IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 8, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JANET MICHELLE STANFIELD, TONY 

ALAN WINSETT and JUSTIN BRADLEY STANFIELD

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Circuit Court for Obion County

No. CC-15-CR-84 Jeff Parham, Circuit Court Judge

___________________________________

No. W2015-02503-SC-R11-CD

___________________________________

An Obion County grand jury indicted Tony Alan Winsett, Janet Michelle Stanfield, and 

Justin Bradley Stanfield for multiple drug and weapons charges based on the warrantless 

search of their home and the subsequent automobile stop involving defendants Winsett 

and Janet Stanfield. The defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence against them 

based on an allegedly improper search. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court 

granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the charges against them. The Court of 

Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The State then filed an application for 

permission to appeal to this Court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11(a). We granted the State’s 

application and, upon review, hold that, with respect to defendants Winsett and Janet 

Stanfield, the warrantless search of the residence was constitutionally permissible based 

on defendant Winsett’s status as a parolee and the doctrine of common authority. 

However, we conclude that the warrantless search with respect to defendant Justin 

Stanfield was constitutionally unreasonable because he retained a reasonable expectation 

of privacy in his bedroom and the State failed to carry its burden of proving that 

defendant Winsett exercised common authority over Justin Stanfield’s bedroom. 

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal 

Appeals Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Remanded to the Trial Court.

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,

and CORNELIA A. CLARK and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a 

separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in the judgment. 

08/07/2018
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Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, 

Solicitor General; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney General; Tommy A. Thomas, 

District Attorney General; and James T. Cannon, Assistant District Attorney General, for 

the Appellant, State of Tennessee.

Beau E. Pemberton, Dresden, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Janet Michelle Stanfield.

Charles S. Kelly, Sr., Dyersbug, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Tony Alan Winsett.

Bruce B. Brown, Union City, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Justin Bradley Stanfield.

OPINION

This matter involves the warrantless search of a Union City residence shared by 

defendant Janet Michelle Stanfield (Janet)1; her boyfriend, defendant Tony Alan Winsett 

(Tony); and her adult son, defendant Justin Bradley Stanfield (Justin). Based on the 

evidence seized pursuant to the search of the residence and the subsequent automobile 

stop involving defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield, an Obion County Grand Jury 

indicted Tony (a parolee) and Janet (a probationer)2for possession of 0.5 grams or more 

of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; unlawful possession 

of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving drugs, a Class D felony; 

and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 

39-17-434(a)(4); 39-17-1307(b)(1) (West 2015); 39-17-425(a). Defendant Winsett was 

also indicted for attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, creating a risk of death or 

injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-16-

603(b)(1). Janet Stanfield was separately indicted for unlawful possession of alprazolam 

with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4), -(d)(1). 

Janet Stanfield’s son Justin was indicted for possession of not less than one-half (1/2) 

 

1

 Because two of the defendants share the same surname, we will occasionally refer to all 

parties by their first names. In doing so, we intend no disrespect. 

2

 Although we refer to Janet Stanfield as a “probationer,” she was actually serving a community 

corrections sentence. The terms “community corrections” and “probation” are not synonymous. A

violation of either program subjects the defendant to revocation proceedings. State v. McNack, 356 

S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tenn. 2011) (citation omitted). However, if a community corrections offender is 

subject to revocation, he or she will receive credit for time spent in the program, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 

40-36-106(e)(4), whereas a probationer will not, see id. § 40-35-310. 
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ounce nor more than ten (10) pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a 

Class E felony. See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4), -(g).

I. Facts and Procedural History

On April 6, 2015, defendant Janet Stanfield lived with her boyfriend, defendant 

Tony Winsett, and her adult son, defendant Justin Stanfield, in a residence in Union City, 

Tennessee. Janet was serving a community corrections sentence for a 2012 felony 

conviction for promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant Winsett 

was on parole for felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent 

to sell/deliver and promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine. Justin was not on 

any form of supervised release.

On April 6, Union City Police Officer Ben Yates, while working with the drug 

task force, conducted a parole search3at the residence of defendant Winsett. Officer 

Yates contacted a parole officer to obtain a copy of defendant Winsett’s parole certificate, 

but at the time of his arrival at the residence, between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m., he was 

unaccompanied by a parole or probation officer and did not first obtain a search warrant. 

Officer Yates was acting upon information that he received from a confidential 

informant, who told Officer Yates that defendant Winsett was using methamphetamine 

and “possibly injecting with needles.” The informant had previously supplied Officer 

Yates with reliable and credible information that had developed a narcotics case. Officer 

Yates had met defendant Winsett through his “line of work” and was aware that 

defendant Winsett was a parolee and that Janet Stanfield resided with him. He had 

observed Justin Stanfield’s vehicle at the residence several times, so he had reason to 

believe that Justin also lived there. Officer Yates, together with Investigator David 

Crocker and Agent James Hall, responded to the Winsett residence. 

When they arrived at the residence, Agent Hall observed a burn pile upon which 

some clear, very large, plastic vacuum-sealed bags had been discarded. The bags were 

dry although it had been raining only ten to fifteen minutes earlier, which indicated to 

Officer Yates that the bags had been recently placed on the pile. After further 

investigation, he determined that the bags contained marijuana residue. 

 

3

 As discussed infra, as a condition of defendant Winsett’s parole, Winsett signed a Parole 

Certificate stating, among other things, that “I will agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person,

vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any 

time without reasonable suspicion.”
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Officer Yates knocked on the front door. Investigator Crocker simultaneously 

knocked on the back door, but no one answered at either door. There were no cars visible 

in the driveway. The police continued to knock on the doors for approximately ten to 

twenty minutes. While Investigator Crocker and Agent Hall continued knocking at both 

entry doors, Officer Yates noted an open window on the north side of the residence and 

proceeded toward it. Through the window he could hear movement inside the house, 

which sounded to him “like a running noise.” Noting the presence of security cameras 

around the house and the recently discarded plastic bags, Officer Yates believed someone 

was present inside the residence destroying evidence. 

Based upon this belief, Agent Hall used a pocket knife to gain entry through the 

front door of the residence. As soon as the officers entered the residence, they detected a 

“very strong odor of marijuana.” A large dog, estimated to weigh 140 pounds, was in the 

living room. Officer Yates attributed the sounds he had heard to the dog. The dog had 

not made any other noise, such as barking, other than the “running noise.” After 

entering, officers noted three bedrooms with open doors. One of the bedrooms was used 

as storage and was uninhabitable. The officers ascertained which of the other two 

bedrooms belonged to whom. Officer Yates recognized defendant Winsett’s bedroom 

because he observed a jacket that he had seen Winsett wearing on previous occasions. He 

knew that defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield had been in a relationship for some 

time and observed articles of women’s clothing; thus, he identified that bedroom as being 

jointly occupied by those two defendants. In Justin’s bedroom, officers found an 

identification card from Justin’s place of employment and a piece of mail addressed to 

him in a closed drawer of a nightstand. 

Officer Yates searched the bedroom occupied by defendants Winsett and Janet 

Stanfield. In it they seized a 9mm Smith & Wesson handgun and thirty-five rounds of 

ammunition. The serial number had been scratched off the handgun. They also seized a 

plastic box containing several sets of clear plastic bags, a set of digital scales, a marijuana 

pipe, and a small blue flashlight. Upon discovering that the flashlight did not work, 

Officer Yates unscrewed the battery compartment and found a small bag of a substance 

that he recognized as methamphetamine. Investigator Crocker located a pill container 

that contained methamphetamine inside the pocket of a black leather jacket. Agent Hall 

found a large pickle jar in Justin’s bedroom, concealed inside a wooden television stand,

that contained approximately seven ounces of marijuana. Agent Hall also seized a Glock 

22 .40 caliber handgun and fifteen rounds from that room. 
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Meanwhile, Officer Yates observed a television monitor in the master bedroom 

that showed live video feed from the security cameras placed around the outside of the 

residence. He noted that Justin’s vehicle passed by the residence very slowly then 

accelerated at a high rate of speed. Officers left the residence and conducted a traffic 

stop of Justin’s car. Nothing was seized from the vehicle, and Officer Yates advised 

Justin of his Miranda rights and placed him in custody. Officer Yates asked Justin if he 

sold marijuana. At first he denied it but subsequently admitted that he did, in fact, sell 

marijuana. Officer Yates requested consent to search Justin’s cellular telephone, which 

he granted. When Justin unlocked the telephone, Officer Yates saw a message to the 

effect of “Deleting All Messages.” He knew that at the initiation of the traffic stop, Justin 

had deleted all of the information on his telephone. As the messages were deleting, a 

new text message appeared. Justin acknowledged that it pertained to a sale of one ounce 

of marijuana. Justin arranged a location to meet the buyer; an officer then transported 

Justin to the jail while Officer Yates drove to the predetermined meeting place to 

confront the would-be purchaser, at which time he placed the man under arrest. 

During the narcotics operation involving Justin’s would-be purchaser, a vehicle 

matching the description of defendant Winsett’s vehicle drove past. Officer Yates called 

Agent Hall and advised him of the sighting. Agent Hall located the vehicle and began 

pursuing it, but the driver of the vehicle would not stop. Officer Yates activated his 

emergency equipment and went to assist Agent Hall. When Officer Yates arrived, Agent 

Hall had already placed the driver, defendant Winsett, in custody, and Janet, the front seat 

passenger, had been detained. Both defendants were advised of their Miranda rights, and 

officers began a search of the vehicle. Agent Hall confiscated four alprazolam pills and 

$238 in currency from Janet’s purse. Defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield were 

arrested based on the incriminating evidence found in the residence and from Janet’s 

person during the vehicle stop. 

Prior to trial, defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 

of the warrantless search. The trial court made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law:

Upon entering the residence, [law enforcement officers] determined 

that there were no people present. They cleared the house, was the 

testimony. By that, they went room to room and verified that there was no 

one present at that location. And at that point the officer also said that they 

could smell the odor of marijuana, although, it wasn’t testified as to 

whether that was the odor of raw marijuana or smoked marijuana. And the 

testimony was that they did not have a probation officer with them. But I 
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think, under the Turner case, . . . that is not fatal to this matter, that the 

officers could in fact go and do the parole search.

What the Court is having trouble with here, though, is while they 

were in the residence and had cleared the residence and had secured the 

residence, they clearly had probable cause to get a warrant. However, 

acting upon their belief that they could just unilaterally search anything 

within the residence, including opening drawers, and they entered – let me

go back. That they entered this residence believing someone was 

destroying evidence, which, once they secured the residence they could find 

that, that wasn’t happening.

So, the Court in this case finds that, once they entered the residence 

and had secured it, the Court finds that at that point they should have gotten 

a warrant, that with no one present, there was no harm, there [were] no 

exigent circumstances to justify the continued Fourth Amendment 

intrusion, therefore, I’m going to suppress the evidence.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictments. 

The State appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Addressing defendant 

Winsett’s motion to suppress, the appellate court first acknowledged that “the evidence in 

the burn pile, security cameras, and unidentified noises coming from inside the house 

may have created exigent circumstances for officers to cause forced entry into the house”

but concluded that any exigency that prompted the forced entry no longer existed upon 

the officers’ discovery of the source of the suspicious noise. State v. Stanfield, No. 

W2015-02503-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 

2017), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Jul. 19, 2017). The appellate court further stated that 

“[o]nce the house was ‘cleared,’ the subsequent extensive search without the parolee’s 

presence did not further any legitimate law enforcement concerns.” Id. The court 

highlighted the State’s failure to address reasonable suspicion for the search or the 

reliability of the confidential information. Id. at *5. 

With regard to Janet’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that with 

regard to a search of a probationer’s residence, a warrantless search is permissible if 

reasonable suspicion for the search exists. Id. at *6 (citations omitted). The intermediate 

appellate court concluded that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion as to Janet

because they were unaware of her status as a probationer and lacked any evidence of her 

engaging in criminal activity. Id. at *6-7. The court concluded that “the subsequent 
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traffic stop and search of Janet’s person was too attenuated from the search of the house” 

and that the evidence seized in the stop was properly suppressed. Id. at *7. 

Finally, as to Justin’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State’s 

“common authority” argument and opined that because the State failed to establish that 

either of the other occupants had common authority over Justin’s bedroom, despite the 

fact that the door was open, the evidence against Justin was properly suppressed. Id. 

We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in this case to 

consider, inter alia, the expectations of privacy enjoyed by an individual granted 

supervised release from incarceration (“a parolee,” i.e. Tony Winsett); an individual 

granted alternative sentencing (“a probationer,” i.e. Janet Stanfield); and a private citizen 

residing with both a parolee and a probationer (i.e. Justin Stanfield). Necessary to our 

discussion is an analysis of how one’s expectation of privacy is impacted when he or she 

either cohabitates with (in the same bedroom) or resides in the same dwelling with a 

person or persons who enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy due to legal status. 

II. Standard of Review 

On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, we will uphold the trial court’s 

findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. State v. 

Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 32 (Tenn. 2017) (citing State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528 

(Tenn. 2014)); State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Turner, 297 

S.W.3d 155, 160 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008); State v. 

Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). “‘Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the 

weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters 

entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.’” Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting 

Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). The party prevailing in the trial court on a motion to suppress 

“‘is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression 

hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence.’” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). We review 

the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of 

correctness. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d at 32-33 (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 

(Tenn. 2001)); Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (citations omitted). 

III. Analysis

A. The Fourth Amendment
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “‘[t]he 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause . . . .’” State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 68 (Tenn. 2017) 

(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV); State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 

2016). Determining whether a particular search is “unreasonable” and therefore a 

violation of the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment “‘depends upon all of the 

circumstances surrounding the search . . . and the nature of the search . . . itself.’” 

Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 

531, 537 (1985)). “‘The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and 

seizures under the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of 

individuals against arbitrary invasions [by] government[al] officials.”’” Christensen, 517

S.W.3d at 68 (quoting State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting 

Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); see also State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 

723, 729 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). 

Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “‘the 

people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68 (quoting Tenn. 

Const. art. I, § 7). The search and seizure provisions of the federal and state constitutions 

are “‘identical in intent and purpose.’” Id. (quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 

S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968)). Under both constitutional guarantees, reasonableness is “the 

ultimate touchstone.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); 

McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 679. A search is presumptively reasonable when conducted 

on the basis of probable cause and with a warrant. See McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678-

79. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, even if the police 

possess probable cause for the search. Id. However, there are circumstances where the 

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 requires neither 

probable cause nor a warrant. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006); 

Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157. The search of a parolee—a person who has been convicted 

of a criminal offense and is serving a sentence involving release into the community—is 

one such circumstance. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157.

B. Warrantless Search of Tony Winsett’s Residence (Parolee)

In the matter before us, both the State and defendant Winsett rely on this Court’s 

opinion in State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009). In Turner, this Court 

considered, as a matter of first impression, the application of Samson v. California to 

Tennessee’s jurisprudence regarding searches and seizures and held that “parolees who 
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are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched without reasonable or 

individualized suspicion.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157. Therefore, we begin our analysis 

with Turner’s synopsis of the Samson opinion. 

In Samson, a California law provided “that every prisoner eligible for release on 

state parole ‘shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or 

other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and 

with or without cause.’” Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (citation omitted). Relying on this 

statutory authorization, a police officer who encountered Samson on the street conducted 

a warrantless and suspicionless search of his person “based solely on [Samson’s] status as 

a parolee.” Id. at 846-47. The officer found “a cigarette box in [Samson’s] left breast 

pocket. Inside the box he found a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine.” Id. at 

847. The officer seized the methamphetamine, and Samson was charged with possession. 

Id. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that the search was reasonable, 

authorized by California law, and not “arbitrary or capricious.” Id. A jury convicted 

Samson, and he received a seven-year sentence. Id. The California Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court’s denial of Samson’s motion to suppress, ruling that suspicionless 

searches of parolees are constitutionally reasonable so long as such searches are not 

“arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id. 

In doing so, the United States Supreme Court considered “the totality of the 

circumstances.” Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that 

this determination requires a balancing, “on the one hand, the degree to which [a search] 

intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed 

for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As for the degree of intrusion on the privacy of the Samson, a parolee, the 

Court explained that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, 

because parole is more akin to imprisonment[;] . . . [t]he essence of parole is release from 

prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by 

certain rules during the balance of the sentence.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, the Court explained, “parolees . . . 

have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.” Id. at 

852. 

Second, the Supreme Court found it “salient” that the California law requiring 

parolees to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other 

peace officer “at any time,” was “clearly expressed” to Samson. Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court pointed out that Samson “signed an 
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order submitting to the condition and thus was unambiguously aware of it.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court balanced the diminished expectation of privacy a parolee has 

with the State’s “‘overwhelming interest’” in supervising parolees, “‘[who] are more 

likely to commit future criminal offenses,’” and the State’s interests in reducing 

recidivism and in promoting reintegration and positive citizenship. Id. at 853 (quoting 

Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (2014)). The Supreme Court concluded 

that the State’s substantial interests in supervising parolees “warrant privacy intrusions 

that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Accordingly, 

the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless, suspicionless search of Samson based on his 

parolee status alone. Id. at 857. 

In Turner, this Court adopted the rationale and holding of Samson, stating:

The [United States] Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal 

conviction subjects the offender to “a continuum of possible punishments 

ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few 

hours of mandatory community service.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 

868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). An offender’s place on 

this continuum alters what is “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment. For instance, incarcerated felons have no legitimate 

expectation of privacy in their prison cells. . . . 

. . . .

On the continuum of possible punishments and reductions in 

freedoms, parolees occupy a place between incarcerated prisoners and 

probationers. Tennessee’s statutory scheme defines parole as “the release 

of a [previously incarcerated] prisoner to the community . . . prior to the 

expiration of the prisoner’s term subject to conditions . . . .” Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-28-102(5). “Release on parole is a privilege and not a right . . . 

.” Id. § 40-35-503(b) (2006); see also id. § 40-28-117(a) (2006). Under 

Tennessee’s statutory scheme, persons released outside of prison walls on 

parole remain in the legal custody of the warden (or relevant penal 

supervisor) and are subject to all of the provisions upon which their parole 

is conditioned. Id. § 40-28-117(a); Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399, 340 

S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960). Parolees remain under the confinement of their 

sentences while on parole. Doyle, 340 S.W.2d at 893.
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Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 161-63 (alterations in original). The Turner Court described 

Samson as “a narrow exception to the usual rule: an exception which is hardly misguided 

given the minimal privacy interests retained by parolees and the government’s 

‘overwhelming interest’ in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of her 

parole.” Id. at 164. 

As such, this Court in Turner expressly held that under both federal and Tennessee 

state constitutional protections, 

[a] parole condition requiring that the parolee submit to warrantless 

searches is reasonable in light of the parolee’s significantly diminished 

privacy interests; the goals sought to be attained by early release; and 

society’s legitimate interest in protecting itself against recidivism. We 

therefore adopt the reasoning of Samson and hold that the Tennessee 

Constitution permits a parolee to be searched without any reasonable or 

individualized suspicion where the parolee has agreed to warrantless 

searches by law enforcement officers. 

Id. at 166 (footnote omitted). 

By contrast, this Court held, the State’s interests were substantial. Turner, 297 

S.W.3d at 163 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). The Court noted that 

“[the] State has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees because 

‘parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.’ 

Similarly, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State’s interests in 

reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive 

citizenship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that 

would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). 

Applying Turner to the matter at hand, the search of defendant Winsett’s residence 

was constitutionally reasonable, even though officers neither had a search warrant nor 

sought to obtain a warrant prior to searching defendant Winsett’s residence, based upon 

Winsett’s status as a parolee. Just as in Samson and Turner, as a condition of defendant 

Winsett’s parole, Winsett signed a Parole Certificate stating, among other things that “I 

will agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of 
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residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time without 

reasonable suspicion.” His signature on the document clearly illustrates that defendant 

Winsett was “unambiguously” aware of the search condition contained in his parole 

agreement, and the officer conducting the search was aware of his status as a parolee. 

See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. Thus, the search of defendant Winsett’s residence was 

constitutionally reasonable based on his status as a parolee alone. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that once the officers entered 

the residence and determined that the source of the suspicious noise was due not to 

nefarious conduct but to a rambunctious canine, the exigency no longer existed, and the 

officers should have halted. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6. This analysis ignores 

the salient circumstance that this defendant enjoyed a lessened expectation of privacy due 

to his parolee status. Moreover, the intermediate court’s conclusion ignores the holdings 

of Turner and Samson, both of which authorized the warrantless search based upon 

Winsett’s parolee status alone.4 

We hasten to emphasize, however, that neither Samson nor Turner afford law 

enforcement unfettered and unreviewable discretion. As this Court emphasized in 

Turner, a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee could be deemed 

unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under circumstances indicating that the 

search was conducted for reasons other than valid law enforcement concerns, for 

instance, “a pattern of repetitive searches while the parolee is at work or asleep,” 

“[s]earches intended to cause the parolee some harm,” or a “search conducted out of 

personal animosity.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 167. “A suspicionless search of a parolee 

would also be constitutionally suspect if the law enforcement officer conducted it without 

knowing that the person searched was a parolee subject to warrantless and suspicionless 

searches.” Id. at 166-67. This Court recognized that “there may be other situations 

where a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable.” Id. at 167. 

Accordingly, as a procedural safeguard, this Court held that “the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee must be 

examined to determine whether the search is constitutionally unreasonable.” Id. We 

noted, however, that “[a] suspicionless search of a parolee subject to a warrantless search 

 

4

 For this same reason, the intermediate appellate court erred by criticizing the State for failing to 

address reasonable suspicion in its brief. Because Turner and Samson authorized a warrantless, 

suspicionless search of defendant Winsett’s residence based on his status alone, the State had no 

obligation to brief the question of reasonable suspicion. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *5.
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condition, and which is conducted out of valid law enforcement concerns, is not 

unreasonable.” Id.

Pursuant to Turner, we must now engage in a review of the totality of the 

circumstances, “of which [the] [d]efendant’s status as a parolee and [his] agreement to 

the warrantless search condition are salient circumstances, and determine whether the 

search of [the] [d]efendant’s residence was reasonable.” Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).

Here, the record lacks evidence establishing that the search was constitutionally 

unreasonable. Officer Yates was aware of Winsett’s parole status and was conducting a

search based upon what he deemed to be credible information5to determine whether 

Winsett was engaging in drug activity—a valid law enforcement concern.

6

 The officers 

arrived at the home in the middle of the afternoon, not during the night. The police had 

been to the residence twice before and had not entered when no one answered their 

knock. On the day in question, the police knocked for ten to twenty minutes and entered 

only after hearing suspicious noises from inside the dwelling that could have been 

attributable to destruction of evidence. Even then, they entered the residence in a manner 

that minimized property damage. There is no evidence in the record that suggests that

Officer Yates was acting in an arbitrary manner. The record is devoid of any proof that 

Officer Yates sought to cause Winsett any harm, that Officer Yates acted out of personal 

animosity, or that the search was one of a pattern of repetitive searches while Winsett was 

at work or asleep.7

 

5

 In conducting its totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals 

concluded that the search was unreasonable because Officer Yates based his search in part on an 

unidentified informant whose reliability and basis of knowledge had not been established and because the 

“exigent circumstances” the officers believed to exist based on the noises they heard while outside of the 

house were subsequently extinguished. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6. In light of Turner, the Court 

of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that these factors were determinative.

6

 In its Rule 11 application, the State asks this Court to address the parameters of what would 

constitute a “legitimate law enforcement concern” under Turner. Resolution of this case does not require 

us to set forth an over-arching definition of that term. Suffice it to say that because this case clearly 

involves detection and prosecution of drug-related offenses, officers were acting pursuant to a legitimate 

law enforcement concern. 

7

 In this case, defendant Winsett was not home at the time of the search, a fact upon which the 

trial court seemingly relied. Our research has yielded no authority for the proposition that a search of a 

parolee’s residence is per se unreasonable if the parolee is not present at the time. To the contrary, at 

least one federal circuit court has concluded that a parole search conducted outside the presence of the 

parolee was, indeed, not unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 

1997) (rejecting parolee’s argument that parole officer’s search of his residence became unreasonable

once the parole officer determined that the parolee was not at home). In its brief, the State emphasizes 
- 14 -

Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, the search of defendant 

Winsett’s bedroom was clearly permissible. Based upon the Turner and Samson

decisions, we conclude that because Officer Yates knew about defendant Winsett’s parole 

status and because Winsett was aware that he was subject to warrantless and 

suspicionless searches at any time as a condition of his parole, officers did not err in 

searching certain areas of defendant Winsett’s residence. Absent any evidence 

whatsoever that the search in question was unreasonable in a constitutional sense and 

keeping in mind the State’s significant interests in combating recidivism and thwarting 

illegal drug activity by parolees, we hold that evidence seized during the warrantless 

search of defendant Winsett’s residence was admissible against him and that the trial 

court erred in suppressing the evidence against defendant Winsett. We reverse the trial 

court’s decision granting defendant Winsett’s motion to suppress and the Court of 

Criminal Appeals’ opinion affirming the same.

C. Warrantless Search of Janet Stanfield’s Possessions in Shared Bedroom 

(Probationer)

We next address the trial court’s decision to grant defendant Janet Stanfield’s 

motion to suppress. As stated supra, defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield shared a 

bedroom within the residence; as such, their legal statuses intertwine. Therefore, it is 

necessary to consider whether the doctrine of common authority applies to the search of 

belongings that were found within the bedroom but that clearly belonged to Janet. 

In State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1996), this Court recognized the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision regarding common authority as set forth in 

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), stating, “[T]he consent of one who 

possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.” Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 230-231 

(citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171). 

The [United States Supreme C]ourt defined common authority as the 

“mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 

control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of 

the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and 

 

that it is not seeking to establish a rule that would permit law enforcement to enter parolee residences in 

the absence of exigent circumstances, such as those present in this case. Thus, we confine our analysis to 

the facts of this case. 
- 15 -

that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit 

the common area to be searched.” 

Id. at 231 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7).8 Following the Matlock decision, 

Tennessee applied the common authority test in a case involving spousal consent. State 

v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 134 (Tenn. 1981). “In Pritchett, this Court stated, ‘[A] wife 

can consent to the search of her home, and if objects are found [that] would incriminate 

her husband, such objects are admissible in evidence.’” Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 231 

(quoting Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d at 134); see also Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 734) (holding that 

a live-in girlfriend can consent to search based on the doctrine of common authority).

Many jurisdictions acknowledge that if a parolee is sharing a residence with 

someone else, a parole search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to 

which the parolee has common authority: 

A warrantless search of a parolee may result in an invasion of privacy, at 

least to some extent, for those living with the parolee. If the Fourth 

Amendment rights of nonparolees living with parolees were not reduced, a 

parolee could avoid all warrantless parole searches by living with a 

nonparolee and asserting the nonparolee’s constitutional rights, and thus 

emasculate one significant feature of the parole system.

5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 

10.10(d), at 556-57 n.138 (5th ed. 2012) 

(citing State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1987) (abrogated on other grounds)

and (citing United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding 

that parole search was lawful as to parolee’s wife because officers only searched common 

areas and the one bedroom that was identified as belonging to Cantley)); see United 

States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument 

that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they 

searched a safe that was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-

 

8

 Later, the United States Supreme Court limited Matlock by holding that “if a potential 

defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does 

not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in 

the threshold colloquy, loses out.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006). Here, neither 

defendant Winsett nor Janet Stanfield was present, so we need not consider how, if at all, Georgia v. 

Randolph applies to parole searches. 
- 16 -

defendant). “Persons who live with [parolees] cannot reasonably expect privacy in areas 

of a residence that they share with [parolees].”9 People v. Pleasant, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 796, 

798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). As such, “a warrantless search, justified by a [parole] search 

condition, may extend to common areas, shared by [nonparolees], over which the 

[parolee] has ‘common authority.’” People v. Smith, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 694, 697 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2002) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171); see also State v. Yule, 905 So.2d 251, 

264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (A nonparolee’s “diminished expectation of privacy 

extends to those portions of the shared residence over which the [parolee] and 

[nonparolee] have joint dominion.”). 

Tennessee has not yet considered the doctrine of common authority as it relates to 

parole searches. 10 However, adoption of the doctrine in this context seems to be a logical 

extension thereof. Applying the doctrine of common authority to parole searches also 

furthers important policy considerations. The State has an “overwhelming interest” in 

supervising parolees and “reducing recidivism.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 163 (quoting 

Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). The privacy intrusion upon an individual sharing a bedroom 

(i.e., an area with common authority) with a parolee is not so invasive that it would not be 

tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. See id.; see also State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 

884, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“Non-probationers who choose to live with probationers 

‘assume the risk that they too will have diminished Fourth Amendment rights in areas 

shared with the probationer.’ˮ) (quoting State v. Adams, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623 (N.D. 

2010)); State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491-92 (Wis. 1994). Therefore, we expressly 

adopt the doctrine of common authority as it applies to parole searches of areas of a 

residence over which a parolee has common authority. 

Nevertheless, the government bears the burden of proving the common authority 

doctrine applies. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); West, 517 N.W.2d at 

491. The State has satisfied its burden in this case. It is without question that Tony 

Winsett and Janet Stanfield shared a bedroom in the residence.11 Thus, by virtue of the 

 

9

 As we explained supra, parole and probation fall along different points on the continuum of 

possible punishments. However, both statuses involve supervised release into the community as opposed 

to incarceration. While these terms are not interchangeable, for the purpose of our analysis, we find 

reference to cases involving probation instructive on this issue. 

10

 While some case law suggests that parole searches are akin to consent searches, other 

jurisdictions disagree on whether a parole search is, indeed, a consent search because of the involuntary 

and mandatory nature of the search. Our decision does not require consideration of that precise issue. 

11

 As part of the rules of community corrections, Janet signed a form requiring that she comply 

with law enforcement requests to conduct a search of her person and all areas of her residence “to control 
- 17 -

doctrine of common authority, law enforcement officers did not err in searching and 

seizing all items of contraband found in the shared bedroom. The trial court, therefore, 

erred in suppressing the evidence against Janet Stanfield.

To that end, having found that the search of the residence was constitutionally 

reasonable as to Janet Stanfield, her argument that evidence seized from her person 

during the ensuing stop of defendant Winsett’s automobile should also be suppressed as 

fruit of the poisonous tree is without merit as well. We reverse the trial court’s granting 

of defendant Janet Stanfield’s motion to suppress and the Court of Criminal Appeals’ 

decision affirming the same.

D. Warrantless Search of Justin Stanfield’s Room 

(Private Citizen)

More problematic, however, was the warrantless search of Justin Stanfield’s room 

and the resulting seizure of marijuana. The extent of the privacy interest of an individual 

who is unencumbered by a conditional release status but who resides with an individual 

subject to such restrictions is a matter of first impression in Tennessee. The State urges 

us to apply the common authority doctrine and uphold the officers’ search of Justin 

Stanfield’s bedroom. 

As suggested by the record, the searches of the bedrooms occurred simultaneously 

but only after the officers determined ownership of each bedroom. Officer Hall, who did 

not testify at the suppression hearing,12 continued to perform a thorough search of Justin 

Stanfield’s room even after establishing to whom it belonged. He seized a pickle jar 

containing marijuana from a closed wooden television stand in Justin’s bedroom. The 

State relies on Justin’s open bedroom door and the lack of evidence that he intended to 

restrict access to the room, such as a lock on the door or testimony that he regularly kept 

the door closed. 

 

contraband or locate missing or stolen property.” Given our conclusion that the search of the bedroom 

was constitutionally reasonable based on the common authority doctrine, we need not and do not 

determine whether the conditions of community corrections to which Janet Stanfield agreed also would 

have supported a suspicionless, warrantless search of her residence.

12 We must note that due to the particular facts of this case, it would have been beneficial for the 

trial court and the appellate courts if Officer Hall had testified at the suppression hearing to clarify some 

of the intricacies of the search. 
- 18 -

Assuming the search was valid as to defendant Winsett, as we have so held, the 

question becomes whether Justin’s bedroom fell within the purview of the parole search. 

See, e.g., 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 70 (2018) (noting that “a parole search may 

extend to all parts of the premises to which the parolee has common authority even over 

the objections of a non[-] parolee living on those premises”). There is no evidence 

indicating whether Justin did or did not manifest an expectation of exclusivity, but the 

State argues that the open door refutes the notion of exclusivity.13

As stated supra, “The ‘rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal 

rights.’” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389). Accordingly, 

we focus on the extent of Justin Stanfield’s constitutional rights. See id. (citing Rakas, 

439 U.S. at 139). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Justin as the 

prevailing party at the hearing on the motion to suppress, together with all reasonable and 

legitimate inferences therefrom. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160. In addition, “evidence 

obtained as a result of a warrantless search or seizure ‘is subject to suppression unless the 

State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the 

narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 729-30 

(quoting Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629). The State, of course, “bears the burden of proof 

when a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant.” State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 

99, 105 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629).

As noted above, the government also bears the burden of proving the common 

authority doctrine applies. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181. As the Tenth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has explained, proof of common authority requires “persuasive evidence of both 

shared use and joint access or control.” United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 

(10th Cir. 1992). The State cannot meet its burden 

if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without 

making further inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough, if the 

circumstances make it unclear whether the property about to be searched is 

subject to “mutual use” by the [parolee] . . . , “then warrantless entry is 

unlawful without further inquiry.” 

 

13

 We also note the dearth of evidence of whether any of Winsett’s or Janet Stanfield’s 

possessions were found in Justin’s room. Had any of their possessions been found in Justin’s room, this 

would have supported the application of the doctrine of common authority as to the search of Justin’s 

room.
- 19 -

Id. (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D. C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89)). The State has not satisfied its burden in this case. 

Justin Stanfield, the twenty-one-year-old son of Janet Stanfield, maintained a 

separate bedroom in the residence he shared with the co-defendants. Officer Yates 

testified that the door was open. Although common sense would dictate that Justin was 

aware that his mother was on probation and that defendant Winsett was on parole, the 

State presented no evidence that Justin was aware of the search conditions of their release 

from confinement or that those conditions could possibly implicate his own constitutional 

protections. “[W]idely shared social expectations” would not support defendant 

Winsett’s or Janet Stanfield’s rummaging through cabinets or drawers in Justin’s 

bedroom. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). Moreover, although Justin is 

the son of defendant Janet Stanfield, this is not a “family” situation; Justin was not a child 

who resided with his mother and father or mother and step-father. Rather, the living 

arrangement is more closely akin to three adult roommates sharing a residence. In such 

arrangements, roommates typically do not have authority to rummage through the 

personal belongings of another roommate. 

We also emphasize that Officer Yates had observed Justin’s vehicle at the 

residence on several occasions and testified that he had reason to believe that Justin lived 

there. Ergo, Officer Yates knew that one of the three bedrooms was occupied by 

defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield and another one was occupied by Justin Stanfield. 

The presence of women’s clothing in the shared bedroom immediately resolved the 

question of who inhabited each bedroom. However, upon observing that a third bedroom 

was uninhabitable due to clutter, officers did not search inside that bedroom; it stands to 

reason that the third bedroom would have been an excellent place to hide illegal 

substances or objects and could have been the source of the odor of marijuana. Rather, 

the officers chose to search the bedroom of Justin Stanfield. These two facts seem 

irreconcilable from a Fourth Amendment perspective. 

While other jurisdictions accept that persons who are not subject to conditional 

release status and choose to reside with parolees or probationers assume the risk that they 

too will have diminished constitutional rights in areas that are shared by all residents, 

State v. Adams, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623 (N.D. 2010), it does not follow that a co-occupant 

has no privacy expectation in his own bedroom and furniture simply because a parolee is 

“physically capable” of reaching said areas, Milton v. State, 879 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Alaska 

Ct. App. 1994); see also Bursch, 905 N.W.2d at 891 (holding that those who live with a 

parolee have normal expectations of privacy in areas under their exclusive control “so 

long as there is no basis for [law enforcement] to reasonably believe the [parolee] has 
- 20 -

authority over those areas” (quoting People v. Robles, 3 P.3d 311, 317 (Cal. 2000)). 

These cases held that “[l]aw enforcement may not search areas that are under the non-

[parolee’s] exclusive control, like the non-[parolee’s] bedroom, just because they live 

with a parolee.” Bursch 905 N.W.2d at 892; see also Robles, 3 P.3d at 317 (“That 

persons under the same roof may legitimately harbor differing expectations of privacy is 

consistent with the principle that one’s ability to claim the protection of the Fourth 

Amendment depends upon the reasonableness of his or her individual expectations.”). 

The risk to non[-parolees’] Fourth Amendment rights demands that, when 

officers conduct a [parole] search where a [parolee] lives with a non[-

parolee], the facts available to the officers must support a reasonable belief 

that the probationer has at least common authority over the area searched. 

State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Burgener, 714 

P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986) (“Inasmuch as authority to search the residence of a parolee 

[or probationer] extends to areas which are jointly controlled with other occupants of the 

residence, the authority to search these premises necessarily portends a massive intrusion 

on the privacy interests of third persons solely because they reside with a parolee [or 

probationer].” (citation omitted)). 

While the warrantless entry into the shared residence did not violate Justin’s 

Fourth Amendment rights, he is not completely divested of his constitutional rights 

simply by residing with a parolee. Even when faced with objections by non-parolees, 

officers may still enter a residence in this situation but may only search the areas that are 

under the control of the parolee, such as the parolee’s bedroom or other areas over which 

the parolee shares common control or authority. Law enforcement officers may not 

search areas that are under the non-parolee’s exclusive control, such as the non-parolee’s 

bedroom, simply because the non-parolee resides with someone on conditional release 

status. 

To give clear guidance to law enforcement officers, we emphasize that law 

enforcement is only permitted to conduct a search of a certain area of a parolee’s 

residence if “the facts available to the officers . . . support a reasonable belief that the 

[parolee] has at least common authority over the area searched.” Davis, 965 P.2d at 533. 

By so holding, this Court is balancing the State’s interests in enforcing the terms of 

parole by not allowing parolees to create a “loophole” by residing with a non-parolee 

while simultaneously respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of an unencumbered 

citizen by not allowing law enforcement officers unfettered access to all areas inside the 

parolee’s residence. 
- 21 -

In expressly adopting the doctrine of common authority as applied to parole 

searches, we also adopt the limitations thereof. Under these circumstances and the 

unique facts presented by this case, we conclude that rather than permitting the search of 

Justin’s bedroom, as asserted by the State, the doctrine of common authority applies to 

limit law enforcement’s search of an area held exclusively by an individual with no 

conditional release status. To hold otherwise would be to grant law enforcement carte 

blanche to conduct full searches of any residence in which a parolee is living, regardless 

of the person who is actual target of the search, thus obviating the warrant requirement in 

such situations. Absent a showing that it was reasonable for law enforcement officers to 

believe that defendant Winsett had shared authority of Justin’s bedroom, Justin held a full

expectation of privacy in his bedroom that was not diminished by the conditional release 

status of his co-residents. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that law 

enforcement reasonably believed that defendant Winsett exerted any authority over 

Justin’s bedroom; as such, Officer Yates and Agent Hall were not allowed to search his 

bedroom merely because they were conducting a parole search of the residence. 

Because the parole search of the residence was proper, it was therefore permissible 

for officers to enter Justin’s bedroom to clear it for officer safety. Upon detecting the 

odor of marijuana in the residence, officers had probable cause to obtain a warrant to 

search further, but they did not. At this point, Justin’s privacy interests were paramount 

to the promotion of governmental interests. See Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (stating that 

“the permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

These limitations also further the State’s interests from a policy perspective. In 

addition to combating recidivism among parolees, the State also has an interest in 

promoting a parolee’s or probationer’s reintegration into society. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 

163 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). It would be counterintuitive to effectively strip 

all constitutional rights from an individual who has no restraint on his legal status by 

virtue of his sharing a residence with a parolee. Should circumstances exist that call into 

question the legality of a non-parolee’s actions, such as the odor of marijuana in this case, 

officers should follow the appropriate channels and obtain a search warrant for the 

exclusive bedroom of the third party. See State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 n.3 

(Utah 1983) (“Caution would certainly suggest that a warrant be obtained if the rights of 

non-parolees might be affected [by a parole search].”).
- 22 -

Having cleared the residence, there was no longer an exigency as it related to 

Justin Stanfield’s bedroom. The parole search was valid as it pertained to the common 

areas of the residence and defendants Winsett/Stanfield’s bedroom, but it did not extend 

to Justin Stanfield’s private quarters. When the officers entered and walked toward the 

bedrooms, it was immediately apparent that one bedroom was uninhabitable, one 

bedroom contained both men’s and women’s clothing, and the remaining bedroom, by 

process of elimination, belonged to Justin. A search of Justin’s bedroom was not 

necessary to determine ownership, yet officers opened a nightstand drawer and located 

Justin’s identification. Armed with this additional knowledge, Agent Hall nonetheless 

continued to perform a thorough search of Justin’s bedroom, opening cabinets and 

drawers. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude 

that the State has failed to carry its burden of proving that a thorough search of Justin’s 

room was permissible under these circumstances. 

CONCLUSION

We hold that because of the sweeping parole conditions to which defendant 

Winsett was subject and of which defendant Winsett and Officer Yates were aware, the 

parole search of portions of defendant Winsett’s residence was constitutionally 

permissible. We further hold that considering the totality of the circumstances presented 

by this case, defendant Winsett’s absence during the search did not rise to the level of 

rendering the search constitutionally unreasonable. Because defendants Winsett and 

Janet Stanfield shared a bedroom, the search of her personal belongings located within 

that bedroom was proper pursuant to the doctrine of common authority and 

notwithstanding any conditions of her probation. The resulting stop and search of the 

vehicle in which defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield were traveling was not so 

attenuated as to necessitate suppression of the evidence seized therein. All evidence 

against these two defendants is admissible, and the trial court erred in suppressing the 

same.

Despite having a reduced expectation of privacy in the common areas shared by 

defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield, defendant Justin Stanfield enjoyed a reasonable 

expectation of privacy within his private bedroom, and absent a warrant or other 

exception to the warrant requirement, the search of his bedroom was improper, and all 

evidence against him was properly suppressed. 

Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to the extent that it 

affirmed the granting of defendants Winsett’s and Janet Stanfield’s motions to suppress, 
- 23 -

and we affirm the opinion as to the court’s upholding Justin’s motion to suppress. We 

remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Costs of this appeal are taxed to the State. 

_______________________________

 ROGER A. PAGE, JUSTICE