United States Commission

on

National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2001

National Security Study Group

assisted by

Booz·Allen & Hamilton
Foreword

he U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) was chartered to

review in a comprehensive way U.S. national security requirements for the next

century. It began in Phase I by describing the future security environment this nation should

anticipate, and in Phase II it delineated a strategy to address that future—to cope with the

challenges and seize the opportunities that will constantly confront this great nation. Phase III

was focused on changes to the national security apparatus, its structures and process, with an aim

toward redesigning it as necessary to succeed in the security environment that lies ahead.

The Commission anticipated that it could not make credible recommendations to improve

the national security apparatus without first understanding how that apparatus functioned—thus

this Addendum. The firm of Booz·Allen & Hamilton assisted the USCNS/21 in conducting this

research and began working with the Commission in July 1999. This Addendum provides a

thorough description of this country’s national security organizations and processes as they

existed in mid-2000. It must be recognized that such large organizations and complex processes

are inherently in a state of constant evolution—even more so during transitions of

Administrations.

This Addendum offers important observations and documents numerous problem areas,

some of which are major concerns. Some of these problems have been around for decades. We

do not claim “discovery” of them, but we exercise the prerogative of considering problems from

the perspective of future security requirements. The Commission’s focus through all three phases

of its work has been on the future, and it has avoided dwelling on the past. Although this

Addendum should not be misconstrued as a “report card” on current or past organizational

performance, it will identify certain historical problems that should no longer be tolerated, which

result from our Cold War-optimized system. Thus problems must be used as evidence to argue

for the redesign of certain institutions and processes.

Before institutional redesigns could occur, or before road maps could be constructed to

get the national security apparatus headed in the appropriate direction, this Commission needed

to understand how the government was structured and how it went about the business of national

security. The seven volumes contained herein analyze key organizations and processes

throughout the Federal government, to include the interagency and inter-branch levels. This

Addendum provided a “baseline” of the national security apparatus, and was completed in draft

form by the summer of 2000 as the Commission’s main Phase III effort began in earnest. It thus

laid much of the groundwork for Phase III. The first volume was updated and reedited in

February and March 2001. The other volumes remain as originally written. No product has been

previously produced that describes the national security structures and processes of the U.S.

government in such detail. It should be useful to researchers and professionals seeking a detailed

analysis of the national security system.

Charles G. Boyd, General, USAF (Retired)

Executive Director

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Volume I, Table of Contents

Foreword

Volume I, Table of Contents

Master Table of Contents: All Volumes

Preface

Chapter 1. Key Observations

1. Background

2. Key Observations—Policy and Strategy Development and

 Implementation

A. The National Security Council Staff

B. Interagency Planning

C. Economics and National Security

D. State Department

E. Department of Defense (DoD)

F. Intelligence

G. Inter-Branch Activities

3. Key Observations—National Security Resource Allocation

A. National Security Planning Guidance

B. Functional Budgeting

4. Key Observations—Gaps and Seams (Homeland Security)

5. Key Observations—Other Themes

A. Information Technology

B. Personnel

6. Challenges

Chapter 2. The Overarching National Security Processes at the Interagency and

 Inter-Branch Levels

Section I. Introduction to the Overarching National Security Processes

1. General

2. National Security Strategy and Policy Development

3. Planning and Implementation of National Security Strategy and Policy

4. National Security Resource Allocation

5. Organization of this Chapter

Section II. National Security Strategy and Policy Development

1. General

2. The Traditional National Security Interagency Process

A. Background
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B. NSC Composition

C. NSC Functions and Purposes

D. NSC Committees and Working Groups

E. The Formal Interagency Process

F. How the Process Works

G. Security Policy Coordination Mechanisms

H. Informal Interagency Processes

I. Observations

3. The National Economic Council Interagency Process

A. Background

B. NEC Composition

C. NEC Functions and Purposes

D. NEC Supporting Activities

E. The Formal NEC Interagency Process

F. Informal NEC Interagency Processes

G. Observations

4. Federal Response Plan

A. Background

B. Plan Organization

C. Plan Preparation

D. Observations

5. The Role of Congress in Policy and Strategy Development

A. Background

B. Congressional Processes

Section III. Planning and Implementation of National Security Strategy

and Policy

1. Background

A. General

B. Formal Process for Monitoring Policy Implementation

2. The PDD-2 Process for Strategy and Policy Implementation

A. The Formal PDD-2 Process

B. The Actual Interagency Process for Policy Implementation

C. Means to Improve National Security Policy Implementation

3. PDD-56

A. General

B. Evolution of PDD-56

C. The Formal PDD-56 Process

D. Value of the Formal Process

4. PDD-63

A. General

B. Background

C. Critical Infrastructure Protection Apparatus

D. Functions and Purposes

E. Preparation of the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (NIAP)

F. PDD-63 Implementation to Date
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5. The Informal Crisis Management/Policy Coordination Process

A. The Breakfast/Lunch Meeting

B. Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast

C. Weekly Deputies Lunches

D. The President-National Security Advisor Relationship

E. Other Personal Contacts

6. The Role of Congress in Policy Implementation

A. Background

B. The War Powers Act

C. Legislative, Oversight, and Ratification Powers

D. The Power of the Purse

E. Conclusions

7. Observations

A. Interagency Monitoring of Policy Implementation is Sporadic

B. PDD-56 Not Used Extensively

C. Growing Role of NSC Staff in Policy Implementation

D. Informal Process Value

Section IV. National Security Resource Allocation

1. General

2. Overview of the Nature of the Process

A. Intra-Department

B. Intra Executive Branch

C. Inter Branch

D. Tension as a Creative Force

3. The Executive Branch—Budget Preparation Process

A. Preparation Overview

B. The Executive Branch—Informal Budget Preparation Process

4. The Legislative Branch—Formal Budget Deliberation and Approval Process

A. The Budget Process

B. Authorizing Committees

C. Appropriations Committees

5. The Legislative Branch—Informal Budget Deliberation and Approval Process

6.Observations

A. Links Between Resource Allocation and National Security Strategy

B. The OMB-DoD Link

C. Outsider Influence in Congressional Deliberations

Appendix 1. Formal Security Policy and Strategy Development—PDD-2

Appendix 2. Informal Security Policy and Strategy Development

Appendix 3. NEC Formal Security Policy and Strategy Development

Appendix 4. Formal Security Policy and Strategy Planning and

 Implementation—PDD-56

Appendix 5. Formal Security Policy and Resource Allocation, Executive Branch

 Budget Preparation Process

Appendix 6. Formal Security Policy and Resource Allocation, The Legislative

 Branch Authorizations
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Appendix 7. Formal Security Policy and Resource Allocation, The Legislative

 Branch Appropriations

Chapter 3. Organization and Reader’s Guide

1. Seven Volume Addendum

2. Individual Volumes

Attachment 1. National Security Key Processes: Definitions, Products,

 and Relationships

Attachment 2. National Security Apparatus Attributes and Definitions

National Security Study Group Staff, Contractors, and Consultants

Bibliography, Volume I

List of Tables

1. Process Relationships

2. FRP Annex Preparation Responsibilities

3. Lead Agency Infrastructure Responsibilities

4. Special Function Responsibilities

List of Figures

1. Organization of Volume I

2. Overall Report Organization

3. Individual Volume Organization, Volumes II – VII
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Master Table of Contents: All Volumes

Volume I – Key Observations and Overarching Processes

Preface

Chapter 1 – Key Observations

Chapter 2 – Overarching National Security Process at the Interagency and

Inter-branch Levels

Chapter 3 – Organization and Reader’s Guide

Bibliography, Volume I

Volume II – Executive Office of The President

Preface

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – National Economic Council (NEC)

Chapter 2 – National Security Council (NSC)

Chapter 3 – Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

Chapter 4 – Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)

Chapter 5 – Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)

Chapter 6 – Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

Bibliography, Volume II

Volume III – Congress

Preface

Table of Contents

House of Representatives

Chapter 1 – House Committee on Appropriations

Chapter 2 – House Committee on Armed Services (HASC)

Chapter 3 – House Committee on International Relations

Chapter 4 – House Committee on the Budget

Chapter 5 – House Committee on Science

Chapter 6 – House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Senate

Chapter 7 – Senate Committee on Appropriations

Chapter 8 – Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC)

Chapter 9 – Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Chapter 10 – Senate Committee on the Budget

Chapter 11 – Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

Bibliography, Volume III

Volume IV – Department of Defense

Preface

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

Chapter 2 – Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T))
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Chapter 3 – Under Secretary for Policy (USD(P))

Chapter 4 – Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E)

Chapter 5 – The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

Chapter 6 – U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

Chapter 7 – Unified Commands

Chapter 8 – Military Departments and Services

Chapter 9 – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Chapter 10 – Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Bibliography, Volume IV

Volume V – Department of State

Preface

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Office of the Secretary of State (S)

Chapter 2 – Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)

Chapter 3 – Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs (E)

Chapter 4 – Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T)

Chapter 5 – Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)

Chapter 6 – Director of Policy Planning (S/P)

Chapter 7 – U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Chapter 8 – Bureau of European Affairs (EUR)

Chapter 9 – Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)

Chapter 10 – Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)

Bibliography, Volume V

Volume VI – Intelligence Community

Preface

Table of Contents

Intelligence Activities

Chapter 1 – Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI)

Chapter 2 – Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Chapter 3 – National Intelligence Council (NIC)

Chapter 4 – Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Chapter 5 – National Security Agency (NSA)

Chapter 6 – President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

Intelligence Oversight Committees

Chapter 7 – Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence (HPSC(I)/SSC(I))

Bibliography, Volume VI

Volume VII – Executive Branch Activities

Preface

Table of Contents

Department of Commerce

Chapter 1 – Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)

Chapter 2 – Economic Development Administration (EDA)
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Chapter 3 – International Trade Administration (ITA)

Chapter 4 – National Telecommunications and Information Administration

(NTIA)

Chapter 5 – Technology Administration (TA)

Department of Energy

Chapter 6 – Department of Energy (DoE)

Chapter 7 – Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE)

Department of Health and Human Services

Chapter 8 – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Department of Justice

Chapter 9 – Department of Justice (DOJ)

Chapter 10 – Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Chapter 11 – Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Chapter 12 – Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

Chapter 13 – U. S. Marshals Service (USMS)

Department of Transportation

Chapter 14 – U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

Department of the Treasury

Chapter 15 – Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

Chapter 16 – U.S. Customs Service (USCS)

Chapter 17 – Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

Chapter 18 – U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

Other Executive Branch Activities

Chapter 19 – Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Chapter 20 – Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Bibliography, Volume VII

Glossary
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PREFACE

NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES AND ORGANIZATIONS:

THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGY

1. Introduction.

his is the first volume of a seven volume Addendum that describes U.S. national

security organizations and processes, as of mid-2000.1 This volume identifies how

the interagency and inter-branch process is currently meeting the challenges of the first quarter of

the 21st century. It also highlights significant gaps and seams in current organizations and

processes. It provides a detailed description of overarching interagency and inter-branch

processes for national security strategy and policy development, for planning and

implementation of national security strategy and policy, and for national security resource

allocation. Finally, this volume contains a user's guide for the remaining volumes.

Volumes II through VII describe the organizations and processes selected by the U.S.

Commission on National Security/21st Century. Each volume begins with a preface and each

chapter within each volume is organized in a common format to permit comparison of structures

and processes across the government. (See Chapter 3 entitled “Organization and Reader’s

Guide” of this volume for a detailed organization of the Addendum.)

In general, current national security organizations and structures are founded on the

National Security Act of 1947, subsequent amendments, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,

Congressional rules, and a host of Presidential, Department, and Agency directives.

Organizational processes and structures have evolved over the years to adapt to changes in

threats and security challenges. The current structure was designed to meet the challenges and

demands of the Soviet threat and the Cold War. It is a credit to the flexibility of the system—and

the people who made it work—that this national security apparatus has remained relatively

effective throughout a decade of significant change since the end of the Cold War.

Yet we now have more than a decade’s worth of experience in assessing and dealing with

the post-Cold War environment and a preview of the security challenges for the 21st century.

That is enough information with which to assess how the system might change to improve its

value for the future.

2. The Future Security Environment.

he U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century assessed the major themes

and implications of the future security environment in New World Coming: American

Security in the 21st Century. The Commission’s Phase I report reached 14 conclusions regarding

the security environment of the first quarter of the 21st century:

A. America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland and

our military superiority will not entirely protect us;

 

1 The research for this Addendum was baselined on the second Clinton Administration. The Administration of President

Bush, as expected, has slightly altered the interagency system and processes described herein. See National Security

Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” (Hereafter cited as NSPD-1).

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B. Rapid advances in information and biotechnology will create new vulnerabilities;

C. New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together;

D. The national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the

vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure;

E. Energy will continue to have a major strategic significance;

F. All borders will be more porous and some will bend and some will break;

G. The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure;

H. Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizing effects on

neighboring states;

I. Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian

populations;

J. Space will become a critical and competitive military environment;

K. The essence of war will not change;

L. U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even excellent

intelligence will not prevent all surprises;

M. The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of

uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fewer forward deployed forces; and

N. The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different

military and other national capabilities.2

his environment contains several common threads that will prove challenging to

existing security processes and organizations. New security challenges will expand

the portfolios of traditional agencies and actors and require greater integration of effort. They

will demand a national security strategy, attended by policies, plans, and responses of a more

complex nature and a more encompassing character than the past. Future security challenges will

also have a more global character and require the participation of the U.S. private sector,

coalition allies, and international organizations, as well as government activities. Taken together,

the new challenges will require new levels of interagency cooperation on strategy and policy

development, planning and implementation actions, and resource allocation.

Technology will provide the national security organizations and processes with new

opportunities and capabilities, just as it will introduce new vulnerabilities. The introduction of

advanced information and communications technologies into our national security processes and

 

2 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,

Major Themes & Implications, September 15, 1999. pp. 4-7.

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organizations is still in the early stages and has been employed on an ad hoc basis. However, it is

already clear that ready access to detailed information from a wide range of sources, and the

ability to communicate around the globe quickly can produce “information overload,” unbalance

old processes, and introduce the temptation to centralize and micromanage operations

hierarchically. Nevertheless, the value of technology, information, and communications has been

clearly demonstrated in recent crises.

Finally, the changing nature of the national security environment and the expanded scope

of actions necessary to meet the rapidly changing environment suggest that new skill sets will be

required. The government will need access to a broad and changing base of expertise to meet the

demands of the 21st century security environment. In acquiring much of this expertise, it will be

in direct competition with the private sector and, in both recruiting and retention, may be

hampered by legal requirements imposed during the previous era.

3. A New National Security Strategy

he U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century proposed a new national

security strategy to meet the needs of the future security environment described

above. In Seeking A National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting

Freedom,3 the Commission’s Phase II report articulated America’s survival, critical, and

important national interests, established a future strategy for the United States—a concert for

security and freedom—and developed six key objectives and policies to attain those objectives.

These objectives were:

First, the preeminent objective is “to defend the United States and ensure that it is safe

from the dangers of a new era.” Achieving this goal, and the nation’s other critical national

security goals, requires the U.S. government, as a second key objective, to “maintain America’s

social cohesion, economic competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength.” A

third key objective is “to assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia,

and India, into the mainstream of the emerging international system.” The Commission’s fourth

key U.S. objective is “to promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy and

improve the effectiveness of international institutions and international law.” The fifth key

objective is “to adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which

America’s partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility.” The sixth and final key objective

inheres in an effort “to help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned

by an era of change.”

The implications of both Phase I and Phase II are that the current national security

apparatus does not possess the capabilities required for the future, nor are its organizations

optimized to execute a national security strategy consistent with the evolving security

environment.

The strategic framework outlined in Phase II for U.S. national security differs from the

Cold War habits of the past half-century. It makes the political and socio-economic components

of national security strategy nearly co-equal with the military, and it takes cultural and

 

3 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. Seeking A National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving

Security and Promoting Freedom, April 19, 2000.

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informational aspects of national security seriously. It is focused as much on opportunities as on

threats. It demands innovation in all components of strategy.

The means and manner of operating U.S. national security structures and processes must

keep up with how the wider world, including U.S. society, will be working in the first quarter of

the 21st century. In that wider world we will see a marked decline in basic costs as information

and other technologies vastly improve productivity. This will be most prominent in societies that

enjoy the human and financial capital and the supportive socio-political systems to take best

advantage of new techniques. If the various agencies of the U.S. government do not avail

themselves of the same techniques of economy and efficiency, they will fall dangerously out of

synch with the rest of the country, with much of the world, and with the problems and

opportunities generated by both.

indful of the need for the structures and processes of national security to be

adequately juxtaposed to the world we face, and with the kind of society America is

becoming, the Commission envisioned seven criteria for considering the U.S. national security

apparatus as a whole.

A. The U.S. government needs adept means for strategic anticipation of national

security challenges. This requires the best possible system of intelligence, from collection to

analysis to dissemination to policy review

B. The U.S. government needs to enhance its capacity for wise strategic calculation

about when to intervene, what instruments of national power are most appropriate for

interventions, and what are the possible consequences.

C. The U.S. government needs to ensure a strategic fusion of all appropriate instruments

of national power, to integrate the many dimensions of its international action.

D. The U.S. government needs greater strategic agility so that its decisions and processes

are flexible and rapidly adapt to changes in the global environment.

E. The U.S. government needs greater strategic breadth to deal with the wide range of

new challenges, the blurring of lines between types of conflicts and forms of warfare, and

between military and non-military capabilities.

F. The U.S. government must do better at strategic assessment, by which we mean the

constant monitoring of performance and drawing lessons from experience.

G. The government needs strategic coherence, by which we mean a better sense of the

relationship between domestic conditions and the efficacy of U.S. actions abroad.

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4. Overview of Study Process and Methods.

hile providing an analysis of the then current “baseline” national security apparatus

as of the year 2000, it is equally important to understand what this Addendum does

not provide. It is a process and structural assessment, not an efficiency or effectiveness

assessment. Neither is this Addendum an in-depth leadership or cultural analysis along the lines

of the “McKinsey Seven S” format.4 Alternatively, some organizational descriptions and some

obvious efficiency and effectiveness problems were captured as “low-hanging fruit” in various

sections of the Addendum.

As research began on this project, it became evident that organizations involved in

national security often lacked common standards of what constituted “key processes,”

“structures,” or “core competencies” and a host of other definitions. Because a common

approach was deemed necessary for a consistent analysis of processes and structures, the

Commission and Booz·Allen & Hamilton (BAH) were forced to develop and apply common

definitions. These may be found in Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 to Chapter 3 of this volume.

Organizations may disagree with the categories and classifications used in our methodology, but

the need for consistency was a self-apparent driving factor in this analysis.

Because the Addendum examines the “state of play” as of mid-2000, it looks at what

today’s organizations are doing. It generally avoids getting into what they should not be doing,

or conversely, what they should be doing instead. In a similar fashion, the Addendum does not

examine what structures should exist or be dismantled, nor does it propose new structures or

processes. Such recommendations are found in the Commission’s main Phase III report.5

While “gaps and seams” in mission responsibilities are not the primary focus of this

Addendum, their existence is important to highlight. Redundancy and overlap between

organizations, as well as greatly diffused lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability

generally point to “gaps and seams. ” These generally lead to the creation of “patches” or

“workarounds,” and the migration of functions and power to different organizations that would

seem to lie outside their traditional core competencies.

To these ends, Chapter 1 serves as an “Executive Summary” for all seven volumes by

providing a set of key observations concerning challenges and gaps and seams, as pinpointed in

current national security processes and organizations. It identifies problems that were eventually

developed into the Commission’s Phase III report. Chapter 2 contains a detailed description of

the overarching interagency and inter-branch processes by which strategy and policy are

developed and implemented and resources are allocated. Chapter 3 of this volume describes the

overall organization of the Addendum and serves as a “Reader’s Guide.” Lastly, because of the

 

4 The “McKinsey Seven S” framework is a widely used process of management analysis and business strategy

implementation that focuses on: Strategy, Structure, Systems, Style, Staff, Shared values, and Skills. See, Thomas J. Peters

and Robert H. Waterman Jr., In Search of Excellence, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982)

5 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. The

Commission’s Phase III report was posted on January 31, 2001 at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001.

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mid-2000 timeline when this Addendum was drafted, any use of the word “current” in this

volume or subsequent volumes that does not reference a particular Administration should be

considered as applying to the second Clinton Administration.
Chapter 1

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

KEY OBSERVATIONS

1. Background.

uring the conduct of our research on national security processes and organizations,

the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) and the firm of

Booz·Allen & Hamilton (BAH) collected and analyzed information provided by the

organizations themselves, and interviewed numerous current and former government officials

and independent observers—some on a non-attribution basis. The assessment also examined

organizational values, cultures, leadership traditions, staff attributes, and internal strategic

objectives, but not to great depth. The results were then catalogued to identify important trends,

challenges, gaps, and seams in both processes and organizations. Specifically, the Commission

was interested in problems that included the misalignment of functions and/or responsibilities,

and conflicting or blurred jurisdictions or gray zones where no particular agency had

responsibilities for an emerging security challenge, as identified in Phase I and/or Phase II.

While each chapter in Volumes II through VII contains a section that provides

observations relative to the individual organization, a number of observations are overarching

and have broad application. These are contained in this chapter and meet the following criteria:

• Trends common to several Departments and/or Agencies;

• Problems that have emerged since the end of the Cold War; and

• Gaps that may occur in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

2. Key Observations—Policy and Strategy Development and Implementation.

everal processes are used to develop and implement policy and strategy, including the

basic interagency process described in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 and

supplemented by other PDDs and Executive Orders that assist the National Security Council

(NSC), the National Economic Council (NEC), and other Executive Branch participants.

Congress has its own set of rules for providing oversight of development and implementation

processes. All of these are described in the succeeding chapter and in other volumes of this

Addendum. During the assessment, seven overarching observations emerged in this category.

A. The National Security Council Staff. The NSC staff has taken on an increasingly

larger role in the development of national security policy. This may or may not be a problem,

depending on the observer’s perspective. The Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs (APNSA)—also called the National Security Advisor—has a dual role. First, the APNSA

functions as an honest broker. He ensures that Departments and Agencies develop options, that

the interagency process evaluates options, and that results are objectively presented to the

President. Second, the APNSA provides advice to the President in conjunction with cabinet

officials and other advisors. The NSC staff supports the APNSA in these roles. According to

veteran national security process participants, the NSC staff functions best when it encourages

the development of a broad range of options, and then integrates “best of breed” policy and

strategy proposals. Often, NSC staffs move beyond integration and coordination functions, and

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when this occurs the interagency system can become less effective, especially if the NSC staff

becomes dominant and centralizes processes around itself.

he balance of power between the NSC staff and the Departments that comprise the

NSC system has ebbed and flowed over time, of course, but by mid-2000 there was

a trend toward centralization.6 On one hand, it may be appropriate to elevate important strategy

and policy development to the highest echelons, but in doing so, access to a broad range of

knowledge, expertise, and options is often overridden. Centralization in this fashion may

adversely affect integration—something that appears necessary to deal with 21st century

challenges—especially if some players are cut out. Although senior personalities play key roles

in power shifts and are often responsible for allowing them to occur, the NSC staff has several

attributes that enable it to move in this direction.

Foremost, the NSC staff is relatively small (about 200 members under the Clinton

Administration compared to over 500 for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) and

nonhierarchical. It also has ready access to a broad range of information that is not uniformly

available to the Departments and Agencies. Because it also has relatively easy access to the

President, it can influence his view of the world and can often claim to know his mind and

policies better than other interagency players—something that can be intimidating and lead to

diminished roles for Departments and Agencies. In short, the NSC staff is powerful, responsive,

and agile and can quickly move to fill policy and strategy vacuums—even temporary ones—with

a measure of authority. Additionally, unlike NSC Principals, Deputies, and the members of

Interagency Working Groups (IWG),7 the staff can often focus more intensely on important

issues because it is not burdened with the concurrent tasks of managing the daily operations of

the Departments. This situation was not unique to the Clinton Administration.

There seems to be a general trend to centralize and escalate the level of strategy and

policy decision making over the life of an Administration, especially when the National Security

Advisor is a dominant player. It appears that a greater number of decisions are made by a smaller

group of individuals near the apex of the power pyramid as Administrations mature. At the

beginning of any Administration, the NSC staff is dependent on the Departments and Agencies

for information and continuity. However, while the NSC staff almost always depends on others

for detailed analyses, it acquires new sources of information, learns how to exploit existing

sources more fully, and often develops an independent body of knowledge to frame decisions

over time. Often, the most significant check on the NSC staff is that many of its members will

eventually return to the Departments and Agencies that detailed them to the NSC in the first

place.

As policy and decision making migrate upward in interagency dealings, it appears that

decision making within individual Departments and Agencies also becomes more centralized,

and issues are resolved at more senior levels. When this occurs, decision makers frequently

bypass staff experts (who are often better able to frame decisions and develop options and who

 

6 The term “NSC staff” is used to differentiate between the staff that works for the President’s National Security Advisor and

supports the NSC and the NSC itself whose members and statutory advisors are all senior government officials—often with

cabinet rank.

7 The term “Interagency Working Group” is used throughout this Addendum. However, we recognize the current Bush

Administration has eliminated IWGs and replaced them with regional and functional Policy Coordination Committees

(PCCs). See NSPD-1. In fact, the general thrust of NSPD-1 and the new Bush Administration has been to reinstate the

policy coordination role of the NSC Advisor and staff, and to remove the NSC from its previous implementation role.

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3

better understand implementation details and implications) and instead rely on their personal

staffs to prepare for decision meetings. This can make the transition from policy and strategy

development to policy and strategy implementation troublesome. On the other hand, senior

decision makers often emphasize the point that by pushing decisions further up the chain they

can avoid bureaucratic squabbles, limit “leaks,” enhance objectivity, and come to grips with the

central issues sooner. There are times when this approach is preferable; however, if it becomes

too routine, decision options and implementation concepts are likely to suffer.

Although technically responsible only for coordination of a wide range of opinion and

judgments, in a bureaucratic environment that tends toward centralization, the NSC staff at times

seizes strategy and policy development initiatives. This occurs most often when issues cross

Department and Agency boundaries and/or when senior Department officials do not appear to

accord the issues high priority. There also appears to be a tendency for the NSC staff to assert

dominance when issues involve new challenges and threats (e.g., counter-terrorism and critical

infrastructure protection).

he fundamental implications of the rise of NSC staff authority in policy and strategy

development are not yet clear. One can make a case that by acting as it does, the NSC

staff employs some of the techniques of cross-functional and product integration teaming that

have proven successful in commercial enterprises. At the same time, by exerting its authority, the

NSC staff may intimidate or override other interagency players. When this occurs, other players

may defer to NSC staff positions and judgments even though they have valuable contributions to

make—or worse, the NSC staff may not consult them, or may do so on terms that are

unfavorable to non-NSC staff players. The quality of options can suffer as a result. In the same

vein, decision making in Departments and Agencies may migrate toward upper levels because

senior officials may believe that is necessary to deal effectively with the NSC staff. Or,

interagency players may resort to informal processes to end run the NSC staff entirely.

What seems clear, however, is that because the NSC staff is at the nexus of information

sources in an age when information is extremely valuable, it may continue to encroach on

strategy and policy development areas that are traditionally the province of Departments and

Agencies. Given its size, the extent to which it moves away from traditional strategy and policy

coordination and into strategy and policy development and implementation is likely to impact its

effectiveness, affect coordination and integration, and change the way Departments and

Agencies make decisions. A fundamental issue, then, is whether the NSC staff should be made

more robust to allow it to perform development and implementation functions more effectively,

or kept relatively small with a more stringent mandate to focus on coordination, integration, and

management of the interagency process. The former option clearly raises issues of authority,

responsibility, and accountability at the NSC level.

B. Interagency Planning. The current national security structure is not optimal for

interagency planning or the integration of the capabilities and efforts of multiple agencies.

The nature of the security environment and threats of the 21st century put a premium on detailed

and reasonably expeditious planning, and on sustained, integrated interagency actions. For

example, the military and diplomatic planning for Operation Allied Force—the Kosovo

response—began in earnest almost a year before military operations were initiated. Operations

involving coalitions and international organizations require significant advanced negotiations

and preparations before they can be undertaken.

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he NSC and NEC staffs are simply not structured or resourced to conduct the detailed

planning necessary to meet complex challenges. They are manned to coordinate and

provide planning guidance. Yet the current security environment—and that envisioned for the

future—place demands on these staffs that they were never intended to meet. The effect of rapid

global communications—including worldwide near-real-time news coverage—has shifted much

of the emphasis to a crisis-of-the-day mode of operations at the expense of longer-range strategy

and policy development. This communications phenomenon is a permanent reality in world

affairs and may even increase throughout the first quarter of the 21st century.

Given these demands, it seems reasonable that the larger staffs within the Departments

and Agencies would do the sort of analysis and information exchange and synthesis that

characterizes effective planning regimes. However, many of them do not consider planning a key

responsibility or they lack the resources to do it effectively. Conversely, others (e.g., the Joint

Staff within the Department of Defense) traditionally have not considered it necessary to share or

coordinate contingency plans with other key players in the national security arena until a crisis

actually unfolds.

With few exceptions (notably the Department of Defense (DoD), the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC))8 Executive Branch

Departments and Agencies lack the training, the experience, the resources, and the cultures to

conduct long-range contingency planning. And, as long as the NSC and NEC staffs are focused

on current crises or policy and strategy development, there is no top-level body that can

coordinate interagency planning on the scale necessary. While there have been times when the

interagency has responded effectively and with alacrity, that performance might have been

improved had integrated planning preceded it. The next time, a quick effective response may be

required with little time for lengthy working sessions. The nature of the future security

environment appears to require advanced, integrated, collaborative planning and organized

interagency responses beyond what is possible under the current interagency system.

Complicating the equation is the lack of formal planning guidance and the processes that

produce it, which offer the opportunity to exchange views and assess options. At present, there is

no integrating link between the National Security Strategy, the policies and strategies developed

within the NSC and NEC processes, and the development of implementing plans and budgets

within the Departments and Agencies. The President, with the advice of the NSC staff, approves

the Contingency Planning Guidance. This document directs the development of DoD

contingency plans, but does not require other national security entities to participate in the

process. There is, in short, no National Security Planning Guidance to direct planning efforts or

Presidential priorities across the government.

To meet the demands of the 21st century, national security processes must facilitate the

planning and conduct of operations in an integrated fashion. Not every Department and Agency

will be involved every time, but responses should be drawn from a wider set than in the past.

DoD has recently taken a first step toward integrated planning by developing interagency

annexes to Defense Department contingency plans, and PDD 63 directed the development of an

 

8 It is noteworthy that FEMA has developed an excellent system to promote interagency planning that focuses on disaster and

emergency response. FEMA’s system might serve as a model for other types of interagency planning. See Chapter 19 in

Volume VII.

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integrated National Infrastructure Assurance Plan.9 However, a more comprehensive approach

will be necessary, including new, disciplined formal processes; better oversight of interagency

planning and implementation; and more effective accountability measures. Given the current size

of the NSC and NEC staffs and their workloads, getting the most out of available capabilities and

resources may require establishing new activities that can manage the planning process while

leaving the NSC and NEC staffs free to coordinate policy and strategy.10

C. Economics and National Security. The 21st century security environment

requires closer integration of economic strategy and policy with more traditional security

and foreign policy activities. Every President in the post-war period has sought to ensure that

international political and security perspectives are integrated into the making of international

economic policy and that, vice-versa, economic goals are factored into national security policy

making. Various Presidents have established diverse processes and entities to accomplish these

tasks. During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations the Deputy Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs managed economic issues. The Nixon Administration set up the

Council on International Economic Policy as a result of Europe’s and Japan’s increasing

economic competitiveness. It was followed by the Council on Economic Policy (CEP) and the

Economic Policy Board, in the Ford Administration; the Economic Policy Group, in the Carter

Administration; the Economic Policy Council, begun in the Reagan Administration and

continued through the Bush Administration.11

At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, the confluence of economic and national

security issues was addressed by the creation of the National Economic Council (NEC) by

Executive Order 12835 in 1993. The NEC has not yet been codified in law as the NSC has. It

must perform its functions with a staff that is much smaller than that of the NSC12 and without

the legitimacy provided by law and Presidential Directives.

As noted in the following chapter of this volume, the NEC employs processes similar to

those used by the NSC, and it continues to evolve both organizationally and in terms of its

relationships with other activities. Given the growing importance of economics in national

security and foreign policy and the blurring of international and domestic economics, there

appears to be a need for closer integration of economic policy development and planning in

policy and strategy development and implementation. While the NSC and NEC currently (mid2000) conduct joint meetings on some issues and share some staff members, it is not clear at this

point how future responsibilities and relationships should be integrated. In fact, the NEC may

dissolve with the change in Administrations, leaving a function that is likely to be filled by

members of the NSC staff and/or appropriate Departments and Agencies.

The NEC performed an important but limited role in the Clinton Administration. Senior

NEC members indicated that they quickly realized the importance of interagency processes as

the key to influencing policy. The NEC shouldered the task of raising the economic aspects of

national security to the same levels as the diplomatic and military factors. It is uncertain whether

an integrated NEC/NSC staff or separate staffs on equal footing are best suited to meet future

 

9 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63: “Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).” 22 May, 1998.

10 Such a mechanism might include the creation of an interagency contingency planning center.

11 I.M. Destler, The National Economic Council: A Work in Progress, (Washington, DC: Institute for International

Economics, November 1996), p. 6. (Hereafter, Destler.)

12 The NEC staff averages fewer than 30 members, compared to over 200 for the NSC and over 500 for OMB.
6

challenges, but it is clear that international and domestic economic factors will need to be more

closely integrated into all national security processes. In any event, this will likely entail closer

ties between the Treasury Department—which remains the main player on economic and

financial issues—and the national security apparatus.

D. The State Department. The Department of State (DoS) does not function in an

effective manner, nor is it organized or resourced to meet current or future global security

challenges. The State Department fulfills a key role in the national security process. The

Constitution assigns the Secretary of State the role of “principal adviser to the President” in

foreign policy and the National Security Act of 1947 made the Secretary a statutory member of

the National Security Council. Recent studies have addressed the Department’s ability to meet

the demands of 21st century national security challenges. There is a perception that the

Department has not fully adapted to a new international environment marked by advanced

information technology, globalization, and the rise of new actors, such as corporations,

international organizations, private-voluntary organizations (PVOs) and citizens’ groups.13

 In the course of the USCNS/21 assessment, interviews surfaced three major problem

areas affecting the State Department’s capacity to contribute to the national security environment

in the 21st century. They are: inadequate funding; a disconnect between policy-making and

program and resource planning, and inadequate personnel policies. In addition, USCNS/21

staff's own research and analysis leads the Commission to conclude that the structure of the

Department is not conducive to effective integration of regional and functional policy issues.

These findings and conclusions are discussed in more detail below.

(1). Securing adequate resources. The State Department is constrained in its

ability to reform itself by the limited resources it controls. The International Affairs (Function

150) portion of the President's budget request for FY 01 is $22.8 billion. To put this amount in

perspective, it is the equivalent of slightly over one percent of the entire Federal budget. In

addition, the International Affairs Budget funds a total of 14 agencies with jurisdiction over

international programs, so that only 25 percent of the International Affairs budget, approximately

$6.5 billion, will go to the State Department, while the rest will fund other Departments and

Agencies ranging from DoD to Agriculture.

Funding for the State Department budget has declined by 20 percent over the past 20

years, even as the U.S. involvement abroad has increased.14 U.S. foreign affairs funding has also

gone to support new peace initiatives in the Middle East, even as the U.S. has cut back on other

foreign support. Declining funding has contributed to what a number of recent studies have

identified as a “performance gap” or “disconnect” in the ability of U.S. diplomatic structures to

respond to shifting international requirements.15

 

13 A number of recent studies have addressed the implications of globalization and new security challenges on American

diplomacy. Each of these studies provided specific recommendations for improvement. See, for example: Financing

America's Leadership: Protecting American Interests and Promoting American Values, (Council on Foreign Relations

Press, 1997) (hereafter, CFR/Brookings Report); Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, (Center for Strategic and

International Studies, December 1998) (hereafter, CSIS Report); Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs

in the 21st Century, (The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1998) (hereafter, Stimson Center Report); America's Overseas

Presence in the 21st Century: The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, (U.S. Department of State, November

1999) (hereafter, Overseas Presence Report).

14 Robert G. Kaiser “Foreign Disservice,” The Washington Post, April 16, 2000, page B1.

15 See: CFR/Brookings Report, CSIS Report, and Stimson Center Report.
7

Declining resources and increased commitments have also affected the infrastructure of

diplomacy. The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel noted a “gap between our nation's goals and

the resources it provides its overseas operations,” and concluded that the U.S. overseas presence

“is near a state of crisis and needs immediate reform.”16 Reversing the decline in international

affairs funding alone will not bring about improvements in the U.S. foreign policy structures,

however, adequate and stable funding is a prerequisite for undertaking and completing

meaningful reform efforts.

(2). Strengthening the link between policy and resources: The Department has

recently undertaken several initiatives to improve policy coordination across regions and

functions. It has developed an International Affairs Strategic Plan (IASP), which ties

international affairs programs to stated national security goals and objectives. It has also

strengthened the process by which Missions and Bureaus produce integrated program plans, by

requiring that the annual Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and Bureau Performance Plans

(BPPs) directly relate to the goals and objectives stated in the IASP.

Despite these improvements, program planning remains a low priority within the

Department. MPPs and BPPs serve primarily to support the annual budget request and are rarely

used to guide mid-course program planning and resource allocations adjustments. The causes

for this are both structural and cultural. First, the Department does not prioritize foreign policy

interests and objectives across regions and functions. Without such a statement of policy

priorities, the Department's planning efforts cannot be completely effective, because there is no

meaningful way to evaluate the allocation of resources among and within bureaus, as well as

between the Department and other international affairs agencies of the U.S. Government.

Planning also suffers from a lack of emphasis within the Department on program and resource

management. The interviews conducted revealed that senior policy officials at the State

Department spend a majority of their time on policy issues and operational tasks rather than on

management. Even at senior levels, officials function as action officers to the next higher level.

While this practice ensures the quality of information flowing to the Secretary from the desks, it

also encumbers senior officials and constrains them in dedicating their attention to management

issues.

(3). Improving workforce management and planning: The national security

environment of 21st century is likely to require expertise in functional areas such as finance and

economics, military and environmental issues. It will also require greater interagency

coordination among a greater number of actors.

The personnel system within the Department currently does not provide clear incentives

for Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel to develop functional skills or pursue

assignments in other departments and agencies that could strengthen interagency knowledge and

relationships. Career advancement within the Department still emphasizes working in regional

bureaus and assignments abroad. With a few exceptions, such as attending the National War

College, Foreign Service officers and State Department Civil Service employees are not

rewarded in their career for taking temporary assignments in other agencies, for example.

 

16 Overseas Presence Report, p. 15.
8

The Department should build incentives in its personnel system for pursuing

nontraditional career paths, as well as developing management and planning skills. One area of

opportunity for the Department in improving workforce skills is to develop a mechanism to

encourage continuous professional development, such as the "training float" concept used by the

Military Services to keep a certain percentage of their personnel in professional development and

training programs at all times.

(4). Improving the integration of regional and functional policy issues17.

The Commission found that the State Department's voice in interagency debate is muted because

the Department's organization is not conducive to the effective coordination and integration of

regional and functional policy issues. The State Department has sought to deal with a more

complex global environment in several problematic ways. First, it has added a number of

functional bureaus, led by Assistant Secretaries of State, and established additional functional

Under Secretary positions to cover emerging transnational issues. DoS has also added a series of

"special coordinators" to cover urgent policy challenges and in some cases to respond to

Congressional and Presidential priorities.

Despite the creation of new senior policy positions for functional issues, the current

structure of the Department does not allow the effective coordination of regional and functional

policy perspectives at a level lower than Under Secretary.18 In addition, during the Clinton

Administration, bureaus were empowered to report directly to the Secretary of State on issues for

which they have responsibility. As a result, regional and functional issues are often elevated to

the highest levels before they can be coordinated or integrated. Interviews also revealed that this

structure leads the Department to speak with more than one voice in interagency venues, thus

diluting the strength of its argument and its influence in interagency policy formulation. This is

especially the case because a great deal of interagency coordination is conducted both formally

and informally at the Assistant Secretary-level and below (and thus at the bureau level).

The Commission believes this structure reduces the influence of the State Department

with respect to other international affairs agencies and results in the poor coordination of foreign

policies. A restructuring that aligns functional bureaus and country desks under regional Under

Secretaries would be more conducive to integration of foreign policies and the reassertion of the

Department of State as the premier voice in foreign policy in the interagency.

E. Department of Defense (DoD). There is a critical need to reshape the

Department of Defense (DoD) to meet the challenges of the 21st Century security

environment. Over the last decade and a half, DoD has undergone a series of dramatic changes

in its organization, threats, and missions. It has moved forward with institutionalizing the

reforms mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It has had to adapt to the end of the Cold War

and to emerging new threats and associated new missions. It began to build upon the

opportunities inherent in the revolution in information and communications technology. And, it

 

17 Findings in this section are based on a conference co-sponsored by the USCNS/21 and the Woodrow Wilson International

Center for Scholars, "The U.S. Diplomatic Community: Its Processes and Structures," October 20, 1999.

18 The regional bureaus, and the Bureau for International Organizations, report to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P).

Functional bureaus report to the Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, the Under Secretary for

Arms Control and International Security, the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and the Under Secretary for Public

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Under Secretaries function as the Corporate Board of the Department and meet

periodically to coordinate policy issues.
9

attempted to reshape its infrastructure by bringing new business practices to bear, especially on

its logistics and support processes.

As a result of these efforts, the organization and processes of DoD have evolved

over this period. The effectiveness of these evolutionary changes has been mixed.

Therefore, a critical need exists to reshape the institution to meet the challenges of the

dynamic, new security environment. DoD's organization and processes need a serious

reevaluation to take advantage of the lessons learned over the past 15 years and contend

with the challenges of the 21st century. An important first step should be to conduct

fundamental review to examine the roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),

the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Defense Agencies. This review should examine the

changing roles and capabilities of each of the components of DoD.

Just as important, DoD processes, including the Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System (PPBS), the defense acquisition system and the Joint Requirements

Process, the management of the support infrastructure, and the deliberate and crisis

planning system—all need improvement. PPBS is the means by which DoD identifies

requirements to meet the demands of the National Security Strategy and allocates resources

to fulfill these requirements. Instituted in the 1960s to provide discipline to the defense

requirement and budget process, PPBS has changed only marginally since its inception.

Meanwhile, it has come under scrutiny as critics have charged that it is too complex, slow,

and lacks the flexibility to adapt to vastly different defense requirements in the post-Cold

War era. This system confronts two new, distinct challenges: meeting the threat and

mission-based challenges of the next decade, and transforming the military establishment

into an effective "Capabilities-based Force" for 2025. These two goals are often in

competition with one another, and the PPBS process has encountered difficulty in

balancing these priorities.

Defense acquisition reform has been the subject of a number of boards and

commissions over the past decade and a half. Despite recognition that the system needs

improvement, and some efforts at streamlining, much is left to be accomplished. Among

the factors for consideration are the role of the Joint Requirement Oversight Council

(JROC), the need to capitalize on the revolutionary changes in information and

communications technology. The changing structure of the defense industrial base, the

need to streamline the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system, and the relationship

between the acquisition process and the PPBS. The JROC was established by Goldwater

Nichols to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his oversight and

assessment of joint military requirements. It provides the Joint Staff and the CINCs with a

mechanism to integrate systems and service-generated programs. Its charter includes

recommending alternatives to defense acquisition programs based on mission need, as well

as cost and schedule. Critics, however, have charged that the JROC has not often

challenged programs that the Services strongly support and is thus not performing as

originally envisioned.

An important challenge for DoD is to modernize the large infrastructure that

supports its operations, to take advantage of information technology and the business

practices that have proven to be successful in the private sector. Currently, infrastructure

comprises about 60 percent of the defense budget. DoD has sought to address this problem

over the past decade by initiating a defense reform effort that spanned a diverse set of
10

organizations and processes, to include acquisition, logistics, and financial management.

The responsibilities for this daunting task, however, are spread across a large number of

organizations and agencies without adequate accountability. DoD attempted to increase

efficiency by adopting new business practices from the private sector, encouraging

competitive sourcing, and undertaking base consolidation and closures as directed by

Congress; however, competing pressures have limited the success of these endeavors thus

far.

To meet the challenge of defense reform, DoD established a system to manage the

reform effort, led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and a Defense Management Council

(DMC), composed of senior OSD, Service and Joint Staff officials. Despite these efforts,

the defense reform initiatives aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the

infrastructure have not yet taken root. This endeavor is a long-term undertaking that

requires focused management attention and direction. One area for improvement is in the

management of defense reform itself. Although the DMC has generated a number of

initiatives to support reform, it has not exercised authority to ensure that they are followed

through. In addition, the DMC has met infrequently, and its meetings have rarely been of a

decision-making nature. Significant improvements to the logistics and support structure of

DoD will require leadership, organization, and a consistent process to ensure success.

Finally, DoD should undertake an examination of what its deliberate and crisis

planning processes can offer to wider national security planning efforts. To meet the

challenges of the 21st century security environment, the USCNS/21 has identified the need

for systematic interagency planning to support the needs of the 21st century security

environment. DoD has the most comprehensive and well-established process for deliberate

and contingency planning among the national security agencies. However, the

Commission recognizes the growing need for integrated planning and mission execution

across all national security agencies. An area of opportunity, therefore, is to explore means

to link the DoD planning process to a wider interagency process.

F. Intelligence. Intelligence support activities necessary to develop and implement

national security policies and strategies do not cooperate as well as they might on a day-today basis. Intelligence support necessary to develop, implement, and conduct national security

strategies and policies is hampered in two significant ways: by organizational constraints that

limit the Intelligence Community's ability to optimally address emerging security threats; and by

a culture that rewards cooperation in crisis situations while implicitly encouraging “stove piped”

day-to-day behavior. Major transnational issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), narcotics trafficking, and environmental scarcity and degradation, have

been recognized as threats by the Community, which has created some issue-specific centers

dedicated to analysis and warning. However, due to organizational limitations, the Community

has not moved quickly to address other, perhaps more challenging security concerns, notably

those involving non-state actors employing new technologies to expand the range of threats and

potential harm to U.S. national interests.

he Intelligence Community is at its best during crises. However, the multiplicity of

agencies, their agendas and interests, their working relationships, and the sensitivity

and security of the information and sources involved in intelligence collection and analysis

frequently make it difficult to achieve a coherent picture during non-crisis periods. While the

Community has moved in the direction of full coordination across the intelligence disciplines in

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key portions of the intelligence cycle (e.g., collection, analysis and production), progress on this

path has been constrained by the lack of enthusiasm for collective action when individual agency

equities are threatened, and by the Community’s diverse organizational cultures. Without a

thoroughly integrated intelligence picture of the security environment, planning is difficult. It is

also more difficult to take appropriate actions to shape the environment, and to deter or minimize

the effects of a crisis.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—who controls only 15 percent of the

Community’s budget as Director of the CIA—continues to be challenged in his ability to

coordinate the efforts of a Community composed of a dozen or more activities. Duplication and

redundancy in the Intelligence Community result in the major intelligence players “rushing to the

soccer ball” instead of “playing their positions” in responding to crisis management, at the

expense of emphasis on long-term intelligence efforts and breadth of analysis. Even in crisis

situations, there are structural and procedural impediments that frequently hobble attempts to get

crucial intelligence to senior policy-makers and war fighters when they need it.

Each member of the Intelligence Community has a different organizational culture,

different values, and different incentives. Many Community clients believe day-to-day

intelligence support is less integrated and less useful than it might be. In illustrating this point,

several senior officials noted that, rather than depend on the Community as a whole for noncrisis support, they rely on one or two intelligence experts, thereby foregoing broader, and

perhaps more useful assessments, because of the difficulty in getting fused intelligence.

Efforts to respond to policy-maker needs have focused intelligence on short-term, crisis

management support at the expense of longer-term and strategic analyses. Initiatives to improve

the coordinating capability of the DCI, such as the creation of the Deputy Director for

Community Management (DDCI/CM) position, have been only partially successful. The DCI

does not have the fiscal and political power necessary to perform this role, and less-senior

managers and analysts are not able to task across agencies to gather the necessary range of all

source intelligence. The changing international environment will require a more flexible

decentralized approach to intelligence gathering that necessitates new expertise and methods.

Additional human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are required, and the lack of

outside experts and the dearth of culturally educated regional analysts is keenly felt. The limited

ability to incorporate open source intelligence further inhibits the creation of a quality

intelligence product that is useful to policymakers. Similar deficiencies exist in the ability of the

intelligence community to incorporate economic and science and technology analysis into

intelligence products.

Better information-sharing capabilities with law enforcement officials are also needed.

The recent trend toward closer cooperation between the Department of Justice and the Central

Intelligence Agency to address the threat of worldwide terrorism is encouraging. However, there

are at least 10 additional members of the Community and incentives, together with a more

rigorous oversight mechanism, may be necessary to better coordinate day-to-day efforts. Unless

the Intelligence Community cooperates more effectively on a day-to-day basis, it will be difficult

to prevent crises or to ensure adequate warning. Time will likely be lost at the start of a crisis

while coordination mechanisms are brought up to speed.
12

G. Inter-Branch Activities. The Executive and Legislative Branches do not consult

effectively enough to satisfy the demands of the new security environment. During the

assessment, former members of Congress and current Congressional staffers repeatedly noted the

lack of consultation between the Administration and the Hill. While a certain amount of creative

tension should exist between the branches of government, at the beginning of a new national

security epoch constructive collaboration is extremely important. Jurisdictional disputes and

bureaucratic struggles plague both branches, as does partisan politics. However, if national

security strategies are to be backed by appropriate organizations and resources, Congress and the

Administration must consult on the best approaches. This consultation must continue on a

regular basis.

An example of consultative failure according to one former Member is the existence of

approximately 78 treaties that await Senate ratification. They languish in part because

Administrations have not been engaged enough with Members before, during, or after the treaty

negotiation process.

chieving consultative success will not be easy. Formal mechanisms, such as hearings

and investigations, tend to be adversarial when the White House is held by a political

party different from the majority party in one or both chambers on the Hill. Informal mechanisms

are available, but are often restrictive and undisciplined. One former influential House Member

has suggested that Congress create a combined standing committee to consult regularly with

senior Executive Branch officials on national security issues. The concept is worth pursuing, but

there must be incentives for the Administration to deal frankly with such a committee if it

becomes established.

There will always be differences over national security specifics (such as the size of the

foreign aid budget, the number of divisions, and individual weapons systems), and Congress may

erect barriers to restrict the Executive Branch’s leeway to conduct security and foreign policy.

These differences should not interfere with the benefits that are likely to accrue if there are

agreements on the overarching issues—or at least an understanding of opponents’ positions.

3. Key Observations—National Security Resource Allocation.

he 21st century environment broadens national security requirements and may require

assigning higher priorities to nontraditional concerns (e.g., homeland defense or

infrastructure security). Resource allocation will involve difficult decisions, which, for the time

being, will be made within the confines of current processes.

As described in Volume II of this Addendum, Executive Office of the President, under the

current system, OMB reviews the budget submissions prepared by Executive Branch

Departments and Agencies to ensure that they comply with the President's policy, priorities, and

directives—often a contentious process involving the NSC staff as well as OMB and Department

and Agency staffs. In addition to reviewing budget submissions, OMB also reviews the

testimony of Administration officials prior to Congressional hearings, and the OMB Director and

his deputies may be called on by Congress to defend the overall budget.

It is important to note that only the State of the Union Address provides a unifying theme

on the President’s national security priorities. However, the State of the Union Address is

A

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prepared after the Departments complete their budgets. Thus, there is no unifying guidance to

assist the Departments and Agencies during budget preparation.

Each Department and Agency uses slightly different processes to build their budget

submissions, and each interprets Administration policies in its own way. The OMB process to

review these budget submissions is complex and operates primarily to ensure that the

Departments and Agencies support the President’s top priorities. The review, like budget

preparation, is conducted in a stovepiped, department-by-department manner.19 Once on the Hill,

the budget is examined by Committees that focus on the Departments and Agencies over which

they have jurisdiction and who jealously guard their prerogatives—another system of stovepipes.

Thus, it is often difficult if not impossible to orchestrate an integrated examination of national

security strategic functions across Executive Branch Departments. The 13 separate annual

appropriations bills exemplify this incremental approach to budgeting.

Congressional action to approve Administration budgets involves three types of

committees in both chambers. The Budget Committees establish spending ceilings and may issue

reconciliation instructions if other Committees exceed those ceilings. Authorizing Committees

authorize funding for Departments, Agencies, and programs, establishing the funding ceilings for

particular programs. In doing so, they may impose restrictions or constraints on spending,

restructure organizations under their jurisdiction, and require specific actions within specified

time limits. Appropriating Committees provide actual funding for all government activities in 13

annual appropriations bills, supplemental bills, and continuing resolutions. All of these

Committees and their Subcommittees hold hearings and prepare legislation and reports. The

latter are non-binding, although the requirements contained in reports are usually honored by the

activities to which they are directed. When passed by both chambers and signed by the President,

bills become laws.

Two observations may lead to process improvements in national security resource

allocation.

A. National Security Planning Guidance. At present there is no single process or

document that links the National Security Strategy to Executive Branch resource allocation

decisions. Although there may be general agreement within the Administration on the National

Security Strategy (required by Congress, prepared by the NSC staff, and published by the White

House), it is not clear that resource allocation decisions support the strategic precepts in this

document in an integrated fashion. There seems to be a gap at the national level between the

National Security Strategy, which is by necessity broad and general, and the budget process. The

White House does not provide additional integrated guidance to Executive Branch Departments

and Agencies with respect to funding for specific national security activities or programs, nor

does there appear to be a method to integrate the spending of several different Departments

and/or Agencies vis-à-vis specific functional areas. Moreover, the document is not coordinated

with the Congress, even informally, as to whether, or how, the National Security Strategy will be

resourced. If strategy is the process of relating ends to means, intentions to capabilities, and

objective to resources, the current National Security Strategy document is not a strategy—

instead it is a political statement, an executive branch “wish list” of policies.

 

19 As the process now exists, it is difficult for OMB examiners to look at functional areas across several organizations,

although OMB examiners noted during interviews that they are “moving in that direction.”
14

 It appears that the broadening scope of national security and the challenges identified in

New World Coming may demand that the national security resource allocation process become

more disciplined and prioritized, and that it integrate requirements and resources in a more

comprehensive manner. Some form of authoritative National Security Planning Guidance

(shorter, less detailed, but similar perhaps to DoD’s Defense Planning Guidance)20 prepared by

“Principals” at the NSC, NEC, OMB level may fill the gap between the National Security

Strategy and budget submissions.

This document would engender high level interagency debate on strategy and

requirements during preparation and invigorate interagency planning. A National Security

Planning Guidance could also encourage longer-range planning for national security investments

to ensure that resources are used in the most efficient manner. Such a document is also likely to

serve as a basis for the OMB budget submission review process and facilitate productive

Executive–Legislative Branch consultations.

B. Functional Budgeting. Processes should be instituted during budget submission

reviews to provide comprehensive examinations of key national security functions across

several agencies. Currently, OMB examiners focus on Departments and Agencies rather than

functions. While this approach provides excellent insight into how funds are allocated within

Executive Branch activities, it does not facilitate cross-department reviews, except for extremely

high interest functions. For example, it is difficult to determine if (or how) State Department

foreign assistance spending is integrated with Department of Defense military-to-military

activities.

While it is probably not feasible to achieve cross-Department visibility over all national

security activities, it should be possible to institute a process that will improve the Executive

Branch’s ability to look at the integration of a range of high value activities and programs (e.g.,

homeland security). Such a system should be flexible enough to shift focus easily when priorities

change.

4. Key Observations—Gaps and Seams (Homeland Security).

edundancy and overlap between organizations, as well as greatly diffused lines of

authority, responsibility, and accountability generally point to “gaps and seams.”

Other strong indicators include the creation of “patches” or “workarounds,” and the migration of

functions and power to different organizations that would seem to lie outside their core

competencies. A key challenge in this respect lies in the area of homeland security.21

In its initial report, New World Coming, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

Century concluded that “America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our

homeland.” The report also noted that “Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in

large numbers” and that the country will become increasingly vulnerable to a large range of

 

20 See Volume IV for a discussion of the Defense Planning Guidance.

21 Other commissions also have highlighted shortfalls and inadequacies of U.S. homeland security capabilities. These include:

the mid-1990s Marsh Commission on critical infrastructure; the 1997 National Academy of Public Administration/FEMA

Commission on the role of the National Guard in emergency preparedness and response; the 1999 Webster Commission on

federal law enforcement; the 1999 Deutch Commission on WMD proliferation; the 2000 Bremer Commission on terrorism;

and the ongoing Gilmore Commission on assessing domestic preparedness to WMD. In addition, numerous “think tanks”

have either published or are undertaking major projects focused on the problem of homeland security.

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threats. In its second report, Seeking a National Strategy, the Commission noted that in order to

assure the security and safety of Americans on American soil, realignments of organizations and

resources would be necessary.

At present, the United States is unprepared organizationally and functionally for the scale

and nature of emerging threats to the American homeland. There are substantial structural and

process deficiencies for addressing non-traditional homeland security issues such as those

associated with cyber crime, non-state actors, WMD proliferation, biotechnology, and

information technology. While coping with these problems is critical, many homeland security

issues do not have “homes” in the present national security structure, and are dealt with on an ad

hoc basis.

These new threats require a comprehensive approach to prevention, protection, response

and recovery, consistent with American values, interests, and institutions. However, many

homeland security problems transcend traditional jurisdictions between Federal Departments and

Agencies, as well as the boundaries between federal, state, and local entities. Major “zones of

ambiguity” exist with respect to who is accountable for the overall effort and who is responsible

for functional requirements. These seams can be exploited by adversaries and, unless repaired,

are likely to complicate prevention, deterrence, detection, and response. At the same time,

protecting the homeland should not come at the expense of constitutional processes and personal

liberties.

Effectively coordinating the activities of participating organizations in a manner

consistent with American values requires clear lines of authority, responsibility, and

accountability together with adequate resources. Some consolidation of jurisdictions and

functional responsibilities could eliminate many vulnerable seams; reduce zones of ambiguity

between federal, state, and local agencies; and help ensure efficient application of resources.

Examples of homeland security issues that are being addressed by ad hoc work-arounds

through traditional stovepipes were found throughout Phase III research. For instance

implementation of national infrastructure protection measures has migrated to the NSC staff

which is designed to oversee policy coordination, not implementation. Also, PDD-63 created the

National Infrastructure Protection Center, but scattered other functions between DoD, the FBI,

and the Department of Commerce.

The Department of Defense views its role in homeland security from the perspective of

“military support to civil authorities” and currently has no single point of contact. Although an

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support position exists, it was created recently

and is not entirely operational. The Department assigned responsibility for homeland security to

the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). This command in turn

created the Combined Joint Task Force—Civil Support (CJTF-CS) to coordinate for and provide

assistance to state and local first-responders, but the task force has a limited staff and limited

resources. DoD has also conducted a program to train a few local fire fighters and rescue groups

in the use of chemical and biological detection equipment; however, this function is being

transferred to the Department of Justice for administration, and has funding problems. DoD is

also attempting to develop regional and local chemical and biological detection capabilities in

the Army National Guard.
16

Border security responsibilities remain divided between the Coast Guard, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Boarder Patrol, and various port authorities,

including the FAA. Disaster response remains scattered between FEMA, the Centers for Disease

Control, and the National Guard. Although FEMA has a planning process for the Federal

Response Plan, standardized planning and coordinating procedures are generally lacking

elsewhere, and many agencies cannot communicate with each other. Finally, there has been no

assessment at federal, state, regional, or local levels as to determine what capabilities and

resources exist now or what requirements must be addressed in the future—especially for

biological attacks.

There are many obstacles to addressing homeland security organizational and process

concerns. However, the nature of the threat to U.S. economic prosperity and domestic tranquility

depends on preventing attacks on the American population and critical infrastructures, and if

prevention and/or protection fails, on effective response that leads to prompt recovery. These

imperatives give special emphasis to overcoming existing impediments to effective coordination

and cooperation at all levels. Failure to do so could result in undermining the credibility of the

government and a public backlash that could have far reaching impact and affect the U.S.

standing as a global leader and its ability to implement the national security strategy.

5. Key Observations—Other Themes.

n the research of national security processes, two cross-cutting themes emerged that

can strongly affect the nation’s ability to meet future challenges. These involve the

usefulness of information technology in national security processes, and the need for high quality

people to make the national security system operate in an optimum fashion.

A. Information Technology. The incorporation of information technology and rapid

communications can positively affect national security processes—and it can also create

new concerns. Immediate access to a wide range of information, the ability to view world

events as they occur, and the capability to instantly communicate across the globe change the

pace of national security processes, activities, and operations. Rapid information exchanges

through innovations such as conference calls and video teleconferences offer certain advantages.

They facilitate rapid decision making and provide participants with access to specific data,

expertise, and judgements that can enable the U.S. government to act inside an adversary’s (or

negotiating partner’s) decision loop. Technology also allows real time options development and

dissemination of implementing actions.

However, the rapid proliferation of information and communications technology by

individual Departments and Agencies has resulted in a wide range of different capabilities that

are not always interoperable. In fact, rather than speed information flow, incompatible technical

capabilities can restrict it. What is clear is that the U.S. government lacks integrated information

architecture at the interagency level. “Compatible” unclassified systems are often unable to

exchange routine information, but worse yet a classified system similar in scope to the Defense

Department’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is totally lacking. This

prevents the rapid exchange of sensitive data, and severely limits integrated collaborative

planning at the interagency level across government.

Other points are also worth considering. While often enabling expeditious action,

technology makes it both possible and tempting to exclude much of the deliberation and resident

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staff expertise that are hallmarks of effective decision making. The need for rapid decision

making is always relative and we should strive to stay inside an opponent’s decision cycle.

However once inside that cycle, speed for the sake of speed can be counter productive. As

several experienced practitioners noted, rapid action is not always the best approach to complex

national security problems. Sometimes it is better to slow down the pace of response and proceed

with careful deliberation. Technology also can also invite operational micro management, such

as the approval of individual targets and weapons during combat operations. The likelihood that

an office in Washington may opt to intervene in operations within a military conflict can stifle

initiative by those on the ground and eventually lead to erroneous decisions that have far

reaching consequences.

Technology clearly offers advantages to improving process effectiveness. Yet adopting

technological remedies is risky if done without a comprehensive review of requirements,

implications, and human decision procedures. This is especially true for information flows. Any

recommendations that advocate information technology improvements should include a

stipulation that information flow assessments be conducted as part of upgrade efforts.

B. Personnel. Personnel recruitment and training to develop and implement

national security strategy and policies for the 21st century may be a challenge. Regardless

of the structure, process, or system, the government’s effectiveness depends on having the right

people with the right skills. Many of those consulted in the course of this study expressed

concern about recruiting, training, placing, and retaining personnel. While recruitment and

retention in the Armed Forces continue to grab headlines, this underlying concern was evident in

almost every Department and Agency. Without the highest quality personnel and the ability to

rapidly structure the workforce to meet changes, the best national security processes and

organizations have minimal value.

everal factors contribute to current concerns. The strong economy and job markets

offer attractive alternatives to public service careers. Government pay scales

(especially starting salaries for positions requiring technical knowledge) are not competitive with

the private sector. As one senior government official noted, his office was no longer able to

recruit talent from top tier universities because placement officers “found government salaries

laughable” in the current environment. Lack of attractive salary and benefit packages (coupled

with an antiquated promotion system that often rewards seniority rather than merit) affects both

recruiting and retention. Recruitment is further hampered by a grueling and invasive approval

process for senior appointees, as well as the severe restrictions placed on post-government

employment. The attractiveness of a stable, cradle-to-grave career in today’s society does not

have the same appeal as in the past. To these detractors must be added public devaluation of

government service by many elected officials in recent years. Together, these factors make

government service an unattractive career choice.

Changes in the way national power must be applied require integrated policy

development, planning, and implementation. Yet career civil servants and political appointees in

the Executive Branch and new members of Congress often come from cultures that may not fully

appreciate the spectrum of new national security imperatives. Efforts to overcome these

shortcomings could benefit by borrowing a page from DoD. The military services have

developed a sophisticated professional military education system, and the Department has

expanded that to include many civil service employees. The system improves the quality of

internal operations and makes adapting to change easier and quicker. The State Department has a

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similar, but more limited, educational system. It may be worthwhile to move beyond Department

systems and initiate interagency and inter-branch training and wargames to help national security

professionals cope with the new spectrum of demands.

As new processes and systems are recommended by reformers, it is important to take

requirements for high quality personnel—both now and in the future—into account. Fixing the

present problem is likely to require legislative actions as well as Department and Agency

initiatives to make government service rewarding and attractive.

6. Challenges.

ational security challenges for the 21st century will require integrated action from a

much wider range of Departments and Agencies across the government. This will

require at least some changing of processes and organizational structures and will almost

certainly require bringing together organizations with vastly different systems for policy and

strategy development, planning and implementation, and resourcing. This is a complex task that

will often collide with established organizational cultures and values. Recommendations for

change must include three factors.

First, they must introduce a mechanism that will permit consultation between the

Executive Branch and the Congress throughout the change process. Unless change of this

magnitude is a true partnership between both branches, it is likely to flounder on the myriad

obstacles that will certainly be placed in its path.

Second, there must be incentives for implementing changes. Directing change, even

Congressional direction, is likely to lead to uninspired implementation (or no implementation)

unless there are incentives for carrying it out. As Lyndon Johnson is reported to have said 30

years ago, the best way to destroy a new idea is to put it into an old organization. The old saw

about bureaucratic resistance to change will almost certainly apply to many of the affected

organizations. Most will view change as personally risky and uncomfortable. Successful change

must be “incentivized” by instituting both positive and negative sanctions that have value to the

organizations in question.

Third, change on this scale must be driven from the top down and monitored throughout

its execution. Because of the complexity and the integrated nature of the changes (and because

much of the resistance to change will occur at the middle organizational levels and below), upper

echelon vision and management will be necessary to implement it without disruption or

unintended consequences. It will also be necessary to ensure that change occurs at the correct

pace, and recommendations for change should include ways to develop a culture of change

among senior officials.

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Chapter 2

The Overarching National Security Processes

At The Interagency and Inter-Branch Levels

National Security Strategy and Policy Development

Planning and Implementation of

National Security Strategy and Policy

National Security Resource Allocation

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION TO THE OVERARCHING

NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

1. General.

here are three key overarching national security processes:

• National Security Strategy and Policy Development;

• Planning and Implementation of National Security Strategy and Policy; and

• National Security Resource Allocation.

Taken as a whole, these processes are designed to define and attain national security goals.

 descriptive process-based analyses of the individual agencies, departments, and

committees that comprise the national security apparatus are contained in subsequent

volumes of this Addendum. This chapter focuses on how the three overarching processes are

aggregated at the interagency and inter-branch level. The underlying analysis is based on seven

“Key Processes” identified by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. These

processes are defined in Attachment 1 to Chapter 3 of this volume, and include Strategy

Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution/Implementation;

Observation, Orientation and Oversight; Preparation; and Resourcing. Additionally, we include a

description of the organizational culture and values of each organization in the process

description (see Attachment 2 of Chapter 3 in this volume for the definitions). In assessing

interagency and inter-branch activities, a natural categorization of the seven processes into three

overarching processes was helpful. The relationship is shown in the Table 1 below:

Table 1. Process Relationships.

OVERARCHING PROCESSES SEVEN KEY PROCESSES

National Security Strategy and Policy Strategy Development

Development Policy, Guidance, and Regulation

Planning

Mission Execution/Implementation

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight

Planning and Implementation of National

Security Strategy and Policy

Preparation

National Security Resource Allocation Resourcing

Most of the organizations examined have developed structures and responsibilities to

manage each of the seven key processes. However, there is a distinct variance in the conduct and

scope of the processes across the government. Moreover, the processes often overlap. For

example, policy, guidance, and regulation processes within some organizations often become

enmeshed in strategy development, implementation, and resourcing. Planning frequently

T

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becomes an integral function of strategy development and implementation. Mission execution is

often absorbed as a subset of planning, and, depending on Congressional demeanor, may be part

of resourcing deliberations. Observation, orientation, and oversight processes feed back into

planning and implementation, and resourcing, while preparation (especially in terms of

determining requirements and funding them) is frequently a component of resource allocation.

While some of the variance is a natural product of the differing missions, objectives and

responsibilities of the individual organization, these differences may cause problems in the future

when integrated planning and execution is necessary to meet national security challenges that

extend across the traditional responsibilities.

2. National Security Strategy and Policy Development.

ational strategy and policy are fundamental for developing Department and Agency

policies and strategies and for presenting them to Congress. In the Department of

Defense (DoD), for example, the policies put forth in the Defense Planning Guidance and the

directions contained in the National Military Strategy (as well as other documents) reflect

broader Executive Branch views as expressed in the National Security Strategy.22 National

security policy and strategy are developed through the formal interagency processes (described

by Presidential Decision Directive 2 ((PDD-2)) and other directives), and supplemented by

informal interaction among senior officials. Congress reviews policy and strategy development

through formal hearings, investigations, reports and informal contacts—all of which influence

Executive Branch activities and ultimately may influence resource allocation decisions and

public support for the Administration.

3. Planning and Implementation of National Security Strategy and Policy.

lanning and implementation of national security strategy and policy is continuous and

is conducted by various elements of the federal government, depending on the issue at

hand. For example, the diplomatic aspects of policies are likely to be carried out by the State

Department; military and defense aspects by DoD; economic and trade aspects by the

Departments of Treasury and Commerce; and strategies for dealing with the Hill and gaining

public support by the White House. Planning and implementation is guided by broad official

statements of national security strategy and foreign policy released by an Administration, such as

the National Security Strategy, the United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs, and the

political-military plans developed under the auspices of PDD-2 and PDD-56 (see below). More

specific guidelines for implementation of a particular policy, however, are provided by

Presidential Decision Directives; Executive Orders; memoranda recording the decisions taken by

National Security Council (NSC) committees; National Economic Council (NEC) decisions, and

speeches, testimony, or other pronouncements by the President or one of his key advisers.

Policy and strategy implementation takes various forms. It occurs, for example, when a

Department or Agency issues specific internal guidance to its component agencies; when an

NSC committee orders the development of a political-military plan to address an emerging

international crisis; or when a military or diplomatic team executes a mission. Implementation

 

22 See Volume IV, Chapters 3 and 5 entitled the “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy” and the “Joint Staff” for a description

of relevant documents and how they are produced. Although the DoD system is perhaps the most complex, most

Departments and Agencies have an equivalent system for linking plans to resource allocation decisions.

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also entails monitoring and oversights, to ensure that various players in the national security

apparatus fulfill their responsibilities.

In the Clinton Administration, as in previous Administrations, policy and strategy

planning and implementation are often interagency processes concentrated in the National

Security Council committees. For example, PDD-2 describes the process by which members of

the NSC/Principals Committee (PC), NSC/Deputies Committee (DC), and Interagency Working

Group (IWG) ensure that national security decisions are carried out by the interagency. An

innovation of the Clinton Administration was to codify a process, described in PDD-56, by

which the interagency members could coordinate contingency planning. As in policy and

strategy development, informal processes and personal relationships among interagency officials

supplement, and in many cases, substitute for the formal process.

Congress also has a role in monitoring policy implementation. Congress holds hearings

and solicits testimony and reports from Executive Branch agencies, from the General Accounting

Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and other resources available to the Legislative Branch.

4. National Security Resource Allocation.

he processes that identify requirements and forecast and provide resources are

designed to generate the capabilities needed to accomplish national security goals and

objectives. Essentially, resourcing involves preparation of the President’s Budget and its

progress through Congress. Although somewhat arcane, this may be the least complex of the

three overarching processes because roles and responsibilities are relatively well defined, and

because there is a schedule that serves as a forcing function to move participants toward

decisions (even when milestones are not met). Fixed responsibilities and schedules are less

evident in strategy development and implementation processes.

5. Organization of This Chapter.

ach of the three overarching processes is discussed in detail in the sections that

follow. Detailed information concerning individual Department and Agency

involvement is contained in the accompanying volumes.23

 

23 Volume II—Executive Office of the President; Volume III—Congress; Volume IV—Department of Defense; Volume V—

Department of State; Volume VI—Intelligence Community; Volume VII—Other Executive Branch Activities.

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SECTION II. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1. General.

part from internal Department and Agency processes,24 overarching strategy and

policy development involves several interagency sub-processes including:

• The traditional Interagency Process as described in Presidential Decision Directive 2

and overseen by the National Security Council (NSC) through the NSC staff; 25

• The process for coordinating the development of economic policy directed by the

National Economic Council (NEC); and

• The process of developing response strategies and policies through preparation of the

Federal Response Plan (FRP) under the auspices of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA).

This section looks at each of these processes individually. It also examines how Congress

influences policy and strategy development.

2. The Traditional National Security Interagency Process.

he traditional interagency approach to national security problems occurs through a

formal process that has its roots in the National Security Act of 1947.26 Over the

years, the process has varied in accordance with the wishes of the President and the strength of

the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), who is often referred to as

the National Security Advisor. The process itself is not codified in law below the full NSC,

although much of the work and most of the decisions are made by various interagency

committees below that level in accordance with Presidential preferences.

A. Background.

(1). Presidential Decision Directive 2. PDD-2, Organization of the National

Security Council, establishes the Clinton Administration’s formal interagency structure and the

processes for considering “national security policy issues requiring Presidential

determination.”27 The document specifies interagency roles and responsibilities at multiple

levels, and reflects the President’s organizational preferences for dealing with “national security”

as the President defines that term.

 28 That is not unique. Because it reflects personal

 

24 Described in appropriate chapters and volumes of this report.

25 Although the term National Security Council (NSC) has specific meaning in law and practice, the term is sometimes used to

denote the National Security Council Staff. In this document, we use the term “NSC” to denote the National Security

Council proper and “NSC Staff” to refer to the staff.

26 The 1947 Act created the National Security Council whose staff oversees the traditional interagency process.

27 Although the language of PDD-2 suggests considerable Presidential involvement, all but the most significant national

security matters are dealt with by the NSC’s committees and working groups as described in subsequent paragraphs and in

the volumes dealing with the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council.

28 The White House. PDD-2. “Organization of the National Security Council.” (Washington: January 29, 1993). (Hereafter,

PDD-2.)

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predilections, each Administration’s version of the national security interagency process is

somewhat different and involves different players in the NSC system. Notwithstanding

differences, the process has been evolutionary over time rather than revolutionary.29

(2). Evolution of PDD-2. Administrations formalize their concepts of

interagency processes and NSC responsibilities in authoritative documents, such as PDD-2. As a

rule, each new Administration builds on its predecessor’s work. For instance, some perceive only

minor differences between the Bush Administration’s National Security Directive 1(NSD-1) and

the Clinton Administration’s PDD-2.30 There are some differences, however, in specific

authorities that were delegated to the NSC/Principals Committee (PC) and the NSC/Deputies

Committee (DC) to work specific issues. And NSD-1 creates specific functional and regional

working groups, while the Clinton Administration’s PDD-2 omitted these groups.31 NSD-1

appears to have been written to push decisions down and allow “the system” to work issues as

much as possible at lower levels, while elevating decisions to the Principals level later in the

process. Overall, most decisions have been made at the same levels in the previous Bush and the

Clinton Administrations. In both Administrations, over time, decision making authority has

migrated from the working groups to the NSC/DC, and occasionally the NSC/PC, although that

trend may be more pronounced in the Clinton Administration.

Because of their importance to national security, interagency process directives are

generally published soon after an Administration takes office. For example, the Clinton

Administration promulgated PDD-2 on January 20, 1993—Inauguration Day—while the Bush

Administration published NSD-1 in April of 1991—about three months into its tenure.

(Interagency directives have been categorized in several different ways. In the Carter

Administration they were titled Presidential Directives (PD), while the Reagan Administration,

titled these documents as National Security Decision Directives (NSDD).32 The Bush

Administration re-named them as National Security Directives, and NSD-1 and NSD-10

described its version of the interagency process.33 The Clinton Administration re-titled them

once again as Presidential Decision Directives.) Formal processes are usually the basis for

informal processes that develop almost as quickly.

(3). Distinctions Between Formal and Informal Processes. One expert

describes the national security process as “an extension of the president’s own concerns and

interests.”34 Thus, it is important to note that the President and his advisors do not always follow

the formal processes reflected in documents to the letter. In fact, formal and informal processes

coexist and complement each other. Often, informal processes are truncated versions of more

 

29 The current Bush Administration replaced PDD-2 with NSPD-1.

30 Some experts attribute these to the Clinton Administration’s favorable impression of the way their predecessor’s model

worked. See for example Vincent A. Augur. “The National Security Council System After the Cold War” in Randall B.

Ripley, et al., eds. U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War. (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).

(Hereafter Augur)

31 Compare language in PDD-2 with NSD-1 (“National Security Council Organization”), dated April 17, 1989.

32 See NSDD-266 (“National Security Interagency Process”) dated June 9, 1987 and NSDD-2 (“National Security Council

Structure”) dated January 12, 1982.

33 NSD-1 and NSD-10 (“Appointments to NSC Policy-Coordinating Committees”). NSD-1 includes many of the

recommendations of the Tower Commission appointed by President Reagan in 1987 to review and make recommendations

for improving the NSC system. Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft USAF (Ret.), President Bush’s National Security

Advisor, had been a member of the Tower Commission.

34 Augur, p.67.
6

formal arrangements and involve at least some of the same players. When informal processes

arise, they often do so not because the formal process is not working properly, but because time

constraints or participants’ agendas suggest the need for something else. Careful review and

comments by participants indicate that informal approaches based on formal processes are often

an effective way to develop policy and strategy. In practice the formal processes become

reference points from which informal processes spring. Many important decisions are reached

using informal processes, however, formal processes tend to be more rigorous and disciplined—

when followed—and are better at ensuring all perspectives receive a hearing. If used properly,

formal process can enhance participant trust in the system.

nformal processes often cut corners to speed up decision making, but such shortcuts

often “freeze out” some players. There is nothing in the research for this project that

suggests this is inherently wrong; however, it is important for core participants to realize that

truncating the involvement of lower level staff experts—or entire Departments or Agencies—

entails a certain amount of risk. A second significant point that affects current practices is that

informal processes sometimes occur because technology makes them possible. For example, the

ability to conduct secure teleconferencing almost at will can tempt decision makers to make

decisions in near-real-time without consulting staff experts who might frame issues more

precisely and suggest a broader range of alternatives.

B. NSC Composition.

(1). Evolution of the NSC. Congress established the formal legal composition of

the NSC in the National Security Act of 1947, and Congress has changed that composition

several times.35 The original law specified that, among others, the NSC would be composed of

the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, who are the only members

that have remained constant throughout. Two years later, in the National Security Act

Amendments of 1949, Congress modified the original composition. This act removed the Service

Secretaries and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, added the Vice

President as a full member and designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as statutory advisors.36 There have been other changes

over the years, and a precedent for Congressional action vis-a-vis the NSC is clearly established.

However, while Congress mandates membership in law, Presidents usually add others to

the NSC to suit their needs and agendas. Further, in the NSC system of committees, the

President, not the Congress, decides membership and limits of authority. Thus, like the formal

processes, the NSC membership and the membership of its committees have evolved to suit the

needs of the President.

(2). Current Membership. PDD-2 expanded NSC membership beyond that

mandated by law in a way that reflected President Clinton’s concept of a link between national

security, economic, and domestic political matters. In addition to the statutory members (i.e., the

 

35 Public Law 253, cited as the “National Security Act of 1947”, Title I, Chapter 343, Sect. 101. “The Council shall be

composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense. . .; the Secretary of the Army. . .;the Secretary

of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force. . .; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. . .; and such of the

following named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the executive departments,

the Chairman of the Munitions Board. . ., and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board. . .”

36 Public Law 216, Sect. 3

 I
7

President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense) and the

statutory advisors (i.e., DCI37 and the CJCS), the Clinton NSC included:

. . . the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the

United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the

Chief of Staff to the President. The Attorney General shall be

invited to attend meetings pertaining to his [sic] jurisdiction,

including covert actions. The heads of other Executive departments

and agencies, the special statutory advisors to the NSC, and other

senior officials shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC

where appropriate.38

he Clinton NSC membership had parallels with that of the previous Bush

Administration. For that Administration, the White House Chief of Staff and the

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs joined the statutory members for NSC

meetings. NSD-1 also states that the Secretary of the Treasury was to attend NSC meetings

unless specifically asked not to do so. The document further specifies that the Attorney General

would be invited to attend when matters “pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions”

were discussed, and the heads of other Executive Branch agencies, the statutory advisors, and

“other senior officials will be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate.”39

Supporting committees were essentially the same in terms of make-up and function for both

Administrations as outlined below, although PDD-2 is not as specific with respect to their duties

as was NSD-1. In short, the primary differences between the Clinton and preceding Bush

Administrations’ interagency systems lie in application, not in membership or formal processes.

Even the major informal processes were similar.40

C. NSC Functions and Purposes. The NSC and its supporting committees and groups

serve as a forum to help Presidents make and manage national security decisions.41 Given the

nature of the membership and the purpose as cited below, the Clinton Administration apparently

intended to use the NSC system of committees and working groups as a mechanism to integrate

the elements of national power that the President believes are key. In the first substantive

paragraph of PDD-2, President Clinton stated that:

The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of

national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic,

foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with

the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate

committees, the NSC shall be my principal means for coordinating

 

37 The DCI is also the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His/her responsibilities include direction of the CIA

as well as management of the Intelligence Community, which consists of thirteen formal intelligence activities located

throughout the government.

38 PDD-2, p. 1.

39 NSD-1, p. 1.

40 Of note, the current Bush Administration released NSPD-1, which in many ways reverts the NSC back to preceding Bush

Administration.

41 PDD-2, p. 1.

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Executive departments and agencies in the development and

implementation of national security policy.42

n other words, although it has not always been successful in doing so, the Clinton

Administration tried to use the NSC system of supporting committees and working

groups to focus diverse elements of national power on questions of national security. To an

extent, this is somewhat different than the approaches taken by earlier Administrations which,

given the strategic environments of their times, often treated national security issues primarily as

military and/or diplomatic questions.

It is noteworthy that although the NSC is established in law and by Administration

policy, its members rarely meet as the NSC. At present, the entire NSC per se as established by

PDD-2 has not formally met since its inaugural meeting in 1993.43 Instead, the Principals and

Deputies Committees, supported by Interagency Working Groups, perform most of the

interagency work, with the Deputies handling the lion’s share.

D. NSC Committees and Working Groups. To assist the NSC in framing issues for

the President and developing policy and strategy, PDD-2 establishes two formal committees and

a series of formal working groups, in addition to the NSC staff and special advisors and

emissaries. These are:

(1). The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The NSC/PC is chaired by the

APNSA and is composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,44 the U.S.

Representative to the United Nations, the DCI, the CJCS, and the Assistant to the President for

Economic Policy, who is also the director of the National Economic Council (NEC) Staff. (The

Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other executive Department and Agency

heads may join the NSC/PC as required. See, for example, PDD-63 requirements for critical

infrastructure protection, which uses the traditional interagency system, but expands

membership, based on lead agency requirements.) In essence, the NSC/PC is the NSC without

the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, unless

invited, and the President’s Chief of Staff.

(2). The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). The NSC/DC is chaired by the

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (DAPNSA) and includes the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(USD(P)), the Deputy DCI, the Vice CJCS (VCJCS), and the Assistant to the Vice President for

National Security Affairs.45 The Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, who

represents the NEC, and other Executive Branch officials may be invited to attend as necessary,

and, when covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities are discussed, a representative

 

42 PDD-2, p. 1.

43 Interviews with NSC staff members.

44 PDD-2 provides that if the Secretaries of State and Defense cannot attend, their Deputy Secretaries or other designees may

attend in their stead.

45 Note that although it is known as the Deputies Committee, the DoD and DoS representatives are Under, not Deputy,

Secretaries, although Deputy Secretaries from both Departments sometimes attend.

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9

of the Attorney General must attend.46 In practice, the majority of interagency work, decisions,

and coordination occur in the NSC/DC.

(3). Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWG).47 NSC/IWGs are established

by the NSC/DC as appropriate and may be either permanent or ad hoc. During the Clinton

Administration, there have usually been about two dozen functional and/or geographic working

groups at any one point. NSC/IWGs should be chaired by Assistant Secretaries, but sometimes

are chaired by others, including members of the NSC staff. Determination of lead Departments

and chairs is based on whether issues are primarily foreign policy and/or defense (Department of

State (DoS) or DoD); economic (Department of Treasury or National Economic Council); or

intelligence, nonproliferation, arms control, and/or crisis management (NSC staff). The NSC/DC

establishes guidelines for NSC/IWG operations, to include designating participants.

(4). The NSC Staff is a combination of professional staff funded through the

NSC budget (which is appropriated by Congress as part of the budget for the Executive Office of

the President) and detailees from the Executive Branch Departments, primarily State and

Defense.48 (For a more detailed description of the NSC staff see the Chapter 2 entitled “National

Security Council” in Volume II of this Addendum.) The staff is traditionally small, less than half

the size of the Office of Management and Budget. In the previous Bush Administration it

numbered 179, which the Clinton Administration reduced to 151 initially (consistent with

President Clinton’s campaign promise to reduce White House staff), but by 1999 the number of

personnel on the staff exceeded 200.

he politically appointed staff members were supplemented by a larger number of

personnel seconded from Executive Branch Departments such as State and Defense.

The theory behind this arrangement was that political appointees bring with them fresh ideas and

an understanding of the Administration’s priorities that can be coupled with the experience of

career civil servants and military officers who supplement the staff and who know how to get

things done within government bureaucracies. Detailed staff members also bring with them a

certain amount of loyalty to the Department or Agency to which they will eventually return,

which can affect how they approach issues and decisions. Career civil servants and military

officers also provide continuity when Administrations change. While they may eventually be

replaced by the incoming APNSA, they usually serve throughout the transition period when the

national security decision making apparatus may be especially vulnerable.

The staff is divided into administrative and substantive roles, depending on the

President’s requirements and the preferences and influence of the APNSA for whom they work.

In policy and strategy development, the staff often plays a coordinating role as brokers of

interagency agreements, but occasionally it assumes a more substantive role of selecting options

and making policy and strategy recommendations directly to the APNSA. The APNSA may take

these staff recommendations directly to the President, bypassing the NSC and interagency

process. However, to the extent that he/she does this, their image as an honest broker for the

 

46 When the NSC/DC is given responsibility for crisis management, it is redesignated as the Deputies Committee/CM (i.e.,

crisis management). See the section on strategy and policy implementation and the discussion of PDD-56 therein.

47 As previously noted, the current Bush Administration eliminated the term “Interagency Working Group” and replaced it

with “Policy Coordination Committee.” See NSPD-1.

48 Detailees normally serve in a non-reimbursable status—that is, their salaries continue to be paid by the Departments and

Agencies from which they came.

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10

interagency community suffers. As members of the interagency perceive that the APNSA is not

accurately representing their positions to the President, they may, themselves, begin to end run

the interagency process, which, ultimately, will lead to policy and strategy development

problems.

ts relatively small size and the large workload taxes the staff’s capability with, as at

least one author has pointed out, an adverse impact on the quality of decision

packages.49 Its small size and the press of daily business also limit its ability to oversee

implementation and to engage in long-range planning, although the NSC staff has attempted both

from time-to-time. In short, the staff seems to focus on current crises, which leaves little time for

longer-range planning.

On the other hand, because it is small and organizationally flat, the staff is inherently

flexible and often fills vacuums it detects in Department and Agency capabilities. As several

staff members pointed out during interviews, small is often a virtue because it permits more rapid

action unencumbered by bureaucratic impediments. Those interviewed indicated that, in their

experience, the size of the staff and the nature of the processes made it especially effective,

although this judgment is somewhat subjective. The deference shown the NSC staff by others in

the NSC system is illustrated by the fact that papers and memoranda prepared by the staff usually

receive preferential treatment, at least in the Interagency Working Groups.

On occasion, tensions develop between the NSC staff, Departments and Agencies, and

other members of the Executive Office of the President. Those with access to the President, may

suggest alternative approaches that are not always NSC staff preferences. While this is

sometimes frustrating to the staff, it is important that the President be able to acquire a range of

views and options.50

(5). Special Advisors and Emissaries assist the President and the APNSA with

particular problems. Although not part of the interagency process per se, these advisors are often

experienced interagency players who know how to gain access to interagency resources when

necessary. They are normally appointed for relatively long terms and are usually accountable to

the President, not Congress or Executive Branch officials. An example of a special advisor is

former Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry, whom President Clinton designated to take the

lead on improving relations with North Korea. Because special advisors and emissaries often

report directly to the President, Executive Branch Departments and Agencies are sometimes

uninformed about significant foreign policy issues.

E. The Formal Interagency Process. (See Appendix 1 of this chapter for process map)

(1). General. This section describes the formal PDD-2 prescribed interagency

process for policy and strategy formulation.51 Although it is formal in the sense that it is

prescribed by the President, it lacks some of the traditional trappings associated with other

formal processes. Specifically, unlike the resource allocation processes, for example (which has

specific dates and a cycle of events leading to a well-defined product), the PDD-2 interagency

 

49 Augur, pp. 55-56.

50 NSC staff interviews.

51 This process may also be used for policy and strategy implementation, or it may devolve into the PDD-56 process described

in the portion of this chapter devoted to policy and strategy implementation.

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11

process is more fluid and less regulated in terms of timelines, direction of movement, and

products.52 Apart from authorizing the NSC, the Congress does not oversee the interagency

process—although Congress can influence it by holding hearings involving some of the

participants or drafting legislation inter alia. (See Volume III, entitled Congress for more

detailed discussions of how the Congress influences strategy and policy development.)

(2). Products. Processes exist to generate products, including advice and

decision packages. The interagency process must deal with a wide variety of issues that impact

U.S. policy and strategy development, as well as implementation and resourcing. The nature of

the products that result from the traditional interagency process depends on the level from which

it is viewed. From the President’s perspective, the interagency process produces decision

options; introduces alternative views; makes decisions below the Presidential level when

appropriate; manages implementation of decisions; and assists in integrating “all aspects of

national security policy.”53

At the NSC/PC level, the process is designed to obtain Presidential guidance and

feedback; frame and refine issues; and produce policy and strategy options for NSC/PC

deliberations and decisions and, when necessary, for consideration by the President. For the

NSC/DC, the process provides a mechanism to obtain guidance from the President and the

NSC/PC; identify and frame issues for action at the DC level or higher; and develop and manage

policy and strategy. NSC/IWGs use the interagency process to identify, develop, and refine

issues and options across several agencies.

(3). Generating Policy and Strategy Issues. The interagency process permits

issue development at different levels. Issues may originate with the President and be passed

downward through the NSC/PC and NSC/DC to the NSC/IWGs with appropriate refinements

and guidance at each level. Or, NSC/IWGs may convince the NSC/DC that an issue merits

consideration, thus surfacing it from the bottom up. Finally, issues may enter the interagency

process from external processes, formal or informal (e.g., an issue raised at an informal meeting

of the Secretaries of State and Defense with the APNSA that is subsequently passed to the

NSC/DC for more detailed consideration or an issue that is raised by Congress during hearings).

(4). Relationship with Other Processes. Although a separate process exists for

crisis management (PDD-56) and infrastructure protection (PDD-63), the processes described in

PDD-2 are interrelated with those and other procedures, and implementation depends upon

actions and decisions taken under the authority of PDD-2. Sometimes the PDD-2 process is used

in lieu of PDD-56 or PDD-63. For example, those interviewed indicated that the process by

which both Bosnia and Kosovo were managed resembled the PDD-2 approach more closely than

the procedures in PDD-56. The PDD-2 process is also the model used by the NEC to develop

economic and trade policy and strategies. Decisions made as a result of PDD-2 interagency

deliberations often affect resourcing proposals made during preparation of the President’s

budget, and are thus related to resourcing processes indirectly.

 

52 “Products” in this case may be no more than one page memoranda—far removed from the multivolumed President’s

Budget, for example.

53 PDD-2, p.1. In cases in which the President is selectively involved in national security issues, the ability of the NSC/PC to

function effectively (including making decisions) seems crucial.
12

F. How the Process Works. Although interagency issues can originate from a number

of sources, one way to illustrate it is to take a bottom-up approach. (Regardless of the approach

taken—bottom-up or top-down—there are no fixed timelines that apply from one iteration to the

next, and the process frequently does not flow linearly or sequentially.)

(1). NSC/IWGs exist to conduct interagency studies, develop and refine issues

and options, and coordinate implementation of decisions. As noted previously, the IWGs are

established and chartered by the NSC/DC and, in effect, work directly for the NSC/DC, which

may specify frequency of meetings and membership. Assistant Secretaries from the appropriate

Departments or NSC staff members chair NSC/IWGs. In the absence of detailed guidance from

the NSC/DC, IWGs meet at the call of the chair, although IWG members often informally exert

pressure to schedule meetings and shape agendas.

NSC/IWG members are supported by numerous intra and interagency task groups and ad

hoc committees, which are important not only for their substantive work, but for building

consensus early in the process. Task group and committee membership often includes Deputy

Assistant Secretaries and action officers. For instance, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

may chair a task group composed of members of his/her office, the Joint Staff, and the

Department of State. This task group may provide information to an NSC/IWG for use during its

deliberations. In addition to formalized task groups, action officers may informally discuss issues

with counterparts in other Departments and/or Agencies and feed results back into IWGs.

Both IWGs and their supporting structures make some decisions that often are reflected

in the types of assessments they do and the options they retain to pass on to the NSC/DC.

Typically, the NSC/IWGs report out to the NSC/DC, which may accept, modify, or reject their

recommendations. On occasion, usually during crises, members of the NSC/PC or NSC/DC may

seek out individual members of an IWG for information, thus bypassing the formal process. For

example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy may converse directly with the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asian Affairs to gain information he

needs for NSC/DC deliberations without consulting the working group as a whole.54

(2). The NSC/DC makes many of the decisions in the interagency process.55 Its

functions include providing guidance and direction to the NSC/IWGs, oversight of the

interagency process, decision making, and resolving interagency disputes. PDD-2 instructs the

NSC/DC to “serve as the senior sub-cabinet forum for consideration of policy issues affecting

national security.” It also is charged to periodically review progress on “major foreign policy

initiatives” and “existing policy directives,” and for “day-to-day crisis management.”56

he DAPNSA chairs the NSC/DC and has the authority to call meetings, determine the

agenda, and ensure that appropriate papers are prepared.57 He/she is enjoined to do

this in consultation with other members; however, meetings are often held on short notice with

minimum consultations or time for staffs to review the agenda and prepare briefing papers.58

 

54 Interviews with DoD staff members.

55 See, for example, Augur, pp. 52-54 and interviews. The NSC staff has a larger volume of work than the NSC/DC, but it is

work that is done at a lower level and without the same decision making authority or accountability requirements.

56 PDD-2, pp. 2-3.

57 PDD-2, p. 3.

58 Interviews with DoD and DoS staff members.

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13

The Deputies Committee is responsible for ensuring that issues are adequately analyzed,

a full range of views is incorporated, appropriate options are identified, and relevant risks are

assessed. Typically, the NSC/DC will establish and/or instruct an IWG, pass along the guidance

it develops or receives from the NSC or NSC/PC, review IWG work, oversee necessary

revisions, refine IWG packages, make decisions (or forward recommendations to the NSC/PC),

and supervise implementation. Where disputes between agencies arise, the NSC/DC attempts to

resolve them at their level or, if that is not possible, passes them to the NSC/PC for resolution.

Informal meetings of selected DC members play an important role. As noted in the

Volumes IV and V on the Departments of State and Defense, these meetings are often

freewheeling discussions in which rough decisions are made and then presented to the remainder

of the DC for refinement and validation.

(3). NSC/PC is the senior interagency forum short of the NSC. It examines issues

and makes appropriate decisions, ratifies decisions made by the NSC/DC, and/or passes issues to

the President for his consideration. In the present example, issues and options developed initially

at the NSC/IWG would be passed to the NSC/DC, where they would be refined once again, and

passed to the NSC/PC for ratification or for the Principals’ decision.

When the NSC/PC reaches a decision (or ratifies a decision made by the NSC/DC), it

passes the decision and applicable instructions to the NSC/DC for implementation. When

necessary, the NSC/PC passes the decision package to the President for his decision, which,

when obtained, is passed to the NSC/DC for implementation. Typically, issues passed to the

President are those which the Principals’ Committee either cannot resolve or which are of such

significance that a Presidential decision is required (e.g., a foreign policy decision with major

domestic political implications).59

(4). The NSC, while including much of the membership of the NSC/PC, is a

separate body. Theoretically, the NSC/PC may pass issues to the NSC, which, according to

PDD-2, advises the President on the appropriate course of action. In theory, the NSC meets “as

required” and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs determines the agenda,

based on guidance from the President and in consultation with NSC members. In practice, the

NSC has not met as a body during the Clinton Administration except for its inaugural meeting.

G. Security Policy Coordination Mechanisms. PDD-29, promulgated in September

1994, created several new entities to develop and coordinate national security policy. These are

the Security Policy Board; the Security Policy Advisory Board; the Security Policy Forum; and

the Overseas Security Policy Board.60

(1). The Security Policy Board. This board, a successor organization to the Joint

Security Executive Committee established by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of

Central Intelligence (DCI), reports to the President through the APNSA. It consists of the DCI,

 

59 Interviews with NEC staff indicate that, in the Clinton Administration, the NSC/PC often defers to the President’s political

instincts and judgement for issues in which the PC envisions two or more solutions, each of which is satisfactory in itself but

entail different levels of domestic political risk.

60 www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd29.htm (Please note that the Security Policy Board, the Security Policy Advisory Board, and

the Security Policy Forum were eliminated by the current Bush Administration’s NSPD-1, which specifically revoked PDD29 and assigned the duties of these three entities to various Policy Coordination Committees. See NSPD-1, p. 6.)
14

the Deputy Secretaries of Defense, State, Energy and Commerce, the Deputy Attorney General,

the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “one Deputy Secretary from a non-defense

related agency [on an annual rotational basis] and one representative from the Office of

Management and Budget and the NSC staff.”61

The Board’s purpose is to “consider, coordinate, and recommend” U.S. security policy

directives, including procedures and practices.62 It is enjoined to do this in consonance with the

following principles:

(a). Policies must realistically relate to threats but be flexible enough to

accommodate changes that result from evolving threats;

(b). Policies must be consistent and facilitate resource allocation;

(c). Standards emanating from policies must be fair and ensure equitable

treatment; and

(d). Policies, practices, and procedures must be effective at affordable

prices.

Consistent with these principles (and except for matters that are the responsibility of the

Secretary of State) the Board proposes and reviews “legislative initiatives and executive orders

pertaining to U.S. security policy, procedures, and practices.”63 The Board is empowered to

coordinate these matters across the interagency spectrum and to resolve conflicts. Although the

Board reports to the President through the APNSA, and not through the NSC system, conflicts

that the Board cannot resolve are forwarded to the NSC/PC for resolution.

(2). The Security Policy Advisory Board. The Advisory Board consists of five

Presidentially appointed members who act as an independent security policy forum. The

Advisory Board must report to the President annually on how well the Security Policy Board and

others have adhered to the four principles highlighted in the preceding paragraph. It is also

enjoined to provide a “non-governmental and public interest perspective on security policy

initiatives to the Security Policy Board and the intelligence community.”64

(3). The Security Policy Forum. The Forum (originally an arm of the Joint

Security Executive Committee before it became the Security Policy Board) is a subordinate

element of the Security Policy Board. It has very broad interagency membership, and the

Security Policy Board appoints the Chair. Members include representatives from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency,

and the National Security Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency and the National

Reconnaissance Office; the Coast Guard; the Departments of State, Commerce, Energy, Justice,

Treasury, and Transportation; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Federal Emergency

Management Agency; the General Services Administration; the Defense Information Systems

Agency/National Communications System; the Office of Personnel Management; the

 

61 www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd29.htm, p. 2. (Hereafter pdd29.htm.)

62 pdd29.htm, p. 2.

63 pdd29.htm, p. 3.

64 pdd29.htm, p. 3.
15

Information Security Oversight Office; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Office of Management and Budget, and “other

agencies’ representatives as invited.”65

The Forum exists to consider security issues raised by its members, the Security Policy

Board, or others. As part of its consideration, it may develop policy initiatives and coordinate

them; evaluate security policies and guide policy implementation; monitor security policies to

ensure that they are equitable and support national security goals.

PDD-29 empowers both the Security Policy Board and the Security Policy Forum to

establish interagency working groups as necessary to carry out their functions.

(4). The Overseas Security Policy Board. This Board is the successor to the

Department of State’s Overseas Security Policy Group and generally focuses on specific security

matters. It reports to the President through the APNSA and is chaired by the Director of the

Diplomatic Security Service. Board members include representatives from the Departments of

State (including the U.S. Agency for International Development), Defense (including the

National Security Agency), Commerce, Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation),

Treasury, and Transportation; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the Office of

Management and Budget.

The Board is empowered to “consider, develop, coordinate, and promote policies,

standards, and agreements on oversees security operations.”66

(5). Personnel. The staff to support these entities operates under the auspices of

the Security Policy Board and is funded by those activities that are members of the Board.

H. Informal Interagency Processes.

(1). General. In The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Jerel Rosati argues that,

despite a reasonably effective national security decision making structure, most Presidents rely

primarily on informal consultations with close advisors.67 In a similar vein, Robert Hunter

suggests that the manner in which the President deals with the interagency system is more

important than formal structures.68 Still another observer, Alexander George, notes that

Presidential personalities and learned behaviors often move them away from formal processes

and into less structured methods where they feel more comfortable.69 Each of these observers—

and others—suggest that even though Presidents have substantial control over the design and

operation of formal national security processes, they tend to rely on informal mechanisms. (The

widely circulated photo of John F. Kennedy in a tete-a-tete with his brother Robert Kennedy

during the Cuban Missile crisis is a poignant example.)

 

65 pdd29.htm, p. 3.

66 pdd29.htm, p. 3.

67 Jerel A. Rosati. The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993).

68 Robert Hunter. Presidential Control of Foreign Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1982).

69 Alexander L. George. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).
16

s Presidents invoke informal methods, interagency processes sometimes take similar

courses with informal systems often being abbreviated versions of more formal

arrangements. When decision makers abandon or modify processes or opt for a less formal

approach, doing so is not of itself grounds for criticism or concluding that formal processes are

ineffective. This section describes several important informal processes that reflect the formal

interagency process and help participants satisfy policy and strategy development requirements.

(See the volumes entitled Department of State and Department of Defense for more detailed

discussions of informal processes and process maps.)70

(2). The Breakfast/Lunch Meetings. (See Appendix 2 of this chapter for

process map.) In both the previous Bush and Clinton Administrations, the Secretaries of Defense

and State and the National Security Advisor have held regular consultations over meals. The

Cheney-Baker-Scowcroft (or CBS) breakfasts were an almost weekly activity, with formal

agendas, information papers and talking points, and post-breakfast taskings. The AlbrightBerger-Cohen (ABC) lunches of the Clinton Administration are similar. The agenda is usually

prepared by the NSC staff (in coordination with the staffs of the other participants) and

distributed ahead of time. Staffs prepare briefing papers and talking points on those matters for

which they have expertise. However, no staff attends the meetings as a rule. This guarantees

confidentiality and perhaps a more open exchange as participants cease to represent their

bureaucracies and are free to advocate what they deem the best options.71 Staffs depend on

feedback from the principals. Officials interviewed believe these events serve an important

function for surfacing and resolving issues quickly, although some acknowledged that feedback

to staff was not always timely or complete.

(3). Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast. This informal event involves the ABC

participants, plus the United Nations (U.N.) Representative, the DCI, and the CJCS, all of whom

are involved in the National Security Council. No staff attends, the gathering has no prepared

agenda, and discussions are reportedly far ranging. Occasionally, taskings for staff result from

these meetings.

(4). Weekly Deputies Lunches. These are similar to the Foreign Policy

Breakfasts except participants are members of the NSC/DC. (In DoD’s case, the Deputy

Secretary of Defense often attends instead of the USD(P), even though the Deputy Secretary is

not part of the NSC/DC per PDD-2.)

(5). The President-National Security Advisor Relationship. APNSAs hold

unique positions. How extensively they are able to use their position to work around the formal

process depends on the amount of influence they have with the President. Henry Kissinger and

Zbigniew Brzezinski were perhaps the most influential, often appearing to ignore the interagency

process altogether. President Reagan’s series of advisors were less so, and the Secretaries of

State and Defense were more influential as a result. Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger appear

to represent a middle of the road approach. They are given credit by interagency participants for

honestly expressing the views of other NSC members as well as their own, although both

occasionally took NSC staff perspectives directly to the President without interagency

 

70 Note that the senior national security officials of the current Bush Administration are also meeting weekly in informal

sessions. However, these are often attended by the President or the Vice President.

71 It is worth noting that “tank sessions” held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (described in Chapter 5 entitled the “Joint Chiefs of

Staff” in Volume IV entitled Department of Defense), although part of a formal process, invoke a similar level of candor.

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consultation. The perception of the APNSA as an “honest broker” who adequately represents the

opinions of others to the President is crucial to the APSNA’s relationship with other interagency

actors. To a considerable extent, his/her ability to present others’ views is as important as the

ability to function as a trusted advisor to the Chief Executive. The two may be inseparable.

he APNSA’s influence also depends on personality, bureaucratic skill, and whether

they see their role as one of coordination or problem resolution. It also depends on

how involved the President is in international affairs. While many APNSAs have had daily

audiences with the President, others have not. In the first Clinton Administration, for example,

Anthony Lake’s ability to influence national security was reportedly limited in part by the fact

that the President was focused on his domestic agenda and did not meet frequently with the

APNSA.72

The importance of their personal relationship is perhaps more important than the

processes by which the President and the APNSA interface. National Security Advisors, unlike

the majority of NSC members, are neither elected officials, nor are they appointed with the

advice and consent of the Senate. They are accountable to the President of course, but not to the

American people (through Senate confirmation for example), although they can and have made

(or substantially influenced) decisions that affect the nation as a whole.

 If they enjoy access to and influence with the President, their staffs tend to be more

influential in the interagency process. This is especially true if the APNSA is seen as a

spokesperson for Administration positions. At the least, NSC staffs may introduce a certain

amount of friction to the interagency process as they maneuver for position, or they may

antagonize interagency interlocutors if they insist that only they know the mind of the

President.73 They may also take on more work than can be effectively handled, given the staff’s

relatively small size. That may require constant juggling, which leaves little time for planning or

coordination. It can also result in decision packages that do not take advantage of the full range

of expertise and options available in the interagency.

(6). Importance of Personal Contacts. Action officers from different divisions

and Departments frequently hold informal discussions in a number of different venues to discuss

substantive issues. Informal discussions also occur with members of the Congress and with their

staffs, as described in Volume III entitled Congress (although in the main, Members of Congress

and staffers interviewed for this study claimed consultations were not as frequent as they would

like). Sometimes these discussions evolve as staff members prepare issue papers for their

principals in support of the formal process. Sometimes they occur as staffers try to build

consensus for proposals or recommendations. Occasionally they develop when members of the

Executive Branch disagree with Administration policy and attempt to build support for change.

Sometimes they occur as sidebars at hearings, conferences, meetings, or seminars.

The results and agreements reached through personal discussions are not always formally

reported, but this networking is an important lubricant for the national security process at large.

Participants in seminars and workshops report that the experience enables them to develop

contacts that facilitate national security problem solving beyond the immediate meeting. What

 

72 See Augur for examples.

73 Several of those we interviewed indicated that they saw this as a problem with the current NSC staff. Demonstrating this

point conclusively would require a more complete analysis.

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transpires through these informal contacts mirrors in many respects formal constructs used by

businesses to flatten organizations and improve information exchange between divisions without

invoking a cumbersome hierarchy (e.g., integrated process or cross-functional teams).

(7). Personality as an Informal Process Driver. Many interagency participants

and observers note that personality figures prominently in successful policy and strategy

development. The willingness of some participants to work closely together (or their

unwillingness to do so); their desire to limit the number of people involved in decision making

(or their willingness to expand it); and the agendas they select to satisfy personal needs, all

impact on formal and informal processes. To the extent that requirements stemming from

personality characteristics can be satisfied within the formal process, participants tend to stay

within its confines. When these requirements are not satisfied by formal mechanisms,

participants often modify formal processes or develop new, informal ones. Although they

sometimes exclude important players, there are numerous indications that informal processes

work—sometimes more effectively and expeditiously than formal ones.

I. Observations.

(1). Formal Process Value. All Administrations have crafted formal interagency

processes for dealing with traditional national security issues and problem solving. Although

informal processes frequently replace portions of formal processes, formal approaches add

discipline, serve as starting points for problem solving regimes, provide mechanisms for

effective information exchange, and offer problem solving continuity. As information is

exchanged and a range of perspectives considered, formal processes help develop best-of-breed

options and build consensus among those who must implement them. Formal processes are also

especially valuable when introducing new factors into the traditional national security equation

(e.g., economics) and as a road map for new process players. In judging the effectiveness of

formal processes, the following attributes are important:

(a). The extent to which the process provides for timely and accurate

exchange of information;

(b). The extent to which it permits development of an appropriate range of

realistic and viable options;

(c). The extent to which it discreetly accommodates consideration of all

perspectives and positions, including dissenting opinions;

(d). The extent to which it facilitates disciplined and systematic option

assessment and evaluation;

(e). Its capacity to identify risks (including political risks) and propose risk

mitigation measures;

(f). Its capacity to make realistic and timely decisions or recommendations

in appropriate formats;

(g). Its ability to effectively oversee implementation of decisions; and,
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(h). Its capacity to make rapid midcourse assessments and adjustments as

required by situation or environmental changes.

Participants’ judgements of process effectiveness vary also according to their perceptions

of how well existing processes are likely to satisfy individual and organizational agendas. To the

extent that formal processes do not satisfy their expectations in some way, they are inclined to

use informal mechanisms.

(2). Informal Process Value. Informal processes arise in each Administration

and supplement formal processes. They often emerge when key players believe that formal

processes do not adequately satisfy their needs, or will not do so quickly or discreetly enough.

Some informal processes permit direct exchanges between the most senior participants with

minimal staff involvement. This may allow participants at all levels to deal with issues from a

best-value perspective instead of defending departmental turf in more formal discussions. While

often effective, informal processes can short circuit broader information exchanges and produce

options that have not benefited from examination and refinement by staff. Carried to extremes,

informal interagency processes can undermine thorough decision making, complicate

coordination across the interagency, lower staff moral, produce one-sided recommendations,

escalate decision making to higher levels of the bureaucracy, and worse yet, produce bad

decisions that are incapable of attaining stated objectives. In assessing informal process value,

the need for discretion and speed must be weighed against the advantages of garnering additional

information and options.

(3). Integration of Nontraditional Elements. Despite language in PDD-2 to the

effect that the interagency process will involve political and economic elements, the structure of

NSC supporting committees does not reflect this intent in the Clinton Administration. Neither the

White House Chief of Staff’s office, the President’s political advisors, the Treasury, and/or the

NEC74 are represented on the NSC/PC or NSC/DC unless specifically invited. While each is

represented at the full NSC level, below that council representation is apparently on a catch-ascatch-can basis. The implication is that, while their participation would improve the value of

national security policy and strategy, they remain less than full partners in both formal and

informal processes below the top process level. (The National Security Advisor and the

Economic Policy Advisor do interact formally and informally, however, and they jointly staff the

Office of Trade and International Economic Policy.)

(4). The National Security Council Staff. The NSC Staff is too small to

adequately coordinate interagency matters, manage operations, conduct detailed analysis, and

engage in long-term planning—all of which the staff occasionally attempts to do. To the extent

that it takes on functions beyond traditional coordination, there is a danger that the quality of

national security policy and strategy decisions may deteriorate. One illustration of the extent to

which the staff has become increasingly involved in substantive matters—and perhaps over

extended as a result—is the increased number of NSC/IWGs chaired by NSC staff. On the other

hand, the staff can contribute in unique ways because of its closeness to the President and

because its members are almost always experts in their fields. The Clinton NSC staff is a mix of

academics and others from outside government (who provide insight and innovation unfettered

by bureaucratic agendas) and career military officers, civil servants, and Foreign Service Officers

 

74 President Clinton created the NEC in 1993 to manage the interagency process for economic policy, and to integrate

economics into national security thinking in a more effective way. Six of its 18 members are also members of the NSC.
20

borrowed from Executive Branch Departments and Agencies (who know how to make the

bureaucracy work to implement solutions). The advantages to this approach are clear, although

there is a risk that borrowed personnel may favor positions espoused by their parent

organizations. (See Chapter 2 entitled “National Security Council” in Volume II entitled

Executive Office of the President for a more complete discussion of NSC staff organization.)

(5). Managing the Interagency Process. The APNSA, assisted by the NSC

staff, manages the formal interagency process for traditional national security applications,

including developing agendas and chairing meetings. Always challenging, how well the process

is managed has significant implications for the quality of interagency work and coordination, as

well as on the amount of time and effort required to produce results.

Different Administrations have employed different management techniques. During the

previous Bush Administration, for example, the National Security Advisor dealt with substantive

matters, while his deputy was concerned with managing the staff and the interagency process.

The “fetish for consensus building which tend to drive participants toward solutions acceptable

to all but lacking in value” can complicate process management.75 Consensus building is

important, but when it becomes a primary objective, decision quality may suffer. Many

interlocutors cited this, and over control by the NSC staff, for poor interagency coordination and

performance in the past. The results of ineffective process management often include delayed

decisions, requirements to rework analyses and recommendations, and frustration with efforts to

produce amicable consensus instead of acknowledging differences and reaching best-value

decisions. In short, ineffective interagency process management can drive officials at all levels

toward informal processes.

3. The National Economic Council Interagency Process. (See Appendix 3 of this chapter for

process map)

A. Background. The National Economic Council (NEC) was created in January 1993

by executive order.76 It was designed to coordinate domestic and international economic policy,

to integrate economics with traditional foreign and national security activities, and to provide

advice to the President.77

Unlike the NSC, the NEC is not a stand-alone office and is not codified in law, although

the Senate confirms many Council members by virtue of the positions they hold elsewhere in the

government (e.g., the Secretary of the Treasury).78 The NEC staff lacks the institutional history

and culture of the NSC, but often models its procedures after those used successfully by the

NSC. Some NEC members are also members of the NSC. A few NEC staff members also serve

on the NSC staff and, as noted in paragraph 2 above, the NSC and NEC jointly staff the Office of

Trade and International Economic Policy. (See Chapter 1 entitled “National Economic Council”

 

75 Augur, p. 61.

76 Executive Order 12835 dated January 25, 1993 (hereafter EO 12835). Its establishment was the direct result of a campaign

promise made by President Clinton in 1992, although most Presidents have sought some mechanism to coordinate

international economic policy.

77 Note that NSPD-1 still refers to the “NEC” and the “Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,” but states that

additional executive orders or NSPDs will address it.

78 The NEC is part of the White House Office of Policy Development. Technically, this establishes the NEC at a level below

the NSC in the hierarchy of the Executive Office of the President.
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in Volume II entitled Executive Office of the President for a detailed description of the NEC and

its operations.)

B. NEC Composition. The full NEC as prescribed in Executive Order (EO) 12835

has at least 18 members, which makes it larger than the NSC, although its staff is much smaller

(about 30 personnel compared to approximately 200 on NSC staff). Council membership

consists of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury,

the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of

Housing and Urban Development, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic

Advisers, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the United States Trade

Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President

for Domestic Policy, the APNSA, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Policy, and the other officials of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies as the President

deems necessary.79 The staff is divided into international and domestic economic branches.

C. NEC Functions and Purposes. The NEC focuses on coordination and integration

for broad policy issues concerning economics and trade. It does not supplant the Department of

Treasury or any other member of the traditional economic community. The Secretary of the

Treasury continues “to be the senior economic official . . . and the President’s chief economic

spokesperson.”80 The Director of OMB and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors

(CEA) also continue to perform their traditional functions of budget preparation and analytical

forecasting.81

The NEC has four primary functions as prescribed by EO 12385:

(1). Coordinate domestic and international economic policymaking processes;

(2). Coordinate economic policy advice presented to the president;

(3). Ensure economic policy and programs are in line with the president’s

objectives and that the president’s economic goals are effectively pursued; and,

(4). Oversee implementation of the Administration’s economic agenda.82

D. NEC Supporting Activities. In making and coordinating policy, the NEC uses

supporting structures similar to those used by the NSC, including a Principals Committee (PC), a

Deputies Committee (DC), and a series of Interagency Working Groups.83 The NEC maintains a

close relationship with the NSC and the staffs of both activities (co-located in the Old Executive

Office Building) coordinate on a daily basis. Daily coordination often involves the NEC and

 

79 EO 12385, p. 1.

80 EO 12385, p. 2.

81 EO 12385 and interviews with NEC staff.

82 EO 12835.

83 Interviews with the NEC staff revealed that the DC is used more for international economic issues than for domestic

concerns. Domestic issues are often much more complex and arcane than international issues, thus working group experts

often engage directly with PC members rather than through the Deputies Committee filter when the ultimate decision will be

made by the PC.
22

NSC Directors and their Deputies. In some cases, especially those dealing with international

economic issues, NSC and NEC staff members co-chair Interagency Working Groups. In other

cases, the staff of one Council will chair working groups, while the other Council is represented

in the working group membership.

lthough there is a core interagency group consisting of the Secretary of the

Treasury, the Directors of OMB and the NEC, and the Chair of the CEA, NEC

Principals and Deputies Committees and Interagency Working Groups can have variable

memberships, depending on the issues under consideration and the stakeholders involved. In this

respect it differs from the NSC system in which PC and DC members are established by PDD-2.

For example, discussions of international trade and economic matters typically (but not always)

include representatives from the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, the Office

of the U.S. Trade Representative, the NSC staff, the Export-Import Bank, and the U.S. Agency

for International Development. The Departments of Justice and Transportation and others are

represented on a case-by-case basis.84 However, membership fluctuates and there have been

cases in which significant issues were discussed without key stakeholder representation.

EO 12835 prescribes a staff directed by the Assistant to the President for Economic

Policy, but provides no guidelines as to staff size. The staff is small compared to the NSC or the

Office of Management and Budget, and lacks traditions and formal mechanisms to coordinate

issues that exists for the NSC staff. (For example, the NEC has a staff of about nine—including

administrative support—to coordinate all international trade and economic issues.)85 The staff

often uses protocols and procedures developed by the NSC staff to move actions through the

interagency process or to prepare issues and policy and strategy recommendations. In the case of

high-level visits, for example, the NSC and NEC often divide preparation requirements with the

NEC taking lead for economic and trade issues. In cases where President Clinton makes a visit

that is predominantly trade-related, the NEC staff may take the lead for the entire event, but

sharing responsibilities with the NSC is more common. Workload arrangements between the two

staffs are usually the result of informal coordination, often at the Deputy Director level, and there

has been some friction in the past.

E. The Formal NEC Interagency Process. The establishing executive order allows

the NEC to operate through “established or ad hoc committees, task forces, or interagency

groups.”86 It further specifies that “all executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with

the Council and provide such assistance, information, and advice . . . as the Council may

request.”87

Given this latitude, the formal interagency process used by the NEC is very similar to

that used by the NSC, and President Clinton’s Director emphasizes the formal process as the best

way to exchange information, develop policy options, and develop trust among participants.88

 

84 Interviews with NEC staff.

85 Interviews with NEC staff.

86 EO 12835, p. 2.

87 EO 12835, p. 2.

88 President Clinton’s last Director assumed his office during the Asian economic crisis—a time when the NEC interagency

process was not especially effective. Interviews indicate that he was sensitive to these problems and made maintenance of

the interagency process a priority. As one staff member noted with respect to international economics, international

economics is about the exchange of information, and formal processes contribute significantly to the building of trust and

the willingness of interagency participants to share information.

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Staff interviews indicate that the Director believes that his two primary functions—serving as a

key Presidential advisor and acting as an honest broker for the economic community in policy

decisions—are best accomplished through the formal interagency process. This has not always

been the case, and previous directors sometimes depended more on informal approaches.

Occasionally, reliance on informal approaches (and the willingness of President Clinton to

accept recommendations generated outside the formal process) has led to mistrust on the part of

participants, who worry that decisions may be made that are contrary to their interests without

appropriate coordination. Additionally, the formal process provides the forum for economists

and foreign policy experts to gain appreciation for each other’ perspectives. Given the NEC’s

emphasis on policy coordination and integration, the formal process approach appears to produce

the desired results.

he formal NEC interagency process works in essentially the same manner as that

used by the NSC. NEC/IWGs frame, analyze, and refine issues, making decisions

as appropriate or passing issues to the NEC/DC. The Deputies Committee reviews issues passed

to it by the working groups or by the Principals Committee. Like the NSC/DC, it makes

decisions and oversees implementation. When appropriate, it refers issues to the NEC/PC for

deliberation and decisions. The NEC/PC makes decisions on some issues and presents others to

the President for his consideration. In terms of policy and strategy development, the NEC often

formally presents its recommendations to President Clinton in joint NSC-NEC memoranda. At

other times, the NEC Director in his role as the Special Advisor to the President for Economic

Policy, coordinates recommendations with the APNSA, but presents them directly to the

President. NEC staff indicated that when the Director presents recommendations to President

Clinton, he represents the perspectives of all interagency stakeholders as an honest broker.

F. Informal NEC Interagency Processes. Like the NSC, the NEC employs informal

processes to conduct much of its business, especially during crises. It uses issue-focused work

groups composed of DC level participants, has informal meetings around meals, and encourages

its staff to develop extensive networks. A senior NEC staff member noted that informal

gatherings are also the venue in which long-range agendas are often developed and long-term

policies are coordinated.

G. Observations.

(1). NEC Relations with Other Key Offices. The NEC was established with the

idea that it would operate collegially with other key economic policy players. To that end, the

organization focuses on policy coordination, rather than policy implementation and oversight,

and it has sought processes that would build trust and that were non-threatening. It also sought to

portray itself as an honest broker willing to give fair consideration to all points of view as part of

the policy development and coordination process and to accurately transmit guidance and

decisions from senior Administration officials to economic policy network members. These

values continue to be priorities for the NEC staff.

he NEC’s attempts to establish and maintain its role appear to have been partially

successful. Its relationships with Treasury, OMB, and CEA appear to be smooth and

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productive for the most part.89 Although a few members of the interagency community have

sometimes sought to go around the NEC and deal directly with President Clinton, NEC staff

noted during interviews that relations had improved in the last several years and there were few

chronic tensions. Relations with the NSC also improved during the second Clinton

Administration, and NEC staff reported that the relationship was collegial and productive;

although the NEC staff also indicated that there were times when the NSC staff appeared not to

take into account economic factors when considering major foreign policy issues.

Nevertheless, the extent to which unhelpful tension exists between the two staffs is

difficult to determine. Certainly the mechanisms to improve coordination between them exist.

PDD-2 and EO 12835 both provide for inter-council coordination and the NEC and NSC share

some staff members. One observer noted that this joint staffing arrangement has done much to

improve relations and provides those with joint positions two channels of access to President

Clinton, although the unique nature of this relationship required careful oversight.90

Part of what appears as friction between the NSC and NEC may, in fact, be the result of

the differences in staff size. It may also result from the fact that the NSC is a stand-alone

organization within the Executive Office of the President, while the NEC is part of the Office of

Policy Development, which includes the Domestic Policy Council. Finally, indications of friction

come from the staff level and may not reflect the perceptions of the senior leadership. This may

be akin to the description in Volume IV of this Addendum covering the Department of Defense

in which some lower level officials believe the interagency process is dysfunctional while more

senior players believe that it works well. One senior NEC member noted that the senior staffs of

both Councils work constantly to convey an aura of cooperation to all staff members. For that

reason, some relatively minor issues are dealt with at senior levels in order to convey the

message that collaboration, not confrontation, is expected.

Another and potentially more troublesome part of the relationship between the NEC and

other members of the interagency community is the ability of senior officials to “end-run” the

NEC and go directly to President Clinton with economic agenda issues. Although this occurs to

an extent with the NSC, the NEC seemed to be more victimized by it early in the Clinton

Administration, if only because the President did not discourage it. The effect was to undermine

interagency faith in the NEC and its processes, and this put the NEC staff and the Adviser to the

President for Economic Policy behind the power curve. Undisciplined approaches make

coordination more difficult and undercut effective policy development as participants focus on

preservation of their agendas in a chaotic environment. Although process improvements will

help alleviate this problem, President Clinton and senior White House staff members can

contribute to the solution also. One helpful step involves ensuring that the Advisor for Economic

Policy and the NEC staff are perceived as key players with inside tracks to the President similar

to the stature accorded the NSC.91

 

89 No information was available with respect to NEC staff relations with other Council members. Interviews revealed that

there is no relationship at all between the NEC and the Federal Reserve Board.

90 I.M. Destler. The National Economic Council: A Work in Progress. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International

Economics, 1996), p. 67. (Hereafter cited as Destler)

91 Suggestions that the NEC should be incorporated as an arm of the NSC have been raised occasionally. Combining the

Councils might provide some advantages if the economic staff had equal footing with the foreign affairs and national

security experts who constitute the NSC staff as it has been traditionally organized. NEC staff members noted during

interviews that they believed combining the two staffs could result in placing economic issues on back burners unless senior

members of the NSC staff had an economic focus.
25

(2). The Formal Processes. In addition to the President Clinton’s occasional

willingness to accept uncoordinated issues at the expense of the Advisor for Economic Policy, at

times the NEC has contributed to the ability of senior officials to work around it by failing to

follow the process itself (or at least giving that perception). The NEC process approximates the

interagency system of the NSC in that it has a Principals Committee, a Deputies Committee, and

Interagency Working Groups for both domestic and international economic policy coordination.

Based on interviews, earlier failures to use this process effectively may have led to tensions and

mistrust among participants, and this hampered communications and information flows. The

failure of the processes to function as effectively as they should have came to a head about the

time that the Asian economic crisis erupted. Gene Sperling, the Director who assumed his

position about this time and who has emphasized the value of effective processes in facilitating

policy development and coordination, appears to have corrected these problems.

Part of the earlier problems may have been that the early methods of operation adopted

by Robert Rubin, the original Director, included a certain amount of informality, which made the

NEC more agile and perhaps initially more acceptable to traditional economic policy makers.

However, informality may have frustrated other participants. As is true for the NSC system,

when players perceive that their agendas may not be satisfied through formal processes (and

when there are no penalties for stepping outside the formal structure) they are likely to explore

other avenues. Effective processes and fairness on the part of the NEC Director can contribute to

participant satisfaction with the formal processes and make informal processes (which must be

employed from time to time) more effective.

Another implication of the lack of discipline in the formal processes is that it may

actually undermine the level of agility the NEC strives to attain. The lack of a disciplined

problem solving apparatus can mean that addressing each issue or problem must begin with

inventing a process to deal with it and deciding which Council member organizations should be

involved. Getting the right players into the right process can require time, and that may actually

reduce agility in time-sensitive cases.

(3). NEC Staff Size. As of mid-2000, the NEC had only about 15 percent of the

staff assigned to the NSC. (The NSC staff numbered slightly over 200 at that time, as compared

to about 30 on the NEC staff, or nearly seven times as large.) Although there are advantages to

small staffs and flat organizations, there are also drawbacks.92 The staff almost always operates

in a crisis mode and cannot undertake longer range planning, which might help shape the

international economic environment. It is dependent on external research and analysis (which

may be biased in favor of the provider), although this is also the case with the NSC and OMB.

Additionally, a small staff and a large workload contribute to staff fatigue, which may be a

significant contributing factor to high turnover rates. Longevity on the NEC staff averages less

than two years.93

Staff design should conform to the role envisioned for the organization. Clearly the NEC

staff is too small to adequately oversee policy implementation. It usually is unsuccessful when it

 

92 One advantage according to the NEC staff is that they have access to the Director without going through several layers of

bureaucracy.

93 Staff interviews, December 1999 and January 2000.
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attempts to do so.94 It is also too small to coordinate or integrate effectively more than a few

issues simultaneously, or to engage in reassessments of existing policy to any level of detail. The

investment in a larger staff could likely increase the NEC’s effectiveness.

(4). Long Range Planning. The NEC and its staff conduct limited long-range

planning, and the definition of “long range” is limited to about one year. Depending on whether

one believes that policy planning is an essential part of policy development and whether or not

non-economic planning concepts have value to economic questions, the inability to do longrange planning may be a shortcoming. The inability to visualize and shape the future seems

important to coordinating the efforts of myriad economic policy players and to developing and

assessing the right issues. Conversely, one can make a case that long range economic plans are

often overcome by events.

Interviews with senior NEC staff indicate that while resources and staff size have some

impact on long range planning capabilities, interagency participants often have little incentive to

engage in long range planning. Unlike the Department of Defense, which has special staff

sections that focus on planning, most other Departments and Agencies use their staffs to deal

with both current events and strategic planning. The press of events and the limits of time

combine to make managing the current crises the highest (and sometimes the only) priority.

Events tend to drive the activities of interagency participants because that is where an

Administration’s most senior officials place the emphasis. When longer range planning occurs, it

is generally done in informal groups and in response to some anticipated event, such as

Congressional action that forces an Administration to re-think its agenda.

(5). NEC Not Codified in Law. The 1947 National Security Act (as amended)

provides the legal basis for the NSC, and that legal basis is one of the sources of the NSC's

power. The NEC exists solely because of an Executive Order. Unlike the NSC, it is not a

separate organization, but part of the Office of Policy Development. A case could be made that

the NEC could operate more effectively in the interagency venue if it were codified in law.

Doing so would increase its stature within the community and help ensure it had funding and

other resources that would improve its effectiveness. One way of codifying it is to adopt

language similar to that used for the NSC in the 1947 Act. This approach would legally establish

the NEC as an entity with general responsibilities, but permit Presidents broad latitude to assign

specific responsibilities and adjust the Council membership to conform to strategic requirements.

On the other hand, absorbing the NEC into the NSC, while placing an emphasis on senior

economic NSC expertise, could possibly accomplish the same objective.

4. Federal Response Plan

A. Background. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) uses an interagency like process

to produce a plan. It has one foot planted in the policy and strategy development sphere and the

other in the policy and strategy planning and implementation arena. The Plan “establishes a

process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal

assistance” during emergencies and disasters within the United States to augment state and local

efforts.95 However, from an interagency process perspective, the plan acts as a focal point and

forcing function for interagency and federal-state-local government policy and strategy

 

94 See Destler.

95 The Federal Response Plan, Basic Plan, April 1999, p. 1. (Hereafter FRP).
27

development, planning, and preparation activities. Succinctly, the plan provides policies,

assumptions, and concepts for federal agencies with response, relief, or recovery responsibilities.

It describes the services available to the States from the Federal Government and groups these

services into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and prescribes procedures for accessing

them. Each ESF is the primary responsibility of a single federal agency, although other

organizations are assigned support responsibilities.

The plan may be implemented “in anticipation of a significant event” or in response to

a Presidentially declared emergency.96 When implemented, the federal government may provide

specialized teams, materiel, and/or facilities to assist state and local governments. Assistance

may include food; power generation equipment; emergency assistance to reopen transportation

networks; shelter and sanitation facilities; water purification capabilities; clearing debris; medical

assistance; and emergency communications, inter alia.

he FRP may be implemented as a stand-alone response, or it may be implemented

in conjunction with other disaster and contingency plans. These include:

(1). The National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime

Emergencies;

(2). The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Control

Contingency Plan (also known as the National Contingency Plan);

(3). The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan; and

(4). In response to terrorist activities pursuant to PDD-39 and PDD-63

requirements (including WMD Incidence Plan and the Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of

Chemical/Biological Terrorism).97

B. Plan Organization. The FRP consists of the:

(1). The Basic Plan, which is a policy document designed to guide federal,

state, and local agencies prepare plans and access assistance.

(2). Twelve Emergency Support Function Annexes, which are

implementation documents that assign specific missions and responsibilities for providing

assistance in various functional areas. The ESF Annexes are:98

(a). Transportation. Prescribes procedures to augment state and

local transportation capacities during emergencies including request processing procedures,

Movement Coordination Center operations, damage assessment, and designing and

implementing alternative transportation systems.

 

96 “FRP. . . at a Glance.” States may request federal disaster assistance and the federal government may provide it under the

provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act (Title 42, U.S.C., Section 5121).

97 FRP, pp. 2-3.

98 Federal Response Plan with Annexes.

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(b). Communications. Prescribes and coordinates federal actions to

provide telecommunications support for national security and emergency purposes and the

restoration of permanent capacities for federal, state, and local entities.

(c). Public Works and Engineering. Provides technical assistance

and evaluation as well as engineering services (both directly and through contractors) for

construction, inspection, debris clearing and removal, repair of critical utilities, emergency

transportation system repairs, and real estate support.

(d). Firefighting. Prescribes procedures for providing personnel,

equipment, and related supplies to suppress fires on federal lands and to assist state and local

authorities suppress fires in both urban and rural environments.

(e). Information and Planning. Details procedures for the

collection, analysis, and dissemination of information concerning actual or potential emergencies

and the integration of supporting agencies into operations centers and response teams.

(f). Mass Care. The only ESF for which a non-governmental

agency has responsibility (the American Red Cross), this annex prescribes procedures and

coordinates efforts to meet food, shelter, and first aid requirements, including establishment of

bulk distribution systems and collection of individual victim information.

(g). Resource Support. Provides procedures for support during

immediate response operations for emergency supplies, facilities, office equipment,

telecommunications equipment, contracting, transportation (in conjunction with ESF 1), security

services, and personnel to augment other efforts, as well as support for requirements that are not

the responsibility of other ESFs.

(h). Health and Medical Services. This annex is designed to

provide supplemental assistance to state and local authorities including needs assessment,

surveillance, medical personnel, and medical equipment and supplies.

(i). Urban Search and Rescue. Prescribes procedures for

establishing and mobilizing task forces that provide specialized assistance including locating,

extricating, and providing medical treatment to victims in collapsed structures.

(j). Hazardous Materials. Prescribes procedures for providing

federal assistance to state and local governments confronted with hazardous materials disasters

or hazardous materials problems that arise in the course of other disasters and emergencies.

(k). Food. Prescribes procedures for identifying food requirements

and supply sources, securing stocks, and transporting them.

(l). Energy. Prescribes procedures for federal assistance in

restoring energy systems. Support for restoring systems includes support for producing, refining,

transporting, generating, transmitting, and conserving.

(3). The Recovery Function Annex. Describes policies and planning

assumptions to assist affected communities' return to normalcy following a disaster.
29

(4). Supporting Annexes. Describes policies for specific activities related to

disaster assistance such as community relations, Congressional relations, and donation

management.

C. Plan Preparation.

(1). Responsibilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

has overall responsibility for drafting, coordinating, reviewing, and updating the FRP. In

coordination with 26 other signatory agencies and activities, FEMA prepares the basic plan. The

ESF Annexes are prepared by activities designated as primary agencies, assisted by other

activities designated as support activities. All activities provide input for the Recovery Function

Annex and Supporting Annexes as appropriate.

(2). Preparation Process. The Basic Plan outlines a simple planning process

for ESF Annex preparation. Essentially, at the national level, the Catastrophic Disaster Response

Group (CDRG), which consists of senior representatives from each of the 27 signatory activities

(26 Federal plus the Red Cross), provides policy and guidance to a subordinate Emergency

Support Function Leaders Group (ESFLG). The ESFLG “is the principal body that addresses

FRP planning and implementation at the working level.”99 The ESFLG develops and resolves

overarching issues. When issues require adjudication at a higher level, the ESFLG passes them to

the CDRG.

The current FRP was published in April 1999 and is the latest version of an effort that

began in the early 1980s. Rather than rewriting the plan, it is updated as required following

periodic reviews. ESF Annexes are the responsibility of the primary and supporting agencies.

These Agencies and their responsibilities are shown in Table 2 below.100

D. Observations. The FRP represents an interagency attempt to simultaneously

develop policies, strategies, and implementation plans for dealing with a wide range of disasters

and emergencies. These disasters may occur naturally or be the result of accidental or intentional

human intervention. The system established under FEMA’s control is inclusive and assigns

specific responsibilities for providing materiel and services in 12 crucial areas, the disruption of

which will have debilitating effects.

Although some of the ESF Annexes have been tested in actual disaster conditions (and

there are provisions to exercise the capabilities in all annexes), the FRP has not had to respond to

the full range of large-scale disasters, such as those that could result from terrorist activities

involving weapons of mass destruction or a pandemic health catastrophe. Nevertheless, the

approach and the plan appear to be sound and could form the basis for more aggressive planning

for homeland security missions.

 

99 FRP, p. 29.

100 FRP, p.14.
30

Table 2. FRP Annex Preparation Responsibilities.

ESF

Annex

Agency

TransportationCommunicationsPublic Works &EngineeringFirefightingInformation &PlanningMass CareResource SupportHealth & MedicalServicesUrban Search &RescueHazardousMaterialsFoodEnergy

Dept of Agriculture S S S P

101

SSS SSS P S

Dept of Commerce S S S S S S

Dept of Defense S S P S S S S S S S SS

Dept of Education S

Dept of Energy S S S P

Dept of Health & Human Services S S S P S SS

Dept of Housing & Urban Dev S

Dept of the Interior S S S S S S

Dept of Justice S S S S

Dept of Labor S S S S

Dept of State S S S

Dept of Transportation P S SS S S

Dept of Treasury S S S

Dept of Veterans Affairs S S S S

US Agency for Int'l Development S S

American Red Cross S P S S

Environmental Protection Agency S S S S P S

Federal Communications C'misson S

FEMA S S S P SS S P S

General Services Administration S S S S P S S

NASA S S S

Nat'l Communications System P S SS S

Nuclear Regulatory Commission S S S

Ofc Personnel Management S

Small Business Administration S

Tennessee Valley Authority S S S

U.S. Postal Service S S S

P = Primary Agency; oversees ESF preparation

S = Supporting Agency; supports primary agency

5. The Role of Congress in Policy and Strategy Development.

A. Background. There have been some common interests between the Congress and

the Executive Branch with respect to national security in the past. However, the Congress, in

accordance with its Constitutional responsibilities, has often challenged Administration policies,

strategies, and programs, and, in doing so, sets the stage for important debates. As one observer

noted, “Congressional deference to the Executive's foreign policy was the exception” over the

 

101 The Forest Service has primary responsibility within the Department of Agriculture, based on its experience with forest

fires.
31

life of the Republic.102 At a minimum, through hearings and legislation the Congress ensures

that the Administration thinks through it policies and strategies during development. The

Congress has oscillated between defining objectives and limits in a general sense to intervening

in minute details and the organizational structure of Executive Branch Departments.103 When

Administrations establish partnerships and consult with the Congress, the Legislative Branch can

be of great assistance, especially in building public support. Conversely, the Congress can help

mobilize public opinion against Administration activities as it did during the Vietnam War.

ongressional interest in national security policies and strategies is rooted in a

number of different areas. Programmatics certainly enter into some calculations,

but so do large ethnic constituencies and their demands. And, as one Member recently noted,

sometimes the Congress becomes involved in policy and strategy development out of partisan

political motives.104 More importantly, Members of Congress have Constitutional

responsibilities with respect to national defense and foreign relations, and these duties are

significant. Thus, the Congress is involved because their involvement is a responsibility in

democratic governments and because by Constitutional design and custom “without

Congressional support, the Executive cannot sustain long-term policies.”105

Congressional involvement, although sometimes viewed with consternation by

Executive Branch officials, can have a positive affect. This is especially true in cases where the

Administration builds consultative relationships with key Members on both sides of the aisle and

with their staffs. This is not to imply that there will not be tensions between the two branches—

those will occur under the best of circumstances and should. The trick is to make those tensions

creative rather than disruptive.106 As Senator Chuck Hagel recently put it, “policies must be

relevant to challenges” and the Congress has a responsibility to help the Executive Branch come

to grips with relevancy.107 One veteran of the House Committee on International Relations

believes the two branches work best together when the Congress is involved in development and

formulation of policy and strategy, but leaves implementation to the Administration.108

Building effective partnerships between the Administration and the Congress has been

accomplished numerous times in the past, but usually depends in large measure on

Administration willingness to share concepts with Congress in informal consultations and more

formally in hearings and perhaps through other mechanisms.109 In doing so, the President must

play a leading role and “articulate a direction” in which policy and strategy should go.110 By

doing so, the Administration can define boundaries and establish priorities for debate. For its

 

102 Robert B. Zoellick. “Congress and the Making of US [sic] Foreign Policy.” Survival, Winter 1999-2000, vol. 41 no. 4,

p.21. (Hereafter Zoellick)

103 The recent Congressionally directed reorganization of the Department of State, which folded several formerly independent

activities into State Under Secretary offices is one example.

104 Chuck Hagel, Sen.(R-NE). “Connecting Foreign Policy: Relevance, Challenge, and the Need for Leadership” remarks given

at the Trilateral Commission Annual Meeting, March 1999. www.trilateral.org/annmtgs, p. 3. (hereafter Hagel)

105 Zoellick, p. 23.

106 Lee H. Hamilton. “Congress and Foreign Policy” remarks given at the Trilateral Commission Annual Meeting, March 1999.

www.trilateral.org/annmtgs (Hereafter Hamilton).

107 Hagel, p 1.

108 Hamilton, p. 1.

109 In his remarks to the Trilateral Commission, Mr. Hamilton suggested establishing a standing Consultative Committee, which

would meet periodically with the President and his key foreign policy advisors. Hamilton, p. 3.

110 Zoellick, p. 35.

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part, Congress should, in the words of one observer, use its offices to “expose foreign policies to

public view and debate. . .[and] as a whole. . .debate and authorize major foreign-policy

moves.”111

To some extent, the Congress does these things now and the ways in which it

influences national security policy and strategy formulation are described in the following

paragraphs. (See Volume III entitled Congress for a more detailed description and discussions of

how key Congressional Committees operate.)

B. Congressional Processes. Although the Congress does not participate directly

in the internal Administration processes described earlier, the Congress exerts influence

over strategy and policy development in a number of ways.

Formally, by holding hearings, Committees can spotlight important strategic issues.

Through the hearing process and subsequent reports, Congressional Committees can influence

the Administration’s choice of strategic options by identifying those it supports and those it

considers unacceptable. It can also produce Committee and staff reports that spotlight issues and

help focus public attention on strategic options and policies. This may push a strategy debate into

the public eye, or it can influence a debate in favor of (or against) a specific proposal.

By constructing authorization bills and bills that regulate various aspects of national

security (such as the organization or structure of Agencies and Departments, legal authorities,

and nominations for high office via the confirmation process), the Congress can affect the

Administration’s strategic options and its resources to carry them out. By using the “power of the

purse,” the Congress can influence strategy development by the amount of funding it authorizes

for various Executive Branch departments, agencies, organizations, programs, or activities.

According to Hill staffers, the most effective way to influence Administration behavior and

shape its actions is by placing restrictions on funding.112 Through conferences to reconcile

differences in House and Senate versions of authorization bills, Members can influence each

other’s views.

he Constitutional responsibility for “advice and consent” grants Senate Committees

significant influence over various policy and strategy development issues via

hearings and consideration of nominations and promotion to senior positions. The ability to delay

or deny a President confirmation of a specific individual for high office—or to extract promises

from the nominee or Administration in return for a favorable recommendation—is a significant

lever. Although these promises may not be legally binding, they serve as “hooks” for future

debate. The Senate also conducts hearings on treaties and in doing so shapes policy and strategy

development by indicating the limits of acceptability.

In addition to these measures, if Members who are powerful and well respected oppose

certain concepts, the Administration may discard some strategic options that are seen as

politically risky in terms of obtaining Congressional approval. This is not to suggest that

Administrations are unwilling to challenge Congress on matters Presidents believe are important.

The evidence clearly indicates the opposite to be the case. However, during strategy

development, Administration officials are likely to take into consideration the prevailing

 

111 Zoellick, p. 37.

112 Interview with Senate Armed Services Committee staff.

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sentiment on the Hill as reflected in a powerful member’s pronouncements.113 This is especially

true of relevant Committee Chairs, given the Committee’s ability to influence structure and

operating procedures or place limits on how funds can be expended for strategy implementation.

In a general sense, then, the Congress influences policy and strategy development by

holding hearings introducing Authorization and Appropriations legislation; by exercising

oversight of Departments and Agencies and conducting or directing investigations; and, in the

case of the Senate, by approving Administration appointments to senior positions and treaties.

Congress’ specific actions with respect to appropriations are contained in the last section of this

chapter dealing with national security resource allocation.

 

113 For example, according to a former Senator, when Senator Nunn chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee, his

reputation and ability to influence other senators on defense matters was such that Administration officials considered how

he would react to policy and strategy matters during formulation.
34

SECTION III. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY

1. Background.

A. General. Planning and policy implementation is an extension of strategy and policy

making. In most cases, the way in which a policy is implemented is determined by the issue at

hand, by the principal players in the formulation of that policy, and by the elements of the policy.

For example, diplomatic elements of a policy are likely to be carried out by the State

Department, military and defense aspects by the Department of Defense (DoD), and

Congressional strategies by the White House. Policy implementation may also occur by directing

the development of a political-military plan, for example in cases where the policy addresses a

crisis abroad.

Technically, policy implementation begins with the release of a Presidential decision to

Executive Branch agencies for implementation, whether in the form of a Presidential Decision

Directive, an Executive Order, a memorandum recording the conclusions of an NSC discussion,

or through a speech or other pronouncement by the President or one of his national security

advisers. The decision is then released to the Executive Branch departments and agencies to be

carried out. The National Security Council structure is responsible for overseeing that the policy

has been implemented satisfactorily.

B. Formal Process for Monitoring Policy Implementation. During the Clinton

Administration, the established means of overseeing the implementation of national security

policy was through the process described in PDD-2. However, a system of informal meetings

among key national security players (such as the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of

Defense, the Secretary of State, and occasionally the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the U.S. Representative to the United

Nations (UN)) supplemented and occasionally substituted for this formal process.

For policy that applies to complex crises with humanitarian aspects, the Clinton

Administration developed a blueprint for a formal implementation process, described in PDD-56.

As interviews highlighted, however, this process was primarily observed in the breach. The

Clinton Administration also developed a process for formulating and implementing policy

relating to the protection of critical infrastructure, described in PDD-63.

This section describes the PDD-2 system for policy and strategy implementation,

building on the discussion in the preceding section. It also examines the PDD-56 and PDD-63

processes as they relate to the implementation of national security policy; addresses the informal

processes used to coordinate different agencies’ positions and actions; and offers some

conclusions about the structure and effectiveness of the interagency for national security policy

implementation.

2. The PDD-2 Processes for Strategy and Policy Implementation. 114

A. The Formal PDD-2 Process. As noted in the section on Strategy and Policy

Development, PDD-2 is the Clinton Administration’s organization for interagency participation

 

114 As previously noted, the current Bush Administration replaced PDD-2 with NSPD-1.
35

in national security matters. It describes a structure of committees of varying seniority designed

to oversee the development and implementation of national security policy at the interagency

level. PDD-2 assigns different tasks relating to policy implementation to the NSC Principals

Committee (NSC/PC), the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), and Interagency Working

Groups (IWGs.)

(1). NSC/PC. PDD-2 establishes the NSC/PC as the body responsible for

reviewing, coordinating, and monitoring the development and implementation of national

security policy overall.

(2). NSC/DC. The NSC/DC is the principal body overseeing the implementation

of policy, especially in crisis management.115 According to interviews, the NSC/DC meets on

average weekly, and during crises such as Kosovo, as frequently as five times weekly.116 It is not

clear, however, whether the NSC/DC regularly carried out policy reviews to monitor the

implementation of Administration policy during the Clinton years. As described below, the

NSC/DC oversees interagency planning for complex contingencies through the process

established by PDD-56.

(3). IWGs. PDD-2 assigns to IWGs responsibility for coordinating the

implementation of Presidential decisions. In the Clinton Administration, IWGs are both

permanent and ad hoc, and are structured around regional or functional issues. During the

Clinton Administration, approximately two dozen IWGs existed at any one time.117

B. The Actual Interagency Process for Policy Implementation. During the Clinton

Administration, interagency coordination of policy implementation appeared to occur ad hoc.

Despite the hierarchy of responsibility described by PDD-2, the systematic monitoring of policy

implementation at the interagency level appears to be the exception rather than the rule.

On some policy issues, such as NATO enlargement and counterterrorism, it appears there

was a systematic, coordinated policy implementation effort. For NATO enlargement,

implementation ran on two tracks: a negotiated process with the NATO allies and Russia run out

of the State Department by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and a Congressional outreach effort

run out of the National Security Council under the leadership of National Security Advisor

Samuel Berger.118 For counterterrorism policy, there is a process at the interagency level to

monitor the execution of policy.119

In most other cases, however, the NSC organization does not consistently follow the

implementation of policy. A number of interviewees, for example, indicated that the NSC staff is

late in distributing the interagency memoranda detailing decisions and required follow-up after

 

115 Interviews with DoD staff, June 22, 1999, and State Department Staff, September 28, 1999.

116 Interview with State Department staff, September 28, 1999.

117 Donald L. Kerrick, Presentation to the National War College, November 13, 1997. As previously noted, the current Bush

Administration’s NSPD-1 replaced “Interagency Working Groups” with “Policy Coordination Committees.”

118 James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, October 1999.) This book provides an authoritative description of the Clinton Administration’s decision

making and implementation of NATO enlargement.

119 Interviews conducted for organizational description of National Security Council.
36

NSC/DC meetings, and occasionally these memoranda are never distributed.120 The uneven

oversight of policy implementation may be due partially to the workload assumed by the NSC

committee structure. Interviews indicated that during the Clinton Administration, coordination of

policy issues tended to occur at levels higher than the IWGs, and primarily at the level of the

NSC/DC. As indicated above, the NSC/DC met weekly and almost daily during crises to address

new or continuing national security issues. This schedule may preclude high-level interagency

attention to policy implementation and follow-up, unless greater use is made of the IWGs for less

pressing policy issues.

he limited staffing of the NSC organization may also impact its ability to review

policy implementation. The NSC’s professional staff numbered about 200 under the

Clinton Administration.121 This staff was responsible for managing the interagency committee

process, providing analytical support to the President through the National Security Advisor,

preparing the President and National Security Advisor for meetings with foreign leaders and for

the President's travels, assisting in the preparation of Congressional briefings and responses to

Congressional inquiries, and maintaining contact with the national security agencies, including

participating in interagency meetings. One senior observer of the policy process observed that,

given the workload of the NSC staff, the NSC organization is too thinly staffed to monitor the

implementation of each national security policy decision.

C. Means to Improve National Security Policy Implementation. A number of

observers commented that current and future national security challenges require the ability to

draw from various assets of the U.S. government for national security policy implementation,

including the nation's military, diplomatic, intelligence, humanitarian, economic, and domestic

preparedness assets. These observers noted that the process laid out in PDD-2 has the elements to

provide that integrated approach, as it is designed to include all Executive Branch agencies

involved in the implementation of a particular policy.

These interlocutors, however, identified two problems with the way the PDD-2 process

was implemented. First, the NSC committees tend to focus primarily on the crisis of the moment

and forego long range planning or oversight of policy implementation. Second, the NSC staff

occasionally oversteps its role as policy coordinator and seeks to control the development and

implementation of policy. According to several of those interviewed, the NSC staff is most

effective when it acts as an “honest broker” among the various interests and perspectives

represented in the Executive Branch. In this role, the NSC staff coordinates meetings and

discussions designed to bring out the differences among the various policy players; distributes

information as appropriate; and oversees the implementation of the different aspects of the

policy. As an “honest broker,” however, the NSC staff should not become involved in the

implementation of policy, for example by participating in international delegations, giving policy

making speeches or interviews, or lobbying Members of Congress and Congressional staff,

because in so doing it may compromise its reputation for impartiality.

he “honest broker” model for the NSC staff has limits. The NSC staff will inevitably

influence policy because of its proximity to the President. The National Security

 

120 Interviews at the Department of Defense and Department of State.

121 Information derived from interviews with NSC staff and an NSC briefing entitled “The National Security Council and the

Interagency Process,” which was provided by the NSC staff. For more information on the organization of the NSC structure,

see the organizational description of the National Security Council, in Volume II.

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Advisor, for example, can influence the outcome of an interagency policy debate by virtue of

being the last person the President consults before making a decision. Similarly, the NSC staff’s

role in preparing the President for his travels and speeches provides an opportunity to influence a

policy decision or the implementation of a policy. To the extent that the NSC staff can retain an

impartial role as a coordinator, however, it will have greater authority in holding the

Departments accountable for their involvement in policy implementation.

3. PDD-56.122

A. General. In cases where a policy involves U.S. involvement in complex

contingencies that require multidimensional responses (including military, diplomatic,

intelligence, and humanitarian instruments) the Clinton Administration established an

implementation process described in PDD-56.123

PDD-56 details the procedures for the interagency to follow in planning for crisis

management. It involves decision making by the interagency structure established by PDD-2;

subsequent planning for the contingency and monitoring the plan’s implementation by an

Executive Committee (ExComm) made up of officials from all the Executive Branch agencies

that would participate in the operation; and review of lessons learned after the operation is

complete.

n its procedural detail, PDD-56 represents a departure from the practice of previous

administrations, which relied primarily on the standard interagency process of meetings

at the NSC level (such as those described in PDD-2 and, during the previous Bush

Administration, in National Security Directive 1, for crisis management). It also reflects an

understanding on the part of the Clinton Administration that crisis management in the post-Cold

War world requires the application of a number of elements of national power simultaneously

and in a coordinated fashion.

As envisioned by the Clinton Administration, successful crisis management requires

adroit application of numerous separate elements to nontraditional problems. Previous operations

suggested to Clinton Administration officials that crisis management exhibits three unique

characteristics that require unique management structures. First, time for deliberation and

planning is relatively short.124 Second, policy decisions must be coordinated first in Washington,

then with those in the field who must implement them. Third, complex contingencies often

require assets from governmental and non-governmental activities that do not normally

participate in national security policy and strategy development or the interagency process

described by PDD-2.

 

122 Note that the current Bush Administration’s NSPD-1 specifically revoked PDD-56 and transferred any existing “Executive

Committees to appropriate regional Policy Coordination Committees.” See NSPD-1, p. 5. One can only assume that the

current Bush Administration intends to conduct “complex contingencies” via NSPD-1’s standard processes. This appears to

fit the Bush Administration’s vision of limiting the NSC staff’s involvement in developing and implementing policy.

123 PDD 56 defines complex contingency operations as peace operations such as the implementation of the Dayton Peace

Accord in Bosnia from 1995 to the present, the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq known as Operation Provide

Comfort in 1991, and foreign humanitarian assistance operations in central Africa in 1994 and Bangladesh in 1991. “White

Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision

Directive – 56,” May 1997 (Hereafter “White Paper PDD-56”).

124 This is not to say that there is not adequate warning of impending crises. Often there is sufficient warning, but the decisions

to respond to the warnings do not occur until the crisis has already developed.

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PDD-56 thus addresses means to involve all the potential assets of the U.S.

government—and some outside the government—that might be brought to bear in a complex

contingency through participation in the ExComm and in the development of the politicalmilitary (pol-mil) plan.

B. Evolution of PDD-56.

(1). Lessons of Past Operations. President Clinton signed PDD-56 in May 1997.

The directive represents an attempt to institutionalize the lessons the Administration learned

about contingency operations during its first five years in office. By 1997, the Administration

had dealt with operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti and a number of lesser crises elsewhere

in Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Lessons from these operations indicated that

most ventures were multidimensional problems that included political, diplomatic, intelligence,

humanitarian, economic, and security requirements. They were, in a phrase, “complex

contingency operations” conducted in response to “complex emergencies.”125

Although the interagency process described in PDD-2 might suffice to manage these

operations, its focus was general and it lacked mechanisms to hold accountable those involved in

achieving U.S. objectives, or to integrate effectively the comparative advantages U.S.

government and non-government activities could bring to bear. In short, the Clinton

Administration wanted to improve the likelihood of success in complex contingency operations

by rapidly integrating a variety of solutions that mirrored crisis requirements.

(2). Haiti. Preparation for Operation Restore Democracy—the 1994 intervention

in Haiti—was a key basis for PDD-56. In the process leading up to the operation, senior

decision makers noted that interagency planning was uncoordinated, with critical gaps between

participants’ plans and concepts, a lack of synchronization and timing of critical events, and

unrealistic resource estimates. The NSC/PC instructed the interagency to prepare a formal

coordinated plan for the operation. This document, the political-military (pol-mil)

implementation plan, was then briefed to the NSC/DC and NSC/PC and refined. Many believe

that the disciplined and interactive planning that occurred as a result of this process was

instrumental in achieving U.S. objectives within acceptable risk and cost parameters.126

(3). Subsequent Operations. Success in Haiti, the effectiveness of the process to

develop pol-mil plans, and the improved mechanisms for managing ongoing operations that

resulted from the planning process led policy makers to adopt the process used for Operation

Restore Democracy for other complex emergencies. Versions of this process were used for

Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, central Africa, and Kosovo, however, none of these crises used the

process in its entirety. Although the process has not been used in every contingency for reasons

that are not well understood, the process was nevertheless important enough to be codified in a

Presidential Decision Directive.127

 

125 National Security Council. Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, August 1998.

(Hereafter cited as: NSC, PDD-56 Handbook)

126 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, Chapter 1.

127 Interviews with senior interagency participants indicate that apart from DoD, other agencies are not comfortable with formal

planning regimes, which are not part of their cultures and for which they are not adequately resourced. This may account for

the lack of extensive pol-mil plans in these operations.
39

C. The Formal PDD-56 Process. (See Appendix 4 of this chapter for process map.)

This section describes the formal PDD-56 process. It is important to note that, as a rule, the

entire process is not used, although portions of it usually are. In the case of both Bosnia and

Kosovo, for example, the process was truncated.

(1). Initiation. The PDD-56 process begins with the decision by the national

security apparatus to participate in a complex contingency operation. This decision will likely

have been taken according to the process described in PDD-2. As PDD-2 envisions the process,

at this point NSC/IWGs would have accumulated information and framed issues for the

NSC/DC. The NSC/DC would have reviewed NSC/IWG input and made appropriate decisions

or prepared options for the NSC/PC, which, if unable to decide, would have prepared

recommendations for the President.128 Throughout the PDD-2 process little formal interagency

planning would have occurred, although agencies and activities would likely have begun internal

planning regimes.

(2). Chartering of the Executive Committee. Specific formal PDD-56

processes begin when the NSC/DC charters the Executive Committee (ExComm), which is

subordinate to the NSC/DC. The ExComm is made up of Assistant Secretary-level officials from

all government agencies that are likely to participate in the contingency operation, including

those agencies not normally represented in the NSC committee structure. ExComm members are

held personally accountable to the President for the planning and implementation of the

contingency operation.129 The ExComm oversees both planning and implementation procedures

and has the following primary responsibilities:

(a). Provides unified policy guidance for agency planners;

(b). Develops the pol-mil plan;

(c). Integrates mission area plans within the overall plan;

(d). Monitors ongoing operations, recommends modifications and

changes, and oversees implementation of approved changes.

(e). Updates the pol-mil plan;

(f) .Implements NSC/DC and NSC/PC decisions; and

(g). Conducts after-action reviews and captures and disseminates

important lessons for future operations.130

 

128 This description of the interagency decision making process, while accurate, should not be interpreted as linear. Instead,

there are likely to be repeated interchanges between levels, and informal meetings (such as Principals and Deputies lunches)

will occur between participants at all levels.

129 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, refers to holding ExComm members responsible to the President as “the organizing principle of

the ExComm.” (p. 9). This method of accountability seems to establish a sense of urgency and a mission-oriented culture,

although it is not clear that members completely forego bureaucratic interests or cultural predilections during ExComm

deliberations.

130 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, Chapters 2 and 3.
40

(3). ExComm Structure. As described in Clinton Administration documents, the

ExComm is designed to be inclusive. The concept behind its organization is to “bring together

representatives of all agencies that might participate in the operation, including those not

normally part of the NSC structure.”131 Actual ExComm membership is determined by the

NSC/DC and theoretically may include both governmental and non-governmental members,

although this study did not identify any cases in which non-governmental players actually had

membership. The NSC/DC also appoints the ExComm chair, and the chair may designate other

members to chair functional sub groups.

ExComm members not only represent their agencies, but also act as program managers

for functional areas (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, civil reconstruction). In this role, they are

responsible for producing appropriate portions of the pol-mil plan, as described in the next

section. They are also responsible for implementing plans in their areas of expertise and for

keeping the ExComm and NSC/DC informed of problems and/or significant issues. The

ExComm meets frequently during all phases, often once each day or more.132

Because it is an Executive Branch committee, the role of the Congress in ExComm

activities has been limited, although building Congressional support for operations is usually

listed as a crucial preparatory task.

(4). The Pol-Mil Plan. The pol-mil plan lays out missions, objectives,

responsibilities, and end states. It is designed to improve crisis management techniques by

centralizing planning while decentralizing the execution of those plans. Management is to be

improved through integration of effort, defining priorities and allocating resources accordingly,

and establishing milestones and metrics to chart operational success and make necessary

adjustments.

The process of developing the plan involves information exchange—a process in itself—

and the development of networks through which participants can take advantage of each others'

expertise—not just during plan development, but throughout. In this sense, the pol-mil plan is

both product and tool. The Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency

Operations describes pol-mil planning as “the centerpiece of the integrated planning process.”

The plan consists of 11 subcomponents:133

(a). Situation assessments—a comprehensive assessment to clarify

essential elements of information and provide a multidimensional view of the crisis (including

general, political, military, weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian, landmine, public security

infrastructure, economic socio-cultural situations; support from host governments, neighboring

states, and international organizations; current international presence; whether or not indigenous

parties consent to a U.S. presence; and, if one exists, the status of the current peace agreement).

(b). Identification of U.S. interests—a statement of U.S. interests and the

strategic purpose for securing those interests through intervention.

 

131 “White Paper PDD-56.” The White Paper also points out that if the ExComm contains non-traditional members, the

NSC/DC will also be expanded to include them.

132 Some interlocutors, especially in the Joint Staff, believe these meetings are too frequent and detract from crisis management

requirements.

133 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, and “White Paper PDD-56.”
41

(c). Mission statement—a statement of the strategic purpose and the polmil mission, including who is to conduct the mission; the type of operation; the expected

duration; and a list of key objectives and specified tasks that the mission will accomplish.

(d). A statement of the desired end state—the identification of the

realistic and achievable conditions to be created by the operation before it ends or turns over

responsibilities to some other entity, including: military, political, economic, and sociocultural

end states.

(e). The concept of the operation—a conceptual description of how the

mission will be accomplished, including: integration of various participants and factors;

establishment of priorities, often with a pol-mil synchronization matrix; and delineation of

operational phases beginning with initial preparation and ending with end state sustainment.

(f). Lead agency responsibilities—the assignment of responsibilities to

participating organizations and clarification of tasks and responsibilities that lie outside the

interagency.

(g). Transition and exit strategies—the multidimensional strategy that

integrates efforts for employing diplomacy, military forces, relief organizations, and others to

achieve the end state.

(h). Organizational concepts—the organizational schematic and

descriptions of chains of authorities and relationships for participating organizations, both in and

between Washington and the area of operations;

(i). Preparatory tasks—tasks to be accomplished before the operation

begins, including: diplomatic consultations, coalition consultations, and identification of proper

legal authorities, funding requirements, and Congressional consultations, inter alia.134

(j). Functional element plans (mission area plans)—critical operational

and support plans prepared by interagency participants, including: political

mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police

reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social

reconciliation, and public information.

lthough one Department or activity may have responsibility for each of these

elements, the preparation concept, as explained in a 1997 white paper, calls for

comprehensive approaches to each element. In commenting on preparation of the various parts of

the pol-mil plan, this document repeatedly refers to the use of interagency working groups to

prepare each element, with integration accomplished by the ExComm and, during the rehearsal,

by the NSC/DC. It also states that each part of the plan will be “fully coordinated.”135

 

134 PDD-56 requires Executive Branch agencies to review funding and legislative authority requirements as part of the process,

and where shortfalls exist in either, to propose solutions.

135 “White Paper PDD-56.”

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No time limits for preparation were found in documents available for this assessment.

Preparation time is influenced by the complexity of the crisis; the urgency of the requirement for

intervention; the resources available to prepare the plan; and the number of organizations

involved in the process and their individual requirements for approval.

(5). The Interagency Rehearsal. Once the pol-mil plan is complete, PDD-56

mandates that the ExComm present it to the NSC/DC. This series of briefings—known as the

Interagency Rehearsal—is designed to comprehensively review the plan and to identify problems

and potential gaps between participants.

(a). Objectives of the Rehearsal. The essential concept is to identify and

resolve differences in understanding or interpretation before the operation begins. There are three

metrics for evaluating each aspect of the plan:

(i). Whether it is effective in terms of accomplishing missions and

objectives in line with milestones and schedules;

(ii). Whether it integrates and synchronizes the activities of the

participants in accordance with the concept of operations; and,

(iii). Whether it is executable in terms of resources, financial

requirements, and legal requirements.136

Rehearsal instructions in the Handbook make two critical points. First, changes in one

part of the plan will likely result in changes in others. Second, that the rehearsal is part of the

pol-mil plan development and preparation process, not a rollout of a completed plan.

(b). Procedures for the Rehearsal. The approach to the rehearsal is

fairly detailed. If followed, a typical rehearsal will begin with a situation update by the

intelligence community. NSC staff then provides a statement of the approved mission,

objectives, end state, and operational concept. Following this, the program managers responsible

for the functional/mission area plans provide detailed briefings that:137

(i). Describe the functional plan’s purpose;

(ii). Give the current situation in the area of operations as it applies

to the functional area;

(iii). Outline key entry conditions and assumptions;

(iv). List the functional element’s purpose, mission, and objectives;

(v). Describe how the functional plan contributes to the overall

objectives;

(vi). Provide the functional element’s concept of operations;

 

136 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, Chapter 3. The Handbook calls for at least one rehearsal and, if time permits, two.

137 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, Chapter 3.
43

(vii). Identify milestones and timelines;

(viii). Discuss synchronization considerations;

(ix). Highlight organizational structure and chain of authority;

(x). Identify key players and their roles;

(xi). Describe the mechanisms for civil-military coordination;

(xii). Identify obstacles and resource shortfalls;

(xiii). Define on-the-ground success; and,

(xiv). Identify unresolved issues that require decisions.

Although there is no guarantee that this checklist will be used for future operations, it is

comprehensive and on a plane with lists used in military command and staff and war colleges

where advanced, proven planning techniques constitute a major part of the curricula.

(6). Monitoring Ongoing Operations. Although the ExComm is responsible for

monitoring and making adjustments (or recommendations for adjustments) during complex

contingency operations, PDD-56 prescribes no specific methods for doing so. A review of

lessons learned contained in the Handbook notes that reassessments must be continuous. This

document states that on-the-ground operations must be transparent; changes must be assessed by

the interagency; there must be effective communications in all directions; and issues must be

resolved in a timely manner, especially when the safety of U.S. forces is at risk.

(7). After Action Review (AAR). At each phase of a complex contingency—

from crisis inception to end state—PDD-56 requires participants to collect relevant data about

performance, analyze this information and derive key lessons, distribute lessons across the

interagency, and incorporate them into policies and procedures for future operations. Upon

completion of each operation, the ExComm is tasked with conducting an After Action Review

(AAR) to determine “what went well, what did not, and why.”138 Lessons extracted from this

review should relate especially to:

(a). Decisions to intervene;

(b). Developing integrated strategies;

(c). Providing effective integration mechanisms;

(d). Determining the leads for operations;

(e). Coalition building;

 

138 NSC, PDD-56 Handbook, Chapter 4.
44

(f). Gaining political support;

(g). Continual reassessment; and,

(h). Transition planning.

D. Value of the Formal Process. The process described in PDD-56 is comprehensive

and, if used, it is capable of integrating interagency players (traditional and nontraditional)

effectively. Although somewhat complex, the process:

(1). Provides a means to accumulate, integrate, and use information;

(2). Permits consideration of all player positions and interests;

(3). Provides decision makers with a range of options;

(4). Facilitates assessment of options and “best course” recommendations;

(5). Enables implementation; and

(6). Permits situational adjustments to original objectives and plans.

PDD-56 provides a mechanism for overseeing ongoing operations and rapidly adjusting

approaches and/or objectives in response to changing situations, although the methods for doing

this are not delineated in the document. The formal process also outlines a process for capturing

and disseminating lessons learned so that the experience of past operations will benefit those of

the future.

4. PDD-63.139

A. General. PDD-63 was the Clinton Administration’s policy, promulgated in May

1998, for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure from cyber-based and physical attacks.

PDD-63 establishes as a national goal the ability to protect critical infrastructure from any attack

designed to disable the federal government, state and local governments, or the private sector. It

details specific procedures and timelines to develop this capability. Specifically, it requires

achieving “an initial operating capability” by the year 2000 and full capacity to protect the

critical infrastructure by the year 2003. The procedures for developing the capability are

described below.

DD-63 is based on the notion that an attack on the nation’s critical infrastructure

would include private sector facilities and assets as well as the government’s

capabilities. Thus a solution must include the private sector as well as state and local

governments. Furthermore, any preparation or response to the challenge must not overtax the

private sector.

 

139 While the current Bush Administration specifically rescinded PDD-56 in NSPD-1, it is interesting to note that PDD-63 is

not specifically addressed in NSPD-1.

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Like PDD-56, PDD-63 is a departure from previous national security directives in that it

describes not only a policy objective but also detailed procedures, including planning processes,

to achieve that objective. Unlike PDD-56, the planning processes in PDD-63 are specific to

critical infrastructure protection, although some of the elements of the directive, such as

identifying lead agencies within the U.S. government for each sector of the infrastructure,

creating a coordination group for the interagency, and establishing public-private partnerships,

are applicable to other homeland defense security challenges.

B. Background. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been increasing recognition

that national security depends in large measure on critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures

are defined in PDD-63 as:

(1). Telecommunications;

(2). Energy;

(3). Banking and Finance;

(4). Transportation;

(5). Water Systems; and

(6). Public and Private Emergency Services.140

Many of these are vulnerable to attack or to failure for other reasons, including weather

or human error. Additionally, most of these systems are interrelated and a failure in one would

likely have impacts on other systems. Finally, many of these systems are owned and managed by

the private sector, and thus it is beyond the capacity of the federal government alone to protect

them. Should one or more critical infrastructures fail, the effects could impede traditional

national security functions as well as economic prosperity, thus affecting both national military

and economic power.

Clinton Administration comments on PDD-63 note that U.S. policy is to ensure the

continuity and viability of critical infrastructures. They also note that the President “intends that

the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate vulnerability to both

physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber

systems.”141 These statements form the basis for PDD-63 process directives.

C. Critical Infrastructure Protection Apparatus.

(1). General. PDD-63 postulates that critical infrastructure protection

requires actions by both the government and the private sector “in a closely coordinated

 

140 “White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive

63,” May 1998 , p. 1. (Hereafter “White Paper PDD-63”) The exact “categories” of critical infrastructure change depending

on the document. Executive Order 13010 listed 8 sectors while the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure

Protection (PCCIP) had 5 sectors. Annex A to PDD-63 contains a detailed list of 15 sectors (see Table 3 below).

141 “White Paper PDD-63,” p. 1.
46

effort.”142 In fact, PDD-63’s goal is twofold: to protect the nation’s infrastructure, a large part of

which is maintained by the private sector; and, to protect the infrastructure assets of the federal

government from the threat of cyber and physical attack. PDD-63 envisions achieving the first

goal by encouraging cooperation between the private sector and the government. The second

objective is the sole responsibility of federal government agencies. Both goals are to be

accomplished by creating a framework for decision making and implementation, involving

different actors at different levels, as described in paragraph (2) below. Implementation of the

policy is to be achieved through the formulation and approval of a National Infrastructure

Assurance Plan (NIAP), the elements of which are described in paragraph (3).

(2). Government Organization for Critical Infrastructure Protection. To

implement provisions for counter-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection PDD-62

establishes a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism

(hereafter abbreviated to “National Coordinator).143 PDD-63 goes on to establish four types of

formal organizations, and two centers.

(a). The National Coordinator. The National Coordinator, who is

appointed by the President without Senate advice and consent, reports to the President through

the APNSA. He/she is not empowered to direct Departments and Agencies, but has the authority

to “ensure interagency coordination for policy development and implementation.”144 The

Coordinator has status as a full member of the NSC/PC or the NSC/DC when those bodies meet

to consider infrastructure matters, and he/she is empowered to provide advice during preparation

of the President’s Budget concerning Department and Agency spending for infrastructure

protection. The National Coordinator chairs the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group

(CICG)(see (d) below) and reports on CICG matters to the NSC/DC or, when called upon, to the

NSC/PC.

(b). Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison. For each part of the

nation’s infrastructure maintained by the private sector, PDD-63 requires identifying a lead U.S.

government agency to work with the private sector in assuring infrastructure protection. The

Lead Agency, in turn, must appoint an Assistant Secretary-level official, known as the Sector

Liaison Official, to work with private sector counterparts from the infrastructure sectors they

represent (known as Sector Coordinators). The lead agency, in concert with private sector

representatives, is to develop protection and education programs for their sector. Sector Lead

Agency responsibilities are shown in the following table.

 

142 “White paper PDD-63,” p. 2.

143 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62: “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans

Overseas.” 22 May, 1998.

144 “White Paper PDD-63,” P. 7.
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Table 3. Lead Agency Infrastructure Responsibilities.

Department/Agency Infrastructure

Department of Commerce Information and Communications

Department of Energy Electric Power

Oil and Gas Production and Storage

Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Services

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Emergency Law Enforcement Services

Department of Transportation Aviation

Highways

Mass Transit

Pipelines

Rail

Waterborne Commerce

Department of Treasury Banking and Finance

Environmental Protection Agency Water Supply

Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Fire Services

Continuity of Government Services

(c). Lead Agencies for Special Functions. PDD-63 defines

special functions as those activities that are inherently governmental (e.g., defense,

diplomacy, law enforcement). It mandates that lead agencies for special functions (i.e., the

Departments and Agencies that have primary responsibility for them) will appoint

Assistant Secretary-level officials to coordinate infrastructure protection within the

interagency system. These officials are given the title of Functional Coordinators. Special

Function Lead Agency responsibilities are shown in the following table.

Table 4. Special Function Responsibilities.

Department/Agency Infrastructure

Department of Defense National Defense

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Law Enforcement and Internal Security

Department of State Foreign Affairs

Central Intelligence Agency Foreign Intelligence

(d). Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. Sector

Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators meet with other government representatives to

exchange information and coordinate in the CICG. The National Coordinator chairs the CICG.

He/she ensures that the appropriate government Departments and Agencies are involved in

Critical Infrastructure deliberations and that the CICG exploits existing security structures and

organizations (e.g., the Security Policy Board and Forum). PDD-63 requires Departments and

Agencies to appoint a senior official (Assistant Secretary or equivalent rank) to the CICG. The
48

APNSA appoints a Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection from the NSC staff to serve on

the CICG.145

(e). National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC). The

NIAC serves as a forum to bring together public and private sector officials. Members are

appointed by the President and include state and local officials as well as federal and private

sector officials. The National Coordinator acts as the Council’s executive director, and the

Council is supposed to meet “periodically” but its first meeting did not occur until 18 January

2001.

(f). National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The

NIPC represents an upgrade of a previously existing FBI organization. The NIPC serves as the

“national focal point for gathering information on threats to the infrastructures,” assessing those

threats, and disseminating information as appropriate to federal, state, and local governments and

the private sector.146 In addition to the FBI, Center membership includes the Secret Service (and

other investigators with experience in computer crimes and infrastructure protection), DoD, the

Intelligence Communities, and the Lead Agencies. The Center is electronically linked to nodes

throughout the remainder of the government and with private sector centers. The NIPC’s mission

“will include providing timely warning of intentional threats, comprehensive analyses, and law

enforcement investigation and response.”147 Departments and Agencies are instructed by PDD63 to share information concerning warnings and threats with the NIPC, and the Center is

enjoined to establish other links to private sector sources as appropriate.

(g). Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). ISACs

represent private sector versions of the NIPC, established for each infrastructure sector with the

assistance of the National Coordinator, Sector and Special Function Coordinators and Sector and

Special Function liaison officials. However, PDD-63 envisions the ISACs as Centers designed

and run by the private sector. The concept is for ISACs to acquire, assess, and pass on

information about threats to the NIPC and to the private sector.

(h). Supporting NSC Structures. In addition to the structures

noted above, PDD-63 calls for the NSC/PC to develop a schedule for completing the National

Infrastructure Assurance Plan within 180 days of PDD-63 approval. The CICG will review this

plan and schedule completion of the taskings required to develop the plan.

D. Functions and Purposes. The organization described above is designed to reduce

infrastructure vulnerability by:

(1). Conducting assessments of sector and functional infrastructures to attack;

(2). Developing and recommending plans to reduce or eliminate key

vulnerabilities;

(3). Developing and implementing a system to identify threats and prevent major

attacks on critical infrastructure assets; and,

 

145 “White Paper PDD-63,” p. 7.

146 “White Paper PDD-63,” p. 8.

147 “White Paper PDD-63,” p. 8.
49

(4). Developing plans to contain and repel attacks on critical infrastructure assets

and to reconstitute capabilities following an attack.

Conceptually, these individuals and organizations are responsible for ensuring that their

own organizations take the necessary steps to protect critical infrastructure,148 develop

appropriate inputs for the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, and coordinate those inputs in

the interagency.

E. Preparation of the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (NIAP).

(1). PDD-63 Requirements. PDD-63 calls for a NIAP that defines actions to

manage or mitigate risk by identifying and correcting vulnerabilities and establishes warning,

response, and recovery mechanisms. Developing a viable strategy and plan requires “buy-in”

from both government and private sector organizations on the need for a plan; arriving at

consensus on the level of security required for commercial infrastructures; creating an

environment conducive to information sharing and remedial action; and developing new

paradigms for the allocation of responsibilities in an era where boundaries between security,

economic, and social interests are blurred.

(2). NIAP Design. Crafting the NIAP was guided by two principles:

(a). Delegation of lead agency responsibilities for development of portions

of the plan away from the Executive Office of the President and to those organizations most

capable of preparing them; and

(b). Creation of functional planning entities as opposed to organizationalbased planning to foster interagency cooperation.

The need to share information among diverse government and private sector actors was a

key guiding principle in plan preparation. Unless mechanisms exist that facilitate information

sharing, it is difficult to construct a viable NIAP.

F. PDD-63 Implementation to Date.

he implementation of PDD-63 is underway, although progress is uneven. The policy

is currently being coordinated by the National Coordinator (mentioned earlier), who

is a member of the National Security Council Staff. The National Infrastructure Assurance Plan

is being developed by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), housed at and funded

through the Department of Commerce. The CIAO was to complete the National Infrastructure

Assurance Plan by January 2001, and has a “sunset clause” to cease existing as an organization

in September 2001.

To date, the CIAO refined the requirements for the second goal of the infrastructure

protection policy—to ensure that the infrastructure of the federal government is adequately

protected—by identifying those agencies to which the requirement applies and developing a

 

148 “White Paper PDD-63,” p. 4. requires each Department and Agency to appoint a Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer and

to designate the organization’s Chief Information Officer as responsible for information assurance.

T
50

timeline by which they are to submit plans for the protection of their infrastructure. The CIAO

reviewed several of the submitted plans, which are now being implemented.

The first goal of the policy—to ensure the protection of the nation’s infrastructure—is

proving more difficult to implement. According to knowledgeable observers, the Department of

the Treasury has become the Lead Agency for the financial and banking sector, and has

appointed a Sector Liaison Official. Treasury is currently working with representatives of the

financial and banking sector in a working group format to identify the sector’s vulnerabilities.

Progress was finally made in the area of telecommunications, where the Department of

Commerce appointed a Sector Liaison Official, and the private sector coordinator is the

Information Technology Association of America.

According to experts, the EPA has been established as the Lead Agency for assessing the

vulnerability of the water supply infrastructure. It has not yet begun its work.

5. The Informal Crisis Management/Policy Coordination Processes.

s in policy development, several informal processes supplement the processes

described in PDD-2 and PDD-56 for implementing policy. In fact, informal

processes may play a particularly important part in coordinating agencies’ positions during the

implementation of a policy, especially during the management of a crisis or a contingency

operation. Such informal processes include:

A. The Breakfast/Lunch Meeting. Weekly lunches involving the Secretary of State,

the President’s National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of Defense (dubbed the ABC

[Albright-Berger-Cohen] lunches) were used to surface and resolve some issues associated with

crisis management. The discussion agenda was prepared by the NSC staff (in coordination with

the staffs of the other participants) and distributed ahead of time. Staffs prepared briefing papers

and talking points on those matters for which they have expertise. However, no staff attended the

meetings. This guaranteed confidentiality and perhaps a more open exchange as participants

ceased to represent their bureaucracies and were free to advocate what they deemed were the

best options. The staff was dependent on feedback from the principals. Officials we interviewed

believed these events served an important function for surfacing and resolving issues quickly,

although some acknowledged that feedback was not always timely.149

B. Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast. This informal event involved the ABC

participants, plus the U.N. Representative, the DCI, and the CJCS, all of whom were involved in

the National Security Council. No staff attended, the gathering had no prepared agenda, and

discussions were reportedly far ranging. Occasionally, taskings for staff resulted from these

meetings.

C. Weekly Deputies Lunches: These were similar to the Foreign Policy Breakfasts

except participants were members of the NSC/DC. (In DoD’s case, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense often attends instead of the USD(P), even though the Deputy Secretary is not formally

part of the NSC/DC.150) A former senior official with firsthand knowledge indicated that major

 

149 The ABC meetings of the Clinton Administration are an evolution of the Cheney-Baker-Scowcroft (CBS) meetings held

regularly during the previous Bush Administration. The rules and approaches are very similar.

150 PDD-2 includes the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the NSC/DC, but not the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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NSC/DC issues were often resolved at these lunches, and then formally announced at the next

NSC/DC meeting.

D. The President-National Security Advisor Relationship. The National Security

Adviser, by virtue of his or her physical proximity to the President, can be a particularly

influential voice in national security policy both in the formal and informal policy making

processes. The role of the National Security Advisor historically has reflected the President’s

own preferences regarding the management of the information flow. President Eisenhower

reportedly eschewed bureaucratic politics and set up a national security policy making apparatus

designed to isolate him from it. According to scholars of the policy process, national security

decisions in President Eisenhower’s Administration were taken after lower levels of the

interagency had vetted ideas and reached compromise on a number of set options, which were

presented to Eisenhower for decision through his Chief of Staff.151 President Kennedy, on the

other hand, sought greater personal involvement with a number of different advisors, and

established a system of decision making that allowed him to participate in the shaping of the

options for decision.152

The personality of the President and his National Security Advisor and the interest of the

former in national security issues also affect the role of the National Security Advisor in any

Administration. A number of observers commented that President Clinton had less familiarity

with national security issues than he did with domestic and economic subjects, and thus sought

information and advice to a greater extent than on other topics.

n any Administration, the role of the National Security Advisor is also likely to be

shaped by the personality of the holder of the position, his or her skills, and whether he

or she sees the role as one of coordination or problem resolution. According to one observer,

during the previous Bush Administration, for example, the National Security Advisor saw his

role, and that of the NSC staff, as honest brokers of the different views held in the bureaucracy,

rather than as policy makers. Interviews revealed that in the Clinton Administration, the National

Security Advisor and the NSC staff have played less of a role of honest broker and more of

adjudicators in policy disputes. To a certain extent the latter is an inevitable outcome of

circumstances: the personalities of the key national security players or the type of national

security issues addressed by the Administration. Also, if the National Security Advisor and NSC

staff enjoy access and considerable influence with the President, they will tend to be more

influential in the crisis management process.

When the NSC staff takes on the role of policy maker or adjudicator, however, a number

of problems can ensue, according to observers. At the least, the NSC staff may introduce a

certain amount of friction to the process as they maneuver for position, or they may antagonize

interagency interlocutors if they insist that only they know the mind of the President.153 They

also may take on more work than can be effectively handled, given the relatively small size of

the NSC staff. That could mean a constant juggling act and little time for planning or

coordination. It can also result in decision packages that do not take advantage of the full range

 

151 Alexander, L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1980), pp. 152-154. (Hereafter, George)

152 George, p 157.

153 Several of those interviewed indicated that they saw this as a problem with the Clinton NSC staff. Demonstrating that

conclusively would require a more complete analysis.

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of expertise available in the interagency. Finally, having the National Security Advisor and NSC

staff in too prominent a policy making role may raise oversight and accountability issues.

National Security Advisors, unlike the majority of NSC members, are neither elected officials

nor are they appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. They are accountable to the

President of course, but not to the American people, either directly or indirectly, although they

can and have substantially influenced decisions that affect the nation as a whole.

In the final analysis, each National Security Advisor has great influence in setting the

tone for the management of national security issues in the interagency process, and can choose

whether to use the NSC organization as an honest broker and coordinator of the different

interagency views or as a shaper of policy. Many experts interviewed cited the honest broker

model as preferable. It is likely to surface all the options on a particular policy issue to the

decision makers—the NSC Deputies, Principals, or the President. However, to work, this model

requires strong NSC staff coordination at the Deputies Committee and IWG level, and

participation by the Executive Branch Agencies in the NSC Committees and IWGs with

representatives who can be held accountable.

E. Other Personal Contacts. Action officers from different divisions and departments

frequently hold informal discussions in a number of different venues to discuss substantive

issues. Sometimes these discussions occur as staff members prepare issue papers for their

principals in support of the formal process. Sometimes they occur as staffers try to build

consensus for proposals or recommendations. Sometimes they occur as “sidebars” at

conferences, meetings, or seminars. Often, the results and agreements are not formally reported,

but this sort of networking is an important lubricant for the national security process at large.

Participants in seminars and workshops have reported that the experience enabled them to

develop contacts that facilitated national security problem solving beyond the immediate

meeting.

6. The Role of Congress in Policy Implementation.

A. Background. The Constitution sets up a system by which the President and the

Congress share powers in the implementation of national security policy. Congress has the power

to declare war; “to raise and maintain Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy;” and to

make rules concerning how the armed forces are to be maintained. Additionally, the Constitution

establishes that the Senate will ratify treaties negotiated by the Administration and confirm

ambassadors and other key federal government officials appointed by the President. Under the

Constitution, however, the President has the role of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces

and is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. This system was designed, in the words of

one scholar, as “an invitation to struggle,” because the respective Constitutional responsibilities

of the Legislative and Executive Branches allow each Branch to contest the other’s intentions or

actions in the national security realm.

espite this adversarial arrangement, the two Branches have not always taken up that

invitation to struggle. Until the middle of the 20th century, Congressional interest in

national security matters was largely muted. Congress deferred to the Executive Branch on

military policy and strategy questions, focusing primarily on influencing the location of military

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bases and other questions with impact on Congressional constituencies.154 The onset of the Cold

War raised the profile of national security and military matters, and increased Congressional

interest and activism in national security policy formulation and implementation. Congress

passed the National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the national security structure of

the Executive Branch. It also began to use the annual defense authorization and appropriations

processes to comment on major national security policy issues.155

The Cold War fostered a certain degree of consensus between the Executive and

Legislative branches of government on U.S. national security interests and a national security

strategy, but it also increased the voice of Congress on national security questions. Eventually,

Congress began to assert its prerogative for national security policy making and implementation

on issues where consensus was lacking, culminating in the passage of the War Powers Act, in

1973.

B. The War Powers Act. The War Powers Act is perhaps the best example of the

delicate separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches of government in

national security matters—and particularly in the implementation of national security policy. The

Act was designed to assert the power of Congress alone to declare war and prevent the President

from circumventing those powers by initiating a limited military operation that later might be

escalated. The Act requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying U.S.

forces abroad for combat purposes, giving Congress the opportunity to deny further

deployments.

Since its passage, the War Powers Act has remained controversial. Congress passed it

over President Nixon’s veto, and it has been considered unconstitutional by every President

since. Congress itself has been reluctant to invoke the powers it granted itself. Although several

U.S. military engagements, including the recent action in Kosovo, brought about resolutions by

Members of Congress designed to invoke the Act, Congress has never successfully used it to

limit the President’s ability to deploy troops in a crisis.

C. Legislative, Oversight, and Ratification Powers. Congress may affect the

implementation of national security policy by passing legislation, short of the War Powers Act,

and impose specific requirements on the Executive Branch. As in the case of the War Powers

Act, however, the Executive Branch tends to view such legislative action as interference in its

prerogative to conduct foreign relations. It usually fights off such attempts and Congress itself is

divided when it comes to voting for such legislation. One powerful brake on Congress is the

political consideration that voting against the Administration, when it has become involved in

operations abroad, might be perceived as a vote against deployed military men and women.

Many Members consider such a vote a no-win situation and, unless carefully constructed, this

type of legislation rarely reaches the floor of either chamber.

A safer and more effective way for Members of Congress to express their opinions on

national security matters and influence the implementation of a policy is by holding hearings.

Hearings afford the Congress an opportunity to foster public debate on a particular security issue

by airing views supportive of or contrary to those of the Administration. They also provide a

 

154 Samuel P. Huntington . The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. (Cambridge, MA:

The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 400-401. (Hereafter, Huntington, Soldier and State)

155 Huntington, Soldier and State, pg. 401.
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forum to call the Administration to task for a failing policy. Finally, they force a dialogue

between the Executive and Legislative Branches, possibly leading to a realignment or adjustment

in policy. Hearings, however, can also provide the Administration with an opportunity to explain

its policy and win Congressional support. The Clinton Administration, for example, successfully

employed this tactic in securing Senate support for NATO enlargement.

he Congress is perhaps most influential over the implementation of national security

policy associated with international treaties, because of the constitutional requirement

for Senate ratification. The Senate has not always ratified treaties negotiated by an

Administration, most recently rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although an

Administration has the prerogative to abide by a treaty even without Senate ratification, Senate

rejection of a treaty backed by an Administration reduces the credibility of the Administration

with its negotiating partners and limits its effectiveness on that particular policy issue.

D. The Power of the Purse. Congressional power of the purse is the most effective way

by which the Congress can influence the implementation of national security policy. Every year,

the Congress passes appropriations bills that fund Executive Branch agencies and programs and

U.S. operations abroad. Occasionally, the Congress must also vote on supplemental

appropriations bills when an operation abroad requires additional funding. The Congress may

influence the way in which the Executive Branch implements a particular policy by denying

funds to implement that policy or imposing certain conditions or restrictions on expenditures. For

example, the Congress may require that the Administration report on the expenditure of certain

funds before more can be made available, or specify a date beyond which no funds will be made

available for a particular operation. The latter restriction, for example, was imposed on the

funding for U.S. participation in the multinational coalition in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Political considerations play a powerful role in exercising the power of the purse as well.

Regardless of whether an operation is popular with the American public at its onset, the

Congress is generally reluctant to appear unsupportive of the military when it is deployed.

E. Conclusions. Although the balance of power between the Congress and the

Executive Branch has tilted toward the Congress on occasion, the Executive Branch currently

holds greater sway over the implementation of national security policy and strategy than

Congress. Several Presidents since the passage of the War Powers Act have engaged U.S. troops

abroad without the prior approval of the Congress. Although Congress has influenced the

implementation of policy, most notably by controlling funding streams for operations abroad,

and rejecting or supporting Administration-backed treaties, its role has been secondary to that of

the Executive Branch.

A number of factors account for this situation. First, the Congress, much more than the

Executive Branch, is subject to political considerations in its evaluation of national security

policy issues. With the majority of Members facing elections every two years, the Congress must

pay greater attention to public opinion, imposing a short-term outlook on national security issues.

Frequent election cycles also give interest groups and ethnic constituencies the opportunity to

influence the Congress in the implementation of national security policy, as they do in the

formulation of policy. As a result, some Members of Congress may develop more narrowly

focused perspectives on national security issues than the Executive Branch.

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Finally, Congress’ own structure may reduce its ability to compete with the Executive

Branch in the formulation of national security policy and oversight of its implementation. The

power to formulate legislation that influences the implementation of policy is distributed among

a vast numbers of Committees in the House and Senate. The traditional Committees of

jurisdiction—the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House International

Relations and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committees, the Intelligence Committees, and the

Appropriations Committees—now share the power to influence national security policy with the

Commerce Committees, the Judiciary Committees, the House Rules Committee, the Senate

Governmental Affairs Committee, and many more.

The distribution of authority among many Committees means many opinions and

perspectives now influence legislation, sometimes resulting in compromise measures rather than

a sharply targeted policy. The Committee referral system is also not conducive to quick action.

Having to wait to vote until each Committee of jurisdiction has acted on a bill reduces the

effectiveness of the Congress to act on sometimes fast-developing national security issues. The

result is that the Executive Branch possesses the prerogative in national security policy making

and implementation.

7. Observations.

onitoring the implementation of a national security policy was an overarching

process within the Clinton Administration, as it has been in previous

administrations. PDD-2 assigns different levels of responsibility to the NSC committee

structure—the IWGs, NSC/DC, and NSC/PC—to ensure that the President’s decisions on

national security have been implemented by the interagency as appropriate. In addition, during

the Clinton Administration there has been an attempt to formalize processes to guide crisis

management in the form of PDD-56 and PDD-63. Although they are not always followed to the

letter, these directives provide guidelines for the interagency to organize itself and prepare plans

for interventions in humanitarian crises abroad and in the area of infrastructure protection. A

number of preliminary observations can be derived from the way policy was implemented at the

interagency level in the Clinton Administration.

A. Interagency Monitoring of Policy Implementation is Sporadic. Despite the

guidelines provided by PDD-2 and PDD-56 to coordinate policy implementation at the

interagency level, these formal processes are not observed in their entirety. Observers in the

process noted, for example, that much coordination of policy at the interagency level was

conducted by the NSC/DC, especially in crisis management, often bypassing the preparatory

meetings of the IWGs. The reasons for this are not well understood. It is possible the NSC/DC’s

involvement in the formulation of policy leaves little time to devote to monitoring the

implementation of previous decisions.

A number of participants in the interagency process also observed that decision

memoranda from NSC/DC or NSC/PC meetings were often released late or not released at all,

leaving it up to the principal who attended the meeting to communicate any action needed to his

or her agency through their personal staff. While this approach may work, it also permits

members to carry a unique interpretation of the decision back to their organization. This, in turn,

can lead to implementation differences, delays, and problems.

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One reason for the lack of systematic coordination of policy implementation may be the

workload of the NSC staff, which supports the NSC/DC and NSC/PC and which usually has a

more-than-full workload. As the definition of national security broadens to include less

traditional areas of concern, more players and more information enter the national security

structure. Accordingly, the burden on the NSC staff to coordinate the input of various

interagency players grows, risking further limitation of its ability to follow up on the

implementation of policy decisions.

B. PDD-56 Not Used Extensively. It is not clear that the entire PDD-56 process is

extensively used. Discussions with DoD and other officials indicate that it was not used in its

entirety for recent operations in Kosovo, but one can argue that this operation fell outside the

definition of complex emergencies upon which PDD-56 rests. Additionally, PDD-56, as written,

appears to have no domestic application. Yet the formal process possesses many of the

characteristics and systems that would be beneficial in response to acts of terrorism or other

domestic disasters. The players would be different, but the PDD-56 system for exchanging

information, developing plans, and monitoring their implementation would be as valuable as for

domestic as well as foreign crises.

Although difficult to demonstrate conclusively in this study, there may be cultural

resistance to PDD-56 processes—especially pol-mil plan development—on the part of some

Departments and Agencies. This may account for a reluctance to use the process. Planning is a

DoD core competency, but it is not a core competency for other Departments who are not

resourced or trained for in-depth operational planning. Nonetheless, the argument must be made

that the planning process (i.e., the exchange of information and the fixing of responsibilities) is

often of equal or greater importance than the plan itself.

Another reason for less-than-comprehensive acceptance of the plan may be that some are

uncomfortable with a process based on methods not employed in their organizations. Although

the PDD-56 Handbook calls for annual Deputy Assistant Secretary-level training programs at the

National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the National Defense University, and the Army War

College, widespread acceptance of the formal process is likely to require considerable time. This

is especially the case where the process is viewed as incompatible with organizational values.

A number of observers from various Executive Branch departments pointed to the value

of a strong coordinator for integrated contingency planning. When the procedures that make up

the PDD-56 process were observed, it was due to the efforts of a strong coordinator at the NSC

staff level who was able to generate participation at an appropriate level of participation from the

Executive Departments.

C. Growing Role of NSC Staff in Policy Implementation. The formal role of the NSC

staff is as coordinator of the interagency process rather than as a formulator or implementer of

policy. A number of observers, however, noted that in the Clinton Administration the NSC staff

has been more active not only in formulating policy, but also in implementing it. Officials

interviewed pointed to cases in which the NSC staff participated in diplomatic missions, briefed

Members of Congress, or drafted issue papers for NSC/DC meetings as examples of a more

activist role by the NSC staff. Many viewed this development with concern, arguing that a

relatively small staff lacks the resources and depth of understanding to address complex policy

issues adequately. In the view of these observers, the role of the NSC staff should be kept to

policy coordination.
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D. Informal Process Value. As identified in the section on PDD-2, informal processes

often run parallel to formal ones. This is the case with PDD-56, with formal processes that are

complemented by informal arrangements to include senior-level meetings over meals and casual

action officer conversations. It is difficult to precisely assess the true value of these contacts

because it is impossible to know how decisions and information exchanges would have differed

if they had occurred in the formal process. However, informal processes clearly exist and have

apparent value in that they are repeatedly used at all levels. Rather than attempting to formalize

such processes, it seems more appropriate to facilitate them. This can be done in part by ensuring

that any changes to the formal system consider the impact on established informal processes.
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SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCE ALLOCATION

1. General.

he success of all national security processes and concepts ultimately depends on

access to resources. Unless sufficient resources are available, development and

implementation of policy and strategy are academic drills. All Executive Branch Departments

and a number of Agencies participate in preparing the President’s Budget, which is then

deliberated and approved by Congress, prior to being signed into law by the President.156 The

process by which the budget is conceptualized and prepared by the Executive Branch and

deliberated and approved by Congress is interbranch.

2. Overview of the Nature of the Process.

Because resources are finite and offsets (rather than plus-ups) are becoming more

common, the preparation and deliberation process is often adversarial.

A. Intra-Department. Precise processes used to link requirements to resources vary

from Department to Department and they usually include a certain amount of tension. Within

organizations, debates routinely occur over the shares each sub-element will receive and whether

a proponent’s program is superior to an alternative proposed by someone else. (An example is

the process by which the Programs Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Directorate in the

Department of Defense (DoD) presents alternatives to Military Service programs.157 In these

cases, the Services usually view PA&E as meddlesome or uninformed. See Chapter 4 entitled

“Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate” in Volume IV entitled Department of Defense.)

B. Intra Executive Branch. Tensions can exist, too, when Departments and Agencies

submit their budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. The

Director of OMB reviews Department and Agency budgets, listens to OMB staff

recommendations, and then makes decisions that are often contrary to Department and Agency

preferences, but are based on the Director’s understanding of the President’s policies and

priorities. When that occurs, it is sometimes necessary for the President to resolve disputes

between his lieutenants. Because OMB is organized along Departmental lines, it is difficult to

examine and debate along functional lines (e.g., counter-terrorism, first response to weapons of

mass destruction).

C. Inter Branch. Once the President’s Budget is submitted to the Congress, spirited

debates often occur between Members of Congress and Administration officials testifying on

behalf of the budget—and between Members with different ideas of what is best for national

security. An example of the latter is the deliberations and arm twisting concerning the purchase

of additional B-2 bombers that occurred in the summer of 1997. Members often debate, too,

whether funds marked for national security might be better spent for other needs. A case in point

is the defeat of a June 1997 proposal to shift billions from the Defense Department to fund

 

156 Under present law, the President’s annual budget includes the next fiscal year’s budget request and a projection for four

years beyond that.

157 Although arguments within DoD occur over programs and alternatives, the amount of the Defense Budget that is allocated to

each Service has remained relatively stable over time. Critics point to more-or-less equal shares and observe that the

arrangement precludes innovative approaches to national security.

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highway infrastructure bills—a measure that was ultimately defeated in an early morning vote by

the narrowest of margins. At the extremes, the Congress can hold up appropriations if it seeks to

force the Executive Branch to handle matters differently.

Once Congress approves the budget and sends it to the White House, the President may

veto it. If he does, the stage is set for what may become heated negotiations in an effort to reach

a compromise.

D. Tension as a Creative Force. Although competitions between participants

occasionally get out of hand, more often these tensions are a positive, even creative force for

finding the best alternatives. The fact that budget share is often a zero sum game ensures that

participants will present alternatives, and that both original proposals and alternatives will be

subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Consequently, decision makers in both the Executive and

Legislative Branches are presented with a range of options and supporting analysis, which should

result in better decisions over the long term. Still, there is no shortage of parochialism in budget

proceedings.

3. The Executive Branch—Budget Preparation Process. (See Appendix 5 of this chapter for

process map)

A. Preparation Overview. Although particulars differ somewhat depending on the

Department, the overall preparation process is essentially the same. It may be summarized in

terms of months:158

• January to March. . . . . . President established general guidance.

• March to May. . . . . . . . .OMB develops significant issues.

• June. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OMB provides budget preparation guidance.159

• June to September. . . . . .Departments and Agencies prepare budget requests.

• September. . . . . . . . . . . .Departments and Agencies submit budget requests.

• September-October. . . . .OMB reviews budget submissions; prepares issues.

• October-November. . . . .OMB Director’s review and “passbacks.”

• November-December. . .Appeals and Presidential Decisions.

• December-January . . . . .President’s Budget prepared and approved.

• January-February. . . . . . President’s Budget submitted to Congress.

 

158 Shelley Lynne Tomkin. Inside OMB: Politics and Process in the President's Budget Office. (Armonk, New York: M.E.

Sharpe, 1998), (Hereafter Tomkin, Inside OMB) and interviews with OMB and DoD officials. DoD operates on a year-toyear cycle despite past attempts to move it to a two-year cycle. Reasons for retaining the annual system include

Congressional resistance to the two-year version.

159 In the case of DoD and some other Departments, preparation guidance does not arrive until after budget preparation is under

way.
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t is important to note at the outset that these timeframes often change. For example,

although the President’s budget is supposed to be submitted to Congress not later than

the first Monday in February, it sometimes arrives later. When Administrations change, for

instance, the new Administration usually does not submit its budget until later in the spring, and

the Congress does not object. Also, although OMB should provide budget preparation guidance

by June for the budget to be submitted the following February, the formal guidance often is not

provided until much later. According to DoD officials, sometimes it does not arrive until

November. When this occurs, Departments usually use informal channels to determine a funding

range for use in budget preparation. Despite deviations, the schedule provides a useful reference

for discussion.

Although described here in dispassionate terms, contention (and often acrimony) mark the

resource allocation process at almost every step—between the Executive Branch and the

Congress; between Members of Congress and among their staffs; between Departments and

Agencies and OMB; and between OMB and NSC staff members. The fact that most decisions

are made at levels below the President should not be interpreted to mean that heated debates do

not occur at those levels. Similarly, differences between Members of the House and Senate and

their staff over what share of the budget should go to national security and how much should be

devoted to specific programs are often pronounced.

(1). March to May. During this period, OMB analyzes the Administration’s

goals and policies in light of changes in the strategic and political environments, and its success

in obtaining funds for critical programs in the budget currently being executed (i.e., the budget

that went into effect on 1 October of the previous calendar year).160 The review includes

programmatic initiatives, as well as Government Performance Reform Act initiatives and

guidance from the President. As part of the review, OMB identifies issues requiring further

investigation.

While OMB is conducting its review, Departments and Agencies usually begin to prepare

initial budget request drafts. These are based on internal Department guidance. For example,

DoD may publish the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)161 and Defense Fiscal Guidance (FG)

during this period, and the Military Services will have already begun to craft their proposed

budgets, known as a Program Objective Memorandum (POM).162 Start points vary depending on

Department and Agency tradition and culture, the size of the budget, and internal approval

processes. According to OMB officials, for example, despite the size of its budget, DoD is

among the most proficient in preparing budget requests because it has a long-range planning

culture and a budget request approval system that is widely understood. Thus by June, DoD has

its own list of issues, and Service POMs are close to completion. (Other Departments and

Agencies have their own systems for preparing budget requests. These systems are no less

effective than that used by DoD and are tailored to the culture and needs of the organization.)

 

160 When viewing the preparation cycle, it is important to keep in mind that it begins almost 18 months prior to the fiscal year

for which the budget will be executed. For example, issues developed during the March-May timeframe in 2000 are for the

budget that will be executed beginning on 1 October 2001 (Fiscal Year 2002). Reform proposals that will require resources

may be without them for as much as two years before the applicable budget is executed.

161 The DPG attempts to link planning and strategy to programming.

162 See Chapter 3 entitled “Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)” and Chapter 4 entitled “Programs Analysis and Evaluation

Directorate” in Volume IV entitled Department of Defense for a more robust discussion of DoD resourcing.

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(2). June. Based on OMB’s initial review (which is sometimes called the Spring

Issue Review), OMB develops a list of top-down issues that will be analyzed and reviewed

during later stages of budget preparation. The OMB staff also provides guidance for budget

preparation to Executive Branch organizations. This marks the formal beginning of budget

request preparation.

(3). June-September. During the summer, Executive Branch activities prepare

their budget requests using OMB and Department and Agency guidance. Often, there are midsession reviews with OMB in which top lines, economic assumptions, and guidance may be

changed. In most cases, formal OMB involvement with the Departments is not great during this

period, although there are informal conversations between OMB budget analysts and Department

personnel. However, because of the size and complexity of the DoD budget, OMB staff members

are involved throughout the summer in the Programming phase of DoD’s Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). In fact, OMB staff participates in internal DoD

issue reviews.163 Thus, although information is continually exchanged between OMB and other

Departments, OMB’s involvement in the DoD process is more extensive.

(4). September. In September, Departments and Agencies submit their budget

requests to OMB for review. The requests are bounded by OMB budget preparation instructions

and top lines. Usually, OMB will use the month of September to review and analyze Department

budget requests prior to beginning “hearings” (see below). This review includes verification of

figures, examination of supporting studies used by Departments to justify some items,

comparisons to the previous budget, extent of compliance with preparation guidance, and

identification and analysis of a small number of additional issues. For example, in the case of

DoD the OMB staff reviews the Department’s budget to ensure that the figures are correct and

that it is consistent with the President’s defense and national security policies.164 This is the

norm for other Departments and Agencies as well.

Concurrently, as the review takes place, OMB staff members enter budget estimates into

the Budget Preparation System (BSP), a computer program that tracks the overall budget

preparation in near real time. This process is known as “scorekeeping.” Inputs may change as a

result of hearings, the Director’s Review, or appeals. However, the initial inputs are the

beginning of budget building at the top level.

(5). September-October. Following budget request reviews, OMB conducts a

series of hearings at which Departments defend their requests. The hearing process begins with

fact-finding analysis by OMB staffs, who develop questions for Departments to address during

the hearings. The term “hearings” is somewhat misleading. Hearings may take the form of oneon-one meetings at staff level, telephonic and/or written inquiries, or they may involve relatively

senior panels of OMB officials, including political appointees. The latter usually is the case if

senior Department officials are expected to be present.

articipants have described the hearings as animated. They allow Departments to present

and justify their budget requests and to present their side of the case with respect to

 

163 DoD officials view OMB participation as a generally positive event because it helps them explain their positions on

programs and to gain OMB support. In the words of one senior, experienced DoD participant, having OMB sit in ensures

that OMB knows exactly what it gets for its money, and exactly what capabilities it will lose when it cuts funding.

164 Interviews with OMB staff.

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OMB issues. Hearings are the best opportunity for Departments to shape the President’s Budget,

short of direct intervention by cabinet officers with the President. One observer notes that they

provide an “opportunity for . . . agency representatives to make a dent in OMB decisionmaking.”165 Hearings also allow OMB to explain the President’s policy in cases where such

explanations are necessary. (A more detailed discussion of OMB hearings is contained in

Chapter 3 entitled “Office of Management and Budget” in Volume II entitled Executive Office of

the President.)

If hearings involve formal meetings, they are usually held at OMB, except for DoD. The

procedure for Defense Department hearings centers on the Department’s internal issue review

procedures. Beginning in the summer months and continuing into the fall, DoD and OMB staffs

review the Defense budget jointly. For other Departments, the hearing process is usually shorter

and may last hours or days. As a rule, both sides know the other’s position prior to the hearings,

and Departments usually have the opportunity to review OMB issue papers in advance. At the

conclusion of the hearings, unresolved issues are carried forward for the OMB Director’s review.

(6). October-November. The OMB Director’s reviews for a particular

Department often begin while hearings are still ongoing for other Departments. The entire review

period can last three or four weeks. In preparation for the review, the OMB staff develops issue

papers and briefings with budget recommendations. Issue papers include an executive summary;

several alternatives, funding levels for each alternative, and the potential outcomes; legislation

required for alternatives to be adopted; and stakeholder positions, including Congress, interest

groups, other government organizations, and the general public. Issue papers end with

recommendations.

ast Director reviews have been conducted in hearing format (in which staff present their

case before the Director and a panel of other senior OMB officials) and/or through

issue books. When hearings are conducted for the Director, the Director and senior OMB staff

members receive issue books prior to each session to acquaint them with substantive matters.

During review sessions, the usual format is to begin with a budget overview, followed by a

presentation of issue papers.166 The Director’s review is closed except for OMB staff. The

minutes of each session are closely held by OMB and not usually released beyond the OMB

staff. Departments do not attend Director review sessions, and Department views are presented

to the Director by the OMB staff. Because it is impossible to review the entire budget, Directorlevel hearings focus on what have been described as “politically visible” issues—those items that

have potentially significant policy impacts.167

As each review is completed, OMB decisions are forwarded to Departments for

incorporation into their final budget proposals. Decisions are known as “passbacks,” which

include the Director’s decisions as well as additional guidance and instructions as necessary.

Once received by the Department, passbacks are either accepted and included in the revised

budget, or designated for appeal.

(7). November-December. If a Department elects to appeal the OMB Director’s

decision(s), it prepares and presents its case during November and December. Technically,

 

165 Tomkin. Inside OMB, p. 122.

166 Interviews with OMB staff.

167 Tomkin. Inside OMB, p. 128.

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appeals are addressed to the President. However, they are often resolved before they reach that

level, although this depends on the President’s preferences. In cases of appeals on national

security issues, the Director of OMB, the President’s National Security Advisor, the Secretary of

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others will often try to resolve appeals

through compromise. When this is not possible, the appeal is passed to the President for decision.

In these cases, the President may seek the advice of the same group, or he may elicit the opinions

of others. Once the President decides, there is no further appeal. Interviews with OMB staff, with

experience dating from the Nixon Administration, indicate that the level of Presidential

involvement in the appeals process depends on the personality of the President. President Carter,

for example, took an active role in deciding most appeals while President Reagan was involved

only in exceptional cases.

The OMB staff treats the appeals process seriously because appeals carry the weight of the

Cabinet Secretary of the appealing Department. Although lower levels of the bureaucracy may

object to an OMB Director’s decision, it does not become an appeal without the consent of the

Department Secretary. The OMB staff noted during interviews that since Secretaries have a

personal relationship with the President, it is in everyone’s interest to resolve appeals before they

reach the Oval Office.

(8). December-January. Upon completion of the appeals process, decisions are

included in the budget and final adjustments are made. These adjustments are based on the latest

predictions and forecasts, including inflation and employment figures. The budget is then

printed.

(9). January-February. The President’s Budget is submitted to Congress prior

to close of business on the first Monday in February, although Presidents often provide budget

highlights during the State of the Union Address in January. Once the budget is submitted, OMB

reviews Department testimony in support of the budget to ensure it reflects the President’s

policies. It also exchanges information with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as

appropriate to clarify specific issues. (OMB sources describe the relationship with CBO as

constructive and valuable overall, although they acknowledge that there are disagreements and

tensions.)

Once Congress begins its deliberations, OMB tracks the President’s Budget through the

Congressional process, assessing the impact of Congressionally mandated changes (i.e.,

scorekeeping), and recommending shifts in approaches as necessary.

B. The Executive Branch—Informal Budget Preparation Process. The informal

processes for budget preparation are based on personal relationships for the most part. These

include interaction between the OMB staff and Department officials with responsibility for

preparing budgets. In the case of some appeals, informal processes may involve interaction

between a Cabinet Secretary and the President. An OMB interlocutor noted that part of the the

OMB staff’s job is to know what is going on in the Departments and Agencies for which they

have responsibility. Thus, there are informal contacts between the OMB staff and the staffs of

the Departments. While some staff contacts are more episodic than routine, in the case of DoD,

contacts are continuous.

At more senior levels, clearly there are discussions between the President’s key advisors,

including the Assistant for Economic Policy, and cabinet officials as part of the appeals process.
64

Generally, the goal is to arrive at consensus solutions without involving the President. Achieving

that goal requires informal interaction between principals to negotiate compromise solutions

during the appeals process and at other times.

OMB participation in DoD program and budget reviews (and those of other Departments to

a lesser extent) is an informal process that is almost formal. As noted above, OMB is involved in

DoD PPBS processes from the outset. It often attends program reviews, and it frequently uses

these reviews in place of the hearings it holds for other Departments.

4. The Legislative Branch—Formal Budget Deliberation and Approval Process.168 There

are three parallel budget processes that occur nearly simultaneously in the Congress. Although

they formally begin when the President’s Budget arrives, in fact Members and staffs begin

preparation months in advance. The three processes are the Budget Process, the Authorization

Process, and the Appropriations Process. Each involves hearings, deliberations, and mark-ups (or

amendments) of the President’s Budget and ultimately contributes to national security resourcing

legislation.

There are timetables for these processes, but they are often ignored. Essentially, the goal

is to produce the 13 appropriations bills and to have them signed into law by the President prior

to the beginning of the next Fiscal Year. Meeting interim milestones often does not seem to be a

significant priority, and, since Congress makes its own rules, it can change them to suit its needs.

A. The Budget Process. Each house of Congress has a Budget Committee that

produces a Budget Resolution that is voted on by the full chamber, and when approved by both

chambers is binding on both houses unless the rules are changed.169 The Budget Resolution sets

ultimate ceilings on spending for Authorizing and Appropriating Committees. In other words, it

tells Committees and Subcommittees how much money they may authorize or appropriate.

Authorizing Committees, in turn, set specific “ceilings,” while Appropriating Committees

establish funding “floors.” The Budget Resolution also tells these committees how much revenue

can be expected and the current services budget (i.e., how much it will cost in the next year to do

the same things that are done in the current year). The Budget Resolution is an internal

Congressional document that does not require the President’s signature.

At the outset of the Budget Resolution preparation process, OMB presents the

Administration’s case to the Budget Committees usually in writing and in oral testimony. The

Committees may also receive alternative views, such as those provided by the Congressional

Budget Office (CBO).170 Unlike OMB, whose job it is to create the budget, the CBO reacts to

that budget. It does so by analyzing it, making recommendations, and providing alternative

economic estimates and forecasts. Simultaneously, other Congressional committees review the

President’s Budget and provide comments (views and estimates) approximately six weeks after it

is received on the Hill.

 

168 Detailed discussions of how Budget, Authorizing, and Appropriating Committees are organized and how they operate are

contained in Volume III entitled Congress.

169 Budget Committees are standing committees created by the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.

Unlike most other Congressional Committees, the Budget Committees have no subcommittees.

170 The Budget Committees exercise oversight of the CBO.
65

he Budget Committee considers testimony and the views and estimates reports as it

drafts the Budget Resolution, which, according to Congressional rules, must be

passed by 15 April annually. Once both chambers adopt the resolution, Authorizing and

Appropriating Committees conduct their mark-ups and draft legislation to the top lines provided

by the resolution (and the accompanying report) for their committees. In some years, there is no

concurrent Budget Resolution. When that occurs, both the House and the Senate traditionally

mark-up using the House budget figures.

The Budget Committees are also responsible under the Budget Act of 1974 for providing

reconciliation instructions whenever an Authorizing or Appropriating Committee exceeds the

ceilings provided in the Budget Resolution. Essentially, reconciliation instructions tell the

Committees and Subcommittees to take the necessary steps to bring revenues and expenditures

into line through reconciliation legislation. The effect of reconciliation instructions is to keep

committees from increasing spending for their areas of responsibility (and increasing the debt)

without finding corresponding offsets from other committees, which are usually unwilling to

give up a portion of their share of the budget.

B. Authorizing Committees. (See Appendix 6 of this chapter for process map.) Each

chamber has Authorizing Committees that have jurisdiction over the organization and structure,

roles and responsibilities, and the amount of funding for activities that come within their

jurisdiction. Authorizations set specific funding “ceilings.” These Committees conduct hearings;

they consider bills, resolutions and reports; and they conduct or direct studies and reviews of

matters over which they exercise oversight. Although the present discussion begins with the

Authorizing procedures, Authorizing and Appropriating Committees actually conduct their work

simultaneously.

By Congressional rules, Appropriations Committees appropriate funds based on

programs and amounts authorized by the Authorizing Committees. The Authorizing Committees

establish ceilings on expenditures; the Appropriating Committees provide actual funding and

may provide less than what is authorized. Rules also require that only Authorizing Committees

are empowered by the Congress to draft legislative (or policy) language for inclusion in

Congressional bills. However, both rules are often violated. In fact, it is not uncommon for

Appropriating Committees to complete their work before Authorizing Committees do, and

legislative language is often included in Appropriations bills.

he Authorizing Committees and their Subcommittees formally begin work upon

receipt of the President’s Budget, although they usually do not mark up legislation

until after the Budget Resolution is passed, or the decision is made to use a particular set of

budget assumptions in lieu of the Budget Resolution. Initially, Authorizing Committees conduct

a series of hearings that involve Department posture statements delivered by senior officials.

These hearings are often wide-ranging and do not necessarily focus on the President’s Budget.

Frequently, authorizing hearings are vehicles for Members to challenge Administration policy,

strategy, or ongoing initiatives.

Typically, the line-up for testimony is fairly deep. For example the full House Armed

Services Committee (HASC) will usually receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the

Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretaries, some Assistant Secretaries (e.g., ASD (C3I), ASD

(S&TR)), the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and the Unified Command Commanders-in-Chief

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among others. Subcommittees (which begin meeting before testimony before the full Committee

is complete) may ask for testimony from some of the same experts, and they often delve several

layers deeper. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretaries and functional subject matter experts at

the action officer level may be called on to testify before Authorizing Subcommittees.

In addition to Department officials and experts, Committees and Subcommittees

routinely seek testimony from non-government expert witnesses. These include members of

academia, industry officials, and former government officials.

earings occur according to the rules established by the Committee or Subcommittee

Chair, usually in conjunction with the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee

or Subcommittee. Committee majority and minority professional staffs prepare the agenda and

furnish Members with central themes and questions as directed by the Chair and the majority and

minority staff directors. Professional staffs usually provide hearing packets to Members a day or

so before the hearings containing the agenda, lists of witnesses, suggested questions and themes,

and witness’ written testimony, if provided by the witnesses.

Members’ personal staffs review these packets and prepare packets for Members that

correspond to the Members’ interests. For example, professional staff read-ahead packages are

often broad, or reflect the interests of senior Committee Members. If a Member has an interest

that goes beyond the read-ahead package, his/her staff will provide the necessary information.

Thus, if the Service Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to give their posture statements, a Member who

is concerned about treatment of women in the military will most likely depend on his/her

personal staff to prepare appropriate questions for use by the Member.

he testimony season begins in February and continues into the summer. Toward the

end of this process, Subcommittees and Committees will begin to mark up proposed

authorizing legislation.171 Committee and Subcommittee “marks” are conducted according to

rules promulgated by the Chair. They are often closed to the public, and sometimes the number

of staff members who can attend is also limited.

The mark up is really a series of amendments and compromises that produces the version

of the bill that will ultimately be voted on by the entire body and then sent to conference with the

other chamber. While marks always involve partisan efforts on behalf of particular programs,

bipartisan cooperation is common, especially if the issue is one that affects a number of

Congressional districts. Examples of bipartisanship during 1997 mark ups involving national

security resourcing matters included agreements to authorize purchase of additional C-17, B-2,

and F/A-18E/F aircraft. (This example also illustrates the fact that the Congress may require the

Administration to expend resources for items that the Executive Branch does not believe

necessary, such as more C-130s.)

nce the mark-up is complete and the Committee has voted on the amended version of

the bill, the staff prepares reports and the final bill draft, which are sent to the floor

for deliberation and vote. The bill is usually floor-managed by the Committee Chair or others

 

171 Because Congress writes its own rules, mark-up procedures vary and Committee Chairs usually have the final word over the

process. Not all Committee Chairs permit their Subcommittees to mark up. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for

example, does not conduct Subcommittee marks under the current Chairman. By contrast, Senate Armed Service Committee

Subcommittees do hold mark ups.

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designated by him/her. During floor deliberations, members may offer amendments, depending

on the rules of debate and germaneness. Upon approval of each chamber’s version of the

authorization bill, a conference is scheduled to resolve differences between the House and Senate

versions.

Conferences typically occur during the summer and fall, depending on when

authorization bills are passed. Committee Chairs and Ranking Members normally choose

conference Members, and conferences may be sub-divided along Subcommittee lines. Most

compromises reached during conferences are worked out by the staff and approved by Members.

A few issues may require active Member participation to resolve.

Compromises and amendments reached during conference are inserted into joint

resolutions, and Conference Reports are published to reflect conference proceedings and

agreements. When both houses pass the resolutions, they become the basis for appropriations and

are sent to the President for signature.

C. Appropriations Committees. (See Appendix 7 of this chapter for process map.)

Like Authorizing Committees, Appropriations Committees were created by Congressional rules.

There is no Constitutional requirement for their existence. However, the Constitution does

require that all expenditures of public funds be appropriated by law, and the Appropriations

Committees were created to help Congress fulfill this obligation. (Until the 1860s, there were no

separate Authorization and Appropriations Committees; a single committee did both.)

Appropriations Committees establish funding “floors.”

t the outset, several premises should be understood. First, government departments

and agencies cannot spend more money than Congress appropriates to them, nor can

they re-program funds for purposes other than that prescribed by Authorization and

Appropriations bills and reports without approval. Second, according to Congressional rules and

customs, when specific amounts are specified in authorizing legislation, the Appropriations

Committee and its Subcommittees may not appropriate more money than the authorizing

legislation allows, although they may appropriate less. Third, appropriations bills are law, and

any policy or legislative provisions included in them are also law, despite internal Congressional

rules that prohibit the inclusion of policy language in appropriations. If legislative (or other)

provisions are in conflict with Authorizing provisions, the most recently passed bill has

precedence—usually the Appropriations Bill. Fourth, Appropriations bills can amend

Authorization bills under some circumstances.

In Congressional appropriations, the “account” is the most basic unit of appropriations

legislation. Accounts include a number of expenditures that are included in single unnumbered

paragraphs in appropriations bills. Each unnumbered paragraph applies to one account alone.172

However, many of a Department or Agency’s appropriations will be bundled into a single

account, and it is not unusual to find agency salaries and expenses funded from a single account.

 

172 Numbered paragraphs apply to all accounts in an appropriations bill. Generally, numbered paragraphs provide limitations,

legislative provisions, and provisions that apply across the government.

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68

Appropriations bills often contain information and instructions about how these funds are to be

spent, but most of the detail will be placed in the accompanying Committee report.173

The Appropriating Committees are responsible for reporting out the 13 regular

appropriations bills and usually at least one supplemental and one continuing resolution each

year. Each regular appropriations bill consists of three major features: an enactment clause

designating the fiscal year; specific account appropriations and account provisions; and

provisions that apply generally.

Most of the Appropriations Committees’ work is performed by 13 Subcommittees, each

of which has responsibility for one of the regular appropriations measures. Although they have

different titles, the actual jurisdictions of House and Senate appropriations Subcommittees align

almost exactly, and bills reported out by Subcommittees are usually not changed substantively by

the full Committees.

raditionally, Appropriations Bills originate in the House, but there is no legal

requirement that they do so. As a rule, however, the House Appropriations bills are

produced first, then reviewed by the Senate. One effect of this procedure is that the Senate is

usually faced with appropriations that are very close to the ceilings established in the concurrent

Budget Resolution. Thus, much of what the Senate does falls into the category of shifting funds

from one program or account to another rather than introducing new programs.

Although informal preparations begin much earlier, the House and Senate Appropriations

Committees begin work formally when the President’s Budget arrives, even though the Senate

does not usually conduct mark ups until it receives the House version. The process—which

involves hearings and investigations—is very similar to that used by the Authorizing Committees

(although the specific procedural rules are different), and the Appropriations Subcommittees and

Authorizing Committees often call many of the same witnesses.

Essentially, the 13 Appropriations Subcommittees conduct hearings to verify estimates

and costs and examine alternative approaches. They may also examine policy issues, often by

agreement with the Authorizing Committees. In some respects, their interests overlap with those

of the Authorizing Committees, although they may arrive at different conclusions.

Once Appropriations Bills have been marked up and passed by the House, they are sent

to the Senate where the process is repeated. When the Senate passes its version, a conference is

scheduled and differences between the versions are reconciled. Both chambers then pass the bill

and it is sent to the President for signature. If the President approves the bill it becomes law. If he

vetoes it, it is returned to Congress for amendment or override. If he neither vetoes nor returns

the bill within ten days while Congress is still in session, the bill also becomes law without the

President’s signature; however, this method is rarely used.

5. The Legislative Branch—Informal Budget Deliberation and Approval Process. As is

true of political processes in general, Budget, Authorization, and Appropriations processes on the

Hill involve compromise, much of which occurs informally. Agreements (crafted between

 

173 Reports are not legally binding on the Executive Branch. However, Executive Branch officials traditionally honor

substantive requirements in reports because to ignore them risks having the provisions written into law the following year,

perhaps with more stringent requirements.

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69

members, between staffers, and sometimes between members and staffers) are based on personal

relationships and common interests. Both are equally important, especially for bipartisan efforts.

For example, in 1997 the Chairman of the HASC,174 the Ranking Member, and a small group of

staffers put together a broad DoD reform initiative and presented it to the HASC as part of the

mark-up.175 Their efforts both to craft the initial proposal and to shepherd it through committee

resulted in incorporating most of the provisions into the FY1998 Authorization Bill.

Personal contacts are also important in bridging the gap between Budget, Authorizing,

and Appropriations Committees. Although a few members of each committee may serve on one

of the others, most exchanges of information and compromises occur through informal, personal

contacts.

Although work on the budget formally begins when it arrives on the Hill, professional

and personal staff informally track Executive Branch programs and budget preparation in the

months prior. For example, if a program is of interest to a Member, his/her personal staff (and

depending on seniority of the Member, Committee professional staff) will employ informal

contacts to provide updates and to attempt to influence preparation of the President’s Budget.

These contacts may involve the Department directly, or they may be based on information

provided to the staff by contractors involved in production.

nother important informal process, though one of long standing, involves the

intervention of outsiders in the budget process. Outsiders fall into two general

categories: Members who do not sit on committees with national security responsibilities, but

who have national security interests; and lobbyists and political action groups.

The former group includes those who have both altruistic and constituent interests, but

who serve on non-national security related committees. For example, a Member may have an

electronics plant in his/her district that would benefit from more robust Defense procurement

funding. Or a Member may feel strongly that defense spending will cut deeply into social

programs.

In these cases and others, Members are likely to seek out other Members who sit on

national security committees and enlist their assistance informally. This can occur on a larger

scale in cases where state delegations tend to vote together on issues that affect Members, as

sometimes occurs with the California and Texas delegations in the House. Either method can be

effective.

Lobbyists, political action groups, and private citizens can also interact informally with

Congressional processes. Members who have seats on the Armed Forces Committees (and their

staffs), for example, are often bombarded with information and appeals for help from these

sources. Not infrequently, lobbyists are the only sources of information for Members with

respect to particular programs. In some cases, lobbyists work closely with Members to develop

coalitions of like-minded Members for particular issues—almost as adjunct staff. This occurred,

for example, when Congress debated buying nine additional B-2 bombers in 1997. In this

instance, major contractors and their suppliers provided information to Members on how other

 

174 The HASC was then known as the House National Security Committee (or HNSC)

175 This measure was originally H.R. 1777 and was informally referred to as the Spence-Dellums Resolution after the Chair and

Ranking Member of the Committee.

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70

Members were likely to vote and data on the number of workers in each district whose jobs

might depend on additional production. Political action groups operate in similar ways. As was

true in the case of Member-to-Member relations, these approaches are usually informal and often

consist of telephone calls or drop-by visits.

Although prohibited by law from lobbying, Military Services engage in similar practices.

They often provide information and offer Members the opportunity to visit bases or crisis areas.

Each Service has liaison officers on the Hill, and each has a flag or general officer as the senior

Congressional liaison. Calls to liaison offices by Members or their staffs usually produce prompt

responses. In some cases, they can result in the appearance of senior uniformed officers to

personally explain Service policies and positions. During Congressional deliberations over

appropriate methods for conducting basic training (single sex or co-ed), three-star representatives

from each Service made the rounds of key House Members to state their Service’s case, and in

the case of the Marine Corps, the Commandant was personally involved. Other Departments and

Agencies have similar liaison structures.

6. Observations.

A. Links Between Resource Allocation and National Security Strategy. The

preparation and deliberation of resource allocation processes are characterized by a plethora of

alternative approaches. The competition among alternatives at all levels, while time consuming,

helps ensure that decision makers are provided with the best options from which to choose. In

considering options, it is important to link them to strategy and policy goals. Reviews and

hearings held by the Departments and OMB help to do that during preparation, as do the

witnesses summoned by Congress during its deliberations.

However, in general there is no Executive Branch-wide national security document to

which programs can be pinned. The National Security Strategy is too broad and general to serve

as a planning and programming document that illuminates Administration strategy and directs

programming to ensure that strategic objectives are satisfied. This situation contrasts with the

Department of Defense, which publishes a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document that

provides programming instructions for the Services that are linked to DoD strategy. However,

even the DPG often fails to list objectives—let alone prioritize them. As threats and challenges

become more complex and responses require actions by different Departments and Agencies

acting in concert, the absence of national-level planning guidance may prove detrimental.

B. The OMB-DoD Link. An informal yet productive relationship exists between OMB

and DoD. Essentially, OMB is involved in DoD budget preparation through staff interaction and

OMB participation in DoD program reviews. This relationship, while sometimes adversarial,

ensures that each side is aware of the other’s perspective, and it offers the opportunity for issue

clarification and resolution at the lowest level possible.

Yet this link, while effective and well developed, is Department-focused, as are the links

between OMB and other Executive Branch entities. Given this approach and OMB’s

organization, it is difficult to set up cross-functional reviews that involve more than one

Department. For example, determining spending for homeland security or counter-proliferation

efforts across the President’s Budget is cumbersome and time consuming.
71

C. Outsider Influence in Congressional Deliberations. Lobbyists and political action

groups are a constant part of Congressional budget deliberations. Sometimes they even act as

auxiliary staff, providing analysis, data, and other forms of information to staff—especially

personal staff members. While this service has some value for staff who are usually not subject

matter experts for most programs and who are pressed by other responsibilities, the information

may not be objective. In essence, lobbyists and political action groups are advocates who are

rewarded based on the success of their advocacy. Although they have the right to advocate, their

efforts sometimes upset the value of the competition between alternatives that occurs during the

budget preparation process.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1

Overarching National Security Process – (Formal) - Security Policy and St

President National Security

Advisor NSC Staff Principals Committee (PC) Deputies Committee (DC) Interagency Inter-Branch IWG (Interagency Workinggroup)

Make Decision

Develop

Recommendations

for the President

Examine Issue

Make

Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to DC

for Implementation

Refine and Develop

Options For PC

Examine Issue

Make

Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to IWG for Implementation

Start Frame Issue 

No

Yes

Yes

No
Appendix 2

 Overarching National Security – (Informal) – Security Policy and Strategy Development – The 

National Security 

Advisor SECDEF (USD(P) SECSTATE 

Gather A-B-C Lunch Issues (POCs) 

Request A-B-C Lunch Issues from Department staff for SECDEF, SECSTATE, and NSA (POCs) Develop A-B-C Lunch Agenda Based on Feedback from Staff (POCs) Distribute A-B-C Lunch Agenda, Talking Points, and Briefing Papers to SECDEF, SECSTATE, and NSA (POCs) Start 
Appendix 3

Overarching National Security Process – NEC – (Formal) – Security Policy and 

President Principals Committee (PC) Deputies Committee (DC) IWG (Interagency Working

group)

Develop

Recommendations

for the President

Examine Issue

Make

Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to DC

for Implementation

Refine and Develop

Options For PC Examine Issue

Make

Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to IWG for Implementation

Start Frame Issue

Inform PC

Frame Issue

Start

No

Yes

Yes

No
Appendix 4

Overarching National Security Process – (Formal) – Security Policy and Strategy P

President National Security

Advisor NSC Staff Principals Committee (PC) Deputies Committee (DC)

Interagency

(Executive Committee)

[ExComm]

Inter-Branch IWG (Interagency Working

group) DoD Component

Make Decision

Direct DC to

Establish ExComm

Examine Issue

Develop

Recommendations

for the President

Make

Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to DC

for Implementation

Develop

Implementation

Guidance

Charter ExComm

Refine and Develop Options For PC Examine Issue Make Decision?

Pass Decision and

Instructions to IWG for Implementation

End

Direct Develop of

Pol-Mil Plan

Arrange

Interagency

Rehearsal (Brief)

Start Frame Issue

Develop Functional

Plans

(DoD Components)

Submit Plans to

ExComm

(DoD Components)

PDD-2 

No

Yes

No

Yes
Appendix 5

Overarching National Security Process – (Formal) – Security Resource Allocation – The E

President NSC OMB Interagency Inter-Branch Interagency Working

Group (IWG)

Discuss Budget

Issues &

Options

Exchange

Information, 

Proposals, and

Evaluations

Bearing on

Policy Decisions

(Continually)

Discuss Agency

Budget and

Policy Issues

"Hearings"

Establish General

Budget and Fiscal

Policy Guidelines

Start 

Resolve

Agency

Appeal?

Provide Budget Prep

Instructions, Ceilings,

and Assumption

Guidance 

Assist Agency

with BudgetPreparation

Identify Issues for

Discussion

Between OMB &

Agency

Review Agency

Budget

Submission

Enter Budget

Estimates into

BPS

Conduct Director'sReview and Make

Decision

Passback Decision

to Agency

Appeal Issue

 Prepare forPresidential

Consideration 

Submit Agency

Budget

Accept

Decision?

Incorporate

Decision Into

Budget Submission

A

March - June June - September September - November 

Yes

No

Yes
Appendix 6

Overarching National Security Process – (Formal) – Security Resource Allocation – T

President Senate House

Congressional

Budget Office

(CBO)

Inter-Branch IW G (Interagency

W orking group)

Initiate theConcurrent

Resolution On

the Budget

(Budget

Com m ittees)

Conduct

Hearings &

Receive Posture

Statem ents For

Authorization

Legislation

Schedule

Conference Am

M ark-Up and

Draft

Authorization Bill Joint Approval

of Bill?

Start 

Submit

President's

Budget

Develop CBO

Economic

Outlook

A

No

Yes
Appendix 7

Overarching National Security Process – (Formal) – Security Resource Allocation – 

President Senate House Congressional

Budget Office (CBO) Inter-Branch IWG (Interagency

Working group)

Allocate

Amounts of

Budget Authority

and Outlays

(Budget

Committees)

Review and

Recommend

Budget Levels

and Legislative

Plans to Budget

Committees

(Standing

Committees ofthe House and

Senate)

Initiate theConcurrent

Resolution On

the Budget

(Budget

Committees)

Conduct

Hearings &

Posture

Statements

Enact Joint

Resolution

Present to

President for

Approval or Veto

Start

Submit

President's

Budget

Hold Hearings &

Review House

Bill

Approve

House Bill?

Allocate Amounts of

Authority and Outlays

to Respective

Sub-Committees

Approve Bill?

Amend Original

Version

Send Bill to

Senate

Draft Bill by

Sub-Committee

Hold Hearings &

Review Detailed

Budget

Justification

Develop CBO

Economic

Outlook

A

B

Yes

Yes

No

No
Chapter 3

Organization and Reader’s Guide

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

ORGANIZATION AND READER’S GUIDE

TO THE PHASE III ADDENDUM

1. Seven Volume Addendum. The Phase III Addendum describes approximately 80

organizations that participate in America’s national security processes. Its seven volumes (1,200

pages) analyze key processes throughout the federal government, to include interagency and

inter-branch organizations. The Addendum offers important observations and documents major

problems germane to the future strength of our national security. The Addendum is released as a

short one-volume Executive Summary that also contains the remaining volumes on an enclosed

CD ROM.

he Addendum has a three-fold purpose: to provide a reference “baseline” for further

Phase III research; to demonstrate a “working knowledge” of the national security

apparatus to validate the Commission’s depth and breadth of research; and to provide a starting

point for Phase III implementation “road maps.”

The Addendum is organized into seven volumes. Volume I contains the key observations

and describes the overarching interagency and inter-branch processes at the national security

level (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Organization of Volume I.

The rest of the Addendum’s volumes are depicted below in Figure 2.

T

Volume I

A

B

C

D

E

USCNS/21 Logo

Title

Hart-Rudman Com.

PREFACE

ORGANIZATION & READER’S GUIDE

KEY OBSERVATIONS

OVERARCHING PROCESSES (VOLs II – VII)

CD ROM w/ all volumes
2

Figure 2. Overall Report Organization.

Volumes II through VII are generally organized in the format shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Individual Volume Organization, Volumes II – VII.

2. Individual Volumes. Each chapter within these volumes is designed to serve as a stand-alone

reference for a specific organization and its role in national security processes. The chapters are

presented in a standard format to permit comparisons and facilitate research. That format is:

• The Executive Summary provides an organizational overview and observations.

Volumes II Through VII

Volume #

Title

A

B

C

Individual Org (Tab per)

Org 2 (Tab per)

Org 3 (Tab per)

D Bibliography

Purpose:

Staff Reference

Report Organization

• Seven Volumes- - -

Vol II

Office

of the

President

Vol III

Congress

Vol I

Vol IV

DoD Vol V

DoS Vol VI

Intell

Community

Vol VII

Others NSC

OMB

NEC

CEA

ONDCP

OSTP

PFIAB

USD(P)

USD(A&T)

PA&E

Jt Staff

JFCOM

CINCs

Services

Agencies

S

P

S/P

E

G

USAID

ACDA/T

CIA

DCI

NIC

SelCmtees

DIA

NSA

Approps

SASC

HASC

Hse I/ Rel

Sen F/ Rel

Budget

Sci

DoE

DoJ

DoTr

DoC

Independents
3

• Section 1 identifies the legal basis for the organization and significant organizational and

interagency directives that pertain to it.

• Section 2 notes the major responsibilities of the organization, identifies subordinate

organizations, and delineates the organization’s major products.

• Sections 3 and 4 deal with the vision, strategy, values, culture, leadership, staff attributes, and

structure of the organization.

• Section 5 discusses the organization’s formal role in seven broad key process categories.

• Section 6 provides information on the organization’s roles in informal processes.

• Section 7 outlines the responsible Congressional committees, the budget, and the personnel

strength of the organization.

• Section 8 provides observations on ways in which the organization contributes to national

security.

Descriptions of organizations deemed most significant to the current national security

apparatus include matrices that relate products and roles to key processes. “Process maps” have

been added as appendices for these organizations. Appropriate references are included in the text

or in footnotes to guide readers to other volumes or chapters to gain a more complete

understanding of particular concepts or issues. A bibliography is added at the end of each

volume, and an acronym glossary is also placed at the back of the Volume VII.

hese volumes are based on comprehensive searches of available literature, laws, and

directives and extensive interviews with current and former practitioners. Research

included both formal and informal processes. There is sufficient information on each

organization to fill several volumes, thus the synthesis of information in the Addendum focuses

on national security processes, versus the operational or tactical levels of abstraction.

The organization and process analysis was conducted along seven “key processes” developed

by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. Because these terms are constantly

used and referenced in the Addendum, they are included in Attachment 1 to this chapter.

Organizational descriptions in the dedicated chapters of each volume (Sections 3 and 4) refer to

certain attributes that are defined in Attachment 2 to this chapter.

T
A1-a

ATTACHMENT 1

National Security Key Processes:

Definitions, Products, and Relationships

Strategy Development—Definition. The collaborative process by which organizations: (1)

Devise and refine visions, assumptions, goals and objectives, endpoints, threats, and the means to

achieve goals and objectives in light of those threats; (2) Describe the future strategic

environment, strategies for coping with it, and their role in that strategy; and, (3) Influence

overarching and adjacent (higher, lower, and parallel) national security strategy processes in

ways that preserve and support national security goals and objectives against a variety of threats

and maximize organizational agendas and aspirations.

Examples of Significant Products include the National Security Strategy and classified and

unclassified Presidential Decision Directives.

Relationship to Other Processes. The vision and strategy that emerge from this capstone process

should inform all other processes. To the extent that is does not, a dysfunctional seam or gap

may exist.

Policy, Guidance, and Regulation—Definition. Processes that: (1) Are used to create, maintain,

and modify organizations and their overarching responsibilities, organizational structures,

objectives; (2) Establish performance standards necessary for operation of the national security

apparatus in accordance with vision and strategy; (3) Govern and direct development of plans

and the implementation of plans during mission execution.

Examples of Significant Products include Presidential Decision Directives that govern the

interagency process, Congressional actions that specify organizational roles, and Departmental

directives and regulations that prescribe missions, functions and responsibilities.

Relationship to Other Processes. Prescribes rules, methods of operation, and structures for

monitoring progress and accomplishing vision and strategic goals and objectives. Guides

development of supporting processes and structures and defines timelines.

Planning—Definition. A process focused on short-, mid-, and long-term increments that: (1)

Structure information and tasking exchanges among relevant organizations focused on

anticipating, or responding to, specific national security issues or requirements; (2) Develop,

analyze, and evaluate options for achieving strategic goals; (3) Determine resources necessary to

accomplish objectives under given courses of action, and reconcile shortfalls when necessary by

adjusting resources, objectives, or options.

Examples of Significant Products include operational plans, contingency plans, political-military

plans, and guidance for determining requirements and preparing resource requests.

Relationship to Other Processes. Gives actionable form to vision and strategic goals and

methods to achieve them in light of risks, threats, and applicable resources. Informs requirement

determination, resourcing, and preparation processes. Provides the basis and frame of reference

for mission execution actions.
A1-b

Mission Execution/Implementation—Definition. The processes for: (1) Accomplishing

operational (as opposed to strategic) goals and objectives by supervising and directing the

actions of entities involved in carrying out diplomatic, military, and law enforcement operations

inter alia; (2) Coordinating, synchronizing, and/or harmonizing the actions of several entities

involved in the same mission to ensure appropriate levels of performance.

Examples of Significant Products include executing/implementing political-military plans, crisis

management regimes, and active operational plans.

Relationship to Other Processes. Vision and strategy provide framework for mission execution

and implementation actions. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation determine the available structures.

Planning provides execution options. Preparation and resourcing determine assets available for

execution. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight uses lessons learned to improve mission

execution processes over time and authority for some forms of oversight.

Observation, Orientation, and Oversight—Definition. Processes by which organizations,

managers, and supervisors ensure that: (1) Organizations establish analytical procedures and

criteria that capture, analyze, and act on information about themselves in order to improve their

performance (with respect to organizational vision and strategy) and respond to environmental

changes; (2) Organizations exercise statutory or regulatory authority over their own and other

activities or functions (including intelligence, analysis and assessment activities) to ensure best

practices, quality control, and resource conservation.

Significant Products include major reengineering and reinvention initiatives, directions to modify

particular actions or activities based on analytical review and evaluation of previous

performance, legislation/directives requiring specific actions.

Relationship to Other Processes. Provides the basis for reviews of strategy and vision; policy,

guidance, and regulation; mission execution; preparation; and resourcing (especially

requirements determination). Provides authority for oversight.

Preparation—Definition. The processes—including training and education, progress evaluation,

modernization and reengineering, research and development, and acquisition—that ensures

entities are ready to accomplish short-, mid-, and long-term requirements as foreseen by vision

and strategy.

Examples of Significant Products include career development programs, curricula and programs

of instruction, training programs, political and/or military exercises and simulations, reform

initiatives, and procurement programs.

Relationship to Other Processes. Ensures readiness of applicable organizations to undertake

requirements set forth in strategy and vision and elaborated on through planning. Closely linked

to resourcing in a reciprocal fashion.

Resourcing—Definition. The processes by which: (1) Requirements are defined and resources

(including financial, materiel, and personnel) are provided or reallocated to satisfy those

requirements in accordance with priorities established in vision, strategy, and high level

planning; (2) Acquisition programs are managed to optimize efficiency and effectiveness.
A1-c

Examples of Significant Products include budget submissions, legislative authorizations and

appropriations, manning levels, and priority determination.

Relationship to Other Processes. Provides resources for preparation, planning, and

accomplishment of strategic objectives. Requirements generation should be closely bound to

strategy and preparation processes.
A2-a

ATTACHMENT 2

National Security Apparatus Attributes

and Definitions

Structure—The framework of an organization that depicts: (1) The formal relationships of

subordinate components of the organization in ways that help identify their roles in key and

supporting processes; (2) The relationships of the aggregate organization to other organizations

with like or similar roles and missions.

Processes—The major work activities of an organization that prescribe how the organization’s

structure gathers and uses information and/or material to generate products (including decisions

and decision making support) in ways that are consistent with established requirements.

Processes may be: (1) Key processes such as the seven described in the preceding section that

result in end products; or (2) Supporting processes that enable key processes to function

effectively and efficiently. There are both formal and informal processes: (1) Formal processes

are those described in directives, regulations, or legislation that specifically define inputs, flows,

and outputs; (2) Informal processes are not formally sanctioned and may replace formal

processes in part or in total.

Values—Invisible elements of the psychological make up of organizations that help define what

an organization considers significant and differentiate it from other organizations. Values are

enduring, resistant to change, and represent the core of what members of the organization

consider most important at a given point in time. If values are out of alignment with culture,

leadership, and organizational strategy, a disruptive tension may occur.

Culture and Leadership Traditions—Elements that comprise the institutional character of

organizations that translate values into observable actions and conditions. Organizations function

best when culture and leadership represent organizational values. In other words, an organization

that values decentralization works best when leadership permits that manner of operation. Or, an

organization that values innovation functions best when its culture facilitates openness and

creative thinking.

Core Competencies—Those basic functions that the organization believes it performs best in

terms of product value or quality. What an organization identifies as core competencies reflects

in part its values, culture, and the leadership’s agenda. Identifying core competencies helps

decision makers determine and communicate what is important for the organization to do, and

what should be done by outsiders. They also assist leaders and managers to decide how to

allocate resources and assign priorities.

Staff Attributes—The formal and informal qualifications necessary for an organization’s staff to

function effectively with respect to core competencies and overhead requirements. Attributes

may be formal and include training and job progression, education, and specific skills. Attributes

may also be informal and include intangible aspects such as how well an individual fits into an

organization’s culture.

Organizational Strategy—Strategy is the outward manifestation of an organization’s vision and

the agenda of its leaders. It delineates ways in which an organization strives towards its vision

and specifies intermediate goals and objectives. It is closely related to core competencies—or at

least ought to be—and like core competencies it aids in establishing priorities and allocating
A2-b

resources and linking them to goal achievement. Strategy often influences structure and process,

and changes in strategy usually reverberate in both.
National Security Study Group

Staff, Contractors, and Consultants

Executive Director Research Staff

Charles G. Boyd Erin C. Conaton, Research Staff Director

Chris Dishman

Deputy Executive Director William Foster

Arnold Punaro Garrick Groves

Christopher Hall

Chief-of-Staff Mark Kohut

Hank Scharpenberg Kelly Lieberman

William Lippert

Study Group Coordinator Geoffrey Megargee

Pat Allen Pentland Kathleen Robertson

Rachel Schiller

Study Group Members Betsy Schmid

Patti Benner Antsen

Lyntis Beard Support Staff

Keith A. Dunn James Freeman, Administrative Officer

Charles Freeman Annette Atoigue

Adam Garfinkle Carmen Augustosky

Frank Hoffman Marilyn Bridgette

Charles Johnson Jamie Finley

Jim Locher John Gardner

Williamson Murray Marvin Goodwin

Barbara Samuels Michele Hutchins

James Thomason Diane Long

Jonathan Nemceff

Gerald Posey

Tom Prudhomme

Paula Siler

Cynthia Waters

Contractors

Fred Frostic, George Raach, Maria Alongi, Heather Kosztolnik, and the Booz·Allen & Hamilton team

Consultants

Charles Barry

Paul Byron Pattak

Note: Only those individuals directly involved in producing this Addendum are listed.
1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Volume I – Key Observations

and Overarching Processes

Amato, Ivan. “Fiber Optics: Communicating at the Speed of Light.” Washington Post,

November 10, 1999.

Cambone, Stephen A. A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1998.

Carlucci, Frank, et al. Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st

Century (Report of the Project on the Advocacy of U.S. Interests Abroad). Washington,

D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center (undated).

Carter, Ashton. “Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs.” Survival Vol. 41, No. 4. Winter

1999.

Cohen, Michael L, et al, eds. Statistics, Testing, and Defense Acquisition: New Approaches and

Methodological Improvements. Washington, D.C.: Naval Academy Press, 1998.

Cohen, Richard E. “Congress: Crack Up of the Committees.” National Journal, July 30, 1999.

Cohen, William S. Report of the Quadrennial Review. Department of Defense, 1997.

Davis, M. Thomas. Managing Defense After the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: The Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1997.

Foster, Gregory D. “A Post-Cold War Strategic Vision.” Society, November1994.

George, Alexander. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of

Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.

Henry, Ryan and C. Edward Peartree. “Military Theory and Information Warfare.” Parameters:

Vol. 28, No. 3, Autumn 1998.

The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide. Purple Book, 1997.

Khalilzad, Zalmay M. and David A. Ochmanek. Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st

Century. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.

Kurz, Robert. “Congress and the Media: Forces in the Struggle Over Foreign Policy.” The

Media and Foreign Policy. Simon Serfaty, ed. St. Martins Press, New York: St Martins

Press and Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute, 1990.

Lowenthal, Mark M. and Richard A. Best, Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational

Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (Report Number 93-

517F), May 1993.
2

Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff–Manual. Joint Staff: Department of Defense,

1996.

Perlez, Jane. “With Berger in Catbird Seat, Albright’s Star Dims.” New York Times. 14

December, 1999.

Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman Jr. In Search of Excellence. New York: Harper &

Row, 1982.

Ripley, Randall B. and Lindsay, James M. eds. U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War.

Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.

Schlesinger, James R. “National Defense Spending.” Colloquy Vol. 20, No.1. April 1999.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. New World Coming: American Security in

the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: USCNS/21, September 15, 1999.

________. Seeking A National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting

Freedom. Washington, D.C.: USCNS/21, April 15, 2000.

________. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. Washington, D.C.:

USCNS/21, March 15, 2001.

U.S. Special Operations Command. SOF Vision 2010. Washington, D.C.: Defense Technical

Information Center (undated).

The White House. A National Security Strategy for A New Century. Washington, D.C.: The

White House, October 1998.

–––––––. National Security Council. Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex

Contingency Operations. August 1998.

–––––––. National Security Decision Directive 207. January 20, 1986.

–––––––. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, "Organization of the National

Security Council System." February 13, 2001.

–––––––. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 “Organization of the National Security

Council.” January 20, 1993.

–––––––. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 9. June 18, 1993.

–––––––. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 27. “Procedures for Dealing with Non-Military

Incidents.” January 18, 1978.

_______. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39: “Counterterrorism Policy [FEMA abstract

and Federal Response Plan].” 21 June, 1995.
3

_______. Presidential Decision Directive-56 White Paper. “The Clinton Administration's Policy

on Managing Complex Contingency Operation.” May 1997.

_______. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62: “Protection Against Unconventional

Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.” 22 May, 1998.

_______. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63: “Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).”

22 May, 1998.

Williams, Bob. McKinsey 7S Model LO15287. (www.learning-org.com).

Zoellick, Robert B. “Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy.” Survival Vol. 41, No. 4.

Winter 1999.
1

ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY:

ADDENDUM ON STRUCTURE AND PROCESS ANALYSES

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAR After Action Review

ABC Albright-Berger-Cohen

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACAT Acquisition Category

ACC Air Combat Command

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACEP Advisory Committee on Export Policy

ACIP Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices

ACJCS Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ACOM United States Atlantic Command

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

 ADAPT Advanced Design and Production Initiative

ADB Asian Development Bank

ADCI Assistant Director of Central Intelligence

ADCI/AP Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production

 ADIC Assistant Director in Charge

ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum

ADP Automated Data Processing

 ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Force

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFC Air Force Council

AFDB African Development Bank

AFG Air Force Group

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

AFPD Air Force Policy Directive

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

AG Australia Group

AISES American Indian Science and Engineering Society

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMIO Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations

 ANSIR Awareness of National Security Issues and Response

AOAs Analyses of Alternatives

AOO Area of Operations

AOR Area of Responsibility
2

APG Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering

APNSA Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

 ASCI Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense

ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence

ASD(ISP) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

ASD(LA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

ASD(S&TR) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction

ASD(SOHA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

ASH Assistant Secretary of Health

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

ATG Advanced Technology Group

ATP Advanced Technology Program

ATSD(IO) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological

Defense Programs

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

B

BA Budget Authority

BBS Bureau Budget Submission

BEA Bureau of Export Administration

BES Budget Estimate Submission

 BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics

BMBL Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

BOB Bureau of the Budget

 BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons

BPA Bonneville Power Administration

BPP Bureau Performance Plan

BPS Budget Preparation System

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BRD Budget Review Division

BSA Bank Secrecy Act of 1970

BSD Business Services Division

BXA Bureau of Export Administration

C

C&SA Counterintelligence and Security Activity

C/B Chemical/Biological

C4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
3

Reconnaissance

CAG Cost Analysis Group

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group

CAP Cooperative Agreement Program

CAP Crisis Action Planning

CARD Cost Analysis Requirements Description

CBJB Congressional Budget Justification Book

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CBRDT Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team

CBS Cheney-Baker-Scowcroft

 CCIPS Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program

CDA Congressionally-Directed Action

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDC/W Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Washington Office

 CDP Center for Domestic Preparedness

CEA Council of Economic Advisors

CEB Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board

CENR Committee on Environment and Natural Resources

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality

CFA CINC Field Assessments

CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force

CFO Chief Financial Officer

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CGARC Coast Guard Acquisition Review Council

CGLC Coast Guard Leadership Council

CGULLS Coast Guard Universal Lessons Learned System

CHAMPUS Civilian Heath and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIAO Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

CIAP Central Intelligence Agency Program

CICG Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CINC

STRATCOM Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command

CINCLANTFLT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet

CIO Chief Information Officer

CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection

 CIRG Critical Incident Response Group

CISA C4I Integration Activity

CISET Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology

 CITAC Computer Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSIs Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions

 CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services

CLPRE Congressional Liaison and Program Research and Evaluation

CMA Community Management Account
4

CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps

CMO Central MASINT Office

CMS Community Management Staff

CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CNS Committee on National Security

COA Course of Action

COG Continuity of Government

ComSci Commerce, Science, and Technology Fellowship Program

COMSEC Communications Security

COMUSMARD

EZLANT Commander of the U.S. Maritime Defense Zone, Atlantic

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONPLAN Concept Plan

CONUS Continental United States

COOP Continuity of Operations

 COPS Community Oriented Policing Services

CPA Chairman's Program Assessment

CPBS Capabilities Programming and Budgeting System

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance

CPR Chairman's Program Recommendation

CR Continuing Resolution

CRD Capstone Requirements Document

CRES Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff

CRGR Committee to Review Generic Requirements

CRITIC Critical Information

 CRS Community Relations Service

CRS Congressional Research Service

CRS Current Readiness System

CS Combat Support

CS Committee on Science

CSA Chief of Staff of the Army

CSA Combat Support Agency

CSG Counterterrorism Security Group

CSO Court Security Officer

CSP Country Strategic Plan

CSS Central Security Service

CSS Combat Service Support

CTAC Counter-Drug Technology Assessment Center

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

 CTC Computer and Telecommunications Coordinator

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

CTS Cryptologic Training System

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

D

D Deputy Secretary of State

DA Directorate of Administration

DA GARDEN Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan
5

PLOT

DA&M Director of Administration and Management

DAB Defense Acquisition Board

DAD Deputy Associate Directors

DAE Defense Acquisition Executive

DAES Defense Acquisition Executive Summary

DAO Defense Attaché Office

DAPNSA Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

DC Deputies Committee of the National Security Council

DC/CM Deputies Committee/Crisis Management

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCC Detroit Computing Center

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DDC Defense Distribution Center

DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DDCI/CM Deputy Director of Central Intelligence/Community Management

DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDP Detention and Deportation Program

DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering

DDS&T Deputy Director of Science and Technology

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DeCA Defense Commissary Agency

DEPOPDEPS Deputy Operations Deputies

DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense

 DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DGIAP Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program

DHAP-IRS Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention-Intervention, Research, and Support

DHAP-SE Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention-Surveillance and Epidemiology

DHL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

DI Directorate for Intelligence Production

DI Directorate of Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIO Defense Intelligence Officer

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DisCom2 Distance Computing and Distributed Computing for Weapon Simulation

DJ-8 Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments

DJS Director, Joint Staff

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DLS Division of Laboratory Systems

DLSA Defense Legal Services Agency

DLSC Defense Logistics Support Command

DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team
6

DNSC Defense National Stockpile Center

DO Directorate of Operations

DoC Department of Commerce

DoD Department of Defense

DoDD Department of Defense Directive

DoE Department of Energy

DoI Department of the Interior

DoJ Department of Justice

DOMS Directorate of Military Support

DoN Department of the Navy

DoS Department of State

DoT Department of Transportation

DOTMLP Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and People

DP Directorate for Policy Support

DPAG Defense Planning Advisory Group

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DPHS Division of Public Health Systems

DPOSD Deployed Port Operations, Security and Defense

DPP Defense Program Projection

DPSB Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board

 DR Directed Research

DRB Defense Resources Board

DRI Defense Reform Initiative

DRM DAB Review Meeting

DRMS Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service

DRU Direct Reporting Unit

DS&T Directorate of Science and Technology

DSAA Defense Security Assistance Agency

DSB Defense Science Board

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DSS Defense Security Service

DSTDP Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention

DSW Directed Stockpile Work

DTB Defense Technology Board

DTBE Division of Tuberculosis (TB) Elimination

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DUF6 Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride

DUSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

DWCF Defense Working Capital Fund

E

E Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs

E/DRB Expanded Defense Resources Board

EAA Export Administration Act

EAC Executive Associate Commissioner

EAF Expeditionary Aerospace Force

EARB Export Administration Review Board

EB Economics and Business Bureau

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
7

EDA Economic Development Administration

EDD Economic Development Districts

EDIC Economic Development Information Clearinghouse

EDO Executive Director for Operations

EE Export Enforcement

EEIB Economic Executives' Intelligence Brief

EEO Equal Employment Opportunity

EIAP Economic Intelligence Advisory Panel

EID Emerging Infectious Diseases

EIP Emerging Infections Program

EIS Epidemic Intelligence Service

ELC Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EO Executive Order

EOC Emergency Operations Center

 EONS Executive Office for National Security

EOP Executive Office of the President

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPCA Energy Policy and Conservation Act (1975)

EPCI Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center

EPO Epidemiology Program Office

EPSCoT Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Technology

 ER Exploratory Research

ERG Executive Review Group (SSP)

 ERLE Energy-Related Laboratory Equipment

ERT Emergency Response Team

 ERULF Energy Research Undergraduate Laboratory Fellowship

ESF Emergency Support Function

ESG Explosives Study Group

 ESP Enhanced Surveillance Program

EU European Union

EUCOM United States European Command

EXCOM Executive Committee

ExComm Executive Committee (in the context of Presidential Decision Directive 56)

EXDIR Executive Director

ExDir/ICA Executive Director/Intelligence Community Affairs

F

FA Finance and Administration

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act

FAM Foreign Affairs Manual

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

 FBIHQ Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FCIP Foreign Counterintelligence Program

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
8

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FDDC Foreign Denial and Deception Committee

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FG Fiscal Guidance

FIA Federal Insurance Administration

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FMP Bureau of Finance and Management

FMP Fisheries Management Plan

FMRO Foreign Military Rights Office

FOA Field Operating Agency

FOA Forward Operating Agency

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command

FOSC Federal On-Scene Coordinator

FPC Federal Preparedness Circular

FRN FEMA Radio Network

FRP Federal Response Plan

FSO Foreign Service Officer

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FY Fiscal Year

FYDP Future Years Defense Plan

G

G Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs

GAO General Accounting Office

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GC General Counsel

GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program

GDO General Defense Operations

GER Global Expertise Reserve

GPRA Government Performance Review Act

GSA General Services Administration

H

HASC House Armed Services Committee

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HDC Harbor Defense Commander

HEU Highly enriched uranium

HEU Highly-Enriched Uranium

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

 HHS/OEP Health and Human Services/Office of Emergency Preparedness

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HMO Health Management Organization

HNSC House National Security Committee

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

HRM Human Resource Management

HSI Hispanic Serving Institutions
9

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUMINT Human Intelligence

I

IA Import Administration

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IASP International Affairs Strategic Plan

IBES Intelligence Budget Estimate Submission

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IC Intelligence Community

IC/CIO Intelligence Community/Chief Information Officer

IC/DC Intelligence Community Deputies Committee

IC/EXCOM Intelligence Community Executive Committee

IC/PC Intelligence Community Principals Committee

IC21 Intelligence Community in the 21st Century

ICAs Intelligence Community Assessments

ICB Intelligence Community Brief

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICCS International Crime Control Strategy

 ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion

 ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

IDB Inter-American Development Bank

IDCA International Development Cooperation Agency

IEA International Energy Agency

IEC International Emergency Cooperation Program (DoE)

IG Inspector General

ILF International Litigation Fund

IM Information Management

IM Intelligence Memorandum

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

INFOSEC Information Systems Security

ING International Notification Group

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

INPHO Information Network for Public Health Officials

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

 INTERPOLUSNCB International Criminal Police Organization-United States National Central Bureau

IO Intelligence Operations

IOB Intelligence Oversight Board

IOTC Information Operations Technology Center

IPBD Intelligence Program Budget Decision

IPDM Intelligence Program Decision Memorandum

IPL Integrated Priority List

IPOM Intelligence Program Objective Memorandum

IPP Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

IPRG Intelligence Program Review Group
10

IPT Integrated Process Team (also Integrated Product Team)

 IPTF Infrastructure Protection Task Force

IR Intelligence Report

IRAC The Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee

IRS Internal Revenue Service

ISA International Security Affairs

ISD Investigative Services Division

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

IT Inland Transportation

ITA International Trade Administration

 ITC Information Technology Center

ITS Institute for Telecommunication Sciences

ITU International Telecommunication Union

 ITWG Infotech Training Working Group

IWG Interagency Working Group

J

JAAR Joint After Action Report

JAARS Joint After Action Reporting System

JAEIC Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

JCLL Joint Center for Lessons Learned

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS Pubs Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

JET Judgement Enforcement Teams

JFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force

 JIC Joint Information Center

JITC Joint Intelligence Training Center

JMET Joint Mission Essential Task

JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List

JMIC Joint Military Intelligence College

JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program

JMITC Joint Military Intelligence Training Center

JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review

JNA Joint Net Assessment

JOA Joint Operational Architecture

JOC Joint Operations Center

JOPES Joint Operational Planning and Execution System

JPD Joint Planning Document

JPG Joint Planning Guidance

JRAC Joint Rear Area Commander

JRB Joint Requirements Board

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JRS Joint Reporting System

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSD Judicial Security Division

JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
11

JSR Joint Strategy Review

JTASC Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center

JTF Joint Task Force

JTP Joint Training Plan

JTS Joint Training System

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

JTTPS Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

JWC4SI Joint Warfare C4 Systems Integrator

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment

JWFC Joint Warfighting Center

K

KDP Key Decision Point

KPP Key Performance Parameters

L

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANTAREA Atlantic Area

LDRD Laboratory-Directed Research and Development

LEDET Law Enforcement Detachment

 LEO Law Enforcement On-line

 LEO Life Extension Option

LEP Life Extension Program

LEU Low enriched uranium

LEU Low-Enriched Uranium

LFA Lead Federal Agency

 LLCE Limited Liability Component Exchange

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

M

MA Mission Assignment

MAA Mission Area Assessment

MAC Market Access and Compliance

MACOM Major Command (Army)

MAJCOM Major Command (Air Force)

MARFOLANT Marine Corps Forces Atlantic

MARFOPAC Marine Corps Forces Pacific

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MBB Mission-Based Budgeting

MBI Major Budget Issue

MC Military Characteristics

MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs

MDEP Management Decision Package

MDZ Maritime Defense Zone

MEC Manufacturing Extension Centers

MET Mobile Enforcement Team

METL Mission Essential Task List

MFA Major Focus Area

MIB Military Intelligence Board

MLC Maintenance and Logistics Command

MLSA Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994
12

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System

MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team

MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

MNS Mission Needs Statement

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPC&A Materials Protection, Control & Accounting

MPP Mission Performance Plan

MSCD Military Support of Civil Defense

MSIC Missile and Space Intelligence Center

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

N

NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVGARD Navy-Coast Guard

NCA National Command Authority

NCC Naval Component Commander

NCEH National Center for Environmental Health

NCHS National Center for Health Statistics

NCHSTP National Center for HIV, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) and Tuberculosis

(TB) Prevention

NCI Nuclear Cities Initiative

 NCIC National Crime Information Center

NCID National Center for Infectious Diseases

NCIPC National Center for Injury Prevention and Control

NCJRS National Criminal Justice Reference Service

NCP National Contingency Plan

NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan

NCS National Communications System

NCS National Cryptologic School

NCW Naval Coastal Warfare

NCWC Naval Coastal Warfare Commander

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

 NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office

NDU National Defense University

NE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency

NEC National Economic Council

NEC Nonproliferation and Export Control Cooperation Team

NERAC Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee

 NEWS Numeric Environment for Weapon Simulations

NFIB National Foreign Intelligence Board

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NGB National Guard Bureau

NGO Nongovernmental organization

NIC National Intelligence Council

NICB National Intelligence Collection Board
13

NID National Intelligence Daily

NIE National Intelligence Estimates

 NIF National Ignition Facility

NIH National Institutes of Health

 NIJ National Institute of Justice

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIMAP National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program

NIO National Intelligence Officer

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NIP National Immunization Program

NIPB National Intelligence Production Board

 NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center

NIS Newly Independent States

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

 NLECTC National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center

 NLETS National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System

NLLS Navy Lessons Learned System

NMCC National Military Command Center

NMCS National Military Command System

NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence Center

NMS National Military Strategy

NMSS Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NMT Office of Nuclear and Missile Technology Controls

NN Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (DoE)

NN-30 Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation (DoE)

NN-40 Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DoE)

NN-50 Office of International Materials Protection and Emergency Cooperation (DoE)

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NPAC TWG Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NRC National Response Center

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NRP National Reconnaissance Program

NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NRT National Response Team

NSA National Security Agency

NSAP National Security Advisory Panel

NSC National Security Council

NSC/DC National Security Council/Deputies Committee

NSC/PC National Security Council/Principals Committee

NSCS National Security Council Staff

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

NSOC National Security Operations Center

NSR National Security Review

NSRL National SIGINT Requirements List

NSRS National SIGINT Requirements System

NSS National Security Strategy

NSTC National Science and Technology Council
14

 NSTL National Security Threat List

NTC National Firearms Tracing Center

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration

NTIS National Technical Information Service

 NTS Nevada Test Site

NVPO National Vaccine Program Office

NWC Nuclear Weapons Council

NWSP Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

O

O&M Operations and Maintenance

OAC Office of Antiboycott Compliance

OAS Organization of American States

OASH Office of the Assistant Secretary of Health

 OBMS Office of Budget and Management Services

OC Operating Committee

OCA Office of Congressional Affairs

OCC Office of the Chief Counsel

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

ODCI Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

OEA Office of Export Administration

OEE Office of Export Enforcement

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness

OES Bureau for Oceans, Environment, and Science

OEXS Office of Exporter Services

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

OFO Office of Field Operations

OGH Office of Global Health

OIA Office of International Affairs

 OIAP Office of Investigative Agency Policies

OICC Operational Intelligence Crisis Center

OIG Office of the Inspector General

 OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review

OIPT Overarching Integrated Product Teams

 OJP Office of Justice Programs

 OLE Office of Legal Education

 OLES Office of Law Enforcement Standards

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

OPA Office of Public Affairs

OPBRE Office of Programs, Budget, Research, and Evaluation

OPCM Office of Policy Coordination and Management

 OPDAT Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training

OPDEPS Operations Deputies

OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operations Order

OPPE Office of Program Planning and Evaluation

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility
15

OPS Office of Policy Support

OPSDEP Operations Deputy

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo

ORD Operational Requirements Document

OSC Office of Space Commercialization

OSC On-Scene Commander

OSC Operations Support Center

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/PA&E Office of the Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis & Evaluation

 OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

OSM Office of Spectrum Management

OST Office of the Secretary of Transportation

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation

OTI Office of Transnational Issues

OTIA Office of Telecommunications and Information Applications

OTP Office of Technology Policy

P

P Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

 P&PD Production & Planning Directive

P.L. Public Law

PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation

PA&EO Program Assessment and Evaluation Office

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PACOM United States Pacific Command

PAD Program Associate Director

PASS President's Analytic Support Staff

PB President's Budget

PBC Program and Budget Committee

PBD Presidential Budget Decision

PC Principals Committee of the National Security Council (see also NSC/PC)

PCAST President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology

PCG Peacekeeping Core Group

 PCP Product Change Proposals

PDB President's Daily Brief

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PDM Program Decision Memorandum

PDRC Program Development Review Committee

PDUSD(A&T) Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology

PE Program Element

PEM Program Element Monitors

PEO Program Executive Officer

PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PGDB Prevention Guidelines Database

PH Port Handling

PHPPO Public Health Practice Program Office

PHS Public Health Service
16

PHTN Public Health Training Network

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

PM Program Manager

PMA Power Marketing Administration

PME Performance Measures of Effectiveness

PNGV Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles

PO Program Operations

POG Program Officer Group

POLAD Political Advisor

Pol-Mil Political-Military

POM Program Objective Memoranda

PP&O Plans, Programs, and Operations

PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

PRA Primary Review Authority

PRC Program Review Committee

PRD Presidential Review Directive

PRG Program Review Group

PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

PSD Prisoner Services Division

PSG Prioritization Steering Group

PSU Port Security Unit

PVO Private voluntary organization

PWG POM Working Group

Q

 QART Quality Assurance Reliability Testing

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

QFR Questions for the Record

QRRC Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

R

R&D Research & Development

R4 Results Report and Resource Request

RC Reserve Components

 RDT Rapid Deployment Team

RDT&E Research and Development and Test and Evaluation

RHA Regional Health Administrator

 RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

RMO Resource Management Office

ROC Regional Operations Center

RPPO Requirements, Plans, and Policy Office

RRF Ready Reserve Force

RSOC Regional Security Operations Centers

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities

S

S Secretary of State

S&T Science & Technology

S&TR Strategy and Threat Reduction

S/P Office of Policy Planning
17

S/RPP Office of Resources, Plans, and Policy

S/S-EX Executive Office, Office of the Secretary of State

S/S-O Operations Center, Office of the Secretary of State

S/S-S Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State

 SAC Special Agent in Charge

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

SAE Service Acquisition Executive

SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

SAP Statement of Administration Policy

SAR Search and Rescue

SASC Senate Armed Services Committee

SAT Stockpile Assessment Team

SCC Service Cost Center

SCE Service Cryptologic Elements

SCG Special Coordination Group

SCM Security Counter Measures

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SEIB Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

SELCOM Select Committee

SEPA Southeastern Power Administration

SES Senior Executive Service

SFI Significant Finding Investigation

SIES Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

 SIOC Strategic Information Operations Center

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SIR Special Intelligence Report

 SLEP Stockpile Life Extension Program

SLOC Sea Line of Communications

SMDP Sustainable Management Development Program

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM Special Nuclear Material

SO/LIC Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

SOAL Special Operations/Acquisition and Logistics

SOCM Sense of the Community Memorandum

SOCOM United States Special Operations Command

SOCS Special Operations/Command Support

SOG Special Operations Group

SOIO Special Operations/Intelligence and Information Operations

SOOP Special Operations/Operations, Plans, and Policy

SORR Special Operations/Requirements and Resources

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

SPACECOM United States Space Command

SPC Strategy and Planning Committee

SPIN Strategic Planning Information Network

SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve
18

SROC Senior Readiness Oversight Council

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine

 SSC Structures, Systems, & Components

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

STFPC Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls

STIC Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

STS Stockpile-to-Target Sequence

SWARF Senior Warfighting Forum

 SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

SWPA Southwestern Power Administration

T

T Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

TA Technology Administration

TACON Tactical Control

TAE Transportation Acquisition Executive

TAM Transportation Acquisition Manual

TCR Technical Certification Report

TD Trade Development

TEP Theater Engagement Plan

TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TOA Total Obligation Authority

TPCC Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee

TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

TRO Training and Readiness Oversight

TSARC Transportation Review Council

TSARC Transportation Systems Acquisition Review Council

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

 TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

U

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

 UC University of California

UCP Unified Command Plan

UJTL Universal Joint Task List

UN United Nations

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

US&FCS U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service

USACOM U.S. Atlantic Command [now U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)]

USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USASC U.S. Army Safety Center

USC United States Code
19

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCINCLANT U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic

USCINCPAC U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

USD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions & Technology

USD(C) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USFA United States Fire Administration

USIA United States Information Agency

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USISTC U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission

USITC United States International Trade Commission

USMS United States Marshals Service

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM United States Space Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTR U.S. Trade Representative

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

V

 V&V Validation and Verification

VCJS Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VCSA Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

VDJS Vice Director, Joint Staff

W

WAPA Western Power Administration

WCF Working Capital Fund

WITSEC Witness Security Program

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMDPG Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group

WSSIC Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee