ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555
OE Annual Report
OE Annual Report

Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................... iii 

Calendar Year 2009 Summary ................................................................................................. v 

Introduction and Overview .......................................................................................1 

 Mission and Authority ................................................................................................. 1 

The Office of Enforcement........................................................................................... 2 

I. Escalated Enforcement Actions................................................................................... 3 

A. Civil Penalty Actions ......................................................................................... 4 

B. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ..................................................... 6 

C. Orders ............................................................................................................... 6 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigation .................... 7 

E. Escalated Enforcement Trends ........................................................................ 7 

F. Demand for Information .................................................................................... 8 

II. Actions against Individuals and Non-Licensees......................................................... 9 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination ................................................................................... 9 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) .............................................................. 9 

V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate Enforcement 

Sanctions....... ............................................................................................................. 10 

VI. Withdrawn Actions...................................................................................................... 10 

VII. Significant Enforcement Actions .............................................................................. 11 

VIII. Hearing Activities ........................................................................................................ 13 

IX. Alternative Dispute Resolution .................................................................................. 15 

X. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ................. 16 

XI. Ongoing Activities ..................................................................................................... 18

A. Safety Culture .................................................................................................. 18 

B. Knowledge Management ................................................................................. 19 

XII. Regional Accomplishments ....................................................................................... 20 
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- TABLES - 

Table 1. Civil Penalty Information ........................................................... 5 

Table 2. Escalated Action Trends ........................................................... 7 

Table 3. CY 2009 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions 

and Program Office ................................................................. 21 

Table 4. CY 2009 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

 Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual ................................... 22 

- FIGURES - 

Figure 1. How NRC Regulates .................................................................. 1 

Figure 2. Escalated Enforcement by Type ............................................... 3 

Figure 3. Escalated Enforcement by Licensee ......................................... 4 

Figure 4. Escalated Action Trends ............................................................ 8 

Figure 5. Confirmatory Order Trends ..................................................... 15 

- APPENDICES - 

A. Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ................................................. A1 

B. Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ............ B1 

C. Summary of Orders ......................................................................................... C1

D. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals ............... D1 

E. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors, and Certificate Holders) .......................................... E1 

 F. Summary of Notices of Enforcement Discretion .......................................... F1 
OE Annual Report

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Abstract 

This report provides the Commission with an overview of Enforcement Program activities for 

calendar year 2009. These activities include escalated enforcement actions, proposed changes 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Enforcement Policy, new initiatives, and revised 

staff guidance. 

Please note that security-related escalated enforcement actions involving, for example, notices 

of violation, civil penalties, and orders, not available to the public are included for statistical 

purposes but not described in this report. 

In calendar year 2009, the Office of Enforcement (OE) continued to focus on appropriate and 

consistent enforcement of NRC regulations. 

→ The agency issued 126 escalated enforcement actions, including the following: 

• 17 proposed civil penalties totaling $174,000 

• 78 escalated notices of violation without civil penalties 

• 28 enforcement orders including orders associated with Alternative Dispute Resolution 

(ADR) settlements and orders prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

• 3 orders imposing civil penalties totaling $29,250 

→ The agency issued two demands for information. 

→ The agency continued the successful use of ADR program in 24 enforcement cases. 

→ OE continued initiatives regarding licensee safety culture in a number of areas, including 

operating reactors, fuel facilities, and new reactor construction. 
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Introduction and Overview 

Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States to 

protect public health and safety, 

the environment, and the 

common defense and security. 

The agency accomplishes this 

mission through: licensing of 

nuclear facilities and the 

possession, use, and disposal of 

nuclear materials; the 

development and 

implementation of requirements 

governing licensed activities; 

and inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various 

types of inspections and 

investigations designed to 

 Figure 1: How NRC Regulates 

ensure that NRC-licensed activities and associated activities are conducted in strict compliance 

with the Commission’s regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, (AEA), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005. These statutes provide the NRC with broad authority. The Energy Policy Act of 

2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, placing additional byproduct material under 

NRC’s jurisdiction, including both naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive 

materials (NARM). The agency implements its enforcement authority through Title 10, Part 2, 

“Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders,” Subpart B, 

“Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or 

Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties,” of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR Part 2). The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory 

framework for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute resolution. 

The NRC Enforcement Policy sets out the general principles governing the NRC=s Enforcement 

Program and provides a process for implementing the agency=s enforcement authority in 

response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of policy is predicated on the 

NRC=s belief that compliance with NRC requirements is essential to ensuring safety, maintaining 

security, and protecting the environment. The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, 
OE Annual Report

 2 

to various categories of non-licensees, and to individual employees of licensed and 

non-licensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a deterrent, 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and encourage 

prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, 

because violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the 

NRC Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations. Enforcement authority 

includes the use of notices of violation, civil penalties, demands for information, and orders 

to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC staff may exercise discretion in 

determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. 

The Office of Enforcement 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies and programs for enforcement of NRC 

requirements. In addition, OE exercises oversight of NRC enforcement, providing 

programmatic and implementation direction to regional and headquarters offices conducting 

or involved in enforcement activities, and ensures that regional and program office 

enforcement programs are consistently implemented. 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, 

Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is responsible for 

ensuring the DEDMRT is kept apprised of certain escalated actions. The DEDMRT is 

consulted on any case involving novel issues, substantial legal, programmatic, or policy 

issues raised during the enforcement review process, or where the Director believes it is 

warranted. OE works in partnership with NRC headquarters and regional offices to enforce 

the agency’s requirements. 

The NRC’s enforcement Web site includes a variety of information such as the Enforcement 

Policy, the Enforcement Manual, and current temporary enforcement guidance contained in 

enforcement guidance memoranda. This Web site also contains information about 

significant enforcement actions issued to reactor and materials licensees, non-licensees 

(vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals. Consistent with NRC 

practices and policies, most security-related actions and activities are not included on the 

NRC’s public Web site. However, OE does include in its enforcement documents collection 

security orders that impose compensatory security requirements on various licensees. The 

enforcement Web site is located at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement.html. 

In addition to enforcement activities, OE has oversight responsibilities for the Allegations 

Program, Employee Protection/Discrimination, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

Program (both early-ADR and post-investigation ADR), external (licensee) safety culture, 

internal (NRC) safety culture, Differing Views (which includes the differing professional 

opinion program, and the non-concurrence process), and Freedom of Information Act 

requests to ensure that alleger identity is not released. Additional information about the 

responsibilities of OE is available at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization/oefuncdesc.html on the NRC’s public Web site. 
OE Annual Report

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I. Escalated Enforcement Actions

 Escalated enforcement actions include the following: 

• notices of violations (NOVs) including Severity Level I, II, or III violations 

• NOVs associated with Red, Yellow, or White significance determination process 

(SDP) findings (for operating reactor facilities) 

• civil penalty actions 

• orders issued to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; prohibit involvement in 

NRC licensed activities; confirm commitments reached at ADR mediation 

sessions; or impose a civil penalty 

Civil Penalties

16%

Escalated 

NOV's w/o CP

62%

Orders

22%

Figure 2: Escalated Enforcement by Type 

Figure 2 above shows the distribution of escalated enforcement actions issued in 

calendar year CY2009 by type of action issued. This represents all 126 escalated 

actions issued throughout the year. The majority of escalated enforcement actions 

issued in CY2009 involved 78 NOVs without a civil penalty. In addition, 20 actions 

involved proposing or imposing a civil penalty and 28 actions involved issuing an 

enforcement order unrelated to civil penalties. 

There are many reasons why escalated NOVs may not be accompanied by a civil 

penalty. These reasons include, in part, the fact that the ROP does not generally 

account for the issuance of civil penalties and the Civil Penalty Assessment process 

described in the Enforcement Policy considers whether credit is warranted for (1) good 

escalated enforcement history; (2) self identification of the violation; and (3 ) if the 

corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive. The process also takes into 

account the gravity of the violation as a primary consideration and the ability to pay as 

a secondary consideration. 

Figure 3 below shows the distribution of enforcement actions based on the type of 

licensees to whom escalated enforcement actions were issued in calendar year 

CY2009. For this chart individual actions are included in the appropriate category and 

not listed separately. In addition, the 3 orders imposing civil penalties are included in 

the materials category for Figure 3. 
OE Annual Report

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Figure 3: Escalated Enforcement by Licensee 

The charts and the tables at the end of this report break this information down further 

by identifying the region or program office that initiated the action, as well as the 

licensees, non-licensees, and individuals who were involved. 

A. Civil Penalty Actions

During CY 2009, the agency processed 17 cases involving proposed civil penalties. 

Nine of these cases involved willfulness. Willfulness is defined as conduct involving 

either deliberate misconduct or careless disregard. 

Information regarding willful violations is identified because such violations are of 

particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on 

licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and 

communicating with candor; therefore, a violation involving willfulness may be 

considered more egregious than the underlying violation taken alone would have 

been, and the severity level may be increased. 

28

9

1 1

18

10 10

41

8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Reactor Fuel Facility Materials

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil Penalty) Civil Penalty Orders
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Table 1 provides information comparing civil penalty assessments for the current 

calendar year as well as for the previous four years. When reviewing the information 

in this table, it is important to note that an enforcement action may include more than 

one civil penalty or more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be 

proposed in one year and paid or imposed in another year. Finally, the amount of a 

proposed civil penalty may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising 

discretion as part of a settlement agreement developed during alternative dispute 

resolution (ADR). 

The total number of civil penalties proposed in CY 2009 is a decrease from the 

number proposed in CY 2008 and is more in line with the total numbers from earlier 

years. There were fewer civil penalties issued to reactor licensees in CY 2009 and, 

because the statutory civil penalty amount is less for non-reactor licensees, the total 

amount of proposed civil penalties in CY 2009 was less. 

Appendix A includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions for 2009. 

Security related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not addressed in 

Appendix A of this report; however, the number of NOVs associated with security 

related issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 

Table 1 – Civil Penalty Information 

1 This amount reflects a $5,450,000 civil penalty that was issued on April 21, 2005, to FirstEnergy Nuclear 

Operating Company for multiple violations, some willful, that occurred at its Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Plant.

2

 The NRC issues an “order imposing civil monetary penalty” when a licensee refuses to pay a 

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 CY 2005 

Number of Proposed Civil Penalties 17 28 18 15 24 

Number of Orders that Imposed Civil 

Penalties 3 0 1 0 3 

Number of Civil Penalties Paid 15 29 17 16 22 

Amount of Proposed Civil Penalties $174,000 $1,185,900 $383,200 $332,350 $6,099,9501

Amount of Imposed Civil Penalties2 

$29,250 $0 $3,250 $0 $112,100 

Amount of Civil Penalties Paid $279,750 $1,039,850 $446,500 $375,500 $5,891,900 
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B. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

During CY 2009, the NRC issued 78 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. Of these 

violations, 18 were associated with White SDP findings under the Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP). No violations were associated with Yellow or Red SDP findings. Six 

NOVs associated with Green SDP findings were issued to licensees. NOVs 

associated with Green SDP findings are not considered escalated enforcement 

actions. Additional information about the ROP is available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html on the NRC’s public Web 

site. 

Appendix B to this report summarizes each of these NOVs without civil penalties 

issued to licensees, as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security 

related issues involving NOVs without civil penalties are not addressed in Appendix B 

of this report; however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is 

included in the data discussed in this report. 

As noted in Table 2 below, the total number of escalated enforcement actions 

decreased in CY2009 compared to the total number of actions issued in CY2008, and 

is more in line with the five year average. This decrease is due, in part, because of the 

improved performance observed by material licensees in complying with the increased 

control orders issued in CY2005. In addition, the total number of material licensees 

decreased due to the States of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Jersey becoming 

Agreement States by the end of CY2009. 

C. Orders

During CY 2009, the NRC issued 31 orders to licensees and to individuals. These 

included 24 confirmatory orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated 

with ADR settlement agreements, 11 orders issued to individuals (6 of which restricted 

their involvement in NRC licensed-activities), and 3 orders imposing a civil penalty. 

Seven of the eleven orders issued to individuals resulted from an ADR mediation 

session. Orders issued to individuals restricting involvement in NRC licensed activities 

included: two individuals being prohibited from involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

for 5 years; three individuals being prohibited from involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities for 3 years; and one individual being prohibited from involvement in NRClicensed activities for 2 years. 

As seen in Table 2, the number of orders issued in CY 2009 decreased from CY 2008, 

in part, due to a few cases in CY 2008 that resulted in a large number of orders issued 

to individuals related to nonlicensed security personnel. 

 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in CY 2009. 

The appendix also includes a brief description of a demand for information (DFI) 

issued in CY 2009. (See Section F below). 
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D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations

In CY 2009, an Office of Investigations (OI) Report supported 37 percent or 47 out of 

the 126 escalated actions: 

• 9 of the 17 escalated NOV cases with civil penalties (53 percent) 

• 14 of the 78 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (18 percent) 

• 25 of the 31 enforcement orders (81 percent) 

The 47 cases supported by an OI investigation represent a decrease from the 59 

cases supported in CY 2008. Although the total number for CY 2009 is a decrease 

from CY 2008, it is more in line with previous annual totals and represents the same 

percentage of cases supported in CY 2008. 

E. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

During CY 2009, the agency issued 126 escalated enforcement actions. This number 

is relatively equivalent to the average number of 120 escalated enforcement actions 

issued for the last 5 years and the number of escalated enforcement actions issued in 

CY 2007 and CY 2005. The number of escalated enforcement actions issued in CY 

2006 was equally less than the 5 year average as the number of escalated 

enforcement actions issued in CY 2008 was greater than the 5 year average. This 

indicates that CY 2009 returned to an expected level of escalated enforcement activity. 

Table 2 provides information regarding the total number of escalated enforcement 

actions from fiscal year (FY) 2005 to CY 2009. Figure 3 provides this information in 

graphical form. 

Table 2 – Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 FY 2005 Average 

Escalated NOVs 

with Civil Penalties 17 28 18 15 24 20 

Orders Imposing 

Civil Penalties 3 0 1 0 3 1 

Orders 28 35 22 15 17 23 

Escalated NOVs 

without Civil Penalties 78 94 77 57 70 75 

Total 126 157 118 87 114 120 
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17 15

22

35

28

3 1 3

78

94

77

57

70

17

28

18

15

24

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Escalated

NOVs (w/out

Civil Penalty)

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders

Imposing Civil

Penalties

 

Figure 4: Escalated Action Trends (FY 2005 – CY 2009) 

F. Demand for Information 

When the NRC concludes that additional information is necessary, the agency may 

issue to a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, a DFI 

(see 10 CFR 2.204). A DFI requires the licensee or other person to provide more 

information or a context for its action(s) so that the NRC is able to determine whether 

an order or other action is warranted. During CY 2009, the NRC issued DFIs in two 

cases. One set of DFIs was issued to various general material licensees to obtain 

information needed to determine whether licensees were aware of their responsibility 

to account for tritium exit signs in their possession, and properly dispose of them at the 

end of their useful life. Another DFI was issued to a physician and authorized user of 

licensed radioactive material at the Department of Veterans Affairs, Philadelphia, to 

obtain specific information regarding his usage of by-product material for any purpose 

including, but not limited to, brachytherapy. Appendix C includes a brief description of 

these DFIs. 
OE Annual Report

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II. Actions Against Individuals and Non-licensee Organizations

During CY 2009, the agency issued 19 escalated actions to licensed and unlicensed 

individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated enforcement 

actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in CY 2009. Appendix C provides 

summaries of the orders that were issued to individuals, including those orders 

prohibiting or limiting their participation in NRC-licensed activities. Appendix D 

summarizes the NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2009. 

The number of escalated actions issued to individuals in CY 2009 remained relatively 

consistent with those issued in CY 2008. 

The agency issued two escalated enforcement actions to non-licensees in CY 2009. 

Appendix E provides a summary of these actions. 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination 

During CY 2009, three cases involving allegations of discrimination were resolved 

using post-investigation ADR. This reflects an increase from the number of 

discrimination cases processed in CY2008. On December 22, 2009, a confirmatory 

order (effective immediately) was issued to confirm commitments made as result of an 

ADR session, held on December 4, 2009, between the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA) and the NRC. On August 13, 2009, a confirmatory order (effective immediately) 

was issued as part of a settlement agreement between the United States Enrichment 

Corporation and the NRC based on a Department of Labor Administrative Review 

Board’s Final Decision and Order. See Appendix C for additional details. 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise where a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a technical specification or other license condition would involve an unnecessary 

plant transient or performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is 

inappropriate for the specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff 

may choose not to enforce the applicable requirement(s). The staff exercises this 

enforcement discretion, designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED), only 

if it is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting the public health and 

safety. The staff may also issue NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other 

natural phenomena, when it determines that exercising this discretion will not 

compromise safety. NOEDs require justification from a licensee or certificate holder 

that documents the safety basis for the request and provides whatever other 

information the staff deems necessary to issue an NOED. The NRC issued one 

NOED during CY 2009 to Dominion Energy Kewaunee. Appendix F to this report 

includes a brief description of the NOED. 
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V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions 

After considering the general tenets of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, the examples 

provided in the Policy supplements, and the safety significance of a violation and its 

surrounding circumstances, the staff may exercise judgment in determining the 

severity levels of violations and discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement 

sanctions to be taken. In exercising discretion, the NRC may either escalate or 

mitigate the enforcement sanctions to ensure that the resulting enforcement action 

considers all the relevant circumstances of the particular case reflects the significance 

of the case and is in the public interest. 

In CY 2009, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in eight cases to address 

violations of NRC requirements. These cases involved use of discretion in accordance 

with interim enforcement policy guidance or in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy. In each case, the staff determined that the facts supported 

issuance of a close-out letter to the licensee in lieu of an NOV. 

The staff applied enforcement discretion for seven cases in accordance with the 

“Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire 

Protection Issues.” The interim Enforcement Policy grants enforcement discretion for 

noncompliant fire protection issues which are identified as a result of a licensee 

transitioning to the Nation Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) 

included in paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 50.48. In order for a licensee to receive this 

discretion, they must meet the criteria as stated in the interim Enforcement Policy. If 

the noncompliance does not meet the criteria, the staff will disposition the 

noncompliance in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. 

The staff exercised enforcement discretion in one additional case of interest. A letter 

was issued on August 6, 2009, to Holtec International (Holtec) which indicated that the 

NRC used enforcement discretion pursuant to Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement 

Policy to not issue a Notice of Violation for a severity level IV violation identified during 

an in-office review concerning a change to the Holtec Final Safety Analysis Report for 

Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1014. Specifically, the licensee improperly used 10 

CFR 72.48 and eliminated a post-manufacture helium leak rate test of a Holtec MultiPurpose Canister (MPC) which is part of the HI-STORM 100 cask storage system. 

The staff evaluated the potential consequence of this failure and characterized the 

action as having low safety significance to public health and safety. The staff decided 

to use discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy in this 

case because: (1) the requirement lacked clarity; (2) the violation had low safety 

significance; and (3) Holtec’s overall good enforcement history. 

VI. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s 

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees 

may provide clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, 

and this may affect the finding of a noncompliance. During CY 2009, the agency did 

not withdraw any escalated enforcement action. 
OE Annual Report

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In addition, OE has established a metric as an indication of enforcement action quality 

based on the number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. 

The goal is less than 30 withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar 

year. This metric does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of 

supplemental information that was not available to an inspector before the assessment 

of an enforcement sanction. During CY 2009, the agency issued approximately 1000 

nonescalated enforcement actions to reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. Of 

these actions, 17 nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. In CY 2009, the 

NRC withdrew only 2 of these disputed actions. 

VII. Significant Enforcement Actions 

During CY 2009, the agency was involved with several significant enforcement actions 

that required coordination among internal and external stakeholders beyond the typical 

enforcement case. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station) 

On January 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving inattentive 

security officers at Exelon’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. An investigation 

conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations determined that multiple security 

officers at Peach Bottom were deliberately inattentive on multiple occasions. In 

addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report observations of 

inattentiveness to their supervision, as required. These security officers put Exelon in 

violation of 10 CFR 73.55, which requires armed responders to maintain continuous 

communication with each alarm station and be available to immediately respond to 

threats, and Peach Bottom License Condition 2.C(3), which requires, in part, reporting 

of aberrant behaviour. Exelon paid the civil penalty on January 14, 2009. Because 

the actions of the security officers were deliberate, the NRC issued a Severity Level III 

Notice of Violation to Wackenhut Nuclear Services, the company formerly providing 

contract security services to Exelon at Peach Bottom, for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5, 

which prohibits any contractor of a licensee from engaging in deliberate misconduct 

that causes a licensee to be in violation of any NRC regulation or condition of a license 

issued by the Commission. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, because 

of their low level in the organization and actions taken by Exelon, the individuals 

involved in this case were not subject to an NRC enforcement action. 

Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. 

Based on an investigation completed by the NRC Office of Investigations, the NRC 

Staff determined that Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. (ETI) failed to have a 

pre-arranged plan with a local law enforcement agency for assistance in response to 

an actual or attempted theft or sabotage of radioactive material or devices containing 

radioactive material, contrary to NRC Order Imposing Increased Controls, EA-05-090, 

Attachment B, dated November 14, 2005. On February 10, 2009, the NRC Staff 

issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty of $13,000 to 

ETI. On the same day, the NRC Staff issued Orders (Effective Immediately) 

Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities for a period of one year to the 
OE Annual Report

 12 

President and then Vice President of ETI. The NRC Staff contended that ETI 

submitted information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate in all material 

respects and that the President and then Vice President of ETI violated 10 CFR 30.10. 

The licensee did not agree with the NRC Staff’s characterization of the issues and the 

President and then Vice President denied that they violated 10 CFR 30.10 and denied 

that statements made to NRC officials were incomplete, false, misleading, or material. 

At the request of ETI and its officers, the staff engaged in the Alternate Dispute 

Resolution Process for the licensee and both individuals. However, an agreement was 

not reached. On May 8, 2009, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) granted 

the licensee’s request for a hearing to resolve the issue. On July 16, 2009, the ASLB 

approved a Settlement Agreement negotiated by the NRC Staff and the licensee and 

issued a Board Order stipulating a number of agreed-to actions. The complete Board 

Order can be viewed from the NRC’s Agency-Wide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) at ML091970597. The Order stipulates, in part, that 

the licensee pay a $4,500 civil penalty, the parties agree to disagree on the NRC 

Staff’s conclusions, the President would not work with NRC licensed material before 

August 10, 2009,and the then Vice President would not work with NRC licensed 

material until February 10, 2010. The NRC incorporated the Board Order into ETI’s 

license so that jurisdiction of the Board Order transferred to the State of New Jersey 

(Department of Environmental Protection) which acquired regulatory authority over the 

licensee as an Agreement State pursuant to paragraph 274b of the Atomic Energy Act 

S & M Testing Laboratory

On March 23, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty 

(Notice) in the amount of $16,250 was issued to S&M Testing Laboratory (S&M 

Testing). The action was based on three separate violations involving inadequate and 

improper storage of gauges containing licensed radioactive material and the licensee’s 

failure to respond to repeated attempts by the NRC to discuss the status of licensed 

activities. In addition, the NRC Staff issued an Order prohibiting the S&M Testing 

President/Radiation Safety Officer from participating in NRC licensed activities for 5 

years. This action was based on the individual’s deliberate failure to confine 

possession of NRC-licensed material to locations authorized on the NRC license and 

to provide the NRC an opportunity to inspect the materials, activities, and facilities to 

verify security of licensed material in S&M Testing’s possession. The President/RSO 

was uncooperative and refused to provide the NRC information regarding the licensed 

gauges including their location and conditions of storage. The individual also failed to 

respond to repeated contact attempts by the NRC. The NRC OI, with assistance from 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, successfully located and met with the 

President/RSO, at which time the individual acknowledged receiving and not 

responding to NRC letters and telephone calls. The NRC Staff eventually located the 

licensed material and had it moved to a storage facility with proper controls and then 

appropriately disposed. After the President/RSO failed to respond to either the Notice 

or Order, the NRC staff determined that the proposed penalties for the violations 

designated in the Notice should be imposed. Accordingly, an Order Imposing the Civil 

Monetary Penalty in the amount of $16,250 was issued on June 08, 2009. This action 

required extensive interaction between Region I, OE, OI, FSME, Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer (OCFO), and OGC within the NRC and with the FBI and the 

Department of Treasury. 
OE Annual Report

13

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry Alleged Discrimination Cases 

On January 6, 2009, OI completed an investigation of alleged discrimination at the 

TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant involving the termination of a contract employee from 

the Unit 1 Restart Project in 2005 after he raised a safety concern to site management. 

On July 31, 2009, OI completed an investigation of a similar alleged discrimination 

case at Browns Ferry involving an adverse employee action against a TVA employee 

in early 2008 after he raised a safety concern to management regarding the site’s 

Fitness for Duty program. Although these two investigations resulted in separate OI 

reports which substantiated separate apparent violations of 10CFR50.7, a single 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session was held in the interest of 

efficiency and to take advantage of the expected similar corrective actions. On 

December 4, 2009, an ADR mediation session was held between NRC and TVA 

management where an agreement was reached. On December 22, 2009, a 

Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to the TVA to confirm 

commitments made as a result of the ADR mediation session. This action involved 

timely and extensive coordination between OI, OGC, and OE within the NRC and TVA 

and the Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University. As a result of this 

single ADR session, the licensee agreed to significant improvements to its safety 

culture programs at all its operating nuclear facilities and at its nuclear construction 

site. 

VIII. Hearing Activities 

A. Davis Besse 

 

During CY 2009, two hearings came to a closure that were pending before the Atomic 

Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) relating to enforcement actions against two former 

employees at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant. 

In the first case, the NRC issued an order on April 21, 2005, against Mr. Andrew 

Siemaszko, a former system engineer at Davis-Besse, for deliberately providing 

inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The order prohibited him from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years from the effective date of the order. 

On April 22, 2005, Mr. Siemaszko requested a hearing before the ASLB. On 

December 31, 2006, the ASLB placed the NRC proceeding on hold because of the 

concurrent proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. 

Siemaszko in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, 

arising out of the same set of facts and circumstances. In August 2008, a Federal jury 

found Mr. Siemaszko guilty on three of five counts. Mr. Siemaszko was later 

sentenced to, among other things, 3 years of probation. On July 16, 2009, the ASLB 

issued an Order approving a settlement agreement entered into by the NRC and Mr. 

Siemaszko and dismissed the proceeding. The parties agreed that Mr. Siemaszko’s 5 

year debarment will be effective from the date of the April 21, 2005 Order, terminating 

on April 21, 2010, with all other terms of the original enforcement order remaining in 

effect. 
OE Annual Report

 14 

In the second case, the NRC issued an order on January 4, 2006, against 

Mr. David Geisen, a former Manager of Design Engineering at Davis-Besse, for 

deliberately providing inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The order 

prohibited him from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years. On 

February 23, 2006, Mr. Geisen requested a hearing before the ASLB. On 

February 1, 2007, the Commission placed the NRC proceeding on hold because of the 

concurrent proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. Geisen 

in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, arising out of 

the same set of facts and circumstances. In October 2007, a jury found Mr. Geisen 

guilty on three of five counts. Mr. Geisen was sentenced, among other things, to 3 

years of probation during which he was barred from employment in the nuclear power 

industry. Starting on December 8, 2008, a 5 day evidentiary hearing was held before 

the ASLB at the NRC Headquarters. On August 28, 2009, the ASLB issued a split 

initial decision with a majority of the Board finding that the Staff failed to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Geisen engaged in the deliberate misconduct. 

The ASLB therefore set aside the sanctions the original enforcement order, including 

the 5-year ban on his employment in the nuclear industry. On September 21, 2009, 

the NRC Staff petitioned the Commission for review of the ASLB initial decision and 

applied for a stay of the effectiveness of the ASLB’s decision to allow Mr. Geisen to 

return to work in the nuclear industry. On November 17, 2009, the Commission denied 

the Staff’s request for a stay. At the end of CY2009, the Commission had not ruled on 

the Staff’s appeal of the initial decision. On January 19, 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court 

of Appeals heard oral argument in Mr. Siemaszko and Mr. Geisen’s appeals from their 

convictions in the district court. 

B. Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. 

On May 8, 2009, the ASLB granted a request by the President, Himat Soni, and Vice 

President, Dhiraj Soni, of Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. (ETI) for a hearing to 

resolve issues identified during an NRC investigation. On July 16, 2009, the ASLB 

approved a settlement negotiated by NRC staff and ETI. Pursuant to the Settlement 

Agreement: (1) the company paid a $4,500 civil penalty; and, (2) the NRC and ETI 

agreed to disagree about the violations identified by the NRC staff. ETI also agreed to 

develop and implement an annual training program that explains specific requirements 

to employees who use licensed materials and to contract with a consultant to evaluate 

the effectiveness of the company’s security and radiation safety program prior to taking 

custody of NRC licensed materials in the future. Additionally, the company agreed 

that it would not possess licensed nuclear materials in New Jersey before November 

10, 2009. Company President, Himat Soni, agreed not to work with NRC licensed 

material before August 10, 2009. The Vice President, Dhiraj Soni, has since left the 

company and agreed not to work with NRC licensed material for a year. The complete 

ASLB Order can be viewed from the NRC’s Agency-Wide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) at ML091970597. For more information see the write 

up in Section VII of this report about ETI. 
OE Annual Report

15

IX. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

The term ''Post-Investigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after the NRC Office 

of Investigations (OI) has completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has 

concluded that pursuit of an enforcement action appears to be warranted. Under the 

NRC’s Post-Investigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three points in 

the enforcement process for discrimination and other wrongdoing cases: (1) before a 

predecisional enforcement conference; (2) when an NOV is issued; or (3) when cases 

result in the issuance of an order imposing a civil penalty. Mediation is an informal 

and voluntary process in which a neutral mediator with no decision making authority 

assists the parties in reaching an agreement or resolving any differences regarding 

their dispute. The staff believes for certain escalated enforcement actions mediation 

affords the parties the opportunity to gain broader or more comprehensive corrective 

actions than those typically achieved through the traditional enforcement process. 

During CY 2009, OE issued 24 confirmatory orders documenting settlement 

agreements (4 reactor licensee cases, 13 materials licensee cases and 7 individual 

cases). Of the 24 cases, all but one was negotiated before a predecisional 

enforcement conference was held. The one exception was negotiated after issuance 

of the NOV and proposed civil penalty. 

The number of confirmatory orders arising out of Post-Investigation ADR process has 

been gradually increasing with a spike in CY 2009. The increase in CY 2009 is 

primarily due to a greater than usual number of individual and materials licensee 

cases. 

Confirmatory Orders Issued 

CY 2005 - 2009

0

5

10

15

20

25

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009

Figure 5: Confirmatory Order Trends 
OE Annual Report

 16 

X. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance 

Memoranda 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document and is revised to reflect regulatory 

changes, experience, and stakeholder input. On January 25, 2007, the NRC 

published a notice in the Federal Register (72 FR 3429) announcing that the agency 

was undertaking a major revision of its Enforcement Policy, including a revision to the 

violation examples contained in the Policy. Notices published in the Federal Register

on September 15, 2008, (73 FR 53286) and October 16, 2008, (73 FR 61442) 

announced that a draft of the proposed major revision to the Enforcement Policy was 

available and that the NRC was soliciting written comments from interested parties. 

The public comment period ended on November 14, 2008. 

During the 2008 public comment period the NRC staff received a wide range of 

comments on the proposed revised Policy from external stakeholders. The staff 

subsequently spent considerable time reviewing all the comments and, as a result, 

incorporated numerous changes throughout the revised Policy. A summary of the 

comments and the NRC’s responses was made available at NRC’s Electronic Reading 

Room and via ADAMS (ML091830260). In mid-2009, the staff also made publicly 

available a preliminary final draft of the proposed revised Policy. This draft reflected 

changes the staff made to the proposed revised Policy as a result of comments 

received during the 2008 public comment period. The preliminary draft of the revised 

Policy was made available at NRC’s Electronic Reading Room and via ADAMS 

(ML092240160). 

Based on comments received during the 2008 comment period, the staff substantially 

revised the violation examples contained in the proposed revised Policy. Because of 

the numerous changes the staff made to violation examples, an additional opportunity 

for public comments on just the violation examples was deemed appropriate. Thus, on 

June 8, 2009, NRC published a notice of availability of draft and request for comments 

regarding the violation examples in the proposed revised Policy (74 FR 27191). The 

public comments on the revised violation examples and NRC responses to those 

comments were made available at NRC’s Electronic Reading Room and via ADAMS 

(ML092650309). 

In late 2009, the staff made publicly available the latest draft of the proposed revised 

Enforcement Policy. This draft reflected changes the staff had made to the proposed 

revised Policy as a result of comments received on the revised violation examples, as 

well as other edits made since the previous draft was made publicly available earlier in 

2009. The draft revised Policy was made available at NRC’s Electronic Reading 

Room and in ADAMS (ML093430119). 

In late December 2009, the proposed revised Enforcement Policy was forwarded to 

the Commission for review and approval in SECY-09-0190. 

OE issues Enforcement Guidance Memorandums (EGM) to provide guidance in the 

interpretation of specific provisions of the Enforcement Policy. A link to the full text of 

all publicly available EGMs can be found in Appendix A of the NRC Enforcement 

Manual. The office issued eight EGMs in CY 2009, which are summarized below: 
OE Annual Report

17

 January 30, 2009, EGM-09-001, "Dispositioning Violations of NRC Requirements 

for Operability of Gaseous Monitors for Reactor Coolant System Leakage 

Detection". The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for dispositioning 

violations of NRC requirements for the operability of radioactivity monitors for 

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage detection. 

 March 31, 2009, EGM-09-003, "Dispositioning Violations of NRC Requirements 

for Initial Validity and Drug Tests at Licensee Testing Facilities". The purpose of 

this EGM is to provide guidance for dispositioning violations of U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements for quality control (QC) specimens 

associated with performing initial drug and validity tests at licensee testing 

facilities (LTFs). 

 May 13, 2009, EGM-09-004, "Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring 

and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements". The 

purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for dispositioning inspection findings 

related to a licensee’s implementation of naturally occurring and acceleratorproduced radioactive materials (NARM) requirements. 

 May 15, 2009, EGM-09-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Fire Induced Circuit 

Faults". The purposes of this EGM are to describe the conditions limiting 

enforcement discretion during the resolution of fire protection concerns involving 

multiple spurious operations. Enforcement discretion is limited to 3 years from 

the date of issuance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189, Revision 2: (1) 6 months 

following the issuance of RG 1.189, Revision 2, for licensees to identify 

noncompliances related to multiple fire induced circuit faults, place the 

noncompliances into their corrective action program and implement 

compensatory measures for the noncompliances and (2) 3 years following the 

issuance of RG 1.189, Revision 2, for licensees to complete the corrective 

actions associated with noncompliant multiple fire induced circuit faults. This 

EGM supersedes EGM 98-002 Revision 2 (ML003710123). 

 July 31, 2009, EGM-09-007, "Dispositioning Violations of National Source 

Tracking System (NSTS) Requirements". The purpose of this EGM is to provide 

guidance for dispositioning inspection findings related to a licensee’s 

implementation of national source tracking system (NSTS) requirements. 

 August 28, 2009, EGM-09-007 (rev 1), “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 

Violations of National Source Tracking System (NSTS) Requirements”. This 

revision corrected an inaccurate violation example. 

 September 15, 2009, EGM-09-006, “Enforcement Discretion for Violations of 10 

CFR Part 72, Subpart K, regarding Implementation of Certificate of Compliance 

Amendments to previously loaded Spent Fuel Storage Casks". The purpose of 

this EGM is to provide interim guidance for the disposition of apparent violations 

of 10 CFR Part 72 general licensees, for any casks loaded with spent nuclear 

fuel, comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications of the certificate of 

compliance under which that cask was loaded. 
OE Annual Report

 18 

 September 24, 2009, EGM-09-008, “Dispositioning Violations of NRC 

Requirements for Work Hour Controls Before and Immediately After a Hurricane 

Emergency Declaration”. The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for 

the disposition of violations of work hour control regulations during conditions 

before and immediately after the declaration of an emergency for a hurricane, 

when licensees sequester plant staff on site to ensure personnel are available for 

relief of duties. 

XI. Ongoing Activities 

A. Safety Culture 

 

In CY 2009, OE continued to be the lead office for the agency’s external safety culture 

policy development. On November 6, 2009, the NRC published a draft policy 

statement on safety culture for public comment that will update and expand an earlier 

policy statement that was focused on safety in control rooms and throughout nuclear 

power reactor facilities. The agency’s goal in this recent initiative is to develop an 

overarching statement that is more inclusive of the full range of the NRC’s licensed 

activities, and better able to address security issues. Because safety culture is an 

indicator of licensee performance and has a bearing on public safety, the NRC has a 

responsibility to consider safety culture as part of its oversight responsibilities. 

In SECY-09-0075 (May 18, 2009), OE provided this policy statement to the 

Commission. In the SRM for SECY-09-0075 (October 16, 2009), the Commission 

approved publication of the draft policy statement in the Federal Register and 

instructed the staff to (1) consider making it applicable to vendors and suppliers of 

safety-related components; (2) engage stakeholders, especially the Agreement States 

and materials users, to ensure that the final policy statement benefits from 

consideration of a spectrum of views and provides the necessary foundation for safety 

culture applicable to the entire nuclear industry; and (3) to consider the use of common 

terminology. The draft policy statement was published for public comments in the 

Federal Register (November 6, 2009) for a 90-day period. The comment period was 

extended to March 1, 2010, based on the comments of stakeholders who were part of 

an external steering committee that OE established to provide logistical input for an 

NRC 3 day workshop conducted in early February 2010. 

OE continues to chair the agency’s internal Safety Culture Working Group (SCWG), 

and provides assistance and guidance to other NRC offices on safety culture 

developmental activities. This assistance includes efforts in the fuel facility, new 

reactor construction, and security areas. OE also participates as the vice-chair of the 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation’s Safety Culture Focus Team (SCFT). The 

purpose of the SCFT is to promote the implementation of the ROP safety culture 

changes effectively and consistently across the regions. The Agency Allegation 

Advisor, located in OE, chairs the SCFT’s subgroup, the Safety-Conscious Work 

Environment Findings Review Group, whose purpose is to ensure regulatory 

consistency by reviewing and handling all potential inspection findings in the safetyconscious work environment cross-cutting area of the ROP. 
OE Annual Report

19

B. Knowledge Management 

In CY 2009, OE engaged in several knowledge management activities. Some of the 

ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate knowledge base include 

supporting training, completing reviews and self assessments, developing internal 

office procedures, and conducting counterpart meetings. 

Training 

OE supported several Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program members 

on rotational assignments to the office. The knowledge gained by those staff 

members will provide a better understanding of the enforcement program in the field. 

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff provided outreach training to internal 

stakeholders on the allegation, enforcement, and ADR processes during counterpart 

meetings and other office training sessions. One example included training for the 

vendor inspection teams on the writing of notices of violation and notices of 

nonconformance. 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

During 2009, OE completed four self assessments related to implementation of the 

enforcement program. On February 25, 2009, an assessment was issued related to 

the posting of web summaries. An assessment of the staff’s consistency in placing 

enforcement related documents in ADAMS was completed on May 11, 2009. The 

use of Form 591, “Safety Inspection Report and Compliance Record” was reviewed 

during the third quarter of 2009, and issued on September 30, 2009. Finally, an 

assessment of the staff’s use of EATS was completed during the fourth quarter and 

issued on January 20, 2010. In general, these assessments identified that the 

specific aspects of the enforcement program reviewed were being implemented 

satisfactorily; however, improvements could be made to guidance documents to help 

ensure a high level of quality. Improvement of these specific guidance documents, 

as well as others, was an ongoing effort during the year. 

Development of Office Specific Procedures 

OE began developing numerous procedures providing guidance on accomplishing 

specific tasks unique to headquarters enforcement staff. Many of the procedures 

had been accomplished by on-the-job training and experience. Procedures on 

developing EGM, writing and issuing enforcement notifications, preparation and 

approval of enforcement case web summaries, and the use of civil penalty 

acknowledgement letters are examples of the instructions developed during the year. 

Enforcement Counterpart Meetings 

In June 2009, regional and headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart 

meeting to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and communications 

among staff. The meeting resulted in a number of ideas that are improving the 

handling of casework. 
OE Annual Report

 20 

XII. Regional Accomplishments 

During CY 2009, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of 

the enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance 

of both nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders, such as OI. 

These assessments included the following reviews:

 reactor and materials program nonescalated enforcement actions 

 regional instructions compared to guidance in the Enforcement Policy, 

Enforcement Manual, Management Directives, and Inspection Procedures 

 enforcement related matters in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing 

the Enforcement Program. However, the reviews did identify the need for enforcement 

guidance and instructions to be updated 
OE Annual Report

21

Table 3: CY 2009 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by 

Region and Program Office

 

Program 

Office 

Civil 

Penalties 

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty

Orders 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

TOTAL 

Region I 6 1 6 26 39 

Region II 1 0 13 17 31 

Region III 5 2 6 27 40 

Region IV 5 0 3 8 16 

NRR 0 0 0 0 0 

NMSS 0 0 0 0 0 

FSME 0 0 0 0 0 

OE 0 0 0 0 0 

TOTAL 17 3 28 78 126 
OE Annual Report

 22 

Table 4: CY 2009 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

Licensee, Non-licensee, or Individual

Type of Licensee Civil Penalty

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty

Orders 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

TOTAL 

Operating Reactor 1 0 4 22 27 

Gauge User 6 1 3 13 23 

Radiographer 7 1 2 8 18 

Fuel Facility 1 0 8 6 15 

Hospital 2 1 0 8 11 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 0 0 5 2 7 

Irradiator 0 0 0 4 4 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Fuel Facility ) 

0 0 2 2 4 

Licensed Individual 

(Reactor) 0 0 1 3 4 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 0 0 3 1 4 

Non-licensee 0 0 0 2 2 

Materials Distributor 0 0 0 1 1 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 1 1 

Academic 0 0 0 1 1 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 1 1 

Research Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Physician 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Well Logger 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 0 0 0 3 3 

TOTAL 17 3 27 78 126 
OE Annual Report

A1

Appendix A: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties* 

Civil Penalties Issued To Reactor Licensees

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-08-298 

Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant 

On January 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $65,000 was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a Severity Level III 

problem involving a violation of 10 CFR 73.55 and Peach Bottom License Condition 2.C(3) 

at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Specifically, an investigation conducted by the 

NRC determined that multiple security officers at Peach Bottom were deliberately inattentive 

on multiple occasions. In addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report 

observations of inattentiveness to their supervision. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Material Licensees

Cal Testing Services, Inc. EA-08-286 

Griffith, IN

On January 5, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $6,500 was issued to Cal Testing Services, Inc., for a Severity Level III violation 

of License Condition 20. Specifically, the licensee failed to connect the control cable to the 

source assembly before cranking the source out of the radiographic exposure device, as 

required by the licensee’s procedures, resulting in a disconnected source event. 

S&M Testing Laboratory EA-08-332 

Caguas, Puerto Rico 

On March 23, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $16,250 was issued to S&M Testing Laboratory for three Severity Level III 

violations. The first violation involved a deliberate failure to confine possession of byproduct 

material to only those locations authorized by the NRC license. Specifically from May 1, 

2007, through September 23, 2008, S&M Testing stored portable gauges at a location in 

Gurabo, Puerto Rico (PR) which was not an authorized storage location on the license. The 

second violation involved a deliberate failure to provide the NRC an opportunity to inspect 

byproduct material and the premises where the byproduct material was stored, as required 

by 10 CFR 30.52(a). Specifically, from May 1, 2007 through August 6, 2008, S&M Testing 

failed to respond to NRC letters and telephone calls that requested information regarding its 

licensed activities and storage of licensed material. The third violation involved a failure to 

utilize a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure 

portable gauges from unauthorized removal whenever the gauges were not under the 

control and constant surveillance of the licensee, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). 

Specifically, between May 1, 2007, and September 23, 2008, the portable gauges were 

stored in locked metal boxes located in an unrestricted area, but the keys to the boxes were 

left in another unrestricted area and during this period the gauges were not under the control 

and constant surveillance of S&M Testing. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

A2 

Sabia, Inc. EA-08-237 

San Diego, CA 

On January 29, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$13,000 was issued to Sabia, Inc. for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 20.1101. 

Specifically, between February 25 and 29, 2008, the licensee conducted gauge 

dismantlement activities and failed to develop, document, and implement a radiation 

protection program commensurate with the scope and extent of this licensed activity. This 

failure created a substantial potential for exposures or releases in excess of the applicable 

NRC regulatory limits when its activities resulted in contamination of its workers and the 

facility. In addition, the licensee failed to have a radiation protection program for the gauge 

dismantlement activities that was sufficient to ensure that occupational doses were as low 

as is reasonably achievable (ALARA), resulting in worker doses that were not ALARA. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Westinghouse Electric Company - Hematite Decommissioning Project EA-09-084 

Festus, MO 

On October 23, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil 

Penalty in the amount of $16,250 to Westinghouse Electric Company - Hematite 

Decommissioning Project for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to implement 

10 CFR 70.24 (a) requirements. Specifically, in March 2006, the licensee failed to maintain 

a criticality accident monitoring system which will energize clearly audible alarm signals 

when it removed the system from service without prior NRC authorization. In addition, the 

Notice of Violation included a second Severity Level III violation for which a civil penalty was 

not proposed, involving the failure to implement 10 CFR 70.9 (a) requirements. Specifically, 

on March 17, 2006, the licensee provided inaccurate information to the Commission when it 

informed the NRC that the Process buildings contained less than 250 grams of uranium235, when in fact, as later determined in November 2008, the Process buildings contained 

an estimated 2,638 grams of uranium-235. This information was material to the NRC since 

it was used in part as the basis for granting a license amendment on June 30, 2006, revising 

the possession limits such that the criticality monitoring system could be disabled. 
OE Annual Report

B1 

Appendix B: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Notices Issued To Reactor Licensees

Carolina Power & Light Co EA-09-121 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

On September 14, 2009, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Carolina Power & Light 

Company for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control” 

associated with a White Significance Determination Process Finding at Brunswick. Specifically, 

the licensee failed to correctly replace control relays on all four emergency diesel generators 

(EDGs) because the termination points for linking control power to the EDG lockout relay reset 

circuitry were incorrectly designated, such that the EDGs could not be operated locally. 

Constellation Generation Group, LLC EA-08-351 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant 

On April 3, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Constellation Energy for a violation of 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, associated with a White Significance 

Determination Process finding at Calvert Cliffs. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain its 

Emergency Plans since an emergency action level table used by operators to assess the 

functionality of the containment barrier during an accident contained an inaccurate threshold for 

identifying a potential loss of the containment barrier. This error could have adversely impacted 

the licensee’s ability to accurately classify an emergency condition. 

Constellation Energy EA-09-045 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Plant 

On June 8, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Constellation Energy for a violation of 

Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, “Procedures,” associated with a White Significance 

Determination Process Finding at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. Specifically, in March 

2008, the licensee did not implement steps for cleaning and lubricating the turbine-driven 

auxiliary feedwater pump’s governor linkage assembly, as required. Failure to conduct this 

preventative maintenance led to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump being declared 

inoperable when the governor linkage became stuck, preventing the pump from obtaining the 

required discharge pressure and flow during surveillance testing in December 2008. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

B2 

Constellation Energy EA-09-249 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Plant 

On November 12, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Constellation Energy for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” associated with a 

White Significance Determination Process finding at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power 

Plant. Specifically, after identifying corrosion on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater 

pump governor control valve stem on April 11, 2005, the licensee did not take adequate 

measures to identify the cause or prevent recurrence of the significant condition adverse 

to quality. This led to additional corrosion and binding of the governor control valve, and 

resulted in failure of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on July 2, 2009. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-08-322 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

On January 30, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 

associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at Palisades. 

Specifically, the violation involved the failure to evaluate radiological hazards and assess 

dose to workers that handled tools used for reconstituting failed fuel during work on the 

refueling floor in October 2007, to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits of 

10 CFR 20.1201. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-09-172 

Dresden Nuclear Plant 

On October 22, 2009, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Exelon Generation 

Company, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.54(j) associated with a White 

Significance Determination finding at Dresden Unit 3. Specifically, on November 3, 

2008, during a maintenance outage, non-licensed operators manipulated the control rod 

drive system and moved three control rods without the knowledge and consent of a 

licensed operator present at the controls. 

Florida Power and Light Energy EA-09-083 

Duane Arnold Nuclear Plant 

On June 6, 2009 a Notice of Violation was issued to Florida Power and Light Energy for 

a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” 

associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at Duane Arnold. 

Specifically, when spurious overspeed trip alarms recurred in June 2008, the licensee 

did not perform any additional evaluation to identify the cause for the new condition 

adverse to quality and did not correct the recurring spurious overspeed trip alarms. This 

allowed the overspeed switch degradation to continue, resulting in the failure of the B 

emergency diesel generator during the monthly surveillance test conducted in November 

2008. 
 

OE Annual Report

B3 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC EA-09-145 

Seabrook Power Station 

On November 12, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to NextEra Energy for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” associated with a 

White Significance Determination Process finding at Seabrook. Specifically, a design 

change to a flange on a jacket water cooling line to the B emergency diesel generator 

turbocharger did not (1) control welding stresses, verify flange alignment, or evaluate 

vibration effects, (2) address suitability of gasket material, or (3) consider flange 

performance history. This resulted in failure of the flange during operation of the B 

emergency diesel generator, leading to rapid loss of jacket cooling water and 

inoperability. 

Northern States Power Company EA-09-010 

Monticello Nuclear Plant 

On May 27, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

for a Severity Level III problem involving its failure to properly implement 10 CFR 50.9, 

10 CFR 55.23, and 10 CFR 50.74 (c) at Monticello. Specifically, on September 11, 

2008, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant submitted NRC Form 396 for renewal of a 

senior reactor operator license, certifying that the individual met medical requirements, 

that contained inaccurate information regarding the individual’s medical condition and 

need for medication. As a result, the license was renewed without the appropriate 

restrictions. Also, the licensee failed to notify the NRC of a change in the individual’s 

medical condition that occurred in 2004. 

Northern States Power Company EA-08-272 

Prairie Island Nuclear Plant 

On January 27, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power 

Company for a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.5.B associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding at Prairie Island. Specifically, the licensee 

failed to adequately control the position of a normally open pressure switch block valve 

for the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The valve was inadvertently left 

closed, causing the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to fail to operate as required 

following a July 31, 2008, Unit 1 reactor trip. The pump was subsequently determined to 

have been inoperable for 138 days, a time period that significantly exceeded that 

allowed by the Technical Specifications. 

Northern States Power Company EA-08-349 

Prairie Island Nuclear Plant 

On May 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company 

for a violation of 49 CFR 173.441(a) and 49 CFR 172.704 associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding at Prairie Island. Specifically, on October 31, 

2008, a shipment of radioactive material sent from Prairie Island to a Westinghouse 

facility in Pennsylvania was found to have a dose rate on an external surface in excess 

of 200 mrem per hour and a subsequent inspection identified that a number of the 

personnel involved in preparing this shipment had not been properly trained. 
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Northern States Power Company EA-09-167 

Prairie Island Nuclear Plant 

On September 3, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power 

Company for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” 

associated with a White Significance Determination Process at Prairie Island. 

Specifically, the licensee failed to implement design control measures to ensure that the 

design basis for the component cooling water system was correctly translated into 

specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions such that the safety-related 

function of the component cooling water system was maintained following a high energy 

line break, seismic, or tornado events affecting the turbine building. 

Northern States Power Company EA-09-193 

Prairie Island Nuclear Plant 

On October 27, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power 

Company for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to properly implement 

10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 55.23 at Prairie Island. Specifically, on May 11, 2007, the 

licensee failed to report a medical condition of a senior reactor operator (SRO) on a 

license renewal form. This resulted in the NRC renewing the SRO’s license without a 

restriction for the medical condition. 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC EA-09-012 

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 

On June 26, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, for 

a Severity Level III problem involving the failure to implement 10 CFR 50.74(c), 10 CFR 

50.9, and 10 CFR 55.23 at Point Beach. Specifically, an individual that initially had been 

issued a reactor operator license in August 1999 was not medically qualified at the time 

because he was under treatment for hypertension and the licensee failed to inform the 

NRC of such, even though Point Beach staff were aware of the medical condition. In 

October 2008, the licensee informed the NRC of the individual’s condition. The medical 

condition was material to the NRC since the individual’s license and subsequent 

renewed license should have reflected the need for a license condition to ensure that the 

hypertension was properly treated. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-09-054 

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 

On June 9, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating 

Company, Inc., for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective 

Actions” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at the 

Hatch plant. Specifically, since 1988 the licensee had observed cracks in the glands of 

the emergency diesel generator couplings, but did not recognize the cracking was an 

indication of coupling deterioration. This fact was not documented during routine 

maintenance inspections, therefore there was no condition report written to identify and 

correct the condition. Consequently, the 1B emergency diesel generator coupling 

developed higher than normal vibration on July 12, 2008, during a routine surveillance 

test and was declared inoperable. 
 

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Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-09-103 

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 

On July 10, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating 

Company, Inc., for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b) associated with 

a White Significance Determination Process finding at the Farley plant. Specifically, in 

January 2008, the licensee identified that approximately 109 tone alert radios had not 

been provided to residences that were within the 10 mile emergency planning zone 

(EPZ) of Farley Nuclear Plant. The licensee’s subsequent review identified additional 

residences within the 10 mile EPZ which were required to have tone alert radios in 

accordance with the Farley emergency plan, but had not been provided such. 

Notices Issued To Material Licensees

Advex Corporation EA-09-030 

Hampton, VA 

On July 2, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations to 

Advex Corporation. The first violation involved the failure to wear an alarming ratemeter 

while performing radiography by an assistant radiographer, as required by License 

Condition 19. Specifically, on January 22, 2008, an assistant radiographer worked in a 

restricted area (permanent radiography vault) and did not wear an alarm ratemeter. The 

second violation involved the deliberate failure of the lead radiographer and the assistant 

radiographer to follow the Operating & Emergency (O&E) Procedure and 10 CFR 

34.47(d) requirements, when the assistant radiographer had an off-scale pocket 

dosimeter. Specifically, on January 22, 2008, neither individual notified the Radiation 

Safety Officer after the radiographers realized the assistant radiographer’s dosimeter 

was off-scale. The assistant did not remove himself from the restricted area and he was 

allowed to continue working with and around radioactive material although he was not 

authorized to return to work, as required by the O&E procedure and 10 CFR 34.47(d). 

Cardinal Health EA-09-221 

Dublin, OH 

On December 30, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Cardinal Health for a 

Severity Level III violation involving the failure to implement License Condition 24. 

Specifically, on several occasions between January and May 17, 2007, a licensee 

employee responsible for dispensing radioactive sources deliberately failed to wear 

finger dosimetry while compounding iodine-131 doses. 

Huntington Testing & Technology, Inc. EA-08-303 

Huntington, WV 

On January 22, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem. 

The violations involved the failure to comply with a license condition and to provide event 

notification as required, in a timely manner. Specifically, on August 20, 2008, the 

licensee had an event where a radiography camera was disabled and failed to function 

as designed. The lead radiographer and the field Radiation Safety Officer conducted 

source retrieval activities and returned the source to its original shielded position even 
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though they were not trained or authorized by the NRC license. In addition, the licensee 

did not notify the NRC until September 3, 2008, two weeks after this event. 

Mercy Health Services. EA-09-181 

Ann Arbor, MI 

On September 15, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Mercy Health Services for a 

Severity Level III problem involving the failure to implement 10 CFR 20.1501 and 

10 CFR 20.2003. Specifically, in May 2008, the licensee disposed of iodine-125 into the 

sanitary sewer system without evaluating the radioactivity of the iodine waste or 

evaluating the average monthly volume of water released into the sewer system. The 

licensee released 2.29E-5 microcurie per milliliter of iodine-125 into the sewer which 

exceeded the regulatory limit of 2E-5 microcurie per milliliter. 

Ohio Valley Medical Center EA-09-182 

Wheeling, WV 

On September 17, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Ohio Valley Medical Center 

for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to implement 10 CFR 35.615(f)(2) 

during high dose radiation (HDR) treatments. Specifically, on June 17, 2009 and other 

occasions prior to that date, neither an authorized user (AU), nor a physician under the 

supervision of an AU and trained in the operation and emergency response for the unit, 

were physically present during continuation of HDR treatments. 

St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital EA-08-329 

Madison Heights, MI 

On February 18, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to St. John Macomb-Oakland 

Hospital for a Severity Level III violation involving a failure to implement License 

Condition 11.B which authorized only a specifically named individual to fulfill the 

responsibilities of the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for brachytherapy activities. 

Specifically, as of November 2007, the authorized individual was no longer employed by 

the consulting firm retained by the licensee and did not fulfill the RSO responsibilities. 

The licensee failed to appoint a new RSO following the previous RSO's departure from 

the consulting firm. 

Virtua Health System-West Orange Hospital EA-09-212 

Voorhees, NJ 

On October 21, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Virtua Health System - West 

Jersey Hospital (Virtua) for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to implement 

10 CFR 35.41(a)(2). Specifically, during patient setup on January 19, 2009, Virtua staff 

raised questions concerning the visualization and positioning of seeds in the prostate 

and there were no procedures to ensure resolution of the questions. As a result, all 

seeds were implanted outside the prostate. 
 

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. EA-09-187 

Bentonville, AR 

On October 28, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Wal-Mart, Inc. (Wal-Mart) for a 

Severity Level III problem involving the failure to: (1) appoint an individual responsible for 

having knowledge of appropriate regulations and requirements to comply with the 

general license; (2) properly transfer and dispose of generally licensed devices; and (3) 

transfer generally licensed devices to another general licensee only if the devices remain 

in use at a particular location. Specifically, between October 2000 and January 2008, 

Wal-Mart did not appoint a responsible individual to manage its general license program 

relative to tritium exit signs, improperly transferred or disposed of up to 2,462 tritium exit 

signs, and also transferred 517 tritium exit signs from various Wal-Mart facilities to other 

Wal-Mart facilities, which were not authorized in a specific or general license. 

Notices Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Honeywell International, Inc. EA-09-074 

Metropolis, IL 

On September 2, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Honeywell International, Inc., 

for a Severity Level III problem involving failures to implement 10 CFR 20.1501(a) and 

10 CFR 40.9. Specifically, a health physics technician deliberately failed to perform 

monthly airflow measurements of 20 chemical fume hoods located throughout the 

facility, and the associated records were not complete and accurate. 

United States Enrichment Corporation - Portsmouth EA-08-330 

Piketon, OH 

On March 4, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to United States Enrichment 

Corporation for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to implement Technical 

Safety Requirement 2.1.3.14 of their license. Specifically, on September 8, 2008, the 

licensee moved a cylinder containing liquid uranium hexafluoride to a storage pad with 

mobile equipment (straddle carrier) instead of an approved crane. In this case, no 

adverse affects to the public or environment resulted from this unauthorized moved. 

 
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Appendix C: Summary of Orders* 

Orders Issued To Reactor Licensees

Exelon Generating Company, LLC EA-09-007; EA-09-059 

Peach Bottom Plant 

On December 1, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Exelon Generating Company, LLC (Exelon) to formalize commitments made as a result 

of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on September 3, 2009. The 

commitments were made by Exelon as part of a settlement agreement between Exelon 

and the NRC regarding apparent violations by a former reactor operator and a former 

maintenance supervisor. The agreement resolved the two apparent violations involving 

the deliberate failure of a former reactor operator to report an arrest in a timely manner 

and the deliberate failure of a former maintenance supervisor to provide complete and 

accurate information on a personal history questionnaire which were identified during an 

NRC investigation. Exelon agreed to take the following actions: (1) provide additional 

training on deliberate misconduct at Peach Bottom and other Exelon sites, for both 

employees and supervisors; (2) perform an assessment to verify the effectiveness of the 

deliberate misconduct training; (3) conduct training with licensed operators on the 

special obligations associated with holding an NRC license; (4) perform an assessment 

of Peach Bottom employee conduct, including trending; (5) conduct additional Exelon 

fleet-wide training on the Behavioral Observation Program, fitness for duty requirements, 

and the Employee Assistance Program; (6) submit a lessons-learned article to two 

professional organizations requesting publication in their respective newsletters; and 

(7) discuss with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations the possibility of incorporating 

training on deliberate misconduct into its supervisor and operator development 

programs. In consideration of these commitments, and other actions already completed 

by Exelon, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation 

for these violations. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-08-211 

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 

On January 5, 2009 a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session. The commitments were made by TVA 

regarding a violation of site security procedures caused by the deliberate actions of 

one contract security supervisor at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, who falsified an 

inventory form to conceal the supervisor’s failure to verify inventory as required by 

licensee procedures. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included. 
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Tennessee Valley Authority EA-09-009; EA-09-203 

Browns Ferry Plant 

On December 22, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to the 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on December 4, 2009. The 

commitments were made by TVA as part of a settlement agreement between TVA and 

the NRC regarding two apparent violations of the NRC’s employee protection regulation 

(10CFR50.7) which were identified during two separate NRC investigations at the 

Browns Ferry. The agreement resolves the two apparent violations. The NRC 

acknowledged that TVA, prior to the ADR session, had taken numerous actions which 

address the issues underlying the apparent violations. TVA agreed to take a number of 

additional actions including implementing a process to review proposed adverse 

employment actions before they are taken to ensure compliance with 10CFR50.7 and to 

ensure the action could not negatively impact the Safety Conscious Work Environment 

(SCWE); issuing a fleet-wide written communication from TVA’s executive management 

communicating TVA’s policy and management expectations regarding the employee’s 

right to raise concerns without fear of retaliation; performing two additional independent 

safety culture surveys before the end of calendar year 2013; and, modifying contractor 

in-process training and new supervisor training to improve awareness of TVA’s policy on 

SCWE. In consideration of these commitments, and the other actions already 

completed by TVA, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of 

Violation for these apparent violations. 

Orders Issued To Material Licensees

Earth Exploration, Inc. EA-09-114 

Indianapolis, IN 

On October 1, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Earth 

Exploration, Inc. to formalize commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute 

Resolution mediation session held on August 25, 2009. The commitments were made 

by Earth Exploration as part of a settlement agreement between Earth Exploration and 

the NRC regarding seven apparent violations which were identified during an NRC 

investigation. The agreement resolves the apparent violations. Earth Exploration 

agreed to a number of actions including, but not limited to, retaining a qualified 

consultant to audit the radiation safety program on an annual basis for a period of five 

years, receiving training on radiation safety program management, and developing a 

plan to inform other organizations of the lessons learned and the importance of 

developing the necessary infrastructure and communication paths to identify and resolve 

competing priorities. In consideration of these and other actions, the NRC agreed to not 

categorize the violations as deliberate and to not pursue any further enforcement action. 

Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. EA-08-174 

Thorofare, NJ 

On July 16, 2009, a Board Order was issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

to Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc. (ETI) to formalize commitments made by ETI as 

part of a settlement agreement between ETI and the NRC regarding apparent violations 

which were identified during an NRC investigation. The agreement resolves the 
 

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apparent violations. ETI agreed to take a number of actions including: (1) pay a $4,500 

civil penalty; (2) develop and implement an annual training program that explains 

specific requirements to employees who use licensed materials; (3) evaluate the 

effectiveness of the company’s security and radiation safety program prior to taking 

custody of NRC licensed materials in the future; and, (4) not possess licensed nuclear 

materials in New Jersey before November 10, 2009. In addition, the company president 

agreed not to work with NRC licensed material before August 10, 2009, and the former 

Vice President agreed not to work with NRC licensed material for a year. See Section 

VII for additional details. 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. EA-08-271 

Molt, MT 

On March 6, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (Immediately Effective) was issued to Mattingly 

Testing Services, Inc., (Mattingly) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session conducted on February 5, 2009. The 

commitments were made by Mattingly as part of a settlement agreement between 

Mattingly and NRC regarding nine apparent violations which were identified during an 

NRC investigation and inspection. The agreement resolves the apparent violations. As 

part of the agreement, Mattingly and NRC agreed to disagree regarding the number and 

nature of the violations identified during the NRC investigation and inspection. Mattingly 

also agreed to take a number of corrective actions, including: contracting an 

independent consultant to evaluate the effectiveness of its radiation safety and 

compliance programs; contracting an independent consultant to provide training to its 

personnel who engage in licensed activities; submitting a license amendment request 

updating specified procedures; and, developing and implementing a disciplinary program 

with a graded approach for infractions. In addition, Mattingly agreed to pay a civil 

penalty in the amount of $8,000. In consideration of Mattingly’s proposed actions, as 

well as those actions previously completed, the NRC agreed not to pursue any further 

enforcement action in connection with the apparent violations and will not count this 

matter as prior enforcement for the purpose of assessing potential future enforcement 

actions. 

Quality Inspection Services, Inc. EA-09-158 

Buffalo, NY 

On March 10, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Quality 

Inspection Services, Inc. (QISI) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session. The commitments were made by 

QISI as part of a settlement agreement between QISI and the NRC regarding NRC’s 

September 15, 2008, Notice of Violation and Proposed civil penalty of $6,500, for a 

willful violation of 10 CFR 34.71, involving the failure to maintain utilization logs of 

radiographic activities and three other related violations. The agreement resolves the 

apparent violations. QISI agreed to take a number of actions including revising the 

existing Operations and Emergency (O&E) Manual, adding a radiation safety component 

to an existing newsletter, developing a video recording that can be used for a 

presentation at a national industry conference, and increasing audits of the 

radiographers working areas. In consideration of QISI’s proposed extensive corrective 

actions, in addition to corrective actions already taken, the NRC agreed to reduce the 

civil penalty originally proposed to $500. 
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Schlumberger Technology Corporation EA-09-261 

Sugar land, TX 

On February 24, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Schlumberger Technology Corporation (Schlumberger) to formalize commitments made 

as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session. The commitments 

were made by Schlumberger as part of a settlement agreement between Schlumberger 

and the NRC regarding two violations which were identified during an inspection and 

investigation involving: (1) a willful failure to maintain required records complete and 

accurate as required by 10 CFR 30.9, and (2) failure to maintain control over licensed 

material as required by 10 CFR 20.1802. The agreement resolves the apparent 

violations. Schlumberger agreed to take a number of actions including: developing and 

implementing an enhanced accountability and security program for licensed materials; 

conducting additional line management reviews of the radiation safety program; and 

paying a civil penalty in the base amount of $3250. In consideration of these and other 

actions, as well as those actions previously completed, the NRC agreed not to pursue 

further enforcement action against Schlumberger for the violations. 

Orders Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

 

AREVA NP, Inc. EA-08-278 

Aiken, SC 

On July 23, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to AREVA 

NP (AREVA), to formalize commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute 

Resolution mediation session. The commitments were made by AREVA as part of a 

settlement agreement between AREVA and the NRC regarding an apparent violation 

involving deliberate misconduct by a former AREVA security officer identified during an 

NRC investigation. Specifically, on five separate occasions and without authorization or 

approval, an individual signed the name of authorizing individuals on Site Access 

Authorization - Unescorted forms, instead of obtaining the signature of an individual 

listed on the Authorization List, as required by procedure. As a result, individuals were 

granted access to the site without proper authorization. The agreement resolves the 

apparent violations. AREVA agreed to a number of corrective actions and 

enhancements related to its access authorization process, including communicating the 

underlying facts of the violation to all AREVA employees, as well as staff at other U.S. 

AREVA licensed facilities to emphasize lessons learned from this incident. In 

consideration of these corrective actions, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a 

civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation or other enforcement action for the 

apparent violation. 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. EA-08-103 

Erwin, TN 

On November 23, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on September 15, 2009. The 

commitments were made by NFS as part of a settlement agreement between NFS and 

the NRC regarding seven apparent violations, some apparently committed deliberately, 

of NRC fitness for duty (FFD) requirements related to a March 2006 incident involving a 
 

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senior executive at NFS which were identified during an NRC investigation. The 

agreement resolves the apparent violations. NFS agreed to take actions to strengthen 

the FFD program, including: (1) establishment of an oversight board for behavioral 

observation program (BOP), FFD, and other issues; (2) enhancements to the employee 

concerns program; (3) changes to the FFD training program to include a discussion of 

case studies, including this incident, and issue reporting; (4) improvements to 

procedures and processes associated with FFD and BOP; (5) improved procedural 

guidance for, and assessment of, the medical review officer; and (6) changes to the 

process for responding to NRC requests for information to ensure completeness and 

accuracy of information. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to 

refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for these apparent violations. 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. EA-08-321 

Erwin, TN 

On November 23, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on September 16, 2009. The 

commitments were made by NFS as part of a settlement agreement between NFS and 

the NRC regarding two apparent violations of NRC requirements involving a primary 

physician who apparently deliberately certified that two security officers had been given 

a hearing examination when, in fact, they had not. The agreement resolves the 

apparent violations. NFS agreed to take the following actions to preclude recurrence of 

these violations: (1) complete an assessment of why this issue was not entered into the 

corrective action program and why a root cause analysis was not completed; (2) 

complete an extent of condition review; (3) benchmark other licensee’s oversight of 

primary physicians to identify best practices; (4) ensure the primary physician 

participates in periodic meetings with a physician engaged in NRC-regulated activities to 

review issues relevant to compliance with NRC regulations; (5) ensure the primary 

physician initiates an evaluation of procedures and processes with a physician engaged 

in NRC-regulated activities; (6) establish standards for primary physicians and other 

contract medical specialists; and (7) enhance selected administrative procedures. In 

consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil 

penalty or Notice of Violation for these apparent violations. 

Shaw AREVA MOX Services EA-09-117 

Aiken, SC 

On November 24, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Shaw AREVA MOX Services (MOX Services) to formalize commitments made as a 

result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on October 8, 2009. 

The commitments were made by MOX Services as part of a settlement agreement 

between MOX Services and the NRC regarding an apparent deliberate violation of 

10 CFR 70.9, “Completeness and accuracy of information,” which was identified during 

an NRC investigation. Specifically, a senior structural engineer directed or allowed a 

junior engineer to sign the senior structural engineer’s signature on travelers, which are 

used as part of MOX Services process to signify that field drawings match design 

drawings. The agreement resolves the apparent violations. MOX Services agreed to 

take a number of corrective actions, including: (1) periodic quality assurance 

assessments and surveillances of vendor submittals, including drawings, to ensure 
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design requirements are properly implemented; (2) periodic training for all MOX Services 

project personnel, including onsite contractors, on the definition of and consequences 

associated with material false statements, as well as the obligations of the signer of 

project records; and (3) periodic safety conscious work environment surveys through the 

life of construction. In consideration of these commitments, and additional corrective 

actions previously taken by MOX Services in response to this issue, the NRC agreed to 

refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for this apparent violation. 

United States Enrichment Corporation Inc. EA-06-140 

Paducah, KY 

On August 13, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to United 

States Enrichment Corporation Inc. and its subsidiary the United States Enrichment 

Corporation to formalize commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute 

Resolution mediation session. The commitments were made by USEC Inc. as part of a 

settlement agreement between USEC Inc. and the NRC regarding an apparent violation 

of 10 CFR 76.7, "Employee protection." The action is based on the United States 

Department of Labor Administrative Review Board’s (ARB’s) August 19, 2008, Final 

Decision and Order (ARB Case Nos. 06-055, 06-058, and 06-119) affirming a DOL 

Administrative Law Judge’s finding. The agreement resolves the apparent violations. 

USEC agreed to take a number of actions that, among others, included: a third party 

independent assessment of the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at the 

Paducah site; and providing SCWE training (including case studies) to Paducah and 

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants, American Centrifuge Plant, American Centrifuge 

Lead Cascade Facility, and designated USEC Headquarters managers and employees. 

United States Enrichment Corporation EA-08-280 

Paducah, KY 

On August 18, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to United 

States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on July 1, 2009. The 

commitments were made by USEC as part of a settlement agreement between USEC 

and the NRC regarding an apparent violation of 10 CFR 95.39(b)(3) which was identified 

during an NRC investigation at the licensee’s Paducah facility. The agreement resolves 

the apparent violation. USEC agreed to take a number of actions including: (1) revising 

procedures and related training; (2) continuation of recurring training for Operations and 

Maintenance supervisors to reinforce conduct of principles and procedure compliance; 

(3) conducting interactive informational training sessions with employees to identify 

critical job tasks and tools to prevent and protect against causing adverse events when 

performing critical tasks; and, (4) communicating the facts of the violation and lessons 

learned to employees at all USEC facilities. In consideration of these actions, the NRC 

agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation or other 

enforcement action for the apparent violation. 

 
 

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United States Enrichment Corporation EA-08-344 

Paducah, KY 

On August 18, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to United 

States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to formalize commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on July 2, 2009. The 

commitments were made by USEC as part of a settlement agreement between USEC 

and the NRC regarding four apparent violations which were identified during an NRC 

investigation at the USEC-Paducah facility. Specifically, the violations involved: 

(1) failing to disconnect equipment during movement of a Uranium Hexaflouride (UF6) 

cylinder causing damage to the manifold; (2) deliberately attempting to conceal the 

damage; (3) deliberately falsifying documents indicating the equipment was properly 

disconnected; and (4) deliberately denying knowledge of the procedure violations. The 

agreement resolves the apparent violations. USEC agreed to take a number of actions 

including: (1) actions to address the willful actions of USEC employees and procedural 

use; (2) recurring training for Operations and Maintenance supervisors to reinforce 

conduct of principles and procedural compliance; and, (3) subsequent effectiveness 

reviews of corrective actions. In addition, USEC committed to conducting a review of 

this incident and a limited number of other significant events, to determine if weaknesses 

in any of the 13 safety culture components, as identified in NRC Regulatory Information 

Summary 2006-13, caused or significantly contributed to the event. In consideration of 

these actions, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a 

Notice of Violation or other enforcement action for the apparent violations. 

Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC EA-08-244 

Columbia, SC 

On August 6, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (WEC) to formalize commitments made as a 

result of an ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by WEC as part of a 

settlement agreement between WEC and the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC 

requirements by a former contract foreman. The agreement resolves the apparent 

violations involving WEC’s maintaining inaccurate records associated with employee 

training and testing of a ventilation system filter which was identified during an NRC 

investigation. WEC agreed to a number of corrective actions. In consideration of these 

commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from further enforcement action for this 

apparent violation. 
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Orders Issued To Individuals

Daniel Culver IA-09-025 

On December 1, 2009, an Order was issued to Mr. Daniel Culver, a former maintenance 

supervisor at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Peach Bottom), prohibiting him from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 3 years from the date the Order 

was issued. This enforcement action is based on Mr. Culver’s deliberate failure to 

provide complete and accurate information on a personnel history questionnaire used to 

obtain unescorted access authorization at Peach Bottom. Specifically, Mr. Culver 

provided inaccurate information regarding his rank in the military, his history of 

misconduct in the military, and the nature of his military discharge. Mr. Culver also listed 

a peer, who was also a personal friend, as a former supervisor on his application for 

employment, even though this individual was not Mr. Culver’s supervisor at the time he 

submitted his application. This represents a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2), which, in 

part, prohibits licensee employees from deliberately submitting to a licensee information 

that the person knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the 

NRC. 

Duane Kuhn IA-09-023 

On December 1, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Mr. 

Duane Kuhn, a former reactor operator at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Peach 

Bottom), formalizing commitments agreed to during an Alternate Dispute Resolution 

mediation session held on September 24, 2009. This enforcement action is based on an 

apparent deliberate violation of Peach Bottom’s Behavioral Observation Program and 

Physical Security Plan, which require that individuals with unescorted access 

authorization report any arrests or criminal charges on their first day back to work after 

the incident. Contrary to this requirement, Mr. Kuhn was arrested on October 13, 2007, 

but failed to report the arrest until April 29, 2008. Mr. Kuhn agreed to: (1) author an 

article in which he discusses the incident and what he learned from it; (2) submit the 

article to Exelon for consideration to use it in its training program; and (3) submit the 

article to two professional organizations requesting publication in their respective 

newsletters. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed not to pursue 

additional enforcement action against Mr. Kuhn for this apparent violation. 

Dr. Cedric Fernando IA-09-012 

On November 23, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Dr. Cedric Fernando, the medical review officer for Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., to 

formalize commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation 

session held on May 15, 2009. This enforcement action is based on two apparent 

deliberate violations of NRC requirements involving Dr. Fernando’s certification that two 

security officers had been given a hearing examination when, in fact, they had not. 

Dr. Fernando agreed to: (1) ensure that an independent assessment is conducted to 

identify causes of this event; (2) implement lessons learned and corrective actions based 

on the results of the assessment; (3) participate in periodic meetings with a physician 

engaged in NRC-regulated activities to review issues relevant to compliance with NRC 

regulations; (4) take a course addressing best practices for administrative office 

procedures and record keeping; and (5) communicate lessons learned and experiences 
 

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of this incident to an appropriate audience. In consideration of these commitments, the 

NRC agreed not to pursue additional enforcement action against Dr. Fernando for the 

apparent violations. 

Dr. Cedric Fernando IA-08-036 

On November 23, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Dr. Cedric Fernando, the medical review officer (MRO) for Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 

(NFS), to formalize commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution 

mediation session held on May 14, 2009. This enforcement action is based on three 

apparent deliberate violations of NRC fitness for duty (FFD) requirements related to a 

March 2006 incident involving a senior executive at NFS who consumed alcohol less 

than five hours before a scheduled working tour. Dr. Fernando agreed to: (1) ensure 

that an independent assessment by a certified MRO into the FFD incident discussed 

above is conducted; (2) implement lessons learned and corrective actions based on the 

results of the assessment; (3) participate in periodic meetings with an MRO engaged in 

NRC-regulated activities to review issues relevant to compliance with NRC regulations; 

(4) attend an MRO symposium; and (5) solicit information from an MRO certification 

program on improvements to the MRO referral process. In consideration of these 

commitments, the NRC agreed not to pursue additional enforcement action against 

Dr. Fernando for the apparent violations. 

Christopher S. Loyd IA-09-044 

On October 1, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Loyd, Radiation Safety Officer for Earth Exploration, Inc., to formalize commitments 

made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on 

August 25, 2009. The NRC had preliminarily concluded that Mr. Loyd's deliberate 

actions contributed to Earth Exploration, Inc., being in violation of NRC requirements 

based on his failure to: (1) perform annual reviews of the radiation protection program; 

(2) perform leak testing of sealed sources; (3) perform physical inventories every six 

months of sealed sources; (4) ensure that dosimetry provided to gauge users was 

processed and evaluated; and (5) ensure compliance with NRC requirements and 

license conditions as the Radiation Safety Officer. Mr. Loyd agreed to take a number of 

actions including: (1) conducting a “lessons learned” training to address oversight of the 

radiation safety program; (2) submitting a report describing the radiation safety activities 

completed every 3 months for a period of 2 years to the licensee and NRC; and, 

(3) submitting a plan on how assigned duties will be accomplished and what steps will 

be taken to ensure that the infrastructure exists for those duties. In consideration of 

these and other actions, the NRC agreed to not categorize the violations as deliberate 

and to not pursue any further enforcement action against Mr. Loyd for these violations. 

Keith Davis IA-09-014 

On April 1, 2009, an Order was issued to Mr. Keith Davis, prohibiting the former Senior 

Reactor Operator at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), from involvement in 

all NRC-licensed activities for a period of three years. The Order was issued because 

Mr. Davis failed to follow the actions of a prior Confirmatory Order. The previously 

issued Confirmatory Order required Mr. Davis to complete the settlement actions within 

three months of the date of the Confirmatory Order and then inform the NRC of 
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completion of these activities by March 27, 2008. Mr. Davis failed to complete the 

actions of the Confirmatory Order which was a violation of 10 CFR 2.202(b). In 

consideration of this violation, the NRC issued the new order banning Mr. Davis from 

NRC activities. 

Jennifer O’Neill-Torres IA-08-072 

On March 23, 2009, an Order was issued to Ms. Jennifer O’Neil-Torres, the Radiation 

Safety Officer (RSO), President, and an owner of S&M Testing Laboratory, prohibiting 

her from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date 

the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on her engagement in deliberate 

misconduct, which caused the licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) & 10 CFR 

30.52(a). Specifically, as the RSO/President/owner, Ms. O’Neill-Torres deliberately 

failed to (1) obtain NRC approval via an amendment to S&M Testing’s NRC license to 

authorize storage of licensed gauges at an alternate location prior to moving all gauges 

from the authorized storage location to an unauthorized storage location; (2) failed to 

provide the NRC an opportunity to inspect the gauges; (3) failed to respond to repeated 

contact attempts by the NRC; and, (4) refused to provide the NRC information regarding 

the licensed gauges including their location and conditions of storage. In this case, she 

not only deliberately failed to respond to repeated NRC correspondence and 

communication attempts, but also failed to address or correct the violations. 

Mark Ficek IA-08-055 

On March 6, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Mr. Mark 

Ficek, President of Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. in Molt, Montana. The Order is a 

result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on February 5, 2009. 

The Order specifies that Mr. Ficek and NRC agree to disagree on whether Mr. Ficek 

violated 10 CFR 30.10. Further, the Order formalizes commitments from Mr. Ficek to 

 (1) refrain from engaging in licensed activities for a period of 2 years, including NRC 

licensed activities and activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to 

10 CFR 150.20; and, (2) for a period of 1 year after the 2 year period of prohibition has 

expired, Mr. Ficek will notify the NRC within 20 days of his becoming involved with NRClicensed activities. In consideration of these commitments from Mr. Ficek, the NRC 

agrees not to pursue any further enforcement action in connection with the subject 

apparent violation. 

Michael Hackett IA-09-026 

On July 28, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Michael Hackett, Radiation Safety Officer for the Department of Veterans Affairs 

Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky (VAMC Lexington). The Order is a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on June 26, 2009. ADR 

was requested by Mr. Hackett after an NRC investigation determined that Mr. Hackett’s 

actions caused VAMC Lexington to be in apparent violation by not implementing portions 

of the radiation safety program including: (1) failing to hold periodic Radiation Safety 

Committee meetings; (2) not performing annual program reviews; and, (3) not 

performing required hazardous material training. The Order specifies that Mr. Hackett 

made no admission that he violated any NRC requirements and formalizes commitments 

from Mr. Hackett for additional actions on his part to provide both the NRC and the 
 

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National Health Physics Program (NHPP) for the Department of Veterans Affairs the 

minutes from quarterly Radiation Safety Committee meetings, annual program review 

results, and specific information following completion of the next training on 

transportation and receipt of radioactive material. Additionally, Mr. Hackett will inform 

the NRC of his specific plans if he is assigned and has accepted responsibility for 

additional collateral duties; inform NHPP and the NRC if he is unable to perform his 

duties; submit to NRC an article with specific information for submittal and consideration 

for publication by NHPP; and inform NRC if he leaves his position before the terms of 

the Order are completed. In consideration of these commitments from Mr. Hackett, the 

NRC agrees not to pursue any further enforcement action in connection with the 

apparent violations. 

Robert C. Robbirds IA-09-036

On October 29, 2009, an Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Robert C. 

Robbirds, a former Nuclear Security Officer at Southern Nuclear Company’s Farley 

Nuclear Plant, for violating 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate misconduct.” Specifically, on June 

27, 2008, Mr. Robbirds deliberately consumed alcohol before reporting for duty and 

while on post as an armed responder inside the protected area. The Order prohibits Mr. 

Robbirds from participating in NRC licensed activities for a period of 3 years. 

Orders Imposing a Civil Penalty

S&M Testing Laboratory EA-08-332 

Caguas, Puerto Rico 

On June 8, 2009, an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty was issued to S&M Testing 

Laboratory. Following the NRC’s March 23, 2009, Notice of Violation and Proposed 

Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $16,250, the licensee failed to respond to 

the Notice and the proposed civil penalties. The Notice of Violation and proposed civil 

penalty was issued to the licensee for (1) the deliberate failure to confine possession of 

byproduct material to only those locations authorized by the NRC license; (2) the 

deliberate failure to provide the NRC an opportunity to inspect byproduct material and 

the premises where the byproduct material was stored, as required by 10 CFR 30.52(a); 

and, (3) the failure to utilize a minimum of two independent physical controls that form 

tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal whenever the 

gauges were not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee, as required 

by 10 CFR 30.34(i). Accordingly, NRC concluded that the violation remains valid and 

issued an order imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in the amount of $16,250. 
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Demand For Information

Various General Licensees EA-09-001 

General Motors Corporation EA-09-131 

 

A Demand for Information (DFI) was issued on January 14, 2009, to certain general 

material licensees and on May 29, 2009, to General Motors Corporation, pursuant to 

10 CFR 31.5. The DFI required certain general licensees to provide further information 

to determine whether NRC can have reasonable assurance that licensees are aware of 

their responsibility to account for tritium exit signs in their possession, and properly 

dispose of them at the end of their useful life. Therefore the DFI required certain general 

licensees to provide: an explanation of how they maintain accountability of tritium exit 

signs currently in their possession; the number of tritium exit signs they currently 

possess, and whether this number matches the number in their inventory records; the 

number of tritium exit signs, if any, that they have determined to be lost; the number of 

tritium exit signs that they have not yet verified as lost, but which they are unable to 

locate; if losses of signs are discovered, any actions they have taken, or plan to take, to 

prevent future losses of devices; and any other actions they have taken, or plan to take, 

to resolve any discrepancy between the number of signs they currently possess and the 

number of signs identified in their inventory records. 

Dr. Gary Kao IA-09-035 

Department of Veterans Affairs, Philadelphia 

A Demand for Information (DFI) was issued on May 26, 2009, to Dr. Gary Kao, an 

authorized user under the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA), Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.204. The DFI required Dr. Kao to obtain specific 

information regarding his activities related to using byproduct material. Specifically, a 

written list of current and planned participation in any activity using byproduct material 

including but not limited to brachytherapy activities, was required to be submitted to the 

NRC. Additionally, Dr. Kao was required to inform the NRC 72 hours prior to engaging 

in any activity using byproduct material subsequent to the DFI. This is in regard to 

concerns raised during an inspection that occurred between February 2002 and May 5, 

2008, of the DVA and Dr. Kao’s activities as an authorized medical user at the facility. 
 

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Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Individuals* 

Orders

The orders issued to individuals during 2009 are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Paul M. Alley IA-09-002 

On January 15, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Paul M. Alley for a Severity 

Level III violation involving 10 CFR 26.10(a) and 10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, Mr. Alley, 

a supervisor in the licensee’s organization, tested positive for marijuana on November 3, 

2008, while taking part in Tennessee Valley Authority’s random fitness for duty testing 

program. 

Robert S. Beveridge IA-09-054 

On February 24, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Robert S. Beveridge for a 

Severity Level III violation involving a deliberate submission of information to the 

licensee knowing that the information was incomplete or inaccurate in some respect 

material to the NRC and deliberately caused his employer, Schlumberger Technology 

Corporation, to be in violation of NRC regulations. Specifically, Mr. Beveridge, 

Schlumberger’s former Radiation Safety Officer, deliberately entered data into inventory 

records indicating that the inventory had been completed, when in actuality the inventory 

had not been completed as required. 

Martin Ferenc IA-09-028 

On July 2, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Martin Ferenc for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the individual’s deliberate misconduct that caused his employer, 

Advex Corporation, to be in violation of its Operating & Emergency (O&E) Procedure 

and 10 CFR 34.47(d) for an off-scale pocket dosimeter. Specifically, on January 22, 

2008, after the assistant radiographer’s pocket dosimeter went off-scale, Mr. Ferenc, as 

the lead radiographer, deliberately continued to work and did not notify the Radiation 

Safety Officer, as required by the O&E procedure. 

Frank B. Mitchell IA-09-032 

On May 13, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Frank B. Mitchell for a Severity 

Level III violation involving 10 CFR 55.53(d), 10 CFR 26.10(a) and 10 CFR 26.20. 

Specifically, on February 25, 2009, Mr. Mitchell, a licensed senior reactor operator at the 

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, reported to requalification training while under the 

influence of alcohol and marijuana. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
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Kurt I. Tetzlaff IA-09-031 

On August 12, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Mr. Kurt I. Tetzlaff for a Severity 

Level III violation of 10 CFR 55.53(I). Specifically, on three occasions between January 

27, and February 11, 2008, Mr. Tetzlaff performed the functions of a senior reactor 

operator, as defined in 10 CFR Part 55, without meeting one of the conditions on his 

license. 

John W. Wade IA-09-015 

On August 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Mr. John Wade for two violations 

of 10 CFR 70.10, “Deliberate Misconduct,” that were categorized as a Severity Level III 

problem. Specifically, while performing duties as a contract foreman at Westinghouse 

Electric Company, LLC (WEC) – Nuclear Fuel Division in Columbia, SC, Mr. Wade (1) 

deliberately falsified training records by accessing and acknowledging procedure training 

records governing job responsibilities as having been completed by his reporting 

employees when in fact the training had not been completed; and, (2) on three separate 

occasions (May 12 - 13, 2007, June 10, 2007, and July 7 – 8, 2007), deliberately 

submitted information to WEC that he knew to be inaccurate, associated with reporting 

his having taken plant roof ventilation filter differential pressure readings, when in fact, 

no readings had been performed. 

Brian S. Watt IA-09-007 

On July 23, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Mr. Brian S. Watt, formerly a 

security officer at AREVA NP, Inc., Richland, Washington, for violations of 10 CFR 

70.10(a)(1), and 10 CFR 70.10(a)(2), that were categorized as a Severity level III 

problem. Specifically, on five separate occasions and without authorization or approval, 

the individual signed the name of an authorizing individual on Site Access Authorization - 

Unescorted forms, instead of obtaining the signature of an individual listed on the 

Authorization List, as required by procedure. As a result, individuals were granted 

access to the site without proper authorization. On the aforementioned five occasions, 

the individual deliberately submitted information to an NRC licensee, AREVA NP, Inc., 

that he knew to be inaccurate in a material respect. Specifically, he knowingly submitted 

access authorization records to the licensee that did not have the actual signatures of 

individuals authorized to grant access to individuals entering the facility. 
 

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Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)* 

Wackenhut Nuclear Services EA-08-301 

Palm Beach Garden, FL 

On January 6, 2009, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation was issued to Wackenhut 

Nuclear Services (WNS) involving 10 CFR 50.5, which prohibits any contractor of a 

licensee from engaging in deliberate misconduct that causes a licensee to be in violation 

of any NRC regulation or condition of a license issued by the Commission. NRC 

investigations determined that multiple security officers employed by WNS were 

deliberately inattentive on multiple occasions at Exelon’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power 

Station. In addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report observations of 

inattentiveness to their supervision. These security officers put Exelon in violation of 10 

CFR 73.55, which requires armed responders to maintain continuous communication 

with each alarm station and be available to immediately respond to threats, and Peach 

Bottom License Condition 2.C(3), which requires, in part, reporting of aberrant behavior. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

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Appendix F: Summary of Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

NOED 09-3-01, issued January 29, 2009, to Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., 

(Kewaunee Power Station), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the licensee to 

operate for 14 days without enforcing the 35,000-gallon limit of fuel oil for the Emergency 

Diesel Generators (EDG) specified in Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.a.7. This allowed 

the licensee to submit a license amendment to change the limit in TS 3.7.a.7 from 

35,000 gallons to 31,858 gallons. This license amendment was allowed based on 

calculations that this is a sufficient amount of fuel to operate the EDG for seven days 

during an accident and the qualitative and quantitative risk evaluation of the new fuel 

requirement had no adverse impact on public health and safety or the environment.