PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 13-4260

__________

EDDIE MCBRIDE; LEONARD RILEY, JR.; 

EDDIE KNIGHT; CHARLES S. MILLER-BEY

v.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION,

 Appellant

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1-01-cv-00005)

District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 23, 2014

BEFORE: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and 

NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
2

(Filed: February 19, 2015)

Stephen B. Potter, Esq.

Potter, Carmine & Associates

840 North Union Street

P.O. Box 514

Wilmington, DE 19899

John P. Sheridan, Esq.

Marrinan & Mazzola Mardon

26 Broadway, 17th Floor

New York, NY 10004

Counsel for Appellant

Michael J. Goldberg, Esq.

73 Harrowgate Drive

Cherry Hill, NJ 08003

Perry F. Goldlust, Esq.

702 King Street, Suite 600

P.O. Box 1675

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellees

__________

OPINION

__________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
3

I.

The International Longshoremen’s Association 

challenges the District Court’s order denying its motion for 

relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The 

Union argues that the Court mistakenly classified Eddie 

Knight as a prevailing party and wrongly awarded him 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $243,758.34, including costs 

and post-judgment fees. The Union also questions whether 

the District Court even had jurisdiction to make the award, 

claiming it did more than our mandate authorized it to do in 

the Union’s prior appeal. We will affirm. 

II

This case has been around since 2001 and this is the 

third appeal we have heard from these parties.1 Knight is a 

member of the International Longshoremen’s Association, 

Local 1694, and was financial secretary for the Local. In 

2000, he distributed a flier that said the Local was hosting a 

group known as the Worker’s Coalition. Adam McBride, 

executive director of the Diamond State Port Corporation 

(created by the State of Delaware to operate the Port of 

Wilmington where members of Local 1694 work) saw the 

flier Knight distributed and offered to be a speaker. McBride 

also contributed $500—paying it directly to the hotel where 

the meeting was happening. 

 

1 See Knight v. International Longshoremen’s Association, 

457 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006); Knight v. International 

Longshoremen’s Association, 527 Fed. App’x. 187 (3d Cir. 

2013).
4

Shortly after McBride did these things, the Union’s 

national vice president, James Paylor, called McBride and 

told him that the Worker’s Coalition was not affiliated with 

the Union. McBride withdrew his offer to be a speaker, but 

he did not ask for the $500 to be returned. 

Knight filed Union charges against Paylor for 

interfering with the Local. Paylor counter-charged Knight. 

He accused him of making frivolous claims that were 

detrimental to the Union. He also said that Knight used the 

Union name without permission, violating Article XXVII of 

the Union constitution. The Union put together a board to 

hear the charges. The hearing board cleared Paylor, but

decided that Knight committed three violations: he misled 

the executive director of the Corporation to believe that the 

Union endorsed the Worker’s Coalition; he violated Section 

302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 

§186(b)) by accepting a gift from an employer; and, he used 

the Union and Local name, without permission, to solicit 

funds from an employer. It recommended that the Union’s 

Executive Council suspend Knight and order him, personally, 

to repay the $500 given by Diamond State Port Corporation. 

The Executive Council adopted the recommendations. 

Knight filed suit, claiming that Article XXVII of the 

Union’s constitution—prohibiting use of its name—violated 

his free speech rights. He also asserted against the Union 

three claims under the Labor Management Reporting and 

Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. § 411). Specifically, he alleged 

that the Union: refused to allow him to record his 

disciplinary hearing; selected a biased union member to serve 

on the board; and failed to give union members proper notice 

about the Act, violating Section 105. The District Court 
5

abstained on the free speech issue and ruled against Knight on 

the due process claims. 

We reversed the District Court’s order in 2006 and 

remanded the case. We ruled that the District Court should 

not have abstained, and decided that Article XXVII was too 

broad, chilling the free speech rights of union members under 

the Labor Management Relations Act. The remand instructed

the District Court to consider changing Article XXVII of the 

Union’s constitution to apply more narrowly to the misuse of 

the Union name. We also reversed the District Court’s order 

on all of Knight’s other claims, ruling that the Union violated

due process under the Labor Management Reporting and 

Disclosure Act: by refusing his request to record the hearing; 

by failing to give him an impartial disciplinary hearing 

committee; and, by failing to properly inform its members 

about the Act. Our remand instructed the District Court to 

determine the appropriate remedy for Knight. Later, in a 

separate order, we awarded attorney’s fees to Knight in the 

amount of $64,285.

Following our remand, the District Court ordered the 

Union to revise Article XXVII and to create a new policy for 

distributing copies of summaries of the Labor Management 

Reporting and Disclosure Act. The District Court also 

ordered the Union to give Knight a new hearing with an 

impartial tribunal, and to allow Knight to record the hearing. 

The Union complied with the order on the due process issues 

regarding bias and a tape-recorded record, and with 

improving its efforts to distribute information about the Act. 

It did not, however, immediately fulfill the requirements of 

the order to change its constitution. 
6

Before the Union’s ethics officer (who was accepted 

by both parties as unbiased) the Union asked for a ruling that 

Knight should be disciplined under Article XVIII of the 

Union constitution for conduct detrimental to the welfare of 

the Union by violating Section 302(a) of the Labor 

Management Relations Act. The hearing was recorded, and 

the ethics officer of the Union presided. The officer decided 

that Knight did not “technically” violate section 302(a)

because the Corporation who gave the $500 did not fit the 

definition of an employer under that section. But, the officer 

went on to conclude that, at the time of the first hearing, it 

was reasonable for the Union to decide that Knight “violated 

the spirit and intent of §302(b) and to direct the return of the 

money.” 

Knight and the Union then filed summary judgment 

motions with the District Court. The District Court denied 

most of the parties’ claims, but it did order a hearing on 

Knight’s assertion that the Union never charged him with 

violating the spirit of section 302(b), infringing his due 

process right under section 101(a)(5) of the Act. It also 

instructed the parties to present evidence regarding Knight’s 

request for compensatory and punitive damages.2 The 

District Court decided that the Union violated Knight’s due 

process rights because it did not give him adequate notice of 

the misconduct for which he was found guilty. It also ruled 

that Knight was entitled to be reimbursed $500 for the fine 

that he paid to the Union (and post-judgment interest on that 

amount). However, it concluded that he did not present 

 

2 The District Court also compelled the Union to comply with 

its earlier order to amend the constitution. 
7

enough evidence to justify either compensatory damages for 

lost income or punitive damages.3

Shortly after the District Court entered this order, 

Knight filed motions to set aside the judgment, to alter the 

judgment for prejudgment interest, and to recover attorney’s 

fees and costs. Knight then appealed the order on the issue of 

damages. The Union cross-appealed the District Court’s 

order, arguing that it did not violate Knight’s due process 

rights. We stayed the appeal and cross-appeal while the 

District Court decided the post-judgment motions. 

The District Court eventually granted Knight’s motion 

for attorney’s fees and costs, awarding him $295,971.87 in 

fees and costs. Citing to Ruocchio v. United Transp. Union, 

181 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999), it concluded that Knight

was a prevailing party who conferred a common benefit to all 

union members because of his successful free speech and due 

process challenges. The Union conceded that Knight’s 

successful free speech and section 105 claims conferred a 

common benefit. The District Court concluded that the 

required changes to the disciplinary hearing also conferred a 

common benefit because they would encourage the Union to 

pay more attention to procedural fairness in hearings that 

would follow, and make members aware of their due process 

rights. It denied the rest of Knight’s post-judgment motions. 

The Union amended its appeal in light of the attorney’s 

fees and costs awards, preserving this issue, but neither party 

 

3 The District Court invited Knight to file a motion and brief 

for prejudgment interest, but entered the final order before he 

was able to do so. 
8

briefed it and we did not address it. In our 2013 decision, we 

agreed with the Union that Knight’s due process rights under 

section 101(a)(5) of the Act were not violated in the second 

hearing, and we disagreed with Knight that damages should 

be awarded. Before we issued our mandate, Knight filed a 

motion with the District Court to require the surety to pay 

attorney’s fees. In the alternative, Knight wanted the District 

Court to order the Union to continue the supersedeas bond 

they posted, or to put up a substitute bond in an amount to 

cover Knight’s attorney’s fees award. The Union filed for 

relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, arguing that Knight no longer was a 

prevailing party and could not claim attorney’s fees. The 

District Court denied the Union’s motion for relief and 

ultimately awarded Knight attorney’s fees, costs, and postjudgment interest. It based the award on its conclusion that, 

because of Knight’s suit, Knight and other Union members: 

can no longer be disciplined for making harmless references 

to the Union name or logo; are more aware of certain due 

process rights at disciplinary hearings; and, are properly 

informed about the Act. It adjusted the amount of the 

judgment downward to $243,758.34, in part to account for 

our reversal on Knight’s due process claim in the second 

round. The Union now appeals the denial of their motion for 

relief.

III.

The Union first says that our order in 2013 remanded 

the case to the District Court to do only one thing: vacate the 
9

award of damages.4 They maintain that the District Court did 

not have authority to do anything else. This is incorrect. 5

There is no question that the District Court was 

required to follow our mandate (Bankers Trust Co. v. 

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985)); 

but, there is no basis here for the Union to say that the District 

Court acted improperly. “On remand, a trial court is free ‘to 

make any order or direction in further progress of the case, 

not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court, as to 

any question not settled by the decision.’” Casey v. Planned 

Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 

(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Bankers Trust Co., 761 F.2d at 950). 

Knight’s appeal focused on the District Court’s damages 

ruling. The Union’s cross appeal challenged the District 

Court’s ruling that the second disciplinary hearing violated 

due process under section 101(a)(5) of the Act. These are the 

issues we decided. It is true that the Union amended their 

cross appeal to add the District Court’s later award of 

attorney’s fees.6 However, as we said, no one briefed the 

issue and we did not rule on it. Therefore, our mandate did 

not prevent the District Court from deciding Knight’s postappeal motions on the supersedeas bond and attorney’s fees,

 

4 Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is based upon 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 

5 We review this question de novo. United States v. Kennedy, 

682 F.3d 244, 253 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012).

6 The District Court had jurisdiction to rule on attorney’s fees 

while the appeal was pending. See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 

117, 120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1985). 
10

and the Union’s motion for relief. The District Court had 

jurisdiction to decide these motions. 

The Union’s second claim is that the District Court 

wrongly denied its Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from 

judgment. The Rule says the following:

On motion and just terms, the 

court may relieve a party or its 

legal representative from a final 

judgment, order, or proceeding for 

the following reasons: . . . (5) the 

judgment has been satisfied, 

released or discharged; it is based 

on an earlier judgment that has 

been reversed or vacated; or 

applying it prospectively is no 

longer equitable. . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). We have plenary review over the 

District Court’s interpretation and application of legal rules 

and doctrines. Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 

403, 405-406 (3d Cir. 2003). Every other aspect of the 

District Court’s decision to deny the motion is examined for 

an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Fenton, 684 F.2d 249, 

251 (3d Cir. 1982). Our scope of review is narrow; we do not 

examine the underlying judgment. Id.

The Union has the burden of convincing us that the 

District Court misinterpreted the legal definition of prevailing 

party here and that, because of this misunderstanding, it relied 

on the wrong facts to decide its motion. Their argument, 

essentially, is that the District Court should have focused on 
11

the relief that we gave the Union in 2013 and should have 

minimized or ignored the judgment in Knight’s favor that we 

filed in 2006. 

The Union says that, without a final judgment in his 

favor, Knight is no longer a prevailing party. Concentrating 

on his underlying motive for the lawsuit (reversing the 

Union’s discipline against him) as the centerpiece of any 

determination on his success in this lawsuit, they say Knight 

lost the battle: his suspension was not revoked and his fine 

was not reduced. Mirroring language in Supreme Court

precedent on attorney’s fees, they contend that “the Court has 

not issued an enforceable judgment against Defendant ILA on 

Plaintiff Knight’s [Labor Management Reporting and 

Disclosure Act] § 101 Claim. The legal relationship between 

Knight and the [Union] was not altered.” See Buckhannon 

Bd. & Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and 

Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001). 

There is truth in what the Union is saying. Our ruling 

on Knight’s second appeal ended his due process challenge. 

This wiped out his entitlement to any damages, and it

eliminated anyone’s credible belief that flaws in the Union’s 

disciplinary process were affecting the outcome of the 

hearing. However, the Union is convinced that the District 

Court lost sight of all of this and analyzed the prevailing party 

issue in a way that contradicts Buckhannon’s ruling. It went 

astray, they claim, by relying on the order we issued in 2006 

(granting Knight relief on his due process and free speech 

claims) rather than focusing exclusively on the final judgment

in its favor. We disagree. The Union approaches this 

argument from different perspectives, and we will examine 

each.
12

The Union underscores the fact that Knight did not 

receive any damages in this case. Citing to Rhodes v. 

Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988), it insists that a party who is not 

awarded damages cannot “prevail.” Rhodes does not really 

say this; but, be that as it may, the Union’s position does not 

account for the effect that the common benefit doctrine has 

here. Although Title I of the Labor Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act does not provide an award of attorney’s 

fees, it is settled law that union members who successfully 

vindicate rights under Title I of the Act can seek 

reimbursement under the common benefit doctrine. Pawlak 

v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 975 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Hall 

v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1973)). The doctrine applies when 

“the plaintiff’s successful litigation confers ‘a substantial 

benefit on the members of an ascertainable class.’” Id. 

(quoting Hall, 412 U.S. at 5). 

Before Hall, the Supreme Court had already brushed 

aside concerns about damage awards when it considered the 

issue of attorney’s fees under the common benefit doctrine. 

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). “The 

fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never 

produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be 

paid does not preclude an award. . . .” Id. at 392. The Court 

concentrated on the “stare decisis effect” of the case upon 

future suits that could arise from the newly created precedent. 

Id. at 393. It also credited the judgment resulting from the 

suit as “vindicating the statutory policy” by contributing to a 

fair and informed voting process for the shareholders. Id. at 

396. Notwithstanding all of this, the Supreme Court set a 

substantial threshold for judging a party as successful under 

this doctrine. Quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court, it

cautioned that the common benefit “must be something more 
13

than technical in its consequence and be one that

accomplishes a result that corrects or prevents an abuse which

would be prejudicial to the rights and interests [of the 

beneficiaries] or affect the enjoyment or protection of an 

essential right [of the beneficiaries].” Id. (quoting Bosch v. 

Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Assn., 101 N.W. 2d 423, 

427 (Minn. 1960)). 

“Success” in lawsuits is a slippery concept that can 

shift between the parties as different phases of the case

unfold. Courts always must be cautious to avoid authorizing

attorney’s fees where a party has “won a battle but lost the 

war.” National Amusements, Inc., v. Borough of Palmyra, 

716 F. 3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal brackets omitted). 

That concern is at the heart of our review here. We 

understand the fact that Knight launched this lawsuit because 

he wanted to reverse the Union’s decision to fine and suspend 

him and that, ultimately, this did not happen. But, his 

complaint, which provides a fair basis for figuring out what 

the legal “war” was about, pointed to problems that could not 

be fixed with money damages. It is important to us that, 

citing to the Act, the focus of Knight’s lawsuit was on

challenging the validity of the process used to discipline him. 

It is also matters that his suit claimed problems that were not 

merely technical or incidental mistakes in the process as it 

applied to him. By claiming that the Union’s constitution 

infringed his free speech rights, and that basic elements of the 

Union’s disciplinary process violated his due process rights, 

he raised larger issues about structural elements of his 

disciplinary process. All of this gave the District Court good 

reason—consistent with Mills and Pawlak—to look beyond 

the absence of monetary damages in the final judgment to 

figure out if Knight’s lawsuit was successful. 
14

The Union goes further, though, arguing that the 

District Court’s opinion mistakenly relied on our judgment in 

2006 and ignored or contradicted the final judgment in this 

case. They make three related arguments to support this idea: 

(1) the 2006 order granting relief was an interim order; (2) 

the relief that Knight got in 2006 was only a remand for a 

new hearing; and (3) our order in 2013 reversed all prior 

orders that supported any claim that Knight prevailed. 

The Union’s argument that attorney’s fees cannot arise 

from an interim order begins with a point that we accept. The 

Union is correct that the order we issued in 2006 contained a 

remand that precluded its finality.7 However, the District 

 

7 The Restatement of Judgments says the following:

Finality will be lacking if an issue 

of law or fact essential to the 

adjudication of the claim has been 

reserved for future determination, 

or if the court has decided that the 

plaintiff should have relief against 

the defendant of the claim but the 

amount of the damages, or the 

form or scope of other relief, 

remains to be determined.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13(b) (1982). “An 

order that establishes liability but leaves open the question of 

damages or other remedies ... [is] not final for purposes of 

preclusion under traditional analysis.” 18A Charles A. 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
15

Court ordered attorney’s fees in this case after a final 

judgment had been rendered. It did rely on unchallenged 

rulings from a non-final order, but it did so only after all 

issues in the case had been resolved.

8

 

The Union is also right when it says, citing to the 

Supreme Court, that a party’s victory on an interim 

(interlocutory) order is often not enough to claim entitlement 

to attorney’s fees. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 759

(1980). Yet, they go too far when they say that an interim 

order can never ground attorney’s fees. The Court in 

Hanrahan, ruling in a civil rights case, said: “It seems 

apparent . . . that Congress intended to permit the interim 

award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the 

merits of at least some of his claims.” Id. at 757-8. It 

clarified this statement, saying: ‘“[T]he entry of any order 

that determines substantial rights of the parties may be an 

appropriate occasion upon which to consider the propriety of 

an award of counsel fees.’” Id. at 757 (quoting H.R. Rep. 

No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976)). Therefore, even were we to say 

that the attorney’s fees in this case were awarded on an 

interim order—an assertion with which we disagree—that 

alone would not be enough to reverse the District Court’s 

decision here. 

The Union moves on to the substance of our 2006 

order, saying that it was essentially a remand for a new 

hearing. They cite to a string of cases where we and other 

 

Practice and Procedure § 4432 (2d ed. 2002) (citing G. & C. 

Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28, 29 (1916)). 

8 See infra pp. 15-16. 
16

courts have decided that a remand for a new trial is not a 

victory that counts as having “prevailed.” See, e.g., Clark v. 

Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1989). Again, 

there is a kernel of truth in the Union’s argument. In many 

cases where a court of appeals remands for a new trial, the 

remand puts the plaintiff “no closer to a verdict in her favor 

than she was before the trial first began.” Swietlowich v. 

Bucks County, 620 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1980) (remand for 

new trial due to errors in jury instruction). As the Supreme 

Court said so elegantly, such victories are “ephemeral.” Sole 

v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (plaintiff won a preliminary 

injunction but ultimately lost on merits of claim). But, none 

of that really matters here because—as we suspect the Union 

is well aware—our order in 2006 did not remand for a new 

trial. 

Our ruling in 2006 gave Knight a final decision in his 

favor on every claim he raised in his complaint. Our Opinion 

suggested to the District Court some courses of action for 

implementing our order, but the remand ultimately gave the 

District Court discretion to figure out the best way to remedy 

the due process and free speech violations. The District Court 

used this discretion to order the Union to change its 

constitution, to implement new procedures at its disciplinary 

hearing, and to come up with a better way of distributing to 

union members information about the Labor Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act. It also decided that, with these 

changes, Knight was entitled to a new disciplinary hearing. 

We never directed the District Court to do this, nor would it 

have really mattered if we did. As suggested in Hanrahan, 

the key issue here is whether the order determined substantial 

rights of the parties. Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 757. The issue 

before us in 2006 was whether the Union respected Knight’s 
17

rights and complied with the Act when it disciplined him, not 

whether the Union’s decision to discipline him was right or 

wrong.9 Our order, and the District Court’s order on remand, 

did not return Knight to “square-one.” His lawsuit 

succeeded: he received a judgment stating that the Union 

breached important rights, and he obtained orders compelling 

the Union to change its constitution and its procedures.

10

 

This leads us to the Union’s final argument: that our 

order in 2013 reversed any possible basis for Knight to claim 

that he was a prevailing party. Our conclusion on this issue is 

very simple. There is no credible way of validating the 

Union’s argument that our holding in 2013 reversed our 

ruling in 2006. Our decision in 2013, rejecting Knight’s new 

 

9

In fact, we had a clear-eyed view of the possibility that, if 

given a new hearing, Knight might still face discipline. See 

Knight v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 457 F.3d at 340 

(“Because we do not have a transcript of the hearing we do 

not know the basis for the committee to have characterized 

Knight's receipt of the donation from Adam McBride 

(admittedly improper under the statute) as a ‘solicitation.’”).

10 The Union also likens the District Court’s orders, 

implementing our 2006 judgment, to preliminary injunctions. 

However, this description makes no sense because the orders 

did not provide prospective relief. Sypniewski v. Warren 

Hills Regional Board of Education, 307 F.3d 243, 252 (3d 

Cir. 2002). The District Court ordered permanent changes to 

the Union’s procedures and its constitution, consistent with 

our conclusions about the Union’s violations of due process 

and free speech rights. 
18

challenges to the fairness of the second hearing did nothing to 

affect our holding about the problems arising from the first 

hearing. Our holding in 2006 was never appealed by the 

Union, and has remained undisturbed through the remainder 

of this case. Our order in 2013 did reverse the District 

Court’s order, but that reversal was limited to the District 

Court’s conclusions about a due process violation in the 

second hearing and Knight’s entitlement to damages. We did 

not touch the issue of attorney’s fees or the underlying issue 

of who prevailed in this case. Therefore, we are not 

persuaded by the Union’s argument that the District Court’s 

decision to deny the Union’s motion for relief under Rule 60 

contradicted or ignored our final judgment in this case. 

For these reasons, we hold that the District Court did 

not err in its understanding and application of the legal 

concept of “prevailing party” under the common benefit 

doctrine to the Union’s motion. The Union’s request for 

relief was entirely based on its claim that our decision in 2013 

took away Knight’s status as a prevailing party. The District 

Court asked the proper legal question under the common 

benefit doctrine to decide this motion: did Knight 

successfully vindicate rights under Title I of the Act? To 

answer that question, it was necessary for the District Court to 

examine the entire case, including our uncontested rulings

from 2006.

We next turn to the District Court’s application of the 

facts to the legal standard. As we have just noted, the 

common benefit doctrine required the District Court to ask 

whether, at the end of the day, Knight vindicated Title I rights 

in a way that was significant to the union members at-large. 

Framed in this way, we conclude that the District Court did 
19

not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on Knight’s 

victories in 2006, rather than his defeat in 2013. 

Again, the Union presses us to place Knight’s motives 

for bringing the lawsuit at the center of any decision about 

whether he prevailed. However, in Pawlak, we separated the 

union members’ personal motives for challenging the union 

on free speech issues (and the ultimate electoral defeat of the 

by-laws they championed) from the benefit that was given to 

union membership by the suit. We concluded that the suit, 

resulting in a consent order, vindicated their freedom of 

speech, ‘“dispelled the ‘chill’ cast upon the rights of all Union 

members and contributed to the preservation of union 

democracy.” Pawlak, 713 F.2d at 980. We reasoned that the 

consent order “contributed to a fair process in bylaws 

referenda . . . . for it now stands as precedent for subsequent 

bylaws referenda.” Id. Similarly, we do not agree with the 

Union that a union member’s lack of success in overturning 

his discipline must wipe out the possibility that union 

members at-large benefited from changes he won in the 

union’s disciplinary procedures earlier in the litigation. It 

was appropriate for the District Court to weigh the impact of 

the uncontested rulings we made in 2006 to analyze whether 

Knight’s case had a significant “stare decisis effect.” 11

 

11 We note that it was particularly proper here where the Act 

authorizing Knight’s causes of action was designed to foster 

the “full and active participation by the rank and file in the 

affairs of the union.” Id. at 975 (quoting Hall, 412 U.S. at 7-

8). Though the District Court did not discuss the claims in 

these terms, it is legitimate, under common benefit analysis, 

to assess whether the suit “vindicate[ed] statutory policy.” 

Mills, 396 U.S. at 396. 
20

All of this leads us to conclude that the District Court 

did not commit any errors by considering the impact of 

Knight’s due process and free speech successes from the first 

hearing. This was plainly relevant to the question raised by 

the Union in its motion: whether Knight could still be 

regarded as a prevailing party. It adjusted downward the fees 

associated with Knight’s claims arising from the second 

disciplinary hearing, but left intact the remainder of the 

award. All of this was well within the discretion of the 

District Court. 

For all of these reasons, we will hold that the District 

Court exercised sound judgment and acted within its 

discretion when it denied the Union’s motion for relief from 

judgment.