PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRY:

AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS

OF JOINT VISION 2020

Melissa Applegate

September 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-066-4

ii
FOREWORD

Since the mid-1990s, the concept of strategic asym

has begun to receive serious attention from the 

Department of Defense (DoD). The 1997 Quadr

Defense Review, for instance, stated, “U.S. domina

the conventional military arena may encourage adver

to use . . . asymmetric means to attack our force

interests overseas and Americans at home.” But 

American strategists and defense leaders sens

importance of strategy asymmetry, much analytica

remains to be done before it is fully understood.

To help with this process, the Strategic Studies Ins

has begun a Special Series on Strategic Asymmetr

study that follows—Preparing for Asymmetry by M

Applegate—is the first of these. In it, the author as

the revisions to Joint Vision 2020, DoD’s roadmap 

future, that must be undertaken in order to prepa

asymmetric challenges.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

work as part of the ongoing assessment of the chal

and opportunities posed by strategic asymmetry.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

MELISSA APPLEGATE is currently a senior intell

advisor at the Defense Intelligence Agency. She ser

an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army from 19

participating in Operations JUST CAUSE and DE

STORM. She has served at tactical, operationa

strategic levels, in both conventional and special oper

organizations. Ms. Applegate is a graduate of Mic

State University and received a Masters of Militar

and Sciences from the U.S. Army Command and G

Staff College in 1994.

iv
SUMMARY

The U.S. military’s joint vision of how it will app

conflict in the future, Joint Vision (JV) 2020, is vuln

to asymmetry. The tremendous relative military c

power of U.S. forces and our commitment to expandin

lead means that, for potential adversaries, asym

approaches will be their only recourse. Asymm

strategies—intentional or opportunistic—will se

counter the operational concepts underpinning JV

Successful asymmetric approaches could preven

United States from fighting as designed or even 

Alternatively, asymmetry may not defeat U.S. force

could prevent them from winning. Asymmetry affec

whole force and must be addressed in that context. Re

on overwhelming offensive military power for warfi

and adopting a defensive strategy against asym

approaches will not ensure mastery of the asym

domain.

This monograph describes how the current vision i

defeat or slow degradation of military effectivene

asymmetric means. It provides a background of why 

hard to change and makes the argument for why we 

adapt to the emerging potential of asymmetry. G

insight into the dynamics driving the significance, 

and impact of this problem set leads to the conclusio

JV2020 operational concepts must be broader and 

adaptive in nature. Mastering the asymmetric doma

legitimate, challenging mission area that will requi

same investment in time, energy, and intellectual c

that has been spent to achieve supremacy in conven

warfighting. This monograph proposes a s

complementary operational concepts that, incorp

into JV2020 through a transition process, will lead 

enhanced vision that incorporates asymmetric chall

v
and result in a transformed vision that better support

forces to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to asymm

This document is the output of The Army-Marine 

Warfighter Working Group, Task 4 on Asymm

Approaches. Army lead is the Office of the Deputy C

Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) with the Office 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSIN

support. Marine Corps lead is the Deputy Commanda

Policy, Plans, and Operations (DCPP&O) wit

Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Develo

Command (CG MCCDC) in support.

vi
PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRY:

AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS

OF JOINT VISION (JV) 2020

INTRODUCTION

We used to worry about losing. Now we worry about winn

perfectly.

Senior Defense official

December 2000

Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) represents a vision o

U.S. military forces can fight and win the nation’s w

the future. It reflects the immense military powe

capability that is expected to result from the 

orchestration of technology, people, and opera

methods, blended in a way that constitutes the p

application of the American Way of War. JV2020 env

conflict and victory on U.S. terms through the applica

power projection, precision, lethality, and speed. If a

to fight as designed, the overwhelming force charact

in JV2020 is, in fact, perfectly unbeatable. While J

acknowledges the diverse nature of asymmetric t

across the conflict spectrum, its application is 

appropriate in traditional, force-on-force confronta

The potential impact of asymmetry, as a conflict dim

of its own or as an intentional direct response to JV

demands an expansion of the way U.S. forces plan, p

for, and respond to future operational environments

Will the emerging global security environment p

the opportunity to execute JV2020 as envisioned? 

absence of Cold War ideological bipolarity and the his

precedent of the world wars, conflict has evolved 

would say devolved) into something not new and diff

but more closely resembling Machiavellian stru

hopelessly intermixing the aspirations of indivi

1
groups, and states into a nameless mosaic. The basic n

of conflict may remain constant, but the quality and s

conflict, like part of an historical cyclical continuum

changed, at least for now and the foreseeable future. 

changes—some fundamental, others subtle—have a

the dynamics of the protagonists, motives, objective

intent of various parties; the tools available; the thr

for justified military action; and the definitions of vi

These changes present an asymmetry to the Am

Way of War. JV2020 implicitly assumes that confli

take on a familiar form suited to the operationa

enabling concepts more fitting of the old paradig

acknowledges the emerging threat asymmetry brings 

environment but does not acknowledge the possibilit

asymmetry may be all there is.

1

 The tremendous re

U.S. military advantage today, and our commitm

expanding that lead, force adversaries toward asym

approaches.

Ensuring American “positive asymmetry” does 

benefit; clearly it is in our best interest for adversa

have to react to us.

2

 We are not looking for sym

threats. However, steadfast pursuit of new and imp

conventional capabilities—essentially getting bette

better at what we are already the best in the world

leave the United States without the proper tool

techniques to fight the emerging threat and shap

victories of the future. Worse, following a predeter

course based on past successes may create a false se

security and blind the United States to problems jus

the horizon or opportunities to shape our future.

Asymmetric approaches can no longer be cons

secondary or peripheral to conventional threats; U.S. 

must master the asymmetric domain with the 

intellectual energy devoted to convent

warfare—because asymmetry is not just a threat. To a 

extent, asymmetry represents the challenge posed 

vast dissimilarity between our own capabilitie

2
warfighting methods and how they translate 

effectiveness, or ineptitude, against the existi

emerging threats U.S. forces can expect to face. JV20

the symbol of American military preeminence in the f

is vulnerable to the application of asymmetric stra

events, and situations. The strengths inherent in J

operational and enabling concepts are countered 

relatively rigid reliance on—and anticipation of—fa

forms of conflict. Essentially this vision remains con

in and comfortable with the American Way of War.

To ensure U.S. forces are capable of operating effec

in a changing global conflict landscape, JV2020 co

must be broader and more adaptive in na

Understanding the complex cause and effect implicat

asymmetry and using that understanding to adapt J

will improve the ability of the U.S. military to co

operations effectively. Adapting this vision 

multidimensional contexts against a broad range of c

environments, and at the same time red

vulnerabilities, will be key to ensuring critical opera

success. Operational concepts, force structure, 

planning, doctrine, and training and education all 

evolve in a way that legitimizes and attacks the chal

of asymmetry. Successfully adapting the joint vision 

these mechanisms will produce a force with true m

dominance.

This monograph will explore why and how the con

of JV2020—indeed our approach to joint vision—need

adapted to compensate for asymmetric dynamics. 

show how the existing vision increases the attractiven

asymmetric approaches to potential adversaries an

they will seek to exploit one or more of the operation

enabling concepts to preclude U.S. involvement or de

the effectiveness of U.S. forces. It will then explore s

compounding problems that exacerbate the potential 

of asymmetry on U.S. forces facing the complex c

environments of today and tomorrow and contribute 

need for change. It argues that transformation and 

3
ahead” concepts currently in vogue must legitimi

potential consequences of asymmetry and the environ

and conditions under which they will flourish. The 

vision must be adapted to successfully meet the chal

we undoubtedly will face, but not at the cost of “du

down” the force to provide a level playing field for the 

the world. Finally, it will offer a broad set of concep

inclusion in the joint vision to take this strategic doc

beyond acknowledgement of asymmetry and towa

adaptive, more responsive model for planner

decisionmakers.

THE THREAT TO JV2020 FROM ASYMMETRY

We live in a wondrous time in which the strong is weak beca

of his moral scruples and the weak grows strong because of 

audacity.

Otto von Bismarck

A challenge posed for any potential adversary 

United States is clear: they cannot, or will choose 

meet the United States on our terms; that is, symmetr

The emerging concepts of asymmetry stem directly fr

adversary’s recognition of U.S. strength, both presen

future. Generally, the rest of the world believes the U

States is the dominant global power and will remain 

some time. The superiority of U.S. military con

technology, and capabilities has been a key theme in f

military assessments since the Gulf War. Many expr

expectation and concern that our military advantag

only grow as we move steadily toward the opera

capabilities expressed in the Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff’s JV 2020.

These realizations are driving potential foes 

conclusion that there is little to be gained by engagi

U.S. military on our terms. In fact, most believe tha

cannot prevail against a U.S. military that has th

support of our leadership, citizens, and key allies, an

4
that embodies the JV 2020 concepts of dominant man

focused logistics, precision strike, and full dimen

protection, enabled by information superiority.

Accordingly, adversaries are increasingly pur

technological and operational counters to demons

and future capabilities as described in JV2020. In 

JV2020 may be the conceptual model driving 

adversary force development and asymmetric appro

A conflict spectrum dominated less by large, force-on

battles and more by disorganized, civilianized

primitive warfare, conducted by individuals and no

actors, offers limitless opportunities to employ 

capabilities against a construct like JV2020 

potentially crippling effects. Regardless of the intentio

opportunistic means used—terrorism, inform

operations, the threat or use of mass casualty weapon

more specific technology or operational conc

adversaries who engage the U.S. military will be seek

counter one or more of the key components of ou

vision.

Adversaries will seek to break the “continuity o

between U.S. leadership, the American people, an

allies. While we think dominant maneuver, adver

think counteraccess or denying forces easy access 

theaters, ports, bases, and facilities and important air

and maritime approaches and lines of communic

Adversaries will develop targeted abilities to count

ability to assemble and move the right force package i

to any point on the globe and to sustain that force on

there. They have or want a host of counterprecision

capabilities; some of the more notable include the gr

use of a variety of cover, concealment, and dec

technologies and methods including deep underg

facilities and multispectral obscurants. Finally, adver

are emphasizing any number of counterprote

capabilities that are designed to inflict mass casualtie

against well-protected or dug-in military forces.

4

5
What is most worrisome about these various asym

approaches is that they offer potential adver

relatively low cost opportunities to achieve disproport

results. What adversaries seek is a set of capabilitie

we are either unwilling or unable to counter i

timeframe that matters. The real threat is that we wo

unable to employ our forces as designed and th

tremendous potential capability embedded in the J

concept would be rendered indecisive or irrelevant. In 

words, if asymmetric approaches are successful, we w

it hard to fight the way we want to and we may not be 

fight at all, the result being military irrelevan

impotency.

Operational planning, supported by the intell

community, has focused on the defensive capabi

combat asymmetry. Terrorism, the proliferation of 

casualty weapons and technologies, foreign inform

operations, and cyber attack capabilities, for instanc

all priority intelligence missions; operational res

options to these threats continue to proliferate a

Service and joint levels. This is only natural because 

the capability end of the asymmetric paradigm whe

real damage to American interests, property, and 

actually occurs. Those efforts are critical and need 

sustained.

But if we “over focus” only on the means or tar

attack, we will miss the true implications asym

represents. A singular concentration on the d

consequences of an asymmetric opponent’s catast

attack may blind the United States to the more insi

albeit less deadly, threat of slow mission failure or 

ineffectiveness. We must build a broader and deeper i

into the motivations, perceptions, objectives

vulnerabilities of our asymmetric adversaries. 

understanding, a necessary precursor to effective res

may ultimately allow the United States to mast

asymmetric domain.

6
The need to evolve JV2020 into a visionary doc

that not only acknowledges asymmetric dynamics, b

that provides effective operational and enabling conce

deal with them is a first step. We cannot ignore the pot

for a conventional competitor to emerge on the horizo

the intent and willingness to fight the American W

War, although at present this scenario appears un

The more difficult challenge will be to identify ad

procedures and processes that will make sense 

emerging threat landscape and then educate the force 

them and to develop new ways of thinking about con

INVITING DEFEAT BY ASYMMETRIC MEANS

I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, 

institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed j

to win this lousy war.

Senior Army officer,

speaking about Vietnam

Asymmetric dynamics and the frustrating chal

they pose to U.S. forces more comfortable with conven

force-on-force combat are in and of themselves pote

capable of preventing U.S. forces from fighting as de

or even at all as alluded. But other factors are influe

how and why asymmetry has evolved as a challenge 

concepts in JV2020 that cannot be ignored if the prob

to be solved productively; a quick discussion follows.

Quality of Conflict.

JV2020 acknowledges the changes to the global se

environment and the impact they have had on ho

United States perceives threats to its national inte

and how potential adversaries see the United States

beyond that acknowledgement, the document proce

outline operational and enabling concepts that are des

to allow U.S. joint forces to win against enemy m

forces anywhere in the world. In other words, it se

7
stage to win under a construct of state against 

warfare. The quality of conflict in the early 21st ce

however, does not appear compelled to follow tradi

20th century paradigms familiar to the United S

Rather, conflict is characterized around the world m

what has been termed fourth generation warfare

state’s loss of its monopoly on war and the return to a 

of cultures in conflict.”

5

 Today and for the fores

future, U.S. national survival or vital interest

generally not at stake and the onset of modern warfar

removed from the life and death struggles of the world 

or the Cold War. This is not to say global or regional w

with global implications will not occur; it simply argue

within the JV2020 timeframe, the objectives, motive

intent of others are much more personal and 

cataclysmic in nature; the scale and scope of conflic

localized.

The traditional measure of threat—capability 

intent equals threat—applied to today’s global se

environment is an elusive equation. Major pot

adversaries may develop military forces to count

United States conventionally by 2020, may demonstra

willingness to invest the enormous resources that wo

required just to close the gap that exists today, an

convey intent to harm the United States. Those facto

much more difficult to assess today; they were kno

assumed during the Cold War. Additionally, there 

indication that the United States plans to stand still 

that happens. Nor should it. To retain our status a

superpower, it is in the interest of this country t

several “leaps ahead” of any potential rival.

The central question becomes how best to ma

supremacy while remaining capable of conducting ef

operations in a world where conflict occurs, but rare

type of conflict envisioned by JV2020. Further, the U

States must decide whether conflicts that fall short 

threshold are legitimate missions worthy of the same 

of effort in terms of doctrine, training, education

8
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developmen

we have placed for years on conventional warfightin

Offense, Defense, and Victory.

Historically, this nation has considered victory in 

paramount. We do not set out just to fight the nation’s 

we plan to fight and win the nation’s wars. The whole 

of JV2020 is to provide an adequate roadmap fo

military forces to prepare to win—decisively. 

inherently offensive in nature, in keeping wit

American Way of War. In conflict that falls belo

JV2020 warfighting threshold, U.S. forces can c

situations, can seize initiative, and achieve sp

objectives; but the last 10 years of protracted oper

have forced the United States to redefine victory on s

levels.

The U.S. military relies on an offensive str

approach as the bedrock to victory, evidenced throu

JV2020. This makes perfect sense for a country 

“winning is not everything; it is the only thing” and “th

defense is a good offense.” There is usually little t

“overwhelming defensive force,” and it would be diffi

“close with and destroy” an enemy from a defe

mindset. Defense is essential, but offense wins the w

whatever form it takes. Traditional force-on-force con

wedded to this concept and has historically p

successful. In such traditional conflict scen

asymmetric approaches employed by an adversar

simply smart tactics; a good offensive strategy wi

produce victory.

In a world where adversaries recognize the futi

fighting the United States “mano a mano,” and who 

asymmetric strategies to prevent the United State

fighting as designed or at all as a baseline cons

asymmetry takes on a different dynamic. U.S. m

preeminence has placed adversaries in a position 

some form of a modernized Fabian (asymmetric) stra

9
only logical. Fabian tactics have not been used by the U

States since the Revolutionary War because they rep

a strategy of weakness intended for use again

overwhelmingly dominant opponent. A conven

military force intent on fighting “by the rules” will be 

challenged by a Fabian strategy. Hannibal could not 

such a strategy against Rome; neither could Napol

Russia—it was, at the time, essentially asymmetry 

finest.

6

 The effectiveness of offensive U.S. suprem

indeed how we will achieve victory—against a c

spectrum that avoids or ignores us, where adver

embrace asymmetry through technology, niche capab

and effective manipulation of world opinion—remain

proven.

Why It Is So Hard to Change.

If force-on-force warfare is receding, and we rec

the changing quality of conflict, why is adaptation 

victory in this new messy world of proliferating proble

difficult? Primarily, it is because—from an hist

standpoint—we are not ready to take the chance th

will not be ready for war. We may be in a period of “str

pause,” but it is impossible to say how long that wi

Therefore, it is difficult to convince the leadership 

major shift in terms of force structure and opera

methods is needed to more effectively manage asym

threats that fall outside the conflict spectrum (as is

incidents) or exist at the lower end where asym

dominates.

Many would argue these traditional conce

overwhelming power, massive technological adva

and intimidating deterrent capability provide a le

comfort and security. To a degree, this is true; 

concepts serve to ensure there will be no more Pearl H

or Task Force Smiths. In a world of asymmetry, how

they offer no guarantees against another Din Bin P

Khobar Towers. Still, the comfort level such force pr

10
and the firm belief that this degree of power will su

against any and all enemies all the time make c

inherently hard.

Meanwhile, in the foggy world of predicting the fut

is difficult to know how best to shape the for

incremental improvements to existing capab

represent a “safe” approach; besides, radical visi

future warfare can call existing doctrine, capabilitie

force structure into serious question. There are 

futurists with expertise in one area or another wh

present emerging technologies and theoretical capab

that may be available, with military applications, bu

dangerously, those which do not require a military a

have devastating effects. The answer to these forec

unlikely to be iterative improvements to ex

capabilities or a continuation of massive organiza

forces. 

Why We Must Change.

Many will argue that with the resources available 

great nation, we can afford to maintain this dom

warfighting force and adapt it to any and all m

requirements; that such an “insurance policy” is well 

the investment. Indeed, this force and JV2020-s

operational concepts won Operation DESERT STO

the exponential advances of the last 10 years are add

this strategy prevents the emergence of a near 

competitor, or so the thinking goes. Why not conti

build on it? Several reasons come to mind.

First, overwhelming U.S. military capability do

effectively deter regional or internal conflicts from ig

or becoming entrenched as protracted cycles of vio

Threats of American intervention may play a role in 

power state decisionmaking, but it has not proven to 

effective conflict prevention mechanism among 

powers and substate warring factions. Additionally, 

are few concrete indications or evidence that the existe

11
a powerful U.S. military can deter nonstate actors 

pursuing their objectives. Indeed, such a force, gl

deployed, offers lucrative targets of opportunity to 

dedicated to demonstrating American weakness (K

Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, for example) or circumv

military operations through asymmetric approaches

Second, there is no adequate capability with

JV2020 force construct to achieve full victory or win a

the kind of conflicts that characterize today’s global se

environment. Civil wars, insurgencies, cross-b

incursions where the United States is not a target, or 

is no identified “enemy” force, are especially proble

U.S. forces operating under JV2020 can control e

situations, and terrain, but only by exerting con

pressure and perpetual presence. These types of c

inherently place self-imposed restrictions o

implementation of JV2020 in that the threshold of 

conflicts usually falls below requirement

“overwhelming force.”

Third, JV2020 continues to apply the 

long-standing assumptions that remained valid throu

the Cold War—we can get there from here, in the 

planners have scheduled, with the appropriate too

forces, and that we will be able to fight as designed 

arrival. With no direct operational or enabling co

dedicated to overcoming the potential for asymm

approaches in JV2020, U.S. forces are left to defend, 

or develop operational concepts in an ad 

manner—because asymmetric approaches still lack f

legitimacy under JV2020. Because of their close assoc

to “warfare on the cheap,” or “warfare without rules,” 

plain free-for-alls, asymmetric dynamics also tend to 

lower priority in terms of devising effective res

mechanisms. There is no institutionalized strate

effective operational doctrine embedded within JV2

cope with these dynamics other than defensively—

historically is not the way America fights and wins its 

12
Fourth, allies cannot or have made conscious dec

not to keep pace with the advances in lethality, pre

C4ISR, etc., based on current or projected defense spe

There are few indications our allies are in a position 

willing to expend the resources necessary to becom

partners under the doctrine of overwhelming force 

have defined it in JV2020. This poses unique challeng

strategic environment where stated policy is one 

dictates we will act unilaterally if necessary, but will a

prefer to operate in concert with our allied par

Alternatively, allies may look more to building the

capabilities with their own vision and purpose, whic

in the end create more problems than they solve in te

interoperability and C4ISR in the event of real war. 

may also lead the way in terms of developing opera

concepts to manage lower threshold conflicts for whic

forces and operational concepts may not be able to “pu

on the throttle” enough to integrate effectively.

Finally, the dominant force we have built very like

be driving military developments by potential adver

in response to their perception that they may be tar

the “Shape, Prepare, and Respond” or whatever str

construct the new administration develops. In other w

the forces and capabilities envisioned in JV2020 and 

drawing board today may be driving not only conven

military developments by potential adversaries, they 

are also making asymmetric approaches more and 

attractive. This “perception-reaction” to U.S. military 

is not an argument to “dumb down” U.S. forces in an ef

“level the playing battlefield.” Rather, it is an effort to 

the need for a more inclusive JV2020 strategy 

incorporates asymmetric dynamics as equally sign

factors for consideration by decisionmakers, force pla

strategists, and operators.

13
Can We Adjust JV2020?

How can we take today’s conventional force, ret

capabilities of overwhelming power, make it more su

for existing challenges and complex environments, 

the same time prepare it for future warfare? Within b

constraints? Without undue risk? How can we defin

achieve victory in a way that is understandable wit

traditional battlefield environment? If the quality 

conflict does not warrant full investment in “overwhe

force, then how do we posture the force with ade

operational methods that ensure victory when vict

measured more as defeat avoidance and tactical obje

met? In essence, how can we apply the same offensive 

we have brought to the warfighting concepts in JV2

the complexities of asymmetry to produce a future 

that does more than acknowledge the problem?

Current understanding and classification of asym

threats tends to look at the capabilities and a

themselves, and not the nature of the problem. We h

institutionalized offensive strategy to deal with asym

Existing focus on most dangerous threats—real, perc

potential, or theoretical—produces a fundam

challenge to operational forces and intelligence taske

dealing on a daily basis with less dangerous, more 

frustrating challenges. Somehow, this complex 

security environment must be reconciled with ex

JV2020 concepts in order to transition the military t

its place as the premier force of decision. Leap-

concepts must take into account more than just techn

precision, and firepower. Rather, leap-ahead capab

must span the operational continuum and include the 

“asymmetric spectrum.”

JV2020 emphasizes the need for new doc

organizations, training, and education of leaders and 

“to take advantage of technology.”

7

 Yet the comple

asymmetry demands more than just adaptation of 

advanced technology into existing methods. It requ

14
new, more inclusive set of planning processe

procedures, innovative doctrine, and TTP that pro

adaptive command, and demands intelligence 

incorporates all aspects of potential operat

environments and outside elements that can inf

events. A transformed JV2020 force will require new 

of thinking about and innovative methods of execu

broad range of missions. This co-evolution-to-

formation must be achieved with a realistic sense of ri

a clear eye on threats and opportunities. Balancin

ability between threat response and proactive influe

shape the future global security environment must un

the building blocks of JV2020. In this way, we can tran

from a Cold War-based force-on-force construct to a 

force capable of accomplishing national military obje

to apply the right tools against a broad spectrum of com

context-dependent situations to achieve real victory 

global security environment of 2020.

THE NEED FOR AN INCLUSIVE VISION

Sacred cows make the best hamburger.

General John Sheehan

former USACOM Commander in C

Asymmetry cannot be treated as a “lesser included 

U.S. forces can—and must—embrace asymmetry 

challenge for which there are effective solutions. 

solutions may not look quite like the American Way o

as we have known it, but effective ways and me

including asymmetry as an integral aspect of the joint 

can be developed. Operational concepts must accomm

the management of change to allow transitio

coevolution, from existing ways of doing busin

institutionalize the multidimensional challeng

asymmetry. The objective result will be a transf

military “means” to address new “ways” of conf

achieve “ends” in the 21st century.

15
Existing paradigms and methods will not adeq

defeat or neutralize asymmetry. No matter how intra

“known” state enemy asymmetries are, they are the e

to deal with—they are extensions of historical con

Current planning and thinking facilitates understa

and development of effective counters. More challengi

the “unknowns”: existing or emerging conflict environ

or nonstate opponents and the potential asymm

approaches they can employ. We must bridge th

between the known and unknown by preparing our 

and transforming our methods.

Broadening the operational and enabling concept

form the baseline for JV2020 to incorporate 

institutionalize asymmetric dynamics thr

enhancements to these concepts will pave the way tow

more comprehensive vision that does more 

acknowledge the changing global security environm

will provide an outline for developing foundationa

needed by decisionmakers, joint planners, and opera

explore all the dynamics of conflict, legitimize and int

the implications of asymmetric challenges, and d

effective solutions.

The New Model—Preparing the Force to Maste

Asymmetric Domain.

Essentially, the U.S. military must maste

asymmetric domain. Currently, JV2020 seeks succ

achieving full spectrum dominance and relying o

primary operational concepts—dominant mane

focused logistics, precision engagement, and full dim

protection, all enabled by information superiorit

interoperability. Proposed guidelines that will be use

military forces coming face-to-face with asymm

dynamics are offered below. The proposal enhances ex

concepts to emphasize the areas that will be critical to 

on in dealing effectively with asymmetry. T

enhancements involve changes to planning, trainin

16
education, and operational and campaign stra

through focused mitigation and balanced response.

Planning. The goal of JV2020, “full spec

dominance,” places it squarely within the offensive s

of a strategy of annihilation—the defeat or neutraliza

an enemy’s military power. Current planning constru

the baseline for the military decisionmaking pr

provide the vehicle that defines the military way

means to achieve this goal. The military generally 

either the deliberate planning process or the crisis 

planning process as a means to assess long- or shor

threats; explore, synchronize, and analyze various c

of action; identify required forces and actions; and 

coordination mechanism for the organizations inv

These processes use various forms of estimates to l

groundwork for any planning that follows. Dif

organizations excel at different planning proc

depending on their mission focus. For example, joint t

special operations forces (European Command’s [EU

Special Operations Command [SOCEUR] comes to 

are adept at the crisis action planning process. 

theater forces like the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK

institutionalized war planning to a science.

Offensive, conventional military campaigns crafte

an exclusive reliance on defensive TTP to ad

asymmetry will be inadequate to ensure future victo

any form. For operations where deliberate, opportunis

inadvertent asymmetry may arise (essential

operations), planning constructs need to be broader in 

and provide a deeper insight into adversaries. Pla

must not rely on historically valid assumptions and m

more contextual in nature. Additionally, asymm

threats may arise as a direct result of U.S. actio

perceptions of U.S. intent, so all planning must wa

how employment of forces using JV2020 opera

concepts will affect the contextual situation on the g

Simply being there creates the opportunity for asym

approaches to be used against U.S. forces.

17
It will no longer be enough to focus on “enemy” 

their composition, disposition, weapons’ character

and targets alone. Estimate formats should be broade

incorporate the contextual terrain; essentially

spectrum analysis must be applied to all potential pla

scenarios. Out-of-theater influencing factors, indi

and group dynamics, civilian attitudes, perceptions, a

actions that arise from them, are examples o

estimative processes must be “stretched.” Logistic

transportation estimates as well must provide in

analysis of alternative approaches to mi

accomplishment in light of potential anti-access strate

Additionally, it is not just the enemy’s main m

effort any more; planners must orient on the tota

efforts by all players within a given operat

environment. Operational plans must focus direc

existing concepts of “essential tasks”; they must c

state their critical path to success so that other supp

elements can focus their efforts to ensure objectiv

achieved. With the proliferation of asymmetric possib

and since every counteraction invites innovation

unlikely that every eventuality can be planned 

defeated. Therefore, it will be critical to clearly ident

U.S. main effort, what parts of the operation mu

protected, and where risk will be assumed.

Finally, operational planning constructs must rea

more and more effectively to include other contri

players. Allies, coalition partners, other age

humanitarian organizations, and private sector ele

all offer varying capabilities in terms of prevent

mitigating (or causing!) asymmetric approaches in su

of—or to the detriment of—military forces and their p

of military objectives. Planning must, as a matter of c

incorporate consideration of these elements and th

they play and how they will, or will not, affect opera

Practically speaking, adapting planning processe

way that truly masters the asymmetric domain will r

18
an investment in time, effort, and resources at the na

joint, and service levels. Leadership must challen

brain trust of the military to broaden how planners 

and prepare responses to operational environments 

the spectrum—in effect, to adapt to new ways of look

conflict, its root causes, and determine what cour

action will be effective, initially and over time. Eff

broad-based—whole context—planning proce

institutionalized at all levels, will produce the k

innovative answers needed to achieve “victory” a

asymmetry.

Training and Education.

In the movie, The Patriot, the British Ge

Cornwallis and his troops are confounded by the opera

methods employed by the South Carolina irregular m

The inability of British forces and leadership to antic

prepare for, and respond to the asymmetric appro

employed by the militia resulted from 

expectation—grounded in their training and experien

how warfare was supposed to be conducted. The bea

the militia’s approach was that it was so unexpect

unnatural, “so ungentlemanly,” and so unfair. It is 

that U.S. forces may find themselves in the role 

British today when facing asymmetry—hamstrung 

unexpected, the unnatural, and the unfair, from a h

actors who have no intention of being gentlemen.

Preparing U.S. forces to operate in a world 

asymmetry appears to be the only logical optio

adversaries will require some significant and inno

adaptations to training and education met

Essentially, the likely use of asymmetric approach

adversaries requires a U.S. force trained to f

multiplicity of asymmetric strategies and Fabian t

from a host of players in a vast array of co

environments, all intended to foil our ability to deplo

fight as designed. We cannot rely on training to 

19
like-minded enemy military force as a successful app

for military preparation against asymmetry becau

world of conflict is no longer a simple blue versu

equation, but increasingly a blue versus red versus 

versus orange mélange. The challenge of trainin

educating a force for asymmetry will be an imposing o

the military training system that has perfecte

preparation of forces for war for over 50 years.

Successfully preparing U.S. forces will mean all

asymmetry to be a valid, legitimate partner in tra

education, exercises, and experimentation. Trainin

education must begin to incorporate asymmetry as a 

life; one which requires military personnel to adapt th

they learn and think about the complex opera

environments they face and the potential for asymm

be a dominant challenge. We must institute a building 

approach to training and education that over time 

forces with the knowledge and wisdom to operate a

asymmetry. Educating U.S. forces to embrace and cop

uncertainty will be a key component to developing ad

leaders who can effectively manage the demands of 

operational environments.

The force must become adept at internalizing wh

now considered different ways of learning about and 

with future conflict, but which, over time, will b

second nature. Similar to the way planners now u

crisis action planning process as a guideline to prepa

an operation, their training and education allow th

adapt this process to emerging situations. They know 

steps must be taken and which can be bypassed, ba

experience and insight but within established param

of recognized military mission areas. In the same 

forces trained throughout their careers to assess an

for potential operational environments—incorpo

asymmetric dynamics as a matter of course—will fac

adaptive courses of action most suitable to ach

success. 

20
Exercises must allow asymmetric “red teams” to 

the full force of their potential to bear. Initially, 

bound to stop some exercises in their tracks; an asym

approach could present a “warstopper” event that st

U.S. forces and prevents them from achieving other tr

objectives. Over time, however, as exercise participan

allowed to explore the dynamics of asymmetry invol

new level of learning will be achieved. Insight into h

anticipate asymmetric approaches, how various acto

bring asymmetry to bear on mission phases, and ho

effects of asymmetry can be reduced or mitigated w

gained and provide a true value-added for the tr

audience.

Experimentation and threat exploration are pro

the most valuable vehicles in force preparatio

asymmetry. They offer the best opportunity to devel

methods and organizational structures that will 

asymmetry or render it irrelevant to U.S. opera

Through experimentation and exploration, unconst

by rigid adherence to existing doctrine and opera

concepts, potential offensive strategies or pro-

response mechanisms to asymmetry can emerge.

Operational Campaigns and Strategies—Focus

Mitigation and Balanced Response.

In conflict, especially the type below the thr

requiring the full use of military power as des

applying massive firepower clearly has the power to s

freeze, to intimidate, and to punish, but it also may se

a lightning rod for asymmetric approaches and stra

Proportionality—and perceptions of what const

it—does count. In a global security environment tha

not universally view the United States as a b

superpower, the use of overwhelming power can 

cascading effects or unintended consequences. U.S. 

must be prepared to anticipate the potential for asym

21
consequences of their operations in an opera

environment as well as on a global audience.

Understanding how opponents view U.S. mi

capabilities, the impact of being on the receiving end o

firepower, the long-term effects of U.S. force presence 

operational environment and how those factors 

achieving end state, all play a role in developing ef

broad operational campaigns and strategies. The co

of focused mitigation and balanced response are inten

ensure military decisionmakers and planners tak

account the immediate, mid-term, and long-term eff

full spectrum dominance in asymmetric terms

example, the use of massive speed, lethality, and pre

against a much weaker opponent likely will achieve s

military objectives. But it also may “justify” the 

dangerous asymmetric approaches by weaker oppo

chemical or biological weapons, terrorism, or s

missions intended to inflict massive casualties. I

invite opponents globally to commit to carrying o

asymmetric event as a way of opposing U.S. policy 

show support for the target of our operations.

Applying appropriate tool-to-task, proportional co

for each phase of an operation and determining appro

priority of effort will be critical. These concepts will r

maximum conceptual and organizational adaptab

U.S. military forces are to ensure their ability to r

counter emerging asymmetric approaches and spe

process by which an asymmetric approach be

insignificant, ineffective, or halted altogether.

Focused mitigation and balanced response concep

require U.S. courses of action at all levels that mitig

prevent disproportionate or negatively cascading e

They require an evaluation of how—real or perce

disproportionate application of U.S. conventional pow

have negative ramifications that may prolong 

involvement and prompt asymmetric response. If dom

maneuver and precision engagement are succ

22
concepts that win wars, the potential use of asym

strategies in response to U.S. actions requires opera

concepts and thinking that go beyond immediate batt

concerns to consideration of ramifications during cou

action development. The potential for asymmetric res

to U.S. actions must then be assessed for the a

operations, the theater as a whole, transit points, a

homeland. Operations must, as a minimum, attem

ensure objectives are achieved without triggeri

asymmetric response—or that U.S. forces have plann

prepared for such an outcome. Precision engag

operations must be applied in a way that includes ph

precision (steel on target) and psychological pre

(shaping a military operation to influence atti

perceptions, and actions).

8

 Detailed risk managemen

risk avoidance assessments against potential asym

will be key in preparing for any precision operation. F

alternative options may in the end prove more eff

upon reflection and analysis. The challenges of the cha

quality of conflict may require military forces to d

alternative strategies and capabilities, force structu

design, or innovative applications of military powe

today are in short supply but which may be better su

achieve a desired outcome than full spectrum dom

alone.

Coevolution and Transformation.

The process of adapting and enhancing the opera

concepts of JV2020 to fully legitimize and incor

asymmetric dynamics cannot happen overnight. Re

planning processes, building and implementin

necessary training and educational tools, broadenin

way the military thinks about and acts on asymmetr

developing effective operational capabilities to 

asymmetry will take time. A period of transition w

required. The operational concepts proposed here 

overlay and complement the existing concepts fou

JV2020. The intent of this transition is to bui

23
processes; refine doctrine, organization, tra

materials, leadership, personnel, and facil

(DOTMLPF) and institutionalize considerati

asymmetric dynamics as a relevant, legitimate conc

all levels among all disciplines.

The end-state transformation would essentially 

integrate the asymmetric domain into the JV

construct. The transformation would result in the pr

of asymmetry becoming manageable and with 

exceptions, a normal part of military operations toda

tomorrow. Transformation would institution

understanding of the scope, significance, and impact 

problem set, and provide the necessary tools and pro

to support U.S. planning and operational respon

asymmetry. Some asymmetric threats will still fall o

the military’s ability to anticipate or will require a u

response outside the normal parameters of strategy, 

and operational processes. Adapting the concepts pro

in this monograph will, however, increase the mil

ability to build pro-active solutions—an offe

strategy—to limit the potentially negative effects an

against the asymmetric problem set.

CONCLUSION

In today’s military where dominance theory pr

and where the services compete fiercely for warfi

missions and capabilities, asymmetry is an or

Mastering the asymmetric domain will likely not 

opportunities for overwhelming victory associated 

conventional warfare because asymmetry in any fo

unlikely to ever threaten the nation’s survival. It is 

considered a “distracter mission” or is relegated 

purview of specialized units and organizations outsi

mainstream of the conventional force. The asym

domain remains, however, a challenge worth pu

because it will affect the whole force; it is this domai

offers adversaries opportunities to demonstrate th

24
U.S. military is not invulnerable; that if it cann

defeated, then perhaps it can be prevented from fi

and winning.

We must accept that change is hard, and change 

welcome. For every leader who looks forward, there w

hundred looking back. If the leadership is really deter

to “leap ahead” to the future, it cannot do so selective

must move the whole force. Skipping a generat

technology and weaponry may be a very smart move

leap ahead, however, must be matched by a similar 

over the hurdles of the past and the realities of the ex

and projected global security environment. It must 

forward strategy, doctrine, training, leadership

manpower on parallel paths to meet the challeng

there as they are, and not as we would have them be

the traditional American Way of War. We must reali

way U.S. forces think and plan for potential advers

and increase understanding of their motives, obje

and intent. Disregarding asymmetry as an “also r

conventional warfare will likely lead to a U.S. milita

dressed up but not invited to the dance.” The answers 

we can master the asymmetric domain, but only if the

willingness to embrace its complexities, legitimi

existence, and use the brute force brainpower that 

within to adapt our capabilities to the realities of con

the 21st century.

ENDNOTES

1. Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; Strategy D

Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

June 2000, p. 6.

In the face of such strong (U.S.) capabilities, the appeal 

asymmetric approaches and the focus on the development 

niche capabilities will increase. By developing and us

approaches that avoid U.S. strengths and exploit potent

vulnerabilities using significantly different methods 

operation, adversaries will attempt to create conditions th

effectively delay, deter, or counter the application of U

25
military capabilities. The potential of such asymme

approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the Un

States faces in the immediate future . . .

2. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry an

Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Strategic Co

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War C

January 2001. This monograph describes how America’s overwh

power represents “positive asymmetry” which can be used effect

reduce or negate the effects of adversary’s “negative asymmetr

3. This section and the Appendix are drawn from draft congre

testimony on asymmetric threats to JV2020, but its inclusion he

not reflect the endorsement of this monograph by any elemen

Department of Defense.

4. The Appendix provides a detailed overview of how 

asymmetric approaches could be employed successfully agai

operational and enabling concepts embedded in JV2020.

5. G. I. Wilson, F. Bunkers, and J. P. Sullivan, Anticipat

Nature of the Next Conflict, p. xxx. The authors detail their view 

changing nature of conflict and offer their reasoning for the diffi

shaping the U.S. military to conduct operations in future 

environments.

Two central ideas shape what we see as emerging with fou

generation: the nation-state’s loss of its monopoly on war 

the return to a world of cultures in conflict. Of concern is a fou

generation opponent who might have a non-nation-state b

such as an ideology or religion. Our national secu

capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-st

framework. Outside that framework, they have gr

difficulties. Wilson, Bunkers, and Sullivan go on to state t

the Clausewitzian model of warfare, with its Trinitar

baseline, represents an anomaly in that for most of history 

was not as neatly compartmented. War was messy, fought 

many reasons, not just “rational” reasons of state. In the view 

the authors, future conflict will increasingly be nontrinitar

and formal Trinitarian militaries “are often ineffective aga

it.”

6. A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars states 

Alexander . . . taught by defeat . . . decided to remain on the de

militarily.” When Napoleon invaded Russia, the Czar’s plan 

26
withdraw slowly to the fortified camp at Drissa and receive a 

attack against entrenched Russian forces while Bagration str

French right rear. While the plan quickly fell apart, the R

executed a steady retreat to the vicinity of Smolensk. While the b

Borodino was magnified by Tolstoy into an apocalyptic strug

Russian goal throughout was to preserve the bulk of the fightin

both on and off this battlefield. Circumstances forced the C

stumble onto the only strategy that had proved successful ce

earlier against Hannibal—Fabian tactics. After seizing M

“Napoleon faced the grimmest problem he had yet known. 

campaign unequaled since Ghengis Khan, . . . the very size of 

(and the presence of Russian forces in the field) left his su

indecisive . . .” By maintaining a force in being and refusing 

Napoleon the knockout blow he so desperately desired, the R

defeated Napoleon with the help of their strongest ally, wint

Russians succeeded with this asymmetric strategy because they 

allow Napoleon to fight his forces as they were designed an

offered an opportunity for decisive victory.

7. JV2020, p. 3.

8. The distinction between physical and psychological prec

explored in Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Centu

Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare, Carlisle Ba

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Augus

pp. 77-81.

27
APPENDIX

ASYMMETRIC APPROACHES AGAINS

JV2020 OPERATIONAL AND ENABLIN

CONCEPTS

JV2020 recognizes that U.S. military forces a

likely to become involved or stay engaged with

collective national willingness to commit our forces an

the course. Adversaries seem to understand this c

also and either have or desire a variety of what c

considered counter-will capabilities. Generally, these 

be designed to deter or preclude the United States 

choosing the military option or to make the United 

disengage short of our military objectives. T

capabilities will focus on severing the “continuity o

between the U.S. national leadership, the militar

people, our allied and coalition partners, and world 

opinion. Asymmetry of resolve and asymmetry of obj

provide the foundation from which counter-will stra

will prove most effective. If adversaries understand 

the U.S. threshold of will exists, they can focus on ach

their objectives with the relatively secure knowledg

the United States will not employ overwhelming forc

its inherent risks under less than vital circumstances 

lack the will to “stay the course.”

Examples of counter-will capabilities both presen

future include information operations that enab

adversary to shape or persuade domestic and foreign 

opinion, the use—or threat of—mass casualty we

either in theater or against U.S. or allied home

Infrastructure attack capabilities focused on threa

U.S. and allied territory and populations and infl

causing, or allowing extensive collateral damage as a 

to pressure the United States to end hostilities could a

29
used. Another example would be deploying in co

terrain such as urban or built-up areas to lure the U

States into a prolonged, high-casualty engagement.

JV 2020 also emphasizes the importance of dom

maneuver and focused logistics; that is, the ne

assemble and move the right force package in time 

point on the globe and to sustain that force once it is 

While we think dominant maneuver, adversaries 

counter-access or denying American and allied force

access to key theaters, ports, bases, and facilitie

important air, land, and maritime approaches and l

communication. Additionally, if adversaries ar

successful in preventing an intervention, they may 

advantage in countering dominant maneuver by simp

offering to meet the United States on a battlefield in 

that is conducive to U.S. operational methods. Wit

“battlefield,” it will be difficult for the United Sta

employ its forces as designed, regardless of environm

will be exceedingly difficult to “close with and destroy

“battle” is offered, or if few targets are presented

United States may have the lethal power to destroy a

capability to seize and control, but will that alone off

United States not only a way out, but also achieve a m

victory recognized as honorable and respected by the 

the world?

Again, any number of counter-access means 

available or under development, if used successfully

significantly invalidate many long-standing, inv

planning assumptions. Examples include more trad

standoff military systems such as antiship cruise miss

other strike assets that can attack forces approach

given theater. Employing dozens of smaller 

platforms, missile patrol boats, catamarans, and the 

swarm approaching forces with hundreds of missile

torpedoes would offer an alternative to the developm

naval forces able to take on the United States. The 

naval mines—even older technology mines—in imp

maritime areas could severely impact time phased for

30
deployment data (TPFDD) flow. Sabotaging preposi

stocks or key in-theater bases and facilities could 

deployment and negatively impact our ability to re

quickly and decisively. Attacks within the United Sta

on allied territory—especially against more vuln

civilian infrastructures—to disrupt mobiliza

deployment, and sustainment activities could se

impair operations. Fomenting instability in foreign st

overturn U.S.-friendly leaders and pressurin

in-theater allies to deny U.S. access could preven

United States from employing military power as de

and could remove the imprimatur of legitimacy.

Another key JV2020 tenet is precision engage

adversaries have or want a host of counterprecision

capabilities. Some of the more notable include the gr

use of a variety of cover, concealment, and dec

technologies and methods, including deep underg

facilities and multispectral obscurants, to hid

activities and assets from U.S. precision intelligenc

strike platforms. The use of human shields placed in f

key facilities to protect those facilities from U.S. 

offers a cheap but highly effective tool of choice, especi

operations where there is significant asymme

objectives and resolve. The pursuit of counters

technologies would enable adversaries to engag

precision strike elements and the development of 

frequency weapons and ground-based lasers could de

degrade precision-munition sensors or destroy 

platforms.

JV2020 also emphasizes the importance o

dimensional protection for U.S. and allied f

Adversaries are emphasizing any numb

counterprotection capabilities that are designed to 

mass casualties even against well-protected or d

military forces. Counterprotection capabilities in

terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and m

delivery systems, and even volumetric and 

conventional weapons with massive destructive effect

31
asymmetry of objective and resolve once again come

play, as does the concept of threshold. If one side or a

wants to draw the United States deeper into a conflic

may pursue a counterprotection strategy that inflicts 

level of American casualties, which, in turn, might r

up our resolve or threshold of intervention. A s

strategy, depending on the situation, might also se

hasten the withdrawal of U.S. forces, similar t

evolution of events in Somalia.

Finally, JV2020 underscores the importan

information and decision superiority. In this ar

particular, potential adversaries have and are deve

extensive capabilities for information operations to in

electronic warfare, psychological operations, ph

attack against our critical information systems—inc

attacks against key satellite down-links and g

stations. Denial and deception, computer network a

and more exotic technologies such as directed e

weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons, all offer 

to prevent U.S. forces from fighting as design

effectively employing their system of systems in a m

that produces the synergy envisioned.

32
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Ms. Melissa Applegate

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams