GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

July 1999 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Reduced Threat Not 

Reflected in Antiarmor 

Weapon Acquisitions

GAO/NSIAD-99-105

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280327 Letter

July 22, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House 

Committee on Appropriations expressed concern with the Cold War 

mindset of the services, which are continuing to develop and procure an 

increasing number of tank-killing weapons. The Committee questioned 

whether current antiarmor acquisition plans are appropriate at a time when 

potential adversaries have smaller armored forces than during the Cold 

War. Accordingly, the Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to 

develop an antiarmor master plan to be submitted with the fiscal year 2000 

budget. The plan is to identify the projected armored threat and the 

quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of eliminating excess 

antiarmor weapon capabilities. The last master plan was prepared in 

September 1990.

You requested that we independently review and comment on the master 

plan. Specifically, you asked that we evaluate the plan’s findings and 

conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions, as 

well as overall antiarmor funding trends. As of June 30, 1999, the Secretary 

of Defense had not submitted the plan. As agreed with your office, we are 

therefore providing information we have gathered that addresses the parts 

of your request that we could complete without the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) plan. For this report, we (1) identified changes in armored 

threats from 1990 to 1997, (2) compared the number and makeup of the 

1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory, and 

(3) identified the funding trends of past and future antiarmor 

procurements. When the master plan is issued, we will review it and issue 

our final report to you.

Results in Brief The number of potential enemy armored targets U.S. forces expect to face 

has decreased considerably since 1990. During the Cold War, the services 

considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by 

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thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today’s conditions, 

however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller 

regional conflicts as the threat basis when developing war-fighting plans 

and requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest 

biannual Outyear Threat Report, issued in 1997, the number of armored 

targets is less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.

The overall size of DOD’s current antiarmor weapons inventory is 

approximately the same as during the Cold War, and inventories of the 

more sophisticated and lethal antiarmor weapons have actually increased. 

Currently, there are 35 different types of antiarmor weapons in the 

inventory and 10 other types in production. While today’s inventory 

weapons have similar capabilities to those in the 1990 inventory, the 10 new 

weapons are expected to provide improved targeting, lethality, and 

survivability capabilities developed in response to the anticipated future 

tank threat.

The services continue to invest in antiarmor weapons and are planning 

funding increases. They estimate they will spend $11.1 billion in total 

procurement funding to acquire the 10 antiarmor weapons currently in 

production, which includes $4.2 billion for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. 

In addition, DOD is developing nine new antiarmor weapons at an 

estimated cost of $3.5 billion. The procurement costs for six of the nine 

new programs have not yet been determined, but the remaining three have 

an estimated procurement cost of about $4.7 billion. Plans to acquire large 

quantities of new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear 

consistent with the reduced size of the armored threat and the existing 

large and capable inventory of antiarmor weapons.

Background Antiarmor weapons are capable of destroying targets such as tanks, 

armored combat vehicles, and/or artillery. To determine weapon 

requirements, the services use the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest 

biannual Outyear Threat Report estimates. The current report modeled a 

scenario in which U.S. forces would fight two major regional conflicts.

In October 1998, the administration issued “A National Security Strategy 

for a New Century,” which describes the new and different threats facing 

the United States since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) testified in October 

1998 that the military needs to change the way it fights, the weapons it uses, 

and the way it acquires weapons to successfully meet the new anticipated 

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threats. According to the Under Secretary, the most likely future combat 

scenarios include information warfare, urban combat, chemical/biological 

attack, terrorism, and nuclear attack. He noted that the dilemma the 

military faces is how to fund competing demands to develop weapons to 

achieve the goals of the early 21st century and meet current readiness 

needs. The Under Secretary stressed that the military needs to shift away 

from traditional weapons designed to counter a Cold War threat. He 

specifically stated that one required action is to reduce the number of 

traditional weapons now in acquisition to fund the required newer 

weapons. This, he said, would enable the military to reallocate resources to 

top-priority modernization programs for communications, sensors, 

space-based reconnaissance, and computer systems.

DOD’s 1990 antiarmor master plan was a single integrated document 

describing the development and acquisition of weapons capable of 

defeating armored threats. Prior to 1990, antiarmor requirements were 

primarily justified according to the potential threat of a Central European 

conflict. A principle component of this threat was the very large Soviet and 

Warsaw Pact inventories of armored vehicles. While the 1990 plan still 

concluded that the Soviet Union would retain major conventional and 

strategic forces and would remain the major concern of defense planning, 

it recognized that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a credible military 

alliance.

In 1993, we reported that DOD had not sufficiently reexamined its 

antiarmor needs since the decline of the Warsaw Pact.1

 DOD reported that 

the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation had plans to conduct a 

2-year study of the antiarmor mission. However, according to a Program 

Analysis and Evaluation official, the Office terminated the study before it 

was completed, and no reportable results were obtained.

Armored Threat 

Substantially Reduced

DOD reports as well as testimony by top Defense officials show that the 

armored threat facing the United States has dropped substantially since 

1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990 antiarmor master 

plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency Outyear Threat 

Report shows that the number of armored targets U.S. forces expect to face 

has dropped significantly during the period. Figure 1 shows the number of 

1

Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Support Continued Need and Long-term 

Affordability (GAO/NSIAD-93-49, Mar. 4, 1993).
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enemy tanks and armored combat vehicles in the 1997 Outyear Threat 

Report is less than 20 percent of the number in 1990 antiarmor master plan.

Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat Vehicles, 1990 Soviet 

Union and 1997 Regional Conflict

This decline reflects the changes in threats since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union in 1991. In 1987, we reported that the Soviet inventory totaled 

approximately 52,000 tanks, including about 29,000 in Europe.2

 About 

26,000 of the tanks in the inventory were produced after 1978 (including the 

T64B, T72M1, and T80). The technical sophistication and the sheer 

numbers of these armored vehicles were far greater than the armored 

threat associated with any other war-fighting contingency, either then or 

now. However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduced the 

likelihood that the United States would have to face an opponent with such 

technically sophisticated armored weapons. Consequently, the armored 

threat as projected in the 1997 Outyear Threat Report is not nearly as 

capable as that of the former Soviet Union in terms of quantity and quality.

In January 1998, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported 

to Congress that threats had diminished substantially, that the United 

States was unlikely to face a global military threat similar to the former 

Soviet Union for at least two decades, and that ground forces throughout 

the world were being reduced. Further, he said many developing nations 

2

Antitank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities (GAO/PEMD-87-22, Sept. 17, 1987).

0 20 40 60 80

Tanks

Armored combat

vehicles

100

1997 as a percent of 1990

1990 Soviet Union

1997 Regional conflict
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had outdated equipment that was either not operational or in serious 

disrepair. Developed countries were in various stages of modernization, 

but ground forces were a low priority.

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report used two 

regional conflict scenarios as the threat estimate for determining 

requirements. Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents 

the United States would face. The number of armored vehicles currently 

maintained by Iraq and North Korea represents only a small fraction of the 

Cold War threat. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency Director 

testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January 

1998 that the United Nations sanctions and arms embargo implemented 

after the Persian Gulf War limit Iraq’s opportunity to procure additional 

weapons and have had a devastating effect on its economy. Further, North 

Korea’s overall military readiness continues to erode along with its 

worsening economic situation.

Antiarmor Weapon 

Inventory Remains at 

Cold War Levels While 

New and Improved 

Weapons Are Added

The overall size of the antiarmor weapon inventory has remained fairly 

constant since 1990. At the same time, weapons have become more 

sophisticated, lethal, and effective. These more highly sophisticated 

weapons, some of which are capable of killing multiple targets, were 

developed to defeat the anticipated future Soviet tank threat.

The 1990 antiarmor master plan divided the inventory and procurement of 

antiarmor weapons into five different categories: infantry/helicopter, 

indirect fire support, fixed-wing, tank rounds, and mines. Figure 2 

compares the number of all types of antiarmor weapons in 1990 and 1998 

within these five categories. There are various types of antiarmor weapons 

within each category. The various types of antiarmor weapons are 

described in appendix I.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998

The 1998 inventory of infantry/helicopter antiarmor weapons is slightly 

smaller than in 1990, but it contains inventories of three additional 

weapons with improved capabilities—the Javelin, the Hellfire II missile, 

and the Longbow Hellfire missile. The 1998 inventory of indirect fire 

weapons increased from 1990 levels. The biggest contributors were the 

higher number of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and the 

recently produced Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunition. The 

1998 inventory of fixed-wing antiarmor weapons also grew over the 1990 

level. It included two additional weapons capable of killing multiple 

armored targets—the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) and the Sensor 

Fused Weapon. The 1998 inventory of tank rounds shrank significantly. 

However, the drop was in the number of tank rounds for the older M60 and 

M61 tanks. Rounds for the M-1 Abrams main battle tank currently in use 

100 96.6 100

128

100

119

100

67.7

100

80

100 100

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1998 as a percent of 1990

Infantry

/helicopters

Indirect

fire

FixedwingTank

rounds

Mines Total

1990

1998
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increased by 425 percent. These rounds are more lethal against modern 

armored targets. The 1998 inventory of mines also shrank from 1990, but 

quantities of two new mines that provide increased performance and 

lethality were added. Detailed comparisons of the 1990 and 1998 

inventories are in appendix II.

U.S. antiarmor weapons proved very capable during Operation Desert 

Storm. The United States and its allies destroyed or forced abandonment of 

2,633 tanks during the air and ground assault against Iraqi ground forces. 

According to a 1992 House Committee on Armed Services report, 

technology gave U.S. forces the edge, and the equipment performed above 

the most optimistic expectations.3

DOD Continues to 

Invest in Antiarmor 

Weapon Capability 

In 1998, the services had 35 different types of weapons in inventory capable 

of performing today’s antiarmor mission and had spent a total of 

$20.2 billion (in then-year dollars) to acquire these weapons.4

 They had also 

spent a total of $3.6 billion through fiscal year 1998 to procure 

10 additional antiarmor weapons and estimated they would spend another 

$7.4 billion to complete procurement of these new weapons. The 

procurement funding requests for the 10 antiarmor weapons in production 

are in appendix III.

In addition, the services are currently developing nine new weapons with 

varying levels of antiarmor capability for a total estimated development 

cost of almost $3.5 billion, $2.6 billion of which has already been spent. 

Some of the weapons such as the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition and the 

Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) are primary antitank weapons. Others such 

as the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM) engage a variety of 

targets, including buildings, bunkers, and light armor. The guided MLRS 

can engage personnel, light armor, or heavy armor, depending on the 

payload selected. At this time, only three of the weapons are approaching a 

procurement decision. Their estimated future procurement funding is 

about $4.7 billion. Table 1 shows the development and projected 

procurement costs for the nine weapons.

3

Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, House Committee on Armed Services (1992).

4

Inventory quantities and costs are defined as what was on contract through fiscal year 1998, not 

necessarily what was on–hand at the end of the fiscal year. For some older Army munitions, inventory 

was based on on-hand data because original procurement data was unavailable. 
B-280327

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Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons

a

Does not include the cost to develop and procure the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) needed 

to deliver the submunition to the target area.

Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget. 

In addition, the Army has spent almost $178 million to develop the 

Enhanced Fiber Optics Guided Missile antiarmor weapon. The future of 

this weapon is uncertain. No funding was requested in the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, and procurement funds for fiscal years 1998 and 

1999 were rescinded and eliminated. Table 2 shows the projected yearly 

procurement funding requests through fiscal year 2003 for the 10 weapons 

in production and the 3 nearing production.

Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests

Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.

Then-year dollars in millions

Total

development

cost

Development

cost to

complete

Estimated

procurement

cost

Brilliant antiarmor submunitiona $1,020 $ 34 $1,864

Improved brilliant antiarmor submunitiona 334 206 Undetermined

Line-of-sight antitank 387 220 Undetermined

Multipurpose individual munition 61 42 Undetermined

Improved sense and destroy armor 988 36 Undetermined

Guided multiple launch rocket system 96 78 Undetermined

Tank round M829E3 255 193 Undetermined

Joint stand-off weapon BLU-108 245 47 2,369

Predator 139 25 492

Total $3,525 $881 $4,725

Then-year dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Weapons 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 To complete

In production $784 $964 $1,154 $1,087 $1,121 $814 $1,975

Nearing 

production

122 267 478 448 480 2,930

Total $784 $1,086 $1,421 $1,565 $1,569 $1,294 $4,905
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Procurement funding for antiarmor weapons fell steadily between 1986 and 

1996. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis, antiarmor funding fell 

from $2.5 billion in 1986 to $770 million in 1996.5

 However, future funding 

demands for the 10 weapons in production and the 3 in development show 

a reverse in this trend. Fiscal year 1999 was the first year to exceed 

$1 billion in antiarmor funding since fiscal year 1994. Funding for these 

weapons is expected to increase each year through fiscal year 2002.

Conclusions DOD has maintained the overall size of its antiarmor weapon inventory at 

the same level as in 1990 while significantly increasing its effectiveness. 

The lethality and accuracy of the weapons in the current inventory are 

superior to those available in 1990. At the same time, however, the threat of 

a massive heavily armored attack by potential enemies has greatly 

diminished, and war-fighting strategies have been modified to reflect global 

changes in threats and priorities. Nevertheless, DOD plans to increase its 

procurement of antiarmor weapons. Plans to acquire large quantities of 

new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear consistent with the 

reduced size of the armored threat and the existing large and capable 

inventory of antiarmor weapons.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred. DOD 

offered comments that were generally directed at explaining and justifying 

the findings of this report. For example, DOD noted that the report did not 

discuss or account for the fact that many of the antiarmor weapons 

quantities are leftover stockpile levels from the Cold War and the 

technology in those weapons did not provide the levels of precision, 

lethality, and survivability available today.

As discussed in our report, we plan to assess DOD’s forthcoming antiarmor 

master plan. The plan is expected to provide an updated assessment of the 

current armored threat, current antiarmor capabilities, and antiarmor 

weapons requirements. We plan to assess the plan’s findings and 

conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions. 

5

Trends and Funding for Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001, Institute for Defense Analysis 

(Jan. 1997).
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Scope and 

Methodology

To determine the change in threat from 1990 to 1997, we compared the 

threat contained in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with the threat 

contained in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report. 

We discussed threat information with representatives from the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland; the U.S. Central 

Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; and the Commander of U.S. 

Forces Korea.

To determine the change in number and types of antiarmor weapons 

between 1990 and 1998, we compared the inventory contained in the 1990 

antiarmor master plan with data the individual services provided on their 

1998 antiarmor inventory. We discussed antiarmor weapon inventories with 

representatives from the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

Plans, Washington, D.C.; the Army’s Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, 

Maryland; the Air Force’s Director for Operational Requirements, Crystal 

City, Virginia; the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; 

and the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

We identified past and future funding trends by obtaining data from the 

1997 Institute for Defense Analysis report on Trends and Funding for 

Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001 and from fiscal year 1999 

and 2000 budgetary documents.

We conducted our review from June 1998 to May 1999 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the 

Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of 

Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request.
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Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400, 

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

,

James F. Wiggins

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor 

Weapons

14

Appendix II

Comparison of 

Antiarmor Weapons in 

Inventory, 1990-98

19

Appendix III

Current Production 

Weapon Funding 

Requests

21

Appendix IV

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

22

Appendix V

Major Contributors to 

This Report

25

Tables Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons 8

Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests 8

Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat

Vehicles, 1990 Soviet Union and 1997 Regional Conflict 4

Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998 6
Contents

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Abbreviations

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System 

BAT Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition

CEM Combined Effects Munition

DOD Department of Defense

HEAA High Explosive Antiarmor

JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon

LOSAT Line-of-Sight Antitank

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

MOPMS Modular Pack Mine System

MPIM Multipurpose Individual Munition

SADARM Sense and Destroy Armor

SFW Sensor Fused Weapon

SLAP Saboted Light Armor Penetrator

SMAW Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon

TOW Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command–link Guided

WAM Wide Area Munition

WCMD Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons ApendxIi

Infantry/Helicoper 

Weapons

Dragon The Dragon completed production in 1980. It is a shoulder-fired, 

lightweight, short-range antitank guided missile that only needs one soldier 

to fire. The missile uses semiautomatic command line-of-sight guidance 

with an infrared tracker. The Dragon has limited antiarmor capability due 

to its 1,000-meter range and lack of fire-and-forget technology (allowing 

personnel to fire the weapon and take cover rather than remaining exposed 

while guiding the weapon to its target).

Hellfire The Hellfire air-to-ground missile is the primary antitank armament of the 

Army’s Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and special operations helicopters; the 

Marine Corps’ Super Cobra helicopter; and the Navy’s Sea Hawk helicopter. 

The Hellfire uses semi-active laser terminal guidance. Beginning in 1990, 

the missile was reconfigured with an interim warhead to improve lethality 

against near-term threat reactive armor. Hellfire II includes improvements 

to defeat all known electro-optical countermeasures and advanced reactive 

armors.

High Explosive Antiarmor The High Explosive Antiarmor (HEAA) rocket is an antitank weapon 

designed to defeat targets at ranges up to 500 meters. It is effective against 

current tanks without additional armor. The rocket is launched from the 

shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW). When the HEAA 

completed development in 1988, it transformed the SMAW into a 

multipurpose weapon suitable for close-in antiarmor urban fighting.

Javelin The Javelin is a portable antitank weapon used by the Army and the Marine 

Corps. The weapon weighs 48.5 pounds and has a maximum range of 

2,500 meters. It provides high lethality against conventional and reactive 

armor and will replace the Dragon. The weapon has a high kill rate against 

all known armored threats at extended ranges under day/night, adverse 

weather, and battlefield obscurants. Its key feature is fire-and-forget 

technology. The Javelin is hardened against countermeasures and does not 

require extensive training for effective employment.
Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Line-of-Sight Antitank The Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) weapon consists of a kinetic energy 

missile and launcher mounted on a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled 

Vehicle (HMMWV). LOSAT is being developed as a mobile, direct fire, 

antitank weapon that provides lethality at long ranges.

Longbow Hellfire The Longbow Hellfire air-to-ground missile is designed to defeat individual 

armored targets and enhance the survivability of the Longbow Apache 

Helicopter. Longbow uses radio frequency guidance. It can be used both 

day and night, in adverse weather, and with battlefield obscurants. 

Longbow Hellfire complements the semi-active Laser Hellfire II with 

fire-and-forget capability, maximizing the ability of the Apache.

Predator Multipurpose 

Individual Munition

Predator is designed to be a lightweight shoulder-fired weapon capable of 

defeating reactive armor. The weapon is designed with a modular warhead. 

The Marine Corps uses a warhead that can defeat tanks with reactive 

armor. The Army has modified the Predator with an alternative warhead, 

the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM). The MPIM provides infantry 

with a fire-and-forget weapon capable of defeating enemy forces in 

buildings, bunkers, and lightly armored vehicles.

Saboted Light Armor 

Penetrator

Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) is a 50-caliber ammunition 

effective against light armor with a maximum effective range of 

approximately 1,500 meters. It is a reduced caliber munition wrapped in 

plastic. The lighter weight allows the velocity to be significantly and safely 

increased in an unmodified machine gun.

Tube-launched, Optically 

Tracked, Wire 

Command-link Guided

The Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command-link Guided (TOW) 

missile is an antitank weapon designed to fulfill the heavy assault 

requirement for close combat maneuver forces. The TOW can be fired from 

a ground tripod or from specifically adapted vehicles such as Bradleys and 

HMMWVs or from Cobra helicopters. The weapon includes a thermal sight 

for operations at night, in reduced visibility, and in countermeasures. 

Several upgraded variants of the missile are in inventory, including ones 

that can counter reactive armor. However, the TOW is not a fire-and-forget 

weapon.
Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Indirect Fire Weapons

Brilliant Antiarmor 

Submunition

The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) is a guided submunition that 

searches and destroys moving armored targets using acoustic and infrared 

seekers. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II can carry 

the BAT to ranges beyond 100 kilometers. The preplanned product 

improvement (P3I) BAT uses millimeter wave, infrared, and acoustic 

seekers to also attack cold stationary or dug-in targets like 

Surface-to-Surface Missile Transporter-Erector Launchers and Heavy 

Multiple Rocket Launchers. The ATACMS Block IIA missile will carry the 

P3I BAT to ranges of 300 kilometers.

Copperhead The Copperhead is a laser-guided projectile fired from standard 

155-millimeter howitzers. Its production was completed in the 1980s. The 

projectile's semi-active laser seeker searches for a target illuminated by a 

forward ground- or aircraft-based observer using a laser. The minimum 

range of the Copperhead is 3 kilometers and its maximum range is 

15.5 kilometers. The warhead can penetrate every tank now in service. The 

Copperhead has been modified with a time-delay fuse, which permits the 

warhead to penetrate reactive armor without detonating it. 

Multiple Launch Rocket 

System

The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has been in production since 

the 1980s. The MLRS basic rocket is a free-flight unguided tactical rocket 

with a warhead containing 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional 

Munition (DPICM) submunitions. The DPICM can penetrate light armor. 

The Extended Range MLRS (ER-MLRS) began production in fiscal year 

1996. The new rocket added enhanced capability through improvements in 

range, accuracy, effectiveness, and maneuver force safety. The extended 

range rocket has a range of 45 kilometers and contains 518 DPICM 

submunitions. Starting in fiscal year 2002, the guided MLRS will integrate a 

guidance control package into the ER-MLRS resulting in reduced mission 

time and increased survivability. 
Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Sense and Destroy Armor The Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) is a fire-and-forget sensor-fused 

submunition delivered by 155-millimeter artillery projectiles or by the 

MLRS. It is designed to detect and destroy light armored vehicles, primarily 

self-propelled artillery. Once dispensed over the target area, it detects 

individual targets using millimeter wave and infrared sensors and fires an 

explosively formed penetrator through the top of the target. The 

155-millimeter projectile carries two SADARMs per round and has a range 

of 22.5 kilometers. The MLRS carries six SADARMS per rocket and has a 

range of 30 kilometers. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the 

Army’s MLRS-delivered SADARM program is currently not funded. 

Fixed-Wing Weapons

Combined Effects Munition The Combined Effects Munition (CEM) is a multipurpose cluster bomb for 

ground support and is used against light armor, personnel, and artillery. The 

CEM weighs approximately 950 pounds and dispenses 202 bomb units. The 

CEM entered production in 1985. Because of its inaccuracy when dropped 

from higher altitudes, the Air Force is fitting CEM with a wind corrected 

munitions dispenser (WCMD) kit. The kit will provide inertial navigation to 

correct for the effects of the wind.

Joint Stand-Off Weapon The Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) is a Navy-led joint program with the 

Air Force. JSOW is an air-to-ground weapon capable of attacking a variety 

of targets from outside enemy point defenses during day/night and adverse 

weather conditions. There are currently three configurations of the JSOW: 

JSOW baseline for soft and area targets, JSOW BLU-108 for massed land 

combat vehicles, and JSOW Unitary for harder/point targets and increased 

kill effectiveness.

Maverick The Maverick is a rocket propelled, air-to-surface, precision guided tactical 

missile with fire-and-forget capability designed for use against tanks and a 

variety of hardened targets. The pilot has to visually acquire a target. When 

the missile is engaged, a video picture instantly appears on the cockpit 

display. The pilot then lines up the target with the gunsight. When the 

missile is released, it finds the target automatically.
Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Rockeye The Rockeye is an air-launched dispenser weapon. It is one of the older, 

best known, and most widely used dispensers. The bomblet is designed 

primarily as an antiarmor weapon for use against tanks, armored carriers, 

and gun emplacements. The Rockeye II carries 247 dual-purpose antiarmor 

bomblets and has a nose-mounted fuse to control the opening of the 

dispenser at predetermined altitudes.

Sensor Fused Weapon The Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW) is a cluster weapon designed for use 

against land combat vehicles. It consists of a tactical weapon dispenser 

containing 10 submunitions. Each submunition contains four warheads. 

The warheads are released in a horizontal trajectory and are activated 

through a small infrared sensor contained in the warhead. This weapon 

provides multiple kills per pass capability. The Air Force is fitting SFW with 

the WCMD kit, which will provide inertial navigation to correct for the 

effects of the wind.

Tank Rounds The 120-millimeter tank round is fired from the M1A1 and M1A2 tanks. 

There are four basic cartridge types: (1) Kinetic Energy; (2) Armor 

Piercing, Fin Stabilized, and Discarding Sabot-Tracer; (3) Chemical Energy 

High Explosive; and (4) training rounds for each of the tactical cartridges. 

The Armaments Enhancement Initiative program provides upgrades to the

120-millimeter round capability to defeat Soviet-built armored vehicles of 

the 1990s and later.

Antiarmor Mines Antiarmor mines in inventory include several non-self-destructing and 

self-destructing mines. The inventory includes the M15, M19, and M21 

non-self-destructing mine and a family of mixed munitions that includes the 

Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), Volcano, and Gator. MOPMS 

contains 21 individual antitank and antipersonnel mines. It is used as a 

protective minefield, for obstacle enhancement, or to close gaps in other 

larger minefields. Volcano contains six antitank mines and is designed for 

quick emplacement. The Gator system has a total of 94 mines (72 antitank 

and 22 antipersonnel) and was developed to place mine fields on the 

ground using high-speed tactical aircraft. DOD has one mine in production, 

the Wide Area Munition (WAM). The WAM is a first-generation smart 

weapon. It recognizes armor and autonomously aims and launches its 

submunition against the target. It offers increased performance and 

lethality over current mines in inventory.
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix II

Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in 

Inventory, 1990-98 ApendxIi

The 1990 antiarmor master plan contained a total of 34 antiarmor weapons 

in inventory or procurement. Comparisons of the weapons by category 

shows that more sophisticated lethal weapons have been added since 

then.1

In the infantry/helicopter weapon category, the 1998 inventory stood at 

97 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1990 inventory contained five 

weapons: the Dragon, the Light Assault Weapon, the Lightweight 

Multipurpose Weapon (AT-4), the TOW missile, and the Hellfire. The 1998 

inventory included these five weapons and three additional ones with 

improved capabilities: the shoulder-fired Javelin, the Hellfire II missile, and 

the Longbow Hellfire missile.

In the infantry/helicopter category, the inventory quantities of 

shoulder-fired weapons were 95 percent of 1990 levels. The 1998 inventory 

included the Javelin, which provides fire-and-forget technology and 

enhanced lethality over the Dragon. The 1998 inventory of TOW missiles 

was about 81 percent of the 1990 inventory. Although the number of TOW 

missiles has declined, the 1998 inventory contained more modern variants, 

which provide more lethality and longer range. The 1998 inventory of 

helicopter air-to-ground missiles was well above its 1990 level and included 

over 20,000 Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire missiles, which provide 

improved lethality and survivability over the basic Hellfire missile.

The 1998 inventory for the indirect fire support weapons category was 

128 percent of the 1990 inventory. This category is composed of artillery 

shells and rockets. The biggest contributors to the larger 1998 inventory 

were the increased numbers of the MLRS rocket and the inclusion of some 

recently produced SADARM submunitions. The SADARM was developed to 

improve the ability of the artillery projectile to accurately locate targets.

The 1998 inventory in the fixed-wing category of antiarmor weapons was 

119 percent of the 1990 inventory. The fixed-wing 1990 inventory contained 

the Maverick air-to-ground missile and the Rockeye and CEM cluster 

weapons. In the 1998 inventory, the Maverick was 104 percent, the Rockeye 

107 percent, and the CEM 164 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1998 

inventory included two additional antiarmor area weapons capable of 

1

We did not include four weapons (25-millimeter and 30-millimeter munitions) in the comparison 

because their quantities were extremely large compared with the other weapons in the same categories.
Appendix II

Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in 

Inventory, 1990-98

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

killing multiple armored targets: the JSOW air-to-ground missile and the 

SFW. 

In the tank rounds category, the 1998 inventory stood at 68 percent of the 

1990 inventory. This category contained 105-millimeter and 120-millimeter 

tank rounds. While the 1998 inventory of tank rounds was significantly 

smaller than the total 1990 inventory, most of the rounds in 1990 were 

105-millimeter M60 or M61 tank rounds. However, the main battle tank 

currently in use is the M-1 Abrams, which uses the 120-millimeter round 

shell. A comparison of the 120-millimeter inventory shows that the 1998 

inventory was 425 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 120-millimeter tank 

rounds have increased lethality against modern armored weapons. Some of 

the newer kinetic energy rounds were designed to defeat the newer 

Soviet-built tanks.

In the mines inventory category, the 1998 inventory was 80 percent of the 

1990 inventory. The 1998 inventory contained two newer mines, the 

Volcano and the WAM. Both provide increased performance and lethality 

over the mines contained in the 1990 inventory.
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix III

Current Production Weapon Funding 

Requests ApenIdxi

Source: Service budgetary data.

Then-year dollars in millions

Weapon Service

Total quantity to be

procured Total cost

Cost through fiscal

year 1998

 Cost fiscal year 1999

to completion

WCMD on CEM Air Force 30,000 $500 $112 $388

WCMD on Gator Air Force 5,000 82 19 63

Javelin Army 24,403 3,012 945 2,067

Javelin Marine Corps 2,553 287 96 191

Longbow Hellfire Army 12,905 2,092 704 1,388

MLRS-extended range Army 6,102 245 109 136

SADARM Army 50,000 1,978 235 1,743

SFW Air Force 5,000 2,066 912 1,154

Tank round M829A2 Army 144,000 614 470 144

WAM Army 3,165 214 40 174

Total $11,090 $3,642 $7,448
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenVIdxi
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report ApendVxi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division, Washington, 

D.C.

William Gillies

Roy Karadbil

Atlanta Field Office Laura Durland

Beverly Breen

(707356) Lert
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