organizational change alone will thus meet limited success.

B. Having the DCI focus only on community issues is not desirable, interviewees

indicated. The DCI needs a powerful agency not only to staff functions, but also to provide

needed credibility with the President and Congress.

C. A full sense of community can be achieved within existing authorities and under the

current operating structure if the DCI demonstrates a robust interest in community-wide affairs

and does not become overly focused on his or her CIA role. This demonstrable interest will go a

long way towards dispelling the widespread community view that the DCI is a captured pawn of
27

the CIA. With the creation of the DDCI/CM position (and the supporting ADCIs for Collection,

and for Analysis and Production), the DCI now has the staff support — both in terms of numbers

and quality—to be an effective community leader if the will to do so is indeed there.

D. Two of the primary values of the organization—fostering collaboration across the

community while maintaining a sense of independence—create a level of tension that

interviewees found to be healthy. While the policy and planning functions encourage

cooperation, those performing the resource and evaluation functions strive to be seen as honest

brokers in conducting their activities.

E. Informal processes and products dominate how the IC conducts its business. Much of

the support, especially in the strategy and policy area, consists of working groups and individual

staff producing issue papers, talking points, briefings, and congressional testimony in response to

requests from supported offices and institutions.

F. The current CMS staff, consisting of a blend of permanent staff and detailees, is

reaching an overall equilibrium of needed talent, although the staff quality remains mixed across

functions. The continued presence of detailees fosters a sense of collaboration, improves the

level of expertise, and provides community agencies with a sense of having a seat at the CMS

table.

G. Those interviewed indicated that, with the advent of the IC/CIO’s office and DCI's

commitment to technology investments, an Assistant DCI for Dissemination would not be

required to improve the community’s dissemination record.

H. Cooperation between the IC and the law enforcement community has improved

significantly over the past several years (particularly in support of counterintelligence

investigations and criminal prosecutions). Law enforcement community detailees now support

the Counterterrorism Center and the Crime and Narcotics Center. Interviews, however, indicate

that the flow of information remains largely one-way (IC to the law enforcement community).
APPENDICES
Appendix 1

DCI - Key Process - (Formal) - Resourcing - Capabilities Programming an

Director of Central

Intelligence

(DCI)

Community

Management Staff

(CMS)

 NFIP Program

Managers SecDef Interagency Inter-Branch Interagency WorkingGroup (IWG)

CMS Chairs

Budget

Reviews of

IBES

Issue IPDM

Review

NFIP

Budget

Issue DCI

Budget

Guidance

Start

Review

IBES andSchedule

Budget

Reviews

Produce

ConsolidatedNFIP Budget

Review and

Crosswalk

IPOM 

Develop and

Submit IBES

Develop

NFIP

Budgets

Develop IPOM 

E/DRB and

IPRG

Provide

Input

E/DRB Provides

Guidance to

DCI on NFIP

Budget

A

A

B

B

C 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Central Intelligence Agency

Overview.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 with the signing of the National

Security Act by President Truman. The National Security Act called for the appointment of a

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) charged with coordinating the nation’s intelligence

activities. The DCI serves as head of the United States Intelligence Community, as principal

advisor to the President for Intelligence matters related to National Security, and as head of the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).1

The CIA is an independent agency, responsible to the President through the DCI, and

accountable to the intelligence oversight committees of the U.S. Congress. The Central

Intelligence Agency’s primary mission is to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign

intelligence in order to assist the President and senior U.S. Government policymakers in making

decisions related to national security. The Central Intelligence Agency does not make national

security policy; it is an independent source of foreign intelligence information for those who do.

The overarching goal is to minimize the uncertainty for national security policy and decision

makers.2

The CIA fulfills its mission to support the President, the National Security Council, and

policymakers who develop and execute US national security policy by:

• Providing accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national

security topics; and by

• Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions

related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.

Organization.

The Central Intelligence Agency is headed by the DCI, who is nominated by the

President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director has two primary responsibilities: first, as

the Director of the CIA; second, as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC).3 This report

will focus on the DCI’s role as Director of the CIA, and will discuss the CIA’s role in supporting

the DCI in this capacity. However, it will also note those instances when roles or supporting

functions are not easily separated and those cases in which the CIA can have significant impact

on the national security process by its support to the DCI in both primary responsibilities.4

 

1 http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/info.html.

2 http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/faq.html.

3 For a discussion of the DCI's role as head of the IC, see the section in this volume entitled Office of the Director of Central

Intelligence.

4 See the section in this volume entitled the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence for a discussion of the roles and

responsibilities of the DCI as the Head of the Intelligence Community.
3

The DCI is assisted by a Deputy Director (DDCI), an Executive Director (EXDIR), and a

Deputy EXDIR. Each of these positions requires Senate confirmation and approval. The DDCI

assists the Director in his duties as the head of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. He

exercises the powers of the DCI in the Director’s absence or when the Director's position is

vacant. The EXDIR manages the CIA on a day-to-day basis. He is effectively the Agency’s

Chief Operating Officer, charged with formulating and implementing policies and programs that

affect the agency's corporate interests, including budget and resources, strategic planning, and

issues that affect the operations of the entire Agency. When the DCI or DDCI represent the IC

before Congress or in Community fora, the EXDIR represents the Agency.

Four Assistant Directors who manage the four main functional or operational directorates

assist the DCI.5 Assistant Directors are nominated by the DCI and appointed by the President.

The four directorates are:

• Directorate of Administration (DA), which provides administrative support to

the CIA in such areas as communications, security, human resources, and logistics;

• Directorate of Intelligence (DI), which is the analytical branch of the CIA and is

responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source intelligence analysis on key

foreign issues;

• The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), which creates and applies

innovative technology to the intelligence collection mission; and

• The Directorate of Operations (DO), which is responsible for the clandestine

collection of foreign intelligence.6

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes.

The CIA influences higher-level national security processes by providing authoritative

intelligence estimates and analytic judgments and raising issues for decision makers to consider

during strategy and policy development. The principal means by which the CIA formally

influences and participates in the national security processes include:

• Production of various types of finished intelligence products; and

• Providing key judgments and recommendations.

The DI is the Director's executive agent for finished intelligence products used for

policy and decision making. It can therefore be considered the principal component of the

Agency involved in national security processes.7

The CIA can also influence national security through regularly scheduled

intelligence testimony and briefings for Congressional Subcommittees on Intelligence.

These presentations include a variety of current intelligence issue and topics as identified

 

5 The Assistant Directors are sometimes also referred to as Deputy Directors.

6 www.odci.gov/cia/information/info.html.

7 http://www.odci.gov.cia.mission/organization.html.
4

by the Committees. Frequently, the DCI or DDCI make these presentations. These

briefings can influence the national security process in several ways, including resource

allocation.8

The following matrix depicts the relationship of the CIA products and roles to the seven

key national security processes identified by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

Century.

Strategy Development. The CIA supports the development of national security strategy

by providing top-level analytic judgments and intelligence estimates on key regional issues or

specific topics of concern to policymakers. The DCI or DDCI is often asked to present special

briefings to Executive Branch strategy and policymakers, including the President, Vice

President, the President’s National Security Advisor and cabinet secretaries and their assistant

secretaries inter alia. There is a regular formal process for providing intelligence to the

President: the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). This is the Agency’s most important product.

Although the CIA has an advisory and not a decision-making role, the PDB can directly (and

relatively immediately) influence national security policy and strategy development.9

Policy, Guidance, and Regulations. As was the case in the CIA's role in strategy

development, the Agency has a supporting role in policy development. Finished

intelligence products, focused intelligence estimates, and the key analytical judgments

made in these products influence policy, guidance and regulation decisions, even though

the CIA does not have responsibility for policy making. The Agency is responsible for

developing guidance in the form of recommendations based on the best available

 

8 See the discussion of hearings in the volume entitled Congress for accounts of how Congress uses hearings to shape

Administration national security perspectives and decisions.

9 Interview with senior CIA official, 29 November, 1999.

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Product

President's Daily Brief    

Economic Executives' Intelligence Brief    

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief    

Regional Reviews    

Terrorism Review   

The Narcotics Monitor  

Proliferation Digest  

International Arms Trade Report  

Special Intelligence Report    

Intelligence Memorandum    

Intelligence Report    

Roles

Provide Intelligence to Senior Policy Makers and Congress     

Product
5

intelligence and all source analysis. U.S. Code Sec 403-3, requires the CIA to “correlate

and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and provide appropriate

dissemination of such intelligence” and “perform such other functions and duties related to

intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council

may direct.”10 In fulfilling these requirements, the CIA influences the development of

national security guidance and in some cases regulations. However, the CIA does not issue

formal guidance or regulations, except for those prescribing management of internal CIA

activities. (While guidance and regulations for IC management activities are promulgated

as DCI Directives (DCIDs), they are released by the DCI in his role as the head of the

Intelligence Community, not as the head of the CIA.)11

Planning. The CIA has a supporting role in planning and provides information to

activities that prepare formal plans. This information includes up-to-date, accurate formal

intelligence estimates that are key to developing viable plans.

Mission Execution. Effective mission execution requires continuous updates and the

CIA is the primary intelligence agency responsible for providing timely and accurate intelligence

to the policymakers and decision makers during crises. In this way the Agency supports mission

execution even though it plays no role in actively directing operational forces.

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight. The CIA supports the DCI and the DCI's

Assistant Directors for Collection and Analysis and Production in their oversight responsibilities

for the CIA and within the IC.12 The Agency is also responsible for observation and orientation

of its own internal collection, analytical, and production processes, including quality control

oversight for finished intelligence products. Additionally, the Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 Intelligence

Authorization Act requires the DCI to submit an annual report to Congress. To respond to this

requirement, Agency components perform oversight and review internal processes and

accomplishments.

Preparation. The CIA leadership emphasizes the continuing development and training

of Agency personnel. Each Directorate establishes internal training programs and monitors

training progress. The Agency is designing a skills inventory and survey tool that will be used to

gather and maintain a single database of Agency employees’ skills. Managers will use the

database to identify personnel to fill critical surge needs and to address skill-mix issues. The DI

established Tradecraft 2000, a mandatory course for DI analysts and managers, to reinforce and

enhance core analytical skills. The DO has a similar comprehensive training program.

Resourcing. Frequently, CIA analyses or intelligence estimates have implications that

influence customer resourcing decisions. This influence can extend to the Executive Branch

(including the Departments of Defense and State), Congress, and the IC (through the resourcing

process managed by the DCI).13 Occasionally, CIA officials may present testimony before

 

10 United States Code, Sec. 403-3.

11 See the section in this volume entitled the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence for a discussion of the DCID

process.

12 For a description of the duties of the Assistant Directors, see the section in this volume entitled Office of the Director of

Central Intelligence.

13 See the section in this volume entitled the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence for a discussion of the resourcing

process. See the section entitled Office of the Secretary of Defense in the volume entitled Department of Defense for a

discussion of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)'s involvement in resourcing processes for DoD-related intelligence

requirements.
6

Congressional committees on resource-related Intelligence issues. However, more frequently the

CIA’s influence on the resourcing process comes from the intelligence products and analytic

judgments presented to decision makers. In this process, the CIA’s role is purely supporting and

not directive.

In addition to formal processes, informal processes are perhaps equally important to the

CIA’s ability to influence the development of national security strategy. On a frequent basis the

DCI or other senior CIA officials are asked to present testimony at Congressional hearings or to

provided special briefings on topics relevant to the IC or national security issues.

The DI and other CIA offices also help prepare the DCI for informal interagency

meetings by providing intelligence estimates and analytic reports on relevant topics. In doing so,

the CIA provides information and analytic judgments that support the DCI as the spokesperson

for the IC, and it can influence the policy making process by providing important intelligence.

Observations.

The CIA produces a variety of intelligence products and its substantive scope is

worldwide. It covers functional as well as regional issues, and its products range from quickreaction, informal oral briefings to complex, long-term research studies that may take months to

complete. Virtually all of CIA’s finished intelligence supports national-level policy

deliberations.14

The CIA enjoys an extraordinary level of access to the highest levels of Administration

policymakers. Senior CIA officials interviewed for this report believe this degree of access is

due to the excellent working relationship that exists between the DCI and the White House, and

is founded on the CIA's professional competency. It is principally because of this relationship

that the CIA is able to influence national security strategy and policy and to be effectively

involved in the policy development process. The White House-CIA relationship is of the highest

importance to the DCI, and he actively works to maintain and improve it.

The DI requires greater interaction with outside experts to meet the broad and complex

analytic challenges it faces in the future. It must position itself to compete in a new information

age in which consumers increasingly will have ready access to alternative sources of high-quality

data and expertise.15

The CIA has a very strong program directed at improving the Agency’s internal

capabilities. The current DCI's “Strategic Direction Program” stresses expertise-building. The

program is to improve communications and operational effectiveness among the four main

directorates and to make significant improvements in recruiting and training of new personnel.

Developing fully qualified intelligence analysts and providing an environment that is conducive

to retaining these highly qualified individuals are the key focuses of the Director’s personnel

strategy. 16

“Enabling,” which is defined as efforts to make better use of technology in the production

and dissemination of intelligence products, is another key component of the DCI’s Strategic

 

14 CIA Publication, A Consumer’s Guide To Intelligence, dated July 1995.

15 http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/undiplan/outreach.html.

16 Based on comments made during interviews of senior CIA officials in November 1999.
7

Direction Plan. Achieving complete electronic connectivity in the IC and being able to

disseminate all products electronically, with the appropriate safeguards and controls, is a longterm strategic goal.
8

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Statutes:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established by the National

Security Act of 1947 Section 103(b) and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of

1949.

(2) The Intelligence Organization Act of 1992, which became effective 1 October

1992, clarified and defined the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) as the head of both the Intelligence Community (IC) and the CIA.

B. Department Directives: None.

C. Interagency Directives:

(1) Executive Order 12333: reaffirms and further defines the responsibilities of

the CIA as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 amendment to it.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35 defines intelligence requirements and sets priorities for

collection and analysis.

(2) Intelligence Community Guidance: DCI guidance to the community is

disseminated through the DCI Directives (DCIDs) that address intelligence collection,

production, and dissemination. The DCID system is under revision at present and may change

substantially in the near future.17

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

A. Major Responsibilities: The CIA is responsible for supporting the National

Intelligence Effort as directed by Executive Order 12333. This Order states: “The United States

intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the

necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of

foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. interests from foreign security

threats." The specific responsibilities assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in support of

this national intelligence effort are as follows:

(1) Collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and

counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable [Key Process

Relations: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Requirements; Planning,

Preparation, Resourcing];

(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the U.S. and, without

assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence

activities within the U.S. in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 

17 CIA. Annual Report To Congress, 1998.
9

(pursuant to procedures agreed upon (by) the DCI and the Attorney General); coordinate

counterintelligence activities and the collection of information [Key Process Relations:

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight; Planning;

Resourcing];

(3) Support the DCI in his responsibility to develop objectives and guidance

for the IC to enhance Community capabilities for responding to future needs for national

foreign intelligence [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development;

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning, Preparation, Resourcing];

(4) Support the DCI in providing overall direction for national intelligence

collection by human intelligence sources as authorized by the IC and in coordination with

other authorized Government agencies, and ensure that the most effective use is made of

resources with the minimal amount of risk [Key National Security Process Relation:

Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning, Preparation,

Resourcing];

(5) Correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and

disseminate appropriately [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development;

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight; Planning;

Resourcing];

(6) Perform additional services of common concern to the IC, when the DCI

determines those services can be accomplished more efficiently if centralized [Key

National Security Process Relation: Potentially all]; and

(7) Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the

national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct [Key National

Security Process Relation: Potentially all]. 18

B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities: The CIA exercises authority, direction, and/or

control over the following DCI activities:

(a) The DCI Environmental Center, a focal point for all Intelligence

Community activities related to environmental issues;

(b) The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center that monitors, assesses, and

disseminates information on international narcotics trafficking and international organized crime;

(c) The DCI Nonproliferation Center, a focal point for all IC activities

related to nonproliferation;

(d) The DCI Counterterrorist Center, which is the IC’s focal point for

intelligence related to international terrorism;

(e) The National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Requirements

Tasking Center, which coordinates IC HUMINT collection requirements and evaluation of

collection activities; and

 

18 Responsibilities of the CIA are specified in EO 12333 and United States Code Sec.403-3.
10

(f) The Counterintelligence Center, a focal point for and coordination of

IC activities related to counterintelligence.

 C. Major Products:

(1) General: The DI delivers finished intelligence information and analysis

to U.S. policymakers in a variety of forms. DI intelligence analysis may be delivered as

written reports, oral briefings, or other forms tailored to the needs of individual consumers.

The DI produces a large volume of individual intelligence products, including quickreaction papers, and in-depth analyses. Most of these respond to specific requests by

intelligence consumers.

The DI supports a wide range of intelligence consumers responsible for U.S.

foreign policy and national security, including the President, Vice President, Cabinet

officers, the National Security Council, sub-cabinet officials, and several Congressional

Committees. Other consumers include the FBI, U.S. Customs Service, and the Drug

Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DI also provides ongoing intelligence support to

diplomatic negotiations and military operations.19

(2) Daily Intelligence Products: The DI’s flagship products are its daily

publications. Because of the sensitive nature of the information, these publications are

highly classified and made available only to a select group of senior officials. These

products are specifically tailored to consumer needs and are intended to support

policymakers on a day-to-day basis. They also focus on new developments and potentially

dangerous future situations. They provide analysis of these situations, related background

information, and assess their significance.20 Daily products include:

(a) President’s Daily Brief (PDB): This document is prepared six days a

week, and contains intelligence reports of the highest significance designed to assist the

President in performing his national security duties. It is distributed only to the President, Vice

President, and a select group of executive branch officials designated by the President.21

According to senior CIA officials, this is the Agency’s most important product and provides

intelligence information that can directly influence national security strategy and policy

development.22

(b) Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB): This document is

produced in coordination with other intelligence agencies and contains key current intelligence

items. It has replaced the National Intelligence Daily (NID). It is produced six days a week and

is tailored to meet the information needs of senior officials throughout the government who are

responsible for U.S. national security policy. Intelligence reports from this publication are

regularly sent to major U.S. military commands and selected U.S. diplomatic posts overseas.23

(c) Economic Executives’ Intelligence Brief (EEIB). This document is

prepared five days a week and is designed to serve the intelligence needs of senior economic

 

19 http://www.cia.gov/di.html.

20 http://www.cia.gov/di.html.

21 http://www.cia.gov/di.html.

22 Interview with senior CIA official, 29 November, 1999.

23 http://www.cia.gov/di.html.
11

policy officials. EEIB topics include foreign trade practices, illicit finance, and international

energy developments.24

(3) Serial Publications and Situation Reports: The DI also produces a

variety of classified serial publications and situation reports that address more specialized

topics, policy issues, or key countries. These publications are classified and disseminated

to a designated group of officials and include:25

(a) Regional Reviews: These are periodic assessments (ranging from

daily to monthly) of foreign political, economic, military, and societal issues relevant to U.S.

policy interests. They are published by the DI's regional analytic offices.

(b) Terrorism Review: This is a monthly publication produced by the

DCI’s Counterterrorist Center and addresses current trends in international terrorist activity and

methods.

(c) Narcotics Monitor: This document is published weekly by the DCI’s

Crime and Narcotics Center. It assesses developments related to narcotics worldwide.

(d) Proliferation Digest: This document is published periodically by the

DI, and all DI components contribute to its content.

(e) International Arms Trade Report: This document is published

bimonthly by the DI’s Office of Transnational Issues.

(4) Research Studies: The DI also produces numerous medium and longterm research studies on key foreign countries and transnational issues. There are three

types of intelligence research monographs. All are classified and intended for use by

designated officials. These reports are:26

(a) Special Intelligence Report (SIR): These reports provide senior

policymakers with brief, highly focused analyses of extremely important topics or events.

(b) Intelligence Memorandum (IM): These serve the policymaking

community’s needs for brief but somewhat more detailed analyses of important issues.

(c) Intelligence Report (IR): IRs provide all levels of the policymaking

community written intelligence support, including basic research and information, responses to

specific questions, situation reports, and briefing books.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: The CIA's published vision statement is “Our vision is to be the keystone of a

U.S. Intelligence Community that is pre-eminent in the world, known for both the high quality of

our work and the excellence of our people.”27

 

24 http://www.cia.gov/di.html.

25 Information an all serial publications derived from information found on http://www.cia.gov/di/work.html.

26 Information on all research publications derived from information found on http://www.cia.gov/di/work.html.

27 http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/mission.html.
12

B. Core Competencies: The CIA identifies five core competencies:

(1) Teamwork throughout the Agency;

(2) Total participation of an excellent and diverse work force;

(3) Continuous improvement in all that we do;

(4) Innovating and taking risks to get the job done; and

(5) Taking an active part in IC analytical efforts and producing all source analysis

on the full range of topics that affect national security.28

4. Organizational Culture. Organizational culture typically refers to the values and beliefs

evidenced in an organization in its day-to-day operations. It generally characterizes how the

work is done, how the employees relate to each other, and how employees relate to others

outside the organization. Effective teamwork is probably the single most important aspect of the

relationship among employees at the CIA, and it is a primary objective of the leadership’s

personnel strategy. The DI in particular has published detailed guidance regarding the

importance of effective teamwork. Part of this guidance includes a commitment to corporate

behavior (defined as supporting the corporate agenda, accepting collective responsibility,

constantly supporting colleagues, and seeking the views of team members during preparation).

A. Values: As an organization, the CIA has published two specific statements with

regard to its principal core values.

(1) "We stand for intelligence that adds substantial value to the

management of crises, the conduct of war, and the development of policy.”

(2) “We stand for objectivity in the substance of intelligence, and a deep

commitment to the customer in its form and timing.”29

Other values that are a part of the CIA's organizational culture include personal and

professional integrity, adaptability, and accepting accountability for actions.

B. Leadership Traditions: The DCI and each of the Assistant Directors exert significant

influence and have extensive responsibility within the CIA. The overall effectiveness of the CIA

depends on the DCI’s ability to create and maintain close, effective, and highly trusted

relationships with the most senior policymakers in the government. Without these relationships,

the CIA as an organization would not have the access to the policymakers and the intelligence it

produces would not influence their decisions and plans. The DCI and the Deputy Directors set

the tone for the organization, and their personalities and focus areas of interest substantially

affect what is done and how it is accomplished.

 Top-level CIA leadership has significant authority and responsibility. Typically the

leadership at levels below the DCI is composed of career intelligence officers, usually from the

CIA, although the Deputy Director is often a military officer. [Traditionally, a senior military

 

28 http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/mission.html.

29 http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/mission/html.
13

officer occupies one of the senior positions in the Agency; however, by law, only one of the top

three Community positions (i.e., the DCI, the DDCI and the Deputy DCI for Community

Management) can be a retired or active duty military officer at any given time.] 30

C. Staff Attributes: The CIA cites certain qualities as desired staff attributes, including

personal integrity, open mindedness, a willingness to be innovative in thinking and approach,

and a personal commitment to the organization's mission. Senior officials interviewed noted that

there is also a strong commitment to providing an environment that is conducive to developing

and maintaining technical and professional expertise.31

D. Strategy: The DCI has a formal strategic plan, known as the DCI’s Strategic Intent,

first published in 1999. It is the vision for the future of the Community, and at its core, it

envisions a unified IC brought together through the effective use of highly advanced technology.

Additionally, the DI has published a strategic plan, known as the Strategic Plan for the

Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century.32 In fulfilling the vision of this plan, the DI has

identified six major goals for the Directorate to pursue. These goals respond to national security

concerns defined by the Executive Branch, as well as to criteria advanced by Congress.

Achieving these goals will help the DI become the:

(1) Major provider of all-source analysis on issues of highest priority to our

national security;

(2) Major all-source interface with key customers;

(3) Primary driver of collection to meet key customers’ needs;

(4) Leading promoter and user of technology for collection, analysis, and

delivery of intelligence;

(5) Model work force, diverse and highly skilled, in which all personnel are

provided training and encouragement to achieve their potential in support of the DI

mission; and

(6) Leader in constructive engagement with academia, business, and the

U.S. public.

E. Organizational Structure: As a result of the dual roles and responsibilities of

the DCI as head of the CIA and head of the IC, a complete organizational diagram of the

CIA would include the activities that fall under the DCI in both roles. To focus the

description of the Agency's functions and organization, the following diagram has been

 

30 The 1996 Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act.

31 Interview with senior CIA official, 29 November, 1999.

32 http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/undiplan/di_goals.html.
14

modified. It depicts only those components that are directly subordinate to the DCI as the

Director of the CIA. 33

Figure 1: Organization of the Central Intelligence Agency34

(1) Director: The DCI is the primary adviser to the President and the

National Security Council (NSC) on national foreign intelligence matters. As noted, the

 

33 See section entitled Office of the Director of Central Intelligence in this volume for a listing of organizations subordinate to

the DCI.

34 Does not include all offices for security reasons.

EXDIR

DEP EXDIR

DIRECTORATE OF

ADMINISTRATION

DDCI

DCI

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY

DIRECTORATE OF

OPERATIONS

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CENTER

DCI COUNTERTERRORIST

CENTER

NATIONAL HUMINT

REQUIREMENTS TASKING CENTER

OFFICE OF POLICY

SUPPORT

DCI

ENVIRONMENTAL

CENTER

DCI CRIME AND

NARCOTICS CENTER

DCI

NONPROLIFERATION

CENTER

COLLECTION

REQUIREMENTS AND

EVALUATION STAFF

OFFICE OF RUSSIAN

AND EUROPEAN

ANALYSIS

OFFICE OF

ADVANCED

ANALYTIC TOOLS

OFFICE OF ASIA

PACIFIC AND LATIN

AMERICA ANALYSIS

OFFICE OF NEAR

EASTERN, SOUTH ASIAN, AND AFRICAN ANALYSIS

OFFICE OF

TRANSNATIONAL

ISSUES

COUNCIL OF

INTELLIGENCE

OCCUPATIONS

OFFICE OF SUPPORT

SERVICES
15

Director is the head of both the CIA and of the IC. The DCI also serves as Chairman of the

NSC’s Senior Interagency Group when it meets to consider intelligence matters. This

committee addresses issues requiring interagency attention, deals with interdepartmental

matters, and monitors the execution of approved intelligence policies and decisions.35 The

President nominates the DCI and the Senate confirms his appointment. The DCI develops

policies for and provides guidance to the Community on future needs and capabilities. As

Director of the CIA, he is also charged with producing and disseminating national foreign

intelligence and with administrative and operational control of the CIA.36

(2) Deputy Director: The DDCI is nominated by the President and

confirmed by the Senate. The DDCI assists the Director by performing such functions as

the DCI assigns or delegates. He acts for and exercises the powers of the Director in his

absence, disability, or in the event the Director's position is vacant.

(3) Executive Director (EXDIR): The DCI appoints the EXDIR, who is the

Agency’s Chief Operating Officer. The EXDIR manages the CIA on a daily basis,

formulating and implementing policies and programs that affect the corporate interests of

the Agency and its personnel. The EXDIR's functions include budget and resources,

strategic planning, senior personnel assignments, and issues that affect the operations of the

entire Agency. The EXDIR represents the Agency before Congress when the DCI or

DDCI represent the IC.

 (4) The Directorate of Administration (DA): The DA is managed by the

Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) and provides administrative support to the

Agency and to the full range of IC components. DA support services include information

technology, communications, logistics, training, financial management, medical services,

human resources, and the protection of Agency personnel and facilities worldwide.

(5) The Directorate of Intelligence (DI): The DI is managed by the Deputy

Director for Intelligence (DDI) and is responsible for the production and dissemination of allsource intelligence analysis. The DDI is responsible for the timeliness, accuracy, and relevance

of intelligence analysis provided to national security policymakers and other intelligence

consumers. The DI includes three offices that deal with regional issues, an office that addresses

transnational issues, and another that provides information services and support.

The DI also houses three interagency centers responsible for analysis of weapons

proliferation, international crime and narcotics, and the environment. With the Deputy Director

of Science and Technology (DDS&T) the DI jointly manages an office that develops new

automated analytic tools. As CIA's principal analytic arm, the DI has the primary role in

providing support to senior policy and strategy makers. Component offices and organizations of

the DI are:

(a) Office of Policy Support (OPS): OPS manages the delivery of

intelligence to the most senior U.S. policymakers. Two of its major elements are the President’s

Analytic Support Staff (PASS) and the CIA Operations Center.

 

35 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications.html.

36 DCI responsibilities are summarized here from the specific responsibilities set forth in the Intelligence Organization Act of

1992 3 and reaffirmed in Sections 1.5(a)-(s) of EO 1233.
16

(i) The PASS is DI's key interface with senior U.S. policy officials.

It publishes the Agency’s daily intelligence products, such as the PDB, SEIB, and the SIR

described in paragraph 2.C. above. In addition, the PASS briefing team provides daily

intelligence briefings for the President, Vice President, and other senior national security

officials.

(ii) The CIA Operations Center provides CIA leadership with 24

hour a day alert and warning of global events affecting U.S. interests and helps ensure the

accuracy of current intelligence for senior decision makers.37

(b) DCI Environment Center: This center is the focal point for all IC

activities related to the environment.

(c) DCI Crime and Narcotics Center: The DI houses this center, which

monitors, assesses, and disseminates information on international narcotics trafficking and

international organized crime.

(d) DCI Nonproliferation Center: The DI houses this center, which is

the IC focal point for nonproliferation issues. The Center develops and updates strategic plans,

enhances collection efforts, and assesses information to provide policymakers with a coordinated

view of nonproliferation issues.

(e) Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff (CRES): CRES

serves as the focal point for obtaining information for DI analysts. CRES tasks IC collectors,

educates analysts on tasking procedures and collection capabilities, and evaluates collection

systems. CRES also makes recommendations on future systems and collection related resource

issues.38

(f) Office of Advanced Analytic Tools: This office is the joint

responsibility of DI and the DDS&T. It was created to improve the quality of analysis through

use of state of the art technologies.

(g) Regional Offices: DI includes three offices that deal with intelligence

and analysis for specific regions. These offices are:

(i) Office of Russian and European Analysis;

(ii) Office of Asia, Pacific, and Latin America Analysis; and

(iii) Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis.

Regional offices are further subdivided in order to analyze specific countries and issues.

(h) Office of Transnational Issues (OTI): OTI produces analytic

assessments on critical intelligence related issues that transcend regional and national

boundaries.

 

37 http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/components.html.

38 http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/components.html.
17

(i) Council of Intelligence Occupations: The main objective of the

Council is to ensure a steady supply of talent so that the DI has the expertise needed to provide

the best possible all source analysis to consumers. The Council works closely with DI managers

to project future expertise requirements, measure current skill levels, and develop plans to fill

projected gaps through recruiting, training, and developmental assignments.39

(j) Office of Support Services: This office enables the production and

dissemination of finished intelligence and fosters the modernization of information systems.

(6) The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T): The DS&T is

managed by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and is responsible for creating and

applying innovative technology to meet today’s intelligence needs. The DS&T is engaged in all

intelligence disciplines and in all phases of the intelligence process so that intelligence can be

collected, analyzed, and disseminated to consumers.

(7) The Directorate of Operations (DO): The DO is managed by the

Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) and has primary responsibility for the clandestine

collection of foreign intelligence, including human source intelligence (HUMINT).

Domestically, the DDO is responsible for the overt collection of foreign intelligence

volunteered by individuals and organizations in the U.S. There are three principal

components of the DO, which produce finished intelligence products that have influence on

the national security process. They are:

(a) The Counterintelligence Center: A focal point for and coordination

of IC activities related to counterintelligence;

(b) The Counterterrorism Center: The IC’s focal point for intelligence

related to international terrorism; and

(c) The National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center: The center

for coordination of IC HUMINT collection requirements and evaluation of collection activities.

 

39 http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/components.html.
18

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement. The CIA interacts with all of the seven

key national security processes. The following matrix summarizes CIA involvement in these

processes. The following paragraphs discuss that involvement.

A. Strategy Development:

(1) Major Activities: Preparation of the PDB, the SEIB, the Economic

Intelligence Brief, SIR, Intelligence Memorandums, and Intelligence Reports. Preparation

and dissemination of all finished intelligence estimates, analyses, and reports that may

influence national security strategy development.

(2) Major Stakeholders: All members of the White House, the National

Security Council, the Departments of Defense and State, and Congress, and the Intelligence

Community.

(3) Key Internal Processes: The CIA provides the primary intelligence

support to policymakers for long-term strategy, during crisis situations, ongoing missions,

humanitarian support missions, and/or military operations. The PDB and the other daily

intelligence publications are developed by a formal internal production and coordination

process, followed by formal delivery to the President, Vice President, and principal senior

officials, as directed by the President. Special intelligence briefings by the DCI or other

key senior CIA officials to the President or other members of the Executive Branch are

supported internally by CIA's analytic resources and have a regular, though less formal

coordination and review process. Other formal processes that support strategy

development are:

(a) Preparation and delivery of special intelligence briefings or

assessments to policymakers outside the Executive Branch who are involved in strategy

development; and

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Product

President's Daily Brief    

Economic Executives' Intelligence Brief    

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief    

Regional Reviews    

Terrorism Review   

The Narcotics Monitor  

Proliferation Digest  

International Arms Trade Report  

Special Intelligence Report    

Intelligence Memorandum    

Intelligence Report    

Roles

Provide Intelligence to Senior Policy Makers and Congress     

Product
19

(b) Preparation and presentation of testimony to Congress on intelligence

related matters. 

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy,40 National

Military Strategy, and Contingency Planning Guidance.41

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Interagency working groups or special

task forces with a specific area or topic.

B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:

(1) Major Activities: (See process map at Appendix 1.) The CIA supports

the policy and guidance processes through delivery of a number of products and services.

These products include the finished intelligence products discussed in paragraph 2.C. The

CIA also affects policy, guidance, and regulation through contributions to and membership

in Interagency Working Groups (IWG) that are empowered to formulate policy, guidance,

and regulation. Other activities supporting policy, guidance, and regulation include:

(a) Special Intelligence Briefings to specific individuals or groups,

including members of the Executive Branch and Congress;

(b) Formal testimony to Congress, presented at hearings, or in written

format; and

(c) Management and participation in the DCI Intelligence Production

Committees; the Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee (JAEIC); the Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Committee (STIC); the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee

(WSSIC); the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee (FDDC).

(2) Major Stakeholders: All departments and agencies of the IC and selected

agencies and organizations of the federal government.

(3) Key Internal Processes: IWGs consist of permanent and ad hoc groups that

have geographic, functional, and/or topical areas of responsibility. Typically CIA analysts are

invited to participate in established IWGs, and the CIA can also convene special IWGs to assist

in producing special intelligence reports or other products, or to keep the analytic community

current on high-priority topics.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Formal IC coordination of published

intelligence products.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Preparation of special intelligence

estimates or assessments provided to the requestor informally, e.g., a short, one-topic summary

paper.

 

40 See section entitled National Security Council in the volume entitled Executive Office of the President.

41 See volume entitled Department of Defense.
20

C. Planning:

(1) Major Activities: Similar to its role in strategy and policy development,

the CIA has a supporting role in contingency planning, defense structure planning, and

planning for other activities requiring timely, accurate intelligence estimates and analytic

judgments. The Agency accomplishes its responsibilities by providing supporting

intelligence estimates and analyses that influence contingency operation and other national

security plans. The CIA also influences IC planning by supporting community reviews of

intelligence production and collection and supporting the Assistant Director of Central

Intelligence (ADCI) for Analysis and Planning in the DCI's office.

(2) Major Stakeholders: Potentially all departments and agencies of the

federal government (depending on the situation, topic, or regional area issue) and the IC.

(3) Key Internal Processes: Supports the ADCI for Analysis and

Production, and the ADCI for Collection.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy, National

Military Strategy, Contingency Planning Guidance, and Unified Command Operational or

Contingency Plans.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IC and Interagency working groups

focused on a specific area or topic.

D. Mission Execution:

(1) Major Activities. CIA analysts regularly provide support to interagency

task forces or to military organizations and some humanitarian operations. This is

accomplished by providing specialized and focused intelligence assessments, reports,

estimates, or key judgments. Analyst teams are also used to support these activities on a

day-to-day basis and the structure of the team is determined by the mission. For example,

CIA could provide support through a Crisis Management Task Force, which provides 24-

hour all-source analytic support, or a Negotiation Support Team that provides support to a

U.S. policy team for an international conference or bilateral negotiation. 

(2) Major Stakeholders: NSC, DoS, DoD, Joint Staff, and Congress.

(3) Key Internal Processes: Development of standard or special

intelligence products, such as SIRs, to support policymakers.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Managing complex contingency

operations; crisis management teams; high-level diplomatic negotiations.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Participation in IWGs or special

task forces.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:

(1) Major Activities: The CIA supports the ADCI for Analysis and

Production and the ADCI for Collection who supervise the process that guides and
21

evaluates IC collection and production. This involves supervising activities of the National

Intelligence Production Board, participation in the IC collection requirement definition

process, and evaluating various collection activities.

(2) Major Stakeholders: The IC.

(3) Key Internal Processes: CIA analysts participate in IC meetings on

collection requirements and evaluation and provide support to the ADCI on issues of

evaluation of analysis and production.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: None.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IC production processes and

processes for determining intelligence collection priorities and requirements.

F. Preparation:

(1) Major Activities. Internal training and development programs (such as the

Tradecraft 2000 course for analysts and managers), analyst rotational assignments within the IC,

overseas experience for analysts, opportunities for professional development, and continuing

education.

(1) Major Stakeholders: The CIA, the IC.

(2) Key Internal Processes: None.

(3) Associated Higher Level Processes: None.

(4) Associated Lower Level Processes: None.

G. Resourcing:

(1) Major Activities: The CIA can play a supporting role in the resource

allocation process by identifying areas of concern or potential concern. Typically, IC

resources (notably collection) are most often affected, but the CIA could influence

decisions in other Agencies or Departments. For example, intelligence reports could

influence DoD’s consideration of options for equipping military forces. CIA officials may

also present testimony to Congressional committees on resource related intelligence issues.

The CIA also influences resourcing by engaging in the formal process of reviewing and

revising intelligence collection and production requirements, but the Agency’s role in the

process is purely supporting and not directive.

(2) Major Stakeholders: The IC, DoD, and DoS.

(3) Key Internal Processes: Production of finished intelligence products as

described in paragraph 2.C., which provide formal and informal intelligence support to

policymakers; production of other intelligence products; and/or participation in IWGs and

other advisory committees or organizations both within CIA and in the IC.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Preparation of the president's Annual

Budget.
22

 (5) Associated Lower Level Processes: IC or CIA collection and production

resourcing decisions.

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.

A. General: The CIA participates in informal processes by providing background

information to the DCI in preparation for his attending informal interagency working groups

such as the National Security Council’s Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast.42 Typically this input

would be provided via the ADCI for Analysis and Production or in coordination with the

National Intelligence Council (NIC).43

B. Analytic Production Teams: The DI's analytic production teams deliver outstanding

support to policymakers during crises. These teams are characterized by collaboration among

members representing multiple analytic specialties and are structured to ensure high performance

in meeting particularly demanding needs of U.S. policymakers and decision makers. These ad

hoc production teams usually have participants from multiple DI offices and often include

collectors and analysts from other Agency directorates and other intelligence agencies. Policy

officials regularly comment on the special value added of DI assessments and briefings.44

C. Other Personal Contacts: Analysts frequently hold informal discussions in a number

of different venues to discuss substantive topics related to intelligence issues. Sometimes

informal discussions occur as staff members prepare formal analytical and estimative

intelligence products. Or they may occur in the form of “think” sessions among colleagues.

Substantive discussions can also take place during or in connection with IWG or DCI advisory

boards or committees. Sometimes informal information exchanges occur as sidebars at

conferences, meetings, or seminars. Often, these unplanned meetings and discussions lead to

more formal exchanges, or even result in the establishment of a special working group or ad hoc

group to consider a particular topic.

7. Funding and Personnel.

A. Authorizations and Appropriations: The Central Intelligence Agency’s budget is

reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget, and authorized by the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House

Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.45 The Defense

Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees make appropriations in both the House and

the Senate.

B. Manpower: The Central Intelligence Agency does not comment publicly concerning

the number of its employees.

C. Budget: Classified.

 

42 For a description of the Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfasts, see the section on the Office of the Secretary of State in the

volume entitled Department of State.

43 See section in this volume entitled National Intelligence Council.

44 http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/toolkit/trade.html.

45 See section in this volume entitled House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence.
23

8. Observations.

A. Finished Intelligence Products: The CIA produces a variety of finished intelligence

products. Its substantive scope is worldwide and covers functional as well as regional issues.

Products range from quick-reaction, informal oral briefings to complex, long-term research

studies that may take months to complete. Virtually all of CIA’s finished intelligence supports

national-level policy deliberations.46

B. Access to Senior Policymakers: The CIA enjoys an extraordinary level of access to

policymakers at the highest levels of the Administration. Senior CIA officials interviewed

believe that this degree of access is due to the excellent working relationships that exist between

the DCI and the White House that are founded on the professional competency that the CIA has

consistently demonstrated. This relationship is of the highest importance to the DCI, and he

actively works to maintain and improve it. It is because of this excellent relationship with the

Executive Branch that the CIA is able to influence National Security strategy and policies and to

be involved in the policy development process. 

C. Future Analytic Challenges: The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence will need greater

interaction with outside experts to meet the broad and complex analytic challenges it faces in the

future. It must position itself to compete in a new information age where consumers increasingly

will have ready access to alternative sources of high-quality data and expertise.47

D. Strategic Direction Program: The CIA has a very strong program directed at

improving the Agency’s internal capabilities. This effort is known as the “Strategic Direction

Program,” and is intended to improve communications and operational effectiveness among the

four main directorates, and to make significant improvements in recruiting and training of new

personnel. Developing fully qualified intelligence analysts and providing an environment that is

conducive to retaining these highly qualified individuals are the key focuses of the Director’s

personnel strategy.48

E. Connectivity in the Information Age: “Enabling,” which is defined as efforts to

make better use of technology in the production and dissemination of intelligence products, is

another key component of the DCI’s Strategic Direction Plan. Achieving complete electronic

connectivity in the IC and being able to disseminate all products electronically, with the

appropriate safeguards and controls, is a long-term strategic goal.

F. CIA's View of Its role in the 21st Century: According to those interviewed, CIA sees

itself as the pre-eminent intelligence agency and the leader of the IC in the 21st Century.

 

46 CIA Publication, A Consumer’s Guide To Intelligence, dated July 1995.

47 http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/undiplan/outreach.html.

48 Based on comments made during interviews of senior CIA officials in November 1999.
APPENDIX
Appendix 1

CIA - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Intelligenc

President DCI

Directorate of

Intelligence

(DI)

Directorate of

Operations

(DO)

Interagency Inter-Branch

Interagency

Working Group

(IWG)

Start 

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Receive Intel

Product Request 

Request

Supporting

Intelligence Evaluate and

Analyze

Intelligence

Tailor Product to

Consumers

ProduceFinished

Intelligence

Product

Prioritize

Intelligence

Requests

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Recieve

Intelligence

Produce Request

Acquire Raw

Intelligence

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Provide Raw HUMINT,

SIGINT, IMINT, and

MASINT Intelligence *

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

Request

IntelligenceAnalysis or

Estimates

* Other intelligence collectors / agencies provide raw intelligence.** Ocasionally under special circumstances.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NIC)

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Intelligence Council

Overview.

The statute that authorizes the National Intelligence Council (NIC) states that the Council

“will constitute the senior intelligence advisors of the intelligence community for purposes of

representing the views of the intelligence community within the Government.”1 To carry out

this responsibility, the NIC reports directly to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his

role as head of the Intelligence Community (IC). Under the direction of the NIC Chairman, the

Council provides mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and ensures IC collaboration on

substantive issues.2 Additionally, the NIC supports the DCI in the following ways:

• Providing estimative, timely, and tailored intelligence support and authoritative

interagency assessments to senior policymakers and warfighters on national security issues using

the best sources inside and outside the IC;

• Representing the DCI and the IC in interagency groups that are responsible for assisting

in the development of U.S. foreign policies by identifying intelligence needs upon which the

Community should focus; and

• Evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support and working with the Community’s

functional managers to refine all-source collection and analytic production strategies.3

Organization.

The NIC is composed of a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, whose office includes three

staffs: the Evaluation Staff, the Director for Outreach and Strategic Planning, and the Senior

Review, Production and Analysis Staff. The NIC also includes 12 National Intelligence Officers

(NIOs) who are either functional or regional experts and are drawn from the government,

academia, and/or the private sector. Each NIO has a deputy and a staff of one to three senior

analysts.

The NIC Chairman guides the NIOs who serve as senior substantive advisers to the DCI

and to senior policymakers. He also oversees the production of National Intelligence Estimates

(NIEs) and other interagency products, and he supervises the processes that guide and evaluate

IC collection requirements and production activities. The NIC staff generally consists of career

intelligence officers; although sometimes staff members are drawn from outside the IC.

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes.

The NIC uses a formal process to produce its major intelligence estimates and products.

It often uses less formal processes in providing guidance and making recommendations to the

 

1 50 United States Code, Section 403.

2 NIC Publication.

3 NIC Publication.
3

DCI or other senior government officials. The NIC Chairman is a member of the Intelligence

Community Executive Committee and also chairs the National Intelligence Production Board.4

Many NIC publications are produced by interagency teams and formally coordinated throughout

the IC as appropriate. The production and key judgments and recommendations made in these

products help the NIC influence various key national security processes.

The following matrix depicts the relationship of NIC products and roles to the seven key

national security processes identified by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.

* Acts only in an advisory role

Strategy Development. The NIC advises on strategy development but does not engage

in the actual development of strategy, and as such it is not a policy or decision-making

organization. However, the NIC supports strategy development by providing top-level IC

coordinated analytic judgments and authoritative intelligence estimates on key regional or

functional topics.

Policy, Guidance, and Regulations. As was the case in strategy development, the NIC

supports policy development by providing coordinated intelligence estimates and key judgments.

The NIC can provide guidance to customers by preparing recommendations that are based on the

best available intelligence and analysis. However, the NIC does not issue any formal policy

directives, guidance, or regulations.

Planning. The NIC has a supporting role in planning and provides information to

activities that prepare formal plans. This information includes formal intelligence estimates that

are key to developing viable operations plans.

 

4 The National Intelligence Production Board is composed of senior Community production managers, including the chairmen

of the DCI production committees.

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)   

Intelligence Community Briefs (ICB)  

Sense of the Community Memorandums (SOCM)   

Intelligence Community Assessments (ICA)    

Desktop Memorandums  

Warning Memorandums  

Warning Committee Watchlists  

Analytic Depth Studies  

Strategic Intelligence Reviews  

NIC Chairman    >

NIOs    >

Products Roles
4

Mission Execution. The Council provides situation updates during crises that are vital to

effective mission execution, but it plays no role in actively directing operational forces.

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight. By providing authoritative intelligence

estimates and by assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence collection and

production apparatus, the NIC assists the DCI in his role in oversight and observations of the IC

and its processes.

Preparation. No involvement.

Resourcing. Often NIC recommendations have resource implications, which will be

dealt with in the resourcing process managed by the DCI.5 Occasionally NIC members may

present testimony before Congressional committees on resource-related IC matters.

In addition to formal processes (including involvement in the interagency), the Council's

structure and its unique role create an opportunity for informal interactions with policy makers,

senior government officials, and non-governmental experts. Interviews indicate that the latter is

especially valuable and almost unique to the NIC among IC activities.

Apart from direct involvement in informal processes by NIOs and other Council officials,

the NIC helps prepare the DCI for his participation in informal interagency meetings. In doing

so, the NIC provides views and recommendations that it would like shared with members of

these influential groups. The special relationship that the NIC Chairman and the NIOs have with

the DCI and with other senior government officials is very important and key to the success of

this informal process involvement.

Observations.

The NIC provides a unique type of support for the DCI and other organizations and

offices within the Executive and (to a lesser extent) the legislative branches. Because it is small

and organizationally flat, the NIC is able to focus on issues without being burdened by

bureaucratic processes or cumbersome administrative requirements.

The NIC functions as the DCI’s “think tank” and contains an eclectic mix of expertise

and experience. In addition to career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence officers,

NIOs are often experts from other (non-CIA) agencies, or even from outside the government.

The ability of NIOs to expand beyond government intelligence activities to draw on other experts

in the private or academic sectors is a nontraditional approach for the IC and a key NIC strength.

By publishing NIEs (which are authoritative IC judgements), the NIC exerts significant

influence in the policy and decision making process. Through the NIEs, the NIO's views reach

the top levels of government where they are treated as valuable decision support tools. One

 

5 See the section in this volume entitled the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence for a discussion of the resourcing

process. See the section entitled Office of the Secretary of Defense in the volume entitled Department of Defense for a

discussion of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)'s involvement in resourcing processes for DoD-related intelligence

requirements.
5

senior official noted that the size of the NIO support staffs should be increased. This would

allow the NIOs to increase the annual number of formal intelligence studies.

Interagency coordination is crucial to the success of the NIC. NIOs are sensitive to the need for

effective IC and interagency working relationships. From the NIC's perspective, the interagency

coordination process works very well, but it clearly depends on effective interpersonal

communication and personal relationships.

There is some indication that coordination between the NIC and organizations

responsible for intelligence collection could be improved. While coordination for Human

Intelligence (HUMINT) requirements development is good, coordination in Signal Intelligence

(SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) requirements processes is less effective.6 One

reason for this may be that the NIC actively participates in HUMINT requirements processes

through a formal interagency committee mechanism. However, although the NIC has the

opportunity to review SIGINT and IMINT requirements and can influence them, the process is

less formal than the process for HUMINT. The lack of an adequate formal process may affect

both targeting and requirements development.

 

6 Interview with NIO, 10/22/99.
6

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NIC)

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Statutes:

(1) The National Intelligence Council (NIC) was established by the National

Security Act of 1947 Section 103(b) as amended by the National Security Act Amendments of

1949. This statute states that “There is established within the Office of the Director of Central

Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council."

(2) The Intelligence Organization Act of 1992, which became effective 1

October 1992, clarified and defined the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Director of

Central Intelligence (DCI) as the head of both the Intelligence Community (IC) and the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA). This act also established legal authority for the National Intelligence

Council and designated the NIC as an IC organization responsible directly to the DCI.

B. Department Directives: None.

C. Interagency Directives: Executive Order 12333 reaffirms the National Security Act

of 1947 and amendment of 1949.

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

A. Major Responsibilities: The NIC assists the DCI in overseeing intelligence

community activities, including intelligence collection, production, and evaluation. The NIC is

not a decision-making body. Its primary mission is to serve as an advisory group for the DCI

and other senior policymakers. To this end the NIC provides objective, interagency intelligence

for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and facilitates IC collaboration on substantive

issues.7 In addition, the NIC:8

(1) Produces national intelligence estimates, which are IC judgements [Key

Process Relations: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance and Requirements; Planning];

(2) Evaluates IC-wide intelligence collection and production including

requirements and resources [Key Process Relations: Observation, Orientation, and Oversight;

Planning; Resourcing];

(3) Assists the Director in carrying out his responsibilities. [Key National Security

Process Relation: Potentially all];

(4) Provides authoritative guidance to IC collectors based on intelligence gaps

identified during the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other products

 

7 NIC publication, October 1999.

8 The 1947 National Security Act.
7

and through a formal requirements review process for Human Intelligence (HUMINT). [Key

National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation;

Resourcing];

(5) Evaluates the adequacy of intelligence support and works with IC functional

managers to refine all-source collection and analytic production strategies [Key National

Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Resourcing].

 B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities: Although the following organizations are

directly subordinate to the DCI, the NIC has some management responsibilities for them and the

Chairman can influence their activities. The Council acts as the executive agent for:

(1) DCI Advisory Panels;

(2) National Security Advisory Panel (NSAP);

(3) Economic Intelligence Advisory Panel (EIAP);

(4) Global Expertise Reserve (GER);

(5) National Intelligence Production Board (NIPB); and

(6) DCI Intelligence Production Committees including:

(a) Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC);

(b) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC);

(c) Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC); and

(d) Foreign Denial and Deception Committee (FDDC).

C. Major Products:

(1) National Intelligence Estimates: NIEs are the NIC's principal product and

are intended to help the military and civilian leadership develop policies, strategies, and plans to

defend U.S. national security. They represent the IC’s most authoritative written judgments on

national security issues by addressing capabilities; vulnerabilities; probable courses of action of

foreign nations or groups; and/or key developments relevant to national security.9 NIEs (which

are often lengthy, can take up to a year to produce, and are coordinated in the IC) are estimates

that make judgments about possible future events and their likely implications for U.S. policy.

Executive summaries are prepared for the President and his senior advisors. The NIC considers

NIEs to be the most authoritative IC product.10

 

9 NIC Publication.

10 NIC Publication.
8

(2) The Intelligence Community Brief (ICB): These “mini-estimates” provide a

brief (compared to NIEs) focus on a specific issue or question.

(3) Sense of the Community Memorandum (SOCM): These memos, usually

only one page in length, provide a general “sense” of the IC on a single key issue. They are

likely to be produced quickly in response to a sudden event or crisis (such as a coup) at the

request of the DCI, President, or other senior government officials.

(4) Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs): These assessments are similar

to NIEs in that they are formally coordinated within the IC and reflect the Community's position.

However, ICAs are intended for the working-level policy makers, not senior officials.

Generally, they address issues of broader IC interest and may include substantial reference

material.

(5) Desktop Memorandums: These are short, very focused papers that are

designed for a narrow audience. Often they are produced for one office or individual and

address specific information needs.

(6) Warning Memorandums: These time-sensitive assessments are designed to

alert policy makers and defense officials to potential crisis situations. They explore potential

threats to national security that could involve U.S. military forces or require an immediate policy

response. For example, Warning Memorandums might address the possibility of a coup, a

terrorist act, or indications of possible armed conflict.

(7) Warning Committee Watchlists and Watchlist Supplements: These lists

assist policy makers in monitoring potential crisis situations or issues and examine potential

threats on a global basis. The lists often highlight issues that are subsequently addressed in

Warning Memorandums.

(8) Studies and Reviews: The NIC also produces two products designed to assess

the IC’s collection capabilities and highlight collection priorities. Generally, these products have

a much more limited distribution than the analytic products discussed above.

(a) Analytic Depth Studies: These documents look at high-priority

targets and assess IC collection capabilities. The studies are used to inform operational plans and

target list preparation.

(b) Strategic Intelligence Reviews: These documents identify key

intelligence issues and collection priorities.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: The NIC vision's statement, "is to ensure that National Intelligence Estimates

are the most authoritative record of the state of our knowledge and ability to understand and

anticipate future challenges to our national security.”11 There are no other published vision

statements that address the NIC products other than the NIEs.

 

11 NIC Publication.
9

B. Core Competencies: Although the NIC has not published a list of core competencies,

recognized staff competencies include functional or regional expertise and the ability to respond

quickly while maintaining rigorous standards for careful analysis and making key judgments.

Another core competency is the ability to deal with issues that cut across several activities, while

another is the ability to tap into non-IC assets.

4. Organizational Culture. The NIC takes pride in its unique organization and streamlined,

non-bureaucratic system. Members are encouraged to be freethinking and creative in

approaching problems and in applying their perspectives on issues. The Council's culture

encourages members to make use of resources outside traditional IC boundaries and to develop

working relationships in non-governmental sectors and organizations. Frequent and effective

communication between NIC staff members is a part of the culture, also.

A. Values: The NIC values the capability to provide objective, thorough analysis and

sound judgments, often on short notice. The ability to interact effectively with senior

policymakers and other members of the Intelligence Community is also a core value.

B. Leadership Traditions: NIC effectiveness and value depends in large measure on the

Chairman. Typically, the Chairman is a career intelligence officer with substantial expertise in

analysis and production. He must be able to interact effectively with senior government policy

and decision makers. The Chairman is appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, but is

not confirmed by the Senate. He has no fixed term of office; the DCI has the authority to replace

or retain the Chairman as he chooses.

C. Staff Attributes: The NIC staff assists the Chairman and Vice Chairman in carrying

out their responsibilities within the Intelligence Community, and it is structured to facilitate

interagency coordination. Generally, the NIC staff is composed of career intelligence officers

with demonstrated areas of expertise. Recognized, substantive issue or area expertise is the most

important NIC staff attribute.

12 A unique NIC strength is the ability to draw upon subject matter

experts from outside the Intelligence Community to serve as National Intelligence Officers.

D. Organizational Structure: The NIC is organized to meet policy maker particular

needs. The NIOs are organized regionally and functionally, and the NIC staffs are designed to

facilitate Council production processes within the IC and the government. While the NIC is a

very streamlined, flat organization, it has not changed significantly since its establishment,

except to add or delete positions in response to changing requirements for intelligence. Structure

changes include the addition of a new area or topical NIO, or the creation of a new supporting

staff. For example, the position of the NIO-At-Large was abolished and then brought back. The

following figure describes the current organizational structure for the NIC.

 

12 Interview with NIO, 22 October 1999.
10

Figure 1: Organization of the National Intelligence Council13

(1) Chairman: The Chairman oversees the NIOs and the production of the NIEs

and other NIC products, and supervises the process that guides and evaluates IC collection and

production. The Chairman is a member of the IC Executive Committee and chairs the National

Intelligence Production Board, which is composed of senior Community production managers.

Additionally, the Chairman is the DCI’s Assistant Director for Analysis and Production

(ADCI/AP).14

(2) Vice Chairman: The Vice Chairman supports the Chairman for both

management and substantive requirements, including analytic projects. He also works to

strengthen NIC and IC links to outside experts.15

(3) NIO: The NIOs serve as the DCI’s senior most substantive experts on either

functional or regional areas.

(a) Regional NIOs: NIOs are assigned responsibility for the following

geographic regions:

(i) Africa;

(ii) East Asia;

(iii) Europe;

 

13 NIC Publication.

14 See section entitled Office of the Director of Central Intelligence in this volume for a more complete description of the DCI

and ADCI/AP relationship.

15 NIC Publication.

Chairman

Vice Chairman

Regional NIOs NIO-At-Large Functional NIOs

Director, Evaluation Director, Outreach &

Strategic Planning

Director, Senior Review,

Analysis & Production

Evaluation

Evaluation

Staff

Production &

Analysis Staff
11

(iv) Latin America;

(v) Near East and South Asia; and

(vi) Russia and Eurasia.

(b) NIO-at-Large: The NIO-at-Large is responsible for a variety of

functions not covered by another NIO.

(c) Functional NIOs: Functional NIOs are assigned for the following:

(i) Economics and Global Issues;

(ii) General Purpose Forces;

(iii) Science and Technology;

(iv) Strategic and Nuclear Programs; and

(v) Warning.

(4) The Director for Evaluation and Staff: The Director for Evaluation is an

expert on all aspects of the intelligence cycle, including requirements generation, collection,

exploitation, and analysis. His activity facilitates the efforts of the National Intelligence

Production Board and supports the NIC Chairman in his capacity as the ADCI/AP. Staff

members are involved in a variety of projects, including the management of the Global Expertise

Reserve, a unique effort to tap into outside expertise and to develop the future national imagery

architecture.16

(5) The Director, for Outreach and Strategic Planning: This position supports

the NIC by facilitating communication between the IC and non-governmental experts. It also

ensures that NIC and IC products meet the needs of policy and decision makers.

(6) The Director, Senior Review, Production and Analysis and Staff: This

staff element provides broad support in the production of NIEs and other NIC reports. Staff

members assist in drafting and reviewing NIEs to ensure conceptual soundness, analytic

integrity, policy relevance, and presentational clarity.17

 

16 NIC Publication.

17 NIC Publication.
12

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement. The NIC interacts with four of the seven

key national security processes. The matrix that follows summarizes NIC participation in these

processes. The following paragraphs discuss that involvement.

* Acts as an advisor only.

A. Strategy Development:

(1) Major Activities: (See Appendix 1 for process map.) Development of the

National Intelligence Estimates, ICBs, SOCMs, ICAs, Desktop Memorandums and Strategic

Intelligence Reviews. Requests for NIC products are received by the DCI, who forwards them to

the NIC Chairman. The Chairman forwards the request to the appropriate NIO. NIOs produce

internal assessments, or they develop interagency intelligence assessments based on the nature of

the requests and the Chairman's guidance. While the NIC does not directly develop strategy, it

does provide information to senior policy makers, which is used to develop strategy. (This kind

of support also can be provided during crisis situations, or in the case of an ongoing mission,

such as humanitarian support or military operations.)

(2) Major Stakeholders: All members of the IC, the National Security Council

(NSC), the Departments of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS), and Congress.

(3) Key Internal Processes: The NIEs are developed by a formal internal review

and coordination process, followed by formal coordination within the IC. At the outset, the

appropriate NIO and his staff develop a work plan. As the NIE is constructed, the NIO seeks

input from both inside and outside the IC. External sources include experts from the private

sector and academia. The NIO and his staff then formulate a draft NIE and circulate it

throughout the IC for feedback and comments.

Once coordinated, the NIE is modified and a final version is prepared. The NIC

Chairman brings it to a session of the National Foreign Intelligence Board for review and final

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)   

Intelligence Community Briefs (ICB)  

Sense of the Community Memorandums (SOCM)   

Intelligence Community Assessments (ICA)    

Desktop Memorandums  

Warning Memorandums  

Warning Committee Watchlists  

Analytic Depth Studies  

Strategic Intelligence Reviews  

NIC Chairman    >

NIOs    >

Products Roles
13

approval. Upon final approval, the NIEs are formally disseminated. 18 Other less formal

processes that support strategy development are:

(a) Preparation and presentation of special intelligence briefings or

assessments (e.g., Sense of the Community Memorandum, Intelligence Community

Assessments, Warning Memorandum); and

(b) Congressional testimony.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy,19 National

Military Strategy, and Contingency Planning Guidance.20

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IC and Interagency working groups with

a specific area or topic.

B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:

(1) Major Activities: The NIC does not participate directly in establishing Policy,

Guidance, or Regulation; however, a number of its products or services are used in this process.

These products include NIEs and the others discussed in paragraph 5.A. The NIC also affects

policy, guidance, and regulation through membership on Interagency Working Groups (IWGs)

that are empowered to formulate policy, guidance, and regulation. Other activities that would

support policy, guidance, and regulation would be:

(a) Special Intelligence Briefings to specific individuals or groups,

including members of the Executive Branch and Congress;

(b) Formal testimony to Congress, presented at hearings, or in written

format;

(c) Management of and participation in any of the DCI advisory panels

such as the National Security Advisory Panel or the Economic Intelligence Advisory Panel; and

(d) Management and participation in the DCI Intelligence Production

Committees; the JAEIC, the STIC, the WSSIC, the FDDC.

(2) Major Stakeholders: All departments and agencies of the Intelligence

Community and selected agencies and organizations of the federal government.

(3) Key Internal Processes: IWGs consist of permanent and ad hoc groups that

have geographic, functional, and/or topical areas of responsibility. Each IWG is a primary

interagency forum for the development and review of intelligence estimates and analyses on

specific topics of intelligence interest. Typically NIOs are invited to participate in established

 

18 NIC Publication.

19 See section entitled National Security Council in the volume entitled Executive Office of the President.

20 See section volume entitled Department of Defense.
14

IWGs, but the NIC can also convene special IWGs to assist in the production of NIEs or other

products, or to keep the analytic community current on certain high priority topics.21

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Formal IC coordination of published

intelligence products such as SOCM, ICAs, and ICBs.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Preparation of special intelligence

estimates or assessments provided to the requestor informally, perhaps as a short one-page

issue/topic summary.

C. Planning:

(1) Major Activities: Similar to its role in strategy and policy development, the

NIC has a supporting role in contingency planning, defense structure planning, and planning for

other activities requiring timely, accurate intelligence estimates and analytic judgments. This is

accomplished by providing the supporting intelligence estimates and analyses that will influence

the contingency operation or other plans developed by the policy makers. The NIC also

influences planning within the IC by review of intelligence production and collection.

(2) Major Stakeholders: Potentially all departments and agencies of the federal

government depending on the situation, topic, or regional area issue.

(3) Key Internal Processes: The production of intelligence reports, estimates and

other products such as Warning Committee Watch Lists and Watch List Supplements, which are

tailored to meet specific needs of planners and policymakers engaged in planning activities. In

the case of production review, the NIC's evaluation staff supervises the National Intelligence

Production Board and supports the NIC Chairman in his position as the ADCI for Analysis and

Production.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy, National

Military Strategy, and Contingency Planning Guidance.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IC and Interagency working groups with

a specific area or topic.

D. Mission Execution:

(1) Major Activities: NIC activities normally do not support ongoing missions on

a day-to-day basis. There are exceptions, however, and the NIC does provide short-notice

support to military organizations and some humanitarian operations as required. It does this

through production of specialized and focused intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, or

key judgments. These can be provided in written form, usually short one-page products, or as

personal briefings to individuals or small groups, depending on the situation.

(2) Major Stakeholders: NSC, DoS, DoD, Joint Staff, and Congress.

 

21 Interview with NIO.
15

(3) Key Internal Processes: Development of standard intelligence products, or

special products, to support policy makers such as Warning Memorandum or Sense of the

Community memorandum.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy; National

Military Strategy.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Participation in Interagency Working

Groups or special task forces created for specific missions or situations. The NIC may be called

on to participate as advisors for real-time intelligence support.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:

(1) Major Activities: The NIC supervises the process that guides and evaluates

IC collection and production. This involves supervising activities of the National Intelligence

Production Board and participation in the IC collection requirements definition process, and in

evaluating various collection activities.

(2) Major Stakeholders: The IC.

(3) Key Internal Processes: NIOs chair IC meetings on collection requirements

and evaluation. The Chairman supervises the NIPB.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: None.

 (5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Influences IC production activities and

intelligence collection priorities and requirements.

F. Preparation: No involvement.

G. Resourcing:

(1) Major Activities: The NIC can play a supporting role in the resource

allocation process by identifying areas of concern or potential concern. Typically, resources of

the Intelligence Community, notably collection, would be affected most often, but the NIC could

influence decisions in other government agencies or departments. For example, an intelligence

warning memorandum could influence the Department of Defense’s decision making process in

considering the commitment of military forces. The NIC also influences resourcing by engaging

in the formal process of reviewing and revising intelligence collection requirements.

(2) Major Stakeholders: The IC, NSC, DoD, DoS, and Joint Chiefs.

(3) Key Internal Processes: Through the production of NIEs (described in

paragraph 5.A.) and all other intelligence products, or by participation in IWGs and other

Advisory Committees or organizations (i.e., DCI panels listed in paragraph 2.B.), the NIC

provides formal and informal intelligence support to policy makers.
16

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy; National

Military Strategy.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: IC collection and production activities.

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.

A. General: Informal processes involve coordination of estimates and judgments

supplement the formal coordination processes. NIOs often engage in a more informal

coordination process in responding to short-term, time-sensitive requests for analytic judgments

or assessments on high-priority intelligence topics. For example, the NIC substantive expert on a

particular topic could convene an ad hoc working group to develop a quick turnaround response

to a specific information request from the DCI or other senior government official in response to

a mission execution requirement.

Also, the NIC Chairman is frequently called upon to provide comments or advice to the

DCI on a “no notice” basis, perhaps in a private office meeting or during a telephone

conversation. An example of how the NIC can indirectly influence policy would be in providing

background information (via the Chairman) to the DCI in preparation for his attending the

National Security Council’s Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast.22 In satisfying these

requirements, the NIC Chairman functions as a top-level advisor.

B. NIOs: The NIOs also engage in informal national security processes by preparing the

DCI for formal or informal meetings with other members of the IC, the Secretary of State, or the

President’s National Security Advisor. According to those interviewed, the NIOs also engage in

personal consultations with other senior DoD officials, such as the Defense Intelligence Officers

(DIOs), Senior State Department officials, or senior staff members of other government agencies

and organizations.

C. NIC Influence: This depends on the recognized expertise and credibility of the NIOs,

and to some degree, on their personality and interpersonal communication skills. The ability of

the NIOs to gain respect and support of the other members of the IC is key to the success of the

NIC. The personality, leadership style, and overall perception of the NIC Chairman affect the

NIC’s influence, as well. How he interacts with the DCI, and how he is regarded by other senior

policymakers, and in the IC as a whole, is critical to the degree of influence the NIC can have on

the national security process.

D. Other Personal Contacts: NIOs frequently hold informal discussions in a number of

different venues to discuss substantive topics related to intelligence issues. Sometimes these

discussions occur as staff members prepare formal analytical/estimative intelligence products; at

other times merely as “think” sessions among colleagues. Substantive discussions can also take

place at any of the numerous interagency working groups or DCI advisory boards or committees

where NIOs are either members or invited participants. Sometimes they occur as sidebars at

conferences, meetings, or seminars. Often, these unplanned meetings and discussions lead to

 

22 For a description of the Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfasts, see the section on the Office of the Secretary of State in the

volume entitled Department of State.
17

more formal exchanges or even result in the establishment of a special working group or ad hoc

group to consider a particular topic.

7. Funding and Personnel.

A. Authorizations and Appropriations: NIC funding is included under authorizations

and appropriations for the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, through the Community

Management Staff budget.

B. Manpower: The NIC staff consists of a Chairman, Vice Chairman, 12 National

Intelligence Officers, each with a Deputy NIO and a staff from one to three senior analysts, along

with technical and clerical support.

C. Budget: Classified.

8. Observations.

A. Based on comments from Council members, the NIC provides a unique type of staff

support to the DCI and to other government organizations and offices. With its relatively small

size and streamlined organization, the NIC is able to focus on substantive issues without being

overly burdened by a large bureaucratic process or administrative requirements.

B. The NIC functions as the DCI’s “think tank” and contains an eclectic mix of expertise

and experience. In addition to career CIA intelligence officers, NIOs are often experts from

other (non-CIA) government agencies or even from outside the government. The ability of NIOs

to expand beyond government intelligence activities to draw on other experts in the private or

academic sectors is a nontraditional approach for the IC and a key NIC strength.

C. The NIC exerts significant influence through the publication of the NIEs, which are

considered to be authoritative intelligence community statements. These estimates are circulated

among senior policy and decision makers. Thus, although the NIC is not specifically considered

a policy or strategy making organization, the influence and support it lends to these processes is

considerable. The views of the NIOs are heard at the top levels of government, and due to their

acknowledged positions as the senior subject matter experts, their views are held in high regard.

D. One senior official noted that the size of the NIO support staffs should be increased.

This would allow the NIOs to increase the annual number of formal intelligence studies.

E. Interagency coordination is crucial to the success of the NIC. NIOs are sensitive to the

need for effective IC and interagency working relationships. From the NIC's perspective, the

interagency coordination process works well, but it clearly depends on effective interpersonal

communication and personal relationships.

There is some indication that coordination between the NIC and organizations

responsible for intelligence collection could be improved. While coordination for Human

Intelligence (HUMINT) requirements development is good, coordination in Signal Intelligence
18

(SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) requirements processes is less effective.23 One

reason for this may be that the NIC actively participates in HUMINT requirements processes

through a formal interagency committee mechanism. However, although the NIC has the

opportunity to review SIGINT and IMINT requirements and can influence them, the process is

less formal than the process for HUMINT. The lack of an adequate formal process may affect

both targeting and requirements development.

 

23 Interview with NIO, 10/22/99.
APPENDIX
Appendix 1

NIC - Key Process - (Formal) - Strategy, Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Nation

DCI Chairman NIC National Intelligence

Officer (NIO) Interagency Inter-Branch

Interagency

Working Group

(IWG)

Meet Regularly to

Review and

Evaluate NIE

Needs

Task NIC

Chairman

with NIE

Request NIE

** Start

Request NIE

Prioritize NIE Needs Request NIE **

Begin

Preparation of

NIE

Formulate

Work Plan

with NIO

Staff

Gather Information

from IC, Academia, 

Private Sector, and

Other Sources

Begin

Development

of NIE 

Produce

Draft NIE

C

Co

Request NIE

**

Request NIE

**

Request NIE

**

* In addition to policy, guidance, regulation, and strategy, NIC products may also have implications for resourcing and planning.** NIE requests can come from Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, or the Department of State.*** NIE customers are usually, but not limited to, the W hite House, NSC, Congress, Department of State, and Pentagon.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Overview.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports directly to the Secretary of Defense,

although administratively it falls under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)). DIA provides military

intelligence products to the Director of Central Intelligence, and represents the military

intelligence services in the national foreign intelligence process. Additionally, DIA provides

defense intelligence to the Joint Staff through regular briefings for the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

DIA's mission is to provide timely, relevant intelligence to the services, unified

commands, defense decision and policy makers, and the individual warfighter.

DIA's products include:

• Intelligence estimates;

• Current intelligence;

• Indications and warnings on current imminent threats;

• Support to strategic and operational planning; and

• Mission execution in contingency, crisis, and combat operations.

DIA is designated by Title 10, United States Code, as a combat support agency (CSA)

and employs over 7,000 military and civilian personnel. It occupies two major facilities, spaces

in the Pentagon, and several smaller offices in the National Capital Region. The Armed Forces

Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), located in Frederick, MD, and the Missile and Space

Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, AL, also report to DIA. DIA is the central agency for

the management of all personnel and resources devoted to measurement and signature

intelligence (MASINT) and military-related human intelligence (HUMINT). The agency also is

responsible for managing the Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) located in U.S. embassies.

Organization.

DIA is organized into a command element supported by nine corresponding staff

elements and eight directorates, based on core functions and missions. The command element

consists of the Director, Deputy Director, and Chief of Staff. The nine staff elements that

support these offices are Director of Military Intelligence Staff; Executive Secretariat; General

Counsel; Inspector General; Senior Enlisted Advisor; Plans, Programs, and Operations; Diversity

Management; Comptroller; and Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization.
3

The chief directorates and sub-directorates include:

• Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Organization (CMO);

• Directorate for Intelligence, J-2;

• Directorate for Intelligence Production;

• Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC);

• Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC);

• Directorate for Operations;

• Directorate for Policy Support;

• Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC).

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Process.

DIA is involved in several key processes related to defense strategy, policy, planning,

preparation, and most significantly mission execution. DIA is the central source for defenserelated intelligence in DoD and the Intelligence Community, and the Director, DIA is the

principle briefer on defense intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI), and other agencies, when appropriate.

Conclusions and Observations.

DIA plays a role in the national security process as the main source of defense

intelligence. Its products figure most prominently into the strategy making, planning, policy

making and mission execution processes of national security. In military-related missions, DIA

plays the role of the central source for intelligence for combat support, planning, and operational

guidance at all levels of engagement. As indicated in its mission statement, DIA places a high

priority on providing relevant, timely intelligence to defense planners, policy makers, and

warfighters.
4

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Directive: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), originally

established in 1961, was created within the Department of Defense (DoD) pursuant to Section

113 of Title 10, U.S.C., which gives the Secretary of Defense broad powers to organize and

create agencies within DoD as he deems necessary. Additionally, Section 193 of Title 10,

U.S.C. designates DIA as a combat support agency, which gives the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) a role in oversight when related to military operations.

B. Department/Agency Directives: The current governing Directive is DoD Directive

(DoDD) 5105.21 (18 February 1997), which replaced DoDD 5105.21 (19 May 1977).

 The Directive "reissues [DoDD 5105.21 (19 May 1977)] to update the responsibilities,

functions, relationships and authorities of the DIA; and establishes the Military Intelligence

Board (MIB), with mission, organization, responsibilities, functions, and authorities as

prescribed herein."1

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

A. Mission: As set out by DoDD 5105.21 (18 Feb 1997), "DIA shall satisfy, or ensure

the satisfaction of the military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary and

Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other DoD Components,

and, as appropriate, non-DoD Agencies of the Federal Government; and provide the military

intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence."

In DIA's words, its mission is "[t]o provide timely, objective and cogent military

intelligence to the warfighters—soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines—and to the decision makers

and policymakers of the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Government."2

B. Major Responsibilities: DoDD 5105.21 (18 Feb 1997) sets forth the following

responsibilities for the Defense Intelligence Agency: "The Director of the Defense Intelligence

Agency advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the ASD(C3I) on all matters concerning military and

military-related intelligence; is the principal advisor on substantive intelligence matters to the

Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Combatant Commanders, and the ASD(C3I); is the principal DoD intelligence representative in

the national foreign intelligence process; and, with the agreement of the Heads of the DoD

Intelligence Components, is responsible for coordinating the employment of DoD Intelligence

Components' personnel and resources to satisfy DoD intelligence requirements."3

 

1 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997).

2 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency website,

www.dia.mil/vector21.pdf

3 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997).
5

In pursuit of these responsibilities, the Director, DIA, is required to perform the following

functions, outlined in DODD 5105.21 (18 Feb 1997): 4

(1) Organize, direct, and manage the DIA and all assigned resources.

(2) Provide peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat intelligence support to the

operational military forces.

(3) Provide military intelligence support for the policy and planning activities of

DoD and, as appropriate, for similar activities of non-DoD national authorities.

(4) Be responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting activities in

furtherance of the Defense Department intelligence mission as follows:

(a) Prepare and submit the DIA program and budget input to the General

Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) as an input to the National Foreign Intelligence Program

(NFIP); participate in the NFIP approval process, the DoD Foreign Counterintelligence Program,

and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).

(b) Review and provide recommendations to the Chairman and the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence

(ASD(C3I)) concerning the planning, programming, budgeting, and use of intelligence resources

for the collection and production of intelligence in support of planning and operational

requirements of the military forces in peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat situations.

 (5) Establish and operate a Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (J2) that shall be

responsible for responding to the direct intelligence support requirements of the CJCS, and task

DIA and the military intelligence components to provide this intelligence and intelligence staff

support.

(6) Manage and direct DoD human intelligence activities.

(7) Participate in and support the activities of the Missile and Space Intelligence

Center; the Intelligence Community centers, committees, and working groups established by the

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); and comparable activities established by the Secretary of

Defense.

(8) Prepare intelligence assessments and estimates concerning transfers of

technology, goods, services, munitions, and other transfer mechanisms, and participate in

interagency, national, and international fora on such transfer matters.

(9) Protect the security of DIA installations, activities, property, information, and

employees by appropriate means, including internal inquiries and reviews of civilian employees,

military personnel assigned to DIA, and other persons having associations with DIA.

(10) Provide representation on national and international intelligence fora.

 

4 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997).
6

(11) Conduct intelligence activities for which DIA is assigned responsibility, and

coordinate the personnel and resources of the Military Intelligence agencies involved.

(12) Chair the Military Intelligence Board (MIB).

(13) Develop and coordinate joint intelligence doctrine in support of the CJCS.

(14) Operate the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in support

of military planning and operations, and ensure appropriate intelligence requirements for

activities including: preparation, support, and conduct of coalition operations with international

forces.

(15) Support the DoD weapons system acquisition process by producing threat

assessments, or validating assessments produced by other DoD Intelligence agencies, for all

major DoD acquisition programs. This function includes the maintenance of strong scientific

and technical programs within DoD to provide inputs to the DoD acquisition process.

(16) Guide the collection of national military intelligence by performing the

following functions:

(a) Operate the Defense Attaché System.

(b) Validate, register, and recommend priorities for military intelligence

requirements.

(c) Provide central management of Measurement and Signature

Intelligence (MASINT).

(17) Manage military intelligence support systems by performing the following

functions:

(a) Oversee the research and development, procurement, and operation of

DoD intelligence infrastructure-related programs, systems, and activities funded in the GDIP.

(b) Provide centralized intelligence dissemination services and supervise a

DoD-wide intelligence dissemination system.

(18) Operate the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center and, in conjunction

with ASD(C3I), oversee joint intelligence training activities within the Department of Defense.

(19) Operate the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) for the professional

education of joint intelligence officers in such a manner as to retain accreditation as an academic

degree-granting college.

 (20) Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defense or the ASD(C3I)

may prescribe.
7

C. Subordinate Activities/Agencies: Within DIA, the Military Intelligence Board

(MIB)5 shall advise the Director, DIA, concerning:6

(1) How intelligence needs, plans, programs, and activities of the Military

Services and the DoD Intelligence Components relate to improvement in intelligence capabilities

to support the operating forces in peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat situations.

(2) Proposals for development and composition of the GDIP and JMIP, and

information on execution of the approved GDIP and JMIP.

(3) DoD Intelligence Component inputs to substantive national and military

intelligence estimates and other substantive intelligence products on which a DoD position is

being developed.

(4) DoD Intelligence Component capabilities to provide intelligence required for

Joint and Service-specific activities in ground, air, maritime, and amphibious operations.

(5) Shortfalls within the military and national intelligence communities where

attention should be directed.

(6) DoD Intelligence Component recommendations concerning the operation of

joint intelligence activities.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: In Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA

describes its most critical responsibility as increasing its "relevance to and involvement with the

warfighters, policymakers and planners" that it supports.7 In support of this new approach,

DIA's vision of military intelligence is to shape the future with "quality people, trained,

equipped, and ready for joint operations, anywhere, anytime."8 Characteristics of this vision

include:

(1) Intelligence driven by warfighter requirements;

(2) Intelligence guided by joint doctrine and national policy; and,

(3) Intelligence empowered by world-class leadership, joint education and

professional experience.

 

5 The principals of the Military Intelligence Board are the heads or senior representatives of the DoD Intelligence components.

Representatives of the military departments, the combatant commands, and the defense agencies, as appropriate, may also

participate as MIB members

6 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997).

7 DIA: Moving Toward the 21st Century, The Defense Intelligence Agency, found at Federation of American Scientists

website, www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/001-03096.htm.

8 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, The Defense Intelligence Agency website,

www.dia.mil/vector21.pdf.
8

B. Core Competencies: According to survey information received from DIA, "DIA's

core competencies revolved around [its] ability to develop raw information onto finished allsource military intelligence for [its] customers to use in decision-making and action. The

intelligence cycle consists of 5 components:

(1) Planning and Direction—establishes customer requirements.

(2) Collection—gathers raw data from which finished intelligence is produced.

(3) Processing and Exploitation—converts data to suitable form for production

of finished intelligence.

(4) Analysis and Production—evaluates, analyzes, and integrates available data

and prepares intelligence products (reports, studies, briefings, etc.).

(5) Dissemination and Integration—delivers intelligence products to consumers

who generate requirements established in the Planning and Direction component."

4. Organizational Culture.

A. Values: DIA lists the following values: 9

(1) Public Service: DIA must continually serve the interests of the American

people, conserve their resources, and respond to their representatives in government.

(2) On-time intelligence: Provide the finest intelligence to U.S. policy makers,

warfighters, peacekeepers, and defense planners in a timely manner.

(3) Dedication and Strength of Purpose: Understand that American lives

depend on the intelligence provided by DIA and approach every task mindful of this obligation.

(4) Engagement of customers: Actively anticipate consumer needs, respond to

changing requirements, and deliver quality products.

(5) Integrity: Ensure absolute integrity of intelligence products and follow the

highest personal and professional standards and conduct.

(6) Sound management and leadership: Honest, empowering, effective

principles of team building, coordination, communication, and decision-making.

(7) Maximizing individual and collective potential: Encourage creativity and

initiative, and exploit growth opportunities with the aim of constantly improving individual and

team contributions to DIA as a combat support agency.

(8) Harmony in professional relations: Create an environment that promotes

fairness and openness, nurtures self esteem and individual worth, and respects cultural diversity.

 

9 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
9

(9) Promoting teamwork as a way of life: View mission accomplishment as a

shared responsibility and an individual and organizational commitment to the greater good.

B. Leadership Traditions: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, is an officer of

flag rank appointed by the Secretary of Defense from active military officers. The Director is

responsible for advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combat Commanders, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence) on all matters concerning military and

military-oriented intelligence, and serves as their principle advisor on all substantive intelligence

matters. Additionally, the Director, DIA serves as the principle DoD intelligence representative

in the national foreign intelligence process, and holds responsibility for coordination of

personnel resources for the other military intelligence services.10

Administrative responsibility for DIA rests with the ASD(C3I), but the DIA Director

submits all intelligence estimates and other substantive intelligence products directly to the

Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense, and when appropriate, to the CJCS and the

Director of Central Intelligence.11 The Director has a civilian deputy, as well as a civilian

Executive Director, who serves as acting Director in the absence of the Director or Deputy

Director. At the mid to senior level, DIA places value on skilled and flexible managers, which it

seeks to cultivate from within its ranks.

C. Staff Attributes: According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, it relies on a highly

responsive, skilled, flexible, and competent staff in order to support its missions and respond to

the higher tempo of operations today.12 The staff of DIA is made up both of a civilian civil

service and a military component assigned from the various services for joint duty.

In pursuit of a skilled staff, DIA recruits personnel trained in military art, operations, and

defense policy, those with regional expertise, as well as technically trained personnel with a

variety of computer and telecommunications skills. It seeks to develop senior level personnel

from within the organization via internal development of personnel along defined career paths

from entry level to senior managerial positions. DIA seeks to develop and retain its skilled

personnel through a variety of training, certification, mentorship, and other professional

development opportunities.

D. Strategy: The DIA mission, as stated above, is to deliver timely and relevant

intelligence to support the military services, policy makers, and warfighters. In order to

accomplish this mission, DIA has developed a strategy called Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the

Defense Intelligence Agency. This document reflects the vision, mission, values, organization,

and goals that will bring DIA into the next decade. It includes direction and guidance from the

National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2010.13 Vector 21 examines the future threat

environment, assesses the current role of DIA, and develops the DIA framework to respond to

that future in fulfillment of its mission.

 

10 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997). Mission & Functions: Defense Intelligence Agency,

Federation of American Scientists website, www.fas.org/irp/dia/mission.htm.

11 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (18 February, 1997).

12 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

13 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
10

E. Organizational Description:

Figure 1: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)14

 

14 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DEFENSE

FOREIGN

LIAISON

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

DIRECTORATE FOR

INFORMATION

SYSTEMS &

SERVICES

DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICERS

DIRECTORATE

FOR

ADMINISTRATION

DIRECTORATE

FOR POLICY

SUPPORT

DIRECTORATE

FOR

INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS

PLANS,

PROGRAMS &

OPERATIONS

JOINT

MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE

COLLEGE

DIRECTORATE

FOR

INTELLIGENCE,

JOINT STAFF

(J-2)

DIRECTORATE

FOR

INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCTION

PUBLIC

AFFAIRS

LEGISLATIVE

LIAISON

DIRECTOR

DEFENSE

HUMINT

SERVICE

CENTRAL

MASINT

OFFICE

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

& SECURITY

ACTIVITY

JOINT

INTELLIGENCE

TRAINING

CENTER

ARMED

FORCES

MEDICAL

INTELLIGENCE

CENTER

MISSILE &

SPACE

INTELLIGENCE

CENTER

NATIONAL

MILITARY JOINT

INTELLIGENCE

CENTER
11

 (1) The DIA Director, a general or flag officer, reports directly to the Secretary

of Defense, although administratively he falls under the direction of the ASD(C3I). The Deputy

Director is a civilian who serves directly under the Director and assists in the overall

management of DIA.

(2) The Directorate for Information Systems & Services is a support agency

that manages DIA's information technology and services.

(3) The Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) is a unique school that is

accredited to award the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and the Bachelor of

Science in Intelligence degree. The JMIC prepares its students for senior leadership positions in

the military and the Intelligence Community by training intelligence professionals and military

service members in intelligence with respect to military operations, force planning, and defense

policymaking. The JMIC also offers the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program with a Master of

Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI), the only degree of its kind, as a premier professional

development opportunity. Research done here contributes directly to U.S. national security and

to the theory, doctrine, and methodology of intelligence.

(4) Plans, Programs & Operations (PP&O) staff is responsible for internal

planning and programming. There are three other areas of responsibility within PP&O:

(a) Defense Foreign Liaison works with foreign military counterparts.

(b) Legislative Liaison works with Congress.

(c) Public Affairs responds to public and media inquiries.

(5) The Directorate for Policy Support, under which all Defense Intelligence

Officers serve, ensures that the intelligence needs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) are fully satisfied. This involves providing specially tailored, daily substantive

intelligence support to over 200 key defense policymakers. The directorate also serves as DIA's

central authority for the management of DoD components' military intelligence agreements (nonSignals Intelligence (SIGINT)/ Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)) with foreign governments and

international organizations, and for the release of DIA information to foreign entities.

(6) The Directorate for Intelligence Operations (IO) supports the national

military strategy, collects Human Intelligence (HUMINT) information (through the Defense

HUMINT Service), and manages collection requirements (Defense Collection Group) to ensure

U.S. information superiority. Additionally, within the Directorate for IO, the Central MASINT

Organization (CMO) manages measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) for the

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and DoD.

(7) The Directorate for Administration (DA) provides central administrative

oversight for DIA's security, military, and human resources, training and career development, as

well as other areas and programs. Within the DA are the Joint Intelligence Training Center

(JITC) and Counterintelligence & Security Activity (C&SA).
12

(a) The JITC provides training for DIA staff members on other defense

intelligence needs as they may arise. This training is provided at all levels in basic defense

intelligence skills, management, analysis, collection management, and automated systems.

(b) C&SA is directly involved in counterintelligence issues and

assessments of threats posed by foreign intelligence activities. C&SA also provides staff support

on counterintelligence to the CJCS and combatant commands.

(8) The Directorate for Intelligence Production (IP) produces and manages the

all-source military intelligence knowledge base supporting the warfighter, policy makers and

weapons acquisition community on regional, transnational, scientific and technical, missile, and

medical topics. It ensures analytical capability is focused to satisfy customer needs across the

entire spectrum of conflict. It operates the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC), which

manages crisis-related all-source military intelligence production throughout DoD. Within the

Directorate for IP are the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Missile &

Space Intelligence Center (MSIC).

(a) The MSIC manages and produces all-source scientific and technical

intelligence on foreign missiles, missile defense systems, directed energy weapons, selected

space program/systems, and relevant command, control, communications, and computer systems.

(b) The AFMIC manages and produces all-source finished medical

intelligence assessments that support U.S. military forces, national policy officials, and the

medical research, development and acquisition community.

(9) The Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, supports CJCS, OSD, the Joint Staff,

and the unified commands. The J-2 is the national level focal point for crisis intelligence support

to military operations providing indications and warning intelligence in DoD and unified

command intelligence requirements. This directorate also has an alert center called the National

Military Joint Intelligence Center. The alert center represents the Director, DIA; the Director for

Intelligence, J-2; and DIA during non-duty hours and provides military/crisis intelligence

continuity for other intelligence producers and national-level decision makers.

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement. DIA is a player in the national security

process by providing estimates and other intelligence products to the Secretary of Defense and

the DCI.

A. Strategy Development: DIA does not play a direct role in strategy development, but

provides intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

Director of Central Intelligence. As the central source responsible for military intelligence for

these three key players, the work done by DIA has a direct impact on visions, goals, and strategy

for national security in the future.

The Director, DIA, chairs the MIB, which is composed of the heads, or senior

representatives, of the DoD Intelligence Components. It advises the DIA Director concerning

inputs to substantive national and military intelligence estimates and other substantive

intelligence products on which a DoD position is being developed; shortfalls within the military
13

and national intelligence communities where attention should be directed; and other substantive

and programmatic issues.

DIA is a member of the three interagency committees of the National Intelligence

Council: Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Committee (STIC), and Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC).

Both the WSSIC and STIC meet twice monthly, and JAEIC meets once a month. These

committees conduct coordinated interagency analyses of topics, which usually require specific

subject matter expertise in scientific, technical, and engineering areas. DIA also plays a role in

Interagency Working Groups as needed.

 B. Policy Guidance and Regulation: DIA's Directorate for Policy Support (DP)

provides direct intelligence support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The DP serves as

the DIA focal point for tasking of all intelligence support requirements from the Secretary of

Defense and other DoD principals, as well as non-DoD Executive Branch policy offices

including the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.15

C. Planning: DIA's Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) produces and manages

the production of military intelligence in support of the requirements of the armed forces, unified

commands, and DoD and national policy makers for planning and policy.

D. Mission Execution: Mission execution for the military services is a key function for

DIA at all levels—from peacekeeping to combat operations. Within the national security

process, DIA is most concerned with mission execution for military operations, and provides key

intelligence for the operational execution of such missions. Intelligence products also are

provided for other kinds of operations, but combat support and support to the warfighter are

central to the values and competencies of DIA.

The Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2) has the major responsibility for military

mission execution, serving the CJCS, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Unified Commands.

J2 is the focal point for crisis intelligence support. As part of the National Military Joint

Intelligence Center, J2 provides real-time assessments and targeting support to decision makers,

while the Defense Intelligence Network disseminates timely crisis intelligence around the

world.16 Additionally, within the DI, the "Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC)

manages crisis-related military intelligence production, including joint intelligence preparation of

the battle space."17

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight: DIA does not play a major role in this

area of the national security process; however, the intelligence provided by DIA to key players in

DoD does play a role in observation, orientation, and oversight as appropriate. Within DIA

itself, the DI is responsible for ensuring that intelligence production is responsive to defense and

 

15 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Organization: Defense Intelligence Agency, Federation

of American Scientists website, www.fas.org/irp/dia/organ.htm.

16 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

17 Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
14

national strategy guidelines, and reviewing programs, missions, and technical capabilities with

respect to the changing threat environment.

F. Preparation: DIA does not engage in preparation on the national security process

level. Within DIA, there are several professional development programs, such as the JMIC and

JITC, which are utilized in the DIA preparation process. At the national security level, DIA is

only involved to the extent that preparation programs within DIA create an agency well prepared

to serve its mission within the larger national security process.

G. Resourcing: The Director, DIA, serves as Program Manager of the General Defense

Intelligence Program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, develops the GDIP as an

input to the NFIP, participates in the NFIP approval process, and oversees execution of funds

appropriated for GDIP and GDIP-related activities. The Director, DIA, also serves as the

Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program (DGIAP) coordinator for the Joint

Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement: The Director, DIA, can make direct

contact with his counterparts and the leadership in DoD and Intelligence Community, as well as

other departments and agencies as necessary in order to fulfill the mission of DIA.

7. Funding and Personnel: Specific funding and personnel information is secret, and therefore

not publicly available.

A. Authorization and Appropriations: The Senate Armed Services and House Armed

Services Committees, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence, and the Authorization Committees of each house have jurisdiction

over DIA budgets.

B. Funding Sources: DIA receives resources from the National Foreign Intelligence

Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and from Communications Security

(COMSEC) accounts in the DoD budget. Within the NFIP, DIA receives funding through the

General Defense Intelligence Program as well as the Foreign Counterintelligence Program

(FCIP). Within the JMIP, DIA receives funding through the Defense General Intelligence and

Applications Program, as well as the Counterdrug Intelligence Program. The vast majority of

DIA funds are in the GDIP, where DIA serves as the functional manager for Production,

Collection, and Infrastructure; coordinating the DIA and Service GDIP activities. The Director,

DIA, serves as the Program Manager for GDIP resources and activities.

C. Budget: Classified.

D. Personnel: Officially, DIA's personnel statistics are classified. Unofficially, DIA

employs approximately 7,000 military and civilian professionals from all intelligence related

disciplines. Manning is approximately 61 percent civilian and 39 percent military.

8. Conclusions and Observations: DIA is the central coordinator of military intelligence for

the Department of Defense and the Intelligence community. It provides current and estimative

defense-related intelligence, as well as Indications and Warnings reports on current threats, to the
15

National Command Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary and Deputy

Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commands.

DIA plays a role in the national security process as the main source of defense

intelligence. Its products figure most prominently in the strategy making, planning, policy

making, and mission execution processes of national security. In military-related missions, DIA

plays the role of the central source for intelligence for combat support, planning, and operational

guidance at all levels of engagement. As stated in its mission statement, DIA places a high

priority on providing relevant, timely intelligence to defense planners, policy makers, and

warfighters in order that they fulfill their missions.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/

CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS)

Overview.

The National Security Agency (NSA) was established as an agency within the

Department of Defense (DoD) in 1952. In 1972 the Central Security Service (CSS) was

established to coordinate cyrptologic activities within the military and to create a more unified

DoD effort. NSA/CSS is an element of both DoD and the Intelligence Community (IC) and is a

Joint Chiefs of Staff Combat Support Agency. NSA/CSS has two broad missions, signals

intelligence (SIGINT) and information systems security (INFOSEC). NSA/CSS is responsible

for briefing the National Command Authority, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central

Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters related to SIGINT, and

receives specific taskings from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Organization.

The Director, NSA, is also the Chief, CSS. NSA/CSS Headquarters is organized into five

directorates, each headed by a Deputy Director. Mission components are the Operations

Directorate, which provides signals intelligence, and the Information Systems Security

Directorate, which protects intelligence. The Support Services, Corporate Management, and

Technology and Systems Directorates provide support for the missions. Intelligence units from

the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE) of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and

NSA/CSS personnel conduct operations under the oversight of the NSA Director at Fort Meade,

MD, field sites around the world, and three Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOC) that

provide focused support to major military commands. NSA/CSS also supervises the Cryptologic

Training System (CTS), consisting of the National Cryptologic School (NCS) at Fort Meade and

the Service cryptologic centers and schools, which provide training for all cryptologic personnel.

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Process.

NSA/CSS's SIGINT and information systems security capabilities play a role in the

national security process. Specifically, the information NSA/CSS collects, processes, and

disseminates to the national leadership allows it to support the strategy, policy making, and

planning processes. Additionally, NSA/CSS plays a role in mission execution, oversight,

preparation, and resourcing.

Conclusions and Observations.

NSA is a player in the national security process, and plays a significant role within the

Intelligence Community. As the central agency for collection, processing and dissemination of

signals intelligence, NSA has primary responsibility for briefing the DCI , as well as the

Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SIGINT. Additionally NSA

sits on the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), which is a formal connection between NSA, the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). In

these roles, NSA has the most impact on strategy, policy making, planning, and mission
3

execution, while having a lower impact on the observation, preparation, and resourcing

processes.
4

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE (CSS)

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Directive: The National Security Agency (NSA) was established within

the Department of Defense (DoD) by Presidential directive dated October 24, 1952, and

implemented by National Security Council Intelligence Directive 9 on December 29, 1952.

B. Department/Agency Directives: The following Directives/Orders have bearing on

NSA/CSS:

(1) Department of Defense Directive 5100.20 (5 November 1971) "prescribes

authorities, functions, and responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the

Central Security Service (CSS)."1 The NSA is a separately organized agency within DoD under

the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The CSS was created in an effort to centralize within

NSA the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of the military services. The result is that

NSA/CSS is the chief coordinator of SIGINT for the Intelligence Community (IC). NSA/CSS is

also charged with providing secure communications systems for all U.S. government

departments and agencies.

(2) Executive Order 12333 (4 December 1981) outlines thirteen responsibilities

for NSA. (See Paragraph 2)

(3) National Security Directive 42 (5 July 1990) designates the Director, NSA,

as the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems

Security. Included in the responsibilities are examining U.S. Government national security

systems and evaluating their vulnerabilities to foreign interception and exploitation; acting as the

U.S. government focal point for cryptography, telecommunications systems security, and

information systems security for national security systems; prescribing the minimum standards,

methods, and procedures for protecting cryptographic and other technical security material,

techniques, and information related to national security systems; reviewing and assessing

annually the national security telecommunications systems security programs and budgets of

Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and reviewing annually the

aggregated national security information systems security program and budget recommendations

of the Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

(4) National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (17 Feb 1972)

designates the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent of the Government for the direction,

supervision, funding, maintenance and operations of NSA/CSS as the unified SIGINT

organization of the United States.

(5) Department of Defense Directive S-3115.7 (25 January 1973) assigns

responsibilities, roles, and missions to DoD components with regard to the SIGINT mission of

 

1 Department of Defense Directive 5100.20, The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service, Dec. 23, 1971.
5

the U.S. and directs the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS to conduct all DoD SIGINT operations except

when he delegates SIGINT operational tasking authority over NSA/CSS activities.

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

A. Major Responsibilities: The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS acts as the principle SIGINT

advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Executive Order 12333 is the blueprint for all intelligence agency

interaction. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversees this process and is the primary

link between the IC and the National Security Council (NSC). The Order also outlines thirteen

specific responsibilities for NSA in detail:

(1) The Order establishes and guides the operation of an effective unified

organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control

over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence

Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except

pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) It vests in NSA control of signals intelligence collection and processing

activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as

required for the direct support of military commanders.

(3) It authorizes collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign

intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.

(4) It grants responsibility for the processing of signals intelligence data for

national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central

Intelligence.

(5) The Order requires dissemination of signals intelligence information for

national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the

military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.

(6) The Order governs collection, processing and dissemination of signals

intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes.

(7) It outlines provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military

operation in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the

Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems,

these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.

(8) The Order charges NSA with executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of

Defense as executive agent for the communications security of the United States Government.

(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States

for signals intelligence and communications security as required.
6

(10) The Order provides for the protection of the security of its installations,

activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such

investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations

with the NSA as are necessary.

(11) It also prescribes, within its field of authorized operations, NSA security

regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of

signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under

control of the Director of the NSA, and exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure

compliance with the regulations.

(12) It governs conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison

for intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of

Central Intelligence.

(13) Finally the Order outlines NSA conduct of such administrative and technical

support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions

described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.

B. Subordinate Activities: Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC) is an

Intelligence Community activity that is hosted by NSA within NSA facilities. IOTC was created

in 1997 jointly by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Its main mission is to ensure

that tools and techniques developed to support information operations by either the IC or DoD

are shared, precluding duplication of effort and increased risk of compromise. Oversight of

IOTC is held by the Bilateral Information Operations Steering Group, and thus is a joint DoD/IC

activity.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: According to NSA, "intelligence and information security work together as

the offensive and defensive squads of a team dedicated to a single goal: information security for

America and its Allies."2 In order to implement this vision, the NSA has adopted a National

Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century (NCS 21) as a roadmap for the future.

B. Core Competencies: NCS 21 enumerates five specific core competencies/continuing

goals for the NSA:

(1) A guarantee of vital information for NSA customers. NSA seeks to:

(a) Ensure the efficient operation of all cryptologic functions of the U.S.

government.

(b) Be the preferred source of actionable intelligence.

(c) Be the preferred provider of information systems security solutions.

 

2 National Security Agency official website, www.nsa.gov:8080/programs/ncs21/vision.html.
7

(d) Foster cooperation between government and industry, and establish

key technology standards.

(e) Establish a center for technical excellence for information warfare.

(f) Examine adequacy of existing authorities for information age

cryptology.

(2) Integration of cryptology with joint operations to ensure dominant battlespace

knowledge. NSA seeks to:

(a) Anticipate warfighter intelligence needs on time, anywhere, with the

lowest possible classification.

(b) Provide the information security products and services necessary for

battlespace security.

(c) Improve readiness as a Combat Support Agency to ensure participation

in exercises and operations.

(d) Ensure interoperability of cryptologic systems.

(3) Integration of cryptologic support to enable policy makers to promote stability

and thwart aggression. NSA seeks to:

(a) Expand collaboration with law enforcement agencies to improve

support to counterintelligence, nonproliferation, and transnational issues.

(b) Work with policy customers to improve interoperability and ensure

that intelligence can be tailored to meet customer needs.

(c) Expand "pull" dissemination capabilities to enable customers to initiate

real time requests to improve crisis support.

(d) Work with the IC to create interactive databases that will enable

searches for information gathered by members of the IC.

(4) Sustainment of leading edge capabilities in key technologies to remain the

world's cryptologic leader. NSA seeks to:

(a) Work closely with U.S. industry to integrate technology forecasts and

assess the rate of market implementation.

(b) Broaden collaborative partnerships with industry, academia, and other

government agencies to maximize the return on technology investments.

(c) Focus research and development efforts on breakthrough capabilities.
8

(d) Expand our capability to model and simulate information operations.

(e) Develop applications to leverage emerging technologies; and sustain

both offensive and defensive information warfare capabilities.

(5) Continued transformation of the cryptologic workforce, process, and

infrastructure in order to meet emerging challenges. NSA seeks to:

(a) Recruit and retain the best qualified and best mix of personnel

available.

(b) Invest in personnel through training, education, and career

development.

(c) Provide the environment, systems, and facilities that personnel require

to fulfill their mission.

(d) Empower the workforce to reengineer their processes to improve

efficiency and create value.

(e) Foster an environment that encourages every employee to contribute.

4. Organizational Culture.

A. Values: NSA/CSS specifically highlights four values for the organization:

(1) People with skills and competencies second to none, adaptability and

diversity, a willingness to take risks, and a forward-thinking, innovative approach to challenges;

(2) Strength from teamwork, effective partnerships with other federal agencies

and private industry, and a relentless commitment to exceed customers' expectations;

(3) Focus driven by customer needs; and

(4) Responsibility that comes from accountability for its actions and the highest

standards of ethical behavior3

B. Leadership Traditions: The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, is an appointed general or

flag officer (usually a lieutenant general or vice admiral), while the Deputy Director is a

technically experienced civilian, typically a career NSA/CSS officer promoted from within the

agency. The Deputy Chief, CSS is a military officer, typically of a different military service than

the Chief.

A review of NSA/CSS's literature and additional information from in-house experts

suggests that NSA does seek to function as a team and is customer focused. The customers in

this case are the White House, Executive Agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),

 

3 National Security Agency official website, www.nsa.gov:8080/programs/ncs21/values.html.
9

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), Military

Departments, multinational forces and allies, and industry.

The NSA/CSS leadership's vision of team identity is embedded through the numerous

training and development opportunities given to personnel through the National Cryptological

School and sponsorship at leading universities. This training serves to upgrade skills and helps

retain and advance qualified staff. Employees are also encouraged to reengineer their own

processes to help improve the timeliness and quality of NSA/CSS's intelligence products and

services. These practices were recently recognized by the White House, when NSA/CSS

received a Presidential Quality Improvement Award on July 15, 1999. The award is presented

annually to federal organizations who demonstrate: 1) Sound and systematic approaches to

delivering quality products and services to customers; 2) Continuous process improvements; and

3) Documented business practices.

C. Staff Attributes: NSA/CSS consists of a jointly staffed headquarters made up of

operating elements from the various military services. Additionally, the NSA/CSS staff includes

a civilian career service similar to that of the Central Intelligence Agency. Within this civilian

career service a great premium is placed on skills and education with numerous programs to

augment employee education and accelerate career opportunities. There is also a specialized

National Cryptologic School within the NSA headquarters.

D. Strategy: NSA/CSS has a dual mission of Information Security (INFOSEC) and

SIGINT. Its strategy for achieving this mission is outlined in its National Cryptologic Strategy

for the 21st Century (NCS 21). This strategy is based on the core values of guaranteed vital

information to customers, integration of cryptology with joint operations to ensure dominant

battle space knowledge, integration of cryptologic support to promote stability, sustainment of

leading edge capabilities in key technologies, and continued transformation of the workforce and

infrastructure to meet emerging challenges (See section 3-B above). These values are grounded

in an understanding that NSA is a customer-based agency that must be responsive to customer

needs in order to be successful in its mission.
10

E. Organizational Structure:

Figure 1: National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS)4

(1) NSA and CSS are led by an appointed general or flag officer who serves as

both the Director, NSA and as Chief, CSS. The Deputy Chief of CSS is a military officer,

typically of a different military service than the Chief. The Deputy Chief oversees the Service

cryptologic organizations, which remain in their parent services for administrative and logistical

support. A technically experienced civilian, typically a career NSA/CSS officer promoted from

within the agency serves as the Deputy Director of NSA. The Executive Director assists the

Director and Deputy Director with the overall management of NSA.

(2) The Deputy Director for Support Services heads the directorate responsible

for providing logistical and administrative support for NSA activities.

(3) The Deputy Directory for Corporate Management (formerly known as

Plans, Policy, and Programs) provides staff support and general direction and internal planning

for NSA. Within the Corporate Management Directorate are two subordinate offices.

 

4 A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Public Affairs Staff, 1995.

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

FOR TECH.

AND

SYSTEMS

DIRECTOR,

NSA / CHIEF,

CSS

EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

FOR

OPERATIONS

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

FOR SUPPORT

SERVICES

DEPUTY

CHIEF, CSS

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

FOR

CORPORATE

MGMT.

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR FOR

INFORMATION

SYSTEMS

SECURITY

LEGISLATIVE

AFFAIRS

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR,

NSA

UNIFIED

CRYPTOLOGIC

ARCHITECTURE

OFFICE
11

(a) The Unified Cryptologic Architecture Office is responsible for

managing and maintaining the overall cryptologic systems and infrastructure for NSA and the

military intelligence agencies.

(b) The Legislative Affairs Office serves as NSA's liaison with Congress

and the intelligence oversight committees.

(4) The Deputy Director for Technology and Systems is responsible for

developing new technologies for SIGINT collection and processing. The directorate performs

R&D for future SIGINT capabilities, including audio and speech signal processing, and

algorithms and databases for signal processing. Additionally it provides performance

parameters, requirements, and system configurations for collection.

(5) The Deputy Director for Information Systems Security is responsible for

NSA's communications INFOSEC missions. This involves protection of all classified or

sensitive information that is either stored or sent through U.S. government equipment.

(6) The Deputy Director for Operations oversees worldwide SIGINT collection

operations.

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement. As an agency within the Intelligence

Community responsible for signals intelligence and information systems security, NSA/CSS

plays a supporting role in the overarching national security process. NSA/CSS provides key

inputs to the DCI, who oversees the IC and disseminates intelligence to the NSC and others.

A. Strategy Development: NSA plays the major role in collecting, processing, and

disseminating signals intelligence, which is required by the National Command Authority, the

Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and other members of the IC to develop strategy as needed.

Additionally, NSA/CSS is a member of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), which is

composed of the heads, or senior representatives, of the DoD Intelligence Components and

advises the DIA Director. The MIB provides inputs to substantive national and military

intelligence estimates and other substantive intelligence products on which strategy is based.

NSA/CSS is also a member of the three interagency committees of the National Intelligence

Council: 1) Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC); 2) Scientific and

Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC); and 3) Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

(JAEIC). These committees conduct coordinated interagency analyses of topics with subject

matter dealing in scientific, technical, and engineering area inputs to strategy development.

Another formal process in which NSA/CSS participates is the formulation of the President's

Daily Briefing and Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. These are both prepared in cooperation

with the CIA and can play a role in the development of strategy. 

B. Policy Guidance and Regulation: NSA/CSS is responsible for signals intelligence

and secure communications regulations and policies. This entails working towards maximum

interoperability of secure systems and intelligence dissemination. Specific details on these

regulations and the processes by which they are adopted and implemented are classified and

unavailable.
12

C. Planning: NSA/CSS provides SIGINT to its customers in response to standing and

rapid response requirements. The National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS) is the process

by which customer requirements are accepted and prioritized. The National SIGINT

Requirements List (NSRL) is an annual list of validated SIGINT requirements that address longand near-term intelligence issues and priorities used for the preparation of operational and other

plans in the coming year. Amplifying requirements address critical, time-sensitive needs and are

managed by the National Security Operations Center (NSOC).

D. Mission Execution: Although NSA does much of its work at the strategic level, it is

often specifically tasked by the DCI to provide SIGINT to the Secretary of Defense and various

military services in support of military operations. This information can range from specific

tactical information to operational and strategic-level information that NSA is able to gain

through its technical capabilities.

Time-sensitive needs are met through 24-hour watch operations at the NSOC and three

Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs). The NSOC can reach the White House with

critical information (CRITIC) within 10 minutes. The Special Support Activity, an adjunct of

the NSOC, provides secure communications equipment and cryptologic experts for deployment

to crisis areas to support military customers. The NSOC manages time-sensitive product

requests and is designed to respond to customers within eight hours.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight: As a member of the MIB and the WSSIC,

STIC, and JAEIC committees of the National Intelligence Council, NSA is able to play a role in

observation, orientation and oversight of the IC. Additionally, in its INFOSEC mission, NSA is

empowered to exercise supervisory control over the transmission, handling, and distribution of

SIGINT and secure communications within the federal government.

F. Preparation: As a preparation function, the NSA has within its headquarters a

specialized National Cryptologic School to advance the skills of its employees. Additionally, the

NSA places a premium on continued education and skill development by offering numerous

programs for scholarship and training at outside academic institutions. These programs are

designed to attract, develop, and retain the best people to carry out the mission of NSA.

G. Resourcing: NSA/CSS is the Program Manager for the Consolidated Cryptologic

Program (CCP) within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement: NSA, as a DoD intelligence agency

within the IC, plays an important role in focusing intelligence assets from the IC and DoD for

national security missions. The NSA Director can make direct contact with his counterparts and

leadership within DoD and the IC in order to fulfill the NSA mission and the national security

process.

7. Funding and Personnel: Officially, NSA's budget and personnel figures are classified.

Available information on these topics is as follows.

A. Authorization and Appropriations: Senate Armed Services Committee and House

Armed Services Committee; the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence, and appropriations subcommittees have jurisdiction.
13

B. Funding Sources: NSA receives funding from the National Foreign Intelligence

Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and from the Communications Security

(COMSEC) accounts in the DoD budget.

C. Budget: The actual budget is classified, but unclassified sources estimate it to be

approximately $3.6 billion.5

D. Personnel: Classified—estimates range from 20,000 (only counting to the civilian

component) to 52,000 (which includes military personnel).6

8. Conclusions and Observations.

NSA plays a significant role within the Intelligence Community. As the central agency

for collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence, NSA has primary

responsibility for briefing the DCI, as well as the Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on SIGINT. Additionally NSA sits on the MIB, which provides a formal

connection between NSA, DIA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). In

these roles, NSA has the most impact on strategy, policy making, planning, and mission

execution, while having somewhat lower impact on the observation, preparation, and resourcing

processes.

 

5 Federation of American Scientists official website, www.fas.org.

6 Federation of American Scientists official website, www.fas.org.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

BOARD (PFIAB)

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

Overview.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) is established by the

President and acts as an advising body on issues pertaining to the intelligence community (IC).

The PFIAB was established by Executive Order 12863 in September of 1993—although

antecedent organizations date to the Eisenhower Administration—and is tasked with seven major

responsibilities, including reporting directly to the President and advising him concerning the

objectives, conduct, management, and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the

IC. Key PFIAB competencies include providing the President with unbiased analysis, and if

needed, recommendations for changes relevant to the IC. Expertise, experience, objectivity,

analysis, and advice are PFIAB's key values.

Organization.

The PFIAB currently consists of 15 Board members (with a limit of 16). The

organization includes a Chairman and Vice-Chairman (appointed by the President and the

PFIAB Chairman, respectively), six full-time staffers and a varied number of consultants as the

situation requires. The PFIAB comprises the Intelligence Oversight Board (with the PFIAB

Vice-Chairman serving as its chairman), which advises the President on the legality of foreign

intelligence activities, and Special Investigative Panels, which are created at the direction of the

PFIAB Chairman for specific taskings. PFIAB funding is provided for under the appropriation

for the National Security Council and was $1M for FY99.

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes.

The PFIAB serves as an advising body to the President and therefore does not have a

formal role in the national security process. Effects of the PFIAB's recommendations have

included changes in the structure and composition of the IC.

Conclusions and Observations.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board serves as yet another source of

guidance for the President within the Executive Office of the President. The expertise and

experience present in the makeup of the Board, along with its commitment to objective analysis,

gives the President the benefit of additional information and analysis in the area of intelligence

issues and policy.
3

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB)

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Directive: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

(PFIAB) was established within the Executive Office of the President by Executive Order (EO)

12863 on 13 September 1993 and is under the direct authority of the President.1

B. Department/Agency Directives: None.

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

A. Major Responsibilities: As stated in EO 12863, the PFIAB shall:2

(1) Assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, of

analysis and estimates, and of counterintelligence and other intelligence activities.

(2) Have the authority to continually review the performance of all agencies of the

Federal Government that are engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence

or the execution of intelligence policy.

(3) Be authorized to assess the adequacy of management, personnel and

organization in the intelligence agencies. The heads of departments and agencies of the Federal

Government, to the extent permitted by law, shall provide the PFIAB with access to all

information that the PFIAB deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities.

(4) Report directly to the President and advise him concerning the objectives,

conduct, management, and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the

Intelligence Community.

(5) Report periodically, but at least semiannually, concerning its findings and

appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for the improvement and enhancement of the

intelligence efforts of the United States.

(6) Consider and recommend appropriate action with respect to matters identified

to the PFIAB by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or

other government agencies engaged in intelligence or related activities, in which the advice of

the PFIAB will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort.

 

1 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/index.html).

The Board was originally established in 1956 by President Eisenhower under the title the "President's Board of Consultants on

Foreign Intelligence Activities". Its name was changed under President Kennedy and it has served all Presidents since that

time except for President Carter.

2 Executive Order 12863 (PFIAB website).
4

(7) Advise and make recommendations (on matters deemed appropriate by the

President) to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, or other

government agencies engaged in intelligence and related activities, concerning ways to achieve

increased effectiveness in meeting national intelligence needs.

B. Subordinate Activities and Agencies:

(1) The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is a standing committee of the

PFIAB. It is tasked to:3

(a) Prepare reports for the President of intelligence activities that the IOB

believes may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning

intelligence activities that the IOB believes may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or

Presidential directive.

(c) Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence

Community (IC) that concern the lawfulness of intelligence activities.

(d) Review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and

General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting intelligence

activities that may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

(e) Conduct such investigations as the IOB deems necessary to carry out

its functions under this order.

(f) Consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified

by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, or other agencies of the

Intelligence Community.

(g) Advise and make appropriate recommendations (with respect to

matters deemed appropriate by the President) to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Intelligence Community.

(2) Special Investigative Panels are designated by the Chairman of the PFIAB

and are responsible for analyzing and reporting findings on specific issue(s). An example of this

panel was the one responsible for looking at security problems at the Department of Energy

(DoE) in June 1999. These panels are a normal feature of the PFIAB and are used regularly

even though they do not carry subpoena authority.4 The Chairman has the authority to decide

the size and makeup of these panels as he/she sees fit (depending on issue and importance).

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: None published.

 

3 EO 12863.

4 PFIAB 10/5/99 (202-456-2352)
5

B. Core Competencies: None published.

4. Organizational Culture.

A. Values: None published.

B. Leadership Traditions: The Chairman of PFIAB is a civilian appointed by the

President. The Chairman, in turn, appoints the Vice-Chairman (who also serves as Chairman of

the IOB). These persons, like the remainder of the Board, are selected on the basis of "...

achievement, experience, and independence."5 The Chairman and Vice-Chairman act mostly as

"facilitators" in that they ensure the proper and effective functioning of the organization.

C. Staff Attributes: Full-time staffers are detailees from other government agencies

such as CIA, Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National

Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

D. Strategy: Given the role intelligence plays in assisting the President and the fact that

he must have ample, accurate and timely intelligence, PFIAB strives to provide advice that

reflects an objective view of the kinds of intelligence that will best serve the country and the

organizational structure most likely to achieve this goal. This strategy has, over the years,

resulted in influencing the composition and structure of the intelligence community, the

development of major intelligence systems, and the degree of collection and analytic emphasis

that is given to substantive areas.6

E. Organization Chart:

Figure 1: Organization of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The PFIAB consists of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Board members, and staff. The

Vice-Chairman also acts as the Chairman of the IOB.7 PFIAB staff and consultants (when

required) serve in support (meeting preparation, issue research, etc.) of the Board and IOB as

 

5 EO 12863.

6 EO 12863.

7 The PFIAB Chairman can also serve as the IOB Chairman (EO 12863).

President

Chairman

Vice-Chairman

(Chairman of IOB)

PFIAB

IOB

PFIAB Staff &

Consultants

Special

Investigative

Panels
6

needed. The PFIAB then reports its findings/products directly to the President. The current

PFIAB is comprised of the following people (plus brief backgrounds):

(1) Warren B. Rudman, Chairman: Partner in the Washington law firm of Paul,

Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. He served as a U.S. Senator from 1980 to 1992, where he

was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence. He previously was Attorney General of

the State of New Hampshire.

 (2) General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF (Ret): Served as Chief of Staff of the Air Force

and Director of the National Security Agency. He retired in 1991 as a Vice President of the

California Institute of Technology and Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. He was a

member of President Bush's PFIAB.

 (3) Cresencio S. Arcos, Jr.: Regional Vice President, International Public Affairs

for AT&T Corporation in Miami. His last position was Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for International Narcotics and Crime from 1993 to 1995. He also served as American

Ambassador to Honduras from 1989 to 1993.

 (4) Zoe Baird: President of the Markle Foundation in New York City. Until the

end of 1996, she was Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Aetna, Inc., and for the year

1997 she was Senior Visiting Scholar and Senior Research Affiliate at Yale Law School. Ms.

Baird previously was Counselor and Staff Executive for General Electric Corporation; a partner

in the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers; Associate Counsel to President Jimmy Carter; and an

attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

(5) John Shelby Bryan: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, ICG

Communications, Inc. Mr. Bryan co-founded Millicom International Cellular S.A., a publicly

owned corporation providing international cellular service, and served as its president and CEO

from 1985 to 1994.

(6) Ann Z. Caracristi: Former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency,

where she served in a variety of senior management positions over a 40 year career. She recently

chaired a DCI Task Force on intelligence training and was a member of the DCI/Secretary of

Defense Joint Security Commission.

 

(7) Sidney D. Drell: Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford University

Linear Accelerator Center. He is an Adjunct Professor at Carnegie Mellon University and has

served as a scientific consultant and advisor to several Congressional committees, the

Departments of Defense and Energy, and the White House.

 (8) Stephen Friedman: Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Columbia

University, Chairman of the Executive Committee of The Brookings Institution and a member of

the Executive Committee of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York. He

served as a member of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence

community ("Aspin/Brown Commission"); and the Jeremiah Panel that studied the National

Reconnaissance Office.

 

(9) Robert J. Hermann: Senior Partner, Global Technology Partners, LLC. He

retired as Senior Vice President for Science and Technology of the United Technologies
7

Corporation in March 1998. He is a former Director of the Defense Department's National

Reconnaissance Office and a former senior official at the National Security Agency.

 (10) Harold W. Pote: Founding partner of The Beacon Group, a private

investment firm, and a Trustee of Drexel University. He is a former Chief Executive Officer of

Fidelcor, Inc., a major regional bank holding company in Philadelphia, and a former founding

partner of PBS Properties of Pennsylvania.

 

(11) Lois D. Rice: Guest Scholar in the Economics Studies Program at the

Brookings Institution. She is a former Senior Vice President for Government Affairs at the

Control Data Corporation and a former Vice President of the College Board (CEEB).

 

(12) Stanley S. Shuman: Executive Vice President, Managing Director and

Member of the Executive Committee of Allen & Company Incorporated where he is involved in

investment banking and corporate finance. He is the longest sitting private member of the

Financial Control Board of the City of New York.

 

(13) Maurice Sonnenberg: Senior International Advisor to the law firm of Manatt,

Phillips & Phelps as well as Senior International Advisor to the investment banking firm of Bear

Stearns. He recently served as Special Advisor to the U.S. Commission on the Roles and

Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and as a member of the U.S. Commission on

Reducing and Protecting Government Secrecy. He also has been a member of President's Export

Council.

 

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement. The PFIAB has no formal role in the

national security process. As an advisory body, it plays a supporting role in the process in that

its findings and recommendations will often lead to changes in the manner in which

"intelligence" policy is developed and implemented.

A. Strategy Development: No current involvement.

 B. Policy, Guidance and Regulation: No current involvement.

C. Planning: No current involvement.

D. Mission Execution: No current involvement.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight: No current involvement.

F. Preparation: No current involvement.

G. Resourcing: No current involvement.

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement. None.

7. Funding and Personnel.

A. Authorization and Appropriations: PFIAB is funded under the Executive Office of

the President (EOP).
8

B. Funding Sources: PFIAB funding is a line item in the National Security Council

(NSC) portion of the EOP appropriation.

C. Budget: $1M for FY 1999.

D. Personnel: PFIAB currently consists of 15 Board members and six full-time staff.

Special consultants are brought in as required, with the number and duration of service

dependent on the task(s).

8. Conclusions and Observations. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board serves

as yet another source of guidance for the President within the Executive Office of the President.

The expertise and experience present in the makeup of the Board, along with its commitment to

objective analysis, gives the President the benefit of additional information and analysis in the

area of intelligence issues and policy.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Overview.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSC[I]) and the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence (SSC[I]) serve as the primary authorizing Committees for the

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the most significant of the national-level strategic

intelligence programs. This authorizing role provides the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) with the unique

responsibilityand capabilityto oversee the increasingly complex U.S. intelligence

community (IC) environment. Through the annual budget preparation and execution effort and

its own inquiries and investigations, the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) play indisputably powerful roles in

oversight, observation, and resourcing processes. Legislation, committee reports and staff

studies (such as the HPSC(I)’s landmark IC21 study) even impact strategy and policy

development and mission execution through their well-researched and constructed

recommendations.

Organization.

The HPSC(I)’s 19 members are selected in proportion to the majority-minority ratio in

the House as a whole. All but four of these members serve in an at-large capacity, with the

remaining members selected from the Appropriations, National Security, Foreign Affairs, and

Judiciary Committees. The HPSC(I)’s members serve six-year consecutive terms.

The HPSC(I) staff reflects the partisan cast of the committee as a whole. Two staff

directors each direct staffs that support the majority and minority party members, respectively.

The HPSC(I) rules specify that the staff should support both majority and minority members

without consideration to party affiliation; SSC(I) staff in interviews claim that, in practice, the

HPSC(I) staff is notably partisan, in comparison with the distinctly bipartisan SSC(I) staff.1 The

HPSC(I) staff is structured to support both its budget authorization and audit and investigations

functions.

The SSC(I) currently consists of 17 members; in contrast with the HPSC(I), half of the

membership is drawn from each party, with the chair chosen from the majority party. Of the

eight seats held for each party, four are reserved for incumbents who serve on the

Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees. The remaining

members are selected from the Senate at large. All members serve eight-year consecutive terms.

Two staff directors drawn from the majority and minority parties lead the SSC(I) staff. In

contrast with the HPSC(I), the directors are supported by a distinctly bipartisan staff, organized

into budget and audit/investigations teams. The budget team, led by the budget director, consists

of five professional staff members each of whom holds responsibility for one of the major NFIP

programs: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the National Reconnaissance Program

(NRP), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP), the Central Intelligence

 

1 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
3

Agency Program (CIAP), and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The audit and

investigations team conducts congressional inquiries, oversight investigations, and staff studies. 

Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes.

Strategy Development. The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) play a tangential but notable role in

strategy development through their development of legislation and their issuance of committee

reports to support legislation, Congressional inquiries, and oversight investigations and their

conduct of staff studies as requested by the House/Senate or Committee leadership.

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation. The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) also impact policy

development through legislation, Committee reports, and staff studies as requested by the

House/Senate or Committee leadership.

Planning. The Committees play no significant role in planning processes.

Mission Execution. The Congressional Committees play a limited role in mission

execution through their mission-related recommendations found in Committee reports supporting

legislation, Congressional inquiries, and oversight investigations. Both Committees review the

use of covert action in response to presidential “findings.”

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight. As the primary body conducting IC

oversight, the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) develop Committee reports as the major product of legislation

development, Congressional inquiry and oversight investigation efforts. Both Committees also

conduct staff studies at the behest of House/Senate and/or Committee leadership on major topics

of interest. The SSC(I)’s oversight responsibilities also include reviewing treaties to determine

the IC’s ability to verify compliance with the relevant provisions of the treaties in question and

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

Intelligence Authorization Bill   

 



 

Authorize Appropriations 

Conduct Inquiries and 

Oversight Investigations

 

Conduct Staff Studies  

Authorize Appropriations 

Conduct Inquiries and 

Oversight Investigations

  

Conduct Staff Studies  

Treaty Review 

Presidential Nomination 

Recommendation 

Products

HPSC(I)

Roles

Intelligence Authorization Bill

SSC(I)

Other Legislation and Committee 

Reports

CDAs/QFRs

Staff Studies
4

recommending approval or denial of presidential nominations for the positions of Director of

Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence for Community Management, and the CIA’s Inspector General.

Preparation. The Committees play no significant role in preparation processes.

Resourcing. The HPSC(I) authorizes the NFIP, Joint Military Intelligence Program

(JMIP), and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) budgets, while the SSC(I)

authorizes the NFIP budget and plays an advisory role to the SASC on the JMIP and TIARA

budgets. Both Committees issue congressionally directed actions (CDAs) and questions for the

record (QFR) as part of their authorization processes.

Observations.

Both the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) staffs believe that no compelling reason exists to establish

a joint intelligence committee. In its IC21 report, HPSC(I) staff note that the primary arguments

for keeping the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) as separate entities are the difficulties in altering one or

another’s authorization or oversight arrangements, as well the perception that intelligence is a

“special” government function warranting such treatment. The SSC(I) staff echo these

sentiments, noting the strains in overcoming different political cultures (the SSCI[I]’s bipartisan

approach versus the more partisan HPSC[I] traditions), as well as the differences in authorization

jurisdictions for JMIP and TIARA. Should these barriers be overcome, however, significant

efficiencies could be achieved in the budget oversight process.

An interesting difference of opinion appears when the two Committees are presented with

the question of establishing themselves as Standing Committees. (As Select Committees, the two

can bypass the normal party caucus procedures for assigning members, to which Standing

Committees are subject. This would limit the chance that members who may pose potential

security risks would be appointed to the committees; it also ensures that seasoned members with

experience on related committees related to intelligence can be appointed.) The HPSC(I) staff

observe that while constitution as a Select Committee may have been to the Committee’s benefit

at its founding, the benefits of such a designation may now be outweighed by the costs. These

costs, as cited by the staff in IC21, include members’ limited familiarity with complex

intelligence issues prior to the completion of their mandatory eight-year term, and the rapid

turnover in HPSC(I) chairmen since 1985. SSC(I) staff interviewees discount the lack of

familiarity argument, claiming that a typical member’s eight-year term is sufficient to develop

the background needed to make intelligent decisions. SSC(I) staff also argue that the rotational

aspect behind the select Committee is very much to its benefit by instilling a healthy skepticism

among members about IC program claims. One interviewee favorably contrasted the SSC(I)’s

critical attitude with that of the more “client-friendly” SASC, one of the Senate’s more

prominent standing committees.

SSC(I) interviewees indicated that they believe the Congressional oversight process does

not place an undue burden on the Executive Branch in terms of reporting compliance costs. One

interlocutor observed that the IC “knows how to play this sophisticated poker game” well enough

to minimize the costs.

In response to a question on the SSC(I)’s JMIP and TIARA advisory role, SSC(I) staff

noted that while institutionally the Committee would want to expand its jurisdiction to cover
5

JMIP and TIARA, in practice such a move would be a mistake, as the Committee is not

organized effectively to address these two programs. One interviewee also observed that with

the emergence of digital technologies for the intelligence dissemination across the globe, the

definitions of “national” (addressing larger intelligence missions in a “strategic” sense) and

“tactical” (addressing the particular requirements of the warfighters) intelligence are becoming

increasing blurred. He noted that, indeed, many of TIARA’s activities would no longer qualify

as tactical under traditional definitions.

A separate Appropriations Subcommittee for intelligence would be constrained in

practice by the continued need to crosswalk with the Defense Appropriations process. Although

having a dedicated Subcommittee would lessen the burden of the committee’s overworked staff

and could result in better protection for IC agency budgets, all of the relevant programs (with the

exception of CIAP) would be bound by DoD 050 constraints, which will limit their overall

funding.

Interviewees stressed the Committees’ excellent record on non-disclosure of classified

and sensitive information. SSC(I) staff noted that two of its members (Senators Leahy and

Durenberger) either resigned or were removed from the committee following their release of

classified (in the Durenberger case) or sensitive (in the Leahy case) information.

Interviewees observed that the IC has excellent intelligence sharing arrangements with

foreign governments. These arrangements have well-defined requirements and strict procedures

for sharing information. One interviewee pointed to the State Department as the primary culprit

in disclosing too much information in its demarches to foreign governments.

While lauding the IC’s attempts to be more open with the public on its activities,

interviewees decried current declassification efforts as too expensive. They stressed that with

insufficient (in their opinion) funds dedicated to addressing current operational intelligence

concerns, funding should not be dedicated to broad-scale declassification.

Interviewees suggested that, in the age of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), EO

12333, which both describes and proscribes the DCI’s responsibilities, should be reconsidered.

EO 12333 places considerable constraints on the DCI’s actions, which some have argued are

inappropriate in a time of an increasingly diverse threat of “bad actors.” While those interviewed

stressed that this should be solely an executive branch decision, one interlocutor argued his

personal view that in a world defined by WMD, the DCI should not be limited in his designation

of intelligence operations. This same interviewee pointed out that limited but bipartisan support

for repealing EO 12333 exists in the Senate.
6

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

A. Authorizing Statutes: House Resolution (H. Res.) 658 (July 1977) established the

HPSC(I); Senate Resolution (S. Res.) 400 (May 1976) established the SSC(I). Section 413 of the

National Security Act of 1947 prescribes the activities the Intelligence Community’s (IC) senior

officials must undertake in their relations with these Committees.

(1) H. Res. 658, reflecting the recommendations of the House’s Nedzi and Pike

Commissions (constituted to investigate intelligence wrongdoings during the Watergate scandal

and make recommendations for intelligence reform), provided expansive powers to the HPSC(I),

empowering the newly-created Committee to oversee all national-level and tactical intelligence

programs.

(2) S. Res. 400 established the SSC(I) following the recommendations of the

Church Committee, launched in 1975 to investigate intelligence abuses beyond Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) domestic activities. S Res. 400 provided the SSC(I) with the

authority to conduct oversight of all national-level intelligence programs. The lack of definition

of “national-level” led to a “long, at times testy, and unresolved” struggle over who should

authorize funds for the Department of Defense’s intelligence activities.2 Since 1984, the SSC(I)

has maintained jurisdiction over the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) while the

Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has claimed sole jurisdiction over the Department of

Defense’s intelligence authorization (through the Joint Military Intelligence Program [JMIP] and

the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities [TIARA]).

(3) The National Security Act of 19473 requires the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) to report to the oversight Committees on current and anticipated intelligence

activities; establishes reporting procedures for the DCI’s use; sets procedures to protect against

the unauthorized disclosure of classified material; dictates the circumstances for reporting on

covert actions; and provides the procedures for funding intelligence activities.

B. Department Directives: The HPSC(I) and the SSC(I) maintain their own rules of

operation.

(1) Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

(105th Congress) were passed by the House and revised in March 1997. The rules continue to

govern the HPSC(I)’s operations today. Among the activities covered are the procedures for

conducting meetings, taking testimony, and handling classified material. The Rules also

prescribe the Subcommittees to be established and dictate the requirements for the appointment

of staff.

 

2 Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide. Washington, DC.: JMITC, 1997,

p.9.

3 Title 50 United States Code, Section 413
7

(2) Rules of the Select Committee on Intelligence, similar to the House rules,

dictate procedures for holding meetings and hearings, address classified material handling, and

specify procedures for hiring staff. Rule 3, which addresses Subcommittees, states that these

entities will established by the majority vote of the Committee and will deal with “such

legislation and oversight of programs and policies as the Committee may direct.”4 These rules

remain in effect today.

C. Interagency Directives: Executive Order 12333, Section 31, issued in December

1981, requires the DCI and other intelligence agency heads to cooperate with Congress in its

oversight activities.

2. Missions/Functions/Purposes. The structure and the major responsibilities of the HPSC(I)

and SSC(I) are specified in the relevant resolutions.

A. HPSC(I). The HPSC(I)’s major responsibilities include:

(1) Authorizing appropriations for National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP),

the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

(TIARA) [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

(2) Conducting congressional inquiries and, as deemed necessary, oversight

investigations [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Mission

Execution; Observation, Orientation, Oversight]; and

(3) Conducting staff studies on major issues as required by the House or HPSC(I)

leadership [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation,

Orientation, Oversight];

B. SSC(I). The SSC(I)’s major responsibilities include:

(1) Authorizing appropriations for NFIP, and advising the SASC on the JMIP and

TIARA budgets [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

(2) Conducting congressional inquiries and, as deemed necessary, oversight

investigations [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Mission

Execution; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

(3) Conducting staff studies on major issues as required by the Senate or SSC(I)

leadership [Key Processes Relation: Strategy; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation,

Orientation, Oversight];

(4) Reviewing treaties to determine the IC’s ability to verify compliance with the

relevant provisions of the treaties in question [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation,

Oversight]; and

 

4 Rule 3, Rules of the Select Committee on Intelligence, February 27, 1997.
8

(5) Recommending approval or denial of presidential nominations for the

positions of DCI, DDCI, DDCI/CM, and the CIA’s Inspector General (IG) [Key Processes

Relation: Observation, Orientation, and Oversight].

C. Subordinate Agencies and Activities: None.

D. Major Products:

(1) Intelligence Authorization Bill;

(2) Other legislation and Committee Reports;

(3) Congressionally-Directed Action (CDAs)/ Questions for the Record (QFRs);

and

(4) Staff Studies.

3. Vision and Core Competencies.

A. Vision: The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) do not have formal vision statements. For the

SSC(I), the Chairman outlines his preferred direction through informal interactions with the staff

directors, who then convey the direction to the staff. The Chairman’s current “vision”

emphasizes the importance of the five “Cs” (counterintelligence, counterterrorism,

counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and covert action) that should drive the Committee’s

action in the current Congress.5

B. Core Competencies: Both staffs note that the Committees stress independence in

their oversight role. In order to exercise such independence, the staffs stress their functional

knowledge and understanding of the intricacies of the budget process as their core competencies.

4. Organizational Culture. The very nature of the Committees’ oversight role leads to inherent

tensions between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Interviewees noted that the

Committees have had numerous difficulties with the Clinton Administration over what is

perceived as inadequate spending for intelligence missions, most notably for

counterproliferation.6 In a constrained budgetary environment, the tradeoffs between investing

in new systems and technologies that are designed to meet future needs must be balanced against

the operations and maintenance of current systems upon which operators rely to get their jobs

done today. The necessarily adversarial relationship that the Committees’ oversight role entails

can, and does, exacerbate differences of opinion on particular issues.

Even in this adversarial atmosphere, the Committees exemplify a strong tradition of

professionalism in their interactions with IC representatives. All staff members, particularly

professional staff members, are expected to conduct themselves with the proper comportment

when dealing with the executive branch, never letting differing points of view interfere with

these professional relationships.

 

5 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.

6 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
9

A. Values: While neither staff maintains a published set of core values, interviewees

indicate that the implicit values of professionalism and respect for the IC, its mission, and its

activities form the bedrock of the Committees’ core values. The Committees’ well-known

adherence to strict legal guidelines for the handling and dissemination of classified information

underscores this respect for the IC and the critical nature of the IC’s information to national

security. 7

B. Leadership Traditions: While members from both Committees espouse the same

basic set of core values (i.e., professionalism in interactions with IC officials, non-disclosure of

sensitive and classified information), the differing political make-up of members between the

two Committees significantly impacts their activities. The HPSC(I) is highly political in nature;

under the Committee’s partisan structure, the Chair, always from the majority party, exercises

significant influence, with the Vice Chair, from the minority party, always cast in a supporting

role. The majority party, through the chairman, sets the agenda, controls hearings and

deliberations, and issues Committee reports. The next ranking member of the majority party

presides over the Committee in the chairman’s absence. Under such a structure, minority party

members can actually be excluded from meaningful participation in budget “mark-ups” and

oversight investigations.8 The HPSC(I) staff reflects this partisan cast.

The SSC(I) functions much differently. The minority party’s senior representative,

who serves as Vice Chair, holds significant power in his/her own right, assuming control of the

Committee in the Chair’s absence. In contrast with the HPSC(I) staff, the SSC(I)’s staff

directors are supported by a distinctly bipartisan staff.

C. Staff Attributes: Knowledge of the particular skills required for oversight and

resourcing activities combined with an ability to pick up the fundamentals of the various

intelligence disciplines quickly provide the staffs with the ability to exercise independence in

their relations with the IC. In addition to understanding the dynamics of the individual

intelligence disciplines, the SSC(I) staff noted that it prides itself on its ability to understand how

the disciplines complement each other in accomplishing intelligence missions.9

D. Strategy: The Committees maintain no published strategy. The SSC(I) develops its

program of action based on the broad outlines provided by the Chairman with his five “Cs.” (See

Section 3, Vision and Core Competencies.)

E. HPSC(I) and SSC(I) Organizational Structure: The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) are

distinguished by their size, tenure, and, most importantly, the differing political cultures in which

the committees operate.

(1) HPSC(I) Organizational Structure. Figure 1 depicts the HPSC(I)’s

organizational structure.

 

7 One interlocutor relayed Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet’s commendation of the Committees’ excellent record

on non-dissemination of classified information. In comparing the Committees’ performance with that of the IC, the DCI

noted dryly that the executive branch “leaks like a sieve.” Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.

8 JMITC, p.10.

9 Interviewees observed that making performance tradeoffs between the intelligence disciplines and capabilities has proven

notoriously difficulty for the IC, noting that even the Community Management Staff’s Program Assessment and Evaluation

Staff has experienced limited success to date in this area. Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
10

Figure 1. HPSC(I) Structure

a) Members. The HPSC(I)’s 19 members are selected in proportion to

the majority-minority ratio in the House as a whole. All but four of these members serve in an

at-large capacity, with the remaining members selected from the Appropriations, Armed

Services, Foreign Affairs, and Judiciary Committees. The HPSC(I)’s members serve six-year

consecutive terms.

(b) Staff. The HPSC(I) staff reflects the partisan cast of the Committee as

a whole. Two staff directors each direct staffs that support the majority and minority party

members, respectively. The HPSC(I) rules specify that the staff should support both majority

and minority members without consideration to party affiliation; SSC(I) staff in interviews

claim that, in practice, the HPSC(I) staff is notably partisan, in comparison with the distinctly

bipartisan SSC(I) staff.10 The HPSC(I) staff is structured to support both its budget authorization

and audit and investigations functions.

 

10 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.

Majority Party Staff

Majority Party Staff Director

Majority Party Members

Minority Party Staff

Minority Party Staff Director

Minority Party Members

Chairman

Vice Chairman
11

(2) SSC(I) Organizational Structure. Figure 2 depicts the SSC(I)’s

organizational structure.

(a) Members. The SSC(I) currently consists of 17 members; in contrast

with the HPSC(I), half of the membership is drawn from each party, with the chair chosen from

the majority party. Of the eight seats held for each party, four are reserved for incumbents who

serve on the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees. The

remaining members are selected from the Senate at large. All members serve an eight-year

consecutive term.

 (b) Staff. Two staff directors drawn from the majority and minority

parties lead the SSC(I) staff. In contrast with the HPSC(I), the directors are supported by a

distinctly bipartisan staff, organized into budget and audit/investigations teams. The budget

team, led by the budget director, consists of five professional staff, each of whom holds

responsibility for one of the major NFIP programs: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program

(CCP), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency Program (NIMAP), the Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP), and the General

Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The audit and investigations team conducts congressional

inquiries, oversight investigations, and staff studies. The bipartisan staff structure largely

inoculates the committee from charges of politics in its actions, but can occasionally slow action

on oversight investigations.

Committee Staff

(Bipartisan)

Majority Party Staff Director

Minority Party Staff Director

Majority Party Members

Minority Party Members

Chairman

Vice Chairman
12

5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.

A. Strategy Development:

(1) Major Activities: The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) play a tangential but notable role

in strategy development through legislation and through their issuance of committee reports to

support legislation, congressional inquiries, and oversight investigations. Both committees have

also been known to influence strategy through their conduct of staff studies as requested by the

House/Senate or committee leadership.

(a) Legislation and Committee Reports. Both Committees use the

formal hearing structure to develop legislation and conduct their oversight functions. Hearings

results and recommendations are captured in Committee report form, which can lead to the

passage of related legislation. To the extent that legislation mandates (or Committee reports

recommend) actions that impact strategy, both Committees exert some influence over the

strategy development process.11 An excellent recent example can be found in the 1996

Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act, which mandated specific changes to IC management and

functions, changes that bore significant implications for the strategy development processes. (See

Section E, Observation, Orientation, and Oversight, for a description of the congressional inquiry

and oversight investigation processes.)

 

11 As noted in the volume entitled Congress, reports are not law and the provisions of reports are not legally binding.

However, report provisions are by custom honored, or the Committee is informed of the reasons why an Executive Branch

organization is not abiding by them. Failure to honor report language risks having the provisions of that language included

in law with more stringent requirements.

Strategy

Development

Policy, Guidance,

and Regulations

Planning

Mission Execution

Observation, 

Orientation,

and Oversight

Preparation

Resourcing

Products

Intelligence Authorization Bill   

 



 

Authorize Appropriations 

Conduct Inquiries and 

Oversight Investigations

 

Conduct Staff Studies  

Authorize Appropriations 

Conduct Inquiries and 

Oversight Investigations

  

Conduct Staff Studies  

Treaty Review 

Presidential Nomination 

Recommendation 

Products

HPSC(I)

Roles

Intelligence Authorization Bill

SSC(I)

Other Legislation and Committee 

Reports

CDAs/QFRs

Staff Studies
13

(b) Staff Studies. At the behest of Congressional leaders, the HPSC(I) or

SSC(I) may undertake a significant study on a topic of interest to the leaders. The HPSC(I)’s

IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century presents the best recent example of a highly

influential study impacting the IC’s role in strategy and policy development. IC21 addressed IC

roles, structure, and activities by viewing the major IC functions through the lens of requirements

in 10-15 years, and making recommendations for the development of a more agile, robust IC.

The resulting study significantly impacted the IC’s role in strategy and policy development

through its recommendations, leading to the 1996 Intelligence Reform and Review Act and its

implementing DCI Directives.

The IC21 development process represents the typical study development process.

Following the request from congressional leaders, committee staffs collect and review pertinent

material from the IC officials and outside experts. (The IC21 process included a detailed survey

sent to more than 40 former and current officials with national security experience, to academics,

and to IC veterans.12) Full committee hearings are often held, generating more information for

staff use in study development. Background work can also make use of formal staff panels of

expert witnesses, and staffs often conduct detailed interviews with national security, intelligence,

and technical specialists. Staff members can make use of the generous amount of information

produced by the annual intelligence budget authorization process, which generally includes

authorization hearings, Member briefings, and staff briefings. (The FY96 authorization process,

which served as a great source of information for the development of IC21, included 11

authorization hearings, more than 20 Member briefings, and over 200 staff briefings.13) Staff

also, through more informal mechanisms, keep apprised of the activities of other Congressional

Committees, commissions, study groups, and other relevant bodies.

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, National Security Council (NSC), Secretary

of Defense, DCI, IC Component Agencies, relevant congressional committees, private/non-profit

commissions and study groups.

(3) Key HPSC(I)/SSC(I) Processes: Congressional review and oversight.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: None.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA authorization

processes.

B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:

(1) Major Activities: The HPSC(I) and SSC(I) also impact policy development

through legislation and through the issuance of committee reports to support legislation,

Congressional inquiries, and oversight investigations and their conduct of staff studies as

requested by the House/Senate or committee leadership.

(a) Legislation and Committee Reports. See Section A, Strategy

Development.

 

12 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives. IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century.

Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 2.

13 Ibid., p. 7
14

(b) Staff Studies. See Section A, Strategy Development.

(2) Major Stakeholders: Secretary of Defense, DCI, and IC Component

Agencies.

(3) Key HPSC(I)/SSC(I) Processes: Congressional review and oversight.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy

development.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA authorization

processes.

C. Planning: No involvement in planning as that term is defined by the U.S.

Commission on National Security/21st Century.

D. Mission Execution:

(1) Major Activities: The Congressional Committees play a limited role in

mission execution through their mission-related recommendations found in legislation,

supporting committee reports, congressional inquiries, and oversight investigations. The

Committees also affect mission execution through their review of the use of covert action in

response to presidential “findings.”

(a) Committee Reports. See Section A, Strategy Development.

(b) Covert action review. Section 413 of the National Security Act of

1947 requires the President to submit a document, known as a “finding,” explaining the need for

use of a covert action and conveying his approval of such an action. The Committees review the

President’s submission and, if a Committee does not deem the “finding” sufficient to warrant

such a use, may launch a congressional inquiry at its discretion.

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, NSC, DoD (Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Armed Services), DCI, IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key HPSC(I)/SSC(I) Processes: Congressional review and oversight.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Processes used by the Executive Branch

to produce Presidential findings.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Intelligence Community resourcing

processes.

E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:

(1) Major Activities: Develops legislation; develops Committee reports to

support legislation development, congressional inquiry and oversight investigation efforts.

Conducts staff studies at the behest of House/Senate and/or committee leadership.
15

(a) Congressional Oversight Process: Committee Reports. See Section

A, Strategy Development. The congressional oversight process can take one of two major forms,

a congressional inquiry (where the committee in question seeks information for clarification or

amplification purposes) or an actual oversight investigation, where the committee solicits

specific information with the intent to act upon that information in some manner. (Interviewees

observed that in the vast majority of circumstances an inquiry produced sufficient information

for the staff to determine that further action would not be deemed necessary.14)

Inquiries are often triggered by highly publicized incidents (e.g., Pakistan’s and India’s

recent nuclear testing activities). Under such circumstances, the staff directors will move

quickly to set up hearings and schedule these hearings on the calendars of the Chair and Vice

Chair. Inquiries may also be initiated at the direct request of the Chair and/or Vice Chair or even

at the expressed interest of House/Senate leaders.

In addition to scheduling and holding hearings, the Committee staffs request

information formally through the relevant agency’s legislative affairs office. A formal request,

signed by the Chair and Vice Chair, initiates this process. Agencies respond through their

legislative affairs offices. (Interviewees noted that the information collection process often

occurs far less formally, through telephone calls made directly to the offices that can supply the

needed information.15)

Upon the staffs’ review of the received information, the audit/investigations director

will make a recommendation, in the form of a memorandum for the record, to the staff

director(s) on whether to proceed with an investigation based on the adequacy of the response. If

the recommendation is to proceed, another round of hearings will be scheduled, with the results

captured in Committee reports.

The SSC(I) uses the Committee report mechanism as the means to report its findings on

the IC’s ability to monitor provisions of a treaty before the Senate for ratification. In preparing

the report, SSC(I) staff identify the current intelligence capabilities that could be applied to

support verification. The staff also reviews IC research and development processes to make an

informed judgement as to whether the resulting new capabilities can be brought to bear on the

verification requirement. The staff makes its recommendations in a committee report delivered

first to the Members and then with their approval, to the Senate leadership.

The SSC(I) also reviews presidential nominees for high-level IC positions and makes

its recommendations to the Senate leadership via a committee report.

(b) Congressional Oversight Process: Staff Studies. See Section A,

Strategy Development.

(2) Major Stakeholders: DoD; DCI; IC Component Agencies.

(3) Key HPSC(I)/SSC(I) Processes: Oversight and inquiry processes.

 

14 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.

15 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
16

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: National Security Strategy

development; National Military Strategy development; DCI Strategic Intent development; DCI

Strategic Intelligence Review development.

(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: Intelligence Community management,

collection, analysis, production, and dissemination processes.

F. Preparation: No involvement in preparation as that term is defined by the U.S.

Commission on National Security/21st Century.

G. Resourcing:

(1) Major Activities: The HPSC(I) authorizes the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA

budgets. The SSC(I) authorizes the NFIP budget and plays an advisory role to the SASC on the

JMIP and TIARA budgets. Both Committees issue congressionally directed actions (CDAs) and

questions for the record (QFR) as part of their authorization processes.16

(a) HPSC(I) NFIP Authorization Process. (See Appendix 1 for process

maps.) The authorization process begins with the HPSC(I) holding hearings and performing a

“mark-up” on the entire NFIP budget submitted by the DCI as a part of the President’s Budget.

(The DCI develops and submits the Congressional Budget Justification Book [CBJB] to support

his budget request.) During this stage, the DCI and NFIP program managers testify and defend

their budget requests. The HPSC(I)’s Committee report and budget “mark” are then sequentially

referred to the HASC, which has 30 working days to review the documents and decide on any

revisions to DoD NFIP programs it deems necessary. Any other Committee that holds a nonbudgetary equity in the bill (e.g., the House Foreign Affairs Committee on items related to

treaties) can also request a sequential review. The only Committees who can review NFIP

budget details other than the HASC are the House Committees with jurisdiction over the State,

Treasury, Energy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) budgets, who can only review the

requests within their appropriate departmental budget.17 

In the DoD NFIP budget case, the HASC may approve the HPSC(I) report and “mark,”

leading to the issuance of a joint HASC/HPSC(I) report which is then voted upon by the full

House. If, however, the HASC finds fault with the HPSC(I) report, it can raise an “issue,” and

the two committees come together to attempt to work out their differences. In the rare instances

where this approach does not succeed, the HASC can amend the HPSC(I) report and send it out

to the full House. (In such a case, the HPSC(I) can either accept the amendment without

objection or debate it in a closed session.)

It has become customary for the HPSC(I) to share its NFIP report and “mark” with the

SSC(I) prior to the SSC(I)’s completion of its own “mark.” The SSC(I) may use this opportunity

to identify issues it intends to raise in conference.18

(b) SSC(I) NFIP Authorization Process. (See Appendix 2 for process

maps.) The SSC(I) pursues a similar authorization process with the NFIP budget, including

 

16 See page 18 for descriptions of the CFR and QDA.

17 JMITC, p. 176.

18 JMITC, p. 176.
17

sequential referral of the report and “mark” to the SASC and the other Committees with

jurisdiction over State, Treasury, Energy, and the FBI.

Because of the unique SSC(I)-SASC relationship, a subtle but notable difference can be

found between the HPSC(I)’s and SSC(I)’s NFIP authorization processes. The amendment

process in the Senate can be characterized as considerably more open; it is not uncommon to

have SASC amendments added to the SSC(I)/SASC developed “mark” or even to have full

debate on contentious issues. Both committees generally avoid debate on classified issues, but

such debate has occurred, always in closed session.19

(c) Conference and Passage. The final House and Senate versions of the

NFIP authorization bill must be reconciled in conference. Because of their primary jurisdiction

over the NFIP budgets, HPSC(I) and SSC(I) members always take an active role on the

Authorization Conference Committee. Once agreement is reached, the House and Senate vote

on the Conference bill, which, with passage by both houses, becomes the Intelligence

Authorization Bill. With the President’s signature, the bill becomes the Intelligence

Authorization Act for that fiscal year.

Where Senate and House “marks” on specific budget items differ, the DCI may appeal

directly to the authorization conference committee, with his appeal submitted through OMB

prior to its delivery to the Hill. The IC prepares its formal first appeal to the Authorization

Conference Committee during each budget cycle approximately five months prior to budget

execution. (The second formal appeal is directed toward the Appropriations Conference

Committees.) When the conference committee reports out a bill, Congress’s position on the

NFIP budget is final, unless the full House or Senate revises the committee’s position, which

happens only rarely and usually requires another conference.

(d) HPSC(I) JMIP/TIARA Authorization Process. In the House, the

HPSC(I) takes the lead on the authorizing JMIP and TIARA. The HPSC(I) holds hearings on

JMIP and TIARA and produces a committee report and “mark.” Concurrently, the HASC holds

hearings and performs its “mark-up” on the DoD authorization bill without the JMIP and TIARA

portions. The HPSC(I) JMIP/TIARA “mark” is then combined with the HASC’s “mark” of the

remainder of the DoD budget. If the two Committees differ on any item or amount in the

HPSC(I) “mark,” they resolve their differences before issuing their joint report to the full House

for a vote.

(e) SSC(I) JMIP/TIARA Authorization Process. On the Senate side, the

SSC(I) serves in an advisory capacity to the SASC, which takes the primary role in authorizing

JMIP and TIARA. During the authorization process the SSC(I) holds hearings on JMIP and

TIARA programs, but uses the information gleaned to advise the SASC as the SASC prepares

the DoD “mark.” SASC then issues its report to the full Senate for passage.

(f) Conference and Passage. This process occurs in the same manner as

for the NFIP. The Authorization Conference’s bill is voted on by the full House and Senate,

resulting in the Defense Authorization Bill. This bill, when signed by the President, becomes the

Defense Authorization Act.

 

19 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
18

(g) CDAs/QFRs. During the authorization process, the committees can

influence programming and budgeting for particular NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA programs through

CDA issuance. This document details particular changes Congress wishes to see made to a

program. The administration formally replies to these CDAs directly and through CBJB

submission. A separate section of the CBJB summarizes CDAs that impact a given program and

provides the status of program response. The Community Management Staff’s Resource

Management Office (CMS/RMO) serves as the DCI’s primary responder to CDAs on NFIP

programs, with formal responses submitted through the legislative affairs office. Whether the

CDA is addressed directly or through the CBJB, OMB must clear the responses to ensure

consistency in administration positions being taken on issues before Congress.

The Committees may also formally solicit information during the authorization process

by issuing QFRs. The QFRs serve as an alternative to hearings in generating additional

information useful in the authorization process. CMS/RMO also serves as the DCI’s delegate to

respond to QFRs, with the responses formally submitted through the legislative affairs office. As

in the case of CDAs, OMB must clear the responses prior to their formal submission to the

committees.

(2) Major Stakeholders: President, OSD (ASD[C3I], PA&E), JCS (J8), Military

Services, IC Component Agencies, OMB, Congress.

(3) Key HPSC(I)/SSC(I) Processes: Intelligence authorization.

(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes: Intelligence Program Objective

Memorandum (IPOM) development and review.

(5) Associated Lower-level Processes: None.

6. Informal National Security Process Involvement. Much of the HPSC(I)’s and SSC(I)’s

daily activities support the rich web of informal processes woven by the national security

community. Members and staff request and receive briefings on a range of current and emerging

security issues. Information needed to support congressional inquiries is often solicited directly

from relevant IC offices via telephone, thus bypassing the more formal request to the legislative

affairs office of the agency in question. HPSC(I) and SSC(I) staff often invite each other to

hearings (although no formal coordination on hearings occurs) to facilitate communication.

Each Committee also invites staffs from other Committees to hearings of mutual interest,

although again no real coordination of hearings occurs (in this case due to differing

jurisdictions). 20 Informal interactions with commissions, study groups, and other organizations

pursuing areas of interest to the committees occurs frequently in the form of conference

participation and the provision of relevant reports and studies to Committee members and staff.

7. Funding and Personnel.

A. Authorization and Appropriations: Not applicable.

B. Funding Sources: Funded from congressional operations resources.

 

20 Interview with SSC(I) staff, November 23, 1999.
19

C. Budget: HPSCI(I) = $5.2 million;21 SCC(I) = $3.8 million.22

D. Manpower: The SSC(I) staff numbers 30, with 11 of these being professional staff

supporting the budget, audit, and investigations functions. The HPSC(I) staff size is believed to

be approximately the same as the SSC(I).

8. Observations.

A. Joint Intelligence Committee: Both the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) staffs believe that no

compelling reason exists to establish a joint intelligence committee. In its IC21 report, HPSC(I)

staff note that the primary arguments for keeping the HPSC(I) and SSC(I) as separate entities are

the difficulties in altering one or another’s authorization or oversight arrangements, as well the

perception that intelligence is a “special” government function warranting such treatment.23 The

SSC(I) staff echo these sentiments, noting the strains in overcoming different political cultures

(the SSCI(I)’s bipartisan approach versus the more partisan HPSC(I) traditions), as well as the

differences in authorization jurisdictions for JMIP and TIARA.

B. Standing Intelligence Committees: An interesting difference of opinion appears

when the two Committees are presented with the question of establishing themselves as Standing

Committees. The HPSC(I) staff observe that while constitution as a Select Committee may have

been to the Committee’s benefit at its founding, the benefits of such a designation may now be

outweighed by the costs. These costs, as cited by the staff in IC21, include members’ limited

familiarity with complex intelligence issues prior to the completion of their mandatory terms,

and the rapid turnover in HPSC(I) chairmen since 1985.24 SSC(I) staff interviewees discount the

lack of familiarity argument, claiming that a typical member’s eight-year term is sufficient to

develop the background needed to make intelligent decision. SSC(I) staff also argue that the

rotational aspect behind the Select Committee is very much to its benefit by instilling a healthy

skepticism among members about IC program claims. One interviewee favorably contrasted the

SSC(I)’s critical attitude with that of the more “client-friendly” SASC, one of the Senate’s more

prominent Standing Committees.

C. The “Undue Burden” of Congressional Oversight: SSC(I) interviewees indicated

that they believe the Congressional oversight process does not place an undue burden on the

executive branch in terms of reporting compliance costs. One interlocutor observed that the IC

“knows how to play this sophisticated poker game” well enough to minimize the costs.

D. Expanded Jurisdiction over Defense Intelligence Programs: In response to a

question on the SSC(I)’s JMIP and TIARA advisory role, SSC(I) staff noted that while

institutionally the Committee would want to expand its jurisdiction to cover JMIP and TIARA,

in practice such a move would be a mistake, as the Committee is not organized effectively to

address these two programs. One interviewee also observed that with emergence of digital

technologies for the intelligence dissemination across the globe, the definitions of “national” and

“tactical” intelligence are becoming increasing blurred. He noted that, indeed, many of TIARA’s

activities would no longer qualify as tactical under traditional definitions.

 

21 H.Res. 101, section 1, March 23, 1999.

22 S.Res 189, section 18, September 27, 1999.

23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,IC21, p. 318.

24 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,IC21, p. 322.
20

E. Separate Appropriations Subcommittee for Intelligence: A separate

Appropriations Subcommittee for intelligence would be constrained in practice by the continued

need to crosswalk with the Defense Appropriations process. Although having a dedicated

Subcommittee would lessen the burden of the Committee’s overworked staff and could result in

better protection for IC agency budgets, all of the relevant programs (with the exception of

CIAP) would be bound by DoD 050 constraints.

F. Protecting Classified and Sensitive Information: Interviewees stressed the

committees’ excellent record on non-disclosure of classified and sensitive information. SSC(I)

staff noted that two of its members (Senators Leahy and Durenberger) either resigned or were

removed from the committee following their release of classified (in the Durenberger case) or

sensitive (in the Leahy case) information.

G. Intelligence Sharing with Foreign Governments: Interviewees observed that the IC

has excellent intelligence sharing arrangements with foreign governments. These arrangements

have well-defined requirements and strict procedures for sharing information. One interviewee

pointed to the State Department as the primary culprit in disclosing too much information in its

demarches to foreign governments.

H. The Administration’s Declassification Efforts: While lauding the IC’s attempts to

be more open with the public on its activities, interviewees decried current declassification

efforts as too expensive. They stressed that with insufficient (in their opinion) funds dedicated to

addressing current operational intelligence concerns, funding should not be dedicated to broadscale declassification.

I. Executive Order 12333’s Relevance to Today’s National Security Environment:

Interviewees suggested that, in the age of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Executive Order

12333, which both describes and proscribes the DCI’s responsibilities, should be reconsidered.

While those interviewed stressed that this should be solely an executive branch decision, one

interlocutor argued his personal view that in a world defined by WMD, the DCI should not be

limited in his designation of intelligence operations. This same interviewee pointed out that

limited but bipartisan support for repealing Executive Order 12333 exists in the Senate.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1(a)

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, an

DCI

House Permanent

Select Committee on

Intelligence

HPSC(I)

 House Armed Services

Committee

HASC

House Interagency Inter-Branch

 Interagency

Working Group

IWG

Resolve

Discrepancies

Start

Forward CBJB and

NFIP Budget to

Congress Provide Testimony

Conduct

Budget

Hearings

Mark Up NFIP andDraft Authorization

Bill

Send NFIP Mark

Up to HASC for

Sequential Review

Review NFIP

Budget

Authorization Bill

Approve HPSCI

Bill?

Identify

Discrepancies

Ap

Provide NFIP

Program Manager

Testimony 

A

A

B

B 

No

Yes

Ye
Appendix 1(b)

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, an

DCI

House Permanent

Select Committee on

Intelligence

HPSC(I)

 House Armed

Services Committee

HASC

House Interagency Inter-Branch

 Interagency

Working Group

IWG

Appeal

Decisions

Reconcile with Senate

Version of NFIP

Authorization Bill

Modify Bill to Bring

Issues for Discussion at

Conference with SSCI

(Forum for DCI Appeal)

Send to Ful

House for

Passage

D

Approve House NFIP

Authorization Bill?

Connect

to Page

2(a)
Appendix 2(a)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Reg

DCI

Senate Select

Committee on

Intelligence

SSC(I)

Senate Arms Services

Committee

SASC

Senate Interagency Inter-Branch

 Interagency

Working Group

IWG

Resolve

Discrepancies

Start

Forward CBJB and

NFIP Budget to

Congress Provide Testimony

Conduct

Budget

Hearings

Mark Up NFIP andDraft Authorization

Bill

Send NFIP Mark

Up to SASC for

Sequential Review

Review NFIP

Budget

Authorization Bill

Approve SSCI

Bill?

Identify

Discrepancies

Provide NFIP

Program Manager

Testimony 

A

A

B

No

Yes
Appendix 2(b)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Reg

DCI

Senate Select

Committee on

Intelligence

SSC(I)

Senate Arms

Services Committee

SASC

Senate Interagency Inter-Branch

 Interagency

Working Group

IWG

Appeal

Decisions

Reconcile with House

Version of NFIP

Authorization Bill

Modify Bill to Bring Issues

for Discussion at

Conference with HPSCI

(Forum for DCI Appeal)

Send to 

Senate 

Passa

D

Approve Senate NFIP

Authorization Bill? 

Connect from Page 1(a) 
1

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